1 Friday, 7 June 2002
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 8.31 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. Madam Registrar, would you
6 please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus
8 Stanislav Galic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Mr. Ierace, you wanted to make some submissions. But perhaps
11 before doing so, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Thank you
13 very much. You will remember that in yesterday's hearing there were
14 certain points that I wished to raise before Mr. Ierace takes the floor,
15 and you told me to speak at the end of yesterday's hearing. I can do this
16 now --
17 JUDGE ORIE: You may do it now, but try to do it in five minutes
18 and not more.
19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well. I will do it in
20 five minutes, and not to waste any time, I would like to add another two
22 The first thing that I wish to see is not a protest, something I
23 wish to contest; it's just to establish facts with regard to the war in
24 Algeria. We wish to ask questions on this subject with the witness of
25 yesterday, who could have answered these questions in closed session. The
1 Defence would like to say that its rights have been violated, and it is
2 saying clearly that this has been the case for the record. These are not
3 questions relating to issues of 40 years back, but we speak today of --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, yesterday a decision has been
5 taken on it. That's the end of the discussion. We're not going to debate
6 on why its the right decision.
7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... Please proceed.
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I didn't say it was a just or
10 a false decision. The Defence simply considers that its rights have been
11 violated, and I will stop there.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, I said that there's no room for
13 debate at this moment on this decision.
14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The second point I wish to has
15 to do with the witness Philips. We made an application yesterday. We
16 will communicate it to you in the course of the day. We wish to add
17 something orally. As regards Witness Philips, in regards to the witness
18 Ewa Tabeau -- do I have time to continue?
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, within five minutes.
20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Well, I won't have enough
21 time. Five minutes will not be enough. Thank you, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. If you don't want to use the five minutes,
23 then please write down what you have to submit to the Court in addition to
24 what you have written already.
25 Mr. Ierace.
1 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it that you could, in some seven minutes,
3 tell the Court...
4 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I have provided two documents which
5 will assist me in keeping my submission brief. While they are being
6 handed out, on the 8th of May, pursuant to the direction that the
7 Prosecution finish its case by the 5th of July, I provided a fresh witness
8 list which involved the deletion of some 63 witnesses, I think it was,
9 from the Prosecution case, and I indicated that the Prosecution would
10 additionally reduce significantly the anticipated time that the remaining
11 witnesses would take in chief. I also said that there were two factors
12 which were not reflected in that list. The first was a decision in
13 relation to the 92 bis witnesses, and the second was the requirements by
14 the Defence as to cross-examination time for expert witnesses.
15 Mr. President, the 92 bis application was filed yesterday. It
16 wasn't, in fact, until this week that we received the last of the
17 translations. We have filed -- I'm sorry. We have filed 21 witness
18 statements, so we have deleted 2. In addition, we have deleted from those
19 21 a number of the annexures and we have placed in a more accessible order
20 for your convenience that material to make it easier to peruse.
21 Mr. President, the Defence, pursuant to your requirement filed on Tuesday
22 a document which set out a document which they require to cross-examine
23 expert witnesses.
24 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interrupt you, Mr. Ierace?
25 MR. IERACE: Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: I can announce to you and to the Defence that the
2 time requested for cross-examination of the expert witnesses will not be
3 granted to the number of hours indicated.
4 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE ORIE: It will be considerably reduced.
6 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, unfortunately, that will not overcome
7 the problem which the Prosecution now faces. The pace of evidence has
8 been significantly less than the Prosecution would have hoped for in spite
9 of the Prosecution taking every possible measure to maintain it.
10 Mr. President, I want it to be clearly understood that I am not in
11 any way seeking to place blame on the Defence or the Trial Chamber or
12 anyone else. That is simply not the issue. The issue is this: That the
13 Prosecution, having done everything it possibly could, we simply cannot
14 keep to a timetable which will enable us to complete the bare requirements
15 of our case in order to fairly present the Prosecution case in a minimal
16 sense and still finish by the 5th of July.
17 I come to the document which comprises a number of charts. The
18 first chart is one that I have prepared overnight. It analyses the time
19 taken by nine of the witnesses that we have called since the 8th of May.
20 There are four witnesses who have not been analysed, two because I did not
21 have precise times available overnight, one because he's part heard, and
22 another because his evidence was only finished yesterday.
23 So in the third column, we have the 65 ter original estimate of
24 evidence in chief, and I emphasise "in chief." Alongside we have the
25 revised estimate. Alongside that, we have the total time by Prosecution,
1 in other words, not just in chief, but also re-examination. And then
2 alongside that, total time taken by the Defence, not just
3 cross-examination, but any further cross-examination. And then in the
4 last column, the time taken by questions from Your Honours.
5 Mr. President, on the bottom row, we see some totals. Total 65
6 ter estimate does not include Eterovic because there was not a total for
7 him, but nevertheless, 25 hours, leaving him out of it. Revised estimate,
8 we are able to drop it to 19 and a half hours, but of course that included
9 for the first time an estimate for Eterovic. In relation to the total
10 time taken by the Prosecution, it is clear that we were well within the
11 revised estimate, including re-examination, we came in at three quarters,
12 roughly, of that revised estimate. Cross-examination, a little more than
13 the time taken by the Defence, additional two hours, and then two hours
14 for questions from the Bench.
15 Mr. President, I've sought to add two additional factors.
16 Firstly, I anticipate, as the Defence has done many times, that it will
17 say that the Prosecution has unduly slowed down the pace of
18 cross-examination by unnecessary objections, and rather than drag this
19 Trial Chamber into a futile match of allegation and counter-allegation, I
20 have cleaned up the transcript of two of the witnesses. In other words, I
21 took the transcript and took out every intervention by the opposing party
22 so we could see how much hard evidence there was.
23 The two witnesses that I selected were Kolp. He was taken by
24 Mr. Mundis, and Niaz, who was taken by me. So it allows for different
25 styles from the Prosecution. The cleaned-up evidence appears, those times
1 appear in brackets, and one can see in relation to Kolp what those figures
2 are, how they compare, in other words, the Prosecution, instead of two
3 hours, took one hour and 22 minutes, Defence took one hour and 52 minutes.
4 In relation to Niaz, the Prosecution took one hour and 3 minutes and the
5 Defence took one hour.
6 But there's another factor, and that is that during
7 examination-in-chief over the last few weeks, the Defence has repeatedly
8 risen to its feet and complained about the quality of the French
9 transcript, its accuracy. I do not for a minute, I repeat myself, seek to
10 be critical of the Defence, of the French translators, or anyone else.
11 What is simply relevant for this exercise is that it slows down the
12 Prosecution, and it is a factor beyond the Prosecution's control.
13 To give you an example of how often that happens, in relation to
14 the evidence of Kolp, during that examination, the one hour and 29
15 minutes, there were 11 objections by the Defence, based simply -- I'm
16 sorry, sixth of which were based simply on complaints about the French
17 transcript. And if one goes to the evidence of Henneberry, during the
18 examination-in-chief there were a total of 16 objections by the Defence --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, looking at the clock and looking at your
20 piece of paper, I see that you're more or less reflecting what is on
21 paper. Could you please proceed, because we will carefully read what you
22 have written.
23 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, before I leave it, can I make one more
24 point about the chart? In relation to Niaz, if one looks at those
25 cleaned-up times, one would expect there to be more hard evidence from the
1 Prosecution than the Defence, one hour 3 minutes for the Prosecution, one
2 hour for the Defence. In fact, when one cleans up that hard copy of
3 transcript, it comes down to 14 pages for the Prosecution, 15 for the
4 Defence. That reflects, that quantifies the difference pace between
5 examination-in-chief and the cross-examination, even where the Prosecution
6 and Defence have exactly the same period of time, the Defence can produce
7 more evidence because they can speak faster, the witnesses can speak
8 faster, and they can get through more questions and more answers. Good
9 luck to the Defence, Mr. President. I'm not complaining about them. I'm
10 simply making the point that in terms of us keeping to our timetable,
11 these are the insurmountable problems we face.
12 Mr. President, to go to the remaining charts, and before I do
13 that, in conjunction, I refer you to the memo addressed to me dated the
14 4th of June from the chief of the VWU, following a meeting I had with her,
15 in which she said, as she repeats in this memo, that they are at a point
16 of effectively seizure. In our attempts to make sure that not five
17 minutes of court time is wasted, so that we can meet the deadline, there
18 have been a number of witnesses who have come to The Hague to give
19 evidence who have become part heard or not reached, simply because we have
20 not been able to keep to the timetable that we foreshadow seven days in
22 Put simply, the VWU cannot maintain this level of intensity, and
23 that point has been made in clear terms to me. We have seen an example of
24 that this week. We have Mr. Mole this morning. I am reliably informed
25 that he is, to put it mildly, less than happy, and one can well imagine
1 why. He gave some evidence on Monday, having arrived last weekend. He
2 will give at best another hour's evidence today and then have to come back
3 at some later point.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. We do understand that this is --
5 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE ORIE: -- a very unpleasant situation for the witness.
7 MR. IERACE: Yes. I come now to the chart. In constructing this
8 chart, the Prosecution has sought to indicate to the Tribunal a more
9 realistic timetable. I do not for a minute suggest that if we adopt this
10 timetable that there will be a wasted five minutes. Rather, in applying
11 this timetable, we do not have witnesses at great expense waiting in the
12 wings, so as to speak.
13 Mr. President, when one applies the remaining witness list to the
14 forthcoming weeks and factors in the break, the Plenary Sessions, and so
15 on, it becomes apparent that the Prosecution requires, until the 30th of
16 August, in order to get through its viva voce witnesses, and that assumes
17 that we are successful in relation to our 92 bis application. I
18 appreciate, Mr. President, that you said this morning that the Defence
19 will not receive the time that they have requested.
20 Mr. President, in the remaining few minutes that are allocated to
21 me, I appreciate I've gone beyond --
22 JUDGE ORIE: I'm afraid there are no more minutes allocated to
23 you. May I take it that this is what you suggest that would be the order
24 of witnesses to appear.
25 MR. IERACE: Rough order.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Rough order, yes.
2 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, could I just say this?
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 MR. IERACE: We are now in the -- I think we're at the 96th or
5 97th day of hearing. We've been going since December. Mr. President, I
6 would like to think that the Prosecution has been viewed as doing
7 everything it could throughout that period to meet the requirements of the
8 Trial Chamber and in so doing that the Trial Chamber could have some
9 degree of confidence that the Prosecution can be trusted to present its
10 case in as efficient a manner as possible. And in making these
11 submissions perhaps for the first time since December, I specify a date.
12 That date, of course, and this timetable, again assumes that nothing goes
13 wrong, that no time is lost, and that there is not a blowout, so as to
14 speak, in terms of legal arguments and so on. So I simply make the point,
15 Mr. President, that perhaps we're at a stage where the Prosecution can
16 be -- the Trial Chamber can have a degree of confidence that if there is
17 some latitude given to the Prosecution, that that latitude will not result
18 in any less efficient a presentation of its case and that one could accept
19 from the Prosecution that we are talking about the bare minimum in terms
20 of an issue of fundamental fairness. The bare minimum that is required to
21 allow the Prosecution to present its case. Thank you, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you have an opportunity to
23 respond, and we'd like to start with the next witness at 9.00. Please
25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
1 Mr. President. 0836, 0851, the Prosecution used up only 220 minutes of
2 the time that you accorded it. This is perhaps one of the reasons that
3 time is being lost. I don't blame anyone. I'm just taking note of the
4 situation. What I wish to do is to make a suggestion, only one example.
5 Yesterday we listened for a very long time, almost half an hour,
6 an integral text of a telephone conversation for which only a few seconds
7 would have been necessary. The Defence believes that this could be cut
8 down. We would have been the first to cooperate with the Prosecution in
9 that sense. We have to manage time better, and the Defence counsel is at
10 the disposal of the Prosecution for this if it so desires.
11 Just a few words by way of conclusion. You will have noted, as
12 most anyone else, that the rare interventions of the Defence on technical
13 matters are made only when it is necessary and not, as a rule, on
14 questions of detail. It is our duty to verify the transcripts, and what I
15 would suggest, to gain time - and we discussed this matter with the
16 representatives of the French government, and this is what goes on at
17 Rwanda - that we should pass directly to the French transcripts, and I
18 think that the Chamber is bilingual, and in this way we would gain time in
19 future, and the Prosecution will be completely satisfied. This is one of
20 the ideas that I could put forward if the Prosecution agrees, and that we
21 could perhaps decide on.
