1 Friday, 6 July 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 8.00 a.m.
6 WITNESS: ANDREI DEMURENKO [Resumed]
7 [Witness answered through interpreter].
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi to continue with your
10 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning, Your
11 Honours. Good morning, everybody.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Waespi: [Continued]
13 Q. Good morning, Witness. Before we talk in detail about the events
14 following the explosion on the 28th of August, 1995, just two very, very
15 small issues. You told us yesterday about that rescue operation, as I
16 perhaps should call it, of members of the Russian battalion, and you said
17 that you successfully arranged a cease-fire among the participants. Do
18 you remember that?
19 A. Yes, that's correct. For a short interval a time it was necessary
20 to pull out the soldiers from the Russian observation post from under
22 Q. And that cease-fire was successful and the operation could be
24 A. Yes, precisely.
25 Q. Do you remember whom you contacted from the warring factions, from
1 the ABiH and from the SRK?
2 A. At the very highest level I was assisted by General Gobillard, who
3 with his staff contacted with the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina so
4 that I myself did not contact with anyone. I know that these agreements
5 came down to the commander of the 1st Corps and down to the lowest level
6 of the relevant company, and I don't know which commanders of the
7 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were involved, but I know that at my request the
8 liaison officer contacted them. The commander of the corps passed on the
9 orders all the way down to the company and the relevant units to stop
11 Q. And the commander of the corps would be Dragomir Milosevic?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you, Colonel. The second issue is about your knowledge
14 about all these weapon systems as you had explained yesterday. I believe
15 also in response to a question by Judge Harhoff. Now, you know as much
16 about mortars and artillery as you know about tanks and all the other
17 arsenal of the weaponry you were trained in and you had under your
18 disposition while commanding all these units.
19 A. Yes, that's correct.
20 Q. So you're not really a sort of hundred per cent specialist only in
21 mortars. You're a specialist about the whole range of -- of weaponry. Is
22 that correct?
23 A. Yes, that's correct. I am a general army commander who has to
24 know everything and who has to have all the skills to command subordinate
1 Q. Thank you very much, Colonel. Now, let's go into the beef of your
2 testimony, and this is the 28th of August. Obviously we knew about your
3 activities because it was widely reported. You know, people talk about
4 your name, and it's mentioned in a couple of communications. Also in this
5 courtroom your name was mention by various participants. But at least for
6 me it's the first time I kind of got the sequence of what you were doing
7 at any time, and I'd like to -- to go back to a few of these activities
8 you conducted.
9 You told us, I believe, that when the explosion happened you were
10 at the -- your headquarters, which is the PTT building in Sarajevo. Is
11 that correct? Morning of the 28th of August, 1995.
12 A. Yes, that's correct.
13 Q. What were you doing at that time?
14 A. I cannot reconstruct these events up to the minute, but at that
15 time I was usually in a briefing. That was my regular schedule.
16 Q. And how long between you hearing of the event by whatever means of
17 communication and going to the crater, how much time was there in between?
18 A. An hour and a half, I think, approximately.
19 Q. And why did you decide, if you recall today, to go to see the
21 A. It was too tragic an event to leave it without supervision,
22 regardless of all my subordinates were doing. I had to see it personally.
23 Q. But you told us yesterday that there were other specialised groups
24 in UNPROFOR who were better equipped to go there, and we also had the UN
25 observers who were on the scene. Are you saying that you just felt as the
1 chief of staff you needed to go there and perhaps show presence at the
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute.
4 Mr. Tapuskovic.
5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you. May I
6 just ask that if Mr. Waespi is invoking a passage from the witness's
7 testimony or statement, if he could indicate which one, such as, for
8 instance, if he says the witness had said that there were better-equipped
9 teams, which I personally don't remember, he might want to refer us to the
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Well, this was yesterday. I mean, if the
12 witness don't recall saying it, then we can ask for the citation, but if
13 the witness himself doesn't challenge it, I don't myself see the need for
15 MR. WAESPI: Yes. Maybe he didn't use the word "better."
16 Q. I think you said that there were specialised teams who would
17 normally attend to scenes like that. I don't want to put words into your
18 mouth. Perhaps, Colonel, you can explain what you meant by these other
19 units who were available.
20 A. As I said yesterday, in every unit of the UNPROFOR, including
21 battalions, including military observers, everyone had their own area of
22 responsibility, and if anything happened in that area they were the first
23 who had to go there and see what happened. So my personal decision to
24 scout for myself did not have anything to do with lack of trust in them.
25 I decided to go because it was a tragic event with a gigantic number of
1 casualties and that's why I thought I would go and see for myself before
2 taking any steps. At that moment, I didn't know that I would personally
3 lead an inquiry team. I just wanted to go and see.
4 Q. Now, you said you arrived at around one and a half hours after the
5 incident, which would be, I think, at around half past 12.00. For how
6 long did you stay at the location?
7 A. I just want to stay on this a moment longer. In your previous
8 question you asked me how much time after you were alerted, not how much
9 time after the event, and I answered an hour and a half. I was alerted 30
10 minutes later, then plus another hour and a half. That makes two hours.
11 So it was not at 12.00. It was a bit later.
12 Q. Yes. Thanks for the clarification. And it's not a memory test.
13 I just want to get some feeling of when you arrived and who you perhaps
14 might have met there, because yesterday you told us that you gave
15 instructions to UNPROFOR people working at the site. Do you remember
16 saying that?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, who were these UNPROFOR people working at the site to whom
19 you gave instructions? If you recall.
20 A. Naturally, I can't recall either the name or the numbers of
21 battalions who worked there, but there were at least two groups, one from
22 the FrenchBat, one from the military observers. They cordoned off -- or,
23 rather, taped off the site, the scene, and proceeded to look very
24 carefully for evidence, especially for shrapnel fragments stuck in
25 buildings and elsewhere. I gave everyone a precise assignment indicating
1 the time allowed and the deadline for reports, but I cannot remember the
2 details now.
3 Q. The other group of UNMOs, was that a group headed by
4 Lieutenant Colonel Konings, the Dutch UNMO patrol leader?
5 A. Yes, possibly. I cannot say for sure but it's possible.
6 Q. And do you remember, just in a general sense, what kind of
7 assignment, if any, you gave to Lieutenant Colonel Konings?
8 A. I remember that I was not authorised to give him any assignments
9 because military observers are a separate section of the UNPROFOR, of the
10 UN force, that was not directly subordinated either to the commander of
11 the sector or the chief of staff. They are a separate branch and that's
12 why they are called independent military observers. But in terms of
13 cooperation, I spoke to the UNMO officer trying to define what was
14 necessary to do first and within what time. I couldn't give him orders.
15 Q. Yes. Thank you for that clarification, but can you tell me more
16 in substance of what did you tell him he has to do?
17 A. Once again, things unfolded approximately like this: We
18 introduced ourselves to each other. We defined the tasks handled by
19 various groups, by the two groups, in fact, and we exchanged a few words
20 about what our assignments were, within what time they were to be
21 performed, and approximately when the reports would follow. Again, I have
22 to emphasise I couldn't issue any orders because they were not my
24 Q. Yes I understand that very, very well but you're talking about
25 coordination, and I just want to make sure I know what kind of
1 coordination you had focusing now on Lieutenant Colonel Konings. So what
2 coordination from your side or what did you tell him you were doing, if
4 A. Let me draw your attention --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.
6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe the
7 witness answered already twice. The question is asked and answered.
8 MR. WAESPI: I'm not sure. I think the witness said that, We
9 exchanged a few words about what our assignments were, within what time
10 they were to be performed and approximately when the reports would follow.
11 And what I'd like to know is what -- an exchange means Mr. Konings set
12 his side and Colonel Demurenko his side. I just want to know what Colonel
13 Demurenko relate to lieutenant Colonel Konings about his assignment, what
14 he was doing.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let the witness answer. Please answer the
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me draw your attention to one
18 thing. I am not confirming that I talked to Colonel Konings. I said I
19 spoke to an officer from the UNMO. I am not confirming the identity of
20 that person. So please phrase your questions relating to a military
21 observer and not Colonel Konings because I don't know the person for sure.
22 This was general talk, I'm saying once again, about what the
23 observers were doing as their part of the work and which other part of the
24 work had to be done by other people, including me.
25 MR. WAESPI:
1 Q. And in relation to the other unit that was there, the French unit,
2 you had similar kind of exchanges between -- as regards to assignments and
3 time frames?
4 A. Yes, precisely. In the same context.
5 Q. And how long did you stay there at the crater site?
6 A. Fifteen, 20 minutes.
7 Q. And was somebody with you?
8 A. Yes. I was accompanied by Captain Tyulenev, who was my driver and
9 my bodyguard.
10 Q. And then you returned back to -- to the headquarters, to the PTT
12 A. Precisely.
13 Q. And when did you find out about this press conference, the
14 British -- I think you said British UNPROFOR spokesperson gave?
15 A. What stuck in my memory is the impression I got when I came back
16 to my headquarters in the PTT building approximately an hour after my
17 visit to the scene.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Excuse me. Colonel, the last question from
19 counsel begs the question of whether you, when you visited the site the
20 first time, whether you were given any indication as to the direction of
21 fire and the angle of descent. So in other words when you came back to
22 your headquarters, were you by then offered any information as to where
23 the shot might have come from?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, at the moment when I
25 was on the scene there were no documents available. The place of
1 explosion itself. It did not indicate anything, it did not provide any
2 clues as to who could have been the perpetrator of that tragedy. We had
3 nothing at that time. Only towards the evening when I got information on
4 one hand from the press conference, and on the other hand I got the two
5 reports that I held in my hands during the video footage we've seen. It
6 became clear that these two reports were mutually contradictory.
7 The spokesman who had no information about preliminary results of
8 inquiry made his statement, and on the other hand I still did not have
9 enough information to refute the preliminary findings. I had those
10 reports which indicated the angle of descent and some other clues. MR.
11 WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President -- just following up -- thank you, Judge
13 Q. Just following up on Judge Harhoff's question, why there were no
14 documents that were created at that time, or perhaps you were not aware of
15 any, from the cater itself, looking at the crater itself, analysing the
16 crater as the French unit and perhaps the Dutch, you can indeed discover
17 the angle descent and the bearing, the general bearing from which the
18 shell, if it indeed was a flying shell, came from; is that correct?
19 A. Without special tools and instruments there is not a chance you
20 can determine the exact angle. This is the work of ballistics experts and
21 specialists in gunnery and various forms of ammunition. All you can see
22 is the trace on the asphalt.
23 Q. Yes, but you have seen, and you showed to the press, and yesterday
24 you, I think, referred to the same document that you can make calculations
25 that relate to the impact of the projectile to the vicinity of the
1 buildings. You make calculations, and you come to conclusion about the
2 angle of descent of a specific projectile.
3 A. Yes, but it's only when you have in front of you reports from
4 specialists who used specialised tools in their work, who calculated
5 possible angles of descent. Only with that, using firing tables, taking
6 into account that angle and the bearings can you chart the line which
7 allows you to check possible firing points. That is the only way. You
8 cannot go any other way. It has to start with the work of ballistics
9 experts who worked with appropriate instruments.
10 Q. Yes, that is correct. The work you did and others did later about
11 the possible charges, about the possible origins of fire, that's a
12 different story, but the bearing, the approximate direction where the fire
13 came from, and the angle of descent, that can be done with margin of
14 error, of course, but the general elements can be done fairly, fairly
15 quickly looking at the crater, measuring the distances between the impact
16 and the height of the buildings, give you a very, very good indication,
17 not perfect, about the angle of descent and the general direction where
18 the shell came from. Can we agree on that?
19 A. Well, you can make some virtual models in your head, but in such a
20 situation that took so many human lives, that is simply not fair, not
21 appropriate. If I reconstructed in my head a virtual angle of descent,
22 that would mean nothing. It would give nothing, no indication of
23 involvement on either the Serbian or Bosnian side.
24 Q. Yes. I agree that at the end it has to be a proper investigation,
25 but the only point I'm making, that given the fairly clear crater on the
1 ground and other elements, perhaps other information the UNMOs had about
2 hearing sounds, it was possible to make a preliminary determination about
3 the bearing and the direction of fire. Do you agree with that?
4 A. No, I don't. I don't. No information about who heard what in
5 terms of flying shells was available then. We saw that only later in
6 reports. Believe me, when you see practically a vertical hole in the
7 asphalt at an angle of 65 to 70 degrees, you cannot tell anything. I'm a
8 professional man, and on that basis I can say nothing. My job was to
9 organise teams and organise that work within a certain deadline.
10 Q. Yes. Very well. We did have experts who testified here that from
11 the pattern you could see on the ground created by the projectile in
12 whatever form it was fired, it -- you could see clearly the approximate
13 direction around that hit the road by the shape of the pattern, but we
14 don't need to go further into that, although we might come back later.
15 Let's talk about this press conference. Did you attend the press
16 conference of the UNPROFOR gentleman?
17 A. Of course not. To me it came as a surprise, and it was a very
18 reckless move on his part if you ask me.
19 Q. So how did you find out about the press conference?
20 A. In military organisation everybody is in constant contact with one
21 another, from the superior commander of the ABiH and from the other side.
