1 Thursday, 5 July 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before the witness makes a declaration, let me
7 just say that, Mr. Tapuskovic, in relation to the experts that you propose
8 to bring to testify, you, of course, have to abide by the requirement for
9 30 days' notice. And, of course the Trial Chamber will also need time to
10 assess the report and the Prosecution response. So this is going to
11 require a minimum of one week per report. The Defence should therefore
12 aim to file its notification no later than the 13th of July. The 30 days
13 from that would take us to the 13th of August, and if that is so, then,
14 the experts would be ready to testify the last week of the sitting, which
15 is the 20th of August.
16 So I just ask you to bear that in mind.
17 Let the witness make the declaration.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
19 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
20 WITNESS: ANDREI DEMURENKO
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.
23 And you may begin, Mr. Tapuskovic.
24 Examination by Mr. Tapuskovic:
25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
1 But I have to inform you first that we are assisted today by Marko
2 Momcilovic, an assistant in our team. He is actually a language assistant
3 enabling us to communicate with the witness if that should be required.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks for telling us and we are glad to have
6 Please commence.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Witness, good afternoon.
9 I appear as Defence counsel for the accused, Dragomir Milosevic,
10 as you are already aware. You don't need more details. We have been in
11 touch over the past few days in proofing that took several hours.
12 Could you now please introduce yourself to the Chamber?
13 A. My name is Andrei Demurenko.
14 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell the Chamber your date of birth?
15 A. I was born on the 28th of April, 1955.
16 Q. Could you briefly tell the Judges about your educational
17 background and your specialised training, just an outline.
18 A. With pleasure. After graduating from high school, I enrolled in
19 an army school, in Moscow, following a four-year course, and after several
20 years of command duty in the army, I went to the Frunze Academy, Military
21 Academy. I also attended an American US staff college. I have a science
22 degree and I am an a Ph.D., actually, and I'm one of the military experts
23 on a US NATO commission. My Ph.D. Is in military science.
24 Q. Thank you. Could you tell the Judges, as a military man, before
25 you became a member of the UN mission to Bosnia whether you served in
1 another military mission elsewhere?
2 A. No, I only served in the Soviet army and, after that, in the army
3 of the Russian Federation.
4 Q. Could you then tell us briefly about your service in the armed
5 forces of the Russian Federation, what duties did you discharge there,
6 what posts did you occupy?
7 A. I am a general army commander, that is, a commander that can exert
8 command duty over all branches of service. I was platoon commander,
9 company commander, battalion commander. I was Chief of Staff in a
10 regiment. Then over two and a half years I commanded a regiment in the
11 Far East on the Chinese border. Following that, I was a senior officer in
12 the operations headquarters of the armed services of the Russian
13 Federation, in the General Staff.
14 Q. Could you tell the Judges if you are specialised or have
15 particular knowledge about a certain kind of weapon?
16 A. Naturally I am familiar with the entire arsenal that was at the
17 disposal of the units that I just enumerated in my previous answer. All
18 the infantry weaponry, all the artillery, including 155-millimetre
19 Howitzers and machine-guns of all calibres, 62 -- sorry, 60, 82,
20 120-millimetres, tanks, APCs, the entire arsenal briefly that the Russian
21 army had at the tactical level, that is, the level of division. I'm
22 perfectly familiar with all these weapons.
23 Q. Could you tell the Judges whether that weaponry used by the
24 Russian Federation was similar to the arsenal used by the former Yugoslav
25 peoples army?
1 A. Without a doubt. As we well know, the Yugoslavia army used
2 Soviet-produced weaponry, delivered by the Soviet Union with the exception
3 of certain infantry weapons. All that was used in the battlefields of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, I mean the warring parties, of course, was perfectly
5 familiar to me.
6 Q. Mr. Demurenko, when you arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, what
7 rank did you hold in the Russian army?
8 A. I was a colonel when I arrived -- I'm sorry, the brief answer is I
9 was a colonel.
10 Q. And when did you arrive in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a member of
11 the UN mission?
12 A. It was in the first decade of January 1995.
13 Q. Could you tell the Judges when you served there in the UNPROFOR
14 what were your duties? What was your job in that context?
15 A. I was Chief of Staff for the Sarajevo Sector. That was the name
16 of my post. As you know, the Chief of Staff is the first deputy of the
17 commander in any army, practically I was the first deputy commander for
18 the Sarajevo Sector. My responsibilities included practically the same
19 duties as those of the commander, decision taking, issuing orders,
20 verifying the execution of orders and tasks issued by the commanding staff
21 of the United Nations.
22 Q. While we are at -- on your background, just tell us how long did
23 you stay in Sector Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
24 A. Practically one year, from January until almost the end of
25 December. Almost an entire year. December 1995, of course.
1 Q. Let me just ask you: When did you finish your military career?
2 A. I retired from the Russian army in December 1997.
3 Q. Could you tell the Judges what that means. What is your current
4 occupation? Does it mean that you are retired?
5 A. Precisely. I retired from the army and I am now in the status of
6 reserve colonel. I'm still on the mobilisation list in the Russian
7 Federation in case of mobilisation, but I'm now a civilian and I work as
8 director of a shipping wharf.
9 Q. I think it is my duty to ask you this: How many years did you
10 serve in the army, briefly?
11 A. Well, very briefly, around 26 years, from 1972 to 1997.
12 Q. Were you retired for a particular reason? Why did you withdraw
13 from the army; could you tell us?
14 A. It is a bit personal rather than for professional reasons.
15 Everything was fine as far as my professional service was concerned, but
16 one reason that convinced me it was time to retire was this: Throughout
17 my career, I was a successful officer with three degrees in military
18 science. I was promoted very quickly through the ranks. However, in the
19 General Staff I could not be promoted to general although it was only one
20 step away for one simple reason.
21 Conservative views prevail in the Russian army to such an extent
22 that a person who graduated from an American Military Academy and could
23 potentially propagate American views absolutely cannot receive the rank of
24 general, and that is why I retired.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Demurenko. I think that will suffice in terms of
1 your background. And it will suffice for the further line of my
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Tapuskovic, before you go into the
5 examination-in-chief, I would like, if you could assist us in establishing
6 the witness's expertise. I think the witness said that he was an expert
7 in military science, but I would be interested in knowing which field of
8 military science.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Judge Harhoff, I, as
10 Defence counsel did not call this witness as an expert, but I appreciate
11 your question and I will ask it of the witness. That is why I tried to
12 elicit his background in the army. But I can ask it directly as well.
13 Q. What do you know, for instance, about artillery weapons? Was it
14 in any way related to your activities?
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you meant the
16 part of the witness's answer when he said he had a Ph.D., I can ask him in
17 what field he has a Ph.D. He said military science.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Previous translation continues] ...
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Witness, Mr. Demurenko, could you please try to answer Judge
21 Harhoff's question. What is the exact field of your Ph.D.?
22 A. Certainly. I have a master of arts degree or a master of -- or a
23 BS in political science. I was the first in Russia who defended a thesis
24 on the topic of use of armed forces in peace keeping operations, and I can
25 also tell you about my knowledge concerning artillery.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you, Mr. Witness. I was just interested in
2 finding out if you had any particular expertise or knowledge about some of
3 the things that you will be questioned about. But there's no need to go
4 further into this, and I kindly ask Mr. Tapuskovic to continue.
5 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tapuskovic, please, quickly,
6 Witness, you said that you left the army because a promotion would be
7 almost impossible because you had been to a Military Academy in the
8 States. If that is the tradition in the army of your country, not to
9 promote anyone who has been to a US Military Academy, I would like to know
10 who sent you there to study and why you accepted to actually go there?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will answer with pleasure.
12 During the so-called Perestroika time-period afterwards, Russia
13 started establishing very actively international relations and at the time
14 the two presidents agreed at the highest level to have exchange of
15 scholars, specialists in order to have good scientific cooperation in the
16 field. I turned out to be the first and the last officer who, in the
17 whole history of Russia over the past several hundred years was admitted
18 to a US staff college, completed it successfully and then returned back
19 to -- hoping and I returned with gratitude, feeling great gratitude to the
20 United States, hoping that I would be able to use what I had learned and
21 experienced in the US.
22 Unfortunately, the relations between the two countries changed for
23 the worse. The mentality of Russian generals in the Ministry of Defence
24 did not keep up with the democratic changes in the country. So the idea
25 was a very good one, but its implementation unfortunately, the situation
1 was not ripe for its implementation. I don't know, perhaps in 10 or 12
2 years the Russian army will be prepared to nurture its generals in the
3 western countries.
4 At the time there were not ready to do that in my case. I was
5 told this personally by a very high military official in the Russian
6 Federation. Unfortunately, I cannot tell you his name right now, but he
7 told me this personally.
8 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Demurenko, let us now go into the substance. Let me ask you
11 this first. While you served in Bosnia-Herzegovina in your position there
12 from January to October 1995, did you ever get to meet General Dragomir
14 A. Until December. I served until December.
15 Q. Yes, yes, you're quite right.
16 So please tell me, during one year that you were there, did you
17 ever meet General Dragomir Milosevic?
18 A. No, we did not meet.
19 Q. You said earlier that you were Chief of Staff of Sector Sarajevo.
20 Thus, I'd like to show the UNPROFOR map to you, 2829.
21 Mr. Demurenko, could you please show us the building or, rather,
22 the location where your staff was headquartered in Sarajevo Sector. If
23 you can circle that location, please, and put a letter S there.
24 A. [Marks].
25 Q. Can you tell us the area of responsibility, the area that you had
1 under your control, the area for which you were responsible. What did
2 that encompass? Which parts of Sarajevo?
3 A. The area of responsibility of Sarajevo Sector included the area
4 shown on the map and even broader than that. I can tell you, looking at
5 the map that everything that was inside the confrontation lines, that is
6 to say, the city of Sarajevo itself, plus the outlying area, extending 10
7 to 15, up to 20 kilometres, all of that was included in our area of
8 responsibility, and I was a Chief of Staff or the first deputy of the
9 commander for Sector Sarajevo, and naturally all of that territory was
10 included in my area of responsibility.
11 Q. I have shown this map to you previously, and I, at the time, did
12 not make any suggestions to you. Is that correct?
13 I wish to ask you this. You see that there is a red line here and
14 a yellow line. Do you understand what they stand for?
15 A. Naturally. This is the front end of defence or the forward end of
16 defence, as we call it in the military, of the two warring sides. The
17 yellow line is the BiH army line, and the red line is that of the army of
18 Republika Srpska.
19 Q. Could it be said that the entire territory inside the yellow line
20 was under the control of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
21 A. Undoubtedly, yes. Yes, that's how it was.
22 Q. Does this mean -- I do not wish to go into details and give names
23 for each of these locations but does this mean that each location inside
24 this line was under the control of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
25 A. Yes, I can confirm that, once again, and I can give you the
1 location names, Mojmilo, Zuc, Grbavica, everything lying within the yellow
2 line was under the control of the BH army, and I personally went to
3 inspect this.
4 Q. You mentioned Grbavica. Who had Grbavica under their control?
5 Under whose control was Grbavica? You mentioned Grbavica as well, but
6 please look at the lines. Are you sure that Grbavica was under the
7 control of the BH army?
8 A. No, I wasn't accurate enough when it comes to the names of
9 locations. I practically know this map by heart. What I wanted to say is
10 that everything shown on the map, all of these names that can be seen on
11 the map, was something that was within my area of responsibility. I
12 didn't claim that Grbavica was under the control of the BH army.
