1 Friday, 24 May 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in this courtroom.
6 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Case Number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus
8 Stanislav Galic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Ms. Pilipovic, I was informed today that the Prosecution -- the
11 Defence takes the position that it could cross-examine Mr. Cutler next
12 Monday. Is that true?
13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, good morning. Thank
14 you. Fifteen minutes ago, I was informed about the position of the Trial
15 Chamber with regard to the examination of Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler. I
16 have to say that I still haven't been handed the official translation of
17 the supplementary information after the interview that was conducted with
18 Mr. Cutler in the afternoon. I have to speak to General Galic and I
19 believe that it will be on Monday that the cross-examination can take
20 place of Mr. Cutler.
21 Thank you for your understanding. I was told that it could be
22 longer but due to continuity and the witnesses that are to follow, the
23 Defence believes that it would be on Monday that the Defence would be able
24 to cross-examine Mr. Cutler.
25 JUDGE ORIE: As you know, the Chamber would even have granted you
1 a bit more time specifically because, as far as we can see, but of course
2 the Chamber has not the full statement of Mr. Cutler that he gave before,
3 but there seem to be new elements in this new information which might have
4 asked for further investigation. So I see, for example, a Christmas party
5 which would have taken place. But if the Defence is willing to consider
6 to cross-examine Mr. Cutler by next Monday, the Chamber highly appreciates
7 the flexibility and, at the same time, I would like to express that
8 although the Prosecution might be under an obligation to inform the
9 Defence, it is still a situation which could cause major difficulties in
10 the progress of the trial.
11 I have some understanding for the situation the Prosecution is in,
12 but of course if you interview the witness during the last few days, then
13 this kind of problems could arise easily. Similarly in respect of
14 Witness AD, I am not going to say much about it, but from what we see now,
15 it would have been perfectly possible, in my view, to at least indicate
16 already to the Defence by mid-March that presumably there would be a
17 request to put him on the list as well. As you know, this Chamber is very
18 much concerned about proceeding as efficiently and as quickly as possible
19 and if -- the Chamber is very grateful to the Defence that they show this
20 flexibility at this very moment. Let's not spend too much time on it,
21 unless there is a specific issue you would like to raise, Mr. Ierace.
22 MR. IERACE: There is, Mr. President, thank you very much. This
23 issue has touched upon a procedure used by the Prosecution, and I think it
24 appropriate and helpful if I might say a few words about that procedure
25 because it may be that there are some misunderstandings at the moment.
1 Firstly, my learned colleague has said that she has not yet
2 received a formal translation. The fact of the matter is she received a
3 draft translation yesterday and information sheets are only provided with
4 a draft translation, not with a formal translation, because of the
5 time that it takes to get a formal translation.
6 Secondly, in relation to this particular supplemental information
7 sheet, the first two paragraphs are within -- withdraw that -- repeat
8 information which is in the statement already, with the exception,
9 essentially, of six words which appear in the last four lines. So that
10 passage is not new material, with the exception of six words.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It's difficult for the Chamber to assess that
12 because we only have the summary of the statements and not any further
13 information. Okay.
14 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I doubt that my learned colleague
15 would dispute that. The rest of the supplemental information sheet
16 content relates to issues which emerged for the first time to the
17 knowledge of the Prosecution as well as to the knowledge of the Defence in
18 the evidence of --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Henneberry.
20 MR. IERACE: -- Mr. Henneberry. If I can emphasise that, the
21 Prosecution had no forewarning that he would say what he did in relation
22 to his conversations with Major Indjic and in relation to the briefings
23 that he attended given by Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler and Mole. That being
24 the case, clearly, it was relevant -- that led to relevant questions which
25 you would expect us, Mr. President, to ask of Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler
1 and Mole.
2 That being the case, as a question of fairness, that should have
3 been done in a proper form before the witness entered the box so that the
4 Defence knew in advance, as much in advance as was possible in the
5 circumstances, what his answers would be. So, Mr. President, in terms of
6 procedure, it is my respectful submission that, contrary to the way it has
7 been put to you by the Defence, this is in fact a proper procedure.
8 As to the format of the supplemental information sheet itself, I
9 made some enquiries before this trial commenced as to what procedure, if
10 any, was followed by the Prosecution in earlier trials when information
11 came to its attention immediately prior to the witness giving evidence or
12 if there was relevant information available as a result of conversations
13 with witnesses which wasn't in the form of a formal statement. Those
14 enquiries revealed that, on occasions, that information was provided to
15 the Defence, out of fairness. When it was provided, it was often done
16 very informally. On occasions, the Prosecutor simply orally communicating
17 it to the Defence perhaps minutes before the witness was called. I opted
18 for this procedure that it be put in writing, that the Defence have the
19 benefit of the name of the person who whom the information was conveyed,
20 the date it was conveyed, and it be provided to the Defence in written
21 form at the earliest opportunity.
22 Therefore, the only issue really which arises here which in any
23 way distinguishes it from the procedure which is applied with every
24 witness in this trial, unbeknown to you, Mr. President, is the lateness of
25 the information being provided, and I have explained why that is. If we
1 had known months ago what Mr. Henneberry would have said, then, of course,
2 those enquiries would have been made of Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler and Mole
3 earlier than a matter of hours before Mr. Cutler was due to enter the
4 witness box. Indeed, I was present during the proofing of
5 Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler on the afternoon of Wednesday and Thursday, and
6 I can assure you that it has been provided as soon as it could be
8 Mr. President, coming now to Witness AD, would it be appropriate
9 to go into closed session for a few moments.
10 JUDGE ORIE: If we have to discuss it. If you say we can do it at
11 a later stage -- it was just a small remark on the timing, but if you
12 think that it is necessary to address the matter at this very moment.
13 MR. IERACE: It is not necessary at this very moment,
14 Mr. President.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we could just establish -- well, perhaps the
16 Chamber was most worried about, of course, the time the Defence had to
17 prepare, and as I did indicate before, we have some understanding for the
18 situation. On the other hand, we also have understanding for the Defence
19 that needs time to prepare for cross-examination. We are not in a
20 position to fully assess what is new, what is not new. But perhaps we
21 established that the problem has been solved. You did not hear from the
22 Chamber any criticism as to providing additional information sheets. That
23 is not understood as to be improper procedure. You didn't hear me say
24 anything like that.
25 So perhaps we, if -- unless there is something that really needs
1 either a decision or further consideration at this moment, I would just
2 like to show that the Chamber is very glad that we could solve the
3 problem, that it might be due to the flexibility of the Defence and with
4 full understanding of the problems the Prosecution had.
5 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I come now for the proposed timetable
6 for today. As I understand it, you have in mind that we do not call
7 Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler until Monday.
8 JUDGE ORIE: No. We were asked yesterday whether the
9 examination-in-chief could take place today and then the Defence would
10 still have time until next Monday to prepare for the cross-examination.
11 That would mean that we start with Mr. Cutler, that if there is time
12 left, that we will deal with available witnesses, and then start
13 cross-examining Mr. Cutler by Monday.
14 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, just one remaining issue. I
15 understand the course we will take today. In relation to Witness AD,
16 there has been a document filed by the Defence. Do you wish a written
17 response from the Prosecution or an oral response?
18 JUDGE ORIE: We will consider that and let you know.
19 Ms. Pilipovic.
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would just like to
21 inform the Chamber that the Defence was not handed the translation of the
22 supplementary information following the interview with Mr. Cutler. I
23 would ask the Prosecution to hand it over to me.
24 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, it was sent by fax yesterday. It may
25 have gone to -- I wonder whether in fact it has gone to the fax number
1 for Mr. Piletta-Zanin. It was sent at 6.00 p.m. -- excuse me, Mr.
3 [Prosecution counsel confer]
4 MR. IERACE: It was sent to a number in The Hague which has been
5 provided to us by the Defence, but in any event, I appreciate my friend
6 doesn't have it and we will provide a copy during the first break.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you will provide it to her, and apart from that,
8 you will check your fax and phone numbers. This technical communication
9 will not cause us any problems in the future.
10 MR. IERACE: Might I be excused, Mr. President? Mr. Mundis will
11 take Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 MR. IERACE: Thank you.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, just for the understanding for the
15 Chamber, the information I just mentioned about your willingness to
16 cross-examine the witness on Monday and your willingness to agree to start
17 the examination-in-chief by today, that is correct?
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I informed the
19 Chamber and I proposed that we would be able to hear the
20 examination-in-chief of Mr. Cutler and then the Defence would start with
21 the cross-examination on Monday, but, of course, it will be good for me to
22 get a hold of this translation. I did not get it by fax. There would be
23 no reason for me to say otherwise.
24 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I have a copy here, together with our
25 fax report, that it was sent to a particular number and the result was
1 that it was sent. But I have a copy for my friend.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you tried to send it and Ms. Pilipovic did not
3 receive it.
4 Mr. Usher, could you please pass the copy of the Prosecution to
5 Ms. Pilipovic.
6 Would you have two copies so that General Galic could also have
8 MR. IERACE: At this stage, Mr. President, I only have the one.
9 But I will provide a second copy at the break.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.
11 So the order for today has been fixed.
12 Mr. Mundis, would you please call your next witness, Mr. Cutler,
13 as far as I understand.
14 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, in light of the fact that my learned
15 colleague has just been handed the draft translation, if she needs a
16 brief recess, we are certainly happy to allow that to happen before I
17 call Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, if you would need more time at this
19 very moment?
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that perhaps
21 if we have a break at half past 10.00, I would be able to inform
22 General Galic about the information.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if that would be sufficient to you.
24 Then, Mr. Mundis, please call your witness.
25 MR. MUNDIS: Prosecution calls James Cutler.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, could you please escort Mr. Cutler into
2 the courtroom.
3 [The witness entered the courtroom]
4 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
5 WITNESS: JAMES PHILIPE CUTLER
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Cutler, I presume?
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is right.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Cutler, before giving testimony in this court,
9 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn
10 declaration that you will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
11 the truth. The text of the declaration will be handed out to you now by
12 the usher. May I invite you to make that declaration.
13 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
14 whole truth and nothing but the truth.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Cutler. Please be seated.
16 Mr. Cutler, counsel for the Prosecution is the first to examine
18 Examined by Mr. Mundis:
19 Q. For the record, can you please state your full name?
20 A. Yes. I am Mr. but ex -- retired Lieutenant-Colonel James Philipe
22 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler, can you tell us what military you are
23 retired from?
24 A. Yes, I am retired from the New Zealand Army and I was an officer
25 in the Royal New Zealand Regiment for 32 years.
1 Q. During the course of your military career, were you posted at any
2 time to the city of Sarajevo?
3 A. Yes, I arrived from New Zealand on the 29th of November and was
4 posted -- I flew into Sarajevo as a senior military observer on the 21st
5 of December, 1992, and officially took over from Lieutenant-Colonel
6 Richard Mole on the day after Christmas, [Realtime transcript read in
7 error " "] the 26th of December, 1992.
8 Q. As senior military observer, can you please describe for the Trial
9 Chamber what your duties and responsibilities consisted of?
10 A. The tasks of the UNMOs under my command, which numbered about 60,
11 was to monitor the airport agreement, to monitor the heavy weapons
12 concentration sites, to monitor prisoner of war and body exchanges.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic.
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise. In the
15 transcript, there is no date, the 26th of December, when Mr. Cutler
16 started his duty. I believe that is important.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it is my recollection that the witness testified
18 that he took over from Mr. Mole on the 26th of December, and we only see
19 the 21st of December as the date of your arrival in Sarajevo. So that has
20 been corrected for the transcript now.
21 Please proceed, Mr. Mundis.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have covered the -- to monitor the airport
23 agreement, to monitor the heavy weapons concentration sites on both sides,
24 to monitor prisoner of war and body exchanges, to monitor the incoming and
25 outgoing fire on both sides, and from the main mandate, to provide our
1 best humanitarian efforts anywhere we could and to generally report the
2 situation as it was reported by UNMOs so that those reports would go
3 through to high headquarters. Those were the major tasks.
4 I added a final task of trying to spread the word on both sides as
5 to what all the UN agencies in Sarajevo were trying to achieve. That
6 would be about the major tasks.
7 MR. MUNDIS:
8 Q. When did your assignment in Sarajevo come to a conclusion?
9 A. I packed by bags and had a farewell party on the night of the 14th
10 of March, 1993, and flew out on the 15th of March.
