1 Thursday 30 May 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.35 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Case Number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus

7 Stanislav Galic.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

9 Welcome to everyone in the courtroom.

10 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, since you are on your feet, I take it that you

11 would like to bring something to the attention of the Chamber.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, good day. Good

13 day to everyone. Yes, very briefly. The Defence counsel has tried to

14 prepare what was necessary for the witness who will be examined in a

15 minute, but we have to emphasise the following: A lot of documents were

16 submitted to the Defence counsel and we didn't have much time and we think

17 that -- if we think that the rhythm of this procedure will be correct, we

18 hope that we might start the cross-examination when the time comes, but

19 the Defence would appreciate it if it were possible for the Defence to

20 call this witness back later, at a convenient time, once it has conferred

21 with General Galic, which we haven't been able to do yet. We haven't been

22 able to confer with General Galic, and I would like to underline that.

23 You are aware of the reasons, they are technical reasons, not something

24 over which the Defence has any power.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace.

1 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, Mr. Piletta-Zanin had courteously

2 informed me before today's session that that was his position. I am

3 grateful for that. The documents which the Prosecution proposes to tender

4 had all been disclosed -- documents which had all been disclosed by the

5 6th of February, some of them as early as April 2001. I hasten to add,

6 however, that the translations of the documents were not provided until

7 this week, some of them only yesterday. However, I anticipate that during

8 examination-in-chief the relevant portions of the documents will, in

9 almost all cases, be a sentence or a few words, even less than a sentence.

10 Occasionally, maybe two sentences. In other words, although my friend is

11 correct when he says he has a bundle of documents - I think there are

12 around 16 or thereabouts, perhaps 20 - there will not be much of a

13 document that will be relevant.

14 Mr. President, the witness has come from Canada. If it is

15 possible without prejudice to the Defence, given the lateness of the

16 provision of the translations, if it is possible without prejudice for

17 the Defence to complete its cross-examination tomorrow, then the

18 Prosecution, and I am sure the witness, will be very grateful for that,

19 rather than bringing him back at some later date. Perhaps could I

20 respectfully suggest that the Defence waits until examination-in-chief

21 is concluded because they may then be greatly assisted in their

22 assessment.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Until now, Mr. Ierace, I didn't hear anything else

24 that the Defence reserved the right. That means that they are already

25 waiting and seeing how things will develop and then we will see whether

1 they use.

2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. In fact,

3 we are ready, but only partially, very partially.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's see. The experience has shown us that

5 sometimes things are going unexpectedly smoother and sometimes they go

6 less smooth. It's I wouldn't say always, but sometimes looking back, we

7 spend a lot of time on issues that were not that much issues any more when

8 we came to the point that we had to actually deal with the matters. So,

9 therefore, I understand the position of both parties.

10 Would the Prosecution be ready to call, as I understand,

11 Mr. Thomas?

12 MR. IERACE: Yes, Mr. President, and he will be taken by

13 Mr. Mundis. Just one remaining matter in relation to Mr. Thomas.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I interrupted you. Yes.

15 MR. IERACE: And that is his exhibits are, in fact, confidential

16 exhibits. I apologise for not having specifically set out that in the

17 letter. They all do carry our ERN numbers. Excuse me, Mr. President.

18 I think, with the exception of rather six documents, they are

19 confidential exhibits.

20 Mr. President, might I be excused since Mr. Mundis is taking Mr.

21 Thomas? And if I am required back in the Trial Chamber during the course

22 of the day, of course, I will be here. Thank you.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

24 Mr. Mundis, will you keep a close eye on what are protected

25 documents and what are not protected documents? It is mainly the, I take

1 it, the relationship between the Prosecution as the receiving party of the

2 information and it is not the personal protection of the witness but it

3 is, rather, a functional protection of the witness and documents.

4 MR. MUNDIS: That is correct, Mr. President, and I would attempt

5 to, once we get to the point where we need to deal with these documents,

6 to deal with all of them, even though it might not be the most logical way

7 of doing that because we will, pursuant to the provider's request, we will

8 ask to go into closed session to discuss the documents and we would

9 respectfully, at that point, request that of the Trial Chamber. And we

10 will attempt to deal with them all at one time, even though that may not

11 seem logical.

12 JUDGE ORIE: You will also have in the back of your mind that if

13 private session would be good enough, that at least keep some of the

14 public character of this trial open.

15 MR. MUNDIS: Absolutely.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

17 Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Since

19 Mr. Ierace will be leaving, one of the series of questions that we intend

20 to ask the witness about this, and he knows a lot about this and this is

21 why I mentioned this a while ago, it had to do with the relation between

22 the warring factions and the press and perhaps it also had to do

23 with the manipulation of information or the manipulation of documents.

24 And I would very much appreciate it if we could address this today since

25 we are almost at the end of the week. It is the day before the deadline

1 that you have fixed for the Prosecution. If you could tell me before the

2 hearing of the witness what the reply of the Prosecution will be to what I

3 have called "deletion or manipulation of documents." I think this is

4 important for us to establish.

5 JUDGE ORIE: It is a request directed to you, Mr. Ierace.

6 MR. IERACE: I think on the last occasion, Mr. President,

7 Mr. Stamp dealt with this issue.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I think we either wanted to have final answer or

9 a detailed description of the efforts undertaken, and I have to look back

10 in the transcript in what detail the information was provided because we

11 got a direct answer then on what happened. I would have to look it up in

12 order to be sure whether that is the degree of detail which would be

13 proper.

14 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, would you require either myself or

15 Mr. Stamp at the beginning of the next session to be present, should there

16 be any further query in relation to that?

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE ORIE: We will discuss the matter and I have a look at the

19 transcript as well, and then we will let you know whether your presence is

20 wished by the Court or not.

21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22 JUDGE ORIE: Then Mr. Usher could you please bring Mr. -- the

23 next witness into the courtroom.

24 [The witness entered court]

25 WITNESS: FRANCIS ROY THOMAS

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Thomas, I presume.

2 THE WITNESS: Yes.

3 JUDGE ORIE: You can hear me in a language you understand?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is correct.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Before giving testimony in this court, the Rules of

6 Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration that you

7 will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The

8 text of the declaration will be handed out to you now by the usher. May

9 I invite you to make that declaration.

10 THE WITNESS: I, Francis Roy Thomas, solemnly declare that I will

11 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth

12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Thomas. Please be seated.

13 You will first be examined by counsel for the Prosecution.

14 Mr. Mundis, please proceed.

15 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

16 Examined by Mr. Mundis:

17 Q. Mr. Thomas, where are you currently employed?

18 A. I am self-employed as a peace support training operations

19 consultant, and that has taken me to Ecuador, Thailand, Switzerland,

20 Sweden, Canada, itself.

21 Q. Prior to commencing your consultant, were you a member of the

22 Canadian Armed Forces?

23 A. Yes, I was -- had 35 years of service as a tank and armoured

24 reconnaissance and I also did -- served in seven UN missions during that

25 time.

1 Q. Can you briefly describe for the Trial Chamber your educational

2 background throughout the course of your military career.

3 A. I attend the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College. I attended

4 the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. I have taken Masters in

5 War Studies at Royal Military College. I spent one year at the

6 United Kingdom tank technology course. I can elaborate further, if the

7 Court desires, on my UN tours as well.

8 Q. If you could briefly tell us which UN tours you participated in?

9 A. I participated in Cyprus as a reconnaissance commander. I was a

10 military observer both on the Golan Heights --

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I apologise. I am very sorry,

12 Mr. President, but I can see the witness has mentioned tank technology and

13 this hasn't appeared in the French transcript. I think that he is

14 speaking too rapidly.

15 JUDGE ORIE: I have not been listening to the French channel, but

16 the speed of your speech is such that the translators cannot translate all

17 the words.

18 THE WITNESS: I apologise this. As a Canadian, I should recognise

19 this.

20 JUDGE ORIE: I will not interfere in Canadian language

21 experiences, Mr. Southwell, but if you would please keep that in mind.

22 THE WITNESS: I will go back. Do you want me to repeat again my

23 education?

24 JUDGE ORIE: I think especially the -- Mr. Piletta-Zanin, since I

25 didn't follow it --

1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. The fact

2 that the translation forgot something is not that important, but we can go

3 back to the passage, to what the witness said when he spoke about his

4 academic experience. This was not completely caught by the French cabin,

5 thank you.

6 JUDGE ORIE: I will just asking the witness who is -- I would say

7 your academic education, if you would repeat from that.

8 THE WITNESS: I attended the Pakistan Army Command and Staff

9 College. I attended the Canadian Army Command and Staff College. I

10 completed a Masters in War Study at the Royal Military College. I also

11 attended a one-year tank technology course in the United Kingdom, and

12 probably for the edification of this Court, I could add at this time some

13 additional qualifications.

14 I also have a NATO background in electronic warfare. I have

15 taken a NATO course in nuclear biological chemical defence. I have

16 German and Canadian parachute qualifications, and I have a United Kingdom

17 joint operations training. To go back to -- was that -- did the

18 translators in French catch that?