22 There is a constant flow of information towards my superiors. Reports
23 come on my desk all the time, and I saw one of them quoting the words of
24 the spokesman about an alleged Serb aggression.
25 Q. And that person who relayed that information to you, was that
1 somebody from the ABiH side or from the Serb side?
2 A. I had no contacts with the Serbian side, and I wasn't supposed to
3 have any, unless you are referring to the case with the Russian battalion.
4 Of course it was as a subordinate officer. I don't remember his name
5 exactly, but it's possible that he was our liaison officer with the media.
6 He was duty-bound to inform me about all of the events that concerned the
7 media and press releases, as well as contacts with the media.
8 Q. So as I understand, he was part of your organisation. He was
9 connected to you.
10 A. Yes. UNPROFOR staff, Sector Sarajevo.
11 Q. And he relayed to you what he heard at the press conference?
12 A. Most likely he did not attend the press conference but just
13 received a press release, which was a standard procedure. He received a
14 hard copy of a press release, and he came and reported to me. I don't
15 think that he attended the press conference because it was organised
16 hastily, and it wasn't as comprehensive as it should have been.
17 Q. And do you recall after so many years the approximate time the
18 press conference was held or you received the information about the press
20 A. It was within an hour of my arrival at the headquarters. So if I
21 arrived back at the headquarters at around 2.00, then at around 3.00 I
22 received this information, roughly.
23 Q. Thank you, Colonel. And was it then that you decided now it's
24 time for you to get more involved and -- and start your own investigation?
25 A. No, that's not how it was. I decided this in the evening. At
1 that point in time I was enraged by the fact that somebody gave them right
2 to indicate who the enemy was. They had no such right.
3 As for the decision to head the investigation group, that decision
4 emerged when two facts met in my head, namely that one person was lying
5 and that I had in my hands reports that everybody would believe. One was
6 the BH document, and the other document was the document of the Dutch
7 officer about the angle of descent. When I realised that there were these
8 two facts, I decided to head this investigation group. Perhaps if it
9 weren't for these two facts, if both of them did not exist, I would not
10 have taken this decision. I would have just thought, oh, right, somebody
11 lied. A lot of people lie during wartime. And then I would have said,
12 "All right, boys. Let us continue the work. We'll try to find the
13 culprit." However, the existence of these two facts, when I realised
14 this, it became obvious to me that I had to do something in order not to
15 allow the truth to escape or at least not to allow the lie to triumph.
16 Q. I'm interested in these two reports which you have mentioned
17 yesterday as well. You repeated that one report is by a Dutch officer,
18 and I believe you yesterday said that the second report was by a Croat or
19 a Bosnian source.
20 So first the report of the Dutch officer. Again, you know, if you
21 don't recall the names, that's fine, but just tell it us as much as you
22 know about the report. Who authored it? How long was it? Can you tell
23 us anything about that so we can perhaps identify together what report
24 you're talking about?
25 A. In my mind you can see that in my hands in the video footage, you
1 can see in that footage that I was holding something in my hands. I think
2 there was the logo of the BH army on that document, a shell was drawn and
3 also the angle of descent, and you should be able to trace this document
4 in the archives of UNPROFOR. The other report was either Dutch or French,
5 more likely it was the French report. I think that I held the French
6 report in my hands, and in one of these two reports there was discussion
7 of angle of descent, bearings. So those were the two documents that I
8 held in my hands in that video footage, and you should be able to locate
9 these documents in the UNPROFOR archives.
10 Q. Yes, I understand now. So what you are saying is that the two
11 reports you showed to the public during your press appearance, I think
12 that was on 1st September were the same two reports that you have seen in
13 the afternoon or evening on the 28th of August; is that correct?
14 A. Just a minute. The interview was given on the 2nd of September,
15 not on the 1st.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, during the night I
18 went over the materials that the Prosecution wanted to introduce through
19 this witness. However, this drawing, this document bearing logo of the BH
20 army exists. I think that it was even admitted into evidence, but I
21 wasn't able to trace it overnight.
22 This photograph of a shell impacting the surface exists. It was
23 introduced into evidence in this case, Your Honours. I was unable to find
24 it last night, although I did my best. It was admitted into evidence
25 through a witness, this document that this witness is referring to. I
1 think that if we tried, both I and my learned friend, we should be able to
2 trace the document. I saw it at least 10 times.
3 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I'm sure I also think know what you are talking
4 about. The only thing I want to make sure is that, because I'm now
5 talking about two reports, the witness had looked at on the 28th of August
6 after or before the press conference these two documents, one Dutch or
7 French, the other one Bosnian or Croat. And the way I understand the
8 witness, he's saying these are the same reports that he waved into the
9 camera on the 2nd of September.
10 Q. Is that a fair characterisation of what you're saying?
11 A. Yes, those were precisely the documents, and I wanted just to make
12 sure that it's clear that it was on the 2nd of September.
13 Q. Yes, thank you very much. I don't think you mentioned it
14 yesterday, but we'll come to the sequence of events in a moment.
15 Now, having seen the crater and having looked at the reports and
16 having heard or read about the press conference, was that now the moment
17 that you decided to form your group of -- of specialists to -- to look
18 into the matter?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And I believe you told the Trial Chamber yesterday that you then
21 went to see General Bachelet, who was your immediate superior.
22 A. Yes, that's correct.
23 Q. And when did you do that? Can you tell us, because that's also
24 something I couldn't find in any document. I'm not denying it took place,
25 but can you tell us more about that when did you meet him where did you
1 meet him? How long did you talk to him?
2 A. It was either on the 28th or the 29th. I don't remember the exact
3 date, but it wasn't earlier than the evening on the 28th, although it's
4 also possible that it was on the following evening, the 29th. As for the
5 briefing, yes, it lasted 10 to 15 minutes, not longer than that.
6 Q. And was somebody else present?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Because as we know now, there was a military assistant who
9 prevented you from seeing the general another time. This military
10 assistant wasn't present this time?
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic?
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we need to be more
13 specific. Was that the first meeting or the second meeting? He's now
14 speaking of the first meeting, and the second meeting took place later. I
15 do not want to interfere, but could my learned friend Mr. Waespi first
16 establish when the first meeting was held and then the time of the second
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
19 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I thought it was clear we are talking about
20 the first time. The witness is sure whether it's on the evening of the
21 28th or the 29th August. The meeting lasted about 10 minutes.
22 Q. And I think you said, Colonel, that the military assistant was not
23 present. It was just between you, the chief of staff, and
24 General Bachelet.
25 A. No, just the two of us.
1 Q. And where did that take place, in the office of General Bachelet
2 at the PTT?
3 A. No. No. That did not take place at the headquarters. I don't
4 remember where it was that I talked briefly to General Bachelet, but it
5 was something that was improvised. I remember that clearly, because the
6 issue arose spontaneously, and I sought an opportunity to discuss this
7 with the general, to tell him that I wanted personally to take part in the
9 In addition to this, it's possible that some details slipped my
10 memory -- from my memory, and it's possible that this was a telephone
11 discussion, not a meeting, an actual meeting, but I definitely made the
12 suggestion to him and he gave me his response.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi and Mr. Tapuskovic, the two reports
15 that were mentioned, the Chamber would wish to see them. Mr. Tapuskovic
16 says that in his recollection they were mentioned earlier in the case.
17 Mr. Sachdeva?
18 MR. SACHDEVA: Mr. President, good morning to you and Your
20 The report, the Bosnian MUP, the police report, which is one of
21 reports I believe the witness is speaking about was tendered through
22 Witness 137.
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: The exhibit number?
24 MR. SACHDEVA: The exhibit number -- it was tendered in various
25 parts. The diagram showing the wall and the angle of descent was P253
1 under seal. The --
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: P2 --
3 MR. WAESPI: -- 53 under seal. The -- the picture of the shell
4 showing the centre of explosion and how the angle of descent is calculated
5 is P254 under seal, and the official MUP CSB report is 255 under seal
6 which provides of list of wounded and deceased. And the other report, if
7 it is indeed the Dutch -- Mr. Konings' report or the French report, the
8 sector -- French sector cell report is P -- it's incorporated --
9 incorporated in P357.
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: 357.
11 MR. SACHDEVA: Yes.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: So the court deputy will get those reports for
14 Mr. Tapuskovic.
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] But, Your Honours, there is a
16 drawing bearing the logo of the Muslim-Croat federation. There is a
17 drawing showing this shell. It's a very clear, striking drawing. It was
18 admitted into evidence. I remember seeing it. It's a drawing of the
19 shell and the angle of impact. This is the drawing that this witness held
20 in his hands. I know it exists. I was unable to find it because there
21 was no time, but I'm sure that the Prosecution can find it.
22 MR. SACHDEVA: Mr. President, that's what I'm referring to. In
23 fact, I have it up on my screen right now. It's P254 under seal and it
24 shows the shell and it shows how the angle of descent is calculated and it
25 has the minister of the interior of the Sarajevo -- the federation
1 Ministry of Interior logo on the diagram.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, yesterday I mentioned the
4 Chamber's interest all these reports which the witness said he saw and
5 which pointed to differing conclusions. I think he said perhaps six or
6 eight reports, and you must be interested, I would imagine, in -- in those
7 reports, because if you -- if you have six or eight reports from fairly
8 credible sources, all with different conclusions, then that must throw
9 some doubt on the Prosecution's case on this point, and so I would have
10 thought you would have been interested in ascertaining from the witness
11 precisely as -- giving information as precisely as he can, to identify
12 these reports so that an effort could be made to find them, because it is
13 occurring to me, at any rate, that the science and the technology in this
14 area is not very -- not very precise, and the question I would have to ask
15 myself as a Judge is how can I be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt about
16 anything that is produced in this area. If so many reports have differing
17 conclusions, what is the Chamber to believe?
18 So for the beginning we will have the two reports which have been
19 evidenced, and we will look at them. But the Chamber does have an
20 interest in identifying with as much precision as is possible the other
21 reports to which the witness referred, and to ascertain if they're
22 available and to get them.
23 Mr. Sachdeva?
24 MR. SACHDEVA: Mr. President, if I might just add and hopefully it
25 might resolve some issues. There are -- there are a series of reports
1 that have been tendered in this case, in the Prosecution case. The three
2 reports, the first one was the patrol report by Mr. Konings, followed on
3 by the French report, the French sector cell report and indeed the Bosnian
4 Muslim MUP report, and I know this is not the place to make closing
5 arguments, but in our submission those three reports concluded that the
6 bearing was roughly 160 to 180 degrees and the angle of descent was 67
7 minimum angle of descent through to 70 degrees. So in our submission
8 there is no contradiction between those three reports.
9 Now, there was a further G2 UNPROFOR report that was the result
10 of a further investigation and as Mr. President and Your Honours have
11 heard evidence, they came to a bearing of 220 to 240 degrees. And the
12 Prosecution has produced witnesses, Bosnian MUP witnesses, expert witness
13 Richard Higgs, and Mr. Konings who have all in our submission refuted the
14 220-240 bearing, because in our submission the crater analysis, the crater
15 was very clear and you could only come to one conclusion, and I submit
16 that you have heard that in our case.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is what I think I will want to do, and I
18 will give instructions for this could be carried out: Each and every
19 report that has been tendered by the Prosecution, I would like it to be
20 placed before this witness and have his comments on it, and then he can
21 tell us whether, having seen those reports, he saw other reports, and
22 we'll make an effort to get them. So that exercise will be carried out at
23 some time, and I'll ask the court deputy to liaise with the Prosecutor to
24 identify all reports that have been tendered, and the Chamber will carry
25 out that questioning of the witness.
1 So let us continue with the cross-examination.
2 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. We do have a list with all
3 these several reports which can be given --
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. -- Let us -- let him finish. Do you want --
5 are you finished, or do you want to speak for him? Yes. Let Mr. -- All
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I want to comment
8 on what Mr. Sachdeva said. There was a third drawing. In addition to the
9 first two drawings, there was also a third one, a third sketch. What
10 Powers, Baxter and some others said was already admitted into evidence.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have given an instruction, and that instruction
12 is to be carried out by the court deputy, the Chamber's legal assistant,
13 with the help of the parties, and this is to be done by the -- by the
14 break, which is at 9.30, and that instruction is to have ready a list of
15 all the reports that were tendered in the Prosecution's case on this
16 incident, and I'd like the witness to comment on them.
17 MR. WAESPI: Yes. Like Mr. Tapuskovic, Mr. Sachdeva also didn't
18 sleep this night, he collected a list of these reports which can be
19 e-mailed, I guess, to the Defence, to Mr. Monkhouse, and to the legal
20 officer and it can be printed out. It lists the dates, the exhibit
21 numbers, and even a couple of points about the conclusions, so I think we
22 should be ready by the break.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Please continue.
24 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. Going back to the issue of you talking to General Bachelet perhaps
1 over the phone, and you said that that might have been a spontaneous act.
2 Is that what you said?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. But at the same time, you already have grouped your group of
5 specialists who would help you to investigate.
