1 Friday, 5 July 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Case Number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus
8 Stanislav Galic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Before resuming the cross-examination of Mr. Fraser,
11 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you indicated yesterday you would leave a bit earlier.
12 Would that be after the second break or ... ?
13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I
14 guess it will be around noon and I will take the liberty to leave,
15 unfortunately not waiting for the break, but around that time.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I am asking you because the Stakic case is not
17 sitting this afternoon, so that would mean that we would have some extra
18 time if this could be scheduled. If we would split up the day in two
19 parts, we would gain a bit more than half an hour. On the other hand, I
20 am aware -- I do take it, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, that you accepted more or
21 less that, well, the last one hour and-a-half would be in your absence.
22 May I first ask you whether you would heavily oppose, if that would be
23 instead of one hour and-a-half, two hours. I take it you are so
24 organised --
25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, if you are
1 asking me personally, I must say that personally, of course, I have
2 resistance to this solution. However, this does not apply to
3 Mrs. Pilipovic, who was sick this week and who nevertheless attended. And
4 in my absence, she wouldn't be able to really check the transcript and at
5 the same time to continue exercising the efforts which she is investing
6 here and which is most harrowing. So I am afraid, as I have said, because
7 it is not my personal response, my answer cannot be positive.
8 As for Mr. Galic, who is sitting behind me, he told me when we
9 could visit him in this regard that he can never sufficiently concentrate
10 when days drag on much longer into the afternoon.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We are talking about half an hour, not more
12 than three-quarters of an hour. Put, please, if you would express
13 yourself on it, Ms. Pilipovic.
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the past six months
15 were really hard work for the Defence and I was not feeling well this
16 week, but if it is not more than half an hour, then I will ask the General
17 what he thinks.
18 I should also like to remind you that our military expert is here
19 in The Hague and we would like to know when Mr. Philipps's examination
20 will begin so our military expert can come and be present.
21 MR. IERACE: Yes, Mr. President. I think we have in the order of
22 half an hour or forty minutes to go with Mr. Fraser, something like that.
23 I anticipate that Mr. Bergeron in chief will be something like an hour at
24 the most. Therefore, I expect that we will reach the evidence of
25 Mr. Philipps today.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. IERACE: And, of course, in a timetable, he is designated to
3 reappear after General Van Baal on Monday. I have only, at the most, five
4 minutes with General Van Baal, so I expect to have one hour or two hours
5 of the testimony of Mr. Philipps again on Monday afternoon.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's clear. How about the Prosecution? I
7 think final arrangements will either be made or not made during the first
8 break, but I am just trying to make an inventory of what the parties
9 could --
10 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I am very much in favour of it. We
11 are falling behind this week considerably and that would help to minimise
12 that. Thank you.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you very much. So at least I now know
14 the positions of the parties, not yet of the accused. Did you confer with
15 General Galic, Ms. Pilipovic?
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, General Galic
17 believes, considering the state of his health, that he told us before the
18 beginning of trial already that he has contracted a virus and has been
19 under the weather for the past week. So the question is whether he can
20 keep his concentration and follow the proceedings.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, so I do understand that there is considerable
22 hesitation on his side. On the other hand, we also might consider to see
23 how things go and ask General Galic to intervene when there would be a
24 situation where he loses concentration to such extent that he would think
25 it fair to stop at that time. But we will consider that during the first
1 break and see whether the schedule changes or not.
2 Then, Ms. Pilipovic, are you ready to continue the
3 cross-examination of Mr. Fraser?
4 Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, it is not Mrs. Pilipovic
6 who will do it. It will be myself, with your leave.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please escort the witness into the courtroom.
8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Perhaps Mrs. Pilipovic will
9 take over for a few moments.
10 [The witness entered court]
11 WITNESS: DAVID FRASER [Resumed]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Fraser.
13 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
14 JUDGE ORIE: May I remind you that your are still bound by the
15 solemn declaration you have given at the beginning of your testimony.
17 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, please proceed.
18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well.
19 Cross-examined by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Colonel.
21 A. Good morning.
22 Q. To save time, we shall do it like this. I will submit to you a
23 list of names, and if these names or a name ring a bell with you, then you
24 will stop me and you tell me about it. Can we agree about that?
25 I have to tell that all these names, of course, have to do with
1 Sarajevo: Kobra, Sultan Fatih, Kulin Ban, Stela, Borsalino, Silos, Gras,
2 Pavle Goranin, Petar Dakic.
3 These names don't tell you anything?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Thank you. Juka Prazina?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Caco?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Thank you very much. Ljiljana?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Fikret?
12 A. There were a number of Fikrets, but you would have to be more
14 Q. Very well. Because in your statement, Witness, you mentioned that
15 you had met several times a certain person called Fikret. Who is the
16 Fikret whom you used to meet?
17 A. There was a Fikret who commanded the brigade just on the other
18 side of the airport that we used to visit and it was in the Butmir area,
19 and he also had the Igman Mount, but I don't know what his real name was.
20 That was the name that we heard him.
21 Q. And since you visited him, could you tell us where was his
23 A. It was in the Butmir area.
24 Q. And more exactly?
25 A. I can't be any more specific than that. It was just in that
1 general area just before you hit the mountain.
2 Q. Thank you. Was the BH army under his control?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. No. I had to check the transcript. Yes.
5 My question was: Did he control the BH army? Did he control the
6 BH army, not whether the BH army was under his control. And that is not
7 the same thing.
8 My question was: [In English] Was he under the control of the BH
9 army? That was the question, sir.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
12 Colonel, I go back to the elements which I gave you, which are
13 only partial, but now I would like to ask you the following question. You
14 spoke about attacks on civilians. Do you remember that?
15 A. In my statement, is that what you are referring to?
16 Q. Yes, in your statement and in your testimony.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you. In your statement, did you speak about attacks on
19 civilians who were going to fetch water, for instance?
20 A. No, I don't recall talking about attacks on people getting water,
22 Q. Colonel, do you know where were armament factories, and by this I
23 mean factories of whatever size?
24 A. There was lots of discussion about armaments factories. I did not
25 personally know where the actual locations of these factories were.
1 Q. Do you know where they were?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Do you know who was there?
4 A. No.
5 Q. [In English] Do you know that there were some factories in
7 A. Yes. We knew there were factories, but I did not know where they
9 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Do you know whether there
10 was a foundry, also?
11 A. When you say a foundry, what do you mean?
12 Q. I am speaking about a shop which specialises in foundring and
13 recasting the explosives which is -- treats the explosives so that they
14 could be reused again in other weapons.
15 A. Again, there was discussion that there were places like that, but
16 I have no personal knowledge of where those places were.
17 Q. Very well.
18 Colonel, do you know - I believe you said so but I do not know -
19 were there mobile targets such as trucks, lorries, transformed, that is
20 the ones which could be used for mortars, for mortars to fire from the?
21 A. I was aware that, from time to time, the BiH army would fire from
22 the city and the British and the French would try to find these firing
23 units, but were never successful because they were never where we could
24 locate them.
25 Q. But my question had to do specifically with mobile targets.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Is it possible to make a break between the
2 answer and the question? Thank you.
3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: It is.
4 THE WITNESS: I am not sure I quite understand when you say
5 "mobile targets."
6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]
7 Q. By "mobile targets," Colonel, I mean -- by "mobile targets," I
8 mean a truck which has a mounted mortar on it, for instance.
9 A. What we did when we would hear outgoing firing we knew were
10 mortars, we would go out and try to find them, but we never did find them
11 because we just were -- you know, when we went to the area where the sound
12 came from, there was nothing there. So I never saw, or the people who
13 went looking never saw the firing unit. Whether it was on the ground or
14 on a vehicle, we didn't see it.
15 Q. Colonel, I have to interrupt you. Did you ever hear speaking
16 while you were there about such mobile targets; yes or no?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Thank you. Colonel, did you, yourself, personally know of the
19 following incidents of the 27th May, 1994; yes or no?
20 A. The date doesn't ring anything -- bring anything to mind, no.
21 Q. I repeat for the transcript, the 25th of May --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
23 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I am not sure whether that is fair,
24 just to put the date to the witness without specifying the incident.
25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Well, I will add the names. I
1 will be very happy to do that.
2 Q. 25th of May, 1994 --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat.
4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Plivac?
6 A. Nothing comes to mind.
7 Q. 13th June.
8 MR. WAESPI: I am sorry, Mr. President. Just a little specificity
9 about what kind of incident is it, is it an incident involving some type
10 of injury or weaponry or a location --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, I think it is up to the Defence to put
12 questions to the witness, and if they would limit and say: "Do you know
13 anything about an attack on the 3rd of January," then of course there is a
14 fair chance that if the date or just one simple name doesn't mention
15 anything to the witness, where the witness might have some recollection
16 if he was better informed then, of course, the answer you get on these
17 kind of questions will be assessed in such a way, of course, in view of
18 the question. So if I say "25th of October" and the witness says, "No,"
19 then of course the Chamber is aware that there is a fair chance that the
20 witness does not know because he has not been provided with sufficient
21 information. And I am certain that Mr. Piletta-Zanin is aware that this
22 is, I would say, more or less a logical consequence of the way he puts his
24 I don't know whether he seeks an answer of a witness that he
25 doesn't know about a certain incident or that he does know. I do not
1 know. But the questions are such we will leave that to the Defence, and
2 the Defence will be fully aware that the way they put the question to the
3 witness is sometimes very indicative for the answer you might expect.
4 Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. President. I
6 will be more specific, more than the previous one.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you are certainly aware
8 that if one witness has a very good recollection, for example, for dates,
9 that does not automatically mean that if another witness would not respond
10 immediately to dates, that the Chamber would automatically accept that the
11 witness is fully informed about the incident he is asked about. So I
12 leave it up to you, but you are aware of the consequences of the way you
13 put questions to the witness, I take it.
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I will rephrase it.
16 Q. The incident of the 25th of May, 1994, was on Nikole Demonje
17 Street, not far from Bulevar Avnoja. It doesn't tell you anything?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Very well. The incident of the 13th of June, 1994, which involved
20 a woman, Sulcin [phoen], of about 44 years of age at the time in the Ive
21 Andrica Street. It rings no bell, either?
22 A. No.
23 Q. The incident of the 19th of June, 1994, one Jasmin Kucinar, who
24 was 31, and his son Damir Kucinar, who was about 4, and who were attacked
25 in relation to an incident to an attack on a tram. Do you know anything
1 about that?
2 A. There were numerous attacks on the tram, but that doesn't mean
3 anything to me.
4 Q. Thank you. On the same day, Mensur Jusic, 36; Belma Sukic?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Thank you. 26th June, 1994, attack involving a person of 16,
7 Sanela Muratovic, in Djure Jaksica Street?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Thank you. The 17th of June, 1994, Mr. Rashid Dzonko, 67 at that
10 time, who was -- who was a conductor, who drove or operated an industrial
11 machine, does he mean anything to you? Milanko Vitomir Street.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
13 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I think if the incident of the 17th of
14 June as it was put to the witness, it probably meant July.
15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am sorry, yes, July. July.
16 Q. July, but same question.
17 A. No.
18 Q. And the same on the 22 of July, 1994, involving certain
19 [redacted], who was wounded not far from Cengic Vila?
20 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, protected witness.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would you please redact? Yes.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Counsel does not have his microphone switched
24 Your microphone is still not switched on.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you could have asked for closed
1 session, if necessary. So therefore -- yes.
2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] My apologies.
3 Q. Was your answer "no" again?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Thank you. Witness, did you know of a statement given by
6 Mr. Wahlgren, who was a General who was also posted in Sarajevo, and who
7 said that -- he said that there were many military targets in Sarajevo?
8 A. I am not familiar with the General in question you are talking
9 about. Were there military targets in Sarajevo? Along the confrontation
10 line, you could say the military headquarters were a military target, but
11 you would have to be more specific.
12 Q. Very well, Colonel.
13 You said earlier -- or not earlier but rather yesterday, asked by
14 the Prosecution, you answered that in fact in Sarajevo there were only
15 civilians and there were no military. Do you remember that?
16 A. What I said was in specific areas, yes, there were civilians and
17 the UN. There were -- the BiH army were along the confrontation line,
18 they had their headquarters. But were there other military targets? I
19 mean, it is a big city. You will have to be a little bit more specific.
20 Q. Very well. I will be specific if I tell you that each of the
21 names that I listed for you earlier, Petar Dakic, Pavle Goranin and so on,
22 they are in fact locations of military targets. Would you agree with me
23 to say that you did not know anything of the locations of the military
25 A. No, I wouldn't agree with you because I just don't know the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 specifics. I mean, there was a war going on and we saw shooting and
2 firing on both sides. Sometimes it was towards another person in the
3 other side's army, but in a lot of cases it was directed towards civilians
4 who had no military value.
5 Q. Very well. Colonel, since you do not agree with me, could you
6 please tell me where is the headquarters of Kobra?
7 A. I don't know where the headquarters of Kobra is.
8 Q. Very well. Where is the headquarters of the Ljiljana group?
9 A. I don't know.
10 Q. Very well. Where is the headquarters of Kulin Ban, please?
11 A. I couldn't tell you.
12 Q. Very well. And so on, do you think you could tell us the
13 headquarters of other locations that I quoted to you?
14 A. No, I couldn't because I didn't deal with those headquarters. I
15 dealt with the corps headquarters.
16 Q. Very well. Thank you.
17 Therefore, you do not know where these military targets are in the
18 city, is that correct?
19 A. I don't have personal knowledge. You would have to ask people who
20 would have that knowledge. I dealt with the corps headquarters.
21 Q. Your answer means that you do not -- did not have that knowledge?
22 A. I said I did not know where those locations were, if they existed.
23 Q. Very well. Thank you. Colonel, do you know accurately - and I
24 would be grateful if you could answer with a yes or no - where was the
25 headquarters of the command of the following brigades: 101st, 102nd, the
1 1st, the 2nd, the 1st Motorised Brigade, the 2nd Motorised Brigade, the
2 5th Motorised Brigade, the 9th Motorised Brigade and the 10th Motorised
4 A. I couldn't give you that information now it's been so long. And,
5 again, I dealt with the corps headquarters, with the government
6 agencies --
7 Q. I am going to have to interrupt you, Colonel, for -- in order not
8 to waste time.
9 I believe that you will answer the same for the command posts on
10 the level of battalions that are more numerous than those of the brigades.
