1 Tuesday, 24 June 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone in and around this
8 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon to
10 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-06-90-T, The
11 Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
13 Two matters. First of all, Mr. Galbraith, it turned out to be
14 possible to move the Thursday afternoon session to the morning. I don't
15 know whether we need that session at all. That's still to be seen, but
16 at least it might accommodate some of your concerns.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Further, I would like to remind you that you are
19 still bound by the solemn declaration that you gave at the beginning you
20 have your testimony, that is that you will speak the truth, the whole
21 truth, and nothing but the truth.
22 Then Mr. Kehoe.
23 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour.
24 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your Honour, I'm sorry.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Kuzmanovic.
1 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Before Mr. Kehoe begins. I know you asked us
2 yesterday to give us an estimate of time, and I'm glad that we have the
3 morning session on Thursday. I would like to let the Court know based on
4 reviewing after the Court session today and preparing today or yesterday
5 and preparing this morning, I will probably -- two hours is a low
6 estimate for me. It might be to two to three, and I wanted to make the
7 Court aware of that, and we will do everything possible to make sure
8 Mr. Galbraith can return home on time.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for this information, Mr. Kuzmanovic. As
10 you know, the Chamber always before finally deciding the matter will
11 consider how the time for cross-examination was used up till that moment.
12 Mr. Kehoe.
13 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour.
14 WITNESS: PETER WOODARD GALBRAITH [Resumed]
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Kehoe: [Continued]
16 Q. Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.
17 A. Mr. Kehoe.
18 Q. Mr. Ambassador, we left off yesterday talking just about some of
19 the sequence of events prior to Operation Storm and even prior to summer
20 1995. And just based on your work in the area, the existence of the
21 Krajina Serbs or the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina
22 dramatic effect on the country economically as well as security-wise, did
23 it not?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Can you just elaborate on that just a bit?
1 A. It was devastating economically. Croatia as we know is a
2 spectacularly beautiful country with -- whose great asset is the coast
3 with a place of natural beauty and also many historic monuments. The
4 fact is the existence of this hostile entity for many of these years
5 meant there were no tourists, no tourists at all. I remember my first
6 trip to Split
7 to by boat, and we arrived in the city because the power lines were cut
8 because the RSK held the dams. The city also didn't have power. It
9 existed -- it had a hum of generators.
10 So the impact was huge, and it was huge in other ways.
11 Transportation, again, instead of being a short trip -- relatively short
12 trip between two parts of the country. You had to take a long route.
13 That obviously affected the shipment of goods. There was very high
14 unemployment. Probably the best way to measure this would be to compare
15 the per capita income in Slovenia
16 was probably 80 to 90 per cent of Slovenia
17 and here I'm just giving an order of magnitude - might have been 40
18 per cent.
19 Q. So it was significant?
20 A. Huge.
21 Q. Just to -- and I turn to the second part of my question, the
22 security concerns Croatia
23 Krajina on its border. Can you elaborate on that just a bit?
24 A. There was -- until 1994 until the cease-fire there was regular
25 shelling from the Serb-held territory onto Croatian territory. I would
1 go down to Karlovac, for example, right on the front side -- or on the
2 front line, almost a divided city, and occasionally shells would have
3 landed there a few days before. I remember one trip, the church there
4 had been hit a couple of times, and part of the -- I think it was the
5 steeple had been knocked over.
6 Zadar was right in range. Again, an important city. Beograd
7 the sea, a tourist destination. So not only were people at risk - not
8 many people after 1991 were injured, but some were - but it's not very
9 pleasant to live under that kind of threat, and of course for a place
10 like Zadar or Beograd
11 to places that are being shelled.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, and could you make a pause between
13 question and answer, and then question again.
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. KEHOE:
16 Q. My apologies, Mr. Ambassador. I should have addressed that at
17 the beginning, but since we speak the same language it is often
19 Now to compound that problem in Croatia, prior to the events in
20 July of 1995, there was a serious refugee problem, as well, wasn't there?
21 A. There was.
22 Q. Can you talk to us about that a bit.
23 A. Croatia
24 internally displaced Croats from 1991, I don't know, 2 or 300.00 people.
25 Again, I wish I could remember the exact figures, and those people were
1 put up in hotels along the coast. Actually, when I made my first trip
2 there for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Intercon at that
3 time was one of the two premier hotels in Zagreb. Half of it was filled
4 with refugees from Vukovar, which had just fallen, and those people were
5 -- these Croats who had been expelled were in these coastal hotels for
6 four years.
7 Then in 1992, with the start of the Bosnian war, Croatia had - I
8 don't know - I think a million more people come through into Croatia
9 Many of them went on to refuge other places, but it was a huge burden for
10 a country this small.
12 per cent good. There was some involuntary repatriation of Muslims to
14 parts of what happened in the -- in those wars.
15 Q. And that would include the treatment of both displaced Croats as
16 well as Bosniaks coming through?
17 A. That is correct. I think it's fair to say that the displaced
18 Croats in general were treated better. They were after all citizens of
19 the country, but the treatment of the Bosniaks was very good even during
20 the Muslim-Croat war.
21 Q. Now, you talked to us a bit about Mr. Babic yesterday as well as
22 Mr. Martic, and in the -- if I can just go to this quickly.
23 In your testimony in the Milosevic trial, you -- at page 32110,
24 said: "For Martic" at line five: "For Martic it was" -- I'm sorry.
25 23 -- page 23110. You noted that for Martic it was absolutely
1 out of the question. He said that Serbs repeatedly told me that Serbs
2 and Croats could never live together, and if the area was integrated into
4 Now he told you that there would be no reintegration into
6 conversations with Mr. Martic, is not?
7 A. It is.
8 Q. And --
9 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, counsel. I apologize for this.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER: I'm just trying to check the pages from the Martic
13 MR. KEHOE: Yes. It's 231 -- excuse me, this is from the -- I
14 think it was Milosevic. Milosevic transcript. I apologise.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I really insist on small pauses.
16 MR. KEHOE: Yes. My apologies to counsel. It's Milosevic at
17 23110, line -- yes. Milosevic trial, that's right. Line 5 through 8.
18 Q. Now, in your negotiations with the Krajina Serbs and with Martic,
19 you noted in your statement - and I believe you have it before you,
20 Mr. Ambassador; that would be your longish statement - you noted in
21 paragraph 8 that the Krajina Serbs played endless games to avoid serious
22 negotiations, and Martic seemed the main person behind these endless
24 Can you tell us a little bit about that, Mr. Ambassador, if you
25 could, and maybe just pause -- let the folks in the booth catch up before
1 you begin.
2 A. My involvement with this and what it was -- therefore was also
3 the start of the so-called Z-4 process were cease-fire negotiations that
4 took place in March of 1994 in Zagreb
5 two sessions.
6 At the end of the second session, which concluded in agreement,
7 the Serbs -- it was agreed that for the second set of negotiations which
8 were going to be on economic- and confidence-building measures that they
9 would begin in two weeks in Plitvice which was in Serb-occupied
10 territory. And the Croats raised the issue of having Croatian
11 journalists come to that event because Serb journalists from the Krajina
12 had been covering the cease-fire negotiations in Zagreb, and the
13 negotiator said, oh, yes; in fact, I was going to invite your
15 The Croatians then submitted a list of five journalists that
16 would accompany the delegation, not a large number for a country that had
17 newspapers, radio, television. The Serbs rejected that because only two
18 Serbs had come to Zagreb
19 journalists they had, and on that basis this meeting didn't take place.
20 The process didn't continue, and they played these kind of games
21 endlessly because in my view they really were not prepared to face up to
22 the issue, which is that there had to be a political settlement that
23 would reintegrate this territory into Croatia.
24 I did say that Martic was the -- I felt was the main actor. I
25 felt that he had no interest in the well-being of the people of the
1 Krajina region. I thought he was interested in himself, not very smart,
2 and very much under the control of Milosevic, who, as I testified
3 yesterday, put him into office.
4 It may be that a more accurate statement would have been that
5 Milosevic was really the main figure behind these delays because I'm sure
6 if he had given the word to be Martic to be serious, then Martic would
7 have managed to be serious.
8 Q. I think you mentioned in the Martic case that when you were
9 negotiating the Z-4 plan in January of 1995, Martic refused to even take
10 a copy of the proposal. Is that right?
11 A. That is correct. It was the most extraordinary thing because you
12 had the ambassadors of the United States, of Russia
13 was the French ambassador representing the European Union; you had a
14 representative from the European Union itself and the United Nations, and
15 they physically refused to touch a document that was a peace plan
16 endorsed by the Security Council.
17 Q. Was it Martic who refused to take it?
18 A. Martic refused to take it.
19 Q. And when your efforts, and I might say laudable efforts, in early
20 August to late July to begin those last-ditch peace negotiations, you
21 attempted to go to Knin to see Martic, didn't you?
22 A. I -- yes. I did.
23 Q. And what happened?
24 A. The reply came that I was unwelcome in Knin, and Babic then sent
25 word that -- could I meet him in Belgrade
1 Q. Now, you went to see -- you told us you went to see Babic in
3 tell you at that time or thereafter that he was unable to meet with
4 Milosevic concerning any of these peace negotiations?
5 A. Yes. He did say that he was unable to meet with Milosevic and
6 that one word from Milosevic and Martic would have accepted this package.
7 Q. Now, going back to your statement in paragraph 63, if I may.
8 Mr. Ambassador, when you were attempting to broker this last-minute deal,
9 you note that one word from Milosevic could have meant all the
10 difference, but Milosevic did not meet with Rudy Perina.
11 Now is who is that, Mr. Ambassador?
12 A. Rudy Perina was the American charge d'affairs in Belgrade, so the
13 top US official in Yugoslavia
15 Q. And as part of your negotiations these first few days of
16 August 1995, was it Mr. Perina's job to try to talk to Milosevic to get
17 him on board?
18 A. Yes, it was.
19 Q. But he was unsuccessful getting a meeting with Mr. Milosevic?
20 A. Yes. He could not get a meeting with Milosevic on the 3rd of
21 August, which was at a time it was apparent to everybody that military
22 action was imminent. Military action that would very much affect the
23 well-being of a significant Serb population that Milosevic himself had
25 Q. Just waiting a second.
1 Now, based on this sequence of events, not only your inability to
2 go to Knin to talk to Martic but the charge, Mr. Perina's inability to
3 meet with Milosevic, what did you conclude?
4 A. I concluded that the prospects for a peaceful settlement were not
5 good but that it was still very much worth pursuing.
6 Q. I understand. Let me turn just a bit away from the Krajina Serbs
7 and talk a little bit about the Republic of Croatia
8 time and just walk through some of the peace initiatives that -- some of
9 which you were directly involved in and brokered and -- such as the Vance
10 Plan -- the Vance-Owen Plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, most importantly
11 the Washington
12 During the course of these various negotiations on these plans,
13 did President Tudjman agree at your request to sit down and negotiate
14 through all these plans that I just outlined and others?
15 A. Yes. So far as I know and think, he agreed to negotiate in every
16 instance that he was asked to negotiate.
17 Q. And a plan that you were heavily involved in, if I may,
18 respectfully was the Washington Agreement in March of 1994. Is that
19 right, sir?
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. Tell us a little bit the Washington Agreement, and if you could
22 just tell us a little bit about the background and what it did in your
23 own words, sir.
24 A. In 1993, full-scale fighting broke out between the Croats and the
25 Muslims in Bosnia
1 of ending the war in Bosnia
2 our top priority - our being the US
3 the Muslim-Croat war, and that involved getting a change of attitude from
5 forge agreement between the two sides.
6 That required a political settlement, and what we came up with on
7 the -- at the suggestion, actually, of a part of the Bosnian Croats who
8 were not aligned with the Herzegovinians, the Posavina Croats, was this
9 plan for cantons, a federation -- a Muslim Croat federation in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina with different cantons, and that is what we negotiated
11 in Washington
13 Once that agreement was reached, the fighting between the two
14 sides ended immediately, and they formed an alliance, and because of that
15 alliance Bosnia and Herzegovina survived, and within 14 months or I guess
16 18 months, the war was over with a settlement that is far from perfect
17 but a lot better than the continuation of the war.
18 Q. So in your view, Mr. Ambassador -- so in your view,
19 Mr. Ambassador, the Washington Agreement was a key ingredient to the
20 ultimate bringing about of peace in the former Yugoslavia?
21 A. It was the cornerstone of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Had there
22 been no Washington Agreement, I do not believe that Bosnia
24 would have survived, and before he died I saw President Izetbegovic, and
25 he said basically that to me.
1 Q. And President Tudjman on behalf of the Republic of Croatia
2 along with the Washington Agreement, did he not?
3 A. He did not like the idea of the Washington Agreement. He did not
4 want to conclude the Washington Agreement, but under intense pressure
5 from the United States he was pragmatic enough to agree. At various
6 times he did what he could to undermine the Washington Agreement, but in
7 the end the agreement did survive.
8 Q. Let me turn your attention, if we may, to a Prosecutor's Exhibit
9 yesterday, 421. I don't know if you have it. We'll bring it up on the
11 MR. KEHOE: This is a P421 -- 451, excuse me. 451 is the
12 excerpts from the "The United States and Republic of Croatia
13 Documentary History." I don't if you have a hard copy before you,
14 Mr. Ambassador.
15 A. I think I have the whole book here.
16 Q. Well, frankly, I don't want to read the whole book. I'm
17 interested in the address or press conference you gave on the 2nd of
18 June. It's page 91 of that document, yeah. It's the page -- the stamp
19 -- the number on the top is 06069577.
20 JUDGE ORIE: It doesn't appear on our screen at this moment.
21 MR. KEHOE: I can proceed. This is a P document, not a D
22 document. P451.
23 THE WITNESS: It is on my screen.
24 JUDGE ORIE: It is not on the e-court screen. It is on my
25 screen, as well, but it says -- no, there we are.
1 Matter resolved. Please proceed.
2 MR. KEHOE:
3 Q. Yes, Mr. Ambassador. Turning to the third-to-last
4 paragraph beginning "Specifically," on the first page of that, and this
5 is your speech on June 2nd, 1994
6 "Specifically Croatia agreed to abandon the idea of a separatist
7 Croatian republic in part of Bosnia
8 the territorial integrity, independence, and unity of that sovereign
9 country. In doing so, Croatia
10 international law and justice. Croatia's decision was key to the
11 Washington Agreement, a political arrangement for a federation of Muslims
12 and Croats with a governmental structure provided very substantial
13 self-government for each community while fully protecting both the human
14 and political rights of these communities."
15 If you turn to the next page, fourth paragraph down, Mr.
16 Ambassador, beginning with: "To reiterate ..."
17 "To reiterate, the federation agreement would not have been
18 possible without the fundamental shift in policy undertaken by the
19 government of Croatia
20 partner in the peace process, we said that as our partner we would work
21 through Croatia
22 political, economic, and security arrangements."
23 Now, Mr. Ambassador, those were your words at that time after you
24 had concluded the Washington Agreement. Is that right?
25 A. Yes that is correct.
1 Q. Now, if we move on, you were also brokering the Z-4 plan, and I
2 think you told us yesterday that President Tudjman was not fully on board
3 initially with the Z-4 plan, but he agreed to negotiate with the document
4 that you presented him. Is that right?
5 A. He was not on board initially or ever. But he -- he did agree to
6 negotiate on the basis of the document, and that was all that we asked
7 him to do.
8 Q. And that document carried with it the document you presented him
9 substantial autonomy for the Serbs in the Krajina, didn't it?
10 A. Very great autonomy, yes.
11 Q. And can you explain that just a bit.
12 A. In that part of the Krajina, which had in 1991 a Serb majority,
13 there would be a separate government with its own elected parliament, its
14 own elected chief executive who would be known as the president of the
15 Krajina. That government would have control over almost all government
16 functions, police, education, culture. It could run its own welfare
17 system, health system. It was entitled to fly its own flag along with
18 the Croatian flag in the same way that, for example, an American state
19 would -- has its own flag. The Krajina would be demilitarised, and we
20 even allowed the possibility, and this was turned out to be quite
21 controversial, that they could have their own bank-notes, much in the
22 manner that Scotland
23 the same as the pound.
24 Q. Just staying with President Tudjman, and we don't need to go into
25 tremendous detail. I mean, his negotiations continued through the
1 Eastern Slavonia
2 Agreement, all of these agreements he and the Republic of Croatia
3 continued to participate, did they not?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now, in the midst of this you were talking to Mr. Babic, and I
6 think you said in your diary that notwithstanding your efforts in this
7 regard, and I believe it's on July the 31st, on page 26 of your diary.
8 On 31 July, you note that: "I point out that the Croatians have every
9 reason to move militarily. The international community seems
10 understanding. The Serbs are way off balance. They have parts of three
11 brigades dealing with the Zepa remnants as they face a professional army
12 in the west. It is sweet revenge on Mladic. Any negotiations now would
13 be a stall."
14 So as we move into this area, it was your conclusion at this
15 point, Mr. Ambassador, that negotiations -- certainly the negotiations
16 going on with Mladic's people in Geneva were a stall -- excuse me,
17 Martic's people in Geneva
18 A. No, I don't think that that is a reference to -- in fact, I will
19 say that is not at all a reference to negotiations between Croatia
20 the Republika Srpska Krajina. It is a reference to negotiations in
22 momentum was beginning to shift from the Bosnian Serbs to the federation,
23 I felt that negotiations after Srebrenica, after Zepa, would be a stall.
24 But it -- this had absolutely nothing to do with the negotiations about
25 the Krajina, and I think - and I could be wrong about that - but I think
1 we did -- the September 3rd meeting -- the August 3rd meeting was not
2 even set at this point.
3 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me.
4 Q. We'll get to this in a bit, though, but you did tell
5 President Tudjman on the 1st of August during your meeting that you
6 didn't hold out much hope for negotiations given all of the Krajina Serbs
7 failures, didn't you?
8 A. I can't at the moment recall whether I said that to
9 President Tudjman, but I would not have had a lot of hope, and now that I
10 think about it, it is possible that something along those lines were in
11 my instructions. That is, in the demarche that I presented, but at this
12 point right now I don't quite remember.
13 Q. You -- turning our attention to Geneva, you knew that you -- you
14 were of the position that -- as with many others in the international
15 community that those negotiations in Geneva were merely pro forma and
16 that the Krajina Serbs were going to refuse every demand by
17 President Tudjman, including the peaceful reintegration into Croatia
18 that not correct?
19 A. I did not think that. I -- I thought that there was some
20 prospect that Babic would be able to get the parliament to agree to
21 accept the deal that I worked out with him on the 2nd of August. I
22 wasn't sure of it, but given what I knew was going to be an enormous
23 tragedy for the population of the Krajina, I felt that we ought to --
24 there ought to be a chance even of a few days to see if Babic could do
25 what he promised he would do.
1 Q. I was talking about the meetings in Geneva.
2 A. Of the 3rd of August.
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. But that was linked to the Babic deal because what was supposed
5 to happen was for Babic to speak to the representatives in Geneva
6 them to publicly accept what Babic and I had worked out.
7 Q. Mr. Ambassador, in the Milosevic transcript at page 23166, lines
8 5 to 14, you stated: "As to the meetings in Geneva, they, the Croatians,
9 used them as a vehicle to present their final ultimatum. They
10 anticipated that there would not be a positive answer, and they proceeded
11 with their attack. I don't think the Croatians had the slightest thought
12 that there was going to be meaningful negotiations, and it was clear to
13 me, as it was to the other diplomats in Zagreb and I think to the broader
14 international community, that the meeting in Geneva was just that, that
15 it was pro forma, that it was a very dangerous situation, that Tudjman
16 was going to outline demands that he had already stated, and that the
17 Serbs were going to refuse them, and that that would provide the pretext
18 for war."
19 Did you state that during the Milosevic trial, sir?
20 A. Yes, I did.
21 Q. And based on this particular events or the sequence of events,
22 starting with all of the negotiations with the Krajina Serbs, in
23 paragraph 63 of your statement you note that there was a basis for the
24 skepticism of the Croat leaders. "While I wish there had been more time,
25 I also understood why there wasn't, and they were probably right to be
2 That was your ultimate conclusion, Mr. Ambassador, after you had
3 finished all of these negotiations. Isn't that right?
4 A. That -- that is correct. Just to come back to what I said in the
5 Milosevic trial, it's certainly true that -- that what the Croatians
6 envisioned that meeting to be a case -- a place where they would present
7 demands which they knew would be rejected and so that that was not a
9 Nonetheless, as I was explaining, it did have a connection to the
10 deal that I had negotiated with Babic, where if the Serbs accepted the
11 deal with Babic or said they would, then it would be worth waiting a few
12 days and see if they delivered on what they promised.
13 But that wasn't how Croatia
14 they didn't send their top negotiator. It was simply an occasion to
15 present an ultimatum which the Serbs would refuse, and that set the stage
16 for the war.
17 Q. And the significant part of that demand that had always been the
18 demand of President Tudjman was the peaceful reintegration into Croatia
19 was it not?
20 A. That was the major demand, but in fairness to the Croatian
21 position, the Serbs had not been forthcoming on a number of other
22 measures, which they had previously agreed, which were much smaller like
23 the pipeline and then reopening the connections through Krajina by rail
24 and road so that the two parts of Croatia could be connected.
25 So not only did they refuse -- were they not forthcoming on the
1 big demand, but they hadn't been forthcoming on much smaller demands.
2 Q. Ergo your statement about the skepticism?
3 A. The statement about the skepticism -- the statement about the
4 skepticism is more specific. It is -- it is that I believe the Croatians
5 were right to be skeptical as to whether Babic would have the power to
6 deliver on what he agreed with me. That -- in short that he would be
7 able to overcome Martic. He said he could, but they were right to be
8 skeptical as to whether he actually could overcome Martic and possibly or
9 likely Martic and Milosevic.
10 Again, I simply felt it was worth waiting a few days to see if
11 that would happen.
12 Q. Let us broaden the context of this and just talk about the larger
13 geographic context in which you were attempting to negotiate this, and
14 I'm talking about your -- you learning of the matters in Srebrenica and
15 what was going on in Bihac and your reaction to that.
16 Now, you touched on it briefly during the Prosecution's direct,
17 and if you could just elaborate on that just a bit exactly what you were
18 observing and what you were concluding based on the information that you
19 were obtaining.
20 A. This was an extremely difficult time. The Serb forces had been
21 on the offensive. They had taken Srebrenica. 7.000 men and boys were
22 missing, and I was quite sure based on my own understanding of the region
23 from serving two and a half years that in fact the missing were dead, so
24 that I believe they were already dead.
25 And then the attack on Zepa and the attack on Bihac. These
1 attacks threatened to change the overall strategic situation in the -- in
2 that part of the Balkans so that you would have a large west Serb state,
3 including the Krajina and the Serbian parts of Bosnia. The position of
4 this west Serb state would be much stronger militarily because once Bihac
5 was gone they would not have to defend both sides of a donut. They would
6 just have a single exterior border.
7 Q. The "they" that you're talking about are the Serbs?
8 A. Are the Serbs, yes.
9 Q. I'm sorry. Continue.
10 A. Yeah. There was a humanitarian dimension. In Srebrenica there
11 were 40.000 people, and Mladic had murdered 20 per cent of them. If he
12 were to apply the same ratio to Bihac with 160.000 people, he would be
13 murdering 32.000 people. It was unthinkable to me that that could take
14 place in Europe
15 powers and the United States would let that happen, but that was what we
16 were afraid might happen.
17 Then the whole UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission was in danger of
18 collapse. The United States is a major part of the United Nations. We
19 pay -- or at that time were paying 31 per cent of the costs, and our main
20 allies - notably Britain
21 UNPROFOR mission that would have to be extracted by NATO. So this was an
22 enormous crisis that was building, and my view was that if NATO was not
23 going to save Bihac and it -- in its London statement, which I think was
24 around the 22nd of July, it only mentioned Gorazde, not Bihac, and if
25 NATO wasn't going to save Bihac, then -- and Croatia was willing to
1 undertake military action that we should not object to that military
2 action. That was my strong view, that was the position that I advocated
3 to my government, and that was the position that my government took.
4 As I wrote in messages, I -- I was aware that Croatian military
5 action to save Bihac would produce a humanitarian crisis with regard to
6 the Krajina, but in what I called the hierarchy of evils, the -- that
7 humanitarian crisis clearly would rank lower than a situation which the
8 Bosnian Serbs took Bihac and massacred 32.000 people.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I want to turn to a video to show
10 you, and this would be 1D33009. This is a video from RSK TV.
11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, before you play a video, I gave
13 permission for two minors to be in the public gallery today for special
14 reasons. I don't know what the video will show us, but I just wanted to
16 MR. KEHOE: It's just a press conference, Judge.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's -- well, could I say that it is
18 innocent or ...
19 MR. KEHOE: I mean, there's no expletives in there, nothing --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. No, but I just wanted to be sure. That's --
21 it's my responsibility.
22 So let look at the press conference, then.
23 [Videotape played]
24 "THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] General Ratko Mladic, the legendary
25 commander of the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska army, an old
1 acquaintance, and one of the Serb legends. This is therefore an
2 opportunity to avail ourselves of the presence of General Mladic to
3 address you and to ask him questions concerning the current situation
4 which is of great importance to the Serb people. So I now give the floor
5 to General Mladic.
6 "General Mladic: Thank you very much. If I can take the
7 opportunity to use the media in order to address the people -- to greet
8 the people of the Republic of Srpska Krajina. We are here together. I
9 have always been here even if I left and was away for a while, but I
10 never really left.
11 "Journalist: For starters, General, how do you perceive the
12 situation as a whole in the Republika of Serbian Krajina and Republika
14 "General Mladic: I would say that the situation is currently
15 rather complicated due to the comprehensive aggression carried out by the
16 Croatian armed forces against the Republika Srpska, and the goal of their
17 operations is to cut off the Republic of Serbian Krajina using their
18 weapons and the mediators and pressure by the international community to
19 enforce a solution in the area by means of force. But I hope that with
20 the help of good organisation and the functioning of all the segments of
21 the Serbian people in both the Republika Srpska and the Republic of
22 Serbian Krajina, the outcome will be resolved successfully, and I think
23 that the Croats made a crucial mistake in this war which is going to cost
25 "Journalist: Do the Serbs have enough strength to withstand the
1 Muslim and Croat onslaught?
2 "General Mladic: The Serb people have enough strength and enough
3 forces, and had countries from the German and Islamic blocks not provided
4 support, unfortunately, along with the support of some others, they would
5 have lost this war long ago. Every prolongation of this war is
6 catastrophic, first of all, for those who instigated it, and by this I
7 mean the Croatian armed forces.
8 "Journalist: General, from a strategic point of view, in my
9 humble opinion, I think the Croat forces are very stretched -- stretched
10 thin across the territory now and towards the Defence lines of our Serb
11 defence forces. To what extent would that be helpful to our strategy for
12 a successful strategic strike to retake and liberate our territories?
13 "General Mladic: It's a good question, and you are displaying
14 journalistic curiosity, but I wouldn't answer your question with any
15 particularly high degree of certainty. Time will show, and time will
16 answer your question.
17 "Journalist: What is the current situation in the Grahovo and
18 Glamoc theatres of war?
19 "General Mladic: The Croatian army formations have attacked and
20 have entered Grahovo and partially entered Glamoc, but I do hope we will
21 retake these and other occupied territories of Republika Srpska very
23 "Journalist: Amongst other issues, we are interested in the
24 situation in Grahovo and Glamoc and the area of responsibility of the 2nd
25 Krajina Corps. Numerous rumours are circulating among the public and
1 even by some media in the Serb territories that there is insufficient
2 defence coordination between the Republic of Serbian Krajina and
3 Republika Srpska. There are even rumours and attempts to bring unrest
4 among the population. There are talks of some sort of selling out or
5 surrender of our liberated lands for "greater gain."
6 "General Mladic: First of all, I wouldn't wanted to comment on
7 this calculated propaganda of a low intensity. As far as I'm concerned,
8 the Serb populist is united from Kupa and Korana and all the way to Timok
9 and south Morava
10 territories as all other peoples on this planet should have the same
11 interest, the same state and remaining structures on such a state, and I
12 believe that in this respect what's going on in every part of these
13 territories, needless to say, and every individual on the planet that
14 Serbs should be allowed to demonstrate an interest in at least the same
15 degree as any other modern state demonstrates in its citizens living
16 within their state or in foreign territory.
17 "Journalist: We surprised you by his presence, but this doesn't
18 mean that they haven't asked me many questions up to now.
19 "General Mladic: You asked a good question. This isn't the
20 first time the Ustashas are attacking, wanting to kill us. However, I
21 believe the time has come that our people as a whole need to realise and
22 which many have come to realise during this war and -- as I had indicated
23 earlier. I believe terrible mistakes have been made by individuals who
24 claim the war with the Croats was over once and for all and that it would
25 be over within seven days, and then in the lines of separation numerous
1 check-points were being opened, customs zones, and in some places there
2 were even soccer games held. As you can see, these proved to be costly
3 decisions resulting in the loss of lives, numerous refugees and burnt
4 villages, but I hope that our people have understood this and that they
5 have enough strength and that they will muster enough strength so that
6 this aggression by Croatia
7 this war in the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be avenged
8 and that they will send them back to where they belong.
9 "I just want to send my regards to the people to tell them that
10 they should remain resolute in defending their country, their historic
11 hearth and graves, and that they don't give in to our form of provocation
12 or any form of propaganda because it is only with the means of our forces
13 that we can create our state. A state can be made with its own children,
14 and so many of our wonderful children have given their lives for both the
15 Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian
16 motivate the rest of us who are still alive and on our feet to apply
17 additional efforts, and we should remain focussed on the finale of this
18 war until the final victory. Thank you."
19 MR. KEHOE:
20 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, the unification of those RSK forces along
21 with General Mladic was something that concerned you greatly, as it
22 impacted not only on Bihac but on the rest of Croatia, didn't it?
23 A. Yes, it did.
24 Q. Strategically, if I could just -- and I know you talked to us
25 about the humanitarian fall-out. Strategically, what would have been the
1 impact to Croatia
2 Serbs joining?
3 A. There would have been a single western Serb state, which would
4 have had a coordinated or united military command and which would have
5 been defending only exterior borders. That is different from the
6 situation that -- that would have -- that prevailed as long as Bihac was
7 there where it was facing the Dudakovic and the 5th Corps from within
8 Bihac occasionally attacking out and then lined up with Croatia on one
9 side and the Bosnian army and the HVO on other sides.
10 So the strategic situation for the Bosnian Serbs and the Krajina
11 Serbs would have been much better if Bihac had fallen.
12 Now, this also concerned the United States because it would have
13 meant that this war would have continued for a very long period of time,
14 that once you had that entity created, the prospects for a piece
15 negotiation based on what the international community had on offer, both
16 for Croatia
17 plan for Bosnia
18 small. So from Croatia
19 disastrous, and from the point of view of the United States and our
20 partners who were trying to make a just peace, it would have been a
21 disaster as well.
22 MR. KEHOE: If I can just tender this video into evidence at this
23 time, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
25 Mr. Registrar.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit D402.
2 MR. KEHOE:
3 Q. And I know this video was talking about the fall of -- I'm sorry.
4 JUDGE ORIE: If you give me an opportunity to --
5 MR. KEHOE: Oh, I'm sorry.
6 JUDGE ORIE: -- admit it into evidence, it might be in your
7 interest, Mr. Kehoe.
8 MR. KEHOE: I apologize, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: D402 is admitted into evidence.
10 MR. KEHOE: My apologies, Your Honour.
11 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, I know that the video talked about the fall
12 of Grahovo and Glamoc, but prior to that time you recognised this
13 possible set of affairs that you have been talking about, and by the way,
14 there was going be in your view a significant refugee fallout to compound
15 the refugee fallout that Croatia
16 A. Yes. It was my view that the 160.000 Bosniaks who lived in Bihac
17 would have been -- the lucky ones would have been expelled, but it's
18 likely that tens of thousands would have been murdered by Mladic. So it
19 would have been both a big refugee burden to Croatia but also, you know,
20 for the entire world and unspeakable mass murder, just like Srebrenica.
21 Q. And to that end, Mr. Ambassador, you used your diplomatic efforts
22 to push for the signing and execution of the Split agreement, did you
24 A. The Split
1 did not have any role in setting up the Split meeting, but the Croatian
2 government asked if I would go down to that meeting, and I did. I think
3 I actually was the only foreign diplomat; I and my staff were the only
4 foreign diplomats to attend the meeting, and we -- I certainly encouraged
5 the two sides to cooperate, and I suppose as a sign of our support for
6 this agreement, when it came time to -- for the picture to be taken at
7 the signing, Ambassador Zuzul one of the senior Croatian officials asked
8 if I would be in the picture, and I agreed to be in the picture.
9 Q. Let me -- let me bring up on the screen 1D33-0061.
10 Mr. Ambassador, we're not going through this whole agreement, but
11 if you look at paragraph 2, you know, it notes the attacks on UN Safe
12 Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the joint operations by Bosnian and
13 Croatian Serbs against UN Safe Areas in Bihac.
14 Mr. Ambassador, this agreement is in response to that, to allow
15 the Croatian forces and the Bosnian forces to operate together in Bosnia
16 to fight the Serbs, is it not?
17 A. That is the great significance of the Split agreement. It
18 represented a request by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina acting
19 consistent with UN charter with its right of self defence requesting the
20 Republic of Croatia
21 different from the previous Croatian interventions in Bosnia. It was
22 done in a lawful manner against a -- joint action against an aggressor.
23 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time we will offer 1D33-0061
24 into evidence.
25 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
2 THE REGISTRAR: This is Exhibit D403, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE ORIE: D403 is admitted into evidence.
4 MR. KEHOE:
5 Q. Mr. Ambassador, it was your belief at the time that Croatia
6 potentially international border violations because ARSK soldiers were
7 crossing from Croatia
8 A. As a matter of international law, a state has an obligation to
9 prevent its own territory being used for attacks onto the territory of
10 another state. The situation was somewhat complicated given that there
11 was an UN presence, but nonetheless, yes, I thought Croatia had a --
12 there was -- had an obligation to make sure that there were not attacks
13 from Croatia
14 Q. Now, this agreement, Mr. Ambassador, was one of the objectives
15 was to allow General Gotovina and the HV troops to launch what we call
16 Summer 95 on Grahovo and other areas moving up from the Livno valley.
17 Isn't that right?
18 A. One of the things that followed from the agreement was the
19 offensive up the Livno valley, yes.
20 Q. And based on your time there, were those attacks successful in
21 alleviating some of the pressure on Bihac?
22 A. They were very significant and had a very positive effect of
23 alleviating the pressure on Bihac.
24 Q. Now let me take you yet further. You knew that this agreement as
25 well as the activities by General Gotovina and the HV were going to be
1 the foundation for the ultimate taking over of the Krajina. Is that
3 A. I -- yes. I knew that this was part of a -- of a military plan
4 that would involve taking over the Krajina. It didn't automatically
5 follow that because of the Livno valley offensive that there would be an
6 Operation Storm, but if there was to be an Operation Storm, this would --
7 this -- this operation would fit -- would fit into it.
8 As I testified yesterday and in other trials, I was also aware of
9 the planning for Operation Storm and the likelihood that it would take
11 Q. And you also knew that the fighting that potentially would take
12 place through the taking over of Grahovo, for instance, and then --
13 taking over Knin, the ultimate goal would be the defeat of the Serbs, and
14 the Serbs, I mean the joint efforts of the ARSK and the VRS. Isn't that
16 A. Croatia
17 region and I suppose to relieve the siege of Bihac and that -- and that
18 this action would further that goal, yes.
19 Q. So when we are talking about -- I'm sorry.
20 So when we are talking about the moving through on Summer 95 and
21 as well as taking back the Krajina, it was also a desired effect for the
22 Croats to defeat Ratko Mladic and the VRS army. Is that right?
23 A. We certainly wanted Ratko Mladic and the VRS army defeated.
24 Q. To that end?
25 A. We -- we -- I mean, we welcomed the -- or welcomed in the sense
1 of not publicly welcomed but were very happy to see the Livno valley
2 offensive because it did defeat -- it was a setback to Mladic, and it
3 helped relieve the siege of Bihac.
4 Q. To that end, Mr. Ambassador, what was required, based on your
5 knowledge of the area at the time, to defeat General Mladic and his joint
6 militaries -- the joint militaries of the ARSK and the VRS at this time?
7 A. I think I'm going take your question in parts.
8 Q. Please do.
9 A. I don't think it required very much to defeat the military of the
10 ARSK, but to defeat the military of the -- the Bosnian Serb army, I think
11 there were two ways it could be defeated. First, by a NATO -- full-scale
12 NATO intervention which arguably -- as authorised by the Security
13 Council, which arguably should have happened but was not going to happen;
14 or, in the alternative, by the combined forces of the Bosnian government
15 and the HVO along with the Republic of Croatia
16 air power. And that is, in fact, how the Bosnian Serb army was defeated,
17 and that is what set the stage for the Dayton Peace Agreement.
18 Q. And these joint efforts that you are talking about that
19 ultimately brought the Serbs to bear, you know now, Ambassador, were led
20 by General Gotovina?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Now, let us go back to right after the Split agreement, if you
23 will. I read your diary, Mr. Ambassador, and it appears to be quite
25 If I may, if we can turn to - I don't know if you have your diary
1 before you - the 24th of July. Let me just take you through some quotes
2 on the 24th of July and the 25th. For your diary entry 24 July 1995:
3 "War appears imminent. Croatians plan to move tomorrow at 4.00 on
4 Bosanski Grahovo. The Serbs have artillery in Sector South and plan to
5 retaliate by shelling Croatian cities. The Croatian plan would then be
6 to take a sharp left at Grahovo and move into Knin," which is ultimately
7 what happened with Operation Storm. Is that right, sir?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. Let's move to the 25th of July. The paragraph beginning: "I
10 received a demarche." "I received a demarche from Bihac. I am
11 instructed to deliver the demarche to the highest official." And then
12 just for the sake of expediency, the last sentence, you give it to
13 Ambassador Zuzul. "Zuzul understands its significance, that if Croatia
14 behaves well it will not be punished for military action if through the
15 Krajina to save Bihac."
16 And now on the 28th, you receive notice that the combined forces
17 -- meanwhile the HV and the HVO are about to take Bosanski Grahovo and
18 Glamoc: "When I got back to the office, I learned that they had. We
19 also have strong indications that Croatians intend an offensive to take
20 all of Krajina."
21 So as this multi-stepped process, you were following this along
22 the way and discussing it with Croatian officials, and certainly with
23 regard to the matters in the Livno valley you gave your approval to that
24 on behalf of the United States?
25 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: A couple of questions there. Maybe they could be
4 MR. KEHOE:
5 Q. I'm sorry if I -- I apologise for a multi-levelled question,
6 Mr. Ambassador. Basically with regard to this process, you were
7 following this on behalf of the United States, and in your discussions
8 with the Croatian officials you were giving your approval for their
9 activities going through -- up the Livno valley and taking
10 Bosanski Grahovo in attempts of defeating the Bosnian Serbs and the
11 Krajina Serbs but also alleviating the pressure on Bihac. Is that a fair
12 assessment, sir?
13 A. To answer it in part, first, yes, I was following this on behalf
14 of the United States. Second, the United States was not approving of
15 these operations in the sense of telling the Croatians to do this, but we
16 were clearly not objecting, and in that context the fact that we were not
17 objecting was highly significant because we and other countries had
18 objected to any action that had expanded the war -- that arguably would
19 have expanded the war, including objecting to military action,
20 November 10th, 1994
21 So that was the significance, but I do not want to leave the
22 impression with this Court that the United States was giving its stamp of
23 approval to military action. We were simply not objecting. Obviously
24 Ambassador Zuzul understood, and that's why I make the point in this
25 thing that when I -- that -- in the diary that he understood that if
2 is, there would not be sanctions, but that is a different statement from
3 saying that there would be explicit approval.
4 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to turn your attention to an audio
5 of part of your meeting with President Tudjman on the 1st of August.
6 While we're coordinating that, we'll get back to that in a
7 second, and I think the question, and you touched on it previously, was
8 what was going on with the UN while you were present at the signing of
9 the Split
10 and you were -- you had a degree of frustration with dealing wit the UN
11 or the UN hierarchy during this time, wasn't there?
12 Let me make this -- just direct to you a particular line in your
13 -- might be easier just to direct you to your diary, June 12, lunch with
15 Clearly is no humiliation. These two won't take. They are adamant
16 against any use of force."
17 Moving ahead to the 14th: "Fred Eckhart was showing Akashi
18 bad press." That's in the first paragraph, Mr. Ambassador. "He was
19 particularly focussed on the Pomfret piece that said that the UN had
20 abandoned its mission. I thought the piece had seemed quite accurate,
21 and Akashi
22 spokesman Ivanko."
23 Let me just take a look at these two Pomfret articles, and then
24 we can go back and ask questions in -- for the sake of moving more
25 quickly, and if I could bring up 1D33-0076.
1 And, again, Mr. Ambassador, this is a Washington Post article by
2 John Pomfret, dated 11 June, 1995
3 but as you can see under the body: "The UN mission here announced today
4 that it will carry out no operations in Bosnia without the consent of the
5 Bosnian Serbs, throwing into doubt its will to protect besieged Muslim
6 enclaves and halt the shelling of Sarajevo."
7 We can go to the bottom of the page of that article, starting
8 with "Western sources": "Western sources said that draft security
9 counsel resolutions circulating in New York and drawn up by France
11 page, please. Top of the page, please: "... must do only what the Serbs
12 want it to and must abandon its threats to use force to protect Muslims."
13 One more article, Mr. Ambassador. Bear with me, and we will ask
14 a few questions about these in concert.
15 And if I can bring up 1D33-0078.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, may I take it that you can deal with that
17 in a couple of minutes so that we would have a break after that.
18 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour.
19 Q. If I -- I just go through this article, and we could take a break
20 and, then I can just begin to question you after that. Satisfactory.
21 Staying with Mr. Pomfret, Mr. Ambassador, this is an article in
22 the Washington
23 issue, and I want to highlight for you a quote on the second page.
24 This is a quote, it is the second paragraph down, Mr. Ambassador:
25 "'A lot of shots are being called by the Bosnian Serbs right now,' said
1 Alexander Ivanko, the United Nations's top spokesman in Sarajevo. Asked
2 if there were any -- if any were being called by the United Nations, he
3 said: 'I can't think of any right now.'"
4 When we come back, Mr. Ambassador, I would like to ask you a
5 couple of questions about that, but at this time, Your Honour, I would
6 like to offer into evidence those two John Pomfret two articles:
7 1D33-0076 and 1D33-0078.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I saw that you have no objections.
9 Mr. Registrar.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 1D33-0076 becomes Exhibit D404.
11 1D333-0078 becomes Exhibit D405.
12 JUDGE ORIE: D404 and D405 is admitted into evidence.
13 We'll have a break, but before we take the break I would like to
14 deliver a very small decision. It can be done in open session.
15 Mr. Galbraith, if you want to save ten seconds you're allowed to
16 leave, but otherwise this is a corrigendum to the Chamber's decision on
17 admission of the statements of seven witnesses pursuant to rule 92 quater
18 issued on the 16th of June, 2008.
19 On this 16 of June, the Chamber issued its decision on admission
20 of statements of these seven witnesses pursuant to 92 quater.
21 The Chamber has noticed that page 03070010 should have been
22 included in the Roman numeral V in the disposition, and the decision is
23 hereby amended to include that page.
24 And this concludes the Chamber's ruling on the matter.
25 We will have a break, and we'll resume at a quarter past 4.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 3.46 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 4.20 p.m.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, before we proceed -- Mr. Tieger, is there
4 anything ...
5 MR. TIEGER: I did have two quick matters, Your Honour, but I can
7 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if you -- this is about cross-examination, so
8 perhaps if you raise the issues you'd like to raise quickly.
9 MR. TIEGER: First, yesterday we tendered bar table documents. I
10 had a quick discussion with the registrar. We just wanted to make -- we
11 thought perhaps those should be marked in advance. I know the Defence
12 asked for time to review those, but in the meantime perhaps those could
13 be marked.
14 And secondly, yesterday a document was presented, a map, that was
15 labelled as borders according to the signing the memorandum, the Academy
16 of Arts and Sciences. I had an opportunity to check that document;
17 couldn't find a reference there that would be -- that I understood to
18 give rise to that map, so I would grateful if my learned friend at some
19 point could point to the portion, and we can work with that out of court.
20 MR. KEHOE: I might add that the witness said that he didn't know
21 for sure, so I didn't offer that document -- that map at this time.
22 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your Honour, I would know you had asked us as
23 soon as we had a chance to offer thoughts on the bar table documents, and
24 I wanted to do that very briefly.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MR. KUZMANOVIC: I have had a chance to look at at least the
2 first third of them, and for the most part we don't have any objection.
3 But the very first document, the 65 ter 3209, we do object to because
4 it's a 1992 meeting relating to population transfers and discussions
5 between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, which we believe is not
6 relevant to this case.
7 Thank you.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you at least for giving us already an
9 impression about your position in relation to those documents.
10 As far as the bar table documents are concerned, I suggest to the
11 parties that I invite already the registrar to assign numbers to them so
12 that they are marked for identification, and then the decision will
13 follow later. But apart from that, Mr. Kehoe, the Chamber has carefully
14 considered the course of the cross-examination until now. The Chamber
15 has observed how the background of Operation Storm has been explored in
16 great detail, including political, strategic, and tactical aspects of the
17 events leading to Operation Storm.
18 The Chamber does not ignore the relevance and importance of that
19 background but also considers that this relevance and importance is not
20 without limits.
21 The Gotovina Defence has announced that it would need six hours
22 of cross-examination of Mr. Galbraith. Having considered the course of
23 the examination until now, the Chamber considers that it would be fair to
24 limit the Gotovina Defence alone to the same number of hours as the
25 Prosecution used. That would be two hours and 49 minutes.
1 The Chamber, however, decided that it should grant the Gotovina
2 Defence five hours in total for cross-examination. Further, the Gotovina
3 Defence is encouraged to avoid repetition, to use its time in a focussed
4 way, and to come to the relevant points as directly as possible, and to
5 find a fair balance between the background of Operation Storm and the
6 core issues of this case, that is, whether or not crimes were committed
7 and to determine whether the accused bear criminal responsibility for
8 such crimes, if any.
9 This decision exclusively deals with the time for
10 cross-examination of the Gotovina Defence. The time requested by the
11 other Defence team seems at this moment in time not reasonable, but the
12 chamber reserves its final position after it has had an opportunity to
13 see how the cross-examination by the other Defence teams develops.
14 You may proceed.
15 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I want to bring up one other item before I ask
17 you some questions in this regard, and if I could take a -- bring up
19 This is a quote that -- from a book called "Complicity With
20 Evil," Mr. Ambassador, and I want page 128, page 4 of that, which has
21 been loaded up. And I'm looking at the quote portion on the bottom of
22 the page, Mr. Ambassador, and onto the next page.
23 If we could just go up a little bit more. The quote starts
24 actually: "'The United Nations had a whole collection of reports of
25 atrocities, and this was just one more of them,' recalls Galbraith, 'but
1 we knew 7.000 people were missing, and this was proof of what happened to
2 them, which I suspected from the start. I was sure that it would be
3 buried by the United Nations. In Akashi's world, the reaction to
4 something like this was that the United Nations had to be careful because
5 it was dangerous and could lead to military action. The United Nations
6 always needed proof, and they had strategies to ensure there was no
7 proof. They would sit on reports or ensure the information was not
8 highlighted, and when it was reported by the press, it just became part
9 of more of the same from Bosnia
10 that this massacre had happened.'"
11 Now, Mr. Ambassador, I know there are several ideas here going
12 from June into the discussion of Srebrenica and Zepa. But if you could
13 tell me, I mean, what was going on with you coordinating with the UN
14 throughout June and July of 1995?
15 A. Well, you asked before, and then when you -- you then presented
16 the material. You asked if I was -- if I had disagreements with the
17 United Nations, and needless to say I had strong disagreements with the
18 United Nations and was very frustrated with how it was conducting itself,
19 particularly in those months, and I think the -- the comments that you
20 have quoted from my diary speak for themselves, so I don't think I need
21 to elaborate on that unless you would like me to. I think I need to say
22 something about this particular quote that you have raised from the Adam
23 Labore book about what happened.
24 The United Nations had -- because it is so significant and so
25 representative. The United Nations -- you had had the Srebrenica
1 massacre and after -- sorry, you'd had the fall of Srebrenica and then
2 the women and children were brought by bus to Tuzla, and at that time
3 that was the -- what the world was focussing on were the human rights
4 violations for those women and children. The UN had people who were
5 interviewing then. And then came this man who was a survivor of the
6 massacre, and he described being taken to -- I won't go into detail, but
7 being taken to a mass grave, shot. The bullet grazed his head, and he
8 climbed out of it and made his way through the woods.
9 And this was just taken down as another report, and when it got
10 back to Zagreb
11 concerned that it would just go into a drawer and that -- and the
12 reaction there was, We need more proof, and so she shared it with me, and
13 I then sent a message saying, This is what's happened to the men and
15 But to me, this was simply proof of a massacre and it was --
16 which -- in circumstances where other people were in peril, namely the
17 population of Bihac. This is the 25th of July. And so, yes, you could
18 say that I was frustrated and had differences.
19 Q. Now, there was a position of the UN that you note in your diary
20 there, adamant against any use of force. Now during this period of time,
21 was it your conclusion the UN simply was not going to use any force to
22 assist in resolving the matter in the former Yugoslavia?
23 A. That wasn't the assignment of the United Nations, and the -- and
24 -- to give the United Nations credit, the humanitarian efforts that it
25 ran kept hundreds of thousands of people alive and if it hadn't been for
1 the UN, Sarajevo
2 But -- and it was under-resourced and you had peacekeepers in
3 blue helmets in the middle of a war zone, so -- and a final point is
4 there were not American troops there, so it was a touchy matter for the
5 American ambassador to be talking about this.
6 Nonetheless, it failed in its mission to protect the safe areas
7 and to stand up against the Bosnian Serbs, and it was also very unwilling
8 to authorise NATO air-strikes, which was authorised by the Security
9 Council, but it required -- before they could take place there were two
10 keys -- the UN had to approve and the NATO had to approve, and it was
11 very hard -- the UN was reluctant to turn its key. It always insisted
12 that the United Nations was somehow neutral, but that in fact was not
13 true. The United Nations was not neutral in this conflict because it had
14 passed more resolutions on the former Yugoslavia than on any other
15 conflict, and every single one of them identified Serbia as the
17 Q. Was it your conclusion at that time, Mr. Ambassador, that the
18 United Nations was not going to use force to prevent the fall of yet
19 another UN protected area, that is the Bihac pocket?
20 A. It was -- yes, it was my conclusion that the UN troops there were
21 not going to defend the pocket because, after all, the Dutch troops had
22 not defended Srebrenica, and the troops in Bihac were less capable. But
23 it was also my conclusion, and this is much more relevant, that they were
24 not going to turn the -- they were not going to authorise the NATO
25 air-strikes that might have saved Bihac.
1 Q. Let us if we can just at this point, we can tender that portion
2 of the -- of the book, 1D33-0068.
3 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D406, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: D406 is admitted into evidence.
7 MR. KEHOE:
8 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I want to move ahead to the events beginning just
9 the days prior to Storm, and just as a reference point. We talked about
10 this before in your diary of the 31st saying that any negotiations was
11 now -- would now be a stall. But I would like to play you a tape of your
12 meeting with President Tudjman, and if I could bring up 1D33-0439.
13 Just for reference points --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. KEHOE: This is the 1st of August on Brioni.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Just very quickly, Your Honour. I'm not sure how
18 much of the tape will be played. What I've had a chance to review based
19 on the portion that was disclosed appears to a smallish excerpt, so I
20 leave it to the witness, of course, in terms of ability to contextualise
21 this, but many of the portions are small fragments of what are obviously
22 longer meetings, so two things: The extent to which the witness may need
23 to see more of the transcript or the recording of the meeting; and
24 secondly, we would need to receive the full transcript or recording of
25 that meeting.
1 MR. KEHOE: We in fact gave the full tape to the Prosecution. We
2 are not going to play each and every item in this take just for the sake
3 of time. We're going to play about three minutes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: And you will tender the whole of it?
5 MR. KEHOE: I'm just going to tender the portions, Your Honour,
6 that I'm going to play. I had given the entire tape of the meeting to
7 the Prosecution.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber will listen to it and see whether
9 the Chamber needs any further context.
10 MR. KEHOE: That's fine, Judge.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
12 Mr. Tieger, if you would have any suggestions what would be
13 needed to get the proper context, then of course you're free to address
14 the matter.
15 Please proceed.
16 [Videotape played]
17 "Galbraith: The military intervention in the Livno valley has in
18 fact had the desired effect. It's relieved the attack on the Bihac
19 pocket and has put new pressure on the Serbs. But as you know, we remain
20 extremely concerned the about the risk that any -- that continued
21 offensive action by your forces could lead to a dangerous escalation in
22 the conflict, and frankly what they mean there is action in Croatia
23 is across the cease-fire line. I don't think there's any -- this is not
24 aimed at the Livno valley offensive. We're concerned that there's a real
25 danger of a Serb overreaction as there is of bringing together the
1 Croatian Bosnian Serbs along with the FRY and an even more hard-line
2 alliance. Zuzul has minimised the chances of a direct Yugoslav
3 intervention, but we think that the dangers are greater than what he
4 says, and so our advice is to be careful in avoiding escalating
5 hostilities unnecessarily and to explore whether the events of the last
6 few days can lead to a reinvigoration of the search for negotiated
8 Today, however, we see little sign that the Serbs are withdrawing
9 from their siege of Bihac; little sign that they are honouring previous
10 agreements, that is the oil -- opening the oil pipeline; little sign that
11 they are engaged on the issues that you have raised, opening the railroad
12 connection or beginning negotiations on political summit; and little sign
13 that they're prepared to allow UNCRO to exercise its full mandate; and if
14 so we have no immediate optimism about negotiations on a political
15 settlement. Nevertheless, we urge to you leave the door open for talks.
16 Serbs and their leaders need time to face the new realities. And in this
17 regard, depending on what you tell me about your plans and how you feel
18 about it, Babic has sent a message to me through Akashi that he would
19 like to see me in Belgrade
20 whether I would do this or not would depend in good measure how you felt
21 about and also what you tell me about what you're planning to do."
22 MR. KEHOE:
23 Q. Now, this is just one part of the a conversation. We'll get into
24 the next part setting out exactly what you -- the United States
25 government's position is on whether or not the Krajina Serbs are willing
1 to negotiate at this point. Is that right?
2 A. I think the -- the tape speaks for itself. I -- I want to be
3 clear, though, that what's being talked about here, which is in a
4 demarche from Washington
5 talking about that demarche, and I'm then handing it over to Tudjman, not
6 all of which necessarily reflects my own views. That is different from
7 the negotiations that I was referring to on the previous day in my diary,
8 which did reflect my own views when I was talking about a stall. That
9 was about Bosnia
10 Q. I understand.
11 A. Okay.
12 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time we'll just play the -- well
13 let's play the next portion of this tape, which is 1D33-0080.
14 [Audiotape played]
15 "Galbraith: I want to -- just to reiterate some of the points
16 that we've made before, which I know many of them reflect your policy,
17 but I would not be doing my duty if I didn't restate them. First, to
18 make clear, you know, it is our advice against military action, and we're
19 not in any sense giving you a green light as some people say in the
20 press. Second --
21 "Tudjman: We didn't say.
22 "Galbraith: Yeah, I know. No, I know you didn't. I know you
23 didn't, but, you know, this is around -- but I want to be clear. Second,
24 I know -- you don't need our advice on the risks. You've made your own
25 judgements, but should things not turn out the way you hope they turn
1 out, you cannot expect that we will come in to the rescue. I think you
2 understand that. Third, the treatment of the Serbian population in any
3 area you take is extremely important, frankly, although Western Slavonia
4 was not perfect. There were problems. The --
5 "Tudjman: But minor problems.
6 "Galbraith: The reflectively good and certainly relative by this
7 conflict treatment of the population and behaviour earned you enormous
8 credit, and I think this was a major factor in international acceptance
9 or the low level of the international reaction. You will -- under these
10 circumstances, in any statements we make we will always emphasise the
11 problems because it's impossible to ever know that there were not
12 problems, and we are always going to be concerned about the problems, but
13 it -- we did notice how much better this was than some of the other
14 things like Medak and -- but we just want to emphasise so strongly that
15 how important this is, that -- that the troops behave well if they do
17 It is also an obvious point, I know you appreciate, that troops
18 that treat civilians well also turn out to be troops that fight better.
19 I mean, they -- I suspect when you take on -- well, you have been taking
20 on rapists, murders, and torturers in Bosnia, and they don't fight very
21 well. They're quite good when they're dealing with 14-year-old girls,
22 but not when they're dealing with a professional army.
23 Finally, it is of paramount portion that any action be taken in a
24 way to -- that there be no UN casualties. We know that there are UN --
25 the Serbs have put tanks next to some UN observation posts. Even if
1 those tanks fire on you, it is critical that you not fire back. This
2 will be something -- this involves our allies, and this is an absolutely
3 critical point.
4 "Tudjman: In such a case, in such a case our units don't fire
5 such point, but ... [indiscernible]
6 "Galbraith: No, I know that you have already considered these
7 points. Again, let me emphasise it is our strong advice against doing
8 this, but you've seen over the three demarches I have presented what our
9 full position is.
10 "Tudjman: Yes, I know. I quite understand.
11 "Galbraith: I -- I know."
12 MR. KEHOE:
13 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, talking about this a bit, you talk about a
14 contrast between what happened in Operation Flash and Medak pocket and
15 how -- I believe you said that what happened in Western Slavonia earned
16 you tremendous credit in the international community or words to that
17 effect. What exactly was going on there, sir?
18 A. In Western Slavonia, a part of the population remained. It was
19 protected. We were working with Croatia
20 that they had a future in Croatia
21 aspects of the Western Slavonia operation that involved human rights
22 violations. I think some I may have become aware of were more focussed
23 on after this conversation, and I may have overstated the case when I
24 said that you earned enormous credit with the international community for
25 what -- how east -- western Slavonia
1 listening to this 13 years later that I overstated the case.
2 Nonetheless, in Western Slavonia about 3.000 of the population
3 remained. They stayed in their homes. You didn't have the kind of
4 burning and looting that characterized what happened in the Krajina, and
5 it was really -- my point was to try and get Croatia to respect the
6 rights of the civilians, and that was a point that I made to Tudjman in
7 -- in other encounters, and also this was at the Villa Weiss [phoen]which
8 is where he had meetings - I guess actually where he stayed, as well - on
10 So I would -- not all the conversation with him would have taken
11 place in the recorded formal session. I would have also been making
12 these points separately, as well, during that trip.
13 Q. Now, let me turn to a document, and it is a 65 ter 3132, which is
14 just one day after -- it not in your book, Mr. Ambassador. If I can
15 bring it up on the screen. This is one day after your meeting.
16 This is a meeting, Mr. Ambassador, at the Minister of Defence.
17 If we could turn to the third page of that document. I mean, just if we
18 -- that's right. If we could just look at this briefly. This is a
19 meeting chaired by Minister Susak with various officers present and other
20 members of the Ministry of Defence, and of course we see at 25 is General
22 And if we can turn to the third page of this document, and -- at
23 the Minister Susak aspect talking to the -- about midway through that
24 interlineation, Mr. Ambassador: "Military police must be more energetic
25 in its actions and must prevent all offences. ZP commanders" -- military
1 district commanders -- "must be the ones to pass on to the other
2 commanders the prohibition of any kind of uncontrolled conduct, torching,
3 looting, et cetera. We must prevent having to take the heros of the home
4 land to Court. PD" -- ideological and political workers -- "must carry
5 out their task of appropriately briefing HV members.
6 "The west has given a partial blessing but nothing must happen to
8 I'd like to talk to you that in conjunction with one other
9 document that's already been received in evidence, and that is D201.
10 This is a -- part of the general attack order from General Gotovina, and
11 if we turn to the second item, 6 -- excuse me, next page 6. It is page
12 2, item 6, I'm sorry. If we can just blow up 6 and 8 a bit.
13 As I noted, this likewise is a day after your meeting with the
14 president, Mr. Ambassador. This is also dated the 2nd of August. An
15 order goes out: "Familiarizing units with the need to eliminate all
16 negative occurrences that will surface in the course of combat operations
17 with a focus on preventing torching and destruction of larger populated
18 areas and towns."
19 "8. Advising members of units on conduct with civilians and POWs
20 in accordance with the Geneva Conventions."
21 Turning my attention to these two documents, Mr. Ambassador, was
22 this the type of reaction that you expected that the government of
24 that you presented to President Tudjman on the 1st, orders such as these?
25 A. Yes. And it's only too bad it didn't turn out that way.
1 Q. But this is what you -- this is the kind of order that you were
2 looking for to being passed down by someone like General Gotovina before
3 this enterprise was undertaken?
4 A. Yes. Yes.
5 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time we will offer into evidence
6 -- excuse me, we also tender the audios. 1D33-0439, 1D33-0080, and 65
7 ter 3135.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, first the audio.
9 MR. KEHOE: 3132.
10 MR. TIEGER: No objection to the audio, Your Honour, with the
11 reservation that to the extent any additional portions may also be
12 tendered in -- to accompany that.
13 Certainly no objection to that excerpt.
14 And no objection to the other document.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Transcripts have been uploaded in e-court.
16 MR. KEHOE: They were.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I listened rather than looking at the --
18 MR. KEHOE: Yes, it has, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Transcripts are there. Mr. Registrar, for the first
20 audio -- or would you like to have them together, Mr. Kehoe?
21 MR. KEHOE: I think it might be easier just to do them together.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Two audios, Mr. Registrar.
23 MR. KEHOE: Separate. I take that back, Judge. I'm being told
24 separately is much better.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, document 1D33-0439 becomes Exhibit
2 number D407.
3 JUDGE ORIE: D407 is admitted into evidence.
4 THE REGISTRAR: 1D33-0080 becomes Exhibit D408.
5 JUDGE ORIE: D408 is admitted into evidence.
6 THE REGISTRAR: And 65 ter 03132 becomes Exhibit D409.
7 JUDGE ORIE: No, the number you just read is not exactly the same
8 number as Mr. Kehoe unless there's any problem with the transcript.
9 MR. KEHOE: I made a -- incorrect. I mentioned the number as
10 being incorrect. I think it's 65 ter 3132.
11 JUDGE ORIE: 3132 where the -- yes, you corrected that. Yes. I
12 had overlooked that.
13 D409. Any objections, Mr. Tieger?
14 MR. TIEGER: No, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: D409 is admitted into evidence.
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. KEHOE:
18 Q. Now, in other contexts, and I address ourselves to the Milosevic
19 transcript at 23 -- 23169. You mentioned that -- at line 18 to 20 in
20 talking about this entity known as MPRI. I know you're familiar with
21 that. An MPRI was an entity that came and trained the Croatian armed
22 forces. Is that right?
23 A. It provided assistant -- certain kinds of training to the
24 Croatian armed forces. It did not provide military training in the sense
25 of -- or combat training. In other words, it operated in a manner
1 consistent with the arms embargo.
2 Q. And was part of that training as you mentioned in the Milosevic
3 case training on human rights?
4 A. It was, yes.
5 Q. Now, moving ahead, you mentioned also in your conversations with
6 President Tudjman that in addition to safeguarding civilians there was
7 also a request that nothing happen to UN personnel?
8 A. Yes, that was very important.
9 Q. And consistent with that, nothing did happen. There were some
10 event -- accidents, but nothing happened to attack individual UN
11 conclaves or entities, did it?
12 A. No. There was a Danish sergeant killed around Petrinja, but that
13 may have been by the Serbs. I don't remember the details now.
14 Q. Now --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, you -- I wouldn't mind even if you would
16 tell us because apparently everyone understands but, the MPRI, isn't that
17 an entity that came -- from where it did come?
18 MR. KEHOE: It was a -- well, maybe we just --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes. You could ask the witness, but it's
20 totally unclear to the Chamber where it came from.
21 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour.
22 Q. Mr. Ambassador, can you just elaborate on that just a --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Well, not -- if you say this was -- from what
24 country they came, by whom they were sent, that's good enough.
25 THE WITNESS: I think a little bit more explanation. It is an
1 American private organisation made up of former US flag officers and
2 others which provided training under contract to third country
3 militaries, and it would have -- it would have -- in order to do it, it
4 had to get a licence from the state department, but it was a private
5 contract between Croatia
6 think, Alexandria, Virginia
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you. Please proceed.
8 MR. KEHOE:
9 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, you put forth these requests, and there was
10 some discussion as to whether or not there was a green light and a red
11 light or a yellow light. The fact is that as far as the United States
12 government was concerned, there was no light, is that right, to go attack
13 the Krajina or not? Would that be accurate?
14 A. I think the Court has just heard exactly what I said to President
15 -- or at least one of the thing -- a principled point that I said to
16 President Tudjman on instructions about it, so I'm not sure that -- that
17 the lights are really all that helpful. We certainly didn't say, don't
18 do it, and we didn't say, do it.
19 Q. Let me turn your attention just briefly to 65 ter 5230, which is
20 your interview with Mr. Engel and Mr. Goldman.
21 A. Oh.
22 Q. And page 8. The bottom of that page we are talking about this,
23 and you were asked: "Would you describe it as an amber light, a
25 And this other individual, Mr. Engel, says: "A little
1 unprecedented time."
2 And you note: "Oh, it was no light, but it was no light, but it
3 -- no light was understood to mean a green light."
4 A. Well, the Croatians did go ahead, and they understood that we
5 weren't saying no.
6 Q. And did they also understand based on your conversations that if
7 they did go forward that there wouldn't be sanctions as long as they
8 abided by the requirements that you set forth in your conversation with
9 President Tudjman on the 1st?
10 A. Yes, I'm sure they understood that, and that was something that
11 we would have wanted them to understand.
12 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time we will offered into
13 evidence 65 ter 5230.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: And what are we -- the whole of the document?
17 MR. KEHOE: It's an interview, Your Honour, just -- the whole of
18 the document was a 65 ter document. Just -- it puts the matter in
19 context. It goes on for a few pages. I think it would be difficult to
20 -- I think it's only 14 pages with the cover sheet.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Do we know by now who Mr. Engel and Mr.
22 Goldman are?
23 MR. KEHOE: I can ask that. I'll ask that question.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes because we get an interview. We don't know if
25 it is a press interview or for anything else.
1 I would not mind -- I mean, if the parties know both who Mr.
2 Engel and Mr. Goldman are. I'm not as formalistic as that we should hear
3 from Mr. Galbraith. I'm certain that he'll jump up if you give the wrong
4 information, so if you just tell me.
5 MR. KEHOE: I will tell you, Judge. They are two United Nations
6 employees that were -- they were not --
7 THE WITNESS: Now, they were --
8 MR. KEHOE: State Department.
9 THE WITNESS: State Department.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You are jumping up.
11 MR. KEHOE: State Department employees. I apologize.
12 THE WITNESS: Yeah. They were -- there was a contract project to
13 write a history leading to Dayton
14 classified history initially, and so they conducted interviews. They
15 may have been under contract to the State Department, so they may not be
16 State Department employees. I don't remember now.
17 JUDGE ORIE: It is clear to me. Please proceed. But of course
18 at the same time you'd like to hear a decision. No objections by the
19 Prosecution. Mr. Registrar, that would be number ...
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D410, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: D410 is admitted into evidence.
22 MR. KEHOE:
23 Q. Moving ahead, Mr. Ambassador, you knew that that -- after your
24 conversation with President Tudjman on the 3rd that the HV was going to
25 move ahead with the attack, did you not?
1 A. Yes. Yes, I did.
2 Q. Yet you also mention in paragraph 30 of your statement that -- in
3 talking about President Tudjman, he was generally cautious on the use of
4 force. And, again, on -- in paragraph 63 you note in the middle of
5 paragraph 63, when you are talking about your conversation with
6 President Tudjman after your discussion with Babic: "Tudjman had been
7 cautious and reluctant about the use of force, and some of that is
8 reflected in the fact that Tudjman devoted time before Operation Storm to
9 meet with me and then met with his advisors to consider the discussion
10 before deciding on war. The fact that they listened to me reflects their
11 inherent caution."
12 Talk to me a little bit about this caution, Mr. Ambassador, at
13 this particular juncture.
14 A. Well, Tudjman had lived through the Second World War, and so he
15 knew what war was about. He was somebody who very much had the interests
16 of Croatia
17 from Milosevic, who I think had his own personal interests at heart, so a
18 decision to go to war is one that he and frankly the other people in his
19 government would weigh carefully. I don't think there were any -- or at
20 least there were not many trigger-happy people among those senior
21 leaders. I cited Tudjman as cautious because a very similar set of
22 issues arose in November of 1994 in which Granic and Susak asked me what
23 the US
24 Krajina to relieve a siege of Bihac that was going on at that time. And
25 I got instructions to say that we -- we -- we advise strongly against
1 doing that. And when I delivered that response, Tudjman said, Well, I
2 agree with you in the presence of Granic and Susak, and so I think that
3 reflected his caution. And in the build-up to Operation Storm, he wanted
4 to be sure that Croatia
5 international community, that the Security Council would not condemn
7 strategist, frankly, he wanted to consider all the consequences of what
8 he was going to do and in every way minimise the risk.
9 Q. I know you -- I'm sorry.
10 I know that you didn't know about those -- I'm sorry. I know
11 that you had seen some of those Ministry of Defence documents from the
12 2nd of August as well as General Gotovina's -- excuse me, order on that
13 same date. But does that reflect a melding of that caution to try to
14 ensure orders go down and people were taken care of and that UN personnel
15 was taken care of?
16 A. Yes, I think it does.
17 Q. Let us turn to the attack itself. If I can just address you to
18 paragraph 59 of your statement, sir.
19 You note in the first line that: "My impression was that the
20 initial phases of the operation were relatively respectful of
21 international law such as bringing people to camps where I understood
22 they were not abused. The Serbs were confined" -- excuse me. "Serbs
23 confined in camp did criticise the shelling to which they were subjected,
24 but this was an indication that they could speak freely. The systematic
25 destruction of Serbian homes and the killing of stragglers, et cetera,
1 built up over time in the weeks after Storm."
2 In paragraph 43, you talk about the actual -- I won't read the
3 whole item, but you talk about the shelling of Knin, that it was not
4 indiscriminate. You noted based on conversations with your attaches it
5 was consistent with what you might expect and not indiscriminate.
6 So it was your conclusion that the actual attack in Operation
7 Storm in these first few days was consistent with international
8 humanitarian law. Is that right?
9 A. I don't think there were major violations of international
10 humanitarian law in those first few days.
11 Q. And this is the operation that was conducted under the command of
12 General Gotovina. You know that now.
13 A. Let me just stand with -- with that statement.
14 At this point, and this is many years, I don't want to be in the
15 position of imputing knowledge that probably I had then as to who was in
16 command of what operation. I principally dealt with President Tudjman
17 and Defence Minister Susak, and so I don't want to -- I don't want to
18 talk specifically about what General Gotovina was doing at a particular
20 Q. I understand. Staying -- going on to paragraph 44, you talk
21 about your -- Colonel Leslie's observations. You say: "I understand
22 that Colonel Leslie of UNCRO made observations that are inconsistent with
23 this view, but I would express some scepticism about those observations.
24 I also tried to -- I also recall that I tried to warn Colonel Leslie that
25 the operation was about to stop but that my warnings were ignored."
1 Tell me about those skepticisms, sir.
2 A. Well, as I recall, the UN - and I think this was significantly
3 based on Colonel Leslie - asserted that there was indiscriminate shelling
4 of Knin. But the UN personnel including Colonel Leslie were basically
5 locked down in the UN headquarters. Because of our close relationship
6 with the Croatian government, we had access that the UN did not have to
7 Knin in the immediate aftermath of -- and to the Krajina in the immediate
8 aftermath of Operation Storm, and so I myself travelled into the Krajina
9 region, and people from the embassy travelled, and that included our
10 defence attache and the people in the defence attache's office as well as
11 political office -- officers, Tim Knight, the DART team when it was
12 there, so we had military, political, humanitarian.
13 I'm just trying to give you the scope of the coverage so that I
14 can then give you the conclusion.
15 Q. Just -- I know it's an acronym, but was is DART?
16 A. Oh, I'm sorry. Disaster Assistance Relief Team. This was the
17 major US
18 out of our embassy.
19 In any event, so we had -- we had people there I think on the 7th
20 and 9th of August looking at what had happened in Knin, and all of them
21 reported to me that -- that the -- that the damage from the shelling was
22 not extensive, in fact, that -- that things were largely undamaged and
23 that windows were broken, that short of thing had happened, but there was
24 no -- there was not a kind of systematic effort to destroy Knin. And I
25 would distinguish the shelling of Knin from the other kind of shelling
1 that took place in the war; for example, the shelling of Vukovar, the
2 shelling of Sarajevo
3 military operation to take a specific objective but which was stand-off
4 shelling aimed at destroying the place, and in the case of Vukovar,
5 destroying it before taking it. It was not that kind of shelling, and it
6 was nothing like -- the damage was nothing like the damage that was
7 inflicted on Dubrovnik
8 time, a few days in 1991, which I myself was an eye-witness to because I
9 was there about ten days later.
10 So that -- it is on the basis of that -- of the observations of
11 the embassy -- of these three different embassy staff teams with three
12 different functions including military experts who had a lot of
13 familiarity with what was going on in the -- in the war who had been
14 following it for years. It is -- it is their expertise as well as my own
15 observations and when I went to Knin much later that led me to be
16 skeptical of this claim of kind of -- of massive shelling, which is what
17 I understand Colonel Leslie to have been saying after Operation Storm.
18 Q. Now, the cable that you were mentioning, if I can just put that
19 in context.
20 MR. KEHOE: And if we can bring up D66.
21 Q. May have been some time since you laid eyes on this, Mr.
22 Ambassador, but it is a cable of -- dated 14 August. It notes in the
23 first paragraph: "None of the Serbs who spoke with us complained of
24 mistreatment by Croatian authorities, and government of Croatia civil
25 authorities have taken great pains to demonstrate publicly their
1 commitment to protect Serb and Serb property."
2 Next to the bottom of that page on the downtown Knin: "Although
3 Knin was reportedly heavily shelled in the early hours of the
4 hostilities, few downtown buildings and residential areas showed signs of
5 shell damage.
6 You talk about the -- go two pages up, please.
7 "Conditions at the government of Croatia-controlled camp were
8 better, where about 250 Serbs were living in a school gymnasium. All had
9 a roof over their head, and most had mattresses. Government of Croatia
10 officials had provided them with three meals a day and had trucked in
11 sufficient water."
12 This was the information you were getting from your
13 representatives on the ground. Is that right?
14 A. Yes. This was one of three teams that went there, and there are
15 actually three cables reporting on it. One a defence department cable,
16 one from the DART team, and this from the political team, and they --
17 with regard to the shelling they all come to the same conclusion and also
18 with regard to many of the other observations.
19 Q. If can I move back, Mr. Ambassador, to P451 that talks about your
20 -- this is a news conference that you conducted with Secretary Shattuck,
21 if I may, on September 30th, 1995. I think it is in your book,
22 Mr. Ambassador.
23 Do you see that, sir? It has the number on the top. It's 244.
24 The excerpt is -- the number on the top is 06069773. It's a press
25 conference that you gave on September the 30th.
1 MR. KEHOE: The ERN is 06069735. That's it.
2 Q. Again, this is a press conference you gave with Secretary
3 Shattuck on the 30th. And, if I may, go to the second page.
4 On the top of that page, you note at the top of that page with
5 Secretary Shattuck -- and this is a press conference you gave about the
6 problems that were taking place in the Krajina, and you note: "First, we
7 have -- are receiving continued reports of major human rights abuses that
8 have occurred in the Krajina region following military action by Croatia
9 in early August. These include killings of ethnic Serb civilians,
10 particularly the elderly, after the Croatian home guards moved in.
11 Beatings and other physical violence against ethnic Serbs, mass burnings
12 and lootings of Serb houses and property."
13 A. Just for the record, this is not me who is saying this. This is
14 it Secretary Shattuck.
15 Q. Well, going back to your particular statement in paragraph 59:
16 "The systematic destruction of Serbian houses and the killing of
17 stragglers, et cetera, built up over time in the weeks after Storm."
18 So in your mind, Mr. Ambassador, the initial operation to take
19 the Krajina was relatively, according to your testimony, in accordance
20 with international law, but these other matters happened down the line
21 after home guards moved in. Is that right?
22 A. Well, my -- my testimony is that the initial -- there were not
23 major violations of international humanitarian law in the initial phases
24 of Operation Storm, and subsequently there were major violations of
25 international humanitarian law which included the systematic destruction
1 of Serbian homes, mass -- mass looting, and the killing of stragglers.
2 Q. Now, these other individuals that were doing this, do you have
3 any knowledge whether or not -- any particular unit they belonged to, et
5 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Your Honour. "Other individuals" seems
6 to be a reference to somebody or some bodies that are not referenced in
7 the previous answer that I see.
8 MR. KEHOE: I will rephrase the question.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
10 MR. KEHOE:
11 Q. The individuals that were conducting these activities, do you
12 have any knowledge what units they belonged to?
13 A. At this stage, I -- I do not, and my -- my view of this was very
14 straightforward. I considered the -- President Tudjman and the Croatian
15 leadership responsible for -- for either permitting this activity to take
16 place, which I considered to be preventable, or possibly having even
17 ordered it. But I am -- I am not taking a position, and I certainly at
18 this point could not, as to which Croatian units were responsible or who
19 below the level of -- of President Tudjman and I suppose the defence
20 minister might have been responsible for these activities.
21 Q. And with regard to any of these individuals, be they part of a HV
22 unit or not, I mean, are you aware of any efforts that took place within
23 the Republic of Croatia
24 for instance, to mobilising 70.000 troops?
25 A. Such as demobilising them?
1 Q. Demobilising them.
2 A. Well, the demobilisation was a matter of -- I mean, the troops
3 were called up in a relatively brief period of time in preparation for
4 Operation Storm, and then once Operation Storm was over, this massive
5 conscription in a small country, it was natural that the troops would be
6 demobilised, but I certainly did not see the demobilisation as being an
7 effort to gain control over the Krajina or to prevent looting.
8 Q. And more specifically, Mr. Ambassador, do you know of any efforts
9 by the Republic of Croatia
10 A. I do not believe that they took sufficiently serious steps to
11 bring this matter under control because it is my belief that the top
12 Croatian leadership in fact was quite happy that the Serb homes and
13 property were destroyed so that Serbs could not return.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Galbraith, the question was whether you
15 specifically know of any efforts. Your answer was about beliefs, and you
16 repeated what you said earlier, but Mr. Kehoe is apparently seeking your
17 knowledge about specific actions.
18 May I -- you have noticed that Mr. Kehoe is limited in his time.
19 Could I ask you to carefully listen to the question and to try to answer
20 them as precisely as possible.
21 Please proceed.
22 THE WITNESS: I do not -- I do not now know of specific efforts.
23 MR. KEHOE:
24 Q. And Mr. Ambassador, to follow up on your prior answer concerning
25 the mobilisation, this massive mobilisation that you discussed prior to
1 Operation Storm and then the demobilisation, this was of soldiers who
2 were not professional soldiers. Isn't that right?
3 A. Yes, that is right.
4 Q. Now, let me turn topics to -- just for one moment, and you noted
5 for us before that -- I'm not going to go back to it, but that Martic did
6 not want to -- wouldn't agree to a peaceful reintegration, but I want to
7 talk to you about the Serbs actually leaving. And if I can turn my
8 attention to your diplomatic diary first, and I'll talking about the 15th
9 of June, towards the bottom of the page, and this is on page 14.
10 Do you see that Mr. Ambassador? "If Croatia took the territory."
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Okay. You note on the first line: "If Croatia took the
13 territory the Krajina Serbs would leave."
14 Moving ahead in your diary to the 2nd of August, you're
15 chronicling your conversations with Mr. Babic, and on page 30 of your
16 diary when you're talking about the attack -- I'm sorry, I don't want to
17 get ahead of you.
18 A. Yeah. I -- I'm with you.
19 Q. Okay. You note -- you've told Babic that if it goes the people
20 will flee and that the problem would be if there was a war and people
22 And lastly, if I could just go to a video, 1D33-0088 -- it is
23 1D33 -- it's an audio, excuse me. If we can play this, and then we can
24 ask this series of questions together.
25 [Audiotape played]
1 " ... said that this would be a great tragedy because we know
2 that many of the Serbs who live there would leave, probably most of them.
3 There would, of course, be thousands of dead on both sides.
4 MR. KEHOE:
5 Q. Now, that's just obviously a snippet of that, Mr. Ambassador, but
6 taking this all -- obviously there are other aspects or comments along
7 this regard. You had concluded at that time that if any type of military
8 activity was conducted that Martic would get -- or the Krajina Serbs
9 would leave the area, wouldn't they?
10 A. Yes. I had concluded that the Krajina Serbs would leave.
11 Q. And what did you base that on, sir?
12 A. I based it on the fact that most of the Krajina Serbs -- most of
13 the Serbs in Western Slavonia had left after Operation Flash; I based it
14 on -- what I would -- a well-founded fear of what Croatian military
15 action might mean based on the experience in the Medak pocket; I based it
16 on the attitude that Tudjman had toward the Serb population; and I based
17 it very much on the vehement anti-Croat -- or Croatia and anti-Croat
18 propaganda of the Serb leadership, which equated Tudjman's Croatia
19 inaccurately, equated Tudjman's Croatia with the Ustasha regime of the
20 Second World War.
21 Q. Now, this was on the heels of this Operation Flash in Western
23 the -- was an element of Serbs who actually stayed, and some of those
24 Serbs thereafter decided they were going to leave anyway.
25 A. I think of the 3.000 who decided to stay, that they in fact
2 Q. Okay. Now, on the day that Operation Storm was going to commence
3 -- well, let's even go before that.
4 Let's go to paragraph 81.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, the audio which was just played, do you
6 intend to tender that into evidence?
7 MR. KEHOE: Yes, I will tender it at this time, Judge.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Could you also tell us -- I saw that it's audio, not
9 video, but I saw on the screen three names, one of the three perhaps the
10 person who spoke. I've got no idea what it is about.
11 MR. KEHOE: This is a -- that was -- the only person that was
12 speaking was the ambassador.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's fine to know.
14 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: But I can't -- and in what context was this audio?
16 MR. KEHOE: This was on the 3rd of August, 1995. It was actually
17 the last meeting that the ambassador had with President Tudjman prior to
19 JUDGE ORIE: Now that's clear to me.
20 Mr. Tieger, any objections.
21 MR. TIEGER: Unless there is something different about this clip
22 that I don't know about. This is a small audio clip of a transcript --
23 transcripts that were -- a transcript, excuse me, that was tendered
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and admitted. Is it part of the transcripts of
1 at least now the audio of those meetings?
2 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Does the audio add anything to what is on paper?
4 MR. KEHOE: I would have to check, Your Honour, but we gave the
5 Prosecution the entire audio from the 3rd meeting.
6 JUDGE ORIE: That's not the issue. The question is whether it
7 adds to the evidence already admitted.
8 MR. KEHOE: I would have to go back and check, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please, let's then refrain at this moment from
10 giving it a number. If it is the same, then I think there's no need to
11 hear it again.
12 Please proceed.
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 THE WITNESS: It is me.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Galbraith. I'm sorry. There are 25 people
17 in this courtroom, so sometimes I --
18 THE WITNESS: The title on that audio was -- included Holbrooke's
19 name, and I have no idea why it was included because he was not at that
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Neither have I, Mr. Galbraith, so therefore --
22 Mr. Kehoe, if you would please check the matter and see whether there is
23 any need to tender it.
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. KEHOE: Yes. That is a mistake on Holbrooke. It is --
1 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
2 Now, Mr. Ambassador, by the way, with regard to going back to
3 Western Slavonia, there was a percentage of the Serb population that left
4 Western Slavonia even though the operation by the HV, in your words,
5 brought them credit. Isn't that right?
6 A. Leaving aside your characterization, there was -- there were
7 about 3.000 -- which I explained my view of, but there were 3.000 of the
8 roughly 13.000 people in Western Slavonia stayed, the 10.000 who left, I
9 think, most of them left actually before the Croatians took over the
10 area, so they left in fear of what would happen rather than leaving -- I
11 mean, some part of them may have left after the Croatians arrived, but
12 some of them were also simply fleeing what they feared would be the --
13 what the Croatians might do.
14 Q. There was that percentage that did in fact stay?
15 A. That's right.
16 Q. Now, turning your attention to -- to paragraph 81. You note in
17 the first sentence: "I don't think it was Tudjman's plan to expel all
18 Serbs from Croatia
19 Now -- do you see that sir?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned to us that when you were talking to
22 President Tudjman you were not giving him a red light or a yellow light
23 or a green light. You were just passing on your concerns. It's a fact,
24 Mr. Ambassador, that if you thought that President Tudjman was ordering
25 the start of Operation Storm to expel all the Serbs from the Krajina, you
1 would have given him a red light as you did back in November of 1994,
2 wouldn't you? And I mean "you," I mean the United States government.
3 A. First, when we gave him a red light back in November of 1994 it
4 had nothing -- it was not because we thought he was going to expel the
5 Serbs. We gave it for -- the reason we gave the red light is that we
6 feared it would lead to a wider war.
7 Second, yes -- well, it's a hypothetical question which I can't
8 answer, but I can answer for myself, which is that if we had believed
9 that -- if I had believed that Tudjman was going to expel all the Serbs
10 from the Krajina, I would have urged in the strongest possible way for my
11 government to give a red light to this operation.
12 Q. And you didn't give any such urging to your government to give a
13 red light, did you?
14 A. I did not believe that Tudjman was going to expel the Serbs. As
15 noted, I believed that most of them would leave.
16 Q. Now --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Could I seek here clarification, Mr. Kehoe, because
18 you introduce in your question, if you thought that President Tudjman was
19 ordering the start of Operation Storm to expel all the Serbs from the
20 Krajina, there is an implicit assumption that that was the purpose.
21 First of all, Mr. Galbraith, did you consider the purpose of
22 Operation Storm primarily to expel the Serbs?
23 THE WITNESS: No, not at all.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Did you consider that this was or could be a side
25 effect of militarily taking over the Krajina territory and have it within
2 THE WITNESS: I did not consider that the expulsion of the Serbs
3 would be a side effect, but I did consider that the departure of the
4 Serbs would be a side effect.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And I think you earlier answered already some
6 questions about whether that suited President Tudjman or not.
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did answer those questions, and -- and to
8 state briefly, I believe that the departure of the Serbs was something
9 that he wanted -- he was happy to see happen.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 MR. KEHOE: But to follow --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, usually if you mix up things, if you then
13 -- you might not -- that you might get answers which do not -- which
14 respond primarily to the mixing up of elements rather than to have a
15 clear analysis of what the witnesses wants to tell us.
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. KEHOE:
18 Q. Well, to follow up on Judge Orie's question just, it goes back to
19 your first line in paragraph 81. You did not think that when Operation
20 Storm was commencing on the 4th of August that the plan was to expel the
21 Serbs. Isn't that right?
22 JUDGE ORIE: That question has put and answered. Clearly, there
23 is a clear answer on it.
24 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, I think based on the answer to the
25 question that you gave that -- I just come back --
1 JUDGE ORIE: No, that was not what was intended by Operation
2 Storm to achieve, isn't it, Mr. Galbraith? That's how I understood your
4 THE WITNESS: I'm getting confused with all the double negatives
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 THE WITNESS: I do not think Operation Storm was undertaken for
8 the purpose of expelling the Serbs from Croatia.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
10 Please proceed.
11 MR. KEHOE:
12 Q. Now, if we can just change subjects to -- to after Operation
13 Storm and -- after Operation Storm, activities continued against the
14 Serbs shortly after Operation Storm. Were you aware of that? I'm
15 talking about the HV against the Bosnian Serbs in conjunction with the
17 A. I am aware that operations continued after Operation Storm and --
18 but to go with your colleague, they were undertaken in conjunction with
19 the government of -- the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not the army of the
20 Republika Srpska Krajina, which ceased to exist.
21 Q. Well, let me stay with the preposition that the fighting with the
22 HV against the Bosnian Serbs and to that extent the elements of the ARSK
23 that were with them, that continued almost immediately after the end of
24 Operation Storm, did it not?
25 A. The Croatian army continued its military campaign. Having taken
1 over the Krajina, it continued its military campaign into Bosnia
2 fighting the Bosnian Serb army.
3 Q. And going back to your diary at August the 7th, page 36, the
4 second paragraph, in the middle of that paragraph: "Croatia
5 were welcomed by many in Washington
7 Now, who was it in Washington
8 A. Many people in Washington
9 certainly welcomed by the -- by many in the Clinton Administration for
10 the reason that I stated, which is that it began to change the situation
11 in Bosnia
12 "To End A War" that this action was the turning point.
13 Q. The turning point --
14 A. In the war, in Bosnia
15 Q. In what sense?
16 A. Well, it -- it led to the defeat of the Bosnian Serbs. The map
17 changed from being one in which the Serbs held 70 per cent of Bosnia
18 the federation, 30, to one whereby October of 1995 the federation held, I
19 don't know, 54, 55 per cent and frankly, once the federation held 55
20 per cent it was a lot easier to get to a 51/49 arrangement than it was
21 when the Serbs held 70 per cent.
22 Q. And so as earlier as August the 7th, there was the -- certainly
23 your thought that this activity by the HV ultimately in conjunction with
24 the ABiH would continue on into Bosnia
25 A. It was my thought that that would occur, it was my hope that that
1 would occur, and that was my recommendation to my government that we not
2 take any action that would discourage Croatia from continuing with that
4 Q. So would it be fair to say that the HV on the command of General
5 Gotovina was largely responsible for changing the map in Bosnia
6 about the Dayton Peace talks?
7 A. The Croatian army military campaign in Bosnia, along with the
8 military campaign by the army of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
9 along with NATO air-strikes that began at the very end of August were the
10 three element -- decisive elements that led to the end of the Bosnia
11 and it would not have been -- it would not have happened if it were not
12 for the Croatian army's military action.
13 MR. KEHOE: May I have one moment, Your Honour.
14 [Defence counsel confer]
15 MR. KEHOE:
16 Q. Now --
17 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, I will continue on. I don't know if
18 Your Honour wants to --
19 JUDGE ORIE: I think it is time for a break.
20 We'll have a break, and we will resume at five minutes past 6.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 6.06 p.m.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, you may start your remaining two hours
24 and one minute.
25 MR. KEHOE: But who's counting, right, Judge?
1 Q. Mr. Ambassador, as the offensive with the ABiH and the HV moved
2 against the Serbs, it -- and moving through Bosnia, you kept abreast of
3 what was going on, were you not?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And you knew, for instance, about Operation Mistral and that
6 portion of the offensive against the Bosnian Serbs?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And throughout this -- and let me direct your -- if I could
9 direct you to your diary on September the 15th at page 54. If you could
10 go to the last paragraph of September 15th on 54, you see right above the
11 September 16th.
12 Do you see that, sir?
13 A. Oh, yes. Yes, I do.
14 Q. Now, during this period of time, the authorities for the Republic
15 of Croatia
16 Susak pressed me as to how far they could go including the Banja Luka
18 So they were actually consulting the United States authorities as
19 to how far they should push the Bosnian Serbs back, weren't they?
20 A. They were, yes.
21 Q. Let me take this further, and I want to let you hear an audio
22 from 1 October 1995
23 JUDGE ORIE: Audio of what, Mr. --
24 MR. KEHOE: Yes. This is 1 October 1995. This is the audio.
25 President Tudjman is on it. The ambassador is there, Ambassador
1 Holbrooke as well. It's actually two audios, but this is the first of
3 [Audiotape played]
4 "... say it is very possible, therefore, that we could have a
5 cease-fire within a week if we want one, and I would urge you to achieve
6 whatever you can militarily in the next week because the pressure for
7 cease-fires is --
8 "Excuse me, would you be so kind ...
9 "I would urge you to do whatever you can militarily in the next
10 week in western Bosnia
11 cease-fire within one week or less, and I would hope that you could take
12 Sanski Most and Prijedor and Bosanski Nova if possible before a
13 cease-fire. If you take -- if you take those three towns before a
14 cease-fire, we can have a successful negotiation on the map. In any
15 case, officially, the United States always says no more military action,
16 but privately, and I cannot be quoted on this, I would urge you to
17 consider the fact that the pressure for a cease-fire within the next week
18 is very, very high. And once we have a cease-fire, I think it will be
19 very important to create a situation in which refugees can return and --
21 MR. KEHOE:
22 Q. Before we ask some questions about that, Mr. Ambassador, I just
23 want to let you play another clip of that meeting on 1 October, 1995.
25 [Audiotape played]
1 "... so let there be no misunderstanding about this famous
2 question of American red lights, green lights, and so on because you read
3 a lot of things in the press. My position has always been clear: Banja
4 Luka was a Serb city and would remain Serb after the negotiations. Why
5 create a half -- a quarter of a million refugees or 200.000 refugees?
6 But I never said not to take Sanski Most."
7 MR. KEHOE:
8 Q. Mr. Ambassador, on these offensives going into western Bosnia
9 the Croatian authorities were taking the guidance from the United States
10 via Ambassador Holbrooke on what towns to take so they could move towards
11 a final settlement of the matter in the former Yugoslavia. Isn't that
13 A. Ambassador Holbrooke and I had private discussions with the
14 Croatians about the military situation, and we did offer our thoughts as
15 to what towns should be taken, and I think we felt strongly that
16 Prijedor, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi should be part of the Federation.
17 And we had discussions and debates about some other places, including
18 Banja Luka, and I'm not entirely sure looking back now that we
19 necessarily made the right call.
20 But as Ambassador Holbrooke said in that exchange, the -- that
21 was a little different from the official view of the Administration which
22 was that we wanted -- that the military operations should cease. I
23 suppose it's fair to say that the United States government does not
24 always operate in perfect harmony. I also do not think that we were in
25 the business of micromanaging, and we did not want to be in the business
1 of micromanaging Croatian military operations or directing them, but we
2 were offering our views as to -- on -- on issues that were both a matter
3 of justice because Prijedor was more or less the Auschwitz of Bosnia and
4 on places that also would make it possible to achieve a peace settlement.
5 Q. But it's fair to say, Mr. Ambassador, that Ambassador Holbrooke
6 when you were present was encouraging and further pushing further
7 military actions of the HV to take certain towns, including Sanski Most?
8 A. Well, you've played the tape. I think it speaks for itself, and
9 I think I've given you what our view was.
10 Q. Now, the HV did take Sanski Most, didn't they?
11 A. They did, yes.
12 Q. And throughout all this, the purpose of a discussion with the
13 Croatian authorities was to engage in military campaigns to defeat the
14 Bosnian Serbs and bring people to a negotiating table, wasn't it?
15 A. It was to defeat the Bosnian Serbs who had -- had committed
16 genocide. It was to liberate, and I use that term, liberate territory in
17 which Bosniaks and Croats had lived from which they had been brutally
18 expelled, Prijedor was a predominantly Bosniak town, and to make possible
19 -- to have enough change in the military situation to make possible a
20 peace settlement.
21 Q. Which ultimately was concluded at the Dayton Peace Accords?
22 A. Concluded about 50 days after -- 51 days after the message that
23 you just played ending a war that had lasted four years, more than four
25 Q. And when there was an expression by Ambassador Holbrooke not to
1 take Banja Luka, Banja Luka wasn't taken?
2 A. Banja Luka was not taken.
3 Q. Now, throughout all this, Mr. Ambassador --
4 A. I have to say, by October 1, I don't think that -- Banja Luka
5 really on the table anymore. The decisive moment for that was in
7 Q. But through all this as these offensives are moving forward, the
8 person who is occupied with these offensives on the ground into western
10 A. Again, I don't -- it was the -- as far as I was concerned it was
11 the Croatian military. I'm not going to comment on the role of General
12 Gotovina. I'm not saying that's wrong in any way. It's just after all
13 these years the specifics of that are not all that clear.
14 Q. If you could just go back for a second to, again, where we just
15 read for Susak asking how far they could go --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, is it your intention to tender the
18 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour. I will tender 1D33-00 --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic, it seems that you have --
20 [Defence counsel confer]
21 MR. KEHOE: If I may, Judge, with regard to the putting of this
22 tape together, Mr. Misetic would like to inform the court of a matter.
23 MR. MISETIC: Your Honour, in the interest of complete disclosure
24 into the Prosecution, the tapes we played, the clips were -- we cut some
25 of the discussion because otherwise the clip would have gone on for ten
1 minutes. I think it would be appropriate since the Prosecution has the
2 complete audio if they can get some time if they have any objection to
3 the fact that the audios had been cut. If -- you know, they may find --
4 they may have an objection to it, so before we tender them into evidence
5 they should be given an opportunity on that.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 MR. TIEGER: I appreciate that, Your Honour, and I was wondering
8 if there are not transcripts that were prepared in connection with this
9 as opposed to the --
10 JUDGE ORIE: And especially who says what because what we see on
11 our screen, I have been listening. It gives the text, but if
12 Mr. Galbraith says that Mr. Holbrooke is speaking, I take it that he is,
13 but on the transcript you usually indicate who is speaking.
14 MR. MISETIC: That is our error, then, Your Honour. If
15 necessary, we will clear it up, but it was Mr. Holbrooke that was
16 speaking on the audio. I believe the Prosecution has been given a
17 transcript of the complete segment prior to the cut, and that would have
18 been this afternoon at some point.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we will then delay both tendering and
20 taking any decisions on admission until tomorrow.
21 Mr. Tieger, is that sufficient time for you?
22 MR. TIEGER: I will do my best, Your Honour, and try to
23 accommodate that time. If there is any problem, I'll --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I'll do my best -- okay. If I -- no, no, I see
25 the point. Please proceed.
1 MR. KEHOE: If I may, Judge, the actual transcript, the ones that
2 -- the excerpts that we played does have the identity of the people that
3 are talking, so I -- we will provide that for guidance from -- to the
4 Office of the Prosecutor.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, let's proceed.
6 MR. KEHOE: With regard to the individual that was just talking
7 on those tapes, October 1st, that was Ambassador Holbrooke, was it not?
8 A. Yes, it was.
9 Q. Now just going back to General Gotovina, if you see the -- again,
10 towards the carry-over paragraph on September 15th, you do mention a
11 meeting between Gotovina and the 5th and 7th Corps commanders. Do you
12 see that?
13 A. Where is that?
14 Q. It is on September 15, just before the inclusion of the
15 September 16th entry.
16 A. Yes, I see that.
17 Q. So at least then you were aware of the fact that General Gotovina
18 was the HV commander who was out fighting these battles?
19 A. Yes, and I know that General Gotovina was the HV commander. The
20 only reason I am reluctant to comment is that at this point I don't
21 remember what dates he might have, been where, and, you know, what his
22 exact responsibilities are, and I know that's an issue in this case, and
23 I know there are people who are just going to be better able to testify
24 about that than I do. But I certainly do know of his role in leading the
25 Croatian forces into Bosnia
1 Q. And I appreciate your concern.
2 If I can just shift gears to yet another topic that you talked
3 about on direct, Mr. Ambassador. And following up on your mentioning
4 that General Gotovina was in Bosnia
5 I'd like to take you back to Knin and talk a bit about what was happening
6 back in the Knin area while matters are moving ahead in other military
7 theatres, and at the first juncture I'd just like to play you - for the
8 sake of speed, Mr. Ambassador - a video along with an audio, and if we
9 can start with this video first of the 8th of August, 1995. It is it ID
10 330091. It is of Mr. Jarnjak in Zagreb as you will see -- excuse me,
11 1D33-0090, and I'm sure you knew that Mr. Jarnjak was the minister of the
13 And if we can just play this video.
14 [Videotape played]
15 "THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Good evening. I hereby open this
16 conversation and welcome the minister of the interior of the Republic of
18 "Mr. Ivan Jarnjak: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Allow me
19 to inform you about what the Ministry of Interior is doing and will be
20 doing in the areas that are now being liberated. The constitutional and
21 legal order of the Republic of Croatia
22 liberated areas. To do that, it is necessary for the Ministry of the
23 Interior along with other institutions to enter those areas with its
24 forces. Following the Croatian army and the special units of the
25 Ministry of Interior, the civilian police entered those areas, as well,
1 immediately after them, establishing fundamental police and border police
2 stations. Following the guidelines of state policy back in 1992, the
3 Ministry of Interior developed the organisational structure of two police
4 administration and police stations for the entire Republic of Croatia
5 including the territories that have now been liberated. Thus, we've had
6 the entire organisational structure ready since 1992, and now we are
7 merely implementing it. Of the police stations that had been expelled
8 from their areas during the aggression, those police stations that had
9 been expelled in 1991 and partly in 1992 continued operating in the areas
10 where they had been relocated. Now they return to their original areas,
11 those being the police spaces Lovinac, Drnis, Vrlika, Kijevo, Slunj,
12 Petrinja, Glina, and Hrvatska Kostajnica. The expelled police stations
13 have also been returned, those being Cetingrad, Saborsko, Plaski, and
14 Lasinje. The border police have become operational in Hrvatska
15 Kostajnica, Kijevo, Slunj, