1 Tuesday, 16 January 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
6 [B/C/S on English channel]
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's happening?
8 I'm hearing French.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, sorry.
10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I haven't heard you.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please proceed with your cross-examination.
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
13 Yesterday, my team has been doing a great deal to overcome the technical
14 difficulties we experienced yesterday. I believe that we will be able to
15 proceed smoothly today.
16 Your assistants asked that I immediately tender certain exhibits
17 into evidence, and can I do it right now at the outset?
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Microphone not activated].
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do not hear you
20 at all. I have no communication with you whatsoever.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, I was asking: These relate to matters that
22 you have dealt with already in your -- in your cross-examination.
23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let's do that then quickly.
25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 The first exhibit is D00-0078. The second one is DD00-0060.
2 I'm not certain whether the other exhibit was tendered into
3 evidence by the Prosecution, which is the 65 ter document number 2. I see
4 that my learned friends from the Prosecution are nodding, so I do not need
5 to tender this one into evidence.
6 The other one is DD00-0094. Then, 65 ter document 2030. Then 65
7 ter document 0055.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 2055.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] 65 ter document number 1. The
10 document dated the 7th of October was, I heard, tendered into evidence by
11 the Prosecution. We have completed the exhibits, I believe.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We need to have numbers assigned to them.
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honours.
17 The 65 ter number 1, 00001, was given an exhibit number yesterday
18 when it was admitted, and that will be D1. Number DD000078 becomes
19 Defence Exhibit D2. DD000094 becomes Exhibit D3. 65 ter number 02030
20 becomes Exhibit D4. And 65 ter number 02055 becomes Exhibit D5.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: 0060, you did not assign that a number.
22 THE REGISTRAR: That will become Exhibit D6, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yesterday, Your Honours --
25 yesterday, Your Honours, I broke my cross-examination of Mr. Harland -
1 good afternoon to you, Mr. Harland; I apologise for not greeting you
2 beforehand - at the point when we were discussing sniping.
3 WITNESS: DAVID HARLAND [Resumed]
4 Cross-examination by Mr. Tapuskovic: [Continued]
5 Q. I should like to ask Mr. Harland to have his statement before him
6 and to read one passage at page 26 of the English version, second
7 paragraph, which is right above the chapter dealing with shelling.
8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could I ask Mr.
9 Harland to read this out.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
11 Mr. Harland.
12 THE WITNESS: "I am also aware of two instances where the Bosniaks
13 were shooting at Bosniaks. One involved an incident near the Residency in
14 late 1993. The other incident was in early 1994 when General Rose's
15 bodyguard 'Goose' said that he had returned fire on a Bosniak shooting at
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Harland, is that true?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. In connection with this, I would like to ask you the following:
21 All the incidents we discussed earlier on, were they, shown in the area
22 where you were in Sarajevo, the result of Serb snipers, representatives of
23 the Army of Republika Srpska?
24 A. I'm sorry, I didn't hear or understand the question well. Sorry.
25 Q. The incidents, the events where Bosniaks shot upon Bosniaks, as
1 you put it, were they shown in the media to have been the result of sniper
2 fire opened by representatives of the Army of Republika Srpska?
3 A. In the local media -- I don't know. I don't know. You mean were
4 they --
5 Q. I'm also referring to international media, to the media worldwide
6 and the local media in Sarajevo. Were these events always depicted as
7 events caused by representatives of the Army of Republika Srpska?
8 A. Oh, yes, I understand now. Yes, in general, when there were
9 victims of sniping or shelling within the confrontation lines, that is, on
10 territory controlled by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was
11 normally assumed or presented in the -- at least in the international
12 media, that those firing had been from outside the confrontation lines,
13 that is, from the territory controlled by the Army of Republika Srpska.
14 And that was, in our view, not always the case, though usually the case.
15 Q. Thank you. Are you aware of this one single instance where the
16 troops of the Army of Republika Srpska shot at their own civilians?
17 A. No. We had no knowledge of any incidents of that sort. We didn't
18 have good access, but I would also doubt if there were any such
19 incidents. Can I make a slight --
20 Q. In your statement --
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. The witness wants to say
23 THE WITNESS: Sorry. I wanted to make a slight clarification,
24 which is we were aware of incidents in which, on the Serb side of the
25 line, one Serb might have been targeted or killed by another, but that was
1 of a different nature. That was when one group was conflicting with
2 another. So I just wanted to make that clarification, sir.
3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. If I understand well, these were typical murders which were the
5 result of relations between persons such as occur throughout the world.
6 Is that right?
7 A. Either criminal or political differences, yes. More normal, you
8 might say.
9 Q. Thank you. In your statement - and I don't think there's any need
10 for me to identify the paragraph; I'm sure you remember this - you talked
11 about both sides engaging in certain sniping activities wherein there was
12 an exchange of fire between snipers, in other words, soldiers --
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. -- from one side would shoot at soldiers from the other side, and
15 they were snipers.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Now that you've confirmed this, this means that both sides indeed
18 had to have snipers for military purposes --
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. -- provided that they did not abuse them?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. I have finished with the sniping topic.
23 I would like to move on to another topic briefly. In late
24 December - I suppose you're aware of this - the former president of the
25 United States of America, Jimmy Carter, was in Sarajevo. Thanks to him
1 and to the negotiations he brokered, a peace -- a truce agreement was
2 reached that lasted between January and April, that's to say, four
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. I don't wish to inquire about the details concerning the
6 agreement. I don't think there's any need for that at the moment, not
7 even to discuss the events that took place at the time. At any rate, this
8 agreement was different from all the previous ones; yes or no?
9 A. Yes. In fact, we called it even by a different name. We called
10 it a comprehensive cessation of hostilities agreement. Yeah, that's
12 Q. Thank you. Let me move on to a matter connected with some issues
13 we discussed yesterday that I have to go back to in order to highlight
14 matters that I believe are relevant in view of Mr. Milosevic's defence.
15 Yesterday, you said that it was in the autumn of 1994, or rather,
16 up until that point Serbs actually wanted the situation surrounding
17 Sarajevo to be crystallised and that they ceased all fire by the autumn of
18 1994, at least reduced the fire. Is that right?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Next we spoke of the anti-sniping agreement, which, in your
21 assessment, yielded results that spanned over several months.
22 A. That's correct, yes.
23 Q. At that point, several days before the end of summer, on the 18th
24 of September, incidents occurred - if you recall, we discussed them - and
25 another one on the 2nd of October, 1994.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Let me ask you something concerning an event we did not discuss
3 and which took place at the end of October 1994, namely, the events taking
4 place at Igman in the demilitarised zone. Do you recall that event?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. I would not go into the details concerning the event. This is a
7 military issue, after all, and we will have to discuss the matter at a
8 later stage. Do you recall that quite a few Serb soldiers were killed in
9 the process and that medical nurses and medical staff who were going to
10 help the wounded and to rescue some people were killed?
11 A. Yes, I remember the incident and I also recall that some medical
12 staff were killed, yes.
13 Q. Thank you. After that, Muslims, the soldiers of the Bosnian army,
14 took control of Igman. After the Serbs had fully demilitarised the area,
15 the Muslim army seized the opportunity and captured Igman. If you do wish
16 to confirm this, please say so; if not, then explain why not.
17 A. Yes. There were two separate processes going on. You are correct
18 that in 1993 the Serb forces had controlled Mount Igman and they agreed to
19 withdraw, and they did withdraw. Subsequent to that, forces of the Army
20 of Bosnia-Herzegovina sometimes transited the area in violation of the
21 agreement in order to make attacks on Serb positions beyond the
22 demilitarised zone, and the incident which you referred to just now, sir,
23 I believe, is in that category.
24 The separate question of whether they re-occupied the zone, the
25 demilitarised zone itself, that was also something which occurred, though
1 it occurred slowly, over a longer period of time.
2 Q. From that point on, after that incident, or over these several
3 days, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina held the positions at Igman.
4 A. Actually, it took place over a series of many months. The
5 incident you are referring to, I believe, actually took place outside the
6 demilitarised zone, but it is certainly true that the Bosnian forces got
7 to that point by transiting through the demilitarised zone, which was a
8 violation of the Igman agreement of 1993.
9 Q. I would like to be more precise than that. Can you tell us at
10 what time was it that the soldiers of BH army captured Igman, took up
11 positions there, and had the commanding view and control over Sarajevo,
12 when was that?
13 A. Actually, they tended not to directly control areas of the
14 demilitarised zone of Igman. What they did was they transited through the
15 zone and then controlled points just beyond the zone, so that the whole of
16 the zone de facto came under their -- under their control. And that was a
17 process which happened gradually. I believe the -- I don't remember the
18 exact date, but the agreement was made sometime in the autumn of 1993. I
19 was there with Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic and later with General
20 Delic and President Izetbegovic. And the violations by the Army of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina began almost immediately, but they didn't secure
22 control of the whole area by establishing points beyond it until the end
23 of 1994, probably.
24 Q. Thank you. But it happened at that point in time?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. We were trying to overcome difficulties with the equipment that we
2 are using, and I hope that I have mastered it. We have DD00-0127 in front
3 of us now. This is a report by the UNPROFOR staff in Sarajevo for the
4 entire month of December. I have page 3 in the English version. I think
5 I've cited the correct number.
6 A. I'm not sure my screen is on.
7 Q. There, I can see it.
8 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Oh, I'm told there is a technical difficulty.
10 THE WITNESS: Ah-ha.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Oh, it's here now. It's on the screen now.
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. At page 3 of the English version, "Sector Sarajevo," the total
14 exclusion zone in Sarajevo, it says: "Nothing to report." And then it
15 says: "This situation in the Sector Sarajevo was relatively quiet on the
16 1st of December."
17 Did you see this report before and can you confirm that this is,
18 indeed, what it says?
19 A. I cannot, after these years, confirm that I've seen this report
20 before, but it certainly looks like a real document. And in general,
21 these sector reports were very accurate.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
23 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President, just for everybody's ease, the
24 relevant part is just at the bottom of this page --
25 THE WITNESS: Ah-ha --
1 MR. WAESPI: -- B, if it could be scrolled down. Now we can see
2 Sector Sarajevo.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
4 THE WITNESS: This is about the Sagger missiles. I remember that
6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. It was just this one point that I read out that was relevant for
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: But that is not what was on the screen, so we
10 have to be grateful to Mr. Waespi.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: In any event, it's there now and you have the
13 witness's answer --
14 THE WITNESS: Well, except there's a question as to whether we're
15 discussing one incident, which is clearly a Bosnian violation, or the
16 incident at the bottom, which is clearly a Serb violation --
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. No --
19 A. -- and I'm not sure --
20 Q. No. Item number 2 --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. -- Mr. Witness, I wanted to deal with it in general terms. It
23 says here: "The situation in Sector Sarajevo was quiet and relatively
25 A. Yes. I see that, yeah.
1 Q. Mr. Harland, I'm interested in what we can read at page 5 of the
2 English version, the part concerning the assessment of UNPROFOR
3 intelligence. Have you found it?
4 A. Uh-huh.
5 Q. D.
6 A. For Croatia.
7 Q. Yes. First comes Croatia, and number 2 is Sarajevo. And I am
8 going to read to you subitem B, which reads: "The continual bringing in
9 of troops of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the area west of the Ilijas salient,"
10 number so-and-so, "suggests that the BH are either stiffening their
11 defensive posture in the area or possibly preparing for a renewal of
12 offensive operations."
13 Is that true, and were you aware of that at that time; or is this
14 correct, what is stated in this report?
15 A. Yes, it is correct, what is stated in the report; yes, I was aware
16 of it at the time; and yes, it was part of a broader build-up by the Army
17 of Bosnia and Herzegovina to attempt to break out of the siege of Sarajevo
18 in the spring of 1995. Yes, sir, all three.
19 Q. Yes. Later on we can read what you just said, that they were
20 preparing themselves. There is another thing in this report. On page 7
21 of the English version, Sector East, Sector South, and then comes Sector
22 Sarajevo. Have you found it?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Subitem A reads: "Shots were fired from a BH position at FreBat's
25 observation point." Is this correct? Was that true?
1 A. That's what it says, yes, sir.
2 Q. Under B, subitem B: "A BH soldier in Butmir threw a hand-grenade
3 at the French APC."
4 Is that correct?
5 A. Yes, that's what it says, sir.
6 Q. And subitem C: "A rifle grenade from ABiH position was fired on
7 the Russian observation point." Is that correct?
8 A. Yes, that's what it says, sir.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Now, I would be grateful if we
10 can have on our monitors a part of the transcript from the Slobodan
11 Milosevic trial when Mr. Harland gave evidence, page 26961, lines 11 to
12 18. I hope there's not another misunderstanding here.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is there a problem, Mr. Registrar?
14 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, I'm informed that the e-court
16 procedures require that the Defence or a party publish any document that
17 the party wishes to use, so that it is your responsibility to have that
18 document put on the screen; it's not the registrar's.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I made a great effort yesterday
20 to facilitate our proceedings today, both for you and myself, and I was
21 told yesterday I cannot -- I will probably manage to overcome this. But
22 yesterday I operated in that way, and I know that Mr. Harland was able to
23 see the transcript and his evidence that he gave.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me ask the Prosecutor whether he is in a
25 position to assist; if not, then you'll move on.
1 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I can assist in two ways. We have the
2 65 ter number of the two transcripts, so I think it could be brought up.
3 That's 2815 or 2816. And because it is the first day, I think it's 2815.
4 Yes, I think we have it now. I do also have a hard copy, if we need,
5 which could be put on to the ELMO.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I understand it's Prosecution Exhibit number
7 1 in this case.
8 In future, Mr. Tapuskovic, know where the responsibility lies.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I shall take a very good note of
10 this, and rest assured that this will not happen again. I've wasted lots
11 of time so far.
12 Are we on this page? Lines 11 to 18, the literal translation is:
13 "... The defence position adopted that time was on their side.
