1 Friday, 7 March 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus
7 Stanislav Galic.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
9 Is the Defence ready to continue the examination-in-chief of
10 the --
11 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. But first
15 of all, could Madam Registrar give us the number of exhibits that will
16 follow, because we have copied pages from the dictionary, and we would
17 like to be able to hand them out with the appropriate number.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'd rather deal with the -- with the exhibits
19 after the first break.
20 I take it then that perhaps the videotape is ready, Mr. Ierace?
21 MR. IERACE: No, it's not, Mr. President. We did some work
22 overnight, and we, just following discussions with Madam Registrar,
23 discovered a further need for compilation. We'll have that ready by the
24 end of the first break.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's the reason why I would like to wait
1 until then, so that all parties have everything ready we need.
2 Madam Usher, could you please escort the witness into the
4 [The witness entered court]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, General Radinovic. Please be seated.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that you can still hear me in a language
8 you understand?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
10 JUDGE ORIE: May I remind you that you are still bound by the
11 solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 Then, Ms. Pilipovic, please proceed.
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Good morning to everyone.
18 WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC [Resumed]
19 [Witness answered through interpreter]
20 Examined by Ms. Pilipovic: [Continued]
21 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
22 A. Good morning.
23 Q. General, yesterday we stopped when talking about the position of
24 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps when General Galic was appointed as corps
25 commander. You spoke about two positions which changed during the period
1 that General Galic was at the command post. My question is with regard to
2 the remaining part of the front. What was the front like and what was the
3 situation like when General Galic became head of the corps?
4 A. I mentioned two changes on the western front, near Otes, and
5 General Galic managed to improve the tactical position on Otes, that's
6 this area here. But he lost this position here at Zuc. General Galic
7 also lost part of the front at the Nisici plateau. That was here. And
8 when he was leaving, he lost this part of the front. That was one of the
9 weakest points in the operative position of the SRK. When General Galic
10 came to the head of the SRK, I would use a certain expression which would
11 be that at the time the corps was in a state of disintegration. It was
12 chaotic. It didn't have a corps commander until General Galic arrived at
13 the beginning of September 1992. At that time three commanders had left
14 the corps. On the 10th of May, General Dzurdzevac was retired. He was
15 replaced by his deputy for logistics, Dragovic, who also left. And
16 General Sipcic, who was appointed as corps commander, he also left his
17 duties and went over to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and he did not
18 return. So General Galic came to the post when there was no commander and
19 there was no one who could transfer the duties of commander to him.
20 Q. General, I'm going to return to the issue of what General Galic
21 took over when he became corps commander. In your assessment, in your
22 opinion, and on the basis of the documents that you analysed, can you tell
23 us -- you said the dynamics at the front did not change significantly.
24 What did you mean by that?
25 A. When I spoke about the dynamics at the front, I meant significant
1 changes on the front, that is to say, taking large areas from one or the
2 other sides in the conflict. So that's why I only pointed out these three
3 major changes. But there were -- there was a greater number of changes in
4 tactical terms. The front would move by 100 metres, for example. There
5 were these small fluctuations which constantly occurred because the front
6 in Sarajevo was always in changing -- there was almost not a single
7 document that does not show that while he was on duty, there was ongoing
8 combat. General Galic, when he assumed his duty, it should be pointed out
9 that that was a period during which an operation of the 1st BH Army Corps
10 was carrying out, and it was called Operation South. This operation was
11 carried out in the direction of Trnovo, Jahorina, Krupac. That's this
12 direction here. And towards Igman the task was to separate the forces of
13 the Sarajevo Corps from Igman, to isolate the Igman Brigade, part of the
14 Ilijas Brigade -- part of the Ilidza Brigade, and to join up with forces
15 who acted from the direction of Visoko, which were grouped within the
16 tactical -- as part of the tactical group Visoko. This operation was led
17 by a special operative command called the Command for the South. That had
18 a status of an operative group. But the main forces carrying it out
19 belonged to Tactical Group 2. There were about 5 or 6 thousand men and
20 they had 25 artillery pieces and five tanks. This force was not -- was
21 quite strong for that time, the middle of August 1992 to 17th of
22 September, 1992. That's the period of that operation. It didn't succeed.
23 The forces of the 1st Corps were not able to join up with the Visoko
24 Tactical Group probably because they obstructed the link between Tactical
25 Group 2 and the Tactical Group Visoko. Probably because of that reason
1 there were HVO forces that were also there.
2 Q. Thank you. General, you spoke about Operation South that had been
3 taken over by the 1st Corps of the BH army, and you told us that in the
4 course of the operation General Galic became the commander. While
5 General Galic was on duty, occupied this post, were there any other
6 operations? We're talking about operations of the BH army on the front in
7 the area of the SRK. And later I'll ask you about the zone of the SRK.
8 First of all, could you tell us whether there were any other operations in
9 the Sarajevo theatre.
10 A. Yes, there were. But in the documents they're called operations,
11 but for a certain type of combat operations to be considered as operations
12 significant forces have to be included. They have to be forces of an
13 operative level, several brigades, a corps, an operative group which is
14 fairly strong. So those operations and really not such, and not at that
15 level, but they were tactical operations which were quite ambitious. That
16 was the Koverat and Jahorina operation, the Life or Death Operation.
17 These were the main operations that were carried out by the units of the
18 1st Corps. And on the side of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, there were
19 several operations, the operation for Otes. We have already spoken about
20 this. There was the Mac 2 operation, a part of the preparations for
21 Operation Lukavac 93. And the most ambitious operation which was carried
22 out by the SRK, it was the main staff of the Army of Republika Srpska that
23 led this operation, it was Lukavac 93. This was the most important
24 operation. Finished in August 1993, and the code for that operation was
25 Lukavac 93, and this operation finished when in the Geneva negotiations
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the president of BH, Alija Izetbegovic, threatened to leave the Geneva
2 negotiations if the operation wasn't brought to an end, and under the
3 pressure of the International Community, the Army of Republika Srpska
4 brought that operation to an end and there was an agreement that the army
5 should withdraw to the initial positions before the beginning of the
7 Q. General, that is what you said, but very briefly, what was the
8 purpose of the Operation Lukavac 93?
9 A. The main problem of the SRK in that direction was the fact that
10 the corridor, Sarajevo-Gorazde via Trnovo was under constant threat.
11 That's this direction here.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 A. That's the Krupac-Trnovo direction.
14 Q. Which part of the front?
15 A. It's the southern front. It goes from Krupac through Trnovo and
16 continues towards Podrinje and Herzegovina. That direction was used for
17 an operational link between the SRK and the Herzegovina Corps. A link was
18 secured between those two units. And in the geostrategic sense, a link
19 was ensured between Herzegovina, Podrinje, and the Romanija plateau as
20 parts of the area of Republika Srpska, and the army, as the forces that
21 controlled the area in combat -- in a combat sense were not to allow the
22 operative position to be threatened because -- and for there to be no
23 connection. In Operation Lukavac 93, this operation was planned and
24 carried out in order to liberate that route, to ensure that there was a
25 link between the Herzegovina and the Romanija Corps, a territorial link,
1 and in order to control the area between Igman, Bjelasnica, Jahorina, and
2 Treskavica. So that is the area concerned, this area here.
3 Q. General, which part of the front are you pointing to?
4 A. I'm pointing to a part of the front in the south of Sarajevo. This
5 is Igman. And we have Bjelasnica here. This is Treskavica and this is
6 Jahorina. So that's the area concerned.
7 Q. General, now that you have analysed the operations and the
8 operational positions of the SRK and of the 1st Corps, can you tell us, on
9 this map can you see the entire operative positions -- all the operative
10 positions of the SRK?
11 A. Naturally, whoever is able to read a map can do this. I think
12 even a layman can do this. You don't have to be specially trained to
13 notice this. The SRK had two major problems in the Sarajevo theatre of
14 war, and that was not to allow forces from the urban part of town to
15 penetrate and join up with forces outside the front, the external front.
16 If that had happened, if the SRK had allowed this to happen, then the
17 route would have been cut off from the Nisici plateau through Semizovac,
18 Ilijas, and Vogosca, and Igman would have been connected to the Nisici
19 plateau and then all the forces west of that line would have been
20 surrounded and threatened with destruction. The 1st Corps would have been
21 able to have a great operational basis in this area, and in that case the
22 war in the Sarajevo theatre of war would have come to an end and the
23 Republika Srpska army would have suffered from this. So the positions of
24 the SRK in the Sarajevo theatre had a key role to play in the entire war
25 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1 Q. Thank you. General, when you were speaking about the map, you
2 mentioned the positions of the SRK, as well as the positions of the
3 1st Corps of the BH army. You told us that while you were preparing your
4 report you visited Sarajevo. General, bearing in mind the claim by the
5 Prosecution that the SRK had the dominant elevations in the Sarajevo
6 theatre of war, that they were under their control, did your research
7 confirm such a position?
8 A. No, my research didn't confirm such a position. My research
9 confirmed that the 1st Corps of the BH army, with regard to the elevations
10 around Sarajevo, they had an advantage in terms of the elevations occupied
11 around Sarajevo. I'd just like to point out to these features on the map.
12 And while preparing my report and when I visited Sarajevo for research
13 purposes, I photographed these features, and if necessary this could be
14 seen. I don't know if this will be feasible, if this will be possible,
15 but I'll try to explain this to you by using the map.
16 When you have a look at the external front, the elevated features,
17 the features of greatest quality, that would be the Igman feature. That
18 would be the most elevated feature.
19 Q. For the sake of the transcript, that's the western part of the
21 A. The south-western part of the front. That's Igman and Ormanj.
22 That is to the west of Hadzici. Igman is an elevated feature. It enables
23 you to control the entire Sarajevo area from -- to Krupac, Vojkovici,
24 Gornji Kotorac, all the way to Vraca. And you can also control the entire
25 airport part, the Butmir part, Nedzarici, Ilidza, Vrelo Bosne, the entire
1 area to the west -- or rather, to the north and north-east of Igman.
2 Throughout the wartime period, the BH army 1st Corps were on Igman
3 and Ormanj. As far as elevated features are concerned, around the outer
4 ring of Sarajevo you can notice Trebevici. On the slopes of Trebevici,
5 the northern slopes, the SRK forces were present there, and they
6 controlled the eastern part of the town from those positions. So that is
7 to say, from Grbavica to Kneginjac, that is to say, the settlements of
8 Bistrik to the extreme eastern part of Sarajevo. As far as Trebevici is
9 concerned as a position of the 1st Corps, in front of Trebevici
10 and -- there's a chain of features which are very interesting for the army
11 positions. That's Velika Colina Kapa, Mala Colina Kapa, and Debelo Brdo.
12 At these positions you had the first -- the forces of the 1st Corps of the
13 BH army during the main period of the war, and you can see that the
14 elevated position in the direction of Sarajevo from Trebevici was under
15 threat by these suburban positions between the town and Trebevici, to the
16 north of Sarajevo. I'm pointing to the Grdonj Hill and units of the 1st
17 BH Corps were there, and from that position the entire area of Sedrenik
18 can be controlled and the settlements towards the central part of the town
19 and to the west towards Kosevo. I'm pointing to the Hum Hill. Throughout
20 the war, Hum was in the hands of the 1st BH army Corps and from Hum it was
21 possible to control Velesici, Pofalici, that entire area of Bjelava,
22 Groblje [phoen], Bare around Kosevo, and then from Hum a chain of elevated
23 features extends toward Orlic, Zuc, Brijesce Brdo, and Sokolje. And all
24 these positions for the war and in Zuc and Brijesce Brdo, the 1st Corps
25 was there from December 1992. From those positions, from Orlici and Zuc,
1 it was possible to fully control Vogosca, that entire area to the north.