13 What I'm say something that everything inside the yellow line was
14 under the control of the BH army and everything shown on this map was
15 within the area of responsibility of my forces, of the UN Sarajevo
16 Sector. The reason why I mentioned Grbavica is that there was a Russian
17 Battalion stationed there. They belonged to the UN forces and, naturally,
18 I visited them.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I tender this map
20 marked as it is now into evidence as Defence exhibit.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: We admit it.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As D285, Your Honours.
23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Demurenko, you have already told the Judges that you came to
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina in January of 1995. Could you please tell the
1 Chamber how it was at the time when you arrived, what happened during the
2 first few months of your stay. Would you be able to describe it to the
3 Judge, please? Naturally, I ask you to focus on what you personally
4 observed first and foremost.
5 A. It was winter time, and it turned to be quite a peculiar period of
6 time in Sarajevo, because regardless of the fact that there was cease-fire
7 in force, from time to time several times a day and particularly at night,
8 one could hear shots fired from infantry weapons.
9 If you are interested in the daily life in the city, then I can
10 tell you that I was somewhat surprised by the slow, even-paced life of the
11 citizens in the city. Naturally, they were anxious because of the fact
12 that the town was under siege, but they also had a bit of ambivalent
13 attitude, blunted attitude toward life. Let me give you an example.
14 There was a French Battalion within the UN contingent and they went out to
15 clean the streets. The residents refused to clean trash and rubbish from
16 the streets and the French soldiers went out to do it for them. So this
17 is just an example of people from the outside doing what the local
18 residents should be doing.
19 As for the military activity, there was practically none during
20 winter time. The activity, if I can call it, in quotation marks, boiled
21 down to sporadic shooting and occasional explosion. This wouldn't happen
22 more frequently than once or twice a week. The information arriving from
23 military monitors and UN observation posts indicated that those explosions
24 were a result of mortar shells, but the majority of them were caused by
25 improvised devices, which were manufactured by warring sides in an amateur
1 way. And for us, officers of modern armies, that would be ridiculous had
2 it not caused bloodshed and tears. They would, for example, take a
3 barrel, fill it up with gas or with petrol and then they would use a
4 simple cloth to -- simple rag to close it off and then they would detonate
5 it, detonate the fuse --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- with matches and then they would
8 roll it to the side held by the enemy.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm not fond of this narrative approach. I don't
10 know where this is going to end. Put a specific question to the witness
11 so we can have a specific answer.
12 You speak of they detonating. Who is "they," Witness?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was simply speaking about this
14 pseudo military activity of these handmade devices.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Who would be -- who are the persons who would be
16 carrying out those actions? Would it be members of the ABiH or the Serb
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Our information pointed to the fact
19 that both sides resorted to this, not very often. As I told you, this was
20 once a week, but we heard these explosions. We registered them and they
21 were caused by both sides.
22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Demurenko, Your Honour, may I
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, you may continue.
25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. When you said just now that the town was under siege and then also
2 describe your area of responsibility, the area that was under your
3 control, if we were to look at this map and at the red line, you mentioned
4 Grbavica earlier. But how about Nedzarici? Can you please explain what
5 you meant by mentioning these locations and by mentioning the siege. Who
6 was under siege in that territory that you had under your control?
7 A. I wouldn't want to give you specific names of settlements and
8 details about the activity there, because I'm not sure that I could give
9 you an accurate picture of what happened 12 years ago. But as for the
10 map, let me repeat once again. The army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
11 inside. They defended the forward defence lines which are the positions
12 marked with yellow. In addition to the forward defence lines there were
13 also units of the BH army that were in reserve. They were either taking
14 rest or they were rotating and going to the forward defence lines.
15 As for the red lines, those were the forward defence lines of the
16 army of Republika Srpska. There is nothing else to add to this. I would
17 rather not use the names of geographic locations.
18 Q. I agree with you, but if we were to look at the location where the
19 Russian Battalion was stationed, which was Grbavica, can you tell us about
20 its geographic position or can you tell us something about Nedzarici. You
21 know very well where Nedzarici is located. What was their geographic
23 A. I apologise, I did not receive interpretation.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you repeat the question, Mr. Tapuskovic.
25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Demurenko, you know where this area of Sarajevo is located,
3 A. Russian Battalion was not in Nedzarici. It was in Grbavica. The
4 Russian Battalion was station -- was billeted in the former barracks of
5 the Yugoslavia peoples army or something resembling it. I'm not quite
6 familiar with the history of that building. It was just a typical --
7 those were typical premises for billeting, and around it they had
8 observation posts and areas that they patrolled. That's all that I can
9 tell you.
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Demurenko. We've been speaking Russian over the
11 past few days and I seem to have forgotten my native language.
12 What I asked you had to do with the location of Grbavica, where
13 the Russian Battalion was stationed. Do you remember what two features,
14 geographic features were important when it comes to Grbavica? Or perhaps
15 if you don't remember, we can drop the subject.
16 A. My only memory about the location of the Russian Battalion in
17 Grbavica was that it was particularly disadvantageous, extremely
18 unfavourable. I don't know who decided to choose that location, but it
19 was a very unfortunate choice, because from the side of the Sarajevo, in
20 fact from both sides there were dominating hills overlooking the
21 headquarters of the battalion, which put the soldiers of the Russian
22 Battalion in an unfavourable position vis-a-vis those who were shooting,
23 including those from the Bosnian side.
24 Q. Mr. Demurenko, if we could complete your story about the initial
1 How would you describe those first months in terms of what you
2 have seen, and how long would you say that initial period lasted?
3 A. Taking into account the comment of the Honourable Judge, I will
4 try to refrain from a narrative and emotional description.
5 It was a period of stagnant confrontation. It was not a military
6 confrontation in the standard sense of the word. There was standard
7 shooting -- sporadic shooting without particular targets or missions.
8 Before April, none of the sides undertook any tactical movements.
9 Q. Now you mention April. How far into April did this stretch?
10 A. Beginning with the first week of April, intensity increasing day
11 by day, the activity of both sides was on the rise, in terms of intensity
12 of shooting, movement of troops along the forward line, in terms of the
13 fierceness of exchanges of fire. If we were to draw a chart, it would be
14 a steadily rising line, peaking in June.
15 At any rate, the military activity of the warring parties steadily
16 increased, beginning with April.
17 Q. Thank you. Mr. Demurenko, did something unusual happen in May,
18 and, if so, could you describe it to the Judges?
19 A. Apart from the intensified activity of the warring parties and the
20 air-strike and rocket strikes against Serbian targets, I don't seem to
21 recall anything much. My most vivid memory from that period was from
22 June, when, as a result of an ABH attack, a Russian observation post was
23 occupied and it was my task to take it back.
24 Q. Now you mention this, could you describe it in greater detail.
25 Whose operation was that?
1 A. Speaking in military lingo, it's at the tactical level. An
2 operation begins with the operational level. It was a battle. The local
3 attack of the BH army along a southward direction, starting approximately
4 from their forward line as shown on the map, towards the location occupied
5 by the Russian platoon, the distance was three kilometres and it was
6 exposed to fire from both sides and for reasons we could not understand, a
7 company strength unit around 50, 60 men strong unit of the BH army
8 attacked, crossed that area, they overcame, overran a platoon strong unit
9 of the UN from the Russian contingent creating an incident, as a result of
10 which I had to take urgent measures to solve this problem.
11 The methods were standard. On one hand, one had to ensure the
12 support of the UNPROFOR command and commission the necessary number of
13 APCs to get to the forward line under fire. Then, I had to resolve with
14 the leadership, at least of the 1st corps of the BH army and the
15 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps on the Serb side, to cease-fire so that I could
16 take back my soldiers without any casualties, and what is remarkable is
17 that I succeeded. After certain telephone calls among the leadership,
18 they agreed to cease-fire for 30 minutes.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute, please.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, what will be the relevance of
22 this evidence of the ABiH occupying a Russian observation post and the
23 post being retaken by the witness?
24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, he cited an example
25 and he first mentioned that offensive and the combat operations that
1 started in June. I would just like to go through a few more questions
2 before I take him back to what happened in June and July. He described
3 one operation and then we shall see what actually happened, who initiated
4 the combat in June and July and I don't want to suggest any answer to the
5 witness, but the idea of the Defence is to show what the combat operations
6 looked like, especially in May, June, July, August, and through to the end
7 of the conflict.
8 Now, for what reason, I have explained already more than once. It
9 is our case that many things depended on operations initiated by the BH
10 army and that is why I want to take the witness back to the incident which
11 I believe is very important as a part of his testimony.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi.
13 MR. WAESPI: Yes, good afternoon Mr. President.
14 For what it's worth the Prosecution has no objection for this
15 background information to come in, rather than I'm more hesitant to allow
16 the Defence to kind of again, argue his case almost in a closing argument
17 in front of the witness.
18 So the Prosecution has no objections to this background
19 information to be led.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I'm grateful to you for that, but it's the
21 Chamber that will decide.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: The Chamber will not allow any more evidence on
24 this matter to be given. The Chamber does not consider the evidence to be
1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honours, am I allowed
2 to ask him at all what happened in June and July 1995?
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: As long as it is relevant, yes. As long as it is
4 relevant. We have ruled that evidence about the taking of the Russian
5 observation post by the ABiH and its retaking by the witness is not
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Witness, you cited this example and we now have to abide by the
9 ruling of the Chamber, no contest.
10 What else happened in June and July? You told us about one
11 operation. But what about the other combat activities that escalated in
12 June, as you said?
13 A. Truth to tell, there was no other activity apart from the
14 activities of the warring parties in the period of June, July and August.
15 The activity of the warring parties intensified steadily, but they were
16 static in nature. There were no major movements of troops. It was trench
17 war mainly. At that moment it was increasingly important, in view of the
18 situation to increasingly use artillery weapons that was somehow taken
19 from heavy weaponry depots. And that, to a lesser or greater degree,
20 contributed to increased activities and increased casualties in that
22 It was civil war, trench war. Apart from that, I have nothing to
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Excuse me, Colonel. What do you mean by civil
25 war? That was the translation. But I didn't understand the meaning of
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand a civil war to mean
3 exactly what it is defined as in the dictionary. There was no outside
4 attack on Yugoslavia. Warring sides that used to be citizens of one and
5 the same country started fighting each other, and these groups differed in
6 ethnicity and confession. On the Bosnian side, I saw not only one
7 religion, and among the Serbs as well I saw members of different
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: You certainly mean -- or do you mean fighting by
10 combatants in the military sense of that word -- in the legal sense of
11 that word?
12 Thank you.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, correct.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. You just said something about casualties. Did you tour the area
19 at the time of the conflict, at the time of fierce fighting, and what kind
20 of casualties are you referring to?
21 A. In the course of military operations and sporadic exchanges of
22 fire, I saw both dead and wounded. Actually, I didn't see them in the
23 street, in the battlefield. I didn't run across them in the street
24 because my duties were mainly at the headquarters, but I saw them in field
25 hospitals and other locations on the forward defence lines. A wounded
1 soldier, a civilian is usually taken to the hospital at the defence line.
2 I saw wounded on both sides.
3 Q. Did you visit hospitals on both sides?
4 A. I did not go on purpose to visit hospitals, but occasionally I was
5 forced to go there. For example, there was a small French hospital was in
6 the UNPROFOR forces and they provided emergency assistance to the wounded
7 soldiers of the BH army before turning them over to Sarajevo hospitals,
8 and on those occasions, and on those occasions -- on one of those cases I
9 saw a surgeon operate on a BH army soldier. Occasionally I would visit
10 hospitals, not because I wanted to visit a wounded, but during my tours --
11 during one of my tours, I saw a Serb being carried on a stretcher and I
12 couldn't tell you whether he was a resident of a local village or what. I
13 just saw that he was wounded, and they -- that he was wounded and that he
14 was carried away. But I couldn't tell you whether he was a civilian or a
16 Q. Did you visit a hospital in Lukavica?
17 A. Yes, that's what I was just telling you about. That was the case
18 I just told you about.
19 As we were passing by Lukavica, I saw a wounded man being taken to
20 the Lukavica hospital, and after seeing that, I entered the hospital and I
21 was able to see for myself that in the hospital they provided treatment,
22 medical assistance, to this wounded Serb. That's what I saw with my own
24 I saw similar cases on the Bosnian side. I saw both wounded and
25 dead being taken to medical institutions.
