1 Monday, 15 January 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Whiting, call your first witness.

6 MR. WHITING: Good morning, Your Honours, Mr. Waespi will be

7 handling the first witness, Your Honours.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see.

9 MR. WHITING: Just so Your Honours know, I will be sitting in only

10 for the first session and then another lawyer for our team will be in the

11 for the remainder of the day.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're blessed with an abundance of riches.

13 MR. WHITING: I certainly am. Thank you, Your Honour.

14 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

15 MR. WAESPI: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning, Your

16 Honours. The first Prosecution witness will be Mr. David Harland.

17 And perhaps, Mr. President, while we are waiting, in your decision

18 of the 12th January of this year, you have accepted our motion to have

19 selected parts of his prior testimony admitted under Rule 92 ter, and as

20 you are aware, the witness testified in the Slobodan Milosevic case on two

21 days, the 18th September, 2003, mainly examination-in-chief and a little

22 bit of cross-examination; and on the 5th of November, 2003, he was

23 re-called for the end of cross-examination, a few questions by the amici

24 and re-direct examination.

25 So once the witness is in, Mr. President, Your Honours, I will ask

1 that he, you know, certify, according to the Rules, that these two

2 testimonies can be formally tendered. And perhaps since I'm new to

3 e-court, I'm not entirely sure whether I actually give him a hard copy of

4 his two transcripts in the Milosevic case and have him confirm that this

5 is in the transcript or whether he actually looks at the transcript on the

6 screen. There have been 65 ter numbers assigned to these transcripts so

7 it could be done electronically, but I'm in your hands as how it is done.

8 [The witness entered court]

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness, since we are beginning it might be well

10 that you provide him with hard copies.

11 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

13 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

14 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi, you may begin.

16 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

17 WITNESS: DAVID HARLAND

18 Examination by Mr. Waespi:

19 Q. Good morning, Mr. Harland.

20 A. Good morning.

21 Q. I hope you have well rested?

22 A. Very well-rested, thank you.

23 Q. Can you please state for the record were full name.

24 A. David John Harland.

25 Q. Now, we did meet yesterday in my office, and I showed you the

1 record of your testimony in the Slobodan Milosevic case. Do you remember

2 that?

3 A. Yes.

4 MR. WAESPI: If the court usher please could hand over to Mr.

5 Harland a hard copy of those two transcripts, I would be mush obliged.

6 Please show it to the Defence first so that they can see that it's an

7 authentic record.

8 Q. Now, Mr. Harland, before coming to testify today, did you have a

9 chance to review your testimony in the Slobodan Milosevic case?

10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. And are you satisfied and can you attest today to the Court that

12 these transcripts accurately reflect your evidence in that case and the

13 answers you would give now, today, if asked about the same matters under

14 oath would be the same?

15 A. Yes.

16 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, the 65 ter numbers assigned, and that

17 was done over e-mail, just for the record I'll just say what we have been

18 told was that the transcript of the 18th September, 2003, have been

19 assigned ter number 02815. And the second testimony, that's 5th November,

20 2003, the ter number assigned is 02816. And I propose, Your Honours, that

21 at the end of his testimony, perhaps at the end of cross-examination and

22 questions by Your Honours, we'll move or we will move to have all these

23 exhibits admitted in one go, rather than step by step.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

25 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

1 Q. Now, Mr. Harland, can you tell us your profession, please.

2 A. I'm a civil servant with the United Nations.

3 Q. And what's your current function?

4 A. I'm the director for Europe and Latin America of the Department of

5 Peacekeeping Operations at United Nations headquarters.

6 Q. And that's in New York?

7 A. That's in New York.

8 Q. Thanks. Could you briefly give for the benefit of Your Honours

9 and Defence the background of your career, your education, your career in

10 the UN very briefly, because it's an impressive career?

11 A. I did my undergraduate studies in my home country, New Zealand. I

12 then pursued graduate studies in law and in international relations, and

13 took a master's degree from Harvard University in the United States, a

14 study in comparative law, and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and

15 Diplomacy. I served with the United Nations extensively for almost 20

16 years in Africa, in Europe, and in Asia and in -- principally in conflict

17 and post-conflict countries. And now, for almost four years, I've been

18 based in New York, my first assignment at UN headquarters.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland. Now, of course we know from your Slobodan

20 Milosevic testimony that you were in Bosnia and in Sarajevo. Now, for how

21 long were you in Sarajevo and when exactly, what was that period?

22 A. I was a civil affairs officer with UNPROFOR initially, and I

23 arrived in the first half of 1993, and I was based in Sarajevo and

24 Kiseljak. I remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war as head of

25 civil affairs of the United Nations mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

1 then I stayed on for almost one additional year in 1999, preparing the

2 report of United Nations Secretary-General on the massacre at Srebrenica.

3 Q. And what were the duties of a civil affairs officer? What were

4 your duties while you were in Sarajevo?

5 A. My principal duties were to make political assessments of the

6 progress of the conflict in that country and to -- in order to do that, to

7 meet regularly with members of the warring factions and also to attempt to

8 negotiate with them measures to mitigate the -- the conflict by securing

9 freedom of movement for civilians or the restoration of essential services

10 to civilians or agreements between the parties that could limit the -- the

11 effect of the war on the civilian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

12 Q. And is it correct to say that part of your duties was to draft

13 reports?

14 A. Yes. I did a lot of drafting. I was the principal political

15 drafter for UNPROFOR and Sarajevo for the whole period of the war that I

16 was there. I drafted all of the special reports, all of the weekly

17 political assessments of UNPROFOR headquarters. I also drafted the text

18 of most of the agreements between the warring factions, which were done

19 under the auspices of UNPROFOR.

20 Q. And I believe in the Slobodan Milosevic case you were introduced

21 as the longest-serving UN official in Sarajevo. Is that correct?

22 A. I believe that is the case, yes.

23 Q. Now, I just have one last kind of general questions before we go

24 into details. Can you tell the Judges, very briefly if you can, your

25 memory of Sarajevo, and as you know this case is concerned with the events

1 after the signing of the anti-sniping agreement in August 1994. So when

2 you think about Sarajevo, about the atmosphere at that time, what can you

3 tell to the Judges?

4 A. Well, I -- I arrived in Sarajevo in the first half of 1993 when

5 the siege had been closed for almost a year. The streets were entirely

6 empty except for some burnt-out vehicles. There was nobody, basically, on

7 the -- on the street. There was the constant background noise of either

8 small-arms fire from the -- the front lines around the city or from the --

9 the heavy weapons, detonations from the Serbian bombardment. It -- it

10 was, in a sense, eerily empty. People would come out for very, very short

11 periods to collect water from water-dispensing points or a little bit of

12 food and then they would scurry back into their homes.

13 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, Your Honours, the way I would like to

14 conduct this examination-in-chief is the following: First, I would like

15 him to clarify four transcript references from the Slobodan Milosevic

16 case; and then I will ask him a few questions about -- I think it's about

17 20 documents, some of them Mr. Harland drafted himself and others he has

18 seen or he knows something about the authenticity of these documents. So

19 that's the basic outline. I think we might be finished within the first

20 session or it might spill a little bit over the next session.

21 So with your leave, Mr. President, I would like to ask him a

22 couple of points in clarification of his Milosevic testimony. The first

23 reference, Mr. President, Your Honours, can be found in his first day of

24 testimony in the Slobodan Milosevic case, again that's the 18th September,

25 2003, and it's on page 26935. And I read it for the record, Your Honours,

1 and for everybody's benefit. It's on line 10.

2 Q. And, Mr. Harland, in this part you talk about a meeting you had in

3 mid-July 1993 with Bosnian Serb leaders, and you make the following

4 comment, and I quote you from your Slobodan Milosevic testimony:

5 "Yes, Dr. Karadzic and the other Bosnian Serb leaders emphasised

6 to us that their principal goal was to force the Bosnian government to --

7 to negotiate peace, a peace agreement on terms that would be acceptable to

8 them and that the reason they were shelling Sarajevo, for example, which I

9 think was what we were protesting about that day was to apply pressure on

10 the Bosnian government."

11 Now, what you testified about in mid-July 1993, did the same

12 mechanism also apply after the period of August 1994, or was that

13 exclusively confined to the 1993 situation?

14 A. No. It applied to the whole period of the -- of the war. The

15 basic dynamic of the conflict around Sarajevo was that the Serbs, who were

16 in a completely militarily dominant position, would use shelling and

17 sniping against civilians as a way to elicit from the Bosnian government

18 behaviour they wanted, and we knew this was their essential purpose for

19 two reasons.

20 First, they told us so. The transcript which you referred to is

21 just one example of how they explained to us that they wanted to apply

22 pressure, as they called it, to the Bosnian government by waging this war

23 of terror against the civilian population. And also we knew it because

24 it -- from observing their behaviour. Most of the -- most of the military

25 activity that I was reporting on was not military activity as we would

1 conventionally understand it. Most of it was undirected or semi-directed

2 artillery fire against civilian-inhabited areas. And one could very

3 easily detect patterns of an increase of such application of terror, you

4 know, whether through bombardment from heavy weapons or snipers or through

5 cutting off electricity and water and food at times of -- when they wanted

6 to achieve greater political leverage.

7 For example, during the Owen-Stoltenberg peace process when the

8 Bosnian government appeared to be stalling on elements of the peace

9 package which were acceptable to the Serbs, there would be a significant

10 increase in these -- this war of terror. The increase of the privations

11 by cutting off the city and an increase in the sniping against civilians

12 and the bombardment -- the random bombardment of the city. And that

13 dynamic continued right through until the end of the war in October 1995.

14 And my own assumption at the time - and I don't think anybody really

15 disagreed with it - was that indeed the principal activity of the Sarajevo

16 Romanija Corps was the -- the application of these instruments of terror

17 against the civilian population; that was what they basically did.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland. Let me turn to the second quote from your

19 Slobodan Milosevic testimony?

20 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, Your Honours, that's on page 26936,

21 beginning at line 16.

22 Q. And your answer, Mr. Harland, is the following:

23 "Well, most obviously, of course, it's another example of the Serb

24 modulating their military effort and modulating the amount of terror; that

25 is, the amount of humanitarian difficulty placed on the population of

1 Sarajevo to, in the context of a -- for political objectives; that is, of

2 getting the Muslims to negotiate or in terms of deterring any NATO

3 military attack on them. Our sense was they -- there was, as it were, a

4 spigot of terror which they would open or close according to how much

5 pressure was on them from the international community or what political

6 concessions they hoped to get from the other side."

7 And I believe you almost answered this question as well with your

8 previous answer. Would that quote, which is specifically directed at the

9 1993 situation in the Slobodan Milosevic case, would that also apply to

10 the period after the signature of the anti-sniping agreement in August

11 1994?

12 A. Yes. And it -- obviously, the level of terror, the extent to

13 which the spigot was more open or more closed varied a lot between 1993

14 and 1995, but the basic dynamic was the same. They attempted to inflict

15 maximum suffering on the people of Sarajevo to induce the Bosnian

16 government authorities to accept a peace agreement on terms agreeable to

17 the Serbs, but they never applied what they believed was too much

18 pressure, that it would lead to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR or to a wider

19 western military intervention.

20 And they were always relatively sensitive to that -- and, in fact,

21 this basic dynamic which is being discussed in the quotation you refer to

22 was the dominant military pattern. There was

23 little conventional force-on-force military activity. The principal

24 application of force was not, as would be understood by any modern

25 military logic, it was purely for these objectives of the application of

1 terror against civilians.

2 Q. Mr. Harland, the next quote, the third one from the Slobodan

3 Milosevic case, can be found on the next page in your transcript?

4 MR. WAESPI: And, Mr. President, Your Honours, it's on page 26937.

5 Q. There you discuss the comparative military activity in the years

6 1993, 1994, and 1995, and I quote:

7 "1993 was the most militarily active of those years. There was a

8 conflict, both between the Bosnian government, that is, that Muslims and

9 the Serbs; and between the Bosnian government and the Croats. 1994 was

10 relatively quiet throughout most of the year, and then 1995 saw a sharp

11 deterioration again right up to the end of the war in October."

12 That was from line 15 to line 20. If you can, Mr. Harland,

13 elaborate a little bit on the sharp deterioration you mentioned here in

14 1995. We might see a couple of documents later, but can you tell Their

15 Honours what's meant by the sharp deterioration in 1995?

16 A. Yes. I should first preface it by saying that this answer is

17 correct with respect to the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina; but with

18 respect to Sarajevo, I would say that 1995 was the most militarily active

19 of the -- of the three years being discussed here. Now, in terms of

20 the -- the sharp deterioration in 1995, I would actually say that this

21 deterioration began towards the end of 1994. 1994 had been a relatively

22 stable year.

23 The Serbs had already taken almost all -- more than the land they

24 ultimately sought to keep under the peace agreement. They would discuss

25 this openly with us. Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik would regularly discuss

1 what they thought were the final holdings they thought they would take.

2 And they had on the ground I think a little over 70 percent of the total

3 territory of the country. And they anticipated that they would have to

4 give some of that territory back in the context of a peace agreement.

5 And they described their military tactics to us as to hold on to

6 the greater amount of land they had and then to let the Muslims, as they

7 referred to the Bosnian government, to let the Muslims understand that

8 they had no military options and that the suffering of their people would

9 only greatly increase if the Bosnian government did not agree to a

10 political settlement with the Serbs that would lead to Serb independence

11 within defined borders, no reversal of ethnic cleansing, and a substantial

12 acceptance of the territory they held. And 1992 and 1993 were largely

13 devoted by the Serbs to gaining that territory and then removing the

14 non-Serb population from those territories.