11 A. Battalions were dealt with by the regiments within the sector.
12 Q. Colonel, my question was not that. My question was that I believe
13 that your answer would be the same for the level of the battalions.
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Thank you very much.
16 Colonel, how could you state that such-and-such rounds or firing
17 that you were able to observe were of an indiscriminate character if you
18 do not know even where in Sarajevo such-and-such targets were located,
19 such-and-such military targets were located?
20 A. Because normally, a professional army would not engage another
21 person's headquarters if it was co-located in a civilian community. Like
22 what I explained yesterday, why we knew there was a tank in the Serbian
23 area but because of collateral damage and the potential of killing or
24 injuring civilians, we wouldn't go after them. But the Serbians didn't
25 take that into account.
1 Q. So what you are saying, Colonel, is that it was perfectly possible
2 that there were military targets but the Serbs should not have attacked
3 them because they were located in the city?
4 A. What I am saying is that every attack that happened was, for the
5 most part, was investigated by us and we would protest it based on the
6 merits of that attack
7 Q. That was not my question, Colonel. You are not answering my
8 question, Colonel. My question, I would be grateful if you could re-read
9 it but I am going to repeat it. What you are saying is that it may have
10 happened that there were military targets in the city but that the Serbs
11 should not have attacked them. Is that right?
12 A. No. What I said was that where there are military targets along
13 the confrontation line and the other side engaged it, we looked at that
14 and observed it but we did not comment because that was a legal military
15 engagement. Where targets were engaged in the city, we would investigate,
16 and where there were civilians involved, you were certain we were going to
17 protest it because that was not a military target.
18 Q. That is still not the answer to my question. If we assume that
19 there were legitimate military targets in the city, the Serb army, could
20 it have attacked them; yes or no?
21 A. From my experience, during the time we are talking about, for
22 example, like the Bosnian Corps headquarters was never attacked when I
23 was there, nor was the Serbian Corps headquarters in Lukavica.
24 JUDGE ORIE: That is not an answer to the question. The question
25 was not whether other military targets were ever attacked. But the
1 question was quite clear, I think, and that is that if there would have
2 been military targets within the city, whether the Serbs would have had to
3 refrain from attacking it because of the collateral damage, as you
4 explained it yesterday. Yesterday, you said: "We would not go after the
5 tank because of the collateral damage."
6 The question now is: If there were headquarters or if there were
7 military targets in the city, whether the Serbian forces would have had to
8 refrain from attacking it because of the collateral damage it could cause.
9 That is the question, I think, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes. I did not even add
11 about collateral damage because sometimes collateral damage comes
12 naturally. But, in general, that was the question, yes.
13 THE WITNESS: If there was a military target in the city, the
14 Serbs had a right to go after the military target and the UN would not
15 protest that because that was within the rules of engagement.
16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Very well. Thank you for your answer.
18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Now, Mr. President, I would
19 like the map to be submitted again to the Colonel that was submitted
20 yesterday. Thank you.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, would you please assist.
22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] And in such a way so that we
23 can see the eastern part of Sarajevo, please, the most interesting part
24 for the questions, please, for the exercise.
25 Q. General, you see this map before you.
1 General, could you please indicate on this map where are located
2 the headquarters of the MUP, M-u-p.
4 A. Colonel.
5 Q. Sorry, Colonel. I apologise. There are so many stripes that I
6 made a mistake.
7 A. That is okay. I can't tell you where the MUP headquarters was.
8 Q. You can't tell me because you don't know or because it is a bad
10 A. I don't know.
11 Q. Thank you very much.
12 Colonel --
13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, did you wish
14 to ask a question?
15 JUDGE ORIE: [Interpretation] Not at all.
16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] So that is what I thought.
17 Q. Very well, Colonel. So I take note that you cannot answer the
18 question. Could you please indicate on this map where was the 10th
19 Mountain Brigade located?
20 A. Are you referring to Fikret again?
21 Q. No. No, Fikret was not 10th Mountain Brigade, it was something
23 A. I can't answer the question.
24 Q. Why? Wasn't it well put?
25 A. It is not a question whether or not it was well put. It is just
1 my knowledge of the brigades, I just don't have that.
2 Q. So you do not know where the 10th Brigade is, right?
3 A. No, I don't.
4 Q. Thank you very much. Could you please indicate the area where
5 Fikret was, the Fikret's Brigade?
6 A. It was in the Butmir area, that is about as specific as I can be.
7 Q. Very well. Thank you.
8 Colonel, you said that the sniper units of the other side were
9 using, in order to fire, they were using the Unis tower and also the
10 building that was known as the legislative building; is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Could you please indicate that on the map, Colonel, where that is
13 located. And if you can, could you please mark it with a pen of a
14 different colour. It should be black, I believe.
15 A. It was near the Holiday Inn. I just can't tell from this map the
16 two towers. I can give you a general area, if that is all right.
17 Q. Very well. You can perhaps put just a cross so that we do not
18 make a confusion. On the area of Unis, if you can put a letter "U" next
19 to it.
20 A. Again, it has been some time so I can't tell --
21 Q. So, if you can't, Colonel, we will take note. Colonel, can you
22 please indicate on this map where is the area of Grdonj?
23 A. No, I can't.
24 Q. Thank you very much. In that case, where are going to ask other
1 Do you know if there were incidents, as far as you know, incidents
2 against Serb citizens on the 1st of May that you may know about, or on the
3 3rd of May in Grbavica?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Do you know if on the 14th of May, there were also incidents,
6 sniping incidents, that as a result killed civilians, injured four, very
7 near the brigade called Ilijas Brigade?
8 A. Nothing comes to mind.
9 Q. Very well.
10 On the -- I will just check the dates. On the 15th of May, also,
11 the very same question in relation to a man called Zoran Vujicic?
12 A. I have no recollection.
13 Q. Thank you very much. On the 21st of May, do you know if there
14 were incidents where civilians were wounded in relation to Vogosca and
16 A. Again, I can't be specific.
17 Q. Very well. 30th of May in Grbavica, there was a child who was
19 A. No.
20 Q. Thank you. Colonel, do you know in which rhythm where combat went
21 on between the warring arms?
22 A. I don't understand what you're -- your question.
23 Q. What was the rhythm of fighting, of battles, of combats, the
24 frequency of fighting between the two warring armies?
25 A. During the period of time that we are talking about, it became
1 more intense, particularly sniping and shelling. And whenever the BiH
2 would attack, the Serbs would retaliate disproportionately in most cases.
3 Q. Very well. On the map, could you show us, General, where did the
4 shellings take place that you knew about? If you can also tell us
5 when, if you can precisely tell us the dates.
6 A. I can tell you general areas. I cannot give you specific dates
7 because that information is not at the tip of my tongue.
8 Q. Very well. Could you please take the pointer and indicate the
9 exact area.
10 A. Again, I can tell you re: areas but not specific areas, specific
11 points. Jewish cemetery was an area, and again from this map, it is
12 somewhat difficult. It has been some time. There was something going on
13 up in this area here and out at, from time to time, at the airport.
14 Q. Very well. Colonel, could you please take a black pen and circle
15 this little area, but please make a square rather than a circle so that we
16 do not have a visual confusion.
17 A. [Marks]
18 Q. Thank you very much. And the airport area, please.
19 A. [Marks]
20 Q. As far as you know, it is in these areas that the shellings
22 A. From time to time, yes.
23 Q. Thank you very much.
24 Colonel, I am going to come back to one of the things that you
25 said yesterday. You said that near the sniper alley, there were only
1 civilians. That is what you said.
2 Colonel, how can you tell apart a soldier from a civilian?
3 A. Well, I didn't think there were very many soldiers who were under
4 the age of 10. And so when we heard there were children being shot, we
5 pretty well ruled out that those were soldiers. When we heard that people
6 were being shot on trams, we ruled out that they were soldiers. But
7 again, when there was a shooting, if it was against a soldier, that was
8 considered a military target, but when it was against what we would
9 -- could prove were noncombatants, that's when a protest to be lodged.
10 Q. Very well.
11 Colonel, you didn't quite answer my question. In Sarajevo, how
12 could you -- how would you tell apart a soldier from a civilian, if we
13 agree that a young child of 4, 5 or 10 years old is not a soldier? What
14 would be the difference between a soldier and a civilian?
15 A. If they were armed and wore a uniform.
16 Q. Very well.
17 Therefore, if there was a body that you saw, hypothetically, which
18 was not in uniform and had no more weapons or no weapons, then you would
19 say that was a civilian?
20 A. If there was a body, no weapon, no uniform, and the investigation
21 said that that was the case, then we would probably, in that hypothetical
22 case, we would probably say that was not a soldier.
23 Q. And the investigation, who was in charge of that? Local
25 A. There were a number of people that would conduct investigations,
1 UNMOs, the unit in the area where the incident took place.
2 Q. Very well. Could you please give me a list, if you can recall, of
3 examples of incidents involving -- in sniping incidents, investigation
4 done by UNMOs where you had also taken part?
5 A. I didn't take personally part in the investigations. I would be
6 receiving the reports from the units or the UNMOs coming up to the sector
7 headquarters, and I can't give you any details because there were numerous
8 ones. It was just my general recollection of the incidents over that
9 period of time.
10 Q. Would you be able to give us at least one example, a specific
11 example, that you would have remembered where there was an investigation
12 which was carried out, say, by UNPROFOR and that you knew about during
13 your stay in Sarajevo?
14 A. Again, I can give you what sticks in my mind. There were some
15 incidents. I can't give you the specific dates, but I can indicate to you
16 there was one shooting in the city on the tram, where some people were
17 shot and killed and they were identified as civilians. There was another
18 incident where there was a bus going outside of the city, going to another
19 community, and along the route, a mother was shot on the bus. And I know
20 that one in particular because General Soubirou went out and actually did
21 the -- he was there on the scene shortly after the incident took place.
22 So those two stick out in mind. But I would have to refer to my own
24 Q. Very well.
25 Colonel, two questions: When you say, "going to another
1 community," you are using this expression in order to designate a
2 different ethnic community?
3 A. There was a bus that went from Sarajevo and I believe it went up
4 north, out of the city, to -- I can't remember the name of the town. But
5 again, the details are somewhat cloudy. But in that one particular case,
6 there was a shooting and a woman was shot.
7 Q. And every time there were written reports that were compiled and
8 were kept by UNPROFOR authorities?
9 A. In every case, there was a report and it was logged in either the
10 unit or the sector situation reports.
11 Q. And this also went for the shellings and the snipings?
12 A. As much as possible. Sometimes the soldiers were overwhelmed by
13 the volume of shelling. They would try to count the number of impacts per
14 day, but it was an art, not a science.
15 Q. To whom were these reports addressed? And this is one of my very
16 last questions. Who was then responsible? To whom were these reports
17 addressed, if you know that?
18 No. To whom were these reports addressed on the side -- on the
19 side of the allegedly responsible side, if that was ever sent there?
20 A. Two reports would be generated out of an incident: The report to
21 the sector headquarters that something happened and what were the
22 details. Based on the report, then we would protest, if a protest was
23 warranted, to the applicable corps headquarters indicating to them the
24 incident. And as I said yesterday, for the most part, we would try to
25 follow up that with a personal meeting with the respectable -- respective
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 headquarters, to try to defuse the situation and resolve those incidents.
2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very last question,
3 Mr. President.
4 JUDGE ORIE: It will be the last question of the Defence or just
5 a few, because I notice that --
6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: It is the very last one.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but of you as the Defence --
8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: The very last one.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. Colonel, I just like to come back to one of the things that you
12 said in your statement. If we have soldiers who do not wear a uniform and
13 who are sharing a weapon, are they still, in your opinion, logical
14 military targets that are acceptable?
15 A. If someone picks up a weapon, then they become a military target
16 if they use that weapon in an offensive manner towards the other side.
17 Q. Therefore, your answer means that if two soldiers are operating,
18 are deployed, and they are sharing one weapon, they then constitute a
19 military target?
20 A. The person with the weapon would be a military target. The other
21 person, if they are not dressed like a soldier, in my estimation, are not
22 a military target if I can't identify them as doing something belligerent
23 to me.
24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No further questions,
25 Mr. President.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
2 Mr. Waespi, is there any need to re-examine the witness?
3 [Prosecution counsel confer]
4 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President. Just a couple of questions.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
6 Re-examined by Mr. Waespi:
7 Q. Colonel Fraser, following up on the last question of the Defence,
8 at that time, did all the soldiers from the BiH army wear uniforms?
9 A. Most of them did, not all.
10 Q. Yesterday, and I would like to ask you for a clarification, you
11 answered to a question by the Defence, and I quote you - it was about
12 sniping from the Presidency side - the quote is: "In the incident where
13 there was sniping from the Muslim side, it would be against the Serbs, on
14 their side of the confrontation line."
15 By "on their side of the confrontation line," you mean which
16 side, the Serb side, Serbs living on the Serb side, or Serbs living on
17 the Muslim side?
18 A. I am talking about on the Serbian side of the confrontation line.
19 Q. Thank you, Colonel Fraser.
20 And the last clarification: You were asked this morning, and I
21 quote the question from the Defence, about "the rhythm of fighting, of
22 battles and combats, between the two warring factions." And your answer
23 was, and I quote you: "Whenever the BH would attack, the Serbs would
24 retaliate, disproportionately in most cases."
25 Can you explain what you mean by, "disproportionately."
1 A. For example, if the BiH sniped against the Serb side, we could
2 expect a lot more sniping coming back against the Muslim side from the
3 Serbs disproportionately. The general discussion around UN soldiers was
4 that it was almost -- it looked like something like a 10-to-1 type of
5 scenario, and we could always expect something a lot more significant.
6 If the Muslims had shelled the Serbian side with a few mortar rounds,
7 we could expect a tremendous amount of shelling coming back against the
8 Muslims. The Serbians were very good and it was just a matter of time
9 when they retaliated, or what the French would say "riposte." It would be
10 far more violent and significant than what was going out.
11 Q. What you just answered relates only to military activity,
12 military -- legitimate military action, also against civilian targets?
13 A. It was the entire spectrum. It didn't matter whether it was
14 military or civilian. The rhythm was about the same.
15 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I have an additional question which
16 was not raised in cross-examination, but I've asked the Defence whether I
17 would be allowed. It is just a question to who his predecessor was.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Did the Defence agree?
19 MR. WAESPI: Yes, they did agree
20 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed.
21 MR. WAESPI:
22 Q. Colonel Fraser, my last question is: Who was your predecessor in
23 your function?
