1 Tuesday, 14 May 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing 2.25 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Case Number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus
7 Stanislav Galic.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
9 Good afternoon to everyone in and around the courtroom. Perhaps
10 we first resume the examination of the witness Commander Kolp and then
11 deal with other issues still outstanding.
12 Mr. Usher would you please bring in Mr. Kolp.
13 [The witness entered court
14 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated, Commander Kolp.
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Commander Kolp, I have a few questions to you.
17 Questioned by the Court:
18 JUDGE ORIE: Let me first try to make my computer run. Yes. It
19 is now connected.
20 Commander Kolp, you told us yesterday about complaints you made
21 about sniping incidents to Major Indjic. Could you please tell us in more
22 detail what his responses were to these complaints.
23 A. What Major Indjic usually answered, it was never a precise answer.
24 He would say "Yes, we will see about it." And he said that their snipers
25 are firing on us and he also often replied to me sometimes. Sometimes he
1 would say, "This is not very serious, only a few shots," and that he
2 would see what he could do. That was that.
3 I have to say that when I met him, it was mostly in the afternoon
4 to speak of this subject and I have to say that he was mostly intoxicated
5 or at least influenced by drink and, therefore, what he said wasn't very
7 Generally, as a rule, he never took my request seriously except
8 on one occasion.
9 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... any denial of
10 sniping activities from the Bosnian Serb side?
11 A. Yes. This happened. It occurred that Major Indjic would say,
12 "Yes, I think you are exaggerating, nothing is going on. This is not a
13 few shots that will make a great deal of difference." That was his usual
14 answer, as a general rule.
15 JUDGE ORIE: You told us yesterday about the impression you had
16 about the authority of Major Indjic. Could you give us facts on which
17 this impression was based.
18 A. Yes certainly. The only point of contact which was authorised
19 and it is important to say and I will try and speak in some order. In
20 the PTT building which is the HQ of the Sarajevo Sector there were three
21 offices for liaison, for the three warring parties. So there was a
22 Bosnian Muslim office -- liaison office, then there was a Bosnian Croat
23 liaison office and then a Bosnian Serb liaison office. My first task is
24 these people were there since I was a liaison officer authorised and I had
25 a UN ID card. So when there was the slightest problem, I would first go
1 to see them. It was simple. I would just go downstairs one floor,
2 without any danger, I would be facing them and I would be able to explain
3 the problem.
4 As far as the Bosnian Serbs were concerned, I would discuss with
5 -- the problem with them and I would never obtain an answer, because in
6 fact, the answer would be, "we have to contact Lukavica and we have to
7 contact Major Indjic in Lukavica." So it was Major Indjic. At a given
8 point, since there were no results after a very short period of time I
9 had the opportunity to go myself and I practically went every day from
10 then on. I went to Lukavica to negotiate with Major Indjic.
11 Major Indjic would receive visitors in his office in Lukavica and
12 he would receive all kinds of people. This is where I saw the UNMOs, the
13 United Nations monitors, and they would go directly to see him there.
14 Then I saw members of international organisations, who, when they had
15 problems, they would go to him and did not want to sort it out with the
16 UN militaries who were present there, so they would go directly to him.
17 And then, as I said yesterday, I also saw the Serbian militaries which is
18 normal, since this was a Serbian HQ, but also the paramilitaries who
19 would go there. And as I was passing through the Serbian checkpoint, the
20 Sierra 1 Kobiljaca and the Sierra 4 at the Kasindolska airport and so on,
21 the police would never take any decision. They would never dare take any
22 decisions, that was my impression. They would have to report to Major
23 Indjic. They had to report to the military branch. The militaries had
24 the power. I wouldn't really like to say that, but they had the --
25 anything that was to do with operations. It was the military who decided.
1 So it went to Major Indjic. Everything was reported to him.
2 So when I was called to see a certain Zoravko Zgonjanin , who was
3 a Colonel, he was the head of police in Ilidza, the same thing happened, I
4 had a long meeting with him and he never wanted to say yes or no. He
5 said, "I have to contact my superiors and he said to me who these were."
6 This was in Lukavica and the person was Major Indjic.
7 As for me, in my opinion, this was a key person.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Did you ever make any observations on whether Major
9 Indjic would then decide by himself or would he report to the next higher
11 A. I cannot but tell you what is my opinion, and in fact, I never
12 asked Major Indjic the question, "Are you going to talk to the general or
13 not? Are you going to talk to the colonel at the main staff."
14 I never directly asked him the question. As for me, my impression
15 was that -- was that Major Indjic decided by himself on a number of
16 issues, but he did not decide on everything. And the reason why he didn't
17 decide on everything, again, I had the occasion, or a minor experience, I
18 had there, and that of my predecessors, we attended there and we also had
19 to read reports. But in any case the commander in chief had to, if not
20 take decisions, then at least would say "okay, you did well, or do
21 nothing." But he would have to be informed of a number of things.
22 The commander in chief of any unit would have to know what is
23 going on. It is true that he cannot know everything.
24 JUDGE ORIE: My next question concerns the efforts you made to
25 put containers into position in order to protect civilians, as far as I
1 understand. You said that when it was tried to put these containers into
2 position that those who did try, were fired at. Did I understand you
3 well when you intended -- that you intended to say that they are fired at
4 by snipers or by any other weapon?
5 A. Well, this happened indeed. It was -- we were requested to do
6 this and Major Indjic agreed. This was the Sector Sarajevo command and it
7 was a higher rank -- higher level of command than mine and also higher
8 than Major Indjic's. So this was an operation that was prepared by the
9 Sarajevo Sector. It was prepared by the HQ of the Sarajevo Sector, its
10 commander and by a specialised branch called the G-5 and this is a
11 military branch which takes care of the relations with humanitarian
12 organisations that can bring assistance to the civilians and the civilian
14 So the decision was taken after several rounds of negotiations at
15 which I did not -- I did not attend in Sarajevo Sector and Lukavica in
16 order to place these containers, in order to protect, of course, but also
17 to protect the tram-line since the tram, although it was on and off
18 running, but like Sarajevo it was itself a symbol and the UNPROFOR wanted
19 to have this tram running and to bring a little bit of happiness to these
20 people. But for the Serbs, this was considered that this was a symbol
21 that they did not wish.
22 JUDGE ORIE: The sniping that was fired at those who tried to put
23 into position the containers?
24 A. There were probably snipers but shots were considerable more than
25 just two or three of snipers. There was also RPG-7 that was fired. So
1 this was again another level when we would compare it to the snipers.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Did you ever experience when you were located in the
3 PTT building any presence of ABiH military equipment in or around the PTT
5 A. In the building, no. Around the building, it is possible. I
6 believe that they had a kind of a bus which they made armoured and they
7 moved it every now and then and it is possible. As I said, there were
8 provocations and I have seen on a couple of occasions that this armoured
9 bus which had military colours and with a BH sign on it.
10 JUDGE ORIE: How were those in the PTT building respond to that
11 provocation, if it was a provocation?
12 A. Well, when -- as a serious provocation, for it to be a serious
13 provocation, the chief of operations of the Sarajevo Sector would send
14 one of his officers to the liaison office, the Bosniak liaison office,
15 which was in the PTT building or I would go myself. I went on several
16 occasions for various things. But this is how it happened. And in
17 general, what we could call a provocation, it was never very long. But
18 it is true that it happened.
19 JUDGE ORIE: My last question to you is about what you told us
20 yesterday on the possibility of firing from within the ABiH territory, if
21 I may say so, to targets within that same territory. Did you ever observe
22 or did you ever gain any knowledge on snipers shooting from within the
23 ABiH controlled area targeting civilians within that same area?
24 A Mr. President, as far as I know, no. I cannot say that this is
25 so. I would say that everything is possible. It is probable that myself,
1 as I told you, if there was a provocation, and I would be in a situation
2 like that. But, I was never present when something like that occurred.
3 And I never heard that specifically this could have taken place. There
4 were rumours that said that this was possible, but I would say that I was
5 never implicated in the operational branch of the Sarajevo Sector where
6 they received proper information. As you know, every nation, a little bit
7 work for themselves. So they kept certain things to themselves. So, as
8 far as I know, no, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis.
10 MR. MUNDIS: Just a few questions, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE ORIE: This is not what we usually do, as you know, Mr.
12 Mundis. Since yesterday you had no further questions, but if you keep
13 the clock in the back of your mind, please proceed.
14 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you.
15 Re-examined by Mr. Mundis:
16 Q. Commander Kolp in response to a question by Judge El Mahdi you
17 expressed that paramilitaries were controlled by difficulty on the
18 Bosnian Serb side and that they did not differentiate between civilians
19 and military when engaging the enemy. You also said you were never in
20 contact with these paramilitaries apart from seeing them in the Lukavica
21 headquarters on a few occasions. And my question is, did you ever see
22 these paramilitary forces at any other time or place, other than in
24 A. Yes it occurred, although it was from afar, because I was blocked
25 for several days. It happened that I saw these kind of people in the
1 area of Hadzici, which is the road which goes from Sarajevo on to Blazuj
2 and then there is the road to Pale, Konjic, Split. But the area of
3 Hadzici is where the road where the convoys are trying to pass would
4 regularly get blocked. And on a couple of occasions, I saw them there,
6 Q. With respect to the shelling of the library that you testified
7 about yesterday, do you know when that shelling occurred? What time
9 A. No, I couldn't tell you at all. Although, I could tell you that
10 this happened before I arrived in Sarajevo. So this must have happened
11 in 1992, perhaps beginning of 1993, but this happened before I arrived in
12 Sarajevo. What I saw was a programme on it as everything was reported
13 what happened. So this was a propaganda to me, but this was before I
14 arrived in Sarajevo.
15 Q. And finally Commander Kolp, in response to a question from the
16 Presiding Judge, you testified that Major Indjic would take some decisions
17 on his own, in your opinion. Can you elaborate and tell us what type of
18 decisions Major Indjic would take by himself without necessarily referring
19 to his superiors?
20 A. Yes. I can without any problems confirm that as far as the
21 clearances, the authorisations of passage are concerned, for most
22 convoys, the typical type of convoys, Major Indjic would take decisions.
23 But I can also say that when more important things were involved also
24 convoys, but humanitarian convoys of a certain so-called sensitive
25 material in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs this automatically had to be
1 transmitted to Pale. So Pale was the main staff HQ of the Bosnian Serb
2 army. In fact it was in Han Pijesak. But Pale was where the decisions
3 were taken. So this was the chain of command.
4 Q. Thank you Commander Kolp.
5 MR. MUNDIS: The Prosecution has no further questions, Mr.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Would this cause the Defence to put additional
8 questions as well? May I then ask you to keep the clock in the back of
9 your mind.
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
11 Further cross-examination by Ms. Pilipovic?
12 Q. Mr. Kolp we spoke about Major Indjic. When asked by my learned
13 colleague you said that he issued permits and had contact with the
14 headquarters. Can you tell us in which capacity Major Indjic was in
16 A. What do you mean "in which capacity he was in Lukavica"? What do
17 you mean by that?
18 Q. What were his responsibilities? Do you know anything about that?
19 You said that you yourself were a liaison officer. Can you tell us
20 what were Major Indjic's responsibilities? What was his post, so to
22 A. Well, I can tell you what I know and what I discovered for
23 myself. Although I was absolutely not a part of the structure or in the
24 hierarchical chain of Major Indjic, so I don't know what his job
25 description was at the time. But I can tell you that according to the
1 context of the head, Major Indjic was an officer who was a coordinator
2 with a certain authority to decide, to take decisions. But, again, as you
3 are asking me the question, knowing the structure, I believe that for more
4 important things, as I said already in answering a question asked by the
5 Prosecution, Major Indjic had to answer to his chief about things that he
6 did. It is inconceivable in a military system and you probably know more
7 about it than I do. That certainly in the Serb army or in the VRS, the
8 army of the Bosnian Serbs is that there is a hierarchical system which is
9 in place and this is a necessary system when one is in military. That is
10 my answer.