6 A. This group of specialists, actually my staff. I can call in
7 anybody of them any minute. I did not assemble anyone until I actually
8 spoke to General Bachelet. I simply thought about it in my head, about
9 the steps that could be taken.
10 Q. Yes, but I believe yesterday you said you offered to General
11 Bachelet to do that.
12 A. That's precisely so.
13 Q. How many people from your staff did assist you and please list the
14 names. We can also go into private session if you want for that exercise
15 so the names don't become public. It's up to you.
16 A. I don't think that there is anything confidential here. I know
17 for a fact that it was Captain Tyulenev and Major Kozhurov from the
18 Russian unit of the Sarajevo sector staff. As for other officers, I
19 called them in as necessary. For example, chief of engineering corps of
20 the Russian battalion was called in by me so that he could assist in
21 establishing whether there were any minefields in those location that we
22 wanted to photograph, which we wanted to visit in our investigation. I
23 also called in other officers as necessary, but I do not remember their
24 last names.
25 There were 5.000 people under my command, and it's impossible to
1 remember all of their names.
2 Q. And the core group of people that worked with you, your
3 bodyguard/driver, you mentioned him before, the other major and the chief
4 of engineering, these were all nationals, citizens of Russia like you?
5 A. Yes, correct.
6 Q. By the way, who was the chief of the Russian battalion at that
8 A. I forgot his last name. In the first part of the winter
9 Lieutenant Colonel Boltikov was the commander and then starting in the
10 spring and onwards, I forgot. He was a colonel of -- of airborne forces,
11 and I forgot his last name, but it will come back to me.
12 Q. Yes. And it's not really --
13 A. Dvornikov, Dvornikov, Colonel Dvornikov.
14 Q. Now, when was it the first time you were sitting together, if at
15 all, with this group of people or perhaps even with one to discuss these
16 three actions you relayed to us yesterday, and we'll come to that in a
18 A. As I said, the investigation took approximately three days, we
19 either assembled or dispersed in various directions. I first gave them
20 the task to establish all the calculations on the first day, on the 28th,
21 and then following that some people worked with the firing tables.
22 Some people dealt with photographs and projecting possible flight
23 trajectory of the shell. Then some people dealt with the location of
24 minefields. Everybody did their own job.
25 Q. And at the end you had what told us yesterday, a report with
1 conclusions, kind of collecting all this information others did in the
2 course of their duties?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Where's the report?
5 A. The report. In my personal archive.
6 Q. Could it be made available to the Court?
7 A. I think so, although there is one problem. At least I thought of
8 it as a problem until now. Before leaving for the Hague, thinking about
9 how I would corroborate my testimony and arguments and knowing that I had
10 in my personal archive some UNPROFOR documents that I took as a memento, I
11 realised that there is a -- possibly a service related delicate problem.
12 On some of those things that I took from the UNPROFOR, you have the stamp
13 "Confidential." Other documents are not confidential. They are written
14 in my own hand.
15 I contacted somebody who specialises in international law,
16 Baktier Muhamyedov [phoen] who used to be an advisor in the former
17 Yugoslavia, to ask him whether the UN would enable me to produce those
18 documents, and he said no, I had to ask for special permission from the UN
19 staff to reveal them.
20 So this is my personal dilemma. I have some useful documents in
21 my archive, but I don't have them here.
22 If it is not contrary to international law, I could make them
23 available to the Court by courier, by regular mail, bring them myself.
24 That is not a problem.
25 Q. We have seen many UN reports. This is confidential, this is 15
1 years ago, and there is a UN procedure which can be fairly quickly to
2 declassify these documents, and I personally, having looked at so many UN
3 reports here, see no issue about confidentiality, but of course that's up
4 to -- I think it's the UN headquarters to look into these issues, and I'm
5 really convinced that we could accommodate you in this respect.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't see the issue either, and I'm very
7 surprised that the report that you yourself prepared, you didn't bring
8 here. I mean, this is the outcome of your investigations. So why didn't
9 you bring it? I mean, even if you were to leave those reports which you
10 felt you could not bring because in your view they were confidential, I
11 mean, the basic report itself, which is the product of your work, why
12 didn't you bring that? Because I mean that would certainly lend
13 credibility to the story you have been telling.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: And if I my follow up on the President's
15 questions. Why was your report never filed?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the point is when I was
17 called to the Tribunal I didn't know what I would be questioned about. It
18 was a very broadly phrased invitation, something like this: "Colonel,
19 could you possibly appear here as a witness to testify about events in the
20 former Yugoslavia at the time when you were there?" And I said yes. But
21 what exactly the subject of questioning would be, what I would need to
22 produce to corroborate my testimony, nothing was specified. I simply
23 brought here what I could bring through the door.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's apparent to me that you'll have to return
25 with the report and any other documents that you have.
1 Let us continue.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Colonel, could you answer my question? It would
3 seem to me that given the efforts you made at the time to ensure that a
4 second opinion was offered even to the public about where the missile
5 might have been launched from, if at all, given those efforts you would
6 have an interest in securing at least that your report was kept on file.
7 That is to say that you wouldn't just keep your own report for
8 yourself but that you would have ensured that it was kept also in the
9 UNPROFOR files. So why didn't you ensure that your report was properly
10 filed with the UNPROFOR?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am absolutely in agreement with
12 you. Moreover, I had been waiting a long time for somebody from the
13 UNPROFOR, from the Sarajevo sector, from the UN BH command, for the UN in
14 general to ask me while I was still there in Sarajevo, "Colonel, could you
15 produce documents to confirm, to corroborate the information that you gave
16 to Associated Press," but nobody uttered a word about it. Nobody ever
17 asked me a thing. I heard from them only two things: "We will throw you
18 out, or we will kill you." Exactly. Exactly. That was the only
19 argument. And nobody asked a thing. It was undesirable information for
20 everyone. Of course I would have been very pleased to share it. I would
21 have been very pleased to file it, place it into archives, but I was
22 rejected as a source of information leading in an unwanted direction. The
23 truth, nobody wanted it.
24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I think I owe you an explanation.
25 I believe I owe it because it would appear completely illogical I hadn't
1 asked the witness to bring these documents and evidence. I had a contact
2 with this witness a year ago, maybe 18 months ago, just enough to locate
3 him and to elicit his consent to appear as a witness. Since that time I
4 did not have any further discussions with him, and when it was decided in
5 those 15 days to compile a 65 ter list of witnesses, it was approved for
6 me to go to Moscow for a two- or three-day visit, but I couldn't do all
7 the work to complete the 65 ter list, including all the exhibits, so I
8 asked the Registry to bring this witness a day or two earlier than is the
9 custom, and I had all my proofing with the witness in the past three or
10 four days, and that's when I learned about the documents. I learned about
11 those he showed during the interview, and now I hear for the first time
12 that he has some more documents which are confidential, and I am really at
13 a loss what to tell you.
14 If I had seen this witness before the trial, I would have insisted
15 that he bring these documents. That is the difficulty the Defence faced,
16 and it is understandable that the Court insists on evidence that could
17 give more credibility to the evidence presented by this witness. But if I
18 had extended my stay in Moscow, I would have fallen short on some other
19 duties that I had to complete in those 15 days.
20 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tapuskovic, I believe -- I have
21 to say that I don't fully agree with you. Since the beginning, you have
22 questioned the Prosecution's position on this incident of the 28th of
23 August, and it was your duty to get in touch with your witness and to ask
24 him to bring all the documents with him, because if you do not have any
25 documents on that particular incident, if you do not have any arguments or
1 documents to counter the arguments presented by the Prosecution relating
2 to incidents referred to in the indictment, then I believe your arguments
3 are not very strong. I don't think you didn't have the time. I believe
4 you did have the time.
5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Judge Mindua, I must
6 respond. I have a certain number of UN documents in my hands that
7 demonstrate eloquently the things that this witness is testifying about,
8 and I have shown them to the witness. These documents are
9 self-explanatory. The problem here is that the witness is also in
10 possession of some more UNPROFOR documents that I didn't know about
11 before. I'm hearing it for the first time now. I didn't know that he had
12 in his possession some UNPROFOR documents that are -- that are
14 If those documents were not approved for disclosure by the UN, I
15 wouldn't have asked him to reveal them to me even if I had known about
16 them. So that I personally, as Defence counsel, don't think I need
17 anything more. I'm speaking on my own behalf, of course, as counsel. And
18 after the testimony of this witness and on the basis of evidence that were
19 already admitted even before him, I as Defence counsel for
20 Dragomir Milosevic need no further documents.
21 If this witness can produce some more documents and the Court
22 wants them, there is a certain procedure to declassify them. If I had
23 known about them, and I didn't, I couldn't have asked the witness to
24 produce them. He brought some other documents, photographs, two documents
25 that have already been exhibited, et cetera, whereas the others that he
1 says are confidential, I couldn't ask him to produce them here, but I know
2 there is a procedure.
3 The documents that I showed the witness are self-explanatory, and
4 I don't think any further comment is needed. I'll leave it for closing
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
7 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Just a couple of clarification points about this report. I take
9 it it's in Russian. The main -- your report is in Russian?
10 A. You know, a report is a compilation of documents. It's the --
11 there is no final detailed report because the entire conclusion boils down
12 to one sentence. The statement made by the spokesman is false. This
13 couldn't have been a shell from the Serb side. That's one sentence. All
14 the rest was in my hands at that time. Firing tables, the maps, reports
15 from other officers in Bosnia speaking of the angle descent, but there is
16 no one finished final report. It is a compilation, including photographs
17 of various locations showing that it was impossible to fire from them.
18 Q. I understand there are various parts. There are these UNPROFOR
19 reports which were in your possession and which you took into account.
20 There are the Bosnian reports, perhaps there is photos, but there are also
21 documents generated by you or your colleagues. At least that's what I
22 heard you say. So these documents which were produced by your colleagues
23 in analysing what other documents might have said, these are now in your
25 A. All these documents are in the video. I hold them in my hands
1 while talking. They are also in my personal file and bear no mark of
3 If you freeze some stills from the video, you will see that. They
4 are the same as the ones I had in my safe. I can send them by post or
5 deliver them otherwise.
6 As for other UNPROFOR reports, I didn't see a single real report
7 with conclusions from the Sarajevo sector. It didn't exist, because
8 nobody wanted the truth.
9 Q. Let me, perhaps, look at it from a different angle. When you went
10 to see General Bachelet at the end of your investigation, you were held
11 back by his military assistant. Do you remember that?
12 A. Yes. But that's not quite so. He couldn't hold me back, because
13 he was a major and I was a colonel. He said, and I believed him, that
14 there was no chance the report would be accepted with such conclusions,
15 and there was no chance to propagate, publish this information that I
16 arrived at, and I believed him.
17 Q. Yes. And you can talk about the report. So what did you show to
18 him? What exactly did you show to him, and what did he refer to when he
19 said that's not going to be published? I'm interested in that report as
20 it were.
21 A. I brought him that batch of documents that I referred to several
22 times a day, the firing tables, two reports, the Bosnian one and the Dutch
23 one, the drawings, and the one-sentence conclusion, "The Serbs didn't do
24 it." I showed him the documents and I told him so. I told him the Serbs
25 didn't do it, and that was enough for him to respond, "No. No chance. No
2 Q. So there is - apart from one sentence - there is no kind of
3 comprehensive report in Russian or any other language that would kind of
4 be the gist of -- of your conclusions?
5 A. Yes, correct, because it wasn't necessary. It was so obvious that
6 it wasn't necessary to write it.
7 Q. I will come to that I guess later, but since we are on that
8 similar topic, you said that you made a film and you took photographs of
9 the sites you were visiting. Where are these photographs now? Where's
10 the film now?
11 A. In my personal file at home.
12 Q. Yes. I think that would be -- I can only talk about myself. That
13 would be very important information to -- to relay to us, these photos.
14 And the film? Did you say a film as well?
15 A. No, no. I didn't say anything about film. I didn't have a video
16 camera. I had a still camera, not even a digital one, and the -- the
17 photographs are in my personal archive.
18 Q. Although I think in your public appearance you said, "I filmed
19 it," but that might have been a translation issue. Anyway, these photos
20 are in your possession in Russia as well.
21 And just to conclude again what your colleagues did, the chief of
22 engineer from the Russian battalion, they didn't produce anything in
23 writing and then submit to you, which you still have in your possession?
24 A. The chief of engineering, as I said, collected information on
25 minefields and enabled the group to identify, locate the minefields. And
1 if the location we needed was in a minefield, he would enable us to have
2 access without getting killed. For that you didn't need any documents.
3 It was practical work; that is, to save the lives of the investigation
5 Q. Very well. Just going back to that encounter with the military
6 assistant of General Bachelet. Do you remember the date? Was it the same
7 day you went public, on the 2nd of September, or was it on the 1st of
8 September that you tried to get to General Bachelet, or was it on another
10 A. Yes, I believe it was on the 1st. I'm not quite sure, but it was
11 towards the end of the investigation. That is, it must have been either
12 the 31st of August or the 1st of September.
13 Q. And can you perhaps remember what time of the day it was, and the
15 A. The location was the next-door office. I didn't have to travel to
16 see General Bachelet. I had to make two steps to the next office. And as
17 for the time of day, I can't tell you. It could have been late at night.