24 A. My predecessor was a Major Christian Bergeron.
25 MR. WAESPI: No further questions, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Waespi.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Nieto-Navia has one or more questions to you.
3 Questioned by the Court:
4 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Colonel, do you know whether there were
5 military personnel in the Tito Barracks during the time that you were
7 A. Yes, there were.
8 Q. Who were there?
9 A. There were -- the French were there, some Ukrainians were there,
10 and for a while, there were some Bosnian soldiers in the area.
11 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: And you told us yesterday that there were
12 some BH snipers, units, somewhere. And do you know the positions of those
14 A. The BiH snipers?
15 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Yes.
16 A. They would move around. We knew where there were some buildings.
17 We believed they fired out of the Unis building. And there were some
18 buildings across the street and along sniper alley they would use. When
19 we tried to press the corps, General Karavelic, about those positions or
20 try to investigate where those positions were, we were always prevented or
21 we couldn't find them. But we would actively go out and try to stop the
22 BiH from doing these actions against -- based on if it was against
23 nonmilitary targets on the other side. But we did the same thing on the
24 Serb side. So we knew where the areas were, but snipers wouldn't go back
25 to the same spot all the time because they wouldn't last very long.
1 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Thank you.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I have a few questions for you as well.
3 You told us that you couldn't indicate on the map Grdonj.
4 A. I remember now where Grdonj is. It is near Sedrenik.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because you testified about it yesterday and you
6 were asked whether you could indicate it on the map. So you know the
7 approximate location of Grdonj?
8 A. Yes, I now remember.
9 JUDGE ORIE: You were asked questions about attacking military
10 objects that would be located in the city. It was not quite clear to me
11 your answer in that respect.
12 If you would be allowed to attack such a military object, although
13 located in an area which was predominantly civilian, would there be any
14 restrictions as to the means you would use to attack such an object, in
15 your view?
16 A. In my view as a soldier, understanding the law of armed conflict,
17 to attack a city, first of all, I personally wouldn't do it. But if
18 someone was going to do it, I would not use indirect fire weapons at all
19 because of the collateral damage and the footprint. You cannot reasonably
20 expect that a mortar is going to land where you want it to land, or an
21 artillery shell, without guided munitions. And at that time, neither side
22 had them that I was aware of.
23 In that case, I would only use a direct fire weapon that could
24 minimise collateral damage and it would have to be against a very specific
25 target. But again, firing into a city is fraught with danger, and in my
1 opinion, I mean, the use of indirect fire was just -- there was very
2 little way of getting to the target you were going after. There was just
3 too much probability of error.
4 JUDGE ORIE: What would be the way to do it if you would like to
5 attack - it is a hypothetical question, I am aware of that - what means
6 you would deem to be acceptable?
7 A. I would have to a lot of observation on the position. I would
8 want to make sure that there were no civilians or noncombatants in the
9 area, to minimise collateral damage, and I would use the weapons system
10 that gave me the highest probability to get that with minimizing all the
11 potential possibilities of hitting something that I didn't want to get
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand. You would like to have all the
14 civilians removed and then to choose your weapon. But let' just assume in
15 a densely populated area, you couldn't get rid of all the civilians
16 around, well, the headquarters or storage of military material. What,
17 after you very well observed the target, what would be your military
18 weapons suitable for such an attack? Or would there be no --
19 A. A sniper would be the only thing I would use. A high-qualified
20 sniper with a rifle with a high-powered scope on it. If I was going after
21 something that I needed a lot of precision, that is about the best thing
22 you could use.
23 JUDGE ORIE: And let's just assume that the -- well, let's call it
24 the military headquarters, was in a building when there was no direct
25 sight from your positions to, well, let's say the lower storeys of that
1 building, would that still make snipers a suitable weapon to attack that
2 military object?
3 A. Probably not.
4 JUDGE ORIE: What alternative would you then have?
5 A. You are talking about something of a larger calibre weapon or
6 something. Now you are getting outside and you are getting into
7 collateral damage. It is a difficult -- it is a difficult problem to get
8 through. How do you get inside to a target that is surrounded by
9 noncombatants? It is a soldier's worst nightmare.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for your answers, sir.
11 Colonel Fraser, you have responded to -- yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Not perhaps all the questions.
13 Now it is 30 seconds, if that much, because one of the questions which we
14 wanted to ask following your intervention was to do with your question.
15 For the reasons that we know and in relation to this question of the
16 Chamber, there is something which I would like the Colonel to tell us, if
17 he knows. Thank you very much.
18 Further cross-examination by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:
19 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, do you know, yes or no, do you have any
20 knowledge if -- whether the headquarters, the general headquarters, were,
21 in a general manner, in a manner of speaking, on the ground floor?
22 A. Are you talking about headquarters in general or which --
23 Q. I am talking about the major part of the headquarters.
24 A. From my recollection of going both to the BiH headquarters or the
25 army headquarters or the corps headquarters, they were in buildings of
1 two to three storeys, if I recall, and the General's office that we went
2 and visited was always on the first level. You go upstairs and it was on
3 the first level. Now -- but the headquarters had more than one floor and
4 so, I mean, there were offices on all the floors. But the General's
5 office that we went and visited was always on the --
6 Q. The first floor?
7 A. Yes, the first floor, I believe.
8 Q. And you do not know whether other headquarters were situated on
9 ground floors or not?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I was about to say that you answered all the
13 questions but you did not yet. But now you have done so. You have
14 answered all the questions both of the -- or am I wrong, Mr. Waespi?
15 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President, just one clarification again.
16 JUDGE ORIE: On this very issue, I take it?
17 MR. WAESPI: About headquarters.
18 Further re-examination by Mr. Waespi:
19 Q. Colonel, you said that the headquarters were not generally
20 targeted. Is that correct?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. Now, was there a direct sight between the headquarters --
23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I must object
24 to this question. I do not think that that was the Colonel's testimony.
25 He said that, generally speaking, the Presidency was not targeted, not the
1 headquarters in plural.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Let me try to find the place. Could you indicate
3 where it was, Mr. Waespi? Otherwise, I will try to find it.
4 MR. WAESPI: The point, Mr. President, I am trying to make is the
5 Defence asked in what storeys the headquarters were. And my question, and
6 I don't need to refer to an earlier testimony, is --
7 JUDGE ORIE: So you rephrase the question without referring to any
8 earlier testimony. Please proceed.
9 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Q. Whether there was any direct sight between the storeys where
11 headquarters were to the areas where the weaponry of the warring factions
12 were, in particular, the Bosnian Serb army.
13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the question
14 phrased as it is cannot be answered because we know that there is a
15 considerable number of command posts --
16 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... all of them or
17 just about a few of them. We will hear from him.
18 MR. WAESPI:
19 Q. Colonel Fraser, can you answer the question in a general way that
20 there was a direct line of sight between the headquarters you had visited,
21 had the chance to visit, and the confrontation lines?
22 A. The -- General Galic's headquarters was in a more open area. It
23 was not in as built-up an area as the BiH. And just outside the front
24 gate there was, as I recall, some farm fields and whatnot. So it was in a
25 barracks that was a little bit more easily accessible. So I mean -- was
1 there a direct line of sight to that complex? I think there was more a
2 line of sight to that complex than there was for the BiH, which was in the
3 city, and it was in buildings that were downtown. So, depending where you
4 were, you might see it, but it is in the middle of town so it is just a
5 bunch of buildings.
6 Q. Thank you, Colonel Fraser.
7 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Before I again will tell you that you answered all
9 the questions, I am looking around very carefully. You did, both the
10 questions of the parties and the questions of the Bench. I thank you very
11 much for having come and testify in this court.
12 Thank you very much. And, Mr. Usher, can you please escort
13 Colonel Fraser out of the courtroom.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 [The witness withdrew]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, could you please escort us through
17 the ...
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P3644.DF, map marked by witness.
19 JUDGE ORIE: It is admitted into evidence. Before I invite the
20 Prosecution to call its next witness, I would like to spend a couple of
21 minutes on another issue and ask some information from the parties.
22 There is a motion of the 14th of July 2000 inviting -- no, I think
23 we should first go into closed session for this.
24 [Closed session]
13 Pages 11242-11249 – redacted – closed session
2 [Open session]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Just for the sake of the record, we turned into
4 open session a couple of minutes too late. We discussed practical issues
5 and nothing else.
6 Mr. Usher, could you please bring in the witness and that will be,
7 Mr. Waespi, Mr. Bergeron?
8 MR. WAESPI: Correct, Mr. President.
9 [The witness entered court]
10 WITNESS: CHRISTIAN BERGERON
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Bergeron, may I ask you to put your headphones
13 on? I take it that you hear me in a language you understand but someone
14 else in this courtroom might speak a different language and then you might
15 not be in a position to follow what has been said.
16 Mr. Bergeron, before giving testimony in this court, the Rules of
17 Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration that you
18 will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. May I
19 invite you to make that declaration? And the text of that declaration
20 will be handed out to you by the usher.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
22 the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
23 JUDGE ORIE: [Interpretation] Thank you, you may be seated.
24 To start with, you will be examined by the counsel for the
1 Please proceed.
2 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Examined by Mr. Waespi:
4 Q. Good morning, Mr. Bergeron. Can you please state --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I have to apologise, I am
7 apologising now, because I was stopped by the security guards, is that
8 Mr. Galura wanted to know everything about me.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, who would not like to know everything
10 about you.
11 Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
12 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. Mr. Bergeron, can you please state for the record your name and
14 your rank?
15 A. I am Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Bergeron. I am a member of
16 Canadian Armed Forces.
17 Q. Did you have a chance to serve in the Balkans in a UN capacity?
18 A. Yes. I served with the UNPROFOR from April 1993 until April 1994.
19 I started with the three weeks at the UNPROFOR HQ in Zagreb and then I was
20 moved to the Sector Sarajevo until April 1994.
21 Q. What was your role when you served in Sarajevo between April,
22 after these three weeks, 1993, and April 1994?
23 A. I worked directly for the commander of the Sarajevo Sector. I
24 could summarise my position as I was a chef de cabinet of the commander of
25 the Sarajevo Sector. My main duties was to accompany the commander of the
1 sector wherever he went and to also attend all the meetings, whether it
2 was with one of the leaders of the military or the political parties or
3 any representative of the UN or other organisations that we called
4 nongovernmental organisations, and of course and to keep a record of all
5 the meetings.
6 I was also making sure that the HQ was functioning properly with
7 regards to the -- that is the secretaries, the security guards, the
8 assistants, and I was also making sure that I was coordinating the agenda
9 of the commander with the HQ and also with the Main Staff.
10 Q. Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel.
11 In the course of your duties, did you have a chance to see weapon
12 sites, in particularly, artillery weapon sites, on either side of the
13 warring parties?
14 A. Yes. One, of course, had to be -- make sure to be able to have
15 access to these sites particularly outside of Sarajevo, that is, in the
16 Serb part. The access was particularly restricted and there was the
17 exclusion zone of 20 kilometres that was put in place in February 1994.
18 So from April 1993 until February 1994, what I was able to observe on the
19 Serb side was quite restricted, however, on the main communication routes.
20 And it was particularly in Lukavica and also the route between Lukavica
21 and Pale, the road between Lukavica and Pale.
22 As for after the exclusion zone was established, the 20-kilometre
23 [Realtime transcript read in error "cent"] exclusion zone, obviously,
24 after troops of the UN were deployed in different areas around Sarajevo,
25 we were able to then be able to see the troops on the ground and to see
1 the equipment and the weapons that were deployed around Sarajevo.
2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am not certain that the
5 transcript mentions exactly what the witness said in relation to the
6 number of the kilometres for the exclusion zone. Could you please
8 JUDGE ORIE: Are you talking about the 20-kilometre exclusion
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is right. In February 1994,
11 after the exclusion zone around Sarajevo was established, it was a
12 20-kilometre exclusion zone around.
13 MR. WAESPI:
14 Q. Thank you. I think what my friend was referring to was the second
15 time he mentioned the exclusion zone, we have in the English
16 transcript "cent," c-e-n-t.
17 While you visited these weapon sites, artillery weapon sites,
18 could you observe ammunition which was placed or brought there?
19 A. Yes. When we went on several occasions between Lukavica and Pale,
20 in that road in particular, we went past very near some sites and we were
21 able to see some artillery pieces, and we were also able to see some
22 ammunition stockpiles which were near the pieces, near the weapons.
23 Q. Turning to the way these weapons positions were used, could you
24 observe the way the Bosnian Serb forces would respond to Bosnian infantry
1 A. Yes. Well, if there were operations or actions that came from the
2 interior of Sarajevo that were attacking their troops along the line of
3 the confrontation, then we didn't always know about such attacks,
4 depending on where they were happening. But in several cases, we were
5 able to -- when they were intense, we were able to know about them and the
6 usual way was, and I believe that this was the case, the first response
7 was with artillery fire or with mortar fire.
8 It seems to me that the Serbs around Sarajevo didn't seem to have
9 a lot of troops. So it was probably not of an infantry that were there
10 able to able to riposte, to respond and to block, to counter attack. So,
11 obviously, their superiority was to do with their artillery and their
12 mortar pieces. So that was their way to stop any actions, operations,
13 carried out by the Bosnian army along the confrontation line.
14 Q. How did the Bosnian Serbs respond? Did they respond just on these
15 infantry attacks, or were there other targets they engaged at those
17 A. There were several reasons to start the artillery fire, as I
18 mentioned earlier. The first reason was definitely a military reason,
19 that is, there would be an operation against them, an action, and then
20 they would counterattack, they would respond. If there was a Bosnian
21 attack, then they would use their artillery, their mortars, their machine
22 guns, any means to stop this attack. That would be the first reason.
23 And then also there was also -- there were opportunity targets
24 that could be presented, that is, for instance, if there were observers
25 going around Sarajevo, if they could see either a military presence or a
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 convoy or a target which had -- which was of major interest, of course,
2 they would definitely be targeting, they would be firing at this target,
3 again, using mortar and artillery. There were also artillery fire which
4 didn't seem to be directed at any specific artillery target, and I believe
5 this was a part of the strategy of a siege, that is, on those occasions,
6 there would be firing at different locations inside the city of Sarajevo
7 on targets, civilian targets, therefore, at times or in order to effect
8 the morale of the inhabitants of Sarajevo.
9 Q. Were you able to distinguish what kind of civilian targets were
10 engaged at those locations?