14 Until 1995, a sufficient quantity -- enough weapons were getting to the
15 Bosnian government and the relations between the Bosnian government and
16 the Bosnian Croats had improved to such a degree that there was a real
17 military threat from the Bosnian government for the first time, and of
18 course the Bosnian government actually had a numerical advantage in troop
19 strength over the Serbs, and the Serbs became anxious of that."
20 Is this, more or less, what you said on that occasion and is that
22 A. Yes, sir, I said that and it's true.
23 Q. I would like to clarify just one issue. You said enough weapons,
24 so in addition to numerical strength, they also were at an advantage with
25 the weapons over the opposing side.
1 A. There were a large number of weapons flowing by that time to the
2 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so their troops were better armed. They
3 never got the heavy weapons or the tanks, but by this stage they had
4 almost enough light weapons to arm, we estimated, perhaps about 200.000
6 Q. Elsewhere you said -- let us not go back to it again because it
7 will take up much more time than I can afford, and I will skip that in
8 order to expedite my cross-examination. The next document is 65 ter
9 number 10 --
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi.
11 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I hate to interrupt my learned friend, and also
12 I hate to suggest that he does something procedurally, but I believe
13 before going to the Milosevic transcript, this UNPROFOR document, dated
14 1st December 1994, was discussed, and that's the number 10 on the bundle
15 received from the Defence. So I suggest that if the Defence moves to have
16 it admitted into evidence, it should be done now before moving on to the
17 next exhibit. That's just my observation.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's right.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Naturally, I intend to
20 move this 65 ter 10 document to be tendered into evidence.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it will be admitted.
22 Please give it a number.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit Number D6 -- 7, Your Honours, sorry.
25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] That's a report dated the 30th of
1 April, 1995.
2 Q. Do you have it in front of you? On page 1 of this report we see
3 in a Mr. Akashi, General Smith, and General Javier had a meeting with the
4 Bosnian government officials, and it says that the Bosnian Serbs had
5 reiterated their offer to extend the agreement from April for an
6 indefinite period of time. Was that true and correct?
7 A. Yes. I believe -- I was not at this meeting, but that was the --
8 that was the position, yes.
9 Q. On page 1, also under item 2, we see that Mr. Akashi, General
10 Smith, and General Javier also had talks with Silajdzic, and it is stated
11 here that Silajdzic, as far as the extension of the cessation of
12 hostilities agreement, confirmed that it was not in their interest for
13 this agreement to be extended and he refused to discuss it. Was that
15 A. As I said, I was not at that meeting, but certainly the Bosnians
16 were --
17 Q. That's what it says here in the document.
18 A. Yeah, yeah, and I believe it's true, because the Bosnians were
19 preparing an offensive at that time, yes.
20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters
21 for interrupting the witness while he was giving the answer.
22 Q. Under item 5 of this same document, or on page 2 of the English
23 version, it says under item 5 Mr. Akashi proposed that the agreement on
24 the cessation of hostilities be either extended or renewed. Is that also
1 A. Well, again, I have to say I was not at this meeting, but that
2 generally reflects the Bosnian view, that a stabilisation of the situation
3 around Sarajevo was not in their interests and that they would prepare an
4 offensive during the spring of 1995. So I believe that this document is
5 almost certainly a correct reflection of what was said at that meeting.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The interpreters can barely
7 hear the Defence counsel.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, the interpreters are having
9 difficulty hearing you. So what is he to do, to speak more directly into
10 the microphone?
11 THE INTERPRETER: Obviously something is wrong with the
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll try to bow a little,
14 although I find it difficult. But if necessary, I'll do that.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we don't wish to affect your posture, but
16 let's try again and see.
17 I'd like to ask the technical staff to have a look at the
18 microphone, but we'll continue until that is done.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is possible that the paper
20 that I'm holding in front of the microphone is making a noise.
21 Q. So, Mr. Harland --
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: It may very well be the paper.
23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Harland, I have a document that you drafted dated the 24th of
25 June, 1995, and you sent it to Phillip, I think it is, Corwin, the last
1 name. I can't see it clearly. Do you have it? This is 65 ter 471.
2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] And I move for this document also
3 to be tendered into evidence, 65 ter 2471.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit it.
5 And please assign a number to it.
6 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Do you have it in front of you, sir?
9 A. No.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, you may have used two other
11 documents without seeking to tender them as exhibits; if that is so, then
12 let's have all of them tendered.
13 Mr. Waespi.
14 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I believe there is only one. That's the one
15 the witness has just been discussing, the 30th of April, 1995.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. We'll admit that.
17 Please give that a number.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D8.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. So this is a report of yours, if you have it in front of you,
21 dated the 24th of June, 1995.
22 A. No, sir.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: "No" meaning it's not in front of you?
24 THE WITNESS: It's not in front of me, sir.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not in front of me either.
1 What's the position there, please?
2 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: I am told that your case manager's mouse is not
4 functioning and that appears to be the root of the problem.
5 MR. WAESPI: What I can assist with, Mr. President, is the 65 ter
6 number of this document would be 2471.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: 2471. Then perhaps the registrar can assist.
8 We're having birthing pains with this e-court system.
9 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. It has given birth. Yeah. This is a
10 document by me, yeah.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. On page 2 of the English version, paragraph 3 reads: "BH army
13 attacked on the 15th and 16th of June Serbian position all along the
14 confrontation line ..."
15 Was that true?
16 A. Actually, I don't have the -- oh, yeah, yeah, the paragraph 2 --
17 yes, that was a failed Bosnian -- quite a large Bosnian offensive.
18 Q. I'm going to ask you later about this. Can you just confirm
19 whether this was true, because the next document speaks about this. But
20 this is what it reads here, what I just read to you, and I'm asking you,
21 is this true?
22 A. Yes, it's true that I wrote this document and yes, it's true that
23 those events happen. I sometimes don't know which one you're asking when
24 you say "is it true?"
25 Q. What I read out to you and what is contained in your report. Is
1 that yes or no?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. I think you can easily answer this.
4 A. Yes is the answer because it's the answer to both, but sometimes
5 you seem to be asking me: Is that what is written, or is what is written
6 true? And in this case the answer is definitely yes because both are
7 true. But it would help me if you could clarify. Thanks.
8 Q. You're right. I should have formulated it more clearly. I
9 wouldn't dwell longer on these issues, but three passages or paragraphs
10 down, there is a very short sentence which reads: "On the 23rd of June,"
11 which means only eight days after the beginning of the offensive, the
12 Serbs had asked for 500 body-bags from your civil affairs office. Was
13 that correct or true?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. [In English] Thank you. Thank you.
16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I move that this document be
17 tendered into evidence as well, please.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit it.
19 Yes, please give it a number.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As number D9, Your Honours.
21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. The next document is another report of yours dated the 2nd of July
23 addressed to Phillip Corwin; 65 ter 2503. Do you have it in front of you,
25 A. Yes, 2 July, yes.
1 Q. On page 1, the summary or highlights reads what you just said a
2 while ago. You said that "the Bosnian offensive around Sarajevo spatters
3 on without any conspicuous success. Ground taken by the Bosnians seems to
4 have been re-taken by the Serbs." Is that what happened?
5 A. Yes, the offensive collapsed.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: May we have the documents enlarged as soon as
7 they are put on the screen, if that's possible.
8 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. This is English version page 2, and you reiterated this, and then
11 you spoke of some -- about some other things. But you say here: "On
12 Wednesday, 28th June, the Bosnians attempted another attack out of the
13 city." Was that true?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And then you went on to say that: "The attack came from the
16 western part of the town and was focussed on ... Nedzarici," which you
17 showed on the map yesterday. Was that also true?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. "The nearby areas of Stup and Rajlovac were also attacked." This
20 was also true; yes?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. "The operation seems to have failed and the Serbs may even have
23 succeeded in pushing the Bosnians back in Stup." This was also true?
24 A. Yes, that is what it appeared to us at the time, yes.
25 Q. After that, it reads: "The Bosnian media - which had been
1 boasting of 'newly liberated territories' - is now talking of the army's
2 'heroic defence' of the city." Was this also true?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And I'm particularly interested to hear from you whether this was
5 also true or not, and on page 3, which reads as follows. In this
6 paragraph, above "Location of Bosnian Weapons," you say that: "UNPROFOR
7 retaliated with 120-millimetre mortars it has placed on Mount Igman," and
8 that they were firing at the Serbs. Was this true as well?
9 A. Yes. These are UNPROFOR mortars we're talking about now.
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. The reason I'm asking you this is as follows: The next
13 heading: "Location of Bosnian Weapons," and I would also like to check
14 whether this is true, and I'm asking you: Is it true that, as you say
15 here: "Since the Bosnian offensive began two weeks ago, the number of
16 Bosnian heavy weapons operating near UNPROFOR facilities has significantly
18 A. Yes. Everything in this document is true as I understood it at
19 the time. And if I may say so, the point of this document is, of course,
20 when they defeated the Bosnians militarily, they began an indiscriminate
21 bombardment of the city and sniping against civilians. So we don't even
22 need perhaps to go paragraph by paragraph. Everything in the document I
23 can confirm.
24 Q. What you just said is not in your report. I do appreciate that
25 you have the right to say it --
1 A. No, it's in this document. Can we please go to the very summary
2 of this document. I feel you're really misrepresenting this document we
3 have in front of us. Can we see the top, just the cover the cover page.
4 It says --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me hear from Mr. Tapuskovic --
6 THE WITNESS: Paragraph 1.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have nothing
8 against Mr. Harland's saying something after I finished my presentation,
9 and the point is in this paragraph, and probably this is why Mr. Harland
10 reacted in this way. I do understand him. He may think that he is
11 allowed to say what he wishes to say, but before that I would like him to
12 confirm this paragraph for the record because this is the crux of the
13 matter and the point of this whole document.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I believe he has already confirmed it.
15 Mr. Harland.
16 THE WITNESS: He has just asked what the point of the whole
17 document is. Well, I would tell him that the point of the whole document
18 is what is written in paragraph 1 on the front page. If we can see it
19 again, it summarises all that goes after, which says: The Bosnians
20 attempted a military break-out of the city, they were militarily defeated
21 by the Serbs, and in retaliation the Serbs then undertook what we
22 considered to be an indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population
23 and then --
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Harland, that would more properly be a point
25 taken up in re-examination.
1 THE WITNESS: Okay. I just didn't want the document
2 misrepresented. It's there in paragraph 1.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
4 MR. WAESPI: I think what the witness took offence of is the fact
5 that Mr. Tapuskovic said, what you just said was not in the report, and
6 that's what triggered Mr. Harland's point. And this comment by Mr.
7 Tapuskovic was at line 23 and that's the reaction of the witness when he
8 said, "No, that's not true, it is in the report and it was on page 1," as
9 Mr. Harland confirmed.
10 THE WITNESS: Mr. Tapuskovic -- I did take offence at that when he
11 said there was not something in the report which clearly was in the report
12 from paragraph 1. I also was not happy when he said that what the whole
13 point of the report was - that was his words - what was the point of the
14 report. I mean, I wrote the report, I know what the point of it was. The
15 point of it was the indiscriminate --
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Harland, just a minute. In answer to
17 Mr. Tapuskovic's question about the point of the report, you made a
18 reference to paragraph 1, so I'd like to see paragraph 1 now because it's
19 a matter that was raised by Mr. Tapuskovic.
20 May we have a look at paragraph 1.
21 THE WITNESS: Exactly, the Serbs have resumed a more or less
22 indiscriminate --
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can you just summarise it for us.
24 THE WITNESS: Well, it says here: "The Bosnian offensive around
25 Sarajevo sputters on without any conspicuous success." Later: "The Serbs
1 have resumed more or less indiscriminate bombardment of the city. Snipers
2 are active. Civilian casualties are high." And so when he tells me the
3 point of the document is something else, I can say I wrote the document
4 and the point of it is what I have just read and is stated in paragraph 1,
5 that the Serb military retaliation was against civilians causing high
6 numbers of civilian casualties.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
8 THE WITNESS: It was --
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
10 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Chairman, I think that -- I
11 feel something that the witness is actually proving right now. I have
12 nothing against your technique and this e-court, but when Defence and the
13 Prosecutor is giving us a document on e-court, we're only shown the one
14 paragraph or a couple of paragraphs. And I would have wanted to have the
15 entire text in order to see also the other paragraphs, maybe the third --
16 the second or the third page. So this is what I suggest. I don't know if
17 it's simple, I don't know if it's too expensive for case managers and both
18 parties, but couldn't they give us a hard copy of the documents that were
19 shown and maybe give a copy -- a hard copy also to the witness. I'm sure
20 that would help. That way we could follow what's going on, otherwise it's
21 too complicated. We see only one paragraph, we don't see the other
22 paragraphs, we don't have a full idea, a full picture.
23 THE WITNESS: And I am misrepresented by that.
24 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: You needn't worry about the misrepresentation
1 because your counsel has a right to raise the matter in re-examination.
2 THE WITNESS: Okay.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Since it arose from a point raised by way of
4 question, I allowed you to look at paragraph 1.
5 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
7 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, maybe just a point to respond. I'm
8 also not an expert. I am not an expert in e-court, but I understand that
9 Your Honours have the ability to, in fact, look at each document yourself
10 and you can scroll through the other pages. That's what I'm being told by
11 an expert on e-court. But perhaps we can raise it in a different setting
12 when we have more time.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll continue.
15 Continue, Mr. Tapuskovic.
16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I really have no
17 intention to abuse the document. I've read this sentence and I know what
18 it means, and I know that this was done merely by way of introduction. I
19 may have made an error, but I was interested in --
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us proceed --
21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] -- the provocations and the
22 Bosnian weapons.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us proceed.
24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Therefore, at page 3 where you said: "Since the Bosnian offensive
1 began two weeks ago, the number of Bosnian heavy weapons operating from
2 near UNPROFOR facilities has significantly increased." This is something
3 you wrote and, first of all, can you confirm that this is indeed what the
4 text says?
