1 Tuesday, 26 March 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.

7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Case Number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus

9 Stanislav Galic.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Madam Registrar.

11 Ms. Pilipovic, we ended yesterday during the cross-examination of

12 the witness. Would you please resume.

13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. However,

14 before I do that, I'd like to ask that the witness be given the map that

15 he had yesterday, D77.

16 WITNESS: JOHN GERARD BRENDAN HAMILL

17 Cross-examined by Ms. Pilipovic:

18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Also, I'd like to ask the Chamber

19 for understanding. It is the Defence's position that at the end of my

20 cross-examination, my colleague will also show the witness two documents

21 which are in English and ask a few questions, because these two documents

22 are in English.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.

24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 Q. Good morning, Mr. Hamill. Yesterday, your last answer had to do

1 with your possibilities when compiling reports on the basis of information

2 about incidents in the territory controlled by the forces of the BH army

3 and where Papa observation posts were. Can you tell us precisely

4 something about the flow of information, that is, the information that you

5 received from patrolling observers to observation posts and then on. How

6 did it go? You told us that you received this information by radio. The

7 Defence would like to know something about the receipt of written

8 information about incidents happening on the Papa side.

9 A. The situation on the Papa side was what you might call a mirror

10 image of what was happening on the Lima side in that they had patrols.

11 They had normally approximately five posts during that period, and they

12 reported similarly instantly by radio when shootreps or increps were

13 required. In other words, if there was an incoming fire into their area

14 or if they saw or heard an outgoing fire from their area. So they would

15 report to the headquarters, and again, as I said, we would hear it on the

16 radio. But we were two separate organisations, the Papa and the Lima,

17 although we were on the same radio net. So they reported through their

18 headquarters. They had a commander on their side called Papa 9er in the

19 same way that there was a commander on the Lima side called Lima 9er, and

20 they reported through him and he commanded them.

21 At that stage, the daily report was made out by him, normally

22 around 16.30 hours, in the same way that we made ours out, and they were

23 forwarded to the headquarters where they were compiled as the UNMO report

24 for sector Sarajevo. But there was absolutely no cross-pollination

25 between the Papa and the Lima sides. We only met each other socially, not

1 professionally. This was in order that the factions could retain

2 confidence in the observers who were working on their side.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill. The Defence would like to ask you, after

4 you submit your report, and you told us yesterday that you had only edited

5 it from the point of language, what then happens to that report? Who is

6 it sent to?

7 A. That report was sent directly to the headquarters of the UNMO

8 organisation in Sarajevo. Now, from there, it went two routes. Firstly,

9 it went to sector Sarajevo where it was used as part of the sector

10 Sarajevo report. Sector Sarajevo comprised a headquarters in the PTT

11 building, a number of battalions. There were three at the time; Egyptian,

12 Ukrainian, and French, and the UNMO organisation. But also, the UNMO

13 report went direct to the headquarters of the UNMO organisation for all of

14 UNPROFOR, which was based in Ilidza barracks in Croatia, in Zagreb in

15 Croatia. So there was a twin track, as it were. Through the sector, and

16 from there, to BH command in Kiseljak and on to UNPROFOR headquarters, but

17 also a short route from the UNMO headquarters in Sarajevo direct to the

18 UNMO headquarters in Zagreb where it formed part of their report -- or

19 extracts from it, rather, formed part of their report.

20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill. Can you tell us, in those cases when you

21 heard protests from the Papa side about the actions of the army of

22 Republika Srpska, would those protests be in writing? And who did you

23 forward them to or hand them over to with regard to the headquarters of

24 the Romanija Corps in Sarajevo?

25 A. The protests that we would get would not be specifically

1 protests. They would be requests. We got requests from the Papa side to

2 use our good offices with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to cause the

3 shelling or sniping to cease. So we would go directly across the hall,

4 five metres, and meet one of the liaison team, whoever was on duty, and

5 request them to get on to the brigade in question to stop the shelling.

6 And this often happened, but not, as I said yesterday, not invariably.

7 Sometimes it was explained to us that the shelling or shooting was in

8 response to an attack on Vojska Republika Srpska positions. And in that

9 case, obviously they were not going to stop until the Papa side had

10 stopped.

11 Q. Since you have just mentioned the sniping activities, the Defence

12 would like to know if, as an experienced military expert, you can accept

13 that the sniping activity is also the fire opened from other infantry

14 weapons, not only from a rifle with optical sights. I'm basing this

15 question on the fact that you know what a sniper is. Or perhaps would you

16 tell us, what is a sniper?

17 A. A sniper, in normal military parlance, is somebody who will target

18 specific individuals at long range and kill them, generally using a rifle

19 with a telescopic sight. Generally, a sniper operates alone from

20 concealment and functions to a certain extent outside a normal military

21 environment in that he doesn't operate as part of a unit. Normally, he's

22 there as an individual.

23 Q. In other words, when you say "sniping activities," or "opening

24 fire from infantry weapons," would you call that sniping activity too?

25 Would you accept that?

1 A. Sniping activity is an attempt to kill a specific individual that

2 you see as opposed to more general use of small-arms fire in an attack.

3 It is targeted, it is specific, and it uses the minimum rounds possible to

4 achieve its task, which is to kill a specific individual who has been

5 spotted by the sniper.

6 Q. So fire from infantry weapons, from small arms, and fire from

7 infantry weapons, you would not call it as sniping activity or the opening

8 of sniping fire?

9 A. Not normally, no.

10 Q. During your tour of duty in Lukavica, how did you and did you

11 investigate any sniping activities? Specifically, can you explain to us

12 what would you do after receiving the information that somebody had been

13 hit by a sniper?

14 A. It was not possible to do anything for the individual in question,

15 obviously, but what we did is we went into Grbavica and drove up and down

16 in the streets of Grbavica, listening for snipers so that we could report

17 to our comrades on the Papa side through the headquarters that there was

18 sniping going on and that we would request them to intervene with the

19 government forces and cause the sniping to be stopped.

20 So it was a case of not helping the individual who had been shot

21 because it was too late for them, but it was an attempt to prevent any

22 other individuals from being killed. Patrolling up and down the streets,

23 listening, reporting when we heard a sniper shot. Because again, you must

24 remember, as I just mentioned, a sniper fires the minimum possible number

25 of shots for a number of reasons. He wants a first-round kill, because

1 any more than one round involves a danger of giving away his position, and

2 the essence of sniping is shooting from a concealed position where he will

3 not be seen and where he will be able to continue his deadly work.

4 Sniping is intermittent. It doesn't happen bang, bang, bang.

5 Q. Can you tell us, during that period of time when you were there,

6 how many protests did you forward on through liaison officers and which

7 incidents did it concern, specifically protests that you received from the

8 Papa side?

9 A. I cannot be specific. Whenever we got a report in from the Papa

10 side, which happened regularly, that there was a shelling or a shooting

11 incident in a particular area, one of us would go in, sometimes me,

12 sometimes one of my colleagues, to discuss the issue with the liaison

13 officers present and to bring about a ceasefire. Now, I -- at this stage,

14 I cannot say specific incidents, specific dates, but regularly.

15 Q. Those protests, would they be referring to a specific incident at

16 a specific place or would they be general?

17 A. Not general, specific. We would be told, "There is shelling going

18 on in a particular area. Please have it stopped." Or, "There is sniping

19 going on in a particular area into a particular area, please have it

20 stopped." Generally, it referred to shelling incidents.

21 Q. Can you tell us, during that period of time, were there any

22 incidents or did you receive any protests related to incidents requiring a

23 particular investigation? If you are telling us that you cannot list

24 those incidents, were there, during this May, June, or July, any incidents

25 that required your particular investigation?

1 A. Not investigation per se. What we're talking about here is

2 attacks going on in an area which was not monitored by us, which was

3 monitored by observers from the Papa side and which they then reported to

4 us as being incoming fire from our side and requesting us to have the

5 activity stopped. In other words, we didn't investigate what happened on

6 the other side of the line. I didn't cross the line normally except to go

7 into the headquarters. I stayed, as my colleagues on the Lima side did,

8 on the Lima side. It was only when we were reporting into the

9 headquarters in the PTT building that -- in Novi Grad or Novo Sarajevo

10 that we would cross the line normally. There were -- there were

11 exceptions, obviously, but very, very rarely.

12 Q. Can you confirm for us if, in the area of Dobrinja and Alipasino

13 Polje, there was a Papa observation point?

14 A. There was a Papa post on a hill overlooking the area, Papa 2 or 5,

15 I cannot remember which. Because again, by convention and by policy, we

16 didn't go to the Papa posts. It was felt better from the point of view of

17 the two parties to the conflict that they would have more confidence in us

18 if we were not mixing with observers who were working on the other side,

19 as it were, and that we required confidence to do our job. So I wasn't

20 specifically aware of the house, for example, that a Papa post would be

21 in. But afterwards, when I was posted in Zagreb as deputy chief

22 operations officer and returned to Sarajevo, I did visit Papa posts, and I

23 noticed one in particular was looking down on the area of Alipasino

24 Polje.

25 Dobrinja would be much further on. There was none specifically in

1 the area of Dobrinja, but patrolling was carried out in the area of

2 Dobrinja. Now, patrolling was also carried out on the Serb side of

3 Dobrinja by our people, and they controlled, for example, in Nedzarici,

4 and also in Aerodromsko Naselje, the airport settlement, because they were

5 areas controlled by Vojska Republika Srpska.

6 So it was a case of operating from a fixed base, but that wasn't

7 the actual observation post. The observation post comprised, in effect,

8 the entire city of Sarajevo and its surroundings, surroundings for us, and

9 the city for the Papa teams. They could be anywhere in that area, and

10 they were required to be generally through the area --

11 Q. Thank you.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill. In May, June, July, you were in Lukavica.

14 Yesterday, you spoke about an incident which happened in Dobrinja, and you

15 said that in September 2001, you visited that part of Dobrinja. Can you

16 tell us, since during the relevant period of time when that happened, that

17 was the 1st of June, 1993, when did you receive information, when did you

18 learn of that incident of the 1st of June, 1993?

19 A. I learned it generally at that time in that we were aware of major

20 incidents which occurred in the city and in the surrounding areas because

21 they would have been reported on the press, if nowhere else. CNN gave us

22 a lot of information. But in this particular case on that day, I spent

23 the morning in the headquarters and the afternoon out on one of our posts

24 in the east of the city, Lima 7, which was somewhere in the area of

25 Sombolovac. So I wasn't aware specifically of that incident at that time

1 when it happened, but I gained my information shortly afterwards but gave

2 it no great heed, as you might say, at the time.

3 Q. Can you tell us who was it that informed you about that incident?

4 A. No, I can't. It was one of those items which is mentioned on a

5 daily basis. You will remember that I explained that we were actively

6 working from 7.00 in the morning until 11.00 at night, exchanging

7 information with other people, with the headquarters. It was very likely

8 somebody from our own headquarters who told me about the incident, but I

9 couldn't be specific. And again, possibly I heard it on the BBC World

10 service.

11 Q. In view of your post at the time, did you draw up a report on that

12 incident because you were informed about it?

13 A. No, I did not.

14 Q. And were you shown a report relative to that incident on the 1st

15 of June, just to have a look at it?

16 A. Again, as I explained, it was on the Papa side. It was not on the

17 Lima side.

18 Q. Yes, I understand that. But can you then explain -- in relation

19 to that incident which happened in the proximity of your observation

20 posts, can you then explain it to us how is it possible that you received

21 absolutely no report in relation to that incident or protest?

22 A. The incident occurred on the Papa side and was reported on by the

23 personnel on that side. It did not happen on my side of the line,

24 therefore, I had no responsibility for reporting on it. The two sides

25 were kept quite separate in regards to the reporting responsibilities.

1 That which happened on the Presidency side was reported on by the teams

2 there. That which happened on the Serb-controlled side was reported on by

3 one of the Lima teams which had responsibility for that area. In the case

4 of the Dobrinja shelling where the football match was shelled, I was, as I

5 said, in the morning in the headquarters on business and in the afternoon,

6 again, on business in the Lima 7 area which was approximately 15

7 kilometres, I would say, to the east of Dobrinja.

8 Q. Yes. So, Mr. Hamill, you are confirming to us that in relation to

9 the incident which happened on the 1st of June, 1993, you, as the head of

10 the team in Lukavica, did not receive any protest related to that

11 incident, nor did you personally submit a written protest in relation to

12 that incident, did you?

13 A. At that time, I was not head of the team. I was the liaison

14 officer. The head of the team was a Norwegian captain who remained there

15 for some time afterwards. I went in as a liaison officer into the

16 headquarters on the UNMOs on the Lukavica side to assist him in his work,

17 being prepared to take over the job from him when the time came. But

18 there was another officer who was the commander of the UNMOs there at that

19 time, not me. I was liaison.

20 Q. So as the liaison officer, your associates never gave you a

21 written protest in relation to that incident, nor did you forward any such

22 protest to anyone. Is that correct?

23 A. To the best of my memory, no. But memory -- I simply cannot say

24 that it happened or that it didn't happen. I have no memory of it

25 happening.

1 Q. Later on, throughout the month of June specifically, did you have

2 occasion, as the liaison officer, to receive any report whatsoever from

3 monitors about that incident, or perhaps your colleague? You told us he

4 was a Norwegian. Could you tell us his name, please. Did either of you

5 receive any kind of report relating to that incident?

6 A. To the best of my knowledge, no.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 Mr. Hamill, while you held that position - I won't repeat it - did

9 you ever receive any information and do you know that in Dobrinja in July,

10 there was an incident when a water line was shelled? Did you receive any

11 report about that while you were the liaison officer in the area under the

12 control of the army of Republika Srpska? Have you heard about that

13 incident at all? Did you, at the time?

14 A. At this stage, I cannot say whether I heard about it at the time

15 or not. I imagine I would have heard when it happened, but that it was

16 just one in a long, long list of incidents. We had major incidents

17 occurring throughout the entire period. We had anything from one thousand

18 to three and a half thousand shells being fired, for example, in a 12-hour

19 period. This would be something which would be of interest and which

20 would stick in your mind. But one shelling, one small shelling, wouldn't

21 stand out after all this time. But I certainly specifically remember

22 times when 3.600 rounds were fired into the city from the north over a

23 12-hour period. I mean, what you are asking me about is one in a whole

24 litany of shellings.

25 Q. Mr. Hamill, I'm asking you about these two incidents, the one of

1 the 1st of June and the 12th of July, as we have reports disclosed to us

2 by my learned friends from the Prosecution that on that day, both on the

3 1st of June and the 12th of July, there were civilian casualties. So I'm

4 asking you when such incidents occurred, such as this shelling of the

5 water line, was it necessary to set up a mixed commission in accordance

6 with international law which should have gone to the spot and established

7 what actually happened in Dobrinja when, according to the report, there

8 were civilian victims?