11 A. I am not sure that I understand the question correctly, if there
12 is a distinction. Were we able to tell whether this was a civilian or a
13 military target? In some cases, both targets could overlap because
14 Sarajevo is -- was a city under siege and, obviously, there were a lot of
15 elements of a defence of Sarajevo which were located in civilian
16 buildings. But also on several occasions, certainly on several occasions,
17 there was firing that was targeted specifically at the civilian --
18 civilian population or civilian facilities in order to demoralise the
19 population. They seemed to have no military operation interest. There
20 was no military reason to do this. When we are talking about a queue of
21 people waiting to get water, therefore, a water line, then we would be
22 talking about civilian targets.
23 Q. Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel. The shelling you had observed --
24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, considering
25 that there will have to be a cross-examination also done, I know this
1 will be checked in the night, but I believe that
2 Lieutenant-Colonel Bergeron said something else as well. Before the queue
3 of people, he also mentioned a part from the water line, he mentioned
4 something else as well.
5 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... which does not
6 appear in the transcript.
7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] In line 25, Mr. President,
8 second space.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I don't want to influence the
11 witness. If he said something else apart from the water line -- what did
12 you say?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was people who were waiting also
14 for the bread, either for water or for bread.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
16 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Q. The shelling you were able to observe in the time you were there
18 which almost covered the year, was it at a continuous level or was there a
19 time when it abated and perhaps later resumed? Do you recall that?
20 A. Yes. The shellings varied from one period to the other in
21 intensity. Even during the course of one day, they could vary in
22 intensity, depending on the time of day. There were periods when it was
23 completely calm. There was a lull, and I believe I remember a period in
24 1993, for about a period of two months, there was a lull that lasted in
25 the summer nearly two months, except that there was still sniper fire.
1 This coincided with the high-level negotiations in Geneva and this was to
2 do with very high instances of high-level negotiations between the
3 factions. And this was manifested on the ground, if I can remember.
4 I remember, for instance, that outside terraces were opening in
5 Sarajevo again. There were a lot of repairs done to the utilities, that
6 is, the water supply, the gas supply. There was a lot of work that was
7 done during this period of time because of this lull in fighting. And I
8 believe also that the tram inside the city of Sarajevo, for a part,
9 started to work again. Therefore, we can see that it could go to zero,
10 but then there were days that it went to more than 1.000 shells during one
12 Q. Do you know why the -- if it resumed, and I guess it resumed
13 because you said there was a lull of a couple of months. Do you know the
14 reasons why the level of activity, to call it like that, resumed?
15 A. If we are talking about the longest lull in fighting while I was
16 in Sarajevo, that is the summer of 1993, since I mentioned that this
17 coincided with the high-level negotiations at that period of time. We
18 were able to follow on the news that there were still some exchanges and
19 this was to do with percentages of the territories for such-and-such a
20 faction. And then when negotiations did not have a result, then
21 obviously, shortly afterwards, the shelling resumed.
22 Q. Were you at the time, or perhaps today, able to come to a
23 conclusion as to the command and control the both warring factions had
24 over their soldiers and officers in terms of the fact that it happened
25 that there was a lull of such a long period during these negotiations?
1 A. In your question, you are asking me to comment on the two
2 factions, on the two parties. Inside Sarajevo, during the year that I was
3 there, I was able to see that there was a definite amelioration in terms
4 of the organisation of the forces inside of Sarajevo, to the point that we
5 were able to see new uniforms, new insignia, and everything else that was
6 put in place in the course of the year. We could see that by the end of
7 the fall, beginning of winter, 1993/1994, there were certain operations
8 inside the actual troops of Sarajevo in order to take over the control
9 inside of the city of the troops. And we can remember certain names, Celo
10 and Caco, and these are people that were commanding the troops on the
11 ground, but they were perhaps some elements that were criminal elements,
12 gangsters. So the authorities, in each of the authorities inside
13 themselves, inside their own forces, there was a kind of taking of
15 There was, in fact, even an attack on these people in order to
16 capture them, in order to take away the commandment from them and in order
17 to put other people in their place. Definitely, there was an amelioration
18 that was an improvement that was visible inside the city of Sarajevo.
19 As for the Serb forces outside Sarajevo, throughout the time I was
20 there, it was clear that General Galic, for me, in my opinion, was in
21 effect commander of the Romanija Corps and he was in charge of everything
22 that was going on around Sarajevo: all the negotiations, all the
23 discussions, any talks that we had for the programme regarding the repair
24 of the utilities, the facilities, the supplies, the gas, the electricity,
25 and so on. We were always able -- we were always at the end of -- the
1 bottom line was that we were always referred to speak to General Galic.
2 If we had talks regarding the access to certain humanitarian convoys,
3 again, the end of the line, it would always end up in General Galic's
4 office. If we had any incidents to discuss, any protests, it was always
5 to do with the office of General Galic.
6 So, for me, it was very clear that General Galic, as the
7 commander of the Romanija Corps, was in control of all the activities
8 around Sarajevo.
9 And if I can just come back to the famous period of
10 February 1994, when there was -- the exclusion zone was established, the
11 20-kilometre exclusion zone, obviously, to start with, the negotiations
12 were at a quite high level with Mr. Akashi, with the special
13 representative, then with the commander of the UNPROFOR, then there was
14 Mr. Izetbegovic who was involved, there was General Mladic who was
15 involved. But when it came to actually finalise the details, the
16 establishment of the area, the commander of the Sarajevo sector was
17 designated as the one who was responsible on the ground. The Bosniaks had
18 designated General Karavelic; and on the Serb side, it was General Galic
19 who was named as continuing to put into place the exclusion zone in
20 detail. And again, for me, this confirmed the status of General Galic,
21 that he was the one who was in control and in command of what was going on
22 around Sarajevo.
23 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, are you aware of an incident of the 31st of
24 December, 1993, that involved tank fire?
25 A. Yes. Towards the end of 1993, on that evening, the commander
1 accompanied the Sarajevo sector commander outside. There was a special
2 event. Barbara Hendriks was giving a recital. And whilst we were
3 outside, the PTT building, which hosted the headquarters of the Sarajevo
4 Sector, was hit not by an artillery shell but by a tank shell, and
5 according to the trajectory, the arc, it was obvious that it was an
6 indirect fire from a tank hitting or aiming at the headquarters as a
7 welcoming card or just as reminder that there were people watching us.
8 Q. Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel. Can you please slow down a little
9 bit because otherwise you are exhausting, on a Friday, the interpreters.
10 Thank you very much.
11 I would like the usher, please, to show to the witness Prosecution
12 Exhibit P1367.
13 Could you please, Lieutenant-Colonel, read on the first page, the
14 title and the subject.
15 A. [In English] Mortar attack at Dobrinja, June the 1st, at 10.20.
16 Q. Can you also please indicate the title, the big letters you see
17 just in the beginning.
18 A. Crater analysis.
19 Q. Thank you. And do you know which year this document refers to?
20 A. [Interpretation] Yes. June 1993.
21 Q. And can you read out who the author of this crater analysis is?
22 A. Captain Houdet, H-o-u-d-e-t, HQ company commander, Sector
24 Q. Have you seen this document before?
25 A. Yes, I have.
1 Q. Can you explain to us how it comes about that you have seen this
2 document and also explain to us what this document is all about.
3 A. Yes. Following the -- let's call it the Dobrinja incident, mortar
4 shells had fallen in a courtyard where children were playing. As a
5 result, I can't remember how many people were killed but at least four had
6 been killed, and this had been the cause of much talking in the Dobrinja
7 neighbourhood, so much so that very quickly the Sarajevo Sector decided to
8 send a team to do a crater analysis. We had Captain Houdet, who was a
9 qualified analyst in our sector, so he went to the site to do all the
10 measuring. He later came back to the headquarters and drafted this
12 Upon his return to the headquarters, whilst he was finishing the
13 report, I joined him in the operations room and I was able to see myself
14 the results he had come to.
15 Q. Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel. And what were those results?
16 A. These results were later made public during the press conference
17 in the Sarajevo Sector of the BH Command. Every morning, we would have a
18 briefing, and following the crater analysis, during one of the following
19 briefings, the results were made public. So once the analysis had been
20 done, it was obvious that the fire had been coming from the Serb-held
22 Q. Did you discuss these findings with anybody from the Bosnian Serb
24 A. Well, it was in a rather informal way. Some days later - I can't
25 remember the exact date - not much later after the Dobrinja incident, the
1 UNPROFOR commander was going to Lukavica. He was to meet with
2 Mr. Karadzic, with General Mladic. I don't know what they were going to
3 discuss. The Sarajevo commander and myself, we were in Lukavica during
4 that meeting. At some point in time during the meeting, there was a
5 break. People got out to do whatever they had to do, and then there came
6 a time when Mr. Karadzic came closer to me, probably because he saw that
7 I had a map in my hands, and on this map, this map of Sarajevo showing or
8 so the confrontation line, I had myself marked the bearings which are here
9 in this report by Captain Houdet.
10 As I said earlier on, when I went to the operations room, I had
11 realised that he was finishing his report, and I had made some handwritten
12 markings to show the angles that he speaks about in his report. I did
13 this because it was quite a major event and I figured we were bound to
14 speak about it again some time later.
15 Mr. Karadzic came closer to me, and quite in an informal way,
16 asked me quite clearly so how we, the UN, we could be sure, certain, that
17 the fire had most definitely been done from a Serb zone. I then showed
18 him my map, the angles, and I very sort of succinctly explained to him how
19 we had come to these findings: On the basis of the line of fire, the
20 direction of fire, and by analysing the arc, we got to an area in which
21 the mortar pieces were bound to have been sitting. And in the Dobrinja
22 sector, this possible area where they could have been was entirely on the
23 Serb side, and more specifically so, towards the south of Lukavica.
24 Q. Was there any response from Mr. Karadzic or -- ?
25 A. No. As I told you, this was, after all, a rather informal talk.
1 He listened to me, to what I had to say. He looked at the map and
2 thereafter he went, he left.
3 Q. In 1994, early February 1994, was there a shelling at the Markale
4 marketplace where you went to the scene?
5 A. Yes. On that day, I was at what we called "the residence." It
6 was the forward command post of the commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, who
7 at the time was General Rose. I had gone there alone with a driver. I
8 was to coordinate some future activities with some members of his staff.
9 And we were discussing various issues. People around us then told us that
10 a very serious explosion had taken place on that marketplace you are
11 speaking about.
12 As I myself was not in the PTT headquarters, I decided to go there
13 - I had to - but before I did so, and it was on my way, so I stopped at
14 the marketplace. I got out of the vehicle. I just walked a little
15 towards the area where the -- to the direction where the explosion had
16 come from, apparently, and then later on I went back to the PTT building
17 headquarters in Sarajevo, knowing that there was probably work to be done
18 later on.
19 Q. How long, in your assessment, after the explosion happened, if you
20 can tell us, did you arrive at the scene?
21 A. I must have been on the scene less than 10 minutes after the
22 explosion, between 5 to 10 minutes, because the Residency or the res -- is
23 very close to this place where the explosion took place.
24 Q. Can you tell us what you saw when you arrived?
25 A. As I arrived, the situation was a very chaotic one. There were
1 still some bodies lying dead on the ground. Other people were carrying
2 some bodies away, and I saw one very close to me. He was taking the body
3 of a man and he put that body into the boot of the area and the area
4 rushed to the hospital -- the car rushed to the hospital. Sorry. A lot
5 of shooting, of course, excited shouting. People were excited, upset.
6 And as I said, I made a few steps towards the area where apparently the
7 explosion seemed to have come from, and I saw tables or stalls that had
8 been turned over, I saw bloodstains. But I did not go to the exact spot
9 where the explosion took place.
10 Q. While you were there have you seen media people carrying
11 television cameras?
12 A. I can't remember that. I didn't notice that when I arrived, at
13 least. I can't remember seeing either camera people or journalists.
14 Although later on in the day, we saw news and footage that had been --
15 must have -- seemed to have been filmed straight after the explosion. So
16 there must have been a few of them around, but I didn't notice them at the
18 Q. Did you see people in uniform?
19 A. There was a Canadian observer, Major Russel. He was at the
20 Residency. We were not at the Residency for the same reasons, but he was
21 there, too. And Major Russel was qualified to do crater analysis, so when
22 the news came, he quickly went to the site. And I saw that this
23 Major Russel was there, too, whilst I was on the site.
24 Q. Just to clarify, if you could please spell the name of this
25 Canadian UNMO.
1 A. R-u-s-s-e-l, Major Russel.
2 Q. Apart from this UNMO, were there any other people in uniform?
3 A. I did not notice that whilst I was there on the spot, but later on
4 there was news or through talking to other people later on, I realised
5 that there was another UNMO. I don't know his name. He was not a
6 Canadian. So that was sure there was at least another UNMO there present
7 on the site because we even saw him on the news. The crowd had sort of
8 challenged him, wanted him to intervene, to do something.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Before you continue, Mr. Waespi, may I just make a
10 short announcement. Everything has been put in place to continue on at
11 2.00, so we have a bit more time. Before I send a final confirmation, I
12 would just like to inform the parties. Yes, please proceed.
13 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. I would like to go to a different subject, and this one will be
15 the last but one.
16 Are you aware of any hunting parties that operated within the
17 Sarajevo theatre --
18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I must
19 adamantly oppose, object, to this wording, because it would imply from the
20 Prosecution that there is an aim that something cruel, when you mean
21 a "hunting party." This kind of wording is inadmissible.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
23 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I can certainly rephrase and explain
24 what is meant by an expression which was used by the witness in his
25 witness statement, if you wish me to do so.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If the witness used it in his witness
2 statement, then -- nevertheless, I would prefer if you try to describe it
3 in such a way as what you understand to mean those words, in more factual
5 MR. WAESPI: Certainly, Mr. President.
6 Q. Lieutenant Russel -- I am sorry, Lieutenant Bergeron, are you
7 aware of any people who came in from outside the Sarajevo war theatre to
8 be engaged in sniping almost on a case-by-case basis and disappear again?
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, so that we
10 could understand the question properly, are we talking about fire that
11 would come from inside Sarajevo towards the other side or the other way
12 around, or both?
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would you please specify the question or --
14 yes, please.
15 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps that could be a question to the witness,
16 whether he has seen different ways these snipers operated.
17 THE WITNESS: The issue of the snipers was a very sensitive one
18 throughout the year of my stay. On several occasions where we would meet
19 with General Galic or people or members of his organisation, we would
20 often mention the fact that there were snipers -- the fact that the
21 snipers would kill civilians, be it women, children, elderly people, for
22 apparently no other reason than to terrorise the population, than to
23 demoralise the population.
