Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 654

1 Friday, 19 January 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness enters court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.31 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before we begin with the evidence, I'll just give

7 two short decisions on applications for protective measures.

8 On the 17th of January, the Prosecution filed a partly

9 confidential motion for protective measures for Witnesses 35 and 50,

10 requesting that each be assigned a pseudonym and being granted image and

11 voice distortion during their testimony. They attached a confidential

12 annex setting out the circumstances supporting the request for protective

13 measures.

14 On the 18th of January, another partly confidential motion was

15 filed for protective measures in relation to Witness 62. The Prosecution

16 requested that this witness be assigned a pseudonym and be allowed to

17 testify with image distortion, and it set out the reasons for protective

18 measures in a confidential annex.

19 The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence has stated that it does

20 not object to the granting of these motions.

21 In light of all the circumstances, including the submissions made

22 by the Prosecution and the contents of the annexes, and also in light of

23 the relevant provisions of the Statute and the regulations, the Chamber

24 grants these two motions.

25 We may now proceed, Ms. Isailovic, with your cross-examination.

Page 655


2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

3 Cross-examination by Ms. Isailovic:

4 Q. [Interpretation] Welcome. Good morning, Mr. Overgard. I'm Ms.

5 Branislava Isailovic. I'm with the Paris bar. I'm a counsel of

6 Mr. Dragomir Milosevic, accused in this case. I'll ask you a few

7 questions that have to do with the examination-in-chief yesterday. I will

8 also use a statement that you made to the Prosecution's investigators on

9 September 8, 1995, April 29, 1996, and April 30, 1996.

10 So, first and foremost, do you remember those statements which

11 have been compiled into a single declaration?

12 A. Yes, I remember those, yes.

13 Q. We have few -- we had a few technical problems this morning, and

14 of course we gave notice to the opposing party of this, and because of

15 these technical problems we've prepared hard copies of these statements

16 and I will ask the usher to please circulate these hard copies to the

17 Chamber and, of course, to the witness.

18 Now, first I'll ask my assistant to display a map on the screen.

19 This is the map that was developed by the Prosecution --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm sorry to have to interrupt, but we don't have

21 the transcript, Judge Harhoff and myself. We have it now. Do you?

22 There's something which you have to do. Judge Mindua just did it for me.

23 Judge Harhoff is still without the transcript, but please go

24 ahead. Please go ahead.

25 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I'm sure

Page 656

1 that this gave enough time for the map to be actually displayed on the

2 screen now. This is the map that takes a bit long to be uploaded.

3 Q. A few questions now maybe before the map is displayed, a few

4 questions.

5 Major, you've been in the military for 18 years before you went to

6 Sarajevo; is that true? So you were in the military for 18 years before

7 coming to Sarajevo; right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Yesterday, you talked about your military training. So first you

10 went to the military school; is that it?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And then you went through a training session in Finland for this

13 mission, for this Bosnian mission.

14 A. Yes, I went to the training in May 1994.

15 Q. During this training course you studied how to make investigations

16 that are required after incidents of shelling and sniping.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. As well as how to gather intelligence and how to analyse craters;

19 is that it?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So this is my question: I'd like to know whether in the training

22 course you also studied technical data regarding the weapons that could be

23 used by artillery units.

24 A. Yes, we had obviously some lessons with technical datas, and I

25 used to recognise them and have them in my head, but now they're out.

Page 657

1 Q. So I guess this was just a refresher course, because you already

2 had information and you had courses on the weapons used by artillery. It

3 was a refresher course.

4 A. This is a course specially for the mission, yes, for the UNMO job.

5 Q. Well, this wasn't exactly my question. So could you assess

6 yourself as being an expert regarding artillery weapons?

7 A. No, not artillery weapons. I'm educated for the anti-tank

8 weapons. But we have -- we used in the support unit mortar 107

9 millimetres. I knew that one. And 80 millimetres [Realtime transcript

10 read in error "188 millimetres"], I knew that one before. I'm not an

11 expert on it.

12 Q. So regarding those anti-tank weapons, the air bomb -- do air bombs

13 fall into that category?

14 A. No. No. I see it says 188 millimetres on line 10. It should be

15 80 millimetres.

16 Q. Mm-hmm. Well, thank you. Now, the map is being displayed. So

17 this is a map regarding the territories where you were stationed. So

18 could you show us Hrasnica on the map, if you please. Could we please

19 move -- display -- scroll forward, if the map could be scrolled upward a

20 little bit.

21 A. You have the Hrasnica area here.

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. My assistant is

23 telling me that normally it's the usher that's supposed to do this. So

24 could you please scroll up, Mr. Usher. Thank you.

25 Q. Major, please, could you show us Hrasnica on this map.

Page 658

1 A. Yes, it's this area.

2 Q. Are you absolutely sure?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. This is Hrasnica where you were stationed? I mean, you were there

5 for quite a while.

6 A. Sorry. I didn't see the airport area here. You have Hrasnica

7 here at the foot of Mount Igman. Sorry.

8 Q. Yes. I don't doubt your goodwill. It's just that the map isn't

9 very legible. So please could you also locate approximately the direction

10 where Ilidza was, because you were mentioning Ilidza yesterday. So could

11 you tell us --

12 A. Ilidza is this direction.

13 Q. And please, I'm sure you know Lukavica, or maybe you know it.

14 A. Well, this here, around this area.

15 Q. Yes. What about -- so this is Lukavica. Do you know anything

16 about this? Do you know who was in control of this part of the territory?

17 A. It was a Serb-controlled area I know.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic, the first area that he mistakenly

19 marked as Hrasnica, it's occurring to me that it's still on the map as

20 being marked, and maybe if he could put a line through it so that we know

21 it's not applicable.

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: I understand he has to erase it.

24 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Okay. Thank you.

25 Q. So on the map could you please show Vojkovici, if this rings a

Page 659

1 bell of course. Does Vojkovici ring a bell?

2 A. Yes, the name is there, but I'm not too sure with the ...

3 Q. Do you know who was in control over that area?

4 A. It was a Serb-controlled area, and ...

5 Q. And, in your recollection, is it close to Hrasnica? Is it the

6 part of Sarajevo that's close to Hrasnica?

7 A. No. No. It's -- I'm not sure ...

8 Q. You're sure of that? And Grlica, that place name, does that ring

9 a bell?

10 A. Grlica, yes, also, but on the map I was -- I don't know if I have

11 it --

12 Q. Would it be close to Hrasnica?

13 A. Grlica, it was not one --

14 Q. Grlica.

15 A. Grlica, it rings a bell also. I don't remember, but I think it

16 has to be in this area, then. We had the Famos factory here, and the name

17 and place now on this map, I'm not sure.

18 Q. To the right of Hrasnica you pointed at something. Is that what

19 you think is that place we're looking for? Because I see that you put a

20 mark.

21 A. Yes, yes. This is the -- I don't remember the name of the place

22 where we had this Famos factory, where we had a lot of firing from into

23 Hrasnica.

24 Q. Do you know who was in control over that part of town?

25 A. That was a Serb-controlled area.

Page 660

1 Q. And, in your recollection, were these densely populated villages?

2 I apologise. Were these villages that were populated also by civilians?

3 A. I don't think there was. I wasn't into that specific area. So if

4 there were civilians there, I can't say, because there was a lot of firing

5 from that area, from the Famos factory building, and we were not allowed

6 in there.

7 Q. Thank you. Let's move on to what you did in Sarajevo, rather, in

8 Hrasnica, which is part of Sarajevo.

9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] So first could we give -- could we

10 tender and give a number to this map that has been marked by the witness.


12 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D14, Your Honours.

13 MR. DOCHERTY: Mr. President.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Docherty.

15 MR. DOCHERTY: Before the map is put into evidence, could I ask my

16 learned friend to mark, or have the witness mark, these various circles

17 and lines that are on the map for sake of clarity of the record. Perhaps

18 put a capital H by Hrasnica, a capital L by Lukavice, and so on, or

19 whatever makes sense, because otherwise, I fear that several months from

20 now we won't remember what these marks mean.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, let that be done.

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Please go ahead. Should I ask

23 questions about this?

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. I'm instructing the witness to do as counsel

25 just suggested.

Page 661

1 THE WITNESS: [Marks].

2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation].

3 Q. So A, you've been noting a few letters. An A, you put an A on the

4 map?

5 A. The A is for Hrasnica.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: And B is for?

7 THE WITNESS: The Famos factory area. And C is Lukavica.

8 MR. DOCHERTY: And lastly, can we put a D by Ilidza.

9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] The direction of Ilidza more than

10 anything, because you can't really see.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

12 THE WITNESS: [Marks].

13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] This is a 65 ter -- could I have

14 the document 2824. It's a 65 ter document.

15 I apologise, Your Honour, our client would like to send us a word,

16 so could the guard please give us that little word that our client wants

17 to have sent over to us?

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, certainly.

19 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] It's not really working that way.

20 It's our assistant that's going there. So let's move on quickly to

21 something else. We're all fine now with the map; right? And this map

22 that has been marked has been tendered into evidence; right? The 65 ter

23 2824, that's been done. Thank you very much.

24 Q. Then, Mr. Witness, you said that your job was to investigate

25 incidents that have happened in Hrasnica. Is that it?

Page 662

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. If I understood you right in your testimony yesterday and in that

3 written statement, these investigations were always conducted together

4 with local police.

5 A. Yeah. They've -- we investigated in our way and they had their

6 investigation going parallel. We are not cooperating at all. We often

7 delegated them our resources, because the policeman was an earlier artist,

8 a painter or something, and he had not have -- did not have experiences.

9 Q. So you were helping local police and giving them all the technical

10 information that you had on the incidents; is that it?

11 A. We only gave them the results and we worked two UNMOs together and

12 helped consult them. They had their own things to do.

13 THE INTERPRETER: The witness is kindly asked to speak into the

14 microphone and not lean forward too much.

15 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Yesterday, we also delved into an investigation which occurred on

17 April 8, 1995, after an incident that resulted from an air bomb being

18 dropped on a house in Hrasnica. That's what -- do you agree with that?

19 A. Yes. It was -- the bomb landed on the 7th and we had an

20 investigation done on the 8th.

21 Q. If I understood things right, this happened during -- after lunch;

22 right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Around what time, please?

25 A. I can't say the exact clock, but it was sometime on the day

Page 663

1 because we had to negotiate our way out again, to get back our freedom of

2 movement.

3 Q. So in France we have lunch around 1.00 p.m. So is it after 1.00?

4 A. I believe it's around 1.00, because we had lunch around 12.00

5 normally.

6 Q. Now, I'll quickly move on to something else.

7 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please display the

8 other -- the other 65 ter map, 2823.

9 Q. This is a map that was shown to you yesterday. It's a bit more

10 detailed, at least when it comes to Hrasnica. So on this map, yesterday

11 you showed us the house where you were stationed at the time. Do you

12 remember that? You located the house.

13 A. Yes, I did, and I have -- when I saw the pictures from this --

14 what pictures we had some problems with yesterday, I located the house to

15 the far east for you. West, I believe, against Ilidza. We had our

16 accommodation just between the two marked spots and into the mountain

17 area. I think it was ...

18 Q. We'll correct that. So just for clarification, if I've understood

19 you right, Sierra Sierra 2 was this house. Sierra Sierra 2 was exactly

20 that house where you were stationed.

21 A. Yeah. We had a house -- the team location in -- I don't know if I

22 understand you right. In that house I was -- the houses are not on the

23 map, as we saw yesterday, where we were stationed. But the station team

24 building was a house of -- where we rented, civilian house.

25 Q. But did you call that -- did you call that Sierra Sierra 2?

Page 664

1 A. That was Sierra Sierra 2 until Christmastime, and then it -- then

2 it was renamed to Sierra India 1, or Sierra Igman 1, because we were the

3 Sierra Igman team.

4 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I think if we could please display

5 the map. It's not on the screen yet, so I'll move on to something else, a

6 question that doesn't require a map.

7 Q. So we'll talk about this investigation that was conducted on April

8 8, 1995. The explosion occurred on the 7th, in the morning; April 7th, in

9 the morning --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- is that it? Did it wake you up?

12 A. No --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty?

14 A. -- we were actually in the living-room after breakfast, because

15 that day I was supposed to go into Sarajevo for a meeting, but -- so when

16 the explosion occurred, I was in the living-room together with one of the

17 interpreters.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty, you no longer wish to make your

19 point?

20 MR. DOCHERTY: Correct, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Can I just -- can I just put a question for

23 clarification, because I was a bit unsure about the answer that

24 Mr. Overgard gave to your question, counsel; namely, the question of

25 whether it was Sierra Sierra 2 which was destroyed by the bomb. That was

Page 665

1 not the case.


3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much.

4 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] No. No. I believe that we

5 understood each other.

6 Q. So you are saying, and you remembered, you actually remember,

7 whether it was a quiet day or whether there had been already sounds of

8 fire, of explosions.

9 A. No. So far that morning it was quiet. No small-arms fire,

10 nothing. So this just --

11 Q. And the day before, the 6th?

12 A. The 6th was -- I don't remember, but I don't think we had any

13 special investigation on the 6th.

14 Q. But since you're a fact witness here, can you tell us, if you

15 remember, whether this period was rather quiet? Or how would you describe

16 that period?

17 A. In April, it -- or March, late March and April, the fighting was

18 getting more intense. It was increasing, the firing, day by day.

19 Q. When you heard the explosion, I understand that you immediately

20 went out and you went on site. Now, what I'd like to know is how you

21 guessed exactly where the explosion had taken place.

22 A. That was very close to our accommodation and so we saw it. We

23 first tried to phone the civilian police, as we did, to inform them that

24 we wanted to investigate. There was no answer in the police station so we

25 went first past the site and went to the police station. There was nobody

Page 666

1 there so then we went back to the site.

2 Q. So if I sum up what you've said, you went on site, you went to the

3 site where the explosion had taken place. You were able to note and to

4 see that the house had been completely destroyed. It's the house that we

5 saw yesterday.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And you saw that there was great damage on eight other houses

8 there.

9 A. Yes, there were several other houses damaged as well.

10 Q. Yesterday, this was not mentioned, but by reading your written

11 statement at page 2 -- I believe that everyone has this statement now, and

12 you, too, Witness. Do you have your statement?

13 A. Yes, I have.

14 Q. And here you say that you did not see the body of the woman who

15 was killed.

16 A. Not at the site, no. I saw her on the morgue only.

17 Q. Then we see in your statement - and you repeated that earlier on -

18 then you walked to see the name of someone, Hakija, Hasan Efendic.

19 A. Efendic, I think that was the name, yes.

20 Q. Hasan Efendic. He was the local police inspector, wasn't he?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Then together with Mr. Hasan Efendic you went back to the site.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Could you please tell me now roughly how much time this took, this

25 going from the site of the explosion to the police station and back? How

Page 667

1 long did this whole thing take?

2 A. Not walked. We used our patrol vehicle. That's a Toyota, so --

3 but it --

4 Q. How long did it take, then? It was quicker.

5 A. That took approximately I believe -- from the explosion till we

6 came from the police station and into the site again, 20 minutes,

7 something like that.

8 Q. You're saying that the commander of the 4th Motorised Brigade of

9 the Bosnian army, I suppose it was the 1st Corps, you said that he had

10 already come to the site and that you saw him when you came back from the

11 local police station.

12 A. Yeah. He arrived to the site as we were looking around to get the

13 overview of what the damages are. So I was at the moment just looking

14 over their wall we saw on the picture yesterday that was broken, and I saw

15 some feet in the pile of bricks and stones there, inside the house.

16 That's when we were ordered away from the site.

17 Q. How did you know that this was the commander of the 4th Motorised

18 Brigade?

19 A. We had been in meetings with him earlier, and it was the -- our

20 interpreter of the corps who was calling me and saying that he was here

21 and wanted to talk to us.

22 Q. Then you said that this gentleman, the commander, gave you an

23 order. By the way, do you remember his name?