5 A. I will confirm that's what --
6 Q. Is that correct?
7 A. You asked me to confirm what the text says. The text is --
8 Q. I will read on for you.
9 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, if I can be heard.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
11 MR. WAESPI: I think there's no need to cut off the witness.
12 Sometimes it's just not possible to say yes or no, and I think the Defence
13 has enough time. We don't object, you know, that this is being done in a
14 polite manner. I'm not suggesting it's not, but please can the witness be
15 allowed to finish his sentences. Thank you, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
17 His technique, Mr. Harland, is to ask you first if that is what
18 the text says and then I think he's going to go on to ascertain whether
19 the contents are true.
20 THE WITNESS: But, Your Honour, that's what half the text says.
21 And for me, as the person who observed the events and then wrote the
22 report, to take one paragraph which says that Bosnian heavy weapons are
23 located near UNPROFOR facilities has increased, without the other half of
24 the text, which gives the context, which is --
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: But then you have a right --
1 THE WITNESS: Good --
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- to put it in context --
3 THE WITNESS: Good. Ah. Well, I want to exercise it but I get --
4 keep getting told just to say yes or no. And all I would say is I -- if
5 you read the next paragraph, it says UNPROFOR was unable to determine
6 whether this was an effort by the Bosnians to draw counter-battery fire
7 from the Serbs or whether it was just a function of the general increase
8 in the number of weapons.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let Mr. Tapuskovic continue his questioning.
10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Therefore, Mr. President, I've
11 lost a great deal of time discussing this matter and I was wrong in not
12 just reading this one paragraph.
13 Q. In this paragraph, Mr. Harland, it reads: "Some people in
14 UNPROFOR see this as an effort by the Bosnians to draw counter-battery
15 fire on to UNPROFOR, which would then be drawn into conflict with the
17 Is that exactly what it says? Please answer my question. You've
18 only nodded.
19 A. That's what one sentence says. There is one more sentence.
20 Q. I will read it for you.
21 A. Okay.
22 Q. I mean, really --
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Tapuskovic. Proceed.
24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation].
25 Q. "Others note that there has been an increase in the number of
1 active weapons and that the density of heavy weapons is not greater around
2 UNPROFOR facilities than it is elsewhere."
3 Was this accurately reported?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. This is my next question: Does this mean that not only were there
6 heavy weapons within the UNPROFOR building or facilities, but also around
7 it, elsewhere, in the vicinity of UNPROFOR facilities and elsewhere in
8 Sarajevo? Hence my question.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I wish to tender the document
12 into evidence. I believe that this is 65 ter 2503 and the most important
13 document for the Defence so far.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
15 Will the registrar please give it a number.
16 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's already D9. It's already admitted.
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honour --
19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: The most recent check shows that it's already
21 admitted as a Prosecution Exhibit P19.
22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC:
23 Q. Mr. Harland, in your evidence - and we're looking for it in the
24 transcript - concerning the Markale 2 incident - and this was your
25 evidence in the Slobodan Milosevic case - you stated in connection with
1 this something which I would like you to read out now. I do not wish to
2 enter into an argument about this with you. This is at page 28670, line
3 22. It's just several lines.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have it yet.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not on the screen.
7 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not on my screen either.
9 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, that should be Prosecution Exhibit
10 number 2.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Waespi.
12 Now, we have it on the screen, but we need to find the line.
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Line 22, at page 28670. The next
14 one is 28671, which is an empty page because of the need to repaginate it
15 with the French version, and then page 28672, line -- lines 1 to 2.
16 Q. If the witness has found the bit, can he please read it out.
17 A. Which line, sir?
18 Q. Mr. Harland, 28670 is the page, and the line is 22.
19 A. "In all cases which I could speak about - I mean we could go
20 through them one by one at great length - are either certainly fired from
21 the Serb side or it's unclear."
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you wish him to go further?
23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] The text goes on to say
24 that: "The one we are discussing is one of the unclear ones. When it
25 comes to Markale 2, I believe the case to be less unclear. But I think I
1 have nothing to add on this one. It was unclear."
2 Q. Is this your statement? Is this what you stated in evidence?
3 A. It is what I stated, and I would perhaps like to clarify that it's
4 unclear in the sense that there's some doubt, but frankly not very much
6 Q. Very well. The 65 ter document 481, the English version thereof,
7 at page 3. Do you have it in front of you?
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. Sector Sarajevo. You talk about the fact that on that day five
10 shells landed. I don't think there's any need for me to read this
11 through, but there is this one sentence here.
12 A. I don't have it. I have some other page of what I think is the
13 right document.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can it be put on the screen.
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] At page 3 of the English
16 version. UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo.
17 THE WITNESS: Mm-hmm.
18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you see that?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Five mortar shells landed. That's there, isn't it?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I should like to ask you the following: Several lines down it
24 says: "It is very difficult to establish the position from which mortar
25 shells were fired because it is impossible to determine the level of
1 charge used to fire the projectiles."
2 This was written in the first report on the 28th. Are you aware
3 of this or not? Although, having been written here, it should be
5 A. Yes. This was a first report. The commanding officer, General
6 Smith, asked for a technical team to review it, and I was present in the
7 room when that technical team from our intelligence, our G2 cell, made
8 their report. And in my physical presence, they said that the -- the
9 shells, the mortar bombs, that killed these 30 people and injured these 80
10 others, had been fired from Serb positions in Lukavica. They said that
11 was beyond doubt.
12 In the final written report of the G2 - it's a confidential
13 document, but it seems to have made its way to this court somehow - it is
14 qualified, it is beyond reasonable doubt. So when I have said in my
15 testimony that there is some unclarity, this is an unclear case, I would
16 prefer to be recorded that I agree with the G2 assessment that it is
17 beyond reasonable doubt that these shells which caused these civilian
18 casualties were fired from the Serb side and deliberately at a crowded
19 market, if I can say, if one can guess at their motive.
20 Can I --
21 Q. This is your comment. I do not wish to go into that. I do not
22 wish to challenge what you're saying right now. I'd like to know the
23 following: Do you know that the senior officer, Mr. Demurenko, who has
24 been mentioned here several times, on that day - and I had footage of that
25 but there's no need for me to show it to you - he stated that the
1 possibility that this arrived from Serb positions was 1:1.000.000. Are
2 you aware of this statement of his?
3 A. He made a statement which was deemed by the technical team, the
4 expert team, to be factually incorrect. The technical team which reviewed
5 it found Colonel Demurenko's statement very unconvincing because it was
6 based on the ballistic signature of one of the five mortar bombs. All
7 four of the other mortar bombs showed the same ballistic signature which
8 indicated a firing point around Lukavica. The fact that one mortar bomb
9 showed a different ballistic signature is consistent with the fact that
10 that bomb, mortar bomb, on its impact, either came through a tiled roof or
11 hit a table on the way down. So Mr. Demurenko's views were stated at the
12 time. They were stated outside of the context of a credible technical
13 investigation. So, yes, I am aware of them, and that is one of the
14 reasons I have said that there is some doubt.
15 But can I say, because this is a rather important moment in the
16 history of the war, that the principal doubt about who fired these five
17 mortar shells that killed all these civilians arises because General Smith
18 made a statement to the press that his investigation showed that it was
19 not clear who fired the shells. Now, in fact, I had been speaking with
20 General Smith, and he chose to make that very neutral statement when, in
21 fact, he was already aware - he had in his hand the technical assessment -
22 that the shots were fired from Lukavica. He chose to make a neutral
23 statement so as to not to alarm the Serbs, who would otherwise have known
24 that he was about to call in NATO air-strikes, which is what, in fact, he
1 So, in my view, this Markale 2 --
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: And how would you know that that was why he made
3 this neutral statement?
4 THE WITNESS: Because I was advising him to do that. I was with
5 him that morning. The situation, Your Honour, was that when it was
6 reported that the Serbs had fired these rounds and killed this large
7 number of civilians, he decided, on the advice of his colleagues, that he
8 would call for widespread NATO air attacks. The problem that he had was
9 that at that very moment some UNPROFOR troops, British troops, were on
10 Serb-held territory between Gorazde and the Serbian border. He,
11 therefore, needed a few hours of time to get the UNPROFOR troops off Serb
12 territory to be entirely safe before the NATO bombers could be brought
14 And so, I spoke with him about it and I advised that he make a
15 fairly neutral statement. And it has been a cause of distress to me for
16 more than a decade that this neutral statement has given rise to a
17 mythology that there is any real serious doubt that the -- that the Serbs
18 fired these rounds, when we have a very clear technical report that they
19 did. I believe it's even in the documents in this case somewhere.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Earlier on you said exactly what you've repeated now --
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. The question which I asked has
24 not been accurately reflected. I asked: How would you know that that was
25 why he made a neutral statement?
1 THE WITNESS: Because we --
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm not asking again. I'm asking that the
3 question be properly reflected in the transcript.
4 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Harland, today you said three times that the shell flew in
7 from Lukavica, according to your knowledge. The indictment alleges that
8 the shell flew in from Trebevic, the highest mount above Sarajevo. How do
9 you account for that?
10 A. I am willing to stand corrected on the firing point, if that's
11 what the G2 report says, but the G2 -- the UNPROFOR G2 intelligence
12 technical assessment report that was presented to General Smith in my
13 presence clearly indicated that it came -- the five rounds, beyond
14 reasonable doubt, came from points in Serb-held territory. If the grid
15 references were not locations near Lukavica, then I apologise. I may have
16 erred in that, but I have certainly not erred in the conclusion. And if
17 that document is in this court, I would simply, obviously, be guided by
18 that document.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have almost
20 completed my cross-examination; however, at the outset we were dealing
21 with some other matters and then we had some discussions and some
22 technical difficulties. I would need some additional time to complete the
23 three remaining topics.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: How much time would that be?
25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Hopefully within 20 minutes I
1 would finish.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's time for the break now, so we'll break for
3 20 minutes and we'll give you the 20 minutes.
4 --- Recess taken at 3.41 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 4.07 p.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may proceed, Mr. Tapuskovic.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Since
8 we were on the subject of Markale 2 and the events relating to it, I'll
9 try as quickly as possible to finalise this topic.
10 Q. If I understood correctly, General Smith, on that very same day,
11 on the 28th, issued certain orders or submitted certain reports. Is that
13 A. Whether it was the 28th or the 29th I now don't recall, but
14 certainly by the -- by the 29th, General Smith had decided to turn the key
15 that would activate NATO air attacks against the Bosnian Serb army, yes.
16 Q. I may be mistaken, but I noted down that it was on the 28th. But
17 nevertheless I do accept what you just said. After that, the following
18 day, NATO bombing began. Is that true?
19 A. Yes. If I remember correctly, but obviously it's a matter of easy
20 historical record, I thought that the bombing began on the night between
21 the 29th and the 30th, not on the night between the 28th and the 29th,
22 and -- because I remember General Smith asked me to call Dr. Karadzic to
23 tell him that the attacks were about to begin and that -- and what the
24 reason was. But I thought that was on the evening of the 29th, but it's a
25 very long time ago now.
1 Q. I may be mistaken. Since you were the representative of the UN,
2 the bombing began without the decision of the Security Council, and that
3 was the first NATO bombing in its history of that kind.
4 A. The bombing began in accordance with the procedure established
5 between NATO and the United Nations, the so-called dual-key process,
6 dual-key arrangement. One key for the launching of the bombing resided
7 with the United Nations, and that key was turned by General Smith in the
8 period either -- I think on the 29th.
9 Q. This was turned in favour of NATO or was it NATO's decision?
10 A. The dual-key arrangement required that both the United Nations and
11 NATO should agree, should so-call turn the key, before NATO air attacks
12 could begin. NATO's key was turned by others and was not our immediate
13 concern. Actually, I believe the NATO key was held by Admiral Layton
14 Smith in Naples, but that was not our concern. Our concern was whether we
15 would turn our key, and that decision rested with the United Nations under
16 this agreement between the two organisations.
17 Q. Thank you. For about two weeks these NATO strikes were very
19 A. Yes, that was the intention, and it was also accompanied by a
20 major bombardment of Serb positions around Sarajevo by the UNPROFOR Rapid
21 Reaction Force on Mount Igman. I believe that, just on the first night,
22 we fired many hundreds of shells to try and suppress the artillery fire of
23 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Yes, that's correct.
24 Q. Quite a few aerial bombs. Would it be fair to say that they're
25 never too accurate and that quite a few civilian casualties were sustained
1 as a result of these aerial bombs being dropped?
2 A. Normally, of course, the Serbs were very quick to protest to us
3 when we had inflicted any casualties, or even when the Bosnians had
4 inflicted any casualties on them in violation of any of the agreements.
5 And in the period following the bombardment by our artillery and the air
6 attacks, we did not receive reports of substantial casualties. And the
7 battle damage assessment photography did not give us the impression that
8 there were civilian casualties. The targets were chosen quite precisely.
9 Q. Did they hit the targets precisely?
10 A. First of all, NATO aircraft were in operation and attacking
11 targets which, on the whole, they had identified, so I cannot speak very
12 well for NATO. Our artillery certainly was under our command and
13 control. But once the key was turned, under this dual-key arrangement,
14 there was substantial freedom of action, including in target selection,
15 that then rested with NATO. But our understanding was that the targets
16 were chosen in a way to minimise civilian casualties and that, in fact,
17 they had.
18 For example, one of the principal targets we were very concerned
19 about was that we wanted to destroy the bridge over the Drina at Foca in
20 order to prevent reinforcements from Yugoslavia, and the battle damage
21 photos show that the bridge had been completely destroyed without touching
22 any of the surrounding area, so we were quite confident.
23 Q. I wanted to hear about the civilian-populated areas and whether
24 there were any casualties there. Very well. What I heard from you will
1 Do you know what the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina provided or fed
2 very precise and accurate data about the Serbian positions concerning
3 troops and weapons? Daily reports were filed by the Army of Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina to NATO, and subsequently NATO engaged those targets. Do you
5 know about that?