24 So, on several occasions, we would mention that this was very bad
25 tactics on their part because the media, the international media, would
1 always pick up on such events. There were photographs in the newspapers.
2 The major media like CNN would take that up because that would happen in
3 the very city, under the very eyes of the reporters who could very quickly
4 move around and report on the events. So this was something that we
5 found -- we found it difficult to understand. We didn't understand why
6 they would carry on with such actions.
7 And, of course, on the other hand, on the side of the Sarajevo
8 people, whether they were Bosnians or Bosniaks or other nationalities
9 within Sarajevo, during that year, it was often told to me that they were
10 probably people coming from outside, not necessarily military people
11 assigned to the Sarajevo siege but people who might have come from other
12 parts of Bosnia or even outside Bosnia. We called them "weekenders."
13 They would come from the weekend or for another day, and that is -- was
14 told at the time that they were probably people who would come, say, for
15 the weekend or for two days and who would occupy some of the sniper
16 positions, Serb positions. And those people would shoot at civilians.
17 Even among the UNPROFOR people, we would talk about this and we would try
18 to get information from the observers. Indeed, we had observers on the
19 Serb side, but their movements were rather restricted. But we never saw
20 it ourselves without having any evidence of it as such.
21 We thought that this was a very likely proposition, that people
22 came from outside to occupy positions in order to use the situation to
23 kill people. At the point in time it becomes difficult to make a
24 difference between what you heard whilst you were there and what was
25 reported later on because that was used by the media a lot. I can't
1 remember in which magazine that was, but there was a whole story that was
2 published where it was intimated that there were some kind of weekend
3 warriors who would come to occupy the sniping positions for the weekend.
4 Q. Let me turn, and only briefly, to the last subject.
5 How many times would you meet General Galic during your tenure in
7 A. Very often. Well, I didn't count the occasions, of course, but I
8 would say at least 25 times. After all, there was -- we had developed
9 some kind of a routine within the Sarajevo Sector with the various
10 parties. And even when there was no major incident, we used to maintain
11 some contact with the various parties. I don't know whether we can talk
12 about an average, but not more than two weeks would go by without us
13 meeting. And I say it again, if there was no major incident that had
14 taken place, still, we would make an effort to have this type of meeting
15 to maintain contact, to use the opportunity maybe to discuss other issues.
16 So if you make a quick estimation, at least 25 times, yes, at least.
17 Q. And what was the contents of those regular routine or perhaps not
18 routine discussions you had with him?
19 A. Of course, that could -- very depended on the incidents, on
20 whether convoys had been stopped at a point. We would meet to take some
21 steps so that the convoys would be allowed to go inside Sarajevo. It
22 could be following incidents such as the Dobrinja incident or the
23 marketplace incident that we mentioned. It could and it was, indeed,
24 following incidents involving UNPROFOR staff, as you know. UNPROFOR
25 personnel, including French, were killed on the airport area, on the Mount
1 Igman area. So as soon, of course, if a man of ours would be killed, then
2 we would try to meet with the parties to discuss that.
3 But there was some kind of a routine, as much as we could, when we
4 would meet the parties, and more specifically say if we talk about General
5 Galic. When we would meet him, we were trying to stick to some kind of a
6 procedure. And generally speaking, we would take stock of the situation,
7 see what had happened since the previous meeting. In some cases we could
8 mention, so if the time that had elapsed was one week we said, well, in
9 the last seven days, we counted so many shelling, mortar shelling
10 incidents, so many sniping, you know, "X" amount of casualties, as far as
11 we knew. So we would report those figures recapitulating what had
12 happened since the last meeting.
13 Q. Was this procedure, these meetings, and the way you described the
14 way they happened, was that the procedure throughout that roughly year you
15 were in Sarajevo?
16 A. Obviously, this was not a very sort of strict or formal procedure.
17 It was a habit that we had developed. And this modus operandi would apply
18 more in meetings that had no particularly purpose, these meetings we had
19 to maintain our contact. Of course, if there was a meeting following,
20 say, the Dobrinja incident, of course, the discussion would revolve around
21 Dobrinja and we would not mention three or four other topics. The idea
22 then was to settle one specific incident or to deal with it in particular.
23 Q. One last question to clarify about the incident of the 31st of
24 December 1993, which involved tank fire. Do you recall the position where
25 the tank was stationed?
1 A. Based on the sort of summary analysis that we did at the time, it
2 was obvious that the shell came from a tank that was stationed around
4 Q. Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel.
5 MR. WAESPI: That concludes my examination-in-chief,
6 Mr. President.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you, Mr. Waespi.
8 Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] With your leave, I will leave
10 the courtroom.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please leave the courtroom.
12 [Interpretation] Now you will be cross-examined by the Defence.
13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Cross-examined by Ms. Pilipovic:
15 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.
16 In April 1993, when you were posted to the -- as the chef de
17 cabinet of the Sector Commander, can you tell us how much did you know
18 about the city of Sarajevo, how well were you informed about it?
19 A. I can't say that I really knew very much when I left Canada, not
20 specifically about the city of Sarajevo. Because as I have said already
21 at the beginning of my testimony, I was first posted to Zagreb, to the
22 UNPROFOR headquarters there. Therefore, I had general knowledge as to
23 the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia, too.
24 However, during the three weeks in Zagreb, realising that I
25 would -- might be posted to Sarajevo, I began to show interest, to try to
1 learn more about Bosnia and specifically about Sarajevo, so that I cannot
2 say that I really had any substantive knowledge at the time when I arrived
3 in Sarajevo. And it was the life in Sarajevo, because you have to
4 remember that we were there 24 hours and we were in the city, we were
5 talking with different factions. So to answer your question, no, I did
6 not know much of Sarajevo at the time of my arrival, but in the months and
7 weeks that followed, I believe I acquired, well, yes, I could say solid
8 knowledge about what went on there in the city and around it.
9 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, you told us that you acquired solid knowledge
10 for what went on there. Could you tell us, in the beginning of your
11 testimony, you said that you were familiar with sites, with armaments
12 sites, on the Serb side, as you said. Could you tell us when was it that
13 you, for the first time, after you arrived you visited a site with the
14 weapons stocks used by Bosnian Serbs in that part of the zone?
15 A. As I have already said, my stay in Sarajevo could be divided into
16 two stages, different as regarding the possibilities to move around and
17 observe weapons systems on the Serb side. Before the notorious exclusion
18 zone, as I have already said, our movements were very restricted,
19 especially before February 1994. What we could see of the weapons systems
20 were those in Lukavica and --
21 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... may I ask you
22 one thing. If you given an answer to a question and when the -- when
23 counsel thinks that you touch upon areas which counsel thinks are less
24 relevant, they are under a time restraint. So sometimes counsel would
25 stop you and say, "Well, I would rather take you to another aspect of the
2 If this would result in a situation where you would feel unhappy,
3 since a specific aspect which is absolutely necessary for the
4 understanding of what you said before, you may address the Chamber and ask
5 whether you could continue. But otherwise, please accept the leading hand
6 of counsel when they interrupt you. Yes.
7 Please proceed.
8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Very well.
9 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, can you tell us when was it the first time
10 that you visited weapons -- a weapons site on the Serb positions? Perhaps
11 you do not remember that. If you do not, just please say so. If you do,
12 then, please, again, tell us, when was that.
13 A. No, I cannot give you an exact date. I can tell you that as of
14 the first meeting that we had with the Romanija Corps, that is with
15 General Galic or his representatives, as of that moment, we could go to
16 Lukavica. And in Lukavica, around Lukavica, inside the barracks, there
17 were certain weapon systems. And in the same vein, the first time that I
18 went to Pale, on the way between Lukavica and Pale, we passed directly by
19 certain positions where there were weapons stocked.
20 Q. Thank you. When you said that you went by positions under the
21 control of the Serb side and that you saw weapons on your way to Pale,
22 that is, in that part between Lukavica and Pale, did you -- were you aware
23 and had you been informed where the positions of the Bosniak army were?
24 Can you tell us --
25 A. I don't quite understand. Who was it that was supposed to inform
1 me? Do you mean if anybody pointed out to me where their positions were?
2 Q. You personally, were you informed about the positions of the
3 Bosniak army, of the BH army, at that time? Did you have any personal
4 knowledge of that?
5 A. Just as much as the Serb positions are -- as I have said, when the
6 UNPROFOR was deployed in Sarajevo specifically, we were under Chapter 5 so
7 that our role was merely to escort humanitarian convoys. And in those
8 cases --
9 Q. Sir --
10 A. The UNPROFOR at the time did not have that kind of information,
11 nor could we collect such information. We were -- we were seeing only
12 what we could see and what the parties told us.
13 Q. Sir, are you telling us that those were the only positions of the
14 belligerents, that is, the positions of the Serb army that you saw during
15 your stay in Sarajevo? And it will be that part of the road that you told
16 us you covered when you went to Pale and that you saw those weapon?
17 A. Until February 1994, those were, you could say, yes, the only
18 weapons systems on the Serb side.
19 Q. Thank you. When we speak about weapons, about the armament, can
20 you tell us how much did you know about the armament of the BH army, in
21 the part of the city of Sarajevo controlled by the BH army?
22 A. Well, a little bit, obviously. Inside Sarajevo, we moved somewhat
23 more freely, if not to all the places. Not everything was accessible to
24 us. There is also the evident fact that we talked between ourselves, that
25 is, the military and the military observers talked between themselves, and
1 we had some idea about the types of weapons systems that existed inside
2 the city. But I do not know exactly the positions that they were kept
3 at. We didn't know exactly how they were deployed.
4 Q. Mr. Bergeron, can you tell us whether you knew how many brigades
5 there were in the 1st Corps, which was in the part of Sarajevo under the
6 BH army's control?
7 A. As I told you, when I was not doing any intelligence, military
8 intelligence gathering, we talk about the commander level because at the
9 brigade it was the battalions inside Sarajevo that maintained coordination
10 with the brigades. We were at the level of the commander, for instance,
11 towards the end, with General Karavelic. But we know, as is true of all
12 military operations, it was sort of divided. So within a corps, there are
13 brigades within the corps, maybe three, four, five or six, I don't know.
14 But I don't have an exact figure.
15 I said this earlier on, I know that during the year, there was a
16 reorganising of the Sarajevo forces. Did that increase or reduce the
17 number of brigades? I don't know.
18 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, if I tell you that there is a document
19 made up by UNMOs during the period of time relevant to Sarajevo, that is
20 between 1993 and 1994, and that was in 1993 that there were 10 brigades,
21 would that piece of information be acceptable to you?
22 A. Well, this figure of 10, I can't confirm it. And I was about to
23 say that the forces inside Sarajevo improved throughout the year of my
24 stay. There were visible signs thereof, of this improvement in command
25 and control, but also in the way that army was organised. It was equally
1 obvious that they had much more infantry available inside Sarajevo.
2 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
3 So you are telling us that you were not informed, that you had no
4 knowledge of the command post of the brigades and battalions in these
5 brigades and smaller units. You are telling us that you had no knowledge
6 where they were, what facilities were they stationed in?
7 A. Once again, refer back to my position: I was chief of cabinet. I
8 was not specialised in intelligence.
9 JUDGE ORIE: You don't have to apologise for not knowing
10 something. Ms. Pilipovic is just asking you whether you know it or not.
11 And if you don't know it, just tell us that you don't know it. I mean, as
12 I told you before, the Defence is under some time restraint. So,
13 therefore, just start to give the information specifically asked for and
14 if the Defence would like to have further information from you, I am
15 certain that they will put further questions in that respect to you.
16 Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
17 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Q. Sir, you spoke about the -- you have told us about the
19 reorganisation of the 1st Corps in a part of the city of Sarajevo under
20 the control of the 1st Corps, and you also said that at times accounts
21 were squared between individual formations. Could you tell us what shape
22 did these settling of scores take? How were they settling the accounts
23 between them? And I mean units within the 1st Corps.
24 A. We learned that, among other things, through these visible signs:
25 There was firing, there were attacks within the city. So we soon realised
1 that these were Bosnians attacks other Bosnians in some way. And as I
2 said, we had battalions with liaison officers, we had observers on the
3 ground, and then even the Bosnian military confirmed this to us without
4 giving us too many details, but they confirmed that they had pulled out of
5 their command certain individuals. So that they'd sort of tidied up
6 within their ranks.
7 Q. Sir, when you tell us that you had information about fire, about
8 shots being fired, do you have any knowledge as to the outcome of that,
9 whether there were any casualties in those parts where this fighting was
10 taking place, that is, do you have any more specific knowledge about that?
11 A. As far as I know, these were not operations of a very large
12 extent. It was rather focused onto one specific building where some
13 people might have sought refuge. Like Caco and Celo, I couldn't tell you
14 how many people were killed among their men. I couldn't tell you that.
15 Q. Do you know if any civilians were victimised during those
16 settlings of accounts?
17 A. I couldn't tell you.
18 Q. When you speak about the reorganisation and operation of some
19 units within the 1st Corps of the BH army, did you know during your term
20 of duty there that there was a battalion which controlled the Butmir area?
21 I mean the Bosnian army.
22 A. Yes. I am aware of the confrontation lines, and when you go down
23 from Mount Igman, you would come into the Butmir village. But
24 personally, I never went inside Butmir. There was probably a commander
25 commanding Butmir, but I have no information on this.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Did you have any information that those troops that were in Butmir
2 - and you will agree with me that Butmir was controlled by the Bosnian
3 army - that fire was opened from that area, targeting the airport area,
4 mortar fire I mean, and that during the period of time when you were in
5 Sarajevo, that there were casualties amongst French troops?
6 A. Yes. Earlier on, we mentioned the Dobrinja case, which was a very
7 clear-cut one. But throughout the year, in most cases, we were not able
8 to confirm with any degree of certainty that a round might have come or
9 could have only come from the Serb zone. In most cases when we would
10 carry out this type of analysis, we arrived at a possibility that the
11 shell could have come either from the Bosnian or from the Serb side.
12 Q. Sir, in view of your function during your tour of duty, how much
13 and were you informed about the activity of snipers in the territory of
14 the city of Sarajevo, that is, in the territory of the city controlled by
15 the BH army and the part of the city controlled by the army of Republika
16 Srpska? Were you personally informed about this, and how?
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
18 MR. WAESPI: I am sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt my learned
19 colleague but the question she had asked before was a multiple question,
20 and the witness answered just by "yes." So it is a little bit difficult
21 to figure out what -- to which parts, if anything, he said. It's the
22 question which had started with, and I quote: "Did you have any
23 information that those troops that were in Butmir... " And so on.