11 Q. Would you agree with me that Major Indjic was the liaison officer
12 between UNPROFOR and Main Staff and that the Main Staff decided on
13 humanitarian convoys and humanitarian assistance?
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Mundis
15 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, that is a compound question and might
16 be confusing.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please split it up.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
19 Q. Mr. Kolp, would you agree with me that Major Indjic was a liaison
20 officer with the Main Staff?
21 A. Which Main Staff?
22 Q. Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska.
23 A. There was certainly a liaison officer but an ordinary liaison
24 officer like I was, has no power to decide and Major Indjic had apparently
25 certain authority to decide on his level. So he was a liaison officer,
1 but he was more than a liaison officer.
2 Q. Are you basing that conclusion on the fact that Major Indjic
3 issued permits for the passage of humanitarian convoys?
4 A. Among other things, yes. But as I told you already, I don't know
5 whether I was asked that question, but I believe that I stated this on one
6 occasion. For one problem, I think this may have been a problem of
7 shelling or sniping, one or the other. I saw Major Indjic and I asked him
8 that this should calm down and after a certain time because there would
9 have to be a way some time maybe to find the good people on the right
10 place and this stopped. So that happened on one occasion.
11 Q. Can you tell us which incident shelling, in which part, in which
12 part of the town did you inform Major Indjic of? Can you be more precise,
13 please. You said that you delivered a protest, but was this protest
14 formulated in such a way as to include exact facts concerning this
16 A. Well, at the time, I cannot tell you. I cannot remember the
17 place where either the shelling or shellings have taken place. I remember
18 I met Major Indjic to ask him.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kolp. And just one more question.
20 You spoke about a container that was placed in front of the
21 building of the Oslobodjenje when you said that there was firing from
22 Nedzarici which was controlled by the Serb forces on -- there was firing
23 on the members of the UN.
24 Did you inform the Serb side that containers would be place in
25 that part of the town?
1 A. Madam, the containers were not placed in front of the Oslobodjenje
2 building. They were placed between in order to cut the -- the street, the
3 so-called --
4 Q. Yes, I understand that. But my question was: Did you inform the
5 Serb side as well and did you reach an agreement with them to have the
6 containers placed there?
7 A. I can tell you very simply that this was an operation for the
8 sector which was quite complex which was organised by the Sarajevo
9 Sector, by the UN forces, by the HQ of the Sarajevo Sector, by Major
10 [redacted] staff. This was quite a large operation where I was support
11 for the G-5 branch. I was there simply as an observer with Colonel
12 Prouteau [phoen] who was a legionnaire with whom I worked and probably
13 there had been reactions but not from me.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 So, therefore, you are telling us that you don't know whether the
16 Serb side had been informed and whether there had been an agreement
17 reached concerning the placement of this containers with the Serb side?
18 I am speaking this from your point of view.
19 A. No absolutely not. The Serb party, the Serb side was informed
20 by the Sarajevo Sector that there would be containers that would be
21 placed in this spot. And I know that, but I can't tell you who it was.
22 It would be impossible for me to tell you. I know the response was given
23 by the Main Staff of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. I don't know who
24 replied, but there was a response to the Sector Sarajevo -- Sarajevo
25 Sector HQ. There was a response and it said that they would not accept
1 the containers placed in that spot there.
2 That is the only thing I know.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have just one more
6 Q. While you stayed in Sarajevo, can you confirm to us that in the
7 part of the town which was controlled by the army of the Republika Srpska
8 as well as the area that was controlled by the army of BH, that both
9 sides at the front line had trenches?
10 A. Yes, absolutely. There were networks of trenches, communicating
11 corridors almost everywhere and the front line was determined and it was
12 impossible to find out whose was whose. Whose trench belonged to whom.
13 But there were trenches everywhere.
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Pilipovic.
16 Commander Kolp [Interpretation], you have completed your
17 testimony before this Chamber. Thank you, Commander Kolp, for coming
18 here and for answering all the questions from the Prosecution and from
19 the Defence. Thank you very much.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is with great pleasure. Thank
22 JUDGE ORIE: Since I do know that the interpreters might not
23 understand any Dutch.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
2 JUDGE ORIE: There are no documents tendered into evidence so
3 that we don't have to give any decisions in that respect. Before I invite
4 the Prosecution to call its next witness, I think we first have to deal
5 with some documents in respect of the testimony of Mr. Magnusson, but I
6 think it should be done in closed session.
7 Could we please turn into closed session
8 [Closed session]
12 Page 8323 – redacted – closed session
12 Page 8324 – redacted – closed session
12 Page 8325 – redacted – closed session
6 [Open session]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we are in open session now, again. Before you
8 raise an issue, Mr. Ierace, may I ask you one question. The Chamber
9 received a submission of an expert report, I would say demographic expert
10 report with three names on it. Is there one specific author that could
11 take responsibility for the whole of the report because it is important
12 for us if we have to give a decision, even after the Defence has given
13 its opinion on it. But we would like to know whether all three authors
14 or one of the three authors would be in a position to take full
15 responsibility for the whole report. Because if it was just for part of
16 the report, then we would like to know which part of the report was made
17 under the responsibility of which author, since it might have consequences
18 for calling witnesses to be cross-examined.
19 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, there is such a person and that is
20 Ewa Tabeau whose name -- and indeed, I added her name to the list or at
21 least identified the statistics expert as being Ewa Tabeau in the list
22 which I handed up last Thursday.
23 JUDGE ORIE: You expect that she can take full responsibility for
24 the context of the report?
25 MR. IERACE: Yes, Mr. President
1 JUDGE ORIE: Then I did understand that you have another issue
2 that you would like to raise.
3 MR. IERACE: Yesterday morning, or rather yesterday in the first
4 session of evidence, Mr. Piletta-Zanin expressed interest in hearing from
5 the Prosecution in relation to a particular topic. I was unable to
6 discern what the topic was, but it seems, Mr. President, that you did.
7 And I think you described it as a grattage. I would be grateful for
8 some elimination --
9 JUDGE ORIE: I think it was the rubbing outs of some parts of
10 medical reports where old dates and other information seemed to be have
11 been removed, before new entries, visible entries were made. I think
12 that is the issue Mr. Piletta-Zanin would like to hear an answer from
13 the -- and a possible explanation from the Prosecution.
14 MR. IERACE: Thank you for that, Mr. President. I will give out
15 an explanation to the Trial Chamber. I think that arose during the
16 evidence of witnesses taken by Mr. Stamp. I will report back to you on
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We will then hear from you.
19 If these are the issues we had to discuss at this very moment,
20 then could the Prosecution call its next witness and that would be a
21 witness who will testify in open court, but as soon as documents will be
22 referred to, we have to turn into closed session because of the protective
23 measures in respect of those documents.
24 MR. IERACE: Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. The
25 Prosecution calls Michael Carswell.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, will you please lead the witness into the
3 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, with your leave, I will withdraw from
4 the courtroom.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Carswell, I take it that you hear me in a
8 language you understand?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
10 JUDGE ORIE: From your answer, I take it that you are English
11 speaking. Mr. Carswell, before giving evidence in this Tribunal, the
12 Rules of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration
13 that you will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
14 The text of this solemn declaration will be handed out to you now by the
15 usher. May I invite you to make that declaration.
16 WITNESS: MICHAEL KENT CARSWELL
17 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
18 whole truth and nothing but the truth.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, please be seated, Mr. Carswell.
20 You will first be examined by counsel for the Prosecution.
21 Examined by Mr. Ierace:
22 Q. Is your name Michael Kent Carswell?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. Were you born in 1945?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. Are you retired major from the, that is, retired from the
2 Canadian armed forces?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Did you join the Canadian armed forces in 1963?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. In 1992 were you posted to UNPROFOR?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. And by then, I think you had some 30 years, 29 years experience
9 in the military; is that correct?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. On the 7th of December -- I withdraw that. On the 6th of
12 January 1993 were you made the Deputy Senior Military Observer in
14 A. Yes, sir, the proper terminology would be the Deputy Sector
16 Q. Did you stay in Sarajevo and in that position until the 20th of
17 April, 1993?
18 A. Yes, sir, I did
19 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, could the witness please come
20 closer to the microphone and perhaps speak a bit more clearly.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it that you heard the request of the --
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I did.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps the usher could assist you in perhaps moving
24 the microphone a bit closer to you.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
2 Q. Did your duties include the compilation of what became known as
3 "sit-reps" on a daily basis?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. Were the sit-reps, was that a shorthand term for situation report,
6 being a report on certain classes of activity and other general
7 observations over the previous 24 hours?
8 A. In general terms, yes, sir.
9 Q. At that stage I think there were two sides of military observers
10 being the Papa side and the Lima side; is that correct?
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. Did the Papa side refer to the Presidency side, that is the side
13 of the Bosnian government?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. Did the Lima side refer to L for Lukavica being the side
16 controlled by the Bosnian Serb army?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. Were there a number of military observers on each side?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. As of February 1993, were there about 60 such observers?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. In a total of 14 observation posts?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. 11 of those being on the Serb side and 3 on the Bosnian
25 government side?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. Was Patrick Haneberry the Lima commander at that stage?
3 A. He was one of two that I dealt with at that time, sir. There was
4 another individual that preceded him.
5 Q. Did you prepare as well as the daily sit-reps, a monthly summary
6 of events?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 MR. IERACE: Excuse me, Mr. President. Mr. President, I ask the
9 witness be shown Exhibit 752.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Is that a protected document, Mr. Ierace?
11 MR. IERACE: It is, Mr. President, and at this stage, perhaps we
12 should go into closed session, the second portion.
13 JUDGE ORIE: I think it depends on whether it will be shown on
14 the ELMO or not.
15 MR. IERACE: I don't propose to take that course.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I think that private session would have the same
17 effect --
18 MR. IERACE: On reflection, I think I can avoid the need for
19 private session in relation to that document at this stage.
20 JUDGE ORIE: If it is not necessary, if you don't apply for it
21 even being aware of the protective status of the statement, then please
23 MR. IERACE: Might the document we shown to the witness. Thank
25 Q. Do you recognise the document in front of you as your -- as an end
1 of the month report for the month of January?
2 A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
3 Q. Was this particular monthly report prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel
5 A. It was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler and I. I would do
6 the initial draft and he would read it, and it would then be forwarded it,
8 Q. I think his name and signature appear on the last page; is that
10 A. Yes, sir --
11 JUDGE ORIE: I am afraid, Mr. Ierace, and Mr. Carswell, that you
12 are developing a speed which might cause some difficulties for the
13 interpreters. So if you would -- if you would look at your screen and
14 perhaps wait to answer the question until the text stops moving, so then
15 the text has been translated. Yes.
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. IERACE:
18 Q. During the three months that you occupied that position in
19 Sarajevo, did you on occasion travel around the territory occupied by the
20 Bosnian Serb army in the vicinity of Sarajevo?
21 A. Yes, sir, I did.
22 Q. How frequently would you do that?
23 A. It would depend on access in that, if there was significant action
24 on the front line, it would be difficult to get across. However, I was
25 not restricted by either the Bosnian side or the Serb side at their
1 checkpoints. I probably would get across, at a minimum, weekly.
2 Q. Having crossed over to the Bosnian Serb side, did you then move
3 around to various observation posts and other parts of that territory?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. Did you have the opportunity to visit gun positions on the Bosnian
6 Serb army side?
7 A. Yes, sir, I did.
8 Q. How often would you do that?
9 A. Initially, when I was getting acquainted with the area, in the
10 first week, I was there in January, that was daily. After that, the teams
11 I met on the -- on the Lima side were pretty much taking care of the close
12 liaison with the positions.
13 Q. Did you visit any gun sites after that first week in January?
14 A. Yes, sir, I did.
15 Q. How often did you do that from that point until when you left on
16 the 20th of April?
17 A. Probably -- this is a guess, sir, but I would -- six or seven
19 Q. Over the course of those various visits, did you form any opinion,
20 having regard to your military background, as to the professionalism or
21 otherwise of the commanders of the gun positions on the Bosnian Serb side?
22 A. Yes, sir, I did.
23 Q. What was that impression or opinion?
24 A. My impression was -- two answers to one question. The command
25 post staff on the gun positions, to me, were very professional and I
1 suspect that they were ex-JNA, seemed to be very efficient. The gunners
2 that I spoke to, the men actually servicing the guns, were probably at
3 draftee level in their level of training. However, I would say they were
4 quite familiar with the weapons they were using.
5 Q. Did you have the opportunity with the assistance of interpreters
6 to speak to members of the gun crews?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Did you form, firstly, any impression over the three months that
9 you were in that position having access, I take it, to reports from the
10 military observers beneath you; is that correct?
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. Did you have the opportunity to form an impression from that
13 material and your own direct observation as to whether any of the shelling
14 fire originating from the Bosnian Serb army side towards the city of
15 Sarajevo was other than aimed at specific targets?
16 A. I believe the targets were -- when the target list would come down
17 to the gun position and was given to them, they were obviously specific
18 targets. Therefore, I am not quite sure what you are leading up to.
19 Q. All right. I will rephrase the question in that case. Did you
20 form any opinion as a result of your observations and exposure to the
21 daily reports from the staff beneath you as to whether any of the shelling
22 originating from the Bosnian Serb army side of the confrontation line
23 targeted anything other than legitimate military targets?
24 A. The shelling, in my impression, on occasion did target
25 non-military targets. I would like to elaborate a bit on that, sir, if I
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. In my perspective, a legitimate target would be a convoy or
4 whatever moving through town, an opposition convoy. There were times when
5 I got the impression -- I am not doing this well -- when I got the
6 impression they were shelling in an area where somebody had been where the
7 opposition had a position -- in a position the opposition had been but had
8 since moved away. So the target -- I am talking myself into a corner here.
9 The target would be less than military, sir. There could be a
10 glimmer of hope by somebody that it could be classed as military. We are
11 dealing with random firing into the city.
12 Q. What would you say about that, random firing into the city?
13 A. Yes, definitely. That was not so much near military positions, in
14 my experience. That was more so from the mortar positions which were very
15 difficult to track.
16 Q. Please so down.
17 A. Which were very difficult to attack -- or to track, in that they
18 were highly mobile. So we had difficulties keeping tabs on the positions
19 of the 82 millimetres and the 120 millimetre, and I strongly suspect that
20 there was random firing going on from them.
21 Q. Can you tell us what you understand by the term "random firing"?
22 A. Not directed by the headquarters where the commander of the weapon
23 or the group of weapons that he has might just decide at a whim to drop a
24 few rounds in, and I am quite sure that happened on a number of occasions.
25 And there was also -- there was also some anti-aircraft fire that would go
1 in with air bursts and, again, that seemed quite random because that could
2 land anywhere virtually over any building. And it was designed as
3 anti-personnel fire, obviously, because it was about 20 metres above the
4 ground, 30 metres above the ground, and that is roughly.
5 Q. Just to divert for a minute, when you say the bursts were 20 to 30
6 metres above the ground, could you explain to us what you mean by that?
7 A. The fuse can be set to explode at various heights. And these ones
8 would probably be set at -- I'm not an anti-aircraft gunner so I'm by no
9 means an expert, but the bullets would explode and throw the shrapnel
10 downwards, much more effective than a round that would hit the ground and
11 explode out. This was in a shower effect.
12 Q. Indeed, is there something about the firing pattern of an
13 anti-aircraft gun which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to aim it
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Ms. Pilipovic.
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that the
17 interpreters have problems keeping up, and it is very difficult for me to
18 follow due to the speed at which it is proceeding.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course. You get the messages from the B/C/S
20 interpreters. I also noticed that the speed is such that all interpreters
21 must have problems, whether they can cope with it or not. So if you would
22 please slow down.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes, sir.
24 MR. IERACE:
25 Q. I will rephrase that last question.
1 Could you tell us something about the ability of an anti-aircraft
2 gun to fire at a specific target?
3 A. As I mentioned earlier, I am not an anti-aircraft gun expert, but
4 my knowledge is that they could probably pin the area down that they
5 wanted to, they that wanted to hit, within about 100 metres.
6 Q. Now, I will take you back to the conversations that you had with
7 gun crews or gun battery crews. As a result of those conversations, did
8 you form any impression as to their understanding, that is the ones you
9 spoke to, their understanding of what it was that they were hitting?
10 A. Yes, sir. The gunners in the majority of the positions, the men
11 on the guns, were not able to see the target except in two positions, the
12 two positions that I am aware of. So they thought, and again I am
13 discussing it with them through the interpreter, they thought that were
14 firing -- firing military targets.
15 Q. How many members of gun crews did you speak to, approximately,
16 over the three months that you were in Sarajevo?
17 A. Probably 20 to 30.
18 Q. I take it this was expressed to you in so many words by them. Is
19 that the case?
20 A. Yes, sir. As part of my job, as my job was at the time, was to
21 get a feel for -- get a feel for both sides and what is going on and how
22 they are doing it.
23 Q. I think you said that there were two exceptions to that, that is,
24 two exceptions to their inability to sight the target. What were those
25 two exceptions?
1 A. There were two positions, one on the south-east corner, on the
2 high ground overlooking Sarajevo, and there was a second one on the base
3 of the airport, that would be in the south-west side, which also looked
4 right over the airport in the south-west of Sarajevo.
5 Q. In relation to those conversation with the gunners, did you ever
6 discuss with them any specific targets in Sarajevo?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. What were they?
9 A. In particular one, and that was the so-called -- sorry, the
10 hospital. And I wanted to know whether those gunners were aware that they
11 were firing on a hospital.
12 Q. The evidence is that there were two main hospitals in Sarajevo at
13 that stage?
14 A. Kosevo hospital.
15 Q. Kosevo?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. All right. And what did you learn when you questioned them about
19 A. The gunners were young, and I believe that they were under the
20 impression that those were military -- a legitimate military target. In
21 all cases -- in all cases they told me that that was an army barracks,
22 being used as an army barracks, and in some cases, I was told that the
23 Bosnians were firing from that by mortar, from that area.
24 Q. Did they tell you where they -- who had told them or how they
25 learned that Kosevo hospital was a military barracks?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. No, sir. I didn't ask them that. I didn't pursue that.
2 Q. All right. Now, you have told us that, with the exception of the
3 two positions that had a direct view, the gunners relied on targets being
4 given to them. Did you learn anything as to the lines of communication to
5 the gun batteries?
6 A. Yes, sir. It was my definite impression from both discussions at
7 Lukavica headquarters, and lesser on the gun positions, that the orders
8 would come from Pale through to Lukavica, and then Lukavica would assign
9 the target list to the various gun positions.
10 Q. When you say that the target list would be assigned from Pale
11 through Lukavica to the gun positions, who at the gun positions would
12 receive that target list?
13 A. The battery command post would receive that target list. They
14 would plot the targets, send the information to the guns, which would then
15 fire on order of the battery headquarters.
16 Q. By the time it came to the guns, would it be a grid reference or
17 something else as you understood it, if you knew?
18 A. I don't know. I saw them working the gun -- the command post. I
19 saw them working on the maps, but whether they received it as a target
20 number or a grid reference, I couldn't say, sir.
21 Q. When you refer to target numbers, what do you mean?
22 A. A target number, sir, is a pre-selected target which either can be
23 -- which either can be live registered, in other words they will fire
24 until they have the range down, or it can simply be taken off the map and
25 the computations put in for the laying of the guns, but not fired.
1 Q. Did you make any observations as to the means of communication
2 from Lukavica to the command posts of the gun batteries?
3 A. I saw two means while I was there: Land line, telephone, and some
4 of the more important CPs had wireless radio in there.
5 Q. What do you mean by "CP"?
6 A. It's a command post, sir. Battery command post
7 Q. Did you ever see any gun positions that appeared to be without
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. What did you understand to be the purpose of those?
11 A. It was my impression that the Serbs were short gunners, therefore,
12 not possible to man every gun position all day. So they moved the gunners
13 around to fire from the various positions.
14 Q. Did you have any understanding as to whether the guns had been
15 pre-sighted or not, that is in the unmanned positions?
16 A. No, sir, that wouldn't -- they would get a target once they manned
17 that position, which would be virtually anywhere. So the guns were
18 put in position, and in some cases, covered, and in some cases, open to
19 the elements, but awaiting the crews, simple as that.
20 Q. Were you ever at a gun position when it was operating, that is, a
21 gun battery?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. On those occasions, did you observe the commanders to be
24 apparently in communication using either the radio or land line or both?
25 A. Yes, sir. Can I elaborate a bit on that, sir?
1 Q. Yes, please do.
2 A. I didn't see at any time the guns do any random shooting. To me
3 -- and, of course, I wasn't in the command post all the time. To me, the
4 target seemed to be selected, sent down to the command post again through
5 the chain I had indicated earlier, and the gunners would then carry out
6 their duties.
7 Q. You told us that your impression was that the orders originated
8 from Pale and you said, I think, that you gained that impression in part
9 from your visits to Lukavica. Who at Lukavica gave you that impression?
10 A. I spoke to the -- on my initial in clearance and familiarization,
11 I spoke to the UNMOs that were in Lukavica, and that is what I was told.
12 I didn't put that question directly to any of the Serb officers in Pale --
13 sorry in Lukavica.
14 Q. Were there occasions when you protested to Lukavica in relation
15 to shelling activities?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. Was there a mechanism set up for you to do that, that is, when it
18 was to be done at very short notice?
19 A. Yes, sir. Generally, what we did, is we would get a hold of the
20 military observers, get a hold of the military observers in Lukavica, and
21 they would immediately go to the Serbian OPs room the Serbian OPs room,
22 and pass on the information. If communications were out with Lukavica, we
23 would go downstairs, talk to the Serbian LO who was working in the first
24 floor of the PTT building.
25 Q. Just to be clear from that, I take it from that answer you were
1 based in the PTT building in Sarajevo --
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. And you would speak to the LO. I take it that's the Serb liaison
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. And who did you understand the liaison officer would contact when
7 you protested to him or her?
8 A. It would be Lukavica, and I am not exactly sure, but I suspect it
9 would be the operations room in that most of our requests, the great
10 majority of our requests, were transmitted very rapidly.
11 Q. Whereabouts was the operations room that you referred to?
12 A. The one -- I assume there were a number there. I am only aware of
13 one and that was in the main headquarters building as you come in the
14 gate, on the right, right beside the military observers.
15 Q. Are you referring to the building complex at Lukavica?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. Did you ever meet the corps commander during your time in
18 Sarajevo, that is the commander of the corps, the relevant corps of the
19 Bosnian Serb army operating in that area?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. Who was that?
22 A. General Galic, sir.
23 Q. Did you ever have occasion to protest to him about shelling of
25 A. Yes, sir. The conversation, as I recall - and it is somewhat
1 cloudy over 10 years, 9 and-a-half - covered that area. In specific
2 terms, what we were generally over there on the two occasions that come to
3 mind were shelling of the UNMO positions and shelling in and around UNMO
4 vehicles as they were moving, military observer vehicles. During the
5 course of the conversation, it would generally be brought up about the
6 overall shelling, but specifically, sir, I can't remember the text of the
8 Q. All right. You have told us that you observed there to be random
9 firing. Were you aware as to whether there were any civilian casualties
10 from such random firing originating from the Bosnian Serb army controlled
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. Did you ever protest to General Galic, in whatever terms, about
14 firing, that is unlawful firing, which occasioned civilian casualties?
15 A. Yes, sir. The immediate response to the shelling would be to go
16 through our Lukavica headquarters, directly to the Serbs. That would then
17 be brought up generally by the Lukavica military observers to the relevant
18 commander who happened to be on the ground at that time or when they could
19 get a hold of him later on.
20 Q. Earlier when you explained the topics covered by you when you met
21 General Galic, you included in those, and I will now quote your
22 words, "During the course of the conversation, it would generally be
23 brought up about the overall shelling." Did that include the random
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. What was the response from General Galic, and I appreciate you
2 have already pointed out it was 9 and a-half-years ago, but perhaps you
3 could indicate was there any denial of responsibility?
4 A. No, sir.
5 Q. What was the nature of the response?
6 A. The nature of the response varied from individual to individual.
7 But General Galic, I cannot be absolutely certain of his response, but it
8 was in general terms, sir. It would have been in defence of the Serbian
9 homeland and it is their attempt to preserve the culture. Of course, that
10 is not the words, but that would be the general gist of the circumstance.
11 Q. You mentioned that the response varied from individual to
12 individual. How many different people -- different individuals, that is,
13 in the Bosnian Serb military leadership did you complain to about random
14 shelling of Sarajevo?
15 A. Specifically, there only would have been two that I dealt with.
16 And that would have been the Deputy Corps Commander and then again on a
17 few occasions the Corps Commander. The military observers would be
18 making their reports to the Serbs on -- on what we would direct them from
19 PTT headquarters on a daily basis.
20 Q. Do you recall the name of the Deputy Corps Commander that you
21 spoke to?
22 A. Unfortunately, sir I do not.
23 Q. On how many separate occasions did you complain to General Galic
24 about random shelling of Sarajevo causing civilian casualties?
25 A. On two occasions, sir, in the course of our discussions.
1 Q. When was the first occasion?
2 A. It was early in my tour over there in February, mid to late
3 February, I believe, and it was I think when the chief UNMO was down. I
4 know I accompanied him at one time and it is not clear in my diary exactly
5 what that time was. But I think it is in mid to late February and we
6 spoke on that occasion. Albeit, I was the number two on the ground, sir.
7 The chief military observer was running the discussion with General Galic.
8 Q. Whereabouts did that conversation take place?
9 A. In the Lukavica headquarters, the OPs room that I had mentioned
10 earlier, sir.
11 Q. When was the second occasion?
12 A. When we were with the sector commander. It escapes me when it
13 was. It would be have been in March, definitely March or possibly early
15 Q. Whereabouts was that meeting, sir?
16 A. This one was before sir in the Lukavica headquarters.
17 MR. IERACE: I notice the time Mr. President. Would it be a
18 convenient time?
19 JUDGE ORIE: If this is a convenient moment we will have a break
20 now until 20 minutes past 4.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 3.49 p.m.
22 --- Upon resuming at 4.25 p.m.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, please proceed.
24 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. Before the break, Mr. Carswell, I was asking you some questions
1 about some meetings that where you were present and also General Galic.
2 Did you form any impression of General Galic?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. What was that?
5 A. My impression was that he had a very good grasp of what we were
6 doing and what our mandate was on the UNMOs. It was both particular --
7 both readings were rather amicable. There was no hard feeling like that
8 or manifested like that.
9 Q. Rather amicable, did you say?
10 A. Yes, sir. He listened to our complaints and in fact took action
11 of them -- caused action to be taken actually. In general terms, sir,
12 the -- in particular the second meeting I felt was a gain for the UNMOs
13 and for the situation in that we voiced our concerns and probably within a
14 day or so, they had been actioned.
15 Q. Did you ever raise --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down.
17 MR. IERACE:
18 Q. Mr. Carswell, I think the interpreters are still having problems
19 because of the speed of your delivery. If you would perhaps, with the
20 leave of the Presiding Judge, sit forward and make a conscience effort to
21 please speak slower, it might help.
22 Did you ever raise with General Galic the question of where his
23 orders came from or did he ever say anything on that topic?
24 A. No, sir. I don't remember the specific conversations. I have a
25 general knowledge of them and I don't remember that being brought up at
1 all, sir.
2 Q. Just a trick that might help you to slow down, if you look at the
3 transcript on the screen in front of you, after each phrase, could you
4 wait until the transcript has caught up before you commence the next
5 phrase of your sentence. Do you follow what I mean?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. All right.
8 You have told us that for immediate communication you would speak
9 to the liaison officer downstairs in the PTT building. Do you know the
10 form of communication that he had to the Lukavica headquarters?
11 A. I believe they had two forms of communication, sir. They used
12 the Motorola and I think they also had land line.
13 Q. In relation to the operation of the gun batteries, you have said
14 that there were some unmanned positions. Where were they in relation to
15 the manned gun batteries? Was there any pattern to that?
16 A. My impression, sir, was that they would be -- they would be
17 subunits of the main battery position and probably, but I can't be sure
18 on this probably serviced by the gunners from the main positions so that
19 would then cause, that would then cause the main position probably not to
20 be able to fire, if they were firing from the other gun position, sir.
21 Q. Were the guns in the sub-position, if I could call it that, of the
22 same calibre as those in the main position, typically, or not?
23 A. In general terms, yes, sir.
24 Q. Did you ever see gun batteries of different calibres? By that I
25 mean, the battery of one calibre and then nearby a battery of a different
2 A. Yes, sir. In some cases -- in some cases, the position would
3 have up to three different calibres.
4 Q. From your observations, were they all operated by the same gun
5 crews or different gun crews, that is, the different calibres?
6 A. I can't -- I can't -- I can't say exactly whether it would be
7 from the same group. I suspect it would be, but I only would see one
8 type being fired at one time.
9 Q. Did you form any opinion as to the degree of accuracy that the
10 Serb gunners were capable of?
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. What was that opinion?
13 A. My opinion was that they were very --
14 Q. Slow down.
15 A. My opinion was that they were very -- very accurate in their
16 firing in that the command post had the targets. The guns were
17 well-maintained and the gunners were seem to be proficient on the
18 weapons. Therefore, the accuracy should be -- should be fairly good,
20 Q. In your military background, did you have any experience with any
21 form of guns at all?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. What was that?
24 A. I was a gunner initially in the reserves. I have also been
25 qualified while in the infantry on mortar.
1 Q. Did you say you have been well-qualified in the infantry on
3 A. Yes, sir on mortar and in Armoured [sic] Corps I was a troop
4 leader and at a time as squadron commander.
5 Q. How closely did you inspect the guns in the gun batteries on the
6 Bosnian Serb army side?
7 A. My first time through in the positions that were not occupied by
8 active gun crews, I went around and had a look at the mechanisms moved
9 the barrels to check for play in the mechanism and had a look at the
10 general maintenance and cleanliness of the weapons.
11 Q. As you said the words "moved the barrels to check for play, I
12 think you moved your arm up and down is that correct?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. Did you detect any play in the barrels?
15 A. I am not an expert, sir, but there didn't see a lot of play at
16 all. The mechanism seemed to be sound and tight.
17 Q. What about the breaches?
18 A. The breaches, the breaches were well maintained. They were
19 clean, rust free.
20 Q. From your observations of the gun positions, did they move from
21 time to time or did they tend to stay in the one place?
22 A. Just stay in one place, sir.
23 Q. Would that have any impact on their accuracy?
24 A. No. They would, if anything, allow any decrease in accuracy
25 through movement and vibration on the mechanisms, that would be
1 significantly reduced, which would allow the guns greater accuracy.
2 Q. Were you able to -- I withdraw that.
3 Is it the case that when operating artillery and mortars,
4 typically there is a forward observation officer?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. And is that because often if not most of the time, the gunners
7 cannot actually see the target they are trying to hit?
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. Do you know whether the Bosnian Serb army had any forward
10 observation officers in Sarajevo?
11 A. Not to my knowledge, sir.
12 Q. Do you know if they use forward observation officers at all?
13 A. Not during the time I was there, sir.
14 Q. Do you mean by that, that you don't know or that they didn't use
16 A. I don't know, sir.
17 Q. I would like to ask you some questions about sniping. In your
18 movement around the Bosnian Serb army side of the confrontation lines,
19 did you ever see any weapons which you were able to identify as being
20 dedicated sniping rifles?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. What brand of rifles were they?
23 A. I saw the weapons on a few occasions from a distance and they
24 appeared to me to be drigonov.
25 Q. Is that spelled d-r-a-g-o-n-o-v.
1 A. I think so, sir, I am not sure.
2 Q. Is that a brand of a rifle?
3 A. Yes, sir. It is a sniper rifle, very effective. And easily
4 identified by its configeration.
5 Q. Specifically, what makes it easily identifiable?
6 A. From a distance, the butt of the weapon is significantly
7 different than any standard small arm that would be on the position and
8 of course the telescopic scope.
9 Q. How would you describe the length of the dragonov compared to
10 other rifles?
11 A. Definitely longer, sir. Longer barrel [sic] and it is a much more
12 sophisicated weapon.
13 Q. In your travels around the city, did you ever see people who
14 appeared to be victims of sniper fire?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. Firstly, did you ever see people who were dead, who appeared to
17 victims of sniper fire?
18 A. I don't -- I saw people being carried away and in some cases it
19 was obvious it was a wound and in other cases, it would be difficult to
20 say. I would have to go and identify, which we did not do, sir.
21 Q. Did you ever see individuals who were wounded apparently as a
22 result of sniper fire?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. Did you ever actually see anyone being shot in the city?
25 A. No. However, people were shot in areas that I was either at or
1 had just arrived at, had been shot shortly before or out of my line of
3 Q. On those occasions where you arrived shortly after, did you ever
4 see any individual who you concluded were without doubt, civilians?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. Can you tell us about those individuals, that is, what it was
7 about them which allowed you to conclude without did you tell that they
8 were civilians?
9 A. In one specific case, sir, it was a young lad. He appeared to be
10 about 12 or 13 years old and he had just passed my vehicle going around a
11 wall and was brought back in about 15 seconds by two Ukrainian soldiers.
12 He had been shot in the lower back.
13 Q. Did you form any opinion as to the effect of the sniping of
14 civilians and what you called the "random shelling" which occasioned
15 civilian casualties on the population as a whole of the city of Sarajevo?
16 A. Yes, sir. The areas that it was safe to move in for sniping,
17 generally canalised the people away from the front lines and probably --
18 Q. What was that word you said?
19 A. Canalised -- moved them from the front lines two or three blocks
20 back from the confrontation line and then there would be barriers
21 put up or whatever to allow them to go through crossroads so that then
22 denied parts of the city for people and on the shelling in that it was
23 random when you went out, you took your chances.
24 Q. Were the barriers, that is the anti-sniping barriers effective?
25 A. To a degree, yes, sir.
1 Q. In what way were they not entirely effective?
2 A. In some cases, the barriers were quite flimsy. In fact, in some
3 cases there would be a series of blankets strewn across to -- basically to
4 deny line of sight. In other cases, there would be gaps between containers
5 that people would have to sprint across and as we were driving or walking,
6 we also drove quickly or sprint.
7 Q. Why would you do this?
8 A. Every position -- every location that afforded line of sight from
9 the Serb side into the Muslim side was a potential place for a sniper to
10 be. I know a little bit about sniping. So they would -- snipers would
11 move their positions, sometimes not fire at all and other times fire on
12 selected targets. That to say, if the individual, if the individual was
13 a professional sniper, he would probably maybe fire one round and
14 regardless of hit or miss, get out of there put his position to another
15 street another window in the same building.
16 Q. Did you notice any pattern to the sniping of civilians in
17 Sarajevo from the Bosnian Serb side?
18 A. I did not, sir.
19 Q. Earlier I showed you a report for the month of January. I would
20 like you to have a look at that again
21 MR. IERACE: I would be grateful if the witness can be shown
22 Exhibit 752 and I note that is not a restricted document, that particular
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, is it still on the desk of the witness, yes.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
1 MR. IERACE:
2 Q. Would you please --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic.
4 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the transcript
5 line -- page 45, line 8, it is recorded that when my colleague -- that my
6 colleague and his side said Bosnian Serb, but I heard in the original the
7 Bosnian side. This is pertaining to the sniping of civilians in Sarajevo.
8 I believe that he said the Bosnian side, not the Bosnian Serb side.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I don't remember.
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] The translation was Bosnian side,
11 so it is not clear to me. Is it Bosnian side or Bosnian Serb side? It
12 was at 16.41.47, the time.
13 MR. IERACE: I had a recollection that I said the Bosnian Serb
15 JUDGE ORIE: I don't remember. But is that how you understood
16 the question, that you -- the question whether you saw any pattern in
17 the-- let me just have a look. Any pattern to the sniping of civilians in
18 Sarajevo from the Bosnian Serb side is that what you understood the
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
21 JUDGE ORIE: So your answer that you did not notice any pattern
22 was related to Bosnian Serb sniping?
23 THE WITNESS: Yes.
24 JUDGE ORIE: If that clarifies the issue, Ms. Pilipovic, then you
25 may proceed, Mr. Ierace.
1 MR. IERACE:
2 Q. Would you please turn to page 5 of the report and by consulting
3 the bottom of page 4, does it appear that the first paragraph on page 5
4 refers to events which occurred on the 15th of January, 1993?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. In the entry for that date, to think these words appear,
7 "shelling of water queue in east Sarajevo killed and injured a large
8 number of civilians," is that correct?
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. Given the system of preparing these reports, are you able to say
11 whether you would expect that event to have occurred on that date?
12 A. Yes, sir
13 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic.
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it is hard for me,
15 due to the speed, to follow what is being said. Could they please just
16 tell us what date it was because this is page 5 of 13 and I believe they
17 are working on the document -- on the report. P752.
18 JUDGE ORIE: I think Mr. Ierace was referring to page 5, but
19 indicated that we would find the date on the last line of page 4, which
20 is the 15th of January 1993.
21 MR. IERACE: It is the second sentence.
22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
24 MR. IERACE:
25 Q. Now that clearly was a civilian target, I take it, a water queue
1 in which a large number of civilians were killed and injured is that the
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. All right. Now you have spoken about random shelling. Apart
5 from this particular incident did it come to your -- in the time that
6 you were in Sarajevo, were you aware of other civilian targets being
7 direct hits by shelling?
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. What type of civilian targets were direct hits?
10 A. Kosevo hospital to use the biggest example was targeted -- was
11 targeted at a regular basis. The -- at times there would be targeting of
12 to me obvious civilian areas, obvious civilian residential areas.
13 Q. Do you recall any other civilian activities, apart from water
14 lines that were targeted, apparently targeted?
15 A. Yes, sir. The roadways. There was one funeral party that I
16 wasn't there when it happened, but shortly after that was engaged.
17 Q. Of course, the roadway can carry military vehicles?
18 A. Yes, sir, it can.
19 Q. Were there any other lines of people, that is queues of people
20 that were his apart from that particular one that you now remember during
21 your three months in Sarajevo?
22 A. Yes, sir. There was one other. And that was a group of people
23 standing just down from the PTT. They were waiting in a group for
24 something. I am not sure what it was. And that group was targeted and
25 they sustained casualties.
1 Q. Did you form any view as to whether incidents such as these were,
2 first of all, as to where the shelling originated from, that is, which
3 side of the confrontation line?
4 A. In many cases, sir, that was exceptionally difficult for any
5 number of reasons given, say like a wartime situation. But primarily and
6 what bothered me the most was the mobility of the mortars to be able to
7 get in, get a few rounds off, and get out of there before we could
8 identify where they -- who had fired, where it was coming from and at
9 times we had rounds landing on the city with no reports from the Serb
10 side -- sorry, the UNMOs working on the Serb side, that they had fired.
11 That they, the Serbs had fired.
12 Q. I think you said that there were three -- I withdraw that. That
13 there were 11 observation posts when you arrived on the Serb side is
14 that correct?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. Did you have observation posts at that stage that covered all of
17 the Serb territory from which artillery or mortars could fire from and
18 still hit targets in the city?
19 A. Absolutely not, sir. That weapons could -- no, we did not. We
20 could not cover the whole territory.
21 Q. In other words, I take it, having regard to that answer, that the
22 fact that there were no reports from UNMOs on the Serb side of a mortar
23 or shell being fired, did not exclude the mortar or shell in question
24 having originated on the Serb side, is that correct?
25 A. It couldn't --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic.
2 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence objects
3 the question as phrased by my learned colleague. I believe this is more
4 than just a leading question.
5 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I was careful to preface it with the
6 words "having regard to that answer." In other words, I sought to clarify
7 the implications of that answer and in my respectful submission, leading
8 in that sense, is permissible.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just take a moment to read again the
10 questions carefully.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber has the opinion that Mr. Ierace is right
13 in when he says that his question just expresses what is implicit in the
14 answer of the witness. So please proceed, the objection is denied.
15 MR. IERACE:
16 Q. Do you understand the question, Mr. Carswell?
17 A. Sir, I do. It would be very difficult to say where that round
18 have -- virtually impossible for any UNMO to say where that round came
19 from. And we were careful not to make any kind of an indication on either
20 point of origin or point of impact, if we were not exactly sure.
21 Q. I will take you back to page 5 of the monthly report. In the
22 entry for the 16th of January, 1993 the third sentence reads "airport
23 road closed for approximately 90 minutes this afternoon due to shelling
24 and small arms fire and the airport was closed for 20 minutes due to what
25 can only be regarded as deliberate sniper fire designed to kill as opposed
1 to scare tactics."
2 Now, do you recollect that particular activity on that day?
3 A. Not specifically that activity, sir.
4 Q. Was there activity, that is sniper activity, at the airport that
5 you do recollect during your three months there?
6 A. Most definitely, sir.
7 Q. Was that mostly in the daytime or the nighttime or equally both
8 day and night?
9 A. It would drop by night, sporadic. However, by day
10 depending -- depending on the whether any activities were being carried
11 out by an aggressive manner by the Bosnian side. Sniping could go up to
12 what I had indicated on the 16th where we would have to close off roads
13 complete. Things were getting relatively serious at that time.
14 Q. At that stage, was there any movement of people across the runway
15 of the nighttime?
16 A. I believe there was -- well, I know there was. The French
17 Foreign Legion at that point were patrolling the runway and intercepting
18 as best they could those who were crossing over land.
19 Q. I take you to the last sentence for that day which reads "more
20 shelling close to the airport road and aimed sniper fire into the airport
21 in addition to a continuation of people crossing the airport at night
22 poses a major problem in this sector."
23 Is that a correct reading of that sentence?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. Does that refer to the crossing of the airport at night by
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. Did the Bosnian Serb military ever complain to you about that?
4 A. Yes, sir, they did.
5 Q. What was their concern?
6 A. The airport had been given up by them to the UN to be used by and
7 controlled by the UN. Their major complaint was that it should not or
8 could not be used as any kind of a transit point for people in and of the
9 city or to bring in any type of supplies or well basically any type of
11 Q. Amongst that traffic, do you know whether there were civilians?
12 A. I do not know. I didn't see it, but in my own mind, I am
13 convinced that the majority of the traffic would be civilians.
14 Q. Did you ever make any observations of that human traffic at
16 A. Yes, sir, I did.
17 Q. Where did you make those observations from?
18 A. I was invited by the Serbs during one of my discussions over
19 there to take a position overlooking the airport in one of the Serb
20 infantry position.
21 Q. Do you remember when that was?
22 A. Mid-January.
23 Q. You started off that the second last answer by saying, "I was
24 invited by the Serbs during one of my discussions over there."
25 Whereabouts did that discussion take place?
1 A. I am not exactly sure, sir but I suspect it would have been
3 Q. Do you recollect whether there was anyone any officers from
4 Lukavica with you at the time you made those observations?
5 A. Yes, sir. There was one officer with me. He was an infantry
6 from the position that I was observing from. He was not from Lukavica.
7 He was from that particular position.
8 Q. Was the -- I withdraw that. Was your attention drawn to an area
9 of the runway or somewhere else in the airport complex?
10 A. Basically the runway, sir.
11 Q. Was the runway lit at the time?
12 A. No, sir.
13 Q. Were you given any aids to assist your vision?
14 A. Yes, sir. They gave me a night viewing device.
15 Q. What type of night viewing device was it?
16 A. It would have been a first generation image intensifier. What
17 that does, is it uses the ambient light to magnify out to about 1.000
18 metres, 1.000 metres, possibly 1500.
19 Q. What is the difference between an image intensifier and say a
20 telescopic lens or lens which allows you to see infrared light?
21 A. They're two different types of night viewing devises. Again, I am
22 not a technician.
23 Q. Perhaps I could ask you this: Does the -- did the image
24 intensifier require a power source?
25 A. Yes, sir, it did.
1 Q. What was the power source?
2 A. I didn't specifically see it but it had a pack on the side that
3 was -- what I am saying is I didn't specifically see the battery that it
4 was enclosed. But it had a power pack -- it had what I assume to be a
5 power pack on the side close to the on/off switch.
6 Q. Had you seen such a device before that night?
7 A. Not that particular type there, no.
8 Q. Do you mean by that, that you had seen image intensifiers before,
9 but not that particular type?
10 A. If you are talking about specifically Sarajevo area, no I had not
11 seen any image intensifiers.
12 Q. But you had seen them before in your life, is that what you are
14 A. Certainly, sir. I have used them.
15 Q. Now, this particular image intensifier that you used on this
16 night, did it appear to be designed for a particular purpose?
17 A. It was much like the ones that we used a few years back. It could
18 be mounted on a rifle, but that would be difficult in that it is very
19 cumbersome on a rifle, probably more onto a lighter heavy machine-gun
20 [sic]. Probably a heavy machine-gun.
21 Q. What is the weight of the image intensifier?
22 A. At a guess, sir, and I am equating it to our own, probably about
23 maximum 4 kilo.
24 Q. What were the approximate dimensions, the one that you used that
1 A. It would be about a foot and a half long and much in general
2 terms would look a bit like a light bulb in that the bottom end where the
3 power was fed into the unit was simply to transmit the power from the
4 battery pack and then the lens and the working parts were in a rather
5 large cone-shape.
6 Q. When you looked through it, what was the nature of the image? Was
7 it monochrome or colour?
8 A. It was first generation, sir. The colour comes out with a
9 greenish tinge in it, so that would be the objects you would be looking
10 at would be a very very slight greenish tint to it.
11 Q. If there was any source of artificial light, say a hand held
12 torch, let's say 500 metre, 800 metres how would that appear?
13 A. That would appear as a light, a very definite light in using that
14 source also to amplify the images, a very definite light in there, in the
15 sight picture and that would additionally eliminate around the sight
16 picture what was there.
17 Q. Of course the torch is a directed beam. What about a candle
18 light, that is a light which shed light rays in all directions. Would
19 that have the same effect or different effect?
20 A. A candle would probably be very much less, depending on distance,
21 it would decrease over distance what you could see.
22 Q. What on this particular night when you used it, what was the --
23 what were the sources of available light?
24 A. Star light and lights that were in and around the airport in that
25 the French were patrolling with their Armoured Personnel Carriers so I
1 could pick off their headlights.
2 Q. I think you said you were looking at the runway area is that
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. Were the runway lights on or off?
6 A. Off.
7 Q. They were off?
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. I take it the nearest buildings would have been some distance
10 from the runway?
11 A. There was no light and no electricity at that point into Sarajevo
12 and the separate power source at the airport was not used all that often
13 to illuminate any buildings.
14 Q. All right.
15 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I would like to show the witness some
16 further documents and I think we may have to do that in closed session.
17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Could we do it private session, Mr. Ierace, or could
19 we not?
20 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I will try and avoid it. Perhaps see
21 how I go?
22 Q. I think you still have before you the monthly report, is that the
24 A. Yes, sir
25 JUDGE ORIE: May I first ask, Mr. Usher, I saw that there were
1 some people in the public gallery. We have not turned in closed session
2 and we might even not turn into closed session at all. It depends on
3 whether it would be necessary, so I don't know whether they disappeared
4 or not. But as far as I am concerned, this is in open session at this
5 very moment, so would you please inform those who are there. You couldn't
6 know, I am not blaming you for anything.
7 Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
8 MR. IERACE:
9 Q. Would you please go to page 8 of the monthly report. In
10 particular, the entrance -- the entry for the 22nd of January 1993, the
11 third sentence of the second paragraph reads, "The impacts have moved from
12 seemingly indiscriminate shelling of the city to the areas of
14 Is that an accurate reading of that sentence?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. There seems to be a reference to impact of shells fired into
17 the city; is that correct?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And is that indeed a reference to the type of indiscriminate or
20 random shelling that you have described earlier?
21 A. Yes, sir. The fire, if there are activities along the front line
22 would obviously shift to the front line and the weight of the batteries,
23 the weight of the guns would be brought to those areas.
24 Q. Would you please go to page 10, in particular the entry for the
25 27th of January 1993 about halfway through that entry, do these words
1 appear, "There was some shelling on the city which appeared to be random,
2 however, the shelling along the front lines appeared to be concentrating
3 in the areas of Rajlovac, followed by a grid reference Stup, followed by
4 a grid reference, and Mojmilo, followed by a grid reference, all front
5 line areas."
6 Is that a correct reading -- an accurate reading of that passage?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. And does that refer to the type of random shelling of the city
9 that you have spoken about earlier?
10 A. Initially, yes, sir.
11 Q. And by "initially," do you mean the first part of that passage?
12 A. Yes.
13 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, might the witness be shown Exhibits --
14 two Exhibits to save time, P816 and P698.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Are these documents tendered under seal, Mr.
17 MR. IERACE: They are, but Mr. President I am going to attempt to
18 extract the evidence in a way which would not require us to go into
19 private session. So at this stage I ask that they be shown to the witness
20 and not placed on the ELMO.
21 Q. I draw your attention to a point about two-thirds of the way down
22 the first page.
23 A. Which Exhibit, sir?
24 Q. This is P816. I am sorry. And I ask you this question: In
25 relation to the random shelling that you have described in your earlier
1 testimony, did that affect, which parts of the city did that affect? In
2 other words, which parts of the city received random firing from the
3 Bosnian Serb army controlled side?
4 A. All sections, sir.
5 Q. During your time in Sarajevo, was there ever any negotiations --
6 withdraw that.
7 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, it might be safe to go into private
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Just make sure private session would duly
10 protect the documents?
11 MR. IERACE: Excuse me, Mr. President.
12 [Prosecution counsel confer]
13 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I am sorry. Given as I understand
14 it, that private session involves no transmission of what is being said by
15 the witness --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. IERACE: -- and counsel, that should suffice.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Could we then please go into private session.
19 [Private session]
12 Pages 8369 –8378 redacted - private session
5 [Open session]
6 --- Recess taken at 5.35 p.m.
7 --- Upon resuming at 5.57 p.m.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic being in open session again, please
9 proceed with cross-examination of Mr. Carswell.
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Q. Mr. Carswell, we will remain with this document, it is a monthly
12 report, P752. On page 4, under the entry January 15th when asked by my
13 learned colleague you confirmed that you observed that there had been
14 shelling of the water queue in the eastern part of Sarajevo and a large
15 number of civilians had been injured or killed. So the entry of January
16 15th, page 4.
17 A. I don't have that, Madam Registrar. Page 4 of my 752, January
19 JUDGE ORIE: I think it is page 4 and continues on page 5.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes.
21 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] When asked by my learned
22 colleague you confirmed that this is what you had written down in your
23 report is that true.
24 A. Yes, ma'am.
25 Q. Mr. Carswell, as a member of the team of observers wasn't it
1 mandatory for you when an accident of this nature took place, to visit
2 the site of it?
3 A. As I indicated earlier, ma'am, not me specifically. One of the
4 teams would have been dispatched there as soon as possible.
5 Q. Mr. Carswell, can you please tell us which members of your team
6 since you were the deputy of the high military observer, therefore, which
7 member of your team visited this site following this incident?
8 A. Again, ma'am, I do not know. That would be in one of the patrol
9 reports. The specific question, I can't answer that, ma'am.
10 Q. Could you confirm for us that any observer visited the site
11 following this incident and wrote a report for you?
12 A. Judging by the way I have written the report, ma'am, one of my
13 teams would have seen that if -- if any of the instances are not, using
14 the term that we used at the time, "UNMO seen" it would be put down as
15 local commander reports. My wording indicates that we had a team on the
16 site at one point.
17 Q. Since you wrote down that this was in east Sarajevo and that a
18 large number of civilians had been killed and injured, can you confirm to
19 us that you had received a report and that based on this report compiled
20 by your observers, you entered into the monthly report the text that I
21 just read to you here, therefore, this item pertaining to east Sarajevo?
22 A. Allow me to read it again, please, ma'am. Yes, ma'am.
23 Q. Can you tell us please when you say "east Sarajevo," can you
24 tell us more precisely regarding this incident at what time exactly it
25 took place, how many people were killed, and were you able to determine
1 where the shells originated from?
2 A. No, ma'am. I can't give you any of that detail. One of the --
3 to elaborate slightly. One of the problems that we had was that
4 sometimes we would get a report such as this, which would cause us to
5 dispatch a team down to the location and who in fact would arrive there
6 after the fact. Now, I can't say specifically on this one whether that
7 happened or not, but, again, judging from reading this, we would have had
8 a team down there and they would probably have seen dead and injured, but
9 some in all likelihood would have been moved away at that point.
10 Q. Since you are telling us that they probably saw dead and wounded,
11 are you, in fact, saying that the observers who visited the site of the
12 incident had an obligation to determine where the shells had originated
14 A. No, sir -- no, ma'am. I am not saying that. The observers on
15 the site would have absolutely no means to determine where that round
16 came from.
17 Q. So you are telling us that the UN observers when visiting the
18 sites of incidents and specifically this one never determined where the
19 rounds had come from; is that what you are telling us?
20 A. No, ma'am, that is not what I am telling you. In some cases, we
21 would -- the observers that were on the positions, the gun positions on
22 the Serb side that were firing, would be able to tell us when those
23 batteries were firing, and it was a simple matter of judging time and
24 space to understand in all likelihood where those rounds were landing.
25 A second method to do it which was used over there but we didn't
1 have that expertise with the observers was crater analysis.
2 Q. Specifically speaking about this instance, did you use one of
3 these two methods that you just described for us?
4 A. I know I did not use crater analysis on that one. In that what
5 we are looking at right now is an excerpt of my complete report and
6 basically the high points of the day. I would have to look at my daily
7 sit-rep for that day to identify whether anybody was able to report a
8 round being fired or a number of rounds being fired from a certain
10 Q. So, therefore, you cannot confirm to us from which positions the
11 water queue was shelled, nor can you tell in which part of the town this
12 took place? You only know that it was in east Sarajevo; is that right?
13 A. East on this report, ma'am, that's correct.
14 Q. Regarding this incident, when you were, therefore, unable to
15 determine from which positions the water queue was shelled, you are,
16 therefore, telling us that you did not inform either -- either warring
17 side of this incident? When I say "either warring sides," by that I mean
18 that you did not inform the army of Republika Srpska or the army of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina or the UNPROFOR sector?
20 A. No, ma'am, that is not what I am saying. I reiterate, this is an
21 excerpt from my daily sit-rep which could very well have -- in fact would
22 have paragraphs eliminated in that this simply were to be used in
23 conjunction of the daily sit-rep, if somebody wanted to question that.
24 And again, my daily sit-reps would probably be in the archives.
25 Q. Mr. Carswell, you just told us about the entire daily report
1 which gives in more detail what happened during the day. Can you please
2 tell us, then, this daily report which had more details, who did you
3 deliver it to and who did you forward it to when there are instances in
4 which civilians were wounded or killed?
5 A. Every report, ma'am, regardless of the activity of the day, was
6 delivered by approximately 2200 hours to the senior operations officer in
7 the UNPROFOR headquarters, in the PTT building.
8 Q. Can you please tell us, on January 15th, who was high -- who was
9 senior officer who was in charge of the analysis of this incident at that
11 A. I don't know, ma'am.
12 Q. Can you confirm for us whether these daily sit-reps which, as you
13 say, were forwarded to the senior, to the high military observer did he
14 then forward it on to somebody else? When I say "forward on" was it sent
15 on to somebody within the warring -- sorry, was it sent on to somebody
16 within the UNPROFOR structure or was it then forwarded it to one of the
17 warring parties?
18 A. No, ma'am. The sit-rep had definitely not be forwarded to any of
19 the warring parties. The information, as far as I know, was passed up to
20 Zagreb and obviously copies would go to the commander in Sarajevo, and
21 the actions would be taken from there. Now, I would also like to clarify
22 one other point. When I told you I gave it only to the UNPROFOR
23 headquarters, that is not entirely correct. I also passed on a copy to
24 Kiseljak and a copy to UNMO headquarters in Zagreb.
25 Q. Can you confirm for us whether regarding this incident and
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 following the receipt of information regarding this incident, whether you
2 -- whether you informed the warring party within Sarajevo that there had
3 been an incident in which civilians were wounded or killed?
4 A. Not that I would have used would have been to pass it through to
5 our UNMOs in Lukavica who would in turn pass it on. And that would have
6 done -- either have been done by radio or I would have gone over. I
7 can't tell you which one -- which one I used, ma'am.
8 Q. Mr. Carswell regarding January 16th when answering my learned
9 colleague's question about the airport you spoke about shelling and
10 shooting on the airport road. Can you tell us whether you were able to
11 determine from which position they fired on the road and airport runway?
12 A. For the artillery rounds I can't answer that question. I don't
13 know. For the sniping and the firing that would cause the road to be
14 closed again, this is not, understand, fresh in my mind. It probably
15 would have been an action between the factions in that -- sorry, not the
16 factions, the opposing sides, in that the road ran past the confrontation
18 Q. So you are telling us that the consequences of the shooting could
19 have been the result of the combat that took place between the warring
20 parties in the airport area?
21 A. Not the shelling, ma'am. Definitely the small arms fire --
22 sorry. Definitely in all likelihood the small arms fire, that was fairly
23 frequent occurrence. The small arms fire would probably have been an
24 action between the opposing sides. The artillery fire or mortar fire
25 would have been not tied up. The distance is too great.
1 MR. IERACE: Mr. President --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace.
3 MR. IERACE: The English transcript has missed the words, "strike
4 definitely." That's an important omission because it effects the meaning
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I think proper care will be taken on that
7 issue, but would we have to ask the perhaps the witness to repeat that
8 part of the answer where he was using the words "strike definitely."
9 Mr. Carswell, I have to explain to you that since hard work is
10 done during the evening hours in the transcript and since we missed a
11 small part, could you please then repeat your answer starting with "not
12 the shelling that was an answer to the question whether the consequence
13 of shooting could have been the result of combat. You said, "not the
14 shelling, madam, definitely the small arms fire," and then please, the
15 rest of your answer. Could you please repeat it.
16 THE WITNESS: Strike definitely.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Q. Mr. Carswell, on January 16th, your entry on January 16th, line
20 9, which describes the events at the airport, you said that the general
21 atmosphere was still tense. It is claimed by the Serbs that they will
22 only fire in retaliation to Presidency force fire.
23 A. Yes, ma'am.
24 JUDGE ORIE: You are referring to the 11th line, I suppose? Yes.
25 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
1 Q. Therefore, you confirm for us that regarding these incidents
2 which had taken place in the airport area, you talked about them to both
3 sides? I am referring to this incident in the airport area.
4 A. Please allow me to reread this. That could have been me speaking
5 or it could have been Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler speaking with them,
6 ma'am. That was a statement I had heard a number of times.
7 Q. Mr. Carswell, can you confirm for us that a large part of the
8 airport runway was exposed to the front lines which were under the
9 control of the BH army, if we look at the Dobrinja area and Butmir area,
10 they were behind the airport and that area was under the control of the
11 BH army, would you agree with me on that?
12 A. Yes, ma'am.
13 Q. Mr. Carswell, in your monthly report on the entry on 21st of
14 January, page 7, you write "that it seems that the military activity is
15 switching to the nighttime when the small arms fire increases in town. It
16 is very hard to make conclusions, however it is possible that this is a
17 battle for power between Bosnian fractions within the town itself."
18 A. Yes, ma'am.
19 Q. Now when you describe these events on the 21st of January, when
20 you described the struggle between Bosnian factions within the city, do
21 you have any further knowledge which military formation this pertains to,
22 if you meant military formations, when you said "Bosnian factions."
23 A. No, ma'am. We had a lot of difficulty in that situations such
24 as this to our knowledge -- too my knowledge, did not occur during the
25 day. They could well have, but as I mentioned, not to my knowledge.
1 However not regularly but occasionally at night, situations would occur of
2 small arms fire in areas that we knew were definitely Bosnian controlled.
3 Not on the confrontation line, but back from.
4 Q. On January 17th 1993 in your report you state the following on
5 page 5, I am not going to read the entire entry, but here you speak about
6 demonstrations and you say "that Serb women and children participated in
7 demonstration asking that a large -- asking for a large scale of release
8 of Bosnian held Serb POWs."
9 A. Yes, ma'am.
10 Q. When compiling this report, did you have any specific information
11 what POW's this refers to and where they were held?
12 A. If we were given that information, ma'am, that would have been
13 included in the patrol report and we, as UNMOs, didn't deal with POWs,
14 but we would pass information when we were requested by either side. But
15 that would go directly from us to the headquarters to pass to the relevant
17 Q. Thank you.
18 Mr. Carswell, in your monthly report in the January 24th entry on
19 page 9, line 6 you said that "the Lima side UNMOs were called to the
20 Blazuj hospital in order to witness that two of the oxygen bottles
21 delivered by the UNHCR were found to contain gunpowder."
22 A. Yes, ma'am.
23 Q. Mr. Carswell can you tell us on whose side was the hospital in
24 Blazuj, under whose control?
25 A. Unfortunately, ma'am I don't remember that.
1 Q. If the Lima side UNMOs were called to the Blazuj hospital, could
2 we agree that that was on the side that was controlled by the army of
3 Republika Srpska?
4 A. It could very well be ma'am, but their mandate also stretched out
5 in to some of the Bosnian areas that would be around there. Given the
6 positioning of our UNMO locations, it was sometimes easiest for a team to
7 be dispatched from the closest position, which could be up to 20
8 kilometres away, and that could cross over to a Bosnian position --
9 Bosnian held area excuse me.
10 Q. Mr. Carswell, following the uncovering of the situation whereby
11 UNPROFOR was transporting gunpowder in oxygen bottles, was there a special
12 investigation following that and did you find out who these people were,
13 UNPROFOR employees, who were transporting gunpowder.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace.
15 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I don't know if it is a
16 mistranslation. But the English transcript attributes UNPROFOR to my
17 learned colleague as the transporter of the gunpowder. The passage that
18 she read out refers instead to the UNHCR being the deliverer.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Ms. Pilipovic?
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. But in my
21 translation, it says that it was delivered by UNPROFOR. I am just
22 reading what has been written, but if we are talking about UNHCR, then I
23 would like -- I will ask Mr. Carswell whether UNHCR vehicles were
24 escorted by UNPROFOR as security.
25 A. I can't speak specifically for this convoy but I expect there
1 would have been -- there may have been an UNPROFOR escort, but I am
2 afraid I don't know the composition of that particular convoy, ma'am.
3 Q. I think that you didn't answer my question, whether following the
4 delivery of gunpowder in oxygen bottles, you investigated within your
5 service who was it that for the UNPROFOR knew that, that gunpowder was
6 being transported in oxygen bottles, do you know anything about that?
7 A. Your question is not clear to me, ma'am.
8 Q. Following this incident --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Was any investigation made in respect of this
11 A. Most definitely. That was not done by the UNMOs. Again we were
12 the observers. That would be passed to headquarters, and then in turn
13 passed on to whichever investigative agency would handle it.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Do you know that this would happen or do you assume
15 that this is the way it would happen.
16 A. Having not seen the documents on the investigation, sir, it is an
17 assumption based on what I heard in the headquarters of people discussing
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Carswell, you told us that you heard that the headquarters,
22 when people were discussing it, did you perhaps heard that this operation
23 was called "operation oxygen" and that for quite a long period of time,
24 this was done, that gunpowder was delivered in oxygen bottles?
25 A. No, ma'am.
1 Q. Mr. Carswell, you told us that you arrived in Sarajevo on the 6th
2 of January 1993 and that you stayed until the 20th of April 1993; is that
4 A. Yes, ma'am. Within those dates. I don't have my diary.
5 Q. Mr. Carswell, I apologise. I have my -- get my information from
6 your statement. Can you confirm that on the 30th of June, 2000 you gave
7 a statement to the investigators of the OTP in view of the circumstances
8 of your stay in Sarajevo. So that was on the 30th of June 2000?
9 A. The OTP?
10 JUDGE ORIE: It is the Office of the Prosecutor?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Like military even court have their own
14 THE WITNESS: My apologies. Yes, ma'am.
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. So, Mr. Carswell, the information that I would like information
17 of comes from your statement that you arrived on the 6th of January and
18 that you staid until the 20th of July, 1993?
19 A. Yes, ma'am.
20 Q. In your statement you said that in February 1993 there were 14
21 observation posts of military observers and asked by my learned colleague,
22 you said that there were 11 observation posts on the Serb side.
23 A. I could well have said that. I didn't -- we -- on occasion, we
24 moved our observation post depending on the circumstances. That was not
25 particularly easy to do because we had to seek accommodation to do that.
1 I can't remember specifically the locations of all the -- of all the OPs,
2 the observation posts and their composition and my information I am
3 taking from that -- those documents that I read in the past -- in the
4 past few days when I talk about 11 OPs in 3.
5 Q. But in any case, we can agree that there was a double number of
6 observation posts on the Serb side compared the Muslim side?
7 A. Definitely.
8 Q. Could you tell us perhaps whether you know, what was the criteria
9 used to determine in the placement of these observation posts and why
10 there was the double number of observation posts on the Serb side? Do you
12 A. Obviously the line of confrontation that surrounded Sarajevo --
13 in fact encircled the city, the Serbs had both gun positions and forward
14 infantry posts, we tried to site our OPs where we could best view what
15 was going on. In some cases, it would be right where with the gun
16 positions; in other cases, we would have them sited so they could hear
17 the firing and identify which position it is coming from. I did not site
18 those positions. They were in place when I arrived.
19 Q. Would you agree with me if I said that it would have been more
20 efficient to have had more observers, observation points on the Muslim
22 A. Yes, ma'am, we probably could have used about two or three more
23 on the Muslim side, in that it was on the Bosnian side -- in that it was
24 with three OPs difficult to cover the whole city, but not impossible. In
25 that we sent out roaming patrols.
1 Q. When you agree with me that it would have been more effective to
2 have had more observation posts on the Muslim side, could we also agree
3 that then you would have been able to establish on the side itself whether
4 the army of Republika Srpska really fired on a location, would you then
5 have been more precise?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Firing on Sarajevo.
8 A. No. In real terms, ma'am, to properly monitor everything, you
9 would virtually have to have a team of every position and every gun. As
10 I mentioned earlier, with mobile mortars used by both organisations, the
11 -- it was virtually impossible to cover all the ground. You simply can't
12 do it, not with the numbers I had.
13 Q. Could you confirm to us that because of difficult work and
14 insufficient number of observers on both the Muslim side and the Serbian
15 side, on the Serb side, you were not always able to establish with
16 precision from which side the incident came or was caused in a certain
17 part of town?
18 A. Yes, ma'am, I can confirm that.
19 Q. Mr. Carswell, in your statement on page 3 of the translation,
20 that is the document 010060, I will formulate the questions in view of
21 your -- in relation to your statement, you said that in the city of
22 Sarajevo, there were about 10 Muslim brigades, is that correct?
23 A. If you -- that is what they were called, ma'am. To call it a
24 brigade, though, in military terms is not correct. The numbers -- the
25 numbers would vary in those organisations from 50 to maybe 250 so it was
1 a brigade of soldiers as anywhere between about 3 and 5.000 in normal
3 Q. Mr. Carswell, I will show you a document, a Prosecution document,
4 0057561, which gives a report --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, have you taken proper care that no
6 protected documents are used in such a way that the protection might
7 become ineffective?
8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour I will first give
9 my -- this document to my learned colleagues this is a Prosecution
10 document, and if there is a problem --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, and Mr. Ierace, may I just hear from you
12 whether any specific measures are necessary at this moment.
13 MR. IERACE: No, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then, please pass the document to the -- well,
15 this is your copy, Mr. Ierace. Ms. Pilipovic, could you please provide a
16 copy for the witness and copies for the Bench.
17 THE REGISTRAR: D108.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
19 Q. Mr. Carswell do you recognise this document?
20 A. No, ma'am.
21 Q. If I tell you that this is a document which was compiled by Mr.
22 Scott who was at the time also a member of UNPROFOR and that this is a
23 list of brigades that comprised the first Corps, and on the first page
24 you also have the report of the brigades of the Sarajevo -- on the second
25 page you have the brigades of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. You can see
1 on the second page the --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, you are now more or less summarising
3 the content of the document. The witness told us that he doesn't know
4 the document. Of course there is no problem in asking him anything about
5 subjects dealt with in this document if he knows anything from his own
6 knowledge about it, but we can't just confront him with the content of
7 the document and then ask for comment and subsequently admit the document
8 into evidence. So, I don't know what your plans are, but.
9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I will now ask
10 a question that will not be in relation to this document.