6 A. I did not know about that, and I can't believe it. But in
7 general, I think that our information was more accurate than theirs.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you know - or maybe you don't know - that the BH
9 army at one point also procured 800 aerial bombs?
10 A. That seems strange because they had no aircraft.
11 Q. They didn't have any aircraft, but they could have been used in a
12 different way. I wouldn't like to tackle this issue any longer.
13 Do you know that prior to these events, 26 aircraft with very
14 serious weaponry was received by BH army?
15 A. You mean they received 26 fixed-wing aircraft in Bosnia?
16 Q. Twenty-six aircraft, yes. According to Alija Izetbegovic and his
17 address to the Presidency - I have this document; I will very soon present
18 it to this Chamber - in a discussion with Silajdzic, he said that in those
19 days they had received 26 aircraft. That's what he said. And you know
20 nothing about that?
21 A. They had some -- they had some helicopters, a small number of
22 helicopters, and they had a couple of very light spotter aircraft. They
23 had no combat aircraft operating over the theatre; that was one of their
24 main problems.
25 [Defence counsel confer]
1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have been
2 cautioned that my question was about the weapons transported in aircrafts,
3 whereas the translation was about equipment.
4 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. Yes, you are right. Aircraft were
5 delivering weapons to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; that is
6 correct. I'm sorry, I misunderstood your question, or it was perhaps
7 misinterpreted, I don't know, as understanding that actual aircraft had
8 been delivered.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Indeed, that is what is reflected in the
10 transcript, so I'm grateful for the correction.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I will now move on to the last
12 two topics. During the break, with your assistance, I tried to locate the
13 pages that I would like to refer to in my examination of Mr. Harland.
14 First of all, it's 28642, line 10; that's the transcript from the Slobodan
15 Milosevic trial.
16 Q. If you can see it in front of you. In your evidence you explained
17 earlier that due to the fact that you were staying in the
18 Muslim-controlled part of Sarajevo, you were unable to say much about the
19 casualties sustained by the army or the civilians on the Serbian side when
20 the cease-fire agreement was being violated because the Serbs did not
21 allow you - or journalists, for that matter - to move freely around the
22 area under their control.
23 A. That's correct. We had much better information about casualties
24 and military activity on the Bosnian side of the line, where we had a much
25 heavier presence. That's correct.
1 Q. But UNPROFOR had much more observation points on the positions of
2 the Serbian side, some 11 of them, as far as I know; and on the Bosnian
3 side there were only three. So there were much more observation positions
4 from which you could have seen what was happening on the Serbian side.
5 Did you ever receive any reports from them about the casualties sustained
6 on the Serbian side, both among the troops and among the civilians?
7 A. Well, first of all, it's not correct that we had more observation
8 posts on the Serb side than on the Bosnian side. We had many more
9 observation posts on the Bosnian side. Also, on the Bosnian side, we had
10 access to the morgue and to the hospitals usually, not always, and also we
11 were present in the civilian-inhabited areas, whereas most of the
12 observation positions we had that looked on to Serb positions were
13 generally not in densely inhabited areas. We had one position in Debelo
14 Brdo, which we discussed on our first day, which I think you could, at a
15 distance, look down into Grbavica.
16 But in general, for civilian casualties on the Serb side, we
17 generally had to wait for the Serbs to tell us that there had been
18 civilian casualties. We often wanted to confirm this by seeing bodies,
19 and they would usually refuse us.
20 Q. You have already explained that. What I wanted to hear is whether
21 you, as a civilian observer - and on the Serbian side there were quite a
22 few hospitals - did you ever visit any of the Serbian hospitals to see
23 whether there were any wounded people there, wounded civilians, or ...
24 A. Actually, they would not let us most of the time. Often we would
25 get protests --
1 Q. Thank you.
2 A. -- in which they would say somebody was at a hospital or their
3 hospital ran out of electricity. But when we asked to check - General
4 Mladic made this allegation several times - we were refused permission.
5 So usually we didn't have access.
6 Q. You have already explained that. The next paragraph, 28699,
7 that's the page number, lines 8 to 14.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have three minutes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I kindly ask you, I have one more
10 topic, Your Honours, to cover.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, the Chamber has been more than
12 generous in its allocation of time to you.
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I am sure that you have been very
14 tolerant, but would you please just take into consideration that it has
15 been very difficult over the past two days to overcome all these technical
16 difficulties. I only have one topic left. I will finish and wrap up very
17 quickly, pose brief questions, and therefore conclude my examination.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, as this is the first witness, yes. But how
20 much longer do you anticipate? Not more than ten minutes?
21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I will do my best, Your Honours.
22 I have one more topic and one more question, and then I'll conclude.
23 Thank you very much. I think it will be all right.
24 Q. If you can just give me a quick and short answer. Can you see
25 this page, 28699, in front of you --
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. -- lines 8 to 14? You say here - and unfortunately at the time I
3 was questioning you as an amicus curiae - that the Muslims provoked very
4 often by returning fire and this happened quickly -- particularly in
5 Sarajevo. They behaved in that way in order to attract the attention of
6 the media. You explained that the Muslims wanted the media to see the
7 Serbs while they were attacking, and sometimes they created conditions for
8 that to be perceived. You also know that it happened on rare occasions in
9 other parts of the country where the media were not -- had not so much
10 influence. That's what you basically said. Is this correct?
11 A. Well, what I said was what is stated here in the transcript from
12 10 to 14, yes.
13 Q. Thank you. And the last topic. In order to be able to ask any
14 questions, can we just scroll a few lines. If you can read it yourself,
15 it will be much easier. Page 28659, line 1, and page 28658, lines 24 and
16 25. Can you please read it yourself.
17 A. Lines 24 and 25?
18 Q. Yes, 24 and 25, and the next line on the next page, please.
19 A. Yes. "There certainly had been Serbs from Sarajevo killed and
20 their bodies put in the pits of Kazani, above Bistrik barracks, and ..."
21 here my page ends, "and that the people who did it were certainly
22 associated with Caco."
23 His Honour mentioned that I can clarify, if I may, some of the
24 context. If I can say, I did indeed say that when --
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I'll allow the witness, Mr. Tapuskovic, to
1 give a clarification.
2 THE WITNESS: I think that the overwhelming number of Serbs who
3 were killed within the confrontation lines, that is, on Bosnian-held
4 territory, were killed by Serb gun-fire. And when Mr. Milosevic, in the
5 context of that trial, people wanted to know if there were any exceptions
6 to that, I said yes, there were some exceptions, and this Kazani incident
7 with Caco was one of them.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. You also said - and I must read this now in French because I don't
11 have time to have it translated - "Caco was a dangerous man."
12 A. I can't remember if I said that, but he was certainly a dangerous
13 man, yes. I don't have the lines, but, yes, that sounds a very plausible
15 Q. Then you went on to say: "At the end of October 1940 -- 1993 --
16 at the end of October 1993" -- I believe this is what you said, that you
17 believed that he was killed in October 1993 by his own men.
18 A. Yeah, not by his subordinates. I think he was killed by the
19 Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though in fact I think -- Caco, of
20 course, had not only been killing Serbs; he had been killing Muslims as
21 well. And I think, in fact, the action which led to his own death was a
22 last spasm of violence in which he had killed a number of Muslims, if I
23 remember correctly.
24 Q. But you did say that he had killed several dozen people and that
25 it was shocking at the time when you were there. Is that correct? And
1 Caco was not the only one. He had a whole unit that was engaged in that.
2 He didn't do it on his own. His whole unit was doing that. Is that
4 A. His whole unit was engaged in violence; that is correct.
5 Q. He was murdered in order not to testify to what he did or to be
6 tried for the crimes that he committed against the Serbs of Sarajevo.
7 A. No, I don't think that's correct.
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: I'm not sure -- excuse me, sir, I'm not sure of
9 which document you are quoting from. The French that you read out, where
10 is that from?
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Just a minute, please. The
12 English version, page 28659, lines 15 to 25; and page 28611 -- 661, lines
13 1 to and 6 and lines 1 to 11.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: It's the Milosevic transcript; correct?
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it is.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
17 THE WITNESS: Anyway, my answer is: No, I do not think that is
18 why he was killed. I think he was killed because he had not subordinated
19 himself to the authorities of the Bosnian government and that he was at
20 the time of his death, in fact, taking violent action against some of the
21 Bosnian government people. And I think it is certainly true that as he
22 killed Serbs, he also killed Muslims; but I think that, more importantly,
23 it's -- it's true that the great majority of Serbs who were killed on
24 Bosnian territory were killed by gun-fire from the Serb side of the line,
25 not by Caco.
1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Microphone not activated].
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for the counsel.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Microphone for you.
4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Around 300 people were killed by artillery fire, but I will not go
6 into that any further. Mr. Milosevic asked you about this, and you
7 responded that the figure of 8 to 9.000 was exaggerated, that it was
8 absolutely not true. Now, we already have documents prepared by some NGOs
9 and other institutions and organisations; some of them have been provided
10 for certain cases tried before this Tribunal. When all of that started in
11 1992, do you know that between 2 and 3.000 Serbs - and there are names of
12 these people - were killed and slaughtered and thrown into Kazani? And my
13 question is: Do you know anything about? Tell me just yes or no.
14 A. No, I believe that's completely untrue. In fact -- no, no, no,
15 clear -- that is a gross misrepresentation of the facts. We kept quite
16 accurate records of the people who died or who went missing or whose
17 families reported them missing, and it would be a grotesque exaggeration
18 to say that between 8 or 9.000 Serbs had been killed, or even that 2 or
19 3.000 Serbs had been killed. It was certainly less than 1.000, and by our
20 examinations, the overwhelming majority of them were killed by gun-fire,
21 sniping, or shelling directed at civilians from the Serb side of the
22 line. So what you say is simply not correct, and I don't know what the
23 NGO is but you should use a different source.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, what if you are correct that
25 between 2 and 3.000 Serbs were killed? What is the point that you would
1 be making in relation to that? What is your case in relation to that?
2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I wanted to ask the following,
3 and this is my last question. I don't want to belabour the point because
4 somebody might accuse me of tu quoque --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, I'm entitled to try to ascertain
6 what your case is.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Of course I will answer your
9 Q. Was there greater fear among the Serbs with regard to the bombs
10 that were landing in Sarajevo because they could have sought shelter or
11 was there fear among them because on that day --
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, I asked you a question.
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] You've asked me why --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes --
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] -- this was important.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I asked -- yes. Why is it important to your
17 case that 2 or 3.000 Serbs were killed, and you haven't answered.
18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] The Serbs feared that this should
19 happen to them anywhere where Muslims were in control. There was everyday
20 fear among them, that any day someone would come and collect them and
21 throw them in pits in Kazani, and this fear was far greater than the rest
22 and it dominated everything else. It so happened that people were taken
23 out of their homes, never to return again, and some of them are known to
24 have been killed and thrown into pits. There was talk about them being
25 very few and that's not true. Mr. Harland himself spoke about under a
1 thousand of them --
2 THE WITNESS: No, no --
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: How would that affect the liability of
4 Mr. Milosevic for the crimes with which he's charged?
5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] One of the reasons why they had a
6 stronghold on their positions was that should it so happen that places
7 where they resided would be taken over, the same thing would happen to
8 them as was happening to the Serbs. Because in the area of responsibility
9 of Republika Srpska in Sarajevo, of the 1st Corps, not a single person met
10 his or her end this way. And I didn't have time to ask him whether he
11 knew of camps, of the silos camp. Could the gentleman please finally
12 explain what was happening at the silos camp in 1995, and let this be my
13 last question.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, your last question.
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you. First, in reply to your half-asked
16 question about the fear of the Serbs in Sarajevo, my experience of the
17 Serbs in Sarajevo is that most of them wished -- or many of them wished to
18 leave the city of Sarajevo but were unable to do so. And the reason they
19 wanted to leave was because the city was under siege and they were at
20 great risk of being killed by indiscriminate shelling or sniping.
21 Were some also killed by Caco and other similar people? I would
22 say yes. And I would say not only was Mr. Milosevic wrong when he said it
23 was 8 or 9.000 and you were wrong when you put 2 or 3.000; I would say
24 that Caco's victims in the Kazani pits would certainly be less than 100.
25 Now, as for -- as for your last question, yes, I was very aware of
1 the detainees, the Serb detainees held at the Tarcin grain silos, and
2 there were over a hundred of them, and we protested regularly to the
3 Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was holding them illegally, in
4 our view, until they got information about the Muslim men in Hadzici who
5 later turned out to have been killed. But the people in that silo in
6 Tarcin, although it was certainly a wrong thing to do, they were not --
7 they were not indiscriminately killed; they were not killed at all. They
8 were simply held when they should not be held. And although that was
9 terrible, it's quite a different order of crime, of problem, to the one
10 we're talking about in this case, the random bombardment of a city of a
11 quarter of a million people. Thank you.
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. But you haven't answered.
14 A. You asked me if I was aware, and I was aware.
15 Q. Please, in your statement you said that the people from the silos
16 were used to clear minefields and pitfalls and to dig trenches, and that
17 oftentimes they were killed. Is that true, concerning those people from
18 silos, in 1995?
19 A. Yes --
20 Q. These are your very own words.
21 A. Yes, but let me clear that we're talking about less than ten
22 people, whereas in the indiscriminate bombing and shelling and sniping of
23 Sarajevo, we're talking about the deaths of thousands and thousands of
24 people. But yes, I'm aware of silos --
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Harland.
1 Your cross-examination is complete.
2 Mr. Waespi, re-examination.
3 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. Just one issue the Defence
4 might want to clear. The last document they put to the witness was the
5 UNPROFOR report from the 29th August 1995, which is 65 ter number 481, and
6 I suggest that it might be moved also into evidence, if Defence counsel
7 wants to do that. That's just the last document which was discussed.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, if you wish that document to be
9 admitted, then we'll admit it.
10 Please give it a number.
11 THE REGISTRAR: It will be admitted as Exhibit D10, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
13 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Re-examination by Mr. Waespi:
15 Q. I first want to clear up a couple of things which were raised
16 today and then we'll move to yesterday.