19 JUDGE ORIE: I will follow the French channel and see whether...

20 THE WITNESS: I wish to make sure that I am speaking at the

21 appropriate rate because they have a difficult job.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes, please proceed.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please approach the

24 microphone.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I don't know whether you were

2 listening, but the French cabin said that questions and answers should not

3 overlap. I think this is better for everyone. Could the witness please

4 wait for the translation to be finished.

5 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...before answering

6 the question. And if Mr. Mundis would do approximately the same.

7 THE WITNESS: Sorry.

8 MR. MUNDIS:

9 Q. Mr. Thomas, could you please tell the Trial Chamber which UN tours

10 you participated in?

11 A. My first UN tour was in Cyprus, where I was a troop commandant

12 with reconnaissance. My second tours were in the Middle East with -- on

13 the Golan Heights and with South Lebanon. My next UN -- my next UN tour

14 was in Afghanistan as a military observer. And I was a military observer

15 in Macedonia, where I was a team leader in Ohrid, and then I was the

16 senior United Nations military observer, which is of interest to this

17 court, in Sector Sarajevo from October 1993 to July 1994. I will say

18 again, I was the senior United Nations military observer in Sector

19 Sarajevo from October 1993 to July 1994.

20 I concluded -- my last UN tour was as Deputy Chief of Operations

21 for the United Nations military component in Haiti, a force of 6.000. My

22 final tour in the Canadian Forces was as the chief, the first -- my final

23 UN tour in the Canadian Forces was as the first chief instructor of the

24 Canadian Forces Peace Support Training Centre. I think that probably

25 gives the Court an idea of my United Nations experience.

1 Some other aspects of my military background that might have

2 relevance to this Court setting, I should tell you, in the Canadian

3 forces, reconnaissance troops are trained and expected to be able to call

4 down artillery fire. I myself can tell you, this Court, that I have, as a

5 junior officer, called down artillery fire.

6 I have done a tour in our National Defence Headquarters as the

7 responsible Canadian officer for the rapid reaction forces, both land

8 and sea -- correction, land and air. The infantry battalion contribution

9 to the Ace Mobile Force land, and also the Air Force squadron that flew

10 F-18s to Central Europe.

11 Another item of interest to this Court, I was involved in the

12 contingency planning cell at our national headquarters, where I dealt with

13 a crisis we had involving our native peoples, preparation and involvement

14 with the Canadian Forces that served in the Gulf War, and I was also

15 involved in the presenting the options for the Canadian contributions to

16 Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and some other UN missions. So this is

17 background that might interest as well because it is involved with options

18 and political considerations of the military components.

19 MR. MUNDIS: Might I ask if the usher could perhaps move the ELMO.

20 I am having a difficult time seeing the witness.

21 Q. Mr. Thomas, I would like to focus your attention on your

22 assignment as Senior Military Observer, Sector Sarajevo. Do you recall

23 the date, the specific date, in October 1993 that you arrived and assumed

24 those responsibilities?

25 A. I can't be exactly sure. I think it was either 14 or 15 October,

1 1993. It was a Saturday, for sure.

2 Q. What were your primary duties and responsibilities as Senior

3 Military Observer, Sector Sarajevo?

4 A. My primary duty was to command and control and make sure that the

5 people under my command carried out their functions as military observers,

6 of the military observers assigned to Sector Sarajevo, which varied in

7 numbers from 110 to almost 200. In fact, 223, I was told one day.

8 Q. During the course of your tour in Sarajevo, how were the military

9 observers that were assigned to your command distributed and allocated?

10 A. I had two teams which will be of little interest to this Court in

11 Eastern Bosnian. I had a team of UNMOs, about 7 to 10, in the pocket of

12 Zepa, and I had a team of 7 to 12 in the team of Gorazde. Within

13 Sarajevo itself, the remainder of the UNMOs were broken initially into two

14 teams, the Papa team which was found inside the city, and the Lima team,

15 acquiring that name from Lima for "Lukavica," was on the Serb side. And I

16 should add at this point - although I am sure previous witnesses have

17 brought it out - that the only armed UNPROFOR troops allowed to operate in

18 the Bosnian Serb area of operations in Sector Sarajevo were, in fact,

19 those troops escorting convoys or on liaison tasks. So we were the only

20 full-time UNPROFOR presence until the ceasefire of February 1994.

21 The main function of my military observers was to monitor and

22 report. And I know that the UNPROFOR mission was delivery of humanitarian

23 aid, but you must bear in mind, my military observers were unarmed and

24 they had no protective vehicles and no means of enforcing adherence to any

25 agreement for delivery of humanitarian aid. But they could report, and

1 that was their main function. They, of course, because they were the only

2 UNPROFOR presence that lived full-time on the Bosnian Serb side, they

3 affected a lot of liaison for all the UN agencies and not just the

4 military component.

5 Q. Mr. Thomas, to whom --

6 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask you, as well, to make a pause because

7 I hear the speed of the French translators and it really goes a bit too

8 quick.

9 THE WITNESS: Sorry. I apologise. I just can't get used to it.

10 MR. MUNDIS:

11 Q. Mr. Thomas, to whom did you report as the Senior Military

12 Observer, Sector Sarajevo?

13 A. I reported to two people. I was double hatted. I was under the

14 operational control of the Commander, Sector Sarajevo. So for operations

15 involving Sector Sarajevo, he, in fact, could give me direction,

16 operational direction. But I also was under the command and the

17 operational command of the Senior Military Observer for Bosnia-Herzegovina

18 and the UN Senior Military Observer and, therefore, the Chief Military

19 Observer for UNPROFOR in Zagreb. And I had two chains of command and I

20 reported up both chains of command. And, obviously, if the sector

21 commander asked me to do something which I felt was in contradiction with

22 my other chain of command, that this would be an issue that would have to

23 be resolved.

24 Q. Mr. Thomas, when you arrived in Sarajevo, whom did you relieve as

25 senior military observer?

1 A. I relieved a Finnish lieutenant-colonel, Lieutenant Colonel

2 Kukkola, a Finnish Engineer Officer. Now, he may, in fact, have another

3 name now, I don't know. Somebody -- I haven't been in touch with him in

4 years.

5 Q. Do you recall approximately how many military observers were on

6 the Papa side when you arrived in Sarajevo?

7 A. I would say about -- there were six teams, with five to -- it

8 would be between 30 and 40. And the remaining teams would be on the Lima

9 side, although I had a very small staff at my headquarters of about seven

10 people when I first arrived.

11 Q. Again, focussing on the Papa side, when you say "six teams," did

12 each of those teams operate out of an observation post?

13 A. They operated out of what I would rather prefer to call a team

14 base, which was situated so that it had good observation. Three of the

15 team bases were sited so as to also offer observation back towards the

16 city so they could observe the impact of shells or towards an area where

17 they could observe an impact of shells. The other observation posts were

18 not really correctly observation posts. One of them was in a house at

19 the base of Mount Igman and that house was really, for all intents and

20 purposes, a team base. And on Mount Igman itself, we had a team, and

21 their main function when I arrived was to resolve an issue that had grown

22 up out of the Mount Igman agreement of August. And, of course, the Papa

23 headquarters itself was on the top floor of a four-storey apartment and

24 it -- there was limited observation from that point but it was not in any

25 sense an OP. It was as good an OP as you could get in a very urban

1 setting in the low ground.

2 Q. Do you recall approximately how many Lima OPs existed at the time

3 you arrived in Sarajevo?

4 A. Yes. There would be six. I should make a point for the

5 edification of the Court. One of the first things I did was to visit

6 everyone in my OPs and spend at least one night sleeping overnight with

7 each team, to meet the individuals at that site and to get to know them,

8 and to get to know what the task was like from their particular vantage

9 point.

10 There was and, again, I know you probably have seen many maps and

11 I feel a bit -- as a reconnaissance officer, I feel a bit naked without a

12 map in front of me to explain. But we had, of course, a team site at

13 Lima. We had team sites. There was a gun position not far from Lima

14 where we had a position. We had one down in the region of Pale which

15 could only be reached by coming back through Pale. We had one over in

16 Vogosca and we had one at Blazuj. And, of course, these were really team

17 sites because if there was a report of a violation, they weren't

18 co-located with known gun positions. Only one site was actually anywhere

19 near a gun position. So if there was firing, these teams would deploy or

20 they would be on parole already and they would be at different areas where

21 we expected firing to take place or where there was trouble or where they

22 could undertake a patrol.

23 Does that answer the question or do you want more elaboration?

24 Q. That is fine, sir.

25 During the course of your tour of duty in Sarajevo, did the number

1 of observation posts on either side of the line increase?

