1 Tuesday, 1 May 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you continue, Mr. Sachdeva, I'd like to

7 ask Ms. Isailovic whether the Defence intends to make a Rule 98 bis

8 submission tomorrow -- sorry, on Thursday, on Thursday.

9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Yes. The Defence wishes to file a 98 bis before the Chamber, but

11 we had planned to do this on Wednesday.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Well, actually, it's to be an oral

13 submission, which is a submission to be made orally, and I'm trying to

14 find out whether, in fact, it is not something which could be accommodated

15 tomorrow, if we were to start at 8.00 in the morning, because, as you

16 know, the amendment that was made in 2004 was really designed to promote

17 expeditiousness in the consideration of this motion.

18 And if you are to make your motion in a relatively short time and

19 the Prosecution reply in a relatively short time, without doing any

20 prejudice, of course, to the substance to the argument which you wish to

21 present, then it is occurring to me, in fact, that we might be able to

22 accommodate it tomorrow if we were to start at 8.00. So I would want to

23 hear from you on that.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: The idea then is that if we could do everything

1 in an hour, hour and 20 minutes, we would then not need to meet on

2 Thursday, but I would need to hear from you whether you think the

3 submissions, which you have to make, could be made in a relatively short

4 period of time if we were to start at 8.00 tomorrow morning, and then we

5 would set aside, an hour, hour and 15 minutes for the submissions and the

6 consideration of them.

7 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm alone today, and

8 I shall confer with Mr. Tapuskovic. I think it is most likely that this

9 is something which we should be able to do tomorrow. But, if possible,

10 because we haven't yet finished with this witness, I do hope that we will

11 be able to finish with the expert today, and tomorrow we will have the

12 last witness of the Prosecution.

13 If we decided to start at 8.00, perhaps we could then, during the

14 second session, once we have finished with the witness, we could then have

15 a break and resume with our 98 bis motion, if this is amenable to you.

16 I shall confer with Mr. Tapuskovic over the break, but this seems

17 quite acceptable to me.

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Whiting.

20 MR. WHITING: Your Honours, of course, the length of our

21 submission depends a little bit on what specifically is challenged by the

22 Defence in its 98 bis submission. If the Defence challenges all of the

23 counts, all of the elements, I anticipate that it would take us a full

24 hour and a half to respond to that, to cover that, and make a proper

25 record, unless Your Honours told us that was not necessary.

1 But in order to go through all the different parts of case, it may

2 take a little bit longer than one might think, if the Defence is going to

3 challenge everything. And that we don't know. We don't know what the

4 Defence intends to do. If their challenges were more specific with

5 regards to very specific parts of the case, it could go much more quickly,

6 but that is not what I would expect. So it could end up taking longer.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Whiting, how long is set aside for the last

9 witness? Do you know?

10 MR. WHITING: I believe that it's -- I believe that it's an

11 hour -- an hour total, half for each side.

12 It may -- we intend to introduce a group of documents,

13 approximately, 85 documents through the witness. I don't think that --

14 but we're not going to go through each one. It's a batch of documents

15 from an archive. We have spoken to the Defence. The Defence do not

16 object to the admission of these documents. Of course, we'll argue about

17 the weight and how they should be interpreted, but I don't think the

18 admission will take very long. We will lay the foundation for where they

19 came from and so forth, establish authenticity. So it may take a little

20 longer than half an hour, but I think it will take a session.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: We shall start at 8.00 tomorrow morning and see

22 how things develop.

23 So you're up now next, Mr. Sachdeva.

24 MR. SACHDEVA: Thank you, Mr. President.

25 WITNESS: IJAZ HUSSAIN MALIK [Resumed]

1 Examination by Mr. Sachdeva: [Continued]

2 Q. Good morning, Colonel.

3 A. Good morning.

4 Q. I trust you are well rested.

5 A. Yes. Thank you.

6 Q. I have on the screen a photograph, 65 ter 03017.

7 Colonel, do you see a photograph there on your screen?

8 A. Yes, please.

9 MR. SACHDEVA: Is it possible for this photograph to be enlarged.

10 Q. Now, Colonel, do you recognise this area?

11 A. Hrasnica. It's Hrasnica.

12 Q. Very well. With the assistance of the usher, if I ask you to, can

13 you mark on the photograph the location of the house where you were

14 staying and which was damaged as a result of the air bomb explosion?

15 A. I'm looking for a reference. There was a nulla; and along that

16 nulla, there was a line of houses, but I cannot find that nulla.

17 Q. Nulla, do you mean small street?

18 A. Nulla is a small water channel.

19 Q. Small water channel, did you say?

20 A. Yeah. I'm not fully sure, but generally I feel that it should be

21 somewhere -- if that is the line, maybe somewhere here in this line, if

22 that water stream is in this direction. So I can't recognise the house.

23 Q. Okay. So would your house be to the -- let's say, to the left or

24 the right of that line, as we're looking at the photograph?

25 A. Sorry?

1 Q. Would your house to be the left or right of that line that you

2 have just drawn?

3 A. If we look it on the upper side.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. And do you see the Igman or the convoy road there on the

7 photograph?

8 A. Yeah, yeah.

9 Q. Can you mark that, please.

10 A. The road, yes.

11 Q. And I'd like also to indicate the location of the observation --

12 the French observation point that we spoke about on Friday, or at least in

13 the rough direction as far as --

14 A. That should be somewhere in this area. It was closer to the start

15 of the road.

16 Q. And do you know roughly how -- in metres how high the observation

17 point was from --

18 A. It was higher than the houses. A little higher than the houses.

19 Q. Okay. Thank you, Colonel.

20 MR. SACHDEVA: That is the examination-in-chief Mr. President.

21 Could I ask that that photograph be tendered and admitted into evidence.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we admit it.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As P636, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic to cross-examination.

25 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

1 MR. SACHDEVA: Excuse me, Mr. President. I'm sorry. I just want

2 to make sure that the evidence was recorded properly and perhaps ask the

3 witness to put the figures OP by the cross, lest it is lost in the record.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, very well. He can do that.

5 MR. SACHDEVA:

6 Q. Colonel, sorry. I said that you had finished. The cross --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: The Prosecutor simply wants the Colonel to put a

8 cross somewhere. We can't object to the cross being put.

9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, when I made the same

10 request, I was told that it was too late because it had already been

11 tendered into evidence. So I'm afraid it's a question of double standards

12 here, isn't it?

13 I once tendered a photograph and then I asked the photograph to be

14 annotated afterwards, and Judge Harhoff told me that it was too late,

15 which I accepted. I accepted what the Honourable Judge had told me, but

16 it seems to me that we are faced with the same situation here.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I don't recollect it, but Judge Harhoff

18 says he has a recollection of that.

19 MR. SACHDEVA: To my recollection, Mr. President, I understand the

20 situation is little bit different. What I can do is simply say that the

21 cross that is marked on this photograph is the location of the observation

22 point that the witness had spoken about in his evidence.

23 Q. Would you confirm that, Colonel?

24 A. Yes, please.

25 MR. SACHDEVA: That's fine.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.

2 Yes, Ms. Isailovic.

3 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Cross-examination by Ms. Isailovic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness. My name is Branislava

6 Isailovic. I'm a lawyer working for the Paris Bar Association, and I

7 represent Mr. Dragomir Milosevic before this Chamber.

8 I shall ask you a few questions concerning your testimony on

9 Friday and this morning. I shall also ask you a few questions about your

10 statement, a statement which you gave to the Prosecutor on the 10th of

11 August, 1996.

12 First of all, I would have liked to see the same photograph, the

13 one which we finished off with, P636.

14 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in on this

15 photograph.

16 Q. Witness, I would like you to turn to this photograph and tell me -

17 and I would like the usher to assist you - I would like you to draw an

18 arrow and indicate in which direction Ilidza is.

19 A. Good morning. And after 12, 13 years ago, I will try and reply

20 all the answers -- all the questions that you're going to ask me.

21 I'm not 100 per cent correct. It may be a little right or left,

22 and it may not be right according to the scale. But generally what I

23 recollect I will try an answer.

24 This is Hrasnica, if that is the end. So towards this side would

25 be the Ilidza, further left -- sorry, further right as I look at the

1 picture.

2 Q. To be sure, the direction indicates -- the arrow indicates the

3 direction of Ilidza; is that right?

4 A. [Marks]

5 Q. Witness, could you now please be so kind as to mark this with the

6 letter I at the end of the arrow, the area which indicates the direction

7 of Ilidza.

8 A. [Marks]

9 Q. Can we agree, then, that the Ilidza area is in a valley, in a

10 plain?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. According to your recollection, could you indicate with an arrow

13 in which direction Butmir is, because you also mentioned Butmir.

14 A. [Marks]

15 Q. And could you mark this with a letter B, please.

16 A. [Marks]

17 Q. So this is in the same direction as the first arrow; is that

18 right?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Yes. Is this in the same direction as Sokolovic Kolonija?

21 A. Kolonija, I am not really sure; Sokolovic, yes, was close by.

22 Sokolovic, Butmir, yes; and further left was the Ilidza. From the post,

23 if we see, the left most is Ilidza; and then we have Butmir and Sokolovic

24 on the track going from Hrasnica to Sarajevo.

25 Q. In the same direction as the arrow goes, the one which is marked

1 with the letter B, is that also where the airport is?

2 A. Yes, almost in the same direction.

3 Q. Witness, at the time, had you been told that there was a tunnel

4 there, and that either the entrance or the exit was close to the airport

5 and therefore close to Butmir?

6 A. It was -- from Hrasnica, it was on the other side of the -- other

7 side of the air strip and not so very close, but generally that was the

8 direction we never used. We never went to that place. But generally I

9 know there was probably some tunnel in that area.

10 Q. Witness, on Friday, you mentioned this observation post which you

11 marked on the photograph. That's where you went in the evening or at

12 night to observe Ilidza, Butmir, and Hrasnica; is that right?

13 A. Yeah. It was generally in the evening, evening and maybe then

14 coming late at night. The timings were not fixed, right? Certainly it

15 wasn't in the morning. It was in the afternoon, late afternoon, and then

16 late, not late night; normally, two to three hours. Maybe starting right

17 up to 10.00, 12.00, and then it could be a little earlier and then three,

18 four hours.

19 So the times were not fixed. We would go there and stay there for

20 three, four hours and then come back. But it was in the evening and

21 night, not in the morning.

22 Q. Witness, when you were at the observation post, were you ever able

23 to observe movements of the ABiH army through Hrasnica?

24 A. ABiH, as a convoy or as individuals? Are you asking me as a troop

25 or just individual moment?

1 Q. Witness, this depends on what you were able to see. Please tell

2 us what you were able to see from the observation post?

3 A. Not as a group or as a company or battalion; but individual

4 movement, yes.

5 Q. You also mentioned what was called the convoy route. Were you

6 able to see any movement of the ABiH units along this road?

7 A. I said no, not in the army vehicles. I had seen some of the

8 soldiers, maybe using the other civil trucks but not as a convoy. Maybe

9 one and then a few, two, three, four going probably -- I mean, this is

10 what I think. It may be incorrect also. Somebody coming from the upper

11 positions staying there in Hrasnica and going back. That could be the

12 one, but not as organised movement.

13 Q. You went to Hrasnica on the 1st of May, 1995; is that right?

14 A. Yes, please.

15 Q. And with the Prosecution, you mentioned an incident that occurred

16 on the 1st of July, 1995, an incident in which you were a victim; is that

17 right?

18 A. Yes, please.

19 Q. Before the 1st of July, you conducted several inquiries on the

20 falling of mortar shells and air bombs?

21 A. Mortar shell, yes.

22 Q. You yourself -- well, did you conduct the investigation yourself?

23 A. Not in Hrasnica. I think it was in Butmir probably; Butmir or

24 Sokolovic. Butmir, I think it is. It was only on the mortar shell, not

25 the other type of fire.

1 Q. Can we say, then, that the sole experience with air bombs was on

2 the 1st of July, 1995?

3 A. Please say again. I'm sorry. I didn't get your question.

4 Q. Your sole experience with this air bomb, this projectile, was on

5 the 1st of July, 1995; is that right?

6 A. Yeah. This was on 1st of July.

7 Q. Witness, on the 1st of July, you didn't actually see this

8 projectile fall on the house, did you?

9 A. No. I just felt it.

10 Q. So you heard a noise, didn't you?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You have described this noise. I would have liked you to say more

13 about it. I feel it is important. You are felt that something big was

14 coming towards you. What did this sound like?

15 A. It was like a rocket or like the fighter aircraft. It was a loud,

16 not whistling, but loud engine on a fighter aircraft, you could say. It

17 could be one of closer example.

18 Q. And how long did this last, according to your recollection? This

19 happened a long time ago. For how long did you hear this sound?

20 A. Twelve seconds [sic].

21 Q. I see, "12 seconds." You said several seconds.

22 A. It was just a few seconds. I am not very sure. I cannot say one

23 or two or three seconds. I'm not very sure, but a very, very short time.

24 Q. Witness, you didn't take part in the investigation which was

25 conducted by the police and by your colleagues from UNMO on the location

1 where the damage was caused and where this projectile exploded.

2 A. Yes. I was evacuated to Sarajevo.

3 Q. After that, did you come back to this place?

4 A. From Sarajevo, I think after that treatment I had few stitches.

5 So I stayed there for three, four, five days, and one of the team in

6 Sarajevo. Sierra Golf was probably the name of that team. And in the

7 meantime, this team, they had moved from this place to another location.

8 They had another house in Sokolovic. So when I came back, I reported

9 there and not into that house. So I went twice, thrice to see that place.

10 Q. I would like you to have another look at the photograph you have

11 before you, Witness. Could you please indicate where the house is,

12 approximately; in other words the area, because there were several houses

13 that were damage. Could you indicate to us where the area was, the area

14 where these damaged houses were, including yours. Just draw a circle

15 around this area please. Can you put a wider circle to indicate the area.

16 I don't want you to mark any particular house.

17 A. Right. I'm not very sure. Maybe it was there, if that is the

18 nulla. I'm not very sure.

19 Q. Could you just write in 1st of July, 1995 next to this circle?

20 That is the date of the incident.

21 A. [Marks]

22 Q. Do you remember -- now that have you the photograph in front of

23 you, do you remember whether there were any units of the ABiH army in

24 Hrasnica; albeit, ABiH headquarters?

25 A. I said I haven't visited any of the units, but there was one

1 captain, the other day I also told, who used to come us and used to say he

2 was staff officer in somewhere in that area. But I have not visited

3 there. Captain Mustafa was his name. That is what I remember.