11 Q. 1993?
12 A. 1993.
13 Q. You have testified that you had approximately 60 UNMOs under your
14 command. Can you tell the Trial Chamber how those forces were
16 A. I had a small headquarters at the PTT building in Sarajevo. It
17 varied between 8 and 10 people. There was myself, a DSMO who, during my
18 time, I had two captains from Canada: James de Rosenroll, followed later
19 - and he was with me most of the time - Major Kent Carswell. I had a
20 utilities UNMO, and at my time there, a very brave lad, name of Flight
21 Lieutenant Jim Finlayson. He was in charge of utilities missions. I had
22 other UNMOs involved with utilities missions. There was one in particular
23 I remember. I had double heading of UNMOs in that headquarters, transport
24 logistics looking after generators ration --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness slow down, please?
1 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please slow down. Everything has to be
2 translated both in Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian and in French. So the
3 interpreters need some time to follow your words.
4 Please proceed.
5 To my surprise, I get the French translation on
6 the English channel at this very moment - perfectly translated, I admit -
7 but perhaps for those who are dependent on the English text, the
8 translation was just what I said.
9 Mr. Mundis.
10 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Q. Colonel Cutler, you mentioned a DSMO. Can you tell us exactly
12 what that acronym stands for?
13 A. Yes. That is the deputy senior military observer. So that if I
14 was absent, away on leave or not in the headquarters, he would deputise as
15 the SMO.
16 So I had my small headquarters within the PTT, that was co-located
17 with Sector Sarajevo, who was commanded -- which was commanded at that
18 time by Colonel Razek, and later a very fine French gentleman by the name
19 of Colonel Valentin. So that was my headquarters.
20 On the Papa side, on the Presidency side within Sarajevo, I had
21 three major observation posts and one Papa headquarters. The Papa
22 headquarters, which consisted of about three or four UNMOs, was located
23 adjacent to the Presidency in the centre of town.
24 I had three major observation posts going from west, around from
25 east to west, Papa 6, which is on the south-eastern flank of Sarajevo;
1 Papa 4 was on the central north of Sarajevo; and Papa 5, to me the most
2 strategically important observation post, was north-west, overlooking the
3 whole basin of the airport, Otes, Stup, Rajlovac, and those sorts of
4 areas. And we could see that particular OP directly from -- from the PTT.
5 I just had to go out on my landing and could see it over the hill.
6 On the Bosnian Serb side, the number of OPs varied, but when I got
7 there, I think it was 7 or 8. We had a -- what we called the Lima
8 headquarters which was co-located with the 1st Corps Sarajevo Corps. That
9 was a small headquarters of about three or four UNMOs. Whilst I was
10 there, a New Zealander had just left, Commander Gwyn Rees, as the
11 subsector commander. Commandant Michael Beary took over from him. I then
12 appointed a Captain Pat Henneberry to take over from him, and under their
13 control were these seven OPs on the Bosnian Serb side.
14 They basically surrounded Sarajevo from Lima 7 on the extreme
15 eastern flank coming around both sides. I don't think I need to go into
16 the detail of their exact locations.
17 Q. Colonel Cutler, you referred to the 1st Corps Sarajevo Corps.
18 Which military corps was that a component of?
19 A. I understood it to be the Bosnian Serb army.
20 Q. You also mentioned that the Lima headquarters was co-located with
21 the 1st Corps Sarajevo Corps. Where was that physically located, the
22 Lima headquarters?
23 A. It was located on the western end, on the ground floor of that
24 building, going the entrance way to the left and down the corridor, and
25 they were on the extreme left. They had a fairly cramped, what I will
1 call their main operations room, and through the -- to the end of the
2 building was their sleeping accommodation. I think there was one other
3 room they used there as well.
4 Q. This building was located in the Lukavica barracks compound?
5 A. Yes, it was.
6 Q. Can you describe for the Trial Chamber the reporting mechanisms
7 that were in place during the period you were in Sarajevo?
8 A. Purely on the UNMO, the United Nations military observer, the
9 reporting was on a daily basis, every day, of what had occurred in the
10 previous 24 hours. That reporting followed a fairly set sequence and
11 ended with the number of incoming and outgoing rounds for any particular
12 day. The report would normally start with the general situation, whether
13 it was a low intense day, a tense day, or a day of high activity. It
14 would then detail the main areas where shelling had occurred and any other
15 activity or front line activity was reported as best the UNMOs
16 could. I say, "as best they could" because to do the job really
17 efficiently, we would have needed another 200 UNMOs to really cover the
19 But they reported the best they could. These reports also
20 included a lot of administrative matters as part of that daily sit-rep.
21 These sit-reps would be compiled at the subsector headquarters on the Lima
22 site and the Papa side and then forwarded by 8.00 every night to my
23 headquarters in Sarajevo. I would then, and my staff, would analyse those
24 and compile the daily sit-rep for UNMOs Sarajevo and they would then be
25 sent off to the sector, copies to the Chief Military Observer in Kiseljak,
1 who was responsible for UNMOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the exception of
2 Sarajevo because my reporting line was direct to the Chief Military
3 Observer located in Zagreb. Copies of our sit-reps went to all of these
4 people. Of course, the Sector Sarajevo and the Colonel Razek and Colonel
5 Valentin would also produce their sit-reps. They would quite often take
6 the activity of the day out of our main sitrep and include it in theirs.
7 So there was quite often double reporting going up the chain of command.
8 Q. Were there also monthly compilations of the sit-reps that you
10 A. Yes. At the end of -- the week after the end after each month, a
11 monthly, full monthly report would be compiled and that would have been
12 compiled from the main activities that had occurred from all sit-reps. In
13 other words, it would be a paraphrasing of the sit-reps for that month.
14 Q. Did you also prepare any type of written reports for the
15 New Zealand government?
16 A. Yes. My directive appointing me as the senior New Zealand
17 National Officer, specified that I was to send a report in the form of a
18 situation report back to New Zealand, two of them within the first week
19 and from there on as I saw fit. But I interpreted that as a -- tried to
20 get one at least one a week. I had nine New Zealand UNMOs under my
21 national command that was spread all over Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
22 some in Sarajevo. I had that responsibility to make sure that their
23 -- of their welfare and I was required to report back to New Zealand.
24 Those reports would consist of listing of all air UNMOs, where they were,
25 how they were, if they were still smiling or if they weren't happy.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Administrative matters took up quite a bit of time, and also how I
2 perceived the situation within Bosnia-Herzegovina and, in particular,
3 Sarajevo where I was posted.
4 Q. In the context of these reports to New Zealand, when you say, "our
5 UNMOs," you are referring to New Zealand UNMOs --
6 A. Yes, I am, yes.
7 Q. -- posted in the region.
8 During the course of your tenure in Sarajevo, did you on any
9 occasion have the opportunity to meet with any Bosnian Serb military
11 A. Yes, I did. From the day I arrived in Sarajevo, I was immediately
12 sent out to go and meet the UNMOs in the various sites. I visited the
13 Bosnian Serb side from first going into Lukavica headquarters; I think it
14 was the 22nd. I was over there for two days. I only recall meeting one
15 or two Serb commanders. At that time, I went around all or most of the
16 OPs on the Lima side. I met various commanders on that first trip, the
17 same on -- then I came back into the PTT and did the Papa side. It was a
18 pretty quick introduction but I must say a very valuable introduction.
19 There had been certain things occurring which I was disturbed
20 about and it was obvious that and Richard Mole's -- Colonel Richard Mole's
21 handover to me, I realised I had to go and meet the corps commander on the
22 Bosnian Serb side, and hopefully his staff, to introduce myself and to
23 start talking about the things that were of major concern in Sarajevo.
24 So I wrote a letter to General Galic, whom I understood had just
25 been promoted to general, basically saying, "I am the new SMO, very glad
1 to be here, look forward to a good working relationship with you," and
2 asked him if I could come over and visit, and that was about another two
3 days' time.
4 As a result of that, I got approval to do that, went across to the
5 Lukavica headquarters. For some reason, there had been a delay, the
6 meeting was turned off, but I did meet General Galic as he was going out
7 of his headquarters with a group of other officers. We shook hands, and
8 that was it.
9 Q. Do you recall the approximate date that you met General Galic as
10 he was exiting his headquarters building?
11 A. It was probably either very late December or early, very early
13 Q. December 1992, January 1993?
14 A. Yes, correct.
15 Q. Did you have the opportunity in early January 1993 to meet with
16 any other senior members of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
17 A. Yes. As a result of the letter, I got a meeting, but it was not
18 with the corps commander, but it was, as I understood at the time, the
19 Chief of Staff, which I was delighted with, Colonel Marcetic. I have
20 difficulty in pronouncing that word but it was "Marcetic." We had a
21 meeting on the floor above the ground floor, which was the first floor, in
22 a room -- quite a large room with a large conference table in it. Present
23 were myself, the interpreter at that headquarters, I think it was Captain
24 Pat Henneberry. There was also Colonel Marcetic, and there one or two
25 other Serb officers there, and I do not recall their names.
1 Q. Again, you've mentioned that this was in a room above the ground
2 floor. Would this be in the Lukavica barracks headquarters building?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. Do you recall if Colonel Marcetic, in addition to being the chief
5 of staff, do you recall if he was introduced to you in any other terms or
6 with any other title?
7 A. No, but I had -- later on, I received a letter signed by him in
8 relation to suspected artillery and mortar positions on Mount Igman and
9 he signed himself off as the deputy corps commander. He may have been
10 promoted or I don't know but he was -- we had him first of all as
11 Chief of Staff. Later on, he was obviously the deputy commander because
12 that is what he signed himself as.
13 Q. Did you subsequently have additional meetings with Colonel
15 A. Yes, I recall that first meeting at which I discussed the problems
16 confronting us at the time, and I had several other formal meetings with
17 him. And there were one or two also informal meetings if I happened to be
18 in the headquarters and he would be there, and it would be almost fleeting
19 but I would get a few words in.
20 Q. Do you recall during your tenure in Sarajevo approximately how
21 many times you met with Colonel Marcetic?
22 A. It would be in the order of 6, 7 or 8 times.
23 Q. Do you recall whether you had any meetings or introductions to
24 anyone who was introduced to you as the Bosnian Serb army liaison officer?
25 A. Yes. I think that occurred on my initial visit. It was pointed
1 out to me that the office directly across the corridor, it was a 6 foot
2 wide corridor, that is where the Serb LO was. I understood his name to be
3 "Jakavic" because that is what I have written in my diaries. His name
4 could have been "Indjic" but I regarded Indjic as being the Serb LO in the
5 PTT. I may have got those two names mixed up, Jakavic and Indjic. I met
6 him on several occasions. I didn't speak to him a lot.
7 Q. Let me attempt to clarify. Based on your previous answer, is it
8 correct that there were Bosnian Serb army liaison officers in both the PTT
9 building and the Lukavica barracks?
10 A. Yes, there was.
11 Q. And in one of those locations was a person by the name of Indjic?
12 A. Yes, I understood him to be in the PTT.
13 Q. And there was another Serb liaison officer at Lukavica barracks?
14 A. Correct. And I understood him to be Jakavic.
15 Q. A person --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please make a pause between
17 the questions and answers.
18 MR. MUNDIS:
19 Q. The person whom you believed to be Jakavic, do you recall
20 approximately how many meetings you had with him?
21 A. He was the liaison officer with the corps headquarters, the
22 Bosnian Serb Corps headquarters, with my UNMOs. I had a great deal to do
23 with him, obviously. I -- really, my conversations with him would not
24 have been lengthy. They would really just have been: "Hello, how are
25 you," et cetera. I didn't have any detailed meetings with him.
1 Q. The person whom you have described as Indjic, approximately how
2 many meetings did you have with him?
3 A. I didn't have many meetings with him at all, but I saw him on many
4 many, occasions, particularly when shelling was occurring within
5 Sarajevo, which was suspected to be coming from the Bosnian Serb side.
6 Either I or one of my UNMOs would be downstairs. We were on the fourth
7 floor of the PTT. We would be downstairs very quickly and saying, "Can
8 you see if you can get Lukavica to stop this firing?" There was one
9 particular occasion which relates to Papa 5 in which Papa 5 was being, I
10 believe, deliberately shelled - in fact, on more than one occasion - that
11 I raced down myself and forgot to open the door handle, and it was a glass
12 door and I went right through the door. That is how angry I was at that
13 particular time. But I saw him on many occasions.
14 Q. We will deal with specific instances where you met with these
15 individuals in a few moments. Let me ask you if you were aware of the
16 ranks of these two individuals, these two liaison officers, if you recall?
17 A. I seem to recall that Indjic in the PTT was a Major. That was my
18 perception. I seem to recall that Jakavic may have been a major when I
19 arrived, but may have been promoted whilst I was there. That was the
20 impression I got. I have no proof of that, but that was my perception.
21 Q. Let me return to your arrival and your handover from
22 Lieutenant-Colonel Mole. Can you briefly describe for us the general
23 situation as reported to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Mole at the time you
24 assumed command?