24 A. No, not at the moment. No.

25 Q. You said that he ordered you to leave the site of the explosion,

Page 668

1 and you went to your base. We saw earlier on that the base was this house

2 that we've identified. Now we have the map displayed on screen. Can you

3 see the map?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And at the same time we'll correct the mistake we made yesterday.

6 So can you please show us on the map this place where you were

7 accommodated.

8 A. I can try. I have to push some buttons. Okay. Our accommodation

9 is more or less from this site here, I believe. I, yesterday, pointed up

10 in the area of the centre of Ilidza -- or Hrasnica, I mean. So we are

11 very close. Yeah, I said here, more or less, our house.

12 Q. Can you please immediately tell us where the incident took place,

13 where the explosion took place? Can you mark that on the map, please.

14 A. Yes. It's already marked as number 6 here.

15 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] So I'd like to have a number for

16 this map that has been marked by the witness, and maybe we could write an

17 A next to Sierra Sierra 2, or Sierra India.

18 Q. Could you please, Witness, write the letter A next to Sierra

19 Sierra 2.

20 A. [Marks].

21 Q. You've said, and that's on the transcript, that number 6 -- am I

22 right in saying that number 6 marks where we find the destroyed house?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Thank you. So you left when you were ordered --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please let the officer give the map a number.

Page 669

1 THE REGISTRAR: That becomes Exhibit D15, Your Honours.

2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 Q. So you said because you were ordered to -- you left because you

4 were ordered to do so by the commander of the 4th Motorised Brigade of the

5 BiH, and you went to this house that is marked with an A on the map. And

6 if I remember correctly, but you can correct me if I'm wrong, you said

7 that the explosion took place around 9.00. Then, if we think that it took

8 you about one hour to do all the things you've described, we could say

9 that you went back to the base around 10.00 or 10.30. Is that right?

10 A. It can be right, yes. Unfortunately, I lost my diary and so on

11 due to some hijacking later on in the duty. But it can be something like

12 that, yeah.

13 Q. Once you arrived at your base, you stayed there until 7.00 p.m.,

14 if I understand correctly.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And in that house there were two other soldiers with you -

17 soldiers or officers, I'm not quite sure what their rank was - two members

18 of the FreBat, the French battalion; is that right? And that is to be

19 found in your statement, at page 3 of your written statement, at the top

20 of the page, in the first paragraph. So you are saying:

21 "[In English] There were three BH soldiers guarding the house.

22 When we wanted to leave our accommodation they would not let us. Some

23 people from FreBat arrived."

24 A. Yes. We had a visit from FreBat, two officers and one

25 interpreter.

Page 670

1 Q. [Interpretation] These three soldiers we mentioned earlier on,

2 they were already standing before your house when you arrived there?

3 A. Yes, they were. They came there at the same time as we arrived.

4 They was there.

5 Q. Were you escorted by anyone to your accommodation, to your base,

6 or was it just the two of you? Because, if I understand correctly, you

7 were with your British colleague there.

8 A. I was together with my British colleague and one interpreter, and

9 we went or drove to our accommodation on our own. As we arrived there,

10 there were these soldiers outside, and they came at the same time as us.

11 Q. So, if I understand you correctly, there were four military

12 personnel there from the United Nations; the two of you plus two members

13 of the FreBat, in that house. And the house itself was under the guard of

14 these three BiH soldiers. Is that right?

15 A. It was the team location, so I believe that most of the team,

16 except for those on leave and so on, were in the house. So the whole team

17 was gathered in the house that day.

18 Q. On top of the four of you, so the two of you plus the members of

19 the FreBat, and then all your colleagues, all the other colleagues of the

20 team.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And all of you were prevented from moving freely for a great deal

23 of time. You were prevented to do so by the three BiH soldiers; is that

24 right?

25 A. Yes, that is correct.

Page 671

1 Q. I would really like to know how they managed to keep you inside in

2 that way, to prevent you from going out, to sequester you.

3 A. First of all, when we heard that they are armed, we are not. The

4 FreBat soldiers were armed, but still we had no mandate to force our way.

5 This has to be solved on a headquarters level with the LOs and

6 commanders. So we are not provoking them as enemies. We are still

7 peacekeepers, not peacemakers. So for us, we respect that. And, yeah,

8 using the phone, using lines to the PTT building and the headquarters,

9 yeah, that was the main thing we could do. And no one will risk to be

10 shot.

11 Q. I fully understand. But we can confirm now that between around

12 11.00 and 7.00 p.m., you were locked in that house with all the members of

13 your teams and all the other people, and in order not to cause any

14 provocation to the members of the ABiH, you decided that you were going to

15 obey their orders.

16 A. Yes. We obeyed and stayed inside the house, tried to send our

17 interpreter out to talk with them if they -- to hear if they had received

18 any new orders about how long and so on, yes. We wanted to go out, of

19 course, to investigate, but we did not -- as I said, we did not provoke

20 them.

21 Q. So at 7.00 p.m., and you say that yourself, and that's all -- it's

22 still on the 7th of April, 1995; right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Thus between 11.00 and 7.00 p.m. you stay in the house, and at

25 7.00 p.m. you left the house.

Page 672

1 A. Yes. Me and Mr. Calum Gunn went out to the site, yes, in the

2 afternoon, or in the evening.

3 Q. You went to the site but you did not conduct your own

4 investigation, did you?

5 A. No, we did not. We just had a look around, see how it was,

6 because it was starting to get dark and there was no use for us then to

7 investigate any further that night.

8 Q. Was this site protected? I mean to say, were people prevented

9 from entering the site?

10 A. Yes. It was marked and clearly stated that no one should enter.

11 And there were guards also in the area.

12 Q. Then you went to your base, and we can read in your statement -

13 and I'd like you to give us some further explanation about this - where

14 you said that you were again prevented from going out of the house, and

15 you were only able to leave the house the next day after lunch; is that

16 right?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. And who prevented you from leaving the house?

19 A. The BiH soldiers were back outside our house, the police

20 soldiers. We had to wait until this meeting had taken place with the

21 liaison officers, and so on.

22 Q. So you were there just to help them take stock of what had

23 happened following the incident that allegedly had been provoked by the

24 army of Republika Srpska; is that right?

25 A. Could I have the text on the screen here? Because I only have two

Page 673

1 mikes now. So I can be sure I'm understanding the question.

2 Q. Mm-hmm.

3 A. Well, we are -- we are not there for -- only to take stock, but we

4 are there to patrol, report what we see, what we are doing during --

5 Q. That was not absolutely not the word I used. [In English] Try to

6 see that in English. You were there to help -- to help them.

7 A. We are there to -- not to help them. We are there to observe and

8 report what is happening and do that job for the UN. So we are still

9 impartial in the conflicts wherever we go.

10 Q. [Interpretation] Since you're impartial, could we conclude that

11 that's the reason why you were maltreated the way you were, because you

12 were impartial?

13 A. As I said yesterday, I think they wanted to get these experts from

14 Sarajevo, bomb/explosive experts from Sarajevo, and they didn't trust us

15 to do the right investigation in this case. This was so big that never

16 had -- things like that had never happened before.

17 Q. But on the 8th of April, after lunch you still went to the site,

18 and in your statement you said that you conducted the investigation

19 together with the Bosnian police.

20 A. Just as they were doing their investigation, we still -- they had

21 a language which we did not understand. So we did ours, just to see what

22 there was. That was the main reason. We had to clarify what caused all

23 this damage.

24 Q. So according to you, the investigation took place on the 8th of

25 April, after lunch.

Page 674

1 A. Yes. That's when we investigated this, and I think if we can get

2 hold of this report from that -- the team reports from that day, we will

3 find that.

4 Q. Witness, I'll deal with this with another witness, because,

5 according to you, the investigation took place on the 8th of April, 1995,

6 because, you see, we have a report with another date, with a different

7 date. But you're not aware of what happened on the 7th because you were

8 held captive in this house. That's why I'm not going to deal with it

9 further with you.

10 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Excuse me, madam, but I have a few

11 questions I would like to put to the witness about the same matter.

12 Please tell us, Witness, with regard to this particular incident,

13 if I understand you correctly, on the 7th of April, between 8.00 and 9.00,

14 between the hours of 8.00 and 9.00, there is an explosion. Is that right?

15 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct.

16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] So you went there, you went to the

17 site, on two occasions. I'm summing up what happened then. When you went

18 to the site on the second occasion, you took note of a number of damage.

19 A house had been completely destroyed, and eight other houses had been

20 damaged. There's a dead body there. And people are wearing camouflage

21 uniforms, or there is at least one camouflage uniform you see there.

22 THE WITNESS: Yes. That was this one inside the house, under the

23 bricks.

24 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] The commander of the 4th Brigade

25 prevents you from going back to the site. So you are, so to speak, held

Page 675

1 captive or confined, if I use the words of the Defence counsel. And when

2 you go back to the site on the next day, you do not find any of these

3 traces, any of these things. Is that the case?

4 THE WITNESS: We don't -- there were no bodies left there, but

5 there still were some remained, shrapnels and so on from the bombs and

6 from the rockets.

7 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. Now let me move on to

8 my questions. According to you - because you're a specialist and we know

9 that you are competent in this matter - according to you, the damage you

10 saw on the second occasion, when you went to the site on the second

11 occasion, was this damage due to or caused by the air bomb, or was this

12 damage caused by ammunition that would have been placed or located in the

13 destroyed house or the surrounding houses? And this is just a

14 possibility. Now let's --

15 THE WITNESS: I cannot say that this came from inside the house,

16 because all the bricks were drawn into the house. So this explosion had

17 been outside the house.

18 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. The camouflage uniform

19 you're talking about, can we say about this camouflage uniform that there

20 was at least one member of the armed forces in the house or around the

21 house? Can we deduct that from the camouflage uniform?

22 THE WITNESS: As we didn't -- we only saw his feet, I don't know

23 if he was a soldier, because a lot of people use these camouflage

24 trousers. It was, I think, something common and cheap for them to get.

25 But anyhow, if he's -- if a soldier was at home in his house and so on, he

Page 676

1 is, according to the Convention, a civilian.

2 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. Now let me move on to

3 my very last question. Could this house have been considered as a

4 military target that could have been targeted by any military force or by

5 the Serbs, for example?

6 THE WITNESS: I cannot imagine that, no. There were no signs of

7 military flags, nothing outside of that house. It was not different from

8 all the other houses in Hrasnica.

9 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

10 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Q. During the investigation that you conducted on site on the 8th of

12 April, 1995, can you please tell us what method you used in order to

13 determine, to identify, the direction of the bomb? On the 8th, were you

14 in a position to establish already that this was an air bomb?

15 A. Yes, due to the shrapnels we found, and so on, this had to be --

16 we found -- in the discussion between Calum Gunn and me, we found that

17 this was an old English air bomb that the shrapnels had to come from. And

18 then we also saw the tails and the engines from the rockets, we saw the

19 remains of them. So for the direction, we had to rely on the -- more or

20 less, to the witness statements and the fact that the windows only in that

21 direction against Ilidza, along that street, were broken; not in front of

22 the bomb, only backwards. So something had gone -- and that also makes

23 the sound we heard just before the bomb came or exploded, it sounded for

24 us that it came from that direction, because there was a noise like an

25 aeroplane coming very low from that direction and into us. That's why we

Page 677

1 were nearly on the floor when the bang came.

2 Q. In your house you throw yourself to the ground. That happened on

3 the 7th. But all the shrapnel, the rockets, you saw it on the 8th; is

4 that right?

5 A. Yeah. We saw some of it when we were there on the site, just

6 after -- before we were detained in our house, ordered to go back. But we

7 could not at that time take a close look to see what it was. But that was

8 on the 8th where we saw more remains. They also had gathered more of

9 them.

10 Q. But what did you see on the 7th, then?

11 A. The 7th, we saw some, I would say, bits and pieces of bombshell,

12 and we saw that it has to be -- at least of the one of the engines. But

13 at that time we could not see what it was to be sure. That was only on

14 the 8th. And then we can start to take notes and make drawings of the

15 site and the houses around.

16 Q. I'm not quite sure. It may be a problem of translation, but you

17 said that on the 7th you were not sure that you had seen all these pieces,

18 or am I wrong?

19 A. On the 7th, we just -- we saw there was, as I say, bits and

20 pieces, shrapnels, metal pieces, but we were not able, or we did not also

21 have the time to have a closer look at it.

22 Q. Therefore, you didn't look at them very closely, but just in the

23 way you looked, you were able to see these bits and pieces, these small

24 pieces; is that right?

25 A. The smaller they are, the -- you could say some 20, 30

Page 678

1 centimetres, some of them. But, as I say, we could not stay. We still

2 had a question at 7.00 in the evening: What was this?

3 Q. Indeed. In your statement, page 3, first paragraph still, right

4 at the end of it, I mean the first paragraph that starts with the

5 words "When we came ..." there you said that you were able to go in the

6 evening to the site:

7 [In English] "The first day we could not find anything, no

8 fragments."

9 A. No, due to the fact that it was getting dark when we were there,

10 the evening. That was after the meeting with the security officer. We

11 did not collect anything or could not see any special things at that

12 time. But what we saw anyhow, it has to be -- just stay there where it

13 was, not to be picked up.

14 Q. [Interpretation] Yesterday and today you mentioned information

15 gathered from eyewitnesses. Did you obtain this information on the 8th?

16 A. Yes, that would be on the 8th we got that information. The 7th we

17 were not given information at all.

18 Q. These eyewitnesses, were they English speaking or were they people

19 who spoke the language? The local people, I mean.

20 A. It was the local people and the statements came through our

21 interpreter.

22 Q. However, did you yourself write down the summary, the minutes of

23 the statements yourself, or was it done only in what is called here B/C/S?

24 A. The summary of this one, or what ...

25 Q. You see, you relied -- and you said it yourself. In order to

Page 679

1 establish from which direction the air bomb came, you relied on the

2 testimony of eyewitnesses. So you obtained this on the 8th through your

3 interpreter. Therefore, you were able to ascertain the contents of their

4 testimony, and I asked you whether this was put down in writing, and

5 whether it was done in English or not at all, to make it possible for you

6 to see what was in there.

7 A. I was -- these statements were taken by, I don't remember, one of

8 the team members, and I don't remember who it was. But that together with

9 the fact that the damage of the windows and so on went in one direction,

10 and what this witness said just -- that makes it. So that was the

11 conclusion we could take on that.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can I ask you something? Without the statement

13 from the witness, would you have been able to determine the direction from

14 which the bomb came?

15 THE WITNESS: We only then could assume, from what I mentioned,

16 this window, that it had come from that direction. I think -- I don't

17 believe that we had other indications. So that would -- that will be the

18 conclusion anyhow, that it came from that direction. But I'm not so much

19 an expert on this type of weapon that I can say exactly, to say that

20 exactly.


22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Yes, I

23 was planning to put the same question as you just did, Mr. President.

24 Q. And we heard that you were no expert in this type of weapon, but,

25 Witness, somehow yesterday you described the weapon. You said that it is

Page 680

1 a weapon you cannot control. I mean the air bomb, that it is difficult or

2 impossible to control. Is it right? Is that what you stated?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So as far as this description, I don't know whether you said that

5 yesterday too, but in your written statement, third paragraph, around the

6 middle of the page you said this:

7 [In English] "You have no control after launching the bomb."

8 [Interpretation] Can you confirm this?

9 A. Yes, I said so, and ...

10 Q. Again, I mean that is quite obvious. I'm really unable to

11 understand, and I'm no expert at all in matters of weapons. I'm a woman,

12 after all, and I did not do any military service. But my feeling is that,

13 looking into this, as I did last year, I was amazed to see that there were

14 a lot of weapons or projectiles that were launched and that could no

15 longer be controlled. There were a lot of pieces or elements. Yesterday,

16 for instance, we had to stop because there was a storm around. So there

17 are a lot of things or forces that do, if not control, influence the

18 direction, the location. Say, if you take a shell, it's bound to fall.