15 During 1994, they were largely content to sit back and wait, hold

16 on to the territory they had, apply what they called the pressure on the

17 Muslim population, and -- and then to wait for a peace agreement

18 acceptable to them. And they were -- they were very open with us. They

19 thought that time was on their side. They said, you know, we hold all the

20 land, we dominate all the high ground, we can apply pressure - as they

21 called it - the shelling and the sniping and the cutting off of the water

22 and gas and electricity and food to the Muslim population.

23 And they thought all they had to do was wait and that in good time

24 the Muslims would accept an agreement, roughly like the Owen-Stoltenberg

25 Agreement, where the Muslims would be left with a small wedge of territory

1 on which they could establish a state, and the Serbs would be given what

2 they -- they wanted on a larger period.

3 So during this period of 1994, the Serbs agreed to a number of

4 measures to stabilise the situation, because holding so much of the

5 territory they were content for the status quo to freeze on the ground.

6 So they agreed to what we call the opening of Blue Routes; that is, the

7 routes that would allow the circulation of the civilian population. They

8 allowed the re-starting of the Sarajevo tramway. They agreed to turn on

9 some of the electricity and water. They agreed to more cease-fires. They

10 agreed to certain measures to limit sniping against civilians.

11 And in general, when they agreed to these things, whether it was

12 the turning on of the water or whether it was the limiting of the sniping

13 attacks against civilians, they were normally able to deliver. And in

14 that sense, 1994 was relatively quiet.

15 Now, by the end of 1994, the Serbs - and again, they explained

16 this to us. Mr. Krajisnik was relatively open about explaining their

17 dilemma to us - felt that perhaps they had miscalculated, that time was

18 not on their side, and that the Muslims were not going to capitulate under

19 those circumstances and accept a land-for-peace agreement; and that in

20 fact the -- although the Muslims were surrounded by their enemies, the

21 Americans had succeeded in brokers a peace agreement with the Croats,

22 assisted by their supporters in the United States and in the Islamic

23 world, weapons were reaching the Bosnian Muslims.

24 So the Serbs, in late 1994, decided that they would start to apply

25 pressure more directly. So they -- at one point, they closed the Sarajevo

1 air-lift, which was bringing humanitarian assistance; they increased the

2 amounting of sniping and shelling; they cut off the electricity and water

3 again; and they began to demonstrate their --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, I draw your attention to the fact

5 that this is a 92 ter abbreviated procedure, and its purpose will be

6 defeated by a lengthy examination-in-chief. So please have the witness

7 give shorter answers and a more summarized procedure is appropriate.

8 MR. WAESPI: I will do that, Mr. President. Thanks for bringing

9 that to my attention.

10 Q. Let me move on to the last quote clarification from the first

11 Slobodan Milosevic transcript?

12 MR. WAESPI: And this is, Your Honours, on page 26951, and it

13 starts on line 8.

14 Q. And I will quote again and ask for clarification from your side.

15 "One of the normal tactical principles of artillery bombardment

16 of course is concentration of fire. You concentrate fire in order to

17 clear ground or suppress enemy fire, in order to take it or something;

18 whereas, the pattern of artillery fire around Sarajevo was precisely the

19 opposite. It was a dispersion of fire. Shells would be dropped

20 apparently randomly across the densely populated civilian areas of the

21 city in a way that would cause a small number of casualties in a large

22 number of places. We assumed that this was to keep the general level of

23 terror high and to forestall any dramatic events around which an

24 international response will coalesce."

25 My question, and I hope for a brief answer, is that a statement

1 which only applied to the situation in 1993, 1994, or also later after

2 summer 1994?

3 A. Yes, and in fact, it probably applied more later on. We prepared

4 daily maps of where the impacts of artillery shells were, and these maps

5 showed a huge dispersion of shells. They would sometimes be concentrated

6 in one broad civilian area or another, but they were certainly not

7 concentrated against what we would consider military targets, no.

8 MR. WAESPI: And, Mr. President, just if I may, going back to the

9 question the witness gave beforehand and just asking him very precisely.

10 Q. In one or two sentences to finish your answer about the

11 deterioration of the situation in 1995, as you had mentioned it in the

12 Slobodan Milosevic case; just two or three sentences.

13 A. So 1994 was a relatively calm and stable year in which the Serbs

14 thought they were achieving their objectives, and they entered into a lot

15 of agreements which they agreed upon to stabilise the situation. Towards

16 the end of 1994 and during 1995, they returned to a pattern of more

17 intense use of military and non-military means against Sarajevo in order

18 to force the Bosnian government to -- to enter into a peace agreement.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland. And my last and fifth quote comes from

20 the second day you testified, that's the 5th November, 2003, in the

21 Slobodan Milosevic case. And my short quote comes from page 28684, and

22 it's a quote from line 6 to line 9.

23 And I believe it was a question by -- in cross-examination, and

24 the cross-examiner refers you to your witness statement, and I quote:

25 "Both sides targeted civilians; and when we could monitor sniper activity

1 in Grbavica, it would appear that the Muslims were sniping more civilians

2 than the Serbs."

3 Now, can you explain what you meant by that sentence, which comes

4 from your witness statement and which was read out in the Slobodan

5 Milosevic case?

6 A. Well, first of all, we knew much, much less about the exact number

7 of casualties, military or civilian, on the Serb side because we didn't

8 have access to the Serb side. So a lot of this was presumptive; that is,

9 the Serb authorities would report to us that four children had been killed

10 by snipers or whatever. And we would largely have to take that on its

11 own, at face value; whereas, on the government side or inside the

12 confrontation lines, we tended to know exactly how many people had been

13 killed or almost exactly. We checked the morgues, we checked the

14 hospitals, and we checked the battlefields and the streets.

15 Now, the Serbs controlled all the high ground around Sarajevo, so

16 they could snipe or shell from almost any position. The Bosnian

17 government, however, had much less capacity to do so. They controlled

18 some high buildings that overlooked parts of the Serb civilian inhabited

19 area of Grbavica. So the fire out of the city by the Bosnian government

20 forces tended to be concentrated from a relatively small number of high

21 buildings overlooking Grbavica, and so I believe what I was pointing out

22 was that in that part of the city, Grbavica, that's where the Bosnian

23 government forces would have concentrated their sniper fire.

24 Indeed, I used to see Bosnian government snipers moving in to take

25 up their position in sniper-nests, just as I was going about my business

1 in the city.

2 Q. Thank you very much for these clarifications?

3 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I'll now move on to the next phase.

4 These are the documents I would like to have the witness refer to fairly,

5 fairly briefly, if I may. And the first document is - and I hope I have

6 that right - 65 ter number 2, which is a document dated the 15th August

7 1994, and that's the famous anti-sniping agreement. And I hope it now

8 appears on some screen.

9 And perhaps if the witness could return the two transcripts from

10 the Milosevic case, Madam Usher.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is on the screen is a reference to the

12 agreement.

13 MR. WAESPI: Yes.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We don't have the agreement itself.

15 MR. WAESPI: I think that's just the first page, Mr. President.

16 If the next few pages could be added -- in fact, we do not need

17 the translation at this point in time.

18 [Prosecution counsel confer]

19 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I understand that it's practice in these courts

20 to have both original and translation displayed at the same time. If

21 that's practice, I'm happy to have it both.

22 If the second page of the English version could be displayed as

23 well for the benefit of the witness.

24 Q. Perhaps, Mr. Harland, if it's big enough, can you tell us in very

25 brief words -- sentences what this anti-sniping agreement is about.

1 MR. WAESPI: And perhaps we can scroll down to the actual message.

2 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

3 MR. WAESPI: And the next page could be put on as well, which is

4 the actual agreement. The next page is another introductory part. It

5 mentions that the day before a British soldier had been killed, and then

6 the next page will be the actual agreement, if that would be displayed,

7 please. Thank you, Mr. Court deputy.

8 Q. Now, Mr. Harland, can you tell us in brief sentences what this

9 anti-sniping agreement was about, who signed it, who was present during

10 the signature ceremony?

11 A. Well, this was an effort, an initiative launched by us. Both

12 sides had indicated that they had civilian sniping casualties. Those

13 casualties, in general, were much higher on the Bosnian side, but there

14 were certainly Serb casualties particularly in Grbavica. So we proposed

15 that the sides enter into an agreement that would limit the sniping.

16 The main argument was about paragraph 2, which is that we wanted

17 the authority to go out and get the snipers, that if anybody violated the

18 rules we would have freedom of movement within both sides to send quick

19 patrols to go and intercept the snipers, either detain them or, if

20 necessary, to kill them if they were in the act of firing. And that could

21 not be agreed, but they -- both sides did agree to pass orders and

22 limiting sniping and to allow us some limited monitoring and to announce

23 it on their public media as an indication of good faith.

24 As for who was there, I mean the -- I mean I was there, but the --

25 and I believe I drafted the text of the agreement and of this cover you

1 were showing. And from the Bosnian side, Mustafa Hajrulahovic was there,

2 Vahid Karavelic, I think, and Hasan Muratovic. The Serb side, General

3 Milosevic, who was relatively new at that stage; and Professor Koljevic;

4 General Tolimir; other people came and went. I think there were also, if

5 I remember correctly, we held the negotiations at a FrenchBat facility at

6 Sarajevo airport, so several French officers were in and out of the room.

7 I now no longer remember exactly who.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Harland.

9 THE WITNESS: Sir.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Was the agreement intended to prohibit sniping

11 that was of a defensive character, or is sniping, by definition,

12 necessarily offensive?

13 THE WITNESS: It was intended to -- to limit -- prevent sniping,

14 both against military and civilian personnel. There is sniping, if I can

15 put it this way, that is legitimate, that is the use of marksmen to target

16 military personnel of the opposing force at a considerable distance. And,

17 in fact, a lot of the sniping that took place in Sarajevo was going on all

18 the time. It was snipers from one position on one side trying to identify

19 snipers, military personnel, on the other side. And they would engage in

20 sort of duels, and they would move quickly from one location to another.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: What you meant wasn't intending to prohibit that?

22 THE WITNESS: Actually it was, because we felt the same people

23 were using the same weapons sometimes to engage in what you might describe

24 as legitimate military activity; that is, activity against other uniformed

25 military personnel. But often they were using it for, you know,

1 indiscriminate attacks against civilians.

2 So our agreement, in fact, tried to stop all sniping. And we even

3 proposed that we put line-of-sight barriers using UNHCR plastic sheeting

4 so that the snipers couldn't physically see each other or couldn't see the

5 civilian population on the other side of the line. So the question is

6 actually a very legitimate one, that we were trying to limit a legitimate

7 military activity as well as the -- the attacks on civilians, just because

8 we thought that they couldn't really be distinguished properly.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

10 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Regarding this, you talked about

11 the policies of Sarajevo Romanija Corps, which was -- which actually

12 sought to instill terror within the civil population in Bosnia with the

13 sniping and the bombing, the shelling. But what I would like to ask you

14 is the following: There were snipers of the government on various

15 buildings that were on high elevation of Grbavica inhabited by the Serbs.

16 It's in the transcript on page 15, from 23 -- lines 23 through 25.

17 So my question is the following: Aside from this intentional

18 policy, according to your statement, on behalf of the corps of Sarajevo

19 Romanija very probably and, according to your statement, that it was also

20 from the Bosnian government at this stage, according to what you have

21 seen, could we have sought or could one have imagined that intentional

22 sniping from Bosnian snipers against their own objectives, against their

23 own -- could they have shot on their own targets? You didn't mention

24 that.

25 THE WITNESS: Yes. That is, of course, a -- an extremely

1 sensitive subject, and it was a very sensitive subject at the time. It

2 was a common allegation of the Serb side that the Bosnians were sniping

3 against their own side. Our observations were that there were -- there

4 were some cases of this, not a large number. Certainly more than 90

5 percent of the victims on the Bosnian side, when we could identify with

6 any certainty where the shots came from, appeared to have been shot from

7 the Serb side of the confrontation line.

8 But there were certainly cases, as you suggest, in which Bosnian

9 civilians on the Bosnian side of the confrontation line were shot by

10 bullets that appeared to have originated on the Bosnian side of the

11 confrontation line. That is correct.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.

13 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

14 Q. Mr. Harland, I have a last question about this document. What was

15 the effect of the anti-sniping agreement?

16 A. There was a -- there was an immediate and sharp decline in the

17 number of civilian sniper casualties. If I remember correctly, we thought

18 that the command and control, particularly on the Serb side, was very

19 strong because we had failed in our efforts to have line-of-sight barriers

20 erected between the two sides; and yet, even so, the number of casualties

21 fell dramatically for a certain period, I can't remember now, a month or

22 two months or maybe three months.

23 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. Harland.

24 Mr. President I would like to move on to the next document unless

25 you have further questions.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, you may proceed.

2 MR. WAESPI: Thank you.

3 Q. The next document, Mr. Harland.

4 MR. WAESPI: And Mr. Court deputy is ter number 1.982, and it's a

5 document dated 18 August 1994, an UNPROFOR memorandum addressed to a

6 Colonel Lugonja, subject: Anti-sniping Application Measures, a two-page

7 document.