22 As regards the Defence's interventions, they are necessary, and
23 the figures that have been submitted to us, although they represent a lot
24 of work, perhaps not useful and justified, do not really reflect the
25 realities. The Defence is much briefer than the Prosecution, and if
1 necessary, it intervenes in written, which the Prosecution could do at
2 times also. Thank you, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE ORIE: I take it, Mr. Ierace, that you want the Chamber to
4 decide on whether this time schedule would be acceptable for the Chamber.
5 We'll try, if not to give a decision, at least give some guidance today.
6 It's a complex matter, so therefore I cannot promise you that, as I told
7 you yesterday, that we could decide in three hours on five weeks. But
8 we'll see whether we can give you some guidance by the end of this
9 morning's session.
10 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, there are three minutes left,
12 three and a half minutes left. I don't know whether you want to use that
13 time in order to make the submissions you couldn't do before.
14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
15 MR. IERACE: I do apologise for interrupting. I simply wanted to
16 correct something. I did indicate yesterday that it was five weeks. In
17 fact, Mr. President, you will see it's six weeks. Thank you.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It makes it even more difficult.
19 MR. IERACE: Yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. As
22 regards - and I will keep to the time limit - as regards the Witness
23 Philips, what we would like to add is that the situation is similar to the
24 situation in the Milosevic case. We know that -- father's --
25 JUDGE ORIE: If there's any problem, please address me.
1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Means the people who are your
2 equals, your Judges, were confronted with a situation, a similar
3 situation, where expert witnesses were called, when in fact these were
4 members of the Prosecution, of the OTP. I think that an oral decision has
5 been made in that sense.
6 As regards the two witnesses, at least in regard to Mr. Phillips,
7 it is not a witness that was a witness to the facts, counted bodies in a
8 ditch or witnessed a shelling. It was a witness who elaborated theories,
9 who spoke of figures and submitted reports, and this is quite different to
10 have a visual witness who said, "I saw this. I witnessed that" than a
11 witness who elaborated a conception, a report. And I hope that I'm still
12 within my time limit. And we oppose on the basis of those witnesses
13 are -- but the Prosecution and nothing else, that they should be heard.
14 [As interpreted] We oppose the production of such reports for the motives
15 that we have set forth in our application that we wrote yesterday and
16 which we will communicate to you today. This was simply what I wished to
18 The other point I wish to raise is the programme of today. We do
19 not know who will be heard in a while, Mr. President, but if it is
20 Mr. Van Baal, we would like to say the following. Neither General Galic
21 nor Ms. Pilipovic had the time to read and then to examine the document,
22 so that even if it were only an examination-in-chief right now, no one
23 here would be capable of listening, of hearing what is to be heard, for
24 the simple fact that we did not have time to prepare, and therefore we're
25 in a situation where we are not able to work, and we would like to point
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 this out. And thank you in advance.
2 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber has taken notice of your objection
3 against the examination of Philips and Tabeau as expert witnesses for the
4 reasons you indicated.
5 Mr. Ierace.
6 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, it would make sense, I think, for you
7 and Your Honours to look at his material before we take that debate
8 further, and that could happen after the week's break. It's simply a
9 chart with a two-page statement, summarising hundreds and hundreds of
11 Mr. President, Witness AD, I've received the decision. The
12 Defence has swore the certificate. I'd be grateful if that could be
13 resolved so as to enable us to take the necessary steps either way. If,
14 Mr. President, the Trial Chamber does contemplate issuing a certificate, I
15 would seek to be heard on that. It would not take long. But if it was
16 possible for a decision about the certificate to be made or communicated
17 to the Prosecution, either today or during the course of next week, I'd be
18 very grateful.
19 JUDGE ORIE: I'll let you know whether additional oral argument is
20 of any use in regard of the certificate requested. If so, we'll let you
21 know when it will take place; and if not, we'll also inform you.
22 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then is the Prosecution ready to call its next
25 MR. IERACE: It is, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE ORIE: And the question mark is who it is.
2 MR. IERACE: It's Richard Mole. General Van Baal is expected to
3 arrive at 11.00, so at whatever point he's brought to the door of the
4 courtroom, then we will suspend Richard Mole and proceed with
5 General Van Baal. Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Ierace.
7 Ms. Pilipovic.
8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Your
9 Honour, it seems to me that we have not yet decided regarding the evidence
10 produced during Witness W.
11 JUDGE ORIE: You're perfectly right. Thank you very much for
12 assisting me. That's what happens when you start so early. We should
13 have to do it in closed session, so therefore let us turn into closed
14 session right now and ask the usher to wait one second with Mr. Mole.
15 Could we turn into closed session?
16 [Closed session]
19 [Open session]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Now we are in open session.
21 Madam Usher, could you please escort the witness into the
23 [The witness entered court]
24 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Mole.
25 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
1 JUDGE ORIE: First of all, I'd like to apologise for the very bad
2 situation for you that you had to wait for quite some time. We are facing
3 some major scheduling problems. I hope you'll understand, but I am and
4 this Chamber is fully aware of the unpleasant situation that has been
5 created by these problems. I hope you will accept this.
6 Mr. Ierace.
7 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE ORIE: May I still remind you you are still bound by the
9 solemn declaration you gave at the beginning of your testimony, Mr. Mole.
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
11 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 WITNESS: Richard Mole [Resumed]
13 MR. IERACE: Good morning, Mr. Mole.
14 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
15 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, could I ask that the witness be shown
16 Exhibit P3704.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Is that the coloured map?
18 MR. IERACE: That's the coloured map, yes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: I think it was distributed already, although I must
20 admit that I don't have it with me at this very moment.
21 Examined by Mr. Ierace: [Continued]
22 Q. Mr. Mole, when you last gave evidence on Monday, I asked you
23 whether you recollected any military offensives by the Romanija Corps, and
24 you said, "One in particular that I recall was the offensive in the area
25 of Otes, which was on the west side of Sarajevo during the early days of
2 You were then shown this map, and you explained to us how this map
3 came into being, in particular, the confrontation line which appears on
4 it, or at least the line which appears on it. Is that the confrontation
6 A. Yes, it is.
7 Q. You told us that you placed that line on the map the date after
8 the 10th of December, 1992. How were you able to determine that it was
9 after that date?
10 A. The conflict which had occurred in the Otes region in the period
11 of early December caused the adjustment to the front line map to exclude
12 Otes from the area of the city.
13 Q. When was the Otes campaign?
14 A. The early part of December, leading up to the 10th.
15 Q. All right. Now, could you please place that part of the map which
16 shows Otes under the screen in such a way with the usher's help, so that
17 we can see it.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] We have an objection to the
20 term "campaign," for legal and technical reasons. I do not think that
21 Otes was a campaign as such, as perhaps as some other campaigns that we
22 know, the campaign in Russia and --
23 MR. IERACE: To save time, Mr. President, I'll change the
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. IERACE:
3 Q. We will refer to it as the Otes offensive?
4 MR. IERACE: I think we're having some trouble getting the map
5 onto the computer screens, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Could we just have the -- well, we don't see anything
7 apart that there is something under the ELMO. Could you please put it as
8 flat as possible, Madam Usher, or zoom it in in such a way, because it
9 might be... I think it should be more flat and then perhaps adjust it
10 to... No, it doesn't seem to be that part, but...
11 MR. IERACE: I'll avoid the use of the ELMO at this time.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see now -- there we were. There we are.
13 MR. IERACE: All right. Perhaps we can zoom in a little. All
14 right. Stopping there for the moment.
15 Q. Mr. Mole, can you point to the area of Otes on the map and hold
16 your finger or the pointer at that place so that the camera can adjust to
18 MR. IERACE: If we could zoom yes. Yes. Thank you. That's fine.
19 A. [Indicates]
20 Q. So I think your evidence is that the offensive by the Romanija
21 Corps was successful in that they captured the area of Otes, thus changing
22 the position of the confrontation line in that part of Sarajevo; is that
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. All right. Now, could you please take a blue marker. At that
1 stage, whereabouts, in what building --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Is that a blue marker, just to be sure? It's not a
3 black marker? Yes.
4 MR. IERACE:
5 Q. Whereabouts was the UN headquarters, your headquarters included?
6 What was the name of the building?
7 A. The building was the PTT building.
8 Q. All right. Please place a cross where that building was, just a
9 little blue cross.
10 A. [Marks]
11 Q. And if you could just write "PTT" alongside it, as small as you
13 A. [Marks]
14 Q. Thank you for that. Now, did you see any of the fighting that
15 took place in the Otes offensive?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. Did you see whether any artillery and mortars and tanks were
18 deployed by the Romanija Corps?
19 A. Yes, sir, but not from the PTT building. We were from another
20 observation point. It was called Papa 5.
21 Q. All right. And could you tell us your assessment of the degree of
22 use of artillery and mortars by the Romanija Corps during that battle?
23 A. Up until that time, it was the most intense shelling that we had
24 experienced, certainly in Sarajevo. We estimated the number of rounds
25 that impacted the area of concern to be about 1.500, but there were
1 parameters which I must explain. The hours of daylight were limited.
2 There was fog in the region. And so our observation time was limited. So
3 one could probably assess that the numbers of rounds would be double
4 within a 24-hour period.
5 Q. All right. Now, at that stage were the Lima observation posts
7 A. Yes, they were.
8 Q. And what reports, if any, were you receiving as to the activity of
9 the various artillery batteries during that period on the Lima side, in
10 a general sense?
11 A. Most of those that we were monitoring were extremely busy, without
12 going far.
13 Q. All right. And did you draw any conclusions or make any
14 observations based on what you saw of the use of artillery in particular
15 by the Romanija Corps in that offensive as to the degree of control and
16 coordination of the Romanija Corps and its leadership?
17 A. The command and control of the artillery positions was such that
18 they could bring to bear a very effective fire mission.
19 Q. All right.
20 MR. IERACE: That map could be returned.
21 Q. In your dealings with General Galic, did you ever have cause to
22 call on him to assist you with any problems involving relationships
23 between your subordinate UNMOs and his forces?
24 A. Yes, I did, sir.
25 Q. Did you ever call on him to take any action in relation to that
1 issue or those issues?
2 A. There were at least two events which involved UNMOs being held
3 illegally by individuals on the Serb side. For different reasons. If I
4 may give one example. One of the individuals and their family, who kept
5 the UNMOs restrained, was extremely upset at the loss of a relative, and
6 it was their method of bringing that to people's attention. So that would
7 be an example of our UNMOs being kept in inappropriate circumstances. I
8 asked General Galic to assist, either directly or through the headquarters
9 on the Lima side, and that assistance was given effectively, efficiently,
10 and quickly.
11 Q. What was the outcome?
12 A. The UNMOs were released and returned to duty.
13 Q. Do you know whether any disciplinary action was taken against his
14 forces who were involved in either of those incidents that you mentioned?
15 A. I presume that it was the equivalent of military police, who were
16 involved under his orders, but I don't know any further than that as to
17 what happened to the individuals concerned.
18 Q. What is it that you recollect that leads you to say that you
19 presume that military police were involved? What do you know of? What do
20 you recollect specifically as to disciplinary measures?
21 A. It was what I was told from my officers on the Lima side.
22 Q. What did they tell you?
23 A. They told me that the military police had been involved in the
24 release of the UNMOs.
25 Q. All right. Now, did you --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Mr. President,
3 merely to gain time. I do not have the impression that this line of
4 examination is all that relevant. It would be unnecessary and I am
5 therefore objecting.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, if there's a question, you think
7 it's irrelevant, you may object against that question, not against a line
8 of questioning in general. But what --
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, then we'll say
10 that the questioned is asked to know whether in this case when the
11 military police supposedly intervened --
12 JUDGE ORIE: No. That was not the question. That was the answer,
13 Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
14 Mr. Ierace, could you please briefly explain the relevance of the
16 MR. IERACE: Yes, Mr. President. This evidence demonstrates the
17 ability of the accused at that particular period, that is, late 1992, to
18 exert control over his subordinates. Here we have an incident where his
19 forces had taken certain action against some UNMOs, and when he so
20 desired, he was able to issue orders and take steps to intervene
21 forcefully to bring about his desired result. So that's the relevance of
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The objection is denied. Please proceed,
24 Mr. Ierace.
25 MR. IERACE:
1 Q. Did you take any steps to thank General Galic following one of
2 those incidents?
3 A. Yes. Whenever he assisted me, and in these particular instances,
4 I did thank him, either directly when I next saw him or through my
5 officers on Lima side.