19 It cannot be controlled once it is launched. Once a mortar shell is

20 launched, it can not be controlled. Am I right or is this totally wrong?

21 A. When you have launched it, it will go and land. You cannot do

22 anything to stop it or to change the direction. It's not controlled.

23 Today you have weapons you can control, but not weapons like this.

24 Q. So based on your experience in Bosnia, say somebody -- or NATO,

25 say, because towards the end of the conflict NATO became involved in this

Page 681

1 conflict. Maybe they did have guided missiles, but the air bombs used

2 then, were they the only weapon that could not be controlled once they

3 were launched?

4 A. No. As I say, mortars and artillery, grenades, are sent out and

5 you cannot hit some -- hit a bull's-eye with them, that's for sure.

6 Q. Thank you very much for your help on this, because, really, in

7 this matter I don't understand much when it comes to weapons. I can

8 confirm that. Thank you.

9 Very quickly I'll deal with the last subject. It has to do

10 with -- well, we have the map here on the screen, and I'd like you to show

11 everybody the famous headquarters of the 4th Brigade. Yesterday, you

12 mentioned the headquarters of a company. I suppose the company was part

13 of the brigade.

14 A. Yes, the company is part of the brigade.

15 Q. Could you please show us the headquarters on the map. And then

16 I'll ask for a number and I'd like to tender the map once it's marked.

17 What you're marking right now, what is it? Is that the company?

18 A. That's the brigade headquarters. I believe it was -- it was one

19 of these houses somewhere.

20 Q. Could it be marked as B for brigade, or "QG" in French would be

21 headquarters, brigade.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let it be marked B.

23 THE WITNESS: [Marks].


25 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 682

1 Q. Then you spoke about the company headquarters. Can we see that?

2 A. That was the combat -- yes. Front line. There are some buildings

3 in this area here, I believe it was.

4 Q. Mm-hmm.

5 A. I cannot go in detail because the buildings are not on the map, so

6 I don't remember exactly.

7 Q. It cannot be seen on the map. Can we scroll down or, rather,

8 scroll up for us to see. Is it possible to scroll it up?

9 A. No, the buildings there are not marked, I think. The normal

10 houses --

11 Q. I know, but ...

12 THE REGISTRAR: For counsel's benefit, once the witness has marked

13 on the map, it can't be manipulated. So we can either have him -- we can

14 move the map and have him remark, or we'll have to keep the map where it

15 is now.

16 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. Court

17 Deputy. That was very useful. So we can erase the second marking because

18 it is not accurate. We can keep only as evidence the map showing the

19 location of the brigade headquarters.

20 Can that be done? Can I have a number?

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can that be done, Mr. Registrar?

22 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. That will be admitted as

23 Exhibit D16.

24 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Now we can have the map again but

25 without any marking. I hope we can move it up, please, so that the major

Page 683

1 can see and show us the company headquarters.

2 Q. Can you do this, sir?

3 A. I can only see the general area, and it had a marking up here.

4 Q. Yes, yes.

5 A. In this area here.

6 Q. Fine.

7 A. Okay. Here, in this area, I believe.

8 Q. All right. I see.

9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we mark this as C? Would

10 that be suitable, Mr. President?

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, let that be done.

12 THE WITNESS: [Marks].

13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] C for company.

14 Q. Because I can see the territory of Kovaci which you mention in

15 your statement as being the location where there were four mortars

16 discovered in April. Would you be able to show us the position?

17 A. The mortars were down there -- in there. In this area here. I

18 can't be more accurate.

19 Q. Thank you. Please could you mark this location with a 4M?

20 A. [Marks].

21 Q. 4M.

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] And I shall ask Mr. Court Deputy

23 to give us a number.


25 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as Exhibit D17, Your

Page 684

1 Honours.

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] May I proceed?

4 Q. Here again I rely on your military knowledge. Could you tell me

5 whether -- in here I've got a ruler, and we have the scale. We can see

6 then in a rather small limited space between the headquarters we've just

7 seen, the brigade headquarters, and then we saw the company headquarters

8 and thereafter the mortars that were discovered but that did exist at a

9 given point in time. It's not a big portion of territory, is it? Some 1

10 kilometre or 1.2 kilometres.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Docherty.

12 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, I respectfully object to that

13 question. There is a scale on the map. The areas are clearly marked.

14 And to have the witness guess or characterise the distances when it can be

15 calculated precisely from the map will only cloud the record.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: He's in a position, you say, to give the distance

17 precisely?

18 MR. DOCHERTY: More than that, Your Honour. Anyone is in a

19 position to give the distance precisely, because in the lower left of the

20 exhibit that has now been introduced as D17 there is a scale. Therefore,

21 from the green dot that's marked as 6 to the 4M, or to the C, can be

22 calculated precisely, and there is no need to ask the witness to give an

23 imprecise calculation for the record.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.

25 Ms. Isailovic, with that in mind, reformulate your question.

Page 685

1 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, I have the ruler in my hand,

2 and I did measure. This is the reason why I'm asking of the witness to

3 tell me whether it is, indeed, roughly 1 to 1.2 kilometres as the distance

4 between the company and the brigade, because from the brigade to 4M it's

5 about 100 to 200 metres precisely.

6 Could the witness, based on his memory - of course, this is not

7 precise; this will be corroborated by further testimony - but on the basis

8 of his recollection, since he was an eyewitness -- that's the only the

9 basis. I'm not asking for exact things. I do agree with the statement

10 made by the Prosecution. I do have my ruler and anybody can calculate.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. What is your answer?

12 THE WITNESS: Well, this would be guessing here, but I think she

13 said the brigade headquarters. But from the company headquarters to the

14 mortar, which was the closest, and they are still more than a kilometre

15 away from the civilian areas, so it's -- the weapons are not that

16 inaccurate when we are coming to mortars. Within an area, you can say you

17 will hit but not ...

18 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. This was not my concern right now. My question is as follows:

20 Because we have two headquarters, therefore, I suppose there are soldiers

21 as well, soldiers that move about the headquarters; right?

22 A. Yes, I would say. And there are, of course, forces in a pocket

23 like this.

24 Q. And I guess that there are other military facilities that are

25 necessary to the running of the headquarters.

Page 686

1 A. These headquarters were in a civilian house, a normal house, but I

2 think emptied for civilians, as I know. But I can't say that clearly and

3 be sure because I did not go into them myself.

4 Q. Precisely. As a military man, I'm asking you this: A

5 headquarters for any unit require other facilities. This is just military

6 logic. You need some warehouse for the weapons you have stored. Were

7 there any other military facilities around the headquarters?

8 A. No, not as I could see. But I don't know what was inside all the

9 buildings, that is all. I cannot say that.

10 Q. Thank you. Perfect. Very last topic, a minor topic. Yesterday,

11 we had brewing the Belgian weapon, 12.7 millimetres in calibre, in

12 territory held bit ABiH, in Igman; is that right? And you explained that

13 it could not reach Hrasnica but only Republika Srpska-held territory.

14 This is to be found in your proofing notes. Do you remember that? Do you

15 remember your statement yesterday?

16 A. Yes, I remember most of this. I don't know if you're absolutely

17 right. We saw them first on Igman, the first time, and were not -- and

18 that was BiH forces, yes. That was the sniper gun, the 12.7.

19 Observations of Serbian forces having this weapon, I cannot confirm that.

20 But I know we had had incoming fire from the Serbia area of 12.7.

21 Q. You are saying that in territory held by the ABiH, that is, Mount

22 Igman, you saw that weapon.

23 A. I saw that weapon passing one soldier driving one day, yes. That

24 was I think in March, but I cannot say because, as I say, all my notes are

25 gone.

Page 687

1 Q. You can therefore confirm that on Mount Igman and on the road to

2 Igman you also had forces, troops, soldiers, or units of the ABiH.

3 A. Of course they are using positions in the hillside there from one

4 time, but there was no -- no places I saw they had -- or stayed all the

5 time. And not on the road. The road was used also by the military, yes,

6 for sure, but mostly civilian traffic, white trucks, blue trucks, and so

7 on, and private cars.

8 Q. If you wanted to go to Igman or if they wanted to go to Igman, did

9 those soldiers go through Hrasnica? Was that the usual route?

10 A. Yes, that was the usual route through Hrasnica. They entered the

11 hillside up to an area called -- on the convoy road, called the bus-stop,

12 and there they collected and went. They were collected by cars and went

13 out into the mountains areas.

14 Q. This would be my next question: This famous bus-stop, it was not

15 a bus-stop, but was it possible from there to use another vehicle to go to

16 Mount Igman?

17 A. Yes, from there they could -- they were in shelter from direct

18 fire, so they could upload vehicles there and drive up to Igman.

19 Q. In your written statement you also mentioned tunnels, and the exit

20 of that tunnel, you said, was often targeted by the army of Republika

21 Srpska. Do you remember where the exit was?

22 A. Yeah. It was in the -- called the Sokolovici area, outside. Just

23 a couple of houses on the field there.

24 Q. Mm-hmm. Major, at the time did you know whether the tunnel was

25 used and what it was used for?

Page 688

1 A. No. They started to dig this hole there. Yeah, it was January,

2 February, something like that. And we passed it very often, the hole they

3 were digging there, just to see what it was, trying to ask the question,

4 What are you doing? And they just told us they were digging holes for

5 collecting water, and so on, a lot of blah, blah, of course, just to lead

6 us off. But in the end they had made this tunnel, yes. But I don't think

7 it was finished before I left.

8 Q. We're lucky we know this from other witnesses.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic, how much longer will you be?

10 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, five to ten minutes

11 more.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll take the break now.

13 --- Recess taken at 11.01 a.m.

14 --- On resuming at 11.27 a.m.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please continue. Ten minutes.

16 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Ten

17 minutes will be plenty.

18 Q. I would like to start where we stopped before the break, so let's

19 go back to the tunnel. You said, and I quote, "We weren't really allowed

20 to look and investigate and find out what was really happening with that

21 tunnel." Is that it?

22 A. Yes, we were not allowed to stay too close there in the beginning.

23 Q. And if my memory is right, you also said, regarding the

24 headquarters, that there also you were not really allowed to inspect what

25 had happened in the surroundings. Is that true also?

Page 689

1 A. We did think about us entering houses around and the headquarters.

2 We only visit that we had into headquarters was for meetings, and that was

3 different from one day or another, where we were not aware who did the

4 meetings, team leader or someone else. We had -- for our own security, in

5 that area of the company headquarters, we did not inspect or patrol that

6 area too much because of the firing risks. We had incidents there where

7 our car got hit. So, yeah, we did not inspect those houses any more.

8 Q. Then around those houses you said that there were soldiers around

9 those houses, that in Kovaci you found mortars. Can you tell us who

10 discovered those mortars?

11 A. The mortars were discovered by our team. I don't remember who it

12 was. They stood there for a while some days and then they were removed.

13 And they were pointing in the direction west, you could say, to the Ilidza

14 area.

15 Q. So I think, from what I understood you said earlier, you were not

16 really allowed to circulate freely. So you found that by chance, because

17 you weren't really allowed to move around to do your inspections; right?

18 A. We were -- most of the time, about these incidents we're talking

19 about, we were allowed to go. But into the front line area we had to give

20 the message that we wanted to inspect that. We had three cars in our

21 team; one car regularly on Mount Igman and two cars to do both patrolling

22 and administrative tasks, for getting food, so on. So I would say one car

23 for patrolling more or less the whole time, but then you had the manpower,

24 how many of us left in the team that day. Some were on leave; some were

25 at meetings, and so on.

Page 690

1 So what you ask for, we had had no restrictions for movement on a

2 daily basis normally. It was a -- we had to -- to go into any special

3 sites close to the confrontation line, we had to give the message to the

4 commander. So sometimes they said -- could say that, No, this will not be

5 secure for you; we don't really want you there. They did not deny us, but

6 we -- of course, as we are UNMOs, we also tried to have a good

7 relationships. We didn't provoke them.

8 Q. How long did it take before you could -- between asking to go to a

9 place at the confrontation line and then being given the okay? Did it

10 take a few hours, did it take a few days, or what?

11 A. It could be an answer on the phone immediately. So we had an

12 interpreter phoning to brigade headquarters and we got the answer at once

13 so that we could perform our task for that day without further planning.

14 Q. Did this mean, for example, that you're calling on the phone and

15 immediately you can go to the confrontation line, right after your phone

16 call?

17 A. Yes, we could go to that area and do what task we were supposed

18 to, if it was normally just patrolling or doing a special task in that

19 area, if it was a sniper accident there or if we had to just stop and have

20 an observation post to see what was happening.

21 Q. Mm-hmm. So I'm talking about the confrontation line. That's just

22 for the confrontation line.

23 A. Yes. That was the only place we had to -- the confrontation line

24 was one area where we had to just tell them we wanted to go, but otherwise

25 we had freedom of movement. We were driving up and down the convoy road

Page 691

1 as we wanted. We went to Sarajevo as we wanted. So no problem with that,

2 that we have to go through the Sokolovic, Butmir areas, so on.

3 Q. Well, I'm interested in this: You're saying you have to give --

4 you have to signal that you're going there. So I'd like to know how long

5 it takes between signalling that you want to go someplace and the moment

6 where you actually arrive in the confrontation line. How long does it

7 take? That's exactly my question.

8 A. Okay. As we get the answer, normally we got that answer at once

9 and then we could go, and then it was just the driving time from

10 accommodation to confrontation line and that's not many minutes. So no

11 problem with that.

12 Q. That was my question. Thank you.

13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] That was my last question, Your

14 Honour, and now I'm done with my cross-examination. Thank you.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Ms. Isailovic.

16 Before you re-examine, may I take you, Major, back to the question

17 that I had earlier asked. I earlier asked you whether the conclusion that

18 you had arrived as to the direction from which the bomb came could have

19 been made without the benefit of the statements from the witnesses, and

20 your answer was yes.

21 THE WITNESS: It will then be --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm just asking. That was the position. You

23 said yes.


25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. So I want to ask you: Was that conclusion,

Page 692

1 in fact, made by you before you had the benefit of the statements from the

2 witnesses?

3 THE WITNESS: That conclusion was taken by us, by the team, me and

4 Calum Gunn, I believe, and maybe some others during this --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Was that --

6 THE WITNESS: -- So --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- conclusion noted?

8 THE WITNESS: I believe it -- I don't know how it was reported to

9 the headquarters.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's your practice in relation to --

11 THE WITNESS: Normally, of course, you have to give the direction,

12 if you have an investigation. So I believe so, yes.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: It would be noted.


15 JUDGE ROBINSON: And could be found.


17 JUDGE ROBINSON: And the statements from the witnesses, where

18 would those be?

19 THE WITNESS: These statements were delivered to our

20 headquarters. Like all papers we were writing, the would deliver them

21 there. So I hope -- from there, I don't know.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: How many witnesses did you examine?

23 THE WITNESS: This witness was -- I had one, but others had talked

24 with other people, and this was a lot of paper done. And I believe that

25 was Calum Gunn collecting it, so I can't say how many. I can't remember.

Page 693

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

2 Mr. Docherty.

3 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour.

4 Re-examination by Mr. Docherty:

5 Q. Major, I want to start my re-examination at the same point as His

6 Honour Judge Robinson. You mentioned some of the things you used to

7 determine the direction from which this air bomb had come. In your

8 accommodation, did you also hear this air bomb before it landed and

9 exploded?

10 A. Yes. As I mentioned, we were in our accommodation and we heard

11 this sound. Something was coming, like a C130 or something, like an

12 aeroplane coming in. That was just to say I was faced against where the

13 explosion was, but I had it on my left ear and I was on my way down when

14 the explosion came, because this was something not familiar, something

15 new, this sound.

16 Q. From the sound, could you tell anything about the direction of

17 travel of this bomb?

18 A. No. We came -- I was inside so that was impossible. But as I had

19 this sound in the left ear, it had to be on the west side of our

20 accommodation.