24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will rephrase my
25 question. I will make it more specific.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.
2 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Colonel, during your tour of duty in Sarajevo, did you have any
4 knowledge, any information, about the operations conducted by the Bosnian
5 troops from Butmir targeting the airport?
6 A. As I said, I can't remember a specific incident where we could say
7 with as much certainty as for the Dobrinja incident. I can't remember any
8 one where we can say with 100 per cent certainty that that fire came from
9 Butmir. I mean, the analysis are not that specific, could have come from
10 Butmir, but it could have come from next door just from the
11 Serb-controlled part.
12 Q. Can you tell us if, during your duty there, any analysis was
13 carried out specifically in the airport area?
14 A. I know that there were, after all, several French people who were
15 killed on the airport, and measurements and analysis were carried out, but
16 I can't remember the exact findings because this was done by the French
17 Battalion that was there stationed on the airport.
18 Q. So I asked you whether you personally, and how, were informed
19 about snipers under the BH army's control and VRS's control?
20 A. Personally, I never saw a sniper shooting. I was informed through
21 daily reports from the observers or from the battalions deployed inside
23 Q. When you say that you received reports, can you tell us whether
24 -- what did these reports say about sniping incidents?
25 A. Well, these were -- we are not talking here about the analysis
1 reports. We are talking about daily reports on the type of activities
2 that had taken place in and around Sarajevo, depending on the means that
3 the UNPROFOR had. And the means were basically the observers. In their
4 reports, the number of rounds was recorded, the number of snipers was
5 recorded. Of course, we knew it did not represent everything that had
6 happened but only accounted for what had been observed.
7 It was mentioned whether there had been fire from either side and
8 the number of casualties as had been observed.
9 Q. When you received such reports, can you tell us if your personnel,
10 that is, UNPROFOR and UNMOs, would they go out to the scenes of sniping
12 A. I would say that we did not go in all cases, that is for sure. In
13 some cases -- I will remind you that there was a division of the city in
14 zones, according to responsibility. Each battalion deployed had a zone of
15 responsibility. So it is a combination of UNMOs' observations and of the
16 battalions as deployed within Sarajevo. They were able to go on to the
17 scenes to see the facts that had been reported.
18 Q. During your tour of duty, do you know how many investigations were
19 conducted following sniping incidents?
20 A. I couldn't give you any figure. I couldn't tell you how many
21 incidents, how many investigations there were. But, of course --
22 Q. Thank you. When you say that you received reports, can you also
23 tell us about these reports? You tell us that they were UNMO reports.
24 Can you tell us, who were they submitted to when it comes to the warring
25 parties in that area?
1 A. No. Well, the type of reports I am speaking about are UNPROFOR
2 reports that we had to prepare every day, and they were transmitted to the
3 higher command. The Sarajevo Sector would transmit a report on the
4 last -- on the previous 24 hours to the BH Command in Kiseljak. As to the
5 UNMO's reports, they were sent directly to Zagreb, to the observers'
6 chief, and he was in Zagreb.
7 Q. Colonel, when you spoke about shelling, you said that there was a
8 period -- that in 1993 there was a period of total calm in Sarajevo. Then
9 you also said that there were periods when 1.000 shells would fall in a
10 day. I believe that is what you said.
11 So can you tell us what areas were under the heaviest shell fire
12 during your tour of duty on both sides?
13 A. Most definitely, they are the zones along the confrontation line,
14 among other places, towards the south-east of the said zone, and a lot
15 also in the north, north-west area of the zone. But there again, this is
16 my better understanding of the situation. But a fair deal was along the
17 confrontation line.
18 Q. Colonel Bergeron, when you spoke about south-east, did you have
19 any personal knowledge as to the military units present in the area and
20 which side those units belonged to?
21 A. Yes. We know that there were many operations, Bosnian operations
22 that is, towards the confrontation line in order to try and cut off the
23 route or the road from Pale to Lukavica, and especially so in the
24 Brajkovac area.
25 Q. Can you tell us how frequent were those operations and what was
1 the incidents of such offensives that you tell us were launched by the
2 Bosnian army?
3 A. There must have been some that we didn't know of, depending on how
4 big they were. But for the one around Brajkovac, where apparently the
5 objective was to capture strategic points around Brajkovac, during my
6 stay, I was made aware of at least two major operations in that sector.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, I am looking at the clock and wonder
8 whether, would this be a suitable moment?
9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Then we will adjourn until 2.00 this afternoon. I
11 would like to see you back -- yes, Mr. Ierace.
12 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, might you clarify what time we might
13 finish today?
14 JUDGE ORIE: Well, we have -- we have available to ourselves the
15 services of the interpretation that would be available to the Stakic case
16 this afternoon. But I think one hour and-a-half has been -- so 3.30 would
17 be the time. But that is what I expect, as a matter of fact, might be
18 five minutes later or sooner. It also depends a bit on how things develop
19 this afternoon.
20 General Galic, you will have a longer pause now for one hour and a
21 half. I am not fully aware, although you informed us before, about, well,
22 the way you could rest during the -- during the break. If there is any
23 reason upon resuming at 2.00 that you feel not fit to follow the
24 proceedings or if at any later moment you would feel that you would lose
25 concentration to such an extent that it would be inappropriate to
1 proceed, would you please inform me?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.
3 I will do so in time. But I believe I will manage.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much.
5 Then we will adjourn until 2.00.
6 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 2.05 p.m.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, once the witness has been brought
9 into the courtroom, you may resume the cross-examination. And I take
10 that you have 20 minutes left.
11 [The witness entered court]
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Bergeron, today during the examination-in-chief you were shown
14 a document 1367 in relation to the crater analysis of the 1st of June,
15 1993. Could you tell us when did you receive the information about the
16 incident that took place on the 1st of June?
17 A. I believe that it was on the very same day, in the hours that
18 followed the incident.
19 Q. Could you tell us when the crater analysis was done, was carried
21 A. It was in the days that followed the incident. It was either the
22 following day or it was two days later, which was more or less one or two
23 days later, maximum two days after the incident had taken place.
24 Q. After you received the information the incident had taken place,
25 could you tell us who was it that you received the information from?
1 A. I did not personally receive the information. The information was
2 received at the HQ of Sarajevo through the operations room, and after
3 that, the word spread that there had been an incident that had taken place
4 in Dobrinja.
5 Q. Did you personally go to see the place where the incident had
7 A. No, I did not go.
8 Q. If you tell us that the analysis was carried out either one day
9 later or two days later, could you tell us, when was it that you saw
10 officially the document on the crater analysis that was done?
11 A. I saw Captain Houdet when he returned from his reconnaissance or,
12 rather, his analysis of the ground, after he took some data, when he
13 returned to the HQ. What I don't remember, whether it was the next day or
14 two days later. But I assume it could not have been much later. It could
15 not have been more than one day after the incident.
16 Q. Could you tell us what other information, what other pieces of
17 information did you have after this incident of the 1st of June?
18 A. We knew that there was a certain number of dead, among them,
19 children. And as I mentioned this morning, I do not remember the exact
20 number. It is probably in one of the reports that we submitted following
21 this incident. But as far as I can recall, it would be at least four
22 people who died.
23 Q. Mr. Bergeron, did you have any information that a number of
24 soldiers were also killed during this incident?
25 A. I do not remember.
1 Q. When you say that a report was compiled following this incident,
2 could you tell us who was this -- to whom was this report forwarded to?
3 A. Again, as I mentioned this morning, every day there was a report
4 of facts on the activities that had taken place in the last 24 hours. So
5 as soon as the report of the Sector Sarajevo would be completed, they
6 would also contain information relating to this incident. And then,
7 equally, regarding the incident that had taken place in Dobrinja, there
8 was a letter of protest that was drafted by the HQ of the Sector Sarajevo
9 and that was transmitted or was forwarded to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
10 Q. When you say that a letter of protest was drafted and it was send
11 to the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, could you tell us when
12 was this letter delivered and who received it at the command?
13 A. I cannot remember. I did not send this letter. We had a section,
14 we had a department in the HQ whose responsibility it was to draft letters
15 of protest. And for your information, there were letters of protest
16 nearly every day, not necessary to the Serb authorities, but it was also
17 to the Bosnian authorities, depending on the activities and the incidents
18 that took place. But there was a standard procedure that letters of
19 protest, at the latest, would be drafted 24 hours following an incident,
20 normally speaking, and then they would be transmitted, normally speaking,
21 to the liaison officer of different party who were -- who were
22 residing --
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.
24 Could you confirm, personally, you, do you know whether such a
25 letter was sent to the command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps or according
1 to the work of the UNPROFOR and the way that the reports were compiled,
2 you presume that this was done within everyday procedure?
3 A. In fact, I think I remember or, rather, I am presuming that this
4 letter was sent to the superior level. Depending on the nature of the
5 incidents, it happened that the letter of protest was sent to a superior
6 network. It could have been directly sent to General Mladic. So
7 depending on the nature of the incident.
8 Q. So, Mr. Bergeron, you don't know whether this was either sent to
9 the Main Staff or the HQ or to the command, you are just assuming that it
10 was sent?
11 A. That is correct, yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Mr. Bergeron, you said that you had 25 meetings,
13 approximately, with General Galic. One of the topics at these meetings
14 was also humanitarian aid. Is that correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. During your mandate, could you confirm to us that there were
17 abuses of humanitarian convoys in order to transport weapons to parts of
18 the city that were under the control of the BH army, in order to arm the
19 army of BH?
20 A. If you are asking me if I knew that humanitarian convoys were
21 transporting weapons, my answer is no, I never knew about such things.
22 Q. I am going to remind you, during your mandate - and that was on
23 the 9th of April, 1993 - do you have any knowledge, and I can refresh your
24 memory, that a humanitarian -- that a convoy was stopped in the area of
25 Ilidza and it was established that that convoy contained ammunition of
1 Arabic manufacture, origin, and other weapons and armaments? That was on
2 the 9th of April 1994. Did you have any information in relation to this
4 A. I do not recall this incident. It was by the end of my tour of
5 duty. I am not certain, but it doesn't -- it doesn't ring a bell, this
7 Q. Let us go back to the incident that happened on the 1st of June in
8 Dobrinja. Do you have any knowledge whether in relation to this incident,
9 other authorised bodies carried out crater analysis?
10 A. As far as I know, there were no other analysis effect apart from
11 the analysis done by Captain Houdet.
12 Q. Mr. Bergeron, during your tenure can you confirm to us that there
13 was an agreement that was concluded about the withdrawal of forces from
14 Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica, the withdrawal of forces of the
15 Republika Srpska army? Do you have any knowledge that such an agreement
16 had been signed?
17 A. Yes. I remember that there was an agreement on Mount Igman so
18 that the Serb forces withdraw from Mount Igman and that the UNPROFOR
19 forces can be inserted in their place.
20 Q. Do you have any knowledge whether UNPROFOR forces respected this
21 agreement on the withdrawal from Igman and Bjelasnica?
22 A. As far as I remember, we deployed Sarajevo troops on Mount Igman
23 and we then -- we had permission to deploy French forces and then
24 Ukrainian. We occupied the ground as it was restricted and as it was
25 agreed on by different parties.
1 Q. Do you have any knowledge that the BH army violated this agreement
2 and that it carried operations out in that area?
3 A. I remember that I had seen and I had read, there were always
4 reports that we read on a daily basis. Yes, there were incidents that
5 were reported on Mount Igman. You have to know that this is a mountainous
6 area. It is a mountain and also wooded, and there were a lot of movement
7 of troops in that mountain.
8 Q. Mr. Bergeron, at that time did you receive information that the
9 army of BH from Mount Igman was shelling the area of Ilidza?
10 A. I don't remember exactly about the shellings from Mount Igman
11 towards Ilidza. I remember of operations that had been carried out from
12 Igman, but not of this one in particular.
13 Q. When you say that you remember about the operations that were
14 carried out from Mount Igman, could you tell us which operations were
15 there and at what time?
16 A. This is my answer: What I mean is that I don't remember specific
17 operations with a specific date. But I remember that there were -- in
18 reports, it was mentioned that there was movement of troops, that there
19 was certain incidents that occurred on Mount Igman and involving BH army.
20 Q. Mr. Bergeron, during your tenure, could you confirm to us that the
21 agreement on collection of heavy weapons of Sarajevo was also signed on
22 the 19th of February, 1994?
23 A. That is correct. If we are talking about the agreement linked to
24 the exclusion zone, the 20-kilometre exclusion zone, that is right, there
25 was this agreement that was signed, yes.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Could you confirm to us or, rather, could you agree with me that
2 on the Serb side or from the Serb side, this agreement was respected while
3 you were at your post?
4 A. Yes, generally speaking. As a matter of fact, the agreement -- of
5 course, it was some time before it had entered into force. But all of the
6 weapons with prohibited calibres were withdrawn for 20 kilometres, and
7 those that could not have been withdrawn, then there was the UNPROFOR
8 presence placed there near and in the vicinity of these weapons that could
9 not be moved. So, yes, they respected the agreement during my tenure,
11 Q. Could you tell us what was the concentration of weapons during the
12 collection of heavy weapons? What was the concentration of weapons on the
13 side of the BH army?
14 A. As far as I recall, we had collected not very many weapons on the
15 inside -- inside of Sarajevo. The weapons were all massed in one place,
16 in the Tito Barracks as we called it. And there were some mortars. That
17 is more or less everything.
18 Q. If I tell you that the Defence has information that BH army had
19 tanks at the time and that there were three to five tanks at the time,
20 could you confirm that this information is correct?
21 A. I have never seen tanks, apart from destroyed tanks, inside
22 Sarajevo. So if there were tanks, they were well camouflaged.
23 Q. Do you have any knowledge that there were cannons, Howitzers?
24 A. As far as I know, there were only mortars inside of Sarajevo.
25 But, again, our movements were quite restricted inside the city in a
1 certain way. But anything is possible. However, personally, I was never
2 informed that there were cannons, for instance, 105 millimetres, 155
3 millimetres, inside Sarajevo.
4 Q. Mr. Bergeron, when you are talking about mortars, do you have any
5 information about the activity of mobile targets, for instance, use of
6 vehicles on which mortars were mounted and that the BH army used in such a
7 way so that from some parts of the city they would fire these mortars?