8 Q. Mr. Harland, can you very briefly tell us what this document is

9 about?

10 A. Actually, I can only see a part of it. Yeah. This is not one of

11 the documents that I wrote. This is, in fact, a document from Sector

12 Sarajevo; whereas, I was the political officer for Bosnia and Herzegovina

13 headquarters. We were both in Sarajevo, but this was the subordinate

14 sector headquarters. But this is a -- a follow-up implementation

15 arrangement.

16 Q. Now, it discusses in the first sentence follow-up meetings about

17 measures of implementation of this agreement, meaning the anti-sniping

18 agreement. Were you aware of these follow-up meetings?

19 A. Yes, and I also was involved in some of the follow-up activities

20 to the agreement. The agreement was also followed by some implementation

21 agreements and a codicil to it. A number of measures designed to make it

22 more effective.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland.

24 MR. WAESPI: If we can move on to 65 ter number 5, and this, in

25 fact, might be one of the codicils you just mentioned a moment ago.

1 MR. WAESPI: 65 ter number 5, it's called codicil to the

2 anti-sniping agreement.

3 Q. Is this a document you had mentioned before?

4 A. Yes, and I believe this one was drafted by me.

5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland?

6 MR. WAESPI: Let's move on to the next document, and this is 65

7 ter number 2007. Perhaps if you can give us a brief comment about an

8 out-going code cable, which has some relevant information about this case

9 dated 12th September 1994. It's stated, Violation of Sarajevo

10 Anti-sniping Agreement.

11 THE WITNESS: This cable, which is appearing on my screen, is a

12 cable from Zagreb which was UNPROFOR theatre headquarters to New York. I

13 was at the subordinate headquarters; that is, the Bosnia and Herzegovina

14 command in Sarajevo. So this cable would have been written using

15 information that we provided then, but this information -- this cable was

16 not drafted by me and would not have been seen by me at the time.

17 MR. WAESPI:

18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland.

19 MR. WAESPI: Let's move on to --

20 THE WITNESS: It does seem correct, by the way.

21 MR. WAESPI:

22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland?

23 MR. WAESPI: Let's move on to the next document which is 65 ter

24 number 2134.

25 Q. It was drafted by Tony Banbury but emanates from the office of

1 Victor Andreev, dated 15th November, 1994, and perhaps if you want to read

2 the first paragraph.

3 A. Mm-hmm, yeah.

4 Q. Do you have a comment about the authenticity of this document, Mr.

5 Harland?

6 A. Yeah. This document was written in my presence, by my office

7 mate, Tony Banbury, yes.

8 Q. Now, let's move on to the next document, which is number 19, a

9 document dated 23rd November 1994, and it's dated -- it's referred to as

10 "Code meeting with Generals Gobilliard and Milosevic, 23rd November

11 1994." And if you can have a look, especially at paragraph 1, Mr.

12 Harland, especially the acronym "DMZ." Can you tell Their Honours what

13 that was all about.

14 A. Well, this is another document from our subordinate headquarters;

15 that is, from the Sarajevo Sector headquarters. And it is about an effort

16 to create a weapons-free zone around Sarajevo, which was sometimes called

17 by NATO the total exclusion zone, but was sometimes were neutrally known

18 as a demilitarised zone. These were -- this was a zone established in, I

19 believe, April of 1994, after the so-called Markale 1 massacre and subject

20 to NATO -- and following NATO threats.

21 And the Serb compliance with it had always been rather

22 problematic, and one of the efforts of UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo was to try

23 to get the terms of the agreement on the demilitarisation of the Sarajevo

24 area truly agreed to rather -- by the parties, rather than simply demanded

25 by external actors such as the United Nations or NATO.

1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland.

2 MR. WAESPI: If we could move on, perhaps, to the next document.

3 Mr. President, Your Honours, this is document 2145. And this is a type of

4 document, Your Honours, which we will see more often in this case and Mr.

5 Harland could perhaps -- I'm not sure whether that's the right document,

6 though, 2145. Yes, that's the right document. Thank you very much, Mr.

7 Court deputy?

8 Q. Can you explain, Mr. Harland, to Their Honours what type of

9 communication this is.

10 A. This is a daily situation report from UNPROFOR theatre

11 headquarters in Zagreb to New York describing the military events of the

12 previous 24 hours.

13 MR. WAESPI: And perhaps as an example, Mr. President, Your

14 Honours, we'll move to page 5 of this document. And if paragraph 2 --

15 yes, that's fine. That's fine.

16 Q. And I can quote paragraph 2: "Sector Sarajevo: The situation in

17 Sarajevo was tense. There was virtually no UNPROFOR movement allowed in

18 the BSA-controlled area, apparently as a reaction to air-strikes over the

19 last three days."

20 Then it moves on to: "Sniper Alley was active with numerous

21 incidents and a heavy exchange of fire in the Holiday Inn and Grbavica

22 areas involving three anti-tank rockets shot at the BiH police station and

23 three others," and so on.

24 So who provided the information for the -- the basic background

25 information for these kind of reports, Mr. Harland?

1 A. We did.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 MR. WAESPI: If we could move on to the next documents. Your

4 Honours, this is 2158.

5 Q. Mr. Harland, any comments on this document? It's dated 10th

6 December 1994.

7 A. Yeah. I wrote this document.

8 MR. WAESPI: And, Your Honours, on page 6, the situation in

9 Sarajevo, the electricity, other utilities situation for the civilian

10 population is discussed on page 6.

11 If we can move on to the next document, this is 2262. And we are

12 now moving into 1995. It's a document dated 29th March 1995,

13 especially -- in particular paragraph 1 might be relevant.

14 Q. Mr. Harland, if you have any comments.

15 A. Yes. This was the deterioration of the security situation in

16 Sarajevo that I was speaking about at excessive length before.

17 MR. WAESPI: And just for Your Honours' benefit, from pages 5

18 onwards, there are a number of charts barely readable, legible. And we

19 are not relying on these charts, obviously, just for the record.

20 If we move on to the next document, Mr. President, Your Honours,

21 that's 65 ter number 22.

22 Q. Can you tell us who Luc Duchesne is?

23 A. Luc Duchesne was a civil affairs officer working for me at Sector

24 Sarajevo headquarters in the -- what we called the PTT engineering

25 building.

1 MR. WAESPI: And the next document is number 6. It dates 24th

2 April 1995, and it's dealing with anti-sniping project, again from Mr. Luc

3 Duchesne. It's a fairly detailed document, detailing all these various

4 measures.

5 Q. And I think you -- I believe you already discussed, you know, the

6 plastic you used. Do you remember that --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- project?

9 A. Yes. We wanted to erect a continuous, very tall, plastic barrier,

10 non-see-through plastic barrier so that snipers from either side would not

11 be able to see targets on the other side of the line. But the Serbs

12 ultimately did not agree for this to go ahead. And when we tried to put

13 some containers, some sea containers unilaterally in the most exposed

14 places, our troops were shot at, in fact, one of them was killed while

15 operating a fork-lift trying to establish these barriers.

16 Q. And shot at from --

17 A. From the Serb side.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland.

19 MR. WAESPI: If we could move on to the next document which is ter

20 number 511. It's, again, an UNPROFOR communication. The releasing

21 officer is Colonel Demurenko.

22 Q. Do you have any comments, Mr. Harland?

23 A. I can't see the text of the document. Colonel Demurenko was the

24 Chief of Staff of our Sector Sarajevo office, an officer from the Russian

25 Federation.

1 Q. And again --

2 MR. WAESPI: If the document could be moved up so --

3 Q. Was is that, again, one of the communications UNPROFOR released?

4 A. Yes. This was a communication from the subordinate Sector

5 Sarajevo office to the UNPROFOR command office at which I worked.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland?

7 MR. WAESPI: If we could move on to the next document, which is

8 ter number 104.

9 Q. It dates 3rd June, 1995, and it deals on page 3 with the food

10 situation in Sarajevo.

11 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps we could go to page 3. At the top, it has a

12 reference to UNHCR bringing in flour to Sarajevo and another reference to

13 the rapidly deteriorating situation of food in the city.

14 Q. Do you have any comments on that, Mr. Harland?

15 A. Yes. The -- Sarajevo was completely surrounded for most of the

16 war. The Serbs usually let in just enough food so that people would not

17 starve; however, at the beginning of 1995, they brought fire to bear on

18 the airport. So the airport was no longer available for bringing in

19 humanitarian supplies. So the only way we were able to feed the quarter

20 of a million people of Sarajevo was by bringing convoys over Mount Igman

21 and then over -- over a narrow corridor of Sarajevo airport that we

22 controlled, and then the Serbs of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps would fire

23 on us and on the humanitarian convoys we were escorting down this mountain

24 dirt-road into the city.

25 And so this report is about ongoing problems that we had and our

1 efforts to protect that Igman road by barricades and fire from attacks

2 from the Sarajevo Romanija Corps that was trying to cut off the supplies.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland.

4 MR. WAESPI: If we could move on to number 2471, please.

5 Q. It's a document dated 24th June, 1995. And, Mr. Harland, I would

6 like you --

7 MR. WAESPI: And Your Honours as well.

8 Q. -- to draw your attention to the third paragraph, which discusses

9 the humanitarian situation in the city, the fact that civilians had been

10 killed at water-lines and marketplaces and negotiations to restore

11 utilities are ongoing. Any comments, Mr. Harland?

12 A. Yeah. This would happen at times of greater political tension

13 that the Serb military would shoot at convoys to try and stop them or

14 would increase the sniping. It was popular to shell water -- places where

15 people gathered for water because people had to gather there in larger

16 numbers. Normally, people were just hiding in their apartments or in

17 their cellars.

18 Q. The next document might need some explanation from your side, Mr.

19 Harland. This is 2490 and it's a document dated 30th June 1995, and it

20 goes to Mr. Phillip Korwin. It's signed by you.

21 MR. WAESPI: If we could go on to the next page, please.

22 Q. The second paragraph is probably the most important, if you want

23 to familiarise yourself, Mr. Harland, it. And please explain us, if you

24 recall the incident, explain us what triggered your reaction.

25 A. Yeah. I was very concerned during the period of May and June and

1 July of 2005 that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had in addition to its

2 effort to increase the level of terror on the civilian population by

3 cutting off the food and increasing sniping and random shelling had also

4 begun some targeted shelling against us. And I was -- during the period

5 this was written, I had moved from my regular job at BH command because of

6 a shortage of personnel, and I had taken over the civil affairs office at

7 Sector Sarajevo.

8 And my counter-part, military counter-part, the acting sector

9 commander and I, Colonel Meille, were very distressed at what was going

10 on. And the Serbs would fire shells at us to limit our activity, to

11 observe sniping and so on. And we didn't have heavy weapons, but often

12 the Bosnian army would fire back at the Serb firing point.

13 Now, this Phillip Korwin had -- he had protested that the Bosnian

14 government had fired these weapons back at the Serbs from a distance that

15 was too close to our locations, and that was -- that was correct. But it

16 seemed to me that the basic point that he was -- missed was that they were

17 doing that because that's the shells from the Serb side were landing right

18 on our positions, I mean literally outside my office windows. We had

19 shrapnel coming through the windows, and nearby Bosnian units were firing

20 back.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland.

22 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I have only five more documents to go,

23 and then we are completed.

24 The next document is 2491. And while the document is being

25 retrieved, Mr. Harland, in answering my question I think you said, or it's

1 in the transcript, as referring to the period May and June and July 2005.

2 I guess you meant or you might have said 1995.

3 THE WITNESS: I'm Sorry. Yes, 1995.

4 MR. WAESPI:

5 Q. This is a document which appears to be signed by the gentleman you

6 just mentioned in your previous answer, Colonel Meille, and it's addressed

7 to MAJOR-GENERAL Dragomir Milosevic. Are you familiar with this junior?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And can you tell us a little bit more about the circumstances, if

10 you can?

11 A. During this period May and June and July of 1995, the Serb direct

12 targeting of us and indiscriminate targeting of the city substantially

13 intensified and also some new weapons that we had not been familiar with

14 before were deployed, such as the slow-moving improvised rockets. And we

15 discussed what actions, political and military, we could take. And one of

16 the first things we agreed should be done was that there -- it should be

17 put on record through a protest.

18 Normally, we simply telephoned our protest or we delivered them to

19 the liaison officer, Colonel Indjic, but sometimes we would directly

20 approach commanders, either in Lukavica or in Pale and relay them and

21 sometimes write these letters. And this is an example of -- of one. I

22 should say they generally didn't do any good.

23 Q. What do you mean by that?

24 A. Well, we would make the protests, but it wouldn't lead to any --

25 to any change of behaviour at all by the Serbs.

1 Q. When protests were launched, letters like that, do you recall what

2 the answer of the protestee to these protests were?

3 A. Sometimes they -- the Serbs would tell us that the Bosnians had

4 either fired out of the city or they were preparing an offensive, and so

5 they had done these things. And we would then say, you know, if the

6 Bosnians have launched a military effort to break out of the city, that's

7 no justification for either targeting us or for targeting the civilian

8 population.

9 But they were normally not responsive. Sometimes they would also

10 say that it was uncontrolled elements, but we -- we did not think that

11 they were uncontrolled elements because the pattern into which they fitted

12 was consistent with the elements that were under -- under command. And

13 when they seemed to have a desire to limit this activity, either in the

14 context of a political negotiation or in response to a threat from NATO,

15 suddenly we might have 100 percent compliance.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can I ask you then, Mr. Harland, from what you

17 say, the Serbs appeared to have disputed the facts as you presented those

18 facts to them. It's not that they promised to do something and then did

19 not fulfil that promise?

