1 Friday, 19 January 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness enters court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.31 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before we begin with the evidence, I'll just give
7 two short decisions on applications for protective measures.
8 On the 17th of January, the Prosecution filed a partly
9 confidential motion for protective measures for Witnesses 35 and 50,
10 requesting that each be assigned a pseudonym and being granted image and
11 voice distortion during their testimony. They attached a confidential
12 annex setting out the circumstances supporting the request for protective
14 On the 18th of January, another partly confidential motion was
15 filed for protective measures in relation to Witness 62. The Prosecution
16 requested that this witness be assigned a pseudonym and be allowed to
17 testify with image distortion, and it set out the reasons for protective
18 measures in a confidential annex.
19 The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence has stated that it does
20 not object to the granting of these motions.
21 In light of all the circumstances, including the submissions made
22 by the Prosecution and the contents of the annexes, and also in light of
23 the relevant provisions of the Statute and the regulations, the Chamber
24 grants these two motions.
25 We may now proceed, Ms. Isailovic, with your cross-examination.
1 WITNESS: THORBJORN OVERGARD [Resumed]
2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Cross-examination by Ms. Isailovic:
4 Q. [Interpretation] Welcome. Good morning, Mr. Overgard. I'm Ms.
5 Branislava Isailovic. I'm with the Paris bar. I'm a counsel of
6 Mr. Dragomir Milosevic, accused in this case. I'll ask you a few
7 questions that have to do with the examination-in-chief yesterday. I will
8 also use a statement that you made to the Prosecution's investigators on
9 September 8, 1995, April 29, 1996, and April 30, 1996.
10 So, first and foremost, do you remember those statements which
11 have been compiled into a single declaration?
12 A. Yes, I remember those, yes.
13 Q. We have few -- we had a few technical problems this morning, and
14 of course we gave notice to the opposing party of this, and because of
15 these technical problems we've prepared hard copies of these statements
16 and I will ask the usher to please circulate these hard copies to the
17 Chamber and, of course, to the witness.
18 Now, first I'll ask my assistant to display a map on the screen.
19 This is the map that was developed by the Prosecution --
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm sorry to have to interrupt, but we don't have
21 the transcript, Judge Harhoff and myself. We have it now. Do you?
22 There's something which you have to do. Judge Mindua just did it for me.
23 Judge Harhoff is still without the transcript, but please go
24 ahead. Please go ahead.
25 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I'm sure
1 that this gave enough time for the map to be actually displayed on the
2 screen now. This is the map that takes a bit long to be uploaded.
3 Q. A few questions now maybe before the map is displayed, a few
5 Major, you've been in the military for 18 years before you went to
6 Sarajevo; is that true? So you were in the military for 18 years before
7 coming to Sarajevo; right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Yesterday, you talked about your military training. So first you
10 went to the military school; is that it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And then you went through a training session in Finland for this
13 mission, for this Bosnian mission.
14 A. Yes, I went to the training in May 1994.
15 Q. During this training course you studied how to make investigations
16 that are required after incidents of shelling and sniping.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. As well as how to gather intelligence and how to analyse craters;
19 is that it?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. So this is my question: I'd like to know whether in the training
22 course you also studied technical data regarding the weapons that could be
23 used by artillery units.
24 A. Yes, we had obviously some lessons with technical datas, and I
25 used to recognise them and have them in my head, but now they're out.
1 Q. So I guess this was just a refresher course, because you already
2 had information and you had courses on the weapons used by artillery. It
3 was a refresher course.
4 A. This is a course specially for the mission, yes, for the UNMO job.
5 Q. Well, this wasn't exactly my question. So could you assess
6 yourself as being an expert regarding artillery weapons?
7 A. No, not artillery weapons. I'm educated for the anti-tank
8 weapons. But we have -- we used in the support unit mortar 107
9 millimetres. I knew that one. And 80 millimetres [Realtime transcript
10 read in error "188 millimetres"], I knew that one before. I'm not an
11 expert on it.
12 Q. So regarding those anti-tank weapons, the air bomb -- do air bombs
13 fall into that category?
14 A. No. No. I see it says 188 millimetres on line 10. It should be
15 80 millimetres.
16 Q. Mm-hmm. Well, thank you. Now, the map is being displayed. So
17 this is a map regarding the territories where you were stationed. So
18 could you show us Hrasnica on the map, if you please. Could we please
19 move -- display -- scroll forward, if the map could be scrolled upward a
20 little bit.
21 A. You have the Hrasnica area here.
22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. My assistant is
23 telling me that normally it's the usher that's supposed to do this. So
24 could you please scroll up, Mr. Usher. Thank you.
25 Q. Major, please, could you show us Hrasnica on this map.
1 A. Yes, it's this area.
2 Q. Are you absolutely sure?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. This is Hrasnica where you were stationed? I mean, you were there
5 for quite a while.
6 A. Sorry. I didn't see the airport area here. You have Hrasnica
7 here at the foot of Mount Igman. Sorry.
8 Q. Yes. I don't doubt your goodwill. It's just that the map isn't
9 very legible. So please could you also locate approximately the direction
10 where Ilidza was, because you were mentioning Ilidza yesterday. So could
11 you tell us --
12 A. Ilidza is this direction.
13 Q. And please, I'm sure you know Lukavica, or maybe you know it.
14 A. Well, this here, around this area.
15 Q. Yes. What about -- so this is Lukavica. Do you know anything
16 about this? Do you know who was in control of this part of the territory?
17 A. It was a Serb-controlled area I know.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic, the first area that he mistakenly
19 marked as Hrasnica, it's occurring to me that it's still on the map as
20 being marked, and maybe if he could put a line through it so that we know
21 it's not applicable.
22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: I understand he has to erase it.
24 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Okay. Thank you.
25 Q. So on the map could you please show Vojkovici, if this rings a
1 bell of course. Does Vojkovici ring a bell?
2 A. Yes, the name is there, but I'm not too sure with the ...
3 Q. Do you know who was in control over that area?
4 A. It was a Serb-controlled area, and ...
5 Q. And, in your recollection, is it close to Hrasnica? Is it the
6 part of Sarajevo that's close to Hrasnica?
7 A. No. No. It's -- I'm not sure ...
8 Q. You're sure of that? And Grlica, that place name, does that ring
9 a bell?
10 A. Grlica, yes, also, but on the map I was -- I don't know if I have
11 it --
12 Q. Would it be close to Hrasnica?
13 A. Grlica, it was not one --
14 Q. Grlica.
15 A. Grlica, it rings a bell also. I don't remember, but I think it
16 has to be in this area, then. We had the Famos factory here, and the name
17 and place now on this map, I'm not sure.
18 Q. To the right of Hrasnica you pointed at something. Is that what
19 you think is that place we're looking for? Because I see that you put a
21 A. Yes, yes. This is the -- I don't remember the name of the place
22 where we had this Famos factory, where we had a lot of firing from into
24 Q. Do you know who was in control over that part of town?
25 A. That was a Serb-controlled area.
1 Q. And, in your recollection, were these densely populated villages?
2 I apologise. Were these villages that were populated also by civilians?
3 A. I don't think there was. I wasn't into that specific area. So if
4 there were civilians there, I can't say, because there was a lot of firing
5 from that area, from the Famos factory building, and we were not allowed
6 in there.
7 Q. Thank you. Let's move on to what you did in Sarajevo, rather, in
8 Hrasnica, which is part of Sarajevo.
9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] So first could we give -- could we
10 tender and give a number to this map that has been marked by the witness.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D14, Your Honours.
13 MR. DOCHERTY: Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Docherty.
15 MR. DOCHERTY: Before the map is put into evidence, could I ask my
16 learned friend to mark, or have the witness mark, these various circles
17 and lines that are on the map for sake of clarity of the record. Perhaps
18 put a capital H by Hrasnica, a capital L by Lukavice, and so on, or
19 whatever makes sense, because otherwise, I fear that several months from
20 now we won't remember what these marks mean.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, let that be done.
22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Please go ahead. Should I ask
23 questions about this?
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. I'm instructing the witness to do as counsel
25 just suggested.
1 THE WITNESS: [Marks].
2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation].
3 Q. So A, you've been noting a few letters. An A, you put an A on the
5 A. The A is for Hrasnica.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: And B is for?
7 THE WITNESS: The Famos factory area. And C is Lukavica.
8 MR. DOCHERTY: And lastly, can we put a D by Ilidza.
9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] The direction of Ilidza more than
10 anything, because you can't really see.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
12 THE WITNESS: [Marks].
13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] This is a 65 ter -- could I have
14 the document 2824. It's a 65 ter document.
15 I apologise, Your Honour, our client would like to send us a word,
16 so could the guard please give us that little word that our client wants
17 to have sent over to us?
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, certainly.
19 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] It's not really working that way.
20 It's our assistant that's going there. So let's move on quickly to
21 something else. We're all fine now with the map; right? And this map
22 that has been marked has been tendered into evidence; right? The 65 ter
23 2824, that's been done. Thank you very much.
24 Q. Then, Mr. Witness, you said that your job was to investigate
25 incidents that have happened in Hrasnica. Is that it?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. If I understood you right in your testimony yesterday and in that
3 written statement, these investigations were always conducted together
4 with local police.
5 A. Yeah. They've -- we investigated in our way and they had their
6 investigation going parallel. We are not cooperating at all. We often
7 delegated them our resources, because the policeman was an earlier artist,
8 a painter or something, and he had not have -- did not have experiences.
9 Q. So you were helping local police and giving them all the technical
10 information that you had on the incidents; is that it?
11 A. We only gave them the results and we worked two UNMOs together and
12 helped consult them. They had their own things to do.
13 THE INTERPRETER: The witness is kindly asked to speak into the
14 microphone and not lean forward too much.
15 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Yesterday, we also delved into an investigation which occurred on
17 April 8, 1995, after an incident that resulted from an air bomb being
18 dropped on a house in Hrasnica. That's what -- do you agree with that?
19 A. Yes. It was -- the bomb landed on the 7th and we had an
20 investigation done on the 8th.
21 Q. If I understood things right, this happened during -- after lunch;
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Around what time, please?
25 A. I can't say the exact clock, but it was sometime on the day
1 because we had to negotiate our way out again, to get back our freedom of
3 Q. So in France we have lunch around 1.00 p.m. So is it after 1.00?
4 A. I believe it's around 1.00, because we had lunch around 12.00
6 Q. Now, I'll quickly move on to something else.
7 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please display the
8 other -- the other 65 ter map, 2823.
9 Q. This is a map that was shown to you yesterday. It's a bit more
10 detailed, at least when it comes to Hrasnica. So on this map, yesterday
11 you showed us the house where you were stationed at the time. Do you
12 remember that? You located the house.
13 A. Yes, I did, and I have -- when I saw the pictures from this --
14 what pictures we had some problems with yesterday, I located the house to
15 the far east for you. West, I believe, against Ilidza. We had our
16 accommodation just between the two marked spots and into the mountain
17 area. I think it was ...
18 Q. We'll correct that. So just for clarification, if I've understood
19 you right, Sierra Sierra 2 was this house. Sierra Sierra 2 was exactly
20 that house where you were stationed.
21 A. Yeah. We had a house -- the team location in -- I don't know if I
22 understand you right. In that house I was -- the houses are not on the
23 map, as we saw yesterday, where we were stationed. But the station team
24 building was a house of -- where we rented, civilian house.
25 Q. But did you call that -- did you call that Sierra Sierra 2?
1 A. That was Sierra Sierra 2 until Christmastime, and then it -- then
2 it was renamed to Sierra India 1, or Sierra Igman 1, because we were the
3 Sierra Igman team.
4 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I think if we could please display
5 the map. It's not on the screen yet, so I'll move on to something else, a
6 question that doesn't require a map.
7 Q. So we'll talk about this investigation that was conducted on April
8 8, 1995. The explosion occurred on the 7th, in the morning; April 7th, in
9 the morning --
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. -- is that it? Did it wake you up?
12 A. No --
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty?
14 A. -- we were actually in the living-room after breakfast, because
15 that day I was supposed to go into Sarajevo for a meeting, but -- so when
16 the explosion occurred, I was in the living-room together with one of the
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty, you no longer wish to make your
20 MR. DOCHERTY: Correct, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Can I just -- can I just put a question for
23 clarification, because I was a bit unsure about the answer that
24 Mr. Overgard gave to your question, counsel; namely, the question of
25 whether it was Sierra Sierra 2 which was destroyed by the bomb. That was
1 not the case.
2 THE WITNESS: No.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much.
4 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] No. No. I believe that we
5 understood each other.
6 Q. So you are saying, and you remembered, you actually remember,
7 whether it was a quiet day or whether there had been already sounds of
8 fire, of explosions.
9 A. No. So far that morning it was quiet. No small-arms fire,
10 nothing. So this just --
11 Q. And the day before, the 6th?
12 A. The 6th was -- I don't remember, but I don't think we had any
13 special investigation on the 6th.
14 Q. But since you're a fact witness here, can you tell us, if you
15 remember, whether this period was rather quiet? Or how would you describe
16 that period?
17 A. In April, it -- or March, late March and April, the fighting was
18 getting more intense. It was increasing, the firing, day by day.
19 Q. When you heard the explosion, I understand that you immediately
20 went out and you went on site. Now, what I'd like to know is how you
21 guessed exactly where the explosion had taken place.
22 A. That was very close to our accommodation and so we saw it. We
23 first tried to phone the civilian police, as we did, to inform them that
24 we wanted to investigate. There was no answer in the police station so we
25 went first past the site and went to the police station. There was nobody
1 there so then we went back to the site.
2 Q. So if I sum up what you've said, you went on site, you went to the
3 site where the explosion had taken place. You were able to note and to
4 see that the house had been completely destroyed. It's the house that we
5 saw yesterday.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And you saw that there was great damage on eight other houses
9 A. Yes, there were several other houses damaged as well.
10 Q. Yesterday, this was not mentioned, but by reading your written
11 statement at page 2 -- I believe that everyone has this statement now, and
12 you, too, Witness. Do you have your statement?
13 A. Yes, I have.
14 Q. And here you say that you did not see the body of the woman who
15 was killed.
16 A. Not at the site, no. I saw her on the morgue only.
17 Q. Then we see in your statement - and you repeated that earlier on -
18 then you walked to see the name of someone, Hakija, Hasan Efendic.
19 A. Efendic, I think that was the name, yes.
20 Q. Hasan Efendic. He was the local police inspector, wasn't he?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Then together with Mr. Hasan Efendic you went back to the site.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could you please tell me now roughly how much time this took, this
25 going from the site of the explosion to the police station and back? How
1 long did this whole thing take?
2 A. Not walked. We used our patrol vehicle. That's a Toyota, so --
3 but it --
4 Q. How long did it take, then? It was quicker.
5 A. That took approximately I believe -- from the explosion till we
6 came from the police station and into the site again, 20 minutes,
7 something like that.
8 Q. You're saying that the commander of the 4th Motorised Brigade of
9 the Bosnian army, I suppose it was the 1st Corps, you said that he had
10 already come to the site and that you saw him when you came back from the
11 local police station.
12 A. Yeah. He arrived to the site as we were looking around to get the
13 overview of what the damages are. So I was at the moment just looking
14 over their wall we saw on the picture yesterday that was broken, and I saw
15 some feet in the pile of bricks and stones there, inside the house.
16 That's when we were ordered away from the site.
17 Q. How did you know that this was the commander of the 4th Motorised
19 A. We had been in meetings with him earlier, and it was the -- our
20 interpreter of the corps who was calling me and saying that he was here
21 and wanted to talk to us.