6 MR. IERACE: Might the witness be shown Exhibit -- I think it is
8 Q. Do you recognise that letter in front of you?
9 A. I might do eventually.
10 Q. I'm sorry.
11 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I'll move on from that. I don't think
12 we need the letter. It may be --
13 THE REGISTRAR: I'm sorry. I don't think we have a 3708,
14 Mr. Ierace.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
16 MR. IERACE:
17 Q. On occasions that you visited -- I withdraw that. Do you recall
18 when it was, approximately, that those incidents took place, that is,
19 where General Galic intervened?
20 A. The dates, no doubt, would be in my original statement, but I
21 don't recall the dates set here.
22 Q. Do you recall the months, or approximately the months?
23 A. I'm struggling.
24 Q. All right. On the occasions that you visited Lukavica, did you
25 ever go to the operations room?
1 A. I did.
2 Q. And we're talking, of course, about the operations room of the
3 Romanija Corps.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Can you tell us what you saw in terms of its layout, visual aids,
6 communications, that sort of thing.
7 A. It was laid out in the conventional fashion for an operations
8 room, with maps, telephones, radios, duty officer, and so on.
9 Q. Do you have any particular expertise in the area of logistics?
10 A. That is my -- or was my main task, yes.
11 Q. And when you say that was your main task, was that before or after
12 you arrived in Sarajevo?
13 A. I had been serving in the military for 24 years, and in most of
14 that period had served in the Royal Corps Transport, a logistic unit.
15 Q. Could you tell us just a little bit about what's involved --
16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] There is an error in the
17 French interpretation. I believe this witness spoke in the past tense,
18 and in the French interpretation I see that interpreters are indicating
19 with their heads -- thank you.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
21 MR. IERACE:
22 Q. Could you tell us just briefly what's involved in logistics in
23 relation to a military campaign?
24 A. The provision of all items required in that campaign.
25 Q. And when you say "all items," does that include munitions?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Primarily.
2 Q. You've told us that you -- I withdraw that. Did you travel to the
3 Lima side on a regular basis or an irregular basis?
4 A. Yes, I did, sir.
5 Q. All right. How often would you visit the observation posts on the
6 Lima side?
7 A. I would visit probably three, four times a week.
8 Q. You've told us that one of the objectives i setting up the -- in
9 positioning the Lima OPs was to maximize the opportunity of observing
10 artillery and heavy weapons. Is that the case?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. Firstly, when you toured the Lima observation posts, I take it
13 that you saw the heavy weaponry that was near those posts?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. Did you see any munitions in those areas?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. What was the -- what type of munitions would you see at those
19 A. There would be the heavy rounds associated with the weapons on the
21 Q. What steps, if any, were taken to protect the munitions from
22 incoming artillery, mortars, and the like, typically?
23 A. One of the common features of all the Lima sites was that the
24 weapons were in the open, the ammunition was in the open. None of both of
25 those items were camouflaged. The soldiers and officers that manned them
1 sometimes were in uniform, sometimes not, being in civilian clothes, and
2 the whole atmosphere of the weapon sites was relaxed.
3 Q. Did the fact that the shells were in the open tell you anything,
4 in terms of your expertise and military experience, as to the degree of
5 perceived threat by the Serb forces?
6 A. Yes. The threat perceived by themselves was low, very low.
7 Q. All right. Now, can you tell us something as to the quantities of
8 shells that you saw at these sites?
9 A. Well, if I can use my own military experience to explain how I
10 would interpret that, would that be acceptable?
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. In our military, as a planning guide, we use an expression called
13 the daily ammunition expenditure rate, which here is best abbreviated to
14 DAER. It is a planning guide that we, as logisticians utilise to plan how
15 many rounds for each weapon, for the unit that we are supplying, is
16 provided on a daily basis for normal use. Clearly, if the usage
17 increases, so does the DAER for different phases of battle.
18 Using that as a basis of the ammunition that we saw on the weapon
19 sites, my estimate would be that they had probably between one and two
20 DAERs available to them on site.
21 Q. And how would that rate in terms -- in a general sense, in terms
22 of whether that is a little, average, or a lot?
23 A. That, as a DAER, would be an average.
24 Q. Did you make any observations that would suggest that the heavy
25 weaponry on the Romanija Corps site was poorly supplied with munitions?
1 A. There was never an occasion when we considered that it was poorly
2 resupplied. They generally seemed to have as much ammunition as they
3 required. We often saw the resupply runs. They were unhindered. So no,
4 there was no reason to believe that they would be short of munitions.
5 Q. Going back briefly to the DAER, is it possible for you to give us
6 an idea of what number of shells would be required for a particular type
7 of weapon, say a particular type of Howitzer or field gun?
8 A. Bearing in mind that the use of this terminology would be British,
9 it's difficult to transpose that across to a different military. But to
10 best answer your question, on a weapon site of, for example, a battery, a
11 field battery, one would expect to see a stockpile of five, six hundred
13 Q. And for how many guns would that be?
14 A. For a battery.
15 Q. A battery, which would be --?
16 A. Four to six.
17 Q. All right. Again in terms of logistics, as you understand it,
18 would a commander typically require detailed information as to the use of
19 munitions, that is, the rate of use of munitions?
20 A. Any commander would have an artillery representative who would
21 advise him of all matters relating to his arm. Crucial to that would be
22 resupply, and if any problem to that resupply had occurred, it would be
23 the duty of the artillery commander to bring it to the attention of the
24 commander, because clearly it would be a limiting factor to the
25 commander's capability.
1 Q. In the case of the Romanija Corps, in a general sense, in terms of
2 its assets, what was its principal weakness - and I include human assets -
3 and what was its principal strength, at the time you were there?
4 A. The disposition of both the forces, either side, was opposites in
5 that the Romanija Corps --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I'm very sorry, but in the
8 French interpretation there was a contradiction which is possibly due, in
9 line 20... I do not know if a word was interpreted correctly. Thank you.
10 Sorry for this interruption.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Could you indicate what word?
12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Weakness. It was said which
13 was the chief -- the principal force, whereas the sense of the original
14 was exactly the contrary. But it has now been corrected.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. May I give you some guidance,
16 Mr. Piletta-Zanin. If this would have occurred, you could have said, "As
17 far as I know, the word weakness in line 20 seems not to have been
18 translated, or not correctly translated." That would be just enough.
19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I will say it. Thank you very
21 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you. The disposition of either side in the
23 conflict was such that they were opposite, and I illustrate that by
24 explaining that the Romanija Corps was heavy on artillery and heavy
25 weapons, but very light, or comparatively light, on infantry.
1 MR. IERACE:
2 Q. All right. Perhaps I'll stop you there, in the interests of
3 saving time. It being the case that one would presumably expect the
4 commander of the Romanija Corps to depend on his artillery as his
5 principal strength; would that be correct?
6 A. That would be a fair assessment.
7 Q. To what extent would that, in your opinion, impact on his need to
8 maintain a close monitoring of the use of his artillery?
9 A. I'm sorry. You'll just have to repeat that.
10 Q. I will rephrase that. I apologise for that. Given his dependency
11 on artillery, that being his principal strength, would you expect the
12 commander to carefully monitor the use of it?
13 A. Yes, that would be essential.
14 Q. Would that extend to both the rate of use of the munitions and the
15 type of target or not?
16 A. Well, there's a logical progression from what we're discussing in
17 that if there is an ammunition expenditure on a daily basis, which there
18 was, it had to be recorded and be known. If, therefore, ammunition was
19 being replaced on a daily basis, it must be going somewhere. So the
20 question begs: Where was it going? As a commander, I would hope to know
21 where it was going.
22 Q. Did you ever see any of the batteries being resupplied?
23 A. I did, sir, yes.
24 Q. What sort of vehicles were involved in that? If you could tell us
25 what typically you would see.
1 A. Yes. They were never the very large resupply vehicles, say, of 10
2 tonnes. They tended to be the smaller vehicles, up to about five tonnes.
3 Q. Going back momentarily to Otes, you've told us that at that stage
4 that was the heaviest frequency of recorded fire, and even that was in the
5 context of limited viewing hours. During that offensive, can you give us
6 a range of incoming impacts from the Serb -- the Bosnian Serb army side
7 into Sarajevo? In other words, over the days of the offensive, what type
8 of number of rounds are we talking about coming in?
9 A. Well, as I mentioned before, the estimate on a daily basis was
10 1.500 seen, therefore probably double that in any 24-hour period, and that
11 multiplied by a function of six days.
12 Q. All right. Are you aware as to where the munitions came from that
13 were used by the Romanija Corps? And in particular, I'm talking about
14 heavy weaponry.
15 A. Yes. Well, all the weapon sites were clearly very busy, both for
16 the fire missions that they were on, and obviously being resupplied.
17 Q. Do you know whether in the vicinity in Serb-held territory there
18 were any munitions factories?
19 A. There's one that I know of, yes, Vogosca.
20 Q. How long was the front line around Sarajevo?
21 A. We estimated it at 64, 65 kilometres.
22 Q. Did you ever circumnavigate the city on the Serb side whilst you
23 were there?
24 A. Yes, I did, sir.
25 Q. And I take it that was driving?
1 A. Yes. Myself and two others took a jeep and went right around the
2 front line on the Serb side.
3 Q. How long did it take you?
4 A. A very long day.
5 Q. Given that you were able to do that, you being a military
6 observer, are you aware of any impediment that would have confronted the
7 commander of the Romanija Corps had he wished to visit any part of the
8 front line during the time that you were there?
9 A. The disposition of the front line meant that physical travel from
10 one side to the other was of necessity going to take a long time. The
11 roads were very narrow, the terrain was very hilly, and therefore overall
12 progress was slow.
13 Q. But are you aware of any impediment to him doing it, had he wished
14 to do it?
15 A. Absolutely none.
16 Q. Going back to the ability of the leadership of the Romanija Corps
17 to intervene when they wished, was there any incident in which you were a
18 participant where intervention from a higher level was called upon?
19 A. Could you indicate what level that might be?
20 Q. All right. Well, perhaps I'll do it a different way. Were you
21 ever involved in an incident where you called upon your contacts with
22 higher leadership within the Romanija Corps to assist to extricate you
23 from a different situation?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. Please tell us about that.
1 A. If I may give an example of one of our functions was the
2 arrangement of body swaps between sides. This required immense amount of
3 planning, and to achieve that I had meetings on the airport with
4 representatives of both sides. I used to collect the representatives from
5 the Presidency side because I lived in the city, and take them to the
6 airport. The incident to which I refer, myself and the Presidency
7 representatives were taken in two French APCs back towards the city from
8 the airport. At the checkpoint on the airport road by Nedzarici, a T54
9 tank and APC on the Serb side prevented further progress.
10 The situation became extremely tense in that they wished to open
11 the APC rear doors, which eventually was done. I was in the company of an
12 RCMP sergeant, Hull, and myself, were in the back seats, nearest the door,
13 when they were opened. The Serb soldiers were intent on removing the
14 Presidency representatives to execute them. We had -- we, Sergeant Hull
15 and myself, intended obviously to prevent that, and for 20 minutes we
16 worked very hard, amidst jostling, to prevent that event occurring.
17 I then asked, when the situated permitted, that I could speak to
18 their commander, and I mentioned him by name, although I don't recall the
19 name now.
20 Q. Let me just interrupt for a minute. Did you in fact make a
21 decision, that is, you and Officer Hull, between yourselves that come what
22 may you would not move?
23 A. That was the decision we had come to.
24 Q. Please continue.
25 A. Because I named their commander by name, there was a certain
1 degree of restraint, and after maybe an hour and a half, the individual
2 who I had asked for arrived on the scene. By good fortune, I had had
3 lunch with this individual that day, and the situation was quickly
4 resolved and we were able to proceed on our way.
5 Q. All right. Now, you say that the commander arrived, the situation
6 resolved, and you were on your way. What was the connection? In other
7 words, once the commander arrived, did he say anything? Did he give any
9 A. First of all, I not only had had lunch that day, but there had
10 been on one occasion an observation point on the Papa side -- no. I
11 withdraw that - close to the Papa side, right in Nedzarici, within the
12 command area of the Serb commander would we're referring to. So I knew
13 him from that as well, not just lunch. It was not a social visit.
14 Because of that connection, he was able then to command his
15 soldiers to effect our continued journey.
16 Q. All right. Now, do I understand you to be saying - please correct
17 me if I'm wrong - that he was a commander from the area of Nedzarici, in
18 other words, that was his area of command?