9 A. To the best of my knowledge, no mixed commission was set up at

10 that time for either of those incidents. The first such commission that I

11 remember specifically was that which occurred after the Markale shelling

12 of the 5th of February, 1994.

13 Q. So you are confirming that you yourself have no knowledge that

14 regarding the incidents of the 1st of June and the 12th of July, which is

15 within your tour of duty, that you personally at any time received a

16 protest regarding those incidents, nor did you forward any such

17 protests --

18 A. I --

19 Q. -- to responsible authorities, nor are you aware that any mixed

20 commissions were formed in relation to those incidents?

21 A. I neither confirm nor deny that I received or forwarded a

22 protest. I am saying that I do not remember if such a protest was

23 forwarded about those specific incidents at that specific time. We had

24 numerous protests that we forwarded, but they may or may not have been

25 part of those.

1 We were operating, as you will appreciate, on a minute-to-minute

2 basis, and when an incident was reported to us that a particular set of

3 activities was happening in a particular place. We immediately went in

4 across to the liaison office. It was part of daily work. We just went

5 in, informed them, requested them to cause the shelling to be stopped, and

6 either they did or they didn't, and then we went on to the next incident.

7 Very, very few incidents actually stand out. Markale is obviously

8 one because of the scale of it. An incident or an activity where three

9 and a half thousand rounds is fired from 4.00 in the morning until 4.00 in

10 the afternoon obviously stands out. An incident where Lukavica barracks

11 was shelled and you're on the receiving end of it obviously stands out,

12 but this was just one in a whole litany, a whole series of attacks that

13 went on killing civilians in the city of Sarajevo -- or these two,

14 rather.

15 Q. You have just told us that you were present when the Lukavica

16 barracks was shelled. Could you tell us when that was and from which

17 positions of the BH army was Lukavica shelled?

18 A. I cannot say from which position it was shelled, as I didn't see

19 the firing. I just know that it was shelled around the middle of July. I

20 think perhaps -- I think it was actually -- no. It was actually the 4th

21 of July, if I remember right, we were shelled by mortars. Several rounds

22 came in over a period of a number of hours. That was one, one occasion.

23 There was -- there were a few occasion like that. I mean, it happened on

24 an irregular basis. About every couple of weeks, a few shells would fall

25 onto the barracks.

1 Q. Talking about the Lukavica barracks, yesterday you explained where

2 you yourself, as the observers, were stationed, what part of the building

3 you occupied. You said that on the floor above you, General Galic was

4 stationed. Could you tell us, regardless of the fact that you told us

5 that you never went to his premises, could you tell us, in view of the

6 position of the Lukavica barracks, what kind of view does it have of

7 Dobrinja, that is, from the premises where General Galic was, that were

8 used by General Galic? Could you confirm that his offices faced in an

9 opposite direction in relation to Dobrinja?

10 A. No, I can't. What I can say is that the area is very, very flat

11 from Lukavica barracks through Dobrinja, the airport. That's why the

12 airport was built there. But Dobrinja itself comprises buildings which

13 are several storeys high, blocks of flats, and from the second storey of

14 that building, if one were on the south side of it, one could see the area

15 of Dobrinja which was still controlled by Serbs. I would say that it was

16 not possible to see deep into Dobrinja because of the fact that you had

17 high buildings. So all that you could see from there would be the first

18 line of buildings in the distance, maybe a kilometre and a half, two

19 kilometres distant. But you couldn't see through Dobrinja for that

20 reason.

21 Similarly, there was a hill on the right-hand side as one -- as

22 one was facing Dobrinja, facing Lukavica, which ended up at Mojmilo. And

23 this hill provided cover from view for the bulk of area beyond the

24 Serb-controlled area.

25 Q. Mr. Hamill, yesterday you told us about the kind of weapons that

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1 the BH army had in view of your area of responsibility. Did you have any

2 information about the deployment of mortars and guns of the BH army?

3 A. The information that we had was that the mortars were used in a

4 classic pattern, that is, that they were brought to a location, they fired

5 a number of rounds, and then they went away somewhere else so that they

6 remained hidden from view, and they were used with great flexibility. So

7 they didn't actually, as far as I know, leave mortars sited any specific

8 location. They had very, very few resources as far as firepower was

9 concerned. They relied on infantry troops, the reverse of the VRS. So

10 they had to husband their resources carefully and not leave them in a

11 position where they could be hit by counter-battery fire.

12 Q. Are you aware, with regard to your area of responsibility, what

13 kind of weapons the BH army had on Mount Igman, and are you aware that

14 there was an observation post at Igman as well?

15 A. Whose observation post?

16 Q. A Papa observation post.

17 A. Not until after Igman had been captured. As far as I know, there

18 were no -- the team was set up sometime, I think, in the end of July. It

19 wasn't there through May and June. I didn't visit them until December.

20 The weapons that the Armija BH had, they certainly included mortars

21 because they would use those to shell Vojkovici.

22 Q. Could you please tell us, since you have now explained how the BH

23 army used those mortars, do you know from which positions the BH army used

24 mortars most frequently?

25 A. It is my understanding that they used them from numerous

1 positions, including directly outside the UN headquarters in Sarajevo and

2 the grounds of Kosevo hospital.

3 Q. Yesterday you told us that you counted the number of shells fell

4 on a particular part of the city and from which positions within a certain

5 period of time. Could you tell us whether you used radars as a means of

6 determining the route of projectiles and the exact spot from which those

7 projectiles were fired?

8 A. No, we didn't because we weren't in possession of radars. Radars

9 are useful for slow-flying projectiles such as mortar bombs. They are not

10 useful, in general, for artillery weapons. What we used were our ears.

11 We heard the rounds being fired on the left. We heard them being --

12 exploding on the right. Therefore, they came from the left and they went

13 to the right. Left was the area of the Kosevo and Vogosca Brigades; right

14 was the area of the city. And similarly, at the same time, the UNMOs in

15 the city were reporting shelling incoming into the city. So it was quite

16 clear; there was no requirement to use radar.

17 Q. Could you tell us, in connection with what you told us yesterday

18 about the sound of a mine as it explodes, at what distance, specifically

19 is it one or two kilometres, you can hear the sound of a mortar shell

20 being fired?

21 A. It can be heard [Realtime transcript read in error "fired"] from a

22 very considerable distance. Depending on conditions, depending on the

23 size of the weapon, depending on the type of terrain, it can be heard

24 across a very, very large distance. We're talking about several

25 kilometres. Certainly five, in ideal conditions.

1 Q. Could you tell us, please, whether that is a sound that an

2 ordinary man can recognise?

3 MR. STAMP: I'm sorry.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stamp.

5 MR. STAMP: Just a correction perhaps in respect to the last

6 answer. I think I heard the witness say, "It can be heard from a very

7 considerable distance." That was how he started his answer. What I have

8 here is, "It can be fired from a very considerable distance," which I

9 don't think would be his answer, having regard to the context in

10 which -- or having regard to the question that was asked.

11 The question was, "You can hear the sound of a mortar shell being

12 fired at what distance?" So I imagine the answer would be as I heard it:

13 "It can be heard from a very considerable distance." And perhaps that

14 part of the transcript could be corrected.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps we should first clarify. The question

16 was, Mr. Hamill, from what distance you could hear the sound of a mortar

17 shell being fired? And then the answer in the transcript says that it can

18 be fired from a very considerable distance. And it is Mr. Stamp's

19 recollection that you said it can be heard from a very considerable

20 distance. Could you -- my recollection is not -- could you please confirm

21 what you --

22 THE WITNESS: It is my belief, Mr. President, that I said it can

23 be heard from a very considerable distance.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, which is logical if you read the rest of your

25 answer.

1 THE WITNESS: Of course.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then this will be corrected as far as the

3 transcript is concerned.

4 Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.

5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Mr. Hamill, could you tell us, please, whether the sound of a

7 shell being fired can be recognised by an ordinary man?

8 MR. STAMP: What is an ordinary man?

9 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that the question is that someone who

10 is not militarily trained, whether they could -- is that what you intended

11 to ask?

12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, yes.

13 Q. A man who is not a professional and who has no knowledge of

14 military equipment, can he distinguish and recognise the sound of a mortar

15 shell being fired?

16 A. I would say there is absolutely no difference to the untrained ear

17 between any type of explosion.

18 Q. When you were telling us about the incident at Dobrinja which you

19 visited, and you said that Mr. Ismet Fazlic identified two craters for

20 you, could you tell us what your conclusions were after examining those

21 craters? You said that there were traces of the wings which are

22 characteristic of craters formed by a gun or a Howitzer. Is that correct?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Do you know and were you informed by anyone as to who carried out

25 the on-site identification of those projectiles and whether, when this

1 incident occurred, any remnants of the projectile were found? Were you

2 informed about that at the time?

3 A. I was not so informed.

4 Q. You told us that your conclusion was that this was a

5 120-millimetre projectile. Can you tell us on the basis of what did you

6 come to that conclusion?

7 A. I said it was most likely a 122-millimetre Howitzer projectile,

8 and I based that on the size of the crater. It was actually quite small,

9 quite shallow. Therefore, it wasn't a powerful explosion. A 120 mortar

10 bomb, for example, would have made a larger mark because it contains more

11 explosive. So it looked to me as a relatively light weapon but still an

12 explosive one. And judging by the wings, it looked to me to be a gun.

13 And when I looked at the area it came from and examined it on the map, I

14 found a location where I knew on that day there were a battery of

15 122-millimetre guns in situ. And my assumption was that they were the

16 guns that fired those rounds. The marks were consistent with having been

17 made by a gun of that calibre, so it was logical to assume that they were

18 the guns which fired it and that no other gun had come into the same area

19 and had fired at that target at that time.

20 Q. Could you please tell us what you used to come to the conclusion

21 that those projectiles were fired from the positions of Lima 5?

22 A. The fact that the rounds had come from that direction. I worked

23 out the bearing that they had come in on, and it pointed down to the area

24 of Toplik, plus or minus 5 degrees. On that basis, and on the basis of my

25 knowledge of the area at the time and the weapons that were in it, I

1 formed a conclusion that it was one or more of that battery which had

2 fired those rounds. The rounds certainly came from that direction. And

3 the only guns that were in that area belonged to the VRS, and the only

4 ones that I knew personally of which fit that description were in the area

5 of -- that I outlined yesterday, of Toplik.

6 Q. As you are telling us that it was the area of Toplik, an area

7 where you had your monitors, did they inform you that in June,

8 specifically on the 1st of June, that a gun or Howitzer or mortar had been

9 fired from Lima 5? Do you have in your archives any documents where your

10 associates are informing you that there was firing with guns from that

11 area on that day?

12 A. In my own personal archives, I do not. However, if guns were

13 fired on that day from that position, there would be a record in the

14 official UNPROFOR documentation which I'm sure the Court can gain access

15 to. Because it would have been reported as a shootrep by Lima 5, the team

16 in Lima 5 who were in situ on the day, as to the time the firing occurred,

17 how many rounds were fired and in what general direction. So while I do

18 not have access to those records, I'm quite sure that somebody does and

19 can produce them.

20 Q. In September, were you informed that the competent Bosnian

21 authority service had carried out any investigation regarding that

22 incident?

23 A. As far as I was concerned, I was doing an investigation

24 independently of any other investigation, and I wasn't interested in what

25 other authorities had done. I was purely carrying out a technical

1 analysis, myself, without reference to other persons' information, whether

2 accurate or not.

3 Q. Could you tell us, please, during that period of time when you had

4 an observer post in Toplik, with regard to the location of the incident,

5 could you tell us where the confrontation line was, or the front line

6 between the two warring factions in that area?

7 A. The front line in that area generally ran at the base of the hill

8 of Mojmilo down across the front of Lukavica to Dobrinja where the

9 easternmost blocks of flats were on one side of the confrontation and the

10 remainder of the suburb was on the other side of the confrontation line.

11 It ran from there down along the edge of the airport, which was controlled

12 by a French battalion at that stage, but at one end you had -- at the east

13 end you had a VRS tank position down at Kula restaurant, and from there

14 then it kind of wandered off by Butmir and on to Hrasnica.

15 In a northerly direction, the front line went across Mojmilo, down

16 into Hrasno to the stadium, down to the River Miljacka, along the river

17 quite a distance, and then climbed back up so that generally the suburb of

18 Grbavica was in VRS -- under VRS control, and the remainder was not. It

19 went up by the Jewish cemetery and along the base of the hill of Zlatiste

20 and then curved around.

21 On the northern side, it was very, very indeterminate. It was my

22 opinion that there was no front line per se between the eastern part of

23 the city and the VRS-controlled area in Sombolovac. It was generally a

24 no-man's land but difficult terrain.

25 Q. Thank you. As we are now talking about Dobrinja, and that you

1 have already told us that there was action, firing, from Toplik in the

2 direction of Dobrinja from guns and Howitzers, you told us yesterday that

3 your experience with regard to the Serb shelling was such that always

4 before shells were fired from artillery weapons, members of the observer

5 mission were called. How do you explain that guns and Howitzers were

6 fired in an area where your observation post was situated?

7 A. I am not saying that the firing was not observed by military

8 observers. If they fired from that position on that day, and if there

9 were UNMOs in situ, they would certainly be aware of it because the guns

10 were very close to the UNMO accommodation. Similarly, as I said

11 yesterday, the battery commander would normally come to the door and say,

12 "We're about to fire. Target is such and such. Would you like to come

13 and have a look?" And the observers who were based in Lima 5 would go and

14 they would examine. They would sight along the barrels. They would check

15 the various instruments on the gun and see which way they were firing.

16 I'm not saying that that did not happen on that day. It may very well

17 have done. I'm not aware that it did; I'm not aware that it didn't.

18 Q. Thank you. Mr. Hamill, before you took up your duties in

19 Lukavica, was someone else from the UN there who performed the duties that

20 you took over? And if so, could you tell us who it was.

21 A. No, there were a team in situ comprising a Norwegian captain and a

22 Russian major, and I joined them as an additional member of the staff

23 preparatory to taking on the role of deputy and then being trained as the

24 commander of the area. However, the UNPROFOR authorities recognised my

25 competence and transferred me elsewhere to a more responsible position.

1 But there would have been no one in the job of liaison officer, but there

2 were two officers living in the same accommodation, working in the same

3 office for a considerable period of time. It is my belief, although I'm

4 not sure, that there was constantly somebody based in the headquarters of

5 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps from its inception, perhaps. Certainly for a

6 considerable period before I came.