4 Q. And he was a BiH army captain, wasn't he?

5 A. I can't hear.

6 Q. This Captain Mustafa, he was an ABiH army -- ABiH army captain,

7 wasn't he?

8 A. He was a captain. Basically, I mean, as far as the UNMOs were

9 concerned, there was a police officer who normally used to visit us for

10 our welfare or something, asking us, well, [indiscernible] in that area.

11 So at times, I'm not very sure, but maybe two, three time, one of the

12 officer, he came with him, and he was captain -- well, he was from that

13 army, and he has visited our UNMO accommodation.

14 Q. Witness, you mentioned, if you'll remember, this policeman who

15 visited you on the 1st of July in the evening. So do you remember that

16 evening that a group of people, of whom we do know whether they were

17 military, went to the location where the incident took place; and

18 on that occasion, they threatened you and your colleagues?

19 A. I was told later, after the incident. I mean, after that

20 explosion, when there was confusion and we were injured, I was told that,

21 yes. There were certain people who -- from that local area. They came

22 running. Probably they were trying to loot that house. I think they took

23 away one of two jerrycans of diesel, and they were asking for money and

24 they were drunk. This is what I was told. I was in hospital. Later on,

25 I was told by my friend that this is what happened.

1 Q. And did your colleagues tell you that they had been negatively

2 impressed by those people who came to loot the house?

3 A. Negatively what?

4 Q. Impressed.

5 A. I'll say yes.

6 Q. Well, perhaps I should use another word because in French being

7 impressed by something is a synonym of being frightened, frightened of

8 something. So were they scared of these locals who went to that place

9 after the incident?

10 A. Initially, I mean, before the incident, there was no problem.

11 They were very friendly. We were absolutely okay in that area. I mean,

12 everybody was very cooperative, whether it was the organisation or the

13 local people.

14 But after that incident, and on that night, I think the drunk

15 people, they came and they tried to snatch certain things and take certain

16 things from that UNMO house. I think I will say that, yes, to some

17 extent, they were frightened, my colleagues. It was all dark, and we were

18 injured. We were being evacuated, and at that time somebody comes and

19 gets in your house. It has horrible effects.

20 Q. And did your colleagues tell you that one of them had 12 Canadian

21 dollars stolen from him and 500 German marks?

22 A. I don't remember the exact amount, but definitely yes. It was

23 Captain Mark or some Canadian captain.

24 Q. Witness, one of the differences between UNMO and UNPROFOR was that

25 you and your colleagues were not carrying weapons. Is that so?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And those people who came, according to your colleagues, were they

3 carrying arms?

4 A. I cannot confirm. They were without them, I think, and they were

5 just trying to force their way.

6 Q. But you'll remember last Friday the Prosecutor tendered a document

7 through you. I'm going to submit it to you, and I'm going to submit it to

8 the Chamber as well.

9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Before that, Your Honour, I would

10 like to tender into evidence this photograph, which has been marked and

11 which is on the screen.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we admit it.

13 THE REGISTRAR: As D184, Your Honours.

14 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Let us now look at document 2770,

15 which has become P635. It is a 65 ter document.

16 Q. So this is the document, and could you look at page 3. And at the

17 very top, you can see the amounts Captain Hache said were stolen from him.

18 He is a Canadian captain, and we were talking about soldiers. We're told

19 that these were BiH army soldiers.

20 A. Right. I said -- you want me to reed the first two, three lines?

21 Q. No. I just wanted to show you the amount of money your colleague

22 said was stolen from him, so as to prevent any misunderstanding.

23 A. Twelve Canadian; US dollar 3.50; 500 Deutschemarks, yes. Is that

24 correct? The black wallet contained about 12 Canadians, 3.50 dollars US,

25 and 500 marks, yes. I said I'm not really sure but, yes, this is correct

1 what is written here.

2 Q. Well, at the same time, other things were stolen from your team;

3 is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And, Witness, you said that you did not go back to Hrasnica

6 yourself. You said that you found a house in Sokolovici, and you may know

7 that another UNMO -- do you know whether another UNMO team remained in

8 Hrasnica or not?

9 A. No. I think it was only our team, and we just shifted our

10 location. There was no other team in Hrasnica.

11 Q. And how do you explain these facts? As of the 1st -- or between

12 the 1st of May and the 1st of July, were you able to see that military

13 activities from Hrasnica stepped up, became more intense?

14 A. I said from -- well, that was the time when we had the maximum

15 shelling. That was the time probably the war was right on its peak. But

16 if you say there was certain activities right in the Hrasnica, I haven't

17 observed. Yes, I have seen the individual soldiers moving here and there,

18 and coming, even using that convoy road, but not as a group -- or I mean,

19 a bigger force. Not as a bigger force.

20 Q. Thank you, Witness.

21 Questioned by the Court:

22 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, my first question is:

23 What was exactly your observation mission? Were you there to observe

24 mortar shellings, mortar fire, or were you also to observe any type of

25 firing and armed troop movements as well.

1 A. Sir, it was any type of firing and any type of movement. That was

2 to be observed; that was the task. It was not restricted to one

3 particular weapon or a particular task.

4 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] I'd like to come back to the

5 Defence counsel questions.

6 Do you confirm that you had never observed troop movements in your

7 area, except some individual soldier movement? If this is the case, there

8 is this report talking about large groups of people and people wearing BiH

9 uniforms. How do you account for that in that case?

10 A. I confirm, sir, what I said earlier. I have not seen in the

11 bigger force, say a company 30, 40, 50 or more people together, travelling

12 in a convoy or moving from place one to place two. I confirm that I

13 haven't seen that. What -- as well as that incident is concerned, yes,

14 the people were more, but they were not the army personnels. They were

15 some of them, maybe one, two, three; and some of them, even in that area,

16 they were wearing the uniform. They also used to wear uniform, one-odd

17 people, and would roam about in that area. I think they were locals.

18 Maybe I'm the one that has been referred one or two or three.

19 They are the uniformed person; and, as I know, they had gone to the

20 different places on the -- their fighting places. They used to come back,

21 stay a night, go back again. So maybe these are those people who have

22 come for that night.

23 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Witness.

24 A. Thank you also, sir.

25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Colonel, when you were injured on the 1st of July,

1 you were taken from Hrasnica to Sarajevo. How did you get to Sarajevo?

2 A. Sir, initially, I was shifted from my location, Hrasnica house, to

3 a local hospital; whereas, I was given the first aid and then it was

4 difficult. I said that the firing was on that track from Hrasnica to

5 Sarajevo. It used to be fired upon any movement on that, so I had to wait

6 for one APC, which had to come from -- it was a French APC which came from

7 Sarajevo, took us from that hospital, myself and the other UNMO from

8 Bangladesh. We both had to move on that, and we had to wait I think two,

9 three hours. I reached hospital at about --

10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much. So you're saying that the

11 transportation from Hrasnica to Sarajevo had to be done in an armoured

12 vehicle. My next question, therefore, is how did the civilian population

13 move from Hrasnica to Sarajevo?

14 A. Sir, it was a normal local transport, and it was a risky affair.

15 They used to move fast. They used to select the timings when the fire was

16 comparatively less or the observation was less.

17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Could you please be more specific. I mean, does

18 that mean during cease-fire periods, or does it mean only at night. So

19 can you explain to us how the civilian population managed to move between

20 Hrasnica and Sarajevo.

21 A. Sir, as I said, it wasn't a normal practice that you would use the

22 APC every time. Late on that night, it was firing so they did not want to

23 take risk. That is number one.

24 Number two is we also used to move, and we used to move on this

25 vehicle and the armoured vehicle that we were otherwise given by the UN.

1 The civilians, they used to move their own vehicle. It was a risky

2 affair. They used to move fast. That that's all. I had not say they

3 should take any precaution, like using the APC or something. They were

4 not provided. But movement was there. It was only normal transport, the

5 local transport and their personal transport, but they used to take risk.

6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Were There any roadblocks on the way?

7 A. No, sir. There was no planned roadblocks. It was just a -- I'll

8 not say a very good track. It wasn't a road. It was a damaged road, I

9 would say. You can't move very fast on that. Certainly the track was

10 there, but there was no planned barriers on that.

11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Do I understand you correctly if what you're

12 saying is that if you were able to move fast enough in a private car, and

13 if you knew that there was for instance a cease-fire or something, then

14 there would be better chances of getting from one place to the other from

15 Hrasnica to Sarajevo without too much of a risk.

16 A. Yes.

17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much.

18 A. Thank you, sir.

19 MR. SACHDEVA:

20 Re-examination by Mr. Sachdeva:

21 Q. Colonel, I just want you to confirm something for me.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could we try again to have the English

23 interpretation.

24 MR. SACHDEVA:

25 Q. I can repeat the question.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just repeat.

2 MR. SACHDEVA:

3 Q. Colonel, I want you to confirm something for me. In response to,

4 firstly, Defence counsel, just a little bit of time ago, with respect to

5 the incident and what happened after put to you that there were a group of

6 BiH soldiers; and following on from that question, His Honour Judge Mindua

7 also asked you whether -- whether you could confirm that you didn't see

8 troop movements, and if this is the case, there is this report talking

9 about large groups of people and people wearing BiH uniforms.

10 I just want to confirm, if we go back to the document, which is,

11 it's 65 ter 25770. I understand it has an exhibit number, but I'm not --

12 it's P635, and we could go to page three, please.

13 Colonel, do you see page 3 of your left-hand side of the screen?

14 A. Yes, I see it.

15 Q. If you go down from the top to line 6 -- from the top down to line

16 6, it's the sentence that starts: "At this time, a large group of locals

17 were milling about in the area."

18 It's the sixth line down from the top.

19 MR. SACHDEVA: Can we scroll back up, please.

20 Q. Colonel, do you see that sentence there?

21 A. "At this time, a large group of locals were milling about in the

22 area."

23 Q. It says: "At this time, a large group of locals were milling

24 about in the area." And then it goes on: "A soldier then arrived,

25 affronted Captain Hache. He yelled something that was not understood by

1 Captain Hache. He was dressed in an BiH uniform."

2 A. Yes, I see it.

3 Q. So can you confirm that, in at least with respect to this

4 paragraph, it does not speak about a group of BiH soldiers, does it?

5 A. That's what I said. It wasn't -- the situation was that we

6 were -- the house was damaged. The people around, they haven't had things

7 to eat. They were rushing into our house, so as to get everything from

8 that house. It was -- it was combination of civilians; maybe one or do we

9 call it sentry or something, who is roaming in that area; maybe a civilian

10 in that ABiH uniform, and maybe one odd, yes, it could be this was also.

11 It is not -- the entire group was not the soldiers. It was a combination

12 of civilians and maybe one-odd soldier, the soldier who had come back from

13 that area, from their defences. This is what I feel.

14 MR. SACHDEVA: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

15 Q. Thank you, Colonel.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, that concludes your evidence. We thank

17 you for giving it, and you may now leave.

18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

19 MR. SACHDEVA: Your Honour, might I be excused.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Certainly.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 [The witness withdrew]

23 [The witness entered court]

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

25 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

1 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

2 WITNESS: EWA TABEAU

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

4 And you may begin, Mr. Docherty.

5 Examination by Mr. Docherty:

6 Q. Good morning, Witness.

7 A. Good morning.

8 Q. Could you please tell us your name, and tell us what you do for a

9 living?

10 A. My knave is Ewa Tabeau. I'm a demographer. I'm project leader in

11 the Demographic Unit, Office of the Prosecutor OTP, ICTY.

12 Q. And can you tell the Court in a few words what it is that a

13 demographer does.

14 A. Demographic is a broad area. I have been working for the last

15 seven years in the area of the demography of conflict. This is a very

16 special area of demography. In this area, here at the ICTY, we produce

17 statistics, population statistics, related to consequences of the conflict

18 in the former Yugoslavia from the 1990s; in particular, we have done a lot

19 of work on Bosnia-Herzegovina and other areas. We produce expert reports,

20 like the one we made for this case, which are often tendered into evidence

21 and presented in ICTY cases.

22 Our role is to produce numbers that are as reliable as possible

23 and describe consequences of this conflicts; and in this way, we provide

24 background information about the population suffering during the

25 conflicts.

1 Q. Thank you. And you mentioned in your answer the preparation of

2 expert reports. Did you, at the request of the Prosecutors in this trial,

3 prepare a demographic report concerning civilians killed and wounded in

4 Sarajevo between August of 1994 and November of 1995?

5 A. Yes. We made this report on the request from the Prosecution.

6 Q. And is that a copy of the report that is on the witness stand with

7 you?

8 A. Yes. That -- this is the report.

9 MR. DOCHERTY: Mr. President, this report was accepted into

10 evidence by the Chamber in a decision dated 4th of April, 2007. Could it

11 please be assigned an exhibit number at this time?

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

13 THE REGISTRAR: As P637, Your Honours.

14 MR. DOCHERTY: One moment, please, Your Honour.

15 For the record, Your Honour, that was 65 ter 03127.

16 Q. Dr. Tabeau, in preparing this report, did you investigate the

17 number of people killed through war-related causes in Sarajevo between

18 August of 1994 and November of 1995?

19 A. Yes. This is one of the statistics that we produced and included

20 in this report.

21 Q. I want to ask you some clarifying questions before we get to the

22 numbers themselves. First of all, I'm using the term "Sarajevo."

23 Precisely, what geographic area did you take in your report as being

24 synonymous with Sarajevo?

25 A. Sarajevo is an area that is composed of ten municipalities, in the

1 broad sense, and there is also another area composed of six

2 municipalities, which is the most central part of Sarajevo. People tend

3 to say "Sarajevo" in the context of this smaller area, and we studied both

4 areas. The Sarajevo Six -- the term "Sarajevo Six" is used for the

5 smaller area of six municipalities of Sarajevo, and the Sarajevo Ten is

6 the broader area. In the case of Sarajevo Ten, some of the municipalities

7 were entirely or partly behind the front lines in Sarajevo. But the

8 Sarajevo six is the central area studied in my report.

9 Q. And, secondly, what period of time exactly did you study in

10 preparing this report?

11 A. We studied actually for context to all purposes, for reference

12 purposes, the entire conflict starting April 1992 to November 1995. But

13 for this particular case, for the Dragomir Milosevic case, we studied the

14 period starting in August 1994 to November 1995, and statistics relevant

15 to this case were compiled according to period, August 1994/November 1995

16 and the Sarajevo Six area.