2 And to a significant extent, the advantages of the Army of Republika
3 Srpska was negated. That is to say, the 1st Corps which had positions in
4 Mrkovici and Radava. If we had the opportunity to see the panorama
5 photograph, we'll see that the positions of the 1st Corps were just above
6 Vogosca. Vogosca was more or less at your feet. There's a sign for a
7 minefield there. And from Zuc and Brijesce Brdo, it was possible to
8 control Rajlovac and the entire valley towards Ilidza. And for the town
9 in particular, I'm pointing to the Mojmilo Hill, it's about 2, 2 and a
10 half kilometres. That's the length. And for that entire length, right up
11 to the foot of the hill, you had the positions of the 1st Corps of the BH
12 army. And from that position, from those features, from Mojmilo, you
13 could control Grbavica, Lukavica, Dobrinja, Nedzarici, and Ilidza.
14 So my research and my decisive conclusion was that it's very hard
15 to accept the claim that the SRK, as far as the elevations are concerned,
16 that they had any kind of advantage. In fact, they were disadvantaged.
17 That's my conviction and my knowledge.
18 Q. Thank you, General. The Defence's plan was to show the video now,
19 but because our time is restricted now, the Defence will show the
20 videotape at the end of your examination-in-chief.
21 My question would now be, following what you told us about combat
22 and battles and about the operations and tactical positions of both
23 armies: Can you tell us first, in your opinion what was -- which side
24 preferred the front to be quiet?
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Mundis.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the Prosecution would object to that
2 question, but prior to addressing that issue, again there have been
3 numerous references to the map. And I'm wondering if Ms. Pilipovic was
4 intending on indicating what the witness has pointed to for the record.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But the witness usually mentioned the names of
6 the elevations which have been mentioned so many times that the Chamber
7 considers that we're talk about Zuc or about Mojmilo or about Debelo Brdo
8 that it is sufficiently known to the Chamber what the witness is referring
10 MR. MUNDIS: With respect to the objection to the question,
11 Mr. President, it's an invitation to speculate with respect to which side
12 preferred the front to be quiet.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, is it a matter of military expertise,
14 or is it a matter of appreciation of facts that you're asking about?
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is a question of
16 military expertise. And bearing in mind the documents and considering
17 everything that the general used as an expert, we think that he could
18 answer such a question.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Then at least you should be specific as to the
20 sources, because as you know, the transparency of the expert's opinions in
21 relation of facts and methodology used is of great importance for the
22 Chamber. Please proceed.
23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
24 Q. General, you told us which documents you used to your expertise.
25 These documents, do they belong to both warring sides?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. You said that you studied many documents. Is it on the basis of
3 those documents that you've studied and on the basis that you used for the
4 research to make your report, can you tell us, would you be able to draw
5 conclusion which warring side preferred the front to be quiet?
6 A. Well, before I answer directly --
7 JUDGE ORIE: When you answer that question, would you please refer
8 to the specific sources on which you rely when giving your opinion on
10 Ms. Pilipovic, you referred very much in general to the documents,
11 which does not then able the Chamber to follow exactly the reasoning of
12 the expert.
13 So would you please then refer to -- on the basis of this
14 document, that document, you find this here, you find that there, so that
15 we can follow exactly what underlies your opinion. Please proceed.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I studied the
17 documents of both sides, documents from negotiations, requests that sides
18 submitted to the United Nations, to UNPROFOR. Further, I read several
19 studies written by direct participants in the events. These were members
20 of international forces. I mean, first of all, General Rose, who was the
21 commander of UNPROFOR for BH. And I also read the reports made by
22 observers and monitors of the United Nations, and I also have some
23 personal knowledge and personal experience. I was a credited military
24 expert in the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Geneva
25 negotiations for five months, so I'm very well aware of what Federal
1 Republic of Yugoslavia delegation wanted and what the Republika Srpska
2 delegation wanted, considering that the strategic objective that was
3 placed under Sarajevo was already --
4 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the Prosecution would have an
5 objection, and we'd like to address that in the absence of the witness,
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I have to ask you, General Radinovic, to
8 follow the usher and leave the room just for a second so that we can deal
9 with the -- deal with the procedural matter.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will leave, but I think it will be
11 more natural for me to finish my answer and then to be excluded.
12 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ... What is the
13 most logical way, this is a legal procedural matter, and the Chamber will
14 first hear the parties. So would you please follow the usher.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis.
19 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the Prosecution's position with
20 respect to transparency is clear to the Chamber. Let me just address a
21 couple of issues that form the basis of our objection with respect to what
22 the witness has just said.
23 He's indicated, again without specifying, a large number of
24 documents that he reviewed. He told us yesterday that he's looked at more
25 than ten -- I think his quote was tens of thousands of pages. That's one
1 concern in light of the directions the Chamber just gave to the Defence
2 and to the witness.
3 We're also concerned, Mr. President, about the possibility that
4 this witness will be talking as a fact witness based on his accreditation
5 to certain negotiations wherein he represented the Federal Republic of
6 Yugoslavia at those negotiations and the fact that that's not fully
7 addressed in his report and also the fact that it may appear as though in
8 responding to this question this witness might be crossing into the
9 threshold of being a fact witness rather than an expert witness. And I'm
10 not sure if this problem will arise in the future, but the Prosecution
11 would object to this expert witness testifying as to -- or being in the
12 position of testifying as a factual witness.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic.
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment, Your Honour.
15 [Defence counsel confer]
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, bearing in mind the
17 objection of my learned colleague, we would like to point out that
18 General Radinovic has been admittedly an expert for many years, and
19 precisely considering all of the functions that he had throughout the
20 relevant period, we believe that this comes within the area of his
21 expertise, that he should be able to answer such questions. But also
22 bearing in mind the time that has been allocated to the Defence and the
23 intention of the Defence to tender so many exhibits through this witness,
24 the Defence would like to withdraw this question and proceed further. I
25 just wish to say that the expert did say that he was a member of the
1 delegation precisely because he was in a position to find out personally
2 about the issues in question. But as I'm saying, I will withdraw this
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you are referring to specific knowledge of
5 the witness - for example, because he has been present during the
6 negotiations or whatever he was - then I think it would be wise then to
7 make a clear distinction in the way you question him, whether you are
8 his -- asking his expertise as an opinion or whether you are seeking
9 information he has obtained during these negotiations, apart from, of
10 course, the matter on whether it's clear from the report and that the
11 Prosecution could expect such a thing. But it's always wise to have a
12 clear distinction between where he talks about facts observed by himself
13 and where he draws conclusions from information which he specified in the
14 report. And I think it could not come as a surprise that where the
15 Prosecution says that it's sometimes unclear what the factual basis is,
16 that this matter has been dealt with before and the Chamber has given its
17 opinion. Of course the report now and then gives facts without precise
18 sources of the basis on which they were established. But I think it's
19 important for the Defence to make a clear distinction between opinion and
20 fact, and if there's a fact, to establish what is the basis of -- on which
21 the witness could testify about these facts.
22 Then please escort the witness into the courtroom again,
23 Madam Usher.
24 [The witness entered court]
25 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. General, can we just please have an answer you started to answer.
3 You personally, what do you know as a participant of the negotiations
4 between the warring sides in Geneva, so your personal knowledge about
5 which side preferred? Were you able to obtain such information and to
6 find out which side preferred for the front to be quiet?
7 A. Well, I was just interrupted as I was about to give that part of
8 the answer. I know personally that the delegation of Republika Srpska
9 from 1992 asked and insisted on stopping the war in Sarajevo and to begin
10 a political process and seek for a political solution. Why this didn't
11 happen, it's a very long and sad story, and I am not answering that
12 question, but I came across many protests and requests by General Galic
13 asking, immediately after he came to the post of the commander, to uphold
14 the cease-fire that was in force then. I believe that there was a
15 document dated 28th of November, I believe, when General Galic is asking
16 through the UNPROFOR for the cease-fire to be respected because that was a
17 chance to start establishing peace, because if the -- if there was -- if
18 the hostilities continued and if the 1st Corps continued to fight its
19 forces, then there would be very little chance for peace. I believe this
20 was very convincing for me that he was asking for the front to remain
21 calm, to stay calm. And now, on the basis of the analysis of the main
22 objectives which is very hard to call on a specific document, one of the
23 objectives of Republika Srpska was the division of Sarajevo and its Muslim
24 and its Serb side. And when General Galic came to the post, this was
25 already established and there was no need for the hostilities to continue.
1 Q. General, we will come back to that. Now I'd like to have an
2 answer from you. In your report you also dealt with and you explained a
3 great deal about the kind of weapons that both warring sides had at their
4 disposal. Could you tell us briefly, in terms of weaponry of the 1st
5 Corps and the SRK.
6 A. I would start with the easier part of that. The SRK had good
7 weapons, and the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had an advantage in the terms of
8 high calibre weapons and they were of better quality pieces. And I mean
9 particularly the higher calibre weapons. So throughout my testimony here,
10 so that we don't have to repeat this, I think there's no need to stress
11 this fact. SRK had an advantage in heavier weapons, and it had a definite
12 advantage. However, this advantage did melt as the war progressed, and we
13 can say that already in 1993 the 1st Corps of BH army also had at their
14 disposal a very good arsenal of weapons for giving fire support.
15 Q. General, can you tell us which heavy weapons, based on your
16 research, did the 1st Corps of BH army have at their disposal?
17 A. The 1st Corps had all kinds of heavy weapons and that the SRK had
18 as well, but they didn't have as many pieces. So they had mortars of all
19 calibres and they had field guns, including 130-millimetre field gun on
20 Igman, and they managed to even fire on Pale. They also had Howitzer 105,
21 155, 122 millimetres. They had also self-propelled weapons.
22 Q. General, we'd like to show you some documents, and that perhaps it
23 is in connection to your answer that you could give us some comment on
24 these documents. These are documents of the BH army. That's D47, 1853,
25 and 243.
1 THE REGISTRAR: I don't have a translation.
2 Q. 247, 1853, 243 -- 224, 1853, and 243.
3 General, while we're waiting for the documents, perhaps you could
4 answer a question in relation to the documents. I wanted to ask you --
5 yesterday about the area of responsibility. Could you tell us what was
6 the area of responsibility of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, how wide was
7 it, and what was the commander of the corps responsible in the area of
9 A. The area of responsibility of the SRK was about 2.000 square
10 kilometres according to my calculations. That is far above the norms that
11 were in force then, in terms of the rules of the JNA, and these rules were
12 also adopted by the Army of Republika Srpska. What was even harder was
13 that the front that the corps controlled, this front, at the time when
14 General Galic came to the authority, it was -- the front line was over 400
15 kilometres, and you can see according to the map that they controlled the
16 front from Zvornik all the way to Gorazde, so the entire Drina River
17 Valley. So when the Drina Corps was established, this part was taken over
18 by the Drina Corps and the SRK remained on the front that as we can see on
19 the map. And this was 237 kilometres long. That was the length of the
20 front line, except that the front line on the outer part was about 182 to
21 185, while the internal front line was 55 kilometres. So that was the
22 length of the front line. That was also above the standards established.
23 And if we look at that the strength of the corps was far below the
24 standards that are valued for developed army forces, that would be about
25 250.000, so we can see that such a huge front had to be controlled
1 but -- so few forces, then we can see that the main operative problem of
2 General Galic was that with so few troops keep such a long front where
3 there were not too many troops. It would be very easy to break through
5 Q. Thank you very much, General. Can you tell us, what was the
6 commander responsible for in his area of responsibility?
7 A. The commander in charge of his area of responsibility, he is in
8 charge of the preparation and conduct of combat operations, what
9 is -- that is the military side of the problem. However, there were many
10 other activities that the corps commander was also in charge of but that
11 he was not responsible for.
12 Q. When you say there were other things that --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could please the counsel and the witness slow
15 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you to slow down, because the interpreters
16 have difficulties in translating all your words.
17 And perhaps you could make a short break between question and
18 answer. And if you'd do the same, Ms. Pilipovic.
19 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] I will try.