25 A. Just prior to me arriving in Sarajevo, there was what Colonel Mole
1 described the battle of Otes, which was on the western flank of Sarajevo
2 city. There had been intense battle, preceded by heavy artillery
3 concentrations, tank fire, anti-aircraft fire, and very intense front line
4 infantry attacks. The front lines in that particular area were very
5 close. Colonel Mole told me that I had arrived at a good time because
6 they were licking their wounds and removing bodies from the battle site.
7 And a total evidence would indicate there was many casualties on both
8 sides, and once again, anecdotal evidence would indicate it was a time
9 when the Bosnian Serb Army, the Sarajevo Corps, realised that there was
10 some very strong resistance, and I think there was a lot of loss of life
11 on the front lines on both sides.
12 That was the general situation militarily, but also there were
13 other concerns like shelling of Kosevo hospital, what was described as
14 indiscriminate shelling throughout the city, which was continuing to keep
15 the population or the morale of the population at a low ebb. That was
16 generally the situation in relation to UNMOs. It disturbed me greatly
17 that it would appear that both sides had great delight on sniping of UNMO
18 vehicles, on UNMO OPs, and also there had been the odd close shelling to
19 UNMO OPs within Sarajevo.
20 That, as I recall it, was the situation when I arrived.
21 Q. Within the first week to 10 days that you were in Sarajevo, you
22 have testified that you got out to the various Papa and Lima OPs. Did you
23 gather first-hand information from your UNMOs on both sides of the
24 confrontation line as to the situation upon your arrival?
25 A. Yes, I did. And I have to admit that the information I received
1 from various sites in some cases was conflicting. There was certainly no
2 peace in Sarajevo, that there was a war in Sarajevo or that a -- Sarajevo
3 was under siege, there is no question about that in my mind. The
4 population was not free to come and go as they pleased. Winter was
5 approaching. UNHCR were having difficulties getting the quantities of
6 food. UNHCR, I presume is a common term, were having difficulty getting
7 the quantities of food in. There had been no water or electricity for
8 quite some time.
9 And things in the city were quite grim. The -- as to the UNMOs
10 and the OPs, as a professional officer, not at all satisfied with some of
11 the construction of the OPs. Sandbagged roofs were about to collapse. In
12 Papa 4, the ceiling was about to collapse. There were too many sandbags
13 on top of. So I had all these internal matters to consider as well, and
14 make arrangements for -- through Colonel Razek with engineers from the
15 Egyptian Battalion to start assisting to make life a bit more safe for the
16 UNMOs in their OPs, particularly within Sarajevo.
17 Q. Colonel Cutler, you mentioned that things in the city were quite
18 grim. Do you recall sending a sit-rep back to the New Zealand authorities
19 on 2 January, 1993?
20 A. I sent a sit-rep back about that time. If it was 2 January, I
21 will accept that, yes.
22 Q. Do you recall in that sit-rep providing information about life in
23 Sarajevo for the civilian population?
24 A. Yes, I recall that well. It -- for a person from New Zealand to
25 see what I saw in Sarajevo was not very nice. And the total evidence from
1 talking to UNHCR people was that this was their second winter, they were
2 approaching their second winter. They were concerned about the state of
3 the hospitals, lack of medical supplies, firing on those hospitals.
4 Doctors had been killed, patients had been killed.
5 I was struck by watching very proud people walking through the
6 streets. Normally, the children would run between containers that were
7 put up to stop the sniping from the southern side of the main river that
8 runs through Sarajevo. Most people would run between those barriers.
9 The -- I was struck by the -- how well dressed the young ladies were and
10 how proud they seemed to be, going about their, as well as they could,
11 their daily business. Children were very well dressed and playing in the
12 streets. But there were others that you would wonder why -- a 6 foot gap
13 between containers, more elderly people would walk between them with their
14 heads held high and not worry about being shot at. We couldn't quite
15 understand that. I interpreted a lot of these things as being defiance
16 and "I don't care if I get killed." I heard stories of little old ladies
17 living on their own on the corner of the street who, when they were
18 delivered food, basically said, "I don't want any food. I don't know if I
19 will make it through this winter."
20 It was -- it was a sad situation.
21 Q. Do you recall again in early January 1993 reporting back to the
22 New Zealand authorities the following: "As soon as the command 1st
23 Sarajevo Corps Serb side is back in his office, I have the task of trying
24 to convince him that the shelling of hospitals and grave sites is really
25 not on"?
1 A. I remember that extremely well.
2 Q. What were you referring to when you made this report back to
4 A. I was referring to many reports that I had received about shelling
5 in and around Kosevo hospital and also reports that funerals that were
6 being conducted had been fired on, the Kosevo hospital and the funeral
7 site graveyard not being that far apart.
8 Q. During your tenure in Sarajevo, do you recall approximately how
9 many reports you received about shelling at Kosevo hospital?
10 A. I received several formal written reports and, in particular, a
11 witness report of shelling on the hospital, early January, about the 11th
12 of January, I think it was, and further reports towards the end of
13 January, 29th and 30th of January, which were most disturbing. They were
14 formal reports I received, but there were also other reports during the
15 month of January that we got that there was shelling of the hospital.
16 Q. During the time you were in Sarajevo, did you cause any
17 investigations to be carried out with respect to shelling of Kosevo
19 A. I didn't cause any investigations to be carried out because that
20 was really the job of the subsector Papa UNMO, Lieutenant-Colonel Carl
21 Harding and his team. There was an investigation that he kicked off,
22 initiated, after the shelling on the 29th and 30th of January. It was
23 conducted by a Major Vislov and a Captain Baker, and I think those reports
24 are available.
25 MR. MUNDIS: I ask that the witness be shown the document
1 marked P745.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis, it is on your list that we are dealing
3 with, mainly Rule 70 documents, so could you please keep that in mind. So
4 we will not put them on the ELMO and I don't know whether any of the
5 information from these documents needs protection as well, then you
6 indicate it, and then we will turn into private session.
7 MR. MUNDIS: I will do so, Mr. President. I am intending, just
8 for the benefit of the Chamber and the Defence, to simply have the witness
9 identify the documents and they will be then subsequently tendered.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 MR. MUNDIS:
12 Q. Colonel Cutler, I see you have before you P745. Without
13 describing the contents of this document, can you verify that this
14 document refers to the investigation you just referred to?
15 A. That is correct. Yes, that is right.
16 Q. This document consists of a cover page that you created and
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. And two subsequent statements of individuals who investigated the
20 shells of Kosevo hospital in late January 1993?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. MUNDIS: That document can be retrieved from the witness.
24 Q. Colonel Cutler, during the course of your tenure in Sarajevo, do
25 you -- or did you receive any information that the army of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina was using the hospital grounds to launch mortars?
2 A. Yes, there had been a lot of rumours floating around that, in
3 fact, mortars were being used or various United Nations installations, the
4 locations of the Egyptian and Ukrainian battalion, and in particular, the
5 Kosevo hospital had been used to screen firing of mortars by the
6 Presidency forces.
7 On the -- I was obviously delighted that on the second week in
8 January, I think it was on the 12th of January, a colonel sergeant from
9 the British Cheshire regiment, who had been in charge of mortars, asked to
10 see me. He had been asking who he could give a statement to. I welcomed
11 him into my office and I took a statement from him that involved him
12 witnessing the fire of a mortar, an 82-millimetre mortar, from adjacent to
13 the Kosevo hospital. I think it was early afternoon. The Colonel
14 sergeant had been escorting a convoy of fuel to that hospital. He and his
15 crew observed this mortar firing five rounds from the hospital, adjacent
16 to the hospital grounds, as part of the hospital grounds.
17 The mortar then stopped firing. The colonel sergeant questioned
18 one of the hospital administrators as to, "Does this happen very often?"
19 And the administrator said, "I am not military. There is nothing I can do
20 about this." On leaving the hospital grounds, which would have been in
21 the order of 30 minutes later, the hospital came under mortar, artillery,
22 and anti-aircraft fire.
23 Q. Colonel Cutler, you testified at page 25, line 24, that you were
24 obviously delighted about this development. Can you elaborate or explain
25 why you were delighted that this report came across your desk?
1 A. As I think I wrote in my covering letter to General Morillon, we
2 had been -- suspected that mortars were using hospitals and UN
3 installations from which to fire their weapons. I had been told in
4 previous meetings by Colonel Marcetic that they suspected that mortars
5 were firing from the hospital location, and this was the first real
6 eyewitness proof that we had that indeed that was the case.
7 Q. Based on your experience in Sarajevo in late December and early
8 January 1993, late December 1992, early January 1993, were you able to
9 draw any generalisations about the patterns of incidents where the city
10 of Sarajevo received incoming artillery or mortar fire?
11 A. The pattern to me was there were two distinct patterns. There
12 was obvious front line firing. This is both sides firing on the front
13 lines, I assume into the trenches. Pure military activity to either on
14 the Presidency side to gain ground at the mortars preceded by or --
15 infantry probes preceded by mortars and artillery, and the same on the
16 Bosnian Serb side.
17 Then there was shelling. That was the pure military side, as I
18 call it. Then there is the other side which I would call "harassing fire"
19 into the city, and it was no particular place. It seemed to be all over
20 the city. From a professional point of view, I could understand that
21 there would be various targets throughout Sarajevo, not necessarily
22 military. But to me there were two distinct phases: Front line activity
23 and harassing indiscriminate within Sarajevo.
24 Q. With respect to the second component, this indiscriminate and
25 harassing firing within Sarajevo, as you have described it, did that seem
1 to follow any certain type of pattern that you were able to discern?
2 A. I always listened carefully to what Colonel Marcetic had to say.
3 And also at later meetings that I attended with General Morillon, with
4 General Mladic, General Gvero, that the Bosnian Serbs would only fire in
5 retaliation to outgoing Bosnian fire. This indeed, as a generalisation,
6 seemed to be the case. In the February-March period, that was -- seemed
7 to be particularly evident to the stage where we would get up in the
8 morning, 6.00, no activity whatsoever and then we would hear a couple
9 of "pop pops" which were obviously outgoing mortar fire from the Bosnian,
10 and within a short few minutes later, there would be incoming fire, and
11 normally the incoming fire would be more than two rounds. If two rounds
12 were fired out, it would be something in the order of 10 to 15 rounds
13 would be incoming.
14 Q. Let me interrupt you briefly to clarify something. On page 27,
15 line 25, you said, "Obviously outgoing mortar fire from the Serbs and
16 within a short few minutes later there would be incoming fire."
17 A. I apologise. From the Bosnian Presidency forces.
18 Q. So you would hear outgoing fire from the Presidency side, the
19 Bosnian side, followed by incoming?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. Can you continue, please.
22 A. Yes. There was a very interesting situation developed which I
23 hadn't realised, that there was no outgoing fire for several days. The
24 pattern was in troughs and peaks of the shelling. And several days we
25 would have no firing. When I say, "no firing" I would mean low activity.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 There would also be some form of front line activity, small arms, the
2 occasional mortar going off, but we regarded that as very low level
3 activity. But some days, the UNMO's OPs would not report any outgoing,
4 and in the PTT we would not hear any outgoing and yet we would hear
5 explosions going off in the distance.
6 Once again, Colonel Marcetic alerted me to the fact that incoming
7 fire onto the Serbian side, particularly Ilidza, was coming from Mount
8 Igman. Indeed, towards the end of my tour after I had many or had a lot
9 of meetings with Colonel Marcetic, and after one particular meeting which
10 we will probably go on to later, he was good enough to ring me up, to
11 contact me via his liaison officer through my UNMO headquarters in
12 Lukavica, to tell me or to warn me to "Tell the Bosnians to stop firing on
13 Ilidza or we will hit Sarajevo." By that I meant, I interpreted, because
14 there was no outgoing fire from the Presidency side, that Ilidza was
15 being hit and indeed we could hear that. And it was, according to the
16 Serb headquarters, was coming from Mount Igman.
17 There was not a great deal we could do about it except to tell the
18 Bosnian allies to, "Tell your people to stop firing." That didn't occur,
19 and as a result Sarajevo was shelled.
20 Q. You have testified about the shelling incidents coming in peaks
21 and troughs. Were you also aware of sniper activity in the month of
22 January 1993?
23 A. That was best described as an occupational hazard. There was
24 sniping; it was continuous and frequent, nearly every day. Some days
25 would be much more intense than others. I don't think there was an UNMO
1 vehicle, any vehicle for that matter, convoys, that was not fired upon.
2 It was a daily occurrence.
3 Q. Based on your experience in Sarajevo, did the sniping activity
4 similarly follow peaks and troughs?