2 A. Yes. The -- I changed dramatically the situation in Sarajevo

3 after the ceasefire. I changed its orientation because, after the

4 ceasefire, we no longer were observing the fall of shot into Sarajevo. We

5 tried to put ourselves in a position to observe the front line better, to

6 act as a buffer in those cases where the UN could not provide troops, in

7 other words, separate the two parties. We set ourselves up in team bases

8 where we could more easily patrol the total exclusion zone which you will

9 remember, from other witnesses perhaps, was 20 kilometres, a 20-kilometre

10 radius from Sarajevo. And, of course, we tried to get into areas that had

11 been potential hot spots in the previous months, where we had not been

12 allowed access in the previous months, and to establish an UN presence.

13 So I had a total, at peak, of 29 observation posts or team sites.

14 I also had to deploy teams to some areas that were slightly remote from

15 Sarajevo, for example, a weapons site south of Pale where there was no UN

16 troops available to man. And I used -- I provided -- I put my team base

17 in that weapons collection point and then they used it as a patrol base.

18 And this was due to the shortage of resources. I did not like having my

19 military observers tied down in this, what I could consider a static task.

20 Does that clarifies that?

21 Q. Yes, sir.

22 A. And I must say, it changed, it evolved. If we had trouble spots,

23 for example, when we were moving guns into the weapons collection points,

24 we had team bases at locations which we later closed. Again, by

25 resources, I had a peak of 223 people. When the peace came in Central

1 Bosnia, I lost military observers. As I lost military observers and

2 vehicles, I closed observation posts.

3 Q. That was actually my follow-up question. You said, at peak, you

4 had 29 observation posts?

5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Do you recall approximately how many observation posts were up and

7 running when you departed Sarajevo?

8 A. I had 17 team sites or observation posts when I left, and I had

9 reorganised the structure because I was trying to have UNMOs able to work

10 on both sides of the line and to be intimately familiar with the people in

11 their little sector on both sides. I had broken Sarajevo into five

12 districts and I created teams that were -- worked a district which

13 included both Bosnians and Bosnian Serbs. So instead of a Papa and a Lima

14 team, I had five -- 17 OPs spread among five teams. No longer Papa and

15 Lima teams, but teams which would deal with both sides, and in some cases,

16 they had access across the front lines, which was not possible in the

17 months before February. I mean, there was very restricted crossing. But

18 this was -- and it also was made necessary by the demands. The ceasefire

19 violations were happening at a very low level and at the battalion level,

20 and the military observers had to be right on top of this and have

21 intimate knowledge and relationships with the battalion commanders

22 involved. They had to know the ground, the trench line, and changes.

23 Does that answer that question?

24 Q. That is fine.

25 Do you recall the approximate date or month that you put this

1 realignment plan into effect?

2 A. Yes. It took place over May and I phased it. I tried it first in

3 the most sensitive area, Grbavica, because the -- in Grbavica, a typical

4 -- for the edification of the Court, a typical situation, there was --

5 the front line was a building we called the red house, and it was about

6 six storeys, and they were fighting through the walls. So they were

7 punching holes through the walls and fighting each other through the

8 walls. And we wanted the UNMOs that dealt with this situation to come

9 into the building from either side, i.e. from the Bosnian side or from the

10 Serb side. So that is the kind of situation we tried to resolve in

11 Grbavica, that an UNMO would not have to go all the way around to come in

12 the Bosnian side of the building because we wanted them to be able to

13 cross at wherever the duties required to see both sides of the line.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Ms. Pilipovic hasn't the

16 translation, and I see that you are going too fast. I hear there was

17 shootings through the holes and it was shooting through the walls, so it

18 is too quick.

19 JUDGE ORIE: I think you have to keep your speed down again. I

20 also notice -- I also notice, Mr. Southwell [sic], that if a very short

21 question is asked of you, you tell us a lot, both in relation to the

22 question but also things that are not directly related to that question.

23 Since we have some restraints of time here as well, I will ask you

24 to listen very carefully to the question and I might ask Mr. Mundis, of

25 course, if you find all the elaborations of such relevance that you would

1 not interrupt the witness, of course, you are entirely free to do so. But

2 some more guidance might assist both the Prosecution with its wishes,

3 also, for the return of the witness.

4 MR. MUNDIS: It is a bit difficult in light of speaking the same

5 languages with the pause between question and answer to jump in. But I

6 will try to do that, Mr. President.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

8 MR. MUNDIS:

9 Q. Mr. Thomas, can you please describe for the Trial Chamber how the

10 UNMOs reported information to you?

11 A. Up until February, the UNMOs reported to their team leader, either

12 on the Papa and Lima side. Their reports for the day were consolidated so

13 as to reach -- so as to reach my headquarters in time for us to prepare

14 report at 1800 hours.

15 Q. What was done with the information that was put in these reports?

16 A. The information was consolidated into an UNMO Sarajevo sit-rep

17 which was sent -- sit-rep, situation report, which was sent to Sector

18 Sarajevo, to BH Command, to Zagreb, and then occasionally to New York.

19 Q. Can you describe in general terms the situation on the ground in

20 Sarajevo upon your arrival?

21 A. It is very complex situation to give a short answer. One incident

22 happened just as I arrived, which interfered with my hand-over. One of

23 the observation posts was evacuated, Papa 3, because it was anticipated

24 that perhaps it would certainly be shelled heavily and maybe the repulse

25 of a Bosnian attack by the Serbs would carry over the fighting into that

1 general area. The evacuation was done by French, and the Bosnian 10 Hill

2 Brigade took the APC for two days, with the possessions of the people. So

3 it was a very hectic time.

4 At the same time, there was an attack ongoing on the Pale road.

5 So it -- and there was shelling, and I think the Court has access to

6 sit-reps that were sent during this period, but you will see that there

7 was a range of shelling. So in November -- do you want me to carry on

8 month by month? I don't want to take up the Court's time.

9 Q. That is fine. Let me just ask a couple of questions. You say

10 there was shelling. Can you characterise the nature of the shelling?

11 A. Do you want for the month of October when I arrived or for the --

12 Q. At the time period when you arrived.

13 A. The shelling was generally into Sarajevo. But I can't be

14 specific. In the area, I was more focused on Papa 3 and there was

15 definitely shelling on Papa 3. You should be aware that the shelling was

16 coming from the Bosnian Serb side, but the Bosnians had also located

17 mortars not too far from the location of Papa 3. There was an attack

18 ongoing onto the Pale road which we couldn't monitor. We weren't allowed

19 close enough to the front lines. It was severe enough that my predecessor

20 had evacuated the OP. In fact, it was ongoing when I arrived in Sarajevo.

21 The aftermath of this evacuation, trying to get our people back into this

22 position, the French trying to get their APC back, the missing kit from

23 the APC, this was a big disruption for the first week that I was there.

24 Moreover, I had taken the time to visit all my OPs at the same time.

25 Q. Do you recall, shortly after your arrival in Sarajevo, visiting

1 the Lukavica barracks?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. What was the purpose of that visit?

4 A. I intended to make, as I had already done in Sarajevo, a courtesy

5 visit on the senior Serb commander in the area, who was General Galic, the

6 corps commander. I had already met his opposite number in Sarajevo.

7 Q. When you arrived at Lukavica barracks, did you meet with the Lima

8 team leader?

9 A. Yes, I did. I met with the Lima team leader and he, of course,

10 had to give me a briefing as well. And I, in fact, made arrangements

11 through him to visit all of his OPs and to spend time at each of the

12 observation posts and team sites in his area of responsibility.

13 Q. Upon your arrival in Sarajevo, who was the leader team leader?

14 A. It was a Danish team leader, Jan Pedersen.

15 Q. Did Major Pedersen introduce you to any officers of the Bosnian

16 Serb army?

17 A. The main officer I remember meeting in my initial visit to

18 Lukavica was then Major Indjic. He is now a Colonel. I did not meet the

19 corps commander and I don't recall meeting any of the other staff,

20 although I have met Marko, who was a security officer.

21 Q. When you met Major Indjic or when Major Indjic was introduced to

22 you, do you recall what his duties and responsibilities were?

23 A. Major Indjic was the liaison officer for General Galic and his

24 headquarters, and my understanding was they wanted him to be the main

25 point of contact for us when we tried to deal with the headquarters.

1 Q. What type of issues would you be dealing with or what would be

2 the subject matter of the issues you would be dealing with at the

3 Lukavica barracks headquarters?

4 A. This would be the complete range, anything that I would want to

5 raise, from getting approval for location of a team site, to dealing with

6 ongoing artillery fire on the city, to an incident involving UN personnel

7 where our people had been shot at by snipers or our accommodation in the

8 city had been shelled. Those are some of the range of some of the

9 issues. Also I --

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am apologising. There is

12 another small problem of translation. I do not see here on page 20, 18

13 in French, I think the French is not correct. I think it is a question of

14 setting up a site. It is just perhaps a small matter which I would like

15 to bring to your attention.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

17 You may continue your answer. You were, at least as I can see on

18 the screen, dealing with ongoing artillery fire on the city, incident

19 involving UN personnel where people had been shot at by snipers or

20 accommodation in the city had been shelled. Those are -- some in the

21 range of some of the issues.