21 Q. And just for the sake of completeness, what is to the west of your

22 accommodation?

23 A. That is against the confrontation line with the company

24 headquarter.

25 Q. Now, you were also asked some questions by counsel for the Defence

Page 694

1 about military traffic on what is called the convoy road. Do you remember

2 those questions?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And in those questions let me ask this: How far is it from the

5 scene of this air bomb incident to the convoy road?

6 A. It is quite a good distance from that. I cannot say in metres,

7 but a kilometre or more.

8 Q. And that question about distances raises the question of guiding

9 ammunition once it has been fired. Again, counsel for the Defence asked

10 you a series of questions about that. Do you remember those?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. I want to ask you about three different types of weapons -

13 mortars, artillery pieces, and air bombs. Before it's fired, can a mortar

14 be aimed?

15 A. It's not direct weapons. You are not aiming, but you are giving

16 it a load, a starter to -- an elevation.

17 Q. Mm-hmm.

18 A. And then you can tell where it's going to land. If you don't have

19 the data about the wind in the higher levels, and so on, you're not sure

20 but this is where you want it to go.

21 Q. So you can make some adjustments --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- so that the mortar falls, shell falls, in the area you want it

24 to fall.

25 A. Yes, yes.

Page 695

1 Q. What about artillery pieces? Can they be aimed?

2 A. No. That's the same with them, but they are bigger. There's more

3 explosives in artillery.

4 Q. But, again, when you say it's the same, only bigger, do I --

5 A. They can go for bombing areas, not specific targets.

6 Q. And can an air bomb even be aimed as to a general area?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. All right. And then an air bomb, as you mentioned yesterday, does

9 not have a guidance system; is that correct?

10 A. This type we're talking about here does not have, no.

11 Q. And so an air bomb is going to come down, if I'm correct, when the

12 fuel runs out.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Wherever --

15 A. Wherever.

16 Q. -- wherever that happens to be.

17 A. Yes. Or it can also be equipped with a timed fuse --

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. -- a timer. So you can predict that somewhere 60 seconds from

20 firing, or something like that, then -- where it can be. That's the only

21 thing you have. That's very inaccurate.

22 Q. Yesterday, on direct examination, I asked you if, in your air

23 force career, you had learned what sorts of weapons are suited to

24 different types of battlefield conditions. Do you remember that?

25 A. Yes.

Page 696

1 Q. Do mortars have uses in different battlefield situations?

2 A. Mortars are to take out positions mostly, to clear areas.

3 Q. So the answer would be yes, they have a military function.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Artillery, does it have a military function?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And the question I put to you yesterday: Is there any battlefield

8 situation in which an aircraft bomb with rocket engines strapped to it

9 would be the weapon of choice for a commander?

10 A. Not to my knowledge.

11 MR. DOCHERTY: I have no further questions, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Major, that concludes your evidence. Thank you

13 for giving it, and you may now leave.

14 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

15 [The witness withdrew]

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: There's a decision which I'll now give on a

17 Prosecution motion for admission of written statements.

18 On the 11th of January, the Prosecution filed a motion for

19 admission of written statements pursuant to Rules 92 bis and ter. The

20 Prosecution seeks the admission into evidence of the statements of, inter

21 alia, Witnesses W35 and W83 pursuant to Rule 92 ter. Yesterday, the

22 Defence indicated that they had no objection to the admission of these

23 statements. The Trial Chamber grants the Prosecution motion insofar as it

24 relates to Witnesses 35 and 83 and admits these statements into evidence

25 upon fulfillment of the conditions set out in the Rule.

Page 697

1 Mr. Waespi, your next witness.

2 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, before the next witness comes in, the

3 completion of Mr. Overgard's testimony means I am finished with examining

4 witnesses for some time. May I be excused from further attendance.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, certainly.

6 MR. DOCHERTY: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 [The witness enters court]

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

9 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

10 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

12 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may begin, Mr. Waespi.

14 MR. WAESPI: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning, Your

15 Honours. I just have one point of clarification for this witness. He has

16 a very prominent position back home; he's the Minister of the Interior of

17 his province, and he needs to go back at the end of today. Also, his visa

18 expires.

19 I will lead the witness for about an hour, so before the lunch

20 break, and I really hope that Your Honours, with your questions, and the

21 Defence will be concluding their questions by the end of today, which I

22 understand is 4.15.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, we'll go on until 5.00, if necessary.

24 MR. WAESPI: I'm much obliged. Thank you very much,

25 Mr. President.

Page 698


2 Examination by Mr. Waespi:

3 Q. Good morning, Mr. Mohatarem. Can you please state your name for

4 the record.

5 A. My name is Ghulam Muhammad Mohatarem.

6 Q. And what is your current position?

7 A. I'm the Home Secretary of the Government of Sindh, the southern

8 province of Pakistan.

9 Q. And you do have a military career, a professional military career,

10 behind you. Can you very, very briefly tell us the steps in your military

11 career, please.

12 A. I retired -- I was commissioned in the army in 1971. I served

13 during my service in the tank corps of the Pakistan army. I've been in

14 Bosnia as the chief UN Military Observer. I've also served as a defence

15 attache in Myanmar and Bangladesh. I retired after 33 years of service in

16 2004.

17 Q. Thank you very much. Mr. Mohatarem, you mentioned you were in

18 Bosnia. Can you tell Their Honours the time you were in Bosnia.

19 A. I was there from mid-February till early January, 1995 to 1996.

20 Q. So that will be February 1995 to January 1996.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you, sir. You mentioned that you were the chief UN Military

23 Observer in observe. Can you tell Their Honours what your job was.

24 A. The job as the chief UN Military Observer was to monitor the

25 agreements that were made between different warring factions, to conduct

Page 699

1 negotiations with different warring factions, to advise the UNPROFOR

2 commander. While I was there, it was Lieutenant General Rupert Smith. I

3 also had a responsibility towards monitoring the movement of humanitarian

4 convoys.

5 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, who was your direct superior? To whom did

6 you report?

7 A. I reported to the chief UN observer -- chief UN Military Observer

8 for former Yugoslavia based in Zagreb.

9 Q. Yes. Do go on.

10 A. Since I was placed in Sarajevo in the UNPROFOR headquarters, I had

11 regular interaction with the commander of the UNPROFOR.

12 Q. You mentioned that you were the chief UN Military Observer. Can

13 you tell us who these military observers, commonly abbreviated as UNMOs,

14 were?

15 A. The UNMOs were -- first I must clarify that while I was chief UN

16 Military Observer for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for administrative reasons,

17 within the area I was known as the regional senior military observer for

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina because there was an equivalent on the Croatian side.

19 The UNMOs were military officers drawn from different countries of

20 the world. While I was there, there were about 350 observers,

21 approximately, drawn from around 38, 39 countries.

22 Q. And these 350 observers were spread all over Bosnia.

23 A. They were spread all over Bosnia.

24 Q. Now, was there a specific unit that was focusing on Sarajevo, on

25 the sector Sarajevo?

Page 700

1 A. Yes. The UNMO headquarters in Bosnia, that is, my headquarters,

2 was divided into -- it had subunits; one based in Tuzla, which was called

3 the Sector North; one in Sarajevo, which was called Sector Sarajevo; and

4 one in the south, based in Konjic, which was called Sector South.

5 Then I had a liaison officer, which was an extension of my own

6 office. This was based in Pale. They were administratively and

7 logistically -- logistically and operationally part of my own

8 headquarters.

9 Then we had teams in the enclaves; one was based in Gorazde, the

10 other was in Zepa, and there was one in Srebrenica.

11 Q. And I take it that you got information reports from all these

12 UNMOs.

13 A. Regularly, yes. Twice a day.

14 Q. So is it fair to say you had a fairly good take on what was

15 happening not only in Sarajevo but also in Bosnia.

16 A. In fact, the UNMO headquarters was the centre of all information

17 that was flowing.

18 Q. Did you have a head UNMO who was in charge of Sector Sarajevo?

19 A. Sector Sarajevo had a lieutenant colonel in command. They were --

20 I remember one of them, because it was a one-year rotation so people would

21 change. I remember one of them was Colonel Mehboob from Bangladesh.

22 Q. Thank you very much for your answer. Let's go now into various

23 areas of experiences you made. You told us that you were in contact with

24 the warring factions for various reasons.

25 Now, let's first turn to the Bosnian army, the government's army,

Page 701

1 "ABiH," as it's commonly known. Did you have contact with liaison

2 persons in the ABiH?

3 A. On the ABiH side there was one contact officer who was the liaison

4 officer with us. His name was General Mustafa Hajrolahovic. I may be

5 wrong in pronunciation. From the political side, from the government

6 side, there was Mr. Hasan Muratovic. I think he was later the Prime

7 Minister of Bosnia.

8 Q. In terms of General Mustafa Hajrolahovic, did you have an opinion

9 about his influence over military activities in Sarajevo?

10 A. I think he was very influential. He had been the corps commander

11 of the Bosnian Sarajevo corps before he was assigned this assignment for

12 liaison purposes. So he had a very good hold on whatever was happening in

13 Sarajevo.

14 Q. Do you remember an incident when you saw shooting emanating from

15 the sector, the UN camp area, and you tried to have it stopped?

16 A. This incident did occur. Since the Serbs retaliated and a mortar

17 shell fell near the French troops, therefore, I contacted General Mustafa

18 and immediately got the firing ceased.

19 Q. And just to make sure, who was firing from near the UN camp area?

20 A. It was an ABiH mortar.

21 Q. Let me turn to the Bosnian Serb army whom you were also in touch

22 with. Were you able to get into immediate contact with General Mladic

23 upon your arrival?

24 A. No. I had difficulties initially for about six weeks, four to six

25 weeks, that I wasn't given an audience by Mr. Mladic, General Mladic, or

Page 702

1 General Karadzic. I think the arrival of the chief UNMO who was a Muslim

2 was not liked by the team there. But over a certain period, I was able to

3 establish a rapport with everybody and I could make my way to them. And

4 on a number of occasions I subsequently saw General Mladic and ...

5 Q. Did you have contact with senior officers of the Bosnian Serb

6 corps around Sarajevo?

7 A. The direct dealing with these -- with the Romanija Corps, I think

8 that was the name, the Romanija Corps, was by the Sector Sarajevo. But as

9 the senior UN Military Observer in the region, I also -- in fact,

10 initially when I arrived, I called on General Milosevic, who was the

11 commander there. That was in the very first week or second week. And

12 then subsequently a number of times I did visit the Romanija Corps; once

13 specifically on the request of the senior military observer of Sector

14 Sarajevo, Colonel Mehboob. And on other occasions also I did visit

15 Lukavica barracks and, you know, the Romanija Corps headquarters.

16 Q. Were there other officers from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps you

17 remember having been in touch with during those times?

18 A. Colonel Indic. He was -- because we had to deal with him on the

19 movement of the convoys. And then he was probably the Chief of Staff, one

20 of the senior staff officers, very influential. And whatever we wanted to

21 get done, a word from Indic did move things.

22 Then there was another gentleman. I think his name was Colonel

23 Luganja. My pronunciation may not be correct. He was also there. He was

24 a security officer or something, and I did come in contact with him.

25 Q. We will get back to some of these gentlemen you mention in a

Page 703

1 moment, but let me turn to the overall picture in Sarajevo and perhaps in

2 Bosnia. While you were in Sarajevo, Brigadier Mohatarem, was there

3 shelling in Sarajevo?

4 A. I think shelling, it was so regular that if it was not there on a

5 particular day you felt disturbed that something bigger is going to come

6 subsequently.

7 Q. And what was shelled? Civilian areas? Military targets? Could

8 you tell the Trial Chamber what you could observe and what reports you got

9 from your subordinate UNMOs.

10 A. The exchange of fire continued on the confrontation lines between

11 the two militaries, but the shelling was not so well aimed. It was

12 targeted at civilians, and the number of casualties that would be on the

13 UN record would indicate that civilians were regularly targeted.

14 Q. And who targeted the civilians? Who was the source of fire?

15 A. The Romanija Corps.

16 Q. Now, could you, from your experience, distinguish a pattern of

17 shelling of civilian areas in Sarajevo related to military activities or

18 other activities that happened elsewhere in Bosnia?

19 A. Shelling was a regular process, but it would increase in intensity

20 if the Serbs wanted to make a point, or if they were serving as -- they

21 were facing reverses somewhere in any of these sectors, the shelling would

22 intensify.

23 I must bring it to the notice of the Honourable Court here that

24 Sarajevo itself was a kind of a theatre. I think the war in Bosnia by

25 itself was the first war which was electronically transmitted the world

Page 704

1 over. Everybody saw it. What happened in Sarajevo was transmitted within

2 minutes everywhere in the world; therefore, it was easier for anybody to,

3 you know, to gauge the mood of the Serbs on a particular day, in terms of

4 you could relate the shelling to what was going on in the other parts and

5 what they wanted to convey to the world.

6 Q. You told us a moment ago, Brigadier, that the Sarajevo-Romanija

7 Corps was the source of fire. Now, who controlled these shelling

8 activities, in your opinion?

9 A. The commander of the Romanija Corps.

10 Q. Now, did you personally experience fire? Were you hit at any time

11 during the time you were in Sarajevo?

12 A. I was -- a number of times I came under fire. My vehicle was hit

13 once on the Igman road coming into Sarajevo from Kiseljak. And once my --

14 the aircraft I was travelling on with Mr. Akashi, coming from Zagreb to

15 Sarajevo, that was hit. And I think another occasion my vehicle took a

16 shell, a shell splinter.

17 Q. Perhaps if we could elaborate a bit more on these two examples.

18 Can you tell us more about the aircraft you were travelling in with

19 Mr. Akashi.

20 A. We were flying in from Zagreb in this aircraft. When it was

21 coming in to land, it was hit by a 14.5-millimetre gun, an anti-aircraft

22 gun, from the Serb side.

23 It would be interesting to tell you that the next day, President

24 Suharto from Indonesia was supposed to come in, and I was asked to convey

25 to the Serb side that if anything happens to that aircraft, NATO would be

Page 705

1 let loose on the Bosnian Serb positions. And the next day the aircraft

2 came in and it wasn't fired on at all, and Mr. Suharto came in and went

3 out.

4 Q. You told us that you were asked to convey to the Serb side that if

5 anything happens to that aircraft, NATO would be let loose on the Bosnian

6 Serb positions. Do you remember to whom from the Serb side you relayed

7 that message?

8 A. I won't exactly remember, but I think I conveyed it to Colonel

9 Indic on one side, in the Sarajevo Corps, and through my liaison team in

10 Pale, I conveyed it to General Milutinovic, I believe, the Chief of Staff

11 there in Pale.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can I ask you, Brigadier, in the absence of the

13 warning that you gave, in your view, was there a real possibility that the

14 aircraft with General Suharto would have been fired on?

15 THE WITNESS: There was always the possibility, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Because that would have been a civilian aircraft,

17 would it not, or would it have been a military aircraft?

18 THE WITNESS: The aircraft that we were travelling in --

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no, the aircraft taking General Suharto.

20 THE WITNESS: I won't remember. But the aircraft which I was

21 travelling in, it was shot at at clear mark and view, and it was

22 Mr. Akashi's personal aircraft that was recognised in the theatre.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

24 Yes, Mr. Waespi.

25 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 706

1 Q. Let me go back, sir, if I may, to the other example you mentioned

2 where you were personally shot at on the Igman route. Do you remember

3 by -- and I think -- no, I don't think you mentioned. Do you remember

4 what weaponry was used to shoot at you?

5 A. It was a 14.5 anti-aircraft gun which was shooting at a fairly

6 long distance. I couldn't see the gun, actually, because we used to move

7 very fast on the Igman road, wherever the vehicle was exposed to firing.

8 There was -- there were two portions on the Igman road where the vehicles

9 were exposed to shooting from the Serb gunners.

10 Q. And the vehicle you were travelling with, can you tell Their

11 Honours whether it was marked.

12 A. It was marked. It was a UN vehicle, white coloured, boldly

13 written "UN," and it also flew a UN flag.