18 Q. And then when you tried to get to General Bachelet who was next
19 door, you ran into his military assistant, or how come that the military
20 assistant was in between you and your superior?
21 A. That is standard procedure. If in the anteroom the aide-de-camp
22 or the commander knows there is a meeting upcoming or some documents to be
23 received, it's necessary to first clear it with him. If it's something
24 spontaneous, initiated by a subordinate, you have to see the aide-de-camp
25 and explain why you want to meet the general, what you want to show to
1 him. So it was perfectly normal.
2 Q. And the aide-de-camp, ADC, or military assistant, he was a
3 Canadian? You said a Canadian?
4 A. I am 90 per cent certain that he was a Canadian officer, but I may
5 be mistaken. Maybe General Gobillard had a Canadian ADC, but if you
6 really want to be sure, you can go to the G1 part of the archive and find
7 out who the aide-de-camp was.
8 Q. Was he perhaps Colonel Fortin, F-o-r-t-i-n? Or Major Fortin at
9 that time?
10 A. A colonel could not have been an ADC. It was a duty to be
11 occupied by a major, but as I said, I can't remember the name.
12 Q. Where was his office in -- was it in between your office and the
13 office of General Bachelet, or maybe on the other side of the doorway?
14 A. According to custom we were all in one building. The commander
15 was somewhere along the hallway. But first when you open that door you
16 enter an anteroom, and then through the next door is the office of the
18 Q. Very well. Was there anybody else present at the conversation --
19 or the encounter, rather, between you and the ADC, or was it just you and
21 A. Correct. We were alone, the two of us.
22 Q. And how long did that meeting last?
23 A. Ten, 15 minutes.
24 Q. Now, you said yesterday that you were in a dilemma between several
25 options. You had, in fact, you said two options, either to stop or to
1 become public. Wasn't there a third option for you, as the chief of staff
2 or alter-ego of the commander, to call him again and get in touch with him
3 before making something you had described as, I think, illegal, or an act
4 of insubordination, whatever your words were? Wouldn't there have been a
5 third way, actually, to try and get in touch with your commander? Maybe
6 wait an hour before making that huge step to -- to get out of the chain of
7 command of UNPROFOR and go public?
8 A. You're perfectly right. In reality, one has more freedom than one
9 often imagines, but in the life of a military man there are much fewer
10 choices. One reason that did not allow me to take the path you suggest is
11 this: I realised perfectly well that if General Bachelet accepts
12 responsibility, personal responsibility, for that kind of investigation,
13 he will relieve me partially of that responsibility and take it upon
14 himself. And by doing so, he may invite a death sentence upon himself.
15 And the General Bachelet was a man whom I had great respect for and didn't
16 wish him that. And I thought to myself, I'll take the risk on my own.
17 I'm not going to set anyone else up. That would be my answer.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll take the break now.
19 --- Recess taken at 9.31 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 9.51 a.m.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
22 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. Can I make a suggestion
23 about scheduling? I'm sure you're aware that I need certainly the
24 whole -- the whole of today with this witness, and since, I think, the
25 feeling is that he needs to come back with his documents and certainly the
1 photos at a later stage, and since he needs to catch a plane later today,
2 I can suggest that I continue for about an hour. I understand that the
3 Defence has another witness which we have not finished yet lined up. So
4 that would be a compromise, but I'm of course in your hands.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I believe that's a workable proposal.
6 MR. WAESPI: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Q. Colonel --
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. Mr. Tapuskovic wanted to say
10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, before we started
11 this session, Mr. Waespi and I spoke about this problem. I think that we
12 concluded that this witness would need to come back, that Mr. Waespi needs
13 additional time for this witness.
14 I am not allowed to contact the witness regarding this issue
15 because the cross-examination has started, so the witness needs to be
16 explained, and I think that it is up to the Chamber to do this, to explain
17 it to him that he will need to come back.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: And the Chamber will do so at an appropriate
20 Go ahead.
21 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. Going back to the ADC of General Bachelet, do you remember whether
23 that was his standard ADC, or was it somebody who just stood in for the
24 maybe main ADC who was out of town?
25 A. To tell you the truth, I don't remember. At any rate, I was
1 supposed to discuss with ADC the issues that I wanted to raise and that's
2 what I did. I just knew that the ADC was there at his duty post.
3 Q. Thank you, Witness. Another fact I wanted to ask you about is the
4 fact that nowhere in these UN documents, and maybe you have some in -- in
5 Russia, about you conducting an investigation. There is -- or an inquiry
6 or whatever you want to call it. There is talk about, you know, the UNMO
7 investigation. There is talk about the other things going on. And given
8 the fact that you were the releasing officer of quite a number of these
9 official UNPROFOR situation reports, I wonder whether you ever considered
10 in mentioning the fact that you were doing something in one of these UN
12 A. As for the official UNPROFOR documents, strictly speaking I don't
13 know that there are any other documents other than daily, weekly, and
14 monthly assessments, the ones that I signed. And in addition to this, I
15 also wrote standard operating procedures for Sector Sarajevo. I signed
16 them. I don't remember signing any other UNPROFOR documents.
17 Now, as for the investigation, I already spoke to you about that.
18 Had I been ordered, had I been asked, or had I been approached at any
19 level and asked to put it in writing, to put the conclusions that my group
20 and I had reached in writing, I would have done it gladly. However, none
21 of the officials asked me to do that. And this was something that I
22 expected throughout the time that I was there until the end of December.
23 And you have to agree that it was quite strange that nobody asked me to do
24 this, which means that they were not interested in it. Otherwise, they
25 would have asked them -- asked me. And insubordination is not something
1 that is desirable in any armed forces. Initiative is not welcome.
2 Q. In the course of these three, four days during which you started
3 your investigation, I think you said you started on the 28th of August
4 already. Did you still attend the normal staff meetings during which
5 there would have been an opportunity to raise any of these matters with
6 your commander? When I talk about staff meetings, I mean meetings of your
7 UNPROFOR staff, Sector Sarajevo.
8 A. Yes, naturally. The regular standard planned activity of the
9 staff went on, including the command staff to which I belonged. However,
10 the issue of that incident was not raised, because practically there was a
11 veto on information concerning that incident. There was an impression
12 that the spokesperson of the UNPROFOR BH command was the only one
13 authorised to publicize the truth, and everybody else had to pretend that
14 they went along with it.
15 Q. But you did have these meetings. Usually there are morning
16 meetings with senior staff, including yourself and including
17 General Bachelet. I just want to make sure I understand you correctly.
18 A. Yes, precisely so. That was the standard procedure. We had our
19 morning meetings. They were not necessarily presided over by
20 General Bachelet. I could not confirm to you that throughout those three
21 days we met with General Bachelet every morning. It's possible that he
22 was absent. However, we continued with our work. There were no
23 interruptions in regular procedure.
24 Q. And there was no opportunity for you to kind of tap on the
25 shoulder of General Bachelet, if indeed he was around, and tell him, "You
1 remember, you know, we discussed over the phone a couple of days ago the
2 investigation. You know, now two or three days later, you know, I'm kind
3 of approaching a conclusion"? Wouldn't there be a way for you to
4 communicate with your -- your superior?
5 A. Most likely that would have been the case. However, it's always
6 much easier to make such claims in hindsight. I didn't really look for a
7 possibility to approach General Bachelet with this. He consented to me
8 doing this work, and I did this work. I did not consider it necessary to
9 further get him involved in this.
10 Q. After the incident or whatever, did you ever have a chance to
11 discuss with General Bachelet that, or you -- when you left UNPROFOR there
12 was no more contact with you with anybody from UNPROFOR, including
13 General Bachelet?
14 A. I don't quite follow you. As I have already explained to you, on
15 the 28th in the evening I met with General Bachelet. We discussed this
16 incident briefly. Both of us reached the conclusion that it was a
17 terrible tragic event, probably the most tragic event, during our stay
18 there in 1995. We both concluded that on one side we had to make sure
19 that our soldiers were safe, and on the other hand we had to become more
20 active in monitoring the activities of the warring sides.
21 On my part I suggested to him that I could head the investigation
22 group. That was what we discussed. And further we did not discuss this
23 issue for the reasons I explained earlier.
24 Q. Yes. And then we have your attempt to talk to him on the 1st or
25 2nd September, and my question is did you at any time later, you know, in
1 September, in October, in December of 1995, or maybe even in 1996, or
2 1997, 2000, discuss your findings, your conclusions, your report, your
3 suspicion, with General Bachelet?
4 A. I understand. Naturally I had a conversation with
5 General Bachelet several days after the interview -- a day or two after
6 the interview. He looked quite distressed, and the reasons for that were
7 quite understandable. As I have already explained to you information was
8 leaked that to a certain extent discredited him, General Rupert Smith,
9 maybe somebody else above them, and it simply slipped out of his control.
10 And humanly speaking, I fully sympathised with him. I understood it. I
11 sympathised with him and everybody else whom I got in trouble without
12 wanting to do that.
13 But let me say once again that to take up the initiative and to
14 say, "Let me write, let me tell, let me explain," was something that there
15 was no need for me to do because nobody asked me to do that. I said that
16 I was ready to announce the truth, and UNPROFOR said, "We will send you
17 back to Russia." That was the end of the discussion. There was no need
18 for me to explain anything else.
19 After that, I was sent to Mons to NATO staff there to head the
20 Russian section at that location.
21 Q. Just a final point. When you talked to the ADC, did you -- I
22 think you already explained, and I'm sorry for going back to that, that
23 showed him, you know, your documents. Do you remember having shown him
24 the photos as well?
25 A. Yes, the photographs had already been developed. I showed him the
1 photographs, firing tables, various papers, and I told him what our
2 conclusion was. Yes, that's how it was.
3 Q. Thank you very much. And the last point on this issue, did you
4 have any contacts with the VRS, with the army of the Republika Srpska, or
5 with any other representative of the Republika Srpska during those days,
6 you know, on -- after the explosion on the 28th of August? Did you talk
7 with any of -- of these people? Of course about the events.
8 A. Yes, I did have contact. The routine regime went on. A liaison
9 officer, Indjic, who was an officer of the SRK, was constantly in touch
10 with UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo. Routinely I would meet both with liaison
11 officer of the VRS army and the BH army. I think the liaison officer for
12 the BH army was Colonel Lugonja or something like that. I did not discuss
13 our report with him because it had nothing to do with Republika Srpska.
14 It had -- it only concerned me and the people that I was responsible to.
15 Q. But did you give them a sense of what you were doing, that you
16 were doing kind of a side investigation to the official UNPROFOR
17 investigations? Were they aware of that?
18 A. I don't know whether they knew about it or not. If they followed
19 me, if they had me under surveillance then, yes, they probably would have
20 known because I was in their territory. I was in the territory of one of
21 the warring sides. So it's probable that they knew about it. But I
22 didn't find it necessary to deliberately inform them about that.
23 Q. Okay. Let's talk about that now, the trips you made. Who went to
24 see these potential firing positions of mortars? Was it of you, was you
25 and your driver/bodyguard? Was there somebody else? Can you tell us a
1 little bit more about that?
2 A. No, just the two of us.
3 Q. And on how many days did you do that, or just on one day?
4 A. Just a minute. You mean visiting the site of the incident or
5 visiting firing positions?
6 Q. Yes, the latter. You talked in your TV appearance that you went
7 through these rocky areas and determined it was impossible to fire a
8 120-millimetre mortar from the places you've seeing, that part of your
9 investigation. When did you go?
10 A. I understand now. There were always several of us going on those
11 tours. As I said, Captain Tyulenev, then artillery men from the Russian
12 battalion. It is quite possible somebody else joined us. So there was a
13 always a number of us. The principal was quite simple. We were look to
14 at the fire tables and coordinate in order to establish with a margin of
15 error of one to two metres the exact location. Unfortunately, at the time
16 we didn't not have a GPS device, but we were able to use the traditional
17 old fashioned instruments to determine the location. I would stand at the
18 location and they would take a make photograph of me in order to establish
19 that within the radius that would roughly be that of this room.
20 It was impossible to fire from that location because there was a
21 forest there in one location. And on the other location there was a
22 pristine meadow, and it would have been impossible to fire from there
23 either. And then in the third location there were just too many rocks and
24 boulders, and again it would have been impossible to place a weapon there.
25 Those are the locations that we visited.
1 Q. Yes. Let's take it step-by-step. You personally -- did I
2 understand you correctly, you personally with your driver/bodyguard
3 visited four locations, the four locations you pointed out in that video
4 we've seen yesterday?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. That's the only location you personally visited?
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute.
8 Mr. Tapuskovic.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Robinson, the
10 question put to this witness was, "You toured these locations just with
11 your driver escorting you," but that's not the case. The witness
12 explained there was always a number of them, and he even mentioned ranks
13 of the people who accompanied -- accompanied him on those locations. It
14 wasn't just him and the driver.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's for the witness to -- to correct that. I
16 think the counsel was putting it to him.
17 Or were you putting it to him that he -- as something that he had
18 already said in court?