22 THE WITNESS: Yes. Do you wish me to elaborate on more?

23 JUDGE ORIE: I will leave that to Mr. Mundis.

24 THE WITNESS: One issue I should bring up is freedom of access was

25 always an issue on both sides. We were prohibited from going into areas

1 by both parties which prevented us obviously from seeing what we wanted to

2 see.

3 MR. MUNDIS:

4 Q. When you say, "ongoing artillery fire on the city," what was that

5 in reference to?

6 A. This would be where, for example, my Papa sent a team site which

7 was in the centre of the city, not far from the market. It would be

8 getting -- be subject to shelling. And we might have, for example, UN

9 vehicles parked outside soft-skin UN vehicles.

10 Q. Did you also, as part of your duties, liaise with Major Indjic

11 with respect to civilian casualties?

12 A. Yes. The normal procedure was, we would pass a message to

13 Lukavica if there were -- if shelling was taking place in the city and

14 the duty staff there would notify Major Indjic. If we wanted to raise

15 the level of response to indicate we wanted a higher degree of attention

16 paid to this, then we would ask Major Pedersen to contact Indjic and make

17 sure he understood that we wanted something done about this.

18 Finally, the next level was for me to personally go to Lukavica to

19 say that this was -- we would -- you know, this would stop. Normally, we

20 wouldn't go that far and I can't relate whether the fire stopped because

21 of our intervention or other factors, in most cases.

22 Q. I will ask you about your meetings with Major Indjic in a moment.

23 First, let me ask you if you recall where the Lima team headquarters was

24 located in the Lukavica barracks.

25 A. It was located directly in the same office building that

1 General Galic had an office and that Indjic had an office. And our

2 operations room and main office for the Lima team was directly opposite

3 the office or the waiting room where I would normally find Indjic and the

4 captain he had working for him. And adjacent to our office OP centre was

5 a room with a sleeping quarters and facilities for cooking meals. So the

6 team actually lived there for a period of time.

7 They also had a house nearby where they, when they weren't on

8 duty, they could sleep. It was more elaborate. We permitted the team

9 because Mr. Major liked to orient his team. He had some training for

10 them before they actually got integrated into his team. So they had a

11 larger house nearby as well. But there was accommodation and operations

12 right opposite Indjic's office, in the same building as General Galic.

13 Q. Do you recall approximately how many times during your tour you

14 met with Major Indjic?

15 A. I -- every time I passed the headquarters and had reason to go

16 and see my people, I would also - as a courtesy, if nothing else - stop to

17 see Major Indjic. Generally, I had also had issues to bring up, and

18 before I would leave my own headquarters, I would review any issues I

19 might have to bring and discuss with Major Indjic. And it could range

20 again --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am really -- I really

23 apologise, but a whole paragraph has been forgotten in the French

24 translation because the French interpreters are not able to keep up.

25 From the sentence 23 where Mr. Pedersen is mentioned, none of this is on

1 the screen. I apologise truly, Mr. President.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course. Thank you for your assistance, Mr.

3 Piletta-Zanin.

4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Apologise for the French

5 booth, but I have to say this. Let us repeat from that point. It is a

6 gap. And I apologise again.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

8 Mr. Thomas, would you please repeat on from where you talked about

9 Mr. Pedersen, that he would prefer to have that house nearby for the

10 people who were not on duty and reasons why he wanted to have that house.

11 THE WITNESS: I apologise, as well, for being a little too fast.

12 Mr. Pedersen had a larger accommodation in a house nearby because

13 he wished to have space for the new team members for the Lima team, all of

14 the seven OPs -- this is in addition to what I previously said -- so that

15 they could be briefed and brought into his team without having them in

16 General Galic's headquarters. And so he had a larger accommodation. The

17 accommodation in the Lukavica barracks proper was for the team that was

18 working there, although, when things were difficult, Mr. Pedersen himself

19 used to stay there the whole time.

20 MR. MUNDIS:

21 Q. Mr. Thomas, do you recall approximately how many times, during the

22 course of your tour of duty in Sarajevo, you met with Major Indjic?

23 A. I would say I met him -- I was there 365 days. I must have

24 surely seen him 150 times. Surely, 100 times, anyway.

25 Q. You mentioned earlier a ceasefire. Do you recall the approximate

1 date the ceasefire took effect?

2 A. I think it was implemented on 9 or 10 February.

3 Q. Let me draw your attention to the time period between your

4 arrival in Sarajevo and the date of the ceasefire. During that roughly

5 five-month period, how frequently would you meet with Major Indjic?

6 A. I would certainly see him, at minimum, once a week and I would say

7 more often than that. I mean twice a week for sure. It would depend on

8 what I was doing.

9 Q. Did you meet with Major Indjic in his office in the Lima team OPs

10 room or elsewhere?

11 A. It depended on what we wanted to talk about, but normally I met

12 in his office.

13 Q. Can you describe the contents of Major Indjic's office?

14 A. I was more interested in what he was going to say and focused on

15 maps and so on that he might have about. But he had sort of a waiting

16 room. We would go in. Normally, we would be spreading a map out on a

17 coffee table and discussing, using the map as the centre of our

18 discussion.

19 Q. Do you recall the topic matters that you discussed with Major

20 Indjic?

21 A. I think I suggested these already. But I would be talking about

22 freedom of movement, I would be talking about shelling, I would be

23 talking about sniper activity, I would be talking about UN people being

24 shot at, and asking him to give us guarantees of security in certain

25 areas. That would be some of the things that we would talk. I might be

1 trying to get his assistance in getting a convoy somewhere.

2 Q. Can you elaborate upon what you might have said to Major Indjic

3 about shelling?

4 A. I am sure I would have raised the issue if one of our OPs -- if

5 the shelling had landed close to our OP, for example, Papa 5 or our Papa

6 headquarters. I would have pointed out to him that he knew where these

7 locations were, that he knew that UN personnel were there, and that they

8 were still firing close. By "close," I mean almost hitting. I should

9 elaborate for the benefit of the Court, when one of my teams was fired

10 upon, I went to the belligerent involved and personally asked to see the

11 corps commander so I could complain about one of my team sites being

12 fired upon.

13 Q. Do you recall if you also had discussions with Major Indjic with

14 respect to shelling of civilians?

15 A. Yes. Although the majority of these kinds of discussions would

16 have been passed if they were through the telephone as initial,

17 trying to get it stopped, or to Major Pedersen. And normally by the time

18 I would be seeing Indjic, there should have been no shelling happening.

19 In fact, maybe I wouldn't have been able to move out if there was

20 shelling.

21 Q. Do you recall any discussions that you had with Major Indjic with

22 respect to sniper activity?

23 A. I think we probably discussed -- and I can't recall any specific

24 incident -- we probably discussed sniper activity in relationship to OPs,

25 to sniper alley, and to reducing tension in areas. I must admit, in the

1 time frame you asked me to talk about, sniper activity was secondary to

2 dealing with shelling.

3 Q. Do you recall on approximately how many occasions you spoke with

4 Major Indjic with respect to shelling of civilians?

5 A. I couldn't make a guess as to how much. I would say that it came

6 up as an issue quite often when I was there. It would be one of the

7 agenda items that I would have marked in my little book to talk to him

8 about.

9 Q. Do you recall approximately how many occasions you spoke to him

10 about snipers targeting civilians?

11 A. This became an issue after the ceasefire when it appeared to be

12 the response of the Serbs to Bosnian violations of digging. The Bosnians

13 would improve their trenches or perhaps even tunnel, and the Serbian

14 response was to initiate sniper activity.

15 Q. Returning to your discussions with Major Indjic prior to the

16 ceasefire, do you recall Major Indjic's response on any of the occasions

17 that you met with him with respect to your protests?

18 A. I am not convinced that our protest had any impact whatsoever.

19 The firing stopped, but I am not sure that it didn't stop because of other

20 considerations. And if the firing continued, the force commander, the UN

21 force commander - actually, the deputy force commander - was responsible

22 for sending a formal note. So I am sure there is a record of some of the

23 formal notes that were sent. And you must be aware as well, that other --

24 the UN military also reported shelling an initiated complaints, such as

25 when the Egyptian battalion was shelled.

1 Q. When you say, "UN military," are you referring to UNPROFOR?

2 A. UNPROFOR, yes. That was the only UN military.

3 Q. During the time period prior to the ceasefire, on how many

4 occasions did you meet with the corps commander, General Galic?

5 A. Once. Prior to the ceasefire, I only met General Galic once.

6 Q. Did you make more than one request to meet with the corps

7 commander, General Galic?

8 A. Yes. I, from the day of arrival, I tried to meet him.

9 Q. To whom did you address these requests for meetings?

10 A. The requests were made through Major Indjic.

11 Q. Did Major Indjic explain to you why he was unable to get you an

12 appointment with the Corps Commander, General Galic?

13 A. I received a variety of explanations. My team commander was also

14 trying to make arrangements for me to meet. There was also some excuse,

15 which ranged from being out of town, to being unavailable, to some kind of

16 operation ongoing or whatever. I think my actual meeting was with him in

17 the hall, where he couldn't avoid me because I was coming in unexpectedly.