5 A. Yes, it did.
6 Q. Let me draw your attention to the middle of January 1993. Do you
7 recall any information or reports coming to you with respect to the
8 Serbian New Year?
9 A. Yes, I do. I made a what could be regarded as a throw away or
10 frivolous comment in a situation report that we expected fireworks.
11 Q. Why was that the case?
12 A. Because we knew that the Serbian New Year was about to be
13 celebrated. I had been educated in the different dates from what I am
14 used to, 25 December and 1 January, there is a 7 January, 12, 13 January.
15 And I had been at the Serbian Christmas dinner in Pale and I knew a week
16 later that it was going to be their New Year. And so I wrote that comment
17 in that sit-rep and, sure enough, we got fireworks display which consisted
18 mainly of anti-aircraft fire from where I was standing, from my left,
19 which was south in the vicinity of over the back of a feature called
20 Mojmilo and around to Lukavica, firing over into what is known as the
21 feature Zuc. And it was tracer, red tracer, which they -- the tracer
22 bullets would send red lights as they travelled through the air. And
23 there was generally a, what one could term a "yippie."
24 Q. A "yippie"?
25 A. A "yippie," a shoot-up.
1 Q. Do you know or did you witness any type of increase in shelling or
2 mortar activity during the Serbian New Year 1993?
3 A. Yes, there was an increase, but it was relatively short-lived.
4 There was anecdotal evidence, which I have absolutely no proof for, that
5 perhaps some of the Serb gunners had had too much to drink and may have
6 just gone outside and decided to celebrate.
7 Q. During the time that you were touring, for lack of a better word,
8 the Lima side, at any time during your tenure, did you have the
9 opportunity to visit any Bosnian Serb army artillery or mortar positions
10 around the city of Sarajevo?
11 A. Yes. I visited mostly heavy weapons concentration sites just to
12 get a feel for what was going on. I didn't stay there long. The sites I
13 recall were on the -- up through Pale. I think it was Lima 7 that had an
14 absolute glorious view of Sarajevo, and there was a lot of fire power on
15 that side. I stood on top of where the Lima 7 UNMOs would do most of
16 their observation from, and looking down to my left, there were batteries
17 scattered around the slightly lower ground.
18 I went to a place on -- around the opposite side where the weapons
19 were described to me as a mortar family, started off as a very large
20 mortar, coming right down to a 60-millimetre mortar, that were all lined
21 up. They called it "the mortar family" for obvious reasons. And I
22 visited a gun line not far from the Lukavica headquarters, that would have
23 been further to the south, where the commander on my request asked me if I
24 would like to go and have a look at the guns. And I did so. There was
25 only one or two Serb gunners walking around at that stage.
1 Q. Can you describe for the Trial Chamber the gun site that you
2 visited in terms of its fortifications?
3 A. I did not -- by "fortifications," do you mean pits?
4 Q. Pits, or if the guns were dug in or sandbagged or anything of that
6 A. No, there was very little protection in that location.
7 Q. Do you recall seeing similar protection in other locations?
8 A. From a distance, and we are talking about a thousand metres, and
9 looking through on the eastern side, there seemed to be some digging
10 around the guns and perhaps forward on the slopes where those guns were,
11 but, no, I did not observe much digging in front line position.
12 Q. Based on your military experience, did it seem to you that the
13 guns from the way they were positioned were in relatively stable positions
14 or were the guns, based on their position, would they have been
15 easily and readily moved to other locations?
16 A. Well, to my knowledge and from reporting, there was very little
17 movement of guns. To my mind, they were all stationary.
18 Q. What would be the military advantage of having stationary guns in
19 the context of a situation like Sarajevo?
20 A. In a siege situation, you have guns in one location, you would be
21 able to register as many targets as you liked. You would be able to have
22 extreme accuracy of firing of those weapons. You would be able to respond
23 very quickly to firing on any target that had been pre-registered and, of
24 course, they had been there for a long time and therefore, targets, many
25 targets, could have been pre-registered with a great deal of accuracy.
1 That would have been the advantage of having static locations.
2 Q. Based on the reports that you received from the various Papa
3 observation posts within the city, can you make generalisations about
4 incoming artillery and mortar fire as it related to the civilian
6 A. I would have -- the fire, to me, that was not front line fire but
7 that that was falling within the city, appeared to me to be intentionally
8 targeted. These are the reports that I got, that they were intentionally
9 targeted. And I would have thought that every crossroad, every likely
10 place of people gathering, like bread lines or water lines, general
11 gathering places, hundreds of targets of that nature would have been
13 To give you an example of accuracy, between the Presidency and
14 what used to be, I think, the transport building, was a very narrow
15 street. With a great degree of accuracy, mortar rounds -- it was just
16 outside my Papa headquarters. With a great degree of accuracy, rounds
17 could be dropped in there quite easily. And that is, to me, exceptionally
18 good firing.
19 Q. Colonel Cutler, were you present at any of the Serb artillery or
20 mortar sites when those weapons were fired?
21 A. No, no weapons were ever fired when I was on the sites.
22 Q. Did you have any discussions with any of the Bosnian Serb army
23 crews manning those guns or mortar positions?
24 A. Through the interpreter at the Lukavica headquarters, the United
25 Nations interpreter, I spoke -- I asked if I could speak to one of the
1 gunners, one of the two gunners that was there. And basically I asked him
2 one question: "How good a gunner are you?" His response was: "We could
3 hit a cigarette packet in the middle of Sarajevo."
4 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I note the time. I am about to go
5 into a rather large area and I am wondering perhaps if I could seek to
6 take the break at this moment.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, perhaps this is a good idea. We will adjourn
8 until 5 minutes t 11.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.
11 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it that a copy has been --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 JUDGE ORIE: I thought my microphone was on. May I take it that
14 a copy of the provisional translation has been provided and another copy
15 to the Defence?
16 MR. MUNDIS: Yes, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed, Mr. Mundis
18 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Q. Colonel Cutler, you alluded to earlier this morning to the
20 shelling of Papa 5?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Did that OP come under fire, mortar or artillery fire, on more
23 than one occasion?
24 A. Yes, it did. There were many occasions when that OP came under
25 mortar, artillery, and tank fire.
1 Q. Do you recall if the attacks on Papa 5 commenced after your
2 arrival in Sarajevo or was that an item that Lieutenant-Colonel Mole had
3 handed over to you as part of his outgoing brief?
4 A. I don't think it was specific but I knew on Colonel Mole that
5 there had been problems with all OPs and, in particular, Papa 5.
6 Q. Did there come a time when, as part of your duties, you raised the
7 issue of Papa 5 and the attacks on that OP with anyone from the Bosnian
8 Serb army?
9 A. Yes. I had cause to evacuate Papa 5. I think in the last week of
10 January, I wrote to General Galic, whom I understood to be the commander
11 of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, at the shelling of that OP, but it wasn't
12 until the 13th and 14th of February, 1993, that I got particularly
13 concerned that I may have to close that OP down because of the shelling
14 it was receiving. And I regarded that that shelling was not
15 indiscriminate, that it was deliberate targeted fire onto United Nations
16 observation posts.
17 Q. What led you to that conclusion?
18 A. Artillery fire, the way it fell on the ground, and from my
19 military experience, it was not harassing fire or indiscriminate fire. It
20 was fired by more than one gun and the rounds from landing on the ground
21 in an impact area, that such would indicate that it was a target.
22 Q. You mentioned that in the last week of January you wrote to
23 General Galic. Do you recall how that letter left your office? What
24 would have been the procedure?
25 A. I always, if I was writing formal letters, I wanted to make sure
1 that it got to the people whom it was intended to receive it. Copies of
2 that letter would -- were interpreted into the Serbian language, and
3 copies of the English and interpreted letter would have gone to, or did go
4 to, the Serbian LO in the PTT. There was a daily APC run into Lukavica
5 headquarters and my UNMOs were in almost every day. The UNMOs would have
6 taken the letter back. So I had three different channels of making sure
7 that formal letters got to where they intended.
8 Normally, I would follow up the day or a couple of days after by
9 visiting that headquarters to ensure that the person whom the letter was
10 written to had indeed received it. And I did that on every letter that
11 I sent.
12 Q. Let me ask you first in reference to the letter that you sent the
13 end of January 1993. Do you recall having any follow-up discussions with
14 respect to that letter and, if so, to whom you spoke?
15 A. I spoke to Colonel Marcetic at Lukavica.
16 Q. Do you recall approximately what day or date you had that
17 discussion with him?
18 A. It would be in early February 1993.
19 Q. Do you recall what, if anything, Colonel Marcetic told you with
20 respect to the letter that you sent the end of January?
21 A. Yes. I recall his response, as was his response to many of the
22 incidents, was basically hands in the air and saying: "This is war."
23 I acknowledged that there was a war but that United Nations
24 installations -- to target United Nation installations was against Geneva
25 Conventions and against the laws of war, and anything else that I would
1 throw. He indicated, I think at that first meeting, that they suspected
2 there was either a mortar -- a Bosnian Presidency side mortar OP or mortar
3 position in the area of Papa 5.
4 Q. Based on what Colonel Marcetic told you, did you conduct any type
5 of investigation to determine if, in fact, there was ABiH mortar locations
6 near Papa 5?
7 A. Yes, I conducted that investigations with Papa 5, and they had no
8 knowledge of a mortar line or a mortar OP in that area. I then took the
9 investigation further and spoke to the commander of the 1 Bosnian Corps in
10 Sarajevo, Gospodin Hajrulahovic, about that particular problem. I said to
11 him that Papa 5 was receiving a lot of fire from time to time, that it was
12 suspected that they may have had mortars or a mortar OP in that area, and
13 if so, that would be using Papa 5 as a stream to do so and would he please
14 investigate it. His response was, he would talk to his unit
16 Q. Do you recall if Papa 5 ever reported outgoing mortar fire from
17 their general vicinity?
18 A. As I took a great deal of interest in Papa 5, I would have
19 recalled that, but I do not recall it.
20 Q. You also mentioned that in mid-February you followed up on your
21 letter of the end of January. Do you recall the approximate dates that
22 you conducted this follow-up?
23 A. Well, the follow-up was a result of very heavy shelling on the
24 13th of February. Approximately 60 rounds of 122-millimetre artillery
25 landed in close proximity to Papa 5. Some shells landed within 2 to 3
1 metres of the building. I had received earlier a number of armour-plated
2 International GMCs. Unfortunately, two of those were parked in the area
3 and they received considerable shrapnel damage. If I recall rightly, one
4 could not be moved. Tires were burst, shrapnel on the body of the
5 vehicle, and to our surprise, shrapnel had gone through a thin panel on
6 the back which was not armour plated and lodged in the back seat -- or the
7 front seat, had gone right through the back and lodged in the front seat
8 of the vehicle. So there was some considerable damage. Fortunately,
9 there were no UNMO casualties on the 13th of February.
10 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask, with the assistance of the usher, that
11 the witness be shown P798. This document, Mr. President, is not covered
12 by Rule 70.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MR. MUNDIS:
15 Q. Colonel Cutler, I'd ask you to take a look at P798 which has now
16 been placed before you. Is this, in fact, the letter that you sent to
17 General Galic on 13 February, 1993?
18 A. That is the letter, sir.
19 Q. I draw your attention to the first two sentences of this letter,
20 and I would ask you if that refreshes your memory with respect to previous
21 complaints that you had made with respect to shelling of Papa 5.
22 A. That is correct, sir.
23 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
24 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask that the witness be now shown P797.1,
25 again a document which is not covered by Rule 70.
1 THE REGISTRAR: I have P797.
2 MR. MUNDIS: That, I believe, is the B/C/S version of the letter.
3 Q. Colonel Cutler, I draw your attention to P797.1. Is this the
4 letter that you sent on 14 February, 1993, reiterating your complaints and
5 concerns about shelling of Papa 5?
6 A. Yes, it is. And particularly evident on page 2 is the capital
7 letters. It doesn't have the UNPROFOR symbol on it. And would have gone
8 out with an UNPROFOR symbol on top of it.
9 Q. Let me ask you about the second page of the document, the sentence
10 that is in all capital letters. What were you referring to with respect
11 to that sentence?
12 A. I was watching the -- I observed the shelling of Papa 5 on that
13 particular day. I had basically had enough. I was quite angry. I had
14 been given assurances by Colonel Marcetic on more than one occasion that
15 he knew the detailed locations of our -- of Papa 5 in particular and,
16 indeed, all our OPs. And it just got a little bit too much to gain that
17 they were shelling it.
18 Q. Do you recall if Colonel Marcetic -- excuse me, Colonel Marcetic
19 ever intimated to you that you would receive a response to these three
20 letters concerning Papa 5?