17 MR. WAESPI: And it shouldn't take that long, Mr. President.
18 Q. The first point, Mr. Harland, you were asked in the beginning line
19 4 about the general assumption that sniping or shelling of civilians
20 within the confrontation lines generally was sourced from outside the
21 confrontation line, and it was discussed about the perception of the media
22 as well. And your response was: "Yes," and I quote you, "not always but
23 usually" that was the case.
24 Can you again tell us what you meant by that.
25 A. The overwhelming majority of the shells that landed on
1 Bosnian-controlled territory, that is, in the city of Sarajevo or the
2 overwhelming majority of people who were killed by sniper fire on
3 Bosnian-held territory of whatever nationality, those shells came from the
4 Serb side and those bullets came from the Serb side. I would say that the
5 number of cases in which there is serious reason to believe that people
6 killed on the Bosnian side of the line were being killed by fire that
7 originated on the Bosnian side of the line would probably be less than 1
8 per cent of the total cases.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland. The next document I would like to show
10 you is Defence Exhibit number 7.
11 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, that's a document dated 1st December
13 Q. I just want to ask you one point about an answer you wanted to
14 give about the Sagger missiles and you were sort of cut off. While the
15 document is being retrieved at page 3, at the bottom, can you tell the
16 Trial Chamber what Sagger missiles were -- that were fired into the city
17 on that day?
18 A. Right. I don't have that document in front of me but I remember
19 the incident. The Sagger is a small wire-guided missile that operates at
20 relatively short range, and at some point - I can't remember exactly when;
21 later in the war - the Serbs began -- we could identify the firing point
22 very easily, began to fire these missiles into the city of Sarajevo. And
23 they were very easy to see where they came from because they trailed
24 little wires behind them.
25 Q. And do you know what these weapons are used for normally, what
1 their prime military purpose is?
2 A. Well, I think in a real war they're for trying to take out
3 armoured vehicles, but here they were just -- you know, they were fired
4 against apartment blocks and office blocks and so on.
5 MR. WAESPI: Just for the sake of the completion of the record,
6 can you please move the document down to the bottom.
7 And now, Your Honours, you see the reference. Sector Sarajevo,
8 paragraph number 2, and then little (a), "380 Sagger missiles were fired
9 into the city at lunchtime," and at the end you see that "three civilians
10 were wounded."
11 Q. Let me move on to the next document, if I may, and this is D9,
12 Defence Exhibit 9, dated 24th June 1995. You were asked a number of
13 issues about this document and also the fact that the Bosnians actually
14 launched an offensive. Please have a look at the first page of this
15 document D9, and perhaps you can also explain the way these documents are
16 written. I believe the front page has the highlights and list in
17 paragraphs what is later described in detail. Is that correct?
18 A. That is correct, and it is correct that this document referred to
19 a Bosnian offensive out of the city. But I think the point I was trying
20 to make in the document was that the Bosnian offensive was principally of
21 a military nature. It was a failure, but it was directed at the Serb
22 military. Whereas what concerned us at the time was that the Serbs then
23 responded with an indiscriminate bombardment of the city and an increase
24 of sniping against civilians, as the documents state.
25 Q. Yes. What I also would like to ask you to look at is paragraph 3
1 on this cover page, the humanitarian situation. What was the humanitarian
2 situation at that time when the Bosnian military tried to break out of the
3 city, Mr. Harland?
4 A. Well, it was extremely bad. And whenever the Bosnians would try
5 any sort of military activity, the Serbs would retaliate against the city
6 as a whole and the civilian population by cutting off the electricity or
7 limiting the amount of water or, in particular, stopping convoys of food
8 or increasing their bombardment of civilian areas.
9 Q. And do you know why the Bosnian military tried to break out of the
10 city, Mr. Harland?
11 A. Because the city was under siege and enduring an appalling
12 humanitarian and general situation. The life was intolerable and they
13 were trying to break the siege, but they failed.
14 Q. And a related document just states a few days later, 2nd July,
15 1995; it's Prosecution Exhibit number 19.
16 MR. WAESPI: And, Mr. President, you heard the Defence saying it
17 is a very important document for the Defence, and I would like to ask the
18 witness to have a look at this document.
19 Q. It's P19, 2nd July 1995, and we have gone over that for a while.
20 But just have a look at it again, especially on paragraph -- on page 2,
21 the second part of the page. "Shelling of the city, active snipers,
22 civilian casualties." Is that an example of the point you just made a
23 moment ago?
24 A. Yes, it's an example of that point.
25 Q. And on the next page, on the top of page 3 -- in fact, that's what
1 we had discussed yesterday, the incident about the little boy. And in
2 fact the first sentence, and you can read it yourself, Mr. Harland.
3 A. "Sniper activity had spread to a number of areas usually considered
4 reasonably safe. On Sunday, a 16-year-old boy was killed while riding his
5 bicycle on Tito Street near UNPROFOR headquarters. Later in the week,
6 sniping spread to the old town in the east and to the west. As with the
7 shelling, many of the victims seem to have been hit while collecting
9 Q. So that was the situation when the Bosnian Muslims tried to break
10 out of the city.
11 A. That is correct. The retaliation was principally against
13 MR. WAESPI: Now I would like to clear up just a few matters from
14 yesterday, Mr. President.
15 Q. The first one relates to the issue of the military hospitals in
16 Lukavica. There were two instances where you weren't allowed to answer or
17 to complete your answer.
18 MR. WAESPI: And, Mr. President, it's on page 372 and 373 of
19 yesterday's transcript.
20 Q. You were asked whether you were aware of the fact that there was a
21 hospital there for the Serbs - and that's Lukavica - and did you know that
22 the hospital was unable to provide medical care for people who were
23 seriously injured. And then you started your answer by saying: "Yes, and
24 in fact the people in Lukavica used other medical facilities; that is
25 correct" --
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.
2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I've never said
3 that it was at Lukavica. I said it was at Ilidza, and it's a quite a
4 different location, at Blazuj. It's 2 or 3 kilometres away and could not
5 have been reached from Lukavica at all. The problem was when one had to
6 reach Lukavica from Zuja. And I never said that there was a hospital at
7 Lukavica. There are a number of hospitals, but the hospital I mentioned
8 was the one at Blazuj, at Ilidza.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi.
10 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I'm grateful for that clarification. I'm just
11 reading from the transcript of yesterday.
12 Q. "Between Lukavica and Ilidza" was the exact quote. In any event,
13 you start to say that "the people in Lukavica used other medical
14 facilities; that is correct," you said yesterday, "which is not at all to
15 say that their medical facilities were," and you couldn't answer, you
16 couldn't continue your question. Do you have any comments about these
17 medical facilities the Serbs used?
18 A. Well, I would only say that the Serbs would often raise concerns
19 like this to us, like how long it took them to get to a hospital or
20 inadequate facilities at a hospital. But, in fact, whenever there was any
21 real comparison, the hospitals on the Bosnian side were vastly worse. And
22 the Serbs actively cut off even the electricity and the water that might
23 have been needed for the proper functioning of those hospitals. So I
24 didn't want to deny that the Serbs had problems with their medical
25 facilities, but they were vastly less than the problems they inflicted on
1 the people who needed medical services on the Bosnian side.
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland. The next point I would like to clarify is
3 on page 393 at the end, and it deals with the signing of the anti-sniping
4 agreement. And you were asked by Mr. Tapuskovic that -- in fact, it was
5 kind of a statement, that -- and I quote Mr. Tapuskovic: "Mr. Milosevic
6 signed the agreement, in spite of all the previous obstruction. This is
7 precisely what I wanted to hear, whether this was true." And then you are
8 recorded as saying yes.
9 Now, you told Your Honours yesterday who was present at that
10 meeting where the agreement was signed. General Tolimir; it was, I think,
11 Professor Koljevic; General Milosevic. Now, can you tell Your Honours -
12 and you were there - what the dynamics were between those three gentlemen,
13 especially between General Tolimir and General Milosevic, as to who is
14 signing the agreement.
15 A. Well, General Milosevic signed it, though it is certainly true
16 that General Tolimir was an active agent in the process. And, in fact, he
17 had been a strong -- General Tolimir had been a strong participant in the
18 discussions --
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, I must ask you to be silent, and
20 it's a question of respect for counsel who is asking a question. If you
21 have a matter to raise, then raise it.
22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] My apologies, Mr. President.
23 Mr. Milosevic wanted to tell me something out loud, and I wanted to merely
24 tell him that while we are in session he should not be saying anything out
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: The practice is for an accused to send a note
2 with the security officer to counsel.
3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I told
4 him. I told him so.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: So he may do that.
6 Yes, Mr. Waespi.
7 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Mr. Harland, if you would like to complete your answer.
9 A. General Tolimir was there and was a very forceful negotiator, and
10 the position represented by all of our Serb interlocutors was that they
11 would not accept the position which we proposed which would make it
12 impossible to snipe, which is that line-of-sight barriers be established
13 and that we be given authority to hunt down snipers trying to violate it.
14 And the agreement was signed by General Milosevic when we withdrew that
15 and accepted that they would simply make public announcements that they
16 had agreed to stop sniping.
17 Q. And just following on, that was the reason why the Bosnian Serbs
18 actually signed this agreement?
19 A. We believe -- it -- we believe that they signed it when we stopped
20 insisting on the line-of-sight barriers or on the authority for us to go
21 and hunt down the offending snipers.
22 Q. The next point of clarification can be found on page 396 at the
23 bottom, and Mr. Tapuskovic ...
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi, continue.
1 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
2 Q. Mr. Tapuskovic quoted from a -- from your witness statement, and I
3 think the quote is not entirely accurate. It is about command and control
4 in sniping situations. And I would just like to direct you to your
5 witness statement on page 11. That's at the bottom of page 11. And the
6 quote you made there is as follows, and I quote:
7 "The agreement worked well for a period in the first couple of
8 months where sniping was quite rare. There was little doubt regarding the
9 command and control of the warring factions over their snipers. The only
10 doubt was sometimes that the French were not sure if shots fired at a long
11 distance at Bosniak civilians sometimes came from the Bosniaks instead of
12 the Serbs."
13 Because you were quoted as saying that you had some doubts about
14 command and control, so, Mr. Harland, can you confirm the witness
15 statement stating that you had little doubt about command and control over
17 A. Yes. We had little doubt about the command and control over
18 snipers, and when the agreement was signed, it was then followed by a
19 sharp reduction in the number of sniper attacks, which seemed to confirm
20 our belief.
21 Q. The next point, second-to-last, I would like to raise with you is
22 at page 399 and 400 of yesterday's transcript. You might recall,
23 Mr. Harland, that you were asked about an issue involving French
24 anti-sniping teams. And you said that the French teams had identified the
25 firing point and they were able to point the firing point out to you. And
1 then I quote you, saying:
2 "And those firing points were certainly within Bosnian
3 government-held territory, and then I was able to see for myself that
4 sniper fire was opened from one of those positions ..."
5 And you continue, saying that it caused "a few civilian
6 pedestrians to run quickly for hiding ..."
7 Now, do you recall the time of that moment when you went to see
8 these French anti-sniping teams and they pointed out one of these Bosnian
9 sniper locations?
10 A. The time of day?
11 Q. No. The time in the year. In which year and which month?
12 A. It was in 1993. Yeah, I remember. People were wearing light
13 clothing, so I guess it was probably -- I don't know, I would guess
14 September of 1993.
15 Q. Thank you very much.
16 MR. WAESPI: And the last point, Mr. President, Your Honours, is
17 the issue of the two Serbian girls that were sniped at, and Judge Mindua
18 was specifically interested in this point, as we are, Mr. President. And
19 we were able to find three documents that relate to this incident. There
20 was an uncertainty about whether it was March 19 -- whether it was August
21 1994 or March 1995.
22 I would like Mr. Harland to be shown three documents. The first
23 one is 65 ter number 02822, and it's a document from Mr. Akashi dated 12th
24 March 1995. It reports about meetings with Bosnian government officials.
25 And the first paragraph is the most important, especially line 5. "My
1 arrival in Sarajevo at 1000 this morning ..." line 5, if that could be
2 highlighted. And I can read it for everybody's benefit. Mr. Akashi says:
3 "My arrival in Sarajevo at 1000 hours this morning was marked by
4 the apparent killing of two young girls - initial reports say 9 and 11 -
5 by sniper fire in Serb-controlled Sarajevo. The closer of the Blue Routes
6 across the Sarajevo airport by the Bosnian Serbs, which they say is in
7 response to the killing of the two girls, by the shelling last night of
8 down-town Sarajevo with heavy weapons - initial reports say 13 rounds of
9 120-millimetre mortars - and by the fact that my aircraft was hit by
10 machine-gun fire as it taxied after landing in Sarajevo."
11 Q. Does that refresh your memory, Mr. Harland, as to the killing of
12 these two Serbian girls and the response of the Bosnian Serbs to that?
13 A. Yes. The incident did, indeed, occur, as I think Mr. Tapuskovic
14 said, in March of 1995. And yes, I now recall that it was repeatedly
15 raised with us by the Serb authorities as the reason they were closing the
16 Blue Routes and taking a number of other measures.
17 Q. And can you tell us -- remind us again of the importance of the
18 Blue Routes for the population of Sarajevo.
19 A. The so-called Blue Routes were some routes that were established
20 to allow civilians to move between different Serb-held areas and between
21 different Bosnian-held areas and even between some Serb- and Bosnian-held
22 areas. And these had been negotiated originally, I think, in early 1994,
23 and then were closed by the Serbs, I think, early in 1995, at roughly the
24 same time they closed down the Sarajevo humanitarian air-lift that we were
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Harland.
2 MR. WAESPI: And, Your Honours, if we could move to page 2 of the
3 same document, paragraph 4.
4 Q. Can you tell us, Mr. Harland, who Mr. Muratovic was who met with
5 Mr. Akashi on that day?
6 A. Mr. Muratovic was a Bosnian government minister. I think he was
7 not yet the prime minister, but later on he was the prime minister.