19 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
20 Q. Do you recollect his name?
21 A. No, I can't.
22 Q. All right. Now, during the period -- before I move on: Do you
23 recollect the approximate date of that incident?
24 A. I think if we look in my original witness statement, the date is
25 included within.
1 Q. We'll come to some reports later.
2 During the period that you were in Sarajevo, can you give us some
3 idea of the daily frequency of sniper fire, mortar impacts, shell impacts
4 inside the city throughout the 24-hour period? If I could first of all
5 ask you this: Was there a day that you recollect where there were no
6 shell impacts in the city?
7 A. Absolutely in the. May I not. May I continue?
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. There was continual background noise of small arms and mortars and
10 artillery throughout all the time that I spent in Sarajevo from September
11 to December 1992. It was a constant background, something it takes a lot
12 to get used to.
13 Q. Please try not to be too cryptic. What do you mean by "it takes a
14 lot to get used to"? I think you should spell that out.
15 A. Firstly, one has to assess what you perceive as normal, and very
16 quickly, when living in the city, one learnt that normal was this
17 persistent, constant level of tension created by small arms, mortars, and
18 heavy weapons.
19 Q. Did you make any observations as to the comparative levels of
20 damage as a result of incoming shell fire to military areas as opposed to
21 civilian areas?
22 A. Firstly, let me define my understanding of the distinction between
23 the two. Clearly, any activity around front lines, any activity around
24 known headquarters, any activity around logistics elements, I would
25 consider military targets. The remainder definitely wasn't. I knew where
1 those military targets were. It would be unbelievable that anybody else
2 who was targeting those areas didn't know where they were, which left
3 large sways of the city, in my opinion, to be not areas of a target,
4 military target.
5 Q. Having explained that, how did the damage compare between the two
6 types of areas?
7 A. I assume you mean physical damage to buildings and so on.
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. Clearly, the damage around the front lines was extensive, because
10 those front lines seldom moved, as perhaps I've begun to explain. The map
11 we've already seen had a front line on it which changed little, except for
12 the Otes area, in four months. So clearly the front lines were a very
13 damaged area of the city. However, the remainder of the city showed
14 immense damage from incoming munitions.
15 Q. Leaving aside the signs of physical damage from past activity, and
16 focusing instead on your observations of incoming fire, how did that
17 compare, while you were there, that is, incoming fire in the areas of
18 military targets, as you have defined them, and areas which you regarded
19 as non-military-target areas?
20 A. Clearly, in the time I was there, there were moments, numerous
21 moments, that the front line was extremely active, but the background
22 noise and overall pressure upon the city was a constant. The only thing
23 that varied in that regard was the intensity, for example, of shelling and
24 mortaring, within the city generally. It went up and it went down,
25 sometimes connected to perceived threats on the front line.
1 Q. All right. When you moved about the city, you being a UN
2 employee, did you wear UN insignia to designate your neutrality?
3 A. Yes. My helmet was blue. We wore blue vests, we had white
4 vehicles with UN markings and UN flags. The vehicles -- can I just --
5 Q. Certainly.
6 A. From the military observers' point of view, all the vehicles we
7 used were soft-skinned vehicles.
8 Q. All right. Did you feel any degree of safety moving around the
9 civilian areas, and can you comment on the comparative degree of safety
10 between moving around the civilian areas and the front line?
11 A. To make a distinction would be foolish if one considered that one
12 was going to be safer in one rather than the other. The whole city was an
13 extremely dangerous place to live.
14 Q. At any stage did you make any assessment of the numbers of
15 civilian casualties on the Bosnian government side which were unrelated to
16 military activity?
17 A. Yes. Looking at our reports that we received from both the
18 Presidency side, from our own observations as we drove around the city, we
19 worked out an average of about 14 or 15 people dying per day, but that's
20 only an average, and I think the numbers numerically over the whole siege
21 of Sarajevo would probably work out to about 14 or 15 a day.
22 Q. You said you had access to the Bosnian government figures. Did
23 you mitigate them in any way? In other words, did you accept them at face
24 value or did you factor in a degree of exaggeration?
25 A. No. I considered that our observation capability was sometimes
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 better in terms of determining the numbers that I've just given you, of
2 our own volition.
3 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I'm about to move on to a new topic.
4 Would that be a convenient place?
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace, because we, of course, have to
6 reschedule this day as well. We started at 8.30. We'll have a break now
7 until 10.30. We'll then continue until 12.00, and we'll have a break
8 from -- until 12.20, and then we'll continue until a quarter to 2.00.
9 We'll have a break now until 10.30.
10 --- Recess taken at 9.58 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 10.38 a.m.
12 JUDGE ORIE: If you'd just grant me one second.
13 As I indicated before, it is difficult for the Chamber to come to
14 final conclusions in respect of the submissions made by the Prosecution.
15 Nevertheless, the Prosecution asked some guidance, especially in view of
16 the coming week. I'll give at least some guidance.
17 The Chamber will be more strict in keeping the time limits for the
18 Defence that they will not use more time for cross-examination as used for
19 examination-in-chief. Of course, there always might be exceptions, such
20 as if the Prosecution would indicate that they would use two hours and
21 they just use half an hour, then that would not automatically mean that we
22 would then, after 30 minutes, say to the Defence that their time is over.
23 So it always depends, but we will be far more strict that the time used
24 for cross-examination will not be more than the examination-in-chief.
25 The second issue is that we spend a lot of time on procedural
1 issues. If they are directly related to the testimony given at that
2 moment, the admission of documents or objections and questions, of course
3 we have to hear them immediately, but we'll not at an average spend more
4 than 15 minutes a day on general procedural issues. And we'll try to do
5 that also as efficiently as possible. That might mean that we try to gain
6 time in, for example, starting earlier or just using the last ten minutes
7 of the day for these kind of procedural issues.
8 The Chamber is very much concerned about the Prosecution's case
9 not being finished before the summer recess. Keeping in mind what I've
10 just said, and also keeping in mind that, at an average, the Chamber
11 intends to grant approximately 50 per cent of the time asked by the
12 Defence to cross-examine expert witnesses, the Chamber would highly
13 appreciate if the Prosecution would use the next week to reconsider the
14 time schedule as it has been presented by now and to see whether a time
15 schedule could be created such that the Prosecution's case would be
16 concluded not later than the beginning of the summer recess.
17 This is the guidance we could give after just a brief period of
18 deliberation. Apart from that, you asked some guidance as far as the
19 application for granting a certificate in respect of Witness AD is
20 concerned. A written decision will be delivered, but the decision will be
21 that the certificate will not be granted.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps I may finally indicate, where I just said
24 that we would be very strict on the time to be used in cross-examination,
25 of course there's a direct relation between the time used in
1 examination-in-chief. We sometimes saw that the Prosecution was able to
2 use far less time, but sometimes we also had to experience that the
3 Prosecution took more time, sometimes dealing very extensively with
4 issues, very specific issues, of which it is not, at first sight, clear
5 whether they would justify such a lot of time. So therefore, we'll also
6 be rather strict, and we know that time gained by the Prosecution usually
7 is double gain. It will affect, in general, the time used in
8 cross-examination as well. It's to both parties to use that time as
9 efficiently as possible.
10 Having given this guidance, I think we could continue the
11 examination-in-chief of Mr. Mole.
12 Madam Usher, could you please escort the witness into the
14 [The witness entered court]
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mole, I'm informed that it might be that at a
16 later stage this morning your examination might be interrupted again,
17 which is a very unhappy -- an un -- it's not the preferable way of doing
18 it, but sometimes there might be no alternative. I again hope you'll
20 Mr. Ierace, please proceed.
21 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 I ask that the witness be shown Defence Exhibit D131, which was
23 formerly tendered this morning in relation to the evidence of Witness W. I
24 don't think that's a confidential exhibit, Mr. President.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.
1 MR. IERACE: It is.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I think everything is under seal.
3 MR. IERACE: Yes. All right. Perhaps we should then go into
4 closed session for this part of the examination-in-chief. It won't be
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll turn into closed session for a while.
7 [Closed session]
23 [Open session]
24 JUDGE ORIE: We are in open session.
25 MR. IERACE:
1 Q. In relation to the visits that you made, I think you said two or
2 three times a week, to the Lima observation posts, did you ever personally
3 observe any instances of what you believed to be the indiscriminate fire
4 of the city with heavy weapons?
5 A. You will appreciate that when you're on a gun site and weapons
6 fire, you are not party to the range map which the commander is using to
7 determine his target. As a result, I always asked that my UN military
8 observers - and therefore I as well - would ask local commanders what
9 their target was, in an attempt to determine whether it was acceptable as
10 a target or not. We were, by virtue of the system I've described, only as
11 effective as the answer that I was given by the local commander, but that
12 did not prevent us persisting in the attempt to reduce the level of
13 tension created upon the city by reducing the numbers of rounds fired.
14 Q. If I understand your answer correctly, are you saying that you
15 would instruct your subordinates to bring pressure to bear on the local
16 commanders when they were concerned about the firing by persistently
17 questioning them as to the nature of the target? Is that the case?
18 A. That is exactly the case.
19 Q. All right. Now, did you ever do that personally?
20 A. Yes, I did.
21 Q. And did you ever receive answers that you regarded as
23 A. Yes. I received answers from the trivial, such as the commander
24 telling me, when firing his mortar rounds, that he was warming the
25 barrels. Albeit I accept warming the barrels is a requirement if you have
1 a fire mission and you then proceed with that fire mission, but the
2 instances that I recall, the firing ceased after a few rounds, whether for
3 my intervention or not, I can't determine, but it rather negated the
4 original reason for firing the weapons in the first instance, to warm the
5 barrels before proceeding on a fire mission. That was one example.
6 On other occasions, one particular one, I was told that the three
7 rounds that had been fired were one for each finger of the Serb salute. I
8 don't consider either of those reasons to be pertinent, reasonable,
9 tactical, or strategic reasons for firing one's weapons.
10 Q. In relation to the incident where you were given the -- incident
11 or incidents where you were given the explanation of warming the barrels,
12 were you able to draw any conclusions as to where the round or rounds were
13 likely to land?
14 A. The rationale for firing the weapon that had been given to me was
15 as irrational and as vague as the assumed target; in other words, I don't
16 think there was a specific target.
17 Q. Were you able to form any view as to whether the rounds fired on
18 that occasion threatened, potentially, civilians?
19 A. In that the rounds were random, in that they were fired towards
20 the city of Sarajevo, there's a very high percentage chance that they were
21 random and fired into civilian areas, because it was not explained to me
22 that they were targeting a military target. I've told you the reasons why
23 they fired the weapons. That would hardly be a sensible answer if they
24 had a legitimate military target.
25 Q. What was the weapon, or what were the weapons involved, first in
1 the incident -- I think you told us that was a mortar?
2 A. Yes, sir. Yes.
3 Q. In relation to the Serb salute, what was the weapon or the weapons
5 A. They were artillery weapons. I can't remember their nomenclature,
7 Q. And whereabouts were they pointed at the time of firing, those
8 artillery weapons?
9 A. All the weapons around Sarajevo commanded by the Romanija Corps
10 were pointing towards the city.
11 Q. Did you ever complain to General Galic about those incidents, and
12 similar incidents, of indiscriminate fire, as observed by you and your
14 A. Most days when we did meet, clearly the topic of discussion was
15 the siege of Sarajevo and indiscriminate fire or intense fire was
16 mentioned, as was pertinent at that time.
17 Q. Are you saying, in effect, that as a matter of routine you would
18 do that, you would complain of indiscriminate fire, as observed by
19 yourself and your subordinates to him?
20 A. Yes, but I add that the rider that you'll recall I talked about
21 the persistent background of fire coming into the city daily. I wouldn't
22 trivialise that, but what I am saying is that we concentrated on the peaks
23 of that incoming fire more than we did on what we perceived as the norm.
24 I hope I've explained myself.
25 Q. Yes. Are you saying to us that the level of fire into Sarajevo
1 was such that you effectively had to adjust your standard of normalcy; and
2 secondly, that adjustment was of necessity reflected in the frequency and
3 nature of your complaints to General Galic?
4 A. That is exactly the case, yes, sir.
5 Q. And again, I'm seeking only to reflect your evidence, and please
6 tell me if I'm correctly stating it.
7 A. No. You say it better than I.
8 Q. But the end result of that was that many incidents that one would
9 normally complain of, because of the exigencies of the situation, went
10 without complaint and you had to focus on the more serious incidents?
11 A. That is the correct interpretation, and that is the reason why I
12 persist with trying to explain this constant background of incoming fire.