21 A. Most certainly. And I followed that up on several occasions when
22 I visited. He told me that the matter would be investigated, that the
23 corps commander considered it serious and that we, he used the word "we,"
24 would investigate.
25 Q. Do you know to whom he was referring to when he said the corps
2 A. I would have assumed General Galic, whom the letter was addressed
4 Q. Did Colonel Marcetic specifically tell you that you would receive
5 the results of this investigation?
6 A. Yes. I had, first of all, asked on a previous letter, but by the
7 time I wrote this one on the 14th, I was demanding an immediate
8 investigation and a response by midday on the 15th of February, 1993.
9 Q. Did you, in fact, receive a response from General Galic concerning
10 the incidents at Papa 5?
11 A. The only responses I ever got was: "It is still being
12 investigated." Other than that, I have never, ever received a formal
13 reply, written reply.
14 Q. Other than the complaints that you lodged with respect to Papa 5,
15 did you on any other occasion lodge any type of complaint or protest with
16 Colonel Marcetic?
17 A. Written complaints, there may have been one or two. I cannot
18 recall if I signed the document complaining about the theft of UNMO flack
19 jackets and jerry cans from what we called Lima X-ray, another location on
20 the Serb side. But I certainly verbally followed up with Colonel Marcetic
21 about that incident. Later on, I heard from my subsector commander in
22 the Lukavica headquarters that in fact Colonel Marcetic had told them that
23 they believed they had found the soldiers responsible for having held
24 UNMOs at gunpoint whilst they took these flack jackets and two jerry cans
25 of fuel. I was reasonably happy. And I think the flack jackets were
1 returned, and we obviously didn't worry too much about the fuel.
2 Q. I would like to draw your attention to any complaints or protests
3 that you made or may have made to Colonel Marcetic with respect to
4 shelling or sniping of the civilian population.
5 A. Every time I did get to speak to Colonel Marcetic, I raised
6 several issues every time. The sniping of UNMO was obviously my great
7 concern, that I wouldn't get any UNMOs wounded or killed, the firing on
8 Kosevo hospital, the shelling, what appeared to be harassing shelling, of
9 Sarajevo that killed civilians. I even got to the stage where I had
10 some rapport with Colonel Marcetic, I felt that as professional military
11 officers. I actually told him that I did not mind in particular if he was
12 shelling the front line positions but I could not accept under any
13 circumstances the shelling into the city that killed civilians and
14 shelling hospitals. Those were the major, major things I complained
15 about every time I saw him.
16 Q. What was Colonel Marcetic's response when you told him this?
17 A. His initial response was always hands up like this and telling
18 me: "This is war." The interpreter would also say that perhaps Colonel
19 Marcetic thought that I didn't understand what was going on. And that is
20 about the sum total of that, except for a meeting later in my piece where,
21 if you wanted me to talk about, I could, he went a little bit further.
22 Q. Can you please describe that for the benefit of the Trial Chamber.
23 A. That was a meeting I had with Colonel Marcetic that I didn't
24 expect to have. I happened to be in the Lima headquarters with my UNMOs,
25 and the liaison officer at the headquarters said that Colonel Marcetic
1 wanted to see me and that he would come down to the UNMO headquarters,
2 which is perhaps a little bit unusual that he didn't ask me to go to his
4 For some reason, I was in a mood where I would not sit down and
5 listen to any excuses. Something had upset me. And I launched into
6 Colonel Marcetic about everything that I have covered with him in the
7 previous two months. I recall the meeting very well. He came into the
8 little UNMO room. As I told you before, it was a rather cramped room.
9 There were about three UNMOs, myself, and Colonel Marcetic in the room.
10 We offered him a cup of coffee, which he accepted, coffee or tea, and I
11 launched into him about all the incidents and again reiterated that I
12 considered him a war criminal because of the shelling and killing of
13 civilians in Sarajevo.
14 I covered all the other incidents about deliberate shelling of our
15 observation posts, firing on hospitals, the cheating and lying that I had
16 received since I had been there. And I have to say that was on both
17 sides. And it was only then that I ever saw him perhaps have some remorse
18 because he -- he said through the interpreter who had interpreted -- the
19 interpreter had told me that he fully understood what I was talking about,
20 and his words were to the effect: "I am sorry all this is going on. This
21 is war." He put his head in his hands, and that basically concluded the
22 meeting. I interpreted from that that there was no denial that all these
23 things were occurring.
24 Q. Can you describe for the benefit of the Trial Chamber any instance
25 when you lodged a complaint or protest with Major Indjic, what his
1 response was?
2 A. I had quite a lot to do with Major Indjic. Are you talking about
3 the Major Indjic at the PTT?
4 Q. I am talking about the person that you have described to the
5 change as Major Indjic.
6 A. Okay, Major Indjic was the Serb LO at the PTT. I had many
7 dealings with him in general about "tell Lukavica to shop shelling,"
8 about one incident in particular whilst the shelling on the 14th of
9 February 1993 of the Papa 5 headquarters. It was under what I would call
10 intense shelling. I was observing it. I went into the OPs room and Lima
11 7 on the eastern flank of Sarajevo that had that good overview of
12 batteries on the eastern flank, basically come up with a perfect fire
13 mission. They were describing a fire mission. If I recall rightly, there
14 was no firing going on in Sarajevo at that particular time.
15 Lima 7 reported a battery on the eastern side firing. They even
16 went to the point of saying on their radio: "Shot over," which meant in
17 military terms that they had gone ahead and fired, and they reported
18 several shots. My -- at the same time, Papa 6 OP, which was almost in
19 direct line of sight of any rounds coming from that battery towards Papa
20 5, warned us out that there were rounds going past the front of their
21 position. It became evident that those rounds were landing in and around
22 or around Papa 5.
23 This all occurred in a very short space of time. We even got to
24 the point of "shot over" Lima -- from Lima 7. Papa 6 would say, "We can
25 hear it." And we saw the splashes, which is the term for explosions, at
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the far end. We even had a time of flight. One officer actually timed
2 the shells. I can't exactly recall but it was somewhere in the vicinity
3 of 15 to 17 seconds. There was no doubt in my mind that the battery that
4 was firing on the eastern flank of Sarajevo was targeting Papa 5.
5 As I said, this all occurred in a very short space of time. I
6 raced down four flights of stairs to Major Indjic's office. This is the
7 incident where I forgot to turn the door handle, kicked the door and all
8 the glass fell out. They -- Major Indjic was rather surprised that I was
9 there in that mood, and I demanded in no uncertain terms to stop shelling
10 Papa 5 and that I wanted an immediate ceasefire.
11 He immediately got on a telephone and told me that he had spoken
12 to his headquarters, that they would cease firing, and we had 30 minutes
13 to evacuate the OP. I was arranging at that stage - this was all
14 concurrent - the French APC supporting the UNMOs, to get standby to go and
15 evacuate that OP. They were actually on the move fairly quickly. The
16 firing ceased. We evacuated the OP. Just as they were leaving the OP,
17 the OP once again come under fire. And I remember it like as if it was
19 Q. Do you recall any specific incidents where you raised complaints
20 or protests with Major Indjic about shelling or sniping of civilians?
21 A. No. I don't have a recall of me personally doing that. But I
22 know that Major Keith Carswell and the DSMO before me did so, had liaison
23 with Major Indjic.
24 Q. Let me turn your attention to the liaison officer at Lukavica
25 barracks. Do you recall whether you had any discussions with him
1 concerning targeting of civilians by either artillery mortar or sniping
3 A. I personally didn't have a lot to do with him. A similar
4 situation is perhaps that General Galic had with me in that I preferred to
5 deal with somebody of more senior rank. However, there was one incident
6 that I remember quite well. It must have been prior to 21, 26th February,
7 because I was at that stage on leave. Captain Pat Henneberry was the
8 subunit commander there. So I would guess it was about -- about the time
9 that Papa 5 was shelled, so mid-February 1993. I had previously put
10 Captain Pat Henneberry in charge of the Lima UNMOs after Commandant Beary
11 had left. It was my choice. I considered Captain Pat Henneberry to have
12 an extremely professional approach to the task of the UNMOs and I was very
13 happy with his performance.
14 I tried to get to know the UNMOs, to see how they were reacting to
15 the situation. It was not easy. And on this particular afternoon, I was
16 sitting in the UNMO headquarters, and he seemed to be very upset about
17 something. Whether I asked him if he was upset, I don't recall, but he
18 did tell me that the Serb liaison officer -- why he was pretty upset was
19 that the Serb liaison officer had told him that the shelling into Sarajevo
20 and the killing of civilians was deliberate.
21 I interpreted that to mean that it was an intentional part of the
22 corps plan of the siege of Sarajevo.
23 Q. Did this statement by Captain Henneberry surprise you at all?
24 A. It surprised me from the point of view that here was a young
25 captain trying to do his job and he felt so sad knowing that children and
1 civilians -- innocent civilians were being killed. It surprised me that
2 he wasn't aware of it, that he may have assumed that that was the case.
3 But here he had direct proof, if you like. It may not have been the
4 truth, of course, but he was very upset about it. To me, it was very
5 evident that that had been going on. It wasn't earth-shattering news to
6 me at all because I had come to the conclusion that harassing
7 morale-lowering fire was a fait accompli in that situation.
8 Q. Colonel Cutler, were you aware of any rumours to the effect that
9 forces of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were shelling the civilian
10 population of Sarajevo?
11 A. Yes. There were quite strong rumours that that was the case, that
12 they were either rogue forces or somebody who was sniping within Sarajevo,
13 that is, Bosnians sniping on Bosnians, and that Bosnians had shelled
14 themselves, if you like, within the city. It was quite strong rumours
15 floating around to that effect. There was never, to my knowledge, any
16 proof of that.
17 Q. Did you -- did you, through the UNMO reporting chain, ever have
18 any evidence that that was the case, for example, a Papa position
19 reporting outgoing mortar fire followed a few seconds later by another
20 Papa position reporting incoming mortar fire?
21 A. No. I cannot recall -- I cannot recall anything of that nature.
22 Q. During your tenure, you have no evidence that came to your
23 attention that the Bosnians were targeting other Bosnians?
24 A. The only evidence, not first-hand and not through my chain, it was
25 reported through the sector, was that several mortar rounds that landed
1 next to a French OP on the entry to the Sarajevo airport. By crater
2 analysis, it was concluded that the rounds could only have come from a
3 Bosnian position. I am not an expert on crater analysis, but I understand
4 the work that they do, and they were reasonably happy that it had come
5 from Bosnian fire. The only other two incidents that I recall, and I do
6 not know if it was proven as a result of investigations, was the day or
7 the days that Vance and Dole visited Sarajevo and the day when Boutros
8 Boutros-Ghali visited Sarajevo when I was there. It just so happened that
9 as their convey was approaching the area of the Presidency, mortar rounds
10 landed on the road in front of them, as I understand it, not a lot, but
11 mortar rounds landed. It was strongly suspected that those rounds came
12 from Bosnian forces and not Serbian forces.
13 Q. And you understand that an investigation was in fact carried out
14 concerning the incidents involving Vance, Dole and Boutros Boutros-Ghali?
15 A. Yes, I do, but I do not know the results of this.
16 Q. Other that those three incidents, that is, the French forces at
17 the airport, the Vance Dole convoy and the Butros Butros-Ghali convoy, are
18 you aware of any other investigations that were conducted by any
19 organisation concerning attacks by Bosnian forces on Bosnian civilians?
20 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel slow down, please.
21 THE WITNESS: I am aware that other incidents were investigated,
22 sniping and shelling, that may have been suspected to have come from
23 Bosnian forces. But I do not recall the exact details, nor do I recall
24 the outcomes of those investigations. There were many, many reports that
25 went to General Morillon from a whole range of people, including UNHCR
1 that were out in the community, but I am not aware of any conclusive
2 results in relation to Bosnians shelling Bosnians other than the ones I
3 have told you about.
4 MR. MUNDIS:
5 Q. Based on your experience and the reporting up the chain of
6 command to you from the various UNMOs, what conclusions did you draw about
7 the source or sources of the artillery and mortar fire that were incoming
8 to the city of Sarajevo?
9 A. Into the city itself as opposed to front lines?
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. I had previously, this morning, have told you that I have no doubt
12 whatsoever, given my knowledge of the use of artillery and mortars, that
13 there is no way that it was other than harassing deliberate
14 morale-lowering fire intentionally targeted into the city of Sarajevo and
15 not on to the front lines.