8 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, I direct you to the first five lines
9 under Sarajevo, and I read it out:
10 "Muratovic condemned the killing of the two young girls, the
11 bodies of whom were shown in graphic detail on Bosnian Serb television
12 last night; said that his government his formed a commission to
13 investigate the incident but asserted that such an incident was
14 justification for neither the shelling of Sarajevo last night nor the
15 closure of the Blue Routes."
16 Q. Can you also confirm, as far as you know, what Mr. Akashi says
18 A. Yes, that was the -- that was the -- that was the events, as we
19 understood it from -- from our meetings.
20 MR. WAESPI: If we could have a number for that document. The
21 Prosecution would like to move that into evidence, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P24, Your Honours. Also, while I'm on
24 my feet, Your Honours, a point of clarification regarding the document
25 with the 65 ter number 02471. That's the sitrep dated 24th of June 1995.
1 That was tendered by the Defence and it was assigned an exhibit number of
2 D9; however, this document was tendered and admitted yesterday by the
3 Prosecution as Exhibit P16.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks for that clarification.
5 MR. WAESPI: The next document deals with the same issue, and it's
6 very brief, Mr. President. It's ter number 0281, and it's again a cable
7 from Mr. Akashi dated 17th March 1995. And the previous document was a
8 meeting between Mr. Akashi and the Bosnian government, and now it's a
9 meeting with Mr. Karadzic. And I would like to show the witness page 4 of
10 this document, which is actually page 3 of the actual report. And it's
11 just one line in the middle of -- I'm not entirely sure that this is the
12 right document. Can we see the cover page, please.
13 I apologise, Mr. President, for these technical problems. No,
14 it's a document -- it should be the 17th March, 1995. But if you don't
15 have it, I can move on. Ter number 02821.
16 THE REGISTRAR: The document that's on the screen is the document
17 that we have for that 65 ter number.
18 MR. WAESPI: Yes. Mr. President, if, just as an emergency
19 procedure, I could put the document onto the ELMO. I just have one copy.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Please do that.
21 MR. WAESPI: And if you could show it to the Defence. It has been
22 disclosed to the Defence, but just for transparency. That's the only copy
23 I have, so I'm just asking the witness to quickly look at the cover page,
24 the first page, and then the fourth page which deals with the meeting with
25 Mr. Karadzic.
1 Q. And that's the marked portion I would like to read out.
2 "Karadzic was adamant that the airport routes would remain closed
3 for 60 days; 30 days for the death of each of the two killed girls in
5 Do you remember these events, Mr. Harland?
6 A. Yes. That was a -- that was their position, and in fact I think
7 they stayed -- stayed closed for longer than that. Yes, that was the
8 message they passed to us.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I would like to move this document
11 into evidence as well.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit it.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P25, Your Honours.
14 MR. WAESPI:
15 Q. And the last document is ter number 02820, which is a daily news
16 report dated March 15, 2006. And we're only concerned with the cover
17 page. That's the way it looks like.
18 MR. WAESPI: If we can move down to the bottom on the left side.
19 Yes. Bosnian Radio Sarajevo. And I'll just read out what it says, Your
21 Q. "Bosnian Radio Sarajevo, on Monday, reported that the General Staff
22 of the Bosnian army officially confirmed on Monday that a Muslim
23 sniper/shooter killed two Serb girls in Serb-controlled Grbavica near
24 Sarajevo on Saturday. News agencies report. The Bosnian army General
25 Staff said this was an 'accident' and added that the soldier who had
1 killed the girls had been arrested and would stand trial."
2 And then just to continue on top of next page.
3 "Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic ordered Serb forces to close
4 the 'Blue Routes' near Sarajevo because of the incident."
5 My question is: Is that an appropriate reaction from the Bosnian
6 Serb army, as stated here?
7 A. We didn't consider --
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: What do you mean by "appropriate"? What do you
9 mean by, "is that an appropriate reaction?"
10 MR. WAESPI: The investigation into the incident, as stated here.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not clear to me how he can comment on that.
12 Don't answer that.
13 MR. WAESPI: That's fine. That's my last question, Mr.
14 President. And I would like to have the document moved as well into
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's admitted.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P26, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, do you have a point?
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I think that this should not be
20 admitted as an exhibit because we can't see that the Bosnian army has
21 really instituted the proceedings the way they should be. This is
22 something stated in the press, but we don't have enough evidence that
23 indeed the proceedings were instituted or who was behind that and that
24 criminal responsibility was indeed incurred. The fact that the media
25 reported that somebody reacted from the Bosnian leadership is quite one
1 matter, and quite another is to have a piece of information attesting to
2 the fact that the person was arrested and that criminal proceedings were
3 instituted against the person. This was not proven.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi.
5 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I entirely agree with Mr. Tapuskovic. That's a
6 media report and it says what it says. And that's as far as this document
7 goes and it's up to Your Honours to consider what it says. If any party
8 wants to take the issue further and call the people who were actually
9 involved in investigating, then it's up to the parties. But the document
10 addresses exactly the issue we were discussing yesterday, the killing of
11 the two Serb girls, and I think it's perfectly valid to have it admitted.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, the point that you have raised
14 doesn't affect the admissibility of the document. It goes to the weight
15 which the Chamber will attach to it, and so it remains admitted.
16 Mr. Harland, that concludes your evidence. Thank you for coming
17 to the Tribunal to give it, and you may now leave.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 [The witness withdrew]
20 MR. WAESPI: If I might be excused myself, Mr. President --
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
22 MR. WAESPI: -- because the next witness will be led by somebody
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
25 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Mr. President, Your
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Isailovic.
3 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] If I have understood correctly,
4 the next witness is going to come into the courtroom now. We said that
5 there were a few procedural questions that had to be settled before the
6 new witness. We thought that we had some procedure to settle before.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: How long will these procedural issues take, in
8 your estimation?
9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm looking at the transcript,
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: How long will these procedural issues take, in
12 your estimation?
13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Tapuskovic and myself
14 have agreed, he needs two to three minutes -- three to four minutes and I
15 need the same, so maybe ten minutes altogether.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. We'll deal with the procedural
17 matters now and then we'll have the witness afterwards.
18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I have already talked to the
19 Prosecutor about these matters yesterday and announced that I would raise
20 these procedural matters. We didn't have time to discuss them before.
21 This is the point: At which point in time do the exhibits related to
22 cross-examination have to be delivered? Different Trial Chambers have
23 different positions on this matter.
24 I would first wish to refer you to the decision upon joint motion
25 by Defence on the presentation of evidence in the case IT-05-87-T,
1 Prosecutor versus Milan Milutinovic. In this case, the Defence insisted
2 on the right of the accused based on Article 21 because the effect of
3 cross-examination is completely neutralised or defeated in terms of
4 checking the credibility of the witness because it allows the Prosecution
5 to instruct their witnesses accordingly before examination. The Trial
6 Chamber examined the motion, and the Defence asked that the deadline
7 within which the disclosure of material concerning cross-examination
8 should be just immediately before the witness takes the stand and before
9 he is directly or she is directly examined.
10 The general position of the Prosecution is that it does not intend
11 to oppose such a request. Three days before the current witness or the
12 witness who just left was examined, we delivered a great volume of
13 evidence that I selected meticulously for that particular reason. The
14 Prosecution was able to discuss the evidence with the witness for three
15 days, and of course the situation resulted in the conflicts or
16 misunderstandings that we witnessed.
17 At any rate, if, three days ahead of the witness's examination, we
18 were to disclose the material that we would use, these three days could
19 gravely prejudice the Defence and the accused, as was detailed -- as is
20 provided by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, namely, Rules 54, 85, and
21 90. However, since the Prosecution does not challenge our motion but
22 supports it and asks that the following paragraph replace paragraph 3 in
23 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and it says:
24 "The list of documents to be used in a side in cross-examination
25 of a side of a witness must be disclosed to the other side or sides at the
1 start of cross-examination of that witness."
2 I don't wish to go on reading through to the end.
3 The earlier witness showed to me that this indeed is a matter
4 requires consideration because the time-limit of three days ahead of the
5 witness taking the stand - and this will also apply to our witnesses when
6 they will appear before the Court - could indeed, as detailed by the
7 Defence counsel in that other case, prejudice and endanger the importance
8 of cross-examination.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: The decision in the Milutinovic case that the
10 material concerning cross-examination should be delivered immediately
11 before the witness takes the stand, was that specifically related to
12 cross-examination by the Defence?
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] No, no. And the Prosecution
14 agreed with this. The Prosecution agreed with the motion. As soon as the
15 witness takes the oath --
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: What I'm asking: Does that apply for both -- did
17 that decision relate both to Prosecution --
18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] To both parties.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Both parties.
20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps I didn't make it quite
21 clear. That was the first thing. And I think that the Chamber should
22 respectfully rule on this as well.
23 Secondly, I would like to raise the issue, a completely different
24 issue. I believed - and this is something that you should be ruling on -
25 that there will be enough time, but then I realised that it's going to be
1 very difficult to find a day in a week when we can communicate between
2 ourselves and when we can receive suggestions from the accused. It is
3 practically very difficult during a working day and the next day to
4 communicate with an accused and to have all this basic communication in
5 order to receive suggestions from his side. If we had sittings every day
6 and we cannot visit the accused on weekends, then it's going to be very
7 difficult to establish these communications, which is sine qua non.
8 I apologise for the suggestions that occurred a while ago, if you
9 perceive this as contempt of court. I had to turn towards the accused. I
10 heard what he was suggesting, but I realised that it was something up to
11 me to prove rather than intervene on the spot in the courtroom --
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Generally, Mr. Tapuskovic, we are due to sit for
13 once -- for a session from either 9.00 to 1.45 or 2.15 to 7.00, so that
14 there would be some time for you communicate with your client. We are not
15 sitting all day, generally.
16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I think that this is barely to
17 maintain the communication, because I believe that in such a complex case,
18 we can have valuable and good contacts with him and to prepare ourselves
19 for the witnesses that are going to appear in view of the deadlines that
20 have been set up. And I suppose that you should rule on this. And it
21 seems to me that this motion is warranted on our side in order to enable
22 us to maintain the minimum of fairness of these proceedings.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, what is it that you're asking? What is it
24 that you're asking?
25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] We are asking for one day in a
1 week that the Chamber does not sit so that we have -- can have full
2 contact with the accused and so that we can make all the preparations with
3 him and receive all the suggestions from him in order for us to be able to
4 do our job properly and prepare our Defence case.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: That would be unprecedented, as far as I'm aware,
6 that a Chamber would decide not to sit one day per week simply to allow
7 communication between Defence counsel and his client.
8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I believe that there were such
9 cases. I cannot respond to you immediately, because I was very busy
10 preparing for this trial, but I can look at the case law of this
11 Tribunal. Of course, Your Honours, you are directing these proceedings.
12 You take due care of everything, and it is our duty to comply with any
13 ruling of yours. But I do believe that this case deserves a little more
14 time than has been allocated for the whole procedure. We do need some
15 time. If we go on at this pace and in this manner, I'm sure that his
16 right to a fair trial will be infringed upon. Of course, that is my
17 opinion, and I have never claimed to always be a hundred per cent sure
18 about any matter.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Tapuskovic.
20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Whiting, you respond to the first point.
22 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour. I will respond to the first
24 Just three things to say about that. The first is that I would
25 not share Mr. Tapuskovic's characterisation in any way with what occurred
1 with the last witness and problems which may have arisen. But having said
2 that, we would not object to a change in the rule that would require
3 disclosure of cross-examination documents at the beginning of the direct
4 examination of the witness, which is I believe what Mr. Tapuskovic is
5 asking for. In any event, it would take care of the problem which he
6 identified, which his concerns seem to be that the Prosecution would have
7 an opportunity to show the documents to the witness before he testified.
8 If we only received them when the witness begins testifying, of course
9 that will not occur.
10 I'll even go further and say that we, of course, would like that
11 to be the rule. If, in the event of the -- if in -- it occurs that during
12 the direct examination there is another document that occurs to Defence
13 counsel that they would like to use in their cross-examination, we will
14 generally not object to Defence counsel supplementing their list and
15 adding that if, in fairness, that is required and it is looked on,
16 obviously, in good faith.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you familiar with the Milutinovic Trial
18 Chamber's decision?
19 MR. WHITING: I am not, Your Honour. I am afraid I'm not. But I
20 do know that there have been different practices adopted in different
21 cases on this rule. And I certainly appreciate -- I appreciate Defence
22 counsel's position, and, of course, I can say my generosity, in all
23 frankness, is a little bit self-interested because I'm looking ahead to
24 when we're going to -- the sides will be switched and the rule will be on
25 us. And I know particularly when we're responding to a Defence case, we
1 often have less time to respond because we get the notice with much less
2 time - we usually only have a few days - and so we will also need the same
3 rule when we are responding to the Defence case.
4 So I think it's a fair rule for both sides that the disclosure
5 occur at the beginning of the direct examination with limited and fair
6 opportunities to supplement the list, if the need should arise.
7 I can say one other -- one thing about the second issue, if Your
8 Honours wish.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
10 MR. WHITING: The only -- what I -- I suppose I would say two
11 things. The first is I do believe there is a precedent for this. I think
12 in the Prlic case, it's my understanding - and this is just based on
13 discussions in the hall, and I may be wrong about this and it may be an
14 incomplete understanding - but it's my understanding that one of the
15 reasons that case sits only four days a week is precisely to allow the
16 Defence counsel to consult with their clients.
17 Having said that, however, I don't think that there is a basis for
18 it in this case. I think the issues -- that the case does have some
19 complexities, but I think the issues are relatively -- are straightforward
20 enough and have been identified that we should be able to sit five days a
21 week. So we would oppose a move to a four-day-a-week sitting. Thank you.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: For that reason at any rate.