1 Q. Just one more question concerning that. When you entered that
2 hospital and when you saw that wounded man, were there any other wounded
3 persons in the hospital?
4 A. If you're referring to the hospital in Lukavica, then, yes, there
5 were other wounded people there. I saw them in beds. And if you're
6 referring to the French hospital, which was located near my headquarters,
7 then I can tell you that I saw one soldier being operated on. However,
8 based on reports and briefings I know that there were many similar cases.
9 This was just a typical case of assistance to one of the wounded BH
10 soldiers. That was a typical case.
11 Q. Witness, you are familiar with the event which took place on the
12 28th of August, 1995. It is usually referred to as Markale 2. Have you
13 heard of this event?
14 A. Yes, yes, I'm quite familiar with that. I personally participated
15 in investigating the incident. That's correct.
16 Q. Mr. Demurenko, first of all, I'd like to ask you about something
17 that preceded that incident.
18 On that day, on the 28th of August, 1995, when were you informed
19 about that event?
20 A. The operations centre, the operations centre which was located in
21 our headquarters was on line and gathering information about the activity
22 of the warring sides. Several minutes after the Markale incident,
23 observation posts were informed about that. The information arrived at
24 the operations centre, a standard type of report was prepared there, and
25 through -- or, rather, within a 30-minute period of time, it was already
1 on the table of the sector commander, Chief of Staff and other deputies.
2 Q. Do you remember anything about the time. What were you told about
3 when that had happened? What did they tell you? Approximately,
5 A. This was not a verbal report. As I told you, we had a written
6 report, hard copy report on the desks. Just after taking a glance at the
7 report, it became clear to me that this was not an ordinary case of
8 shelling, because there was a large number of casualties. A figure of
9 several tens of casualties was mentioned. This number was such that it
10 required immediate action.
11 Q. While you were there at the headquarters, did you have to do
12 something after receiving this kind of information?
13 A. In accordance with my duties, my official duties, my level was
14 such that it did not require me to do anything special. UNPROFOR, just
15 like other peace keeping forces, UNPROFOR forces acted in accordance with
16 the standard operating procedures that I was quite familiar with, due to
17 my American schooling. Based on standard operating procedures, after any
18 incident causing casualties, units or brigades begin initial
19 investigation. Thus, I wasn't duty-bound to jump from my chair and run
20 into town to see what had happened. I knew that standard operating
21 procedures were already in place, steps were already taken at the time
22 when I received the written report on my desk.
23 Q. Could you please tell Their Honours when you arrived at the site,
24 what time it was?
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute.
1 Mr. Waespi is on his feet.
2 MR. WAESPI: Yes, just an observation. I don't think the witness
3 said that he went to the site.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you go to the site?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that I didn't jump
6 immediately and run to the site because I was the Chief of Staff.
7 However, I did go to the site two hours later.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Carry on.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. So you went to the site of the incident. Did you do anything
11 yourself at the time?
12 A. Yes. Upon arriving there, I observed the crater of the impact. I
13 saw that the experts were there working at the site. I saw blood on the
14 pavement, on the street. I made an initial observation of the causes --
15 or, rather, consequences of this attack, of this shell landing there.
16 Following that, I gave instructions to the UNPROFOR members working at the
17 site, and then I went back to the headquarters in order to prepare
18 appropriate orders.
19 Q. Could you please tell the Judges whether upon your return back to
20 the headquarters you learned anything else about the event itself?
21 A. Yes, I did learn the following, something that actually shocked
23 Upon my return to the headquarters, I learned that the
24 spokesperson of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina who I think was a
25 British lieutenant-colonel, organised speedily a press conference where he
1 said something that was unacceptable. Actually illegal. The spokesman
2 said that this was just another example of an atrocity and a crime
3 committed by Serbian army and that they need to be punished and condemned
4 as the enemies of humanity. This was completely groundless. There were
5 absolutely no grounds for him to state something like, because nobody
6 could say something like that before the investigation was concluded.
7 What he did was actually an act of provocation.
8 Q. So how much time elapsed from the event until you heard that this
9 was stated? How much time elapsed between that and your return to the
11 A. Yes, I understood your question.
12 As I have told you, I went to the site two hours after it had
13 taken place. I spent there some 30 minutes working. It took me another
14 30 minutes to arrive back at the headquarters, and upon my arrival there,
15 I heard that there had been this statement made, which is to say that the
16 statement was made two to two and a half hours after the incident. This
17 man took it upon himself to state something that he had no right to state.
18 Q. Mr. Demurenko, did additional information arrive in the course of
19 the day, be it officially or unofficially?
20 A. It was not my duty to collect official information. However, the
21 required documents were on my desk, were put on my desk. Namely, those
22 were the results of this initial investigation.
23 What kind of documents were those? Those were two reports, if I
24 can remember well. The first one was a report made by a Dutch officer who
25 was a ballistics trajectory expert. The second report was produced by a
1 ballistic expert who was either a Croat or an expert from Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina. This is something that you can easily verify if you look in
3 the records.
4 Something very simple was stated there. They established the
5 angle of approach, of descent at the time the shell reached the surface.
6 It was a very important document, which allowed us to proceed with the
7 investigation, to go further with it.
8 Q. Please tell me, under the circumstances, upon receiving these two
9 reports, did you speak to anyone who was your superior? At the time who
10 was your superior?
11 A. At the time General Bachelet was my commander. He replaced
12 General Gobillard there, some month and a half earlier. I went to see him
13 with a briefing, where I proposed to head myself an investigation group,
14 because it was absolutely inappropriate not to do anything similar, given
15 what a tragic event had taken place, and he gave me his consent. He
16 okayed it.
17 Q. And what did you do?
18 A. I proceeded to investigate, to organise an investigation. I had
19 to gather a working group of experts who were to assist me in my work. I
20 was to collect all existing documents, including those reports that I have
21 mentioned. The investigation itself -- or, rather, the work of the
22 investigation itself was not a complicated one. This is something that
23 had been done many times in the past.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. I'd like to ask you, Witness,
25 whether it was normal procedure for a person in your position to propose
1 that you yourself would head an investigation into this matter.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I can give you my answer.
3 It was not a typical, standard procedure. In each sectors there
4 were groups that normally undertook such investigation. However, given
5 the number of casualties -- and their number increased hour by hour.
6 Initially we were told a couple of dozen casualties and then within an
7 hour the numbers grew to 30 dead and 70 wounded and then within the next
8 hour that in turn increased to 50 and 80, respectively. At the end the
9 figure quoted was 120. Given the consequences, I thought that it required
10 a non-standard approach, and I took it upon myself to head this
12 It is true normally that such investigations are typically headed
13 by a captain or a major, not by a colonel. It is true.
14 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, you said that after the
15 event the UNPROFOR spokesperson, a British officer, made a statement
16 which, according to you, was illegal. Given your position, you were head
17 of staff, I would like to know if you had punished this British officer or
18 if somebody within the chain of command had taken measures against this
19 person to show that he had actually committed a mistake.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, he was not my
21 subordinate. I need to explain this to you. There were two staffs in
22 Sarajevo. There was a large staff which was the UNPROFOR command for the
23 entire Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then there was also Sector Sarajevo,
24 which represented only a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I was Chief of
25 Staff of Sarajevo Sector, and this spokesman worked for the entire
1 UNPROFOR command for Bosnia and Herzegovina. His superior was General
2 Rupert Smith; therefore, I was not able to punish somebody who was not my
4 As for him being punished at all, I know nothing about that.
5 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] So you don't know if he was ever
6 punished, right?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know anything about that,
8 correct. Perhaps he was promoted.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Demurenko, I wanted to use a different approach, but given
11 what you said about seeing two reports on that day which prompted you to
12 take certain measures, as you described to us, I would now like to show
13 something else. I would like you to focus on this now. I will show you a
14 document dated on that day which was sent to Mr. Kofi Annan. Same date
15 document. This is Exhibit D00-D10 [As translated].
16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please bring it up on
17 the screen.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll take the break now and have a look at the
19 document when we return.
20 --- Recess taken at 3.43 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 4.06 p.m.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Mr. Demurenko, you will now see a document, D00-10. If you
25 please, would you like at page 1 first of the English version, because you
1 speak English. It's a document from August 1995.
2 Look at the heading to see who is sending this document, the
3 source of this document, which officer. Towards the top, you see "from,"
4 and then the name of the person. It says August 1995 and then in the next
5 line it's "from."
6 A. Oh, yes, I see it now.
7 Q. Lieutenant-General Janvier. That was the Force Commander?
8 A. The Force Commander of the UNPROFOR for the entire Yugoslavia.
9 Q. Could you now see who the recipient is, who is it addressed to?
10 A. Certainly. Kofi Annan, obviously.
11 Q. Let us now look at page 2 of this document, English version, which
12 is page 3 in B/C/S; in fact, 4.
13 Further -- or, rather, earlier you saw it was from August and now
14 you see the exact date. What is that date? Top of the page.
15 A. 29 August.
16 Q. Could you please look more carefully? Maybe we should scroll down
17 a bit. I'm not going to suggest the answer to you. But could we lower
18 the English version.
19 MR. WAESPI: You know, this is document I don't object to leading
20 the witness to a passage.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Go ahead, Mr. Tapuskovic.
22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Waespi.
23 Q. This is a document from 28th August 1995. Do you agree? Yes or
25 A. Yes, yes.
1 Q. You have to answer for the record.
2 A. Yes, I agree with this.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsel, as far as I could see the document was
4 actually dated the 29th of August, at least the English version. There
5 was a date on the top of the -- on the right side of the top of the page
6 which I thought said 29th of August. There you go.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Judge Harhoff, this
8 document is dated 28th and it refers to the 28th of August. You see it in
9 the heading. It's an UNPROFOR report for the 28th of August, and we are
10 now going to look at the page that I want to show to the witness.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: No.
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is not contested it is a
13 report dated 28th of August addressed to Kofi Annan.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's see whether Mr. Waespi can shed light on
16 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I don't want to testify but this appears to be
17 a standard daily situation report which covers the whole, as you see at
18 the front page, cover page, the whole of the 28th August, from the first
19 minute to 23.59, and it was faxed, it appears to me, on the 29th of
20 August, 1995 at 10.36 to whoever. But maybe the gentleman can tell us,
21 you know, the way these reports were drafted, these sitreps.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: You seem to be quite knowledgeable yourself,
23 Mr. Waespi, in military matters.
24 Witness, can you shed some light on this? How are we to read it?
25 Are we to read it in the way Mr. Waespi just suggested?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Strictly speaking, this is a
2 standard report.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are concerned with the date. It's the date.
4 We know it's a standard report, yes.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I see that -- yes.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... Why does it
7 have the 29th of August, as Judge Harhoff pointed out, at the very top?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see also the 29th.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can you explain it?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I cannot explain it, because in
11 order to explain that I would have to know the entire procedure of
12 drafting. There are types of reports that cover the previous day, but
13 they are dated on the date of sending, which is perfectly normal,
14 especially if one was sending a report on line to the Secretary-General.