13 It was taken as a norm, yes.
14 Q. All right. Now, you've told us that you made these regular
15 complaints. Can you tell us what his response was to these complaints?
16 A. I can probably do that to the best effect if I give an example of
17 a particular meeting. I believe it was in November 1992, where I hadn't
18 been able to get across to Lukavica for about a week and a half. It might
19 have been two weeks. And when we initially met, General Galic suggested
20 that I hadn't been to see him for a while, and my immediate reaction was
21 one of considerable anger, because the reason I hadn't been able to go
22 across the airport was that the intensity of shelling was such that I had
23 placed a restriction of movement on all UN military observers, including
24 myself. So clearly, once I had expressed the reason why I hadn't been
25 able to come across and meet him, I naturally asked what the objective
1 was. This would not be an unusual question in our meetings. I never
2 recall getting what I would consider a tactical or strategic answer, in
3 military terms, to that question. The conversation tended to be
4 tangential to that issue and be removed to other items.
5 Q. On occasions when he did offer -- well, first of all, were there
6 occasions when he did offer some sort of explanation?
7 A. Yes. There would be the constant response that the Muslims, that
8 being his expression, not mine, were attacking in a particular sector of
9 the city, which of course, with the observation points that we had, both
10 within and outside the city, we were in a position to verify, or
11 otherwise, and I don't ever recall the local tactical situation changing
12 to the degree that would realistically permit the response of weaponry
13 being fired into the city as an appropriate military response.
14 Q. All right. Well, on those occasions when he sought to justify the
15 fire into the city on the basis that it was in response to using his
16 words, as you've related it, as a result of a Muslim attack in a
17 particular sector, did you ever say to him, given your explanation, that
18 your subordinates were able to confirm that in fact there was no offensive
19 by the Bosnian government forces?
20 A. Within the context of the example I gave you, to best serve to
21 answer the question: Because I was unable to cross the airport for such a
22 period of time, we had that time to analyse what was militarily happening
23 within the city. So I was informed before the meeting that nothing of
24 significance was occurring, and hence the reason for my questioning of
25 General Galic.
1 Q. Did you tell him?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. What was his response then?
4 A. Much the same as I've described before, leading onto other issues.
5 Q. When you met with General Galic, in what language did you and he
7 A. I spoke in English, he spoke in his own language, and the
8 translator did the business between us. That was our translator, the
9 UN-employed translator.
10 Q. At any of those meetings did he have a translator or interpreter?
11 A. I don't recall one as such. My preference, obviously, would be to
12 take my own interpreter. How much Captain Indzic knew of English and
13 interpreted, I cannot say.
14 Q. Do you mean to imply by that comment that Captain Indzic was
16 A. As we said earlier this week, he was present at a number of the
17 meetings, understandable to a degree that one should have somebody else to
18 make sure that interpretation was correct. So understanding that
19 viewpoint caused me not to be concerned about his presence in that regard.
20 Q. Did you ever have any concerns as to the ability of your
21 UN-employed interpreter?
22 A. No, absolutely none.
23 Q. Did you always use the same interpreter or different interpreters?
24 A. No. I always used the one that was directly employed by the UN on
25 Lukavica side.
1 Q. Again, are you saying that the UN had an interpreter permanently
2 positioned at Lukavica for the assistance of UN staff?
3 A. That is correct. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Did General Galic ever say to you words which you regarded as
5 conveying an intention to shell the city indiscriminately?
6 A. In my original witness statement given in 1997 --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I apologise. I
9 would like to object to this question because we see that we have the
10 presence of an interpreter, which is necessary, and we have to underline
11 that if words were uttered, they could only have been uttered through the
12 channel of the interpreter, and I think you should rephrase your question
13 in that sense.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mole, when asked what General Galic ever said,
15 the Chamber takes it that you were asked what General Galic would have
16 said as far as it was interpreted to you by an interpreter. Please
17 proceed. You may answer the question.
18 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Is somebody expecting me to answer the
20 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps I'll repeat the question to you.
21 THE WITNESS: That would be good. Thank you.
22 JUDGE ORIE: The question was, and I rephrase it now: Did General
23 Galic, as you experienced from the translation given to you, ever say to
24 you words which you regarded as conveying an intention to shell the city
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 THE WITNESS: If I may refer to my original statement which I gave
2 in September 1997, there are numerous occasions that I pointed out that
3 events elsewhere in Bosnia, as well as events more local, would, if the
4 circumstances as perceived by General Galic, were right, would cause more
5 pressure to be placed upon the city by shelling. We would really have to
6 look at specific instances.
7 MR. IERACE:
8 Q. All right. Well, first of all, in relation to an offensive you
9 have mentioned already, Otes, not so much in terms of what General Galic
10 might have said, during that offensive, based on your observations and
11 those of your subordinates at the time, was there any shelling of the city
12 which appeared to be unrelated to military activity?
13 A. Clearly, the majority of the weapons which we monitored were on
14 the specific fire mission of Otes, but some of those weapons were far
15 enough away to make their useful contribution to that fire mission to be
16 limited. So one would expect that those weapons were not necessarily to
17 be in use. Events, however, proved that that was not the case. All the
18 weapons that we were monitoring at that time were in use. Rounds were
19 landing elsewhere in the city. Just to put a balance on these events --
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. -- it would not be unusual, when a side is under pressure in a
22 particular tactical or strategic position, to reapply pressure elsewhere
23 to relieve the situation in the first place. This occurred up on the hill
24 known as Zuc, to the north of the city, where I believe the Presidency
25 forces made some advances on a second front. So some of the rounds of
1 those weapons which were not realistically supporting the Otes assault
2 could well have been firing there. However, this never stopped throughout
3 this period, the persistent landing of rounds elsewhere in the city, not
4 related to the confrontation on those two locations or on the front lines
5 anywhere else.
6 Q. All right. Now, I move your attention to Mount Igman. Who
7 controlled Mount Igman, or parts of Mount Igman, if there was more than
8 one force, during your tenure as the senior military observer?
9 A. That was the Presidency side.
10 Q. Did General Galic ever say anything about the use of Mount Igman
11 by the forces of the Presidency?
12 A. Mount Igman was a constant source of annoyance to Serb forces in
13 that there were some artillery pieces on the hill which were targeted
14 towards, specifically, Ilidza and sometime Lukavica.
15 Q. At that stage was Ilidza a Bosnian Serb army held territory?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. Against that background or in relation to that, was there any
18 relevant conversation that you had with General Galic?
19 A. Being the senior military observer, it was quite correct that I
20 should act as a conduit for both sides if they had complaints about the
21 activities of the other. General Galic observed the activities of Mount
22 Igman and made complaint to me about those rounds landing on Ilidza or
23 Lukavica. As a result, I would take those complaints to the other side,
24 much as I did in reverse to General Galic from the Presidency side. That
25 would be my action.
1 Q. Going back to an answer that you gave about five minutes ago in
2 relation to the issue of events happening elsewhere, I think you said
3 elsewhere in Bosnia and also locally, was Mount Igman one of those areas
4 or not?
5 A. Absolutely. That would be what I would consider one of the local
6 concerns for General Galic, yes.
7 Q. What, if anything, did General Galic say about Mount Igman in that
8 regard, in terms of threats?
9 A. There was an accepted norm that if the Serb side failed to achieve
10 their objectives - and I use that in the widest context, so that could be
11 anything from a local complaint to something else that happened within
12 Bosnia - the general perception was that Sarajevo would suffer as a
13 result. This was always interpreted to mean that artillery fire would be
14 brought to bear on the city in response. There were instances where this
15 was quite specifically made as a threat.
16 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I'm in a difficult situation. This is
17 not, in normal circumstances, an appropriate juncture to leave this
18 witness's evidence, but on the other hand, I think events require that we
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace. I note that it's 11.20 now. We
21 expected another witness to arrive.
22 MR. IERACE: I've just been informed that witness has.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But on the other hand, if he's 20 minutes late,
24 if you'd think it appropriate to continue, let's say for another ten
25 minutes, I think then the balance is still 20 minutes late, only ten
1 minutes to wait.
2 MR. IERACE:
3 Q. Mr. Mole, let me take you to the words you just uttered. There
4 were instances -- I'll read the last two sentences, and I think you are
5 referring to a relationship between events in Sarajevo and elsewhere, a
6 perceived relationship. You say this: "This was always interpreted to
7 mean that artillery fire would be brought to bear on the city in response.
8 There were instances where this was quite specifically made as a threat."
9 Can you please give us those instances where it was quite
10 specifically made as a threat.
11 A. May I refer to my statement which I made in 1997?
12 Q. I think probably the Trial Chamber would prefer you did not and
13 rely rather on your memory.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we remember
16 that we had brought up the problem during the witness's last testimony.
17 It was said yes in terms of dates. I don't know if the witness takes
18 notes. This is not a usual procedure.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace asked the witness not to refer to his
20 statement but to tell us what he could answer from his own memory on this
21 moment. I don't know whether you're using any notes. No, you're not.
22 Please proceed. You may answer the question. The question was about the
23 instances where it was quite specifically made as a threat.
24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I apologise,
25 but I see the witness is consulting something. I don't know what he is
1 consulting. We want to know what it is. That's all.
2 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you, Mr. Mole -- I can't see it, because
3 it's behind the screen. Are you consulting any document or ...
4 THE WITNESS: In front of me, sir, I have my witness statement
5 which I made in 1997.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'd rather you not look at it and just see how
7 far we come. If your memory needs to be refreshed in one way or the
8 other, we will explicitly hear, so if you could answer the question.
9 THE WITNESS: Could I ask you a question first?
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 THE WITNESS: It seems to me, as an outsider, that I, as a
12 witness, present both my evidence in Court and my statements which I have
13 made previously. I see that as the whole.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but let me just interrupt you. You're required
15 to answer the questions, and if you think that your memory does not enable
16 you to answer these questions at this very moment, please indicate so, so
17 that the Prosecutor can ask the Court leave to refresh your memory in the
18 way it's usually done, or to -- well, we have procedural ways of solving
19 that. But it's not expected that you answer the questions by reading your
20 earlier statement. So --
21 THE WITNESS: To answer the question meaningfully, then it makes
22 sense, after ten years, that I make reference to a statement which I made
23 nearer the time.
24 JUDGE ORIE: I think Mr. Ierace first asked you to do it without
25 making reference. If we would not proceed then, Mr. Ierace is perfectly
1 able to handle the matter and we'll finally see whether we end up at your
2 statement or not.
3 Yes, please proceed.
4 MR. IERACE:
5 Q. Mr. Mole, in the first instance, I would like you to try, on the
6 basis of your memory. If you don't remember, then please tell us. So if
7 you remember any instances of specific threats in that context you've
8 mentioned, could you tell us what they were. First of all, if I could
9 assist you: What were the nature of the threats, in a general sense?
10 A. The nature of the threats would be perhaps on two levels within
11 the context of Bosnia as a whole. If I may take the first one, and that
12 would be other activities of the United Nations.
13 Q. Let me stop you there, and maybe we can save some time. Are you
14 referring to threats uttered to you or in your presence?
15 A. I'm sorry. What threats?
16 Q. All right. A few moments ago, you said - this is page 51, line
17 23, for the benefit of the Trial Chamber - referring to the use of
18 artillery fire on the city: "There were instances where this was quite
19 specifically made as a threat."
20 Now, when you said those words, did you mean that someone uttered
21 a threat?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. All right. Now, who?
24 A. During the conversations that I had with General Galic - and I
25 will take as an example that one we've already used, that being Igman -
1 that if the firing from Igman did not cease, there would be reciprocal
2 firing by his weapons onto the city of Sarajevo.
3 Q. All right.
4 A. Does that answer your question?
5 Q. Yes, it does, and thank you for that. On how many --
6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I apologise,
7 but what I would like to point out - and I saw it a moment ago - that
8 before answering the question, before my preceding intervention, the
9 witness had already opened up his note, his written statement, and had
10 consulted it, and I think that this should be clarified. If this was the
11 case, I saw him doing it, and I must make this public.
12 THE WITNESS: May I answer that?
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you would please inform us whether you
14 consulted your notes.
15 THE WITNESS: The question initially was: What other events would
16 have created that activity I have just described. It was the other events
17 I was looking up. I have already been discussing the case of Mount Igman,
18 and therefore I have to take no notice of my statement, because I've
19 continued where we left off.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So you consulted your notes in order to see
21 whether you could find any of the other events that would have caused --
22 THE WITNESS: That is absolutely right, Mr. President. That is
23 exactly the case.