14 Q. We were talking about shelling. Let's very briefly talk about

15 sniping, Mr. Mohatarem. What experience did you and your subordinate

16 UNMOs make about sniping during the time you were in Sarajevo?

17 A. Sniping happened mainly along the confrontation lines, and in the

18 streets leading onto -- where there was a visibility for the snipers.

19 There was a particular place which was called as "Snipers' Alley," which

20 was the main road coming from the airport. I won't remember the name of

21 that road. In front of the -- in front of the Holiday Inn, general area

22 in front of the Holiday Inn, that was the main target, but all along the

23 confrontation line. And most of the casualties or those that were hit by

24 these snipers were civilian kids, women, old people who couldn't, you

25 know, who couldn't move fast or who were unaware of these snipers.

Page 707

1 Q. And what was the source of this sniping fire?

2 A. Sniping fire was from the Serb side.

3 Q. Let me move on to weapon collection points. Did the Bosnian army,

4 the ABiH, have weapon collection points?

5 A. Under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, there were common

6 weapon collection points established for the ABiH and for the army of the

7 Republika Srpska. There were two points for the ABiH. One was in the

8 Tito barracks. This was manned by the Ukrainian battalion. And there was

9 another in the tunnel beside the waterworks. I think it's Ciglana. I

10 won't remember the name of the tunnel. Ciglana, I think. Ciglana

11 tunnel. This was manned by the Egyptian battalion.

12 There were five on the Serb side -- seven on the Serb side. There

13 were five or seven, and they were all around Sarajevo. And the Serbs had

14 very intelligently placed the weapon collection points, and even the

15 weapons were placed in a manner that they could shoot from where they

16 were. And they had minimum dislocation. Unlike the ABiH weapons, which

17 were placed in a barracks and then in a tunnel, the Serb weapons were in

18 the open and ready to shoot at any time from where they were.

19 Q. Thank you, sir. Did you or your UNMOs personally see the weapons

20 collected at these weapon collection points of the Bosnian Serb side

21 actually firing?

22 A. I personally saw them firing. On a particular day, the UNMO team

23 which was in the north had a very good OP from where -- observation point,

24 from where they could see the Bare and Poljana weapon collection points.

25 I saw a 122-millimetre gun also firing and I also saw a tank firing from

Page 708

1 there.

2 Q. You mentioned in relation to the Bosnian army weapon collection

3 points that they were manned by the Ukrainians and the Egyptians. What

4 did you mean by "manned"?

5 A. Manned is that these were -- they were assigned to protect these

6 weapon collection points or secure them.

7 Q. Was there also a unit from UNPROFOR who was assigned to the

8 Bosnian Serb weapon collection points?

9 A. There was a Russian unit which was assigned, and I think the

10 French were also looking after one of the weapon collection points.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Mohatarem. Just one point about rogue or irregular

12 troops which are mentioned occasionally as playing a role in Bosnia. Do

13 you have any comments on whether, on the ABiH side or on the Bosnian Serb

14 side, there were any such rogue elements or irregular troops being active?

15 A. I don't think so. There were no irregular troops. There was

16 nobody outside the command of either the ABiH or the Romanija Corps.

17 Everyone -- every soldier was accounted for, and he was directly

18 responsible to his superiors for whatever he was doing. I don't believe

19 that there were any irregulars or freelance operators there.

20 Q. Now, you mentioned, sir, a few minutes ago that you met a couple

21 of times with General Dragomir Milosevic, and I think that you mentioned

22 that you were requested to come along with your Sector Sarajevo head of

23 UNMO, the gentleman from Bangladesh, Lieutenant Colonel Mehboob. Now, can

24 you tell us what was discussed during those couple of meetings between you

25 and General Milosevic?

Page 709

1 A. What we had done in the UNMO headquarters was that we had

2 formulated a standard format for meetings with the -- both the ABiH and

3 the Serb army. To start with, the format was, you know, we would lodge

4 protests about sniping, about freedom of movement, about anything that we

5 had concerns. They were conveyed, and that is -- I think this is exactly

6 what I -- and the humanitarian convoys. I think this particular meeting

7 was in relation to the movement of the humanitarian convoys as well as

8 some shooting which was taking place, and the UNMOs were under threat.

9 Q. And when you say that you lodged protests about sniping, what

10 exactly do you mean?

11 A. Sniping which was taking casualties of the civilians in the town,

12 and we would go and lodge protests. There was one set of protests that I

13 would file into Pale, and normally I wouldn't do it with the Romanija

14 Corps, but it was on the request of -- because the colonel himself wanted

15 this to look more important, this particular meeting, so he wanted me to

16 go with him and I'd gone.

17 JUDGE MINDUA: Excuse me, sir.

18 [Interpretation] Brigadier, you mentioned two meetings at least

19 that you had with General Milosevic, and during these meetings you dealt,

20 among other things, with sniping incidents. I'd like to know the

21 following: When you talked to him about these sniping incidents, did he

22 deny this, the reality of these sniping incidents, or did he accept that

23 these facts, these events had taken place, or did he justify them by

24 military necessity, or did he provide you with any other type of

25 explanation? What did he say? What was his opinion about sniping?

Page 710

1 THE WITNESS: Most of the time that we confronted the Serb

2 commanders with information on this sniping or other violations they were

3 rather dismissive about it. They won't accept that they had been shooting

4 at civilians. They did accept that they'd been firing at their military

5 counterparts. But exactly about the shooting at civilians, they were

6 fairly dismissive about it. They didn't care about it, actually.

7 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Judge.

9 Q. Let me continue to a few events, Brigadier Mohatarem, that

10 occurred from April onwards, 1995, about which I believe you do have

11 knowledge. April 1995, do you remember attacks on UN personnel in

12 Sarajevo, in Gorazde, and can you briefly tell us, if you may, what that

13 was all about?

14 A. The months of April, May, and June, I think, were the most

15 difficult months during my tenure in Sarajevo. From the very beginning of

16 April, the talks started that the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement is

17 about to collapse or it will not be extended beyond the 1st of May;

18 therefore, there were tensions.

19 I remember that in early April - I won't know the dates - there

20 were sniping incidents in which two French soldiers were injured. And in

21 Gorazde, the Serbs who had -- in fact, from the very beginning of April,

22 what they had done was that they'd stopped all humanitarian convoys and

23 supply convoys for the UN also; therefore, there was a shortage of

24 everything in Sarajevo and in the enclaves. In this period they were

25 shooting at the British soldiers who were posted in Gorazde also.

Page 711

1 In fact, very interestingly, I asked my team in Pale to check up

2 as to why they are shooting at the British, because they'd not done it

3 before, and the answer that I got was that because of -- the Serbs saw the

4 British riding mules and, you know, horses in that area, and that had

5 happened because they'd run out of fuel. And so this is the logic they

6 gave for shooting at the British. They didn't think they were the British

7 soldiers. At the French, they'd done it, I think. It was first week of

8 April. I won't know the dates.

9 Q. Thank you for your answer, sir. During April, and in connection

10 with these French casualties, did you hear about a comment made by the

11 brigade commander of the Ilidza Brigade?

12 A. Yes. I was conveyed this by the commander of Sector Sarajevo that

13 he had said they will get a dozen French for every Serb soldier who's

14 killed. This is, I think, either preceding or after a Serb attack on one

15 of the bridges, Vrbanja bridge, I think, where there were French

16 soldiers. Two of them got killed. The Serbs also took away some of the

17 soldiers; I won't remember the number. The French counterattacked and

18 took the Vrbanja bridge and caused casualties on the Serb attackers also.

19 And the Serb attackers were dressed in French uniforms when they attacked

20 the French themselves.

21 Q. Going back to your UNMOs but still staying in April 1995, was

22 there a hijacking of vehicles of your monitors?

23 A. That was a regular phenomena there on the Serb side. The vehicles

24 were hijacked. Slightly earlier than April, I think in February, March, I

25 lost 11 vehicles. In April, I won't remember exactly, but I thought -- I

Page 712

1 think we lost one vehicle from our Pale team which was subsequently seen

2 in convoys of the Serb leadership.

3 Q. And a related question; we haven't touched upon that: Did your

4 subordinate UNMOs have freedom of movement; and if you can answer that

5 question in both parts, in relation to whether they were stationed in the

6 Bosnian Serb-held territory or in the territory held by the government

7 forces? Was there freedom of movement for them?

8 A. The freedom of movement of government forces --

9 government-controlled areas was generally there. There were certain areas

10 they were sensitive to and they did prevent -- occasionally prevented the

11 movement of the UNMOs. Otherwise, there was freedom of movement. In

12 fact, most of the United Nations' presence was in the ABiH-controlled area

13 and they had freedom of movement.

14 On the Serb side, no, nothing of that sort. There was no freedom

15 of movement. If there was movement allowed, it was very controlled.

16 Like, if I was allowed to move around, I would have people trailing me and

17 people ahead of me. It was just exactly -- if I'd given a timing that

18 I'll move -- stay at this place at 11.00 to such a time, it was restricted

19 to that, the routes, everything.

20 Q. Thank you, Brigadier. Let me move to an activity that occurred on

21 the 16th and 17th of May, 1995. Do you recall an attack by the Bosnian

22 Serb army on a feature Their Honours are already aware of, Debelo Brdo?

23 A. Yes, I am aware of that.

24 Q. And can you tell Their Honours what this was about, how it

25 developed over these couple of days?

Page 713

1 A. This incident was for -- the Serbs wanted to take -- there were

2 two pimples or small hillocks which is entered there. That's why the name

3 Debelo Brdo. These were overlooking the Miljacka river. Access --

4 control over this would have given them access or a direct line of site

5 shooting ability to the Serb gunners at the centre of the Sarajevo town.

6 And this they attacked with fire, mostly, with artillery fire, and they

7 wanted to drive out the defenders from there.

8 They didn't succeed. It was businesslike. It was directed at the

9 defender -- within the confrontation line and directed at the defenders,

10 but they couldn't dislodge them. It continued for two days, and after two

11 days, the Serbs gave it up. But they came back, I think, after one week

12 and tried to do the same thing again.

13 This was -- the western side of Sarajevo town, the one on the west

14 of the river, the Serbs had a traditional claim on that area and they

15 thought that that was part of the Serb area, traditional Serb area, and

16 they wanted it back.

17 Q. Now, you said a moment ago that they didn't achieve their aim to

18 get this area back. Do you remember what happened, in your observation,

19 after they realised they could not gain it through their actions, you

20 described them as military actions?

21 A. They rained Sarajevo town with artillery, with mortars; snipers

22 were active all along the confrontation line. They took a fairly heavily

23 toll on the civilians. I think in the month of May the civilian

24 casualties were 70-plus killed and I think 250-odd injured. In those two

25 days, I think they were very heavy on the civilians.

Page 714

1 Q. Do you remember an attack on one of the entries of the airport

2 tunnel on the Butmir side that happened in early May 1995?

3 A. There was an artillery shooting at the entrance of the Butmir

4 tunnel on the Hrasnica side, and there I think 11 people were killed and,

5 I don't know, I think 50-odd were injured in this. In fact, General Smith

6 was very disturbed about this, and he discussed the possibility of a NATO

7 attack on that particular occasion. But Mr. Akashi did not permit it and

8 it did not take place.

9 Q. Can you briefly address the issue of humanitarian aid convoys into

10 the city? Were their check-points you had to deal with?

11 A. All humanitarian convoys moving into Serb areas were managed

12 through my office. We would be in -- we were the only office which was

13 directly in contact on the Serb side. And we were dealing with Pale, not

14 the Romanija Corps, in the context of the convoys.

15 There were two check-points, S1, S4, and they created whatever

16 difficulties they could. But generally if the -- after difficulties, the

17 convoys were able to move if they were cleared by the army headquarters in

18 Pale. There were cases where things were removed from the containers and,

19 you know, the crews were robbed, but the convoys went on.

20 Q. And can you tell Your Honours where these check-points S1 and S4

21 were located?

22 A. On the northern side of the town.

23 Q. And who manned those check-points?

24 A. These were manned by the Romanija Corps. They were manned by the

25 Romanija Corps. But the movement of the convoys were allowed or

Page 715

1 disallowed by Pale.

2 Between the first week of April to June, I think, there were very,

3 very few convoys. I had sent, I think, 195 requests or something and got

4 clearance for five only. That caused a lot of hardship to the people, and

5 it was a deliberate move to starve the people and to deny, even to the UN

6 personnel, the resupply.

7 Q. Let me move to a next topic, and we are almost at the end. This

8 is air bombs. Are you familiar with the launching of air bombs at the

9 time you were there in Sarajevo, in 1995?

10 A. Yes. I've seen the air bombs. I've felt the air bombs. These

11 were 500-pound aircraft bombs, and they had four 1.28-millimetre rocket

12 motors [Realtime transcript read in error "mortars"], you know, screwed to

13 them to give this 500-pound bomb flight. And these were fired from an

14 improvised launcher which -- the rail that they prepared looked like an

15 electronic pylon with crossbars, and that was placed on large trucks, and

16 from that these were launched. I've seen one myself, this launcher, on

17 the Pale road, and ...

18 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Excuse me, but it seems to me that

19 the witness did not say "rocket mortars" but "rocket motors." There's a

20 difference between a mortar and an engine, a motor.

21 THE WITNESS: I said rocket motors.


23 THE WITNESS: M-o-t-o-r.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's clarified. Thank you.

25 MR. WAESPI: Thank you very much, Ms. Isailovic.

Page 716

1 Q. Did they have a sound, these weapons?

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, you have it wrong on the -- as to what I

3 said. "Motors," m-o-t-o-r-s. So let that be corrected.

4 THE WITNESS: I couldn't get your question.

5 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I'll repeat it gladly.

6 Q. Did these aerial weapons have a sound?

7 A. They were very noisy weapons. I was having my lunch near the

8 Presidency in a UN restaurant, and I just left that building when this

9 weapon came with a whistling sound and exploded very heavily. All the --

10 in that particular restaurant where I just had food, all the windowpanes,

11 et cetera, had broken down. And there were casualties this particular

12 day.

13 Q. Do you remember the approximate, perhaps the exact, date of this

14 incident?

15 A. No, I won't. I won't remember that. I won't remember the date,

16 the exact date. It should be in May or June somewhere.

17 Q. And that's in 1995.

18 A. 1995. There were others also, because the two UNMOs got injured

19 in Hrasnica, which is south of Sarajevo. This bomb had exploded and they

20 also suffered injuries.

21 Q. And that's, again, this incident around that time frame, April,

22 May, June.

23 A. Yeah, within this time frame.

24 Q. Now, you mentioned the attack you experienced yourself at the UN

25 Presidency. Was that a military target?

Page 717

1 A. The UN building was not a military target. It was hit by a

2 shell. One of the trees was chopped off. Luckily, it didn't hit the

3 building. And we protested against this. General Smith himself signed

4 the protest which was sent out.

5 Q. Now, you described to Their Honours the make-up of these aerial --

6 these aerial weapons. Can you tell Their Honours, from your experience,

7 could these be guided, could these be aimed at specific targets?

8 A. They were not. They couldn't be aimed. They were free flight,

9 and they were aimed to cause casualties wherever it hits. They were

10 weapons which could not be managed. They could not be managed in terms of

11 range. Direction -- general direction could be given to them, but they

12 could fall anywhere.

13 Q. And did you have a nickname for these bombs?

14 A. These were called pigs, called pigs by the people there.

15 Q. Let me move to the incident in August 1995 commonly referred to as

16 the Markale market attack or massacre. Where were you at that time?