7 Q. So when you all worked together, did you receive information from

8 them that during that time prior to your arrival, prior to your arrival

9 there, there was an attack of the humanitarian aid convoy in Hrasnica and

10 Dobrinja and that, in that column, civilians had been wounded and that

11 that fire had been opened from the direction of Vogosca and Hrasnica? Do

12 you have any knowledge that before you arrived there, there was an action

13 launched from that area against a convoy of humanitarian aid?

14 A. Sorry. You mentioned two areas here, Vogosca and Hrasnica. At

15 that time, Vogosca was under the control of the VRS and Hrasnica was under

16 the control of the armija. Can you explain --

17 Q. Hrasnica and Igman. Hrasnica and Igman.

18 A. Okay. Yes, I heard of an incident, but again I have no personal

19 knowledge of it. But it was mentioned to me as part of my initial

20 briefing that such incidents occurred, yes.

21 Q. Do you have any information that from the part of the

22 neighbourhood that what -- near the airport controlled by the BH army,

23 that, is the entrance into that tunnel, that there were civilian

24 casualties in that area hit as they were crossing the airport?

25 A. My understanding is that there were civilian casualties. Now, I'm

1 also aware from my own observation that civilians crossed the runway of

2 the airport not just by the tunnel but above ground also. At night. Not

3 by day, at night. And they were shot at. I cannot say, because it was a

4 considerable distance from my room, whether people were hit or not, but we

5 could see figures crossing.

6 Q. Mr. Hamill, to finish up with the map, could you take the map and

7 mark where was your observation post in relation to Vogosca so that we can

8 round off the area covered by Lima.

9 A. Right. Now, there were a number of locations used by the UNMOs

10 during this period. The one that I moved to in early July was in Blazuj,

11 which is off this map. It's on the road -- it's where the road from

12 Kiseljak and the road to Mostar diverge. So I will mark the approximate

13 area. That was the area known to us as Lima 2.

14 Q. Mr. Hamill, just a moment. We need to specify for the record that

15 "L2" -- I can't see what letter is that. So can we say for the record

16 what is the Blazuj area? Could you please put letter "B" next to "Lima

17 2" --

18 A. Certainly.

19 Q. -- so that we can know it is Blazuj?

20 A. [Marks]

21 Q. Thank you.

22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] For the record, Mr. Hamill has

23 written Blazuj beneath "Lima 2," which was the area where the Lima 2

24 observation team was located.

25 Q. Mr. Hamill, can you tell us, where were the front lines between

1 the two warring sides in that area in relation to Blazuj?

2 A. In relation to Blazuj, it was between two confrontation lines.

3 The Igman and Ilidza Brigades were the two brigades which were monitored

4 by Lima 2, and effectively they operated up to the base of Mount Igman.

5 Ilidza to the east and the Igman Brigade to the west. The Igman Brigade

6 operated out of a location in the village Blazuj itself, and the Ilidza

7 Brigade operated out of a hotel complex not far from Vrelo Bosne. So they

8 were two brigades in that area.

9 Now, to its east also we had another observation post near

10 Rajlovac, and that was Lima 3. Okay.

11 Q. We'll come to that later. Later on I will ask you also to

12 indicate where Lima 3 in Rajlovac is, because before that, can you tell us

13 during your tour of duty, do you know if there was any shelling in the

14 areas of Ilidza and Blazuj of that part of the city of Sarajevo from the

15 positions the BH army? And I mean its positions on Igman.

16 A. There were shellings in that area, yes.

17 Q. Were -- was there -- were there any attacks from BH positions in

18 relation to this area controlled by the army of Republika Srpska, and was

19 small-arms fire and sniper fire opened against these areas? Do you know

20 that?

21 A. What happened in that area during my period there was a major

22 attack which seemed to us, and again I must emphasise it seemed to us, to

23 be initiated by the armija on Igman. And it was responded to in the main

24 by the two brigades that I have -- I've mentioned, the Ilidza Brigade and

25 the Igman Brigade. And Colonel Cojic, the Commander of the Igman Brigade,

1 brought his men successfully to the top of Igman and effectively captured

2 Igman from the armija. But as I say, it seemed to us at the time that the

3 activity had been initiated by the army of BH rather than by the VRS. The

4 VRS then took advantage of the situation to continue onwards and capture

5 Igman. That would have been mid-July.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill. Can you mark on the map the area that you

7 said was covered by Lima 3 and that it was the area of Rajlovac?

8 A. Now, I cannot be specific on this, but this is the Rajlovac area,

9 and the team was on a hill overlooking it somewhere around there. Again,

10 I cannot be specific on this particular occasion. I --

11 Q. Mr. Hamill, for the record, I will say that under Lima 3 -- you

12 indicated Lima 3 observation post, and under it you've placed the letter

13 "R" to indicate that it was the area of Rajlovac. During your tour of

14 duty there, can you tell us if, from the positions of the BH army, there

15 was any fire opened against Rajlovac, and can you tell us which are the

16 positions which the BH army held in relation to Rajlovac?

17 A. In relation to Rajlovac, the BH army was on this hill feature

18 looking down onto Rajlovac. Now, the front line would have been somewhere

19 in that area, but that's only very, very roughly.

20 Q. Can you tell us if during that period of time when you were there,

21 did you have any knowledge of any fighting during that time and whether

22 there were any combat operations between the two armies and how often did

23 that happen? Did you receive any reports to that effect?

24 A. Yes. This was a very, very active area. There was -- there were

25 constantly warring activities going on in the area, infantry attacks by

1 the armija against the RS positions in an attempt to break through and

2 break the hold that the VRS had on Sarajevo. It was very, very active.

3 Q. Do you know whether in this area which you have marked as a hill

4 and a square saying "BH," whether this is the area of Brijesce Brdo and

5 Sokolje Brdo area, and do you know which BH army's formation held that

6 part of the front line?

7 A. It is Brijesce Brdo, but I don't know who specifically held it on

8 the armija side.

9 Q. Mr. Hamill, have you just marked on this map all of the Lima posts

10 in the part of the city controlled by the troops, by the forces of the

11 army of Republika Srpska?

12 A. No, I have not. There are more. Lima 11, Lima 1-1, was in

13 constant contact with the Vogosca Brigade and was based in a house

14 overlooking the Vogosca area.

15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] For the record, Mr. Hamill has,

16 under Lima number 11, marked the observation post and the area of Vogosca

17 where this observation post was located.

18 Q. Mr. Hamill, can you tell us concerning the neighbourhood of

19 Vogosca, was that part of the city of Sarajevo exposed to the attacks of

20 the BH army from Hotonj, Zuca and Vulic [phoen], and were those lines

21 where there were frequent conflicts and exchanges of fire?

22 A. Yes. There were very, very frequent conflicts and exchanges of

23 fire in that area as the armija had position which overlooked Vogosca and

24 indeed which could be seen clearly from the position Lima 1-1.

25 Q. Mr. Hamill, can you confirm for us whether during your stay in

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1 Sarajevo and during your tour of duty there, and after we've identified

2 the positions of your observation posts, can you confirm for us that the

3 hills and elevations such as the hill of Mojmilo, Mount Igman, Brijesce

4 Hill, then hills of Zuc, Osnicina [phoen], Hotonj, and Orlic, that

5 throughout the conflict, they were under the control of the BH army?

6 A. I'm not aware of the location of Orlic, but the remainder were

7 certainly throughout the entire period under the control of Armija BH.

8 Perhaps if you tell me where Orlic is, I can confirm that, too.

9 Q. It is near the hill, Zuc hill.

10 A. [Previous translation continues]...

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill.

12 A. No, we're not finished. There was another team to the east of

13 Lima 1-1 in the area of Radava who had liaison with the Kosevo Brigade. I

14 don't believe that it's on this map, but I will indicate generally where

15 it was located.

16 Q. For the record, Mr. Hamill has put "L-12" to indicate the

17 observation post Lima 12 which was in the area of Radava.

18 In relation to the Radava area, Mr. Hamill, can you tell us

19 something concerning the front line. You tell us that this area was

20 controlled by the Kosevo Brigade. In relation to which part of this area,

21 how far were the positions of the BH army?

22 A. The BH army was much further down in this area. Now, we did not

23 have good access to this area. It was difficult to get teams in and out.

24 There was a lot of suspicion of our team by the leadership of the brigade,

25 and we did not have good cooperation in that area.

1 Q. When you say that the positions of the BH army in relation to your

2 observation post at Radava, when you say that they were at the foot, does

3 it mean that they were in the area of Sedam Suma, Grdonj, and the hill of

4 Hum?

5 A. To the best of my recollection, the front line would have been

6 somewhere in the area of Sedam Suma.

7 Q. And is it where the Grdonj -- where that hill is also located next

8 to Sedam Suma?

9 A. I'm sorry, I can't see it.

10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill. Can you tell us --

11 A. Could I say, I was in that area only once, so my knowledge of what

12 went on that area would be very, very limited. We had severe problems in

13 that area, as I said, with establishing relationships, and we were chased

14 out of it on more than one occasion. We had severe restrictions of

15 movement imposed on us by both the VRS and their irregular allies, the

16 so-called Chetniks. So it was difficult to find out exactly what was

17 happening in that area. There was one other team farther to the east in

18 the area of Sombolovac, as I mentioned. That was team Lima 7, much

19 further to the east.

20 Q. And you can't mark it on this map here, can you?

21 A. No. Also during my period, we established a team in Grbavica. If

22 you wish, I can mark that also.

23 Q. Yes, Mr. Hamill. Thank you.

24 A. The team was accommodated in the position shown on the map, shown

25 as Lima 6 Grbavica, but they operated exclusively within the Grbavica

1 area.

2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill.

3 Mr. Hamill, on the 5th of December, 1993, you were on Mr. McEvoy's

4 [Realtime transcript read in error "McEnvoy"] team, doing a round of

5 Sarajevo. Is that correct?

6 A. On that day, I was down for a conference in Kiseljak, and I took

7 the opportunity to have a look at the Papa side of the city and was

8 brought around by a John McEvoy, not McEnvoy. There is a misprint. So

9 McEvoy. He brought me around the various parts of the Papa area which, of

10 course, was very interesting for me as it was almost new territory.

11 Q. Do you remember whether you visited the Kosevo Hospital on that

12 occasion and how Mr. McEvoy explained to you on that occasion and showed

13 to you the part of the hospital when two nurses and a doctor were killed

14 by a shell? Did you have an opportunity to see the damage done then?

15 A. I did.

16 Q. Can you tell us, during the examination of the damage done on that

17 occasion, could one see the craters caused by the projectiles?

18 A. There was one hole in the wall. It was a circular hole, quite

19 large. I think at this distance I would say probably a metre across, and

20 it was almost perfectly circular.

21 Q. Can you tell us, with regard to the examination of that part of

22 the building which was damaged and the damage was caused by a shell, what

23 were the conclusions that you arrived at? Could you establish precisely

24 from which positions could have been fired the projectile which damaged

25 that part of the hospital?

1 A. The damage was pointed out to me as having been caused by a mortar

2 bomb. However, when I examined it, I didn't do it closely, but it seemed

3 very clear to me that it had been caused by a flat trajectory shell; that

4 is, one which came in almost horizontal to the ground and caused a

5 circular explosion rather than a shaped hole that one might have expected

6 if the round had come in downwards. So it seemed to me to be a

7 high-velocity, direct-fire weapon such as would be used on a tank. I felt

8 it was almost certainly a tank round. And there was -- from that point of

9 view, I looked around, and I could see no positions occupied by the VRS

10 that could have fired a tank round at that building at that time.

11 Q. So you are telling us that with regards to the examination of the

12 crater caused by the shell in the hospital, that on the basis of that

13 examination, one cannot confirm that it was fired from the area under the

14 control of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. Is that it?

15 A. It was my opinion that it was not fired from the area under the

16 control of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, but rather fired from within the

17 city.

18 Q. When you say from the positions within the city, do you mean by

19 that - can you confirm for us - that it could have been also done from

20 mobile mortars used by the BH army?

21 A. No, not mortars. Tank. Not a mortar. It was not a mortar round,

22 in my view. It didn't appear to have the characteristics that one would

23 expect even from an explosion on a wall from a mortar round. It appeared

24 to be, to me, to be a direct-fire, flat-trajectory weapon, such as a field

25 gun or, more likely, a tank.

1 Q. Mr. Hamill, do you have any knowledge whether in the vicinity of

2 the Kosevo Hospital, the BH army in the area of the tunnel which is near

3 the hospital, that it had a tank there?

4 A. I have no such knowledge.

5 Q. Do you have any knowledge with regards to the Kosevo Hospital

6 where were the positions of the BH army which had a tank? Do you know

7 which --

8 A. [Previous translation continues]... and by their nature, they

9 move on a regular basis. And as I mentioned earlier on, it would not have

10 been the policy of an organisation with scarce resources to squander those

11 by leaving them exposed to counter-battery fire or to leave them in

12 positions which would make them open to attack. So really the question is

13 not relevant. A tank, of its nature, moves.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill.

15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I see it is time for

16 a break. I will have a few more questions to ask in relation to the

17 incident which Mr. Hamill investigated at Markale, but I believe this

18 would be a convenient time for break.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, may I just ask you, as you might have

20 noticed, I did not interrupt you in order to indicate to you that the

21 cross-examination took already more time than the examination-in-chief. I

22 did not want to interrupt you at that very moment.

23 How much time would you still need, approximately?

24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, 10 minutes, say.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And how much time would Mr. Piletta-Zanin need

1 then?

2 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Less than 10 minutes perhaps. We

3 shall do our best to be as efficient as possible.

4 JUDGE ORIE: We'll then have a break now. We'll adjourn until

5 11.00, and then I expect the cross-examination to be concluded in

6 approximately 15 minutes.

7 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

8 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, please continue.

10 Yes, Mr. Stamp.

11 MR. STAMP: May it please Mr. President, Your Honours --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

13 MR. STAMP: -- my learned friend. May I, before my learned friend

14 for the Defence recommences the cross-examination, just take the

15 opportunity to announce the presence of Ms. Mahindaratne - I am sure I

16 have the pronunciation correctly - Prashanthi Mahindaratne, who is now

17 joining the Prosecution team in this matter. Thank you, Mr. President,

18 Your Honours. May it please you.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Welcome, Ms. Mahindaratne. I might have some

20 difficulties in pronunciation, pronouncing your name, but I'll try to do

21 my utmost best.

22 Ms. Pilipovic, then please continue.

23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

24 Q. Mr. Hamill, you told us yesterday that on the 11th of February,

25 1994, in early morning, you arrived in Sarajevo as a member of the team.