24 JUDGE ORIE: This clarifies the situation.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
1 MR. IERACE:
2 Q. On how many occasions did General Galic say words to that effect
3 to you through an interpreter?
4 A. That is a very difficult question to answer, but it would be
5 numerous, and by that I would say in the course of the number of visits I
6 made, between five and ten times.
7 Q. And is that -- were all of those occasions in relation to Mount
9 A. No. They related to other instances as well, sir.
10 Q. Do you remember the nature of the -- of General Galic's concern,
11 other than Mount Igman, in respect of the other occasions?
12 A. The item which caused him the concern?
13 Q. Yes.
14 A. Yes. An area of strategic importance for the Bosnian Serbs in
15 Bosnia was an area around Brcko. It was --
16 Q. Could you please spell that?
17 A. Yes. B-r-c-o -- B-r-c-k-o sorry. It's in northern Bosnia, up
18 against the Croatian border. And it was a narrow area of land controlled
19 by the Serbs, which gave them access to their Krajinas on the west side of
20 Bosnia. This area was often under threat, and depending on the fortunes
21 or otherwise of the Bosnian Serbs, that was a pressure point which was
22 brought into the conversation, as relating to Sarajevo.
23 Q. What did General Galic say, as best as you can remember, about
24 that issue and Sarajevo?
25 A. The point with Sarajevo is that it was a policy of containment
1 which he was exercising, and as a result of that, he considered that his
2 military capability could be brought to bear on the city in response to
3 activities elsewhere, and one interprets that by virtue of his weapons
4 disposition to be the application of his artillery pieces to maintain that
5 policy of containment.
6 Q. All right. What I'm specifically asking you is: As best as you
7 can remember, what did General Galic actually say to you through an
9 A. Within the number of times I've told you, somewhere between sort
10 of five and ten times, I would be quite specifically told that Sarajevo
11 would be shelled if - and I leave the "if" as a series of dots.
12 Q. You mean by that he would say that --
13 A. He would respond to the situation which had brought that as a
14 threat, yes.
15 Q. Again just to clarify, are you saying that on five to ten
16 occasions he said to you that he would shell Sarajevo if forces weren't
17 removed from Mount Igman, if other courses of action weren't taken? Is
18 that what you mean?
19 A. Correct. So the event of the day, so to speak, yes.
20 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, would that be an appropriate time?
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mole, as I indicated before, we unfortunately
22 have to interrupt your testimony again. Of course, we also would have
23 preferred to hear it in one -- uninterrupted. But unfortunately that's
24 not possible. May I ask you, I order you, more or less, not to speak with
25 anyone on the testimony that is on its way at this very moment. And I
1 take it that you'll be informed when your testimony will be continued.
2 And I apologise for all the inconveniences attached to it.
3 Madam Usher, could you please escort Mr. Mole out of the
5 [The witness stands down]
6 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I have received a note conveyed from
7 the interpreters, I think it is, that they need to make some arrangements
8 which essentially, I think, mean that a brief recess might be advisable.
9 It involves obtaining some furniture and headset and the like.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Have you got any idea on how much time this
11 will take? Madam Registrar seems to be a bit surprised. Because I do
12 understand that the interpreter will be sitting next to the witness.
13 MR. IERACE: Yes. Oh, I see.
14 JUDGE ORIE: The chair is there. I don't know. We usually have
15 two sets of headphones over there.
16 May I ask the booth: The registrar is a bit surprised on what
17 measures still have to be taken. Could they inform us what kind of
18 measures still to be taken and how much time it will take.
19 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters who are in the booths are in
20 place, so there is nothing in the booths. Perhaps only the interpreter
21 who will be helping the witness in the courtroom. She will be coming with
22 him, I suppose. She is waiting in front of the courtroom.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, the booth informs us that they have no
24 problems at this very moment, so let's perhaps first ask the interpreter
25 to come in, so that he or she can make the solemn declaration, and then
1 you call your next witness.
2 So since Madam Usher has disappeared, if she can hear me, or if
3 someone can convey a message to her, I'd like to have the interpreter
4 first enter the courtroom.
5 [The interpreter entered the courtroom]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning. Could you please state your name so
7 that we know who you are. You are interpreting from Dutch into English?
8 THE INTERPRETER: English into Dutch. I shall be whispering the
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And also the other way around?
11 THE INTERPRETER: The English booth will take the Dutch
12 interpretation simultaneously.
13 JUDGE ORIE: May I then invite you to make the solemn declaration
14 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence require the interpreter to make. The
15 text is in front of you.
16 INTERPRETER: EVA BODOR
17 THE INTERPRETER: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth,
18 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated.
20 Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I wanted to say that we have a
22 problem with interpretation because the French booth won't understand what
23 the -- won't hear what the interpreter is saying because she was speaking
24 out of the microphone. It's too late now.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The witness having been requested to do so has
1 given the -- yes. I'm sorry. The interpreter has given the solemn
2 declaration according to the text contained in the Rules of Procedure and
3 Evidence, and she did so on my request after she had given her name. Yes.
4 Please be seated.
5 Madam Usher, may I then ask you to escort the witness into the
7 [The witness entered court]
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence
10 reiterates its opposition. It is not able to listen to the main
11 interrogation, for the reason stated this morning, and appeals to the
12 moment the witness has made a statement.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning. I take it you're General Van Baal.
14 Before I will ask you to make a solemn declaration, I would first have to
15 deal with a procedural issue. So please be seated for a second, and then
16 I'll come back to you.
17 It's not quite clear to me, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, what your objection
18 is. Am I right in understanding that you complain about not being able to
19 hear it in its first translation, or that you're not able to hear the
20 original language used?
21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President. I am not
22 talking now about the interpretation, at least not for the time being.
23 I'm referring to the fact that a large number of documents which were to
24 be produced, which were to be submitted in Serbian to the accused have not
25 yet been disclosed to him. And I'm not referring only to the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 cross-examination but also to the examination-in-chief, because we cannot
2 properly listen to this witness, since we cannot follow it accurately in
3 Serbian text. That is, that is our position. We cannot simply follow
4 because the documents have not been provided in Serbian in time.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ORIE: If it would bother you specifically during the
7 examination-in-chief, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you may indicate so, and if
8 you -- we'll then see what document is in front of us and how much time
9 you need either to read a few lines, or, if it's a lot of pages, of
10 course, we'll then assess what the problem is and we'll also assess
11 whether there's any specific need for you -- whether there's any justified
12 request to consult with your client.
13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 JUDGE ORIE: So we'll start.
15 May I ask you to stand up again. Mr. Van Baal, the Rules of
16 Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration at the
17 beginning of your testimony. The text of the declaration will be handed
18 out to you by the usher. I think it's in English, but if you think you
19 could make that statement in English, it requires you to speak the truth,
20 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. You could do it in English.
21 If you say, "No, I have to do it in my own language," then it first should
22 be translated to you. But if you do it in English... Yes.
23 WITNESS: ADRIANUS VAN BAAL
24 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
25 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, General Van Baal. Please be
2 seated. You first will be examined by counsel for the Prosecution.
3 Mr. Ierace, is it you or -- yes. Please proceed.
4 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 Examined by Mr. Ierace:
7 Q. Sir, would you please state your full name and rank.
8 A. Lieutenant General Adrianus Van Baal.
9 Q. Were you born on the 15th of January, 1947?
10 A. Yes, indeed.
11 Q. Did you enlist in the Dutch army in 1966?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. On the 27th of January, 1994, were you appointed to the position
14 of Chief of Staff to the Bosnia-Herzegovina command in UNPROFOR?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Did you hold that position with the rank of brigadier general?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. Did you take up that position on the 24th of February, 1994?
19 A. Yes, indeed.
20 Q. Pursuant to that position, when did you arrive for the first time
21 in Sarajevo?
22 A. On 7 February 1994.
23 Q. At the time that you arrived, had there been a devastating
24 incident at Markale market in Sarajevo, that is, in the preceding
1 A. That's correct.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
3 THE WITNESS: That was the --
4 JUDGE ORIE: We have to take care. I heard the witness speak a
5 few words after you went on your feet. So in order to have no confusion
6 far as translation is concerned, could perhaps the last words of General
7 Van Baal please be translated.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Especially on the 6th, the tragic
9 bomb explosion happened on the main square.
10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] 62, line 11 says fortnight.
11 It was not properly interpreted. It was interpreted as "the preceding
13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
14 MR. IERACE:
15 Q. Sir, could you tell us again the date that you arrived in Sarajevo
16 for the first time.
17 A. 7 February 1994.
18 Q. All right. What was the mood, and indeed the political climate,
19 in Sarajevo in terms of the warring parties in the wake of the Markale
20 market incident?
21 A. To make clear what my position was at the time, I was visiting the
22 headquarters in Kiseljak for the first time, and the Chief of Staff of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brigadier Ramsay, met me at the Sarajevo airport and
24 told me what the current situation was in the city itself. In the morning
25 I had met with General Rose, at Zagreb, and he had updated me on the
1 current situation of having departed from the city, and Ramsay also
2 informed me of the latest developments. Horror and a very explicit appeal
3 for help; those are the two concepts that I recall from that period. And
4 that summarises what he said, especially help from the -- appeal for help
5 by the Bosnian Muslim government for international aid.
6 My intention was to hurry to the headquarters in Kiseljak
7 afterwards, and we did that too, because that was the objective of my
8 visit, to meet the staff. And only a very small share of the staff was
9 present at the time in the residency in Sarajevo. But, as I said, General
10 Rose was in Zagreb.
11 Q. All right. Now, did you become involved in certain negotiations
12 in relation to the Total Exclusion Zone, sometimes known as the TEZ?
13 A. I was not involved in those. At the 10th I returned to the
14 Netherlands to prepare in the Netherlands for my definitive departure to
16 Q. Upon your return, though, did you become involved in the
17 enforcement of the Total Exclusion Zone, in other words, in the gathering
18 of heavy weapons?
19 A. From the moment I was actually in office as Chief of Staff, this
20 was one of my main tasks.
21 Q. Was there a particular incident in about March of 1994 in the
22 context of which you met General Galic?
23 A. Yes, indeed. Two meetings took place that were related. On 21
24 March and 27 March. 21 March was following getting some heavy weapon
25 systems under control in the Total Exclusion Zone, in the Citluk area, a
1 village that I may not be pronouncing correctly, Cekrcici. The heavy
2 weapons that were positioned there were directed at Visoko. The United
3 Nations military observers had, during the preceding days, determined that
4 these weapons were positioned in the Total Exclusion Zone, admittedly
5 along the edge, 19.200 metres to 19.800 metres, but at that time within
6 the Total Exclusion Zone.
7 On 20 March, General Rose assigned me to instruct the Canadian
8 Battalion stationed in Visoko and to get the weapon systems under the
9 control of UNPROFOR.
10 Q. If I could ask you to pause there for a moment. Was there --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The word "edge" was again
13 misinterpreted it was said as a frontier, which was not correct.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
15 MR. IERACE:
16 Q. Was there an incident which involved the safety of members of the
17 Canadian Battalion? If you could -- if you're in a position to do so,
18 perhaps you could answer yes or no.
19 A. This is difficult, because the action itself was definitely not
20 without risk to the Canadian Battalion. But there was no threat from the
21 positions where the heavy weapons were positioned. There was no threat to
22 the Canadian Battalion. But the action that I had instructed was a
23 military action and was not without danger.
24 Q. Did you receive some information that at one point some
25 remote-controlled mines had been placed under some APCs which at the time
1 were occupied by members of the Canadian Battalion?
2 A. Yes, indeed. That happened at 22.45. I received the report that
3 remote-controlled mines had been placed under APCs at the Canadian
4 Battalion, which had positions around the heavy weapon systems that they
5 had taken under control.
6 Q. All right. And did you take immediate steps to secure their
7 removal by contacting Radovan Karadzic, that is, Dr. Karadzic?
8 A. That's correct. He assured me that he would ensure that these
9 remote-control mines would be removed.
10 Q. Did you later discover that although those mines were removed,
11 others were placed -- that is, other mines were placed near another APC
12 that evening?
13 A. Not that same evening, but the next morning. And I received that
14 report from the commander of the Canadian Battalion immediately before I
15 was about to depart for Pale to resolve this situation.