17 A. I was outside Sarajevo. I was in Kiseljak.

18 Q. And how were you made aware of the Markale attack?

19 A. I was on the radio all the time.

20 Q. And did you initiate any actions after you heard about the attack?

21 A. I wanted to get back to Sarajevo. I tried the French people who

22 were guarding the Igman road. They did not allow a soft-top vehicle, and

23 I was denied entry and I had to go back. Then the next day I requested

24 for movement, and I couldn't even get on on the 29th. But on the 30th,

25 early morning, I was specially provided an APC by the French, and I

Page 718

1 travelled -- I left my own vehicle in Kiseljak and came to Sarajevo in

2 that APC. And I was immediately summoned to the BHC, which is the

3 UNPROFOR headquarter, and I was briefed about it.

4 I was asked about this very incident. Because what had happened

5 was that once this incident took place, after the crater analysis were

6 provided to the UNPROFOR head commander, he had requested for NATO

7 air-strikes, but within 24 hours these strikes were called off. I think

8 on the 30th they were called off. On the 29th, they started; on the 30th

9 they were called off, because one of the senior UNMOs, a lieutenant

10 colonel from Russia, he went to the press and public and he said that the

11 firing had not been done from the Serb side. So there was a kind of

12 embarrassment and the NATO attacks were halted.

13 As soon as I came in, I was asked to reverify what had been

14 provided by the UNMOs, because most of the crater analysis was generally

15 done by the UNMOs. This decision was based partially on the analysis

16 provided by the UNMOs.

17 But I must also tell you that there were different people doing

18 crater analysis there. There were the French engineers who would also go

19 to the craters; there was the Bosnian police who would go to the craters;

20 there was a team from the US embassy which covered important incidents.

21 There was a British symboline, which is a piece of equipment, you know,

22 mortar-tracking equipment, which also played a role. They also recorded

23 the ingoing and outgoing weapons. And the French also had these recording

24 devices, radar mortars, which were there.

25 Everybody combined to come to a decision on this thing. It was

Page 719

1 not only one -- one, you know, one unit or the UNMOs alone who had come to

2 this. But still, we were asked to do a -- redo this investigation.

3 I had gone to the place, the site myself. I'd seen the crater

4 myself. The team which had initially done -- which was -- the commander

5 was -- the team leader was a Dutch officer, Colonel Konings, and he had

6 done the crater analysis. There was some difference of opinion in the

7 actual degree of entry, the hit that the round had taken. We had given

8 170 degrees and the others had -- one of the -- I must also add here,

9 sorry to go back, there was a British --

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Brigadier. I'd much prefer shorter

11 answers, and I would ask the counsel to put specific questions to the

12 witness.

13 MR. WAESPI: Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

14 Q. Did you actually make a report about your findings?

15 A. Yes. That is the -- I was asked specifically to give a report

16 about the findings of the UNMO team, and I gave the report and placed the

17 weapon which had fired on the Serb side.

18 Q. And what was the basis for your information? You said you went to

19 see the site, but you also talked to some people. What was the basis for

20 your findings?

21 A. The basis was physical. The UNMO team had done a professional

22 job. And it was not only one round which had come into Sarajevo that day;

23 there were five rounds. While the others concentrated on this round where

24 a lot of civilians had got killed, we had done it for the other four

25 rounds also. You could trace back the line of fire and trajectory, and we

Page 720

1 came to the conclusion that it was initiated from the Serb side.

2 Q. And do you have your report with you?

3 A. I don't have.

4 Q. And how big was your report?

5 A. The final report that I gave to General Smith's staff was one

6 page.

7 Q. Let me show you a couple of -- in fact, three documents, and that

8 will then conclude the examination just before lunchtime. The first

9 document is 65 ter number 198.

10 If you could look at the --

11 A. I've seen this report.

12 Q. Yes. What is it?

13 A. This is the report by the UNMO team leader, Colonel Konings.

14 Q. And that was the report you took into account when drafting your

15 conclusions.

16 A. Yes, I did.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: May we have it enlarged.

18 MR. WAESPI: Are you satisfied, Mr. President?

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, it hasn't, but go ahead while it's being

20 done.

21 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, this report will play a control with

22 several other witnesses. Colonel Konings will come himself and testify.

23 The next -- if this report could be assigned an exhibit number.


25 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P85, Your Honours.

Page 721

1 MR. WAESPI: If the next document could be shown. This is ter

2 number 224. If it could be enlarged as well.

3 Q. Do you know what that represents?

4 A. Yes, I do know.

5 Q. And what is it?

6 A. The UNMO headquarters report, Sector Sarajevo. This one is from

7 Zagreb. Sorry. This one is from Zagreb.

8 Q. And if we could go to page 20, the second part of page 20.

9 "On the Federation Side ..." if that part could be enlarged. And

10 perhaps I can read it slowly.

11 "UNMO team Sedrenik was tasked to investigate the impacts in the

12 general area of the marketplace (central city Sarajevo). The patrol

13 carried out investigation in conjunction with sector engineers, the local

14 civilian police and a local judge from Sarajevo court. The combined team

15 conducted all investigations together, including visits to Kosevo and

16 state hospitals to confirm dead, injured people."

17 It goes on to talk about the crater analysis, and then at the end

18 he talks about the impacts done by "120-millimetre mortar projectiles and

19 the firing range, 170 MAG degree."

20 Do you have a comment about that?

21 A. This is the factual -- the report that is made by the UNMOs.

22 Q. Thank you, Brigadier Mohatarem.

23 MR. WAESPI: The last document, Mr. President, if it could be

24 assigned a ter number as well. I apologise.


Page 722

1 THE REGISTRAR: That would be Exhibit P86, Your Honours.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, may I ask you, are you bringing any

3 evidence as to the total number of snipers that were engaged in this

4 campaign?

5 MR. WAESPI: We will bring evidence from a military expert who

6 will talk about units that had sniping elements. We have documents that

7 show that sniping training was conducted. Whether we can actually argue a

8 final number I'm not sure about, Mr. President.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: But I wonder whether the brigadier will have an

10 estimate of the number of snipers.

11 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it would be difficult for me.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Difficult. Okay, thanks.

13 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. The last document I wanted

14 to show to the witness is ter number 269.

15 Q. If you could have a moment to look at this document. It is

16 drafted by General Nikolai and addressed to Mr. Rasim Delic. Please read

17 it yourself.

18 There is a second page which was attached to this document, and

19 that's a document, a letter by Colonel Meille to Major General Milosevic.

20 This is the second document, in essence, protesting about shelling and

21 sniping of civilian areas.

22 Have you seen these documents before?

23 A. Yes, I've seen them. I don't remember them vividly, but such

24 communication was -- I had access to this.

25 Q. Is that an example of protests that were lodged towards the

Page 723

1 Bosnian Serb authorities?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And how many of these letters are you aware of would have been

4 filed during the time you were there as a senior military observer?

5 A. Many, many. I don't think so -- I'll be able to recall, but I

6 think in May we had eight or nine letters going out, in May alone.

7 Q. Thank you very much.

8 MR. WAESPI: If I can have a moment to consult with my colleague,

9 Mr. President.

10 [Prosecution counsel confer]

11 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I see it's time for the break. I may

12 have one or two questions right after the break, and that will then

13 conclude my examination-in-chief.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just put them now, or are you not ready?

15 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I'd like to consult with my colleague before

16 doing that, Mr. President.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Because I'm mindful of your urging us earlier to

18 ensure that the brigadier leaves today.

19 MR. WAESPI: I'm advised it will be no more than two or three

20 questions.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.

22 We'll take the break now, and we'll resume at 2.00 p.m.

23 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.47 p.m.

24 --- On resuming at 2.05 p.m.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I just clarify that this afternoon we'll sit

Page 724

1 until 5.00 to ensure that the brigadier's testimony is concluded. In the

2 event that it is concluded prior to that time, we will not begin the next

3 witness, because it would not be productive to have the witness just for a

4 few minutes.

5 So you have a few more questions, just a minute or two?

6 MR. WAESPI: No, Mr. President. We have consulted over time.

7 There are no more questions.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.

9 Then please begin the cross-examination.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

11 First, I wish to say that this morning we discussed an issue with

12 the Prosecution concerning another witness who was to be examined today.

13 We agreed that even had we sat all day today it would not have been

14 possible to examine him because disclosure took place too late for us to

15 be able to examine that witness. I will, of course, not abuse your

16 patience, and I will try to be as efficient as possible today in order to

17 conclude my examination as soon as possible.

18 Does this suffice, Your Honours?

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, it does.

20 Cross-examination by Mr. Tapuskovic:

21 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mohatarem, I am attorney-at-law Tapuskovic

22 from Belgrade. I appear for the accused, Mr. Milosevic, and I wish to put

23 some questions to you concerning issues of interest to the Defence.

24 I will rely on the statement you made on the 11th and 12th of

25 August, 1996, to the investigators of the Prosecution and only two

Page 725

1 documents.

2 You will recall that on the 11th and 12th of August, 1996, you

3 were examined immediately after the conflict in the area in question, and

4 you may have been among the first witnesses to be questioned after the

5 tragic events in Sarajevo. Is this correct?

6 A. This is correct.

7 Q. For this reason, I believe that your memory of the circumstances

8 you were a witness to has remained fresh or, rather, was fresh at that

9 time. So would you confirm that at the time you gave this interview you

10 had a very good recollection of the events you were talking about?

11 A. Yes, I had.

12 Q. In answer to Mr. Waespi's questions, you said - I cannot recall

13 the exact words - something to the effect that Sarajevo at the time of

14 these events, and especially during the time you were there but perhaps

15 before that also, was a kind of stage for all the world and was a kind of

16 media centre of the world. Would that be correct?

17 A. That would be correct.

18 Q. Everything that happened in Sarajevo itself was very quickly

19 learned by the whole world; perhaps sometimes on the same day. Would that

20 be correct?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Witness, was anything known in the world about what was happening

23 in the areas where the Serbs were? The whole world thinks or believes or

24 is convinced or has evidence showing that the Serbs were firing, but they

25 knew nothing in the centres of the important countries or, rather, their

Page 726

1 citizens knew nothing of what was going on on the other side.

2 A. Yes, that is correct.

3 Q. Thank you. My next two questions concern your profession. I

4 won't dwell on it long. But as you're an expert for tanks, as far as I

5 was able to understand, would that imply that you were fully familiar with

6 the problems that exist in the case of other artillery weapons besides

7 tanks?

8 A. I generally know better about tanks than the other weapons.

9 Q. Thank you. As, for the most part, you were a land officer, do you

10 know anything about airborne bombs, any kind of bombs dropped from planes?

11 A. Yes. I've undergone courses where I learnt about the different

12 kind of bombs.

13 Q. But can you consider yourself a soldier who is an expert in such

14 problems?

15 A. I'm not an expert on air bombs, but I've learned during the course

16 of my service. All land forces officers are also briefed or they undergo

17 courses where they see airborne munitions also.

18 Q. Thank you. I wish to rely on a certain document or, rather, on

19 certain documents. One is the witness statement of the 11th and 12th of

20 August, 1996. That's DD00-02-17. We had some problems with the

21 electronic network this morning, but we have just been informed that it

22 can, in fact, be used now.

23 Do you see this statement, sir? Your statement, do you see it?

24 A. No, I don't. Yes, I see the cover page.

25 Q. Yes. In order to conclude as quickly as possible, I would ask you

Page 727

1 to look at page 3 of the English version, towards the bottom of the page,

2 where you are talking about your arrival in Sarajevo by plane. Have you

3 found this?

4 A. Yes, I do. With Mr. Akashi.

5 Q. Yes. Before I ask you something about this, could you tell the

6 Chamber whether you met the accused? Is this him, Dragomir Milosevic, the

7 accused? Could you confirm to the Chamber that he was the man you had

8 contacts with?

9 A. I did call on him, and I do recognise him.

10 Q. On how many occasions did you talk to him directly? Were you on

11 your own in the delegation, were you chairing the talks with him, or was

12 he just present there?

13 A. No. I went with a delegation; I think two or three UNMOs.

14 Q. Thank you. On the page you see before you, you said -- rather,

15 you gave an example, and you say that the fact that shots were fired on

16 the plane in which Akashi and you arrived in Sarajevo, and this occurred

17 in February, 1995, when you arrived; is that correct?

18 A. Not on that day, that particular day I arrived, but subsequently

19 we'd gone to Zagreb and came back on the aircraft.

20 Q. Let me remind you that that's what it says here. So is what it

21 says here incorrect?

22 A. Yes, I was -- I was on the aircraft with Mr. Akashi.

23 Q. But you say when you arrived in Sarajevo, after your plane landed,

24 the day after -- it says here, "Mr. Soekarno" it must be "Mr. Suharto,"

25 was supposed to come to Sarajevo; is that correct? And then, "The day

Page 728

1 after," you say, "we conveyed to General Milosevic that if they fired at

2 this aircraft, the whole NATO would come after them and nothing happened

3 during this visit."

4 My question is if you met Milosevic for the first time a week

5 after this event, as you explained, how could you know that the shots were

6 fired from the Serb side? And why did you not address both sides? Could

7 you answer that question?

8 A. This was the professional opinion of the UNMOs who covered this

9 shooting, that it was from the Serb side.

10 Q. And you say, "We conveyed to General Milosevic." Who conveyed

11 this? How do you know it was conveyed to General Milosevic and not to the

12 Serb side in general? There were far higher ranking and more responsible

13 on the Serb side.

14 A. It was conveyed on two levels; one was to Mr. Milosevic's

15 headquarters through the Sector Sarajevo, and my own team at Pale also

16 conveyed it to the army headquarters. That was the normal procedure.

17 Q. Mr. Milosevic was very rarely at Pale. He spent most of his time

18 at the positions. So it would have been more normal to convey this to

19 someone who made decisions at the top of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20 A. It was conveyed to the top also, as I mentioned earlier, through

21 the liaison team at Pale as well as through Sector Sarajevo to the

22 Romanija Corps.

23 Q. Can you tell me, you spoke about the media in relation to

24 Sarajevo. At the time you were there, did all these visits by eminent

25 leaders, presidents, UN leaders at the time, mean that shots were often

Page 729

1 fired at the vehicles bringing these people to Sarajevo and that the Serbs

2 were always suspected of doing this in the media, and that this was done

3 the very same day the events occurred? Would that be correct?

4 A. Yes, that is correct.

5 Q. Thank you. I would now like to move on and refer to certain

6 events. I have to skip now to the last page of your statement where you

7 mention Markale. I would very much like to clarify the Markale issue

8 before the Chamber as soon as possible, so perhaps you can tell me

9 something about it. You have already mentioned it when questioned by

10 Mr. Waespi.

11 On the last page of your statement, somewhere in the middle of the

12 page, you mentioned the 28th of August. Have you found that place?

13 A. Yes, I have.

14 Q. You say here that it was published on the 28th of August, that it

15 was the Bosnian Serbs who were responsible for this shelling; is that

16 correct?

17 A. Yes, it is correct.

18 Q. So what you just said happened again. As soon as the event

19 occurred, on the same day, the Serbs were blamed before the whole world.

20 MR. WAESPI: I'm not quite sure whether that's what the witness

21 statement says, and I'm not sure whether counsel is directing the witness

22 to the statement or whether he wants to elicit the same information from

23 the witness.

24 The witness statement says on the 29th of August the announcement

25 was made by the Bosnian Serbs, or that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible

Page 730

1 for that shelling. Just an observation from my point.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's only the date that you're questioning.

3 Okay.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] First, I should have -- well, I

5 should have made a pause between what I read out and what I asked.

6 Q. First, Witness, I asked you to confirm whether it's correct or not

7 that on the 29th of August, as it says in your statement, the announcement

8 was made that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for this shelling. You

9 stated this in 1996. That's what it says here.

10 A. On 29th August the Serbs were blamed for the shelling.

11 Q. So my question is: As soon as the terrible event occurred, on the

12 very same day, the Serbs would always be accused in definite terms of

13 having done it, of being responsible; is that correct?

14 A. Yes, it is correct.

15 Q. Thank you. In the next sentence you go on to say: "General

16 Janvier was also on leave that day, so General Smith decided to ask for

17 NATO airstrikes." Is this correct?

18 A. This is correct.

19 Q. The next sentence:

20 "On the 1st of September, the bombing by NATO stopped due to

21 declaration of a Russian colonel, Demurenko, that the shelling was not by

22 the BSA, the Bosnian Serb army."