15 But speaking specifically of the document in front of me, I can
16 say nothing in particular, apart from the fact that it refers to Sarajevo
17 saying that a certain number of shells, five shells fell on the centre of
18 Sarajevo, causing casualties, including more than 30 dead. I cannot add
19 anything to that.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: We note the -- the distinction, the discrepancy,
21 if indeed it is a discrepancy, and we will proceed.
22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I will refrain from giving my own
23 interpretation because there is no reason for me to do so, but I would
24 like the witness to see now the second page of this report concerning
25 Sarajevo. In the B/C/S version it will be page 7.
1 Q. Mr. Demurenko, could you please look at page 2, UNPROFOR,
2 paragraph 1, Sector Sarajevo. That's English page 2.
3 Please pay attention to the beginning of this sentence, which
4 begins with: "At 11.10."
5 Could you read this aloud, slowly?
6 A. Yes, certainly.
7 It says here that the mortar shells that impacted, at least one of
8 them, and the coordinates are indicated, killed over 30 persons and
9 injured more than 80. This mortar shell was assessed to be fired from 170
10 degrees and the investigation showed that the distance to the firing point
11 is still to be determined. The definition of firing positions for mortar
12 rounds is very difficult, as it is impossible to determine the level of
13 charge used to fire the projectiles. Follow descriptions of mortar shells
14 that were fired by different warring factions, et cetera.
15 Briefly what is described here is the difficulty of determining
16 the fire points.
17 Q. Mr. Demurenko, I have to come back to this later, but now I'm
18 asking you, if this report had reached the headquarters of your command at
19 the same time as those other two reports, would you have still asked
20 General Bachelet to take any steps, in view of what had already been
21 stated at the press conference?
22 A. Well, my reply would have to be as follows: If the data
23 available, if the standard data was not sufficient, namely, that there was
24 an attack and there were casualties but the perpetrator could not be
25 determined yet, and if there had been no statements, no public statements
1 on the subject, then I would not have been required to take any further
2 steps to investigate personally.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now show the witness
5 another report, also for the 28th of August, Prosecution Exhibit P85.
6 Q. Witness, do you see in this handwritten text the date of the
8 A. Yes, I see it. The 28th, 1900 hours.
9 Q. Since this is not in dispute and this is a Prosecution Exhibit,
10 the document was issued by Colonel Konings. Yes or no?
11 A. Lieutenant-Colonel.
12 Q. Correct. Look at point 2 of this report. Could you please read
13 it. Aloud, please.
14 A. Let me tell you frankly, I can tell you bits and pieces, because I
15 cannot read the whole of it. It's not legible enough. Obviously, it
16 speaks of an artillery attack, a shelling attack. It says it is
17 impossible to determine the fire point with accuracy.
18 Q. Sir, Mr. Demurenko, it is my fault. I wasn't precise enough.
19 Read the second point. It's very brief. Just one sentence. It
20 begins with: "The bearings ..."
21 A. I cannot make out one word. Then it says -- oh, it's perfect now.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...
23 MR. WAESPI: Assuming the B/C/S version --
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute, Counsel.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Estimated angle.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: When counsel is on his feet, witness, you must
2 stop speaking.
3 MR. WAESPI: There is a B/C/S version and which is more legible
4 because it is a translation, and perhaps that's helpful for the witness as
5 well, although the last second he said he can read it now.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Waespi.
7 Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. It is now zoomed in. Make you can read it out now, para 2.
10 A. Yes, I will, in Russian. It says: "The bearings in combination
11 the estimated angle of impact could give no evidence on the origin of
12 fire ...
13 Briefly, the conclusion is that it was impossible to identify the
14 perpetrator of this attack with any accuracy at the current moment.
15 Q. Mr. Demurenko, if on the 28th of August, as Chief of Staff, you
16 had had this report by Lieutenant-Colonel Konings, would you have still
17 gone to General Bachelet to ask for permission to undertake any steps as
18 Chief of Staff personally?
19 A. I have to say this once again. This is perfectly natural. It
20 would have been very odd indeed if in wartime everybody knew everything
21 immediately. Under the circumstances a constant exchange of fire, it is
22 difficult to establish the truth. What is critical in determining the
23 perpetrator of an attack, one has to have in mind two things that
24 happened, two major things that happened. First of all, the public
25 statement that was made and shouldn't have been made by the spokesman of
1 the UNPROFOR.
2 Q. Mr. Demurenko, please. My question was very brief after you have
3 read this. If you had had this report in front of you, as should have
4 been the case, would you have gone to General Bachelet to ask for
6 A. No, I would not have approached him at all.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness another
8 document dated 29 August, DD117.
9 Your Honours, I ask for your leave to read this in B/C/S to save
10 time. This will help us go through this document more quickly and will
11 help me focus the witness on what is important.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the length?
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, the witness could confirm
14 the date and confirm the identity of the signatory.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, go ahead.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I see the 29th of August,
17 Lieutenant-Colonel Konings.
18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] There are two very brief
19 paragraphs that I would like to read to the witness and they are not in
20 dispute. This document entirely is not in dispute because it has been
21 admitted already, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, go ahead.
23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Demurenko, here at the beginning this report is related to the
25 report of the UNMO patrol dated 28th August 1995, paragraph 2, on the
1 following page, under number 4 AA says: "At the time when five impacts
2 occurred, Military Observers of the UN from the CC team on observation
3 posts did not see or hear the shells fired either from the territory of
4 the Bosnian army or the territory of the Bosnian Serbs."
5 And then under point 3 it says: "All facts from the previous
6 reports remain unchanged and valid."
7 If you had known about this report on the 29th, would you have
8 continued any activities related to the problem that was the subject of
9 that announcement or that communique made the previous day? Yes or no.
10 A. In that context the answer would be yes, because this report
11 shows, again, the amount of confusion and contradiction involved in
12 various reports from various sources and it shows how wrong the spokesman
13 was to take it upon himself to make that announcement the way he did. So
14 my answer is yes.
15 Q. Very well. What did you do after all. You talked to General
16 Bachelet. And what did you do afterwards?
17 A. I gathered a group of experts. Those were my closest aides. I
18 set a task, I defined the task, namely, to make ballistic calculations in
19 order to either confirm or deny the information given by the first expert
20 on the angle of impact of the shell upon the surface.
21 Second, to calculate the angle of the shell, to show it on the
22 map, to, rather, draw the line of descent on the map. Further, the
23 investigation was supposed to include personal inspection of all possible
24 fire positions of that particular shell, including photo documentation of
25 those locations.
1 The task was defined. On the following day we started
2 implementing it. The experts used charts or tables, firing tables for
3 120-millimetre mortars. They also prepared drawings of the angle of
4 descent, and then on the following day we made -- we made a site visit
5 where I made photographs, which became part of the investigation file.
6 That's what I did.
7 Q. When did you finish your task? When did you finish your work with
8 the expert team? You started working on the following day, and when did
9 you conclude your work?
10 A. We worked for three days, on the 29th, 30th and 31st. On the 1st
11 I had the results of investigation together with appropriate conclusions.
12 Q. And what did you do then? Did you communicate this to your
13 superiors? Did you try to do anything about this?
14 A. Yes. I prepared appropriate material. I wanted to report in the
15 standard procedure. I wanted to brief the commander on the results of the
16 investigation. However, I had an encounter with his assistant who was a
17 Canadian officer, and this changed my mind about that.
18 When I came with the results of the investigation and I showed the
19 conclusions to the assistant and the assistant realised that our
20 conclusions differed from those prepared by the public and UNPROFOR
21 spokesperson, this Canadian officer told me, "There will be no publishing
22 of your report, it will be impossible to publish it, announce it, or to
23 give this report to the commander." When I heard this, I took my report
24 and the photographs and I left.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Colonel, what exactly did your report conclude?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was just one conclusion. The
2 result of the investigation indicated that the Serbs could not have fired
3 the shell in that incident. The Serbs did not do it. Rather, the army of
4 Republika Srpska did not do it.
5 I have arguments to support this conclusion.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you only find a negative? Were you able to
7 conclude who -- who did it?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was very important to maintain
9 the principle of impartiality of an UNPROFOR officer. I set a task for
10 myself to expose the lies stated by the spokesperson about Serbs being the
11 aggressors in that particular incident. It was not my task to show who
12 fired that shell. This is a very important principle, and I can explain
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, go ahead, Mr. Tapuskovic.
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I would like to ask you something that follows from what you just
18 Now that we have touched upon this issue of who had done it.
19 Mr. Demurenko, did anyone say anything two hours or several hours after
20 the incident? Did somebody say anything about the truth being
21 established, or, rather, would you have done the same had somebody asked
22 you to do it?
23 A. I would have used all my professional efforts. I would have aimed
24 all my professional efforts at establishing the truth, regardless of
25 whether the truth suited somebody or not. I would like to draw your
1 attention to the fact that it is the duty of an UNPROFOR officer to act
2 without any bias and not state lies to the public. Had the spokesperson
3 stated that it was done by the Bosnian side, I would have still set the
4 same task to myself, namely to establish the truth, to expose the lie.
5 Had somebody made a rumour that this was caused by an American missile, I
6 would have still acted the same, because all lies need to be exposed.
7 Now, as to establishing who had actually done it, that would be
8 the next step.
9 Q. Mr. Demurenko -- or, rather, Your Honour Robinson?
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Previous translation continues] ... that there
11 were lies about Serb aggressions or Bosnian aggressions or US aggressions
12 in your example. Where did you get the presumption from that there were
13 lies about who did it?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to
15 reiterate that I was wasn't trying to prove anybody's guilt in this. All
16 I was trying to do was to show that UNPROFOR was a professional,
17 non-political force of the United Nations. The task of UNPROFOR is to be
18 as objective as possible. The person who claimed that the Serbs were
19 guilty in this incident had no grounds to do that, had no results of an
20 investigation ready yet. Therefore, this should not have been announced.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Any investigation, including your own
22 investigation, I assume would have been made with the purpose of
23 establishing where the missile was fired from, would it not?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. This was supposed to be the
25 second step. The first step was what was announced and then the second
1 step should have been to announce the perpetrator. I was not allowed to
2 continue with my investigation, and it is difficult for me to say why I
3 wasn't allowed.
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: I interpret your reference to the result of your
5 first investigation to imply that the BiH would have fired those missiles,
6 because if the result of the first investigation you made was that it
7 could not have been the Serbs, then the obvious conclusion to be drawn
8 from that fact have been that it would then have been the Bosnian army who
9 had fired the shell. Would it not?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I wouldn't want to
11 follow that line of thought as to the second step of the investigation. I
12 have my point of view based on certain evidence, and my point of view is
13 that there was no shelling attack. This was a terrorist attack. This was
14 something that was done within Sarajevo. It was a provocation. However,
15 right now, I don't have in my hands either any arguments or evidence to
16 support this. However, there are some indicators of what I'm claiming,
17 and I found indicators of that while I was in Sarajevo. However, we're
18 running ahead of ourselves.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Meaning what? When you say "running ahead of
20 ourselves," does that mean that later on in the testimony you will be
21 telling us about those indicators. You will be?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, at last the trial is becoming interesting.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank God.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Please go ahead.
2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I can swear to you
3 that I did not discuss this topic with the witness at all. It is my duty
4 to explain this to you. I wanted to first conclude his evidence, and then
5 I thought that it would be up to you to evaluate his evidence. Naturally
6 I realise that the Judges have every right to intervene at any moment, but
7 let us try first to conclude with the evidence of this witness and then
8 turn to the issues mentioned just now by the witness. This is quite a
9 surprise for me as well.
10 Now, by your leave, Your Honour Robinson, may I continue?
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. When you went to General Bachelet, you went to his office and you
14 were told what you told us about. What did you do in that situation?
15 Could you please explain that to the Judges?
16 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
18 MR. WAESPI: Just so that we're clear, we are now back to the 28th
19 of August in the evening, because the way I understand it -- the evidence
20 on the 1st, when the gentleman wanted to see General Bachelet, he was kind
21 of stopped by the military assistant.
22 I just want to know which encounter with General Bachelet are we
23 talking about.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can explain.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please tell us.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It involves following.
2 On the 28th, in the evening, I addressed General Bachelet
3 directly, suggesting to him that I had an investigation group because the
4 incident was quite a significant one. It wasn't just any old incident.
5 On the 28th, in the evening, he consented to this. He said that
6 it was all right for me to head this investigation group.
7 Now, the question put to me by Mr. Tapuskovic refers to the events
8 on the 1st, when I was prepared to go see General Bachelet with the
9 results of my investigation. However, his assistant, upon seeing my
10 conclusions in my report, quite clearly said that there was no chance of
11 this report ever reaching General Bachelet and that there was no chance of
12 ever publicising the results of the investigation, so my attempt to reach
13 General Bachelet was not a successful one and I can continue with what
14 happened afterwards.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, go ahead.
16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. My question is actually what followed. What did you do next?
18 A. I had two avenues open to me. The first avenue was to cease any
19 activity and not do anything else in order to promote the investigation.
20 The second avenue was not quite a proper one from the point of view of
21 military ethics and subordination but I had to resort it. Through the
22 liaison officer for public relations, I got in touch with a media company
23 in order to publicise the reports. This liaison officer agreed to have an
25 Q. Which agency conducted an interview with you?
1 A. Associated Press.
2 Q. Can you tell the Judges this: When you were deciding on whether
3 to have the interview or not, what was your dilemma that you had as a
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, he hasn't said -- has he said he a
6 dilemma? He did? Yes. Very well.
7 Yes, proceed.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there was a dilemma. The first
9 option open to me was not to do anything and just to routinely complete my
10 service. This dilemma still persists with me. It still troubles me.
11 That was probably the first and the last time in my life that I violated
12 the principle of insubordination. I realised that I would get into
13 trouble. My superior, General Bachelet, for him I have sincere
14 admiration, he is a very decent man. I did something to get him into
15 trouble and from the point of view of military subordination, I deserve
16 the punishment. I also got into trouble. General Smith, who was in
17 charge of UNPROFOR for Bosnia and Herzegovina, it wasn't proper to leak
18 this information through inappropriate channels. There was additional
19 problem that concerned me personally. I knew that my chance of surviving
20 in that situation was one to 1.000. I was actually supposed to die there
21 in Sarajevo, because nobody was able to take out to the world that
22 information in a situation where I was surrounded by hostile forces and
24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I received the
25 footage of the interview from the Prosecutor's office a few days ago. I
1 think it is necessary for Defence but also for the OTP to show the
2 Defence. It is around 14 minutes long. I believe we should view it in
3 its entirety. The interview was provided in English. We had it
4 translated into B/C/S and it is in e-court. We have turned over the B/C/S
5 translation to the translation service. I believe it would be necessary
6 for us to see the footage so that I can continue my line of questioning,
7 and I believe that the Prosecutor will have some follow-up questions as
9 I want to show you the footage by your leave.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we will see the footage.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is DD00-4130, the transcript
12 that is.
13 [Videotape played]
14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "I would like to explain certain
15 details of the investigation conducted by UN experts and has to do with
16 the horrific event that took place a few days ago. As you know, there was
17 a shell that landed in the very centre of town. Over 35 people were
18 killed and more than 80 wounded, as the reports state.
19 As a professional, I cannot agree with the argument put forth by
20 UN experts as to the reasons and the source of the explosion. It is
21 completely unacceptable for me and my colleagues in this area to accept
22 those arguments. That is why I'll try to explain some new information
23 that I have at my disposal.
24 First of all, if you're familiar with the main basic facts, these
25 are as follows: This is the material with the results of the UN experts'
1 report. This copy is in French and contains several very surprising
2 conclusions, including the idea of the place of origin of that shell,
3 meaning that it originated from the Serbian side. This is a sketch
4 depicting the angle under which the shell landed in Marshal Tito street.
5 This is the angle between the ground surface and the angle of descent of
6 the shell. That is it very important.
7 These are copies of the photographs of the street. This is the
8 very place where the shell landed. This drawing is very important for
9 us. As you can see, this was the line of fire. This was the place of
10 impact. And according to the results of the investigation, the line of
11 fire was 176 degrees and 29.76. This is to the south-east, which is
12 important to know.
13 This is another sketch, and what is interesting is that this
14 material originated from the Muslim army. It depicts the angle between
15 the surface and the shell. As you can see, it says that the angle was 70
16 degrees. This is a copy of a map, and this is my idea that I will explain
17 on the flip chart.
18 According to the material that I have, I believe that the experts
19 who participated in the investigation were professionals. In keeping with
20 this official report and the documentation, we have this image of
21 Sarajevo. The green line represents the line of confrontation. These are
22 the two buildings and the place of impact. According to the
23 documentation, the direction of fire was at 176 degrees. That was the
25 And that poses another interesting question, which is why is it
1 that within the UN we have two different sets of documents, two different
2 reports and two different conclusions about the single investigation. In
3 the other set of documentation another angle of descent is mentioned. As
4 far as the first angle of descent is concerned, 176 degrees, we know what
5 was used there and that was a 120-millimetre grenade or shell. The same
6 ordnance used to be used in the Soviet Union. I know the weapon very
7 well, since I'm a professional soldier.
8 This booklet represents the system description and data on the
9 weapons system and according to it we can see that there are six different
10 standards of that particular weapons system. Taking that the degree was
11 70 degrees and that this was the line of fire after comparing that against
12 the standards, we can conclude the following: From this area, which is
13 900 metres, and then the next area is 1400 metres, the next area from
14 which such a projectile could have been fired is 2.000 metres, which is at
15 the very line of separation. Theatrically speaking, it could have been
16 launched from the Serbian side.
17 The following three possibilities for firing were at 3.700 metres,
18 3.400 metres and 3.600 metres.
19 I visited the location today with my own expert group. We were
20 here, and here, and here, and I have no doubt in my mind that this place
21 was unacceptable, that no shell could have come from here. There's no
22 possibility to fire a shell from this position at the place where it
23 actually landed.
24 Now I'm talking about the terrain where the Serbian troops are. I
25 am a soldier, a colonel, and this is indeed something that has to be done
1 within the framework of a special investigation requiring experts,
2 prosecutors, and perhaps members of a military court. However, it is
3 necessary for us only to realise that this was wrong.
4 As for the other direction, this was the distance between the
5 place of firing and the place of impact, which is 2400 metres. I was
6 there today and there's absolutely no possibility to fire a shell from
7 this area. There are slopes there and forest and there's no possibility
8 to fire from there. I photographed the area, and I will have the
9 photographs ready, showing all of these places. I can also show you a map
10 with the exact data and directions. The main issue with the official
11 experts was that they only tested the angles and directions, automatically
12 blaming the Serbs. However, I believe it is incorrect and that it
13 requires a more thorough investigation followed by a complete ballistics
14 test, trying to decide on all positions from which there could have been
15 firing as well as comparing those against the places where artillery
16 batteries are located.
17 Again, I want to say that the results are wrong, that the
18 documentation used is wrong, and that the conclusion is absolutely
20 The consequences of this event and its investigation are yet to be
21 felt. Yesterday we saw aerial attacks, resulting in civilian casualties.
22 I believe it is absolutely unacceptable, especially for me as a
23 professional soldier who cannot agree with the situation in which we
24 follow a powerful, influential group without the possibility to explain
25 our own position, such as the one we have.
1 To repeat, I'm a citizen of my country, and, as such, have I to
2 say the following. Let us stop accusing falsely. Let us stop the hatred
3 towards the Serb side. I don't want to talk about the Muslim-held areas.
4 I don't want to accuse anyone. This is an issue to be resolved by
5 professionals, experts. What is necessary for us, however, it is
6 necessary to carry out a thorough investigation with all of the details
7 and arguments to be included."
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to suggest, since we
10 have all had the patience to listen to this, to admit the video footage
11 and the transcript that accompanies it into evidence.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, anything on that?
13 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President. We have no objection.
14 Just a brief way of explanation, when we realised that Colonel
15 Demurenko is indeed coming to testify, we realised that he actually made
16 this presentation before TV stations and we asked the Bosnian government I
17 believe to deliver the tape, which we received a few days ago. So that's
18 the way we -- we got it, and we obviously immediately gave it to the
19 Defence. It is a contemporaneous report and we believe it should be
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: We admit it.
23 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Colonel, can I just ask for one little bit
1 You said, I think, several times during your interview in the
2 footage that it would have been impossible for anyone to fire a mortar
3 grenade from those areas depicted on or indicated on your line going down
4 176 degrees. Because you said that there were hills and forests, I
5 believe, and it would be impossible to fire a mortar grenade from anywhere
6 in that area. That's how I understood it. But I'm not sure I understand
7 why would it be impossible. A mortar grenade, I suppose, can be fired
8 from many places and -- and if there's a clearance in the woods or if
9 there's a road, then you can probably fire it from there.
10 So what supported your conclusion that it would have been
11 impossible to fire a mortar from anywhere in that area?
12 Just explain to us very briefly. Thanks.
13 THE WITNESS: If you excuse me for my poor English, I will try to
14 do it very shortly by -- on the paper.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's try to get the mics near to the witness.
16 THE WITNESS: 120-millimetres mortar is very specific, very old
17 type of weapon. Really this is a tape and tube. No special equipment for
18 very, very specific point for firing. And as you know maybe, we have this
19 type of weapon, only six charges. It's an a specific small back with
20 explosion. The principle of the firing for a mortar, this is a tape, this
21 is a tube, and we can to change of this angle only on the vertical, not on
22 horizontal and six charges. And therefore, during the maximum horizontal,
23 for example, 89 degrees and -- like this, and one charges, the maximum
24 parabola, if we will have this angle as a minimum, for example, 30, 30
25 degrees, and the six charges of this, if this is a parabola but a little
1 bit other, like this. And in Sarajevo, in this incident, it was
2 absolutely clear that this is the two building, this is the crater, this
3 is the terrain. This is boundary, confrontation line, this is BiH. This
4 is the Serbian. Both sides.
5 And we know exactly, in accordance with data of expert, I don't
6 know -- approximately 60, 70 degrees, maybe 70, I forget it, but all the
7 same now. And in this case, I mean this angle, this angle has therefore
8 only one, two, three, four, five, six, point for firing position, and we
9 inspected each -- I mean on Serbian side, even on confrontation line each
10 position with photoparat. In three of these firing positions, it was
11 stones. It's not road, it's stones. Absolutely impossible to stay plate
12 on the stones. In accordance with military point of view, absolutely
13 impossible. And one position is the forest, the mine can't move through
14 there, the part of the trees, because blast immediately.
15 Therefore, we check it on the photoparat photo, each four
16 positions, and five position with other angle. Do you remember from this
17 point? No inspection of the BiH. We said, okay, maybe could be next step
18 for us, but absolutely clear 100 per cent that Serbs can't to organise the
19 provided shelling from this position according with this angle. Angle is
20 no without doubts, because expert, ballistic expert.
21 That's all. Is it clear, more or less.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: But, Colonel, would there not be quite a large
23 margin around each of these six firing points? And even so, the further
24 out you get, the larger the margin within which the fire could have been
25 shot is increased? So if you take the example with the six charges,
1 that -- I mean, if it was fired from there, it could have been fire, I
2 suppose, quite a large area. It did not necessarily have to be fired from
3 the position where you were and you took the photograph. If, for
4 instance, a couple of hundred metres away there would have been a road or
5 something else, the shot could have come from there. So are you able
6 really to exclude that the mortar could not have been fired even from an
7 area adjacent to the place where you were?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to emphasise one thing once
9 again. I know this weapon very, very well. Maybe my -- maybe the
10 interpretation of the word "charge" was misleading. There are no
11 different shells, six shells there. There are six charges. And it's
12 charged manually. You put the shell inside the tube and it flies up.
13 So the firing tables for mortars that you saw in that video
14 footage show that in that direction only six charges are possible, either
15 one, two, three, all the six were taken into account. Margins of
16 deviation are measured in metres, like ten to 15 metres, the size of this
17 room, but the margin of deviation cannot be 100 metres. We took into
18 account ballistic trajectories. It's the science of physics. We cannot
19 go beyond that.
20 If you take a certain line of fire, only six possible firing
21 points exist, depending on the charges used. We photographed an area of
22 20, 30 square metres. We always proceeded from a certain surface on which
23 the mortar had to rely. It cannot hang in the air. It cannot be
24 suspended on a tree. We showed the photographs and we saw the ground was
25 pure, clear. No mortar had stood there.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Previous translation continues] ...
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thanks to Mr. Harhoff, Judge
5 Harhoff, sorry, the witness has already clarified certain points, but I do
6 have a few more questions for this witness.
7 Q. Mr. Demurenko, since I have shown you that document that General
8 Janvier addressed to Kofi Annan on the 28th of August, the day of the
9 incident, and you read the passage that said it was very difficult, in
10 fact impossible to determine with accuracy the origin of fire, because it
11 is impossible to determine the charge used in the projectile. If we do
12 not know the charge and the angle of fire, is there anyone who can make a
13 real conclusion as opposed to an assumption, and is this consistent with
14 your view?
15 A. I'm sorry, I didn't understand the question.
16 Q. Mr. Demurenko, in the report by General Janvier to the United
17 Nations addressed personally to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, you've read
18 it just a moment ago, it said it is very difficult to determine the origin
19 of fire because it was impossible to determine the charge used. That's
20 what the report said. Is this somehow related to what you testified
22 A. Yes, yes, correct.
23 Q. And can you tell us something about those reports, those other
24 reports that you only saw when you came here to testify, reports dated the
25 28th and 29th. Are the bearings alone sufficient to make any conclusions
1 beyond a reasonable doubt?
2 A. It would be sufficient in order to say what didn't happen in my
3 report and say, in fact, did say what didn't happen. But in order to
4 determine what happened, it was necessary to continue the investigation,
5 to form a team that would inquire to the full and find the perpetrator.
6 But I don't know that it ever happened. The shelling continued and the
7 investigation went nowhere.
8 Q. I'd like to show you one more sketch that was admitted into
9 evidence through another witness that I'm not going to mention, and I
10 would like you to look at that drawing, that sketch.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] P632.
12 Q. While we're waiting, you have already marked on your own drawing
13 those two rectangles for buildings. I have to ask you, as a layman, if a
14 target was located between two such buildings, would it be possible -- how
15 shall I put this? Maybe the Chamber will not allow me to ask this
16 directly, but would it be able -- would it be possible to aim at an
17 invisible target under those circumstances and, as we know, you were on
18 the spot.
19 A. Generally speaking, mortars were specially designed to target aims
20 behind obstacles, around a corner, over and above a building, and they
21 have their particular peculiar ballistic trajectory.
22 However, the chances that the first shell would really hit a
23 narrow street are one in a million. Of course it happens, but it's really
24 one in a million. If you fired one million shells, then one of them would
25 land in such a small narrow street.
1 Q. Let me ask you one more thing. On this sketch, on this chart,
2 does it faithfully reflect the site of the crater that you went to inspect
3 that day?
4 A. Well, this is an approximate, a rough sketch. It is not done to
5 scale. But basically it is a faithful reflection of that alley, the
6 buildings on both sides, the distance between them, around 15 metres.
7 There is one proviso. On this drawing I see a trace of a shell impact on
8 one building and something I cannot identify on top of the other
9 building. I cannot confirm this because I never saw anything like it.
10 Q. How do you know this is a trace of a mortar shell, this circle? I
11 admit we have discussed this and I have to admit before the Chamber that
12 we did discuss this sketch. I showed it to the witness. I asked the
13 witness this precise question .
14 But, Witness, what do you mean by this?
15 A. If I'm answering the question why do you think this is a trace
16 made by a mortar shell, if you remember that drawing of the angle of
17 descent, the officer investigating the incident had part of a tail-fin in
18 his hands, part of a tail-fin of that alleged shell, and it was said on
19 the basis of that that it was 120-millimetre shell. But I personally
20 never saw it. So it was one-third of that shell, so the other two-thirds
21 must have been fragmented.
22 Q. I actually want to ask you this. When you were there at the site,
23 did you observe anything peculiar expect for the crater? Did you see
24 anything fresh, any fresh traces that could have been a result of an event
25 which take place on that day?
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Don't answer the question. Let us hear
2 Mr. Waespi.
3 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I think it's leading. The proper question would
4 be what did you see when you were there at any given time, can you
5 describe. What does "fresh" mean in this context?
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, he could ask did you see any traces.
7 Did you see any traces? Don't shake your head. Answer yes or no.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were no new traces. I didn't
9 see anything unusual. Unusual for me, that is.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Expect for the crater on the ground, which you inspected.
13 Witness, just tell me, please. Answer my question. Expect for
14 that crater that was there at the site; correct?
15 A. Except for that crater and another four craters of the alleged
16 additional four shells landing from different directions. We inspected
17 all of them and there was quite a lot of doubt as to how those craters are
18 to be interpreted.
19 Q. And when did you hear what I read out to you from the second
20 report on the 29th? When did you hear about the fact that there was no
21 audible trace? Nobody registered audibly the trajectory of the shell,
22 nor was it registered on any radars. When did you hear of that fact?
23 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
25 MR. WAESPI: I don't think the witness has mentioned radars yet.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is so, Mr. Tapuskovic.
3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I can only go back
4 to what I put to the witness when I read it out from the report of the
5 29th, where it is stated that there had been a report of UN Military
6 Observers who neither heard nor saw any shells fired from the territory of
7 the -- territory under the control of the RS army. When did the witness
8 hear of this? I already put this to the witness. I need now to know when
9 he heard of this.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: The complaint is that you have mentioned radars.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Oh, yes, I'm a little bit tired,
12 yes, sorry.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...
14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation].
15 Q. Mr. Demurenko, did you learn at the time of any other report, in
16 addition to those two that ended on your desk based on which you undertook
17 certain measures. Did you, in the following days, learn anything else
18 about the event which took place on the 28th and what significance did it
19 have for your reasoning about this?
20 A. Your Honours, I'm now being asked to comment on two or three
21 documents which were a result of that investigation, whereas at the time I
22 had ten, 15, 20 various sources of information. Some of them were reports
23 of UNMOs. Some of them were reports produced by observation posts of the
24 UN. Some were reports produced by civilian police. In addition to these,
25 there were also verbal accounts of residents. I wouldn't want to comment
1 on each of those sources right now, especially since I don't have them in
2 writing right now. But at any rate, all of these documents, all of these
3 sources were heterogeneous. They pointed to different directions based on
4 which I concluded that one should not jump to conclusions. One needed to
5 make a diligent investigation before coming up with any results and
6 pointing fingers.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: You said you had 10, 15, 20 various sources of
8 information and all of them different. Is that so? But you don't have
9 them here. Are they obtainable?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Some of them should certainly be in
11 UNPROFOR archives. I told you that we had various sources of
12 information. We had reports of Military Observers, we had reports of
13 observation posts within the UN, plus we had civilian police reports. All
14 of these documents should exist in UN archives or UNPROFOR archives. In
15 addition to this, we also had accounts of civilians. I don't think that I
16 need to elaborate on these right now, but if you want me to, I can.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just concentrate on one point. You say that they
18 were all different. Different in what respects?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] None of these sources identified
20 accurately the source or the origin of fire. Some sources indicated the
21 following: We didn't hear this. The observation post stated this, that
22 we didn't register on our monitors any shells in the air. Some of them
23 said that there was no audible record of a shell flying through the air.
24 Third sources stated that there were no five explosions but just one,
25 where some sources indicated that there were five shells.
1 So all of these sources pointed to various explanations and
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: We should take the break now.
4 I believe you will be with us for some time, Witness.
5 --- Recess taken at 5.39 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 6.00 p.m.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Since you have ruled on the video being admitted as well as the
10 transcript, I just wanted to remind you that no number was assigned to it.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let a number be given to it.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the video interview and the
13 corresponding transcript DD00-4130 will become Exhibit D286.
14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] And another thing, Your Honours,
15 the sketch the witness made was in response to Judge Harhoff's question.
16 I would like to tender it as a Defence exhibit unless you decide
17 otherwise, as something that was done on the request from -- upon the
18 request from the Bench.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it may be exhibited, but I just wonder
20 whether it is sufficiently intelligible, without markings to indicate what
21 is what. I don't know. Judge Harhoff?
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Well, if I'm held responsible for the production
23 of this evidence, I think I can interpret it fairly well, but we might
24 wish to ask the witness to just indicate with a pen the explosion to the
25 right on the lower part. If you just put an X. And then-- then starting
1 from the left, you say charge six, C-6 and 5 and 4 and so on.
2 THE WITNESS: [Marks].
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Yes. And you put "Charlie" in front of it so we
4 know that it's the charges. C-6, C-5, C-4, C, the letter C.
5 THE WITNESS: [Marks].
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Right. Thank you very much, sir.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the hard copy sketch will be
8 admitted as D287.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Demurenko, we spent a great deal of time on your testimony so
11 far. And I will try to conclude my examination-in-chief with a few
12 additional questions.
13 First, I'd like to ask you to tell us something about whether
14 after you had given the interview, and you have explained circumstances
15 and your reasons, in the days that followed after the interview was
16 broadcast, did you have any problems?
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, go ahead. Yes.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Can you tell the Judges whether after the interview you had some
21 difficulties, problems, unpleasantness. Perhaps you can explain.
22 A. Yes, I can. My difficulty was actually quite simple, to remain
23 alive. Because literally on the following day, Captain Salajdzic, liaison
24 officer between the BH command and Sector Sarajevo, came to me and told
25 me, "You have one day of life to live, Colonel. You have no chance of
1 leaving the headquarters. At any intersection, you can be killed. An
2 order was issued to kill you." This is what I was told by the BH officer.
3 As for UNPROFOR, initially there was a decision taken by the
4 commander to send me away, within 24 hours to send me away. In reality,
5 it was not a terrible problem for me, because I wasn't afraid of going
6 back to my homeland. However, the UNPROFOR commander for
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina was smart enough to listen to other voices there, who
8 told him if we send Demurenko away we will acknowledge publicly that we
9 are afraid of the truth and that we do not want the truth.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yeah. This requires a little more explanation,
11 Witness. Remind us now who was this person who told you that you have
12 only one day to live. You said he was a captain. Who was-- Captain what?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] His rank was that of a Captain. His
14 last name was a Salajdzic. He was a nephew of the BH prime minister and
15 he was a liaison officer between the BH army and Sector Sarajevo. He was
16 with my -- he came to my headquarters on a daily basis. I apologise for
17 switching into English.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: But did he offer any further explain as to why
19 you only had one day to live? Did he explain how this would come about?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. In quite a detailed way. He
21 said that on that occasion I took a pro-Serb and anti-Bosnian position,
22 which wasn't true, but that was their interpretation. This made certain
23 commanders and certain structures in Bosnia angry. I'm not sure quite who
24 they were, but automatically I was listed as enemy, and enemies are
25 usually destroyed in wartime. As for the means that they were going to
1 implement --
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Who -- did he say -- did he identify the persons
3 or the entity that would be responsible for killing you or that will kill
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Naturally he didn't say who had
6 taken that sort of a decision, but he said quite clearly the following:
7 He knew that I crossed the confrontation line several times every day. I
8 went through a Bosnian check-point, through a Serbian and then again
9 through a Bosnian, through a Serbian check-point, any time I went through
10 a Bosnian check-point, and I was travelling in a car which wasn't
11 armoured, it was very easy to shoot me through. He explained that in
12 detailed way.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... Just answer
14 the questions I'm asking. Don't volunteer anything.