1 Could you tell us who formed the commission for investigating the incident

2 of the 5th of February, 1994?

3 A. If I may correct, Mr. President --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Witness. Microphone,

5 please.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You're feeling at home --

7 THE WITNESS: I am sorry. No problem.

8 JUDGE ORIE: -- pushing the buttons. Please proceed.

9 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, if I may correct what I said

10 yesterday. On consulting my notes, I found that we did in fact arrive on

11 the 10th but commenced work, as the learned defender has mentioned, early

12 on the 11th. It was around 9.00 on the 11th when we commenced work. The

13 commission at that time comprised the chief military observer, Brigadier

14 General Gerardus Bastiaans, from Netherlands, who was replaced during the

15 course of the day by Colonel Michel Gauthier, who subsequently signed the

16 report. So the initial -- yes.

17 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Mr. Hamill, I asked you who formed the commission, the name of the

19 person who set up the commission of which you were a member.

20 A. It was my understanding that it was set up by direction of the

21 special representative for the Secretary-General, acting through the force

22 commander to the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier General Gerardus

23 Bastiaans.

24 Q. Mr. Hamill, you told us yesterday that you didn't examine the

25 shrapnel because there was no evidence that the shrapnel came from the

1 mine that actually exploded at the marketplace -- from the shell that

2 exploded at the marketplace.

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. By analysing the shrapnel by physical or chemical means, could it

5 be established whether they come from one and the same shell?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You told us that you examined the crater of the shell which fell

8 on the marketplace in Sarajevo on the 5th of February. Could you tell us

9 how deep the crater was?

10 A. The crater was not very deep. If memory serves me, it was perhaps

11 about ten centimetres deep. The fuse tunnel was somewhat more, perhaps

12 20, 30 centimetres, perhaps a little less.

13 Q. Mr. Hamill, were you told whether a part of the fuse had been

14 found?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Was the fuse found or a part of the fuse?

17 A. I believe so.

18 Q. Could you tell us what the velocity of the shell was or what it

19 should have been and what it was to create the kind of crater that you saw

20 at Markale?

21 A. The velocity of the shell isn't terribly relevant. When a mortar

22 bomb is fired, as I mentioned yesterday, it gets a number of incremental

23 charges, each of which gives a boost to its initial velocity. So

24 depending on the charge that it's fired at will determine the velocity it

25 comes down at. If it's fired with a large charge, it will rise very high

1 in the air. It will come to a high vertex height and drop from there, and

2 it is literally dropping. So the limiting factor would be air

3 resistance. I mean, the rate of acceleration is standard. What is it?

4 9.81 metres per second, per second, but there is a terminal velocity.

5 So it's not terribly relevant, to be quite honest. It can't be

6 determined. There is no method of determination from which height the

7 mortar fell and, therefore, no method of determining exactly what the

8 initial velocity was and, therefore, what the charge was. It cannot be

9 done.

10 Q. Mr. Hamill, as you were talking about the charge, are you

11 confirming your finding that it is impossible to establish from where the

12 mine was fired because it is not known how many additional charges were

13 used?

14 A. That is substantially correct. Because of the fact that it is

15 impossible to determine, absolutely impossible to determine, the number of

16 additional increments to the primary charge, then it is not possible with

17 any sort of validity to say where the round was fired. However, what one

18 can do if one has a good fuse tunnel and measures the incident angle, by

19 consulting the range tables, one can work out six areas, in the case of a

20 bomb like this which had six possibilities of different charges. If a

21 mortar bomb had seven possibilities, for example, if it had seven charges,

22 then there would be seven possible areas from which it could have been

23 launched, all of them along the same line and all of them comprising

24 effectively an oval area along that line, discrete from each other like

25 pearls on a necklace, but well separated, if you can follow the analogy.

1 Q. Mr. Hamill, you were mentioning six possible positions. Is it

2 possible, approximately, to establish the probability of hitting the

3 Markale marketplace viewed from six possible firing positions?

4 A. It is my view that in this particular case, due to the lack of

5 adjusting rounds, that it was a fluke that the marketplace was hit. It

6 was not necessarily the target. It may have been, but it may not have

7 been. A mortar, particularly a 120-millimetre mortar which is not rifled,

8 is not a terribly accurate weapon. It is an area weapon for suppression

9 of activity over a wide area. It has a danger radius of about

10 500 metres. In other words, the splinters can travel up to 500 metres.

11 It has technically got a lethal radius of 54 metres. That is, anyone who

12 is not protected within 54 metres of the point of detonation is almost

13 certain to suffer fatal wounds.

14 But a mortar bomb, again, by its nature, because of the fact that

15 it travels to a very high vertex height, it travels through different

16 levels of atmosphere, where there are different temperature conditions,

17 wind conditions, wind direction, for example, wind strength, all of which

18 have an effect on what is a slow round. You can see a mortar bomb flying

19 through the air. It is that slow.

20 That is not possible with artillery weapons, but with a mortar

21 bomb, it can be seen. Its time of flight is 30 to 45 seconds. And during

22 that period, several different factors come into play, such as the wind

23 speed, the wind direction, the air temperature, the temperature of the

24 charge which fired it, barometric pressure. All these factors combine to

25 make it an inaccurate round.

1 Now, the fact that -- yes.

2 Q. Mr. Hamill, you've just told us that it is possible to see the

3 bomb flying. Could you tell us at what height it is possible to notice

4 it?

5 A. Generally, you'll see the bomb flying if you're behind the weapon,

6 and you'll watch it for a period of maybe 15 seconds, up to about 15

7 seconds. But you have to be at the right angle. It can't be done

8 normally from the side except in exceptional circumstances; from behind,

9 because there is little apparent movement.

10 Q. Could you please tell us whether the mine is fiery, like a

11 fireball?

12 A. No, not unless it's rocket-assisted. There's a specific type of

13 round which is used which has a rocket to assist the achievement of a

14 higher vertex height, and thus more range. But normal bombs, once they

15 are fired, they are fired. The explosion occurs within the barrel,

16 there's a large flash of fire at the mouth of the barrel, and that's it.

17 The bomb is launched. It is inert as regards fire coming out of it or

18 anything like that. It's merely a projectile at that stage.

19 Q. Mr. Hamill, thank you. You mentioned six possible firing

20 positions. My question is whether from all these potential positions of

21 firing of the mentioned bomb, is the probability equal regarding hitting

22 the Markale marketplace from each of these positions?

23 A. Yes. Effectively, yes. The probability would be slightly higher

24 the nearer the target is to the weapon. But not much. You're looking at

25 approximately equal times of flight because of the fact that if the round

1 is close, then generally it will be coming from a higher angle. So again,

2 it takes a considerable period to fly through the air.

3 Q. Could you tell us with what degree of precision a bomb fired from

4 a mortar can hit the set target?

5 A. Providing that adjustment has occurred, that is, that previous

6 bombs have been fired within the same general area, there are laid-down

7 parameters. It must be within a time span of two hours. It must be left

8 or right no more than, if I remember, about 150 mils, that is, say,

9 10 degrees. And it must be within certain range parameters. Then there

10 is a good likelihood of hitting close to a target with a mortar bomb.

11 But it is not an inherently accurate weapon in the same way that a

12 gun or even a Howitzer is. It is difficult to get a round on target,

13 extremely, extremely difficult to get a round on target, directly on

14 target, even when the rounds have already been adjusted. There is still a

15 certain amount of scatter. There is a beaten zone within which the round

16 will land so many metres left and right, so many metres forward or

17 backwards. In the case of a round being fired where there is no previous

18 adjustment, it is extremely difficult to get -- it is almost certainly

19 impossible to get a first-round hit.

20 Q. Mr. Hamill, just one more question for you: On the basis of the

21 sound produced by the bomb, is it possible to determine the direction and

22 the position from which the bomb was fired?

23 A. Depending on the observer, he may hear the round being fired; and

24 again, depending on the terrain, it may be possible to determine the

25 general direction. But it will not be possible to determine a location,

1 just direction. And again, you must take into account the fact that there

2 may be terrain features in between, there may be buildings in between,

3 there may be woods, for example, all of which would tend to muffle, mask,

4 or deflect the sound. So really, it's an extremely inherently unreliable

5 method. General direction is all that you will get.

6 Q. Mr. Hamill, you examined the crater created at the Markale

7 marketplace. Can a valid examination be done if the tunnel of the crater

8 has been mechanically changed?

9 A. It was my view and my opinion on examining the fuse tunnel that it

10 was inherently -- it was pretty well intact. It wasn't completely intact,

11 but it was intact enough that I could make an estimate of the angle of

12 incidence as being between 950 and 1.100 mils. That is within less than

13 10 degrees. A colleague of my mine put it to between 1.000 and

14 1.100 mils. I would say that the fuse tunnel was fairly intact. It was

15 certainly intact enough to give us an angle of incidence which really

16 proves nothing because, as I said, there are six possible locations from

17 which that round could have been fired if those measurements were

18 accurate, which I believe they were. But the measurement of the direction

19 does not rely on the fuse tunnel method. There are other methods which we

20 also used. We used different methods.

21 And again, I would point out, madam, that there was remarkable

22 consistency across the results despite the fact that each of us did our

23 tests independently of the other and using different methods.

24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Hamill, I have completed my

25 part of the cross-examination. My colleague Piletta-Zanin has a few

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1 questions for you now.

2 JUDGE ORIE: May I also remind Mr. Piletta-Zanin that where I

3 indicated that -- where you indicated, yourself, that the cross-examining

4 by Ms. Pilipovic would take another 10 minutes, it took approximately

5 20 minutes by now. So may I ask you to be as efficient as possible.

6 Please proceed.

7 Cross-examined by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:

8 Q. [Interpretation] Witness, good morning. I will express myself in

9 French. Good morning.

10 Do you know, sir, the name of Mr. Michael Rose? Is the name

11 familiar?

12 A. Yes.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please bring the microphone

14 closer to him.

15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Could you tell us whether -- could you, sir, tell us whether

17 Mr. Michael Rose was for a time responsible for UNPROFOR in Sarajevo?

18 A. General Michael Rose was the commander of BH command. That is, he

19 was responsible for all UNPROFOR personnel in Bosnia i Herzegovina.

20 Q. Thank you for your answer. Do you know Mr. Divjak? Does the name

21 sound familiar, Divjak?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Witness, do you know the name of one of your colleagues, that is

24 Commander Jan Segers?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Witness, I should like to show you two documents now, but before

2 that, could you tell us if you know whether General Michael Rose wrote a

3 book relating to his activities in Bosnia?

4 A. He did. I haven't read it.

5 Q. Was the title of that book "Fighting for Peace"?

6 A. It may have been. I do not know.

7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have here a

8 copy of page 48 of this book which I should like to show to this witness

9 and to read an extract from it. And may I do so?

10 JUDGE ORIE: I'll ask Mr. Stamp. Are you aware of the existence

11 of this book and --

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] We have copies to distribute.

13 JUDGE ORIE: -- the book as the whole?

14 MR. STAMP: I am aware of the existence book, and yesterday, my

15 learned friend Ms. Pilipovic gave me a page from the book.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

17 MR. STAMP: I imagine that is the same thing my friend

18 Mr. Piletta-Zanin is referring to now.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Perhaps the usher could assist

21 me to distribute copies to everyone. I think there will be a sufficient

22 number of copies. One for the witness and each of the parties.

23 [In English] Oh, you can't have it. Mr. Usher, would you also

24 take this one, please. Thanks.

25 [Interpretation] I think the interpreters already have copies in

1 the booth. Yes. Yes, I see them nodding. Yes. Thank you.

2 Mr. President, may I continue?

3 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...

4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

5 Q. Witness, you have before you page 4 [as interpreted]. I'm going

6 to read the last paragraph on this page and to ask you a question about

7 it. I will begin by reading, for the benefit of the booths --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

9 MR. STAMP: I got page 48. I see reference here to page 4.

10 Perhaps that's in error.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] In French, I was talking about

12 page 48.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for the counsel,

14 please.

15 JUDGE ORIE: We accept that it's a slip of the tongue.

16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: Thanks a lot.

17 Q. [Interpretation] So page 48, and I am reading the last paragraph.

18 [In English] "Although the Serbs had now agreed virtually

19 everything the Bosnians had asked for, Divjak was reluctant to sign up to

20 a ceasefire, once again on the grounds that the UN proposal was not linked

21 to any long-term political settlement. I told him that the people of

22 Sarajevo would at that moment certainly settle for something short of

23 this, just to be able to live in peace. He still would not agree. At

24 this point I sprang a nasty surprise on him. I told him that the first UN

25 examination of the bomb crater in Markale marketplace indicated that the

1 bomb had been fired from the Bosnian side of the battle lines. The room

2 went deadly silent and Hajrulakovic looked anxious. He coldly asked me to

3 explain. I told him that the angle of the trajectory of the mortar bomb

4 suggested that it had been fired at extremely short range from their side

5 of the lines or perhaps detonated in situ. It was difficult, I said, to

6 be precise when only one bomb had been fired and also because the Bosnian

7 army had removed some of the important forensic evidence before the UN

8 arrived."

9 [Interpretation] End of quotation.

10 Witness, could you please confirm that indeed, as far as you know,

11 an important part of the evidence had been removed before the arrival of

12 UN experts?

13 A. Before I do that, may I say yes, the name of Divjak is now known

14 to me now that I see it in context.

15 Secondly, I would say that what General Rose said was nonsense in

16 this extract. He obviously knew nothing about the operation of mortars,

17 or else he was much more likely trying to make a political point and to

18 further his negotiating position, but this -- sorry.

19 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interrupt you? I think the question

20 was --

21 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.

22 JUDGE ORIE: -- whether General Rose was right when he said that

23 part of the evidence was taken away before the UN arrived. As far as I

24 understand your answer, you're commenting on his assessment of -- at least

25 on the report of what was the source of fire of the mortar. I'd just like

1 to avoid whatever confusion, because the statement contained several

2 elements of information, and I think you're commenting on another one than

3 the question was about.

4 THE WITNESS: Okay.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [In English] Thank you for your assistance.

7 Q. Please answer the question.

8 A. Okay. From our investigation, from speaking to individuals who

9 were on the scene, they were satisfied that no item was removed from the

10 scene by anybody.

11 Q. [Interpretation] Witness, are you sure? Are you sure that what is

12 usually called the stabiliser had not been taken out before you arrived

13 there and then put back in the place? When I say "before you arrived

14 there," I mean the team.

15 A. It certainly happened before the team, because the team didn't

16 arrive until the 11th of February. However, a team from FreBat was there

17 shortly after the explosion, and a witness, a UN witness, had been present

18 from within a very few minutes of the explosion. It is not conceivable in

19 the confusion which occurred that any item would have been moved that

20 quickly, before he saw what was happening.