19 MR. WAESPI: No, Mr. President. I'm aware that there was a team.
20 And in fact that's what I'm trying to figure out, which locations the
21 witness himself visited and if there were other locations that other
22 members of his team visited. I'm just not entirely clear at this stage
23 about that.
24 Q. So, Colonel, you yourself and your driver visited these four
25 locations? That's number one.
1 A. I understand your question. It's not that I just visited and
2 photographed these locations with a still camera. We didn't film them.
3 We photographed them with a still camera. And if you remember, there was
4 also the fifth location that we showed in the video, because one of the
5 observers pointed to this possible fifth location, and we did visit it
6 too. Naturally, we thoroughly visited it wherever the minefields allowed.
7 We visited dozens of locations, physically visited them and investigated
9 Q. Just following on your last answer. What dozens of locations did
10 you visit? So you not only visited these four locations you identified
11 and pointed out during your presentation, you also visited dozens of
13 A. Yes. We visited them. We travelled there in APCs and then
14 continued on foot. So we would get to a certain point that we calculated
15 on the basis of the angle of descent, and then we would go on foot, either
16 climb or descend, and it was probably thousands of metres that we walked
17 on foot.
18 Q. And just to make sure that I understand that, was it the whole
19 group that would be always together, or was it just you and your driver to
20 visit some locations and your colleagues would visit other locations, or
21 is it a combination, that sometimes you would be alone with your driver
22 and sometimes you would split up? Can you explain the mechanics of your
24 A. I certainly can. However, I don't think that the Chamber would be
25 interested in technical details. This is what it looked like: First we
1 did theoretical work on the basis of documents. We drew a line on the
2 map. Following that, we sent officers, engineers, who conducted
3 reconnaissance of minefields and either made a passage through minefields
4 or were able to establish that there were no minefields there. Thus there
5 was no danger for us. Then other officers would mark with cones the line
6 so that we could easily follow the line. In addition that, artillery
7 specialists would visit the location and mark on the spot, the very spot
8 from which this shell was allegedly fired.
9 So everybody did their job. I went with the captain and the man
10 who made photographs, who was also an officer. We moved along that line,
11 and we photographed all the possible spots from which the shell could have
12 been fired. It's a thorough, detailed, laborious type of work.
13 Q. But I'm -- I just want to go back to my earlier point. Did other
14 people from your group, like these artillery specialists, did they visit
15 locations you did not visit yourself?
16 A. I'm not sure I understood you. The entire area of responsibility
17 covered by the Russian battalion had to be very well-known to them, and
18 they had to be there. I don't understand the question.
19 Q. I'm just asking whether you personally visited all the spots you
20 thought were potential firing spots according to what you heard analysed
21 in these reports? You personally did that?
22 A. Yes. Yes, I did that myself, and I have on record photographs
23 which show me pointing my finger on the location, and the photographs
24 corroborate the -- the argument that I'm making.
25 Q. Okay. And you said that you drew a line on the map which would be
1 sort of the guiding principle for you to visit these locations and that
2 line, I guess, would be what you knew from the reports was the possible
3 direction of fire, that was 176 degrees. That's at least what you said in
4 this public appearance.
5 A. There are two numbers, at least two numbers there. One referring
6 to the bearings, the azimuth, and when degrees are mentioned it's the
7 angle of descent. I believe it was 67 degrees.
8 Q. Yes. And the direction of fire if you take a 360 degree circle, I
9 know -- I think the NATO count was 6.400 mils., and I think the Russian
10 army 6.000. These are all ways to calculate the direction of fire. But
11 looking at the 360 degree circle of a watch, of a clock, you would look at
12 a possible direction of fire of 176 degrees?
13 A. Yes, that's correct.
14 Q. Very well. And what you did, and you explained it nicely on that
15 chart behind you, is you followed this or looked at these four possible
16 locations which were on the Bosnian Serb side which correspond to the
17 possible charges used to fire that shell, namely charge three, four, five,
18 and six.
19 A. Yes, correct.
20 Q. And so the guiding principle for you to look at these locations
21 was this line of 176 degrees.
22 A. Both the line and the angle. The angle indicated the exact
23 locations of fire points.
24 Q. Yes, because looking at the JNA charts, you were able to calculate
25 at what distance a specific charge would be fired achieving this angle; is
1 that correct?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Now, if we could have a map, 03346A, please. This is a map,
4 Colonel, which hopefully depicts the area of where you were venturing out
5 on -- on those days. And while that's being retrieved, can I ask you
6 again, did you visit these four locations on one day or was it spread over
7 several days?
8 A. I think it was spread over two days.
9 Q. And which two days would that be?
10 A. On the 29th, we did the theory work, the calculations using firing
11 tables and maps. On the 30th we were on location, and possibly on the
12 31st we continued working on the location. Two, two and a half days.
13 Q. And starting on the 30th, what time in the morning did you leave?
14 A. You will understand that 12 years later it's difficult -- it's
15 difficult to remember the chronology of the site visits, but we tried to
16 set out early in the morning and work until dark.
17 Q. Thank you. I appreciate your answer. I agree it's difficult to
18 cast your mind back such a long time and talk about details.
19 Do you see a map in front of you, Colonel?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, can you orient yourself on this map?
22 A. Generally speaking, yes.
23 Q. And do you see the Old Town of -- of Sarajevo, especially the dark
24 brown part which delineates the area where Markale was, just in a general
1 A. Yes, I understand.
2 Q. And obviously if you looked at a direction of fire of 170 degrees,
3 which is almost half of the circle, and if you look at a watch it's 6.00,
4 so you would have looked at all these locations, you know, in the south of
5 the city.
6 Now, can you take a pen and just -- we can even enlarge the photo,
7 and if --
8 MR. WAESPI: Mr. Usher, can you help the Witness, please? There
9 is no need to rush.
10 Q. And really take your time, and your markings need to be clear, and
11 you have made such a nice chart, and we saw from your TV presentation 12
12 years ago that you're a capable presenter. So take your time and please
13 show us the way, the exact way you travelled, perhaps even indicating
14 where you travelled by car. You said you used an APC. And then where you
15 left the car and where you walked on foot. And perhaps just think about
16 it first, orient yourself, and then as clear and as precise as you're able
17 to, tell us which location you visited on the 30th of August and perhaps
18 even the next day. And I'm only interested now in this part, looking at
19 the degree of 176, and not the other one, which I think was about
20 230 degrees near Lukavica.
21 A. Tell me, please, what is the scale of this map, because I can't
22 see it.
23 Q. Let me just look at the original, please. Now it's slightly
24 distorted also because we have enlarged it. Unfortunately it says on my
25 map scale "not available," but we do have a similar map, a street map,
1 which has a scale, and perhaps you can compare those two with each other,
2 which allows you to be correct. We can do that. We can give you 28 --
3 this is ter number 2872. That's a normal commercial street map. And
4 perhaps you want to look at that first. So since you didn't make a
5 marking that, I think we can leave that the way it is and go back to the
6 street map and that has a scale. It indicates what a thousand metres is.
7 Yes. The map we are looking at has a scale of 1:20.000. That's
8 the next one we will see in a moment.
9 And I appreciate your comment about the scale. That's a very
10 important issue before you mark any map. Thanks. Thanks for that.
11 Yes, Colonel, this is a commercial map, and the scale, as I said,
12 is 1:20.000, and at the bottom to the right you see a little marking,
13 legend. That's what 1 kilometre is.
14 A. And what am I supposed to do, show it on this map or on the
15 previous one?
16 Q. You can do it on this one, if you prefer. And since we are
17 talking about that, let's do it on this one.
18 MR. WAESPI: If the area south of the Old Town could be enlarged.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.
20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I just feel obliged to say, since
21 this is a scale of 1:20.000, that military maps are always on a scale of
22 1:25.000, 1:50.000 or 1:100.000, but a military map can never be 1:20.000.
23 For a military expert of this profile to give us some information.
24 This is a commercial street map as my colleague Mr. Waespi said himself.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you for that information.
1 MR. WAESPI:
2 Q. I can just offer two maps. I can offer the first one, and I'll
3 inquire what the scale was, but this one gives you a rough idea about the
4 distances so you can acquaint yourselves about the distances, and I think
5 we could go back to the first happen. It's up to you, whatever you want.
6 A. Frankly, it's all the same to me. You understand this is a,
7 frankly speaking, prehistoric, obsolete method, very primitive. What can
8 I do here? I can draw an approximate line, but that cannot be the real
9 thing. You cannot hold me to that. I can take a military map and the
10 material from that video presentation, and then with a proper map I can
11 draw a proper line. That will take only 10 minutes of an IT specialist's
12 time. On this map I can approximately indicate, yes.
13 Q. Yes. I'm not interested in the line, I'm interested in the
14 locations you visited and even more, in the way, the actual route that you
15 took on the 28th. And I would feel more comfortable, Colonel, if we would
16 go back to the first map that we talked about, but only if you feel
17 comfortable as well.
18 A. Any map would be good.
19 Q. Okay. Let's go to the first map, because it's more detailed and
20 it has the contour lines. And the number of that map was 03346A. Yes.
21 And it's obviously a military map as well, because it shows the -- some
22 parts of the warring factions. Yes. I think that's a good cutout right
23 now. Don't go any further. Yes. You need to go more to the -- the
24 cutout has to be bigger. It was perfect just a moment ago. More to
25 the -- yes. I think that's fine. That should be it. That should be
1 okay, yes.
2 So can you indicate, and really take your time, the route you took
3 on the 28th -- on the -- I think you said on the 30th of August, and
4 perhaps the next day, in discovering possible mortar locations?
5 A. Is it clear?
6 Q. Yes, but I'm mostly interested less in -- in these calculated
7 drawings than the actual route. What did you do -- where did you start?
8 When you came from Sarajevo, which route did you take? Where did you
9 leave the APC and start to work on foot as you told us a moment ago?
10 A. As you look at this drawing, approximately, and I underline
11 approximately, you see the route of the APC. Usually I would set out in
12 my car from Sarajevo to Grbavica, to the Russian battalion. There we
13 would switch to an APC. We moved along roughly this route up to a point
14 where you see a little circle, and from there on we went on foot.
15 Q. Okay. Let's just take it step-by-step. It's really important,
16 Colonel, that we get an idea of your actual route you took.
17 You said you had an APC, and you say that from a certain point.
18 "Where there is a little circle from there we went on foot." Please mark
19 that point from where you went on foot with the letter A.
20 A. [Marks]
21 Q. So -- and I'm just trying to find out how you reached that point.
22 Did you follow from Grbavica the route towards Pale, then crossed this
23 imaginary line, which is your blue line, to the village of Knjegnjac, and
24 then you took that turned road towards your letter A? Was that the route
25 you took?
1 A. Either that, or we followed the blue line that you see through the
2 fields. The track. Not the real road but the dirt track. We used all
3 possibilities. An APC can overcome a slope of 30 degrees, so it was an
4 all terrain thing. It could handing that terrain.
5 Q. Okay. Let me put it differently. Which of these four locations,
6 the possible firing locations of a mortar, did you visit first, if you
8 A. If I remember correctly, we started from the front end, this point
9 that I'm showing now, this little cross that I'm putting now, on the
10 confrontation line practically. That was the beginning. And then we went
11 down from point to point along this route on the front line side into the
12 depth that is behind the lines.
13 Q. Okay. Very well. Let's start with location number one. Can you
14 put -- I know which one you mean, the one at the confrontation lines, but
15 please put the number 1 beside it. The first location you visited?
16 A. [Marks]
17 Q. Great?
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Waespi, could I suggest that we coordinate
19 with the drawing made already by the witness so that we would call that
20 C3, and then C4 and C5 and C6.
21 MR. WAESPI: That's an excellent suggestion, yes.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [Marks]
23 MR. WAESPI:
24 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Now, how did you get to location number as 3
25 as it is now? Previously 1. It's now 3. You went by APC. Where did you
1 leave it, and where did you walk towards?
2 A. We reached every point by walking. We would leave our APC in any
3 convenient place that was safe, outside of minefields, not under fire by
4 either warring party. I cannot show you on the map because there were
5 dozens of such locations. I can improvise, of course, but I don't think
6 this is the proper place for improvising.
7 Q. So in relation to the first location, location 3, you remember
8 what you saw there? What kind of area was it? If you recall after such a
9 long time, and perhaps the map and the contours, it's green - it appears
10 to be wooded - reminds you of that. Can you explain us what you saw
12 A. Let me tell you, I remember all the four points perfectly well,
13 but which one of them corresponds to which site on the map I can not tell
14 you exactly.
15 Q. I have a hard copy --
16 A. I have photographs, though.
17 Q. Yes. I have a hard copy of the same location, so -- which is not
18 touched by your markings, which kind of covers some, perhaps, even
19 important information contained on the maps like contours. So I think it
20 might be easier for you to look at the untouched map, and at the same time
21 we can continue working on your interactive map as it were.
22 MR. WAESPI: So if the witness could be shown -- you can show it
23 to counsel as well. In fact, counsel can have a map as well. And if
24 Your Honours would like to see a hard copy, I'm certainly --
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, I'm going to ask you to stop at about
1 7 minutes to 11.00 so that I can make the arrangements for the witness.
2 MR. WAESPI: Very well. Your Honours -- thank you.
3 Q. So just talking about this first location, number 3, just tell us
4 as much as you can --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic is on his feet.
6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm the only one, it seems, who
7 didn't get the map.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic has not received a map.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] The map disappeared from my
10 screen. Thank you.
11 MR. WAESPI:
12 Q. So, Witness, just tell us as much as you can about this location
13 which is now number 3. What do you remember? How far away from the road,
14 this transit road Pale-Lukavica it was? I know it's a long time ago and
15 it's kind of perhaps even guesswork, but just try to help us a little bit
16 about how you reached that location. Were there minefields to cross
17 through? Did you meet people, soldiers from any warring factions at that
19 A. It's perfectly obvious that we passed through the front line of
20 the Army of the Republika Srpska. The Defence positions were standard.
21 We didn't see anything out of the ordinary there. The troops were on
22 duty. We were led through by a local commander who would show us that
23 there was no minefield there, that it was safe. And we reached our
24 destination point without running any risks; although, the exchange of
25 firing between two warring sides continued.
1 It was on a slope approximately one kilometre from the road
2 leading east, and there's not much to add, as you must know. These maps
3 tend to become obsolete after a while. Although I see that this is dated
4 2007, the surveys underlying the map were done 10 or even 20 years before.
5 So there could be a field or a dirt track through. Our standard
6 procedure would be to run through the reference points indicated by the
7 artillery men, make sure that it was possible to photograph, make
8 photographs, make sure that the reference point was not going to come
9 under fire, and then we would move further into the rear towards point
10 number 4.
11 You see these are very difficult slopes at a very large angle,
12 which in itself tells you that it's impossible to place a mortar there.
13 The fields were flat completely like a golf terrain.
14 Q. How long did it take you, as far as you remember, from the
15 location where you left the APC, then talking to this local commander who
16 accompanied you to the suspected fire location? How long did all that
17 action take, if you recall?
18 A. Of course. It was not a problem. The entire distance was five
19 kilometres. If you multiply it by the gradient, we took two days all in
20 all, two and a half days.
21 Q. Sorry, can I interrupt you Witness? I'm really only focusing on
22 this location which is now marked as 3. You told us just a moment ago
23 that you were met by a local commander. There were a few minefields, and
24 you went to the suspected location. How long did that action last on that
25 first suspected fire location number 3? How long it take for you to go
1 there to take the photo, to interact with these soldiers? Can you tell us
2 after such a long time?
3 A. I can remember. I personally didn't talk to any soldiers. The
4 UNPROFOR doesn't look kindly upon that sort of thing. The local officer
5 had to make sure that we were not fired upon, mistaking us for the enemy,
6 but I was not the one who contacted with the local commander. He was told
7 to assist us by the higher command. And there were no minefields, thank
8 God. It took approximately two hours.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi.
10 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Hold your fire. There are some logistical
12 matters that we have to consider.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are considering how to get the documents to
15 the witness. It has been said that some of them are confidential and that
16 the better course might be to have the witness come back at least a day
17 before so that he could prepare, but another option would be to lift the
18 confidentiality so that the witness can prepare himself properly. He is
19 of course not to discuss his evidence with anybody, and I will tell him
21 MR. WAESPI: Yes. He could photocopy maybe the cover page of each
22 document and send it by e-mail or fax to court officers who could then ask
23 for UN clearance, because that's a very, very quick process.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, I'm now talking about the documents that we
25 have. We would lift the confidentiality.
1 MR. WAESPI: Yes. As I say, I don't think any of these documents
2 are confidential any more. I think there might be one or two sketches
3 which were under seal, but that only concerned because the witness was a
4 protected witness. In my view all these documents are public documents
5 which can be given to the witness.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes and if any is confidential, we will take the
7 necessary steps to lift that confidentiality. So that by Monday we would
8 have a collection of all the documents to be sent to the witness.
9 Now, as far as the witness is concerned: Witness, the documents
10 that you have and which may need translation, we would have to arrange for
11 you to send them to the Tribunal so that they can be translated.
12 Another matter to consider is the timing. We have about three and
13 a half weeks left in this term, and then when we resume, in principal only
14 we only have one week in August. So it would seem to me that the
15 arrangement should be made for the witness to return prior to the 26th of
16 July. That would be the best arrangement.
17 So, Witness, this is what is going to happen: The Registrar or
18 the Victims and Witnesses Unit is going to contact you as to when you
19 should return. You are not to discuss the -- your evidence with anybody.
20 Do you understand that?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We will have the documents sent to you so
23 that you can read them and be prepared for your testimony when you return.
24 In relation to the documents that you have and that need to be
25 translated, arrangements will be made for you to send those documents to
1 the Tribunal well ahead of time so that they can be translated.
2 Is there anything else, Mr. Waespi?
3 MR. WAESPI: Yes. For us, I think the photos would be equally
4 important so that --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. He's to bring -- when I say documents, I
6 include in that the photographs that you mentioned.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand. I do have a question
8 for you.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I need to clarify something. I told
11 you that the documents that were part of investigation that I held in my
12 hands in the video are not confidential, and I could either mail them or
13 send them via courier to you.
14 As for the documents that are marked as confidential, those are
15 just ordinary reports concerning firing incidents, and they can be found
16 in UNPROFOR archives. For me they represented a memento, and as for
17 whether the Court would accept them as documentary evidence, that is quite
18 a different matter. That is something that did not arise in our work.
19 Do you really need these firing incident reports as part of
20 documentary evidence here?
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: To the extent that they are relevant, yes, we
22 will need them. So bring all of them. The confidentiality can't stand in
23 the way of the progress of the case. If there is a procedure that is to
24 be followed in relation to documents that are UN documents and are
25 confidential, then we'll follow it, but the court proceedings take
1 precedence over that confidentiality. So we will make contact with you.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have another question, a minor
3 one. Could it please be done in such a way as to accommodate my schedule?
4 I'm quite a busy man.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. To the extent that that is possible, of
6 course. Do you have particular dates? Can you identify now dates that --
7 when you would be available?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have dates for which I have other
9 engagements scheduled. I'm director of a plant, and I'm quite busy. I'm
10 fully busy between the 19th and the 25th of July, and then from the 2nd to
11 the 5th of August. Right now I'm available at other times.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Well, that will be taken into account, and
13 the Registrar will make the appropriate arrangements.
14 It would seem then that an effort should be made to have you here
15 before the -- before the 19th, before the 19th, but we'll take that into
16 account. And remember, you're not to discuss your evidence with anybody.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand that.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may now leave, and you will be advised when
19 you are to return. It's 11.00.
20 Mr. Waespi.
21 MR. WAESPI: This is the last item. I don't mind if the witness
22 wants to take that map with him.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Which one, the one on the --
24 MR. WAESPI: On the ELMO.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may take that. Yes, he may take that map
1 with him.
2 MR. WAESPI: And if the video could be saved -- the map on the
3 screen could be saved as well and tendered as an exhibit for the time
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, let that be done.
6 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as P807, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may now leave.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
9 [The witness stood down]
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: So my understanding now, Mr. Tapuskovic, is that
11 we would return to the witness who was giving evidence two days ago. That
12 is whom?
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Witness Rade Ivanovic. D-22 --
14 or T-22. Cross-examination was in progress when we interrupted his
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Cross-examination. That's Ms. Edgerton.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 WITNESS: RADE IVANOVIC [Resumed]
19 [Witness answered through interpreter]
20 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, could I just have your indulgence for
21 a moment so that I could log on to the transcript on LiveNote.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Whenever you're ready to begin, Ms. Edgerton.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours
24 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton: [Continued]
25 Q. Welcome back, Mr. Ivanovic. I'd like to resume --
1 A. Thank you.
2 Q. I'd like to resume what we had begun two days ago in asking you
3 questions based on your examination-in-chief and some other matters, and
4 to go back to something that you said when you and I were talking two days
5 ago. You confirmed that you had been a member of the Crisis Staff for the
6 Serbian municipality of Trnovo from 21 April 1992. Is that correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And you confirmed that Radivoje Draskovic who was the SDS
9 president for Trnovo, and you thought that as head of the party he also
10 held the position as head of the Crisis Staff. Is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now, apart from you and Draskovic, who else was on the Crisis
14 A. The commander of the Trnovo battalion Danilo Golijanin, and
15 several other members whose names I cannot recall right now. I believe
16 one was -- one was Danilo Golijanin.
17 Q. Now, I asked you a couple of times whether you would agree with me
18 that the purpose of the Crisis Staff was to organise the Serbs dealing
19 with both civilian and military issues, and you replied focusing on two
20 things, that as the police you dealt with mostly civilian matters, and
21 that the main purpose of the Crisis Staff, you said, was to protect the
22 population from possible conflicts and attacks. Do you remember that?
23 A. The purpose of the civilian police was to protect the civilian
24 population. The Crisis Staff was also supposed to work on behalf of the
25 civilian population in order to protect them from certain unfavourable
2 Q. And in that context, and at the time you were a member of the
3 Crisis Staff for Trnovo, had very much a military role or function, didn't
5 A. In April, as well as in May, it had no military function.
6 Q. All right, then. With that answer I'd like to ask for
7 document 03365 to be brought up on the screen for us.
8 Now, these documents, Mr. Ivanovic, are minutes of the meeting of
9 the SDS Crisis Staff for Trnovo, dated 29 April, 1992. Now, just looking
10 at the list of meeting attendees at the top of the document, you would
11 agree with me that you were present at this meeting. Isn't that correct?
12 It you have trouble reading it, you can say and Mr. President
13 registrar might be able to enlarge the list of meeting attendees for you.
14 Do you see your name on the first line -- last name on the first line of
15 the meeting attendees?
16 A. I do.
17 Q. Now, along with you, Draskovic, Golijanin, I see the names also a
18 Glisa Simonic; Nedjo Vlaski; Andjelko Milic, who you named previously;
19 Savo Vlacic; Dragan Klepic; Radmilo Golijanin. These were all members of
20 the Crisis Staff with you; isn't that correct?
21 A. Nedjo Vlaski did attend the meetings of the Crisis Staff although
22 he was not a member. As for the others listed, I think all of them were
23 members of the Crisis Staff?
24 Q. Now, I'd like to turn to another page in this document with the
25 B/C/S document. It's the last paragraph. If you could scroll down. I
1 hope I have this correct. On the bottom of page 1 that you see in front
2 of you. And this same entry should appear on English page 2.
3 Do you see, Mr. Ivanovic, where Radivoje Draskovic begins
4 speaking, the last paragraph on the bottom of page 1, he reports there on
5 his meeting with the JNA and says: "We agreed with the JNA
6 representatives, and they will get involved in," and he uses the words
7 "cicenje opstine." We have to get crews for APCs and tanks. This is
8 good because of the psychological moment. The army is ready to clear up
9 the situation in Trnovo."
10 That's what he's recorded as saying at the meeting at which you
11 were present, Mr. Ivanovic. Isn't that correct?
12 A. Right now I cannot remember whether things went exactly as this.
13 There was some discussion about the protection of the Serbian people,
14 because in Sarajevo as of April 4 there were combat activities in certain
15 locations in the town itself.
16 Q. And actually, that doesn't answer my question, does it,
17 Mr. Ivanovic, because I asked you -- I read to you the paragraph and
18 simply asked you whether that -- what I've read to you is accurately
19 reflected in the minutes that you've read. Is what I read to you
20 accurately reflected in the document in front of you in?
21 A. I no longer see what Radivoje Draskovic said. I see the last
22 paragraph only. It seems that there are three portions of it.
23 Q. If we could go back, please. If we could go back to page 1,
24 please, bottom of page 1 of the B/C/S copy. You see Radivoje Draskovic in
25 the very second sentence reports on his meeting with the JNA, saying:
1 "We've agreed with the JNA representatives, and they will get involved in
2 ciscenje opstine." Isn't that correct?
3 A. I cannot recall exactly right now. I suppose this is correct
4 since it is a part of the record.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honours.
6 [Prosecution confer]
7 MS. EDGERTON: I wasn't certain, Your Honours, if the correct
8 English portion of the document was appearing on the screen in front of
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it is, and the words that you read in B/C/S
11 mean mopping up or cleaning -- or cleansing.
12 MS. EDGERTON: I --
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: But I see beside it "unclear." Why is "unclear"
14 written beside it.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I can't speak to whoever made the
16 translation of this document, so I simply reverted to the words as they
17 appeared in the B/C/S document to rely on my colleagues in the
18 interpretation booth to give the correct interpretation.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, have we had that?
20 May I ask the interpreter what is the correct interpretation of --
21 I will not dare to try to pronounce it, but you know the two words that we
22 are speaking of, ciscenje opstine.
23 THE INTERPRETER: It is very difficult to conclude based on the
24 context itself. It remains ambiguous. Either of the two options offered
25 might be correct.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: And the two options are what, mopping up or
3 THE INTERPRETER: Yes.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Thank you. Yes.
5 MS. EDGERTON:
6 Q. Mr. Ivanovic, looking at this document and seeing what the
7 president of the Crisis Staff --
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic is on his feet, Ms. Edgerton.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the problem is the
10 word itself, ciscenje. Except for the phrase ciscenje opstine, there is
11 nothing else in that sentence. The word ciscenje is stripped bear. There
12 is no qualification assigned to it within that sentence. There is
13 something else that I cannot read which was handwritten.