23 Is this correct?

24 A. Yes. This statement was made by Colonel Demurenko.

25 Q. He was the chief of that sector, a high-ranking Russian officer,

Page 731

1 Colonel Demurenko.

2 A. Yes, he was the chief of that sector.

3 Q. And he was among the first to visit the site. Is that something

4 you know about?

5 A. No, he was not the first to visit the site. The team, led by

6 Colonel Konings, was the first to visit the site.

7 Q. Is it correct what you say next:

8 "All agencies who made the first deduction about the origin of the

9 fire, including my office, were ordered to conduct a new investigation,

10 and for the moment the NATO air-strikes were put on hold."

11 A. That is true.

12 Q. Thank you. After that, your office conducted an investigation, is

13 that correct, and determined that the mortar used was 120 millimetre? Is

14 this correct?

15 A. Yes. We confirmed the findings of the investigation team.

16 Q. No. It says here that your office, under your leadership, came to

17 that conclusion. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes. I came to that conclusion that the initial findings of the

19 team were correct.

20 Q. Can you then tell us when you first addressed General Smith? I

21 understood you to say that it all started based on your report, the NATO

22 activity.

23 A. As I spoke before, there were several agencies which conducted the

24 crater analysis. Mine was one of them. And General Smith took a decision

25 on the basis of the total picture that emerged in front of him.

Page 732

1 Q. I won't go back to that. There may be some minor discrepancies.

2 But what I really want to ask you is something I have to ask, with the

3 help of a document which is already in evidence here. 65 ter number 481.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] 65 ter number 481, may this

5 document be shown to the witness. It's a report dated the 28th, the day

6 before the air-strikes began. The 28th, on the same day. Could the

7 witness please look at the first page. Yes, this is it.

8 Q. On the first page of this document, you see that on that first day

9 General Janvier is reporting directly to Mr. Annan. Is that correct? Do

10 you know about this report?

11 A. No, I don't know about this report.

12 Q. Very well. You never saw this report?

13 A. No, I didn't.

14 Q. You said that the shell that was used was of 120-millimetre

15 calibre weapon and that this was confirmed by your office.

16 A. Yes, that's true.

17 Q. Are you aware, because you say you know about artillery, that

18 mortar shells that -- rather, that it's very difficult to establish from

19 where a mortar shell was fired, because it's impossible to establish the

20 charge used to fire the projectile, and that this refers to the event of

21 the 28th of August.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Where are you?

23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] From the document I'm showing the

24 witness, the document he's not aware of but which is dated the 28th, and

25 it's on page 3 in the English version. UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo. If the

Page 733

1 witness could read the passage where 120-millimetre calibre shells are

2 mentioned. And he established that the mortar use was 120-millimetre.

3 THE WITNESS: I don't see that on the page that is open in front

4 of me.

5 MR. WAESPI: If I can assist, I think it's the previous page, page

6 2 of the actual document, because there is always a cover page. It

7 starts -- so it's the previous page and it starts: "B. UNPROFOR: Sector

8 Sarajevo," "(a) Sarajevo."

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Waespi.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Towards the end of this paragraph, rather, halfway down the

12 paragraph, it reads that in relation to that specific type of shell, it is

13 very difficult to determine the positions for these mortar rounds because

14 it is impossible to determine the level of charge used to fire the

15 projectiles.

16 My question is: Witness, do you know anything about this,

17 anything about --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi. Let's hear Mr. Waespi.

19 MR. WAESPI: Yes, it's a short paragraph, and I think it would be

20 most fair that the whole paragraph, not just the second part, which I

21 agree is most relevant for the Defence's point, but the whole -- because

22 it, in fact, confirms about the calibre, these 120-millimetres. I think

23 it would be fair. At least the witness has time to read the whole

24 paragraph before addressing the second part.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Let's give the witness a minute to

Page 734

1 read the paragraph in its entirety, and then you can put the question.

2 THE WITNESS: Okay, sir, I've read it.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Put the question now, Mr. Tapuskovic.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there is one remark

5 that I would like to make. I will never ever, throughout this trial, try

6 to use things out of context in order to lead the witness. It is

7 precisely because of time. I think it would be an excellent idea if we

8 had the time for every witness to go through the entire document before

9 he's asked any questions at all; however --

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think it would be a good idea to get on with

11 your cross-examination.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

13 Q. Witness, do you know about this, what the document reads,

14 something about a shelf of this kind as something that the artillery

15 experts who wrote this - and these, in all likelihood, were top-notch

16 experts, since they were acting on behalf of General Janvier - is it

17 possible that they were entirely right in saying this? Or is it the case

18 that you don't know about this particular feature normally displayed by

19 this type of shell? Can you answer that one for me, please?

20 A. Yes. There was no difference of opinion among all the five teams

21 that conducted the crater analysis on the type of weapon used.

22 Everybody -- nobody had a difference of opinion that it was 120-millimetre

23 mortar. The difference of opinion was, as is evident, that in the degree

24 of impact on the -- on the degree from which the shell had come.

25 Q. Sir, you know that Colonel Demurenko, who, although he may have

Page 735

1 not been at the scene in the very first minutes, right from the outset,

2 explained his position of the chance of a shell landing in that precise

3 place was one against a million. Is that right?

4 A. No, that's not right, if the shell was given the correct

5 trajectory. And these shells, there were five of them, they were not

6 fired specifically at a particular target. They were generally fired in

7 the area. And this particular one, the one which fell on the Markale

8 market, took its toll. But, yes, in terms of the buildings that were

9 around this, this shell had to be at a particular degree to have landed

10 where it actually landed.

11 Q. Thank you. I have no reason to keep you on this, sir.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Brigadier, may I just ask you, the sentence:

13 "The definition of firing positions for mortar rounds is very

14 difficult, as it is impossible to determine the level of charge used to

15 fire the projectiles."

16 By the definition of "firing," is it meant the position from which

17 firing took place?


19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, do you agree with that statement? What's

20 your comment on that statement?

21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, exactly pinpointing the position may

22 not be possible, but the trajectory indicates that the distance that the

23 fire -- the round took, this mortar took, was more than 2.000 metres. And

24 that meant that it was on the Serb side. It was fired from the Serb side.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

Page 736

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Thank you. Just after the air-strikes started; is that right?

3 A. The air-strikes started, after about 24 hours.

4 Q. Thank you. Towards the end of the statement, you say:

5 "On the 14th of September, the army of the Republika Srpska

6 capitulated and pulled back."

7 That's what you say. Back in 1996, you stated that, didn't you?

8 So several months after the end of the war; right?

9 A. This is on the 14th of September. The army of Republika Srpska

10 agreed to pull out its heavy weapons from the zone which was earmarked

11 earlier for safety of the people of Sarajevo.

12 I may clarify here: There was a zone which was marked where heavy

13 weapons could not be taken in, and these weapons, after the 14th of

14 September, they were withdrawn by the Republika Srpska.

15 Q. You stated in quite definite terms:

16 "After the period of the NATO bombing there was little shooting in

17 Sarajevo."

18 Is that true, first of all?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. So September, October, and November -- this is in reference to

21 September, October, and November 1995. Would that be a fair assessment?

22 A. Yes. The hostilities were very -- at a very low level in this

23 period. This is the period where the -- the work-up to the Dayton Accord

24 had started, and all the warring factions were, you know, taking that into

25 account.

Page 737

1 Q. What about the army of the Republika Srpska? Did they not face

2 both NATO and the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as enemies at the time?

3 A. The enemies of Republika Srpska were the BiH army. NATO was there

4 as the -- as the -- as the tool of the international community. And it

5 was not an enemy of Republika Srpska.

6 Q. I do understand that, but what I'm asking you is something else.

7 In those situations, was the army of the Republika Srpska not facing both

8 the BH army and NATO as opposition? You may or may not be able to answer,

9 but what about most of the information about the positions held by the

10 army of the Republika Srpska? Was NATO not being informed about those

11 positions precisely by the BH army at the time?

12 A. It's not correct. NATO had its own means. It had its --

13 Q. Thank you. Thank you.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness complete the answer. You asked

15 the question.

16 THE WITNESS: NATO had its own means. It had the satellites. It

17 had other electronic devices, radars, which were watching the movement or

18 the positions of the Republika Srpska army.

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. In relation to that I have another question. This is page 2, the

21 paragraph halfway down the page, that page of your statement. You talked

22 about this a while ago while questioned by the Prosecutor, Mr. Waespi. I

23 would like to go back to that now, given what I just heard from you. Have

24 you got that there, sir? There's reference there to Mustafa

25 Hajrolahovic. You tell a story there. On a day, the ABiH fired a mortar

Page 738

1 from the vicinity of the Zetra UN camp. Is that right?

2 A. That's right.

3 Q. This is plumb in the centre of Sarajevo; isn't it? Is that right?

4 A. It is. It is in the centre of Sarajevo.

5 Q. The Serbs fired back and one of their shells landed next to a UN

6 base. Is that true as well, sir?

7 A. That is true, and we protested to the BiH.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi is on his feet.

9 MR. WAESPI: Yes. Just to be precise, the statement didn't say it

10 landed next to the UN base. The statement says that their shells fell "in

11 the UN camp." This is on page 2 of the statement.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I thank you. I think that's even

14 more precise. Yes, that's right. I may have misread, but perhaps I

15 wouldn't even be asking you this. You did talk about this when you spoke

16 to Mr. Waespi. But the next passage, the next paragraph, about NATO,

17 that's why I'm asking. That's the reason.

18 The next example -- another example was during the NATO

19 air-strikes, in the period end of August and beginning of September. This

20 is poorly written. And then there's the example:

21 "A Bosnian rocket-launcher fired from Sedrenik; nevertheless, the

22 Bosnian government had agreed not to undertake any action during the NATO

23 air-strikes."

24 I'm not sure if I read this correctly.

25 "They continued to operate, although they kept saying that there

Page 739

1 was no longer any need for them to operate."

2 Can you please shed some light on this? I don't think there is

3 any need for me to lead you on this. There is no need whatsoever.

4 A. They did fire a rocket and they were ticked off with that and

5 that's all.

6 Q. Could you please tell me briefly, sir - maybe it's slightly beside

7 the point - but do you know about the shells that, according to the

8 indictment, fell on the TV building and the PTT building? Do you know

9 about those bombs?

10 A. Yes, I know about the bomb. On the PTT building, it was one of

11 those 500-pound air force bombs. It fell next to the PTT building. And

12 there was another one, which is the TV building, which is very close by to

13 each other. But these bombs, as I pointed out earlier, they couldn't be

14 aimed exactly at a target.

15 Q. You've explained that, according to what you understand. I

16 wouldn't dwell on that. We've heard enough on that. But do you know,

17 sir, that there were quite a number of mortar positions occupied or held

18 by the BH army around those buildings at the time? Is this something that

19 you were aware of, or not?

20 A. They may be -- they may be close to it. I exactly won't be able

21 to comment on the exactly location of the BiH army positions.

22 Q. Thank you. I would like now to go to page 4, second paragraph of

23 the English. There is some talk there of Srebrenica as well.

24 A. I can see that.

25 Q. It reads:

Page 740

1 "Sarajevo had a big significance. It was like a theatre for the

2 world. Example: One week before the attack on Srebrenica, in July 1995,

3 the Bosnian Serb army started with heavy indiscriminate fire on Sarajevo

4 to attract the attention to Sarajevo and away from Srebrenica."

5 Is my reading correct, sir?

6 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

7 Q. My question: Was the BS army firing for that reason, or was,

8 perhaps, July precisely the time of the most severe clashes between the

9 two armies? I'm talking about July 1995, as well as June 1995. I see it

10 says "July" here, but it started in June, didn't it? So above all, there

11 were clashes in progress between the two armies after an offensive had

12 been launched by the BH army, and Srebrenica in actual fact had nothing

13 whatsoever to do with it.

14 A. I think the Serbs were shooting at Sarajevo to distract the

15 international community from Srebrenica.

16 Q. Thank you. Now, I think I'm coming to something that is perhaps

17 quite important. It's the same page, down towards the end of the page,

18 and then it continues on the next page of the English statement. Have you

19 got that, sir? It's the very last sentence of page 4. Well, there you

20 go. There, you say, "In my opinion, the military targets in Sarajevo

21 were," and then you go on to list some of those. Bullet 1, the battle

22 locations and the confrontation lines and close to the confrontation

23 lines. Is that correct, sir?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Could you tell us, how large were these areas where the clashes

Page 741

1 were occurring on both sides of the confrontation line? I wouldn't like

2 to go into that myself. I just want your take on this. How deep on both

3 sides of the confrontation line?

4 A. Between a maximum of about 2.000 metres from the line where they

5 were divided. Maximum.

6 Q. So there were units fighting in those areas, but there was no

7 firing along the front line itself, because the forces there were

8 separated by an area that was about 15 metres long. That's all that

9 separated them; is that right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Thank you. You go on to state that, in your opinion, the HQs of

12 the BH army were also among the military targets, and you go on to state

13 that these were not within the city itself; is that right?

14 A. Yes. The main headquarters was outside the city.

15 Q. But the Main Staff -- you say the Main Staff of the corps, the

16 corps HQ; is that right? It was in the city itself, wasn't it?

17 A. The Sarajevo Corps headquarters was inside the city.

18 Q. Yes. So you suggest here that it was never hit, although the BSA

19 were targeting it, which is hard to understand. That's what you said at

20 the time, wasn't it?

21 A. I did so, and I was surprised at the building, that it was

22 standing absolutely intact, because you couldn't hit the -- the Serb

23 forces couldn't hit this building.

24 Q. But isn't that a sign that around the building there were units

25 protecting the corps HQ? There were weapons deployed around the building

Page 742

1 and soldiers who would have constituted a military target. Wouldn't that

2 have seemed to be the case, sir?

3 A. Any headquarters is a military target.

4 Q. Thank you. There's something that I've skipped. You list the

5 Presidency, too, as a target; is that right?

6 A. Yes, I had.

7 Q. The Presidency was the Supreme Command of the entire army. It was

8 right in the middle of the city, wasn't it?

9 A. It was, and I have listed it as a military target because of the

10 same, that it was the Supreme Command of the army.

11 Q. A military target, yes. Thank you.

12 You go on to say, "The brigade HQ ..." When you say that, do you

13 mean the units in the area 2 kilometres deep from the front line? Is that

14 what you mean?

15 A. The fighting brigade headquarters were within those 2 kilometres,

16 or whatever it would be. These were not in civilian areas where the

17 normal people were living.

18 Q. But they were within that 2 kilometre area --

19 A. Yes, they were.

20 Q. -- in Sarajevo; right? And the same thing applied along the

21 entire front line, didn't it?

22 A. I suppose so, yes.

23 Q. There were brigades there in all these places, with their support

24 units or auxiliary units. I will not be listing those now. I asked

25 Mr. Dragomir Milosevic to tell me about those brigades. I myself served

Page 743

1 back in the military in 1969; I'm not very knowledgeable about that.

2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not get the last part of

3 counsel's question.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please repeat the question. Please repeat the

5 question.

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. The brigades -- my apologies. Maybe I put this there so they

8 couldn't hear.

9 I am asking you about this: A brigade has so many people, but

10 they have their own units. Each brigade, all of those units were deployed

11 around the front line. I'm talking about the front line held by the BH

12 army. All those brigades, as you have confirmed for us - this was 2

13 kilometres deep - so all those brigades were inside this line held by the

14 BH army, and all over along the entire line, in all these places. Is that

15 right, sir?

16 A. Yes, that is right, because the physical features on the ground,

17 in places they had to be closer; at places they were slightly back. But

18 they were not beyond 2.000 metres.

19 Q. Next you state the exit of the tunnel under the airport as a

20 potential military target. Is that right, sir?

21 A. Yes, sir, that's right.

22 Q. Do you know that on an almost daily basis, especially during the

23 tenure of Dragomir Milosevic, and also the time after you got there and

24 after that, a lot of soldiers entered Sarajevo through that tunnel and

25 would use the same tunnel to go back, to go to Igman to do something

Page 744

1 there, and new forces were being brought into Sarajevo; is that correct?

2 Do you know anything about that, sir?

3 A. That is true, and that's why I've listed it as a military target.

4 Q. At the very end you even list the government offices, because

5 probably there were soldiers around the government offices, too; is that

6 right?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Thank you. An additional question: I'm moving on to Debelo Brdo

9 now. That's the next thing I want to discuss because there were many

10 references to Debelo Brdo in your statement. You were there, weren't

11 you? I have no time to show you the map now. You were at Debelo Brdo in

12 your capacity as an observer, were you not?

13 A. Yes, I've been on Debelo Brdo.

14 Q. Did you ever go to Culina Kapa?

15 A. No, I don't remember this name.

16 Q. Did you ever go to Mojmir, which is a long ridge to the right of

17 Debelo Brdo? And it's quite a long one, indeed.

18 A. I won't remember the name, but, yes, there were ridges jutting out

19 of Debelo Brdo.

20 Q. There were BH soldiers deployed there, BH army soldiers, and the

21 same appeared to be the case at Debelo Brdo, didn't it?

22 A. The BiH was deployed at Debelo Brdo.

23 Q. Let me not dwell on this because there's never an end to this.

24 From the north, I suppose you know that, because that is impossible not to

25 see for anyone arriving in Sarajevo, Zuc and Hum, especially the hill

Page 745

1 where the TV aerial is positioned.

2 A. Yes, I do recognise them.

3 Q. All those were the positions manned by the BH army; right?

4 A. Yes, they were manned by BH army.

5 Q. Page 7, paragraph 1, of the English version. You speak about

6 Croats in Kiseljak here. Were you able to find it?

7 A. No, I couldn't.

8 Q. Page 7, in the English version, for the first paragraph. You --

9 A. The first paragraph, yes.

10 Q. So this is about Kiseljak. You see what you see here.

11 "One could call it strange that the Serbs never shelled Croat

12 areas but always Muslim areas in regions where these two factions were

13 close together ..."

14 Was that the case? Can you confirm this?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. "Also, Kiseljak was never shelled." And it was Croat controlled;

17 right?

18 A. Yes. During my stay it was not shelled, but earlier on Kiseljak

19 had received shelling.

20 Q. It's an area that is not so small on the demarcation line where

21 the Croats were, at the front line, at the demarcation line; is that

22 correct?

23 A. No, it's an area that is not so small. Yes, the confrontation

24 line between the Croats and the Republika Srpska was not too small, yes.

25 Q. What I want to ask you, and I hope you can give me an answer,

Page 746

1 because there were no provocations and nobody shot at each other, then

2 naturally there were no clashes. This, perhaps, is a conclusion rather

3 than a question, so it perhaps could not be -- I am perhaps not permitted

4 to ask it, but perhaps I am. So, in other words, there were no clashes

5 there because nobody fired on anyone there.

6 A. It may be true.

7 Q. Thank you. So now we come to Debelo Brdo. That's page 7, halfway

8 down, a couple of paragraphs down from Kiseljak.

9 A. Yeah, I can see that.

10 Q. You say here that "The Republika Srpska army attacked Sarajevo,"

11 and I want to read everything to be completely fair, "on the 16th and 17th

12 of May to conquer Debelo Brdo from where they would be able to control the

13 whole city centre of Sarajevo." Is that so?

14 A. Yes. The position dominated the city centre of Sarajevo.

15 Q. And this position that dominated the city centre of Sarajevo was

16 held by the Bosnia-Herzegovina army; is that correct?

17 A. That's correct. In this particular area.

18 Q. Yes. Had Serbs taken this position, as you say here, it would

19 have been a great advantage for them at the negotiating table. This is

20 what you say here. Is that correct?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. However, what I want to ask you about is the second reason.

23 Another reason to attack this area was because the BH army snipers had,

24 from their positions, a clear view of Grbavica. Is that correct?

25 A. That's correct.

Page 747

1 Q. And I don't want to dwell on this. Let us move on to the next

2 paragraph. You say:

3 "The Bosnian Serbs wanted to have the western side of the Miljacka

4 river."

5 Is that correct?

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 Q. Want I was to ask you is this: Was not their primary objective to

8 stop the sniping incidents where Grbavica was targeted from Debelo Brdo?

9 Is that correct?

10 A. That could have been a military aim, yes.

11 Q. Could you please tell me, slightly to the left of Debelo Brdo,

12 below its slopes is the Jewish cemetery not located there. This is an

13 area where both the Serbs and Bosnia-Herzegovina troops were deployed. Do

14 you know anything about that?

15 A. Yes, I have been to the Jewish cemetery.

16 Q. And is it located below the slopes of the Debelo Brdo?

17 A. Yes. It is located on the slopes of Debelo Brdo and along the

18 track which goes up to Debelo Brdo.

19 Q. I hope I will be able to finish this fairly quickly. You said

20 that when you arrived in Sarajevo on the 13th of February, 1995, that you

21 stayed until the 19th of January, 1996.

22 A. That's true.

23 Q. Now I would like to go back to page 5. I'm sorry. Let me just

24 check once again. Yes, that's correct. It is on page 5 of the English

25 version. And please focus on the paragraph where you talk about the

Page 748

1 chronology of your tour of duty. Is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Were you able to find it?

4 A. I can see it.

5 Q. I would like to read a couple of things to you. You said that you

6 landed on a certain date, and at that moment the Cessation of Hostilities

7 Agreement was in effect, the COHA; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I will not read the next sentence because it seems to me that it

10 has nothing to do with Sarajevo - and the Prosecutor may not agree with me

11 on this - but then you go on to say:

12 "In Sarajevo there were some major agreements to be monitored,

13 like the cease-fire, the airport agreement, the anti-sniping agreement,

14 and the agreement on the weapon collection points."

15 Is that correct?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. In this regard I would like to ask you the following: The areas

18 where the Serbs' weapons were collected, the points where the weapons

19 would be stored were designated by the United Nations. You do know that.

20 A. There points were designated by the United Nations after

21 discussion with the Serb side.

22 Q. And then you go on to say something about Bosnian weapons. You

23 say that the weapons that were under the UN control, that they did not

24 take out their weapons before June 1995, when the offensive took place.

25 And we're talking about 100 -- in fact, this is my question to you: Do

Page 749

1 you know that there were 150 heavy artillery pieces there?

2 A. On the Serb side or on the BiH side?

3 Q. The BH army side.

4 A. I do not know the exact count on both sides.

5 Q. But they took it out of the UNPROFOR control. It was no longer

6 controlled by UNPROFOR.

7 A. After June they had taken out some weapons, in June, when they

8 were launching an offensive, and before that they were under UN control.

9 Q. Yes. Yes. And did you know -- I cannot really go into this

10 document because it would take us five minutes to get at the document. So

11 if you don't know anything about it, just tell me so.

12 You knew that, according to the reports and the assessments of the

13 Military Intelligence Services in UNPROFOR, that the BH army, ever since

14 December, had been actually preparing for the offensive that would be

15 launched after the winter, or rather, in spring. Did you know about that?

16 A. The speculations were there, but I cannot comment whether they

17 were preparing for the offensive.

18 Q. Let's take it one step at a time. I have to apologise. You know

19 that there were talks, in fact, that the cease-fire agreement that was in

20 force from January until April, that negotiations were going on to extend

21 the agreement and that the Serbs wanted to have it extended indefinitely,

22 and that they wanted all activities to cease in the entire territory of

23 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do you know about that?

24 A. No, I don't know about that.

25 Q. Do you know that the BH army did not want to talk about the

Page 750

1 extension of the cease-fire agreement under no conditions? They did not

2 want to talk about the extension.

3 A. Yes, that is -- that is correct. The BiH army did not want to

4 freeze on the front lines that were there. They were not satisfied with

5 what they had.

6 Q. You do know that the BH army -- I will try to wrap up as soon as

7 possible, and I will actually have to forego asking some questions. You

8 do know that the BH army, in particular its 1st Corps, had the supremacy

9 in terms of the number of troops over the Republika Srpska army.

10 A. That is correct, that the BiH army had more numbers, but it was

11 overcompensated by the firepower at the disposal of the Republika Srpska

12 army.

13 Q. Yes. That's why I'm asking you this, because on page 7, at the

14 very bottom of the page, the last sentence here on page 7 of the English

15 version, and then it actually runs over to the next page -- were you able

16 to find the last sentence on page 7 of the English version --

17 A. Yes, I have.

18 Q. -- and then it runs over. Were you able to find it?

19 A. Yes, I have.

20 Q. I want to clear something up with you here. The Serbs knew that

21 the Bosnians would dominate in number of troops. Is that what it says

22 here? That's correct; right?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. Nevertheless, although the Croats did not allow the weapons to

25 come into Bosnia to supply the BH army, the BH army had the chance to rest

Page 751

1 and to resupply during the cease-fire. Is that what it says here? Is

2 that correct?

3 A. That's correct. They got the rest. They got the relief.

4 Q. You do know that aeroplanes were used, as was the tunnel, to bring

5 weapons, tonnes of weapons, for the BH army in this period. Or is it

6 something that you're not aware of?

7 A. There's no question of aeroplanes being used. The airfield was

8 controlled by the UN, and only UN aircraft were landing there, or those

9 aircraft of NATO and others which were permitted by the UN to land.

10 Q. You don't know anything about the aeroplanes that were able to

11 land in Tuzla and then those supplies were able to reach Sarajevo by

12 different routes. Well, I'm not going to go into that because I would

13 like to complete my examination.

14 Please look at the last sentence in this paragraph. I don't want

15 to read it aloud now. In fact, I don't want to read the rest.

16 In 1995 they were getting better materiel, and then you say:

17 "The combination of the manpower and the achievement of better

18 materiel for the BH army put the Serbs in the weaker position."

19 Is this correct?

20 A. Yes, relatively weaker position.

21 Q. And this is the point in time when the offensive was launched, the

22 BH army offensive against the Republika Srpska army.

23 A. That's true.

24 Q. Thank you very much. I would like to thank you.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

Page 752

1 Re-examination?

2 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I'll be very brief.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please go ahead.

4 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. The first point I forgot

5 during my examination-in-chief was to tender the last document,

6 Mr. President, we discussed, which was ter 269, the protest letter of

7 Mr. -- I think signed by General Nikolai. If that could be admitted as an

8 exhibit, Mr. President.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, yes.

10 THE REGISTRAR: That is Exhibit P87, Your Honours.

11 Re-examination by Mr. Waespi:

12 Q. Brigadier, I just have a few matters to clear up. At the end you

13 were asked about the numbers of heavy weapons and the materials, weaponry,

14 available to the parties, and you also said that at the end of September,

15 or in September, when the Bosnian Serb army had to pull out of Sarajevo or

16 pull its heavy weapons out, I believe then you were able to see what heavy

17 weaponry the Bosnian Serbs pulled out. Do you remember in terms of

18 numbers, tanks, guns?

19 A. Yes, it is -- we organised this pull-out. The Serbs had 54 tanks;

20 the Bosnians had 3 tanks. The Serbs had 150 guns; the Bosnians had 7

21 guns. So that was the difference of materiel between the two.

22 Q. The next point I want to ask you is you were put a proposition by

23 Mr. Tapuskovic that the Serbs were always being blamed the same day of the

24 shelling, and you said yes. Can I ask you what the foundation was from

25 your side to -- I'm not using the word "blame," but to put the

Page 753

1 responsibility of a shelling to the Serb side? What was the basis for

2 your doing that?

3 A. It was done professionally. The UNMO teams went to the spot where

4 the shelling was done, or the firing was done. They made the analysis and

5 reported back to my headquarters. On that basis we would convey to the --

6 to the concerned authorities who had, you know, overstepped ...

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: With respect, Brigadier, that doesn't tell us

8 anything. It doesn't tell us -- you say it was done professionally, but

9 that's self-serving. How was it done?

10 THE WITNESS: It was the done that they went to the spot where the

11 shelling had taken place. They would carry out a crater analysis, and

12 that crater analysis was analysed and it gave a direction of fire and it

13 gave a range from which direction it was fired, and we came to the

14 conclusion who fired it.


16 MR. WAESPI: Does that answer your question?


18 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

19 Q. The last point I wanted to ask you, Brigadier: You said there was

20 this 2.000-meter zone around the confrontation line, and I quote

21 you, "where these clashes were occurring."

22 Now, are you saying that in this area there was a kind of military

23 activity going on?

24 A. Yeah. Up to a maximum, considering the range of weapons at the

25 disposal of the foot soldiers, it couldn't have more than 2.000 metres.

Page 754

1 That is the maximum, I said, as the area where the clashes were taking

2 place.

3 Q. But you agree that this did not allow to engage at civilians who

4 might be -- happen to be in this zone defined as 2.000 metres.

5 A. Yes, I fully agree with you. You don't -- when a sniper is

6 shooting at a child, he knows it's a child and it's not a combatant. If

7 he's shooting at a woman, he knows she's not a combatant. So it's not

8 difficult for people to discriminate between combatants and

9 non-combatants.

10 Q. And the last point, when you say in your witness statement - and

11 you confirmed it in questions by the Defence - that government buildings

12 might be military targets also because soldiers might be standing around,

13 again, that does not allow to shoot at civilians which might be around

14 government offices.

15 A. I would agree with you. It doesn't give a licence to anybody to

16 shoot at civilians.

17 Q. And that would refer to both sniping and shelling.

18 A. And shelling.

19 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. No further questions.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

21 Brigadier, that concludes your evidence. We thank you for coming

22 to give it, and you may now leave.

23 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

24 [The witness withdrew]

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: We had anticipated that the cross-examination

Page 755

1 would have been longer. The next witness, is that witness still around or

2 has the witness left?

3 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, unfortunately, my e-mail is not working

4 here, so I -- I know that when we got the guidance from the Trial Chamber

5 at the beginning of the session, I asked that the lawyer handling the next

6 witness inform Victim and Witnesses Unit, and my assumption is that the

7 witness has been sent back to her hotel. But if we can have a moment, we

8 can check to see if she's still in the building; and if she is, we can

9 proceed.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I need to investigate something further, because

11 Mr. Tapuskovic made a --

12 MR. WHITING: I can --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- a submission about lateness and being

14 informed.

15 MR. WHITING: I can address that, Your Honour.


17 MR. WHITING: What that was a reference to is, when we informed

18 counsel, Defence counsel, a month ago about who the witnesses were going

19 to be this first week, we did not include that witness because we thought

20 we were going to have a -- we did not know we were going to have a double

21 session on this day. We then found out that there was going to be a

22 double session and we were told to put -- add on another witness and we

23 did. When we did that, however, we, just by oversight, forgot to inform

24 Defence counsel. They only realised this yesterday; we only realised this

25 yesterday. So what Mr. Tapuskovic -- and it was just merely an oversight

Page 756

1 on our part, and we apologise for that.

2 What Mr. Tapuskovic referred to in terms of our agreement, which

3 is, of course, subject to the Court's endorsement, is that we agreed that

4 we would take the position that it would be fine for us to do the direct

5 examination and that the cross-examination could wait until Monday so that

6 Defence counsel is not prejudiced by our oversight. So that is what was

7 being referred to.

8 So I think that if the witness is here we could do the direct

9 examination, but I don't -- the witness -- unfortunately, the witness is

10 not here. I've just received a note that the witness is not here.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

12 Mr. Tapuskovic.

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, given the situation, I have

14 nothing to add. I did have a few points, but they do not have any bearing

15 on the merits, so I don't want to bother you with them.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: The matter has been explained.

17 We will adjourn until Monday, 9.00 in the morning.

18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.26 p.m.,

19 to be reconvened on Monday, the 22nd day

20 of January, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.