20 Q. So you said that there was political authority, control of the
21 territory, security --
22 A. Support resolving all social problems, water supply, electricity
23 supply, the infrastructure. So there would be a large number of
24 activities that were very important for life but that were not part of the
25 responsibilities of the corps commander. The corps commander was in
1 charge of the military activities.
2 Q. General, you can see the document 224 in front of you. I would
3 also ask for document 1853 and 243. Can we also have the 224.
4 A. Document 224, that is the document of the 1st Corps, where the
5 corps is analysing combat readiness of his own forces. But what's
6 important to notice here in the part that -- when they're speaking about
7 the enemy side, that is, about the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, they say the
8 Sarajevo Romanija Corps is surrounded by seven brigades by about 8.000
9 troops. That is a very indicative fact for the combat readiness of that
10 corps. There would be 8.000 compared to 55.000 that were in the city,
11 that is, not such a strength that would ensure the positions being kept.
12 Q. General, from this document, I would like to show you on the other
13 side 573 in B/C/S. If you can give us your observation, considering this
14 is an estimation of combat readiness of the 1st Corps. According to
15 the --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel slow down when reading.
17 A. I'm sorry, I can't find this.
18 Q. This is the second page of this document.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Could you slow down when you are reading.
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. So this is the second page at the end. "There is -- there are no
22 safe data that the enemy has. One line at the end -- no, at the front, at
23 the front of the defence and in terms of depth, it doesn't have fortified
25 A. Yes, this speaks about the combat disposition of the Sarajevo
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Romanija Corps units on the Sarajevo front. So that means that the
2 commander of the 1st Corps assessed that the depth of the defence of the
3 1st Corps is very short and that means that it only had one line and the
4 depth had nothing.
5 Q. I think you're talking about the 1st Corps.
6 A. Yes. He is assessing his own forces and he is assessing the enemy
7 forces, and he is saying that this is not very strong. I'm apologising.
8 So the 1st Corps Commander is assessing the combat readiness of his own
9 opponent and he's saying that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, that they have
10 only one line without any depth, without any reserves.
11 Q. General, in the documents that you studied for your report, did
12 you get to any facts or data as to what was the front line of the BH army?
13 A. Yes. I came across documents where those who make assessments but
14 do not belong to the corps, that is, the observers and some of the
15 UNPROFOR members, they always said that the 1st Corps had no depth. Even
16 one observer of the United Nations - I can't remember quite his name - but
17 he said that the 1st Corps didn't even have battalions or companies
18 because he says they didn't need any. But operative documents of the 1st
19 Corps do contain data from which we can see that the corps did have
20 organised defence in three lines, that is, the first line, the reserve,
21 and the units that were preparation -- in preparation and resting for the
22 coming operations.
23 Q. Thank you. General, you can see before you document 1853.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Can you tell us, that is an SRK document. This is an order by
1 General Stanislav Galic, 16 December 1993. Can you tell us about item 1
2 of this document.
3 A. Item 1 of this document speaks about the situation on the front
4 and a little lower down --
5 Q. I mean this item.
6 A. It speaks about the 1st Corps. This one, just like the other
7 commander, his opponent, is assessing the situation of his opponent, of
8 the 1st Corps of the BHA. He's analysing and ascertaining which forces he
9 is facing on the other side of the Sarajevo theatre. And he then says
10 these are the 1st, the 2nd, the 5th, the 9th, the 15th, the 101st and
11 102nd Motorised Brigade, the 1st, 2nd, and 10th Mountain Brigade, the 1st
12 Mixed Artillery Brigade, the Reconnaissance Sabotage Brigade, the HVO
13 Brigade Kralj Tvrtko, Croatian Defence Council, the anti-aircraft defence
14 regiment. The 1st and the 2nd Independent Battalion. The Delta
15 Detachment, al Fatah detachment, special MUP detachment called Lasta,
16 special detachment called Biseri. Special unit Vikic's men, as well as
17 other units, instruction centres, and many other units supporting, the
18 staff and logistic units. He further gives the strength, the disposition,
19 and everything else that fits into everything I have already said in the
20 beginning when I spoke about the general relationship of the forces in the
22 Q. General, have a look at document 243. It's an addition to the
23 command of the command of the 1st Corps, and it is dated 8th of December,
25 A. Let me just have a look at it, please. Yes. It's an addition to
1 the command of the command of the 1st Corps dated the 8th of December,
2 1993. It's a standard type. Item 1: "Aggressor." That's how they
3 called the Army of Republika Srpska in the Sarajevo theatre of war. At
4 the bottom of that item there is a paragraph that says, "The battalion,"
5 and they are referring to the battalion defending that position in
6 Nedzarici. That was the most difficult operative location in the Sarajevo
7 theatre. "The battalion is mostly brought up to strength with local
8 people. It's composed of local people and refugees from the Zenica region
9 and is not at full establishment strength. And in combat to date, it has
10 had considerable casualties." And this was something characteristic of
11 Nedzarici and throughout the entire wartime period. Some of its companies
12 in one month, they would lose all their men. One company lost 92 men in
13 one month, and that is almost the entire company.
14 Q. General, could you have a look at page 2 of the document of the
15 1st Corps. That's 541 in the Serbian version, item 5.2, given that this
16 is an addition to the command, can you tell us what the command of the 1st
17 Corps, who has provided this addition, states what he has planned under
18 this item.
19 A. The form is again standard. The positions expressed aren't
20 appropriate to the doctrine and theory of war. But the type is standard.
21 It gives a task to a company to pass into attack with the 5th Motorised
22 Brigade with one unit in reserve and also to introduce reserves and in
23 cooperation with neighbours to carry on with an attack and clear up the
24 Nedzarici settlement, next to the Aleja Bujica Street [phoen]. So they
25 had to clear the terrain, clear Nedzarici. That means to clear the area
1 of everything that they come across.
2 Q. Thank you. General --
3 A. I apologise. Perhaps under item 4 there is also something that is
4 very characteristic of the way the 1st Corps waged war. The commander
5 decided to say that creating panic among Chetniks and civilians, they
6 should launch an attack and group their forces. So the purpose is
7 expressed that civilians should be targeted.
8 Q. General, we'll return to that later when my colleague continues
9 questioning you about this document.
10 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interfere. Just for my clarification,
11 when you asked about documents when one party assesses the strength of the
12 other party, was it your purpose to establish what was in the mind of one
13 party in respect of the strength of the other party, or did you intend to
14 establish what the strength actually was?
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we wanted to
16 establish what the strength of both sides was.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. May I then have one methodological
18 question -- then I have one methodological question. If you want to
19 establish the strength of a force, would you primarily seek the basis for
20 that in what was the assessment of the other party, or would you primarily
21 look at the documents of that warring faction itself in order to see what
22 they knew about their own strength rather than rely upon the assessment
23 which might be a wrong assessment, it might be a right assessment, but
24 there is a risk that the assessment is not correct, whereas the own
25 documentation could be expected to be more precise, more reliable? Could
1 you tell us why you rely upon assessments of the other party rather than
2 on own documents?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I relied on documents
4 of the side itself, on our own side, and on the side -- on the other side
5 that is involved in the process of gathering information on the opposing
6 side. So the information found in intelligence studies, this is not
7 totally irrelevant, information that we find about the enemy side, these
8 sides in contact on a daily basis, and they know each other fairly well.
9 And my analysis of both sides has proved that there were no significant
10 differences between what the sides claimed about themselves and what one
11 side would claim about the other side.
12 JUDGE ORIE: So you say since you checked the assessments, they
13 were correct?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the whole these assessments are
15 correct, assessments that are about the units on opposing sides.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Also the strength of units, I mean, the number
17 of -- because we have been confronted with strength also expressed in
18 numbers. I mean, if you say there are ten units and that assessment is
19 correct but there could also be a situation where you say there were ten
20 units comprising 50.000 people where the ten units are correct but the
21 50.000 is not correct. Is it correct not only in terms of number of units
22 or number of brigades, number of battalions, but is it also correct in
23 respect of the number of men involved? For example, if you say there is
24 an assessment of seven brigades, 8.000 people, would they be both correct?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For this corps, yes, that would be
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 correct. As far as the assessments made by the SRK for the 1st Corps, as
2 far as the number of units and the composition and the name of the unit,
3 that's correct. As far as the number, whether it was 4.200, et cetera,
4 that was not important for my analysis and I didn't check that piece of
5 information because no one can be certain that on that day there
6 were -- there was a certain number of men present.
7 JUDGE ORIE: So you said -- you say now that the assessment to
8 some extent you did not check it, as far as the number of men involved are
9 concerned. I'm asking you this because you earlier mentioned the number
10 of those belonging to the other forces. You compared the number of your
11 people and the number in the other force. But you say when an assessment
12 is used as to the strength of the other party, the number of units, you
13 checked that. But whether the number of men is correct, you didn't check
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I didn't check that.
16 JUDGE ORIE: That brings me back to my initial question:
17 Is -- whether from a methodological point of view it would not be better
18 if you are establishing - and because, Ms. Pilipovic, that's what you
19 intended to do - when you are establishing the strength of a force,
20 whether it would not be better to rely upon their own information rather
21 than rely on the assessment of the other party. I'm just asking
22 methodologically whether that would be to be preferred.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That would be preferable, but the
24 parties, when they compile operative documents, they don't mention the
25 strength of the units. They mention the composition of the unit and the
1 task but not the strength, and they don't even mention the composition of
2 the unit with precision. This is for internal use. But when we don't
3 have direct information, then you have to obtain indirect information.
4 And one of the indirect methods is to take into account an assessment that
5 you get from the opposing side. That is a method that is used in military
6 research in general.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Also after the war, because you said this is for
8 internal use, but perhaps after a war you might have access to sources
9 that give this internal information.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, yes, I did that after the war.
11 General Ajnadzic, who was the chief of the staff of the SRK, or rather, of
12 the 1st Corps of the BH army, wrote a book. That was his MA study, and he
13 mentioned the strength of his corps, the strength of the forces at the
14 outside front and the internal front, including the armed police, and that
15 was --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 78.000 [Realtime transcript read in
18 error "58.000"] men.
19 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General, you mentioned operative positions and tactical positions
21 of the warring sides. I apologise. It says "58.000" in the transcript.
22 It should say "78.000." Yes, yes. My colleague pointed it out to me.
23 So you said 78.000?
24 A. Yes, 78.000. That's what Ajnadzic said. I took it from him.
25 Q. In your report, you also mentioned weapons and you mentioned the
1 weapons that the SRK had. You expressed your opinion. You made an
2 assessment. I would now like to show you documents 247, 1852, 204, and
4 THE REGISTRAR: Would that be 1851 -- 247, 1851?
5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: 204, 290.
7 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] 204 -- yes.
8 Q. General, the four documents that you have in front of you, the
9 first one is dated the 17th of January, 1993. It's from the command of
10 the Igman Brigade. The second is 23/12/92. That's 1851. It's a report
11 from the SRK. 204 is a document of the violations of the
12 cease-fire -- signed by the cease-fire from the command of the SRK.
13 17/12/1993, that's the date. And document 290, command of the operative
14 group Igman, dated 12 March 1993.
15 General, can you tell us, with regard to these four
16 documents -- these five documents, can you tell us what they are about and
17 what information we can find in them? I'll return to the document on the
18 truce later on.
19 A. In document 297 -- 247, 247, it's a report from the command of the
20 Igman Brigade dated the 17th of January, 1993 in which it informs the
21 command of the SRK that on that day, the 17th of January, 1993, this day
22 that Howitzers were used against the civilian population in Hadzici,
23 105-millimetre Howitzers and 120-millimetre mortars.