17 Q. Let's turn, first, to the question of deaths, and the first

18 question concerning the study of deaths is: What exactly the method was

19 that you were following. Did you attempt to actually count all deaths, or

20 did you take a sample and then extrapolate from that to get the overall

21 number?

22 A. We were actually in a very exceptional situation source-wise, so

23 we could afford to produce statistics that can be seen as results of an

24 accounting approach, as opposed to the extrapolation approach.

25 Extrapolation is usually based on a sample based on which certain numbers,

1 statistics are produced. But in our report about the killed persons, we

2 actually tried to count them, as many as we could identify in our sources.

3 Simply speaking, sources were good enough to go for the accounting

4 approach.

5 Q. Now, you have mentioned a couple of times in that answer the

6 sources you had and how good these sources were. Could you give us a

7 summary of the sources that you had at your disposal, and then we will go

8 through them one at a time and talk about what those sources are and how

9 thorough their coverage was. But to begin, could you just summarize the

10 sources for us please?

11 A. The three major sources that we used for the statistics on the

12 killed persons include the databases, mortality databases, compiled by, in

13 first case, the statistical authority of the Federation of Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina. The Second source is a similar mortality database

15 established by the statistical authority of the Republika Srpska. These

16 two sources jointly cover 140.000 death records from the conflict period,

17 starting April 1992 to November -- actually, even, December 1995, and

18 include both natural deaths -- records of natural deaths and also records

19 of war-related deaths.

20 War-related deaths are marked, are flagged in this databases,

21 based on the documentation that was available to the statistical

22 authority. So it was decision that actually came to us together with the

23 original sources.

24 These two sources are quite exceptional. They are big. They are

25 reliable because established by professional statisticians, and both were

1 established used standardised forms; questionnaires, the so-called death

2 notification questionnaires; the respondents who were the close relatives

3 of the deceased --

4 Q. Dr. Tabeau?

5 A. I'm too fast.

6 Q. I am sorry. Could I interrupt for just one moment. First of all,

7 I think the interpreters would appreciate if could you slow your rate of

8 speech just a little bit. Second of all, I was wondering if you might

9 also be able to tell us, briefly, what the other sources were that you had

10 reference to, and then we will come back and do a more thorough exposition

11 of each source, once we have got them are all out on the table?

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 A. Thank you very much. So once, again, major sources include two

15 mortality databases; one by FBiH statistical authority, one by RS

16 statistical authority. In addition to these two, we use the ICRC List of

17 Missing Persons, 2005 Edition. In addition to these three major sources,

18 we used smaller sources and -- well, sources that were not established by

19 professional statisticians. I'm speaking of the Bakije Funeral Home

20 business records and about the Sarajevo Household Survey from mid-1994.

21 Bakije Funeral Home is the largest and oldest funeral home that has

22 burying Muslims in Sarajevo. So most Muslims, if not all, are buried in

23 this particular funeral home. The Sarajevo Household Survey is a survey

24 conducted by mid-1994, by a research institute from Sarajevo, a survey

25 that is very large, covering 75.000 households living in Sarajevo by

1 mid-1994.

2 We used these sources covering both the records of killed persons

3 and also the records of wounded persons. So even though we didn't use

4 this particular one for the estimates of the killed persons, we still did

5 use these particular source for our estimate of the wounded persons.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. But this is not all, let me finish. This is the list of sources

8 that were directly used to produce statistics. But because of reporting

9 of military status is incomplete and generally poor in several sources, we

10 decided, in addition to these major sources, to use three lists of fallen

11 military personnel from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina; the list of

12 ABiH fallen personnel, VRS fallen personnel, HVO fallen personnel.

13 Q. Let's start at the stop of those sources. You mentioned two

14 statistical sources compiled by governmental bodies. One was compiled by

15 the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One was compiled by the

16 statistical authorities of the Republika Srpska. How were those compiled,

17 and how were they useful to you in preparing your report?

18 A. I started speaking about this already, so these are databases

19 established on reporting of deaths. That is normally done in every

20 country and is part of vital events statistical information system. The

21 two databases were established actually on our request of the OTP request

22 by these both authorities. They used -- the statistical authorities used

23 a standardised questionnaire to collect the information from the

24 relatives, the so-called death notification questionnaire. The

25 questionnaire is attached in the annex to this report.

1 The Informants or the persons from whom the information was

2 obtained were the close, very close relatives of the persons reported, so

3 the information in the forms is reliable to the extent, of course, the

4 families remember details of the deceased but usually they do.

5 The design of this databases is very professional. Databases were

6 cleaned by professional statisticians. Responses in the databases have

7 been standardised. So the quality of information that we have in this

8 databases is very high.

9 However, these two databases, even though very good, are still

10 incomplete. The coverage is not full. We know that parts of information,

11 relevant information, is not there, and this is related to the fact that

12 not all families were able to report the deaths in time. Usually, there

13 is a short period of three days for doing this. And part of the

14 documentation was destroyed in the war as well.

15 ICRC List of Missing Persons is an another source --

16 Q. Dr. Tabeau, before you go to the ICRC List of Missing Persons,

17 were you able to get an idea of how incomplete or the extent of the lack

18 of completion of the two statistical databases, and how did you go about

19 doing that?

20 A. It is very hard to establish the incompleteness of these sources,

21 especially of these sources. We know that all existing documentation from

22 the territory practically of entire country has been computerised, and it

23 is in these databases. The number of records of 144.000 is also high. It

24 higher than normally would be expected if there was no conflict at all,

25 but the difference is not that large. We are aware of many, many more

1 victims than what we see as an extra axis of mortality in these two

2 databases. So incompleteness must be counted in thousands; not a few

3 thousand, but many, many thousands of deaths that are not there.

4 Some of them are missing persons. The list of 22.000 individuals

5 reported to the ICRC could not be reported to the statistical authorities,

6 as the bodies of many of them are still not identified. So as long as

7 there are bodies not identified and there is no death declaration, it is

8 impossible to include such a person in statistics, simply speaking. This

9 is why we decided to include the list of missing persons as the third

10 major source.

11 Q. I think you anticipate my next question, which is to describe,

12 please, the role that the ICRC database of missing persons played in your

13 analysis, especially in filling in information that might otherwise might

14 not have been available from anywhere else. Could do you that, please?

15 A. Well, as I said, records of missing persons are just additional to

16 the records of known deaths. Records of known deaths in the two major

17 databases are the FBiH databases. Missing persons are on the list of

18 missing persons.

19 In Sarajevo, missing persons were not that frequent, compared with

20 other episodes of the conflict, like Srebrenica for instance. But we

21 still did it for completeness and for obtaining as large coverage as

22 possible.

23 Q. And then you mentioned this in a couple of answers ago. But now

24 that you have got a list of dead and missing presumed dead people, how do

25 you go about making sure -- since your brief was to look into the number

1 of civilian deaths, how do you go about making sure that you're not

2 counting a killed soldier as a killed civilian, or vice verse counting a

3 killed civilian as a killed soldier? How did you approach that?

4 A. This is an important issue; because in the major sources, the

5 reporting of military status is incomplete and efficient. So using the

6 original -- and in some sources, there is no information about military

7 status at all, like, for instance, in the ICRC list of missing person. In

8 other sources for some individual, there is record of a military unit a

9 person belonged to but. That's all we have. Based on this, it would be

10 very unreliable to produce statistics on civilians killed verses soldiers

11 killed in the siege.

12 Well, we decided, therefore, to use the three lists of fallen

13 military personnel in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Three's

14 three lists jointly cover for the entire conflict and entire country about

15 48.000 records. The main group of individuals reported in these three

16 military lists are army members, but also police members are included and

17 there is also personnel of Ministry of Defence included, as well as

18 individuals who were involved in production section -- sector providing

19 services and goods to the army. But we still did use this list knowing

20 that the number of military personnel reported in these three list is

21 probably a little bit too high. These were not only soldiers who died in

22 combat, but also other individuals associated with the armies in this or

23 that way.

24 We used these lists as a reference source. We compared records on

25 these three lists with the master list that we compiled and on sources

1 that we decided to use for producing statistics, and marked the records on

2 our master list the records found in the military lists, as soldiers, as

3 military personnel.

4 In addition to this, to be on the safe side and to be

5 conservative, we still kept any individual marked as a military person, as

6 a soldier. In the original sources, we kept this person marked as a

7 military person. So we didn't change this reporting. So we, simply

8 speaking, created a variable, an item that was measuring, and I think it

9 was quite a good measure of the military status, civilians versus

10 soldiers.

11 Q. Now, we have talked about the three, I believe you say, main

12 databases that you used; the two governmental statistical databases plus

13 the ICRC's List of Missing Persons. But there were two other databases

14 that you used. The first being the Sarajevo Household Survey. To begin

15 with, could you just explain to us what you is the Sarajevo Household

16 Survey, and then I will have some questions about how it was used in your

17 report?

18 A. Sarajevo Household Survey is a large survey conducted in the

19 spring and summer of 1994, so practically earlier than the indictment

20 period of the Dragomir Milosevic case begins. And this survey covers --

21 in principle it was meant as a complete survey, so it was meant to cover

22 all population, all households living in Sarajevo within the front lines

23 by mid-1994. All together we estimated that the population, in terms of

24 individuals covered by the survey, amounted to approximately 340.000

25 individuals, which is about 75 per cent of the settled population in

1 Sarajevo in 1991, in the Sarajevo Six area. That means it was a large

2 survey.

3 It is a survey, although not run by statisticians, professional

4 statisticians, but still by researchers, and it is a survey based on a

5 standardised questionnaire, in which we have actually a full information

6 about victims in terms of individuals with names, date of birth, with --

7 sorry, year of birth, and information about whether or not a person was

8 killed or wounded. So it is a quite an extensive and large survey.

9 Reliability is perhaps not as high -- as good as in the RS and FBiH

10 mortality databases, but it is still quite acceptable for this kind of

11 analysis that we prepared in this report.

12 Q. And who -- you say this was not prepared by professional

13 statisticians. Do you know who it is was that did conduct the Sarajevo

14 Household Survey?

15 A. Yes. It was a group of researchers working in the institute for I

16 think -- I don't remember the name of the institute, but I think in the

17 section number 2, where the sources discussed -- the name of the institute

18 is mentioned in full, and this is the Institute for Research of War Crimes

19 and International Law. The institute was led at that time by Professor

20 Smail Cekic. I think Smail Cekic is still there also today, and he has

21 done not only this survey but also several other surveys. Well, I think

22 they produced some results that can be seen as meaningful.

23 Q. Now that we have a sense of what the Sarajevo Household Survey

24 was, could you tell us what role it played in the statistical and

25 demographical analysis that you conducted for this trial?

1 A. The Household Survey, as I said, was not used for producing

2 statistics on the killed person. We used this survey in other estimates

3 of the number of persons wounded in the siege. The survey is exceptional

4 because of its size and because of the fact that covers wounded persons,

5 both hospitalised and not hospitalised. That means it gives a much better

6 impression of the size of the wounding process in Sarajevo. When compared

7 with, for instance, hospital admission records, that only covers patients

8 with the most serious injuries and wounding, who are admitted to hospital

9 for treatment.

10 So it is good source to be used to together with other sources,

11 based on which we could make an estimate, an extrapolation of the number

12 of persons wounded in the siege.

13 Q. Okay. And then, lastly, you mentioned the business records of

14 Bakije Funeral Home in Sarajevo. Can you tell us, please, why you used

15 those business records and what role those records wound up playing in

16 your statistical analysis of killed persons?

17 A. Well, this is yet another additional sources, reporting on the

18 killed persons. Well, in situations like the siege of Sarajevo, the

19 situation occasionally became very chaotic and people were killed on the

20 streets sometimes in large numbers. These funeral home guys, the Bakije

21 Funeral Home, was very active in burying bodies found on the streets.

22 They just were collecting bodies often under fire -- being under fire and

23 buried the bodies. Often they looked for families of the individuals and

24 actually notified the families of the losses.

25 And as I said, there is no source in conflict situation that is

1 complete 100 per cent. So the more sources can be used, the better for

2 the completeness of produced statistics. This is the main reason that we

3 decided to use the records of the funeral home. In addition, it's a large

4 source. It contains approximately 12.000 records for the conflict period

5 from April 1992 to December 1995, which is a lot, actually.

6 Q. The last question I have regarding these sources is to ask you to

7 pleas explain to Their Honours how it is that you avoided double counting;

8 and if someone was listed in both, let's say, the federal statistical

9 database and the Bakije Funeral Home database, how did you make sure that

10 you counted them once and not twice?

11 A. Well, we applied here our standard methodology, which always

12 included as part of our standard procedure for any source. First of all,

13 checking sources one by one and checking whether or not there are in the

14 duplicates in the sources. Whatever duplicates are found are then

15 eliminated in a single source, yes.

16 JUDGE HARHOFF: But, Counsel, how would the witness discover if it

17 was a duplicate?

18 MR. DOCHERTY: That's the question I had thought I put to the

19 witness. Maybe it wasn't that clear. Dr. Tabeau, the hypothetical

20 example I gave was a person was listed both in one of the statistical

21 databases and in the funeral home database, and the question pending was

22 how do you make sure that person gets counted once not twice.

23 A. Yes. Comparing records involves comparing a number of data items

24 available from every record. If there are two persons reported in two

25 sources, the persons are characterised by names; first name, father' name,

1 surname, date of birth, place of birth; and then another portion of

2 information is the information about the death or wounding, including date

3 of the event, place of the event, causes of the event.

4 In searching for duplicates, we compare the personal information;

5 that means name, first name, surname, father's name, and date of birth.

6 And if we find records that have identical or very similar value in this

7 four fields, then we study the remaining part of the information, the

8 information about the event. Based on the results of this comparison, we

9 declare a person, a record, to be a duplicate, one or not. That is

10 basically the methodology.

11 Methodology is just comparing relevant pieces of information

12 related to possibly the same individuals listed on different lists.

13 I hope that is a clear answer. But there are more issues than

14 just the issue of comparing certain pieces of information. Names, for

15 instance, are often misspelled. Pieces of date of birth are missing.

16 There is also a possibility that date of birth is reported differently in

17 different sources. So the borderline related to when one can accept a

18 pair of related records as a duplicated record and when not is sometimes

19 very hard to find indeed.