14 However, the word ciscenje remains completely isolated. There
15 is nothing to explain it. Whether it pertains to any type of cleaning, I
16 really don't know. There is nothing else but that one word.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's your submission then? Are you asking us
18 to do anything about it or ...
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I believe that my learned friend,
20 Madam Prosecutor, should try and expand on that, should try and ask the
21 witness to give an interpretation of it. I don't think I am allowed to do
22 that. Perhaps the Prosecutor has an interpretation of her own and maybe
23 we could hear something from the witness as well. If we are going to
24 consider this word "ciscenje," I believe my learned friend should follow
25 up on it.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: In terms of the purpose that this particular
3 evidence is designed to serve, it doesn't appear to the Trial Chamber that
4 it matters much. So please proceed.
5 MS. EDGERTON:
6 Q. So my question to you now, Mr. Ivanovic, is wouldn't you agree
7 with me that the Crisis Staff -- according this document the Crisis Staff
8 for the Serbian municipality of Trnovo, of which you were a member, was
9 involving the JNA in the ciscenje of the municipality?
10 A. The JNA did not take part in any activities in April Trnovo at
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic is on his feet.
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Since this is cross-examination,
14 I expect my learned friend to put to the witness exactly what this
15 cleaning or cleansing was about. She can put to him whether this was
16 cleansing of people, cleaning of streets. There is nothing else here
17 except for the word "ciscenje." If my learned friend wants to suggest
18 anything to the witness I won't object. Why insist on the word "cicenje"
19 any further when there is nothing there to explain it.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: But she has put to him that the Crisis Staff of
21 the municipality of Trnovo, of which he was a member, was involved with
22 the JNA in the ciscenje, which is the cleaning of the municipality. You
23 would want her to go further and to put to the witness what the cleaning
24 was about. Was it a cleansing of people or a cleansing of anything else.
25 Well, that depends on whether the witness agrees with the proposition.
1 Do you agree then, Witness, having seen the document that the
2 Crisis Staff was involving the JNA in the ciscenje of the municipality?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just tried to tell you that the
4 JNA took no part in any activities in Trnovo in April. There were some
5 reservists there of the VRS, as well as the local population and the local
6 Serb police. Other than that, there was no one else there in April.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the date of this document, Ms. Edgerton?
8 Can we see the date.
9 MS. EDGERTON: 29 April 1992, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: 29th April. I see. And the witness's position is
11 that the JNA took no part in any activities in Trnovo in April, and you
12 would maintain that position notwithstanding the -- what you have seen in
13 the document. Is that so?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I am sure that the JNA took no
15 part in any activities in Trnovo in April.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: On that note, we will take the break.
17 --- Recess taken at 11.20 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 11.46 a.m.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours.
21 Q. Mr. Ivanovic, I have one more question about this same document
22 and the same paragraph. I'd like you to -- I'd like to direct you to the
23 sentence immediately after the one we were talking about. If you could
24 find it again at the bottom of the page. It says: "We have to provide an
25 area for military personnel carriers and tanks." Or, actually, "We have
1 to provide terrain for military personnel, carriers and tanks." Do you
2 see that?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Isn't this a military function, providing an area for military
5 personnel carriers and tanks?
6 A. As I said, in April there was no JNA in Trnovo. Once I got
7 through the entire minutes now, I realised that this was a preparatory
8 meeting since there was a danger for the Serb people in Trnovo since they
9 were in the minority. There were only 28 per cent Serbs in Trnovo. This
10 was a preparation meeting aimed at gaining assistance from the part of the
11 army that was in Kalinovik according to the words of Radivoje Draskovic.
12 Q. Therefore, then, the Crisis Staff was engaging in military
13 functions at that time, weren't they?
14 A. In April there were no military functions in Trnovo. The only
15 thing that went on were the preparations for the defence of the Serb
16 people against potential attacks.
17 Q. Thank you. Then, Your Honours, I'd like to have this document
18 entered, please, as a Prosecution exhibit.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As P808, Your Honours.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Can I move on to one further document, ter number
22 03371, please. 03371 minutes of the Crisis Staff meeting for the Serbian
23 municipality, dated 18 May, 1992.
24 Q. Do you see your name among the attendees at the top of the page,
25 Mr. Ivanovic?
1 A. I do.
2 Q. Now, if we could move, please, to page 2 in both versions of the
3 document. One, two, three -- fourth paragraph of the English where
4 Mr. Glisa Simonic is speaking, and in page 2 of the B/C/S. First
5 paragraph of the document. There, Mr. Ivanovic, Glisa says, "We at the
6 Command and Crisis Staff should be as," one and Draskovic responds, "There
7 is no drastic peace without ethnically clean territories." Simonic
8 mentions meetings with the Minister of the Interior Kosorac and Gagovic,
9 and then continues: "You cannot free a town without destroying it with
10 artillery and conquering it with infantry."
11 Do you see all that on the page before you, sir? It's underlined,
13 A. If I may have a moment.
14 Q. Absolutely. Have you found the portion I've read to you, sir? Do
15 you have trouble finding it, sir? Should I direct you to it on the page?
16 A. I'm trying to read the whole thing.
17 Q. Have you found the portion that says: "You cannot free a town
18 without destroying it with artillery and conquering it with infantry,"
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Thank you. Sir, about two weeks after this Crisis Staff meeting
22 took place, that's exactly what happened in Trnovo municipality, isn't it?
23 A. I know what you have in mind. I know what happened two weeks
24 after that.
25 Q. Around 29 or 30 May, Serb residents started evacuating Trnovo,
1 didn't they?
2 A. On the 29th of May --
3 Q. Sir?
4 A. -- the Serb population --
5 Q. Sir?
6 A. -- left Trnovo, that is correct.
7 Q. Thank you. On 29 May, Colonel Ratko Bundalo told
8 Zeljko Spasojevic, and you know who he is, don't you, sir?
9 A. Who do you have in mind, Zeljko Spasojevic?
10 Q. Zeljko Spasojevic.
11 A. I know I him. He's the man from Trnovo.
12 Q. Colonel Bundalo told him there would be attack on Trnovo and the
13 Muslims would be driven out. That's exactly what happened, isn't it, sir?
14 A. The 29th of May we, the civilian police, were in the culture hall
15 in the settlement of Trnovo itself. We functioned as a police station
16 there. We left that station because it had been agreed that the
17 civilians would be evacuated because it was announced that the Muslim
18 forces would attack Trnovo. Therefore, the civilians left Trnovo and
19 moved to the village of Tosce, which is in the vicinity some three
20 kilometres away.
21 Q. Mr. Ivanovic, we're talking about the Serbs now, and we've already
22 dealt with the Serb evacuation of it Trnovo.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. On the 31st of May, Serb forces shelled Trnovo for several hours,
25 didn't they, sir?
1 A. Yes, there was shelling.
2 Q. And following that non-Serbs evacuated Trnovo in large numbers.
3 In fact, there was a total evacuation of non-Serbs from Trnovo, wasn't
5 A. The army of Republika Srpska entered Trnovo on the 31st of May,
6 and they mostly found Trnovo without any residents in it. Even the Muslim
7 population had left Trnovo. I don't know when they did it, whether they
8 did it in the course of the day or earlier. I couldn't say that.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, before I move on to another area,
10 could I have this document entered as the next exhibit, please.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As P809, Your Honours.
13 MS. EDGERTON:
14 Q. So, Mr. Ivanovic, if I told you that a Trial Chamber of this
15 Tribunal in September 2006 found, among other things, that approximately
16 2.500 non-Serbs left Trnovo as a result of this attack, would you agree?
17 A. I wouldn't agree when it comes to 2.600 residents, no.
18 Q. What number would you put it at then, sir?
19 A. I wouldn't be able to give you an accurate number. I know that in
20 the town of Trnovo the dominant ethnic group among the population was
21 Serbs in town itself, and in the neighbouring villages which were under
22 the control of the Muslim army, the dominant population, was the Muslim
23 one. In the city itself it was the Serbs.
24 Q. Now, moving on to another area, sir, just before we broke on
25 Wednesday I was asking you if it was correct that the Serb people in
1 Trnovo had formed their own TO command. Do you remember that?
2 A. I don't know what you have in mind, the TO command. The Serbs had
3 organised themselves in order to defend themselves. This was the reserve
4 force of the TO. They were not professional soldiers. This is how it was
5 until late May 1992.
6 Q. Nevertheless --
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Edgerton.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: At the beginning of the session, as we were
10 coming into court, the court deputy looked at me very sternly and said
11 Ms. Edgerton has 20 minutes left. He pays more attention to those matters
12 than I do. I don't want this witness to have to return.
13 And, Mr. Tapuskovic, you will have re-examination? You may not.
14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Maybe not.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Maybe not. Okay.
16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] But I cannot know that in advance
17 until the cross-examination is over.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: So how much more time will you spend?
19 MS. EDGERTON: Fifteen minutes, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes.
21 MS. EDGERTON:
22 Q. Mr. Ivanovic, I put it to you that a command for the defence of
23 the Serbian people in Trnovo was established right after the barricades of
24 March 1992, and it was established with Golijanin, yourself, and
25 Zeljko Spasojevic, among others. Isn't that correct?
1 A. As far as I'm concerned, that is not correct. At least my name
2 should not be included there. It was only in April that I was appointed
3 chief of Serbian police. Prior to that I was in the multi-ethnic police,
4 which included Muslims.
5 Q. And are you saying by your answer, sir, that following April 1992
6 you were a member of the battalion command, the Trnovo battalion command?
7 A. No. I was not a member of the battalion command. I was chief of
8 civilian police.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Could I please have a document, 03369, brought up
10 on the screen. And the next page, please, of the B/C/S. I'm sorry, I
11 don't know what that is in English.
12 Q. Sir, I'm going to direct you now to a collection of transcripts of
13 Trnovo battalion command meetings going first to page 7 of the B/C/S and
14 the English page 7.
15 Sir, on this page that you see in front of you, this page records
16 a meeting of the Trnovo battalion command of 19 May 1992, and lists you
17 among the participants. Isn't that correct?
18 A. Well, I was normally invited to meetings as chief of police, but I
19 was not a member of the command, because the civilian police was separate
20 from the military command.
21 Q. So then, sir, even though this collection records you present at
22 battalion command meetings on May 20th, two times on May 22nd, on
23 May 23rd, May 25th, May 27th, May 28th, you assert that you weren't an
24 effective part of the Trnovo battalion command? And I'm not asking about
25 a formal part but an effective part.
1 A. I'm not quite clear what your question means. I told you in so
2 many words that I was invited to meetings to brief them as chief as police
3 on the situation in town, but I was not a member of that command.
4 Q. Sir, you appeared and took part in and reported to the Crisis
5 Staff for the Serbian municipality of Trnovo throughout April and May
6 1992, I put it to you. Throughout May 1992 you were a regular participant
7 in Trnovo battalion command meetings, and I put it to you, sir, that you
8 were involved in every stage of the planning, preparation and
9 participation ultimately in the takeover -- the military takeover of
10 Trnovo municipality, weren't you?
11 A. No.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, could I have this document tendered
13 as the next exhibit, please?
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As P810, Your Honours.
16 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
17 Q. Now to move on to I think -- to move on to another area, sir. In
18 your previous testimony you said that in November and December 1994, you
19 were made part of the VRS. Do you remember saying that?
20 A. I didn't understand the question.
21 Q. Do you remember saying to Mr. Tapuskovic that in November and
22 December 1994 you were made part of the VRS? To be more precise, as I
23 recall, you said your elements of your police unit were made part of the
24 VRS. And it was at page 70 of your previous testimony.
25 A. I did not state it that way --
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. Mr. Tapuskovic is going to tell
2 us how it was stated.
3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] The witness started answering, so
4 I give up. I don't want to interrupt him.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1994, for the month of December,
6 as you stated, Madam Prosecutor, the civilian police was not part of the
7 VRS, the army of Republika Srpska. It assisted ad hoc when defence lines
8 were in jeopardy. In those cases the Ministry of Defence of
9 Republika Srpska would pass down orders that the civilian police should
10 help out the army, but the police was not part of the army.
11 MS. EDGERTON: May I have document number 03378 brought up on the
12 screen, please.
13 Q. And while we're waiting for that document, ask you, Mr. Ivanovic,
14 actually this subordination to the VRS, if I can call it that, took place
15 much earlier, didn't it, by 1993?