16 Q. All right. So you were informed the next morning that that had
17 happened during the night; is that the case?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. All right. Now, did you then travel to Pale and meet
20 Dr. Karadzic, that is, that day?
21 A. Yes. I met Dr. Karadzic, and General Galic was with him.
22 Q. Were you introduced to General Galic by Dr. Karadzic?
23 A. I was introduced to General Galic.
24 Q. All right. Did you then have a discussion in strong terms with
25 Dr. Karadzic on the topic of the mines which had been placed in such a way
1 as to jeopardise the safety of members of the Canadian Battalion?
2 A. Yes. I had an extensive discussion. First I had spent 15 minutes
3 listening to the statement by Dr. Karadzic. I then explicitly said that I
4 did not want to speak with Dr. Karadzic any longer, as long as the problem
5 of the mines under the vehicles remained unresolved. I had also
6 harmonised the position with General Eva Bodor, the Commander of UNPROFOR
7 in Zagreb, and Karadzic responded by asking General Galic whether the
8 mines had been removed, because he assumed that they would be removed. At
9 the time, I emphasised to him again that the information that was still
10 relevant, because I had heard otherwise, that the mines were already
11 removed, and that had been reported to me during the first 15 minutes of
12 this conversation.
13 At the time, General Galic, as my interpreter told me, General
14 Galic was instructed to ensure that the mines would disappear, and after
15 15 or 20 minutes, Dr. Karadzic reported that the mines had disappeared.
16 I waited until I received such confirmation from the Canadian
17 Battalion and the headquarters of BH command. It took a bit longer, but
18 not much longer.
19 Q. When you say it took a bit longer, do you mean by that it took a
20 bit longer to have the mines removed?
21 A. No. The report from the Canadian Battalion, via Kiseljak to Pale.
22 Q. During that conversation, did Dr. Karadzic address General Galic
23 at any stage in heated terms?
24 A. Yes, indeed.
25 Q. Do you recall what he said to General Galic, according to your
2 A. After we had determined that the heavy weapons were indeed within
3 the exclusion zone, we examined a solution, and the opinion of
4 Dr. Karadzic and myself was that the only possibility was to get the
5 weapons out of the Total Exclusion Zone and to move them to the
6 north-west. Subsequently, a discussion started which, based on military
7 arguments, General Galic indicated that it would be unwise to position
8 these heavy weapons towards the north-west because that would put them on
9 the front slope and they would be easily visible from Visoko.
10 Dr. Karadzic responded by saying, "They have to go, so bury them." That
11 means burying the heavy weapons so that they would no longer be in plain
13 General Galic showed that he clearly did not agree with this,
14 through his non-verbal communication and his position, but he was assigned
15 to do this. And that was the main point of the discussion.
16 Q. Earlier on the discussion of the mines, did Karadzic also address
17 General Galic, that is, on the removal of the mines?
18 A. Yes. General Galic arranged for the mines to be removed under the
19 APCs -- from under the APCs.
20 Q. At any stage did Dr. Karadzic indicate to General Galic, according
21 to your interpreter, that he, that is, Dr. Karadzic, was unhappy with
22 General Galic in relation to any earlier understanding as to the removal
23 of the mines?
24 A. That's correct. He had assumed that following the first contact
25 at night, that the mines would not be repositioned.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, may I ask you to have a look at the
2 clock. We'd like to have a break at approximately 12.00, so ...
3 MR. IERACE: This might be a convenient time, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll adjourn until 20 minutes past 12.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 12.01 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 12.22 p.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, please proceed.
8 MR. IERACE:
9 Q. General, you've told us of two instances during that meeting with
10 Dr. Karadzic and General Galic, when Dr. Karadzic spoke to General Galic
11 in strong terms, first about the removal of mines and later about the
12 positioning of heavy weapons. How did General Galic react, if at all, to
13 being spoken to by Dr. Karadzic in those terms? Did he exhibit any
15 A. As regards my request with the removal of mines, he left the room,
16 and after 20 minutes he informed us that the mines had been removed. I
17 drew the conclusion that he issued an instruction that that be carried
18 out. As regards the removal of the heavy weapons from the TEZ, the
19 discussion was very lively, both in attitude and in the way it was
20 conducted, because they were explicitly dealing with military issues for
21 General Galic and he thought it was unreasonable to remove the heavy
22 weapons. And with that argument, Karadzic didn't want to be confronted
23 with that argument, because he seemed to be determined that the heavy
24 weapons be removed. And there was a very hefty, lively discussion.
25 Q. How many interpreters were present at that meeting between
1 yourself, Dr. Karadzic, and General Galic?
2 A. I only had one interpreter.
3 Q. Was that interpreter employed by the United Nations or some other
5 A. Yes. She had many years of experience with UNPROFOR, and then her
6 name -- Jana -- Lana Pavlovic. And she had already worked for previous
7 commanders and chiefs of staff of the BH command.
8 Q. All right. Now, based on what you were told by way of briefing,
9 as to the period immediately prior to your arrival in Sarajevo on the 7th
10 of February, 1994, was there any change in the frequency of shelling and
11 sniping in the city after the Markale market incident?
12 A. When I returned to Bosnia on the 24th of February, I received an
13 update of all the incidents which took place in the period when I was
14 absent, and it was relatively, surprisingly peaceful. The shock which ran
15 through the town had the effect that the hostilities ebbed away and on the
16 24th of February we could say that the TEZ was in full effect, not only as
17 regards heavy weapons, but also there was a sharp reduction in the use of
18 small arms.
19 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I ask that the witness be shown
20 Exhibit 2380, that's P2380.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, being an R on the ERN number --
22 MR. IERACE: Yes. I ask that we move into closed session for
23 that, Mr. President.
24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it would be a
25 good idea --
1 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... assisting you
2 already. Since this document is a confidential document, we now turn into
3 closed session.
4 [Closed session]
12 Pages 9853 to 9860 – redacted closed session.
19 [Open session]
20 JUDGE ORIE: We are now in open session.
21 MR. IERACE:
22 Q. General --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, to a large
25 extent when a lot of these things happened between the closed session and
1 the moment we have now, I think perhaps you should perhaps resume what
2 happened in the period of time.
3 JUDGE ORIE: I just have first to find the point of time where we
4 left the issue -- the document --
5 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, if you wish --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 MR. IERACE: -- I'd be happy to do that in the form of a leading
8 question to the witness, just summarise what he said.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That would perhaps be a proper way of doing it.
10 MR. IERACE: All right.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
12 MR. IERACE:
13 Q. General Van Baal, on the 16th of March, 1994, did you meet General
14 Milovanovic, who was at that stage the chief of the Main Staff of the VRS,
15 that is, the Bosnian Serb army?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. Did he tell you that if the trams continued to run in Sarajevo,
18 then they and their passengers would be targeted, in other words, that he
19 would ensure that they were targeted?
20 A. Yes, he did.
21 Q. Following the 16th of March, did the trams run and were they
22 indeed targeted, together with their passengers?
23 A. Yes, they were.
24 Q. All right. Now, in terms of the structure of the VRS, and in
25 particular, the respective positions of General Milovanovic and
1 General Galic and General Mladic, was General Mladic the immediate
2 superior to General Galic?
3 A. He was.
4 Q. Did General Milovanovic nevertheless occupy a position of
5 considerable influence over General Galic?
6 A. Not based on the hierarchy, but based on his position as Chief of
8 Q. And that's chief of the Main Staff?
9 A. Yes, Chief of Staff of the VRS.
10 Q. And as a matter of basic military structure, was the Main Staff
11 the level of immediate assistance, that is, the immediate subordinates to
12 General Mladic?
13 A. Yes, indeed.
14 Q. And did you understand -- if I could ask that question in a
15 leading form. I don't think it's in dispute. Did you understand that
16 General Galic was the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, that is,
17 one of the corps of the VRS?
18 A. That's true.
19 Q. Now, given your view, based on your experiences, that there was a
20 centralised command system - and I think your evidence in closed session
21 was to the effect that it was an effective command system; is that right?
22 A. Yes, that's what I indicated. That's correct.
23 Q. And at this point I will cease to ask you leading questions.
24 Given the conversation you had with General Milovanovic, did you
25 form any view as to whether or not General Galic, had he desired to do so,
1 could have ordered a cessation of the sniping of civilians in Sarajevo and
2 ensured that order was carried out? Please wait --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
4 MR. IERACE: -- before you answer.
5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Our position to this question,
6 because it seems to be referring to something that is hypothetical and
7 conditional, and possibly a state of mind of the accused, which means that
8 this witness cannot answer for this reason.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to
11 add --
12 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] The objection is
13 sustained, so I don't know whether there's any reason to add ...
14 Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
15 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Q. Did you form any view as to whether or not, having regard to what
17 General Milovanovic had told you, that the sniping of the trams and the
18 passengers after the 16th of March, 1994 was the result of the execution
19 of orders emanating from the command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, once again, I
21 object regarding the use of the term "sniping." Assuming that the General
22 said that there was sniping on the trams, it has not yet been established
23 that they were implementing sniper techniques.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, it has been the testimony of this
25 witness. He used the word "sniping." I think in the question -- the
1 question does not refer to the words of General Milovanovic, because it
2 says: "Having regard to what General Milovanovic had told you, that the
3 sniping of the trams and the passengers after the 16th of March," and that
4 refers to the earlier testimony of the witness. So the objection is
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I found no evidence that direct
7 assignments were issued by the headquarters of General Milovanovic to the
8 snipers in Sarajevo. I did -- I am convinced however, that there was a
9 centralised command and control by the VRS throughout my period there, as
10 well as considering General Rose's experience in the preceding appeared,
11 it appeared that assignments issued by Mladic or Milovanovic were indeed
12 then carried out. But in answer -- I don't have any proof with respect to
13 your specific question of a direct assignment to carry out sniping.
14 MR. IERACE:
15 Q. I appreciate that you had no direct exposure to orders. Was there
16 anything about the targeting of the trams and the passengers after the
17 16th of March, 1994 which appeared inconsistent with the threat made to
18 you by General Milovanovic?
19 A. I took the threat very seriously, and considering the fact that
20 the sniping continued and even increased at a certain period later in the
21 year, and it was explicitly indicated by us that we needed to try to have
22 the sniping from both sides ceased. I conclude that there was indeed a
23 policy or a tactic of using sniping as means of repression and terror.
24 I'd like to add very explicitly: From both sides.
25 Q. When you say "from both sides, do you refer to sniping emanating
1 from the side of the Presidency, that is, the Bosnian government, as well
2 as from the side controlled by the VRS, in particular, the Sarajevo
3 Romanija Corps?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. When about did you leave Sarajevo for the last time?
6 A. 28 August 1994.
7 Q. Between February and August 1994, that is, whilst you were in
8 Sarajevo, were there any active measures taken by UNPROFOR to neutralise
9 snipers on both sides who were targeting civilians?
10 A. In various situations, the Sarajevo sector undertook actions to
11 try to neutralise snipers. As for the exact dates and actions, do not
12 appear in my notes because preventing and eliminating snipers was the task
13 of the commander of Sector Sarajevo. At the BH command headquarters we
14 received reports, and afterwards we heard about the activities aimed at
15 preventing them.
16 In addition, both General Rose and I, as well as Mr. Viktor
17 Andreev, the political advisor to General Rose, tried throughout the
18 period to reach an anti-sniper agreement between the Bosnian Muslim army
19 and the VRS.
20 Q. Were those efforts ultimately successful?
21 A. Ultimately, at the end of August 1994, an anti-sniper agreement
22 was indeed signed. It did not lead to a complete cessation.
23 Q. When you say "it did not lead to a complete cessation," can you
24 describe the extent of the impact of the agreement? In other words, was
25 it slight, was it significant, or whatever words you choose to be
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 A. I am not properly prepared for this question, because it was in
3 the period after my departure. The overall situation from September 1994
4 deteriorated markedly. I can't give you a specific positive answer.
5 Q. Let me take you back to the period preceding all this, when you
6 were there. When did negotiations seriously get underway on the
7 anti-sniping agreement, approximately?
8 A. From May onward, we tried to achieve the agreement, but we
9 succeeded formally only in early August.
10 Q. Was there ever any suggestion by the representatives of the
11 Bosnian Serb army during the negotiations that they did not have the power
12 to stop the sniping if they wished?
13 A. That was reported repeatedly, also to the Bosnian Muslim side, on
14 the other side. Both parties benefitted from a cessation in the sniping
15 and were willing to talk about it. Often these agreements were new
16 agreements, were linked to other claims, which made it very difficult to
17 focus on the subject that we wanted to resolve.
18 Q. At this stage do you recollect any of the linked claims made by
19 the Bosnian Serb army side?