20 THE WITNESS: Both. Sometimes they would dispute the facts. They

21 would say that the Muslims had fired mortars at themselves, for example,

22 but generally we were confident that this was not true. We had our own

23 mortar-detecting radars. We had UNMOs, military UN observers on the

24 ground so we were normally confident of the facts. But you are correct

25 that they would sometimes dispute the facts.

1 Then sometimes they would give an explanation, but not promise to

2 change their behaviour because they apparently thought it was reasonable

3 that if there had been a Bosnian military act in one area, that they could

4 respond in this way.

5 And the third possibility, which you've just mentioned, is that

6 they might undertake to -- to stop the behaviour, but we didn't notice any

7 abatement of it. And we did monitor the exact number of incoming rounds

8 very carefully from day-to-day.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.

10 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I note the time.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's time for the adjournment. We adjourn

12 for 20 minutes, and I would like to see the Legal Officer in my chambers.

13 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

14 --- On resuming at 10.50 a.m.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.

16 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. We have five documents

17 left, and I think we can finish fairly quickly. The first document, Mr.

18 President, Your Honours is ter number 2503. This is a communication

19 drafted by you, Mr. Harland, 2nd July 1995. And it deals on the third

20 page on top of it with an incident on 25th of June when a 16-year-old boy

21 was killed while riding his bicycle.

22 Q. And I believe you were fairly close to that incident, Mr. Harland.

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 Q. Have you actually seen the incident?

25 A. The incident took place just around the corner from where I was.

1 I was -- in fact, there are many, many sniping incidents all the time, and

2 I didn't always write up each one of them in our -- our reports. I

3 mentioned this one only because in -- as a specific incident because I

4 happened to be walking down the street from the main UNPROFOR

5 headquarters; that is, the building which is now the US embassy in

6 Sarajevo I think on -- is it on Djure Djakovic Street as it was called

7 then down the street.

8 And I heard a small number of shots, and then there was a -- a

9 commotion. I think I was near the bottom of the street and then I turned

10 the -- near the Kino, the cinema Radnik, and I turned at the Alipasino

11 mosque, and there was a bicycle on the ground. And people were trying to

12 pull away a young boy who had been hit in the head and who was dead.

13 And there was always a mixture of fear and panic, worry when

14 people tried to help because you never really knew where the shot had --

15 often didn't know where the shot had come from, and people were afraid of

16 more. And people were indicating to -- that there was, in fact, a

17 building. I think it was the one we called the white building in Grbavica

18 as -- which was, in fact, visible from that point which seemed to have

19 been the firing location, yeah.

20 Q. And on -- who held that territory on which the white building was

21 located in Grbavica?

22 A. That was a Serb-held position.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland.

24 MR. WAESPI: If we could move on to the next document. This is

25 103. It dates 8th July, 1995.

1 Q. And you were the drafter, Mr. Harland.

2 THE REGISTRAR: I'm sorry, could you repeat the number.

3 MR. WAESPI: 103, I'm sorry.

4 THE REGISTRAR: I'm sorry, but I don't have a 103 in e-court. I

5 have a 28 and the next document is 104.

6 MR. WAESPI: Yeah. It's a document dated 8th July 1995. The ERN

7 is R0024208.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 MR. WAESPI: Otherwise, we'll just go over it.

10 THE REGISTRAR: I'm sorry, but I cannot locate the document with

11 that ERN number.

12 MR. WAESPI: Okay. We'll have --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Move on to another document.

14 MR. WAESPI: Yes. The next one is 2597. And I believe we have

15 talked about one of these releasing officers before; it's Colonel

16 Demurenko.

17 Q. Are you familiar with Colonel Demurenko, Mr. Harland?

18 A. Yes, I knew Colonel Demurenko.

19 Q. What was his position?

20 A. I believe he was Chief of Staff of the sector headquarters for

21 Sector Sarajevo.

22 Q. And that's, again, a standard UNPROFOR communication?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Now, let's move to the next document, which is the second-to-last,

25 2629. And it's an outgoing code cable dated 5th September 1995. And the

1 first paragraph deals with the fact that there was "no evidence of

2 significant heavy weapon withdrawal from the Sarajevo area." Are you

3 familiar with this document, Mr. Harland?

4 A. This document is a cable from UNPROFOR theatre headquarters in

5 Zagreb to New York. So I would not have seen this document at the time of

6 drafting, but my office probably would have provided the information on

7 which it was based.

8 Q. And do you remember the dispute about the withdrawal of heavy

9 weaponry from the Sarajevo area that occurred in September 1995?

10 A. Yes.

11 MR. WAESPI: And the last document, Mr. President, Your Honours,

12 is document number 3. And it's titled, "First Meeting on the

13 Implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement of 5th October 1995."

14 Q. And it lists you, Mr. Harland, as being present, a few other

15 personnel from UNPROFOR, and a few personalities from the side of

16 Republika Srpska; Mr. Milosevic, Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic. Do you recall

17 these meetings, series of meetings?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And what was the purpose of these meetings?

20 A. In the weeks prior to this communication, the Government of

21 Croatia had launched a military attack against the Croatian Serbs;

22 Operation Oluja, Operation Storm. And the Croatian-Serb forces had

23 collapsed in complete defeat. Croatian government forces had then surged

24 into Bosnia and were on a military campaign against the Bosnian Serbs.

25 And the Bosnian Serbs feared that they were on the brink of a complete

1 military collapse. We knew this because General Mladic came to us in

2 great alarm and said that he wanted quickly to accelerate the peace talks

3 that were going on under the auspices of the Americans at that point.

4 And the Bosnians who were on the advance for the first time in the

5 war said that they could not consider a full end to the war unless the

6 Serbs restored electricity and gas and food to the people of Sarajevo,

7 sort of lifted the sort of cycle of terror, which the Serbs had already

8 said they didn't really have it within their power to lift so easily. And

9 yet, they -- here was the agreement where suddenly the Serbs wanted it to

10 happen and, indeed, it did happen. The gas and electricity supplies

11 suddenly increased and so on.

12 MR. WAESPI: And my last question, Mr. President, Your Honours is:

13 Q. You have met the accused, Mr. Dragomir Milosevic, his predecessor,

14 General Galic. You met General Tolimir and other Bosnian Serb generals.

15 Can you tell Their Honours your impression about these personalities?

16 A. I met General Milosevic in the context of meetings, as I had his

17 predecessor General Galic. But I didn't have a personal relationship with

18 him as, you know, I did perhaps with General Mladic or Professor Koljevic

19 or even General Tolimir. So I don't -- did not have a strong impression

20 of General Milosevic as a personality. But I did -- I did have the

21 impression that from seeing him in the negotiations on the sniper

22 agreement in 1994 that he was a forceful and commanding personality,

23 rather more commanding presence, perhaps, than his predecessor, General

24 Galic. But I did not know General Milosevic personally, I could say.

25 MR. WAESPI: Do we have that document, 103? If it just could be

1 displayed, because it's again drafted by Mr. Harland. Document number

2 103.

3 Q. Again, Mr. Harland, that's a document drafted by you. Is that

4 correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 MR. WAESPI: And on page 2, Your Honours, one of the subjects

7 discussed are attacks on civilians, but we don't need to go into that

8 because it's mentioned there and Mr. Harland testified about that in

9 detail.

10 That completes, Mr. President, Your Honours, examination-in-chief.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, there are two matters I take up.

12 First, the Chamber will not accept that the Prosecutor can spend an hour

13 and 40 minutes in a 92 ter proceeding. The 92 ter proceeding is designed

14 to facilitate the admission of evidence from previous proceedings without

15 going through an examination-in-chief. It's not a new procedure; it's

16 really 89(F) codified. And I have been in trials in which we have used

17 89(F), and the Prosecutor spends no more than 10, 15, or 20 minutes

18 introducing the witness.

19 So an hour and 40 minutes is unacceptable. It defeats the purpose

20 of the procedure, which is to expedite the proceedings. I allowed you to

21 go on, as this was the first witness, but I'm to say that the Chamber will

22 not allow that length of time for the introduction of a 92 ter. I'm

23 resisting trying hard not to say examination-in-chief, because it is not

24 examination-in-chief. The procedure is designed to avoid

25 examination-in-chief.

1 The other matter is that I've decided to admit -- to deal with the

2 admission of the exhibits now rather than at the end of cross-examination,

3 because I think that would facilitate the cross-examiner's citation of

4 documents.

5 MR. WAESPI: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. I accept your point

6 about the procedural issues. It was also the first witness from our side

7 which -- and also my first witness under this rule. So I do apologise if

8 I went over -- over the examinable time, and we will certainly abide by

9 your ruling in future. Thank you, Mr. President.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can we deal with the admission of the exhibits

11 now.

12 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, do you want me to read out the numbers

13 I'm proposing to tendering or is it the court officer who is doing that?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's have the court officer.

15 You'll read the admission of the exhibits.

16 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

17 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honours. The transcript dated

18 18th September, 65 ter number 02815, will be Exhibit P1. The transcript

19 of the 5th of November, 65 ter number 02816, will be Prosecution Exhibit

20 P2. The anti-sniping agreement, 15 August, 65 ter number 2, will be

21 Exhibit P3. The UNPROFOR memo 18th of August, 01982, will be Exhibit P4.

22 The codicil to the anti-sniping agreement dated the 1st of October, 65

23 ter number 5, will be Exhibit P5.

24 The cable dated 12th September, 65 ter number 02007, will become

25 Exhibit P6. The memo dated 15th of November, 65 ter number 02134, will

1 become Exhibit P7. The memo dated 23rd of November, 65 ter number 00019

2 will become Exhibit P8. The daily sitrep 24th of November, 65 ter number

3 02145, will become Exhibit P9. The weekly sitrep report dated 10th of

4 December, 65 ter number 02158, will become Exhibit P10.

5 The agreement dated 29th of March, 65 ter number 02262, will

6 become Exhibit P11. The report dated the 15th of April, 65 ter number

7 00022, will become Exhibit P12. The memo dated 24th of April, 65 ter

8 number 6 will become Exhibit P13. The UNPROFOR message dated 22nd May, 65

9 ter number 00011, will become Exhibit P14. The UNPROFOR memo dated 3rd

10 June, 65 ter number 00104, will become Exhibit P15.

11 The UNPROFOR memo dated 24th of June, 65 ter number 02471, will

12 become Exhibit P16. The UNPROFOR memo of 30th June, 65 ter number 02490,

13 will become Exhibit P17. The protest letter dated 30th of June will -- 65

14 ter number 02491, will become Exhibit P18. The UNPROFOR memo dated 2nd of

15 July, 65 ter number 02503, will become Exhibit P19. The UNPROFOR memo

16 dated 8th of July, 65 ter number 3, which also had an ERN number of

17 R0024208, that will become Exhibit P20.

18 The UNPROFOR sitrep of 28th August, 65 ter number 02597, will

19 become Exhibit P21. The cable dated 5th of September, 65 ter number

20 02629, becomes Exhibit P22. The cable dated 5th of September -- I'm

21 sorry, I just did that. The minutes dated 5th of October, 65 ter number 00

22 -- sorry, was the 65 ter number 00 --

23 MR. WAESPI: I think it's 3.

24 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct. 0003 becomes Exhibit P23.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

1 Mr. Tapuskovic, cross-examination.

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President and

3 Your Honours. There is a technical problem. I just needed the lectern.

4 I took part, Your Honours, on several occasions in certain proceedings in

5 this Tribunal, and I was in a different situations. But this is the first

6 time that I'm taking part in the procedure of this nature where we are

7 dominated by technology and electronics.

8 We made a tremendous effort to try to overcome these difficulties,

9 and hopefully today we shall manage to function properly and do our duty

10 as required. But before I start my cross-examination, I would kindly ask

11 you that during today's sitting, towards the end of it, rather, you

12 allocate a few minutes for certain procedural matters that I would like to

13 raise before you.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll do that, Mr. Tapuskovic.

15 Cross-examination by Mr. Tapuskovic:

16 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Harland. We are meeting now

17 for the first time -- for the third time --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Correction.

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation].

20 Q. -- and I would like to express my pleasure that you are still in

21 good health. What I would like to say is that I will do my best to ask my

22 questions as directly as possible; and as you already know, we should try

23 if possible and whenever possible to give us the briefest possible

24 answers. If -- preferably, if you can just say yes or no.

25 There are a couple of topics that I would like to cover related to

1 the documents that you had prepared, and I will try to be as direct as

2 possible. The first issue that I'm interested in and what the Chamber

3 should hear about, you said that you arrived in Sarajevo in the capacity

4 of -- in your capacity towards the end of May, 1993. Is that correct?

5 A. Yes, the end of May or the beginning of June, yes.

6 Q. And you are well aware that the Security Council Resolution dated,

7 I think, the 4th of May, number 824 referred to protected zones, and one

8 of those protected zones was Sarajevo. And I presume that the United

9 Nations had sent their representative, among other things, in order to

10 implement this on the ground which was contained in the resolution, 824.

11 Is that correct?

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: You've asked three questions there. I would like

13 you to ask the questions separately, and please bear that in mind, but I

14 will allow the witness to answer.