21 Our team interviewed several witnesses who had been there from

22 practically the beginning and who were quite certain that there had been

23 no disturbance. Again, I would suggest that --

24 Q. Witness, thank you very much. Let us try to be as brief as

25 possible. Will you then tell me if -- if the stabiliser taken out or

1 removed within the interval of several hours, if that had been the case,

2 would it have affected your conclusions?

3 A. Our conclusions were not quite as accurate as they might have been

4 had the fin and tail section still been in situ when we arrived there.

5 However, insufficient mechanical damage had been done to the crater to

6 change what was actually written. What we wrote was written on the basis

7 of what we saw.

8 Q. Thank you, Witness. Witness, with regard to the shrapnel, when

9 you said members of commission, did they ask to take possession of this

10 evidence? And by "this" I mean shrapnel.

11 A. At the time, it was considered by the team leader that the

12 shrapnel did not have integrity in that there was no definite chain

13 linking the items, the shrapnel which were taken from the hole, from the

14 crater, with the shrapnel that was shown to us. And in any event, the

15 shrapnel was very, very small pieces which were insufficiently large to

16 conduct an analysis by mechanical means.

17 Q. Witness, will you please try to show me with your fingers or with

18 your hand what do you mean when you say too -- very small. Could you tell

19 us what it is you understand as very small?

20 A. [Indicated]

21 Q. Witness, there were no larger pieces than that?

22 A. Not shown to us. Not that I remember.

23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] For the record, Mr. President,

24 let me say that the witness has made a gesture to show the space between

25 his index finger and his thumb of about five [as interpreted]

1 centimetres. I believe that was correct.

2 Q. Witness, I will now show you a photograph which you will get in a

3 moment. This photograph has number ERN --

4 MR. STAMP: If I may.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stamp, yes.

6 MR. STAMP: Thank you. I think it might well be just a matter of

7 the translation or what I heard. I think the translation has it here that

8 Mr. -- my friend is putting -- it has "five centimetres."

9 JUDGE ORIE: I see it now. I listened to the French version.

10 What Mr. Piletta-Zanin said, in my recollection, is that it was one up to

11 not more than two centimetres. Approximately one but not more than two.

12 I think that's --

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

14 Yes, indeed that is what I did say.

15 Q. Witness, I'd now like to show you an exhibit which has already

16 been introduced, D61.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] And could the usher please

18 help me to show you. And we do not have a sufficient number of copies, so

19 let me show it this way for everybody so everybody can see this document

20 which we have already produced.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Since there are no copies, Mr. Usher, perhaps it

22 could be placed on the ELMO so that everyone is better able to --

23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Usher, for your

24 assistance. Could we please focus.

25 Q. Witness, you have before you a photograph which allegedly

1 represents some of the fragments which were collected from the site.

2 Could you confirm for us first that the scale which we have at the bottom

3 here, that is a line in white and black, that the scale is in

4 centimetres? That is, that every box, every square, means one

5 centimetre. Would that be correct?

6 A. It certainly appears that way.

7 Q. Thank you very much. And in relation to the shrapnel and the

8 fragments which we are showing you, did you see fragments of this size of

9 which some seem to be five to six centimetres long, if we can trust the

10 scale below?

11 A. I do not recall seeing such fragments.

12 Q. Thank you for your answer.

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No more questions regarding

14 that photograph, Mr. President. It can be removed from the ELMO. I'm

15 simply trying to be as fast as possible.

16 Now I'd like to show another document which has number D79, 7-9.

17 I believe that we have also given the text to the interpreters so as to

18 allow everybody to understand me better. But we can give it to everybody,

19 and I will keep one copy of it. I do not know if the booths have the

20 document. No, the interpreters do not. So we shall need three copies for

21 the booth, Usher, please.

22 [In English] Would you bring some for the translation booth.

23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Let me wait for 30 seconds so

25 that the booths can get this copy. My apologies.

1 Q. Meanwhile, Witness, you have before you a document which has the

2 stamp of the United Nations, and it seems that it has some French

3 abbreviations and also English abbreviations. Do you recognise this type

4 of document? Could you just say yes or no, please.

5 A. No.

6 Q. So you have never seen this type of document?

7 A. No, never.

8 Q. Witness, the name that you can see at the bottom of this document

9 and the names -- these names are Anne Mawis - and I'm not sure that I'm

10 pronouncing them properly - and Marc Le Nouaille, are they familiar to

11 you?

12 A. I know neither name.

13 Q. And the name of General Briquemont, which you can see on page 5,

14 does that sound familiar to you?

15 A. Yes, I know General Briquemont. He was the commander of BH

16 command - in other words, all UN forces - in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General

17 Francois Briquemont, I believe.

18 Q. Indeed, thank you. Witness, since you are an expert in these

19 matters, could you tell us what does "SMIO" mean that we see at the top on

20 the left-hand side, the second line?

21 A. SMIO stands for "senior military information officer."

22 Q. So we are talking about a relatively high-ranking officer, are we?

23 A. No.

24 Q. So we are talking about a low-ranking officer?

25 A. All UNMOs should be of the rank of captain or major. The job of

1 SMIO in UNMO HQ in Zagreb varied. Sometimes it was a major, sometimes it

2 was a captain. And on one occasion that I'm aware of, it was a major who

3 just got promoted to lieutenant colonel. So UNMOs do tasks. This is one

4 of the tasks that is done by UNMOs. The SMIO worked for me in Zagreb.

5 Q. Thank you very much for your answer, Witness.

6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have one or

7 perhaps two paragraphs, and I'd like to read them, if I have your leave.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you may.

9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. We find

10 it on page 4, and that is indeed page 4, third paragraph, rather, the

11 third chapter, and it begins, "Even the Muslim Bosnians..." That is the

12 question. And I will be quoting from letters JS. These are the initials

13 of Mr. Jan Segers who was at the SMIO that we are talking about.

14 I am beginning the quote: [In English] "... the shelling of their

15 own people. In particular, the terrible massacres at the marketplace in

16 Sarajevo. Concerning the first one, in February 1994, which killed 70

17 persons, UN always have told that they didn't know who were the

18 responsibles. Nevertheless, it was quite sure that it were not the

19 Serbs. Some rumours mentioned that it were explosives who were put under

20 a table... Concerning the last shell on the marketplace, the one just

21 before the NATO massive air strikes against the Serbs, the spokesman of

22 the UN confirmed that the projectile was coming from their lines. But the

23 UNMO who did the investigation immediately after the catastrophe, as well

24 as other UN officers who did an investigation, have stated that it was

25 possible that the projectile was fired from the Moslem side. Of course,

1 the ballistic and crater analysis are not an exact science. And we all

2 know very well that we are manipulated: Local authorities are using us in

3 their own interest. When we are telling something that you don't have to

4 say, we are threatened or expulsed."

5 [Interpretation] End of quotation.

6 Q. Witness, I want to ask you two questions: This is a text which

7 was produced by Mr. Jan Segers, and it mentioned the existence of

8 rumours. Did you personally hear any such rumours?

9 A. Yes, I did.

10 Q. Could you then tell us under what circumstances did you hear those

11 rumours?

12 A. I mentioned in my testimony yesterday, for example, the story that

13 was given to us by a captain of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps headquarters

14 that the projectile had been launched pneumatically from an address maybe

15 150 metres from the marketplace. That was one. The second one was we

16 were told there was a bomb placed in the marketplace and this was

17 detonated, and the mortar bomb didn't, in fact, exist. Another one was

18 that the mortar bomb was used as a cover for the detonation of an

19 explosive device in the marketplace. All of these were total and utter

20 nonsense. This piece of paper is also similarly nonsense. Rumours are

21 rumours. Fact is fact. The analysis was a complete and thorough analysis

22 and was accurate and stated exactly what we found.

23 Q. My last question -- thank you for this answer. And my very last

24 question: So this United Nations officer says that he was aware to a

25 certain extent that they, or we - I mean the UN staff - were, and I quote

1 it again, "manipulated." Was that your impression, too, at times?

2 A. It depends on your definition of "manipulation." What I would say

3 about that is that it was quite clear that the competing factions of every

4 side, not just in Bosnia but also in Croatia, in Macedonia, wherever,

5 would use the United Nations to its own best effect, naturally. But we

6 were aware that such a thing was happening. And indeed, there had to be a

7 certain flexibility in our operation; otherwise, we couldn't have achieved

8 what we did achieve. So certainly there were attempts to manipulate us.

9 Of course there were. I was present. I was an attempted victim of

10 manipulation. But once one is aware that people are trying to manipulate

11 one, then one can deal with it. It's not a problem. It's a fact of

12 life.

13 Q. Witness, with regard to those witnesses that you mentioned and

14 these problems of manipulation, a moment ago, I heard you say that

15 Sarajevo troops, the so-called government troops, had deployed mortars in

16 the immediate proximity of the Kosevo Hospital. Could you, yourself, see

17 them since you were outside that particular -- outside the city?

18 A. No, I could not. But this information was given to us by our

19 colleagues on the Papa side, that is, the UNMOs who worked on the side

20 inside the city.

21 Q. And you consider this information reliable?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No more questions,

24 Mr. President. Thank you.

25 Thank you, Witness.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stamp.

2 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any need for the Prosecution to re-examine

4 the witness?

5 MR. STAMP: Yes, just one or two matters of clarification.

6 Re-examined by Mr. Stamp:

7 Q. You said that sniping, in normal military parlance, means a

8 concealed person, operating independently, shooting from a distance with

9 optical devices for assistance. You also spoke of sniping in a more

10 general sense from, for example, the Bristol Hotel into Grbavica. Having

11 regard to what -- to those two comments you made, I'd like you to have a

12 look at Document P3675. And let me ask you for one clarification.

13 A. Yes, I think I know to what you're referring.

14 Q. Page 8 of that document, at K. Could you just read that paragraph

15 quickly and I'll ask you a question.

16 A. Certainly. "Sniping, a term used indiscriminately in the conflict

17 in the former Yugoslavia applied usually to the targeting of civilians

18 with a variety of single-shot and multiple-shot [machine-guns] weapons.

19 The expression derives from the fact that the source of fire is usually so

20 well concealed that it is difficult to pinpoint. Sniping in the military

21 sense is conducted for specific purposes, sometimes using specialised

22 weapons that are expressly designed for sniping. Sniping in the Balkan

23 context is against a civilian population that is neither capable of

24 protective measures nor equipped for an appropriate repast. Snipers in

25 NATO armies undergo an extensive selection and training regime."

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1 Q. Thank you very much. Would you agree with me that that passage

2 explains two different context in which you have used the expression

3 "sniping"?

4 A. Yes. As I said yesterday, sniping normally applies to firing

5 single shots against specific targets. There is, in artillery terms, a

6 term called a "sniping gun" which is a single-gun action against a

7 pinpoint target, and that would be closer to the definition of sniping as

8 used here.

9 Q. And that would be sniping in the military sense?

10 A. Well, they are both sniping in the military sense. They both

11 are.

12 Q. Very well.

13 A. But the normal sniping that we refer to refers to an individual

14 with a specific one-shot weapon with optical enhancement, firing from a

15 concealed position at a target, at a specific target.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 Can you -- you spoke about or you were asked about the incident at

18 the waterline on the -- in July 1993. Can you recall where you were on

19 the 12th of July, 1993?

20 A. I can. I was actually in Radava at the time, negotiating with the

21 headquarters staff of the Kosevo Brigade, so I was on the very far side of

22 the city on that day.

23 Q. You were asked questions about the incident of the 1st of June,

24 1993, and you said that you learned about it at the time, you can't

25 remember exactly from whom, but you would certainly have learned about it,

1 if nowhere else, from CNN, which gave you a lot of information. Where

2 would you have received this type of information about that shelling from

3 CNN?

4 A. I'm making an assumption that I may have seen it --

5 Q. I understand that. But where, if you had received it from CNN,

6 would you be viewing CNN?

7 A. Inside the headquarters.

8 Q. At which barracks?

9 A. In PTT. Now, we also had television in Lukavica, but generally we

10 watched television Republika Srpska, or from Banja Luka.

11 Q. I see. You said that the UNMO --

12 A. Sorry. I also had the World Service on my radio.

13 Q. Indeed. BBC World Service.

14 A. Yeah, yeah. Uh-huh.

15 Q. That's in evidence. Thanks very much.

16 You said that the UNMO personnel were inadequate right through the

17 former Yugoslavia, including in and out of Sarajevo. Having regard to

18 that, would the UNMOs be in a position to record all the artillery fire

19 from any side?

20 A. No. As I indicated, we were in very short supply. At one period,

21 we were down to five observers for the entire southern sector of the

22 city. This was totally insufficient. We had to close some of our

23 locations at times because of the dearth of observers.

24 Q. And from that, I take it there would have been a substantial

25 amount of fire which would have escaped UNMO observation?

1 A. Fire would have escaped observation, but in general terms, there

2 would have been a team located sufficiently close to hear firing going on

3 and to report it. That is not to say that we recorded every single

4 engagement or every single round fired in every single engagement. That

5 would have been beyond our capabilities.

6 Q. You said - and perhaps I heard you incorrectly - that Mount Igman,

7 among other places, was under the control of the Bosnian army throughout

8 the conflict, yet I recall you saying that at one stage in the conflict it

9 had been captured by one party. Could you just explain that? Was it

10 under the control of --

11 A. It was --

12 Q. -- any party throughout the conflict?

13 A. It was under the control -- Igman itself was under the control

14 initially of the Bosnian government, that is President Izetbegovic's

15 government. However, as I indicated, around the 19th of July, a battle

16 commenced on Igman, during which the troops of the Igman Brigade and the

17 Ilidza Brigade attacked Igman and captured it. It was taken by them.

18 The UN stepped in, forced a ceasefire and patrolled the area on

19 the top. At one stage, however, the UN withdrew from certain positions

20 and they were reoccupied by the army of the BH government, that is,

21 President Izetbegovic's government. So that they had it for most of the

22 conflict. They had it taken from them for a period - not all of Igman

23 now, they still had part of the mountain, it's a big mountain - and then

24 they retook peacefully, they reoccupied an area which had been evacuated

25 by UN troops.

1 Q. In respect to the Kosevo hospital incident --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- did you do a formal and complete investigation of that

4 incident?

5 A. I did not. I formed an impression of what I saw on the spot.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. I did not -- I did not do a complete analysis.

8 Q. Thank you. You said you are not sure but you believe the fuse or

9 a part of the fuse was found. If that was found and that came to the

10 attention of the UNPROFOR team, would that have been recorded in the

11 report?

12 A. As I think about it, I think it's quite possible that we didn't

13 find it, because if we had done, I'm sure I would have remarked on it.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 A. I think I may have been mistaken in saying that it was found by

16 us.

17 Q. And I take it that you did not remark on it in the report which

18 you --

19 A. No.

20 Q. -- penned.

21 A. No.

22 Q. You said the fragments that you saw were a certain size, which you

23 indicated. From your report, there were two sets of fragments. There was

24 one which were found inside the fuse tunnel. That one set, you had

25 already indicated it was very small. And there were some fragments which

1 were shown to members of the team by the Bosnian representatives, by the

2 representatives of the Federation. Can you recall if you were present

3 among the members of the UNPROFOR team at the meeting where that set of

4 fragments was shown?

5 A. I do recall. I was not present.

6 Q. The fragments, therefore, which you saw which were too small would

7 have been the other set of fragments which were taken from the crater?

8 A. That is correct. May I say that the head of the team who saw the

9 fragments told us that the fragments which were in the possession of the

10 authorities told us that they were not usable.

11 Q. Thank you. You said that mortars are normally set up, fired, a

12 few rounds will be fired, and then they are moved. Could you briefly

13 explain to us, in the normal operation of a mortar where it is used in the

14 shoot-and-scoot fashion, to use your terms, what would be adjusting

15 rounds?

16 A. A mortar goes into position. The best available data

17 meteorologically and ballistically would be fed into a computer which

18 would then calculate an elevation and a bearing to fire the mortar on.

19 Q. Do you always have to use a computer?

20 A. No, you don't. No, no, not at all. You can do it by eye. If you

21 can see the target, you can do it by eye.

22 Q. Is there --

23 A. Or you can use other means. There are other aids.

24 Q. Thank you. I'm simply asking you how the concept of adjustment

25 works where the mortar is shooting and scooting.

1 A. What happens is there has to be an observer who can see the fall

2 of shot, that is, where the rounds land. When the first round is fired

3 from the mortar, the observer reports back to somebody on the gun line,

4 normally a command-post officer who mans the command post which calculates

5 the data, where the round has come down in relation to the target and in

6 relation to himself. At that stage, the person in the command post takes

7 that information, translates it into technical data, into a new bearing

8 and a new elevation and possibly a new charge, and fires the weapon

9 again. The second round then comes somewhat closer but probably not on

10 target. Again the observer reports back the new impact area, gives a

11 correction, and that is applied on the gun. At that stage, the mortar

12 commander will fire several rounds from all his tubes and then pack up and

13 go away. Normally, he would fire five rounds per tube.

14 Q. And at that stage, having fired these earlier rounds, he would be

15 on target?

16 A. Yes, he would.

17 Q. Now, the earlier rounds are called adjusting rounds?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And having come on target, they would pack up and leave?

20 A. Having done what the observer wanted them to do to the target,

21 they would pack up and go, yes.

22 Q. Thank you. You were based in Zagreb, I take it, when you were

23 asked to go to the market for investigations?

24 A. That is correct.

25 Q. Thank you very much. I take it that the -- your evidence is that

1 the mortars of the Bosnian Serb army and the artillery in general was

2 always normally placed at one set position; is that correct?

3 A. That is correct. They very, very rarely moved.

4 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much.

5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your permission,

6 may we take advantage of the presence of Mr. Hamill for him to give us a

7 definition of a sniper?

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but I think he gave a definition, more or less,

9 and then confronted with a definition which was not exactly the same.

10 But in your view, Mr. Hamill, did you give us a definition of a

11 sniper? Because we --

12 THE WITNESS: It's my belief, Mr. President --

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

14 THE WITNESS: -- that I did several times.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's my recollection as well. But if there's

16 any specific element perhaps on that definition that you'd like to put an

17 additional question, I'll be -- but if you just ask for a definition, I

18 expect Mr. Hamill to tell you the same as he did before.

19 Further cross-examination by Ms. Pilipovic:

20 Q. [Interpretation] What is the range of a sniper?

21 A. It depends on the weapon he's firing. I mean, a sniper rifle can

22 fire to 1.000 metres very, very accurately. If the optical instrument on

23 the rifle is calibrated and is strong enough, he can take out a person's

24 head at 1.000 metres with a rifle.

25 With a gun, on the other hand, it is dependent on what the layer

1 of the gun, the person who is actually sighting the gun, can see. He must

2 be able to see his target. And again, that is the essence of sniping,

3 that you see the target that you are firing at. You must locate that

4 target, you must use a telescopic instrument to lay your cross-hairs on

5 that target, and then you fire on it. So it's -- the definition of

6 sniping, effectively, is firing on a seen, specified target. That's --

7 that's in its basic element.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Does that answer your question?

9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hamill, I will ask my colleagues whether they

11 have any questions to you.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE ORIE: Judge El Mahdi has one or more questions to you.

14 Questioned by the Court:

15 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Witness. I

16 won't take too much time, you must be tired, but I would like to go back

17 to what we referred to as snipers. According to your knowledge and

18 experience, do you have the impression that these snipers acted within the

19 framework of a strategy or was it, rather, individual actions that were

20 not coordinated?

21 A. It is my belief that snipers operated as a tool of the management,

22 as it were, and they were there for a specific purpose, and they were

23 under the control of somebody -- somebody in authority, so that there was

24 a strategy for using snipers as an instrument of terror.

25 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Let us go on now to

1 the shots that targeted the Markale marketplace. If I understood

2 correctly, there was a single shot, a single shell that hit the market.

3 In your opinion, was it possible to target the market with a single round

4 without prior adjustment, regardless of who may have done the firing?

5 A. In my opinion, it was -- it would have been an extremely lucky

6 shot for the firer if he had hit the target that he was aiming at first

7 time around, for a number of reasons. There had been no firing in the

8 area for some considerable time, certainly well outside two-hour time

9 limit that we allow for. In my view, that particular round was not

10 necessarily aimed at the market but was aimed somewhere in the general

11 area of the city of Sarajevo.

12 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] In your testimony, you use the

13 expression or definition, that is, the notion of Chetniks. What do you

14 mean by the word "Chetnik"?

15 A. A Chetnik, Your Honour, was a royalist soldier during the Second

16 World War. However, during the Yugoslav secession wars, the expression

17 became used for a Serb irregular, that is, a soldier of a militia not

18 directly or apparently not directly under the control of the governing

19 authorities of one of the entities which was conducting military

20 operations. That's why I used the term "so-called Chetnik" rather than

21 "Chetnik."

22 In this particular case in Sarajevo, there was a band of

23 irregulars which I believed to be under the control of a particular

24 officer. This band was led by one Vasilije Vidovic, and their object was

25 to spread terror throughout the area and to prevent entry into specified

1 areas, generally to the north and east of the city of Sarajevo.

2 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. You spoke of them as being

3 allies of the army, allies of the VRS. Is there any institutional

4 relationship? Were they subject to directives or orders from the regular

5 army, or were they totally independent?

6 A. It is my view that they were tools of the regular army used for

7 specific purposes, used for purposes which would be illegal normally. And

8 they were -- they could be disowned, as it were. The authorities could

9 disown them, could disclaim responsibility for their activities and claim

10 that they were outside control.

11 I was asked yesterday about uniforms and I said that the Bosnian

12 Serb army, the VRS, wore a kind of brown-green camouflage uniforms. The

13 irregulars, the so-called Chetniks, did not wear such uniform. They wore

14 black clothes or perhaps civilian clothes. They were not dressed in

15 appropriate uniform. But again, as I say, my view was they were used as a

16 tool of the authorities to conduct operations which could be disowned,

17 "black" operations, if you will.

18 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] I apologise, but my last question

19 is that you said that in your opinion, the shells that hit the hospital

20 came from a tank. Is that true? Did both sides have the opportunity to

21 drive tanks around in that part of the town?

22 A. No. Only one side, the army of the government of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, had access to that area. From recollection, I would

24 say that the VRS had not got access to -- they had no possibility of

25 firing tanks at that hospital at that time. There was a range of hills in

1 between their positions and the hospital.

2 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Therefore, the tank was close to

3 the hospital, was it not, and was moving around under protection or, in

4 your opinion, can a tank move without being protected? Because other

5 witnesses have said that, in military terms, tanks normally need

6 protection. They don't circulate. They don't move around individually

7 alone.

8 A. Normally, Your Honour, tanks would move in troops of three or four

9 as part of a squadron of 12 or 14, as part of a regiment and so on.

10 However, as I mentioned, the Armija BH were extremely short of heavy

11 hardware such as tanks and artillery and they used them in an

12 unconventional method as did, indeed, the VRS use their equipment in an

13 unconventional method. This is not a classic war as we have seen on the

14 various battlefields of Europe or the Middle East. This is more akin to a

15 siege wherein you had an area inside and an area outside a front line, the

16 front line remaining effectively in the same place for most of the

17 period. So that a tank, if moving inside, was moving within its own

18 protected area in that sense, or if it were outside, if it were, for

19 example, on the hill of Gornja Mladica, it was moving in an area which was

20 under the control of the appropriate authorities to which it responded, so

21 that it was certainly easy, in that sense, for a tank to move around

22 inside the area in Zetra stadium, for example, or that general area

23 without interference from outside.

24 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Also a few questions, Mr. Hamill. First, just for my

1 better understanding, you testified yesterday about sniping, I would say,

2 in the area of Grbavica and Hrasno. You told us that there was sniping

3 coming into Grbavica from the armija side, as you told us. Was that

4 sniping fire always received at the other side of the front line, or did

5 you ever experience that sniping fire was coming from and received at the

6 same side of the front line?

7 A. The sniping generally took place on the front line itself. There

8 were blocks of flats in the lower Grbavica area leading on to the River

9 Miljacka and other buildings, shops and so on. And they tended to be the

10 target of the snipers, or those people in those areas tended to be the

11 targets of the snipers. So that it was clearly coming from the other side

12 of the river. It was coming from the area controlled by the armija.

13 Sometimes incendiary rounds were used; sometimes small arms were used.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but the whole Grbavica area was controlled --

15 A. By the Serbs.

16 JUDGE ORIE: By the Serbs.

17 A. Yes, yeah.

18 JUDGE ORIE: And you never noticed any, I would say, sniping that

19 stayed within one side of the front line? Well, let's say BiH sniping

20 fired --

21 A. VRS to VRS, no. No, oh, no. No.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

23 You told us that you never noticed any intentional civilian

24 objects being targeted when you were, I think, at your Lima posts. Were

25 you usually aware of what the targets would be? You explained to us also

1 that you would be informed about the targets.

2 A. Mm-hmm.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Were you always informed? In how many per cent of

4 the cases were you informed about any firing? You would be informed about

5 the target and also perhaps in how many per cent of the cases you were not

6 informed at all about fire?

7 A. Firing was always reported because of the fact that a team was

8 living on the firing site or close to it. So there was no way of firing

9 without the team not being aware of it.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

11 A. So they told us what they were firing at. They told us perhaps it

12 was in response to an attack on certain positions or certain villages or

13 areas. Invariably, the firers would tell the team which would be

14 supervising them, as it were, which would be monitoring them, what they

15 were firing at. But would always claim, of course, that it was a military

16 target, and there would be no way of verifying what was on the other

17 side.

18 JUDGE ORIE: You could not, by reading the reports later on, the

19 increps, see whether the target mentioned to you were also actually the

20 targets where the shells or the projectiles landed?

21 A. I have to say, Mr. President, there was a lot of firing going on

22 at the time, and we were more interested in providing reports than in

23 reading them. I cannot recall any instance of sitting down and

24 correlating one to the other.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Do I then have to understand your testimony, if

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1 you say that you never noticed any targeting of civilian objects, that you

2 were never told civilian objects to be targeted?

3 A. Correct.

4 JUDGE ORIE: On a question of Judge El Mahdi, you told us that, in

5 your view, sniping was used as an instrument by the -- let me perhaps just

6 read your words.

7 A. By the authorities.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, by the authorities. And I do understand, the

9 military authorities?

10 A. Military and civilian, Mr. President, yes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Military and civilian, yes.

12 Could you tell us on what this view is based? You told us it was

13 your view, but what's the basis of your view?

14 A. It is based on the fact that it continued throughout the period

15 from April 1992 until the end of hostilities. And if the political and

16 military authorities had wished, they could have stopped sniping. They

17 didn't obviously so wish. Therefore, they were, at the very least,

18 encouraging it. And in my view, the direct follow-on, the logical

19 follow-on, is that they were using it as an instrument of terror against

20 the opposing side. I would say that there was sufficient control over the

21 area, there was sufficient control over the military by the political end,

22 and there was sufficient control over the lower military units by the

23 higher military formations, that they could have stopped any illegal

24 activity of that nature had they so wished. They did not do so. The

25 firing continued. The sniping continued. Civilians kept getting

1 targeted. Therefore, it must have been a decision made or else a

2 non-decision made not to stop them. Either way, it was policy that they

3 would use snipers.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Another question in a total different area. You

5 explained to us the -- I would say the adjustment mechanism in firing

6 mortars. You would first fire one round, then see where it lands, and

7 then...

8 Could you tell us: An experienced, a well-trained crew, in their

9 first effort, so in their first adjusting round, how close would they, at

10 an average, come to a target? I mean, would it be 200 metres, 500 metres,

11 1 kilometre? Because you said the second round could come closer. So I'd

12 like to know what would be approximately the diversion range of the first

13 round, and then perhaps of the second round.

14 A. Given good map data and given good meteorological data and map

15 spotting and computation, it should be within 2 or 300 metres of the

16 target. The second one would be a lot closer, perhaps on the other side

17 of the target, less than half that distance. And then the third one would

18 generally be on or about the target. And again, as I mentioned, a mortar

19 bomb has a very wide area of damage, so that if it's within a hundred

20 metres, it can be considered to be -- with 120, it can be considered to be

21 a target round because you will cause the disruption that you require at

22 100 metres. So say 300, say 100, and next you're right on target.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that answer. You told us about the

24 damage you saw I think it was in the Kosevo Hospital which you expected to

25 have been fired from a tank, rather horizontally.

1 A. Yes.

2 JUDGE ORIE: The impact came from what side; the north, south,

3 east, west?

4 A. It would have been from the north.

5 JUDGE ORIE: From the north.

6 A. From the north. Generally from the north. Again, I wasn't

7 examining my compass, but it was a general northerly direction.

8 JUDGE ORIE: And when you're talking about the hills, these are

9 the hills north of Sarajevo.

10 A. The hills north of Sarajevo, yes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much.

12 You told us that an untrained ear could not distinguish between

13 any kind of explosion. Did you have specific explosions in mind? I mean,

14 a normal rifle is also kind of an explosion in it. That's my first

15 question, what type of explosions you were talking about.

16 A. Yes.

17 JUDGE ORIE: And my second question would be what would training

18 on the spot for one, two, or three years by civilians do to their ability

19 to make a distinction?

20 A. For the first part, my understanding of the context was that it

21 was the difference between a shell fired from a gun or Howitzer and a bomb

22 fired from a mortar, and it was in that context that I said an untrained

23 ear would not be able to tell the difference between them, or perhaps even

24 an explosion caused by explosives being detonated or a mine being

25 detonated.

1 Now, the population of Sarajevo was subject to rigorous training

2 during a very long period of time, and I'm quite sure that they would have

3 fine-tuned their senses. However, there is no difference really between

4 the sound made by a shell and a bomb. It's just a very large rolling

5 bang. But it's quite different to the sound made by a gun or a mortar

6 firing. They would certainly hear a difference there after a while.

7 JUDGE ORIE: And apart from the firing of the explosive itself,

8 would the way it moves through the air make a different sound? We heard

9 testimony before about whistling sounds or -- could you explain to us what

10 would be the difference and what an untrained or a trained-on-the-spot ear

11 could deduct from what we hear?

12 A. You are quite right, Mr. President, when you mention the whistling

13 sound. This is caused by the fact that when a shell is fired from a gun,

14 it goes through the barrel and is twisted as it is moving, because there

15 is rifling, that is, there are grooves twisted through the barrel to give

16 it spin. And the spin is required to stabilise the round to make it fly

17 in a straight line. Without spin, it would wobble and thus not be

18 accurate.

19 So what you're hearing is the sound of the shell rotating as it's

20 going through the air. And also the fact is that guns in particular are

21 fired at very high muzzle velocities. They are very fast. So you get a

22 crack as well, which would be equivalent to a sonic bomb. You get this

23 crack, you get the whistle.

24 A mortar bomb on the other hand, because of the nature of the

25 weapon, is fired from a much lighter type barrel and using lower pressure

1 explosives so that it goes off with a whomp. And as it flies through the

2 air, there's no spin. The reason there's no spin is because there's no

3 rifling on the barrel to give it spin. In place of rifling to give it

4 stability, it has a tail with fins on it, six, eight, or ten fins,

5 whatever number of fins the makers deem it requires. So this -- these

6 fins stabilise it in flight, and it is practically silent. Because of its

7 slowness and lack of spin, practically silent.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Could you finally give us -- you told us about the

9 shootreps and the increps, and you mentioned a couple of times the

10 differences between the factions. Could you give us an indication as far

11 as either shelling or perhaps even sniping is concerned what was the

12 balance between one of the parties firing? Would it be 50/50? 40/60,

13 70/30 and in --

14 A. In general terms, there were far more shootreps, far more - maybe

15 ten times as many shootreps - from the -- no, sorry, maybe not ten. But

16 certainly considerably more times shooting from the VRS side than from the

17 armija side. The shooting from the VRS side tended to be of a heavier

18 nature, that is, artillery weapons or mortars. There was a much heavier

19 concentration of small-arms fire came from the armija side, the Armija BH

20 side. Now, small-arms fire would generally go unremarked in the daily

21 reports. The only things which went into the daily reports were heavy,

22 very heavy, small-arms fire which would indicate a battle, or shelling.

23 And as the shelling came predominantly from - 90 per cent probably - from

24 the VRS side, there seemed in the reports to be a major imbalance in that

25 way.

1 But again, the VRS used artillery in the same way that the armija

2 used infantry. The VRS was infantry light. They didn't have the troops,

3 so they needed the artillery as a force multiplier to make up for the lack

4 of troops. On the other side, the armija had masses of troops but little

5 by way of heavy weapons, so they used the small-arms much more heavily

6 than the VRS would have done.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much for that answer. And final

8 question is you told us about mortar positions held just perhaps very

9 short time at Kosevo Hospital and at the UN building. We have heard

10 testimony before about one report of a mortar firing from the Kosevo

11 Hospital. You used the plural.

12 Could you give us more information about the other occasions where

13 it happened, apart from one that was reported, at least according to the

14 testimony given in this Court.

15 A. I'm afraid, Mr. President, that was anecdotal evidence which I got

16 socially from our colleagues on the Papa side. So I couldn't give

17 specific instances, dates, times. But there were -- in conversation, it

18 would have been said that it happened on a number of occasions. Now,

19 again, we're talking maybe two, maybe five. I don't know. It's purely

20 anecdotal evidence.

21 JUDGE ORIE: That's similarly true for the UN headquarters?

22 A. I only remember one specific instance, because I came into the

23 headquarters either that day or the day after and it was said to me,

24 "They've done it again. They were firing from the car park." So the

25 word "again" was used, indicating that it was not the first time.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you very much.

2 Yes. I was about announcing a break, Mr. Ierace, but --

3 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, the -- I'd seek Your Honour's -- your

4 leave to ask one question by way of clarification of an answer given by

5 the witness to a question asked from the Bench. It is simply a question

6 of clarification and nothing more than that.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please put the question. We'll then have a

8 break, of course, after the -- if there's any question -- do you have any

9 additional questions on the basis of --

10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes. I would also have a

11 point of clarification. It may have been the -- it may be the same one as

12 Mr. Ierace. Who knows?

13 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... from other side,

14 from both sides, or perhaps the same question. We could do it before the

15 break.

16 Mr. Ierace, please proceed.

17 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

18 Further examination by Mr. Ierace:

19 Q. Sir, you told us that there were bands of irregulars who, in your

20 opinion, came under the control of the authorities. You referred to one

21 band who you said you believed to be under the control of a particular

22 officer and that the band was led by one Vasilije Vidovic. Do you mean by

23 that that the officer's name was Vasilije Vidovic or was that someone

24 else?

25 A. No. In this particular case, the leader of the band was Vasilije

1 Vidovic. However, it was my belief - I was told by my interpreter - that

2 he was under the control of another officer, an officer who was, in fact,

3 as far as I know, a brigade commander and commander of the -- a kind of

4 interim or intermediate commander of various brigades on the northern side

5 of the city.

6 Q. Were you told the name of that officer?

7 A. I was. I was told that his name was General Josipovic.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Was it the same question, Mr. Piletta-Zanin?

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No. No, because after all,

12 this was three questions, not just one.

13 JUDGE ORIE: I have a doubt to accept your estimations as far as

14 the time is concerned. If you tell us that you can do it really in a

15 couple of minutes, I'll give you the opportunity now, otherwise we'll

16 first have a break.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I shall be as brief as the

18 Prosecution.

19 Further cross-examination by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:

20 Q. [Interpretation] Witness, you spoke a moment ago about the

21 authorities' control over a group of snipers. When giving your personal

22 assessment, because this was an assessment, did you also have in mind

23 the -- the so-called Sarajevo troops and the Sarajevo authorities, that

24 is, the government authorities?

25 A. Of course.

1 Q. Thank you for your answer, for being so clear and precise. My

2 second question: Witness, in relation to the question of snipers, had you

3 heard of an anti-sniper agreement or at least a draft agreement which was

4 elaborated in Sarajevo?

5 A. I have some memory of such discussions.

6 Q. Thank you. Was it General Galic, who is here present, who was the

7 initiator on the Serb side of this draft?

8 A. I cannot say.

9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No further questions. Thank

10 you.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much.

12 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: I'm sorry, Mr. President, we don't have the

13 answer to the question about -- when it says: "When giving your personal

14 assessment because this was an assessment, did you also have in mind the

15 so-called Sarajevo troops and the Sarajevo authorities, that is, the

16 government authorities?" talking about the sniping. You said, "Of

17 course," or something like that.

18 A. Exactly. "Of course." I said, "Of course."

19 JUDGE ORIE: I didn't check in the transcript but that's also what

20 in my recollection was that you -- yes. The answer is not -- at the end

21 of line 20 of page 72, there's an "A" for answer but the answer was, "Of

22 course," you said. Yes.

23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I would like to confirm that,

24 because perhaps we were speaking too quickly.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This concludes your testimony in this court. I

1 thank you very much for answering questions of all the parties and

2 questions of the Bench. You will understand that it is important for this

3 Court to have the information from those who are present at these times

4 and these places in order to prepare the decisions it will have to take.

5 So thank you once again very much for coming.

6 Mr. Usher, could you please lead Mr. Hamill out of the courtroom.

7 [The witness withdrew]

8 JUDGE ORIE: I suggest to the parties that since it's twenty

9 minutes to one that we first have a break until 1.00 and then deal with

10 the documents. We'll adjourn until 1.00.

11 --- Recess taken at 12.40 p.m.

12 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, I would first like to go through

14 the documents. But if there's anything you'd like to raise before we come

15 to the documents, yes, please.

16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I believe I do,

17 Mr. President. To begin with, I should like to apologise to the Chamber

18 for being unable to be present yesterday. But I'm quite sure that my

19 colleague Ms. Pilipovic has explained the reasons.

20 Now, Mr. President, the Defence wishes to say the following: We

21 have already raised it before you on different occasions, and reiterate

22 that a document which it considers indispensable for the Defence, and

23 these are the documents which principally are of military nature, either

24 what we call here directives coming from headquarters to -- from the main

25 staff to army corps and so on and so forth. You have this witness who

1 knows a great deal about Sarajevo, even though he was there for a very

2 short time. However, the Defence has still not received the documents

3 which exist, and therefore we were unable to ask all the questions of this

4 witness simply because it was denied - and I'm using that word - denied

5 access to documents to which the Prosecution knows exist, (a); and (b),

6 where they exist. When I say where, it is one floor away from here. And

7 we were completely handicapped in conducting our Defence. Perhaps it was

8 shorter, so that is perhaps good, but on the other hand, the Defence would

9 have been better, and that is not a good thing. Thank you.

10 JUDGE ORIE: This Chamber expects to be informed on short notice

11 about the new developments in this area, and we are -- we have taken

12 notice of your objection that you have not received yet the documents, or

13 at least, have access to those documents you would need for proper

14 cross-examining also the witness of today. That's how I understand your

15 position. We'll keep a close eye on it. And of course, we have taken

16 decisions before on how to proceed, and we'll see what's the outcome of

17 that.

18 Madam Registrar, would you then please guide us through the

19 documents.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2261, UNPROFOR investigation report.

21 P226.2, "Examination of the Crater at Sarajevo Market" report.

22 Exhibit P2261A, "Sarajevo Market Explosion of 5 February, 1994, a

23 Background Summary of UNPROFOR's Investigative Report." P3675, "Weaponry

24 in the former Yugoslavia" report.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think one of the questions is that whether

1 the translation of this report is tendered as well or it's just given for

2 the information of the other party. I don't remember to have received the

3 translation of the report. I don't know what the Prosecution intended.

4 Well, Mr. Stamp is not there any more.

5 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I'm not sure where Mr. Stamp is.

6 There may have been a misunderstanding as to the timing of the tendering

7 of the exhibits. I wonder whether we could leave the tendering of the

8 exhibits until five minutes before we finish this afternoon.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, although I clearly indicated that it would be

10 the first thing to do after the break.

11 MR. IERACE: Yes.

12 JUDGE ORIE: I'd rather proceed. I've heard no objections

13 whatsoever, and the only thing still to be decided is whether 3675.1 is

14 tendered as well, because that's the B/C/S version of the same report. We

15 have not been provided with a translation, and I think the Chamber would

16 have difficulties anyway in reading the B/C/S version. So if it was just

17 a translation for the benefit of better understanding by General Galic,

18 then...

19 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I do have a copy of the report with a

20 translation. Excuse me, Mr. President.

21 That is a translation into B/C/S as well as the English original

22 version. If that assists with the tender, the translation, of course, is

23 P3675.1.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but do you want to tender the translation as

25 well? It has not been provided to the Chamber. You have one, and I don't

1 know whether it's just a matter of...

2 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, as I understand it, there was some

3 indication from the Bench yesterday that a copy wasn't required. But in

4 any event, I am able to provide copies for each member.

5 JUDGE ORIE: The question is whether you want to tender the

6 translated version as well.

7 MR. IERACE: Yes.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you want to. That's then 3675.1. Could you

9 please further guide us, Madam Registrar.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D --

11 JUDGE ORIE: If you --

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I do not know whether the

13 Defence had this translation. I wasn't here yesterday, but I do not

14 believe -- I do not think that this translation was given to the evidence

15 [as interpreted]. But whatever the case, I'd like -- I'd like to cast an

16 eye for what I've received.

17 Yes, I had the instruction from my colleague.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please ask the usher to give the extra copy

19 to the Defence.

20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have to check

21 the channel. I asked for the translation into English, but perhaps I

22 wasn't quite clear.

23 JUDGE ORIE: It was a misunderstanding, because I was talking

24 about the translation in B/C/S. And I can imagine that you and not

25 Ms. Pilipovic are in a position to --

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1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Could I have the English text,

2 please.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, the Prosecution will provide you

4 with an English text, or it will be given to you by the usher now. If

5 there's any objection to be made, you can do it at a later stage. We're

6 just talking about -- on the other hand --

7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you,

8 Mr. President.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Could you then please guide us further, Madam

10 Registrar.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D77, map marked by witness; Exhibit D78,

12 excerpt from book "Fighting for Peace" by General Sir Michael Rose;

13 Exhibit D79, UNPROFOR report, article written by Jan Segers.

14 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask for clarification, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

15 The names under the Article, Ann Mawis and Marc Le Nouaille, on the top,

16 it says: "Written by Commander Jan Segers," but the content of the

17 document seems to be something like an interview.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. What I

19 understand as regards this document is -- is that it is the record which

20 was done by Ms. -- by the two undersigned of a statement or an article

21 which appeared in Tele Moustique, which is a weekly, if I understand well,

22 and the date is the 30th of November, 1995, and in which Mr. Jan Segers

23 participated, so that that is why he appears as the author. And these are

24 the excerpts from that.