24 Q. Thank you. General, the document 23 December, 1851, it's a
25 regular combat report from the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
1 A. Yes. It's dated the 23rd of December, 1992, and the command of
2 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps informs the main staff of the Army of
3 Republika Srpska that the enemy continued strong assault actions on the
4 north-western part of the front and that the enemy artillery, the
5 artillery of the 1st Corps - and this is in relation to the SRK - fired
6 110 grenades at the Hadzici area. They fired 60 grenades at the Ilidza
7 area, 50 shells at the Rajlovac area, Vogosca and Semizovac were fired at
8 with 120 shells, and 70 shells were fired at the Ilijas area.
9 Q. Thank you. General, document 204 is a document from the Sarajevo
10 Romanija Corps. The date is the 7th of December, 1993. And it is about
11 the violation of the signed truce by the Muslims. Is that the document
12 you have?
13 A. Yes. That is a document that the command of the SRK used to
14 report to the president of the RS assembly, presumably as a signatory to
15 that truce. They informed that in the period from the 1st of August,
16 1993, until the 5th of November, 1993, while that truce was in force, the
17 artillery of the 1st Corps fired at Grbavica and Vraca. They fired 101
18 projectiles at Grbavica and Vraca. They fired 94 projectiles at Dobrinja
19 and Lukavica. And the positions of the 2nd Sarajevo Brigade. That's the
20 area. They fired 44 projectiles at the Vojkovici area and 250 projectiles
21 on the Rajlovac area. At the time of the truce, they fired a total of
22 1.426 projectiles.
23 Q. General, have a look at document 290. It's the command of the
24 operative group Igman.
25 A. Let me just have a look. Yes, I remember the document. There was
1 a misunderstanding with regard to obtaining weapons. Certain ammunition
2 was obtained for 152-millimetre Howitzers, and it was forwarded to its
3 destination in the unit and the commander of the 1st Corps was informed
4 that the ammunition was not appropriate for that type of weapon because
5 the operative group Igman has 152-millimetre Howitzers M-84 Nora and
6 Howitzer 152 T-20 Howitzers and the shells can't be used without being
8 Q. Thank you, General. The documents that you have now analysed for
9 us, do they mention the fact that the 1st Corps of the BH army had heavy
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I showed you the document about the violation of the truce that
13 was signed, and you mentioned this in your report too. Were you able to
14 assess how often truces were signed and on the basis of the documents were
15 you able to assess how frequently these truces were violated and by whom
16 and how long were they in force?
17 A. At the moment I don't know how many truces were signed, but there
18 were a lot of them. They were frequently negotiated, probably under the
19 pressure of the International Community. But likewise, those truces were
20 violated even more frequently. So not a single truce was respected. I
21 came across many documents in which the commanders of the SRK complained
22 about violations of truces by the Muslims.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could document 275, 298, and 1849,
25 could these documents be shown to the general.
1 Q. General, do you have document 275 from the command of the 102nd
2 Motorised Brigade in front of you?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Given that this is an order for using artillery in defence, can
5 you briefly tell us - and items 2, 3, and 4 - what does this document talk
7 A. The command of the 102nd Motorised Brigade - and let me just tell
8 you where that brigade was located - that's this area here, Stup. From
9 Alipasino Bridge to Nedzarici, that's the position that it held. The
10 command of the 102nd Brigade ordered that artillery should be used and
11 requested that the 102nd Motorised Brigade should organise a decisive
12 defence in the Centrotrans zone, the house of pensioners, and Zora factory
13 Sipad. So these are positions on Stup. The brigade artillery group had
14 its positions in Vitkovici, and Vitkovici is here. You can see it here.
15 And it's important to say that in Vitkovici Hill, there were
16 120-millimetre mortars and there were likewise 120-millimetre mortars on
17 Zestika and 122-millimetre mortars are used and there were also
18 122-millimetre Howitzers in the Zrak area. This group of 102nd Motorised
19 Brigade had Zis, 60-millimetres mortars, 120-millimetres, rockets, 107
20 millimetres -- rocket launcher, 107 millimetres. It also had cannons, 76
21 millimetres. So not a single type of weapon that a brigade of that level
22 would not have.
23 Q. Thank you, General. You have in front of you the document
24 numbered 298. That's the command of the 1st Corps, dated the 16th of
25 February, 1993. It's an order from the staff of the Supreme Command. Can
1 you tell us, what is being ordered in this order? Briefly.
2 A. Document 298 is an order from the command of the 1st Corps of the
3 BH army dated the 16th of February, 1993. And it is an order to disband
4 an artillery brigade and that its organisational units should be
5 disposed -- should be positioned in other war units. First of all, a
6 mortar battery, 120-millimetre battery with all the personnel and the
7 materiel and technical means should be placed within a 3rd Motorised
8 Brigade, and a 3rd Motorised Brigade was located at positions in the
9 direction of Zuc. I apologise, the 3rd Motorised Brigade -- yes. That's
10 where the 3rd Motorised Brigade was located. The 122-millimetre Howitzer
11 battery with the entire crew, and then something is handwritten, should be
12 placed in the 1st Motorised Brigade. I apologise. It's important to say
13 that here you have four battalions, and -- artillery battalions, and it's
14 said that these units should be disbanded and these battalions should be
15 assigned to brigades and that would increase the strength, the firing
16 power, of the brigades.
17 Q. General, before the break, have a look at document 1849, which is
18 a command, an order, from the 1st Motorised Brigade. Could you have a
19 look at page 2 of the document 3 -- 2, under item 4, where it says
20 "Decision," the penultimate paragraph under item 4. It says, "The combat
21 disposition with the line." Is that the document?
22 A. Yes. That's the document I was thinking of when I spoke about the
23 combat disposition of the brigades of the 1st Corps, and here you can
24 clearly see that the combat disposition of that brigade was in two lines
25 with reserves, so up to three lines, in fact, three positions. You can
1 see that that brigade had a depth. It wasn't a classical linear
3 Q. Thank you. General, on page 3 of this document, item 13, where it
4 says "morale," the last paragraph, it says, and I'll read this out - and
5 then perhaps you could tell us what your position is - it's an order from
6 the 1st Motorised Brigade. "Since the occupation of such a fortified
7 settlement is impossible without destroying and setting fire to objects,
8 which at the same time very strong fortifications, demolish and set fire
9 to everything so that this operation can be carried out safely. Because
10 of the well-known brazenness and lack of principle, don't believe any
11 person, any captured persons, especially those under arms."
12 Can you tell us what the commander of the 1st Motorised Brigade
13 had in mind when he wrote this?
14 MR. MUNDIS: Objection. Calls for speculation.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course you could ask the witness how he
16 understands this, what the meaning of it would be, but we cannot ask him
17 what someone had in his mind.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Yes.
19 Q. So the meaning of the paragraph that I've read out to you, in your
21 A. As far as I can see - and I've had this document in front of me
22 already - this is a document in which the commander of the brigade orders
23 an attack to be carried out against Grbavica. Grbavica is a part of
24 Sarajevo that was under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska, that
25 is to say, under the control of the SRK. In this paragraph the commander
1 is ordering action to be intense, and he's mentioning the attitude towards
2 civilian features. He's ordering that civilian objects should be
4 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, given that it's time
5 for a break -- Your Honour, could I ask a question. It's of a technical
6 nature. How much time does the Defence have?
7 JUDGE ORIE: The decision initially was three hours. Then it was
8 four hours. And I think we left an opening that it might be five hours,
9 depending on the way you conduct the examination-in-chief. In this
10 respect, I would like to say that going into many details might not always
11 assist this Chamber, and so therefore I very much would like to stress
12 that the Defence makes clear priorities what are the main issues. But
13 that is how much time you would have, and you used until now approximately
14 two hours and 15 minutes.
15 We'll adjourn until 11.00.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.32 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.
18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] May I take the floor, please,
21 before the witness comes in. I only need 15 seconds to say the following:
22 We have a technical problem which is very important. One of the
23 maps - and General Galic has now just told me - is that we'd like to show
24 to the expert, and unfortunately this map is -- remained in Geneva. One
25 is in Geneva and one is here. We only have one copy of the map. It's a
1 technical problem which may arise. So this could imply that we will need
2 more time. That's the only thing that we are saying. We're trying to
3 find a solution, but we just want you know now.
4 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it that you do not need more time but you
5 need time at another moment.
6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I didn't say that I didn't
7 need more time, but if you're inviting me to say that, I'll say it gladly.
8 I wasn't speaking of the time to do with the map, but I can speak about
9 time with pleasure. Very well.
10 JUDGE ORIE: No. I was just referring to that more time can mean
11 more things. The first is that you need more time in order to finish your
12 preparation or that you need more time for the examination of the witness.
13 I was referring to the first rather than to the second.
14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we are
15 practically ready, but we have to specify that we will have to see whether
16 we will need more time later on.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis.
18 MR. MUNDIS: Two items, Mr. President: First, it's unclear to the
19 Prosecution exactly what this map or maps that Mr. Piletta-Zanin is
20 referring to indicate. He indicates that one is in Geneva and one is
21 here. I'm not sure if this is a map that's been disclosed to the
22 Prosecution or not.
23 JUDGE ORIE: I take it -- could the parties please discuss that
24 during the next break so that we'll see whether there's any remaining
25 problem in respect of a map. I think we've got two at this moment.
1 Whether we have three finally or not.
2 MR. MUNDIS: If I may raise one other issue, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 MR. MUNDIS: During the break, we were handed another bundle of
5 documents, apparently which the Defence is intending on putting to the
6 witness. I note from the exhibit numbers those documents which were
7 attached to the Radinovic report bear numbers roughly from D172 to D301, I
8 believe. There are numerous documents on the list I was just handed, and
9 in this bundle that are D1800-series for lack of a better word. There
10 appear to be about ten of them. It does not appear that these were on
11 the exhibit list with respect to this witness. We're make some inquiries
12 and checking these documents now, but it's unclear whether those documents
13 were also in any of the letters which we received from the Defence
14 indicating additional documents they would put to the witness. I've
15 checked a few of them very quickly, and they do not appear to be,
16 Mr. President. So I'm simply raising this now.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You reserve the right to oppose against showing
18 these documents to the witness. I noticed that we had some documents in
19 the 1800-series until now as well. So the Defence can expect that if
20 there would be any - I don't know whether there is - but if there would be
21 any document that was not indicated before, they can expect opposition
22 from the Prosecution.
23 Then I'd like to make two observations, as far as the Chamber is
24 concerned. The Chamber discussed briefly the way the examination-in-chief
25 develops. Looking at it, how it does develop until now, this would not
1 encourage the Chamber to grant five hours instead of four. The second
2 observation is that if the Defence would leave details and come to what
3 the Chamber considers to be points more in --
4 [Technical difficulty]
5 JUDGE ORIE: There seems to be problem with the transcript. Yes.
6 We -- there are a few lines missing. The second observation, let me start
7 with that, is that the Chamber would -- no, again the transcript seems to
8 be -- whether it's a technical transcription problem. There again seems
9 to be a technical difficulty.
10 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
11 JUDGE ORIE: I'm informed that for technical reasons we have to
12 restart and that takes us five minutes to have everything set again to
13 restart. So we'll adjourn for five minutes.
14 --- Break taken at 11.13 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 11.24 a.m.
16 JUDGE ORIE: The technical problems being solved, we'll restart.
17 I'll just repeat that I said before that until now the way that the
18 examination-in-chief develops does not encourage the Chamber to grant more
19 than the four hours indicated.
20 The second issue is that the Chamber can imagine that in
21 prioritising, there are issues that are of greater relevance than a lot of
22 the details we have dealt with until now and of which we find quite a lot
23 in the report itself, and it may be clear to the parties that the expert
24 testimony is not there to repeat what the report already says.
25 Please proceed. If the witness is brought into the courtroom.
1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since we are
2 speaking precisely about methodology and so that we can be clearly in a
3 position to proceed, we don't know whether the witness handed you his
4 homework, as you wished for him to do so.
5 JUDGE ORIE: No, it has not yet been done.
6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well. Could we perhaps
7 ask him to do this so that we can be certain and save time that we find so
9 [The witness entered court]
10 JUDGE ORIE: What homework did you have exactly in mind,
11 Mr. Piletta-Zanin?
12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] What you asked him to do,
13 Mr. President, what you asked him yesterday. There were modifications
14 that the witness wanted to put into his text, and you asked him to do that
15 in writing, and I don't think that he has done that.
16 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you, General, did you already prepare in
17 writing the corrections you'd like to make in respect of your report, as I
18 invited you to do yesterday?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I have done that,
20 Mr. President. But unfortunately, I don't work on the computer, and I
21 have that written in hand. Perhaps I can dictate it to someone.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Or -- I don't know how your handwriting is. I
23 hope it's better than mine, but --
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not very good. Unfortunately, no,
25 it's poor.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Then perhaps we should provide you with a
2 dictating -- a small machine so you can dictate it and that it will then
3 be worked out.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have such a machine, or do you need one from
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't have it.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I will personally take care that one is
9 available for you.
10 Then please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
11 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. General, in your report, you compiled it and you came to a
13 conclusion that in the Sarajevo theatre there was light infantry weapons
14 that was used; is that correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. In your research, did you come across documents that you studied
17 and that there was talk that there were snipers used in the Sarajevo
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. In your research, did you come across data whether the parties had
21 snipers and which side had snipers, if they did have snipers?
22 A. In my research, I managed to establish that the SRK during the
23 mandate of General Galic had snipers 7.9 millimetres, semi-automatic
24 rifle, and snipers of calibre 7.62 millimetres, while the 1st Corps of the
25 BH army had those very same snipers, as well as 12.7-millimetre snipers.
1 Q. Can you tell us a little more precisely. When you say that SRK
2 had snipers, can you explain that.
3 A. SRK, according to its establishment in the units of the brigades,
4 would have one sniper per section, except that I have to say that I
5 checked this data in talking to the brigade commanders. When I spoke to
6 the commander of the Kosevo Brigade, Mr. Krajisnik - I think that's his
7 name, Krajisnik - he told me that to start with, until 1993, mid-1993, had
8 no snipers at all. The same thing I heard from General Istej [phoen],
9 commander of the 1st Romanija Brigade, who said that not in all of the
10 battalions in their sections there were snipers.
11 Q. Thank you. When we're talking about your research into BH army,
12 what data did you obtain --
13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence would
14 like to show the general documents 279, 1855, 281, 242.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
16 Yes, Mr. Mundis.
17 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, while that's being done, the
18 Prosecution would reiterate its request for the notes of the expert with
19 respect to the two individuals that he just spoke of and that was the
20 basis of his testimony.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Did you make any notes of the interviews you
22 had, for example, with Mr. Krajisnik?
23 THE WITNESS: [No audible response]
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You have these notes?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Would you provide them to us.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Did you provide them to the counsel before?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, when I gave the whole
5 bundle of conversations, unfortunately the interview notes from Krajisnik
6 and Ugresic conversations fell out, but I have them on me. Do you want me
7 to hand it over now or during the break?
8 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we'll wait until ...
9 So I do understand that you provided your notes in the past to
10 Defence counsel, apart from the Krajisnik and the Ugresic notes; is that
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: May I also ask you: Did you have any hesitation to
14 give these notes on whatever basis to this court?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
16 JUDGE ORIE: It was not on the basis of confidentiality that you
17 felt that you could not give these notes to anyone?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not at all. It's a
19 working -- it was a working paper.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] While I was preparing for my report,
22 and I spoke to people that I believed could give me important information.
23 So this is just a free-style notes. It's not a standardised
24 questionnaire. Of course I have no problem in handed that over.
25 JUDGE ORIE: You did not promise those persons that you would keep
1 confidential what the conversation was about?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They didn't ask me, and I didn't say
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much.
5 Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
6 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, yes -- one moment.
8 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
9 JUDGE ORIE: You may now provide the notes that you had of these
10 conversations with Mr. Krajisnik and Ugresic to Madam Registrar. We'll
11 return the original to you, but they'll be copied so that the parties can
12 look at it. You just said that you had them with you.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can do that immediately?
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please.
15 THE REGISTRAR: The witness has just been given document 279, 146,
16 1855, 280, 241, 220, 216, 214, 210.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you please.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, you have before you documents of the BH army. Can you
20 briefly look at them and tell us if these are the documents that you used
21 and from which you drew your opinion that in the Sarajevo theatre units of
22 the 1st Corps of the BH army had snipers, then they had training, that
23 snipers were operational throughout and what their positions were. Are
24 these those documents? Could you please look at them and tell us,
25 General, bearing in mind the time we have is limited. You don't have to
1 analyse each document individually, but can you just please look at them
2 and tell us if these are these documents.
3 A. I have before me order of the commander of the 2nd Motorised
4 Brigade of the 1st Corps of the BH army.
5 Q. The next document?
6 A. This is the order of the commander of the 1st Motorised Brigade
7 and the order of another commander of a motorised brigade, the 1st
8 Motorised Brigade, and of some army unit without clear identification
9 which unit is in question; it simply says "army unit." In the first
10 document the order says that "all snipers that the brigade has has to be
11 put in permanent constant function 24 hours."
12 Q. Thank you, General. The other documents, do they also speak about
13 the same things?
14 A. Yes, they speak about the same things. But the document from the
15 2nd of October, 1993, is interesting from the point of view that there is
16 a sniper platoon that is being established. So the 1st Motorised Brigade
17 from its three battalions makes -- or establishes a sniper platoon in the
18 first item.
19 Q. Thank you, General. The documents that are also marked, you can
20 just call out the numbers of the documents.
21 A. In the document D280, there is an order for the snipers to be
22 grouped in the 1st Corps.
23 Q. Thank you, General. General, the other documents that you used,
24 are they also about this?
25 A. Yes, they are. I also came across a document that now I can't
1 find, to be honest, here and from which you can see that the 1st Corps
2 also has snipers using 12.7-millimetre gun. It says -- one of the
3 documents says that all snipers should be combat ready, including snipers
4 using 12.7-millimetre calibre gun. That would be a good thing to find
5 this document. It would be a pity not to find it. But this is certainly
6 that should be found. I have quoted all these documents.
7 Q. Thank you. Since this is quoted, cited in the report, then we
8 don't have to find it. So you're telling us these are documents where it
9 says that snipers were operational in the Sarajevo theatre of war.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you, General. General, you told us that General Galic
12 became a commander of the SRK on the 7th of September, 1992. Can you tell
13 us, in your expertise, you wrote a great deal about, this but can you tell
14 us how did that come about that at the time Colonel - at that
15 time - Stanislav Galic came to be the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija
16 Corps, and what was the situation in the battlefield in the combat area
17 that he encountered? And this is to do with the takeover of his duties
18 and the organisation of his system of command and control in the Sarajevo
20 A. General Galic came to the commander of the SRK from being the
21 commander of the 30th Division, that is, of course, an honour for any
22 officer and General Galic, still as a young officer, when he was recruited
23 to be the -- in the support battalion of the main staff, he was part of
24 the elite of the then-JNA units and certainly before him he had a
25 brilliant career and to be appointed corps commander, that is the crown of
1 such a career. And I also know in this sense that the unit that
2 General Galic commanded in the 5th military district in Ljubljana was
3 supposed to be transferred to Valjevo and certainly this could not have
4 suited him because of the family situation, which was quite unfavourable
5 for him because his children continued to live in Slovenia, so this was a
6 very painful, not to be with his family. His wife was Hungarian, and he
7 thought that it would be completely normal to go to Federal Republic of
8 Yugoslavia to be in Serbia, where Serbian language is spoken, where there
9 would be a new war adventure in Bosnia. He really didn't need that. But
10 a soldier doesn't need -- doesn't ask about his duties and he's not in a
11 position to choose.
12 Q. Thank you. General, with which problems or which problems did he
13 face, General Galic, when he came to be the commander of the corps
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Mundis.
16 MR. MUNDIS: Objection, Mr. President. This line of questioning
17 seems to follow very closely pages 90 - excuse me - 92 through 94 of the
18 expert's statement, and I note that none of that material is sourced, and
19 we would challenge this evidence unless a proper foundation for the source
20 of this information has been established.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you please respond whether this does
22 reflect, these pages, and whether there are any sources available.
23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it is a
24 reflection -- the expert said that he has personal knowledge as well when
25 he answered my question and explained this, and I asked this question to
1 lead up to the question as to what General Galic took over when he was
2 appointed as commander of the SRK and in order to show the witness certain
4 Q. General, what did General Galic take over when he was appointed --
5 JUDGE ORIE: There is an objection. I would first like to look at
6 it in more detail. I note, Ms. Pilipovic, that none of the pages -- that
7 most of the pages mentioned are relatively poor of indication of sources.
8 So therefore, if you'd like to deal with any of these issues, would you
9 please lay the proper foundation.
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, when you answered the question in the biography of
12 General Galic, when talking about General Galic's background, can you tell
13 us what the sources of the information are.
14 A. As assistant to the Minister for Strategy, that was my last duty
15 in the army in the course of -- when the former Yugoslavia was
16 disintegrating and before the units were transferred. At that time I
17 participated in the planning, and I personally know that General Galic's
18 division was to be transferred to Valjevo. Because it was on a route
19 attacked by Croatian paramilitary forces, for that reason the Supreme
20 Command diverted that brigade, that column, to Banja Luka and Galic
21 arrived in Banja Luka instead of arriving in Valjevo. This is something
22 that I know and I am sure it can be checked in other sources, but I have
23 personal knowledge of this. I don't know what kind of documents I could
24 show you in order to convince you of this.
25 Q. Thank you. General, you told us that in the Sarajevo theatre of
1 war when the general was at the time a colonel, when he arrived there and
2 was appointed as commander, at that time three commanders had already left
3 that theatre of war. Can you tell us what the commander -- what duties
4 Colonel Galic took over and what measures did he take for reorganising the
5 command system. What sort of problems confronted him, first of all, and
6 what action did he take?
7 A. The main problem that Colonel Galic had when he arrived at the
8 command of the SRK was the ongoing action of the 1st Corps. And I have
9 said that it was called Operation South. The Rogoj area was lost in that
10 action, which links Brno with the area towards Foca, the pass, that pass
11 was lost, Trnovo was lost. There were serious crimes committed against
12 the Serbian population.
13 Q. General, since you have written about this in detail, could you
14 briefly tell us what other problems General Galic came across.
15 A. Well, stopping the Operation South was the key problem, the most
16 urgent issue. Secondly, it was necessary to stabilise the fronts in other
17 parts of the battlefield. Thirdly, it was necessary to visit the zone of
18 responsibility, to talk to the commanders, to see what the situation was
19 in the field, to organise the system of command because combat reports
20 would not arrive regularly from all the units and from some units they
21 didn't arrive at all. From the Igman Brigade, for example, there weren't
22 any reports for a certain period of time. Other units would not send
23 reports on a regular basis. The operative centre and the operative
24 command wasn't functioning properly. There wasn't an information centre
25 for the corps for public relations. In that zone of responsibility of the
1 SRK there were several very important military and industrial facilities
2 intended for special purposes. They produced weapons and ammunition.
3 Q. General, did he come across other concrete problems?
4 A. There were political problems, high-level politics, and problems
5 that concerned local politics. There were local politicians who would get
6 directly involved in the system of command. There were problems with
7 paramilitary forces. This was also a very serious problem at the time.
8 In brief, there were a lot of serious problems that Colonel Galic had to
9 confront in a short period of time and had to solve in order to organise a
10 system of command and control, an efficient system of command and control.
11 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'd like to show
12 the witness the following documents: 1854, 1857, 1858, 264, and
14 Q. General, to these documents, 1854, 16 September 1992 signed by
15 General Galic; 1857, 22/9/92; 1858, the same date, 22 October 1992; 264,
16 12 October 1994, 265. Do these documents mention what General Galic did
17 when he was appointed as corps commander?