16 Q. What was the source of that fire?
17 A. On many occasions, Sarajevo was quiet. There was no outgoing
18 fire. I could only assume that the noise was made by firing from Bosnian
19 Serb gun positions. And on many days, UNMOs would report firing as
20 outgoing from a particular location and rounds would be falling into the
21 city. Whilst one can -- may never be exactly sure that the rounds that
22 were outgoing were the ones falling in the city, having watched this go on
23 for some time, my conclusion was quite clear as to who was -- that the
24 Bosnian Serb were firing into the city.
25 Q. Colonel Cutler, were you aware of incidents where individuals
1 attempting to cross the airport were the victim of sniping attacks?
2 A. The French Foreign Legion based at the airport were responsible
3 for the airport area, its security, and all incidents around there.
4 Therefore, reporting up to me was not -- I was not directly involved in
5 that particular area. However, from sector commander conferences, the
6 French CO every morning would give a report of crossings, attempted
7 crossings, of the Sarajevo airport during the previous night. I was quite
8 amazed at the number of people who would be going in either directions
9 across that airport, and I think it was very, very difficult task that the
10 French Foreign Legion had at the airport.
11 Q. Based on these briefings, did you receive any information
12 concerning casualties of individuals attempting to cross the airport?
13 A. Yes. Normally at that morning briefing, the commanding officer
14 would report the number of people attempting to cross the airfield and
15 the number of casualties that had been received that night, that is
16 casualties being fired upon from other than UN forces. I don't think that
17 the French fired a shot. Now, who caused the casualties, I do not know.
18 Q. Do you have any recollection concerning, first of all, the
19 numbers of people cross the airport?
20 A. I recall from sit-reps that I would write at nighttime from the
21 morning conference information I received figures like 200. 300 would
22 be -- 300 would be a fairly heavy night. And numbers like 90, 101, I
23 think I recall in one incident. So it was between 80 and up to 300. It
24 seemed to get more and more as my time there went on.
25 Q. Do you recall the number of people that were reported as either
1 wounded or killed as an attempt to cross the airport?
2 A. Some nights, surprisingly, there were none. Other nights, I think
3 it was in the very small -- I recall the figure 2, 5. I don't recall -- I
4 do not recall any more than 5. It may well have been but they were very
5 small figures, mainly from -- in fact only, if I recall rightly, from
6 sniper fire or from small-arms fire.
7 Q. Do you recall an incident in which you reported in a situation
8 report: "sniping against a bus full of civilians, Polish civilians."
9 A. Yes. That was a report given to me in which the UNMO involved I
10 think was another New Zealander, Major Howard Duffy. A bus load of Polish
11 civilians was moving between Sarajevo proper and the airport, going down
12 to the airport road. That bus load of civilians was fired upon. It would
13 have been approximately adjacent to the suburb and the pocket called
14 Nedzarici. If I understand correctly, there were several killed, Polish
15 civilians killed in that incident, and several wounded. The UNMOs were
16 travelling or had caught up to the busses that had stopped on the side of
17 the road when they were fired upon. They were being escorted by French
18 APCs. It was described to me as a bit of a shambles. The UNMOs, if I
19 recall correctly, always carried shell dressings, moved forward on the
20 right-hand side down a little dip and started to administer first aid to
21 two of the victims. At the same time, the reports said that the French
22 APC had called back to the OPs room in Sarajevo at the PTT for ambulances,
23 and I think the UNMOs did the same.
24 Q. Colonel Cutler, you have testified about the theft of flack
25 jackets and jerry cans. Were you also aware of incidents in which
1 Motorola radios owned by the United Nations were stolen or pilfered?
2 A. Yes. During my time there, I think I would have recalled at least
3 4, 5 occasions on the Serb side and I think about three occasions on the
4 Presidency side, that Motorolas had been stolen or taken at gunpoint and
5 that we had no doubt whatsoever that our communications were being
6 monitored by both sides.
7 Q. Do you ever recall instances in which non-UN personnel were using
8 the UN frequencies on the Motorola radios?
9 A. Yes. The Serbo-Croat language was used on the Motorolas, not that
10 frequently, but we certainly heard that language going across the
11 Motorolas. Indeed, I recall it was common practice on leaving Sarajevo for
12 the call sign leaving - my call sign happened to be uniform 9 - that they
13 would just ring up and say: "Everybody, this is uniform," whatever - in
14 my case, uniform 9 - "leaving Sarajevo for the last time." And I recall
15 when I was going to the airport that I was farewelled by several UNMOs
16 receiving my call and also the Serb-Croat language was heard, and I assume
17 it was a farewell.
18 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask that the witness be shown Prosecution
19 Exhibit P809 under seal.
20 Q. Colonel Cutler, I would ask you to take a look at P809. On the
21 face of this document, was it created by the UNPROFOR Lima headquarters at
22 Lukavica barracks?
23 A. Yes, the Lima headquarters.
24 Q. And based on the date indicated on the face of this document, was
25 that during the time when you were the senior military observer?
1 A. Yes, 15th of February, 1993.
2 Q. I would like you to look at the group of the first six names on
3 this document listed under commanders, Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Can you tell us which of those six named individuals you
6 encountered during the time you were in Sarajevo? And "encountered," I
7 mean met briefly or met with or knew or were aware of.
8 A. Well, certainly General Galic, and certainly the man that I did
9 most work with, Colonel Marcetic, second named. The other four names do
10 not ring any bells, although I notice there is a person they call Colonel
11 Zarkovic, whom I would have thought that he was the group -- it looks like
12 it says, "In charge of the group for cooperation of UNPROFOR." I would
13 have put a "J" instead of the "Z." But whether or not that is the same
14 person, I do not recall. I understood his name -- I understood that
15 person's name to be Jakavic with a "J" and not Zarkovic. I do not recall
16 any of those other names.
17 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
18 MR. MUNDIS: That document can be retrieved from the witness.
19 Q. Colonel Cutler, do you recall attending a Serbian Christmas
20 function in Pale during the time you were in Bosnia?
21 A. Yes. I found the fact that I was attending a bit rather unusual.
22 General Morillon had passed a message to the sector commander
23 Colonel Razek that he had been invited to attend the Serbian Christmas
24 dinner the 7th of January in Pale. The General Morillon did not think it
25 appropriate to go, but that the senior military observer, having the
1 umbrella of neutrality, he saw no problem in me attending and I was
2 basically told to attend. I took the opportunity to visit Mokro barracks
3 to the north-east of Sarajevo during that visit. We left early. I took
4 an interpreter from the Serbian Corps headquarters. Her name was
5 Jadranka. Jadranka. And I think my driver escort for the day was another
6 New Zealander, Captain Petar Flint. We visited the UNMOs at Lima 7 and I
7 think it was about midday-ish that we went to a location that was like a
8 community hall in Pale where there was a Christmas dinner. And I attended
10 Q. Do you recall if there were any senior military officers from the
11 Sarajevo Romanija Corps present at that dinner?
12 A. I do not recall anybody from the Sarajevo Romanija Corps but there
13 were some rather senior officers there.
14 Q. To your knowledge, who was the most senior military officer
15 present at that dinner?
16 A. General Mladic. There was General Gvero, and there was the
17 President of Bosnia, Bosnian Serb Republic, Dr. Karadzic, and there was
18 also Dr. Lukic, whom I understood to be the prime minister.
19 Q. During the course of that dinner, did you have the opportunity to
20 have any discussions with General Mladic?
21 A. It was not a particularly long dinner, and I appreciated that.
22 There was not a lot of alcohol there either, which I appreciated. The
23 initial discussions through interpretation with General Mladic were that
24 he reminded me that New Zealand troops had been through Yugoslavia many
25 years ago. He invited me to establish, or he would have no difficulty
1 with me to establish an UNMO presence at his Pale headquarters, which
2 later on was, in fact, established.
3 He indicated that he had no intentions of pulling his guns away
4 from surrounding Sarajevo. He indicated that the only way for peace was
5 to form a buffer between the city and the surrounding countryside, which
6 would have taken brigades and brigades of United Nations military
7 personnel. Those were the initial conversations, although I didn't speak
8 to him that long. He set me back on my heels a little bit when I --
9 towards the end of the dinner, I asked him through interpretation: "Where
10 is all this going to end?" And his response was - it shocked me a little
11 bit - that Muslims were not real people, that as long as he remained the
12 commander of the Bosnian Serb army, he would kill all Muslims or push them
13 into the sea, and I did not have a response to that.
14 Q. Similarly, did you subsequently have a discussion with President
15 Izetbegovic concerning his views as to how the conflict could come to an
17 A. Not with President Izetbegovic. I only met him a couple of times
18 very briefly. No, I discussed it with the supreme commander of the
19 Bosnian army, whose name was Sefer Halilovic.
20 Q. What did General Halilovic tell you in response to the question:
21 "How would the war end?"
22 A. I am not too sure he was a general. Certainly, he was introduced
23 to me as "Gospodin." I think it was accepted that he was a general. He
24 spoke about the history of Muslims in particular in and around Sarajevo
25 and that he considered they had a right to be there ever since the Ottoman
1 Empire, and that he would fight with every man, woman and child to save
2 what was rightfully theirs.
3 Q. Thank you, Colonel Cutler.
4 MR. MUNDIS: The Prosecution has no further questions for the
5 witness, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Mundis.
7 Colonel Cutler, for procedural reasons, the order as far as your
8 examination is concerned is that cross-examination will not start right
9 away but you will be cross-examined by counsel for the Defence next
10 Monday. I couldn't give you an exact time because it depends on the
11 developments from now until Monday morning, whether we could start right
12 away on Monday or that it would be later that day. When I say "Monday
13 morning," I have to correct myself, because we are sitting Monday in the
14 afternoon, so that would mean that, as I hope, somewhere in the afternoon
15 next Monday you will be cross-examined by the Defence.
16 I hope at least that you are still available, and that you could
17 stay in The Hague until next Monday. I was informed that you had been
18 stuck already for quite a few days here.
19 THE WITNESS: I am at the Court's pleasure in this regard. I
20 have informed my people back in New Zealand that I may have to stay on a
21 little longer. They are happy with that, and I am getting to know The
22 Hague quite well. Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So you will be excused for this moment, but we
24 expect you back next Monday, and I think if you would leave in one way or
25 the other a place where you can be reached so that we could inform you
1 whether we expect you to be cross-examined right in the beginning of the
2 afternoon session, that is at quarter past 2.00, or let's say one hour
3 later or two hours later. May I meanwhile instruct you not to speak with
4 anyone about your testimony given until now in this Court. That means
5 also not with representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Then you are excused for this very moment. And would
8 you please, Mr. Usher, escort Colonel Cutler out of the courtroom.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Mundis or Mr. Ierace, or Mr. Waespi. I
11 don't know who to address.
12 MR. IERACE: The next witness is Mr. Gardemeister, who will be
13 taken by Mr. Waespi. I might indicate that we are hopeful that we can
14 finish his testimony entirely in the time left today. Perhaps we will see
15 how long the examination-in-chief takes. I expect it will be very quick.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The usher has gone. Mr. Mundis, you are
17 standing. You are asking --
18 MR. MUNDIS: If I may be excused, Mr. President.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, on one condition, that if you meet the usher out
20 of this courtroom that you will frankly ask him to bring in Mr.
22 MR. MUNDIS: Yes.
23 MR. WAESPI: Good morning, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Waespi. On my clock it is already
25 the afternoon, but only since two minutes.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps it is a good moment to indicate that we will
2 only discuss two exhibits with this witness out of the ones we have
3 indicated to the Defence. So perhaps if these could be prepared for the
4 sake of quickness, perhaps, and those will be Exhibit -- Prosecution
5 Exhibit 1448. That is a document dated 22nd July, 1993. And the second
6 document will be Prosecution Exhibit 1579, and this is dated 26th -- 28th
7 August, 1993.
8 WITNESS: JORMA KALEVI GARDEMEISTER
9 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Gardemeister Kukkola, I presume?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: You speak English so I don't have to ask you if you
12 hear me in a language you understand. Is English your native language?
13 THE WITNESS: No, it is not. My native language is Finnish and
15 JUDGE ORIE: Finnish and Swedish. If there ever would be a
16 problem in expressing yourself in English, please indicate so because we
17 would like to prevent whatever kind of confusion in this courtroom caused
18 by language problems.
19 Mr. Gardemeister Kukkola, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
20 require you to make a solemn declaration that you will speak the truth,
21 the whole truth and nothing but the truth at the beginning of your
22 testimony. The text of the declaration is handed out to you now by the
23 usher. May I invite you to make that declaration.
24 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
25 whole truth and nothing but the truth.
1 .JUDGE ORIE: Now, the next pages are not necessary. Please be
2 seated, Mr. Gardemeister. You will first be examined by counsel for the
4 Mr. Waespi, please proceed.
5 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Your Honours. Perhaps if the usher could
6 again assist the case manager. Thank you very much.
7 Examined by Mr. Waespi:
8 Q. Good morning, Mr. Gardemeister Kukkola.
9 A. Good morning.
10 Q. Can you please, for the record, state your name?
11 A. Jorma Gardemeister, formerly Kukkola.
12 A. Where were you born?
13 A. I was born in Helsinki.
14 Q. Did you serve since 1969 in the Finnish army?
15 A. Yes, I did.
16 Q. And as part of that, or perhaps besides that, were you serving in
17 the United Nations and various -- on various occasions among others in
18 countries such as Cyprus and Lebanon?
19 A. Yes I did.
20 Q. You were posted to the former Yugoslavia as an UNMO effective from
21 11th May, 1993?
22 A. That's true.
23 Q. And between 11th June, 1993 and 19th October, 1993, were you the
24 SMO, the senior military observer, for the Sector Sarajevo?
25 A. Yes, I was.
1 Q. As part of your duties, did you meet with General Galic?
2 A. Yes I did.
3 Q. How many times would that occur?
4 A. During my four and a half months in Sarajevo, I think I met him
5 around four times, four or five times.
6 Q. Did you also meet with senior subordinates of General Galic and
7 can you tell us their names?
8 A. Well, I met Mr. -- Colonel Milosevic and Colonel Milovanovic, and
9 I also met, of course, the liaison officers in Lukavica several times, and
10 several commanders on the Serbian side of Sarajevo.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Gardemeister.
12 As a result of these meetings with General Galic and his
13 subordinates and also based on information you had from your UNMOs, did
14 you form an impression as to the degree of command and control of
15 General Galic the way he exercised it over his troops?
16 A. No, I didn't have a chance to meet General Galic for long
17 meetings. What I -- what I heard from my UNMOs, and especially the team
18 leader in Lukavica, it was rather confirmed that General Galic had a good
19 command of his Corps.
20 Q. Now, Mr. Gardemeister, I would like to raise with you one
21 particular incident and I would like you to be shown a document, and it is
22 again a document under seal, number Prosecution number 1448, dated the
23 26th of July.
24 MR. WAESPI: Now, I am wondering, Your Honours, because he will
25 talk about this document, whether it would be appropriate to go into
1 closed session.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if the content of the document will be discussed
3 and since the content of the document is protected, we could turn into
4 closed session. I am just wondering whether private session would be
5 enough as well. It is --
6 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps he would like to place it onto the ELMO --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Then of course we would have to -- if it is put on
8 the ELMO, although as far as I can see now, it is just text.
9 MR. WAESPI: It is. You can certainly read it out so we can stay
10 in private session.
11 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber always prefers to have the -- to have as
12 little as possible infringement on the principle of the public character
13 of the trial and, therefore, being no pictures there, I think that private
14 session would do. And I see, Madam Registrar, agrees that from a
15 technical point of view that this would be sufficient.
16 JUDGE ORIE: We will then turn into private session at this
18 Mr. Waespi, would you please assist me in indicating when it is
19 not necessary any more to remain any more in private session.
20 MR. WAESPI: I will certainly, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed. We are in private
23 [Private session]
12 Page 8952 – redacted – private session
12 Page 8953 – redacted – private session
12 Page 8954 – redacted – private session
5 [Open session]
6 JUDGE ORIE: I see that "PS" has disappeared so we are in open
7 session again. Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
8 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 Q. Did you have, Mr. Gardemeister, occasion to meet a number of
10 commanders of artillery units on the Bosnian Serb side apart from the
11 meeting you just described?
12 A. Yes. During my four and a half times -- four and a half months
13 stay in Sarajevo, I did visit most of the Bosnian Serb artillery
15 Q. Did you form an opinion about the professionalism of the officers
16 and the crews, the soldiers, you have seen?
17 A. Yes, I did. I was rather surprised of the good professionalism of
18 the artillery officers. We had long sessions and talked about how they
19 are manoeuvreing with their devices and artillery, mortars, and so on.
20 And the impression was very professional, they gave to me. I didn't speak
21 to all the gun soldiers or privates, but the overall impression was
23 Q. Did you also form an opinion as to the accuracy of gunfire,
24 artillery fire, perhaps mortar, based on conversations you had with
25 commanders on the site?
1 A. I can give you the one example. When I was visiting the artillery
2 position east of Sarajevo, up on the high mountain, and I talk to the
3 artillery commander and I ask him to point out the objects in Sarajevo
4 itself, and he gave me a short briefing. Then I ask him that, "What about
5 UNMO stations? Are you aware where the UNMO stations are situated
6 within Sarajevo?" He pointed out immediately and said that, "You can
7 relax because I know exactly where your positions are and our aim is
8 rather accurate."
9 Q. Did he tell you further anything about the degree of accuracy he
10 and his troops were able to achieve?
11 A. Well, I was told by him that they can hit specifically with
12 artillery in a very, very small goal or aim.
13 Q. Did he indicate what type of goal or aim that could be? Did he
14 give an example for that?
15 A. Just pointing out some big houses but we didn't go into details.
16 Q. Now, Mr. Gardemeister, I would like to show you a second and,
17 indeed, the last document and this is Prosecution Exhibit 1579. It is
18 again, under seal.
19 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, if we could have the same procedure
20 again, we go into private session.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could we turn into private session.
22 [Private session]
12 Page 8957 – redacted – private session
12 Page 8958 – redacted – private session
12 Page 8959 – redacted – private session
12 Page 8960 – redacted – private session
20 [Open session]
21 JUDGE ORIE: I find confirmation that we are again in open
23 You will now be cross-examined by counsel for the Defence,
24 Mr. Gardemeister.
25 Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Cross-examined by Ms. Pilipovic:
2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Gardemeister, good day. Your mandate in
3 Sarajevo was from the 11th of June, 1993 up until the 19th of October,
4 1993; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. Is it correct that while you had your mandate in Sarajevo during
7 that period, in reaction to the events that took place at that time, 27th
8 of May, 1993, you gave a statement to the investigators for the
10 A. 27th of May I -- I was not in Sarajevo then.
11 Q. Sir, I am asking whether with regard to your stay in Sarajevo
12 during the 1999 -- 1993 period, did you give the investigators of the
13 Prosecution on the 27th and 28th of May, 1998 a -- a statement about this?
14 A. My former stay in Sarajevo, yes, I did, for the Finnish
15 authorities. And also later on, to Mr. Cleaver, who came back on the way
16 to Finland to interview me, and I gave him statement to him also regarding
17 my experiences while I was in Sarajevo if that is the question.
18 Q. Thank you. Sir, when you gave your statement you said that you
19 were present as a member of the team of observers of the UN observers and
20 that you were present at observation posts in Sarajevo. Were those
21 observation posts Lima and Papa?
22 A. Yes. I was the SMO senior military observer responsible for Lima
23 and Papa teams in my office in the famous PTT building inside Sarajevo.
24 Q. When you told us that your office was in the PTT building in
25 Sarajevo, during your stay there, did you have any information that in the
1 area of the building that you used, was the building a military target?
2 Were there mobile mortars which were -- by the PTT building and which were
3 used by members of the 1st Corps of the BH army?
4 A. Yes. I remember that, couple of cases like that, when the Bosnian
5 Corps brought mortars in the vicinity on a tractor or tractors, but I
6 don't remember the exact time.
7 Q. While you were in Sarajevo during that period, how often did
8 members of the 1st Corps of the BH army use the PTT building in this
9 manner as a place from which they would fire mortar shells?
10 A. I remember, as I told you, one or two cases like that.
11 Q. Sir, you also stated that, when you were describing your job, that
12 you took a count of combat activities and of the amassing of the army, or
13 rather that you would report on combat activities such as the amassing of
14 men; is that correct?
15 A. I didn't understand the question. I have to read it once again.
16 Our main task was to report on military actions in Sarajevo area,
17 and it consisted of counting of outgoing shells and counting of incoming
18 shells. Also, we were supporting the warring factions when it came to the
19 force to reach a ceasefire. Those were our main tasks.
20 Q. When you say that you had to support the warring parties, can you
21 tell us with regard to the period for which you had the mandate, do you
22 have any information as to whether in the area of the town of Sarajevo and
23 beyond, there was any fighting between the two parties in the conflict?
24 A. Well, when it comes to fightings between the two parties, during
25 my time, there was lot of fighting, exchange of fire going on, on
1 separate, let's say, time limits. Or sometimes we had extensive fire.
2 Sometimes the situation was a little bit more stable, with only sniper
4 Q. In your statement which you gave to the investigators, on page 4
5 of your statement, you said that you helped with the repairs of utilities;
6 is that correct?
7 A. That is correct. We had one or two military observers with a main
8 task of supporting the -- that task in Sarajevo.
9 Q. When you helped with repairing the utilities, can you tell us
10 whether during that period you had any information about how the public
11 utilities were damaged? What was the cause of the damage to the
13 A. I am not aware of the details because actually, when I took over,
14 they were about to finish with that kind of missions with UNMOs. But I
15 understand that they were concerned with repairs of electricity and other
16 utilities inside Sarajevo. And the UNMOs would accompany the technicians
17 and were also to provide the communications, and in case of problems, to
18 support the team.
19 Q. Did you have any information about when they were trying to solve
20 the problems relating to the utilities, was a mixed war commission
21 responsible for this? Did it have any authority in this area? And when
22 I say a "mixed war commission," did it consist of representatives of the
23 warring factors both from the Muslim and the Serb side?
24 A. I do not know. I was not -- I didn't have that detailed
25 information about the mission. As I told you, that works were almost
1 completed when I took over.
2 Q. Sir, for the period of June and July in the area of the Sarajevo
3 battlefield, were you aware of the fact that there was combat operation
4 which was being conducted and which was called "Lukavica 1993"?
5 A. No, that -- that code name, I was not aware of.
6 Q. Do you know whether at the time of your mandate an agreement was
7 reached according to which the Serbian forces should leave the area
8 between Igman and the Ilidza and that they should hand this area over to
9 the control of UNPROFOR forces?
10 A. Yes, I was aware of that and I was very much dealing with this
11 mission from UNMO side.
12 Q. When you say that you had much to do with that task, that you were
13 very involved in this task, do you know whether forces of the BH army --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please repeat that question?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, you were asked to repeat the question,
16 but you might not have heard it. It was on the English channel.
17 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] I didn't hear that. Yes, Your
19 Q. Could you tell us, and do you know whether, ignoring the
20 agreements of UNPROFOR with the Serbian side, was the area of Igman left
21 to the units of the BH army with UNPROFOR's agreement? Was this area
22 handed over to units of the BH army?
23 A. Well, what happened on Igman didn't really go as planned. When
24 Bosnian Serb forces were withdrawn, or withdraw according to the plan, the
25 French UNPROFOR did not immediately get deployed, but what really happened
1 was in some states that ABiH, the 1st Corps, took over instead of the
2 French unit. So there was not -- the planning was not come to practice as
3 it was planned.
4 Q. Sir, in your statement, on page 8 of your statement, and I am
5 going to quote part of it, part of your statement. It is page 8 and it is
6 the third paragraph, you said: "The military targets in the town included
7 the Presidency, the corps command post and the Igman road." On the basis
8 of what you stated there, can you explain to us how the units of the
9 1st Corps were deployed of the BH army in Sarajevo?
10 A. Generally speaking or in one particular area of Sarajevo?
11 Q. When you said -- when you spoke about the military targets, I said
12 that you said the staff command and command posts. Could you tell us
13 about the command post of the brigade? How many brigades were there in
14 fact in Sarajevo which belonged to the 1st Corps?
15 A. The 1st Corps, the Bosnian 1st Corps, comprises of ten brigades,
16 one of the brigades being an HVO brigade. That was the situation within
17 Sarajevo itself during my time.
18 Q. Sir, when you gave us a list of these military targets which I
19 have read out from your statement, could you be so kind as to mention
20 certain other elements of the combat and operative order of the units of
21 the 1st Corps of the BH army and which represent legitimate military
23 A. Well, which were legitimate targets, of course, when it comes to
24 the command posts, the HQ of 1st Corps was located in downtown Sarajevo
25 itself and the brigade command posts were in the respective AORs in
1 Sarajevo. And later on the 1st Corps had unit, of course, up on the
3 Q. During your mandate, while you had a mandate, did you visit the
4 command posts of the brigades or any other command posts which belonged
5 to the 1st Corps of the BH army?
6 A. During my stay, I did visit 1st Corps HQ around five, six times.
7 I did visit only one of the -- of the brigades HQ in Sarajevo itself.
8 Furthermore, I did visit several times the 1st Corps command post up on
9 the Igman.