20 But because the sources main sources were of high quality, these

21 comparisons were not as hard as one might think they were hard. Actually,

22 it was, I think, not such a big issue here, the elimination of the

23 duplicates. But I was trying to say is there are several aspects of

24 looking for duplicates. On one level, these are the duplicates within the

25 sources, source by source. This often happens that even one single source

1 reports on one person several times. So, first of all, duplicates --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can I ask you --

3 THE WITNESS: Yes.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- do you have a separate, discreet exercise to

5 discover double counting, or is it something that you just come upon

6 fortuitously?

7 THE WITNESS: Discreet exercise, I mean, on whether I have a

8 number? What do you mean? Is it terms of discretion?

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, not discretion. Discreet means separate. Do

10 you have an individual, independent exercise to discover double counting,

11 or is it something that you discover as incidental to your other

12 statistical work.

13 THE WITNESS: It is a major part of our work. 90 per cent of our

14 work is checking duplicates. When sources are combined, like we did for

15 this project, sources are met. When sources are met together, then we

16 have an additional problem; not only duplicate within sources, source by

17 source, but we also have an overlap of sources. So if a master list is

18 created, based on a number of sources, then what has to be done at that

19 stage is yet another exercise for -- of looking for duplicates, because

20 the overlap of the sources must eliminated.

21 This is what we do most of our time, and there is a unit. There

22 are three persons who are fully skilled to do this kind of work, and we've

23 doing this for several years.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

25 We have passed the time for the break, so we will adjourn now for

1 20 minutes.

2 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

3 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

4 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Docherty.

6 MR. DOCHERTY:

7 Q. Dr. Tabeau, just a couple of things before we go on. First of

8 all, I was ways approached at the break and asked to please remind you to

9 speak a little bit more slowly. This is very dense and technical material

10 you're testifying about, and I know that can be hard to bear in mind

11 because you are fight properly focussed on the substance of your

12 testimony. So I hope will you not be offended if every once in a while I

13 give you a friendly reminder.

14 And in a second matter, in doing a final, final check of the

15 report before coming to Court, did you find some typographical errors?

16 A. Yes, I. I made a list of things that needed to be corrected, but

17 most of them are typos. There are also two more specific corrections,

18 like one major report, expert report, that we made in the past is not on

19 the list of our expert reports. Well, one number must be corrected, but

20 none of these corrections change the substance of the report.

21 Q. We have -- we have made copies of the list that you prepared.

22 MR. DOCHERTY: Could I please ask that those be distributed at

23 this time, so that everyone can take a look at them.

24 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

25 MR. DOCHERTY:

1 Q. Your testimony, Dr. Tabeau, just to repeat, is that none of this,

2 in the errata sheet, would change the substance of the report?

3 A. That's right.

4 Q. I want to move on, then, to the topic that we were covering just

5 before the break, which was number of killed persons from war-related

6 activities in Sarajevo during the indictment period. And I want to refer

7 to tables 8A, 8B, 9A, and 9B, which appear in your report, beginning on

8 page 23 of the English version and continuing to page 24. And for

9 convenience, we have put those on a power point slide.

10 MR. DOCHERTY: I will ask Ms. Bosnjakovic to please pull up slide

11 number one and broadcast it within the courtroom.

12 Q. Dr. Tabeau, do you see that on the screen in front of you?

13 A. Not yet.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. What is this screen for? Can I have that table and the

16 transcript at the same time?

17 Q. No.

18 A. Okay. Thank you.

19 Q. To be begin with, Dr. Tabeau, we see this division again between

20 Sarajevo Six and Sarajevo Ten. Is that correct?

21 A. Yes. It's correct. Perhaps I should list or mention the

22 municipalities that are included in Sarajevo Six. This is Sarajevo

23 Centar, Ilidza, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Stari Grad, and Vogosca. This

24 is the area of the Sarajevo Six.

25 The area of the Sarajevo Ten, in addition to the six, we have also

1 Sarajevo Hadzici, Ilijas, Pale, and Trnovo.

2 Q. Now, I notice that for both Sarajevo Six and Sarajevo Ten, you've

3 got two minimum numbers. One is called absolute and one is called more

4 likely. I want to be begin with the minimum number absolute. What does

5 that number respect, and why is it called the absolute minimum number?

6 A. This number is the very, very minimum, absolute minimum number

7 obtained from the merged sources, that would be the FBiH, RS, ICRC List of

8 Missing, and Bakije Funeral Home lists. These are the records that can be

9 seen and are documented in the sources as violent, war-related deaths.

10 These records were marked by the statistical authorities as resulting from

11 the so-called war activities. War activities cover a whole broad change

12 of situations, certainly situations in which people were killed by

13 fire-arms, different types of fire-arms, or they died another type of

14 violent war-related death.

15 These deaths for which we have extensive information about their

16 violent war-related character, and the information comes from the

17 documentation available to the owners of the sources.

18 The --

19 Q. Now --

20 A. -- minimum numbers, if I may continue, don't include cases which

21 are indirectly related to war. All these indirect war-related deaths are

22 included in another component. Natural deaths are not recorded here in

23 the statistics.

24 Also unknown causes of death, case of unknown causes of death are

25 excluded from these first kind of statistic absolute minimum number. The

1 number of unknown -- of cases with unknown causes was, however, relatively

2 big. In the case of Sarajevo Six, this number was more than one thousand

3 deaths. So we thought it was really important to give an impression of

4 what the statistics would look like if a part of the cases with unknown

5 causes would be included in statistics. It's pretty sure that among the

6 cases with unknown causes of death, a number of cases were from natural

7 causes and a number were from violent war-related causes.

8 There are statistical techniques that can be used to estimate

9 these two components and this is what we did. This is why the second

10 minimum number is included in these tables, and we call this number a more

11 likely minimum number.

12 I want to stress that both numbers, the absolute minimum and the

13 more likely minimum, are still minimum numbers, at least numbers. That

14 means they are by no means complete, and there is number of deaths still

15 somewhere there that we were unable to count and to include in statistics.

16 Q. So, Dr. Tabeau, just for the record, as the demographer who

17 prepared this expert report, what is the number of civilians who were

18 killed in Sarajevo Six as a result of violent, war-related causes between

19 August of 1994 and November of 1995?

20 A. This number is 449. This is the absolute minimum number. But

21 more likely, I believe, we believe, that the minimum number is 659 deaths.

22 Q. And then the same for the Sarajevo Ten, how many civilians were

23 killed as a result of violent, war-related causes between August of 1994

24 and November of 1995?

25 A. An absolute minimum is 631, and a more likely minimum number is

1 915.

2 Q. I want to turn now to the question of calculating the number of

3 people wounded as a result of war-related activities. In --

4 JUDGE MINDUA: One moment. Just a minute, Prosecutor, before

5 moving on to another topic and before talking about the wounded,

6 Witness --

7 THE WITNESS: May I request your assistance, please. I want

8 transcript on my screen. I'm sorry for this. Thank you very much.

9 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, I have listened very

10 carefully to everything you have said so far; and as far as Sarajevo Six

11 is concerned, you mentioned that there were unknown causes of death that

12 might have been due to road accidents or diseases or crimes or other

13 reasons. You also said that deaths were caused by shells and caused by

14 the war for the main part in your testimony.

15 Before the break, you stated that you avoided double counting and

16 counting one death twice. So this is my question: With the technique you

17 use, is it possible to know whether an unknown cause of death or a natural

18 cause of death, like a disease, could that be accounted for or introduced

19 in your records? Could it be considered to have been caused by the war by

20 rocket fire or by a mortar shell?

21 In other words, with the statistical data you use, and given the

22 way you work, is it possible to avoid such a thing happening? Do you

23 understand my question?

24 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I believe that I understand the

25 question, although it is very complex. I think it is important that we

1 will -- I will talk a little bit about the methodology. We actually spent

2 quite sometime earlier today on speaking about the sources, but I didn't

3 explain the method we used for producing these statistics.

4 I want to begin with the information that in all these sources

5 individual records of information are available. One case reported in

6 every source represents one individual. Information that we have about

7 individuals is complex. We have information about personal details, like

8 names, date of birth, place of birth, residence, et cetera, and also an

9 extensive part of information is related to the event considered. One

10 type of event we studied was the violent, war-related deaths, the killed

11 persons, and the second event very studied is the wounding event.

12 Every event is characterised by a number of items, by the date,

13 what day and month and year is concluded, by the place of the event.

14 Place is often expressed as a particular place, a small territorial area,

15 and also a place in terms of a larger territorial area, like a

16 municipality, which is an official administrative area. We have also

17 information about causes of death or wounding.

18 Reporting of causes of death might be very complex, and it is very

19 complex. The simplest situation is with the list of missing persons for

20 whom we know that they went all missing, so that would be the cause of the

21 fact that the person is still unaccounted for. But in terms of known

22 deaths, of course, the causes are much more complex, especially that both

23 natural causes and violent, war-related causes are reported.

24 In these two major databases, we asked the authorities who

25 developed these databases to use a medical classification of health

1 conditions, diseases, or accidents that led to death. So the medical

2 classification is available for a vast majority of our deaths. This is

3 just one perspective. The medical perspective is based on the official

4 classification of diseases, causes of death provided systematically by the

5 WHO, World Health Organisation 10th edition. It is used in both

6 databases.

7 So medical causes report about what organ failures led to death.

8 So that is a whole description of how, why the people died because of what

9 organs and what injuries to the organs.

10 There is a table in the report - it is Table 12, as far as I

11 remember. Yes, Table 12 -- in which causes, medical causes of death of

12 the violent war-related deaths are listed. In addition to medical causes,

13 there are two other classifications available for causes of death of known

14 deaths. These are for violent deaths. We have type of violent death.

15 There are five major types. One of them is war activities. Other of the

16 five include accidents, including traffic accidents, other violent deaths

17 include murder, suicide. These would be the major categories. And this

18 was the type of violent death, which is a second perspective.

19 There is a third perspective available as well, and the third

20 perspective tells us for violent deaths what external factors led to that.

21 And the external factors would be whether the person died in fire, was the

22 person poisoned, was the person injured in some kind of circumstances. So

23 this would be the external causes of death. They described the

24 circumstances of death.

25 So regarding causes of death, we have a lot of information that we

1 can use to study and to decide whether or not we can include a given death

2 as a violent, war-related case. And this is had a we did. We studied,

3 first of all, violent deaths, only violent deaths that were marked by the

4 authorities as war-related. That means resulting from war activities.

5 And we neglected completely all natural deaths, which are different from

6 violent deaths. Generally, all deaths are either violent or natural. We

7 concentrated on the violent deaths, and one category was the major

8 category of war related resulting from war activities.

9 Yes.

10 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Have you finished or not yet.

11 THE WITNESS: Not really. It is a very long story.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think we have heard enough, Doctor. Let Judge

13 Mindua continue his questions.

14 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you for the explanation you

15 provided. I shall now be much clear, and I hope this will be my last

16 question.

17 Among the sources, you mentioned the Statistical Institute of the

18 Republika Srpska and you also mentioned the BiH Institute. This is my

19 question: I wanted to know whether you were able on looking at all this

20 statistical data, whether it be data coming from the ABiH or the Republika

21 Srpska, did you note any death that came under a heading which you may

22 have found in other sources you used, like the ICRC or the Household

23 Survey which was conducted? Did you see that certain cases were

24 officially due to the war or did you discover that these same people had

25 died in a different way?

1 THE WITNESS: I think this question relates to how we dealt with

2 the overlap of sources. It's indeed the one and the same death, one in

3 the same case could be reported in several sources, up to five sources.

4 This is as many as sources as we used for this project. It's important to

5 explain that our intention was to make one master list of death cases, a

6 list that would be based on all individual sources.

7 But merging sources involves issues of which of the overlapping

8 records should be taken for as the only one that remains in the master

9 list, and which ones should be skipped as duplicated. One and the same

10 case, one the same death can be reported in FBiH database, RS database,

11 ICRC database, and Bakije Funeral Home, and which of the four we take for

12 the master list and which ones we decide are do you believe indicated.

13 Knowing that sources are -- some are better, some are less good,

14 we decided to use a hierarchy sources. It was that FBiH and RS databases

15 were considered to be our best sources, and they were consistent in case

16 of duplications that whatever source was used here for just keeping this

17 one single record was okay, whether it was FBiH or RS.

18 Then if saw one the same record, the very same record in addition

19 in other sources, we neglected the other record. So what remains is this

20 one reported in the our best sources. So that is the way we dealt with

21 the overlap.

22 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

23 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much, Doctor.

24 These explanations are difficult to really understand, especially

25 when you come down to the details, so maybe I could put an example to you,

1 and you could to us just how you would handle such an example.

2 Let us say that there is a shelling incident, and one of your most

3 reliable sources will say that 22 persons were killed, the other most

4 reliable source would say that there were only 19 persons killed; and when

5 you then check all the other sources you have, you were able to establish

6 the identity of only 15 of the victims. This would leave you in a very

7 difficult situation, I would assume. Which result would you end up?

8 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't think it is a difficult situation,

9 because depending on which -- the maximum reported, in this incident, is

10 22 persons, 22 persons. That means even if the 15 would be reported in

11 our best sources, I would, first of all, take the 15. But because it is

12 only 15 in the best sources, and the rest is in less good source, then I

13 would additionally include seven records from other sources.

14 So I wouldn't have more than 22. That is the maximum reported in

15 my sources, but I would not have less or more than 22. I would just have

16 22.

17 JUDGE HARHOFF: But chances would be that in fact, in the example

18 that I mentioned, in fact there were only 19 people killed, because one of

19 the reliable sources said 22, the other said 19, and you were only able to

20 establish the identity of 15 of these 19 or 22 people.

21 So there's a small margin here which I just wonder whether you

22 would go on the safe side and say out of this example, we only know for

23 sure that 15 people were killed, or would you go with the middle figure to

24 say that we can establish four sure that at least 19 people were killed,

25 or would you take the bigger number.

1 THE WITNESS: Once again, we have three numbers; 22, 19, and 15,

2 and we have four sources. And just assume that 22 and 19 were reported in

3 the best sources, and the other number, 15, was reported in the least

4 reliable source, the fourth source. How I would deal with this situation.

5 Well, the maximum individuals reported in this one incident is 22 persons.

6 Because the two best sources report a very close number, 22/19, I would

7 certainly compare the 22 with 19. And there is a very good chance that

8 the 19 are exactly the same in the 22, in my first source. So I would

9 still have 22 records after I would have analysed the two sources.