22 Q. Then you said that this gentleman, the commander, gave you an
23 order. By the way, do you remember his name?
24 A. No, not at the moment. No.
25 Q. You said that he ordered you to leave the site of the explosion,
1 and you went to your base. We saw earlier on that the base was this house
2 that we've identified. Now we have the map displayed on screen. Can you
3 see the map?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And at the same time we'll correct the mistake we made yesterday.
6 So can you please show us on the map this place where you were
8 A. I can try. I have to push some buttons. Okay. Our accommodation
9 is more or less from this site here, I believe. I, yesterday, pointed up
10 in the area of the centre of Ilidza -- or Hrasnica, I mean. So we are
11 very close. Yeah, I said here, more or less, our house.
12 Q. Can you please immediately tell us where the incident took place,
13 where the explosion took place? Can you mark that on the map, please.
14 A. Yes. It's already marked as number 6 here.
15 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] So I'd like to have a number for
16 this map that has been marked by the witness, and maybe we could write an
17 A next to Sierra Sierra 2, or Sierra India.
18 Q. Could you please, Witness, write the letter A next to Sierra
19 Sierra 2.
20 A. [Marks].
21 Q. You've said, and that's on the transcript, that number 6 -- am I
22 right in saying that number 6 marks where we find the destroyed house?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you. So you left when you were ordered --
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please let the officer give the map a number.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That becomes Exhibit D15, Your Honours.
2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Q. So you said because you were ordered to -- you left because you
4 were ordered to do so by the commander of the 4th Motorised Brigade of the
5 BiH, and you went to this house that is marked with an A on the map. And
6 if I remember correctly, but you can correct me if I'm wrong, you said
7 that the explosion took place around 9.00. Then, if we think that it took
8 you about one hour to do all the things you've described, we could say
9 that you went back to the base around 10.00 or 10.30. Is that right?
10 A. It can be right, yes. Unfortunately, I lost my diary and so on
11 due to some hijacking later on in the duty. But it can be something like
12 that, yeah.
13 Q. Once you arrived at your base, you stayed there until 7.00 p.m.,
14 if I understand correctly.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And in that house there were two other soldiers with you -
17 soldiers or officers, I'm not quite sure what their rank was - two members
18 of the FreBat, the French battalion; is that right? And that is to be
19 found in your statement, at page 3 of your written statement, at the top
20 of the page, in the first paragraph. So you are saying:
21 "[In English] There were three BH soldiers guarding the house.
22 When we wanted to leave our accommodation they would not let us. Some
23 people from FreBat arrived."
24 A. Yes. We had a visit from FreBat, two officers and one
1 Q. [Interpretation] These three soldiers we mentioned earlier on,
2 they were already standing before your house when you arrived there?
3 A. Yes, they were. They came there at the same time as we arrived.
4 They was there.
5 Q. Were you escorted by anyone to your accommodation, to your base,
6 or was it just the two of you? Because, if I understand correctly, you
7 were with your British colleague there.
8 A. I was together with my British colleague and one interpreter, and
9 we went or drove to our accommodation on our own. As we arrived there,
10 there were these soldiers outside, and they came at the same time as us.
11 Q. So, if I understand you correctly, there were four military
12 personnel there from the United Nations; the two of you plus two members
13 of the FreBat, in that house. And the house itself was under the guard of
14 these three BiH soldiers. Is that right?
15 A. It was the team location, so I believe that most of the team,
16 except for those on leave and so on, were in the house. So the whole team
17 was gathered in the house that day.
18 Q. On top of the four of you, so the two of you plus the members of
19 the FreBat, and then all your colleagues, all the other colleagues of the
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And all of you were prevented from moving freely for a great deal
23 of time. You were prevented to do so by the three BiH soldiers; is that
25 A. Yes, that is correct.
1 Q. I would really like to know how they managed to keep you inside in
2 that way, to prevent you from going out, to sequester you.
3 A. First of all, when we heard that they are armed, we are not. The
4 FreBat soldiers were armed, but still we had no mandate to force our way.
5 This has to be solved on a headquarters level with the LOs and
6 commanders. So we are not provoking them as enemies. We are still
7 peacekeepers, not peacemakers. So for us, we respect that. And, yeah,
8 using the phone, using lines to the PTT building and the headquarters,
9 yeah, that was the main thing we could do. And no one will risk to be
11 Q. I fully understand. But we can confirm now that between around
12 11.00 and 7.00 p.m., you were locked in that house with all the members of
13 your teams and all the other people, and in order not to cause any
14 provocation to the members of the ABiH, you decided that you were going to
15 obey their orders.
16 A. Yes. We obeyed and stayed inside the house, tried to send our
17 interpreter out to talk with them if they -- to hear if they had received
18 any new orders about how long and so on, yes. We wanted to go out, of
19 course, to investigate, but we did not -- as I said, we did not provoke
21 Q. So at 7.00 p.m., and you say that yourself, and that's all -- it's
22 still on the 7th of April, 1995; right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thus between 11.00 and 7.00 p.m. you stay in the house, and at
25 7.00 p.m. you left the house.
1 A. Yes. Me and Mr. Calum Gunn went out to the site, yes, in the
2 afternoon, or in the evening.
3 Q. You went to the site but you did not conduct your own
4 investigation, did you?
5 A. No, we did not. We just had a look around, see how it was,
6 because it was starting to get dark and there was no use for us then to
7 investigate any further that night.
8 Q. Was this site protected? I mean to say, were people prevented
9 from entering the site?
10 A. Yes. It was marked and clearly stated that no one should enter.
11 And there were guards also in the area.
12 Q. Then you went to your base, and we can read in your statement -
13 and I'd like you to give us some further explanation about this - where
14 you said that you were again prevented from going out of the house, and
15 you were only able to leave the house the next day after lunch; is that
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. And who prevented you from leaving the house?
19 A. The BiH soldiers were back outside our house, the police
20 soldiers. We had to wait until this meeting had taken place with the
21 liaison officers, and so on.
22 Q. So you were there just to help them take stock of what had
23 happened following the incident that allegedly had been provoked by the
24 army of Republika Srpska; is that right?
25 A. Could I have the text on the screen here? Because I only have two
1 mikes now. So I can be sure I'm understanding the question.
2 Q. Mm-hmm.
3 A. Well, we are -- we are not there for -- only to take stock, but we
4 are there to patrol, report what we see, what we are doing during --
5 Q. That was not absolutely not the word I used. [In English] Try to
6 see that in English. You were there to help -- to help them.
7 A. We are there to -- not to help them. We are there to observe and
8 report what is happening and do that job for the UN. So we are still
9 impartial in the conflicts wherever we go.
10 Q. [Interpretation] Since you're impartial, could we conclude that
11 that's the reason why you were maltreated the way you were, because you
12 were impartial?
13 A. As I said yesterday, I think they wanted to get these experts from
14 Sarajevo, bomb/explosive experts from Sarajevo, and they didn't trust us
15 to do the right investigation in this case. This was so big that never
16 had -- things like that had never happened before.
17 Q. But on the 8th of April, after lunch you still went to the site,
18 and in your statement you said that you conducted the investigation
19 together with the Bosnian police.
20 A. Just as they were doing their investigation, we still -- they had
21 a language which we did not understand. So we did ours, just to see what
22 there was. That was the main reason. We had to clarify what caused all
23 this damage.
24 Q. So according to you, the investigation took place on the 8th of
25 April, after lunch.
1 A. Yes. That's when we investigated this, and I think if we can get
2 hold of this report from that -- the team reports from that day, we will
3 find that.
4 Q. Witness, I'll deal with this with another witness, because,
5 according to you, the investigation took place on the 8th of April, 1995,
6 because, you see, we have a report with another date, with a different
7 date. But you're not aware of what happened on the 7th because you were
8 held captive in this house. That's why I'm not going to deal with it
9 further with you.
10 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Excuse me, madam, but I have a few
11 questions I would like to put to the witness about the same matter.
12 Please tell us, Witness, with regard to this particular incident,
13 if I understand you correctly, on the 7th of April, between 8.00 and 9.00,
14 between the hours of 8.00 and 9.00, there is an explosion. Is that right?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct.
16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] So you went there, you went to the
17 site, on two occasions. I'm summing up what happened then. When you went
18 to the site on the second occasion, you took note of a number of damage.
19 A house had been completely destroyed, and eight other houses had been
20 damaged. There's a dead body there. And people are wearing camouflage
21 uniforms, or there is at least one camouflage uniform you see there.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes. That was this one inside the house, under the
24 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] The commander of the 4th Brigade
25 prevents you from going back to the site. So you are, so to speak, held
1 captive or confined, if I use the words of the Defence counsel. And when
2 you go back to the site on the next day, you do not find any of these
3 traces, any of these things. Is that the case?
4 THE WITNESS: We don't -- there were no bodies left there, but
5 there still were some remained, shrapnels and so on from the bombs and
6 from the rockets.
7 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. Now let me move on to
8 my questions. According to you - because you're a specialist and we know
9 that you are competent in this matter - according to you, the damage you
10 saw on the second occasion, when you went to the site on the second
11 occasion, was this damage due to or caused by the air bomb, or was this
12 damage caused by ammunition that would have been placed or located in the
13 destroyed house or the surrounding houses? And this is just a
14 possibility. Now let's --
15 THE WITNESS: I cannot say that this came from inside the house,
16 because all the bricks were drawn into the house. So this explosion had
17 been outside the house.
18 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. The camouflage uniform
19 you're talking about, can we say about this camouflage uniform that there
20 was at least one member of the armed forces in the house or around the
21 house? Can we deduct that from the camouflage uniform?
22 THE WITNESS: As we didn't -- we only saw his feet, I don't know
23 if he was a soldier, because a lot of people use these camouflage
24 trousers. It was, I think, something common and cheap for them to get.
25 But anyhow, if he's -- if a soldier was at home in his house and so on, he
1 is, according to the Convention, a civilian.
2 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. Now let me move on to
3 my very last question. Could this house have been considered as a
4 military target that could have been targeted by any military force or by
5 the Serbs, for example?
6 THE WITNESS: I cannot imagine that, no. There were no signs of
7 military flags, nothing outside of that house. It was not different from
8 all the other houses in Hrasnica.
9 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
10 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. During the investigation that you conducted on site on the 8th of
12 April, 1995, can you please tell us what method you used in order to
13 determine, to identify, the direction of the bomb? On the 8th, were you
14 in a position to establish already that this was an air bomb?
15 A. Yes, due to the shrapnels we found, and so on, this had to be --
16 we found -- in the discussion between Calum Gunn and me, we found that
17 this was an old English air bomb that the shrapnels had to come from. And
18 then we also saw the tails and the engines from the rockets, we saw the
19 remains of them. So for the direction, we had to rely on the -- more or
20 less, to the witness statements and the fact that the windows only in that
21 direction against Ilidza, along that street, were broken; not in front of
22 the bomb, only backwards. So something had gone -- and that also makes
23 the sound we heard just before the bomb came or exploded, it sounded for
24 us that it came from that direction, because there was a noise like an
25 aeroplane coming very low from that direction and into us. That's why we
1 were nearly on the floor when the bang came.
2 Q. In your house you throw yourself to the ground. That happened on
3 the 7th. But all the shrapnel, the rockets, you saw it on the 8th; is
4 that right?
5 A. Yeah. We saw some of it when we were there on the site, just
6 after -- before we were detained in our house, ordered to go back. But we
7 could not at that time take a close look to see what it was. But that was
8 on the 8th where we saw more remains. They also had gathered more of
10 Q. But what did you see on the 7th, then?
11 A. The 7th, we saw some, I would say, bits and pieces of bombshell,
12 and we saw that it has to be -- at least of the one of the engines. But
13 at that time we could not see what it was to be sure. That was only on
14 the 8th. And then we can start to take notes and make drawings of the
15 site and the houses around.
16 Q. I'm not quite sure. It may be a problem of translation, but you
17 said that on the 7th you were not sure that you had seen all these pieces,
18 or am I wrong?
19 A. On the 7th, we just -- we saw there was, as I say, bits and
20 pieces, shrapnels, metal pieces, but we were not able, or we did not also
21 have the time to have a closer look at it.
22 Q. Therefore, you didn't look at them very closely, but just in the
23 way you looked, you were able to see these bits and pieces, these small
24 pieces; is that right?
25 A. The smaller they are, the -- you could say some 20, 30
1 centimetres, some of them. But, as I say, we could not stay. We still
2 had a question at 7.00 in the evening: What was this?
3 Q. Indeed. In your statement, page 3, first paragraph still, right
4 at the end of it, I mean the first paragraph that starts with the
5 words "When we came ..." there you said that you were able to go in the
6 evening to the site:
7 [In English] "The first day we could not find anything, no
9 A. No, due to the fact that it was getting dark when we were there,
10 the evening. That was after the meeting with the security officer. We
11 did not collect anything or could not see any special things at that
12 time. But what we saw anyhow, it has to be -- just stay there where it
13 was, not to be picked up.
14 Q. [Interpretation] Yesterday and today you mentioned information
15 gathered from eyewitnesses. Did you obtain this information on the 8th?
16 A. Yes, that would be on the 8th we got that information. The 7th we
17 were not given information at all.
18 Q. These eyewitnesses, were they English speaking or were they people
19 who spoke the language? The local people, I mean.
20 A. It was the local people and the statements came through our
22 Q. However, did you yourself write down the summary, the minutes of
23 the statements yourself, or was it done only in what is called here B/C/S?
24 A. The summary of this one, or what ...
25 Q. You see, you relied -- and you said it yourself. In order to
1 establish from which direction the air bomb came, you relied on the
2 testimony of eyewitnesses. So you obtained this on the 8th through your
3 interpreter. Therefore, you were able to ascertain the contents of their
4 testimony, and I asked you whether this was put down in writing, and
5 whether it was done in English or not at all, to make it possible for you
6 to see what was in there.
7 A. I was -- these statements were taken by, I don't remember, one of
8 the team members, and I don't remember who it was. But that together with
9 the fact that the damage of the windows and so on went in one direction,
10 and what this witness said just -- that makes it. So that was the
11 conclusion we could take on that.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can I ask you something? Without the statement
13 from the witness, would you have been able to determine the direction from
14 which the bomb came?
15 THE WITNESS: We only then could assume, from what I mentioned,
16 this window, that it had come from that direction. I think -- I don't
17 believe that we had other indications. So that would -- that will be the
18 conclusion anyhow, that it came from that direction. But I'm not so much
19 an expert on this type of weapon that I can say exactly, to say that
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Yes, I
23 was planning to put the same question as you just did, Mr. President.
24 Q. And we heard that you were no expert in this type of weapon, but,
25 Witness, somehow yesterday you described the weapon. You said that it is
1 a weapon you cannot control. I mean the air bomb, that it is difficult or
2 impossible to control. Is it right? Is that what you stated?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. So as far as this description, I don't know whether you said that
5 yesterday too, but in your written statement, third paragraph, around the
6 middle of the page you said this:
7 [In English] "You have no control after launching the bomb."
8 [Interpretation] Can you confirm this?
9 A. Yes, I said so, and ...
10 Q. Again, I mean that is quite obvious. I'm really unable to
11 understand, and I'm no expert at all in matters of weapons. I'm a woman,
12 after all, and I did not do any military service. But my feeling is that,
13 looking into this, as I did last year, I was amazed to see that there were
14 a lot of weapons or projectiles that were launched and that could no
15 longer be controlled. There were a lot of pieces or elements. Yesterday,
16 for instance, we had to stop because there was a storm around. So there
17 are a lot of things or forces that do, if not control, influence the
18 direction, the location. Say, if you take a shell, it's bound to fall.