10 Q. When you said that within the 1st Corps of the BH army that there
11 were 10 brigades, could you tell us whether you know how many military
12 targets there are, legitimate military targets, there were in Sarajevo,
13 what the total number was, if we consider the fact that within the
14 framework of the 1st Corps, the part of the town that was under the 1st
15 Corps, there were ten brigades?
16 A. Then it would come to a total of 11 military targets when it
17 comes to the command posts, and groups is another thing. Of course, they
18 were also military targets.
19 Q. Would you agree with me if I say that the logistics basis of the
20 firing positions of the artillery and mortars, the positions of
21 battalions, companies and platoons, observation posts of the commanders of
22 companies and of platoons and then special battalions, are these elements
23 which consist -- compose a brigade and, in your opinion, are these also
24 military targets?
25 A. Of course, but when it comes to Sarajevo, the situation was not
1 that -- that simple. I mean, the brigades were not as sites of normal
2 brigades and it was not very clear where you had military target as one
3 has normally when it comes to, let's say, a normal European unit. The
4 battalions were not as -- having as many soldiers as a normal European
5 battalion normally includes. So the thing, where were the targets is, it
6 cannot be that easily described.
7 Q. When you say this, would you agree with me that it was very
8 difficult to tell military targets from civilian facilities in a situation
9 when military targets were positioned in an urban part of town which is
10 used by civilians?
11 A. Partly yes, but it is my -- as I understand, the most of the
12 military concentration of those 10 brigades were concentrated near
13 so-called confrontation line and not in where the most of civilian people
14 lived in.
15 Q. When you say this, do you confirm that you know the position of
16 the brigades of the 1st Corps of the BH army?
17 A. Yes, we had -- we had a kind of sketch and our UNMO Papa team was
18 rather well aware where this 10 brigades had a concentration within
20 Q. Sir, you said in your statement that it was from Lima positions
21 that brigades of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps were observed; is that
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. Could you tell us from one Lima position, how many brigades were
25 you able to observe?
1 A. Normally, one Lima position, we were covering one brigade. And
2 sometimes two Lima positions were covering part of the same brigade. At
3 the main plan how we did deploy our Lima teams was also related to the
4 artillery positions of BSA.
5 Q. Could you tell us, at the time when you -- during your mandate,
6 how many Lima positions were on the Serb side?
7 A. Well, when we started, when I took over in Sarajevo, we had
8 actually situation where we had a kind of -- kind of a command of Lima in
9 Lukavica and 11 stations around Sarajevo. But when I left -- before I
10 left Sarajevo, I did flatten the Lima stations so that only, if I remember
11 right, six or seven were left, and a substation commander in
12 Lukavica was, let's say, downsized to a team leader and the teams which I
13 am referring to in Lima side were from that moment on only stations.
14 Q. Could you tell us, how many Papa positions were there at the
16 A. When I arrived in Sarajevo, we had -- we had only three Papa
17 positions within Sarajevo, inside Sarajevo, and one Papa position in
18 Hrasnica at the foot of Igman. When the situation became more tense, I
19 established one more Papa station, Papa 4, close to Zuc area.
20 Q. In a situation in one part of town, you had 10 brigades. Would
21 you assess that four observation posts were sufficient to inform about the
22 activities of the 1st Corps, i.e. of those 10 brigades?
23 A. Well, if ABiH army had artillery and more heavier weapons as it
24 did have, I would say that, no, it is not enough. It was not enough.
25 But in the case when they were mostly armed only by weapons like rifles
1 and some mortars, I would say that, since we knew where their positions
2 were and this so-called heavy arms, in my opinion, it was sufficient.
3 Q. If I put it to you that the army of BH had five tanks, that it
4 also had rocket launchers, Howitzers, would you agree with me that this is
6 A. What we did confirm was that they had two tanks, no artillery,
7 only mortars and small arms. Rocket launchers, I was not aware of.
8 Q. Sir, on page 8 of your statement, you said: "When it was just
9 shelling between the two armies, we did not really protest the shelling.
10 When the shelling was only military against military, we did not
11 really protest the shelling."
12 My question, when you said this, how did you know that this was an
13 exchange of fire in an area of the front line or -- and that it was not
14 shelling of the civilians?
15 A. Well, through our UNMO stations, I got the fax to my office, and
16 the decision or conclusion was made in most of the cases in a good
17 cooperation with UNPROFOR French units and the UNPROFOR HQ in the same
18 building were I had my office.
19 Q. When you say that you got the facts and data, could you tell us
20 in which way would you get these?
21 A. Normally, when it comes to -- came to exchange of fire, normally,
22 the first source of information and the one I most relied on was my UNMO
23 stations inside Sarajevo and outside Sarajevo. And also I got information
24 from -- from the French battalions, liaison officers from both sides,
25 Bosniak and also from the liaison officers from Lukavica.
1 Q. I apologise. When you received such information, my question was:
2 How did you get it? Was it in a written form or was it over the phone?
3 A. Normally, it was over the phone or on VHF radio.
4 Q. When you received a piece of information over the phone, did you
5 check that information that you received?
6 A. Normally, always we did check the information and that was done
7 either by our UNMO teams, I sent UNMO teams to the spot, and also what I
8 did normally, I got in touch with the French units, and so it was always a
9 kind of double-check in question, if it was possible.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, looking at the clock, keeping in mind
11 that there might be a need for re-examination of the witness and there
12 might be some questions as well from the Bench, I am taking into account
13 that you used your time similar, or even more, than examination-in-chief.
14 Could you please conclude? If there are one or two remaining questions,
15 of course, that is no problem.
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I have another couple.
17 Q. Sir, under page 8 of your statement, you said "the greatest danger
18 for the Bosnian Serb civilians was the sniping activity and that was also
19 the greatest danger for the soldiers on the front line. Chief of Staff of
20 the Vogosca brigade said that his soldiers suffered more from sniper
21 activities than from anything else."
22 Could you confirm whether this is correct?
23 A. What the Chief of Staff of Vogosca brigade told me on Zuc when I
24 was visiting the front line with him was confirmed by me because he told
25 me so.
1 Q. I apologise. Could you tell us from which positions and which
2 army was firing towards Vogosca?
3 A. Towards Vogosca it was -- it was ABiH 1st Corps firing towards
5 Q. One more question: When you spoke of an incident that you
6 investigated on the 26th of July 1993 and you said that it was established
7 that the blame lay on the Serb side, could you tell us which mortars --
8 which mortars were used by the Serb army and which were the Muslim army
9 where your observers were on the Sarajevo front?
10 A. Serbs were using 82, 120, I suppose, and also the very small one,
11 40 or 50. And artillery which was not -- which was not used --
12 Q. How about the Muslims? Which mortars were used by Muslims? Would
13 you agree with me that they were using exactly the same type of mortars as
14 used by the Serbs, that is 120 and 82 millimetres and 60?
15 A. Yes, of course, because they were ex-JNA arms. But the thing is
16 that they did not have artillery.
17 Q. You spoke here of a mortar incident. I am just interested to hear
18 from you how you could assume, considering that both sides used that same
19 type of mortars, how could you assume that the mortar was fired from the
20 Serb side?
21 A. In this particular case, the artillery craters were the precising
22 facts, but normally it was really very difficult to say when it comes to
23 mortar shelling.
24 Q. Could you tell us what is the crater trace, from which weapon --
25 from which weapon was it?
1 A. I don't remember any more that fact. 120 --
2 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic.
4 Mr. Waespi, is there any need to re-examine the witness?
5 MR. WAESPI: No, Mr. President, no further questions.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Judge El Mahdi has a question for you, Mr.
8 Questioned by the Court:
9 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Sir, I just wanted to ask you,
10 you said that, and I am quoting in English, [In English] "The
11 brigade command posts were in the respective AORs in Sarajevo." What do
12 you mean by AORs in Sarajevo?
13 A. Well, AOR means "area of responsibility." The Bosniak brigades in
14 Sarajevo was divided when it comes to AOR to then brigades of ABiH.
15 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] So, there were 10 areas of
16 responsibility, as you say, of command, as you say in Sarajevo itself, in
17 the city, and you knew the locality of these command posts?
18 A. Yes. Sarajevo was split in 10 AORs of respective brigades and our
19 UNMOs, we were aware of the command posts.
20 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] You said also that it wasn't easy
21 to distinguish a military target inside the city. Are you saying that the
22 military targets were difficult to tell apart from the civilian targets?
23 A. Well, in some cases, perhaps, yes. But as I told before, the main
24 concentrations, as far as I know, were more, let's say, related to the
25 so-called confrontation line. But, of course there were logistics bases.
1 I am not aware of the details inside Sarajevo town itself.
2 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] My last question would refer to
3 the officer who was punished, and I'm referring to the incident that you
4 spoke of during the shelling that was observed from the Lima 7 position,
5 and I believe that it was targeting the French positions. You said that,
6 after your request, the officer in charge was punished. Could you confirm
7 that he was punished or was this just an information that was transmitted
8 to you without any evidence?
9 A. First of all, we did not ask BSA to take any measures. We just
10 told them what was the conclusion of our inquiry. And the second thing is
11 we are not aware if that officer was punished. We were just told so and
12 we didn't have any chance to confirm it by ourselves.
13 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Finally, Mr. Gardemeister, I have got a few questions
15 for you as well.
16 First you have told us about the French element of UNPROFOR that
17 was near the stadium and which was attacked. Could you tell us, what
18 stadium, because the Chamber by now knows that there were more stadiums in
20 A. It was near Skanderija.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then a second question is about the calibres,
22 the calibre used during that mortar attack. Your testimony was that you
23 came to the conclusion on the basis -- well, on a series of grounds that
24 the fire came from BSA artillery positions. And you said the first one
25 was that the calibre used was not normally used by the 1st Corps. So you
1 deduced something from the calibre. At a question of counsel for the
2 Defence, you answered that apart from artillery that the same calibres
3 were used 60, 80, to 120 and you added that you did not remember, quite
4 well, what calibre was involved here.
5 But at one side you tell us that the calibres used were the same,
6 and on the other hand, you tell us that the calibres was one of the
7 elements on which you deduced that the fire must have come from BSA
8 positions. Could you further explain to me how you could deduce that in
9 view of the fact that you testified that they would use the same calibres?
10 A. The basic thing is that this French element of UNPROFOR was
11 shelled by mortar and artillery.
12 JUDGE ORIE: And artillery, yes.
13 A. And since ABiH did not use artillery in that area, and they didn't
14 have artillery, as far as we know, and also according to our logbook, and
15 the logbook, there was no outgoing ABiH artillery or mortar. So it was
16 impossible --
17 JUDGE ORIE: That was one of the other reasons you gave us. But
18 so it was not on the calibre of the mortars, but on the artillery part of
19 the attack that you made your conclusions.
20 These were my questions. This concludes, Mr. Gardemeister, your
21 testimony in this court. I would like to thank you very much for coming.
22 It is a long way for you, as well, to The Hague. Thank you very much for
23 coming and testifying and answering questions of both parties and of the
24 Bench. I wish you a good trip home again.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, could you please escort Mr. Gardemeister
2 out of the courtroom.
3 [The witness withdrew]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Madam Registrar, I think we have two documents
5 both under seal.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: To be admitted.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1579 under seal, UNPROFOR report; Exhibit
9 P1448, under seal, UNPROFOR report, 26 July 1993.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Both documents are -- I wanted to say admitted into
11 evidence but I only then saw that you were on your feet, Ms. Pilipovic.
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence objects
13 to the tendering of the Exhibit 179 considering that we do not have a seal
14 or a signature on this document regardless of the fact that the witness,
15 during the examination-in-chief, said that this was a document which was
16 done on the computer.
17 Therefore, we have no information and we contest to the origin of
18 this document and we contest its authenticity.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 THE COURT: Mr. Waespi, would you like to respond.
21 MR. WAESPI: Yes, only briefly, Your Honours. I think the witness
22 clearly identified that he knew what this document was all about. He
23 could readily explain what was written in there. He explained why this
24 form was different from the ones they used before, and I don't think there
25 is any doubt that this is an authentic document.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, the objection against admission of
2 this document is denied. The witness has identified the document as the
3 document in the form and of the content as he could testify about. So
4 the document is admitted into evidence just as the other one 1448, both
5 under seal.
6 Mr. Ierace.
7 MR. IERACE: I have an urgent matter to raise in closed session.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if it is urgent. Of course, I need the approval
9 of the interpreters and --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Of course, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much. And I have another problem can
12 you do this as quickly as possible, otherwise the Stakic case has to wait
13 for more time. So we will turn into closed session and if you could just
14 do it as brief as possible.
15 Could we turn in closed session.
16 [Closed session]
12 Page 8979 - redacted, closed session.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
7 1.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday,
8 the 27th day of May, 2002, at 2.15 p.m.