10 So then I would go to the 15 individuals reported in the last

11 source, and I would compare the names of the 15 with the list of 22 I

12 have. And it is very likely that there is again the 15 names included in

13 the 22 already.

14 So I would still have the 22 individuals reported, if there is a

15 consistency among source; if there is not, I may have 15 additional names,

16 15 additional new names, that I would probably included in my list as

17 well, at this stage. If they are not overlapping name, completely new

18 names, then in addition to the 22, I would have new 15 names. This is

19 what I would do, even though I would know that the 15 names come the least

20 reliable source.

21 JUDGE HARHOFF: I'm confused, but on a high level.

22 Please, Mr. Prosecutor.

23 MR. DOCHERTY:

24 Q. Dr. Tabeau, let me follow up, if I may, with the question Judge

25 Harhoff was asking.

1 Now, Judge Harhoff put this position that there is a specific

2 shelling incident, and deaths are reported as resulting from that shelling

3 incident. First of all, are deaths in fact reported that way in the

4 sources that you looked at?

5 A. Not by shelling incidents. This is not included among the causes.

6 I don't have information about shelling, sniping incidents as causes of

7 death, but I do have information about the time and place. Every incident

8 actually can be quite well approximated by using the information about the

9 time and place of incident.

10 Q. And let me follow up on that. It will get better, I promise.

11 Judge Harhoff was also putting to you, for example, that one

12 source might say that 22 people were killed in a shelling on such-and-such

13 a day. In order for a record to be counted, to be included in your master

14 list, what is the minimum that that record has got to have before you will

15 say, Here is a countable death, into the list it goes, and we will check

16 and maybe sure it is not double counted somewhere else, but this is a

17 record that I will include, and which records are so incomplete where you

18 say, No, we just can't even put that in?

19 A. Well, we are required for records to have all names, and that

20 means first name, father' name, surname; and ideally the date of birth,

21 complete date of birth; complete date of incident, ideally, I'm saying;

22 and complete place of incident; and ideally information about cause of

23 death. But this is not what was available for all -- absolutely all

24 records.

25 So as a minimum, we decided to have names, year of birth, and year

1 of death, and the cause of death that was explicitly not natural. That

2 was the minimum that was required for our statistics.

3 Q. So in a hypothetical situation, in which some source says, and

4 maybe not evenly one of the sources that you use, but somebody says,

5 Wasn't that incident awful. There were 30 people killed; no names, no

6 date of births, no dates of death. Does that claim of 30 people killed on

7 such-and-such a day make into your report or not; and then please give the

8 reasons for your answer.

9 A. Of course, if we couldn't have information about place of death

10 and date of death, there is no way we could use this record. This record

11 is useless from the point of view of the work we had done.

12 Well, it was required, as a basic principle, to work with these

13 records which were relevant to the siege area and the siege period of this

14 case. That means the area was the Sarajevo Six, and the date of incidents

15 relevant to the case were from August 1994 to November 1995.

16 Q. This will the last question on this. In this master list of

17 deaths, are you working from death records or from incident records?

18 A. We are working from death records. We don't have incident data as

19 the basic principle for selecting records into the database. This is not

20 what we had at our disposal, the incidents information.

21 JUDGE HARHOFF: I still have not fully understood, in the example

22 that I mentioned before, how you would handle the data according to which

23 you are using all available sources, reliable and unreliable, you were

24 only able to establish the identity of 15 people, yet your two most

25 reliable sources then told you that there were more deaths. In one

1 source, it would say that they were sure that there were at least 19

2 deaths; that is to say, four people unidentified. The other source says a

3 slightly higher number, let us for the example just say 22 people.

4 That is one thing. But then if you wish, you may try and explain

5 to the Chamber just how you would handle this information, and how you

6 would establish the number to be entered into your record.

7 The other information that you gave us was that you are using a

8 death approach and not an incident approach. We have heard during this

9 trial that there were numerous incidents of sniping, and I guess that

10 these have been recorded as sniping incidents. In this Chamber, in this

11 trial, we have only heard evidence of a limited number of these sniping

12 incidents. So I assume that apart from the cases that we have heard, the

13 sniping cases that we have heard during this trial, there are a number of

14 other sniping incompetences.

15 Let us assume that there is one single shot fired by a sniper and

16 one person is killed in the street and nothing else; then how would you be

17 able to establish that this person was killed by a sniping incident and

18 not as a casualty of a traffic accident, a simple, normal traffic

19 accident, which would be unrelated to the war? People are killed, of

20 course, in traffic every day. So if you had no attention paid to the

21 incidents, then I have difficulties in understanding how you would be able

22 to distinguish a war-related casualty with a traffic casualty.

23 Could you try to explain this to us.

24 THE WITNESS: Yes. I will start with the second part of the

25 question; the person shot by a sniper in the sniping incident.

1 I don't have the information about sniping incident, but I would

2 see this person as killed -- as died, for instance, because of a heart

3 injury; and in the classification of violent deaths, I would see this

4 person as died because of war activity. And if I have a little bit of

5 luck, then in external causes, I see this person as died of a gunshot. I

6 wouldn't see whether it was a sniper, perhaps in some cases I would, but

7 not in all. But I would definitely see that fire-arm was involved.

8 So that is the logic behind this project that we completed. We

9 don't have information about sniping incidents. We don't have information

10 about shelling incidents. We don't have information about any other

11 shooting incidents during the siege, but we do have information about

12 deaths and we do have information about the nature of the deaths. And we

13 are able to distinguish between natural deaths and violent deaths; and

14 among the violent deaths, we are able to distinguish this one particular

15 group of deaths related or resulting from war activities.

16 So it is not this direct approach that ideally we would like to

17 have, beginning from the sniping/shelling incidents and counting the

18 deaths resulting from this. This is not possible because there are no

19 sources that I would how to do this, on the scale that we have done in

20 this report.

21 But we have talk the other end. We have a good reporting of

22 deaths from the siege period and the siege area, and this is quite an

23 exceptional number of sources that we have. And starting from this end,

24 we produce statistics that are if not 100 per cent then, they are in a

25 very large extent certainly reporting on the very same victims from the

1 very same incidents.

2 But the link between the incidents, sniping/shelling, and the

3 deaths yet needs to be made as a direct link. If I would have lists of

4 victims of certain sniping/shelling incidents, I could have searched for

5 them in my master list and check whether they are reported and how they

6 are reported.

7 So this is actually the essence of this report, right, what I said

8 now.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: What about the first question posed by Judge

10 HARHOFF.

11 THE WITNESS: I would like to put a drawing on the ELMO, if I may.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 THE WITNESS: Well, I have here an example of three sources:

14 Source 1, this is this area; source 2; and source 3. Just imagine we have

15 a project in which we want to make a master list that would be composed of

16 records coming from three sources; one, two, three. Because the sources

17 are related to each other, why, because they report on the same or similar

18 period an area, there must be that the sources are overlapping. And the

19 overlap of sources is a complex issue.

20 This is the overlap all three sources; one, two and three. So

21 this is a group of records that, if I would simply put the three sources

22 together, together means if there N1 one number of records in Source 1, N2

23 number of records in Source 2, N3 number of records in Source 3, then

24 putting them together means N1 plus N2 plus N3. That is the overall total

25 of just putting them, technically speaking, together, merging them. But

1 the total, N1 plus N2 plus N3, is the wrong total because we know that

2 sources overlap and we have to get rid of a number of records.

3 So this group of records; that is, these cases, are counted three

4 times; one, two, three. They are reported in all sources. This group are

5 records overlapping between two sources; one and two. Here, one and

6 three; here, two and three. So these are counted, too; those are counted,

7 too; and those are counted, too. So my role is to eliminate of every

8 record reported three times. Of every report reported three times, I have

9 to eliminate two and leave just one in the master list. And of all

10 records, reported two times, my task is to keep just one of every two and

11 get rid of the other one.

12 So master list is just combining sources in the good way, getting

13 rid of duplicated records, and coming up with a number of records that can

14 be seen as unique and related to the incidents in question, and show this

15 as statistics. This is what we have done.

16 So coming back to the example: 22, 19 and 15. So depending --

17 this would be 22; this would be in total 19; and this would be 15.

18 Depending on how they overlap here, how they overlap here, my number can

19 be as large as 22 plus 19 plus 15. That would be the maximum if there no

20 duplicated records at all, at all. So I would just 22 plus 19 plus 15, if

21 no duplicates, or much less than that, much less than that, I think,

22 depending on how they overlap. So that is my answer. I hope it made it a

23 little bit easier to understand.

24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Is that the best answer can you provide to us.

25 THE WITNESS: At this stage, yes, but I can come up with a

1 concrete example with names, in a later time, if it would help.

2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Let me move back to your answer to my second

3 question --

4 THE WITNESS: Yes.

5 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- about how you distinguish a war-related

6 casualty from a normal casualty. Let's again have an example. We have

7 this little boy walking home from school one day. It's a hot and sunny

8 day, and he is being shot at. The bullet hits him in his arm, and he is

9 taken to hospital. I guess the record would show that he has a broken

10 wrist, the bullet hit him through the wrist. Now, I can see two

11 possibilities. One possibility would be that he is recorded as a victim

12 of a sniping incident; the other would be that he fell on his bicycle and

13 broke his wrist. Where would he end up in your system?

14 THE WITNESS: This is not a killed person. It is a wounded

15 person, so we have a case of a wounded person. If was it a serious

16 injury, and it was, he would go to hospital with his mom, and he would be

17 diagnosed there. There would be a file made for him in that hospital. In

18 the hospital, I'm not sure whether he would be admitted or not. Even if

19 he would not be admitted, there is a very good chance the file would be

20 very extensive and complete.

21 And for wounded persons, we have extensive information about

22 shelling and sniping as causes of wounding. This is very different from

23 the information that is available for the killed persons. For killed, we

24 don't have information about shelling or sniping as causes of death. For

25 wounded persons, we do. This is a matter of reporting what is available

1 and reported in the sources.

2 JUDGE HARHOFF: I'm sure I understand. Why would the medical

3 records from hospitals be available to you only for persons that were

4 wounded but not killed?

5 THE WITNESS: Because killed persons are not taken to hospital.

6 This is why. Because they are killed and they are not requiring any

7 medical help. They are just dead, so they don't end in hospitals. We

8 don't have admission for the killed persons. If a wounded persons died of

9 the injuries, then for this group we would have the admission file

10 available. But this is only a very small group of individuals. Those

11 first wounded, who didn't recover from the injuries and died of the

12 injuries, for those we would have information about shelling, sniping as

13 causes of wounding.

14 So this is a different source we used for the wounded persons, and

15 this is why the difference.

16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty, what do you see as the significance

18 of Dr. Tabeau's evidence, significance for the case for the Prosecution.

19 MR. DOCHERTY: Dr. Tabeau's evidence establishes the number of

20 people killed and wounded as a result of war-related activities during the

21 indictment period and particularly those areas in the Sarajevo Six, which

22 are the areas within the confrontation lines. The Prosecution's view is

23 that this is an absolute minimum number of persons killed or wounded as a

24 result of activities directed by the accused in this case.

25 Dr. Tabeau will not say, of course, that last bit, but the

1 inference is there to be argued, and it certainly will be argued.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: So in the absence of this kind of evidence, where

3 does that leave your case?

4 MR. DOCHERTY: In the absence --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: In the absence of this kind of evidence.

6 MR. DOCHERTY: In the absence of this kind of evidence, it leaves

7 us unable to give -- it would leave us unable to give an exact number in

8 terms of casualties suffered as a result of activities perpetrated by the

9 troops under command of the accused and would leave us with anecdotal

10 evidence; for example, police officers saying that there were a lot of

11 calls during the siege period and few following the siege period. It

12 would also leave us, for example, the medical records that were introduced

13 via spreadsheet earlier in the trial, but it would leave us without an

14 exact number and it would leave us without the statistical derivation of

15 that exact number.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you need an exact number to prove your case?

17 MR. DOCHERTY: I don't need an exact number. However, I hope we

18 are doing something more than the bear minimum needed to prove the case.

19 The -- the question -- if we went with the bear minimum, that would be a

20 very -- very dodgy approach.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm just trying to put the evidence in context.

22 MR. DOCHERTY: Uh-huh.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm just trying to get it in context.

24 MR. DOCHERTY: And, of course, depending on the outcome of the

25 liability phase of the trial, these number could be highly relevant in

1 fixing an appropriate penalty, a sentence.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I agree. It would be relevant there, yes.

3 MR. DOCHERTY:

4 Q. Dr. Tabeau, I promise, I hope this is last question following up

5 on Judge Harhoff.

6 In Judge Harhoff's example, there were 22, there were 19, there

7 were 15, and I believe Judge Harhoff said there were a number of

8 unidentified people. You have already testified that you have a master

9 list of unique records. Can a wholly, unidentified person have a unique

10 record?

11 A. Not in the sources that we used. A record, to be included and

12 considered meaningful, must be fully identified. There must be names and

13 other information about the person. If there would be only cases,

14 reported, dearth cases or wounding cases, without the information about

15 persons, we would reject them.

16 Q. So this is --

17 JUDGE HARHOFF: So the answer to my question was, in the example I

18 mentioned, you would end up recording only 15 deaths.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If there are only 15 with names,

20 then yes, of course.

21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

22 THE WITNESS: Of course, yes.

23 MR. DOCHERTY:

24 Q. I'm now going to turn to wounded persons, and I'm going to start

25 off the same way I did with the death persons but hopefully a bit quicker,

1 because I understand from the answers that you have already given that

2 your sources were by and large the same, only you also made use of the

3 Household Survey in calculating wounded persons. Is that correct?

4 A. Actually, the sources were not --

5 Q. I apologise. I misstated that. The sources for wounded persons,

6 I meant to refer back to the hospital records that you had talked about,

7 were by and large hospital records. Can you tell us what use you made of

8 hospital records in calculating the number of wounded persons?

9 A. So to make it clear once again, our sources for the wounded

10 persons were just different. It was just basically hospital records that

11 we used as the main source for producing the minimum number of the wounded

12 persons. Hospital records came from three major hospitals in Sarajevo;

13 Kosevo, Dobrinja, and State Hospital. The hospital records is a very

14 small sample of records on all wounded persons in the siege of Sarajevo.

15 The only covered persons who were admitted the information comes from

16 admission files of the hospitals; non-hospitalised wounded persons are not

17 covered in this sample, moreover, records from other hospitals, like the

18 war hospitals that operated in Sarajevo during the siege, in addition to

19 these three major hospitals. So the records of war hospitals are not

20 included in our sample. Records from emergency help stations are not

21 included either. So what I'm saying is it is a very small presentation

22 that we have and a very small number of wounded persons, as a minimum

23 number that we can present.