8 Specifically, do you have any information that such mobile targets were
9 used in the vicinity of the PTT building?
10 A. I know that on several occasions there were reports or, rather,
11 there were complaints from the Bosniak side that there were -- that there
12 were certain mobile targets that were moving near certain buildings, near
13 some civilian buildings, that there were firing. I am not -- don't
14 remember specifically the PTT building was involved. But, yes, as a
15 matter of fact, they were -- like all the forces, they had mobile
16 equipment. And it was known that Bosniak authorities may have authorised
17 their placement near civilian buildings and may have authorised them
19 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask for a clarification. The transcript says
20 that there were complaints from the Bosnian side. Should that be the
21 Serbian side or from the Bosnian side?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What want to say is that we, the
23 UNPROFOR side, we were writing letters of protest and we were presenting
24 them to the Bosnian side because they were firing mortars near civilian
1 JUDGE ORIE: So that would be complaining to the Bosnian side. It
2 now reads "from," complaints from the Bosnian side. But perhaps that is a
3 matter of language. The UN was complaining to the Bosnians about what
4 they did? Yes.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. That was a violation as far
6 as we were concerned. Yes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, I used your last minute, but, --
8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Your Honour,
9 with your leave --
10 Q. Mr. Bergeron, during your mandate, did you receive any
11 information that in the area of the city of Sarajevo under the control of
12 the BH army, that there were camps or prisons? Did you have such
14 A. No. This is not something that I knew anything about, no.
15 Q. Did you have any knowledge that there were prisons called Stela,
16 Silos, Tarcin, where Serbs were imprisoned? Did you have any such
17 information? Did you receive any such information?
18 A. It is not a kind of information I remember, no. I don't remember,
19 no. I am not saying that it didn't exist, but I do not remember that.
20 Q. One more question, Mr. Bergeron. How much were you informed about
21 the activities of snipers of the BH army?
22 A. Again, I don't have very good knowledge of specific activities on
23 such a date. But according to the reports that we received and what was
24 observed on the ground, we knew that there were also obviously snipers who
25 were operating on the Bosnian side.
1 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Pilipovic.
3 Mr. Waespi, is there any need to re-examine the witness?
4 MR. WAESPI: No, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Nieto-Navia has one or more questions to you.
6 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Questioned by the Court:
8 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Interpretation] Colonel, you mentioned that
9 there were snipers who were able to go -- come into the city and leave the
10 city. How could -- how would they be able to do it if the population in
11 general was not -- they were not able to do that?
12 A. Perhaps I wasn't quoted well because what I said was that, from
13 the Serb positions, there were snipers who were able to come from the
14 outside of the city, who were able to come from the outside of Sarajevo
15 from other areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina or even from outside of Bosnia, in
16 order to join certain Serb positions who were overhanging Sarajevo or
17 around Sarajevo. This was around Sarajevo.
18 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Yes, now I understand.
19 Another question: According to the testimonies that we have heard
20 here, the firing of tanks, where there was direct fire, but you spoke here
21 referring on the firing on the PTT building, you spoke about indirect
22 fire. How could you explain this contradiction, this apparent
24 A. This is a little bit of a military jargon but when we are talking
25 about tanks, yes, most of the tanks would go for the direct hit. That
1 means that they would see the target on which they want to fire and they
2 would be firing directly on that target. It would be like somebody firing
3 with a rifle, with a gun. On the other hand, since we look at the
4 inclination of the tank, if we know the position, then it becomes like an
5 artillery piece, not quite, but if we -- if people are firing at an angle
6 and without knowing exactly where the target is -- without knowing exactly
7 where the target is, then we know roughly where the firing we get.
8 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: You see the target?
9 A. No, you don't see the target. It will be the oblique trajectory
10 that would then -- that is why we would call it indirect fire. Without
11 seeing the target, it would then be in an arch. Then this is a way of
12 getting to the target, not in a very precise way, but still it would get
13 to the target.
14 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE ORIE: [Interpretation] Judge El Mahdi has a question for
16 you. [In English] I must apologise, I have forgotten to put my microphone
17 on when I said, [Interpretation] Judge El Mahdi has one or more questions
18 to you.
19 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 I understood that you said that the damage, that the worst damage,
21 the most serious damage was done along the confrontation line. In your
22 opinion, is there a parallel between a confrontation line and military
23 targets? My question, I am going to have to explain it.
24 Could we conclude from this, from what you said, that in essence
25 military targets, "confrontation line," quote, unquote, and those small
1 areas, were those that were most targeted, or were they essentially the
2 targets of fire?
3 A. I am just going to be a little -- add a little clarification and a
4 specification. You said that I had said that the most important damage
5 -- the most considerable damage was along the confrontation line. What I
6 really said was that the most of the shelling -- I don't know the damage
7 that was a result of that but we are talking about the shelling this
8 morning. So what I said is that the majority of the shelling took place
9 or the impacts arrived around the confrontation line, in the areas around
10 the confrontation line, where the combatants were, the troops, facing each
11 other were. So it is in that sense, and, yes, as a matter of fact, what I
12 believe happened was that all of the shelling that happened inside the
13 Sarajevo, most of them - I cannot tell you exactly a percentage - but I
14 believe that the vast majority was directed as the examples that I gave
15 this morning, to stop a Bosnian attack, for instance, the troops that were
16 moving or an attack, an assault, in order to stop the targets of
17 opportunity. Most of those attacks happened around the confrontation
19 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. We can, however, conclude
20 at least not to rule out the hypothesis that the shelling outside of this
21 area was intentional, was deliberate? Or was it not deliberate,
22 unintentional, since there was this explanation in order to fix the angle
23 of the firing, it still needed a certain military manoeuvre and a certain
24 amount of work done. So you could, however, say that the shelling outside
25 of this area or near this area was in some way, the damage, that it was
1 inevitable in some way?
2 A. "Collateral," in military jargon.
3 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes, in order not to say
4 "collateral." Do you rule out this possibility?
5 A. I would, however, like to qualify it because, yes, as a matter of
6 fact, when we are talking about pieces that were moving, cannons, if we
7 moved the cannons and here we have the main battery, if, as a matter of
8 fact, there is a period of adjustment of several shells, that what is
9 needed is the expertise of the marksman. However, yes, there were --
10 pieces were not also static. But there were also pieces that were static,
11 weapons that were static and for some time. So the coordinates, the
12 angles, all the charges necessary was certainly recorded.
13 I assume that from starting points, Serb army already had maps of
14 firing with targets recorded, with elevations, all the necessary facts in
15 order to adjust their firing because they had already targeted and fired
16 at these locations for quite a long period of time. So it is a "yes and
17 no" answer: "yes" for the mobile pieces, but it is "no" in some other
18 cases when the pieces or the weapons were already in those places for some
19 period of time.
20 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you.
21 Just a slight clarification, please. This is in relation to what
22 you said. During the effort of the army, or rather the command of the
23 army, of the Presidency army, to have an effective command and control on
24 some of their factions inside their troops, you spoke of some exchange of
25 fire which took place between units of the army of the Presidency and some
1 groups, and that this had caused some civilian victims.
2 How long did it last, this operation? Was this a one-day or
3 two-day operation or did this go on for months?
4 A. Well, from what we knew about it or, rather, the most important,
5 the most famous that we could see the effects on the ground itself, this
6 operation must have lasted about 48, 72 hours. This operation took away
7 Celo and Caco. As far as I remember, this was an operation, 72 hours.
8 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] However, this operation did cause
9 some civilian deaths?
10 A. There were losses, I know, but I don't know how many. I don't
11 know the details.
12 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... questions for
14 you as well, Mr. Bergeron.
15 The first is: You told us this morning that sniping was mentioned
16 in meetings with General Galic and that you found it difficult to
17 understand that they continued sniping. And then a few lines further, you
18 said: "It was often told to me that there were probably people coming
19 from outside." And then you told us about, well, the weekend warriors, if
20 I may call it.
21 It was often told to you by whom? Because it is part of an answer
22 that deals in one respect with General Galic, meetings with General Galic,
23 and it is not clear to me what was the source, who told you about these
24 weekend warriors.
25 A. Again, I would just like to be a little bit accurate. When we are
1 talking about sniper activity inside the city, as a matter of fact, there
2 were. There were dead. We saw them. We counted them in certain
3 situations and so on.
4 Now the point to know whether there were people from outside the
5 city, as I mentioned this morning, and this is something I cannot certify;
6 I cannot confirm for sure, but obviously the Bosniaks on the inside told
7 us these things and we in the UNPROFOR, we spoke to each other. We spoke
8 about it. We spoke to the UNMOs, the observers. And at the end of the
9 day, we came to the conclusion that this was a possibility. This is all I
10 can say. I cannot say this is a certainty. But the more we talked about
11 it, the more we looked, the more we observed, the more we believed that
12 this was a possibility that this happened.
13 JUDGE ORIE: This information had nothing to do with your meetings
14 with General Galic but came from elsewhere, from -- not within the city.
15 A. No.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Next question. We -- you have testified this
17 morning about the crater analysis by Captain Houdet. May I first ask you
18 one question: If I read in this crater analysis "angle of descent,"
19 should I consider an angle of descent to be the angle between the -- well,
20 the direction in which the shell falls and the horizon?
21 A. As I said, I am not a specialist in crater analysis. But if I
22 understand correctly, this is -- the angle of descent is in relation to
23 the ground.
24 JUDGE ORIE: You did read the crater analysis, you confronted, in
25 an informal way, Mr. Karadzic with the results. May I take it that you
1 have read it and that you would agree with the conclusions of Mr. Houdet?
2 A. Yes, on the basis of the fact that he was qualified. He had the
3 expertise to interpret this and to have the analysis of the facts, of the
5 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... try or may I ask
6 you to try and follow me in how I understand the findings of Mr. Houdet
7 and then see whether we all come to the same conclusions.
8 Madam Registrar, could you please, with the assistance of the
9 usher, give a sketch number one to the witness and to the parties and the
10 accused and, of course, to the other Judges.
11 Could you please, Mr. Usher, put it on the ELMO. Yes.
12 What I tried to do is to visualise what I think I read in the
13 crater analysis. I indicated with letter "A" the angle of descent that
14 would be allowed by the surrounding buildings. And I did put a letter
15 "B" where we talk about the minimum angle of descent for 81 millimetre and
16 120 millimetre mortars.
17 Does my understanding of what the crater analysis say correspond
18 with your understanding?
19 A. Yes. The only thing which should be done is that one should
20 continue --
21 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... Just for the
22 first part. Then, Madam Registrar could you please give a document number
24 On number two, I try to visualise in addition to the other sketch
25 an angle of descent of, let's say, approximately 70 degrees. Would that,
1 keeping in mind what would be the minimum angle of descent, would that be
2 a possible angle of descent? I mean, is my understanding of what a
3 "minimal angle of descent is," would that correspond with a possible angle
4 of descent as indicated under "C"?
5 A. If I rely on Mr. Houdet's notes, that would not be possible. This
6 would not be possible, if I rely on the notes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Would that mean that the minimum angle of descent in
8 your understanding would be that it is either a more flat trajectory and
9 it could not be a higher trajectory? Would that mean that the --
10 A. No. I think that I have to come back -- I have to change my
11 answer, in fact. I should -- I should agree with your interpretation,
12 yes. As a matter of fact, yes, because it could have gone this way.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Would you then please have a look at a third sketch I
15 I tried to visualise here what approximately might be the
16 consequence of a more flat or a more steep angle of descent. According to
17 this sketch, the minimum range of fire for line "B" would not allow any
18 conclusion -- would not allow the conclusion that it should have been
19 fired at a distance not closer than the firing point of trajectory "B."
20 I am just wondering, what I tried to do is understand what line of
21 reasoning was in the report of Captain Houdet, and I had some difficulties
22 in understanding. Therefore, I tried to interpret how I - and I am not
23 the only one in the Chamber - how I would understand what he established
24 and what consequences that might have. And I am asking you, since you --
25 I am more or less asking you now to choose between the conclusions of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Captain Houdet and the attempt of this Chamber to understand the findings
2 of Captain Houdet.
3 A. It is certain that it would be better to have Captain Houdet
4 here. I am sure you are aware of that. And here I wouldn't want to
5 testify as a ballistics expert or a crater analysis expert, because I am
6 not that.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Having followed this provisional line of thought,
8 whether you would still stick to the conclusions of Captain Houdet, or
9 that you would leave it open, or that you would have some comment on our
10 attempt to understand the situation.
11 A. I understand very well what you are trying to understand, but if
12 I can say that in the heat of the moment, what really it was the angle
13 that caught my attention, and then the interpretation, to look at the
14 designated zone, which said that the mortar had to be in one of this area,
15 anywhere in that particular box. And the whole box was within the Serb
16 territory. That was what happened. But I didn't have all the other
17 interpretation and all the curves and so on.
18 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know where the woods are, but if you
19 find the wood between 1120 metres from the point of impact or 1340 metres
20 from the point of impact, a bit further on, that you might locate the
21 mortars in that wood because of the consequences you have drawn out of the
22 data you have collected. I am just trying to understand. There are data
23 in this crater analysis, and there are conclusions, and I am trying to
24 understand how these conclusions are a logical outcome of the data that
25 has been taken into consideration.
1 A. I have to repeat, I am not a technical expert to explain the
2 angles, I'm afraid.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Waespi. I am not entirely ready, so if you
5 have any additional questions in this respect --
6 MR. WAESPI: No, just a hint, perhaps. As you know, we have a
7 mortar expert coming and perhaps this person, since Lieutenant-Colonel
8 Bergeron said he was not an expert in that, he could have a closer look at
9 your question.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course, we should ask perhaps a mortar expert
11 to come as well. But I don't know whether the Prosecution is going to --
12 I mean, it is through this witness that the crater analysis was presented.
13 And this witness, well, at least gave a firm impression that he would
14 understand and follow the conclusions of Captain Houdet. So this does not
15 exclude any further examination of other experts or witnesses on this
17 Just one moment.
18 Yes. You told us before that you had a map in your hands when you
19 saw Mr. Karadzic. And you also said, "And on this map, this map of
20 Sarajevo, showing also the confrontation line, I had myself marked the
21 bearings which are here in this report of Captain Houdet."
22 Could you tell us exactly what you are talking about, if you said
23 that you marked the bearings that are in the report of -- whether those
24 confrontation lines or point of impact or what was that? Or was it one
25 of the maps attached to the crater analysis?