18 A. Yes. This is a series of documents in which you can see the
19 measures that Galic took in order to organise the system of command in his
20 corps. There's an order saying how reports should be submitted and on
21 what subjects and when. The second document has to do with assigning
22 teams for command. This is a condition for the efficient functioning of
23 the operations centre; that is to say, the command post, and also has to
24 do with what to do when commander is not in the command. Then there is an
25 order from the corps commander which mentions measures for dealing with
1 shortcomings, and this has to do with the organisation in the corps, the
2 order in the corps, and then there are measures that have to do with
3 regulating the circulation of unauthorised persons and have to do with
4 relations with UNPROFOR and the civilian authorities, relations with
5 UNPROFOR, the mission, the liaison section, the liaison team for UNPROFOR.
6 And document 264 is an order from the corps commander which orders that
7 behavious towards civilians should be strictly regulated, civilians who
8 are not Serbian in his zone of responsibility.
9 Item 1, it says --
10 Q. General, it's not necessary for you to read out from these
11 documents. The following document is also a document in which
12 General Galic orders --
13 A. Yes. He orders alcohol being provided and says that you should
14 respect competence, the hierarchy when communicating with the superior
15 command, and also when you may address the main staff and there's an
16 entire system of measures which organise the system of command. I haven't
17 seen any documents here. I've had them in my hands, and perhaps it's my
18 fault for not having set them aside, but there are documents where the
19 commander of the SRK orders the system of communication to be used through
20 documents for the secret of command of troops. So it's a system of coded
21 documents and coded communications which is being ordered. And he
22 installed an informations centre for the corps which was to be responsible
23 for communicating with the public. So the entire system of command was
24 being organised in a way that was regulated by the rules.
25 Q. Thank you. General, you told us that in the area you mentioned
1 the weapons of the SRK. Can you tell us what General Galic did, what
2 steps did he take, in order to organise the use of the artillery.
3 A. I came across over 25 documents which were orders of Galic's and
4 had to do with regulating the use of the artillery in the Sarajevo theatre
5 of war. In all of those documents which I had at my disposal, he
6 explicitly forbid the use of the artillery if this had not been ordered
7 and if targets had not been identified, and he said that no one had the
8 right to target civilian features and settlements.
9 Q. Thank you. General, the Defence will show you document 238,
10 193 -- 238, 193, 258, 251, and 257.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, just for the sake of the transcript,
12 although the Chamber has difficulties in following every detail, but on
13 page 49, line 3, the answer reads: "Yes, he orders alcohol being provided
14 and says that you should respect competence ..." If this was a reference
15 to documents --
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Forbids it, yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ... I rather read
18 that "it's most strictly forbidden to deliver and consume alcohol." So I
19 take it that it's a mistake.
20 Please proceed.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Documents 238, 193, 258, 251, and 257.
22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. General, do you have the documents in front of you, the documents
24 that say how the use of the artillery is regulated? It's document 238,
25 that the command of the SRK adopted on the 23rd of June, 1992, and it's
1 signed by Commander Tomislav Sipcic?
2 A. Yes. It forbids the use of all artillery in the corps zone.
3 Q. General, document 193, is that also a document about the
4 locations --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, it was just reference was made to 238,
6 I think. It was said -- you asked -- yes, "it forbids the use of all the
7 artillery in the corps zone." What I read, but perhaps I'm wrong, in 238
8 is "usage of all artillery weapons in corps zone is prohibited. Only
9 corps commander may permit the usage of artillery weapons." That is two
10 lines, instead of the one line just read. Could I ask you whether I
11 correctly understand this that the --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you please use your microphone.
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the entire document
15 has been translated.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But you're -- the answer of the witness was
17 that this document forbids the use of all artillery in the corps zone.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I agree.
19 JUDGE ORIE: When I read that relatively short document, it says
20 that it's forbidden to use any artillery weapons without the consent of
21 the corps commander.
22 Is that a correct understanding of this document?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You've understood that correctly.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But I wasn't given the opportunity
1 to read it out by the Defence.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. General, document 193, does it also mention locations and can you
5 tell us whether this document has anything to do with grouping the
6 artillery dated -- the document is dated the 14th of June, 1992.
7 A. Yes. This document follows the agreement on handing the airport
8 over to UNPROFOR, placing the airport under the control of UNPROFOR. The
9 Army of Republika Srpska handed the airport over to UNPROFOR. It was to
10 control it, and it was to be used for humanitarian purposes and for the
11 purposes -- for the needs of the UN. And all the brigades in the vicinity
12 of the airport undertook to group the artillery in certain locations so
13 that they could be controlled, or rather, so that it would be possible to
14 prevent fire from being opened. So this is the first process of strictly
15 controlling the artillery of the SRK that was positioned around Sarajevo.
16 Q. Thank you. General, do the other documents also mention the
17 organisation and use of artillery in the Sarajevo theatre of war?
18 A. Yes. All of these orders -- I don't know if it's necessary for me
19 to read them out --
20 Q. Just tell us whether those orders confirm what you have just said.
21 A. Yes. Yes, they very explicitly order the establishment of full
22 control over artillery use.
23 Q. Thank you. General, you told us that General Stanislav Galic was
24 confronted with the problem of paramilitary forces and the problem of
25 civilian authorities. The Defence would like to show you document 229,
1 1860, 197, 198, and 199.
2 General, the documents 229, 1860, 197, 198, and 199, are these
3 documents that show that General Galic did everything that was in his
4 power, so to speak --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis.
6 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the Prosecution doesn't seem to have
7 all of these documents, or at least the documents that we do have that are
8 next in the bundle don't have exhibit numbers on them. So perhaps if
9 somehow my colleague could perhaps provide the dates of those documents, I
10 might be able to fill in the exhibit numbers.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Ms. Pilipovic, we find the same problem, that
12 some of these documents are not numbered, although stamped. Until now, we
13 found them all in the subsequent order, so --
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] That's a mistake. I'll give the
15 dates. 8th of August, 1992, that's the date for document 229. The 3rd of
16 November, 1992, combat report, that's document 1860, the command of the
17 Tactical Group of Vogosca. The 27th of August, 1993, report on taking
18 measures with regard to the Vaske [phoen] case, 27th of August, 1993.
19 JUDGE ORIE: You should then give us the numbers as well. The
20 command of the tactical group of Vogosca -- it goes too quick for me. The
21 27th of August, 1993, is that number 197?
22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then the next one, 198, is numbered and is also the
24 27th of August; is that correct?
25 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Then 199 is numbered. Is yours numbered as well,
2 Mr. Mundis?
3 MR. MUNDIS: Yes, it is. Yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we have one which is even without a stamp,
5 it seems, and that is a document also of the 27th of August, 1993, which
6 in the translation it starts with "very urgent." It's number 20/15 and
7 then "982." What number would that have, Ms. Pilipovic?
8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Let me just ask my associate. The
9 last number, which number is the last one? 1911.
10 Q. General, do these documents mention all the measures taken by
11 General Galic with regard to paramilitary formations, and which measures
12 did he take? And when I say "all the measures," I mean some of the
13 measures that he may have taken and which measures were they?
14 A. In these documents, it mentions measures General Galic took to
15 solve the crisis with paramilitary formations, the measures he took to
16 prevent paramilitary formations from acting in his zone of responsibility.
17 And document 229 illustrates what Galic's attitude was towards the
18 paramilitary formations, inappropriate behaviour in his zone of behaviour.
19 And you can see that as soon as he assumed the duties of commander of the
20 SRK he took the same measures in order to prevent paramilitary forces to
21 act in his zone of responsibility because this disrupted the system of
23 Q. General --
24 JUDGE ORIE: I'd just ask, because it goes very quickly at this
25 very moment. The document you referred to that would indicate that he
1 overcame all the problems with the paramilitary formations -- it just says
2 what action he took, not whether he was successful in that. But perhaps
3 you could answer that question, whether the measures that he took to
4 overcome the problems with the paramilitary formations were successful or
5 that there remained some problems.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] While General Galic was in the
7 position he had, he had problems with the paramilitary formations but he
8 solved some of the problems. He replaced the commander of the Igman
9 Brigade, who was at the limits -- whose behaviour was at the limits of
10 paramilitary behaviour. To an extent he managed to solve the question of
11 relations with the authorities, with the organs of power.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We don't need to go into details. But you said
13 he solved some of the problems. I do understand. Not all, but some of
15 Please proceed.
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Q. General, you told us that General Galic also confronted the
18 problem that concerned the civilian authorities.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Can you tell us whether General Galic in some way managed to solve
21 those problems or is your position different?
22 A. I don't think he ever managed to completely solve those problems,
23 and these problems were a serious burden for him. As far as his relation
24 to the political authorities is concerned, he had problems with high-level
25 politics, that is to say, with the presidency of Republika Srpska, but
1 similarly he had problems with local politicians. I personally came
2 across a document in which General Galic responded -- answered the
3 complaint from the command of the general staff with regard to some of the
4 measures he had taken in relation to the political organs of
5 Republika Srpska. And the last sentence in that document, when he says
6 "if anyone thinks that I have not behaved appropriately, then I have
7 violated the rules. I consider this to be my last report", and it seemed
8 as if he was offering his resignation. But in the army this is not a rule
9 and it is not unusual for people to resign. But you could see from that
10 document that he had serious problems in communicating with the high
11 political echelons.
12 Q. Thank you. General, I'll show you documents 268, 209, and 1862.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Ms. Pilipovic, I'm running into the same
14 difficulties at this stage. I don't have numbers on all the documents.
15 Could you provide a little guidance, please. I have 268 and 209.
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] 1862, document 1862.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. But I don't have any numbers on my -- on the
18 copies provided to me, not all the numbers.
19 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. It's document 1862,
20 and the date is the 26th of March, 1994.
21 Q. General, do you have in front of you documents 1862, 268, and 209?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You said that in one of the documents the general also offered his
24 resignation. Is that document 1862?
25 A. Let me just have a look.
1 Q. Page 2 of this document, does it say that "if I have failed to
2 respect the laws of Republika Srpska and by waging the war and leading the
3 unit have caused damage to the Serbian people, then let this report be the
4 last one as the report of the commander of VRS"?
5 A. Yes. This is the document I was referring to. And in the last
6 paragraph, it appears that the general is offering his resignation.
7 Q. General, is that a document which was sent to the main staff of
8 the Army of Republika Srpska and to General Milovanovic personally?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And this document, is it apparent that this is a problem with
11 regard to the disposition of the UNPROFOR forces in the zone of
12 responsibility of the SRK?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Thank you. General, from this document, can we conclude from it
15 that the general had problems also regarding the disposition and orders to
16 do with the work of UNPROFOR?
17 A. Yes. He had some serious problems there, and for many reasons.
18 First of all, the communication with UNPROFOR was reduced by the main
19 staff, and he had the obligation to work with them but he couldn't decide
20 because the decision-making process was with the main staff. He couldn't
21 make decisions. So he was here between this gap, trying to deal with
22 UNPROFOR correctly. And on the other hand, there was also the interests
23 of high politics and obligations of the main staff. And the way he dealt
24 with UNPROFOR was severely restricted by the main staff.
25 Q. Thank you. General, during my examination I'd like to show you a
1 set of documents, and then my co-counsel will continue the examination.
2 In your report you dealt in detail with the issue of UNPROFOR
3 cooperation. Can you tell us whether General Galic took measures and what
4 kind of measures did he take in terms of UNPROFOR cooperation?
5 A. In looking at the documents, analysing documents for my report, I
6 came across many documents in which General Galic is dealing with UNPROFOR
7 issues, either ordering measures to his subordinates on how to behave with
8 UNPROFOR personnel or ordering measures in order to protect UNPROFOR
9 checkpoints from firing from his own forces or filing protests or
10 responding to protests. I even came across a very warm-hearted letter
11 written by an UNPROFOR member addressing General Galic before the UNPROFOR
12 member left and thanking him for the support that he gave him during his
13 mandate. I believe that was Mole.