15 THE WITNESS: Yes. You're right about when I arrived and you are

16 correct about the date of the passage of Resolution 824 and you are also

17 correct that 824 became a part of the mandate of UNPROFOR.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Is it correct that upon your arrival, as one of your primary

20 tasks, you had a duty to secure or ensure free movement of people?

21 A. Yes. It was a mandated task of UNPROFOR to try to secure freedom

22 of movement, yes.

23 Q. You talked to a large number of Serbs and -- those Serbs whom you

24 met in Sarajevo, and they expressed their desire to leave Sarajevo?

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. When you say that, are you primarily referring to those Serbs who

2 were in the neighbourhoods under the control of the Muslim military

3 forces?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. And those who wanted to leave were unable to do so because they

6 were not allowed by the Muslim authorities to do that. Is that correct?

7 A. That is correct. That is certainly one of the main reasons they

8 could not leave.

9 Q. If that is correct, that they were not allowed to leave, does that

10 constitute a serious violation of international conventions?

11 A. I'm not a lawyer, but it was certainly --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Don't answer. Don't answer that question.

13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I appreciate that.

15 I am not going to go through this transcript because that will take too

16 much time; but at the last trial, Mr. Harland responded directly in

17 affirmative to this question and it can be found in the transcripts.

18 Q. My second subject is somewhat similar.

19 Before you came to Sarajevo, were you familiar with the fact that

20 in Sarajevo, before the outbreak of the conflict, between 150 and 180.000

21 Serbs had lived in Sarajevo?

22 A. Was I familiar with that fact before I arrived in Sarajevo? I

23 don't recall. Perhaps I was not familiar with that, but became aware of

24 it on my arrival.

25 Q. Thank you. Before you arrived in Sarajevo, or maybe afterwards,

1 were you informed about the existence about a certain national Serbian

2 project of ethnic cleansing that was being implemented solely by the

3 Serbian side?

4 A. No. It was not our impression that ethnic cleansing was solely

5 done by the Serbian side, and that was not my personal experience. I

6 travelled extensively around the country. And, in fact, the first example

7 of ethnic cleansing that I saw was I was in the city, small city, of

8 Kakanj when it fell to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was

9 fighting against the Croats. And the Croat population was being

10 physically removed house by house by a unit called the 7th Muslim Brigade.

11 Q. Thank you. But when you arrived in Sarajevo, did -- were you

12 not -- did you not become aware yourself, in light of the information that

13 you just mentioned, and did you learn that at the time when you arrived,

14 only 40.000 Serbs were living there at the moment when you arrived --

15 means that at the moment when you arrived about 140.000 Serbs had already

16 left.

17 A. Yes. I don't now remember the exact number, but that is

18 approximately our understanding as well. Yes.

19 Q. There's another thing. A while ago you spoke about the pressure

20 when you responded to the question of my learned colleague Waespi about

21 the pressures that were being exerted, and you also mentioned that they

22 were holding 70 percent of the territory throughout the war and that as a

23 result they launched or adopted a so-called offensive strategy, so to

24 speak.

25 But did you know and did you ever find out about the fact that

1 before the war, before the war broke out, 65 percent of the territory of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina was owned by the Serbs according to title deeds,

3 according to land registers, as an inalienable right which is related to

4 right to the private property. Were you aware of that?

5 A. That was an assertion that was frequently made to us by our

6 Bosnian Serb colleagues, but my own office did some research on the matter

7 and we disagreed with that finding by a Serbian group. We found that

8 about 30 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was entirely

9 uninhabited and was the property of the state. It is true that the Serbs

10 were more preponderant in the rural areas and so the areas under the

11 communist system had some level of private title.

12 The Serbs did hold more of them in the rural areas. In the urban

13 areas which were more inhabited by the Muslim population, there would

14 often be more socially owned -- so-called socially owned properties. But

15 the general statement that the Serbs owned 65 percent of Bosnia is a

16 certainly misleading and, in my view, basically an inaccurate statement

17 about the distribution of population in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18 Q. Mr. Harland, you just mentioned yourself the word "communism." Do

19 you know that in the communist system, property had been confiscated from

20 people who owned it and became state property. Only now, after all the

21 reforms that had been implemented, the situation is being reversed and

22 people are getting back their property, regardless of what had happened

23 before, and that the property owned by the Serbs during the communist era

24 was confiscated from them but left in the land registry. Were you aware

25 of that? If not, just tell us so?

1 A. Yes. We were aware that title to land in Bosnia-Herzegovina over

2 a period of 130 years had changed dramatically; sometimes forcibly,

3 sometimes voluntarily. At the moment of -- in the late 19th century, it

4 was overwhelming Muslim owned. There was a wave of confiscations and then

5 there was substantial Serb holdings; and then after 1945, there was a

6 large amount of state or so-called social holdings.

7 Yes. We were very aware that title had shifted dramatically over

8 a period of several decades, and that's one of the reasons that this

9 figure of the Serbs owned 65 percent of Bosnia seemed to us an essentially

10 unscientific and more propagandistic statement than actually an accurate

11 reflection of the distribution of population in Bosnia-Herzegovina; though

12 it is true that the Bosnian Serbs by and large were more preponderant in

13 rural areas and, therefore, tended to have more land. That is true as a

14 general fact.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, the question that you put, if I

16 understood it correctly, is that 65 percent of the territory of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina was owned by the Serbs according to title deeds, but

18 ownership of property is -- is a different concept from ownership of

19 territory, is it not?

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] That's correct. But most of the

21 Serbs remained in the area that they owned precisely around Sarajevo, what

22 Mr. Harland just mentioned, and I wanted to ask him about that. These

23 rural areas around Sarajevo were held by the Serbs or owned by the Serbs.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, but you're speaking of property, private

25 property?

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, about property, private

2 property. That is correct. Exclusively about the property -- private

3 populate, that's what I am referring to. That's correct.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I didn't want that to be confused with ownership

5 of the territory, with questions of sovereignty of the territory.

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Of course, that's a matter of --

7 it's a legal matter and there's no need to dwell on that. I perfectly

8 understand what you are saying and I take note of that, and we shall

9 address this issue in the course of the forthcoming proceedings.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please proceed.

11 THE WITNESS: Though, the statement is still wrong even as -- even

12 as framed like that. If you were to take all of the private property

13 deeds of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time of the 1991 census and put them

14 all together, those title deeds owned by people declaring themselves of

15 Serb nationality would certainly not have represented 65 percent of the

16 surface area of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17 And in fact, this has been badly manipulated. And in fact, I

18 wonder, sir, President Milosevic even gave me a map which coloured the

19 Sarajevo area according to which population was preponderant and owned

20 which parts, and so there is just a little green strip in the valley of

21 Sarajevo. And it covered the whole of Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica,

22 which are essentially uninhabited areas with the colouring of Serb

23 ethnicity. These were, we felt, essentially manipulations, propagandistic

24 statements rather than statements of fact.

25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] .

1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland. Let us move now on to another subject

2 matter. You said that you arrived in Sarajevo as a civil servant of --

3 for the United Nations. Is it true - and I can see from the reports and

4 from what you said today - that you were involved in military issues as

5 well?

6 A. My responsibility was to report on all the mandated areas of

7 UNPROFOR's work; that included military as well as political and

8 humanitarian. That is correct, sir.

9 Q. In your earlier testimony, you said that Sarajevo was in the

10 valley and that the Serbs were on hilltops around it. You said the same

11 today.

12 A. Yes.

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask this map that

14 Mr. Waespi had already submitted, 0044-1766, that's the UNPROFOR mark, to

15 be displayed on screens, please. It was shown in the opening statement.

16 We don't have it on e-court, as I believed that it was. I don't have it.

17 I don't have a copy for Mr. Harland either. If one copy can be given to

18 Mr. Harland, can we try somehow because this is very inconvenient. I had

19 other maps as well, but I believe that I can use this one.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Harland has been given a copy.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] 004401676.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is marked number 6.

24 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President.

25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] So we can't see it on our

1 monitors, right?

2 THE WITNESS: I have it on my monitor.

3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] If we can move it a little bit

4 towards east.

5 Q. Mr. Harland, Kiseljak where you work, it was in the valley, wasn't

6 it?

7 A. No, Kiseljak is not on this map.

8 Q. Very well. I wanted to ask you something else. Since you said

9 what you stated, and we all heard you, did you ever go within this circle

10 here? On this map you can see this yellow line which indicates the Army

11 of Bosnia and Herzegovina positions. Is that correct?

12 A. Yes, it seems to.

13 Q. And the red line indicates the Army of the 1st Corps of Republika

14 Srpska. This is the demarcation line. Is that correct?

15 A. Yes, at a certain date. I couldn't tell you what date.

16 Q. If we look at this area here, were you ever at Colina Kapa which

17 is on -- to the east. It's a hill about 966 metres high. Did you hear

18 about that ever Colina Kapa? It's not marked on this map, but it's

19 somewhere here to the east and near Debelo Brdo. And this hill called

20 Colina Kapa is 966 metres high. Were you ever there or weren't you?

21 A. I was at Debelo Brdo, which is marked on this point, which was

22 the -- one of the higher positions occupied by --

23 Q. I'm not receiving interpretation.

24 A. I was saying I did visit Debelo Brdo, which you mentioned, and

25 which is marked on this map and which is an area higher up.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you point that out for us, Mr. Harland.

2 THE WITNESS: It is here. It is a hill, a reasonably high hill,

3 that was heavily contested between the Bosnian army and the Serb army.

4 And UNPROFOR also had a position on the hill that was regularly under

5 attack, but I believe that the question is trying to ask me whether I was

6 aware that there was some high ground within the confrontation lines as

7 marked on this map. And yes, of course, I'm aware that there was some

8 high ground, but essentially this is a valley which is overwhelming

9 dominated from the north and south and east faces of the valley by higher

10 ground held by the Serbs. So we could probably just move on if we -- if I

11 accept that perhaps.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Debelo Brdo, Mr. Harland, is 800 metres high, and Colina Kapa

14 around 1.000 metres. Did you ever go to Mojmilo? Can you please look to

15 the left a bit. It's a very long hill, and the altitude is 680 metres.

16 From Mojmilo, one can have control on both sides towards the

17 Serbian-populated places. Can you just say yes, that you went to this

18 hill and that it's a dominant hilltop over all the other surrounding area?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, let's move to the north. There's only one named here, which

21 is marked, and it's Zuc. You know that Zuc is 830 metres high. Is that

22 correct?

23 A. It's certainly a hill.

24 Q. A little bit to the east there's the Oric hill, which is nearly

25 900 metres high. Did you ever go there?

1 A. Yes.

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I wouldn't like to

3 go on. There are a large number of other positions, but it's not

4 necessary to bother this witness with this. So other people who are more

5 familiar with the terrain will speak about that.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I would like to see the last hill, the Oric hill,

7 where is that?

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] A little to the right, lower than

9 Zuc; that hill is 876 metres high, and nearby is Volujak, which is 824

10 metres high. All these hills were held by the Muslims within the yellow

11 line; therefore, the full control on these higher-ground positions of

12 Sarajevo was there. Can we --

13 Q. Is it fair to say that, yes or no?

14 A. It is certainly fair to say that from the north slope of Zuc,

15 which was controlled by the Bosnian army, they were able to look down into

16 Serb-held Vogosca. That is true. So there was -- if your point is that

17 there was some high ground that was controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina

18 army which overlooked some Serb-held territory, that is true. I don't

19 think it negates the general proposition that Sarajevo lies in a valley

20 and that the floor of that valley was controlled by the Army of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And these surrounding hills on the whole were

22 controlled by the Army of Republika Srpska.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. I think --

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Microphone not activated]

2 THE INTERPRETER: Your microphone, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: The last two hills that you mentioned, we haven't

4 been able to find them on the map.

5 Have you seen them, Mr. Harland?

6 THE WITNESS: The Zuc feature, which is the principal high ground

7 controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina just north of Sarajevo, is

8 marked on -- on our map --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I have that.

10 THE WITNESS: -- here, and the other subordinate features are not

11 marked. And Zuc, I did visit and can confirm that it is high ground that

12 overlooks Serb-held territories. The other smaller features, some of them

13 I have visited and some of them I have not visited.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: What about Vogosca?

15 THE WITNESS: Yes. Vogosca was a community which prior to the war

16 had a Muslim preponderant population, but it was taken very early in the

17 war by the Serbs. And it had a couple of valuable factories in it for

18 ammunition and motor vehicles. And the Muslim population was killed or

19 expelled, but the Muslims, through the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were

20 able to control high ground that overlooked Vogosca.

21 So what the honourable colleague says is correct, that the Serb

22 population, the Serb people who either had previously lived in Vogosca or

23 who came then to serve or work in Vogosca were within the field of sight

24 of Bosnian small-arms fire. So he is right in saying that there was some

25 exceptions to the general statement that the Muslims were in the valleys

1 and the Serbs controlled the high ground.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Are you able to point on the map,

3 even though they are not marked, where those are?

4 THE WITNESS: No, sir.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: You are not.

6 Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President Robinson, Vogosca

8 is marked here all up to the north, and it's in a valley. From Zuc, it

9 can be fully controlled.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we have found it, yes.