24 However, knowing all this, knowing that the incompleteness is so

25 large, and knowing that the hospital records are just one of the sources

1 that could be used for these kind of analysis, we also tried to improve

2 this minimum number by producing an estimate of a more complete number of

3 all wounded persons, both hospitalised and non-hospitalised.

4 We have done this by including in our analysis one additional

5 source, the Sarajevo Household Survey. The Sarajevo Household Survey,

6 even though the reporting ends in this source by mid-1994, but the period

7 from April 1992 to July 1994 is covered by both hospital records and also

8 Sarajevo Household Survey. By comparing these two sources, especially by

9 studying similarities between those two sources, we quantified the

10 relationship, the statistic relationship, between the sources and used

11 this relationship in order to produce a forecast of a more complete number

12 of wounded persons, not only hospitalised but also non-hospitalised.

13 Q. If I could follow up on that with just two questions. Number one,

14 when you testified regarding deaths, you said that your effort was to

15 actually count every single death that was violent and war related in the

16 right area at the right time. You also made mention of another way that

17 statisticians, demographers can do their work, and that is by taking a

18 sample and then extrapolating from that sample to the population at large.

19 Which approach did you follow when calculating numbers of wounded

20 persons?

21 A. So in the case of wounded persons, it wasn't a counting approach.

22 We didn't have enough foundation for doing this. This is why we decided

23 to go ahead with a small sample and one additional source that we used to

24 produce statistical estimate, an extrapolation of certain relationship

25 that we quantified between the two sources.

1 Q. My second question is: What kind of hospital records, I know they

2 were from three hospitals and they were admissions and so forth, but

3 people are admitted to the hospital for all sorts of reasons. What a

4 records were put into the sample and what records were excluded from the

5 sample?

6 A. Well, these were by all means only selected records. The

7 selection was made by including only those patients admitted to hospitals

8 that were either woman of any age, or men below age of 18 or above age 60.

9 So men between 18 and 60 were excluded from our selection. So the sample

10 can be seen as representing exclusively civilians.

11 Q. And what about the cause for which the person was admitted to the

12 hospital?

13 A. Well, as I mentioned earlier today, the cause is available as

14 shelling or sniping. These are the two major causes of wounding. A third

15 cause are cases where either shelling or sniping is mentioned jointly; for

16 some reason, it was not possible to distinguish whether it was sniping or

17 shelling. So there is a group of wounded persons who have a cause of

18 wounding reported as sniping or shelling, and that is a very small margin

19 of number of other causes which are not specified in terms of shelling or

20 sniping, just other, in a very, very small number of these cases.

21 Q. And what did you do with that very, very small number of cases

22 that were other cases?

23 A. Well, we still kept in our database because all these persons were

24 wounded persons and that was also reported in the hospital files. This is

25 the reason why.

1 Q. And at the end of putting together this sample and then

2 extrapolating from this sampling, were you able to calculate minimum

3 numbers of wounded persons in Sarajevo between August of 1994 and November

4 of 1995?

5 A. Yes. We have done such extrapolation and we calculated and

6 estimated a number.

7 Q. I want to refer now to Table 22 on page 54 and Table 25 on page 65

8 of the English version of your report and that would be slide number 2.

9 Now, here you've calculate observed absolute minimum numbers, and

10 then in Table 25 estimated more complete minimum numbers of wounded

11 civilians. I'm going to ask to you define these two terms. Could you

12 tell us what you mean by an observed absolute minimum number?

13 A. Observed absolute minimum numbers are just the numbers produced

14 based on the sample of the hospital records, of civilians selected

15 according to their age and sex criterion. I call this number minimum

16 number because, as I mentioned, the sample does not include many other

17 records available from other hospitals, like war hospitals and emergency

18 help stations. It is also likely that certain files were destroyed during

19 the war or certain records were never taken by the authorities. This

20 often happens in this kind of conflict situations. We cannot be sure that

21 records selected from hospital archives for use in and other projects is a

22 complete selection of all relevant records.

23 Nevertheless, it's good enough to use this record to obtain

24 minimum, absolute minimum numbers, and this is what is presented in Table

25 22. An absolute minimum number of civilians wounded by any cause, mainly,

1 of course, sniping, shelling, and possibly other causes, is 405. Of this

2 number, 405, at least 254 were wounded by shelling; 77 by sniping; and

3 another 70 were wounded, either by sniping or by shelling.

4 Q. So to sum it up, Table 22 is the sample. These are individuals

5 for whom there is a hospital record that you can examine; is that correct?

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 Q. After the number wounded by shelling, 254, we have in parenthesis

8 185 plus 69, can you just tell us what the significance of the numbers in

9 parenthesis are please?

10 A. 185 is the number of cases in which shelling was reported as cause

11 of wounding explicitly, so there is the use of term "shelling." And there

12 are 69 additional cases for which the term "shelling" has not been

13 explicitly used. But from the description of the circumstances of

14 incidents, it is clear that these are also cases of wounded by shelling.

15 So we call these cases implicit shelling cases and still include them

16 under the same category of wounded by shelling.

17 Q. In Table 25, you then say there is an estimated, more complete

18 minimum number of wounded civilians. That's at the bottom half of the

19 slide that is on our screen. Can you tell us, please, the derivation or

20 the source of these numbers that are in Table 25.

21 A. These numbers were obtained from our modeling and extrapolation

22 procedure. The procedure made use of the information or records reported

23 as wounded persons from May 1992 -- sorry, April 1992 to July 1994, which

24 is a period proceeding the indictment period, but by comparing the two

25 sources hospital records that report only hospitalised patients only and

1 Sarajevo household records that report on both hospitalised and

2 non-hospitalised patients. So by comparing these two sources, we

3 established a statistical model that described the relationship between

4 those two types of records.

5 This model is a quantification of the similarities between the

6 sources. And the quality of the model, statistically speaking, is

7 extremely high. There is no doubt that the tool as such as any

8 deficiency. So using this estimated relationship, we made a forecast or

9 extrapolation, which is the particular type of forecast that we made, and

10 estimated, based on the observed numbers of records in the hospital files,

11 the more complete number of patients of two types; hospitalised and

12 non-hospitalised. These are the resulting numbers.

13 We estimated actually several models. One for all cases jointly

14 and some other models; one for shelling, one for sniping, and one for the

15 shelling/sniping category.

16 Q. And those are the numbers that are set forth in Table 25 on page

17 65 of your report?

18 A. Yes, that's right.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Please pause between question and answer for the

20 sake of the interpreters.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you both hear that.

22 Dr. Tabeau, please pause between question and answer.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I apologise.

24 MR. DOCHERTY:

25 Q. Changing topics yet again, Dr. Tabeau. In your statistical

1 analysis, were you able to draw any statistically based conclusions about

2 whether civilians were deliberately targeted in Sarajevo between August of

3 1994 and November of 1995?

4 A. We studied the relationship between killed civilians and killed

5 military, in great detail. Based on this studies - we have conducted

6 actually several types of studies of this relationship - I think there are

7 good reasons to believe that there was targeting of civilian population in

8 this particular conflict period in Sarajevo.

9 MR. DOCHERTY: If I could ask for slide number 8.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic is on her feet.

11 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

12 We're rushing and in a rush because this is the end of the

13 procedure. So in my view, these questions should not be for the expert

14 but the Chamber. I think that to save time, we ought to look at the

15 expert part of her testimony.

16 Thank you.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying she's

18 not competent to give this evidence? Because I thought the next question

19 now would be for her to explain how she would arrive at that kind of

20 conclusion.

21 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Well, the question that was

22 asked was have the civilians - well, the civilians between quotation

23 marks - have they been deliberately targeted. In my view, this is

24 question which should not asked in the context of this expert testimony.

25 Thank you.

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty, the Defence is saying this is a

3 question which is properly for the Chamber. What do you say to that?

4 MR. DOCHERTY: Two things. First of all, what were the -- I have

5 asked one question on this topic; and so if the objection is to

6 foundation, I think I've got to attempt to lay the foundation and then

7 Ms. Isailovic can challenge it -- point out where she feel it is lacking.

8 If the question is -- if is the objection is that is one for the Chamber,

9 what -- the ultimate question, of course, is for the Chamber. But what I

10 have asked - and I was I think very careful with the way I phrase the

11 question - is: As a statistician, can you draw statistical conclusions,

12 not legal conclusions, statistical conclusions. I think that that is

13 appropriate -- an appropriate question to put to this witness.

14 And, thirdly, this is material that is in Dr. Tabeau' report.

15 There is a mechanism by which the Defence can say that they challenge the

16 qualifications of the expert to give all or any part of the report, and

17 that was not done in this ways; rather, a request was made, and it will --

18 it's being followed today, that Dr. Tabeau be produced for

19 cross-examination. That has been done.

20 I also take the observation in that regard to be untimely. So

21 given the carefully phrased manner of the question and given the timing of

22 the objection, I would ask the Chamber to deny this submission.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic, I think his best answer of the

24 three is that these she's being asked to give a statistical conclusion not

25 a legal conclusion.

1 What do you have to say about that?

2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if the question is

3 asked whether deliberately shooting civilians is a statistical matter,

4 well, in my view, this is not the right question. In my

5 cross-examination, I try to put all these data in perspective. In my

6 view, these are precisely legal questions which should not be asked to the

7 witness and not to experts.

8 Anyway, you have already made a ruling.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have not made a ruling.

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: The Chamber's analysis is that if the witness, as

12 a statistician, has some statistical method that can assist the Chamber in

13 determining whether civilians were deliberately targeted, that's a matter

14 on which she can testify. We will hear the method and then it is for us

15 to maybe of it what we will. We may discard that piece of her evidence

16 entirely, but let us hear what the method is.

17 And I would be interested to find out, Mr. Docherty, whether this

18 kind of evidence has been given in other cases. Are you able to say?

19 MR. DOCHERTY: I will ask the witness, but I can tell that you the

20 answer will be that the data has never before been good enough to allow

21 this to be done.

22 THE WITNESS: If I may.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us hear from the witness.

24 THE WITNESS: The method concentrates on studying the ratios of

25 killed civilians versus killed soldiers. These ratios are not knew in

1 these kind of studies. I'm sure that in several other cases, these ratios

2 were studied and presented. I think in this particular case, there is a

3 very good foundation to look at the ratios very carefully and study them

4 in several ways, and this is what we did. This kind of study I think is

5 the first one that I present.

6 So from this point of view, it is the first time that the ratios

7 of civilians to soldiers were studied by month of the siege, by day of the

8 siege, by the siege episode, and by both day and siege episode. And in

9 addition to this, we also studied a selection of major dates from all six

10 municipalities. So the extent that we have done this is for the first

11 time so broad.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I'm keen to hear the explanation, but I

13 regret that I may not be here for the last session because I'm feeling

14 indisposed, and so my colleagues will hear the explanation when we resume

15 at the end of the break.

16 We are adjourned.

17 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.

18 --- On resuming at 12.41 p.m.

19 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] As you have noticed, the President

20 is absent; and under Rule 15 bis, the Chamber has decided to remain in

21 session and I would like to give the floor to the Prosecution.

22 MR. DOCHERTY: Thank you, Mr. President.

23 Q. Dr. Tabeau, before the break, we were talking about statistical

24 light that can be shed on the question of whether civilians were targeted.

25 I'd like to continue with that now.

1 We've talked so far today about numbers of killed and wounded

2 civilians. Did you also track at least raw numbers of killed and wounded

3 soldiers?

4 A. Yes. We also produced statistics on soldiers killed in the siege.

5 Q. And were you able to plot the killed and wounded soldiers on a

6 time-line, if you will; in other words, develop a time pattern of when

7 soldiers were killed and wounded?

8 A. One correction regarding wounded person, we only studied the

9 civilians. Regarding killed persons, these were both civilians and

10 soldiers. So in this part of the testimony, I will be talking about the

11 killed persons; civilians and soldiers.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. So the question was about a time pattern of killings of soldiers

14 and civilians. We did study these in several ways, most generally by

15 looking at the numbers of killed civilians and soldiers by month, starting

16 in August 1994 until November 1995. I have a figure in the report,

17 figure -- figure 11, which illustrates these issues, and perhaps we can

18 take a look at this figure right now.

19 Q. And this figure is being broadcast, and if I could ask Mr. Usher

20 to help you get had an in front of you.

21 A. I think I have it, yes.

22 Q. Okay. Let's just start with some basics. This is Figure 11 from

23 your report, and it is found on page 39 of the English version. We have a

24 number of different colours on this report, and we'll just go through them

25 one after another from top to bottom -- actually not from top to bottom.

1 The green colour represents what?

2 A. Represents soldiers. These are killed soldiers, records of killed

3 soldiers.

4 Q. And the red area represents what?

5 A. These are records of killed civilians.

6 Q. And then there's a small grey area at the very top. What does

7 that gray area mean?

8 A. It is records of persons of whom we don't know, whether they were

9 soldiers or civilians.

10 Q. Then along the horizontal axis, what is plotted?

11 A. It is the time-line, say, starting months, basically speaking.

12 These are the units that we used for this chart, starting with August 1994

13 until November 1995. It's the last month presented in this chart.

14 Q. Now, on the left-hand side, along the vertical axis, what is being

15 plotted?

16 A. It is the axis that is used to show the scale for numbers of the

17 deaths of killed, both civilians and soldiers.

18 Q. All right. And then, lastly, there are a number of purple bars;

19 and also on the right hand vertical axis, there's a different quantity

20 being plotted. What is the significance of these purple bars and of the

21 quantity on the right hand vertical axis?

22 A. The bars illustrate the ratios of killed civilians in relation to

23 killed soldiers. The interpretation of this ratios is basically the

24 number of the civilians killed per one killed soldier. These ratios are

25 shown here in Figure 11, month by month. These are monthly data, and the

1 level -- the values shown in the bars can be found in Figure 11 in the

2 right-hand side axis. This is a different scale than the one on the left

3 side.

4 Q. Now, I want to start at a fairly general level and then come down

5 to this specific case that we're in court about today.

6 Is it possible for a statistician to determine, using statistical

7 methods, whether two sets of data, whatever those data sets might be,

8 whether two sets of data are varying with the same pattern or with a

9 different pattern? Can you do that?