14 Q. Yes, General. I believe that that was mentioned in your report.
15 Other documents now, 203, 1863, 1864, and 1865.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Ms. Pilipovic, none of my documents have any
17 numbers on them any more. Can you please give some further guidance,
18 dates, perhaps, of the documents.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Let's have a break. Let's have a break and let all
20 the documents be numbered perhaps by your assistant. It's useless
21 to -- we will adjourn until twenty minutes to 1.00. And meanwhile, may
22 all the documents be numbered, at least the ones that -- for the
23 registrar. If she would then read out whenever a document is shown to the
24 witness what is the number and what is the date of that document.
25 We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. President, the English booth would like to
4 make a correction.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.
6 THE INTERPRETER: On page 48, line 22, in reference to document
7 264, while the witness was commenting on the content of the document, he
8 did not say that the troops should severely treat civilians, non-Serb
9 civilians, but that the behaviour of the troops should be strictly
10 regulated in their behaviour towards them.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much for this correction for the
12 transcript. I'd like to add that in view of the speed in which we are
13 working at this moment, that I really admire you that you have only one
14 correction to be made.
15 Then I take it, Mr. Ierace, that the problems with -- well,
16 problems -- that all issues in respect of the exhibits to be tendered
17 through Mr. Gray are solved. Is that correct?
18 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, in terms of the Prosecution exhibits
19 of a video nature, yes. At a stage convenient to you, I wish to say
20 something in relation to a Defence video exhibit, that's D348/30. That's
21 the Defence compilation video.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Registrar, if you would proceed in such a
23 way that exhibits not yet tendered, that you mention them and that we'll
24 give an opportunity to the parties.
25 MR. IERACE: Mr. President.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. IERACE: Perhaps before that happens, I should indicate that
3 the Prosecution seeks to withdraw the following three videos and replace
4 them with one, which contains all of the segments and the three to be
5 withdrawn. Would you wish me to put them on the record right now. The
6 three to be withdrawn are P3793, P3794, and P3798. The replacement video
7 is P3793A. And I should add that one segment from those videos has been
8 not placed on P3793A because it was not shown to the Court.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it that Defence has received a
10 copy -- not yet.
11 MR. IERACE: Not yet, Mr. President. It took all this morning to
12 produce one copy, which Madam Registrar has now.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: No, I don't. I do not have a copy.
15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President. As usual,
16 we have not received whatsoever. I would like to thank the interpreters
17 but would like to say that we -- this is something that we wanted to
18 tell -- to inform you about, and it's in reference to document 264. So
19 there was a wrong meaning. And there is another thing, but in order not
20 to slow things down, in reference to what the Prosecution has said, we
21 have confirmed, but our position a priori is the same one, that is, that
22 only segments of the tapes tendered should be tendered in terms of
23 evidence and not all of the tapes. Thank you.
24 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that the Prosecution now has prepared
25 one tape on which those fragments shown are -- do appear. So therefore, I
1 do not know whether I truly understand your objection.
2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President. We
3 understood the same thing, and our understanding is perfectly correct, we
4 believe. What I'm saying is that I did not view the tape. No one has
5 viewed the tape. And I fear that in it there could be some segments that
6 the Prosecution did not show to us during public hearing, so somehow there
7 is something that we are trying to -- or they are trying to put under the
8 table, so to speak. So I think that that would be something too much.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me first look at the compilation tape.
10 Then we can see whether there's a basis for your suspicions.
11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, as I can see
12 that the Prosecution is not responding. Perhaps they could just tell us
13 yes or no, whether they've also included the segments, which is a lot
14 simpler, that the Prosecution wanted to tender but that they did not view
15 in the courtroom. And then we can see what the position of the parties
17 JUDGE ORIE: I took it - but if I'm wrong in my understanding,
18 Mr. Ierace, please tell me - I took it that those parts played are put on
19 the compilation video, nothing else, nothing less. Yes.
20 MR. IERACE: That's the case, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ierace.
22 Then would the Defence like to first view the video, or shall we
23 take a decision on admission and then give an opportunity, if there's
24 any -- okay. We'll then -- no, I would rather do it for one practical
25 reason, one very practical reason, I would like to do it the other way
1 around. As you know, sometimes we have admitted documents, exhibits into
2 evidence, and having given an opportunity to one of the parties to come
3 with a later objection if they had checked some items. Since we have
4 another registrar next week, I'd rather proceed in this way today. And
5 apart from that, Mr. Ierace has confirmed to us that there's nothing else
6 on that tape. So to start with, we'll accept that, having not heard any
7 specified reasons why that would not be true. But if you have checked,
8 the Defence always has an opportunity to come back to it and object
9 against the exhibit, that videotape.
10 Madam Registrar.
11 Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] So that I can understand
13 things fully, so the tape -- the Prosecution put on one tape also what we
14 have played to your Chamber, or just the segments that the Prosecution had
16 JUDGE ORIE: I understood that you prepared a tape on which all
17 the -- I think there were nine fragments -- appear that you showed, and
18 the Prosecution has done the same, as far as I understand, for those
19 fragments shown by the Prosecution.
20 Madam Registrar, would you please guide us through the ...
21 THE REGISTRAR: P3793A, videotape containing various clips; D1845,
22 map of Sarajevo marked by witness; D1846, UNPROFOR letter dated 29 July
23 1992; D1847, agreement by the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with
24 regard to the opening of Sarajevo airport; D348/20, videotape containing
25 various clips; P3788, excerpt from book written by Lewis MacKenzie
1 entitled "Peacekeeper, the road to Sarajevo"; P3793.1, English transcript;
2 P3794.1, English transcript; P3797, excerpt from book entitled "In harm's
3 way"; P3787, article published by magazine, Washington report, July/August
4 1993; P3793.6, English transcript; P3793.2, English transcript; P3793.3,
5 English transcript; P3793.4, English transcript; P3793.5, English
6 transcript; P3793.7, English transcript; and P3793.9, English transcript.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it seems to be,
9 but that is a problem, when we are working about something that has gone
10 by, and it was some time ago. We were not able to check this, that in
11 referring to the book by Mr. MacKenzie, this was just read out. This is
12 not something that was handed over to us, and certainly not in the Serbian
13 language, as it should have been done. So I believe that the Prosecution
14 has read it well. It's all in the transcript. But this should not be
15 tendered as an exhibit because -- I mean, as far as I recall, it was just
16 a reading of one page or perhaps two pages, because now I recall this was
17 a bottom of one page, and as far as I can see it in my memory now, there
18 was a few lines in the following page of the text, so I don't think that
19 this is something that should be tendered as an exhibit.
20 However, Mr. President, of course my memory could fail me, and
21 sometimes Defence has these failings.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Admitting the document into evidence would
23 enable the Defence to find the context in which it is published. The
24 relevant part that has been read has been translated at that very moment
25 in a language General Galic understands. I don't know whether the
1 Prosecution insists on tendering this document or that the objection
2 would ...
3 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I suppose the main benefit of the
4 tender is that it makes clear what edition the passage came from. There
5 would be a page number at the top. Certainly the Defence was provided
6 with a copy of the English text, but I wouldn't regard it as a critical
7 issue. It would simply be useful for that reason.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I object to
10 that. I can remember that there are very interesting things for the
11 Defence in fact in this document, so it can be tendered.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Oh.
13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Then all the documents are admitted into evidence,
15 and the Defence will have an opportunity to make objections against the
16 completeness or incompleteness of the video tendered by the Prosecution,
17 that is, 3793A. But perhaps I had not given you an opportunity yet to
18 make any objection, Mr. Ierace.
19 MR. IERACE: Thank you for that opportunity, Mr. President. It
20 relates to Defence Exhibit D348/20. That was the Defence video
21 compilation. The first segment was of the BBC type. It contained,
22 amongst other things, by way of identification, three images: One of a
23 Ukrainian radar unit, according to the commentary; some people in a forest
24 talking about the distance to the enemy's confrontation line; and also,
25 some words spoken by Richard Gray himself. Mr. President, I think that
1 was shown to the witness on the first day of his testimony, which was the
2 18th of February. And you may recall that immediately following it being
3 shown to the witness, I rose to my feet and questioned where on the four
4 videotapes that particular segment had come from. And indeed that became
5 a topic which I raised at various times over the last two and a half
6 weeks, and the Defence indicated with assurance initially that it had come
7 off the four videotapes which they said they received from the witness and
8 which they disclosed to the Defence.
9 Well, Mr. President, I have now meticulously checked the four
10 videotapes. Each is four hours long. And that segment does not appear
11 anywhere on the four tapes. You may remember that Richard Gray gave
12 evidence that he gave the Defence four or five videotapes. One possible
13 explanation is that there was indeed a fifth videotape.
14 Mr. President, at a meeting during the week, I asked the Defence
15 to show us where on the four videotapes the segment was, and they
16 declined. My submission at this stage is, firstly, that the -- that
17 segment be removed from evidence, the transcript in relation to it should
18 remain. But more importantly, the Defence now is obliged to provide an
19 explanation to the Trial Chamber as to where that segment came from,
20 because the issue goes, I think even more importantly, beyond
21 admissibility, but rather disclosure. The Prosecution would be very
22 interested to know, if there was a fifth videotape, what else was on it.
23 Thank you, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin or Ms. Pilipovic, could you respond
25 to that briefly.
1 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I know that we had a
2 meeting about this, but I really don't know which segment it is. We were
3 never told which was the segment in question. Can we please first resolve
4 this issue. We, as far as I recall, we proposed to our learned colleagues
5 if we can have a look at the segment again. I'm afraid I'm not very
6 technically minded so that I can assess this.
7 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, there can be no doubt about the
8 segment, because I rose to my feet when it was first shown to the witness.
9 I have repeatedly referred to it as the first segment on the Defence tape.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So it's the first segment on the Defence tape,
11 Ms. Pilipovic, and especially there were three -- I do understand that
12 these are three very brief passages where people are in a wood and -- yes,
13 I remember that, although -- so it should be possible to look -- you
14 have -- I take it you have a copy of your -- the tape you tendered into
15 evidence. So please try to check that first --
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we do have this tape,
17 but on the first segment I really cannot rewind my memory to that. I'll
18 have to have a look at it again, together with my co-counsel. But at this
19 very moment, I really cannot recall.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So please do then look at it again and --
21 Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I
23 remember very clearly this segment. In fact, I think that I can see what
24 happened. We have to view these tapes again. We are going to try and do
25 that during the weekend. In any case, what I do not wish to happen, for
1 whatever -- whosever fault this is, it could have been a technical fault
2 because there were many tapes sent back and forth. So I hope that this
3 was -- the segment was not erased. We will have a look at our copy,
4 because we only have copies, and of course if we can be of assistance, to
5 the Prosecution, we will do it of course. Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I'd like to hear from the Defence at the beginning of
7 next week, either that they found the segments Mr. Ierace was referring to
8 on one of the four tapes and where it could be found. I then think that
9 if I would be Defence counsel and I found them, I would not be very happy
10 after this weekend. Let me be very clear on that.
11 If, on the other hand, it is not found, I can imagine that
12 Mr. Ierace looking back through the hours he spent on meticulously
13 reviewing the tapes might not be very happy. And then, of course, the
14 next issue, whether there has been a fifth tape and whether it has been
15 disclosed or should have been disclosed is then -- might then become an
17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
18 JUDGE ORIE: If the parties could work on the basis of their
19 copies. If that would create any problem, the originals have not yet been
20 sent back to Mr. Gray, neither is the original tape that has been tendered
21 by the Defence as being in the hands of the registrar for all this time.