19 It cannot be controlled once it is launched. Once a mortar shell is
20 launched, it can not be controlled. Am I right or is this totally wrong?
21 A. When you have launched it, it will go and land. You cannot do
22 anything to stop it or to change the direction. It's not controlled.
23 Today you have weapons you can control, but not weapons like this.
24 Q. So based on your experience in Bosnia, say somebody -- or NATO,
25 say, because towards the end of the conflict NATO became involved in this
1 conflict. Maybe they did have guided missiles, but the air bombs used
2 then, were they the only weapon that could not be controlled once they
3 were launched?
4 A. No. As I say, mortars and artillery, grenades, are sent out and
5 you cannot hit some -- hit a bull's-eye with them, that's for sure.
6 Q. Thank you very much for your help on this, because, really, in
7 this matter I don't understand much when it comes to weapons. I can
8 confirm that. Thank you.
9 Very quickly I'll deal with the last subject. It has to do
10 with -- well, we have the map here on the screen, and I'd like you to show
11 everybody the famous headquarters of the 4th Brigade. Yesterday, you
12 mentioned the headquarters of a company. I suppose the company was part
13 of the brigade.
14 A. Yes, the company is part of the brigade.
15 Q. Could you please show us the headquarters on the map. And then
16 I'll ask for a number and I'd like to tender the map once it's marked.
17 What you're marking right now, what is it? Is that the company?
18 A. That's the brigade headquarters. I believe it was -- it was one
19 of these houses somewhere.
20 Q. Could it be marked as B for brigade, or "QG" in French would be
21 headquarters, brigade.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let it be marked B.
23 THE WITNESS: [Marks].
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Or HB.
25 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Then you spoke about the company headquarters. Can we see that?
2 A. That was the combat -- yes. Front line. There are some buildings
3 in this area here, I believe it was.
4 Q. Mm-hmm.
5 A. I cannot go in detail because the buildings are not on the map, so
6 I don't remember exactly.
7 Q. It cannot be seen on the map. Can we scroll down or, rather,
8 scroll up for us to see. Is it possible to scroll it up?
9 A. No, the buildings there are not marked, I think. The normal
10 houses --
11 Q. I know, but ...
12 THE REGISTRAR: For counsel's benefit, once the witness has marked
13 on the map, it can't be manipulated. So we can either have him -- we can
14 move the map and have him remark, or we'll have to keep the map where it
15 is now.
16 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. Court
17 Deputy. That was very useful. So we can erase the second marking because
18 it is not accurate. We can keep only as evidence the map showing the
19 location of the brigade headquarters.
20 Can that be done? Can I have a number?
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can that be done, Mr. Registrar?
22 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. That will be admitted as
23 Exhibit D16.
24 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Now we can have the map again but
25 without any marking. I hope we can move it up, please, so that the major
1 can see and show us the company headquarters.
2 Q. Can you do this, sir?
3 A. I can only see the general area, and it had a marking up here.
4 Q. Yes, yes.
5 A. In this area here.
6 Q. Fine.
7 A. Okay. Here, in this area, I believe.
8 Q. All right. I see.
9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we mark this as C? Would
10 that be suitable, Mr. President?
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, let that be done.
12 THE WITNESS: [Marks].
13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] C for company.
14 Q. Because I can see the territory of Kovaci which you mention in
15 your statement as being the location where there were four mortars
16 discovered in April. Would you be able to show us the position?
17 A. The mortars were down there -- in there. In this area here. I
18 can't be more accurate.
19 Q. Thank you. Please could you mark this location with a 4M?
20 A. [Marks].
21 Q. 4M.
22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] And I shall ask Mr. Court Deputy
23 to give us a number.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as Exhibit D17, Your
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] May I proceed?
4 Q. Here again I rely on your military knowledge. Could you tell me
5 whether -- in here I've got a ruler, and we have the scale. We can see
6 then in a rather small limited space between the headquarters we've just
7 seen, the brigade headquarters, and then we saw the company headquarters
8 and thereafter the mortars that were discovered but that did exist at a
9 given point in time. It's not a big portion of territory, is it? Some 1
10 kilometre or 1.2 kilometres.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Docherty.
12 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, I respectfully object to that
13 question. There is a scale on the map. The areas are clearly marked.
14 And to have the witness guess or characterise the distances when it can be
15 calculated precisely from the map will only cloud the record.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: He's in a position, you say, to give the distance
18 MR. DOCHERTY: More than that, Your Honour. Anyone is in a
19 position to give the distance precisely, because in the lower left of the
20 exhibit that has now been introduced as D17 there is a scale. Therefore,
21 from the green dot that's marked as 6 to the 4M, or to the C, can be
22 calculated precisely, and there is no need to ask the witness to give an
23 imprecise calculation for the record.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.
25 Ms. Isailovic, with that in mind, reformulate your question.
1 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, I have the ruler in my hand,
2 and I did measure. This is the reason why I'm asking of the witness to
3 tell me whether it is, indeed, roughly 1 to 1.2 kilometres as the distance
4 between the company and the brigade, because from the brigade to 4M it's
5 about 100 to 200 metres precisely.
6 Could the witness, based on his memory - of course, this is not
7 precise; this will be corroborated by further testimony - but on the basis
8 of his recollection, since he was an eyewitness -- that's the only the
9 basis. I'm not asking for exact things. I do agree with the statement
10 made by the Prosecution. I do have my ruler and anybody can calculate.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. What is your answer?
12 THE WITNESS: Well, this would be guessing here, but I think she
13 said the brigade headquarters. But from the company headquarters to the
14 mortar, which was the closest, and they are still more than a kilometre
15 away from the civilian areas, so it's -- the weapons are not that
16 inaccurate when we are coming to mortars. Within an area, you can say you
17 will hit but not ...
18 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. This was not my concern right now. My question is as follows:
20 Because we have two headquarters, therefore, I suppose there are soldiers
21 as well, soldiers that move about the headquarters; right?
22 A. Yes, I would say. And there are, of course, forces in a pocket
23 like this.
24 Q. And I guess that there are other military facilities that are
25 necessary to the running of the headquarters.
1 A. These headquarters were in a civilian house, a normal house, but I
2 think emptied for civilians, as I know. But I can't say that clearly and
3 be sure because I did not go into them myself.
4 Q. Precisely. As a military man, I'm asking you this: A
5 headquarters for any unit require other facilities. This is just military
6 logic. You need some warehouse for the weapons you have stored. Were
7 there any other military facilities around the headquarters?
8 A. No, not as I could see. But I don't know what was inside all the
9 buildings, that is all. I cannot say that.
10 Q. Thank you. Perfect. Very last topic, a minor topic. Yesterday,
11 we had brewing the Belgian weapon, 12.7 millimetres in calibre, in
12 territory held bit ABiH, in Igman; is that right? And you explained that
13 it could not reach Hrasnica but only Republika Srpska-held territory.
14 This is to be found in your proofing notes. Do you remember that? Do you
15 remember your statement yesterday?
16 A. Yes, I remember most of this. I don't know if you're absolutely
17 right. We saw them first on Igman, the first time, and were not -- and
18 that was BiH forces, yes. That was the sniper gun, the 12.7.
19 Observations of Serbian forces having this weapon, I cannot confirm that.
20 But I know we had had incoming fire from the Serbia area of 12.7.
21 Q. You are saying that in territory held by the ABiH, that is, Mount
22 Igman, you saw that weapon.
23 A. I saw that weapon passing one soldier driving one day, yes. That
24 was I think in March, but I cannot say because, as I say, all my notes are
1 Q. You can therefore confirm that on Mount Igman and on the road to
2 Igman you also had forces, troops, soldiers, or units of the ABiH.
3 A. Of course they are using positions in the hillside there from one
4 time, but there was no -- no places I saw they had -- or stayed all the
5 time. And not on the road. The road was used also by the military, yes,
6 for sure, but mostly civilian traffic, white trucks, blue trucks, and so
7 on, and private cars.
8 Q. If you wanted to go to Igman or if they wanted to go to Igman, did
9 those soldiers go through Hrasnica? Was that the usual route?
10 A. Yes, that was the usual route through Hrasnica. They entered the
11 hillside up to an area called -- on the convoy road, called the bus-stop,
12 and there they collected and went. They were collected by cars and went
13 out into the mountains areas.
14 Q. This would be my next question: This famous bus-stop, it was not
15 a bus-stop, but was it possible from there to use another vehicle to go to
16 Mount Igman?
17 A. Yes, from there they could -- they were in shelter from direct
18 fire, so they could upload vehicles there and drive up to Igman.
19 Q. In your written statement you also mentioned tunnels, and the exit
20 of that tunnel, you said, was often targeted by the army of Republika
21 Srpska. Do you remember where the exit was?
22 A. Yeah. It was in the -- called the Sokolovici area, outside. Just
23 a couple of houses on the field there.
24 Q. Mm-hmm. Major, at the time did you know whether the tunnel was
25 used and what it was used for?
1 A. No. They started to dig this hole there. Yeah, it was January,
2 February, something like that. And we passed it very often, the hole they
3 were digging there, just to see what it was, trying to ask the question,
4 What are you doing? And they just told us they were digging holes for
5 collecting water, and so on, a lot of blah, blah, of course, just to lead
6 us off. But in the end they had made this tunnel, yes. But I don't think
7 it was finished before I left.
8 Q. We're lucky we know this from other witnesses.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic, how much longer will you be?
10 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, five to ten minutes
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll take the break now.
13 --- Recess taken at 11.01 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.27 a.m.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please continue. Ten minutes.
16 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Ten
17 minutes will be plenty.
18 Q. I would like to start where we stopped before the break, so let's
19 go back to the tunnel. You said, and I quote, "We weren't really allowed
20 to look and investigate and find out what was really happening with that
21 tunnel." Is that it?
22 A. Yes, we were not allowed to stay too close there in the beginning.
23 Q. And if my memory is right, you also said, regarding the
24 headquarters, that there also you were not really allowed to inspect what
25 had happened in the surroundings. Is that true also?
1 A. We did think about us entering houses around and the headquarters.
2 We only visit that we had into headquarters was for meetings, and that was
3 different from one day or another, where we were not aware who did the
4 meetings, team leader or someone else. We had -- for our own security, in
5 that area of the company headquarters, we did not inspect or patrol that
6 area too much because of the firing risks. We had incidents there where
7 our car got hit. So, yeah, we did not inspect those houses any more.
8 Q. Then around those houses you said that there were soldiers around
9 those houses, that in Kovaci you found mortars. Can you tell us who
10 discovered those mortars?
11 A. The mortars were discovered by our team. I don't remember who it
12 was. They stood there for a while some days and then they were removed.
13 And they were pointing in the direction west, you could say, to the Ilidza
15 Q. So I think, from what I understood you said earlier, you were not
16 really allowed to circulate freely. So you found that by chance, because
17 you weren't really allowed to move around to do your inspections; right?
18 A. We were -- most of the time, about these incidents we're talking
19 about, we were allowed to go. But into the front line area we had to give
20 the message that we wanted to inspect that. We had three cars in our
21 team; one car regularly on Mount Igman and two cars to do both patrolling
22 and administrative tasks, for getting food, so on. So I would say one car
23 for patrolling more or less the whole time, but then you had the manpower,
24 how many of us left in the team that day. Some were on leave; some were
25 at meetings, and so on.
1 So what you ask for, we had had no restrictions for movement on a
2 daily basis normally. It was a -- we had to -- to go into any special
3 sites close to the confrontation line, we had to give the message to the
4 commander. So sometimes they said -- could say that, No, this will not be
5 secure for you; we don't really want you there. They did not deny us, but
6 we -- of course, as we are UNMOs, we also tried to have a good
7 relationships. We didn't provoke them.
8 Q. How long did it take before you could -- between asking to go to a
9 place at the confrontation line and then being given the okay? Did it
10 take a few hours, did it take a few days, or what?
11 A. It could be an answer on the phone immediately. So we had an
12 interpreter phoning to brigade headquarters and we got the answer at once
13 so that we could perform our task for that day without further planning.
14 Q. Did this mean, for example, that you're calling on the phone and
15 immediately you can go to the confrontation line, right after your phone
17 A. Yes, we could go to that area and do what task we were supposed
18 to, if it was normally just patrolling or doing a special task in that
19 area, if it was a sniper accident there or if we had to just stop and have
20 an observation post to see what was happening.
21 Q. Mm-hmm. So I'm talking about the confrontation line. That's just
22 for the confrontation line.
23 A. Yes. That was the only place we had to -- the confrontation line
24 was one area where we had to just tell them we wanted to go, but otherwise
25 we had freedom of movement. We were driving up and down the convoy road
1 as we wanted. We went to Sarajevo as we wanted. So no problem with that,
2 that we have to go through the Sokolovic, Butmir areas, so on.
3 Q. Well, I'm interested in this: You're saying you have to give --
4 you have to signal that you're going there. So I'd like to know how long
5 it takes between signalling that you want to go someplace and the moment
6 where you actually arrive in the confrontation line. How long does it
7 take? That's exactly my question.
8 A. Okay. As we get the answer, normally we got that answer at once
9 and then we could go, and then it was just the driving time from
10 accommodation to confrontation line and that's not many minutes. So no
11 problem with that.
12 Q. That was my question. Thank you.
13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] That was my last question, Your
14 Honour, and now I'm done with my cross-examination. Thank you.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Ms. Isailovic.
16 Before you re-examine, may I take you, Major, back to the question
17 that I had earlier asked. I earlier asked you whether the conclusion that
18 you had arrived as to the direction from which the bomb came could have
19 been made without the benefit of the statements from the witnesses, and
20 your answer was yes.
21 THE WITNESS: It will then be --
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm just asking. That was the position. You
23 said yes.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. So I want to ask you: Was that conclusion,
1 in fact, made by you before you had the benefit of the statements from the
3 THE WITNESS: That conclusion was taken by us, by the team, me and
4 Calum Gunn, I believe, and maybe some others during this --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Was that --
6 THE WITNESS: -- So --
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- conclusion noted?
8 THE WITNESS: I believe it -- I don't know how it was reported to
9 the headquarters.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's your practice in relation to --
11 THE WITNESS: Normally, of course, you have to give the direction,
12 if you have an investigation. So I believe so, yes.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: It would be noted.
14 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: And could be found.
16 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: And the statements from the witnesses, where
18 would those be?
19 THE WITNESS: These statements were delivered to our
20 headquarters. Like all papers we were writing, the would deliver them
21 there. So I hope -- from there, I don't know.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: How many witnesses did you examine?
23 THE WITNESS: This witness was -- I had one, but others had talked
24 with other people, and this was a lot of paper done. And I believe that
25 was Calum Gunn collecting it, so I can't say how many. I can't remember.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
2 Mr. Docherty.
3 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour.
4 Re-examination by Mr. Docherty:
5 Q. Major, I want to start my re-examination at the same point as His
6 Honour Judge Robinson. You mentioned some of the things you used to
7 determine the direction from which this air bomb had come. In your
8 accommodation, did you also hear this air bomb before it landed and
10 A. Yes. As I mentioned, we were in our accommodation and we heard
11 this sound. Something was coming, like a C130 or something, like an
12 aeroplane coming in. That was just to say I was faced against where the
13 explosion was, but I had it on my left ear and I was on my way down when
14 the explosion came, because this was something not familiar, something
15 new, this sound.
16 Q. From the sound, could you tell anything about the direction of
17 travel of this bomb?
18 A. No. We came -- I was inside so that was impossible. But as I had
19 this sound in the left ear, it had to be on the west side of our
21 Q. And just for the sake of completeness, what is to the west of your
23 A. That is against the confrontation line with the company
25 Q. Now, you were also asked some questions by counsel for the Defence
1 about military traffic on what is called the convoy road. Do you remember
2 those questions?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And in those questions let me ask this: How far is it from the
5 scene of this air bomb incident to the convoy road?