23 MR. WHITING: Yeah.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
25 We'll now take the break. We'll break for 20 minutes.
1 --- Recess taken at 5.34 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 5.55 p.m.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Microphone not activated].
4 The Chamber will consider both --
5 [French on English channel]
6 MR. WHITING: I think we have French on the English channel, so
7 that's making a mess, probably, of the transcript. So we need to fix
8 that, and I don't know if the transcript captured everything that -- yes,
9 the transcript did not capture anything that was said because it was
10 French coming in. So I think we need to repeat everything that just
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Oh, I see. It's not there at all. What I said
13 was that the Chamber has heard the submissions by both parties on the
14 questions raised by Mr. Tapuskovic and we'll give a decision shortly.
15 So the next witness will be led my Ms. Edgerton.
16 MS. EDGERTON: That's correct, Your Honour.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
19 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
20 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. You may sit.
22 And you may begin, Ms. Edgerton.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Just prior to beginning questioning, I think I should indicate,
25 for the purposes of our colleagues in the translation booth, as well as
1 this Chamber, Lieutenant-Colonel Fortin, being Quebecois, French Canadian,
2 prefers to testify -- will be testifying in two languages, in English
3 during his examination-in-chief, and he prefers to respond to his
4 cross-examination in French.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
6 WITNESS: LOUIS FORTIN
7 Examination by Ms. Edgerton:
8 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, could you please state your name for the
9 proceedings and for the record.
10 A. Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Fortin.
11 Q. All right. Now, if we could have --
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are kindly asking the speakers
13 to pause between questions and answers because we need to interpret what
14 you are saying.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you hear that?
16 MS. EDGERTON: I did. Unfortunately, my earphones have a terrific
17 echo so I've got them around my neck, and I didn't quite hear it in time.
18 Could we bring PT number 2817 on the monitor in front of the
19 witness, please. That would be his statement taken 22 November 1997,
20 which was the subject of the Prosecution's motion and subsequent ruling
21 under 92 ter.
22 THE REGISTRAR: I'm sorry, could you repeat the number, please.
23 MS. EDGERTON: 2817. If it helps, ERN number 00555105.
24 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel Fortin, prior to coming to testify here today,
25 have you had an opportunity to review your written statement, which now
1 appears on the screen in front of you?
2 A. Yes, I have.
3 Q. Now, on review of the document, I understand you wish to make only
4 one small correction on the record, and that was with respect to paragraph
5 75 that appears on page 14 of the document.
6 MS. EDGERTON: And for everyone's assistance, the first sentence
7 of that paragraph presently reads: "At 8.30 the morning of June 28th, the
8 Bosnian Serb army started shelling Stup and Nedzarici." And the
9 correction you wish to make today is that it shouldn't read "Bosnian Serb
10 army" but "Bosnian army." Is that correct.
11 A. It is.
12 Q. Now -- thank you. With this correction, Lieutenant-Colonel, do
13 you find this written statement to be true, to the best of your
14 recollection, an accurate reflection of what you would say today if more
15 fully examined?
16 A. I do.
17 MS. EDGERTON: With that, Your Honours, I'd ask that this be
18 assigned an exhibit number.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit it. Let it be given a number.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P27, Your Honours.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
22 Q. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, I'm going to ask you a number of
23 clarifying questions about this previous statement and put to you some
24 documents which relate to the matters discussed in your statement, but
25 before we do that, could you just tell us: Do you still hold the rank of
1 lieutenant-colonel with the Canadian forces?
2 A. I do.
3 Q. What's your present occupation?
4 A. I'm currently the J9 --
5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are again kindly asking you to
6 make pauses between questions and answers.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Lieutenant, you must observe a pause between
9 question and answer for the benefit of interpretation.
10 THE WITNESS: Understood.
11 I'm currently the J9 at Joint Task Force Headquarters East, one of
12 such -- one of four such headquarters stationed in Montreal, and I'm
13 responsible for inter-agency relations with the police, emergency
14 services, to coordinate our response in case of domestic operations, be
15 they earthquake, terrorist attack, or things like that.
16 MS. EDGERTON:
17 Q. Thank you for that clarification and additional information. Now,
18 if we could go directly to your statement, I'd like to bring you to
19 paragraph 13, page number 4. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, in this paragraph
20 you indicated your first sector commander was French General Herve
21 Gobilliard. Do you know how long General Gobilliard had been in place by
22 the time you arrived in Sarajevo?
23 A. Yes. General Gobilliard had been in Sarajevo for about nine
25 Q. Thank you. Now, if we could move further on to paragraph 21 of
1 your statement; that's on page 5. In paragraph 21, you generally
2 identified who, within the sector, was responsible for liaison, but it's
3 not clear from this paragraph whether the Serb side designated an officer
4 responsible for dealing with UNPROFOR. Did they do that?
5 A. My understanding is that before my arrival, the Serb side also had
6 a liaison officer in the PTT building, but when I arrived it was no longer
7 the case. But they had designated a liaison officer who was
8 Lieutenant-Colonel Indic, stationed in Lukavica barracks.
9 Q. Now, if he was stationed in Lukavica barracks, in the sector, as
10 is set out in your statement, at the PTT building in the city centre,
11 could you tell me how sector commands liaison with the Serb side was
12 actually carried out? How did you communicate?
13 A. There were three ways, mainly: By phone, by fax, or through the
14 use of a French liaison officer who was in Lukavica.
15 Q. Would that be a French UNPROFOR liaison officer?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Permanently stationed in Lukavica?
18 A. I'm not sure if he was permanently stationed there, but he was
19 designated to work from there.
20 Q. Were there also, for example, runners who might have gone from
21 sector headquarters to Lukavica to effect liaison?
22 A. When necessary, yes.
23 Q. Do you recall how often "necessary" might have been? Was that a
24 daily matter, a weekly matter, or something less frequent?
25 A. No, I don't recall, I'm sorry.
1 Q. All right. Perhaps we could then just move on to paragraphs 32
2 and 33 of your previous statement, and those take us to page 7. Now, in
3 those two paragraphs, you deal with correspondence received and generated
4 by the sector command, in particular letters of protest. And maybe we
5 could just talk briefly about those. In paragraph 32, you explain that
6 many letters of protest were drafted by Colonel Meille. Could you -- are
7 you aware on what information the protest was based?
8 A. Whenever there was an incident, someone broke the cease-fire - we
9 had information from the observation posts that we had all around the
10 city - they reported to the sector headquarters, the operations room. And
11 based on the information we got there, we would write a letter of protest
12 if the cease-fire was broken.
13 Q. And your role in the preparation of these letters was generally
14 translations. Is that correct?
15 A. I wrote some of them, but mostly it translated what Colonel Meille
16 wrote in French into English. Sometimes editing was suggesting ways of
17 phrasing the letter.
18 Q. Now, when the subject of the protest concerned Sarajevo and what
19 was going on within the city, is there one individual to whom the protests
20 were generally addressed?
21 A. If the letter was intended to the Serb side, it would be addressed
22 to the Serb commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, General Milosevic.
23 Q. And similarly, to the Bosnian side, it would go to the corps
24 commander there?
25 A. Yes, General Aznadzic, if I remember correctly.
1 Q. Now, would such letters or other correspondence sometimes be
2 signed by the sector commander in your presence?
3 A. Sometimes he would sign in front of me, yes. But usually, without
4 being always present when he signed, I would bring in the document
5 unsigned and then go and take it a few minutes later.
6 Q. Having said that, then, perhaps we could ask you to look at a
7 series of letters, the first bearing the PT number 2396. Wonderful.
8 Lieutenant-Colonel, could you have a look at this letter, dated 2
9 June 1995 regarding access to detainees held by the Bosnian Serb forces,
10 and tell us whether you recognise the signature on it.
11 A. Yes, the signature of the sector commander, General Herve
13 Q. And who is the letter addressed to?
14 A. To General Milosevic.
15 Q. Now, does this letter relate to those same UN forces described in
16 paragraphs 50 and forward of your statement?
17 A. Can you bring the statement back, please.
18 Q. Yes. Sorry, page number 10. My apologies.
19 MS. EDGERTON: If you could just scroll down to the bottom of the
20 page so that the lieutenant-colonel can -- thank you. And perhaps we
21 could move over to page 11.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes. The letter that was posted just before refers
23 to the same presenters.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps we could have that marked as a subsequent
25 exhibit, please.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as Exhibit P28, Your
4 MS. EDGERTON: Could I ask for a further document to be brought up
5 on the screen. It bears the PT number 2398.
6 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, could you please have a look at this letter,
7 dated 3 June 1995, which deals effectively with the encirclement of
8 UNPROFOR forces by the Bosnian Serb army, and tell us who it's addressed
10 A. Addressed to General Milosevic.
11 Q. And could you --
12 MS. EDGERTON: Could we move down on the letter.
13 Q. And do you recognise the signature?
14 A. Yeah, it is that of General Gobilliard.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have that marked as the next exhibit,
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: It will be admitted as Exhibit P29, Your Honours.
19 MS. EDGERTON:
20 Q. There's a further document bearing the next PT number in sequence,
21 2399, also dated 3 June 1995, regarding missing UNPROFOR equipment, among
22 other things. Lieutenant-Colonel, who's this letter addressed to?
23 A. Again, to General Milosevic.
24 Q. And do you recognise the signature at the bottom?
25 A. Mm-hmm, that of General Gobilliard.
1 MS. EDGERTON: The next exhibit, please.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's also admitted.
3 You wanted to have that admitted, I presume?
4 MS. EDGERTON: Please.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P30, Your Honours.
7 MS. EDGERTON:
8 Q. There will be three more documents of this nature, the next one
9 being 2400, relating to the Bosnian Serb attack on Vrbanja bridge, also
10 dated 3 June 1995. Do you -- could you tell us the addressee on the
11 letter, Lieutenant-Colonel?
12 A. General Milosevic.
13 Q. And the signatory?
14 A. General Gobilliard.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, could we have that marked as Exhibit
16 P31, please.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as Exhibit P31.
19 MS. EDGERTON:
20 Q. A further document bears the PT number 2401 dealing with the
21 treatment of UNPROFOR soldiers during and following the take-over of
22 Vrbanja and a threat to kill one of those soldiers. You see again -- you
23 see this document now before you, Lieutenant-Colonel. Could you tell us
24 who it's addressed to.
25 A. General Milosevic.
1 Q. And who is the signatory?
2 A. General Gobilliard.
3 Q. And I see here that beside -- in the last paragraph of this
4 letter, beside the name Lieutenant-Colonel Indic, who you've already
5 mentioned and who appears further in your statement at paragraph 41, I see
6 the name Colonel Lugonja, written here as "Lugonja". Who did you know
7 Lugonja to be?
8 A. My understanding is that he was a senior officer in the corps
9 headquarters commanded by General Milosevic.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have that as P32, please, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as Exhibit P32.
14 MS. EDGERTON:
15 Q. And the final document of this nature for the moment has the PT
16 number 2413. It dates from 8 June 1995, dealing with an artillery attack
17 by Bosnian Serb forces.
18 Lieutenant-Colonel, does it appear on the screen in front of you?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And who is the letter addressed to?
21 A. General Milosevic.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Now, if we could scroll down on the letter.
23 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, I note the warning in the last paragraph of
24 this letter. I wonder if you could read that to us, for the record,
1 A. It's General Gobilliard writing to General Milosevic.
2 "Once more, I ask you to issue orders to prevent the situation
3 from deteriorating to the point where a diplomatic solution is no longer
4 possible and I bring to your attention the fact that you are responsible
5 for the acts of the troops who implement your orders."
6 MS. EDGERTON: If we could have that marked as P33, please, Your
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as Exhibit P33.
10 MS. EDGERTON:
11 Q. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, do you recall ever having received a
12 response to any of these letters of protest?
13 A. No, I don't.
14 Q. Was it your practice to make sure that they had actually been
16 A. We always confirmed that they had received it.
17 Q. How did you do that?
18 A. By phone, most of the time.
19 Q. With whom?
20 A. With Colonel Indic, or when it was hand-delivered, it was
21 hand-delivered to him, so we knew -- we had confirmation then.
22 Q. Now, if we could go back to your statement, please, page 7,
23 paragraph number 36. In this paragraph, Lieutenant-Colonel, you talk
24 about your own observations of sniping. You make a number of significant
25 comments. Perhaps I could bring you to the last sentence in paragraph 36
1 where you set out your assessment that "sniping in Sarajevo was used more
2 as a terrorist tactic than anything else."
3 Could you tell us the basis of that assessment.
4 A. Like I said in the previous sentence, "Sniping is a very efficient
5 military tactic," meaning that usually a sniper can hold a much larger
6 force on a stand-still for a long period of time, because every time he
7 shows up and fires he hits an important target, a commander or something
8 like that. In the case of the sniping that I saw in Sarajevo, the targets
9 were not military. Sometimes they were UN soldiers; most of the time they
10 were civilians.
11 Q. Now, in this paragraph you say that you were shot at regularly on
12 your way to the Residency. Can you remind us what's located there and why
13 you were travelling there?
14 A. Well, the PTT building was in the western part of the city. The
15 Residency was in the eastern part and it was where the BH command, or
16 headquarters UNPROFOR, as it was what they called it, was located. And I
17 went there regularly, almost every day, to liaise with my counterpart, the
18 military assistant to the commander of UNPROFOR. So every evening during
19 that period in June I would -- I would drive to the Residency to conduct
20 my liaison.
21 Q. And --
22 MS. EDGERTON: I realise, Your Honours, that we are moving from
23 document to document and the system seems to be working very well at this
24 moment. I wonder if we could move to a map on the e-court; it bears the
25 PT number 2813. Map 6 strongly resembles that map, Your Honours; however,
1 map 6, to my knowledge, hasn't yet been uploaded into e-court. I'm in
2 Your Honours' hands. It might be easier to have the witness refer to map
3 number 6 on the ELMO; that would be the one, Your Honours.
4 Perhaps you could, for the sake of technology and other things,
5 indulge us for a moment because my colleague says the map is coming up on
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
8 MS. EDGERTON: But because it is a map and an image it takes a bit
9 longer to produce it than a document.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we'll wait a little.
11 MS. EDGERTON:
12 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, do you have a map from front of you on your
14 A. Yes, ma'am.
15 Q. And do you recognise what's depicted on the map?
16 A. It's the city of Sarajevo with the confrontation line all around
18 Q. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, I wonder if, with my colleague's
19 assistance, you could take the marking tool on the right-hand side of your
20 monitor and, for all of us in the courtroom, if you could point out or
21 mark out the route that you would take from the PTT building to travel to
22 the Presidency -- the Residency, pardon me.
23 A. The PTT building is somewhere around here. I would travel on the
24 main route and go up, and the Residency is about here.
25 Q. Now, in terms of being sniped at while you were making that trip,
1 which you've mentioned in your statement, could you identify what the hot
2 spots were for you along that route, the areas of particular security
3 concern or danger?
4 A. Actually, there were two areas, the main one being here which was
5 called Grbavica and a Serb-held area. The last portion of the road could
6 be observed, about that portion, from the area of Grbavica, and I was
7 regularly getting fired at from there. What was most scary is that we
8 knew they had heavy weapons, so small arms could not pierce my armoured
9 vehicle but the heavy weapons could. And the other spot was right here,
10 and it came from Bosnian -- the Bosnian side.
11 Q. Now, along this route, were there UNPROFOR anti-sniping posts or
13 A. Yes, mostly in that same area. From the Holiday Inn, which is
14 about here, if I remember correctly, to here were most of the anti-sniping
15 locations and all observing south.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: What was the -- how did the anti-sniping post
18 THE WITNESS: They were usually static vehicles with soldiers
19 doing -- keeping observation on the area they were designated to protect
20 from sniping, and they had orders to fire back proportionally with --
21 whenever they had a positive identification of a sniper.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: And did that work successfully?
23 THE WITNESS: Not really, Your Honour. It did offer a sense of
24 security to the population. Soldiers were at work doing their job trying
25 to protect them, but it was very difficult to observe snipers.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON:
3 Q. Just going back, Lieutenant-Colonel, to something you said earlier
4 about they had heavy weapons -- it was at lines 19 through to lines 25.
5 You know, "they had heavy weapons" and small arms couldn't pierce your
6 armoured vehicle but heavy weapons could. When you say "they had heavy
7 weapons," who are you talking about?
8 A. The Serbs in the area of Grbavica.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have this image marked as the next
10 exhibit, please, and then perhaps have a clean image of the map again on
11 the screen.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P34.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Just to have the witness clarify something else
15 from paragraph 36 on a fresh image. I think it's less confusing to have
16 not so many markings on the map. Thank you.
17 Q. Now, you note also in paragraph 46 there were two or three
18 locations where a French VAB would help people cross the street. So in
19 regards to that paragraph I have two questions for you.
20 First of all, could you tell us what the acronym VAB stands for?
21 That's the first question.
22 A. VAB means "vehicule de l'avant blinde." It's a French armoured
23 personnel carrier.
24 Q. Now, the second question is: Do you recall where these locations
25 were where you saw the armoured vehicle helping people cross the street?
1 And, as you're doing, can you mark it for us.
2 A. Yes. And from my recollection, it was in the same area near Tito
3 barracks and near the Holiday Inn. I'm not sure which of those buildings
4 it is, but somewhere around here, in between two areas and at those two
6 Q. Now, when you say "helping people cross the street," are you
7 describing people in civilian clothing or people in military clothing?
8 What did you observe?
9 A. Well, they were civilians all the time.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, could we have this second image
11 marked as P35, then, please.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, let it be so marked.
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as Exhibit P35, Your
15 MS. EDGERTON: And if we could return the lieutenant-colonel to
16 his statement, paragraph 37, which appears on page 7. Sorry, it appears
17 on page 7 at the bottom and continues on to page 8. So if you could call
18 up page 8, the question is about -- the bottom part of the paragraph. I'm
19 sorry, is it easier if I give you the pre-trial number of the statement
20 each time I refer to it?
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a question directed to the court
22 registrar, I think.
23 MS. EDGERTON: It is. Thank you.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. Yes, that would be helpful.
25 MS. EDGERTON:
1 Q. Now, in paragraph 37, which is at the top of the page, you talked
2 about a visit to a sniper nest south of Vrbanja, and finding there an
3 underground tunnel network between buildings. The only question I ask
4 you -- I'd like to know about that paragraph is: Can you remember
5 approximately what time of the year this was? And it should be at the top
6 of page 8 rather than page 9. Yeah, that's right, top of page 8, please.
7 A. What was your question again regarding this --
8 Q. Could you just tell us, do you remember approximately when this
9 visit took place?
10 A. Yes, I believe it was in October.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MS. EDGERTON: If we could just scroll down the page a little bit
13 now to paragraph 39.
14 Q. You talk about something called a range card. Could you explain
15 what that is, a range card.
16 A. Well, each observation post or other static UN post would
17 basically make a drawing of its area of responsibility. So an observation
18 post would normally be set up with a primary arc of responsibility to be
19 observed and major features in that arc would be drawn on a range card
20 with distance identified on the card and major features, like I said.
21 That way it made it much faster and easier to report on things that were
22 being observed in that area.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Edgerton, Mr. Fortin is a 92 ter witness, is
24 he not?
25 MS. EDGERTON: He is, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: So, as I said in relation to the previous
2 witness, this is an abbreviated, expedited procedure to replace
3 examination-in-chief. I don't expect you to spend so long introducing the
4 documents, which is really what you should be using this time for.
5 MS. EDGERTON: I'll take your guidance in hand, Your Honour, and
6 move directly to the remainder of the documents that we have on our list.
7 If I could have PT 2393 brought up on the screen, please.
8 Q. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, in paragraph 62 of your statement you
9 speak of a meeting between Colonel Demurenko and Indic. This document
10 confirms -- this document talks about Colonel Demurenko confirming a
11 letter from General Gobilliard was handed to General Milosevic. Could you
12 please have a look at this document and tell us whether this is a report
13 on the meeting you mention in paragraph 62.
14 MS. EDGERTON: And if we could scroll slowly through the document
15 for the lieutenant-colonel, I'd appreciate that. If you could continue
16 down and then bring up the second page now. Thank you.
17 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel?
18 A. Yes, I believe it's the letter I was referring to.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have that marked as the next exhibit,
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as Exhibit P36.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
24 And, Your Honours, at this point I'd like to deal with a series of
25 documents which I'd like to tender as contextual and illustrative of the
1 larger context of the -- of the larger context that was in play at the
2 time of the events the witness's statement records. And I'm in Your
3 Honours' hands as to whether you'd like to have them brought up on the
4 screen before we deal -- before we have them entered as exhibits, or
5 whether I could deal with it merely orally.
6 These, Your Honour, are generally a series of intercepted
7 telephone communications which, in our pre-trial conference, our learned
8 friend had conceded the authenticity of, and some documents which derive
9 from the military archives at Banja Luka, a further collection, again,
10 which my learned friend stated he had no objection as to the authenticity
11 of these documents. I tender them at this point, Your Honour, purely as
12 contextual documents that would assist Your Honours in evaluating the
13 context of the evidence that Lieutenant-Colonel Fortin has presented.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Deal with the matter orally.
16 Yes, Ms. Isailovic, I didn't see you there. I'm sorry.
17 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, Your Honour, I have
18 stood up to address this issue which was raised during our pre-trial
19 conference. And if I remember correctly - and I hope this is the case -
20 we said that we would meet to look into this question again because
21 Mr. Tapuskovic wasn't quite sure exactly which telephone conversation you
22 were talking about. So we had not settled the issue, and we didn't quite
23 know which conversations we were talking about. These are telephone
24 conversations for which we may not be able to vouch the authenticity.
25 So --
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you --
2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] -- I think we need to address this
3 question and we need to meet with the Prosecution to be able to come to a
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: How many documents are we dealing with? How many
8 MS. EDGERTON: Please let me count for a moment, Your Honour. I
9 counted very quickly, but I think we're dealing with a total of six or
10 seven documents and intercepts.
11 Could I just make the following proposal, Your Honour, that might
12 serve to expedite things: I'd like to tender -- we're not talking, for
13 this purpose, about exhibits that my learned friend doesn't know about,
14 because they've already been the subject of disclosure and preparation for
15 Lieutenant-Colonel Fortin's testimony. But nevertheless, could I suggest
16 that they be tendered at this moment as contextual documents, and of
17 course we will have the meeting that needs to be had in the immediate
18 future with my learned friend, and my learned friend be given a limited
19 period of time withing which to respond on the authenticity. And Your
20 Honours may rule after that point.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic, what we have in mind was
23 instructing counsel to give you the documents immediately after we break
24 this evening so that you can look at them.
25 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you allow me, I
1 would just like to say something. I did get three documents of this
2 kind. I think the Prosecutor has just mentioned six documents. Did I get
3 it wrong or did I miss something?
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Edgerton --
5 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] As far as the disclosure of
6 documents is concerned.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: You did say six? Six or seven?
8 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, and they've been disclosed last Friday, Your
9 Honours. So if Your Honours direct me to provide additional copies of
10 material for the sake of clarity and expediting matters, I'm quite happy
11 to do that. The notion behind proposing them at this moment is that it
12 assists the parties, Your Honours and your staff included, to hear the
13 related evidence at one time rather than diffusely through the course of
14 the proceedings.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you suggesting, then, that we would mark them
16 for identification?
17 MS. EDGERTON: I'm suggesting at this moment they be marked for
18 identification pending my learned friend's speedy response as to the
19 authenticity, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, the Chamber will do that.
21 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm sorry. Just one
22 thing I'd like to add. I think we may encounter a problem. We did get
23 the list of documents, and I have prepared my cross-examination on the
24 basis of this definitive list I got. But on this definitive list, I have
25 three intercepts and I don't have six. That's the first point I would
1 like to make.
2 Second, prior to that, I got another list and I did prepare my
3 cross-examination on the basis of this list, and I thought I had the
4 definitive list yesterday. I listened to the Defence counsel yesterday
5 and I understand, but we can't allow all and everything.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is the position. We'll mark these documents
7 for identification. Counsel will transmit them to you after the hearing.
8 We'll have to investigate independently whether you were, in fact, served
9 with the documents. If we find that you were not served and you are in
10 any way embarrassed in your preparation for cross-examination, we'll take
11 that into consideration.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours. Can I deal with these
13 orally now?
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
15 MS. EDGERTON: The first being -- the first being an intercept
16 dated 15 June 1995, PT 2438.
17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mark them separately, individually, for
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be marked for
21 identification as Exhibit P37.
22 MS. EDGERTON: And I note that our case manager Ms. Bosnjakovic
23 will be supplying my learned friend with the audio files to go with these
24 transcripts that we're dealing with at this moment immediately after the
25 close of proceedings today so that the audio files can be assigned related
1 numbers - I would suggest 37A for the audio file or 37B - so that the
2 numbers are cross-referenced. Oh, I see that my court officer -- that the
3 court officer already has these.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.
5 MS. EDGERTON: The next, which is a document, PT 2430.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be marked for
7 identification as Exhibit P38.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
9 MS. EDGERTON: That being a contextual document, an order to all
10 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps units to prepare for a Muslim offensive out of
12 The next one bears the number P595.
13 THE REGISTRAR: This will be marked for identification as P39.
14 MS. EDGERTON: That being an intercepted conversation between
15 Dragomir Milosevic and Ratko Mladic, dated 16 June 1995.
16 The next -- pardon me with my pen. The next one being PT 2446.
17 THE REGISTRAR: This will be marked for identification as P40.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for one moment, Your Honour, so I
19 can group these all together.
20 The next one bears the number PT 2488.
21 THE REGISTRAR: This will be marked for identification as P41.
22 MS. EDGERTON: That being an intercepted telephone conversation
23 between one Prstojevic and one Veselinovic. The following one is PT 2493.
24 THE REGISTRAR: This will be marked for identification as P42.
25 MS. EDGERTON: That being a document drafted by -- or signed by
1 Dragomir Milosevic, setting out conditions on the Sarajevo front,
2 mentioning an artillery salvo hit the TV building.
3 And, again, your very brief indulgences, Your Honours.
4 I think that covers those contextual documents, Your Honour, and I
5 would just like now to go back to documents which Lieutenant-Colonel
6 Fortin has specifically prepared himself.
7 Q. The first one bears the number PT 2472. Lieutenant-Colonel, could
8 you please confirm that you were the drafter of this document.
9 THE WITNESS: Can you scroll down, please.
10 MS. EDGERTON: I think it's a two-page document, and you'll have
11 to take us to the second page.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, I drafted that document.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Could it bear the next exhibit number, please.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P43.
16 MS. EDGERTON: With your indulgence, Your Honours, I propose to
17 spend the next five minutes with the last two documents, if I may.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, go ahead.
19 MS. EDGERTON: The next one, bearing the number P2473. If you
20 could scroll down and go to the next page after that, please.
21 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, is this another record of a meeting prepared
22 by you?
23 A. Yes, it is.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Could it receive the next exhibit number, please.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P44.
2 MS. EDGERTON: And the next document is PT 2479, please.
3 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel - if we could scroll down again and go to the
4 last page - another document prepared by you, a record of a meeting
5 between General Smith and Colonel Meille. Is that correct?
6 A. That is correct.
7 MS. EDGERTON: If that could receive the next exhibit number, Your
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P45.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, that concludes the 92 ter examination,
12 keeping your guidance in mind.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.
14 We are at the end of the day's proceedings now.
15 Ms. Isailovic, you should take advantage of the evening and
16 tomorrow morning to examine these documents that you have not seen.
17 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Microphone not activated].
18 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly turn your microphone on, Ms. Isailovic.
19 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. I just wanted to thank
20 you and I shall do that, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.
22 We'll adjourn until tomorrow, 2.15.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day of
25 January, 2007, at 2.15 p.m.