1 A. That is right. It's the second map, which shows the point of
2 impact in Dobrinja, and from the point of impact, there are two lines that
3 go towards south-east. On this very same map, there is a minimum range
4 that we spoke about. So according to this, it means that this mortar,
5 the box, is basically -- that he spoke about, goes from the edge of the
6 minimum range, and then he goes further. So the mortars could have been
7 anywhere in between within this perimeter. And according to what Captain
8 Houdet said, it could not be any more further up in the X. It couldn't be
9 anywhere further -- it could not have been anywhere nearer Dobrinja than
10 it was already marked on the map.
11 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... basis of his
12 report, which the Chamber tried to understand.
13 A. Yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much for your answers.
15 Since the Chamber did put a lot of questions, are there any
16 additional questions in this specific respect?
17 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, can we have a short break? Because
18 one of our colleagues is coming down. Would that be possible?
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It is not -- I thought you would be prepared,
20 but -- I mean, it is a Prosecution exhibit that we discussed. So this
21 would at least conclude, for this moment, the examination of this witness,
22 but if we would have a break now, we intended to continue until 3.30. I
23 don't know how much time you would need and whether it would be possible
24 perhaps to continue with another witness and perhaps ask Mr. Bergeron not
25 yet -- not to leave the building yet and see whether there is any need to
1 recall him on today, if the Chamber would allow such a request.
2 MR. WAESPI: I think it would be preferred if we could start with
3 the next witness, and perhaps at the end of the day, if there is any need
4 for re-examination, do that.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course, we have to keep in mind whether all
6 the supporting interpreters and staff is still available then.
7 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, if I may assist, we are a little bit
8 handicapped because as is often the case, unfortunately, the LiveNote
9 has stopped working on our machine, which handicaps us from going back to
10 earlier text. If we switch now to Mr. Philipps, I think we need a short
11 break in any event to set up the PowerPoint. Perhaps during that break
12 someone could attend to the LiveNote and perhaps we could recall Mr.
13 Bergeron at, say, 20 past 3.00 or 25 past 3.00.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me just confer with my colleagues.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Ierace, is there need for the other technical
17 support also?
18 MR. IERACE: Yes. For Mr. Philipps, we will need a short break to
19 set up the PowerPoint.
20 THE REGISTRAR: There is no break required. The technician can
21 come in and do it immediately.
22 MR. IERACE: All right. In that case, then -- all right, yes.
23 Perhaps the LiveNote technician could come in now.
24 THE REGISTRAR: They have been called.
25 JUDGE ORIE: We will have a break, anyhow, for five minutes, and
1 during the break, the Chamber will decide on whether an opportunity will
2 be given, if the Prosecution would ask to do so, to put further questions
3 to Mr. Bergeron. The Chamber notes already that the issue of the report,
4 and the conclusions to be drawn out of that report, were both in chief and
5 in cross dealt with, so there is nothing specifically new about the
6 questions the Chamber has put.
7 Mr. Bergeron, may I -- may I ask you to remain available for the
8 next -- during this afternoon? It might be that you will not be
9 recalled. That would mean that this would have then concluded your
10 testimony in this court. And if you are not recalled, I already thank
11 you for having come and having answered all the questions of the parties
12 and of the Chamber. But perhaps we will see each other back later this
14 We will adjourn for five minutes.
15 --- Break taken at 3.00 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 3.12 p.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence would
19 just like to inform the Chamber that today in the courtroom we have the
20 expert of Defence, Lieutenant General Dr. Radovan Radinovic.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Welcome into this courtroom. Before we continue,
22 Mr. Ierace, the Chamber has considered -- we do not oppose against
23 additional questions, but I don't know whether it could be done right
24 away, or that you -- if you say you need more time to consult experts --
25 MR. IERACE: No, Mr. President. I don't seek to ask any further
2 JUDGE ORIE: No further questions. That means that there will be
3 no recall of -- yes. Okay. Then could you please call your -- yes, we
4 first have to -- yes. I always know quite well how to deal with
5 documents, but I think marking for identification my own sketches will
6 preserve them for history.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1367, crater analysis; Exhibit P1367.1,
8 B/C/S translation; document marked for identification number 13, diagram;
9 marked for identification number 14, diagram; marked for identification
10 number 15, diagram.
11 JUDGE ORIE: The exhibits are admitted into evidence and the
12 other documents are marked for identification.
13 Mr. Ierace?
14 MR. IERACE: I call Richard Philipps.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Usher, could you please assist?
16 [The witness entered court]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Philipps, I take it that you can hear me in a
18 language you understand?
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Before giving testimony in this court, the Rules of
21 Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration that you
22 will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The
23 text will be handed out to you now by the usher. May I invite you to
24 make that solemn declaration.
25 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
1 whole truth and nothing but the truth.
2 WITNESS: RICHARD PHILIPPS
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated, Mr. Philipps.
4 Mr. Ierace?
5 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Examined by Mr. Ierace:
7 Q. Sir, is your name Richard Philipps?
8 A. Yes, it is.
9 Q. And were you born in 1962?
10 A. Yes, I was.
11 Q. Are you a military analyst in the military analysis team of the
12 Office of the Prosecutor of this Tribunal?
13 A. Yes, I am.
14 Q. In relation to your education, did you receive a Bachelor of
15 Arts? And if so, from which institutions?
16 A. I received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of
17 London, in French and linguistics, and also from the University of
19 Q. And indeed, are you a British citizen?
20 A. Yes, I am.
21 Q. At some stage, did you join the military?
22 A. I was commissioned into the territorial army in 1985.
23 Q. What training have you undergone in the military?
24 A. I was an officer cadet from 1981 to 1994, part-time. And then
25 after being commissioned in 1985, I underwent training in the intelligence
1 corps in the British Army part-time as an analyst. Further to that, I
2 have attended various courses at military colleges, including the Staff
4 Q. Do you remain a member of the territorial army?
5 A. I am still an officer in the territorial army in the United
7 Q. Now by way of employment, have you any employment background in
9 A. I have worked in a number of firms, both as a systems analyst, a
10 business analyst, and a military analyst. I became a military analyst in
11 about 1991.
12 Q. As a -- withdraw that. What experience have you had as a military
14 A. As a --
15 Q. Before you came here. Part-time and full-time.
16 A. I have been employed by the territorial army on a part-time basis
17 doing military analysis since 1985. I have been a military analyst
18 full-time for the British Army during the Gulf War. And then in January
19 2000, I was mobilised full-time and spent nine months in Sarajevo in the
20 headquarters of SFOR.
21 Q. Was that at Butmir in Sarajevo?
22 A. In Butmir, the headquarters of SFOR in Sarajevo.
23 Q. Now, at some stage, were you requested by me to analyse certain
24 documents with a view to preparing a presentation based on those documents
25 of the structure of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
1 A. Yes. You asked me to put together an order of battle, that is,
2 the structure of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
3 Q. In order to do that, to prepare the order of battle, to use the
4 appropriate terminology, did you have recourse to documents from various
5 sources, including the following: Documents disclosed by the Defence to
6 the Prosecution pursuant to reciprocal disclosure obligations, documents
7 retrieved by the investigators of the Office of the Prosecutor from
8 various sources?
9 A. Yes, all those sources that you have mentioned.
10 Q. All right. Now, in preparing a presentation of the order of
11 battle, did you use Link notebook software version 5.0.19?
12 A. Yes that is the current version of Link notebook currently in use
13 by the Office of the Prosecutor.
14 Q. Did you prepare a visual presentation which broadly covered the
15 period of the conflict in Sarajevo, that is from May, 1992 to December
17 A. Yes. The chart or order of battle covers that period.
18 Q. Now, is the chart presently positioned to your left?
19 A. Yes, it is.
20 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I wonder whether one of the overhead
21 cameras could perhaps focus on the chart as a whole so that we can test
22 its visibility through the video channel on the computer.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Could those who use the cameras, who direct the
24 cameras, try to get the chart on the screen? You have it?
25 MR. IERACE: We have it in broad form, Mr. President. That will
1 suffice for the moment.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 MR. IERACE:
4 Q. Mr. Philipps, have you prepared by PowerPoint software a computer
5 presentation of the chart which presently is in paper form to your left
6 and which can be seen through the video?
7 A. Yes. I have taken the chart on my left, electronically cut parts
8 of it and pasted them into a PowerPoint presentation which can be viewed
9 on the screen.
10 Q. So, when invited, can you take us through that chart section by
12 A. Yes, I am able to do that.
13 Q. As you do that, I will ask you first to indicate with the pointer
14 on the table what area of the chart is about to appear on the computer
15 screen through PowerPoint.
16 A. Yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please slow down a bit. The interpretation
18 has some -- and those who are preparing the transcript have some
19 difficulties in following your speed.
20 Please proceed.
21 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. Now, does the chart indicate the following information, where
23 available, from the documents at your disposal: firstly, the
24 identification -- I should say firstly the structure of the corps. Is
25 that correct?
1 A. Yes, it shows the structure.
2 Q. The identification of personnel, including personnel changes, in
3 respect of senior command positions?
4 A. Yes, that is correct.
5 Q. Again, where available from the documents, have you indicated the
6 dates, the ranks, and command positions, where known?
7 A. Yes, where these are known.
8 Q. Have you indicated the headquarters, formations, units and
9 subunits, of the various aspects of the structure of the corps?
10 A. Yes, I have.
11 Q. All right. Do you also show on the map VP, numbers?
12 A. Yes, I have also shown VP numbers, where these are known, for
13 formations on units.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Would you explain to us what a VP number is?
16 A. A VP number is a four-figure identification which is unique to a
17 formation within the VRS.
18 Q. Where appropriate, and again of course subject to the completeness
19 of the information at your disposal, have you indicated any changes to the
20 structure of formations over the period of the conflict, therefore,
21 including the indictment period?
22 A. Yes, I have. Where a formation has changed its name or been
23 merged with another formation, I have indicated that on the diagram.
24 Q. Have you also included, based on that same information, any
25 attachments to and detachments from the formations, where, for example, a
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 unit has temporarily been transferred to the disposal of another brigade?
2 A. Yes, I have.
3 Q. Have you also indicated the type of weaponry, and in some cases,
4 the number of batteries or items of weaponry which were attached to
5 various levels of the structure?
6 A. Where this is known.
7 Q. All right. Now, have you adopted various symbols in order to
8 indicate certain things, an example being a dash to indicate the date of
9 the existence of a unit or post, that may in fact be earlier than the date
11 A. Yes, that is correct. Where it is not clear that the date is the
12 first date of existence of a unit, I have put a dash in front of it to
13 show that it may have existed with this name before the date shown.
14 Q. All right. And have you used a number of other symbols which
15 appear on the chart?
16 A. Yes. I have used standard NATO map marking symbols to indicate
17 certain units.
18 Q. Now, in relation to the documentation that you utilised which came
19 from the Defence, have you seen any of the originals of the photocopies
20 which you received?
21 A. No. All the documentation that I have been working with from the
22 Defence have been photocopies.
23 Q. Have you presumed for the sake of your exercise that the
24 information in those documents is correct?
25 A. Yes, I have.
1 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, at this stage, I would go to a
2 detailed explanation of the chart. I note the time. I am happy to do so.
3 We have five minutes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: If you could do it in five minutes, please do so.
5 MR. IERACE: All right.
6 Q. Now, would you please place on our screens the first of your
7 PowerPoint images.
8 A. I believe I shall require some technical help for that to appear
9 on all the screens.
10 JUDGE ORIE: I took it that that was prepared during the break,
11 but it seems not to be. Or is it computer evidence and not video
12 evidence? I think it is computer evidence.
13 MR. IERACE: Yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: And I see at least "Case IT." I see something on the
15 screen and I see a cursor.
16 MR. IERACE:
17 Q. Do you have the image --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Which button -- your button for the screen in front
19 of you, you should choose the third button. Whether you start low or
20 high, it is the same.
21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
22 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have something on your screen now?
23 THE WITNESS: I see it now, yes, absolutely.
24 MR. IERACE: All right.
25 THE WITNESS: On the screen in front of you should be the same
1 image as the diagram on my left.
2 MR. IERACE:
3 Q. Please go to the next image. Does the red area which now appears
4 in the overview image indicate the part of the chart that we are about to
5 go to?
6 A. Yes, it does. This represents the corps headquarters of the
7 Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
8 Q. Do you mean by that all of the information which is contained
9 within that area of the chart?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Would you please point to that area on the chart alongside you
12 with the pointer.
13 A. [Indicates]
14 Q. All right. I think that image is lost anyway, Mr. President. I
15 think the PowerPoint presentation is now on all three channels. But I
16 don't think it is of any consequence.
17 All right. Now, would you please go to the next image and
18 explain the significance of the other red boxes which now appear on the
20 A. These red boxes represent the various brigade and operational
21 group headquarters within the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
22 Q. If we -- well, first of all, how many brigades were there?
23 A. Shown on this diagram, which will require some explanation, there
24 are 12 brigades and one operational group headquarters.
25 Q. All right. Now, are the brigades arranged on the chart in any
1 particular order?
2 A. Generally, the brigades on the second line on the chart are
3 arranged in such a manner as to be clockwise in the direction that they
4 were arranged around the city of Sarajevo.
5 Q. In due course, we will come back to the detail of each of those
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, when we look at the clock, if it would be
8 a matter of one or two minutes but, if not, then perhaps we should have
9 the break now.
10 MR. IERACE: Yes, Mr. President. I propose to recall Mr.
11 Philipps on Monday, after we complete the evidence of General Van Baal.
12 Thank you.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We will then adjourn until next Monday, 9.00
14 in the morning. I take it that -- no, we are sitting in the afternoon.
15 It is a quarter past 2.00 in the afternoon.
16 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, just before we adjourn, would you
17 think it appropriate that the wording of the caution to the witness be to
18 not speak with any member of the Galic team in its broader sense, until
19 his evidence is completed.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I should have thought of it myself. Thank you
21 for your assistance.
22 May I instruct you not to speak with anyone about your testimony
23 here and that, of course, will include not only the Galic team but
24 everyone of the OTP, but of course especially the team which deals with
25 the Galic case.
1 We will then adjourn until a quarter past 2.00 next Monday,
2 although there will certainly be ways to be found in order to not let you
3 wait here for one hour and-a-half because we will first hear another
4 witness. So we will adjourn until Monday.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
6 3.30 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday,
7 the 8th day of July, 2002, at 2.15 p.m.