11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Oric is next to Zuc, and it's

12 even higher; it's 876. It's not marked here, but, Your Honours, you will

13 be able to see this is an incomplete map, and of course I have no need to

14 insist upon this further. With other witnesses, we are going to point to

15 the number of these hills within this yellow circle line overlooking the

16 valley. For now, I think that Mr. Harland has painted a clear picture to

17 the best of his knowledge. However, in order for the Chamber to

18 understand better, Grbavica -- it says here Hrasno, Debelo Brdo, and

19 Grbavica.

20 Q. Is this area there, if you can see it on the map, between Debelo

21 Brdo and Hrasno. Grbavica is situated in a valley. Is that correct?

22 A. Yes, sir. That is the one part of the urban heart of Sarajevo,

23 which was controlled by the Bosnian Serb forces. And like the rest of the

24 urban area of Sarajevo, it lies principally in a valley.

25 It actually flows down from higher ground, known as Vrace, down

1 to right the valley of the Miljacka River a kilometre or two below. But,

2 principally, the higher buildings, the most densely populated area was, as

3 in the rest of Sarajevo, was actually on the valley floor. That is

4 correct.

5 Q. And let us finish this part. Let us look at the map. On this

6 specific spot, you can see that the forces of the Army of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina surround Grbavica from three sides. Is that right?

8 And that this is something that can absolutely be seen. It is at this

9 spot that Grbavica was encircled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is it

10 fair to put it that way?

11 A. That is correct. It was surrounded on three sides by the Army of

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13 Q. I do not wish to belabour the point. There are other such spots,

14 but, Mr. Harland, let's look at Nedzarici. You know very well where they

15 are placed. Can you show Nedzarici for the Chamber?

16 A. Yes. It's on -- can you see where I'm indicating on this map?

17 I'll move the map a little bit. If you come north from the airport, you

18 find the small settlement of Nedzarici, which comes from the airport side

19 in a triangle with the tip of the triangle almost at the famous

20 Oslobodjenje newspaper building. It was a famous point of much exchange

21 of fire throughout the war.

22 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, for instance, when we are discussing

23 Nedzarici, whether Nedzarici was encircled throughout where this line runs

24 and that members of the Army of Republika Srpska could barely have this

25 one corridor as their way out. For the rest, Nedzarici was surrounded by

1 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina on all the other sides?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Thank you. You also discussed roads. One of your last duties

4 involved roads. When you discussed the matter in the investigative stage,

5 in the minutes of the 9th of February, 10th of February, and so on and so

6 forth in your statement, back in 1998, I can show it to you and you can

7 confirm to me whether this is true - that's at page 7 in the English

8 version - you stated: "The Serbs were unable to travel the

9 Ilidza-Lukavica route." Is that correct?

10 A. That is correct. I mean, I don't have the statement. Oh, here it

11 is. That is a correct statement of fact; but to get from Ilidza to

12 Lukavica, they had to travel a very long way around into Eastern Bosnia

13 and back. Yeah, that is correct.

14 Q. Can you please show distance from Ilidza, and can you show the

15 route where it runs, and you said it was just several kilometres long?

16 THE WITNESS: Do I understand also that others have on the screen

17 what I'm indicating to on mine?

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

19 THE WITNESS: Here it's not marked. Oh, here is the suburb of

20 Ilidza and over here is the suburb of Lukavica. These were both

21 Serb-controlled areas, and they're only a couple of kilometres apart. But

22 as you can see, there was Bosnian-held government territory in between.

23 So in order to get from Ilidza to Lukavica or vice versa, any traveller

24 would have to take a very circuitous route east of Sarajevo into the

25 mountainous territory of Eastern Bosnia, and then come back in safety away

1 from the confrontation lines from the south and east and into Lukavica.

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Is it correct that you are of the opinion that the Serbs did not

4 care that much about the roads as the Bosniaks did?

5 A. Well, the Serbs were not surrounded. I mean, there was no siege.

6 There was no -- these areas were not surrounded, and so they had some

7 access; whereas, the -- the people of Sarajevo, a quarter of a million or

8 whatever, they were completely surrounded. They dug a small tunnel out of

9 the city from Dobrinja to Butmir which allowed people to go in single file

10 and very small numbers. So the Serbs and the Bosnians were in completely

11 different situations.

12 And whenever we were able to measure the -- the humanitarian

13 situation in terms of average hours of electricity or water or the average

14 intake of food or the number of casualties for the -- per population unit,

15 the situation within the confrontation lines was, you know, obviously

16 vastly worse than the situation outside the confrontation lines held by

17 the Serbs. But if your point is that there were also some difficulties

18 for the Serbs, either in areas exposed to fire or because they had to take

19 long routes to get to where they wanted to go, that's true; but that was a

20 different and altogether lesser order of problem in terms of human need.

21 Q. Thank you. Let me present you with an example which has to do

22 with your statement that the Serbs did not care that much about the roads.

23 You spoke of the short distance between Nedzarici and Grbavica -- that is

24 to say, between Lukavica and Ilidza. Do you know -- are you aware of the

25 fact that there was a hospital there for the Serbs, and did you know that

1 the hospital was unable to provide medical care for people who were

2 seriously injured? Are you aware of this? Can you confirm that this is

3 true?

4 A. Yes, and, in fact, the people in Lukavica used other medical

5 facilities, that is correct, which is not at all to say that their medical

6 facilities were --

7 Q. No, no.

8 A. All right.

9 Q. But you do confirm that there was this hospital and that it wasn't

10 intended for seriously injured. When the need arose for a seriously

11 wounded person to be transported to a better-quality hospital, one had to

12 skirt this yellow and red lines, some 180 -- some 90 to 100 kilometres to

13 reach an adequate hospital. Is that right?

14 A. Sir, if you're trying to make a comparison between life inside and

15 outside the confrontation line, it's impossible. I lived there throughout

16 this period. There were some difficulties outside --

17 Q. No, no.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. Robinson, I

19 should like my question to be answered. I'm fully respectful of all that

20 was happening in the valley. I'm not going into that matter. I'm raising

21 the matter of roads. I'm not talking about military issues. I'm talking

22 about these specific problems concerning those who were seriously injured

23 and who had to travel the distance, and because of the fact that they had

24 to travel the long distance they died along the way. Is that true, please

25 say yes or no.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Harland, please respond.

2 THE WITNESS: Yes, I believe that's correct.

3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation].

4 Q. You mentioned the tunnel. I'd like you ask you, in connection

5 with the tunnel, you spoke about this in the investigation stage in your

6 statement. And I'm not sure if you have one in front of you now. And I'm

7 talking about page 20, the last paragraph, and the first paragraph of page

8 21, or rather, the paragraph starts as the last one on page 20 and the

9 first one on page 21. There, Mr. Harland, you discuss your meetings with

10 General Delic. Is that right?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. You stated there: "Delic did not have good command and control

13 over his troops in Sarajevo and outside Sarajevo very little." Is that

14 correct?

15 A. That was our impression, yes.

16 Q. You go on to say: "I would say that he had only limited control of

17 forces in Sarajevo." Is that correct? And to the east of the Presidency,

18 in particular?

19 A. That was certainly true in the earlier status of the war; but as

20 time wore on, the command and control arrangements in the Army of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina improved somewhat in our view; though they were

22 probably never as good as the command and control arrangements in the Army

23 of Republika Srpska in our view.

24 Q. This is precisely what the tunnel made possible, because you said

25 here that once the tunnel was made, the tunnel that connected Sarajevo

1 with Central Bosnia, the matters improved. Is that true?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. In the statement you gave in the Slobodan Milosevic case, you

4 stated - this is in French, and you will have to confirm this so that I do

5 not go on searching for this in the English version - you said that

6 Karadzic and the Serbs tolerated the existence of the tunnel because it

7 made possible communication, food, and medical supplies, and so on. Is

8 that correct?

9 A. Yes. Dr. Karadzic once said to me I -- we were talking about the

10 tunnel, and he said to me, "You know, we could -- we could destroy it, but

11 we're going to let the Muslims breathe." And it confirmed our view that

12 the Serb intention was to inflict, you know, terror and suffering on

13 Sarajevo but not actually to starve everybody to death. They could have,

14 in fact, cut off all the food and water and probably forced the actually

15 surrender of Sarajevo at certain points, but they chose not to and they

16 chose to allow the existence of this tunnel.

17 Q. I should now like to present you with a document, which is dated

18 the 7th of October, 1994, and marked --

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I have your assistance in

20 this, please.

21 Q. This is an outgoing dispatch message addressed to Annan. And in

22 connection with the meeting with Karadzic and Mladic, I would like to show

23 you paragraph 5 of the document under B2, which can be found at page 3,

24 page 3. 001-4722-R001-4731. This is the 65 ter document number 1. Item

25 5, under B, or rather, item 5, B2. Have you found it?

1 A. No. No. I think this is a paragraph immediately before D, so it

2 must be paragraph C. I don't know.

3 Q. We have items A and B under 5, so --

4 MR. WAESPI: I think it's on page 2, the English version.

5 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Waespi.

7 THE WITNESS: Mm-hmm. Sure.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Do you recall that the following was noted in the report, in the

10 middle: "On Sarajevo as a whole, Dr. Karadzic outlined the following

11 conditions," and then some matters are being mentioned; and then

12 concerning the tunnel: "The tunnel beneath Sarajevo should be covered up

13 and placed under the control of UNPROFOR."

14 So he never agreed to having the tunnel function. In other words,

15 this is contrary to what you're saying, that he agreed with it. Because

16 at this particular meeting, he asked for the tunnel to be covered up,

17 filled up.

18 A. Yeah, I was at this meeting. Yes. The tunnel always --

19 Q. This is enough for me. Time will pass quite quickly.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you agreeing that this contradicts what you

21 said before?

22 THE WITNESS: No, I -- not at all. Dr. Karadzic contradicted

23 himself, which he did all the time, by the way. He's a very flamboyant,

24 very charming character, but he's not at all consistent. And I believe

25 that he was under pressure from his military people to close the tunnel

1 and to take a harder line. His military advisor, in particular General

2 Tolimir, was constantly pushing Dr. Karadzic to push us to close the

3 tunnel because it ran under territory we controlled.

4 But Karadzic, when he spoke to us in private, didn't exhibit great

5 concern about it. And he, in fact, was much aware than his military

6 commanders that if he pushed UNPROFOR too far or the Bosnian civilians too

7 far, that could provoke a NATO intervention which would be bad for the

8 Serbs. So Karadzic was himself zigzagging on this issue and on many

9 others I should say, like the provision of food to Sarajevo and so on.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you.

11 THE WITNESS: Sorry, sir.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Under item 6, if I can direct your attention to this, this is

14 precisely what you're saying, that the military authorities insisted on

15 something quite else; and then here it is stated what Mr. Mladic said --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi.

17 MR. WAESPI: Yes, this is on page 4, item 6, for the court

18 deputies.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Mladic firmly protested against the fact that the ABiH infantry

22 used the tunnel to go out of Sarajevo and attack. Is it true that when

23 the airport became operational in mid-1994, the ABiH used the tunnel to

24 carry out various missions out of Sarajevo and to get back to Sarajevo

25 again. Is that correct or not?

1 A. That's correct, but the date of -- which you gave was not right.

2 The airport was opened in 1992, and the tunnel was dug by the Bosnians I

3 believe in 1993. But your statement about what the tunnel was used for,

4 which meant that it was including for military purposes to conduct attacks

5 against the Serbs in other areas and then to bring back troops, that is

6 correct that it is one of the purposes for which it was used.

7 Q. Very well. I may have been mistaken in that regard. However, at

8 the time when the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps was Dragomir

9 Milosevic, the tunnel was constantly operational from August 1994 onwards.

10 Are you aware of the fact that the tunnel was more than 700 metres long?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you know that the tunnel had a cable that was running through

13 it and that electricity supplies were restored to Sarajevo from the

14 Neretva; that was in late 1994 when the cable provided more or less

15 sufficient energy supplies?

16 A. No, that's not correct, sir.

17 Q. I can, of course, put this to you. This is something that Alija

18 Izetbegovic stated in his book. You haven't seen the book?

19 A. I have. I've read the book, but I'm surprised you're quoting it.

20 Q. Well, I'm compelled to, because in his book he wrote that

21 thousands of tons of weapons and ammunition were brought in through the

22 tunnel into Sarajevo. Is that right?

23 A. That is correct.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is it correct that he said that?

25 THE WITNESS: It's correct that he said it, and it's correct that

1 it was true. It's a fact. We used to try to monitor the flow of goods.

2 There was an awful lot of black marketeering. The brigade commander, the

3 Bosnian brigade commander on the Butmir side I think his name was

4 Prevljak, he was we believed heavily engaged in black marketing.

5 But there was also a flow of weapons and of military personnel

6 because Sarajevo had a large base of population, and they would send

7 troops out to fight in other areas. The weapons, on the other hand, were

8 outside of Sarajevo, they would be given weapons, and then they would send

9 troops back in for -- to their homes and often send weapons in as well.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: And why would you be surprised that Mr.

11 Tapuskovic is quoting from Alija Izetbegovic's book?

12 THE WITNESS: I wasn't realise -- didn't realise that he

13 considered it a reliable source for a narrative of the conflict in Bosnia

14 and Herzegovina, but I'm glad to hear that he does, sir.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I can only give you my impression. To me, that is the most

17 important thing, to be able to hear something like that from the person

18 that headed the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You spoke of black

19 marketeering. Were Muslim citizens able to use the tunnel to leave the

20 town whenever they wished to and to come back?