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, he never said that
18 they were subordinated to the army of Republika Srpska. He testified that
19 on some occasions when assistance was required the police would join the
20 army of Republika Srpska, would act jointly with the army. That's how it
21 can be stated to the witness, and then he can clarify and provide
22 additional information.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: That may be an overstatement, Ms. Edgerton. A
24 reformulation then.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps I can just move forward by abandoning that
1 and directing the witness to the document --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps I could just abandon that formulation and
4 direct the witness to the document that appears on the screen on his
6 Q. Sir, can you see that document? Sir? Thank you.
7 A. I see.
8 Q. And isn't it correct that in 1993, in fact August 1993, by order
9 of the VRS Main Staff and on direction of the SRK commander at that time,
10 General Galic, you and seven others were moved from the MUP Ilidza to the
11 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade with a view to establishing the Trnovo
13 A. I'm looking at this document but I was not a part of the army. I
14 was not a member of the army. I know that Aleksa Ivanovic was not a
15 member the army either. And I was not in the Ilidza MUP as I said before.
16 I was working at the police station of Kula. I don't know the other
17 persons here. I don't know Srdjan Veletic or the others. I know about
18 the first one, Marinko Avramovic, but he was in the police at Ilidza the
19 whole time until the end of the war.
20 Q. Sir --
21 A. And he never transferred to the VRS.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
23 MS. EDGERTON:
24 Q. Mr. Ivanovic, are you saying this document doesn't refer to you?
25 A. I don't know whether it refers to me, but I never received this
1 order. I never held it in my hands, and I was never transferred.
2 Q. And you have never --
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you've near seen it before?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Never. This is the first time.
5 MS. EDGERTON:
6 Q. And you were never directed -- whether or not you've seen this
7 order, you were never directed to join with units of the 2nd Sarajevo
8 Light Infantry Brigade in any kind of operations?
9 A. Never. May I explain? Until the end of the war I was on the
10 police force, and later on in peacetime I continued working until end
11 1999. I have all the documents confirming that I was retired as a
13 Q. Mr. Ivanovic, if you weren't given your area of operations or the
14 area on which you purported or said that you were operating in, if you
15 weren't operationally subordinated to the 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry
16 Brigade, who were you subordinated to then?
17 A. The Ministry of the Interior, Republika Srpska, specifically to
18 the centre of public security of Serbian Sarajevo.
19 Q. Well, now, am I correct in my understanding of an operation that
20 when you're called upon by the VRS to come and join them at weak areas of
21 the lines, you don't march in there as an independent unit or independent
22 individuals of the Serbian MUP, you're operationally subordinated to the
23 military command responsible for the area in which you're active. Isn't
24 that the case?
25 A. Well, yes. When we acted under the command of the army, that's
2 Q. So, sir, what brigade were you then operationally subordinated to?
3 A. The 2nd Sarajevo Brigade, I believe. It held the defence
4 positions in the territory of Trnovo municipality in 1993, 1994.
5 Q. Thank you. I'll move on to another area that you touched upon in
6 your testimony.
7 MS. EDGERTON: And I won't seek to tender this document in
8 evidence, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic. No longer insisting.
10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] No. I just wanted to say that I
11 object to the admission of this document because it isn't signed. I
12 didn't know that it was not going to be tendered.
13 MS. EDGERTON:
14 Q. I just want to move on, sir, to a couple more areas, one being
15 that when you testified in chief about the time you were at the Kula
16 police outpost, you said that: "During the period 1994/1995, there were
17 arrested or detained members of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina held in the
18 Kula prison. It wasn't such a large number of them but there were some,
19 and I know that most of them were very quickly exchanged then."
20 Now, sir, do I take from that that you never -- you're asserting
21 you never saw civilians imprisoned at the Kula prison facility?
22 A. Which civilians do you mean, Madam Prosecutor?
23 Q. I think it was an easy enough question. Were there not civilians
24 imprisoned at Kula along with these members of the army of Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina who were detained there?
1 A. I didn't see any civilians in 1993, 1994, 1995 in Kula. I never
2 saw civilians imprisoned at Kula.
3 Q. Sir, I put it to you that Serb authorities themselves noted that
4 approximately 10.000 -- 10.000 Muslims of all ages had passed through Kula
5 prison up until the period of 28 October 1994. Knowing that -- knowing
6 that, do you still --
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I am not objecting
9 to the question itself, but I would like to know on the basis of what
10 documents is it asserted that 10.000 civilians passed through the prison
11 at Kula? On what grounds? Is it just an offhand number?
12 I think I owe you an explanation, Your Honours, from a few days
13 ago when you used me -- when I used a number and you told me it was not
14 appropriate for anyone, including me, and I owe you a response when you
15 tell me you want me -- you want it. But I do agree that whenever we use
16 numbers we should be careful and precise.
17 Now we hear the number of 10.000 civilians who passed through the
18 prison at Kula. On what basis? The Prosecution should clarify.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Quite apart from that, Ms. Edgerton, I don't
20 consider that you have acted properly in putting the question in that way,
21 because you are putting it to the witness that Serb authorities noted that
22 approximately 10.000 Muslims passed through Kula prison, and then you say,
23 "Knowing that," but the witness has not acknowledged that.
24 MS. EDGERTON: May I rephrase, Your Honour?
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
1 MS. EDGERTON: And I can do it certainly by reference to a
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: So much the better.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. In fact, I'll reference two sources, the
5 first being document 03389.
6 Q. Sir, on the screen in front of you is a document dated 28 October
7 1994, which is a request for assistance addressed to the RS refugee
8 commissariat and the Prime Minister, noting that since the beginning of
9 the war KP Dom Butmir has been a transit point for Muslim civilians going
10 to Sarajevo or other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina in addition to its
11 basic function.
12 The document also notes as you go further that a rough estimate is
13 that 10.000 Muslims of all ages pass through the prison for a few days or
14 a few months.
15 As -- it says further: "As the prison used as a transit point for
16 receipt of Muslim civilians even now," in October 1994, "and will be in
17 the future, it is hoped that a positive answer will be given to secure the
18 basic resources for KP Dom Butmir so that the process of family reunion
19 and freedom of movement for the Muslim population of the RS on the
20 territory of former Bosnia and Herzegovina can continue to be implemented
21 without hindrance."
22 Sir, seeing this correspondence, are you -- do you then still hold
23 to the view that -- the view you expressed during your testimony in chief
24 and recently that there were no civilians incarcerated at Kula?
25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] In this document there is
3 absolutely no reference to any imprisonment of these people in Kula. It
4 says that only transit was made possible through this institution towards
5 the Muslim part of Sarajevo with the aid of humanitarian organisations.
6 There is no mention of the word "imprisoned" or "imprisonment." And I
7 have that much understanding of this language. It says only that there
8 was transit pending transfer to the Muslim part of Sarajevo.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Edgerton, your time has passed, but in any
10 event, point me to the words in this passage that ground the question you
11 just put to the witness.
12 MS. EDGERTON: The words in this passage appear on the second page
13 of the English version that say -- the last paragraph on the second page
14 that says: "Since we are currently using this facility for the above
15 purposes of transit accommodation of Muslim civilians, and we plan on
16 continuing do so in the next period," and then continues to ask for
17 resources to provide for them.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: And the question that you put was what?
19 MS. EDGERTON: Based on the date of the document and the assertion
20 that they're currently using this facility for the purpose of transit of
21 civilians, I felt I was able to ask -- to put the document to the witness
22 who had said in 1993, 1994, 1995, he did not see civilians at Kula prison
23 and ask whether or not he was -- he wished to change his testimony having
24 seen the document.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes?
1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] That was not the question. The
2 question included imprisoned civilians. This document shows that it was
3 all done in cooperation with the commission. There was no mention of
4 incarceration. That's one thing. And to help refugees to reach their
5 apartments on the other side is another thing. It was done by the
6 commission for the refugees.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton, my colleague has found the
8 question, which is at page 78, line 12. It was an easy enough question.
9 "Were there not civilians imprisoned at Kula along with these members of
10 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina who were detained there?" So there is no
11 basis for putting that they were imprisoned because the document says that
12 the facility was used for the purpose of transit accommodation.
13 Later on apparently you did use the words "pass through," but
14 perhaps now you can conclude by putting the question on the basis that
15 the facility was used for transit, and ask the witness whether he can
16 confirm or not confirm.
17 MS. EDGERTON: I'll simply revert, actually, Your Honours, to my
18 earlier question and the wording that I perhaps more properly used there.
19 Q. Mr. Ivanovic, seeing this document which affirms that Kula was, as
20 of October 1994, used as a transit facility and that 10.000 Muslims of all
21 ages had passed through there up until the period of 28 October 1994, do
22 you still hold to your assertion that you didn't see any civilians there
23 in 1993, 1994, or 1995?
24 A. I still hold to my assertion that in 1994 and 1995 I did not see a
25 single civilian. It wasn't possible for me either. I could have seen
1 some detainees. I know there were some detainees from the Serb army as
2 well as from the Muslim army, and you could see them from my office
3 because they would be taken outside for their regular exercise. I didn't
4 see any civilians though.
5 As for the other part of the question which specifies that 10.000
6 people went through the KPD Kula, I have to say that they had no means to
7 accept so many people. I know that today, for example, the KPD Kula
8 cannot house more than 120 detainees. It was not expanded since the
9 wartime, and the figures you are mentioning are beyond their ability.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Now I must find out, Mr. Tapuskovic, are you
11 re-examining, because we are not going beyond 12.45. Are you going to
12 re-examine and, if so, for how long?
13 Because you are now well past the time allotted to you,
14 Ms. Edgerton.
15 MS. EDGERTON: I'm aware, Your Honour.
16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I won't insist on
17 keeping the witness here any longer just in order to re-examine him,
18 although I would have certain questions. In any case, once we reach
19 12.45, I agree that we release the witness no matter how far we got. I'm
20 even willing to set aside all of this remaining time to the -- for the
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: But I don't know whether she wants the rest of
23 the time.
24 One last question, Ms. Edgerton.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Could I use that to ask that this document be
1 tendered as the next Prosecution exhibit, Your Honours?
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. That will be all.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document is P811.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] There was an objection I wanted
8 to make. This document speaks exclusively about the humanitarian aspect.
9 This is why I object to it -- its admittance. I just wanted to mention,
10 to underline, that this document speaks of a humanitarian activity in
11 cooperation with humanitarian organisations in order to transport
12 civilians to different parts of Sarajevo.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: So on that basis you're saying --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: What are you saying, that on that basis, for that
16 reason it's not relevant or ...
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is my position that it is
18 irrelevant the way it was used by the Prosecutor in order to try and prove
19 that civilians were being arrested. Civilians had to go through that
20 facility in one way or another in order for them to be able to reach their
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Edgerton. Ms. Edgerton, we admitted the
23 document before Mr. Tapuskovic was able to make his objection, so I'd like
24 to hear you now on the objection.
25 MS. EDGERTON: The objection is on the basis of relevance, saying
1 that I used it to try and prove that civilians were being arrested, Your
2 Honour, as I understand it. And, Your Honour, the document when squarely,
3 I would submit, put to the witness's testimony in chief and in
4 cross-examination where he said, "He never in 1993, 1994, and 1995 saw
5 civilians at Kula prison." I put this document to him without referring
6 to the word "arrest" or "detention," it simply went to his assertion that
7 he hadn't seen civilians, and it's a matter for his credibility.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Credibility.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Directly.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Credibility, Mr. Tapuskovic, that's the
11 basis on which the questions were put. So we admit it.
12 I do understand then you have no re-examination? In which case --
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Has my learned friend finished?
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. You might have missed that, but she did
15 indicate that she was finished.
16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Then we could perhaps clear
17 something up. It had to do with the 31st of May, 1992 and the witness's
19 Re-examination by Mr. Tapuskovic.
20 Q. What was happening before the 31st of May, 1992, to the people who
21 resided in Trnovo? What was happening before that? During the
22 cross-examination, you said that on the 31st of May the VRS entered
23 Trnovo; is that correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Why did they have to enter turn Trnovo since before that time
1 Serbs made up the majority of the population in Trnovo? What had happened
2 before the 31st of May?
3 MS. EDGERTON: That's a leading question, Your Honours, with
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, very leading. Very leading. Reformulate
6 it, Mr. Tapuskovic.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. What happened before the 31st of May, in the months preceding that
9 date in 1992?
10 A. In April and May 1992, in the area of Trnovo municipality, 90
11 per cent of the territory was controlled by the members of the army of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are over 40 villages in that area, all of which
13 had been surrounded by the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As of the 3rd of
14 June until the 7th of July, in those villages over 100 civilians were
16 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I chose not to rise initially, but
19 when the evidence came to the time period past the 31st of May, 1992, I
20 feel I should rise because that's not something that comes from my
21 cross-examination. I would submit I --
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I agree. Let's conclude this, Mr. Tapuskovic.
23 It doesn't arise.
24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I have
25 no further questions.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Tapuskovic.
2 Witness, that concludes your evidence. We thank you for coming to
3 the Tribunal, and you may now leave.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: As a matter of fact, we'll adjourn and resume on
6 Monday at 9.00.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Could I just have an indication with the next
8 witness who would normally have appeared on the schedule, T-61?
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Who is the next witness, Mr. Tapuskovic?
10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. The next witness is Witness
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that --
13 MS. EDGERTON: I know everything I need to know now, Your Honours.
14 Thank you.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have your work cut out for you on the
17 MS. EDGERTON: Absolutely.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we are adjourned.
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.34 p.m.,
20 to be reconvened on Monday, the 9th day
21 of July, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.