22 So if the parties -- at this moment, if the Defence would work on the
23 basis of the copies they have, and if there's any reason to doubt whether
24 the copies are true copies of the original, it can be checked. But then
25 the Chamber would very much like to know exactly what parts to play and
1 whether it has to be done in court or outside court. That's also another
3 Having said this, I think the -- most of the problems in respect
4 of the exhibits introduced through --
5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, but I think there
8 could be a problem in terms of my memory. These were two different
9 segments; first, where we saw Colonel Gray at the end of one segment next
10 to a radar where he was saying I think that if they had wanted it, they
11 could have destroyed the --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, just as you will need 16 hours,
13 although by quickly viewing it it might take less hours, to look at the
14 tape over the weekend, I'd like the Prosecution to check whether it's
15 really at the beginning of the first fragment or not. You have got a
16 copy. So it's a short tape. If you play it quickly, you can easily
17 identify it.
18 If it would be on any other place than at the beginning of the
19 first segment, please immediately inform the Defence.
20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think as a matter of fact we are now dealing
22 with a lot of practical problems --
23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very simply, in my mind I
1 think there are two segment, not one segment. I would just like the
2 Prosecution to let me know. It's very brief. Are they talking about one
3 segment or two segments? Because in the text they're only talking about
4 one segment. It's a very simple question of clarification.
5 JUDGE ORIE: I think in the transcript you are even talk about
6 three short --
7 MR. IERACE: Three particular images, whether it's one segment or
8 two is only known to the person who placed it on the tape. But to
9 emphasise my point, none of those three scenes appear on any of the four
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So we're talking about that.
12 You check whether it's in the beginning of the first fragment
13 shown in this court. If not, you immediately inform the Defence. The
14 Defence checks over the weekend where these images could be found on one
15 of the four original tapes, and I think we spent now enough time on it.
16 If there's any further question in respect to this, the --
17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. After court time. I mean, these are really
19 practical problems, isn't it?
20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No. But I didn't raise the
21 problem, but I can answer this question very briefly so that we can sort
22 this out. As far as I recall, yes, these are the first two segments. And
23 I confirmed this according to my memory. And during the weekend, I will
24 make sure that I can confirm this. Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think the -- what is on these images has been
1 described by Mr. Ierace, and that -- yes.
2 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, just before we return to the
3 witness --
4 JUDGE ORIE: I would have one other issue as well.
5 MR. IERACE: Yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know whether it would be the same or not.
7 The -- we would still hear from the Defence about whether they -- whether
8 the subpoena issue still stands. There is a motion, either it's withdrawn
9 or --
10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ...
12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I tried
13 on many occasions repeatedly, and before some time ago managed to contact
14 the wife of General MacKenzie. Now I'm only coming across his answering
15 machine, so we have lost contact, I'm afraid.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But the question was: There is a motion
17 pending --
18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The answer is yes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: You insist on the decision.
20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] We will bring our reply at the
21 end of the hearing today. Thank you.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes. As I was saying,
24 Mr. President, the answer is yes.
25 JUDGE ORIE: You insist on a decision on the motion in which you
1 apply for a subpoena to be issued in --
2 [Defence counsel confer]
3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The answer is yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And the question -- would you please listen to
5 me. The question to which your answer is yes is whether the Defence
6 insists on a decision in respect of a motion they filed in which they
7 apply for a subpoena to be issued in respect of Mr. MacKenzie? That's the
8 first. And the other person would be Mr. Nambiar.
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The answer is yes for the
12 first part and also for the second also yes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. A decision will be taken soon.
14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Any other issue?
16 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, just in relation to rebuttal. There's
17 a 92 bis mission in Sarajevo which is finishing on this weekend, and on
18 Monday, if you require it, I should be able to give an update on -- give
19 some more detail in relation to that, and certainly on Monday I expect to
20 be able to disclose some material to the Defence.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So I take it that there will be a request to be
22 allowed to present rebuttal evidence. Do you have any idea on how much
23 time --
24 MR. IERACE: Yes. Yes, I could assist.
25 JUDGE ORIE: If you could give us an indication already or --
1 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, at this stage there are some eight 92
2 bis statements. Three of them go to the destruction of mosques in
3 Sarajevo in the indictment period. A fourth concerns the school of
4 theology, the manner and timing of the assumption of control of the school
5 of theology by Bosnian Serb forces, the layout of the building, its
6 appearance when it was recovered by its usual occupants. There will be
7 two 92 bis statements in relation to the positions of weaponry of the ABiH
8 in the vicinity of Kosevo Hospital and the Ciglane tunnel. There will be
9 one 92 bis statements in relation to Witness G's injury and his medical
10 records. There will be a 92 bis statement in relation to a tape recording.
11 If I could leave it at that at this stage, but not involving the accused.
12 Roelof From, who is the mapping expert for the Prosecution, we will seek
13 to call, and through him introduce five maps in respect of particular
14 sniping incidents where the Defence has for the first time challenged
15 whether there was a line of sight and through him also we'll seek to
16 tender maps in relation to the balance of the sniping incidents which have
17 the corrected latitude and longitude lines, if I could call them that.
18 There'll be no other changes. That would simply allow one to apply a
19 ruler to the maps.
20 Mr. President, there are two, perhaps three, other witnesses who
21 would be called, an investigator to give evidence in relation to the SRK
22 documents, what he's learnt from the Defence, since that's become an
23 issue, and perhaps Mr. Philipps in relation to issues arising from the
24 present witness -- perhaps one or two other issues. All that in mind,
25 Mr. President, assuming hypothetically that there was no
1 objection -- well, I'll amend that. Assuming hypothetically that the 92
2 bis witnesses were accepted without the requirement for cross-examination,
3 we would be left with, I expect, three viva voce witnesses whose evidence
4 in chief in terms of two would be relatively short, in terms of Mr. From
5 would ideally involve the witness from the witness box demonstrating
6 electronically some aspects of the mapping. That would take about two
7 hours in chief. All up, the Prosecution case, examination and
8 cross-examination, should be less than a week if the 92 bis witnesses, any
9 of them, are required for either examination in chief or
10 cross-examination, that would take an extra, I should think, week and a
11 half. Thank you.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, at the moment
14 the Defence can't comment at all, but we would have appreciated it
15 if -- may I continue?
16 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ... Comment on it
17 at this very moment. But yes, you would appreciate what?
18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Nor do I, Mr. President. But
19 I find it strange that we are now told about such a great number of
20 elements that are to be provided pursuant to Rule 92 bis, and I would like
21 to say that in my opinion it's the obligation of the Prosecution to inform
22 us of this a lot earlier so that we can prepare for this. How are we to
23 make our position clear if we are not at all aware of all of these facts?
24 This is a game that the Defence does not appreciate. Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This comment doesn't add anything to --
1 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, if I could respond --
2 JUDGE ORIE: -- The issues that are in front of us. I always ask
3 to refrain from using words like "games," et cetera, et cetera. It would
4 have been enough to say that the Defence is surprised that it's informed
5 this late. The Chamber has ruled when the Prosecution should give the
6 information. They have done that. And that's it for the moment of
7 course. At the later stage the Defence will have an opportunity to
8 respond after they have taken knowledge of the material.
9 Mr. Mundis.
10 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, if I could briefly. This -- as the
11 Chamber is aware, the Prosecution has repeatedly sought access to the
12 notes which this expert witness took in interviewing individuals. He made
13 reference to passing over the bundles of his notes to the Defence in
14 response to questions from the Bench he indicated that those notes were
15 not taken under any form of confidentiality and that those notes are in
16 the possession -- apparently in the possession of the Defence, with the
17 exception of the two sets of notes that fell out of the bundle, those two
18 having been given this morning to Madam Registrar.
19 The Prosecution reiterates its request for copies of those notes,
20 whether they're in the hands of the Defence or in the hands still of the
21 expert. The Prosecution is not in a position to commence
22 cross-examination until we have all of these notes and until these notes
23 have been translated and until I've been given an opportunity to analyse
24 the contents. Our position has been clear that we believe this expert has
25 co-mingled information obtained from these interviews, many of these
1 interviews concerned individuals who either testified - for example, the
2 two witnesses whose notes were passed over this morning testified in this
3 court, in this Trial Chamber in mid-January - and the Prosecution's
4 position is clear that we believe that we are entitled to these, they go
5 to the transparency of the expert's statement, they go to the methodology
6 that he employed, and we believe that fairness dictates that we be given
7 access to these notes, and it appears now that they are in the hands of
8 Defence and that they perhaps have been for some time. And we reiterate
9 that we want those notes, Mr. President, and we want ample time to have
10 those notes translated and analysed before we commence our
11 cross-examination of this expert.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Are these notes in the hands of the Defence,
13 Ms. Pilipovic?
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as far as I know,
15 those notes were disclosed pursuant to the decision of the Trial Chamber.
16 They were disclosed to the Prosecution a month ago when the Trial Chamber
17 decided that the notes used by Mr. Radinovic for his statement -- when the
18 decision was taken that they should be disclosed, we disclosed them. So I
19 don't know what the problem is. I think that General Radinovic also spoke
20 to experts on two occasions, and he didn't provide us with information on
21 this. This was even sent from Belgrade, because I was at the trial here.
22 I've been here from the 5th of January.
23 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ... The Defence.
24 The answer is they are, but they are disclosed.
25 Mr. Mundis.
1 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, it appears from the expert's statement
2 that he interviewed approximately 34 individuals, if you tally up the
3 categories that he cites to. I believe it's page 6 of his report. We
4 have received from the Defence notes with respect to nine of those 34
6 JUDGE ORIE: We'll then ask the witness.
7 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you. And with the two that we've received
8 today, Mr. President, that is 11 out of 34.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
11 JUDGE ORIE: For the information of the parties and -- or rather,
12 for the Victims and Witnesses Unit, the examination of the witness will
13 not be resumed today. So the witness is to be called in for one second so
14 that we can instruct him as usually and tell him that we'll continue next
16 So Madam Usher --
17 Yes, Mr. Mundis.
18 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, if he could also be asked about any
19 notes, and if we could get those to begin the process of translating them,
20 if they exist.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'll ask him about the notes. But that's the
22 only thing we'll deal with.
23 But then at the same time, next week we'll deal with all the
24 outstanding exhibits. There's a small list. It will be given to the
25 parties, and we will, apart from one of them - that's Exhibit
1 D185A - introduced on the request of the Chamber by the witness Vorobev
2 we'll take a position on that and it will be distributed to the parties,
3 even in the absence of ...
4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like
5 some information. Why next Wednesday?
6 JUDGE ORIE: Next Wednesday? I said next Monday, I think.
7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: You said next Wednesday. I'm asking for --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Then I apologise for this mistake.
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: That's all right. That's all right.
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE ORIE: General Radinovic, unfortunately we see no
12 opportunity to continue today. There would be 15 minutes left and we have
13 to deal with a few other issues before the weekend. So we'll continue
14 next Monday at 9.00 in this same courtroom. I again, would like to
15 instruct you not to speak with anyone about your testimony and -- still to
16 be given and the testimony you gave until now. I'll provide you with a
17 small dictation machine if you promise me that you'll return it so that
18 you can read the notes you have provided.
19 But I have another question: Until now, your report speaks about
20 interviews of many, many persons. Do you -- did you make notes of all
21 these interviews? There are a little bit over 30, I think, mentioned.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President. I spoke to some
23 individuals on several occasions with General Lugonja, I don't know how
24 many times I spoke to him. With General Lizdek on several occasions too.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just stop you. We have received until now
1 nine notes of interviews. There were another two provided to us today.
2 Are these 11 sets of notes, are these the complete notes you have made of
3 these interviews, more than 30 interviews? Is that correct?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That is clear.
6 Then you are excused.
7 Madam Usher, would you please escort the witness out of the
9 [The witness stands down]
10 JUDGE ORIE: If there's no other urgent matter which should be
11 dealt with right away, the Chamber would prefer to adjourn until next
12 Monday, 9.00.
13 We'll adjourn until next Monday, 9.00.
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
15 at 1.30 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday,
16 the 10th day of March, 2003, at 1.30 p.m.