18 Q. When you say, "meeting with him in the hall," you are referring to

19 General Galic?

20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Do you recall the reasons you gave to Major Indjic for wanting a

22 meeting with General Galic?

23 A. The first meeting was, I like to know who I am dealing with. I

24 make it a policy when I am in these kind of operations to know who the

25 people are that I work with. And he was a key player and I didn't know

1 him. And I don't consider I really know him today.

2 Q. Did you consider it important for the fulfillment of your duties

3 to meet with General Galic?

4 A. Yes, I did. And I raised the issue not only with Indjic, I

5 raised it with the French commander as well, that I was not seeming to

6 get access that I needed.

7 Q. Can you describe the meeting or encounter that you had with

8 General Galic in the hallway?

9 A. It was just a courtesy. I wanted to meet the General and I

10 wanted to indicate who I was so he knew me, so he knew the face behind

11 the activity that I was doing.

12 Q. Do you recall the approximate date of this encounter?

13 A. I can't remember. It happened after Christmas. And it happened

14 obviously from Christmas to February the 6th or 7th, when the market

15 massacre took place; it seems like a blur of activity.

16 Q. Do you recall the duration of that meeting or encounter?

17 A. It was just a -- that is why I think it was a chance encounter.

18 I can't remember any of the details, and it was just a courtesy

19 acquaintance, get-acquainted meeting.

20 Q. Did you discuss any of the substantive issues that were on your

21 agenda to discuss?

22 A. No. It wouldn't be my practice normally. I like to meet the man

23 and then raise -- ask to see him again to raise the issues.

24 Q. After this chance encounter or this encounter in the hallway, did

25 you have any other meetings with General Galic?

1 A. Yes. After the ceasefire, the French commander took me as one of

2 his military advisors and I had at least 7 to 10 meetings in the space of

3 two weeks immediately after the ceasefire. And I was present in the same

4 meeting with the French commander and with General Galic and I had several

5 opportunities to talk directly about matters of substance, mainly related

6 implementation of the ceasefire, location of weapons collections points,

7 freedom of access for us to do our job and inspecting the total exclusion

8 zone.

9 Q. During any of the meetings that you had with General Galic, was

10 the subject of civilian sniping, sniping of civilians or shelling of

11 civilians discussed?

12 A. No, but, of course, the market massacre was the whole reason that

13 we were having those meetings, and the ceasefire.

14 Q. Do you recall anything that General Galic said in these meetings

15 with respect to the market massacre?

16 A. No. I can't remember anything that was said at the meetings, nor

17 did we raise the issue of who was responsible. Because by this time, a UN

18 special investigating time had been created and dispatched to Sarajevo to

19 look into the matter.

20 Q. During the time of the -- from the time of the signing of the

21 ceasefire until your departure from Sarajevo, did the ceasefire hold

22 throughout that period?

23 A. I can't give a short answer to that. And I should say that there

24 was no signing. General Rose announced in front of the media and the face

25 of the two parties that there had been too much signing already, and that

1 he expected at 12 noon the next day that both sides would stop firing, and

2 if anybody shot after that, the media there would know which side was not

3 adhering to the ceasefire. So there was actually no physical signing,

4 which actually created a problem for us in some ways because there was no

5 document.

6 Do you want me now to go into some detail about the ceasefire

7 holding? I can give a general impression.

8 Q. I would prefer a general impression, sir.

9 A. The first two weeks of the ceasefire, I think was a missed

10 opportunity. The soldiers in the ground, in the trenches, on both sides -

11 and I visited the trenches - wanted to stop fighting. And if you look, I

12 had no requirement to start creating a summary of sniper activities for

13 the remaining days in February because there was very little.

14 But, in March, the first casualties started. We had complaints

15 from the Serbs that the Bosnians were improving their positions. And,

16 indeed, from personal experience, I can tell you I saw trenches that moved

17 forward. Also, the Bosnians and the Serbs both killed each other with

18 sniper fire.

19 So what had been very good in the ground for the guys in the

20 trenches was changing because of the nature of sniper warfare. Several

21 measures were instituted by General Rose, but for example, the bus to go

22 from Sarajevo to Visoko, to create an outlet for people from Sarajevo,

23 required convoy escort throughout the whole time of my remaining tour.

24 This was a confidence-building measure, and it is true the lines were more

25 open for UN. But another incident that showed that the tension was coming

1 back: Initially, I could go for the first time from Sarajevo to Pale on

2 the road that had been intended to connect those two places. But then,

3 for a number of excuses, mines appeared again, roadblocks appeared again,

4 and we were once more stuck with going around. And we, the UN, and the

5 belligerents appeared to be moving towards a conflict again.

6 And I -- the sniper and the defensive positions, there was -- it

7 became worse and worse, except for isolated incidents. And when I found

8 in certain areas that I was able to arrange a ceasefire, such as during

9 the World Cup, and perhaps it is appropriate to use that as an example, a

10 very sensitive area near the airport, the two battalions, we found by

11 putting military observers there -- I don't want to take too much of the

12 Court's time on this, but it illustrates the point. The two battalions

13 wanted to watch the World Cup, and so did their soldiers. We got a

14 ceasefire, but a sniper bullet killing a football player on one of the

15 battalion teams got them all shooting again, and I feel that the sniper,

16 the orders of the snipers, came from higher authorities. So the higher

17 authorities, in my humble opinion, were not prepared to make the ceasefire

18 work, but the soldiers on the ground wanted it, and slowly but surely --

19 when I left, we initially -- in March, I was able to send patrols to

20 exactly the front lines and to patrol the entire front line, walk it. We

21 did walk it.

22 In June, when I tried to do the same, to see what changes had been

23 made to the front line, I was denied access by both sides.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis, if you could fine a suitable moment for a

25 break.

1 MR. MUNDIS: Just a couple of more questions.

2 Q. Mr. Thomas, in the period until after the ceasefire was arranged

3 until your departure from Sarajevo, what was the level of shelling

4 activity in the city compared to the period prior to the ceasefire?

5 A. There was no shelling at all from indirect fire weapons. The few

6 reported violations, and I investigated one personally that was in

7 no-man's land, were hand held anti-tank weapons fired in a high

8 trajectory, which created the impression -- would have a similar impact as

9 a mortar. I am talking about an RPG-7 fired at an elevation, or another

10 hand held anti-tank weapon. And the round would travel in an arc and

11 create an explosion similar to a mortar round. But there was no mortar

12 rounds or artillery rounds fired that we could tell determine within

13 Sector Sarajevo into the city. There was some violations from artillery

14 firing from within the total exclusion zone, within the Sarajevo area, but

15 into central Bosnia.

16 Q. Can I ask you now very briefly again about sniping activity during

17 that period in -- I believe what you said was, in the first month or

18 so after the ceasefire, there was a dramatic decrease in sniping which

19 then picked up again in the final couple of months in your tenure.

20 A. I would ask the Court if they can look at a document which I

21 think has been submitted, but it had a summary of the sniping. I found

22 I had -- after starting on the 1st of March, I found that the sniping had

23 increased to the point that I needed to start creating a summary of who

24 was killing who. And I maintained that summary until the day I left. And

25 from that, you will see a record of the sniping activities. It is

1 similar in form to another document I think that the Court has which I

2 started in December, of recording incoming shells on both the Bosnian and

3 on the Serb side. So both sides had people killed by shells and both

4 sides had people killed by snipers, and I had to start doing this again in

5 March. And I can't recall from the top of my head, but I think the Court

6 could examine that document and see a pattern.

7 MR. MUNDIS: This would be an appropriate time for a break, Mr.

8 President.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it is. We will adjourn until 20 minutes past

10 4.00.

11 --- Recess taken at 3.50 p.m.

12 --- On resuming at 4.27 p.m.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis.

14 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, in light of the fact that the witness

15 and I both speak the same language and the witness tends to give rather

16 lengthy answers, as the Chamber has already noticed, I am wondering, if it

17 might be appropriate for yourself, Mr. President, to direct the witness

18 to look more in my direction rather than facing the Bench so that I can

19 perhaps give him some indication by hand as to when --

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Mundis. I don't know whether that would be

21 the proper solution because the witness is informed by the Chamber. So,

22 therefore, I would not like to say, "Just look at the one who questions

23 you," but I and the Chamber has noted the problems you might have. I

24 don't ask you to make a pause if you say, "Mr. Witness, please stop."

25 Now, I will ask his attention that if he hears something alike from your

1 mouth, that he should stop and wait for further questions or guidance.

2 Because, otherwise, he will not return to Canada soon.

3 MR. MUNDIS: Yes, Mr. President.

4 JUDGE ORIE: So I will instruct the witness to listen carefully,

5 and the pause is not necessary under these circumstances.

6 MR. MUNDIS: I will attempt to intervene as quickly as possible,

7 and then once he stops, pause.

8 JUDGE ORIE: And if you don't overcome the problems, Mr. Mundis,

9 if you give me a signal, I will transfer it to the witness.