10 A. Of course, in several ways. One of the ways is just making this

11 kind of charts, as the one we have in front of us, just by showing the

12 different series together in one chart. This is a cumulative presentation

13 here, so the numbers of killed civilians go first; and on the top of them

14 we show the numbers of killed soldiers, and on the top of them the numbers

15 of individuals of unknown status. So the upper most line represents the

16 overall time pattern, overall time pattern of killings of both civilians

17 and soldiers and individuals of unknown status during the siege of

18 Sarajevo starting in August 1994 until November 1995.

19 Q. Now, purple bars that show the ratio between killed civilians

20 verse killed soldiers, what does the size of this purple bar, the

21 magnitude of the purple bar tell us about whether these two sets of data,

22 killed civilians and killed soldiers, are varying the same way or a

23 different way?

24 A. Well, this is what I wanted to add next, that the bars, that means

25 the ration killed civilians to killed soldiers, is a way of expressing the

1 structure of the data shown here in Figure 11. As we see there is no way

2 that we can see the numbers of killed civilians proportionate and stable

3 in the entire period, August 1994 to November 1995. So in certain

4 periods, the ratios are higher; in certain other periods, the ratios are

5 lower, telling us that the structure of the data, the proportion between

6 of killed civilians versus killed soldiers is different; sometimes higher

7 and sometimes lower.

8 Q. Now, in your report, you divide days of the siege into what you

9 call high days and what you call low days. Do you know what I'm referring

10 to?

11 A. Yes. But before answering this question, I would like to make one

12 more comment relating to Figure 11.

13 It is important to notice that in Figure 11, there are in fact a

14 few distinguished episodes shown as a general time pattern of killings.

15 Obviously, there is one very high peek in the figure, the one associated

16 with June 1995. But generally speaking already from March 1995 to August

17 1995, we can seek of a period of increased numbers of killed individuals.

18 And there is an another period of increased numbers of killed

19 individuals, starting in August 1994 until approximately December 1994.

20 And there are two quieter episodes as well. The first quiet episode is in

21 January/February 1995, and the second quieter episode is from September

22 1995 to November 1995. That's very important because later I will refer

23 to this episodes.

24 The two episodes with increased numbers of killed persons, will

25 call high episodes, and the two other episodes with lower numbers of

1 killed persons I will call low episodes.

2 Q. Now, the question was whether you had divided siege days into high

3 days and low days. Did you do that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. What is a high day?

6 A. So addition to distinguishing high and low episodes, we also

7 looked at the days, so the daily pattern of killings, and then we

8 distinguished two types of day. Low days are days with less than three

9 deaths per day, and high days with three or more deaths per day.

10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Civilian --

11 THE WITNESS: This is both. This was threshold that was used for

12 the overall number, and it is only a threshold that is used to distinguish

13 between days, not to calculate statistics: Low day versus high days.

14 MR. DOCHERTY:

15 Q. Why did you make that distinction? Why was it important to

16 divide the siege into high and low days?

17 A. Well, the reason is that already in Figure 11, we saw something

18 that was kind of an annoying result, meaning that the ratios, C to S

19 ratio - I will call them civilians to soldiers, C to S, ratios - were

20 obviously relatively high in quiet episodes, as opposed to low ratios in

21 high episodes.

22 So if we focus for a moment on the second high episode, the one

23 with the highest number of killed persons in June 1995, that is the

24 highest peak in Figure 11, if we look at it, and then if we look at the

25 ratio, C to S ratios shown also in this figure, the lowest ratio, C/S

1 ratio is obtained for the June 1995 for the month in which there is the

2 highest number of killed persons.

3 So, basically speaking, when the siege was becoming very active,

4 the ratios, civilians to militaries, were dropping at the same time. This

5 was some kind of annoying result, and we wanted to the study and to

6 understand it better, because if we would find a confirmation of the

7 picture in Figure 11, also with other data, daily data, for instance, then

8 approximate it would tell us that even though siege was quiet in certain

9 period, civilians were still killed, and in relative terms in higher

10 numbers than in the very active siege periods.

11 So this is why we decided to study low and high days.

12 Q. When you looked -- now, you have talked about the pattern that you

13 see in Figure 11, which is deaths overall go up, ratio goes down; deaths

14 overall go down, ratio goes up. When you divided into low and high day,

15 what kind of a pattern did you see between the overall number of deaths

16 and the ratio of killed civilians to killed soldiers?

17 A. There is a table in the report, Table 18, in which ratios, C to S

18 ratios, are shown for the low days and for the high days. I think it is a

19 good idea to take a look at this table. So for the low days, the days in

20 which less than three deaths were observed, the ratio is 1.6 civilian per

21 one soldier. And for the high days, the days when three or more deaths

22 were observed, the ratio is 0.9 civilians per one soldier. So this is

23 just a beginning, yet another confirmation that what we saw in Figure 11

24 for the months and episodes of the siege is further seen in the daily

25 data.

1 So in order to present an even more complete picture, we studied

2 both the low and high days, and the low and high episodes together. And

3 we made a table in which these ratios are shown from this perspective, and

4 this is Table -- as far as I remember, Table 20.

5 JUDGE HARHOFF: On page?

6 THE WITNESS: But we can also use the slide with -- with some

7 major results from this table, and this is slide 10.

8 MR. DOCHERTY: If we could see an excerpt from Table 20, it's

9 slide number 10.

10 Q. Now, here, Dr. Tabeau, this is a portion of Table 20. It's on

11 page 46 of the English version of the report, and here we see the division

12 into phases that you talked about a minute ago when we were looking at

13 Figure 11. Overall, what pattern do you see between killed civilians and

14 killed soldiers based on this document that is on the screen now?

15 A. Well, if we look -- well, perhaps I will explain table a little

16 bit.

17 As you said, it is an excerpt from Table 20. The absolute numbers

18 of civilians and soldiers are skipped, and what is presented in slide 10

19 is only the values of the ratios, C to S ratios, which is the crucial part

20 of this table. These ratios are shown, first of all, by the phases or

21 episodes of the siege. As I said, there are two high phases, and there

22 are two low phases.

23 So the high phase is, first of all, August to December 1994. This

24 is the first high episode, and the second high is from March to August

25 1995. And then we see in the same table in slide 10, low phases: The

1 first one, January/February 1995; and the second one, September/November

2 1995. So the ratios for the episodes are shown in the last column in this

3 table, which is called "all days," last column.

4 And we see a very consistent result compared with Figure 11

5 discussed a few minutes ago, and with this little table that was number

6 18, which was already discussed. For high episodes, the ratios for high

7 episodes are close to 1. That means for the first high episode, there is

8 1.1 civilians killed per 12 soldier; and for the second high episode,

9 there is exactly 1 civilian killed per 1 soldier.

10 For the low episodes, for January/February 1995, which is the

11 first low episode, the ratio is 3.5 killed civilians per 1 soldier. And

12 for the second low episode, the ratio is 1.7 killed civilian for 1

13 soldier.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. So obviously for the low episodes, the ratios are higher than for

16 the high episodes. This is one remark, first observation, from the data

17 in this table.

18 Now, we can take a look at these ratios -- at the ratios shown for

19 the high and low days. So for every episode there are two additional C to

20 S rations presented here; for instance, for first high phase, which is

21 August/December 1994, we have two additional ratios. One is equal to 1.5

22 and the other one is 0.9. The first one relates to low days; the second

23 one to high days. But we see the ratio for the low days in this

24 particular episode is again higher than the ratio for the high days. And

25 this observation holds for every episode, for all of them. The ratios on

1 the low days are higher than the ratios on the high days.

2 So all in all, it is yet another confirmation of what I said

3 earlier, that obviously in quieter period of the siege, civilians were

4 killed more frequently in relation to soldiers than on the more active

5 episodes of the siege.

6 But the question remains now: What about these very intense

7 periods of the siege? Can't we make the same analysis of the ratios for

8 those as well, and of course we can. So this analysis is available from

9 the report, based on data from Table 21.

10 Table 21 in the report is on page 47 of the English version. This

11 Table contains data, a selection of certain data, that were used in a

12 correlation analysis of the numbers of killed civilians with the number of

13 killed soldiers. What kind of selection is included in Table 21? It is

14 only the high days, that means days with three or more persons killed, in

15 municipality of the Sarajevo Six. So these are selected dates,

16 municipality by municipality, only dates -- this is Table 21, not 20. We

17 are speaking of Table 21 now. Yes.

18 Well, I still don't see Table 21 on my screen. This is Table 20

19 repeated, which is not a correct thing. We should be looking at Table 21,

20 next one. This is why I'm waiting now for the Table. That's right. This

21 is Table 21.

22 This Table contains a selection of dates - this is just one part

23 of the tables. There is another one on the next page - selection of dates

24 where the number of killed persons were three or more by municipality.

25 Numbers of the killed persons are shown by the military status, so

1 civilians and soldiers and unknown status. All these three categories are

2 shown separately.

3 So the observations on the killed civilians -- on the number of

4 number of killed civilians and the number of killed soldiers were used in

5 a correlation analysis. In this analysis, a correlation coefficient was

6 obtained, was calculated, between the number of killed civilians and the

7 number of killed soldiers using this data from Table 21.

8 This is correlation coefficient is a measure within a relationship

9 between these two variables; number of killed civilians and number of

10 killed soldiers.

11 Q. Dr. Tabeau, I need to interrupt at this point. You have been

12 going on for quite sometime about the data, and I think that you have told

13 us that the number of killed civilians is not varying the same way as the

14 killed soldiers and that in fact they are varying in different directions.

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. Okay. If civilians were being killed as a by-product of military

17 activity; that is to say, tragic but unintended consequences of intense

18 fighting, then at the times in Figure 11, when the number of overall

19 deaths goes, up would you expect the number of civilian deaths to go up

20 proportionally or disproportionally?

21 A. I would expect it to go up proportionally, of course. That is the

22 natural expectation one would have [indiscernible] casualties. This how

23 it is usually, although it might differ depending on the military

24 objectives of course.

25 Q. And is that in fact the pattern that you are seeing; more intense

1 activity, proportionally more civilian casualties?

2 A. It is not; it is not. It an inverse relationship in statistical

3 terms. So the increase in one number causes a decline in the other

4 number.

5 Q. And from that inverse pattern, plus all the other data that we

6 have been talking about for the past few minutes, are you able as a

7 statistician to say whether this data sheds any light on question of

8 whether civilians were being deliberately targeted, rather than dying

9 accidently as the tragic but unintended consequence of military activity?

10 A. Yes, I believe I would. Statistically speaking, yes, that is the

11 case. So the very natural question one is asking in such a situation is:

12 Well, if we assume that the number of casualties is a proxy for the number

13 of military activities, in an area, so if there is a lot of activities,

14 the number of casualties should also be higher relatively speaking.

15 But we saw very quiet periods in the siege, but still we saw

16 civilian casualties on these days, or even months, not only days. So I

17 was asking myself, and not only me, other physician my team, how is it

18 possible if there were no military activities or if there were no major

19 military activities that civilians were still dying and we know they were

20 dying of military -- of violent, war-related causes.

21 Moreover, we see this pattern here. Based on a very minimum

22 sample of the data, this analysis has all been done based on the on the

23 absolute minimum numbers. Not corrected. These are the absolute minimum

24 numbers. This is the smallest numbers that were produced in this report.

25 So it's pretty sure that there were more casualties. We don't know how

1 many exactly, but it is 100 per cent sure that there were more casualties.

2 .

3 And we also know that the way we define the status variable, we

4 overestimated the militaries in our definition, not the civilians. So

5 what can be expected is that the pattern is even more dramatic in the

6 quieter periods than what we showed here in this report.

7 Q. I'm going to ask to you take a look at one more slide, and that

8 will be power point slide number 9.

9 A. Table 21, if I can just finish it, the correlation coefficient, or

10 is there no time for this.

11 Q. How about if you tell us what a correlation coefficient is.

12 A. It a measure of association between two variables; in this case,

13 number of civilians and number of soldiers. In case of a perfect

14 correlation, perfect linear association, the correlation coefficient is

15 equal to one; and if is zero, that means there is no relationship between

16 two variables. So the correlation coefficient calculated for Table 21 is

17 0.2, which certainly belongs to lower values measuring the relationship.

18 The relationship is very weak.

19 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, did you want to pursue that?

20 JUDGE HARHOFF: The relation thus, between the number of civilian

21 deaths and the military deaths, is not very strong.

22 THE WITNESS: It is very weak. This what is what I'm saying.

23 Yes. I'm saying this based on the high days analysis.

24 JUDGE HARHOFF: I have a number of questions relating to your

25 method, but I don't want to the Prosecutor so maybe I will hold back my

1 questions until you are finished, or maybe we should pursue my questions

2 relating to the method. At this moment, unless you want to press on to

3 something else, I leave it in your hands.

4 MR. DOCHERTY: It's entirely up to you, Your Honour. I have one

5 more slide, the one on the screen, and then I will be done.

6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Let's have your slide then.

7 MR. DOCHERTY:

8 Q. Dr. Tabeau, on the screen, I have asked for Figure 12.

9 A. I have it. I have it.

10 Q. Now, this seems to -- well, does include a large period of time

11 that precedes the indictment period, and so let's start with the obvious

12 preliminary question. If you as a statistician are asked to analyse

13 statistics from August of 1994 to November 1995, how did does it help you

14 do your work to go back all the way to April of 1992?

15 A. Well, it helps a lot because it gives a broader context to the

16 statistics obtained for this particular case, and it helps to understand

17 better what kind of numbers we have been dealing with here.

18 Q. And on Figure 12a, it looks like - correct me if I'm wrong - the

19 same presentation as if Figure 11?

20 A. That's right.

21 Q. Now, on the left, pre-indictment period, it seems that the purple

22 bars are lower than they are during the indictment period. Am I correct

23 in that?

24 A. Yes, this is very correct. They are lower and the level is more

25 uniform compared with the period after August 1994.

1 Q. And from the greater size and lower uniformity after August of

2 1994, what conclusions do you, as a statistician, draw on the question of

3 deliberate targeting of civilians during the indictment period.

4 A. Well, this is very clear here. When looking at Figure 12a,

5 obviously civilians were killed more frequently in relation to militaries

6 in that period after August 1994. Well, I think for me, as a

7 statistician, I see it as the basis for the statement about the targeting

8 of civilian population.

9 Q. So the inference of targeting of civilians, is it stronger,

10 weaker, the same in the indictment period versus before the indictment

11 period.