25 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I do object to the tender of D79 for

1 these reasons: that when one looks at the document, it purports to be, and

2 I stress that, a reprint of an excerpt from a Belgian weekly paper which

3 appeared on the 30th of November, 1995. The witness has taken to the

4 document as a whole and asked whether he recognised that type of

5 document. He did not. He was asked whether he knew of Jan Segers. He

6 did not. Indeed, the only point of agreement between the witness and the

7 Defence was that he was aware of the existence of General Briquemont.

8 There is no basis for the document to be tendered.

9 The witness was invited to comment on a particular passage which

10 appears in the document that was read to him. So it's on the record. So

11 by the document not coming into evidence, the integrity of the evidence

12 otherwise is not impaired. There is no basis for the document to be

13 tendered, in my respectful submission, thank you.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Piletta-Zanin, it's true that you read the

15 whole part you asked any comment on to the witness, which was on page 4,

16 the third paragraph. Yes.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, that is quite true,

18 Mr. President. On the other hand, Mr. Ierace omitted to say that the

19 major question why we showed the witness this document, why we're

20 producing it, that it comes from the United Nations, that is, UNPROFOR,

21 and because it refer to the existence of rumours and manipulation. And

22 the witness had answered that that was it. And therefore, I believe that

23 it is relevant. And we intend to show it to another witness again to ask

24 him if the -- if UNPROFOR produced these kind of documents or not.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, I agree with you that it is

1 saying "UNPROFOR" at the top. It seems to be a kind of an extract from or

2 a whole article from a text. So if you would expect to -- for example,

3 the ICTY to take responsibility for whatever is in the press clippings

4 which is distributed sometimes, then of course that's a different thing.

5 Press clippings are -- this looks very much like press clippings. And if

6 you're talking about manipulation and about rumours, that's exactly the

7 part that was read to the witness. So -- but let me just confer with my

8 colleagues to see what to do with it.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE ORIE: I'm referring to the decisions usually taken in

11 respect of previous statements given by witnesses, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, and

12 since only a small part of the document which has been read by you to the

13 witness has been dealt with during the cross-examination, the Chamber

14 decides that the objection should be sustained and that all relevant parts

15 of the document and the existence of the document are covered and are in

16 the transcript.

17 So the -- the document is not admitted into evidence.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Let it be so, Mr. President.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, are you ready to call your next witness?

20 MR. IERACE: Yes, Mr. President. I call Witness AH. I indicate

21 in advance that the witness will in due course be shown some photographs.

22 It would be appropriate, in my respectful submission, for those

23 photographs to be dealt with in a way in which they cannot be viewed

24 publicly because of a signature on them and --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --

1 MR. IERACE: -- some individuals who appear on them.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We will keep a close eye on that. Witness AH

3 is protected by pseudonym, face, and voice distortion. May I expect that

4 the voice distortion has been prepared properly?

5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

6 JUDGE ORIE: I am informed that the voice distortion is not yet

7 properly prepared, so we'll have to have a break for five, up to ten

8 minutes in order to test whether the voice distortion is effective or

9 not.

10 Mr. Piletta-Zanin?

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Before we

12 take that break, I should merely like to note one thing that I've just

13 discovered, and that is that the English translation seems that I know --

14 but that there are some modifications, some changes in hand, by hand. But

15 I see -- no. No, observation. There are initials here.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you should have conferred with

17 lead counsel, because he could have explained to you that part of the

18 testimony was specifically on this handwritten. So will you please,

19 first, if you have not been present during the examination, first confer

20 with lead counsel and only then make any observations.

21 We will have a break for five, up to ten minutes, until the voice

22 distortion has been properly prepared.

23 --- Break taken at 1.25 p.m.

24 --- On resuming at 1.33 p.m.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace.

1 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I call Witness AH.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And is proper care taken that while entering

3 the courtroom, the face of the witness will not be shown to the outside

4 world? I'm asking for confirmation to the technical booth.

5 Could I please get a confirmation that when the witness is

6 entering the courtroom, that her face will not be shown.

7 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

8 JUDGE ORIE: It is confirmed to me.

9 Since -- is there anyone in the public gallery? No. So please,

10 Mr. Usher, would you escort the witness to the courtroom.

11 [The witness entered court]

12 JUDGE ORIE: Can you hear me in a language you understand?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

14 Could it be a little louder, please.

15 JUDGE ORIE: I'll repeat the question to you. Could you hear me

16 in a language you understand?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

18 JUDGE ORIE: You're nodding. Would you please give an answer

19 aloud, because when you nod it will not be understood by the interpreters

20 and it will not be translated, and therefore it will not be in the

21 transcript. So whenever I ask a question, or if anyone else asks you a

22 question, would you please give an audible answer.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can hear you.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. AH, I'll not call you by your own name because

25 protective measures are granted in respect of you. So therefore, I'll

1 address you as "Ms. AH." Before giving testimony in this Court, the Rules

2 of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration that

3 you'll speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The

4 text of this declaration will be handed out to you now by the usher. May

5 I invite you to make that declaration.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

7 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much. Please be seated.

9 WITNESS: WITNESS AH

10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. AH, you'll first be examined by counsel for the

12 Prosecution. You'll then be examined by counsel for the Defence.

13 So please, Mr. Ierace, would you proceed. And may I remind both

14 parties to put off their microphones when the witness is answering

15 questions.

16 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I ask the witness be shown Exhibit

17 P3676.

18 Examined by Mr. Ierace:

19 Q. Does the piece of paper in front of you correctly record your name

20 and date of birth?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Do you have a brother?

23 A. Yes.

24 MR. IERACE: Before that exhibit is taken from the table in front

25 of the witness, with the leave of the Bench, I seek that the witness

1 writes on the same piece of paper the name of her brother.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 A. [Marks]

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, would you please show it to the parties,

5 and then give it to the registrar.

6 Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.

7 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

8 Q. Madam, I will be asking you some questions which involve your

9 brother. Please try to remember to not mention his name when you respond,

10 if you could. Thank you.

11 A. I'll do that.

12 Q. Where were you living in 1992?

13 A. In Sarajevo.

14 Q. During the war, at some stage, did you leave Sarajevo and, indeed,

15 leave Bosnia?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did your brother travel with you when you left Bosnia?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. When did you return from overseas and resume living in Sarajevo?

20 A. In June 1994.

21 Q. In 1994, in June, were you aged 19?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Was your brother aged 13?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. At some stage after you and your brother returned to Sarajevo, was

1 your brother wounded?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Were you with him when he was wounded?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. What was the date on which he was wounded?

6 A. The 22nd of July, 1994.

7 Q. Where were you and your brother when he was wounded?

8 A. In front of a shop.

9 Q. Was any other member of your family with you and him at that

10 time?

11 A. Yes, our mother.

12 Q. Where were you going at that time?

13 A. To visit my aunt.

14 Q. Where had you come from, what part of Sarajevo?

15 A. The Otoka neighbourhood.

16 Q. So were you walking from that neighbourhood to visit your aunt at

17 the time that your brother was shot?

18 A. Yes, but my brother was on a bicycle. But just when that

19 happened, he was on his feet. He was on the ground.

20 Q. What sort of shop was it?

21 A. A shoe shop.

22 Q. Why did you -- why were you in front of this shop?

23 A. We just stopped in front of the shop window.

24 Q. What exactly happened as you stopped in front of the shop window?

25 A. [redacted],

1 [redacted] --

2 [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 appreciate that it is very hard to remember that.

7 Had you been looking at the shoes in the shop window?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Had your mother been doing the same?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. All right. Now, I think you told us that you heard the sound of

12 breaking glass. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I note that does not appear in the

15 transcript, but I think I heard that in the English translation.

16 JUDGE ORIE: You mean the name, and therefore, you'd like to

17 have --

18 MR. IERACE: No, Mr. President. I mean the witness saying she

19 heard the sound of breaking glass.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes. Perhaps you could repeat the question. I

21 didn't --

22 MR. IERACE: I think it's -- I've pointed it out anyway,

23 Mr. President. I'm merely explaining why I said what I did.

24 Q. All right. Now, did you hear any noise come from your brother

25 after you heard the sound of breaking glass? Did your brother say

1 something?

2 A. Yes. He said, "I am wounded."

3 Q. What happened after that?

4 A. Next to the shop is a passageway through the building, and we --

5 the three of us went inside, into that passage. And after that, two men

6 came to our assistance and took us to the hospital.

7 Q. Did you go to the hospital in a car?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Before you went to the hospital in a car with your brother, did

10 you notice any blood on him?

11 A. Yes, but only on his body.

12 Q. What part of his body?

13 A. His stomach.

14 Q. How long did you stay at the hospital?

15 A. I don't know exactly. A couple of hours.

16 Q. What did you do after you left the hospital?

17 A. With those same men, we returned -- actually, nearby there's a

18 cafe from which these men had come out, and we had left the bicycle there,

19 and we returned with them to fetch the bicycle.

20 Q. Did you speak to someone when you returned to the scene, about

21 some damage to the cafe?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Who did you speak to about that?

24 A. To a man who was present in the cafe at the time it happened.

25 Q. Did you see any damage inside the cafe or on the outside of the

1 cafe?

2 A. Yes. Inside the cafe, I saw a hole made by a bullet.

3 Q. At the time that your brother was shot, were there any other

4 children near you?

5 A. I really don't remember.

6 Q. Were there any other adults near you?

7 A. I think there were, but I can't assert that with certainty.

8 Q. What type of clothes were you wearing at that time that your

9 brother was shot?

10 THE REGISTRAR: Microphone, please.

11 MR. IERACE:

12 Q. I will repeat the question. What type of clothes were you wearing

13 at the time that your brother was shot?

14 A. I really don't remember what I and my mother were wearing, but my

15 brother had a T-shirt and shorts.

16 Q. Did you have an occupation at that time, a job?

17 A. No, I was going to school.

18 Q. Did your mother have an occupation at that time?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. What was that?

21 A. At the time, she was working in the Red Cross.

22 Q. Did you notice at the time your brother was shot if there were any

23 military vehicles nearby?

24 A. I really don't remember.

25 Q. Did you notice anyone in a military uniform in the area at the

1 time your brother was shot?

2 A. I don't remember.

3 MR. IERACE: I ask that the witness be shown P3269.

4 Mr. President, if they are placed on the ELMO, might it be -- might the

5 ELMO image be controlled in such a way as it is not made public.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could the technical booth confirm that whatever

7 is on the ELMO, at least this document, will not be broadcasted out.

8 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

9 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I've just noticed the time.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I was just conferring with my colleagues. If it

11 would be possible for those who are technical and interpreting, assisting

12 us, I'd like to go on until 2.00. But there is a Status Conference in

13 this courtroom later on, so I'd like to stop in approximately seven

14 minutes, unless there's any firm objection.

15 THE INTERPRETER: No objection, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much for your cooperation.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The Defence is pleased to

18 continue.

19 MR. IERACE: Likewise the Prosecution.

20 Q. Madam, did you make a statement to an investigator from the Office

21 of the Prosecutor in September of last year?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. At that time, were you shown some colour photographs?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Do you recognise the four photographs in front of you as being

1 those photographs?

2 A. Yes.

3 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, is it safe for the documents to be

4 placed on the ELMO?

5 JUDGE ORIE: I will just -- I asked for a confirmation that it

6 would be safe, and it is confirmed to me now by the registrar.

7 MR. IERACE: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

8 Q. Now, at the time that you were shown these photographs, did you

9 place some black pen marks on two of them?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Did you also sign each of the four photographs?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. All right. Now, do you see that the photographs are numbered 1,

14 2, 3, 4?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. In relation to photograph number 1, does that show the street

17 where you and your family were when your brother was shot, as seen from a

18 distance?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Did you place a black circle towards the middle of that

21 photograph?

22 A. Yes.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I don't know

25 whether we can have it on the ELMO for General Galic to be able to

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1 follow. I understand that Mr. Ierace wanted it put on the ELMO, but we're

2 not seeing anything yet.

3 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, that was deliberate on my part. I'm

4 about to ask that it be placed on the ELMO, but I wanted to ask some

5 questions of the witness before she did that, to establish the basis of

6 the relevance of the black mark.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. On the other hand, it's difficult for General

8 Galic to follow your questioning if you're talking about markings on the

9 photographs. And if there's one person in this courtroom who can't see

10 it, would it be a problem for you to put it on the ELMO now?

11 MR. IERACE: Not at all, Mr. President. I assumed that he would

12 have a copy.

13 Might it be placed on the ELMO, that is, photograph number 1.

14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

15 MR. IERACE:

16 Q. Now, you've told us that this photograph which we in the courtroom

17 can now see is a view from a distance of the street in which your brother

18 was shot. You've also told us that you placed a black circle on that

19 photograph, towards the middle. What is the significance of the black

20 circle?

21 A. It marks the place where we were at the moment my brother was

22 wounded.

23 MR. IERACE: I request that the second photograph be moved up so

24 it can be viewed on the ELMO.

25 Q. Did you also place a black mark on this photograph, and if so,

1 what does it indicate?

2 A. Yes. It indicates that same spot where we were.

3 Q. And can you tell us who the two people are who appear in the

4 photograph?

5 A. Yes. My mother and my brother.

6 Q. Having regard to your earlier evidence, is the shoe shop

7 immediately behind your brother and mother in that photograph?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. After your brother was shot, whereabouts did you and your family

10 run to?

11 A. To this passageway which can be seen on this photograph.

12 Q. On the left of the passageway, we can see what appears to be a

13 cafe. Is that the cafe that you referred to earlier?

14 A. Yes.

15 MR. IERACE: I ask that photograph 3 be placed on the ELMO.

16 Q. Does photograph 3 also show your brother and mother?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Is it a view taken from the passageway, looking away from the

19 building which contained the shoe shop?

20 A. Yes.

21 MR. IERACE: Might photograph 4 be moved onto the ELMO.

22 Q. Does photograph 4 show a close-up of the same hill that can be

23 seen in photograph 3?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Do you know the name of that hill?

1 A. I think it is called Hrasno.

2 MR. IERACE: Excuse me, Mr. President.

3 Q. Did you see an injury on any part of your brother's body that day

4 after he was shot?

5 A. Excuse me, but could you repeat the question, please?

6 Q. Yes, and I'll slightly rephrase it. After he was shot on that

7 day, did you see any wound on your brother's body?

8 A. Just then, yes, but when we went to the hospital, then no.

9 Q. Whereabouts on his body was the wound?

10 A. In his stomach.

11 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, that completes examination-in-chief.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Ierace. Perhaps I may ask

13 one question. You were talking -- you were asking a question to the

14 witness about her age at the time, and we have the name sheet. I had some

15 difficulties in combining both your question and the answer to the name

16 sheet. Is it a mistake on your part or --

17 MR. IERACE: Well, Mr. President, that being the case, might I

18 continue examination-in-chief for just a moment or two tomorrow morning,

19 and I'll clarify that issue tomorrow morning?

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

21 MR. IERACE: Thank you.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.

23 Ms. AH, as I call you, we stop for today. Tomorrow morning there

24 will be one or perhaps a couple of questions still by the counsel for the

25 Prosecution and then questions will be put to you by counsel for the

1 Defence and perhaps also questions by the Judges. We'll start again

2 tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this same courtroom, and we'll adjourn until

3 then.

4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.04 p.m.,

5 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day

6 of March, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.

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