15 Did you find his report credible?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I tried not to believe him. That's
17 my answer.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you report this to any --
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did go to a church after that.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you report this to anybody?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, but I went to a church.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: You never made a report to any of your army
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I'm an officer. I'm not afraid
25 of anything.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: You just went to a church?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Orthodox church.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: And what? You prayed?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I begged the All Mighty to help me
5 stay alive for the sake of my family. I believe that he heard my pleas.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Demurenko, a little while ago you mentioned some indicia to
9 the Judges. What sort of indications were you talking about? I probably
10 would not have asked you this had you not mentioned this in one of your
11 answers. I don't know on whose question that.
12 A. I apologise, indicators of what?
13 Q. Mr. Demurenko, I think you mentioned some indicators, although I
14 might be wrong, but some indicators about a terrorist activity when you
15 were asked about your opinion on where the shell had come from.
16 A. Yes. After all, I'm not a specialist on anti-terrorist
17 activities. Rather, I'm a specialist on peace keeping operations. But
18 nevertheless, there was something that pointed to the fact that this was
19 not a shelling incident but, rather, an explosion caused by terrorists
20 inside the city. I will list the indicators, starting with the most
21 important ones.
22 First that certain facts were not consistent. One shell killed
23 120 people, whereas four other shells only wounded three or four people.
24 Therefore, it is illogical, how come one shell was that effective, in
25 quotation marks, and how come other shells were so ineffective. That was
1 the first point.
2 The second point: On two occasions within two years in 1994 and
3 in 1995, at the same place, in a market frequented by so many people in a
4 small street in a market called Markale, there were explosions that killed
5 numerous people, peaceful residents. It is simply improbable that on each
6 occasion a shell would be fired from the mountainous area and land in the
7 very same spot killing so many people on two occasions.
8 Third point, if an expert proved that he found a crater and a
9 portion of the shell, that means that only the other part of the shell was
10 fragmented. I know exactly what a shell does. It is made out of iron.
11 It has no -- it has no clusters. And it is simply improbable that a
12 shell, being what it is, ended up killing with its fragments over 100
13 people. It was not made up of little clusters.
14 Plus there was some other indicators. There was no audible
15 trace. It wasn't registered on any radars or anything of the sort. So
16 all of these facts point to the conclusion that this was a planned
17 operation, a provocative act that gave somebody material to blame the
19 I want to assure that you I'm a very objective person. It is not
20 my aim here to defend the Serbs. All I'll say is that they should not be
21 satanised. It is quite wrong to do that.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: What about the crater?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's very easy, believe me. After
24 the war, I discussed this with specialists in anti-terrorist combat. You
25 take an urn, like for garbage, you put a detonation device and take the
1 explosive device, you push the shell downwards and you create the
2 impression of a -- the same as when a shell explodes.
3 On the one hand it is a very hand-fisted imitation but on the
4 other hand it has a certain amount of sophistication. It's an
5 improvisation. I cannot say that I have evidence for this.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: I don't want to take Mr. Tapuskovic's time, but we
7 have had evidence here to show or to tell us that a mortar could not
8 explode just by being dropped from a couple of metres. It would need to
9 have much more velocity in order to actually explode.
10 So how would you make the mortar grenade explode from a very short
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Moreover, I know how to -- how these
13 bearings, how the clusters work. A shell can explode only by being fired
14 from a mortar. If you throw it from a rooftop, it won't explode. That's
15 true. But I'm saying again, to simulate an explosion of a shell using a
16 different explosive device is not difficult, because the crater is the
17 same. If you take a shell and fix it using screws or whatever else and
18 explode it with a different detonator, the crater will look the same.
19 There are factors that make me believe that it couldn't have been
20 a mortar shell.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: The information that you gave in answer to
22 Mr. Tapuskovic was a response to his question as to what did you say, what
23 are you saying are the indicators of a terrorist attack. Are you saying
24 that the three pieces of information that you just gave us are indicative
25 of a terrorist attack? Because that's not clear to me. It's not clear to
1 me whether that is what you are saying. And if that is so, then -- then
2 why are they so indicative?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm not a high-flying
4 specialist in legal matters or anti-terrorist combat and I cannot
5 determine what is an anti-terrorist act -- what is a terrorist act and
6 what isn't, but I'm 100 per cent sure and I try to convince you of the
7 first part of my testimony which has to do with facts.
8 The second part are my own conclusions about what could have been
9 done and how. It is not my task here to convince that you it was a
10 terrorist act and I was not prepared for it.
11 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, one question remains. The
12 issue of fragments. If the incident was in fact a terrorist attack and
13 not a mortar shell, what about the fragments that were found? You said at
14 one stage that they could have been put there, but looking at the facts,
15 do you think you're right? If those shell fragments were put there, were
16 attached, don't you think that the people who were at the market could
17 have noticed that? Do you think that people at the market would have
18 accepted to be sacrificed like sheep?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The answer is obvious. It is a real
20 crime, whoever may have perpetrated it. And of course, those were people
21 who were dreaming of staying alive, having their families, having their
22 life continue. They did not think of death. They never wanted to be
24 As for the shrapnel found in the bodies of those dead and wounded,
25 part of those did not belong to the iron part of the shell, but that in
1 itself does not mean that this shell did not have an additional charge,
2 because in every impact, fragments of glass and other objects find their
3 way into people's bodies. If it was indeed an act of agent provocateur, I
4 think that we cannot find evidence of it 12 years later.
5 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have completed my
8 examination-in-chief. I would like to thank the witness and you.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have concluded, Mr. Tapuskovic? Yes.
10 Mr. Waespi.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Waespi:
13 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. Witness, we have about a little bit more than half an hour left
15 today, and I take it it will be -- also take much of tomorrow, although of
16 course, I'm in the Trial Chamber's hands, but I intend to use as much time
17 as I need. I understand that you had plans to travel away, so I just want
18 to say that, and I don't think it is realistic to do that.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have been informed that the witness will be
20 available tomorrow.
21 Mr. Tapuskovic to confirm this.
22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I can confirm that he will be
23 here until 11.00. I don't know what your ruling will be. We are starting
24 at 8.00 a.m. and his plane is not before 1.00 p.m. So if my learned
25 friend took as much time as I did, and I really overdid it, then I don't
1 know how far that would take us. Maybe 11.00.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us get on with it.
3 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I will do my best.
4 Q. Let's start with some background information you gave us in the
5 beginning of your testimony.
6 In 1992 to 1994 you were not stationed in Sarajevo. You were not
7 in Bosnia. Is that correct?
8 A. No.
9 Q. I think the second microphone needs to be turned on as well.
10 A. Yes, that is correct. I was not in Bosnia.
11 Q. So the first time you came to Bosnia was in fact in -- I think you
12 said in the first few days in January 1995?
13 A. Precisely.
14 Q. Then you explained us your career in -- in the Soviet army, the
15 Russian Federation army. You said you were a commander of a platoon, a
16 company, a battalion, a regiment. What kind of formations were that,
17 artillery, infantry, mechanised?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. All of them or were you focussing on -- I don't think you first
20 command an infantry platoon and then an artillery regiment. Which units
21 did you command?
22 A. I can answer this. The Soviet as well as the Russian system of
23 education is different from the western system in a way, and I can-- I
24 know something about this because I had training in America.
25 On the tactical level, a Moscow institution prepares, trains
1 officers from platoon commanders up to battalion commanders. So
2 everything that is at the disposal of the platoon, company, and battalion,
3 we had to learn about. In a mechanised infantry battalion, we have a
4 120-millimetre battery. I know that very well. At the next level --
5 Q. Yes. But what kind of battalion did you command, an infantry?
6 Actual command not learning about it, just commanding. Was it an infantry
7 or a tank or an artillery battalion?
8 A. In Russian, yes, we call it motorised rifle battalion, and that
9 includes mortar battery, mortar unit.
10 Q. So that would be an infantry unit rather than a mechanised unit?
11 A. Mechanised, motorised. Not mortar. It involves either infantry
12 or APC-equipped. That would be mechanised in western terms.
13 Q. Thank you very much. In fact I was forced in earlier times of my
14 career to learn a lot about the Soviet army. So I can probably tell, but
15 I've never thought about that from that experience.
16 Anyway, the regiment that you commanded, again what was that? Was
17 it artillery, was it motorised, was it mechanised?
18 A. It was mechanised regiment, including three battalions, also
19 mechanised, in western terminology, an artillery unit, a rocket unit, a
20 tank unit and 12 different companies, all in all, 2.000 troops, privates,
21 Sergeants, that is, it NCOs and officers.
22 Q. And for how long did you command that regiment?
23 A. Two and a half years.
24 Q. And did you have a Chief of Staff there as well?
25 A. Yes. I was Chief of Staff of that regiment before becoming its
1 commander, and in my further career I remained commander in the Far East.
2 Q. And is that helpful being a Chief of Staff of a unit before
3 becoming its commander?
4 A. It is a standard hierarchy, a standard step on that ladder. I was
5 Chief of Staff of battalion first, before becoming commander of the
6 battalion, and then I was Chief of Staff of the regiment before becoming
7 commander of that regiment. It is an absolutely standard way of
9 Q. And it makes sense, does it not, because the Chief of Staff is
10 really the second most knowledgeable officer in any unit. He is the alter
11 ego of the commander.
12 A. Right, right.
13 Q. I think you also told us that as a Chief of Staff you basically
14 have the same duties as the commander. You also have, you know, the
15 authority to order and so on, just basically being the stand-in to the
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. And I don't know whether you have much information about the
19 Yugoslav system. You talked a little bit about the weaponry that was
20 basically very, very similar or identical. Would the same apply to the
21 functions of the Chief of Staff and the commander? What you just said
22 about the Soviet army about the role of the Chief of Staff, the
23 relationship to the commander, that would also apply to the VRS as you saw
24 it working in 1995?
25 A. I'm not prepared to say with 100 per cent certainty that the
1 powers and authority are the same, the system is the same, but there is a
2 70 per cent similarity. I believe the Yugoslav army was in a way a copy
3 of the Soviet army. Yugoslav officers attended Soviet army schools at the
4 highest level, and I believe that in all armies of the Warsaw Pact
5 countries, the Chief of Staff had basically the same position as in -- in
6 other member countries.
7 In Sarajevo Sector, I practically had no dealings with the
8 leadership of either warring parties. And that supported my duty of
9 impartiality. I only had to have contact with liaison officers, that's
11 Q. Because your main function as a Chief of Staff was to organise the
12 inner workings of the UNPROFOR staff, which was comprised of many
13 nations? Was that your prime function as a Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR,
14 Sector Sarajevo?
15 A. Generally speaking, the primary task of any Chief of Staff is to
16 maintain combat readiness of subordinate troops, their preparedness to
17 efficiently operate. That was tactical operation, intelligence, although
18 the word "intelligence" wasn't used. In Yugoslavia it was called
19 collection of information, cooperation with your own units and
20 neighbouring units, and only then did the Chief of Staff have to perform
21 as a stand-in for the commander in command functions.