12 A. Well, it is obviously stronger, the targeting of civilians in the

13 indictment period than before.

14 MR. DOCHERTY: Judge Harhoff, that is all the questions I have on

15 this topic. Also, I have one document to tender, and then I will be

16 finished my direct examination. We passed out an errata sheet,

17 Mr. President, at the beginning, and it has now been given a 65 ter number

18 and put into e-court. It is 03127A, and I would ask that be admitted into

19 evidence in lieu of having the witness go through her report and verbally

20 make corrections.

21 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Vous allez l'admettrez. [No

22 interpretation]

23 THE REGISTRAR: As P638, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. I remind the Prosecutor

25 that you have 18 minutes left.

1 MR. DOCHERTY: That concludes my direct examination, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Fine.

3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

4 Doctor, as I said, I'm not sure I fully understand the statistical

5 methods that you have applied in order to reach the conclusion that

6 civilians are the deliberate target of attacks.

7 If you look at Figure number 11, it would seem to me -- and can

8 you also in fact look at the picture which is on the screen right now,

9 Figure 12a. In both cases, it seems to me that the number of civilians

10 killed during the period is really relatively stable. It increases while

11 there is increased military activity, and you can see in Figure number 11,

12 the green peak, you have from the months of May 1995 till August 1995 --

13 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, excuse the interruption. Would it be

14 all right if we switched on the screen to Figure 11. We have figure 12a

15 on there now. I'm sorry.

16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Absolutely.

17 But if I, as a non-statistician, were to evaluate this, I would

18 say, Well, it really looks as if there is a relatively stable number of

19 civilian deaths which increases when there is increased military

20 activity. And maybe during those periods, it is true that the number of

21 soldiers relative to the number of killed civilians of course increases,

22 because increased military activity would make soldiers more susceptible

23 to attacks and therefore also to death.

24 This is my problem. This would only make sense if could you

25 compare it with statistical data from other wars, because seen in

1 isolation this tells you nothing. You would have to have a basis for

2 comparison; not only a basis of comparison for other wars in which

3 civilians are killed, but also comparison in terms of -- in terms of

4 military sieges during armed conflict.

5 Let me put to you another interpretation, not that I -- and again,

6 I underline that I have no statistical knowledge or understanding,

7 really. But if I were to say that when there is a military siege of an

8 urban area, then there is a very natural number of deaths occurring among

9 civilians. That goes with the very fact that it is a siege of a civilian

10 area, of a town, or city. And that does not necessarily reflect the

11 intention of the person who is holding the siege to target civilians. One

12 could say it is collateral damage that occurs whenever you have sieges of

13 civilian areas, urban areas.

14 So I'm just reluctant to accept without any further explanation

15 your conclusion that here in this case, in this particular case, civilians

16 were deliberately and specifically targeted. So I wonder if you could

17 help me out on this problem.

18 THE WITNESS: Okay. You address three issues. The first one was

19 additional results from other conflicts or other siege episodes or sieges

20 generally.

21 I think I already presented such data for the first two years of

22 the siege in Sarajevo. Even though it is still the same area, urban area,

23 we saw a very different pattern for the first two years than for the

24 second two years; and, unfortunately, I don't have more results of this

25 kind. I could have made some additional analysis for other episodes of

1 the conflict in Bosnia because I have the sources.

2 But for now we have two results. One is the pattern we see for

3 the indictment period, August 1994 to November 1995; and the second one is

4 April 1992 to July 1994. And, as we see, it is in Figure 12a that these

5 patterns are quite different. I don't think that the circumstances

6 changed in the first two years; and in the second two years of the siege,

7 it was still the same Sarajevo, Sarajevo Six urban area.

8 May I continue or --.

9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Well, yes. You may continue, but could I just

10 kick in one observation. What Figure 12a shows us is that there were more

11 military activity in the first half of the entire period.

12 THE WITNESS: That's right. But still the pattern is relatively

13 stable. If you look at the bars, it is. So that means that the

14 proportion between civilian deaths and military deaths remained more or

15 less stable in the first two years. So that means if we would redo this

16 chart, and if we, one, show the cumulative pattern, I mean the areas, now

17 they are shown on one on the top of the next, but if we could just make a

18 line chart, which I did, then you would see the lines for civilians and

19 military is more or less parallel.

20 It is not the case for the next two years of the siege. The lines

21 would cross, especially in the quieter periods.

22 JUDGE HARHOFF: But would that not be a natural and logical result

23 of the decrease in military activity?

24 THE WITNESS: But why would then civilians be killed if there was

25 no military actions. That is my problem.

1 JUDGE HARHOFF: There was still an armed conflict.

2 THE WITNESS: Yes, of course. If you look at Figure 11, which

3 shows the only the indictment period, then it is pretty obvious that

4 civilian -- civilian deaths can be seen in the entire period. From the

5 very beginning to the end, of course, they increased in the high episodes

6 of the siege, meaning that there should be some deaths that could not be

7 voided, and that means collateral damage.

8 But, generally speaking, I personally have a problem when I know

9 that siege was, say, kind of resting, there were no major war activities

10 going on, but still civilians were killed; and if it comes to causes of

11 wounding, because I have causes of wounding expressed as sniping/shelling,

12 not for killed but I do have causes for the wounded persons, then you see

13 from the causes that these were mainly victims of sniping in the quieter

14 periods. That means people were shot. Why?

15 If you refer to chart -- Figure 23, please, page 57.

16 23, page 37.

17 JUDGE MINDUA: Go ahead.

18 THE WITNESS: This figure shows causes of wounding based on the

19 sample of hospital records of Sarajevo.

20 This is a clear figure, a clear chart. The red line is wounding

21 by sniping; the blue one is wounding by shelling; and the last line, which

22 is I think green or something like that, the dot-like line, is sniping and

23 shelling jointly.

24 So, actually, in the quieter periods, especially February,

25 January/February, but also in the first active period or high period of

1 the siege, that is from August to December 1994, there were quite some

2 wounding caused by sniping.

3 Sniping is there all the time, right? And in addition to sniping

4 victims, we see wounded persons by shelling obviously, mostly in the

5 second high episode, around June 1995, right? So that tells me shelling

6 means major military activities going on, and obviously there were

7 military activities going on, especially in the second high period, which

8 was not the case really earlier, before this episode. But still people

9 were shot by sniper obviously.

10 So that is my reasoning. Well, if you look at these causes and

11 the data, the time pattern in killings that we identified, based on

12 completely different sources, and if we compare these two patterns, time

13 pattern for wounded, time pattern for killed persons, if we calculate the

14 correlation coefficient, the correlation is 0.99, which is almost 1. It

15 is a perfect relationship between two. This tells me that I may think for

16 the killed also about the same causes of the death as for the wounded,

17 because the consistency of these two sources is incredible. It's almost

18 an 1 to 1 correlation.

19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Your figures may appear convincing, yet I am still

20 uncertain as to the conclusions to be drawn from your figures, because I

21 have no basis on which I can compare these figures. If we had before us

22 information from previous military sieges of urban areas, which could

23 provide us with some basis for comparison, I think I would feel more

24 secure. But I'm simply not certain about how to -- how to interpret the

25 information that you are putting to us.

1 I have no idea of what sieges normally imply; but it may well turn

2 out that when you have a military siege of an urban area, then there is

3 inevitably a much higher degree of civilian casualties that you would

4 normally expect in a war; and that then when in addition to the siege,

5 there is then increased military activity, then the figure goes up more

6 for soldiers than it does for civilians; and then finally as long as the

7 siege goes on, and as long as during that siege there is an armed

8 conflict, then civilian casualties are perhaps a, what do I call it, a

9 collateral thing. I have no idea. I accept your figures and they look

10 very convincing. I just don't now how to interpret them.

11 THE WITNESS: If I may comment. Having this experience of so many

12 years of working in the area of conflict statistics, I must admit there

13 are no war episodes which are the same. I don't think there will be

14 another siege, or in Bosnia, there was siege of Mostar. I don't think

15 these two can be compared because all of them is just a unique case of a

16 different situation.

17 This is a very different situation from official statistics and

18 western countries demography, where you can find a lot of similar results;

19 of course, not of this type, but in that other area, that can be compared,

20 that can be studied, and conclusions can be drawn. Conflict analysis is

21 unique. There is nothing like a general picture of a conflict and

22 conflict casualties. All I can say is that I think that we could look, me

23 personally, into the statistics I made for the report, Mostar report, and

24 think about whether or not there is anything similar in these two. But I

25 still believe that the siege of Sarajevo should be seen as a unique case

1 study. This is how it is, unfortunately.

2 JUDGE HARHOFF: I accept that. Thank you very much.

3 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you very much,

4 Witness. I'm now going to give the floor to Defence counsel for-- its

5 cross-examination. You have 12 minutes, I believe, before we adjourn.

6 Cross-examination by Ms. Isailovic:

7 Q. [Interpretation] My name is Branislav Isailovic. I am a member of

8 the Paris Bar Association, and I am one of the lawyers representing Mr.

9 Dragomir Milosevic. I shall give you my point of view which is point of

10 view of a lawyer, not particularly well versed in mathematics, and I would

11 like to address one sole point of your report.

12 I don't have much time so I would like to start off with fairly

13 basic items. Could you confirm that your executive summary is in fact the

14 conclusion of your report; is that right?

15 A. Yes, it is.

16 Q. This is at the beginning, and this indicates it's either the

17 conclusions that you made at the end of your report; is that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. I will start off by the heading or the title of area report, which

20 included the word "siege." On page 1 of your report, if you turn to the

21 footnote, you provide an explanation thereof and you state that you will

22 indicate what a siege means.

23 A. Yes. There is a footnote on this page. Yes.

24 Q. In light of the previous questions that were put to you, from what

25 I understand, the term "siege" is not a word which was used randomly. The

1 term already means something, when you are conducting this kind of survey,

2 in light of your expertise.

3 A. Well, we didn't use it as a random term, because this is a term

4 that was commonly used.

5 Q. I didn't use -- I said it wasn't chosen by chance; in other words,

6 the meaning is contained in it already. When you use the word "siege" and

7 you use it as a title in your report, this already presupposes a certain

8 meaning?

9 A. Well, as I explained in the footnote, it is used here to describe

10 the presence of an armed conflict in Sarajevo in that time and blockade as

11 well. And that's all. I think I didn't attach any other meanings to this

12 word.

13 Q. From what you said, this doesn't only have to do with the presence

14 of an armed conflict but of blockade as well?

15 A. Yes, this is what it says in the footnote. Yes.

16 Q. So where do you draw this conclusion, the fact that there was a

17 blockade. Where do you draw this from?

18 A. Where did I draw this conclusion? I think from the many readings

19 I did about the siege of Sarajevo, and that there were difficulties with

20 providing international aid to the population of Sarajevo, that there was

21 a shortage of food, that there was a shortage of medicines. I have read

22 several reports, among others, by Physicians Without Borders. I think

23 this are my sources for the term "blockade."

24 Q. Given that your expert's report was commissioned by the

25 Prosecutor, it wasn't the Prosecutor that gave you the information or that

1 determined the title. The Prosecutor did not suggest the title, did it?

2 A. No, they didn't. It was the title we proposed for the report.

3 And, well, this is not my first report relating to Sarajevo, so I think I

4 have some expertise in this area.

5 Q. The siege which you review in your report, how important is it

6 when you draw your conclusions?

7 A. Well, I don't think I understand the question, that you mean that

8 the presence of an armed conflict, how important it was for -- to the

9 conclusions?

10 Q. No. Let me spell this out a little bit. Sometimes difficult to

11 understand each other when we don't speak the same language.

12 Now, in your title, you use the expression "siege of Sarajevo."

13 This is what you indicate in the title of your report. So this does have

14 an impact on the conclusion you are to draw at the end of your expert

15 report. Is that right?

16 A. I don't think that the title can have any impact on the

17 conclusions. The conclusions are the results from this research project

18 and from the analysis of our sources. And, well, when proposing the

19 title, we hoped to be clear and specific about what is this report about.

20 And, as I'm saying, the siege is the presence of an armed conflict in the

21 Sarajevo area in this period.

22 Q. Precisely. I would like to pick up on this answer of yours. Your

23 research project could have be entitled the dead and the wounded during

24 the conflict that unfolded in Sarajevo area. Could that have been a title

25 for your report?

1 A. Yes, certainly. Yes.

2 Q. Now, as I have very little time left, I would like to address the

3 sources you have used. And in your report, right at the beginning of your

4 report, from what I understood, there are two conflicts statistics and

5 official statistics. In other words, you made the difference between the

6 two, to begin with. Could you explain to us what difference there is

7 between these two statistical methods.

8 A. Well, I think this is a very good question, and official

9 statistics usually are based on well established and complete sources. If

10 not complete sources, then they are based on samples of which we know how

11 large and how representative they are. So official statistics is a very

12 different area from what we are able to present for -- in the conflict

13 statistics. Even in countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is

14 absolutely exceptional source-wise, compared with other conflicts, I mean

15 there are many sources, some relatively reliable and relatively complete,

16 others less reliable, less complete, and some are really very bad as well,

17 but source-wise Bosnia is very exceptional.

18 Having said that, I still must admit it is not possible to produce

19 complete statistics based on high quality complete sources. And this is

20 the difference. We have to look at this report and at the statistics,

21 keeping this in mind. The numbers are incomplete for many reasons, and of

22 samples we often don't know how representative they are. But, still, we

23 can use these samples, like the hospital records, knowing by comparison

24 that the patterns obtained from this sample, samples, are very consistent

25 with other results based on better sources. We can still go ahead with

1 these kind of less complete sources.

2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Ms. Isailovic. It is

4 now quarter to 2.00. We shall now adjourn and resume at tomorrow at 8.00.

5 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I am sorry, because we addressed

6 this issue in the presence of Judge Robinson, what about motion 98 bis? I

7 don't think we are going to wrap this up to tomorrow. I was able to get a

8 reply from my colleague. Does this mean we shall address this issue, on

9 Thursday morning, i.e., the 98 motion?

10 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] I think we shall proceed the way we

11 intended and hear the last witness, and then we will have the break, and

12 we will start at 8.00 tomorrow morning, and then have the 98 bis motion.

13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] This is important. I need to pass

14 on the information to Mr. Tapuskovic. I shall be questioning the witness.

15 So we will start tomorrow; is that right? Yes, indeed.

16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. The Court stands

17 adjourned.

18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

19 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 2nd day of May,

20 2007, at 8.00 a.m.

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