10 MR. MUNDIS: I should also just indicate very briefly before the

11 witness returns, is that I would at this point like to turn to the Rule 70

12 documents and I would ask that we go into closed session for that.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Before doing so, Mr. Ierace asked whether he would

14 have to return in respect of what is now called the "grattage." Could you

15 convey to him that the Chamber asked for either an answer or a written

16 report. What we got, as a matter of fact, was a short answer by Mr. Stamp

17 which was, well, not an answer in the sense that it would explain the

18 reasons of the grattage, and the Chamber would very much like to be

19 informed in more detail on exactly what steps have been taken. Mention

20 was made of correspondence and we would like to be informed rather

21 in detail of dates, et cetera, who was addressed, so that we are in a

22 better position to assess whether the answer that no on knows would

23 finally be an acceptable answer or not.

24 MR. MUNDIS: Would you like those details conveyed in writing or

25 would you like --

1 JUDGE ORIE: We would prefer to have them in writing by next

2 Monday. It is dragging along for quite some time now, so it could be

3 prepared for next Monday.

4 MR. MUNDIS: That would be the 3rd of the June, this coming

5 Monday.

6 JUDGE ORIE: This coming Monday, yes.

7 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. President.

9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

10 I don't know if this witness has to return to French or English

11 Canada very soon, but what I do know is that the problems facing the

12 French booth come from the fact that they work from the relay and not --

13 they don't translate directly. So what is important, I think -- I think

14 that is what I have understood according to what I was told by the French

15 booths. It is important that when they see that this witness is speaking

16 too rapidly, it would be important to slow him down. It is his speed that

17 can create problems for the French booth, if I have understood this matter

18 correctly. Thank you.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. There seems to be no doubt as to the speed

20 being the cause of the problems.

21 We then now turn into closed session. Private session would not

22 be enough, Mr. Mundis?

23 MR. MUNDIS: No, sir, my instructions were closed

24 session.

25 JUDGE ORIE: It was not my question what your instructions were

1 but whether it would be good enough. But let's just assume for the time

2 being that your instructions were in accordance with the necessity of

3 closed question. There is no one in the public gallery? There is one.

4 Mr. Usher, could you then please assist in bringing the witness

5 into the courtroom.

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10 --- On resuming at 6.14 p.m.

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23 [Open session]

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Thomas, we are now in open session again. We

25 take it that the clarification that you give, if you refer to the number

1 of documents, and give your clarification, if they are still needed.

2 Mr. Mundis, I leave that entirely up to you.

3 THE WITNESS: I can clarify these documents P2055. I can only

4 apologise for what we did at the time, but that should clearly read

5 January for December where it says "period." Because I have checked with

6 the casualty and those sit-reps and Exhibit P2063 should also read January

7 for December where it says "sit-rep." Were those the only documents in

8 question or was there another one? Just let me -- 2051, to confirm again,

9 2051.

10 MR. MUNDIS:

11 Q. What would be the correct date on that one?

12 A. This one, that should be -- also read January. Where it has

13 "December" on the line "period," it should read "January."

14 Q. Those changes would simply be in order to correct what appear

15 to be typographical errors?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Thomas. I have a few more documents to show you,

18 sir. I would ask at this time that the witness be shown P2297 and also

19 P2761.

20 THE INTERPRETER: Might the interpreters in the booths also get

21 copies at this time of the documents because we have been working

22 throughout this whole day without any copies of the documents.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, I don't know whether you have heard,

24 but the interpreters are asking if there are available copies for them as

25 well.

1 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, while the documents are being

2 distributed, I will accept responsibility for failing to provide the

3 documents earlier to the interpreters, and I beg their apology for that

4 oversight.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Mundis.

6 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

7 Q. Mr. Thomas, I ask you to first look at P2297. Are you familiar

8 with this document?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber who created this document or who

11 compiled the information on this document?

12 A. I created -- had this document created, to provide me with a

13 summary of the casualties which you saw on the sit-reps or some of the

14 samples of the sit-reps.

15 Q. What was the purpose for creating this summary document?

16 A. It was to give me an overview, day by day, during the month, of

17 the casualties on both sides.

18 Q. This document begins with December 1993. Do you recall whether

19 you had similar summaries made for that portion of October when you were

20 in Sarajevo, or for the month of November 1993?

21 A. No. I arrived in October and they didn't have this kind of

22 procedure. My first two weeks were spent getting to know the different

23 teams and their sites, and it was only early in December that I got around

24 to organising the procedures that I wanted in my own headquarters. And

25 this is one of the procedures I found very useful, to have a summary

1 such as this so that I could take to meetings and describe to people and

2 to brief people.

3 Q. I would ask you to turn please to the fourth page of this document

4 of February 1994.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. There are no entries after the 7th of February, 1994; is that

7 correct?

8 A. That is correct. After the market massacre -- the market massacre

9 isn't reflected so I can only assume that it occurred on the 8th. And the

10 casualties for that day were horrendous. I think, if my recollection

11 serves me, 200 or more. And for the rest of February, there was no

12 artillery fire. So the only casualties that would result after that were

13 sniper fire, and as I think I alluded to earlier when you asked me a

14 question about the situation after the ceasefire, initially, there was

15 almost no activity for the first two -- the remaining weeks in February,

16 there wasn't enough casualties to justify keeping this kind of a summary.

17 Q. Let me ask you two questions to clarify. First: Does this

18 summary which is marked P2297, reflect shelling casualties only or

19 shelling and sniping casualties?

20 A. This document reflects shelling and sniping casualties. It would

21 be based on what had been submitted on the sit-reps. However, it has to

22 be correlated with the sit-reps with care, as the sit-reps were ended at

23 1800 hours and this would reflect casualties that occurred during the

24 night. And, therefore, there would be some differences between this

25 summary, which reflected evening casualties, and the casualties covered

1 in the two sit-reps, which went from 1800 to 1800. And the duty officer

2 on duty would have had to make a judgment when he made this summary for

3 me, when he was including the casualties of the evening, whether they

4 properly belonged in the 2nd of December or the 3rd of December, for

5 example.

6 Q. So it is possible that if you were to compare a sit-rep for a

7 given period with this summary chart, that the numbers might not match?

8 A. They might not match, and my intent wasn't to have this -- this

9 was to give me the feel for the casualties, when they occurred and what

10 dates. And the sit-reps, I could haul out then to compare what I had told

11 the headquarters.

12 Q. I draw your attention, Mr. Thomas, to the casualties listed on

13 page four of this document, February 1994, 8-5, which would reflect the

14 5th of February, 1994?

15 A. Yes, that is correct.

16 Q. The casualties on the Bosnian side are rather substantial?

17 A. That very -- in fact, might be the date of the marketplace

18 massacre, and thanks for bringing that to my attention. Because I can't

19 think of any other date that we had that tremendous amount of casualties.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Could I repeat that I ask to slow down.

21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

22 was just about to intervene.

23 Mr. President, can we -- there is a confusion in the French

24 transcript. Can you repeat the question, please?

25 MR. MUNDIS:

1 Q. In reference to the summary of casualties for 5 February, 1994, on

2 the Bosnian side, the numbers seem to be rather substantial. Can you

3 recall or explain why the numbers were particularly high on that date?

4 A. My earlier explanation perhaps isn't correct. I -- at first

5 sight, it appears to be the date of the market massacre, but I am not

6 convinced because we had no activities after the market massacre occurred.

7 We had casualties -- we stopped having any casualties. So there is some

8 discrepancy here which, again, I would have to see the sit-reps for those

9 days to reconcile this. Because as far as I am concerned, when the market

10 massacre occurred, basically, we had an end for a period of time to

11 casualties. Unless, in fact, these are bodies that were brought into the

12 morgue which my guys counted and they appeared in the morgue for the first

13 time on those dates.

14 Q. With respect to document P2761, can you tell the Trial Chamber

15 what this document is?

16 A. This was a document which unfortunately I had to start creating

17 because now we started to have casualties, sniper casualties, on both

18 sides. As you will notice, there are both Bosnian and Bosnian Serb and,

19 indeed, I have the French casualties also recorded. So this was a summary

20 of the casualties.

21 The only thing that is not clear in my mind, whether we in fact

22 originated this in the UNMO headquarters or whether in fact this was a

23 document that originated in the French sector headquarters, and I am not

24 -- my recollection isn't clear on that matter. But this is what this

25 represents, is a summary, a daily summary, of the sniper casualties.

1 Q. And the key at the bottom of this document pertains to the figures

2 listed on the document?

3 A. That is correct. Soldiers, we tried to distinguish between

4 soldiers, civilians and, of course, killed, wounded, and then there was a

5 distinction made for females.

6 Q. How did you make the determination as to whether or not an

7 individual was a soldier or a civilian?

8 A. The basic characteristic we used, and I should say that this was

9 also used in judging casualties from shelling, was that women and children

10 were assumed, unless otherwise identified, to be not soldiers. The males

11 over a certain age were assumed to be soldiers or possible replacement

12 soldiers because, in Sarajevo and in also on the Serb side, most of the

13 males wore bits and pieces of uniform and, in fact, if they were over the

14 age of 16 or 17, could have basic military training, conscript training,

15 so therefore were suitable to be employed as soldiers.