21 A. Yes. If they were well-connected or if they paid a fee, yes, some

22 were able to. But the great majority of -- or many of the population who

23 would rather not have endured the siege were -- were not able to use the

24 tunnel to escape the suffering of the siege.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, it's time for the break. Do you

1 have one more question?

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] My last question.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. The Serbs never. They either had to pay hefty sums of money to go

6 out; and then even if they managed to get out, it would so happen that

7 they would be killed at the end of the road. Are you aware of this?

8 A. No. Some Serbs did use the tunnel. Generally, Serbs -- Serbs who

9 were trying to leave Sarajevo for good, permanently, they generally would

10 not use the tunnel, because the tunnel was connecting it to other Bosnian

11 government-held areas. If they wanted to leave Sarajevo, they tended to

12 cross the front line in order to go to Serb-held territory, Lukavica or

13 Ilidza. And there they would normally have to pay some money to a Bosnian

14 commander and sometimes they would also have to pay money to a Serb local

15 military unit, and then they could escape that way.

16 But some Serb businessmen who stayed on the Bosnian side during

17 the war, they did use the tunnel to buy goods outside where prices were

18 cheaper and then bring them back and sell them at a larger profit.

19 Serb -- Bosnian businessmen of Serb nationality known to me were involved

20 in this black market trade, along with Bosnian Muslims. Black market was

21 a major feature of the war in Sarajevo.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll take the break now. 20 minutes.

23 --- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m.

24 --- On resuming at 12.43 p.m.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, you may continue.

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.

2 Q. Mr. Harland --

3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

4 Q. Mr. Harland, let us move now on to military questions, as it were;

5 particularly, the problems that arose in the aftermath of the tragic event

6 of Markale on the 5th of February, 1994. I'm not going to remind you

7 about this. For the Chamber, I think it will be interested that

8 everything that was undertaken in order to calm down the situation, and in

9 that respect I would like to ask you a few questions.

10 You know that the agreement was concluded - I would not go into

11 many details right now - and that this agreement was reached for a large

12 number of heavy weaponry on both sides to be placed under the control of

13 UNPROFOR. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. And it was done in a certain sense, as you explained page 28674,

16 line 10-21. I would not go back to that, because it will take too much

17 time. I would like only to focus on one thing. I don't know if it is

18 true that part of the weapons, so my first question was: Was part of the

19 weapons at certain points placed under the direct control of UNPROFOR?

20 A. They were placed under the monitoring of UNPROFOR, yes.

21 Q. And was a considerable amount of weapons replaced or moved 20

22 kilometres away?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Very well. Now I will present to you a document drafted by you.

25 Victor Andreev sent it to Sergio De Mello. It's dated the 17th of

1 February. This should be our exhibit, and I just omitted a while ago that

2 the previous document be marked as Defence document number 1. That's 7th

3 of October, 1994; that would be Exhibit Number 1 if you permit that.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll admit that as Exhibit Number 1 for

5 the Defence.

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] So this is the document dated the

7 17th of February; In English version last paragraph on page 1, which I'm

8 going to read to you.

9 Q. Do you have this document in front of you, sir? So page 1

10 immediately after the introduction which shows who had drafted the

11 document. Can you see that?

12 A. I have that cover page, yes, sir.

13 Q. Last paragraph on this cover page reads as follows: "The Serbs

14 are cooperating more than they had been ever before. Heavy weaponry is

15 silent and a number of long-standing problems have been solved." Is that

16 correct?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Another question, and I must ask you that because it relates to

19 this document and I want to avoid going back to it again later. In

20 English version, that's page 3, immediately after the passage which says

21 "Rump BH." So page 3 of the English version towards the end under the

22 heading "the Rump BH," the last-but-one paragraph.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. It says here:

25 "The BH authorities of Sarajevo appear to be diverting even more

1 food than usual away from those that it intended to,

2 perhaps less than one-third of the aid brought into the city. It is not

3 entirely clear what is happening to the balance. Some resurfaces on the

4 black market and some of it is diverted to the military; most, however,

5 cannot be accounted for."

6 So this is what you wrote in your report. Does this mean that

7 these enormous amounts that were arriving in Sarajevo in order to aid the

8 civilians were diverted elsewhere?

9 A. A large amount, yes, sir.

10 Q. Thank you. I would now read a piece on page 28657 of the

11 transcript line 2-6, if we can please have this on your monitor. Has this

12 been found, please.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. It has been found.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It reads as follows:

15 "Towards the end of 1994, it seems that the Serbs genuinely wanted

16 the stabilisation on the situation in Sarajevo and they ceased fire. In

17 fact, they did that" --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. It's not on our screen.

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [No interpretation]

20 MR. WAESPI: And am I correct that you're referring to his

21 testimony in Slobodan Milosevic, to the transcript page?

22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

23 MR. WAESPI: And that is the second day he testified?

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] That's been tendered, yes.

25 28657, 2-6.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just wait until it has been identified and found

2 so that we can see it.

3 [Defence counsel confer]

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. That's the

5 transcript from the trial in the proceedings against Slobodan Milosevic.

6 I apologise if I omitted to say that.

7 THE REGISTRAR: And do you have a 65 ter number, please?

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Should it be admitted under 65

9 ter?

10 MR. WAESPI: 65 ter, if I can assist, is 02186.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, you must make sure that you have

12 all of the relevant data for easy identification of your documents.

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] You're right. I was sure that I

14 had the correct page, and that's what I have from the transcript from the

15 Slobodan Milosevic trial, page 28657.

16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't get the line number.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you repeat the page and the line.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] 28657, lines 2 to 6.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] This is very important to me, and

21 I simply don't know.

22 Q. So by the end of February 1994, the Serbs did seem genuinely to

23 want a stabilisation of the situation around Sarajevo, and they did stop

24 shooting. And, in fact, they did so. They reduced the amount of fire

25 coming from their side of the confrontation line from February of 1994,

1 right through till the autumn of 1994 to a very low level. Is that

2 correct?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. In this period - and I wouldn't refer to the transcript any longer

5 because I believe you remember, and you confirmed that in Slobodan

6 Milosevic trial - that between 10th February and 27th April 1994, there

7 were 318 cease-fires by the Muslims, to which you responded approximately.

8 Is that correct?

9 A. I don't remember the exact number, but that is approximately

10 right, yes.

11 Q. In order to avoid any further confusion, I have to refer to the

12 following on page 28 --

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I just -- it's not clear to me what you mean

15 by 318 cease-fires by the Muslims, to which you responded.

16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] 318 times the Muslims fired from

17 their positions in violation of the truce and cease-fire.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's different from what is on the transcript.

19 So they breached the cease-fire 318 times?

20 THE WITNESS: Right.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: And that occasioned a response from UNPROFOR. Is

22 that so, Mr. Harland?

23 THE WITNESS: It elicited protests from us, yes.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. Let me read this in French.

2 [Interpretation] "We were concerned about the fact that certain --

3 about certain elements, that's for sure, about the fact that some Muslim

4 leaders did not want to stabilise the situation all around Sarajevo. This

5 was extremely frustrating for General Rose."

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi --

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] That's correct.

8 MR. WAESPI: If he could give a reference to the transcript page,

9 please.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll give you in the English

11 version. That's page 28659, lines 15 to 18. It's a very brief statement.

12 THE WITNESS: Yeah, that sounds correct, sir, yes.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Harland, let me present to you now a document dated 18th

16 September 1994; just a portion of this document, on 65 ter list, there's

17 not the entire document. This is just a part of this document. It's on

18 the 65 ter list -- no, it's not on the 65 ter list; only part of it is but

19 not this particular part.

20 It refers to the protection forces of UNPROFOR related to the

21 report on the shelling which took place on the 18th of September, 1994.

22 This part was tendered as 1429; part of this document was entered under 65

23 ter with the number 1429. And this is going to be our exhibit, but I

24 omitted, Your Honour, to tender previously two other exhibits. So these

25 are all the documents that we are tendering into evidence that I have just

1 mentioned.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, would you just mention them so we can give

3 them an exhibit number.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It's difficult now to do it post

5 factum. I'll do it at the end for sure.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, yes.

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Does -- this part of the document is before the witness. This is

9 0026-3949 and 0026-3950. That's the report. Can you see it, Mr. Harland?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. According to this document, it is clearly shown on one side are

12 activities by the ABiH army and on the right-hand side were activities by

13 the Bosnian Serbs on the 18th of September. So look at this. The

14 activities carried out by the Bosnian army started at 1715 hours, and the

15 number of shells is given; then 30 -- 10, 30, 30, 30, 30, 40, 30, and so

16 on and so forth until 1850 and, or rather, 1907, at which time a response

17 came from the Serbian side; whereas, the shelling from the Bosnian side

18 continued; and then the Serb shelling ceased at 1814, whereas, the Bosnian

19 shelling continued until 2049 hours. Is that correct?

20 A. Yeah, that's what it says here, yes.

21 Q. So please look at the next page on this report, which is contained

22 in this document. It reads:

23 "This attack had two likely objectives: To block the Serbian

24 logistic road in order to obtain a release of the Serbian pressure on the

25 Bosnian logistic road through Mount Igman to -- to provoke the Serbs to

1 make a mistake and open fire at the town for the president, Izetbegovic,

2 to give a strong argument for negotiating a lifting of the embargo by the

3 USA. At the same time, the Bosnian opened aversionary fire in the eastern

4 suburb near the coordinate 9358 with the intention possibly to simulate

5 the attack towards the east along the road to Pale."

6 Do you know about this document, and is this correct?

7 A. I didn't write this document, but it sounds like a plausible

8 account of that incident, yes.

9 Q. Let me now move on to the next document which was drafted by you

10 only two days later, on the 20th of September. You wrote it and Victor

11 Andreev forwarded it to Sergio De Mello. It is, again, part of 65 ter

12 number 2230.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is this the document which is now on the screen?

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it is, but I can't still see

15 the page that I intend to quote from.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is that page? Page 2230.

17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] The last two numbers are 4232.

18 MR. WAESPI: Yes, if I can assist, Mr. President, and colleague

19 from the Defence, the next page is in fact the document drafted by Mr.

20 Harland.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: Yes.

22 Q. [Interpretation] Here you report about a meeting held in Pale. As

23 far as I can see here, on page 1, the message was that you had a meeting

24 with Karadzic and that he made an angry remark about the Bosnian attack on

25 Sarajevo.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is paragraph 2. Mr. Harland, can you

2 confirm that?

3 THE WITNESS: Yes, I wrote that.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. And in paragraph 7, after the meeting in the Presidency in

6 Sarajevo, it says here that you reported that President Izetbegovic was

7 absolutely contrite about Saturday's attack and promised, in front of

8 General Delic, that there would be no repetition of the incident. He

9 stated that orders had been passed to Bosnian soldiers on the ground not

10 to respond to provocations. Is that correct?

11 A. Yes, I wrote that.

12 Q. And, in fact, it was the Bosnian side who was provoking. Is that

13 correct?

14 A. Yes, certainly.

15 Q. He also promised that Bosnian forces would stop their attacks on

16 the Serb supply route around Sarajevo. Is that correct, too?

17 A. Yes, though not everything President Izetbegovic promised was

18 always implemented.

19 Q. Thank you. Now, I have a document dated the 2nd of October, Major

20 Fraser's report for the 2nd of October.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] This is 65 ter 2055. The mouse

22 is not working on our desk.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Do we have the document now on the screen?

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Harland, you don't have it on your screen?

1 A. No.

2 Q. 65 ter 2055.

3 A. I have it.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Now, I hope these are initial growing pains,

5 because I would have to say that right now the system is slower than the

6 previous one where we used hard documents.

7 It's there now, Mr. Tapuskovic.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] May I continue, Your Honour?

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, please do.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. On page 2, we can see that this is the message related to the

12 meeting with Ganic, as attended by Gobilliard, Fraser, who was actually

13 sending the report. And under item 2 on the next page reads:

14 "General Gobilliard began the meeting and then he said that

15 another incident had happened in a demilitarised zone and the exclusion

16 zone of heavy weaponry involving 200 troops of the 4th Brigade, the

17 members of the alleged Muslim league and the policemen."

18 Do you know about this?

19 A. This was one of a number of violations by the Bosnian government

20 of this TEZ. I don't remember this specific one and I was not at this

21 meeting, but it sounds like a correct account, yes.

22 Q. Now, please, Mr. Harland, take a look at the last item in this

23 report compiled by Mr. Fraser, which reads -- the last page, paragraph 10:

24 "Dr. Ganic appeared unaware of the troops in the TEZ/DMZ, but

25 unconcerned. He was uncomfortable with the idea that the incident might

1 be raised by Mr. Akashi and Defence Minister Perry. He was anxious that

2 this not happen because of the impression that the Muslims were provoking

3 the Serbians."

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I ask that when the documents are put on the

5 screen, they are highlighted so that we can see them in bigger print.

6 It's difficult to read what is there now. Yes.

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Was this that I have read out

8 enough or should I do it again?

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, that's fine. You may proceed.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] The last sentence: "He did not

11 deny the presence of the soldiers in the exclusion zone, demilitarised

12 zone, but he tried to redirect, without success, the discussion to the

13 attacks in the north around Bresa."

14 Q. Is that right?

15 A. Well, I was not at this meeting, but it sounds like a very typical

16 discussion with Dr. Ganic, yes.