22 Q. Yes, I understand that. What I'm trying to get is the UNPROFOR
23 solution, in terms of the division of labour between the commander, the
24 Chief of Staff and perhaps deputies was slightly different, because in
25 UNPROFOR, in at least in 1995 there was a commander, there was a Chief of
1 Staff, but there was also deputy commanders, and one deputy commander
2 would have been a French colonel, Colonel Meille. Do you remember that?
3 A. Colonel, precisely.
4 Q. And when the commander, you mentioned a General Bachelet, was
5 away, then the deputy commander -- I --
18 Q. And if I can continue, if General Bachelet or his predecessor
19 Gobillard was away, there was a custom that Colonel Meille would be the
20 acting commander. Did you remember that?
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...
22 A. Not quite. First of all, Colonel Meille arrived much later.
23 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
24 MR. WAESPI: Can we go briefly into the private session,
25 Mr. President?
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, yes. Private session.
2 [Private session]
14 [Open session]
15 MR. WAESPI:
16 Q. I think, Colonel, you wanted to explain something about the acting
18 THE REGISTRAR: Sorry for the interruption. Your Honours, we're
19 back in open session.
20 MR. WAESPI:
21 Q. Colonel, I believe you wanted to mention something about the
22 acting commander, Colonel Meille. Please do so.
23 A. In any army there is hierarchy of substitutes, the first
24 substitute is usually the Chief of Staff and then the second substitute is
25 responsible for combat readiness, as a rule. In this case, in our sector
1 we followed the standard procedure with the exception that Colonel Meille
2 was only there for six months out of the year that I was there. He came
3 in May and left in September. We knew each well. He was my close
4 associate, and his job was to cooperate with and supervise the French
5 contingent, which would have been difficult for me since I don't speak
7 Since 50 or 60 per cent of our total troops were the French
8 Battalion, commander when he had to go away, left as his deputy the French
9 commander, not the Russian commander, logically. But I cannot remember a
10 single occasion when General Bachelet would have been absent and I did not
11 cooperate closely with my French colleague. We were constantly in contact
12 and cooperated on all issues. On the 20th of August, General Bachelet was
13 there -- sorry, on the 28th of August, General Bachelet was there.
14 Q. Let me very, very briefly address the Russian Battalion, because
15 you mentioned two aspects of it. First of all, you talk about the
16 extremely unfavourable location of the Russian Battalion. But there was a
17 couple of very good observation points. For instance, one of them was at
18 a restaurant called Vidikovac. Do you remember that?
19 A. Yes, I seem to remember that was in the south-east.
20 Q. Yeah.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, south-west, interpreter's --
22 A. From that vantage point you can see the entire valley.
23 MR. WAESPI:
24 Q. And this area was controlled by -- apart from the Russian
25 Battalion who was there, was controlled by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,
1 the part where Vidikovac was located?
2 A. Partly, yes. But if you don't mind, that doesn't mean that the
3 positions of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were equally advantageous,
4 tactically speaking, as the observation post of the Russian Battalion, and
5 the reason is simple. UNPROFOR located their observation posts wherever
6 that they pleased. Whereas the warring parties could put up their
7 observation posts only where it was possible. The other party often got
8 there before them. As soon as one location was free, the other party
9 would occupy it.
10 Q. But Vidikovac, being the top of Trebevic mountain, was within the
11 part controlled by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?
12 A. Yes. That was a routine practice among the military. This is
13 where the observation post is known as an observation location, because
14 you want to take up the most favourable location for observing.
15 Q. Thank you. Because I just wanted to make the point that having
16 occasionally not very good positions for weaponry does not mean that you
17 could not have good observation points and then link those two elements,
18 the weaponry on one side, and the observation points on another side.
19 That is a common military -- military tactic?
20 A. I apologise. What exactly this has to do with the observation
21 post of the Russian Battalion, what does this have to do with the weaponry
22 location? Are you referring to the SRK location? You know, what link is
23 there between UNPROFOR as a peace keeping force and one of the warring
24 sides? Russian Battalion did not fight on the side of the SRK, or perhaps
25 I misinterpreted your words.
1 Q. Yes, maybe I wasn't clear enough. I just putting to you that
2 normally if you have some weaponry which is not in a very good location,
3 if you combine it with a observation point, I'm talking about military in
4 general, not about the warring capacities of the Russian Battalion. So if
5 you combine weaponry and great observation, that's a way to conduct
6 military business, is it not?
7 A. In abstract terms, without referring to the Serbs or to the
8 Russians, in that case, you are correct. But only in one case if this
9 is -- you are not referring to guided missiles, but, rather, to Howitzers,
10 mortars, and so on. Observation is of no use to you if you are using a
11 tank, infantry weapons or anything of the sort.
12 Q. I agree. And I was also talking about the ABiH. I was talking
13 any military force in that region when I was asking about the combination
14 between weaponry on one side an observation on the other side.
15 Let me go on to a very brief point. Also you were asked about the
16 area of responsibility of your sector. Was the enclave of Zepa also a
17 part of your sector?
18 A. No. Srebrenica and Zepa did not make part of your area of
20 Q. So if General -- one of the commanders would have said that some
21 of the enclaves, including Zepa, were part of it, you would deny that or
22 you just don't remember that?
23 A. Certainly not. An order is an order. And if a general who was my
24 direct superior gave such an order, then naturally I would proceed with
25 implementation of that order, especially since everybody else knew that
1 those enclaves were the fragile points of that -- of that war, that needed
2 special attention.
3 Q. Very well. You were shown a map, the UNPROFOR map which had the
4 confrontation lines in yellow and red. Do you remember that? And you
5 were asked who controlled the inside of that ring, and you answered it was
6 the ABiH, and it's the SRK, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, that controlled
7 the outside of the ring. Is that correct?
8 A. Yes. Outside of Sarajevo, it was the SRK -- outside of those
9 lines, it was the SRK, and within those lines it was the 1st Corps of the
10 BH army.
11 Q. Incidentally, did you ever meet the commander of the 1st Corps of
12 the Muslim army, or the Bosniak army?
13 A. No. I had no meetings with the corps commander. On one occasion
14 I met the brigade commander. We had an issue to discuss.
15 Q. You also talked about the civilians inside the confrontation lines
16 and I believe you used the word "anxiousness," and you gave an example
17 that you saw the civilians not collecting their garbage, so UNPROFOR had
18 to take over and do that job. Is one -- would you call that a lethargic
19 attitude towards life in general?
20 A. Yes, that is quite an appropriate word to describe the situation.
21 Especially in winter time, when people are hibernating. I was quite
22 surprised by this. Prior to that, I had experience of fierce fighting in
23 the former Soviet Union territory. And I was all ready for war when I
24 arrived in Sarajevo, and upon arriving there, I started asking, well,
25 where is the war? I mean, there was just occasional exchange of fire and
1 most often by drunk soldiers firing into the sky, tracer bullets and so
2 on. And I also saw a lot of love couples walking in the street, so I was
3 quite surprised.
4 Q. And would you describe those -- or would you accept that the
5 lethargic attitude of people is a explanation perhaps that the civilians
6 were under siege for two, three years already, that they kind of lost
7 almost their will to -- to lead a normal life, as it were?
8 A. Naturally, that is one of the explanations. The other one is that
9 the best, most energetic and just plainly speaking different people had
10 already left the area. Some of them had left the area entirely, some of
11 them went to fight on, say, the side of the BH army and so on. So the
12 least active segment of the population remained in town, so what you said
13 makes sense, I agree.
14 Q. I said that I wanted to discuss two brief aspects of the Russian
15 Battalion. We discussed one. The second one is this small incident about
16 the Russian Battalion which needed to be taken out by you. And did you
17 remember, was it the case that the unfortunate Russian soldiers were
18 caught on Debelo Brdo between the French who also had an observation point
19 there, and just between a battle between the Serbs and the ABiH and so the
20 help of UNPROFOR the Russian soldiers had to be taken away. Is that a
21 fair characterisation of the way the situation evolved?
22 A. I think that we're discussing the same incident. If I can
23 remember, it was in late July.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, I want to raise a matter with the
1 Witness, you remember that in your examination-in-chief you
2 indicated that there were some 10 or 15 or 20 reports about the explosion,
3 all with different results. I believe you said some of them might be with
5 One, were these reports that you actually saw and read? Just yes
6 or no. Were these reports that you actually saw and read? Yes.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I read several
8 contradictory reports of UNPROFOR, yes, that's correct.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: About how many? About how many? Can you be more
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I read six, seven, or eight such
12 reports. When I mentioned the figure of 15 to 20, I also said that some
13 of them were verbal, oral which were not written down. And, yes, that's
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: The six, seven, or eight that were written, where
16 did they come from?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely so, yes.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. Where did they come from, where did they
19 emanate from?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In UNPROFOR there were several
21 sections that were duty-bound to report. I will list those sections to
23 First of all, there was a report coming from the operations
24 centre, collecting information from all forces. Then there was a report
25 of G2 section which was an intelligence military section. Then there was
1 a military police section. Then there was a report of Military Observers,
2 that was the fourth report. Then there were various reports coming from
3 individual battalions, say the Russian Battalion commander and so on. So
4 I can go on listing these reports.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... In the
6 Prosecution case, how many reports did you submit on this incident?
7 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I also thought about that during the
8 last break. We had the G2 report, we had the Bosnian, local Bosnian
9 police report which the witness has in his hands as well. We had the
10 report of the French engineers. I think the witness showed it into the
11 cameras. We had our own expert, Mr. Higgs. Of course that was not
12 available to the witness. And I think there was another report by a
13 Colonel Powers from the US, a very short one, which also addresses these
14 issues. But all these reports kind of aren't reports that are original.
15 They refer to each other and kind of summarise. So it is probably very
16 difficult to say how many reports you have which are of original nature.
17 And then, of course, you have the UNMO reports. The two we have seen from
18 patrol leader Konings. You can call them reports, although they are more
19 observations. And, yes, Mr. Knustad and other people of course as the
20 witness pointed out made oral reports as to what they heard but I would
21 say that there are four main reports which the Prosecution has submitted
22 into evidence.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness, you just heard the reports that were
24 offered in the Prosecution's case. Are you in a position to say whether
25 any of the reports that you saw and read was not included in the list just
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Listed by me? Named by me or by the
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, named by the Prosecutor. I'm trying to see
5 whether any of the reports that you said you saw and you read we have not
6 yet seen. Because I want to see them. I want to make that clear. I'd
7 like to see the reports which you say all indicated different results,
8 different conclusions, and so my first -- my first effort is to see
9 whether we have them here already or how many of them we have.
10 So I'm asking whether, having heard what the Prosecutor said he
11 produced in his case, whether you saw any other reports, saw and read any
12 other report on this matter.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I understood the
15 Naturally I'm not -- I don't know Mr. Higgs. Perhaps I did read
16 his report.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, briefly on this.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's just a report by Mr. Higgs.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't want a long speech. It's late in the
21 Yes, now go ahead.
22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to be
23 of assistance to you and everybody else.
24 I picked three or four documents out of all of the documents, but
25 there are many other reports that were already admitted, say, Baxter
1 report, Powers report. There's a whole number of reports by intelligence
2 services. I only used the official reports, which were introduced through
3 some other witnesses into evidence. I thought that what I used here was
4 not sufficient. We need to use other material.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're going conclude the day's proceedings, and
6 tomorrow I will return to this matter.
7 We begin at 8.00.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Friday, the 6th day of July,
10 2007, at 8.00 a.m.