11 Q. Mr. Carswell, you said in your statement on page 3, when you were
12 talking about the 10 brigades you said, "I travelled -- I tried to travel
13 through their areas on a regular basis so that they would become familiar
14 with me." Is that correct?
15 A. Yes, ma'am.
16 Q. Could you tell us which were these brigades that comprised the
17 1st Corps of the BH army in Sarajevo?
18 A. I am not sure I understand. Are you asking for the locations of
19 their headquarters?
20 Q. I will first ask you whether you know, considering that you
21 visited the -- their areas, could you clarify, when you said "areas" what
22 did you mean by that? What do you understand an "area" to be?
23 A. It would be an area of responsibility for an organisation within
24 the overall -- the overall defensive position or the overall position.
25 What I meant when I visited is that I tried to drive around there as often
1 as possible. I did not specifically meet with the -- meet with the
2 brigade commanders. I more drove the position so they got -- and I would
3 encourage by UNMOs to do this -- so they were familiar with us. We did
4 the same on the Serb side. We got to know them and they got to know us by
5 face. And that makes it a lot easier to operate once the individuals know
6 who you are.
7 Q. Mr. Carswell considering that you clarified what area of a
8 brigade is, could you tell us in the Dobrinja area would you agree with
9 me that in the Dobrinja area was the area of the 5th Motorised Brigade?
10 A. I don't remember specifically, ma'am, the positions of the units
11 and their actual areas of responsibility.
12 Q. Do you know, these brigades, were they positioned along the
13 confrontation lines? Were they deployed along the confrontation lines?
14 A. Deployed in a strict military sense, no. They would have
15 soldiers forward and they generally the remainder of the unit would be
16 back somewhat. It is not necessary in virtually any military operation
17 to have all forward all the time.
18 Q. When we are talking about these 10 Muslim brigades, could you
19 tell us whether -- do you know whether as part of these brigades, were
20 also battalions, companies and detachments parts of these brigades?
21 A. No, ma'am. That would -- I can't tell you that, but in my
22 opinion, it would be impractical, given the numbers of people in the
24 Q. Could you tell us --
25 JUDGE ORIE: For the clarification for the transcript, your
1 answer reads in the transcript "that would -- I can't tell you that, but
2 in my opinion it would be impractical," which suggests that you could tell
3 us. So not -- "I cannot" should be read as "I can tell you that." If you
4 look at page 85, line 15.
5 A. When she asked me sir, I was asked if I knew specifically how they
6 were broken down, which I don't know. To elaborate on my answer, if a
7 company-sized group requires a certain amount of command structure, if the
8 particular brigade had maybe 200 total in it, that would be two companies
9 in a normal rifle battalion. I am sure they did break down into smaller
10 groups, but I wouldn't use those terms.
11 JUDGE ORIE: So you could not tell us in full detail and it would
12 be impractical as well, is that what you tell us?
13 THE WITNESS: In my opinion, it would be impractical to break
14 down like that, yes.
15 THE COURT: Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Carswell, if I tell you that
17 in Sarajevo, the 102 Motorised Brigade at that time had 3.200 soldiers,
18 would you agree that this is a correct information?
19 A. No, I couldn't confirm that, ma'am.
20 Q. Mr. Carswell when we are talking about the brigade of the 1st
21 Corps of the BH army, you said that you regularly visited these areas.
22 Could you tell us when you visited these areas, where were the
23 soldiers -- in what kind of facilities were they staying in, on these
25 A. I was never into any of their billets nor would I expect it to be
1 in the context of a battle, that is privileged information. So I never
2 did go to any of their billets. The reason I tell you they were not
3 forward, is when something started to happen, you can see the soldiers
4 coming in groups, twos and threes, forward to the battle, to join their
6 Q. Did you, when you toured the area of responsibility, did you also
7 visit the command posts of the brigades that you toured and visited?
8 A. I did not visit all of the command posts.
9 Q. When you say that you didn't visit all of the places are you
10 saying that you did visit some command posts? If you have, could you
11 tell us which ones and which facilities were you at?
12 A. The two that I visited that are clear in my mind, ma'am, were in
13 the south-east corner, in the south-east of the town of Sarajevo. To
14 give you specific location I couldn't do that, ma'am.
15 Q. Could you describe for us the buildings or the facilities where
16 you were? Were these military facilities or were these residential
17 buildings or were these apartments that were used by the army for their
18 own purposes?
19 A. The two buildings were relatively close to each other, I would
20 say within half a kilometre. One was beside a destroyed apartment --
21 sorry, destroyed -- it looked like a furniture store or clothing store. I
22 wasn't sure what it was, but a commercial building. And the other one
23 was in a warehouse district. Basically the offices of a warehouse were
24 used in that one. Those were the only two that I can be relatively
25 certain on.
1 Q. These two buildings, these residential buildings where command
2 posts of the brigades were, did they have any visible signs that you
3 could see that these were military facilities?
4 A. I would not use the term, ma'am, "residential." They were
5 commercial, not residential and visible signs, definitely not would be
6 advertising their position.
7 Q. If I tell you that so far in this case we have heard the testimony
8 of many witnesses from the BH army areas, they said the soldiers were in
9 private residential buildings, in schools, and in residential buildings
10 that were on the front line; would you agree with me --
11 MR. IERACE: I object, Mr. President to the representation of the
12 evidence that is contained in that question on the grounds that it is
13 not accurate. In particular, while there has been evidence that soldiers
14 were in private residential buildings in the sense that they slept at
15 home, and some further evidence in that regard, I don't recall evidence
16 that they were in schools. I would be grateful if my friend could remind
17 me of what that evidence was.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will say that
19 a witness who was not protected was heard here and he testified about the
20 shelling of the water queue, Mr. Hussein Grebic, and who showed on a map
21 of Sarajevo he pointed for Dobrinja, the command post for the 5th
22 Motorised Brigade and on that occasion, I cannot be absolutely precise,
23 whether which day it was, it was in Dobrinja; and he said they slept on
24 abandoned buildings on the front line. And when I asked whether the
25 school was working at the time, the witness said that the school was not
1 working at the time because the army was staying there. I will check in
2 relation to my question, but I will now withdraw it because I cannot be
3 absolutely precise, if that is what you would like me to do.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At least, soldiers sleeping in a civilian
5 building is perhaps not under all circumstances the same as having
6 command post in civilian buildings. So I would not oppose against such a
7 line of questioning, but with more detail. And if it can assist
8 you to find that part of the evidence of Mr. Grebic, I would be glad to do
9 so. So if you proceed, I will try to see whether I can find anything on
11 Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. Mr. Carswell, in your statement when you said that you toured the
14 areas of 10 Muslim brigades, could you tell us whether in that urban area
15 of Sarajevo, according to you, could you tell us how large was that zone,
16 that area of responsibility, including its length and depth, the area of
17 responsibility of these 10 Muslim brigades?
18 A. Specifically, I cannot. It wasn't broken up evenly, I remember
19 that. But I couldn't tell you whether it was 1.000 metres or 10.000
20 metres, ma'am.
21 Q. When touring these 10 Muslim brigades, were you able to determine
22 what kind of weaponry they had?
23 A. We had two means of doing that; obviously that which we saw
24 while we were travelling, and then there was the heavy weapons collection
1 Q. Can you tell us in which locations did your observers observe the
2 artillery of the 1st Corps of the BH army?
3 A. I am not -- I am not sure. Are you talking about weapons other
4 than that at the collection points?
5 Q. Mr. Carswell, did your observers follow the activity of the
6 mortars that belonged to the 1st Corps and if they did, then from which
7 locations did they do so?
8 A. Two methods to do that, ma'am. The first was -- I will back up a
9 bit. As I mentioned earlier, they are mobile weapon, so those weapons
10 would not be used from a static position over a period of time. So based
11 on that, we didn't have any specific points to observe any mortar
12 positions, however the first method was a -- hearing the mortar fire and
13 that is somewhat difficult if there is other noises in the area. So
14 mortar is not a loud weapon.
15 And the second one was where we would observe something being
16 towed, a weapon being towed. That was also difficult. The observation
17 was not difficult. The observation was not difficult, but to follow that
18 weapon, by the time we could get in our vehicles and get down there, they
19 were gone.
20 Q. In addition to mortars that we spoke about just now, did you have
21 information that the 1st Corps of the BH army also had a Howitzer battery
22 and then another Howitzer battery of 120 millimetres and also a battery
23 of 122 millimetres that were within the 2nd 6th and 3rd,
24 Motorised Brigade.
25 I have in front of me a document in front of me dated 16 February
1 1993 from the 1st Corps, and therefore, I would like to know whether you,
2 during your mandate, January, February, and March and April of 1993, were
3 in a position to observe the activity of mortars and Howitzers that fired
4 from the area that was under the control of the 1st Corps of the BH army,
5 if not you yourself personally, then your observers?
6 A. Whose document is that, ma'am?
7 Q. Mr. Carswell, this is a document belonging to the 1st Corps of
8 the BH army, dated 16 February 1993. It is an order issued by the
9 commander of the Corps and this is a document that was given to the
10 Defence by the Prosecution.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace.
12 MR. IERACE: The question that precedes this statement from my
13 learned colleague really is two questions and an observation. And my
14 learned colleague is now simply informing the witness of what she
15 understands to be the origin of the document which really is of no
16 assistance in cross-examination. The simple approach would perhaps be
17 simply to ask the witness if he is aware of whether the ABiH had a
18 Howitzer battery of 120 millimetres and so on, indicating that she is
19 getting her information, that my learned colleague is getting her
20 information from a particular document, this really doesn't assist.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic.
22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, I asked Mr. Carswell whether
23 he had information that the 1st Corps of the BH army had Howitzer in
24 their possession.
25 THE WITNESS: No, ma'am.
1 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. When you say, "no ma'am," do you not know, or did you not have
4 A. It was my impression at the time that there were no -- no weapons
5 above the 120 millimetre mortars in the -- in the Bosnian positions
6 within Sarajevo, other than those held -- those held at the collection
8 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, it is 7.00. I don't know whether
9 this would be a suitable moment to break.
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Could you give us an indication on how much time you
12 would still need?
13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will try to take
14 less time than the examination-in-chief, so I believe that I will
15 conclude within half an hour tomorrow.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I am afraid, then, you are not taking less time, but
17 more time. As far as my bookkeeping goes, the Prosecution took 1 hour
18 and 30 minutes, and you are now up to 1 hour and 20 minutes. In order to
19 give you, we started the examination-in-chief at a quarter past 3.00. We
20 then until 10 minutes to 4.00. We started again at 16:25 and the
21 examination-in-chief was finished by 10 minutes past 5.00.
22 So that would make, if I am not making any mistake, even less
23 than one hour and a half. I think you are approximately -- I am afraid I
24 made a mistake in your favour already, if I said that you still had 10
25 minutes. But we will do the bookkeeping very carefully, Ms. Pilipovic,
1 but I am afraid that you are further in time than you expected yourself.
2 But in order to save time, it might assist you that when you refer to
3 the testimony of Mr. Grebic, if you would look at Day 68, page 7295, at
4 line 18, you will find a school with soldiers in it on the front line.
5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, could you give us an indication on
7 well, whatever time Ms. Pilipovic would still take, how much time you
8 would need for re-examination.
9 MR. IERACE: So far I have only two questions until now.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you very much.
11 Mr. Ierace, you promised us that you would check on whether the
12 parts of the documents that were tendered or not tendered were -- we
13 don't have to deal with it now -- but would you please inform us tomorrow
14 so we can take a decision? Yes.
15 MR. IERACE: I will, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Then we will adjourn until tomorrow at 2.15 p.m.,
17 same courtroom.
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
19 7.10 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday,
20 the 15th, day of May, 2002, at 2.15 p.m.