20 A. Especially total demilitarisation of Sarajevo, which means total
21 disarmament, including small arms, of the BiH soldiers.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, may I just ask you to seek a
23 clarification? I see on page 84, line 21, the beginning of the answer is:
24 "That was reported repeatedly." It's unclear to me whether the
25 suggestion that they had no power to stop was reported repeatedly or that
1 they did not have the power or -- it's unclear to me. Would you please
2 ask the witness to clarify.
3 MR. IERACE: Yes.
4 Q. General, during the negotiations from May through to August, did
5 either side claim that they lacked the power or authority to stop the
6 sniping of civilians on the opposing side?
7 A. Yes, such claims were made.
8 Q. Was that by both sides or just one of the sides?
9 A. At any rate, in my presence, General Milovanovic did that. And on
10 the side of the Bosnian Muslims, while there were clear UNMO reports of
11 snipers being active from a high building in the heart of the centre, it
12 was stated very explicitly that they could not -- had no influence to stop
14 Q. From your perspective, was there some irony in General Milovanovic
15 making that claim, given what he had said to you on the 16th of March,
17 A. It often happened that this term was used. We don't have any
18 control over what's happening on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While
19 in a great many cases, at least during my period, it was clear that there
20 was indeed very rigid control, and there was some influence on the ground
21 activities, especially with respect to the use of heavy arms, and these
22 specialised snipers with specialised weapons must have been under control
23 in military respects. That does not mean, however, that Milovanovic
24 assigned such orders himself. I was unable to verify that as far as
25 sniping is concerned, but I was as far as the use of heavy weapons goes.
1 Q. Leaving to one side your uncertainty as to whether
2 General Milovanovic personally ordered sniping, and remaining with your
3 expressed belief that sniping was in fact rigidly controlled, in spite of
4 claims by the Bosnian Serb army to the contrary, did the same apply, in
5 your opinion, to the Bosnian government army or not? In other words --
6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] My honoured colleague, I'm
7 considering the transcript, and on my screen, I -- something appears to be
8 missing. It starts with lead -- it's not a leading question I believe,
9 but there's a sentence and a word that appears to be suggesting
10 something. In 86 and 87 -- line 7, I believe.
11 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... I have no clear
13 MR. IERACE: Excuse me, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ORIE: It's 86, 7. No. That's -- no. That's the answer.
15 I followed that, to be honest, in Dutch.
16 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, in relation to my friend's objection,
17 I respectfully submit that is not a leading question. The first part of
18 my question summarised precisely using the words of the witness, repeated
19 precisely using the words of the witness what he had said to that point.
20 That was a necessary prerequisite to then inquiring whether or not the
21 same applied to the other army, that is, the army of the Bosnian
23 JUDGE ORIE: I did not understand that Mr. Piletta-Zanin was
24 objecting on the leading character of a question, but that he missed a few
25 words in the transcript, and that he thought were leading but --
1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Technique, but I believe the
2 word "did" is what Mr. Ierace meant. And that was omitted from my
3 screen. So that might be the source of the problem. Perhaps he could ask
4 his question again.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Part of the answer was: "I was unable to verify that
6 as far as sniping is concerned, but as far as the use of heavy weapons
7 goes, General Milovanovic personally ordered sniping." I think the answer
8 was that General Milovanovic, as far as your knowledge goes, at least that
9 you do not know that he ordered any sniping.
10 THE WITNESS: That's correct.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Would that clarify the issue? Please --
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE ORIE: We are afraid that there has been some mix-up between
14 answers and questions on the transcript. May I take it that when working
15 overnight on the transcript, that specific attention will be paid to the
16 page 86, especially lines, let's say, 1 to 20.
17 Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
18 MR. IERACE: I can assist, Mr. President.
19 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm sorry, but just
20 to be able to focus better and follow, could our learned friend slow
21 down? Could he ask his questions slower? And I have difficulty, and I
22 see the interpreters are talking very fast and it is difficult to follow.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Since I am listening to the live channel, I
24 have not checked this. Could I ask you, Mr. Ierace, to slow down a bit,
25 and General Van Baal, the interpreters have a difficult job, so if you
1 would slow down as well.
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
4 Q. General, you've told us that both sides claimed during the
5 anti-sniping agreement that they lacked effective control over the snipers
6 from their side. You have told us also that you formed a different view
7 in relation to the side controlled by the Bosnian Serb army, that in fact
8 they had quite rigid control. What about the other side? Did you form a
9 view as to whether the other side had effective control or not of snipers
10 operating from their territory, that is, the side of the Bosnian
11 government? Please wait.
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. Could my learned
13 friend be asked to slow down, please.
14 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ...
15 MR. IERACE: Mr. President --
16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Nevertheless, Mr. President,
17 where is the line quoted where the General said that there was lighter
18 control? Because I can't find it myself either.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, if there's any doubt as to the correct
20 quotation, I always invite the parties to quote literally.
21 MR. IERACE: The question asked by Mr. Piletta-Zanin refers to
22 lighter control. In fact, I said rigid control, and I can take the Trial
23 Chamber to where those words appear.
24 JUDGE ORIE: In French it was -- yes.
25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [No interpretation]
1 JUDGE ORIE: In French it was correctly said, but could you please
2 find it.
3 MR. IERACE: Yes. That's page 86, line 2. Commencing at line 1,
4 General Van Baal said: "It was clear that there was indeed very rigid
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
7 MR. IERACE:
8 Q. General, do I need to repeat the question a third time or do you
9 sufficiently remember it?
10 A. I can't give you an unambiguous answer, because the actual
11 conversations with the Bosnian Muslim army were often conducted by the
12 Sarajevo sector. So General Soubirou reported the same as what I heard
13 from the Serb side. And my conclusion is that the Muslim army was also
14 capable of controlling the snipers.
15 Q. All right. Now, you said also, about ten minutes ago, I think,
16 that you formed the view that the sniping perpetrated by the Serb side, if
17 I could call it that, that is, the side that was controlled by the Bosnian
18 Serb army, was intended and planned to cause terror. What was it about
19 the sniping which led you to that conclusion, that is, that the objective
20 was to cause terror?
21 A. Without any discrimination, indiscriminately shooting defenceless
22 citizens, women, children, who were unable to protect or defend
23 themselves, at unexpected places and at unexpected times.
24 Q. Do you remember -- I withdraw that. You refer specifically to the
25 shooting of defenceless citizens, women, children. To what extent were
1 women and children victims of sniping issuing from the side of the
2 confrontation line controlled by the Bosnian Serb army?
3 A. I don't have figures for that, and I can't estimate either. I
4 advise you to review the reports of the Sarajevo sector very carefully,
5 and those by the UN military observers, because those kept very careful
7 Q. I appreciate that you don't have the figures available to you at
8 the moment, but perhaps I should restructure the question. Did you form a
9 view at the time as to whether the proportion of victims who were women
10 and children was disproportionate in any way? In other words, given that
11 you singled out women and children, was there something about the
12 approximate proportion that they constituted of the civilian casualties or
14 A. That was the case, predominantly women and children.
15 Q. Now, did you make any complaints or protests to the leadership of
16 the VRS about sniping of civilians in Sarajevo?
17 A. I did that, but I didn't do it alone. General Rose and
18 General de la Presle and Viktor Andreev repeatedly with the VRS raised
19 this issue and protested vehemently. Regarding General Soubirou, there
20 were constant attempts to contact the representatives of the Romanija
21 Corps with General Galic, and the liaison officers of Kapeca Beric [phoen]
22 and Major Indzic, but these efforts were only occasionally successful
23 because throughout the time actual conversations were hardly possible at
24 that level.
25 Q. You say that throughout the time conversations were hardly
1 possible at that level. Do you mean by that that attempts to contact
2 those people were fruitless, or do you mean something else?
3 A. Very deliberately, after the end of the Gorazde crisis in early
4 April, the level of contact was moved to the very highest level by the
5 VRS, at the VRS. Specifically, General Mladic did not want to have any
6 more dealings with General Rose, only with General de La Presle. In
7 several visits I accompanied General de La Presle on behalf of Bina
8 Moskovic [phoen]. I was allowed to & continue dealing with Milovanovic,
9 but at lower levels the contacts were broken off. And only incidentally
10 was I able to contact liaison officers to talk about these important
12 Q. You mentioned as a liaison officer Major Indzic.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Interrupt because of a reason
15 of translation in the French booth. They did not say that the contact
16 were broken off at a lower level, and not at the higher level.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it was indeed lower level.
18 Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.
19 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. Did you ever make any complaint to Major Indzic about sniping or
21 shelling of civilians in Sarajevo, either deliberately or
23 A. Yes, I did.
24 Q. On one occasion or more than one occasion?
25 A. More occasions.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Were those complaints in person or in writing or both?
2 A. Usually the most contact I had with Mr. Indzic was by telephone.
3 The formal complaint was put down on paper as far as possible and was sent
4 to General Milovanovic.
5 Q. What were the range of responses that you received to complaints
6 made to, firstly, Major Indic?
7 A. For the sake of clarity, I did not send any letters to Major
8 Indzic but to General Milovanovic. The arguments varied and ranged from
9 "we don't have the snipers under control" to saying that the Muslims and
10 blaming the Muslims were shooting and targeting their own population, and
11 various variations of that topic and various aspects and these two topics.
12 Q. And I think you said that the complaints you made to Major Indzic
13 were by telephone. Is that correct?
14 A. That's right.
15 Q. And what were the range of responses that you received from
16 complaints made to General Milovanovic in relation to sniping and, I take
17 it, shelling of civilians in Sarajevo, either directly or
19 A. They also included the elements I mentioned with my talks with
20 Major Indzic, and an additional point was that the Muslims had heavy
21 weapons and they targeted Sarajevo.
22 Q. All right. Now, you've told us that you met General Galic on I
23 think it was the 21st of March, 1994. Did you meet him on any other
25 A. I met him again on the 27th of March.
1 Q. What was the context of that meeting?
2 A. Some less important items which weren't discussed on the 16th were
3 discussed then. Some practical points which came out of our conversation
4 with Karadzic on the 20th, and some subjects which were new and were
5 introduced by General Milovanovic.
6 Q. And just to make it clear: Did you ever have a occasion to make
7 any complaint or protest to General Galic as to the sniping and shelling
8 of the civilians of Sarajevo, either directly or indiscriminately?
9 A. As far as I know, I never had any direct contact after that with
10 General Galic.
11 Q. Now, did you form any view or make any observations as to the
12 regard or lack of regard that the soldiers of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
13 had for General Galic?
14 A. As far as I learned from others, General Galic was very popular
15 and he had great authority.
16 Q. All right. Did you ever see any sign of that popularity?
17 A. Once I saw a tape of a Serbian music band, where General Galic was
18 on the photo, with the text "King of Mount Igman."
19 Q. Was General Galic's image the only image on the tape? In other
20 words, was it just him or was there someone else as well? On the tape
22 A. On the image there were some other musicians. I recognised one of
23 them as someone who was in the Panorama Hotel in Pale, someone with an
24 enormous Serbian moustache.
25 Q. That was translated as moustache, and I noticed you gestured with
1 your hands under your chin.
2 A. Moustache.
3 Q. All right.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I checked the translation, Mr. Ierace.
5 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Mr. President, at this stage I seek to go back into closed session
7 to show some material to the witness, and I anticipate we'll be in closed
8 session for approximately 10 to 15 minutes at the most.
9 JUDGE ORIE: We'll then turn into closed session.
10 [Closed session]
12 Pages 9880 to 9889 – redacted – closed session.
12 [Open session]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We are in open session. So you'll hear from
14 the Victims and Witnesses Unit when the examination will be continued in
15 this courtroom. May I instruct you not to speak with anyone about the
16 testimony you started to give in this Court. Thank you very much.
17 Madam Usher, may I ask you to escort Genera Van Baal out of the
19 Thank you very much for your assistance.
20 [The witness stands down]
21 We will be in recess next week. That's the reason why we
22 discussed this morning, in the early morning hours, the procedural issues
23 still outstanding. Since no one is on his feet, I take it that there are
24 no remaining issues to be discussed at this very moment. I hope that you
25 all have a good week. I don't know whether you will get enough rest, but
1 we'll see that after we return.
2 We'll adjourn until the -- until Monday, the 17th of June.
3 Madam Registrar, would that be in the morning or would that be in
4 the afternoon?
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ORIE: At 9.00, as I understand, according to the normal
7 court schedule, 9.00 in the morning, same courtroom.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.53 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Monday, the 17th day of
10 June 2002, at 9.00 a.m.