16 Q. Based on this methodology, would you expect these numbers to be on

17 the high end, or on the low end?

18 A. In what way do you mean? You mean the number of soldiers reported

19 to be on the high end or the number of civilians?

20 Q. Let's take the number of soldiers.

21 A. I would say that you would find that most males that we could

22 possibly identify as being 17 or 18, therefore, of draft age, that they

23 would be considered soldiers or possible replacements and they would

24 probably be wearing some military attire. So I would say that perhaps a

25 number of soldiers might be slightly overestimated in the sense that

1 untrained soldiers wouldn't be used if they could avoid it. Although, in

2 Sarajevo at that time, I think they would use them. And that is why we

3 took the conscript age because these guys would have had their basic

4 training so they would know how to use the weapons.

5 Obviously, both sides -- I should make it clear -- both sides used

6 combatants who were not militarily trained and who were under this age.

7 But when you see the body, it is hard to interrogate it.

8 Q. Let me turn your attention now to sniping in general. During the

9 time that you were in Sarajevo, based on the information that was reported

10 to you by the military observers, were you able to identify locations

11 where Bosnian Serb --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I apologise. There seems to

14 be a problem today. It is not perhaps the problem of the booth. Perhaps

15 it is a technical problem. A whole sentence has not been translated, that

16 "it is difficult to interrogate a body." Well, it hasn't been translated

17 at all, and it is not the first time I have noticed this. I can't get up

18 every few minutes, but this time I think it was useful that

19 I did.

20 JUDGE ORIE: I think you read it for assistance. Mainly drawing

21 attention to a mistake is accompanied by a few lines of why you are sorry

22 and why it was useful, et cetera. If you do it as short as possible, that

23 would certainly assist.

24 Where we should resume? Perhaps, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you indicate

25 what line has not been translated.

1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: It is exactly the line 6 current page, "When

2 you see the body, it's hard to interrogate."

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes, yes. The words were not translated: "But

4 when you see the body, it is hard to interrogate it."

5 Please proceed, Mr. Mundis.

6 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

7 Q. With respect to sniping, during the time you were in Sarajevo and

8 based upon the reports that you received from the military observers, were

9 you able to identify locations where Bosnian Serb army snipers were

10 active?

11 A. Yes. We knew of three sites in particular that I can cite, is

12 that there was a tower in the field opposite Lukavica, between the

13 entrance to the Lukavica barracks.

14 Q. Let me ask you --

15 A. And -- yes.

16 Q. When you say "a tower," what kind of tower?

17 A. It was a tower, a part of a church. There was also a site in the

18 School of Theology, Nedzarici, and there was a site in Grbavica that was

19 opposite one of our military observer posts, and we knew this one quite

20 well because there was retaliatory fire. And every time we discovered the

21 location of this sniper post, we would ask the Bosnian Serbs to move it.

22 There was, of course, certain areas in the city, the press named

23 "sniper alley" which contained target areas for snipers. The practice of

24 sniping, of course, once they fire, if there's other snipers active

25 against them, they would move once they'd fired and given away their

1 location. To say there was one or two locations is perhaps misleading.

2 I think that, in the case of sniper alley, there were several

3 locations they used and they moved to. There was no alternative to using

4 the tower location opposite -- the church tower close to Lukavica. They

5 would have no other dominating fire position. So they had to continue

6 using the tower, even though it was known to be the location of a sniper.

7 A similar thing would be said for the School of Theology. It was

8 a structure which allowed sniping, and there was no other good position

9 they could move to, if once -- so they would have to stay there and move

10 back into the building, out of sight, to avoid retaliatory fire or decide

11 to stay and take the retaliatory fire. But on some of the other

12 locations, and this would apply to snipers on both sides, they would fire

13 and try to move to another alternative location that covered the same

14 target area, and some of these positions would offer that opportunity.

15 Q. Which neighbourhood or part of the city could be targeted by a

16 sniper from the church tower?

17 A. That would be in Dobrinja, the area that was close to the airport.

18 And I think the Court is familiar with that area. I am sure you have seen

19 it many times already on maps from other witnesses. But that area would

20 be targeted. And the School of Theology also targeted that area from the

21 other side. If you think -- visualise the Dobrinja area and it's curved

22 like this, and the airport is here, and the tower is here and the School

23 of Theology is in here, Nedzarici, in an area held by the Bosnian Serb.

24 There was a machine-gun located in the School of Theology - and perhaps

25 I'm getting into too much detail - but it could cover the street for a

1 kilometre and-a-half and kill anybody that tried to cross that street.

2 Later, in the period after the ceasefire, we would put a military

3 observer patrol in there to observe this position and then they wouldn't

4 fire while we were present. In the tower, they had a similar control of

5 the streets on the far end of Dobrinja which were close to the Lukavica

6 area. There was an open space there. And my only observations - I was in

7 the School of Theology - but my observation of the tower was limited

8 because I only saw it from within Dobrinja itself. I was never able to

9 get access to see it from the Serb side. I might add that there was also

10 a Bosnian sniper nest in the far end of Dobrinja which could engage

11 targets going into Lukavica barracks. So those two -- I hope those

12 snipers killed a few of each other off.

13 Q. Are you familiar with any geographic formations in or around the

14 city of Sarajevo from which Bosnian Serb army snipers operated?

15 A. Yes. There is one which we were -- after the ceasefire, we tried

16 to negotiate a military observer presence called the "Sharpstone." And

17 this took -- this would be an issue which would have started out at a team

18 level because the team in the city where the casualties were occurring

19 wasn't allowed to operate on the Serb side. We would have to have the

20 team that was responsible for that area on the Serb side go around and try

21 to negotiate and then talk to the radio with the team in the city. This

22 is why I tried to change the organisation in May and June of that year.

23 So I often got involved because I could freely cross the line. In the

24 case of Sharpstone, I was able to cross the front line. I met my team on

25 the Bosnian side, I got briefed on the situation, for example, the latest

1 casualties of that day, and they were shooting from that feature. I don't

2 even know the rhyme nor reason of why they picked individuals to be

3 killed.

4 Then I crossed the line, I went up to the Serb position, and it

5 was, in fact, a very well dug-in position and there was no need for any

6 special facilities for the snipers. They could just pick a trench and

7 prepare themselves, shoot, and then move to another trench. And had a

8 very clear view. And this was one of the things that we spent some time

9 negotiating, first at the local level, no luck, and finally it would have

10 been something I would have brought to General Galic's attention at his

11 headquarters.

12 Q. When you say "brought to General Galic's attention," how would you

13 do that?

14 A. Well, I would bring it to Major Indjic, and that is as far as it

15 went. Although there was indications that we would be, in fact, given an

16 opportunity to put a UN presence there, and that is one of the things

17 that was changed with the air strikes in Gorazde. We lost all the

18 negotiations that we had around the Sarajevo area at that time for these

19 -- a UN presence. I was prepared to send an UN team to live there, to

20 the Sharpstone feature.

21 Q. Let me ask you now about any complaints or protests --

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I apologise. This is the

23 fifth time the interpreters are asking me to slow down. I don't know,

24 should I use a different language. Should I say it in Italian?

25 JUDGE ORIE: I will change to the French channel myself again.

1 And may I just ask you, I mean, it is a very difficult task the

2 interpreters perform, and I know that you don't do it on purpose, but

3 please. Please.

4 THE WITNESS: I apologise to the interpreters. I realise when I

5 have this information, I want to get it out.

6 JUDGE ORIE: The interpreters say straight away when the speaker

7 is -- when the witness is speaking too fast. Thank you very much.

8 Please proceed.

9 MR. MUNDIS:

10 Q. Mr. Thomas, you mentioned protests made at the local level. Were

11 there any instances where you made any type of protest or complaint

12 directly to any of the brigade or lower level Bosnian Serb army

13 commanders?

14 A. Yes. Normally, it would be done, like in the case of Sharpstone.

15 If, in fact, the initial protest or complaint by my local team commander

16 did not appear to have any impact, in the case of Sharpstone, and I will

17 use it as an example because there was a significant number of casualties

18 from that location, we -- then I would make a visit to the brigade

19 commander.

20 At that particular time, we even had trouble determining which

21 brigade was controlling that position. So we then turned to Colonel

22 Indjic, or Major Indjic as he was at the time, and I certainly would have

23 asked for an interview with General Galic because this position was so

24 important to us. Because this Sharpstone position was so important to us

25 that we needed his intervention to make sure that we got -- I don't recall

1 meeting with General Galic on this topic. I think I may have met with his

2 chief of staff. But what I do remember is that we appeared to have

3 agreement in principle that we could establish a UN presence on the

4 Sharpstone. But this agreement was made very early in April of 1994 and

5 this was overtaken by events after the air strike when my people were

6 taken hostage on the Bosnian side -- Bosnian Serb side, and basically

7 negotiations and everything we had been working for was stopped or put on

8 hold.

9 Q. Let me ask you about other instances where you or any of your

10 personnel spoke directly to brigade commanders with respect to

11 complaints.

12 A. Yes. I personally intervened in another situation with the

13 brigade commander at Ilidza because I felt in his case, if we had reached

14 an agreement, there would be no firing or no sniper activity, that this

15 would be respected. And so when his soldiers opened fire one morning

16 after we had an agreed ceasefire, I found out that they had been provoked

17 by the sniper killing -- Bosnian snipers killing three pregnant women. So

18 with the certain brigade commanders, I definitely had the feeling that if

19 they said something would happen, that it would happen, on the Bosnian

20 Serb side.

21 My only caveat to that statement would be they often made it very

22 difficult for me to pin them down to an agreement to anything. So they

23 might not agree to anything after half a day of negotiations.

24 Q. Were you able to reach any conclusions with respect to command and

25 control issues based on these meetings in which someone said something

1 would happen and, in fact, it did?

2 A. Yes. This may take some time, so I ask the Court to bear with me,

3 in the sense that each of the brigade commanders was different. At the

4 level of the brigade I found the Bosnian Serb commanders were generally

5 ex-JNA, very professional, and with quite a lot of skills which I

6 respected. They had operational and tactical knowledge and they could

7 demonstrate this and they had an understanding of the situations they

8 faced.

9 The soldiers they worked with I would say, for the most part, were

10 Territorial Defence soldiers. So I would say that they had to exert

11 supervision to make soldiers also follow their instructions. And in

12 this -- in the most part, I would say again, they did this in a

13 professional manner, but there were exceptions, because they were not

14 working with a professional. They were working with Bosnian Serbs who had

15 been -- had training and then had been put into the whole defence forces,

16 and the same thing was true on the Bosnian army side, but they had less

17 experience than the Bosnian Serb officers in exerting control.

18 So I expected at the brigade level on the Bosnian Serb side

19 adherence to orders that had been issued by the brigade. Similarly, the

20 Bosnian Serb brigade commanders as professionals were -- took orders from

21 the Bosnian Serb corps commander. I can't recall a single instance where

22 they didn't reflect if it had been the corps commander's direction. It

23 didn't appear that they would object. So I thought that from the General

24 Mladic down, down to the brigade commanders, there was a kind of command

25 and control that I would kind of -- that I expect, for example, in the

1 NATO army, as a general rule.

2 Q. Mr. Thomas, you mentioned earlier when we were reviewing some

3 documents about the theft of certain UN-owned property.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. During the time that you were in Sarajevo, were you also aware of

6 UN radios being stolen?

7 A. Yes. Of course, UN radios were stolen. This is a particularly

8 sore point with me because in Sarajevo itself, radios and diesel fuel

9 which we carried in our vehicles was very valuable. And so whenever I

10 parked my vehicle, and I often travelled alone to visit a team, I had to

11 carry my radios, take them out and take out my cans of fuel, spare fuel,

12 and carried them into the building, otherwise they would be stolen. This

13 is inside Sarajevo.

14 The same thing was true on the Bosnian Serb side, but if we were

15 in the Lukavica barracks, for example, I didn't expect anything to be

16 taken. But out in the rural communities, it could also happen. And it is

17 because both the radios and the fuel were valuable.

18 Q. Mr. Thomas, do you know or have any first-hand information about

19 what happened to the radios?

20 A. The radios were used by both parties to listen to our radio nets.

21 And I will given an example of both parties using it. My voice was dubbed

22 on Bosnian Serb television, because I was asked about what I was doing on

23 Bosnian Serb television. And it was taken directly from my radio net.

24 To use an example from the other side, to be balanced, one of my

25 liaison officer's, out of courtesy, turned off his radio as he walked in

1 to a Bosnian officer's office, but he heard his name being called on the

2 Bosnian officer's radio. So he obviously had his radio on our frequency

3 and was listening to it and didn't even have the sense to turn it to

4 another frequency as we came in the room. So both sides had, as far as I

5 was concerned, free access to our radio net.

6 Q. Do you know if or do you recall seeing an UN radio in the

7 possession of Major Indjic?

8 A. I did not see a radio that could be clearly identified as UN. But

9 Major Indjic clearly had a Motorola radio in his possession and it is just

10 a question of the crystals and the frequency.

11 Q. Based on --

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I have to

13 admit that I don't see what the relevance of these questions is, the

14 questions that have to do with radios, whether they belong to the UN or

15 not, and I would like to object to the relevance or rather the lack of

16 relevance of these questions.

17 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I perhaps should respond in the

18 absence of the witness or be allowed a little bit of leeway to ask the

19 witness two or three more questions which I think should make the

20 relevance of this line of questioning quite clear.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, first of all, the question has been

22 answered. I do not know whether your next question would be on the same

23 subject and we would have to discuss it otherwise.

24 MR. MUNDIS: I do have perhaps one additional question on the

25 subject. Depending of course upon the answer I receive to that question,

1 there may be one or more follow-up questions as well.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, if we have to deal with a matter

3 that presumably takes more time so, therefore, if you find it of

4 importance to avoid that what is, in your view, irrelevant evidence comes

5 to the Chamber, then we will ask the witness to leave the courtroom. If

6 the objection is such that you do not insist, then we could continue.

7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] May I take the time to confer

8 with General Galic? Thank you.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Just in order, for your information, the matter of

10 relevance is, first of all, a very practical thing, that we shouldn't

11 raise irrelevant things, but on the other hand, we should not pay more

12 time to discussions on relevance as it would take to hear the irrelevant

13 evidence. Another issue is that it is, especially in jury trials, it is

14 very important that the jury is not faced with any irrelevant information

15 to the case. A Bench trial is perhaps a bit less vulnerable

16 in this view.

17 Please confer with your client.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

19 Thank you very much.

20 [Defence counsel confer]

21 [Defence counsel and accused confer]

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The Defence maintains its

23 position, unfortunately. Thank you.

24 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask the usher to escort the witness out of the

25 courtroom. Looking at the clock, it is five minutes to 7.00. I take it,

1 Mr. Thomas, that a discussion on the relevance of questions might easily

2 take two or three minutes and then we are at 7.00. Therefore, I assume

3 that after hearing the arguments on the relevance of the issue, we might

4 adjourn until tomorrow. But since it was only one remaining question of

5 Mr. Mundis, would you please stay around. But, if you are not called back

6 into the courtroom, then for you it means that the case is adjourned until

7 2.15 tomorrow in the afternoon. Thank you very much.

8 If I would not see you any more today, please do not discuss with

9 anyone, not even representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor, your

10 testimony. Yes. So either until five minutes or until tomorrow in the

11 afternoon.

12 [The witness steps down]

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Mundis, please respond to the objection.

14 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the issue of the relevance of this

15 line of questioning can be stated quite simply. The witness will testify

16 to the fact that information was relayed to him from his military

17 observers at various observation posts on both the Papa and Lima side over

18 the UN radio network. He has also testified that both sides to the

19 conflicts, both parties, were in possession of these radios. The

20 relevance of this information, Mr. President, and again, depending on the

21 answers to the question or questions that the witness may be asked, have

22 to do with whether or not the information being reported by the military

23 observers was in fact being received by the parties to the conflict.

24 In effect, Mr. President, this information is or could be

25 considered a direct form of notice to the accused that the events in

1 question were happening. The Prosecution submits that this line of

2 questioning is relevant for that limited purpose of being another example

3 of a form of notice that was available to the parties, and particularly to

4 the Bosnian Serb army side of the conflict.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Mundis.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, before further conferring, would

8 you please respond.

9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you. The first thing

10 that surprised me in what Mr. Mundis has told us is that he hasn't told us

11 whether the military -- members of the military used coded language, which

12 is the first thing which one does when there is sensitive information.

13 Members of the military are careful to preserve their information --

14 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...whether it

15 surprises you or not is not the issue. The issue is whether or not Mr.

16 Mundis have reasons for the relevance.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] And the second thing is that

18 if we place ourselves that on the principle that two or three radio sets

19 might disappear, were they immediately provided to General Galic. I am

20 certain that General Galic would not admit this was the case.

21 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...seek to establish

22 that as far as the means of communication were concerned, that the

23 communication of the UNMOs could be overheard and therefore information

24 might have come to both parties, but also to the Bosnian Serb army?

25 MR. MUNDIS: That is correct, Mr. President. That is the entirety

1 of this line of questioning.

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 JUDGE ORIE: The objection is denied.

4 You said you had one more question. If that would be true, we

5 could try to finish it. But if there are any other questions as well,

6 then we will try to --

7 MR. MUNDIS: Again, Mr. President, as I said, I would anticipate

8 one, but of course, depending on the answer or in light of the fact that

9 this witness tends to give lengthy answers, I can't guarantee that we

10 would be done in one or two minutes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we better adjourn until tomorrow, quarter

12 past 2.00 in the afternoon.

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

14 7.04 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday,

15 the 31st day of May, 2002, at 2.15 p.m.

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