6 A. It is quite a good distance from that. I cannot say in metres,
7 but a kilometre or more.
8 Q. And that question about distances raises the question of guiding
9 ammunition once it has been fired. Again, counsel for the Defence asked
10 you a series of questions about that. Do you remember those?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I want to ask you about three different types of weapons -
13 mortars, artillery pieces, and air bombs. Before it's fired, can a mortar
14 be aimed?
15 A. It's not direct weapons. You are not aiming, but you are giving
16 it a load, a starter to -- an elevation.
17 Q. Mm-hmm.
18 A. And then you can tell where it's going to land. If you don't have
19 the data about the wind in the higher levels, and so on, you're not sure
20 but this is where you want it to go.
21 Q. So you can make some adjustments --
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. -- so that the mortar falls, shell falls, in the area you want it
24 to fall.
25 A. Yes, yes.
1 Q. What about artillery pieces? Can they be aimed?
2 A. No. That's the same with them, but they are bigger. There's more
3 explosives in artillery.
4 Q. But, again, when you say it's the same, only bigger, do I --
5 A. They can go for bombing areas, not specific targets.
6 Q. And can an air bomb even be aimed as to a general area?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. All right. And then an air bomb, as you mentioned yesterday, does
9 not have a guidance system; is that correct?
10 A. This type we're talking about here does not have, no.
11 Q. And so an air bomb is going to come down, if I'm correct, when the
12 fuel runs out.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Wherever --
15 A. Wherever.
16 Q. -- wherever that happens to be.
17 A. Yes. Or it can also be equipped with a timed fuse --
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. -- a timer. So you can predict that somewhere 60 seconds from
20 firing, or something like that, then -- where it can be. That's the only
21 thing you have. That's very inaccurate.
22 Q. Yesterday, on direct examination, I asked you if, in your air
23 force career, you had learned what sorts of weapons are suited to
24 different types of battlefield conditions. Do you remember that?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Do mortars have uses in different battlefield situations?
2 A. Mortars are to take out positions mostly, to clear areas.
3 Q. So the answer would be yes, they have a military function.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Artillery, does it have a military function?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And the question I put to you yesterday: Is there any battlefield
8 situation in which an aircraft bomb with rocket engines strapped to it
9 would be the weapon of choice for a commander?
10 A. Not to my knowledge.
11 MR. DOCHERTY: I have no further questions, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Major, that concludes your evidence. Thank you
13 for giving it, and you may now leave.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
15 [The witness withdrew]
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: There's a decision which I'll now give on a
17 Prosecution motion for admission of written statements.
18 On the 11th of January, the Prosecution filed a motion for
19 admission of written statements pursuant to Rules 92 bis and ter. The
20 Prosecution seeks the admission into evidence of the statements of, inter
21 alia, Witnesses W35 and W83 pursuant to Rule 92 ter. Yesterday, the
22 Defence indicated that they had no objection to the admission of these
23 statements. The Trial Chamber grants the Prosecution motion insofar as it
24 relates to Witnesses 35 and 83 and admits these statements into evidence
25 upon fulfillment of the conditions set out in the Rule.
1 Mr. Waespi, your next witness.
2 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, before the next witness comes in, the
3 completion of Mr. Overgard's testimony means I am finished with examining
4 witnesses for some time. May I be excused from further attendance.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, certainly.
6 MR. DOCHERTY: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 [The witness enters court]
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
9 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
10 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may begin, Mr. Waespi.
14 MR. WAESPI: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning, Your
15 Honours. I just have one point of clarification for this witness. He has
16 a very prominent position back home; he's the Minister of the Interior of
17 his province, and he needs to go back at the end of today. Also, his visa
19 I will lead the witness for about an hour, so before the lunch
20 break, and I really hope that Your Honours, with your questions, and the
21 Defence will be concluding their questions by the end of today, which I
22 understand is 4.15.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, we'll go on until 5.00, if necessary.
24 MR. WAESPI: I'm much obliged. Thank you very much,
25 Mr. President.
1 WITNESS: GHULAM MUHAMMAD MOHATAREM
2 Examination by Mr. Waespi:
3 Q. Good morning, Mr. Mohatarem. Can you please state your name for
4 the record.
5 A. My name is Ghulam Muhammad Mohatarem.
6 Q. And what is your current position?
7 A. I'm the Home Secretary of the Government of Sindh, the southern
8 province of Pakistan.
9 Q. And you do have a military career, a professional military career,
10 behind you. Can you very, very briefly tell us the steps in your military
11 career, please.
12 A. I retired -- I was commissioned in the army in 1971. I served
13 during my service in the tank corps of the Pakistan army. I've been in
14 Bosnia as the chief UN Military Observer. I've also served as a defence
15 attache in Myanmar and Bangladesh. I retired after 33 years of service in
17 Q. Thank you very much. Mr. Mohatarem, you mentioned you were in
18 Bosnia. Can you tell Their Honours the time you were in Bosnia.
19 A. I was there from mid-February till early January, 1995 to 1996.
20 Q. So that will be February 1995 to January 1996.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you, sir. You mentioned that you were the chief UN Military
23 Observer in observe. Can you tell Their Honours what your job was.
24 A. The job as the chief UN Military Observer was to monitor the
25 agreements that were made between different warring factions, to conduct
1 negotiations with different warring factions, to advise the UNPROFOR
2 commander. While I was there, it was Lieutenant General Rupert Smith. I
3 also had a responsibility towards monitoring the movement of humanitarian
5 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, who was your direct superior? To whom did
6 you report?
7 A. I reported to the chief UN observer -- chief UN Military Observer
8 for former Yugoslavia based in Zagreb.
9 Q. Yes. Do go on.
10 A. Since I was placed in Sarajevo in the UNPROFOR headquarters, I had
11 regular interaction with the commander of the UNPROFOR.
12 Q. You mentioned that you were the chief UN Military Observer. Can
13 you tell us who these military observers, commonly abbreviated as UNMOs,
15 A. The UNMOs were -- first I must clarify that while I was chief UN
16 Military Observer for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for administrative reasons,
17 within the area I was known as the regional senior military observer for
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina because there was an equivalent on the Croatian side.
19 The UNMOs were military officers drawn from different countries of
20 the world. While I was there, there were about 350 observers,
21 approximately, drawn from around 38, 39 countries.
22 Q. And these 350 observers were spread all over Bosnia.
23 A. They were spread all over Bosnia.
24 Q. Now, was there a specific unit that was focusing on Sarajevo, on
25 the sector Sarajevo?
1 A. Yes. The UNMO headquarters in Bosnia, that is, my headquarters,
2 was divided into -- it had subunits; one based in Tuzla, which was called
3 the Sector North; one in Sarajevo, which was called Sector Sarajevo; and
4 one in the south, based in Konjic, which was called Sector South.
5 Then I had a liaison officer, which was an extension of my own
6 office. This was based in Pale. They were administratively and
7 logistically -- logistically and operationally part of my own
9 Then we had teams in the enclaves; one was based in Gorazde, the
10 other was in Zepa, and there was one in Srebrenica.
11 Q. And I take it that you got information reports from all these
13 A. Regularly, yes. Twice a day.
14 Q. So is it fair to say you had a fairly good take on what was
15 happening not only in Sarajevo but also in Bosnia.
16 A. In fact, the UNMO headquarters was the centre of all information
17 that was flowing.
18 Q. Did you have a head UNMO who was in charge of Sector Sarajevo?
19 A. Sector Sarajevo had a lieutenant colonel in command. They were --
20 I remember one of them, because it was a one-year rotation so people would
21 change. I remember one of them was Colonel Mehboob from Bangladesh.
22 Q. Thank you very much for your answer. Let's go now into various
23 areas of experiences you made. You told us that you were in contact with
24 the warring factions for various reasons.
25 Now, let's first turn to the Bosnian army, the government's army,
1 "ABiH," as it's commonly known. Did you have contact with liaison
2 persons in the ABiH?
3 A. On the ABiH side there was one contact officer who was the liaison
4 officer with us. His name was General Mustafa Hajrolahovic. I may be
5 wrong in pronunciation. From the political side, from the government
6 side, there was Mr. Hasan Muratovic. I think he was later the Prime
7 Minister of Bosnia.
8 Q. In terms of General Mustafa Hajrolahovic, did you have an opinion
9 about his influence over military activities in Sarajevo?
10 A. I think he was very influential. He had been the corps commander
11 of the Bosnian Sarajevo corps before he was assigned this assignment for
12 liaison purposes. So he had a very good hold on whatever was happening in
14 Q. Do you remember an incident when you saw shooting emanating from
15 the sector, the UN camp area, and you tried to have it stopped?
16 A. This incident did occur. Since the Serbs retaliated and a mortar
17 shell fell near the French troops, therefore, I contacted General Mustafa
18 and immediately got the firing ceased.
19 Q. And just to make sure, who was firing from near the UN camp area?
20 A. It was an ABiH mortar.
21 Q. Let me turn to the Bosnian Serb army whom you were also in touch
22 with. Were you able to get into immediate contact with General Mladic
23 upon your arrival?
24 A. No. I had difficulties initially for about six weeks, four to six
25 weeks, that I wasn't given an audience by Mr. Mladic, General Mladic, or
1 General Karadzic. I think the arrival of the chief UNMO who was a Muslim
2 was not liked by the team there. But over a certain period, I was able to
3 establish a rapport with everybody and I could make my way to them. And
4 on a number of occasions I subsequently saw General Mladic and ...
5 Q. Did you have contact with senior officers of the Bosnian Serb
6 corps around Sarajevo?
7 A. The direct dealing with these -- with the Romanija Corps, I think
8 that was the name, the Romanija Corps, was by the Sector Sarajevo. But as
9 the senior UN Military Observer in the region, I also -- in fact,
10 initially when I arrived, I called on General Milosevic, who was the
11 commander there. That was in the very first week or second week. And
12 then subsequently a number of times I did visit the Romanija Corps; once
13 specifically on the request of the senior military observer of Sector
14 Sarajevo, Colonel Mehboob. And on other occasions also I did visit
15 Lukavica barracks and, you know, the Romanija Corps headquarters.
16 Q. Were there other officers from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps you
17 remember having been in touch with during those times?
18 A. Colonel Indic. He was -- because we had to deal with him on the
19 movement of the convoys. And then he was probably the Chief of Staff, one
20 of the senior staff officers, very influential. And whatever we wanted to
21 get done, a word from Indic did move things.
22 Then there was another gentleman. I think his name was Colonel
23 Luganja. My pronunciation may not be correct. He was also there. He was
24 a security officer or something, and I did come in contact with him.
25 Q. We will get back to some of these gentlemen you mention in a
1 moment, but let me turn to the overall picture in Sarajevo and perhaps in
2 Bosnia. While you were in Sarajevo, Brigadier Mohatarem, was there
3 shelling in Sarajevo?
4 A. I think shelling, it was so regular that if it was not there on a
5 particular day you felt disturbed that something bigger is going to come
7 Q. And what was shelled? Civilian areas? Military targets? Could
8 you tell the Trial Chamber what you could observe and what reports you got
9 from your subordinate UNMOs.
10 A. The exchange of fire continued on the confrontation lines between
11 the two militaries, but the shelling was not so well aimed. It was
12 targeted at civilians, and the number of casualties that would be on the
13 UN record would indicate that civilians were regularly targeted.
14 Q. And who targeted the civilians? Who was the source of fire?
15 A. The Romanija Corps.
16 Q. Now, could you, from your experience, distinguish a pattern of
17 shelling of civilian areas in Sarajevo related to military activities or
18 other activities that happened elsewhere in Bosnia?
19 A. Shelling was a regular process, but it would increase in intensity
20 if the Serbs wanted to make a point, or if they were serving as -- they
21 were facing reverses somewhere in any of these sectors, the shelling would
23 I must bring it to the notice of the Honourable Court here that
24 Sarajevo itself was a kind of a theatre. I think the war in Bosnia by
25 itself was the first war which was electronically transmitted the world
1 over. Everybody saw it. What happened in Sarajevo was transmitted within
2 minutes everywhere in the world; therefore, it was easier for anybody to,
3 you know, to gauge the mood of the Serbs on a particular day, in terms of
4 you could relate the shelling to what was going on in the other parts and
5 what they wanted to convey to the world.
6 Q. You told us a moment ago, Brigadier, that the Sarajevo-Romanija
7 Corps was the source of fire. Now, who controlled these shelling
8 activities, in your opinion?
9 A. The commander of the Romanija Corps.
10 Q. Now, did you personally experience fire? Were you hit at any time
11 during the time you were in Sarajevo?
12 A. I was -- a number of times I came under fire. My vehicle was hit
13 once on the Igman road coming into Sarajevo from Kiseljak. And once my --
14 the aircraft I was travelling on with Mr. Akashi, coming from Zagreb to
15 Sarajevo, that was hit. And I think another occasion my vehicle took a
16 shell, a shell splinter.
17 Q. Perhaps if we could elaborate a bit more on these two examples.
18 Can you tell us more about the aircraft you were travelling in with
19 Mr. Akashi.
20 A. We were flying in from Zagreb in this aircraft. When it was
21 coming in to land, it was hit by a 14.5-millimetre gun, an anti-aircraft
22 gun, from the Serb side.
23 It would be interesting to tell you that the next day, President
24 Suharto from Indonesia was supposed to come in, and I was asked to convey
25 to the Serb side that if anything happens to that aircraft, NATO would be
1 let loose on the Bosnian Serb positions. And the next day the aircraft
2 came in and it wasn't fired on at all, and Mr. Suharto came in and went
4 Q. You told us that you were asked to convey to the Serb side that if
5 anything happens to that aircraft, NATO would be let loose on the Bosnian
6 Serb positions. Do you remember to whom from the Serb side you relayed
7 that message?
8 A. I won't exactly remember, but I think I conveyed it to Colonel
9 Indic on one side, in the Sarajevo Corps, and through my liaison team in
10 Pale, I conveyed it to General Milutinovic, I believe, the Chief of Staff
11 there in Pale.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can I ask you, Brigadier, in the absence of the
13 warning that you gave, in your view, was there a real possibility that the
14 aircraft with General Suharto would have been fired on?
15 THE WITNESS: There was always the possibility, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Because that would have been a civilian aircraft,
17 would it not, or would it have been a military aircraft?
18 THE WITNESS: The aircraft that we were travelling in --
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no, the aircraft taking General Suharto.
20 THE WITNESS: I won't remember. But the aircraft which I was
21 travelling in, it was shot at at clear mark and view, and it was
22 Mr. Akashi's personal aircraft that was recognised in the theatre.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
24 Yes, Mr. Waespi.
25 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. Let me go back, sir, if I may, to the other example you mentioned
2 where you were personally shot at on the Igman route. Do you remember
3 by -- and I think -- no, I don't think you mentioned. Do you remember
4 what weaponry was used to shoot at you?
5 A. It was a 14.5 anti-aircraft gun which was shooting at a fairly
6 long distance. I couldn't see the gun, actually, because we used to move
7 very fast on the Igman road, wherever the vehicle was exposed to firing.
8 There was -- there were two portions on the Igman road where the vehicles
9 were exposed to shooting from the Serb gunners.
10 Q. And the vehicle you were travelling with, can you tell Their
11 Honours whether it was marked.
12 A. It was marked. It was a UN vehicle, white coloured, boldly
13 written "UN," and it also flew a UN flag.
14 Q. We were talking about shelling. Let's very briefly talk about
15 sniping, Mr. Mohatarem. What experience did you and your subordinate
16 UNMOs make about sniping during the time you were in Sarajevo?
17 A. Sniping happened mainly along the confrontation lines, and in the
18 streets leading onto -- where there was a visibility for the snipers.
19 There was a particular place which was called as "Snipers' Alley," which
20 was the main road coming from the airport. I won't remember the name of
21 that road. In front of the -- in front of the Holiday Inn, general area
22 in front of the Holiday Inn, that was the main target, but all along the
23 confrontation line. And most of the casualties or those that were hit by
24 these snipers were civilian kids, women, old people who couldn't, you
25 know, who couldn't move fast or who were unaware of these snipers.
1 Q. And what was the source of this sniping fire?
2 A. Sniping fire was from the Serb side.
3 Q. Let me move on to weapon collection points. Did the Bosnian army,
4 the ABiH, have weapon collection points?
5 A. Under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, there were common
6 weapon collection points established for the ABiH and for the army of the
7 Republika Srpska. There were two points for the ABiH. One was in the
8 Tito barracks. This was manned by the Ukrainian battalion. And there was
9 another in the tunnel beside the waterworks. I think it's Ciglana. I
10 won't remember the name of the tunnel. Ciglana, I think. Ciglana
11 tunnel. This was manned by the Egyptian battalion.
12 There were five on the Serb side -- seven on the Serb side. There
13 were five or seven, and they were all around Sarajevo. And the Serbs had
14 very intelligently placed the weapon collection points, and even the
15 weapons were placed in a manner that they could shoot from where they
16 were. And they had minimum dislocation. Unlike the ABiH weapons, which
17 were placed in a barracks and then in a tunnel, the Serb weapons were in
18 the open and ready to shoot at any time from where they were.
19 Q. Thank you, sir. Did you or your UNMOs personally see the weapons
20 collected at these weapon collection points of the Bosnian Serb side
21 actually firing?
22 A. I personally saw them firing. On a particular day, the UNMO team
23 which was in the north had a very good OP from where -- observation point,
24 from where they could see the Bare and Poljana weapon collection points.
25 I saw a 122-millimetre gun also firing and I also saw a tank firing from
2 Q. You mentioned in relation to the Bosnian army weapon collection
3 points that they were manned by the Ukrainians and the Egyptians. What
4 did you mean by "manned"?
5 A. Manned is that these were -- they were assigned to protect these
6 weapon collection points or secure them.
7 Q. Was there also a unit from UNPROFOR who was assigned to the
8 Bosnian Serb weapon collection points?
9 A. There was a Russian unit which was assigned, and I think the
10 French were also looking after one of the weapon collection points.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Mohatarem. Just one point about rogue or irregular
12 troops which are mentioned occasionally as playing a role in Bosnia. Do
13 you have any comments on whether, on the ABiH side or on the Bosnian Serb
14 side, there were any such rogue elements or irregular troops being active?
15 A. I don't think so. There were no irregular troops. There was
16 nobody outside the command of either the ABiH or the Romanija Corps.
17 Everyone -- every soldier was accounted for, and he was directly
18 responsible to his superiors for whatever he was doing. I don't believe
19 that there were any irregulars or freelance operators there.
20 Q. Now, you mentioned, sir, a few minutes ago that you met a couple
21 of times with General Dragomir Milosevic, and I think that you mentioned
22 that you were requested to come along with your Sector Sarajevo head of
23 UNMO, the gentleman from Bangladesh, Lieutenant Colonel Mehboob. Now, can
24 you tell us what was discussed during those couple of meetings between you
25 and General Milosevic?
1 A. What we had done in the UNMO headquarters was that we had
2 formulated a standard format for meetings with the -- both the ABiH and
3 the Serb army. To start with, the format was, you know, we would lodge
4 protests about sniping, about freedom of movement, about anything that we
5 had concerns. They were conveyed, and that is -- I think this is exactly
6 what I -- and the humanitarian convoys. I think this particular meeting
7 was in relation to the movement of the humanitarian convoys as well as
8 some shooting which was taking place, and the UNMOs were under threat.
9 Q. And when you say that you lodged protests about sniping, what
10 exactly do you mean?
11 A. Sniping which was taking casualties of the civilians in the town,
12 and we would go and lodge protests. There was one set of protests that I
13 would file into Pale, and normally I wouldn't do it with the Romanija
14 Corps, but it was on the request of -- because the colonel himself wanted
15 this to look more important, this particular meeting, so he wanted me to
16 go with him and I'd gone.
17 JUDGE MINDUA: Excuse me, sir.
18 [Interpretation] Brigadier, you mentioned two meetings at least
19 that you had with General Milosevic, and during these meetings you dealt,
20 among other things, with sniping incidents. I'd like to know the
21 following: When you talked to him about these sniping incidents, did he
22 deny this, the reality of these sniping incidents, or did he accept that
23 these facts, these events had taken place, or did he justify them by
24 military necessity, or did he provide you with any other type of
25 explanation? What did he say? What was his opinion about sniping?
1 THE WITNESS: Most of the time that we confronted the Serb
2 commanders with information on this sniping or other violations they were
3 rather dismissive about it. They won't accept that they had been shooting
4 at civilians. They did accept that they'd been firing at their military
5 counterparts. But exactly about the shooting at civilians, they were
6 fairly dismissive about it. They didn't care about it, actually.
7 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Judge.
9 Q. Let me continue to a few events, Brigadier Mohatarem, that
10 occurred from April onwards, 1995, about which I believe you do have
11 knowledge. April 1995, do you remember attacks on UN personnel in
12 Sarajevo, in Gorazde, and can you briefly tell us, if you may, what that
13 was all about?
14 A. The months of April, May, and June, I think, were the most
15 difficult months during my tenure in Sarajevo. From the very beginning of
16 April, the talks started that the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement is
17 about to collapse or it will not be extended beyond the 1st of May;
18 therefore, there were tensions.
19 I remember that in early April - I won't know the dates - there
20 were sniping incidents in which two French soldiers were injured. And in
21 Gorazde, the Serbs who had -- in fact, from the very beginning of April,
22 what they had done was that they'd stopped all humanitarian convoys and
23 supply convoys for the UN also; therefore, there was a shortage of
24 everything in Sarajevo and in the enclaves. In this period they were
25 shooting at the British soldiers who were posted in Gorazde also.
1 In fact, very interestingly, I asked my team in Pale to check up
2 as to why they are shooting at the British, because they'd not done it
3 before, and the answer that I got was that because of -- the Serbs saw the
4 British riding mules and, you know, horses in that area, and that had
5 happened because they'd run out of fuel. And so this is the logic they
6 gave for shooting at the British. They didn't think they were the British
7 soldiers. At the French, they'd done it, I think. It was first week of
8 April. I won't know the dates.
9 Q. Thank you for your answer, sir. During April, and in connection
10 with these French casualties, did you hear about a comment made by the
11 brigade commander of the Ilidza Brigade?
12 A. Yes. I was conveyed this by the commander of Sector Sarajevo that
13 he had said they will get a dozen French for every Serb soldier who's
14 killed. This is, I think, either preceding or after a Serb attack on one
15 of the bridges, Vrbanja bridge, I think, where there were French
16 soldiers. Two of them got killed. The Serbs also took away some of the
17 soldiers; I won't remember the number. The French counterattacked and
18 took the Vrbanja bridge and caused casualties on the Serb attackers also.
19 And the Serb attackers were dressed in French uniforms when they attacked
20 the French themselves.
21 Q. Going back to your UNMOs but still staying in April 1995, was
22 there a hijacking of vehicles of your monitors?
23 A. That was a regular phenomena there on the Serb side. The vehicles
24 were hijacked. Slightly earlier than April, I think in February, March, I
25 lost 11 vehicles. In April, I won't remember exactly, but I thought -- I
1 think we lost one vehicle from our Pale team which was subsequently seen
2 in convoys of the Serb leadership.
3 Q. And a related question; we haven't touched upon that: Did your
4 subordinate UNMOs have freedom of movement; and if you can answer that
5 question in both parts, in relation to whether they were stationed in the
6 Bosnian Serb-held territory or in the territory held by the government
7 forces? Was there freedom of movement for them?
8 A. The freedom of movement of government forces --
9 government-controlled areas was generally there. There were certain areas
10 they were sensitive to and they did prevent -- occasionally prevented the
11 movement of the UNMOs. Otherwise, there was freedom of movement. In
12 fact, most of the United Nations' presence was in the ABiH-controlled area
13 and they had freedom of movement.
14 On the Serb side, no, nothing of that sort. There was no freedom
15 of movement. If there was movement allowed, it was very controlled.
16 Like, if I was allowed to move around, I would have people trailing me and
17 people ahead of me. It was just exactly -- if I'd given a timing that
18 I'll move -- stay at this place at 11.00 to such a time, it was restricted
19 to that, the routes, everything.
20 Q. Thank you, Brigadier. Let me move to an activity that occurred on
21 the 16th and 17th of May, 1995. Do you recall an attack by the Bosnian
22 Serb army on a feature Their Honours are already aware of, Debelo Brdo?
23 A. Yes, I am aware of that.
24 Q. And can you tell Their Honours what this was about, how it
25 developed over these couple of days?
1 A. This incident was for -- the Serbs wanted to take -- there were
2 two pimples or small hillocks which is entered there. That's why the name
3 Debelo Brdo. These were overlooking the Miljacka river. Access --
4 control over this would have given them access or a direct line of site
5 shooting ability to the Serb gunners at the centre of the Sarajevo town.
6 And this they attacked with fire, mostly, with artillery fire, and they
7 wanted to drive out the defenders from there.
8 They didn't succeed. It was businesslike. It was directed at the
9 defender -- within the confrontation line and directed at the defenders,
10 but they couldn't dislodge them. It continued for two days, and after two
11 days, the Serbs gave it up. But they came back, I think, after one week
12 and tried to do the same thing again.
13 This was -- the western side of Sarajevo town, the one on the west
14 of the river, the Serbs had a traditional claim on that area and they
15 thought that that was part of the Serb area, traditional Serb area, and
16 they wanted it back.
17 Q. Now, you said a moment ago that they didn't achieve their aim to
18 get this area back. Do you remember what happened, in your observation,
19 after they realised they could not gain it through their actions, you
20 described them as military actions?
21 A. They rained Sarajevo town with artillery, with mortars; snipers
22 were active all along the confrontation line. They took a fairly heavily
23 toll on the civilians. I think in the month of May the civilian
24 casualties were 70-plus killed and I think 250-odd injured. In those two
25 days, I think they were very heavy on the civilians.
1 Q. Do you remember an attack on one of the entries of the airport
2 tunnel on the Butmir side that happened in early May 1995?
3 A. There was an artillery shooting at the entrance of the Butmir
4 tunnel on the Hrasnica side, and there I think 11 people were killed and,
5 I don't know, I think 50-odd were injured in this. In fact, General Smith
6 was very disturbed about this, and he discussed the possibility of a NATO
7 attack on that particular occasion. But Mr. Akashi did not permit it and
8 it did not take place.
9 Q. Can you briefly address the issue of humanitarian aid convoys into
10 the city? Were their check-points you had to deal with?
11 A. All humanitarian convoys moving into Serb areas were managed
12 through my office. We would be in -- we were the only office which was
13 directly in contact on the Serb side. And we were dealing with Pale, not
14 the Romanija Corps, in the context of the convoys.
15 There were two check-points, S1, S4, and they created whatever
16 difficulties they could. But generally if the -- after difficulties, the
17 convoys were able to move if they were cleared by the army headquarters in
18 Pale. There were cases where things were removed from the containers and,
19 you know, the crews were robbed, but the convoys went on.
20 Q. And can you tell Your Honours where these check-points S1 and S4
21 were located?
22 A. On the northern side of the town.
23 Q. And who manned those check-points?
24 A. These were manned by the Romanija Corps. They were manned by the
25 Romanija Corps. But the movement of the convoys were allowed or
1 disallowed by Pale.
2 Between the first week of April to June, I think, there were very,
3 very few convoys. I had sent, I think, 195 requests or something and got
4 clearance for five only. That caused a lot of hardship to the people, and
5 it was a deliberate move to starve the people and to deny, even to the UN
6 personnel, the resupply.
7 Q. Let me move to a next topic, and we are almost at the end. This
8 is air bombs. Are you familiar with the launching of air bombs at the
9 time you were there in Sarajevo, in 1995?
10 A. Yes. I've seen the air bombs. I've felt the air bombs. These
11 were 500-pound aircraft bombs, and they had four 1.28-millimetre rocket
12 motors [Realtime transcript read in error "mortars"], you know, screwed to
13 them to give this 500-pound bomb flight. And these were fired from an
14 improvised launcher which -- the rail that they prepared looked like an
15 electronic pylon with crossbars, and that was placed on large trucks, and
16 from that these were launched. I've seen one myself, this launcher, on
17 the Pale road, and ...
18 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Excuse me, but it seems to me that
19 the witness did not say "rocket mortars" but "rocket motors." There's a
20 difference between a mortar and an engine, a motor.
21 THE WITNESS: I said rocket motors.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Motors?
23 THE WITNESS: M-o-t-o-r.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's clarified. Thank you.
25 MR. WAESPI: Thank you very much, Ms. Isailovic.
1 Q. Did they have a sound, these weapons?
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, you have it wrong on the -- as to what I
3 said. "Motors," m-o-t-o-r-s. So let that be corrected.
4 THE WITNESS: I couldn't get your question.
5 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I'll repeat it gladly.
6 Q. Did these aerial weapons have a sound?
7 A. They were very noisy weapons. I was having my lunch near the
8 Presidency in a UN restaurant, and I just left that building when this
9 weapon came with a whistling sound and exploded very heavily. All the --
10 in that particular restaurant where I just had food, all the windowpanes,
11 et cetera, had broken down. And there were casualties this particular
13 Q. Do you remember the approximate, perhaps the exact, date of this
15 A. No, I won't. I won't remember that. I won't remember the date,
16 the exact date. It should be in May or June somewhere.
17 Q. And that's in 1995.
18 A. 1995. There were others also, because the two UNMOs got injured
19 in Hrasnica, which is south of Sarajevo. This bomb had exploded and they
20 also suffered injuries.
21 Q. And that's, again, this incident around that time frame, April,
22 May, June.
23 A. Yeah, within this time frame.
24 Q. Now, you mentioned the attack you experienced yourself at the UN
25 Presidency. Was that a military target?
1 A. The UN building was not a military target. It was hit by a
2 shell. One of the trees was chopped off. Luckily, it didn't hit the
3 building. And we protested against this. General Smith himself signed
4 the protest which was sent out.
5 Q. Now, you described to Their Honours the make-up of these aerial --
6 these aerial weapons. Can you tell Their Honours, from your experience,
7 could these be guided, could these be aimed at specific targets?
8 A. They were not. They couldn't be aimed. They were free flight,
9 and they were aimed to cause casualties wherever it hits. They were
10 weapons which could not be managed. They could not be managed in terms of
11 range. Direction -- general direction could be given to them, but they
12 could fall anywhere.
13 Q. And did you have a nickname for these bombs?
14 A. These were called pigs, called pigs by the people there.
15 Q. Let me move to the incident in August 1995 commonly referred to as
16 the Markale market attack or massacre. Where were you at that time?
17 A. I was outside Sarajevo. I was in Kiseljak.
18 Q. And how were you made aware of the Markale attack?
19 A. I was on the radio all the time.
20 Q. And did you initiate any actions after you heard about the attack?
21 A. I wanted to get back to Sarajevo. I tried the French people who
22 were guarding the Igman road. They did not allow a soft-top vehicle, and
23 I was denied entry and I had to go back. Then the next day I requested
24 for movement, and I couldn't even get on on the 29th. But on the 30th,
25 early morning, I was specially provided an APC by the French, and I
1 travelled -- I left my own vehicle in Kiseljak and came to Sarajevo in
2 that APC. And I was immediately summoned to the BHC, which is the
3 UNPROFOR headquarter, and I was briefed about it.
4 I was asked about this very incident. Because what had happened
5 was that once this incident took place, after the crater analysis were
6 provided to the UNPROFOR head commander, he had requested for NATO
7 air-strikes, but within 24 hours these strikes were called off. I think
8 on the 30th they were called off. On the 29th, they started; on the 30th
9 they were called off, because one of the senior UNMOs, a lieutenant
10 colonel from Russia, he went to the press and public and he said that the
11 firing had not been done from the Serb side. So there was a kind of
12 embarrassment and the NATO attacks were halted.
13 As soon as I came in, I was asked to reverify what had been
14 provided by the UNMOs, because most of the crater analysis was generally
15 done by the UNMOs. This decision was based partially on the analysis
16 provided by the UNMOs.
17 But I must also tell you that there were different people doing
18 crater analysis there. There were the French engineers who would also go
19 to the craters; there was the Bosnian police who would go to the craters;
20 there was a team from the US embassy which covered important incidents.
21 There was a British symboline, which is a piece of equipment, you know,
22 mortar-tracking equipment, which also played a role. They also recorded
23 the ingoing and outgoing weapons. And the French also had these recording
24 devices, radar mortars, which were there.
25 Everybody combined to come to a decision on this thing. It was
1 not only one -- one, you know, one unit or the UNMOs alone who had come to
2 this. But still, we were asked to do a -- redo this investigation.
3 I had gone to the place, the site myself. I'd seen the crater
4 myself. The team which had initially done -- which was -- the commander
5 was -- the team leader was a Dutch officer, Colonel Konings, and he had
6 done the crater analysis. There was some difference of opinion in the
7 actual degree of entry, the hit that the round had taken. We had given
8 170 degrees and the others had -- one of the -- I must also add here,
9 sorry to go back, there was a British --
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Brigadier. I'd much prefer shorter
11 answers, and I would ask the counsel to put specific questions to the
13 MR. WAESPI: Yes, thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. Did you actually make a report about your findings?
15 A. Yes. That is the -- I was asked specifically to give a report
16 about the findings of the UNMO team, and I gave the report and placed the
17 weapon which had fired on the Serb side.
18 Q. And what was the basis for your information? You said you went to
19 see the site, but you also talked to some people. What was the basis for
20 your findings?
21 A. The basis was physical. The UNMO team had done a professional
22 job. And it was not only one round which had come into Sarajevo that day;
23 there were five rounds. While the others concentrated on this round where
24 a lot of civilians had got killed, we had done it for the other four
25 rounds also. You could trace back the line of fire and trajectory, and we
1 came to the conclusion that it was initiated from the Serb side.
2 Q. And do you have your report with you?
3 A. I don't have.
4 Q. And how big was your report?
5 A. The final report that I gave to General Smith's staff was one
7 Q. Let me show you a couple of -- in fact, three documents, and that
8 will then conclude the examination just before lunchtime. The first
9 document is 65 ter number 198.
10 If you could look at the --
11 A. I've seen this report.
12 Q. Yes. What is it?
13 A. This is the report by the UNMO team leader, Colonel Konings.
14 Q. And that was the report you took into account when drafting your
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: May we have it enlarged.
18 MR. WAESPI: Are you satisfied, Mr. President?
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, it hasn't, but go ahead while it's being
21 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, this report will play a control with
22 several other witnesses. Colonel Konings will come himself and testify.
23 The next -- if this report could be assigned an exhibit number.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P85, Your Honours.
1 MR. WAESPI: If the next document could be shown. This is ter
2 number 224. If it could be enlarged as well.
3 Q. Do you know what that represents?
4 A. Yes, I do know.
5 Q. And what is it?
6 A. The UNMO headquarters report, Sector Sarajevo. This one is from
7 Zagreb. Sorry. This one is from Zagreb.
8 Q. And if we could go to page 20, the second part of page 20.
9 "On the Federation Side ..." if that part could be enlarged. And
10 perhaps I can read it slowly.
11 "UNMO team Sedrenik was tasked to investigate the impacts in the
12 general area of the marketplace (central city Sarajevo). The patrol
13 carried out investigation in conjunction with sector engineers, the local
14 civilian police and a local judge from Sarajevo court. The combined team
15 conducted all investigations together, including visits to Kosevo and
16 state hospitals to confirm dead, injured people."
17 It goes on to talk about the crater analysis, and then at the end
18 he talks about the impacts done by "120-millimetre mortar projectiles and
19 the firing range, 170 MAG degree."
20 Do you have a comment about that?
21 A. This is the factual -- the report that is made by the UNMOs.
22 Q. Thank you, Brigadier Mohatarem.
23 MR. WAESPI: The last document, Mr. President, if it could be
24 assigned a ter number as well. I apologise.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That would be Exhibit P86, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, may I ask you, are you bringing any
3 evidence as to the total number of snipers that were engaged in this
5 MR. WAESPI: We will bring evidence from a military expert who
6 will talk about units that had sniping elements. We have documents that
7 show that sniping training was conducted. Whether we can actually argue a
8 final number I'm not sure about, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: But I wonder whether the brigadier will have an
10 estimate of the number of snipers.
11 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it would be difficult for me.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Difficult. Okay, thanks.
13 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. The last document I wanted
14 to show to the witness is ter number 269.
15 Q. If you could have a moment to look at this document. It is
16 drafted by General Nikolai and addressed to Mr. Rasim Delic. Please read
17 it yourself.
18 There is a second page which was attached to this document, and
19 that's a document, a letter by Colonel Meille to Major General Milosevic.
20 This is the second document, in essence, protesting about shelling and
21 sniping of civilian areas.
22 Have you seen these documents before?
23 A. Yes, I've seen them. I don't remember them vividly, but such
24 communication was -- I had access to this.
25 Q. Is that an example of protests that were lodged towards the
1 Bosnian Serb authorities?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And how many of these letters are you aware of would have been
4 filed during the time you were there as a senior military observer?
5 A. Many, many. I don't think so -- I'll be able to recall, but I
6 think in May we had eight or nine letters going out, in May alone.
7 Q. Thank you very much.
8 MR. WAESPI: If I can have a moment to consult with my colleague,
9 Mr. President.
10 [Prosecution counsel confer]
11 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I see it's time for the break. I may
12 have one or two questions right after the break, and that will then
13 conclude my examination-in-chief.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just put them now, or are you not ready?
15 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I'd like to consult with my colleague before
16 doing that, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Because I'm mindful of your urging us earlier to
18 ensure that the brigadier leaves today.
19 MR. WAESPI: I'm advised it will be no more than two or three
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.
22 We'll take the break now, and we'll resume at 2.00 p.m.
23 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.47 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 2.05 p.m.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I just clarify that this afternoon we'll sit
1 until 5.00 to ensure that the brigadier's testimony is concluded. In the
2 event that it is concluded prior to that time, we will not begin the next
3 witness, because it would not be productive to have the witness just for a
4 few minutes.
5 So you have a few more questions, just a minute or two?
6 MR. WAESPI: No, Mr. President. We have consulted over time.
7 There are no more questions.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.
9 Then please begin the cross-examination.
10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
11 First, I wish to say that this morning we discussed an issue with
12 the Prosecution concerning another witness who was to be examined today.
13 We agreed that even had we sat all day today it would not have been
14 possible to examine him because disclosure took place too late for us to
15 be able to examine that witness. I will, of course, not abuse your
16 patience, and I will try to be as efficient as possible today in order to
17 conclude my examination as soon as possible.
18 Does this suffice, Your Honours?
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, it does.
20 Cross-examination by Mr. Tapuskovic:
21 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mohatarem, I am attorney-at-law Tapuskovic
22 from Belgrade. I appear for the accused, Mr. Milosevic, and I wish to put
23 some questions to you concerning issues of interest to the Defence.
24 I will rely on the statement you made on the 11th and 12th of
25 August, 1996, to the investigators of the Prosecution and only two
2 You will recall that on the 11th and 12th of August, 1996, you
3 were examined immediately after the conflict in the area in question, and
4 you may have been among the first witnesses to be questioned after the
5 tragic events in Sarajevo. Is this correct?
6 A. This is correct.
7 Q. For this reason, I believe that your memory of the circumstances
8 you were a witness to has remained fresh or, rather, was fresh at that
9 time. So would you confirm that at the time you gave this interview you
10 had a very good recollection of the events you were talking about?
11 A. Yes, I had.
12 Q. In answer to Mr. Waespi's questions, you said - I cannot recall
13 the exact words - something to the effect that Sarajevo at the time of
14 these events, and especially during the time you were there but perhaps
15 before that also, was a kind of stage for all the world and was a kind of
16 media centre of the world. Would that be correct?
17 A. That would be correct.
18 Q. Everything that happened in Sarajevo itself was very quickly
19 learned by the whole world; perhaps sometimes on the same day. Would that
20 be correct?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. Witness, was anything known in the world about what was happening
23 in the areas where the Serbs were? The whole world thinks or believes or
24 is convinced or has evidence showing that the Serbs were firing, but they
25 knew nothing in the centres of the important countries or, rather, their
1 citizens knew nothing of what was going on on the other side.
2 A. Yes, that is correct.
3 Q. Thank you. My next two questions concern your profession. I
4 won't dwell on it long. But as you're an expert for tanks, as far as I
5 was able to understand, would that imply that you were fully familiar with
6 the problems that exist in the case of other artillery weapons besides
8 A. I generally know better about tanks than the other weapons.
9 Q. Thank you. As, for the most part, you were a land officer, do you
10 know anything about airborne bombs, any kind of bombs dropped from planes?
11 A. Yes. I've undergone courses where I learnt about the different
12 kind of bombs.
13 Q. But can you consider yourself a soldier who is an expert in such
15 A. I'm not an expert on air bombs, but I've learned during the course
16 of my service. All land forces officers are also briefed or they undergo
17 courses where they see airborne munitions also.
18 Q. Thank you. I wish to rely on a certain document or, rather, on
19 certain documents. One is the witness statement of the 11th and 12th of
20 August, 1996. That's DD00-02-17. We had some problems with the
21 electronic network this morning, but we have just been informed that it
22 can, in fact, be used now.
23 Do you see this statement, sir? Your statement, do you see it?
24 A. No, I don't. Yes, I see the cover page.
25 Q. Yes. In order to conclude as quickly as possible, I would ask you
1 to look at page 3 of the English version, towards the bottom of the page,
2 where you are talking about your arrival in Sarajevo by plane. Have you
3 found this?
4 A. Yes, I do. With Mr. Akashi.
5 Q. Yes. Before I ask you something about this, could you tell the
6 Chamber whether you met the accused? Is this him, Dragomir Milosevic, the
7 accused? Could you confirm to the Chamber that he was the man you had
8 contacts with?
9 A. I did call on him, and I do recognise him.
10 Q. On how many occasions did you talk to him directly? Were you on
11 your own in the delegation, were you chairing the talks with him, or was
12 he just present there?
13 A. No. I went with a delegation; I think two or three UNMOs.
14 Q. Thank you. On the page you see before you, you said -- rather,
15 you gave an example, and you say that the fact that shots were fired on
16 the plane in which Akashi and you arrived in Sarajevo, and this occurred
17 in February, 1995, when you arrived; is that correct?
18 A. Not on that day, that particular day I arrived, but subsequently
19 we'd gone to Zagreb and came back on the aircraft.
20 Q. Let me remind you that that's what it says here. So is what it
21 says here incorrect?
22 A. Yes, I was -- I was on the aircraft with Mr. Akashi.
23 Q. But you say when you arrived in Sarajevo, after your plane landed,
24 the day after -- it says here, "Mr. Soekarno" it must be "Mr. Suharto,"
25 was supposed to come to Sarajevo; is that correct? And then, "The day
1 after," you say, "we conveyed to General Milosevic that if they fired at
2 this aircraft, the whole NATO would come after them and nothing happened
3 during this visit."
4 My question is if you met Milosevic for the first time a week
5 after this event, as you explained, how could you know that the shots were
6 fired from the Serb side? And why did you not address both sides? Could
7 you answer that question?
8 A. This was the professional opinion of the UNMOs who covered this
9 shooting, that it was from the Serb side.
10 Q. And you say, "We conveyed to General Milosevic." Who conveyed
11 this? How do you know it was conveyed to General Milosevic and not to the
12 Serb side in general? There were far higher ranking and more responsible
13 on the Serb side.
14 A. It was conveyed on two levels; one was to Mr. Milosevic's
15 headquarters through the Sector Sarajevo, and my own team at Pale also
16 conveyed it to the army headquarters. That was the normal procedure.
17 Q. Mr. Milosevic was very rarely at Pale. He spent most of his time
18 at the positions. So it would have been more normal to convey this to
19 someone who made decisions at the top of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
20 A. It was conveyed to the top also, as I mentioned earlier, through
21 the liaison team at Pale as well as through Sector Sarajevo to the
22 Romanija Corps.
23 Q. Can you tell me, you spoke about the media in relation to
24 Sarajevo. At the time you were there, did all these visits by eminent
25 leaders, presidents, UN leaders at the time, mean that shots were often
1 fired at the vehicles bringing these people to Sarajevo and that the Serbs
2 were always suspected of doing this in the media, and that this was done
3 the very same day the events occurred? Would that be correct?
4 A. Yes, that is correct.
5 Q. Thank you. I would now like to move on and refer to certain
6 events. I have to skip now to the last page of your statement where you
7 mention Markale. I would very much like to clarify the Markale issue
8 before the Chamber as soon as possible, so perhaps you can tell me
9 something about it. You have already mentioned it when questioned by
10 Mr. Waespi.
11 On the last page of your statement, somewhere in the middle of the
12 page, you mentioned the 28th of August. Have you found that place?
13 A. Yes, I have.
14 Q. You say here that it was published on the 28th of August, that it
15 was the Bosnian Serbs who were responsible for this shelling; is that
17 A. Yes, it is correct.
18 Q. So what you just said happened again. As soon as the event
19 occurred, on the same day, the Serbs were blamed before the whole world.
20 MR. WAESPI: I'm not quite sure whether that's what the witness
21 statement says, and I'm not sure whether counsel is directing the witness
22 to the statement or whether he wants to elicit the same information from
23 the witness.
24 The witness statement says on the 29th of August the announcement
25 was made by the Bosnian Serbs, or that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible
1 for that shelling. Just an observation from my point.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's only the date that you're questioning.
4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] First, I should have -- well, I
5 should have made a pause between what I read out and what I asked.
6 Q. First, Witness, I asked you to confirm whether it's correct or not
7 that on the 29th of August, as it says in your statement, the announcement
8 was made that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for this shelling. You
9 stated this in 1996. That's what it says here.
10 A. On 29th August the Serbs were blamed for the shelling.
11 Q. So my question is: As soon as the terrible event occurred, on the
12 very same day, the Serbs would always be accused in definite terms of
13 having done it, of being responsible; is that correct?
14 A. Yes, it is correct.
15 Q. Thank you. In the next sentence you go on to say: "General
16 Janvier was also on leave that day, so General Smith decided to ask for
17 NATO airstrikes." Is this correct?
18 A. This is correct.
19 Q. The next sentence:
20 "On the 1st of September, the bombing by NATO stopped due to
21 declaration of a Russian colonel, Demurenko, that the shelling was not by
22 the BSA, the Bosnian Serb army."
23 Is this correct?
24 A. Yes. This statement was made by Colonel Demurenko.
25 Q. He was the chief of that sector, a high-ranking Russian officer,
1 Colonel Demurenko.
2 A. Yes, he was the chief of that sector.
3 Q. And he was among the first to visit the site. Is that something
4 you know about?
5 A. No, he was not the first to visit the site. The team, led by
6 Colonel Konings, was the first to visit the site.
7 Q. Is it correct what you say next:
8 "All agencies who made the first deduction about the origin of the
9 fire, including my office, were ordered to conduct a new investigation,
10 and for the moment the NATO air-strikes were put on hold."
11 A. That is true.
12 Q. Thank you. After that, your office conducted an investigation, is
13 that correct, and determined that the mortar used was 120 millimetre? Is
14 this correct?
15 A. Yes. We confirmed the findings of the investigation team.
16 Q. No. It says here that your office, under your leadership, came to
17 that conclusion. Is that correct?
18 A. Yes. I came to that conclusion that the initial findings of the
19 team were correct.
20 Q. Can you then tell us when you first addressed General Smith? I
21 understood you to say that it all started based on your report, the NATO
23 A. As I spoke before, there were several agencies which conducted the
24 crater analysis. Mine was one of them. And General Smith took a decision
25 on the basis of the total picture that emerged in front of him.
1 Q. I won't go back to that. There may be some minor discrepancies.
2 But what I really want to ask you is something I have to ask, with the
3 help of a document which is already in evidence here. 65 ter number 481.
4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] 65 ter number 481, may this
5 document be shown to the witness. It's a report dated the 28th, the day
6 before the air-strikes began. The 28th, on the same day. Could the
7 witness please look at the first page. Yes, this is it.
8 Q. On the first page of this document, you see that on that first day
9 General Janvier is reporting directly to Mr. Annan. Is that correct? Do
10 you know about this report?
11 A. No, I don't know about this report.
12 Q. Very well. You never saw this report?
13 A. No, I didn't.
14 Q. You said that the shell that was used was of 120-millimetre
15 calibre weapon and that this was confirmed by your office.
16 A. Yes, that's true.
17 Q. Are you aware, because you say you know about artillery, that
18 mortar shells that -- rather, that it's very difficult to establish from
19 where a mortar shell was fired, because it's impossible to establish the
20 charge used to fire the projectile, and that this refers to the event of
21 the 28th of August.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Where are you?
23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] From the document I'm showing the
24 witness, the document he's not aware of but which is dated the 28th, and
25 it's on page 3 in the English version. UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo. If the
1 witness could read the passage where 120-millimetre calibre shells are
2 mentioned. And he established that the mortar use was 120-millimetre.
3 THE WITNESS: I don't see that on the page that is open in front
4 of me.
5 MR. WAESPI: If I can assist, I think it's the previous page, page
6 2 of the actual document, because there is always a cover page. It
7 starts -- so it's the previous page and it starts: "B. UNPROFOR: Sector
8 Sarajevo," "(a) Sarajevo."
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Waespi.
10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Towards the end of this paragraph, rather, halfway down the
12 paragraph, it reads that in relation to that specific type of shell, it is
13 very difficult to determine the positions for these mortar rounds because
14 it is impossible to determine the level of charge used to fire the
16 My question is: Witness, do you know anything about this,
17 anything about --
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi. Let's hear Mr. Waespi.
19 MR. WAESPI: Yes, it's a short paragraph, and I think it would be
20 most fair that the whole paragraph, not just the second part, which I
21 agree is most relevant for the Defence's point, but the whole -- because
22 it, in fact, confirms about the calibre, these 120-millimetres. I think
23 it would be fair. At least the witness has time to read the whole
24 paragraph before addressing the second part.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Let's give the witness a minute to
1 read the paragraph in its entirety, and then you can put the question.
2 THE WITNESS: Okay, sir, I've read it.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Put the question now, Mr. Tapuskovic.
4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there is one remark
5 that I would like to make. I will never ever, throughout this trial, try
6 to use things out of context in order to lead the witness. It is
7 precisely because of time. I think it would be an excellent idea if we
8 had the time for every witness to go through the entire document before
9 he's asked any questions at all; however --
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think it would be a good idea to get on with
11 your cross-examination.
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
13 Q. Witness, do you know about this, what the document reads,
14 something about a shelf of this kind as something that the artillery
15 experts who wrote this - and these, in all likelihood, were top-notch
16 experts, since they were acting on behalf of General Janvier - is it
17 possible that they were entirely right in saying this? Or is it the case
18 that you don't know about this particular feature normally displayed by
19 this type of shell? Can you answer that one for me, please?
20 A. Yes. There was no difference of opinion among all the five teams
21 that conducted the crater analysis on the type of weapon used.
22 Everybody -- nobody had a difference of opinion that it was 120-millimetre
23 mortar. The difference of opinion was, as is evident, that in the degree
24 of impact on the -- on the degree from which the shell had come.
25 Q. Sir, you know that Colonel Demurenko, who, although he may have
1 not been at the scene in the very first minutes, right from the outset,
2 explained his position of the chance of a shell landing in that precise
3 place was one against a million. Is that right?
4 A. No, that's not right, if the shell was given the correct
5 trajectory. And these shells, there were five of them, they were not
6 fired specifically at a particular target. They were generally fired in
7 the area. And this particular one, the one which fell on the Markale
8 market, took its toll. But, yes, in terms of the buildings that were
9 around this, this shell had to be at a particular degree to have landed
10 where it actually landed.
11 Q. Thank you. I have no reason to keep you on this, sir.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Brigadier, may I just ask you, the sentence:
13 "The definition of firing positions for mortar rounds is very
14 difficult, as it is impossible to determine the level of charge used to
15 fire the projectiles."
16 By the definition of "firing," is it meant the position from which
17 firing took place?
18 THE WITNESS: Yes.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, do you agree with that statement? What's
20 your comment on that statement?
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, exactly pinpointing the position may
22 not be possible, but the trajectory indicates that the distance that the
23 fire -- the round took, this mortar took, was more than 2.000 metres. And
24 that meant that it was on the Serb side. It was fired from the Serb side.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Thank you. Just after the air-strikes started; is that right?
3 A. The air-strikes started, after about 24 hours.
4 Q. Thank you. Towards the end of the statement, you say:
5 "On the 14th of September, the army of the Republika Srpska
6 capitulated and pulled back."
7 That's what you say. Back in 1996, you stated that, didn't you?
8 So several months after the end of the war; right?
9 A. This is on the 14th of September. The army of Republika Srpska
10 agreed to pull out its heavy weapons from the zone which was earmarked
11 earlier for safety of the people of Sarajevo.
12 I may clarify here: There was a zone which was marked where heavy
13 weapons could not be taken in, and these weapons, after the 14th of
14 September, they were withdrawn by the Republika Srpska.
15 Q. You stated in quite definite terms:
16 "After the period of the NATO bombing there was little shooting in
18 Is that true, first of all?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. So September, October, and November -- this is in reference to
21 September, October, and November 1995. Would that be a fair assessment?
22 A. Yes. The hostilities were very -- at a very low level in this
23 period. This is the period where the -- the work-up to the Dayton Accord
24 had started, and all the warring factions were, you know, taking that into
1 Q. What about the army of the Republika Srpska? Did they not face
2 both NATO and the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as enemies at the time?
3 A. The enemies of Republika Srpska were the BiH army. NATO was there
4 as the -- as the -- as the tool of the international community. And it
5 was not an enemy of Republika Srpska.
6 Q. I do understand that, but what I'm asking you is something else.
7 In those situations, was the army of the Republika Srpska not facing both
8 the BH army and NATO as opposition? You may or may not be able to answer,
9 but what about most of the information about the positions held by the
10 army of the Republika Srpska? Was NATO not being informed about those
11 positions precisely by the BH army at the time?
12 A. It's not correct. NATO had its own means. It had its --
13 Q. Thank you. Thank you.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness complete the answer. You asked
15 the question.
16 THE WITNESS: NATO had its own means. It had the satellites. It
17 had other electronic devices, radars, which were watching the movement or
18 the positions of the Republika Srpska army.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. In relation to that I have another question. This is page 2, the
21 paragraph halfway down the page, that page of your statement. You talked
22 about this a while ago while questioned by the Prosecutor, Mr. Waespi. I
23 would like to go back to that now, given what I just heard from you. Have
24 you got that there, sir? There's reference there to Mustafa
25 Hajrolahovic. You tell a story there. On a day, the ABiH fired a mortar
1 from the vicinity of the Zetra UN camp. Is that right?
2 A. That's right.
3 Q. This is plumb in the centre of Sarajevo; isn't it? Is that right?
4 A. It is. It is in the centre of Sarajevo.
5 Q. The Serbs fired back and one of their shells landed next to a UN
6 base. Is that true as well, sir?
7 A. That is true, and we protested to the BiH.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi is on his feet.
9 MR. WAESPI: Yes. Just to be precise, the statement didn't say it
10 landed next to the UN base. The statement says that their shells fell "in
11 the UN camp." This is on page 2 of the statement.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I thank you. I think that's even
14 more precise. Yes, that's right. I may have misread, but perhaps I
15 wouldn't even be asking you this. You did talk about this when you spoke
16 to Mr. Waespi. But the next passage, the next paragraph, about NATO,
17 that's why I'm asking. That's the reason.
18 The next example -- another example was during the NATO
19 air-strikes, in the period end of August and beginning of September. This
20 is poorly written. And then there's the example:
21 "A Bosnian rocket-launcher fired from Sedrenik; nevertheless, the
22 Bosnian government had agreed not to undertake any action during the NATO
24 I'm not sure if I read this correctly.
25 "They continued to operate, although they kept saying that there
1 was no longer any need for them to operate."
2 Can you please shed some light on this? I don't think there is
3 any need for me to lead you on this. There is no need whatsoever.
4 A. They did fire a rocket and they were ticked off with that and
5 that's all.
6 Q. Could you please tell me briefly, sir - maybe it's slightly beside
7 the point - but do you know about the shells that, according to the
8 indictment, fell on the TV building and the PTT building? Do you know
9 about those bombs?
10 A. Yes, I know about the bomb. On the PTT building, it was one of
11 those 500-pound air force bombs. It fell next to the PTT building. And
12 there was another one, which is the TV building, which is very close by to
13 each other. But these bombs, as I pointed out earlier, they couldn't be
14 aimed exactly at a target.
15 Q. You've explained that, according to what you understand. I
16 wouldn't dwell on that. We've heard enough on that. But do you know,
17 sir, that there were quite a number of mortar positions occupied or held
18 by the BH army around those buildings at the time? Is this something that
19 you were aware of, or not?
20 A. They may be -- they may be close to it. I exactly won't be able
21 to comment on the exactly location of the BiH army positions.
22 Q. Thank you. I would like now to go to page 4, second paragraph of
23 the English. There is some talk there of Srebrenica as well.
24 A. I can see that.
25 Q. It reads:
1 "Sarajevo had a big significance. It was like a theatre for the
2 world. Example: One week before the attack on Srebrenica, in July 1995,
3 the Bosnian Serb army started with heavy indiscriminate fire on Sarajevo
4 to attract the attention to Sarajevo and away from Srebrenica."
5 Is my reading correct, sir?
6 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
7 Q. My question: Was the BS army firing for that reason, or was,
8 perhaps, July precisely the time of the most severe clashes between the
9 two armies? I'm talking about July 1995, as well as June 1995. I see it
10 says "July" here, but it started in June, didn't it? So above all, there
11 were clashes in progress between the two armies after an offensive had
12 been launched by the BH army, and Srebrenica in actual fact had nothing
13 whatsoever to do with it.
14 A. I think the Serbs were shooting at Sarajevo to distract the
15 international community from Srebrenica.
16 Q. Thank you. Now, I think I'm coming to something that is perhaps
17 quite important. It's the same page, down towards the end of the page,
18 and then it continues on the next page of the English statement. Have you
19 got that, sir? It's the very last sentence of page 4. Well, there you
20 go. There, you say, "In my opinion, the military targets in Sarajevo
21 were," and then you go on to list some of those. Bullet 1, the battle
22 locations and the confrontation lines and close to the confrontation
23 lines. Is that correct, sir?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. Could you tell us, how large were these areas where the clashes
1 were occurring on both sides of the confrontation line? I wouldn't like
2 to go into that myself. I just want your take on this. How deep on both
3 sides of the confrontation line?
4 A. Between a maximum of about 2.000 metres from the line where they
5 were divided. Maximum.
6 Q. So there were units fighting in those areas, but there was no
7 firing along the front line itself, because the forces there were
8 separated by an area that was about 15 metres long. That's all that
9 separated them; is that right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you. You go on to state that, in your opinion, the HQs of
12 the BH army were also among the military targets, and you go on to state
13 that these were not within the city itself; is that right?
14 A. Yes. The main headquarters was outside the city.
15 Q. But the Main Staff -- you say the Main Staff of the corps, the
16 corps HQ; is that right? It was in the city itself, wasn't it?
17 A. The Sarajevo Corps headquarters was inside the city.
18 Q. Yes. So you suggest here that it was never hit, although the BSA
19 were targeting it, which is hard to understand. That's what you said at
20 the time, wasn't it?
21 A. I did so, and I was surprised at the building, that it was
22 standing absolutely intact, because you couldn't hit the -- the Serb
23 forces couldn't hit this building.
24 Q. But isn't that a sign that around the building there were units
25 protecting the corps HQ? There were weapons deployed around the building
1 and soldiers who would have constituted a military target. Wouldn't that
2 have seemed to be the case, sir?
3 A. Any headquarters is a military target.
4 Q. Thank you. There's something that I've skipped. You list the
5 Presidency, too, as a target; is that right?
6 A. Yes, I had.
7 Q. The Presidency was the Supreme Command of the entire army. It was
8 right in the middle of the city, wasn't it?
9 A. It was, and I have listed it as a military target because of the
10 same, that it was the Supreme Command of the army.
11 Q. A military target, yes. Thank you.
12 You go on to say, "The brigade HQ ..." When you say that, do you
13 mean the units in the area 2 kilometres deep from the front line? Is that
14 what you mean?
15 A. The fighting brigade headquarters were within those 2 kilometres,
16 or whatever it would be. These were not in civilian areas where the
17 normal people were living.
18 Q. But they were within that 2 kilometre area --
19 A. Yes, they were.
20 Q. -- in Sarajevo; right? And the same thing applied along the
21 entire front line, didn't it?
22 A. I suppose so, yes.
23 Q. There were brigades there in all these places, with their support
24 units or auxiliary units. I will not be listing those now. I asked
25 Mr. Dragomir Milosevic to tell me about those brigades. I myself served
1 back in the military in 1969; I'm not very knowledgeable about that.
2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not get the last part of
3 counsel's question.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please repeat the question. Please repeat the
6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. The brigades -- my apologies. Maybe I put this there so they
8 couldn't hear.
9 I am asking you about this: A brigade has so many people, but
10 they have their own units. Each brigade, all of those units were deployed
11 around the front line. I'm talking about the front line held by the BH
12 army. All those brigades, as you have confirmed for us - this was 2
13 kilometres deep - so all those brigades were inside this line held by the
14 BH army, and all over along the entire line, in all these places. Is that
15 right, sir?
16 A. Yes, that is right, because the physical features on the ground,
17 in places they had to be closer; at places they were slightly back. But
18 they were not beyond 2.000 metres.
19 Q. Next you state the exit of the tunnel under the airport as a
20 potential military target. Is that right, sir?
21 A. Yes, sir, that's right.
22 Q. Do you know that on an almost daily basis, especially during the
23 tenure of Dragomir Milosevic, and also the time after you got there and
24 after that, a lot of soldiers entered Sarajevo through that tunnel and
25 would use the same tunnel to go back, to go to Igman to do something
1 there, and new forces were being brought into Sarajevo; is that correct?
2 Do you know anything about that, sir?
3 A. That is true, and that's why I've listed it as a military target.
4 Q. At the very end you even list the government offices, because
5 probably there were soldiers around the government offices, too; is that
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Thank you. An additional question: I'm moving on to Debelo Brdo
9 now. That's the next thing I want to discuss because there were many
10 references to Debelo Brdo in your statement. You were there, weren't
11 you? I have no time to show you the map now. You were at Debelo Brdo in
12 your capacity as an observer, were you not?
13 A. Yes, I've been on Debelo Brdo.
14 Q. Did you ever go to Culina Kapa?
15 A. No, I don't remember this name.
16 Q. Did you ever go to Mojmir, which is a long ridge to the right of
17 Debelo Brdo? And it's quite a long one, indeed.
18 A. I won't remember the name, but, yes, there were ridges jutting out
19 of Debelo Brdo.
20 Q. There were BH soldiers deployed there, BH army soldiers, and the
21 same appeared to be the case at Debelo Brdo, didn't it?
22 A. The BiH was deployed at Debelo Brdo.
23 Q. Let me not dwell on this because there's never an end to this.
24 From the north, I suppose you know that, because that is impossible not to
25 see for anyone arriving in Sarajevo, Zuc and Hum, especially the hill
1 where the TV aerial is positioned.
2 A. Yes, I do recognise them.
3 Q. All those were the positions manned by the BH army; right?
4 A. Yes, they were manned by BH army.
5 Q. Page 7, paragraph 1, of the English version. You speak about
6 Croats in Kiseljak here. Were you able to find it?
7 A. No, I couldn't.
8 Q. Page 7, in the English version, for the first paragraph. You --
9 A. The first paragraph, yes.
10 Q. So this is about Kiseljak. You see what you see here.
11 "One could call it strange that the Serbs never shelled Croat
12 areas but always Muslim areas in regions where these two factions were
13 close together ..."
14 Was that the case? Can you confirm this?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. "Also, Kiseljak was never shelled." And it was Croat controlled;
18 A. Yes. During my stay it was not shelled, but earlier on Kiseljak
19 had received shelling.
20 Q. It's an area that is not so small on the demarcation line where
21 the Croats were, at the front line, at the demarcation line; is that
23 A. No, it's an area that is not so small. Yes, the confrontation
24 line between the Croats and the Republika Srpska was not too small, yes.
25 Q. What I want to ask you, and I hope you can give me an answer,
1 because there were no provocations and nobody shot at each other, then
2 naturally there were no clashes. This, perhaps, is a conclusion rather
3 than a question, so it perhaps could not be -- I am perhaps not permitted
4 to ask it, but perhaps I am. So, in other words, there were no clashes
5 there because nobody fired on anyone there.
6 A. It may be true.
7 Q. Thank you. So now we come to Debelo Brdo. That's page 7, halfway
8 down, a couple of paragraphs down from Kiseljak.
9 A. Yeah, I can see that.
10 Q. You say here that "The Republika Srpska army attacked Sarajevo,"
11 and I want to read everything to be completely fair, "on the 16th and 17th
12 of May to conquer Debelo Brdo from where they would be able to control the
13 whole city centre of Sarajevo." Is that so?
14 A. Yes. The position dominated the city centre of Sarajevo.
15 Q. And this position that dominated the city centre of Sarajevo was
16 held by the Bosnia-Herzegovina army; is that correct?
17 A. That's correct. In this particular area.
18 Q. Yes. Had Serbs taken this position, as you say here, it would
19 have been a great advantage for them at the negotiating table. This is
20 what you say here. Is that correct?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. However, what I want to ask you about is the second reason.
23 Another reason to attack this area was because the BH army snipers had,
24 from their positions, a clear view of Grbavica. Is that correct?
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. And I don't want to dwell on this. Let us move on to the next
2 paragraph. You say:
3 "The Bosnian Serbs wanted to have the western side of the Miljacka
5 Is that correct?
6 A. Yes, that's correct.
7 Q. Want I was to ask you is this: Was not their primary objective to
8 stop the sniping incidents where Grbavica was targeted from Debelo Brdo?
9 Is that correct?
10 A. That could have been a military aim, yes.
11 Q. Could you please tell me, slightly to the left of Debelo Brdo,
12 below its slopes is the Jewish cemetery not located there. This is an
13 area where both the Serbs and Bosnia-Herzegovina troops were deployed. Do
14 you know anything about that?
15 A. Yes, I have been to the Jewish cemetery.
16 Q. And is it located below the slopes of the Debelo Brdo?
17 A. Yes. It is located on the slopes of Debelo Brdo and along the
18 track which goes up to Debelo Brdo.
19 Q. I hope I will be able to finish this fairly quickly. You said
20 that when you arrived in Sarajevo on the 13th of February, 1995, that you
21 stayed until the 19th of January, 1996.
22 A. That's true.
23 Q. Now I would like to go back to page 5. I'm sorry. Let me just
24 check once again. Yes, that's correct. It is on page 5 of the English
25 version. And please focus on the paragraph where you talk about the
1 chronology of your tour of duty. Is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Were you able to find it?
4 A. I can see it.
5 Q. I would like to read a couple of things to you. You said that you
6 landed on a certain date, and at that moment the Cessation of Hostilities
7 Agreement was in effect, the COHA; is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. I will not read the next sentence because it seems to me that it
10 has nothing to do with Sarajevo - and the Prosecutor may not agree with me
11 on this - but then you go on to say:
12 "In Sarajevo there were some major agreements to be monitored,
13 like the cease-fire, the airport agreement, the anti-sniping agreement,
14 and the agreement on the weapon collection points."
15 Is that correct?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. In this regard I would like to ask you the following: The areas
18 where the Serbs' weapons were collected, the points where the weapons
19 would be stored were designated by the United Nations. You do know that.
20 A. There points were designated by the United Nations after
21 discussion with the Serb side.
22 Q. And then you go on to say something about Bosnian weapons. You
23 say that the weapons that were under the UN control, that they did not
24 take out their weapons before June 1995, when the offensive took place.
25 And we're talking about 100 -- in fact, this is my question to you: Do
1 you know that there were 150 heavy artillery pieces there?
2 A. On the Serb side or on the BiH side?
3 Q. The BH army side.
4 A. I do not know the exact count on both sides.
5 Q. But they took it out of the UNPROFOR control. It was no longer
6 controlled by UNPROFOR.
7 A. After June they had taken out some weapons, in June, when they
8 were launching an offensive, and before that they were under UN control.
9 Q. Yes. Yes. And did you know -- I cannot really go into this
10 document because it would take us five minutes to get at the document. So
11 if you don't know anything about it, just tell me so.
12 You knew that, according to the reports and the assessments of the
13 Military Intelligence Services in UNPROFOR, that the BH army, ever since
14 December, had been actually preparing for the offensive that would be
15 launched after the winter, or rather, in spring. Did you know about that?
16 A. The speculations were there, but I cannot comment whether they
17 were preparing for the offensive.
18 Q. Let's take it one step at a time. I have to apologise. You know
19 that there were talks, in fact, that the cease-fire agreement that was in
20 force from January until April, that negotiations were going on to extend
21 the agreement and that the Serbs wanted to have it extended indefinitely,
22 and that they wanted all activities to cease in the entire territory of
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do you know about that?
24 A. No, I don't know about that.
25 Q. Do you know that the BH army did not want to talk about the
1 extension of the cease-fire agreement under no conditions? They did not
2 want to talk about the extension.
3 A. Yes, that is -- that is correct. The BiH army did not want to
4 freeze on the front lines that were there. They were not satisfied with
5 what they had.
6 Q. You do know that the BH army -- I will try to wrap up as soon as
7 possible, and I will actually have to forego asking some questions. You
8 do know that the BH army, in particular its 1st Corps, had the supremacy
9 in terms of the number of troops over the Republika Srpska army.
10 A. That is correct, that the BiH army had more numbers, but it was
11 overcompensated by the firepower at the disposal of the Republika Srpska
13 Q. Yes. That's why I'm asking you this, because on page 7, at the
14 very bottom of the page, the last sentence here on page 7 of the English
15 version, and then it actually runs over to the next page -- were you able
16 to find the last sentence on page 7 of the English version --
17 A. Yes, I have.
18 Q. -- and then it runs over. Were you able to find it?
19 A. Yes, I have.
20 Q. I want to clear something up with you here. The Serbs knew that
21 the Bosnians would dominate in number of troops. Is that what it says
22 here? That's correct; right?
23 A. Yes, that's correct.
24 Q. Nevertheless, although the Croats did not allow the weapons to
25 come into Bosnia to supply the BH army, the BH army had the chance to rest
1 and to resupply during the cease-fire. Is that what it says here? Is
2 that correct?
3 A. That's correct. They got the rest. They got the relief.
4 Q. You do know that aeroplanes were used, as was the tunnel, to bring
5 weapons, tonnes of weapons, for the BH army in this period. Or is it
6 something that you're not aware of?
7 A. There's no question of aeroplanes being used. The airfield was
8 controlled by the UN, and only UN aircraft were landing there, or those
9 aircraft of NATO and others which were permitted by the UN to land.
10 Q. You don't know anything about the aeroplanes that were able to
11 land in Tuzla and then those supplies were able to reach Sarajevo by
12 different routes. Well, I'm not going to go into that because I would
13 like to complete my examination.
14 Please look at the last sentence in this paragraph. I don't want
15 to read it aloud now. In fact, I don't want to read the rest.
16 In 1995 they were getting better materiel, and then you say:
17 "The combination of the manpower and the achievement of better
18 materiel for the BH army put the Serbs in the weaker position."
19 Is this correct?
20 A. Yes, relatively weaker position.
21 Q. And this is the point in time when the offensive was launched, the
22 BH army offensive against the Republika Srpska army.
23 A. That's true.
24 Q. Thank you very much. I would like to thank you.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
2 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I'll be very brief.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please go ahead.
4 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. The first point I forgot
5 during my examination-in-chief was to tender the last document,
6 Mr. President, we discussed, which was ter 269, the protest letter of
7 Mr. -- I think signed by General Nikolai. If that could be admitted as an
8 exhibit, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That is Exhibit P87, Your Honours.
11 Re-examination by Mr. Waespi:
12 Q. Brigadier, I just have a few matters to clear up. At the end you
13 were asked about the numbers of heavy weapons and the materials, weaponry,
14 available to the parties, and you also said that at the end of September,
15 or in September, when the Bosnian Serb army had to pull out of Sarajevo or
16 pull its heavy weapons out, I believe then you were able to see what heavy
17 weaponry the Bosnian Serbs pulled out. Do you remember in terms of
18 numbers, tanks, guns?
19 A. Yes, it is -- we organised this pull-out. The Serbs had 54 tanks;
20 the Bosnians had 3 tanks. The Serbs had 150 guns; the Bosnians had 7
21 guns. So that was the difference of materiel between the two.
22 Q. The next point I want to ask you is you were put a proposition by
23 Mr. Tapuskovic that the Serbs were always being blamed the same day of the
24 shelling, and you said yes. Can I ask you what the foundation was from
25 your side to -- I'm not using the word "blame," but to put the
1 responsibility of a shelling to the Serb side? What was the basis for
2 your doing that?
3 A. It was done professionally. The UNMO teams went to the spot where
4 the shelling was done, or the firing was done. They made the analysis and
5 reported back to my headquarters. On that basis we would convey to the --
6 to the concerned authorities who had, you know, overstepped ...
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: With respect, Brigadier, that doesn't tell us
8 anything. It doesn't tell us -- you say it was done professionally, but
9 that's self-serving. How was it done?
10 THE WITNESS: It was the done that they went to the spot where the
11 shelling had taken place. They would carry out a crater analysis, and
12 that crater analysis was analysed and it gave a direction of fire and it
13 gave a range from which direction it was fired, and we came to the
14 conclusion who fired it.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
16 MR. WAESPI: Does that answer your question?
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
18 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Q. The last point I wanted to ask you, Brigadier: You said there was
20 this 2.000-meter zone around the confrontation line, and I quote
21 you, "where these clashes were occurring."
22 Now, are you saying that in this area there was a kind of military
23 activity going on?
24 A. Yeah. Up to a maximum, considering the range of weapons at the
25 disposal of the foot soldiers, it couldn't have more than 2.000 metres.
1 That is the maximum, I said, as the area where the clashes were taking
3 Q. But you agree that this did not allow to engage at civilians who
4 might be -- happen to be in this zone defined as 2.000 metres.
5 A. Yes, I fully agree with you. You don't -- when a sniper is
6 shooting at a child, he knows it's a child and it's not a combatant. If
7 he's shooting at a woman, he knows she's not a combatant. So it's not
8 difficult for people to discriminate between combatants and
10 Q. And the last point, when you say in your witness statement - and
11 you confirmed it in questions by the Defence - that government buildings
12 might be military targets also because soldiers might be standing around,
13 again, that does not allow to shoot at civilians which might be around
14 government offices.
15 A. I would agree with you. It doesn't give a licence to anybody to
16 shoot at civilians.
17 Q. And that would refer to both sniping and shelling.
18 A. And shelling.
19 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. No further questions.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
21 Brigadier, that concludes your evidence. We thank you for coming
22 to give it, and you may now leave.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: We had anticipated that the cross-examination
1 would have been longer. The next witness, is that witness still around or
2 has the witness left?
3 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, unfortunately, my e-mail is not working
4 here, so I -- I know that when we got the guidance from the Trial Chamber
5 at the beginning of the session, I asked that the lawyer handling the next
6 witness inform Victim and Witnesses Unit, and my assumption is that the
7 witness has been sent back to her hotel. But if we can have a moment, we
8 can check to see if she's still in the building; and if she is, we can
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I need to investigate something further, because
11 Mr. Tapuskovic made a --
12 MR. WHITING: I can --
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- a submission about lateness and being
15 MR. WHITING: I can address that, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
17 MR. WHITING: What that was a reference to is, when we informed
18 counsel, Defence counsel, a month ago about who the witnesses were going
19 to be this first week, we did not include that witness because we thought
20 we were going to have a -- we did not know we were going to have a double
21 session on this day. We then found out that there was going to be a
22 double session and we were told to put -- add on another witness and we
23 did. When we did that, however, we, just by oversight, forgot to inform
24 Defence counsel. They only realised this yesterday; we only realised this
25 yesterday. So what Mr. Tapuskovic -- and it was just merely an oversight
1 on our part, and we apologise for that.
2 What Mr. Tapuskovic referred to in terms of our agreement, which
3 is, of course, subject to the Court's endorsement, is that we agreed that
4 we would take the position that it would be fine for us to do the direct
5 examination and that the cross-examination could wait until Monday so that
6 Defence counsel is not prejudiced by our oversight. So that is what was
7 being referred to.
8 So I think that if the witness is here we could do the direct
9 examination, but I don't -- the witness -- unfortunately, the witness is
10 not here. I've just received a note that the witness is not here.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
12 Mr. Tapuskovic.
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, given the situation, I have
14 nothing to add. I did have a few points, but they do not have any bearing
15 on the merits, so I don't want to bother you with them.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: The matter has been explained.
17 We will adjourn until Monday, 9.00 in the morning.
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.26 p.m.,
19 to be reconvened on Monday, the 22nd day
20 of January, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.