17 Q. Thank you. I would like to deal with one topic very swiftly. Do

18 you know that General Dragomir Milosevic took the command over around the

19 10th of August or precisely on the 10th of August, 1994?

20 A. I knew it was about that time because he appeared as the commander

21 of the Romanija Corps in the discussions about the anti-sniping agreement,

22 which I think was just after that time, yes, but I didn't know the exact

23 date.

24 Q. Are you aware of the fact that several days earlier - I believe it

25 was on the 4th of August, 1994; therefore, several days before he assumed

1 the duty - the FRY introduced sanctions against the Army of Republika

2 Srpska and that the sanctions were in force at the time General Milosevic

3 took up his duties?

4 A. Yes. We were aware of the sanctions and, in fact, we

5 internationals were trying to encourage their imposition. But, you know,

6 they were only partially successful of course, yes.

7 Q. However, at one point you said - and I don't have time now to go

8 and find exactly where this was - that the Serbs were evidently concerned

9 about the borders being closed, the borders opposite the Federal Republic

10 of Yugoslavia?

11 A. That's correct. Dr. Karadzic raised it with us several times.

12 Q. I am about to broach quite a broad topic that deals with sniping.

13 And it was mostly for that topic that I wanted to deal with your statement

14 that you gave to the OTP investigators on the 17th of April, 1997, on the

15 13th of January, 9th of February, and the 10th of February, 1998, and

16 which concerns sniping.

17 I do not wish to go back to the agreement that was already

18 discussed, because I don't want to analyse the matters concerning the

19 agreement. The agreement was already tendered into evidence by the

20 Prosecution. Nevertheless, I do have a couple of questions.

21 In the statement, when discussing the anti-sniping agreement at

22 page 11, the second paragraph, and the one immediately following it in the

23 English version. In the B/C/S version --

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] For the benefit of the

25 interpreters at page 10, the last paragraph.

1 Q. -- the following is stated: "From the end of July until the 14th

2 of August, we had a series of abortive meetings." These were your words.

3 "They were mainly abortive, but nevertheless the agreement was signed."

4 Therefore, for several months from the 14th of July, you were

5 negotiating unsuccessfully. Dragomir Milosevic took up his duties on the

6 10th of August; and there -- and then on the 14th of August, he signed

7 this anti-sniping agreement. Is that right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. In the paragraph before that one --

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Waespi is on his feet.

11 MR. WAESPI: Yes, just to correct the record. That paragraph you

12 just quoted from the witness statement, "from the end of July until 14th

13 August." It's a little bit different. After the abortive meetings, "they

14 were mainly abortive because of the lack of interest in an agreement by

15 Tolimir and Indjic who were obstructing the negotiations." Just to

16 complete the record. Thank you.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Waespi.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Waespi, this is precisely

19 what I was referring to, the obstruction. There was obstruction of the

20 agreement; however, Mr. Milosevic signed the agreement, in spite of all

21 the previous obstruction. This is precisely what I wanted to hear,

22 whether this was true.

23 Q. In the previous paragraph --

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please state

25 the answer for the transcript.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you in the position to confirm that, Mr.

2 Harland?

3 THE WITNESS: Yes.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask Mr. Harland to

5 confirm his answer verbally and not just by nodding.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I asked the witness whether he was in a position

7 to confirm that.

8 And what is your answer, Mr. Harland?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes. I'm in a position to confirm it, and I can

10 also say that we were making no progress when we wanted to have an

11 agreement to create a physical barrier that would stop snipers from being

12 able to see the other side. And at the last meeting, we made what we felt

13 was a -- a major concession, which is that we would not have the authority

14 to actually hunt down violating snipers and -- in Article 2, and we would

15 not actually have any construction of a physical barrier. And at that

16 point, the Serbs agreed to sign; before that, they had not. So Mr.

17 Tapuskovic's chronology is essentially correct.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. But in the previous paragraph you said, literally: "The

20 background to this agreement is that the Blue Routes were closed in part

21 due to the sniping by the Bosniaks of Serb civilians." Is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Then at page 11, the last paragraph in the English version, you

24 stated what you stated, in fact, today, that the agreement worked well for

25 a period in the first couple of months when sniping was quite rare?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. Do you remember that the agreement also said that the parties

3 should publicly, or rather, that a public statement should be issued to

4 the effect that the Serb side honoured this while the Muslims did not?

5 A. No. I remember that we asked that both sides make public

6 statements that -- that they were promoting the -- the agreement; and

7 then, if I remember correctly, the famous incident in which two young Serb

8 girls were killed in Grbavica happened before the agreement; and that then

9 after the agreement -- and there had been a large number of sniper

10 casualties on both sides; and that after the agreement - actually, if I

11 remember correctly - the number of sniper incidents on both sides dropped

12 away almost to zero for many weeks.

13 Q. You mentioned the two young Serb girls. Was this in the month of

14 August? Weren't you perhaps mistaken there? Did this not happen in the

15 month of March during the violation of the agreement? Actually, they were

16 killed during a truce that was supposed to last for four months?

17 A. I cannot now remember the date.

18 Q. In your statement, you also said that whenever it was possible to

19 monitor a sniping at Grbavica, the impression was that Bosnians were the

20 ones who were sniping more extensively than the Serbs. That's at page 24,

21 paragraph 5 in the English version.

22 A. That was our impression from counting both sniper rounds and

23 sniper victims in the Grbavica area and the adjacent areas controlled by

24 the Bosnian government, yes, sir.

25 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Just a minute, Mr. Tapuskovic.

1 There's a very important point which you addressed, and I'm wondering if

2 we couldn't get back to that. You mentioned the death of two young Serb

3 girls. Is that right? Because we don't have the date of that incident.

4 You are hesitating. And if we don't know, you've checked this

5 with the witness and you wondered whether this was in March or in August.

6 You must understand that this is a very important point. Is there any

7 official UN document or any other document that could help you remember

8 the day when these two young girls were killed?

9 THE WITNESS: Certainly, we kept a full record. And it could be

10 found in the daily situation reports of Sector Sarajevo, though I would

11 just mention, Your Honour, that there were a large amount of sniper deaths

12 on both sides, and this particular incident was one of very many. But it

13 became famous because there was so much discussion around how -- whether

14 or not one bullet had killed both of the girls. So in my -- it can be

15 checked, but in my memory I cannot with absolute certainty distinguish the

16 date of this incident from that of a large number of others.

17 JUDGE MINDUA: Thank you.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour Mindua, a lot of time

19 has passed since, and it is quite possible that Mr. Harland cannot state

20 this with any precision. But I'm sure in due time we will be able to

21 clarify this matter, and I will not insist on the date, whether it

22 happened in August of 1994 or in March of 1995. It isn't that important

23 really. At any rate, he knows about the case when two young Serb girls

24 aged 12 or 13 were killed.

25 Q. In your statement, you also said that you had some doubts about

1 the command and control that the respective sides had over their snipers,

2 and that the French were not certain whether the shots were fired -- that

3 were fired on Bosniaks from a great distance actually originated from

4 Serbs or Bosnians?

5 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Tapuskovic please speak into his own

6 microphone, please. Thank you.

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It's the reference to the

8 statement of the page that he just now.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, you're being asked to speak into

10 your own microphone.

11 THE WITNESS: That is correct. It was often not possible from to

12 a victim's wounds to tell where the firing point was located. That's

13 correct, yeah.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation].

15 Q. Mr. Harland --

16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] And, Your Honours, I will be

17 doing my best to try and refer as little as possible to the documents

18 prior to the tenure of Mr. Milosevic. But I do have a document dated the

19 3rd of November, 1993, which was drafted by Mr. Harland and was then

20 forwarded by Mr. Victor Andreev to Sergio De Mello.

21 I would like to present Mr. Harland with only one paragraph

22 thereof. R001449 is the number of the document. Could we look at page

23 R0014152 -- or no, no, no, I'm sorry. That's the anti-sniping agreement.

24 This is R0029446.

25 THE INTERPRETER: And could Mr. Tapuskovic please speak slowly

1 when citing numbers.

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I've grown a bit tired with all

3 the business with the papers now.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, never mind that. The interpreter

5 is asking you to speak more slowly when citing the numbers and the pages.

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I've grown a bit weary of this,

7 that's why, perhaps.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it's too early in the day for that, Mr.

9 Tapuskovic.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I agree. There we go. It's

11 here. That's the English version. That's at page 3 of the English

12 version, in the middle of the page. That's the fourth paragraph from the

13 bottom.

14 Q. Have you found it?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. The text reads: "BH snipers have been firing on UN personnel

17 around UNPROFOR's forward HQ. Two Bosnian snipers have been firing not

18 only at UN personnel, but also at local pedestrians in the vicinity. BH

19 Corps claims that these snipers are 'renegade supporters of Caco.'"

20 A. Yes, I wrote that. And, in fact, I remember the incident and I,

21 in fact, was present when those snipers were shooting around that area.

22 And I spoke also with the anti-sniping teams from UNPROFOR that identified

23 the exact sniping positions, yes.

24 Q. Could you explain something else. You mentioned local

25 pedestrians, does it mean that they were firing on Muslim citizens?

1 A. Well, you can't tell whether somebody is Muslim or Serb or Croat,

2 but they were certainly firing on civilians who were inside -- in the

3 Bosnian-controlled territory. Yes, that's correct. Also, I think, on

4 Djure Djakovica Street.

5 Q. At page 6 of your statement you gave to investigators, paragraph

6 2, you talk about an assessment you made concerning snipers. I don't know

7 if you found this bit.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. "In this assessment I also indicated that in the area of the

10 forward HQ of UNPROFOR, two Bosnian snipers were active who also fired on

11 UN personnel."

12 Is that more or less the same statement you made that we looked at

13 just a moment ago?

14 A. Yeah, it appears to be.

15 Q. With regard to this incident, I do recall that the French brought

16 two of their own snipers to find -- find these two and kill them. Is that

17 right?

18 A. Yes, and I met those two French snipers.

19 Q. Thank you. You say you've met them. Can you tell us, did they

20 liquidate them?

21 A. At the moment I talked to them, they had not. They had identified

22 the firing point. Actually, they were a team. One of them seemed to hold

23 some sort of telescopic sight, and the other one had a gun with a

24 telescopic sight. And the one who was principally trying to identify the

25 firing points had located actually more than one firing point, and they

1 were able to point them out to me.

2 And those firing points were certainly within Bosnian

3 government-held territory, and then I was able to see for myself that

4 sniper fire was opened from one of those positions and that it -- the

5 sniper fire landed also in Bosnian government-held territory near the

6 bottom of Djure Djakovica Street, causing a few civilian pedestrians to

7 run quickly for hiding, yes, sir.

8 Q. I would like to finish this particular chapter, if I may. This is

9 very important and is linked with what we've just been discussing?

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. And how much longer will you be in your

11 cross-examination?

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do believe that I

13 shall need some more time. I don't know how much was -- is envisaged

14 within the six hours. I do believe that I should address the matters

15 thoroughly, in view of the documents that I have. At first there were ten

16 hours set aside, which were then reduced to six.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: When is your next witness, Mr. Waespi?

19 THE WITNESS: It's Witness Fortin, and he's available. He will be

20 next.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would half an hour more tomorrow be enough for

22 you, Mr. Tapuskovic?

23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, I'm sure this

24 will not be enough. I do have several important topics that I haven't

25 addressed yet and which are even more important than the ones I've done.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi.

2 MR. WAESPI: Yes. The witness, as you know, has been scheduled

3 for five or six hours, I might be mistaken. So we are still within that

4 range, although you might have additional questions. And it's a first

5 witness, and I can assure you that the next witnesses will be short and

6 well within the time allocated. So while this first witness might be a

7 little bit longer than anticipated, you know, the other ones might be a

8 little bit shorter. So by the end of this week I'm sure we will be well

9 within the schedule, Mr. President.

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, one hour, would that enable you

12 to complete your cross-examination? The witness was scheduled for five.

13 The Prosecutor did overrun his time.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. Robinson, I will

15 do my best to stay within the time. I'm not sure whether I will be able

16 to, but I will try to cut down the issues I still have left this afternoon

17 and to try and finish within the time given. But could I perhaps just

18 finish this one sentence that we are dealing with right now?

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have to adjourn immediately after that.

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Mr. Harland, I would like to hear whether the following is true,

22 in the context of the meeting between General Rose and the BiH commander:

23 "I do recall that we continued making comments about this over the

24 following several months more than once. During the meeting with Mr.

25 Ganic, General Rose complained about mortars mounted on trucks and sniper

1 fire opened by Bosnians on their own people. Ganic's customary reply was

2 to say that Rose was anti-Muslim." Is that true?

3 A. Is what true, sorry? Is it true that he said that, or is it true

4 that he was anti-Muslim?

5 Q. Is all of what I said true, that Rose, along those lines --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, do you wish to say something before

7 the --

8 MR. WAESPI: Yes, just the source. Is it Mr. Harland's witness

9 statement, is it Rose's book, is it a document?

10 THE WITNESS: We're reading from the witness statement.

11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] That's the statement dated 17

12 February and then the other dates, at page 6, as I indicated a moment

13 ago. And this is before Mr. Harland, this text, and is what I just read

14 out true, correct?

15 A. That is correct. I made that statement and I knew those facts

16 because I was in those meetings between General Rose and Dr. Ganic.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We must adjourn now, and we resume

19 tomorrow at 2.15 here.

20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

21 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 16th day of

22 January, 2007, at 2.15 p.m.

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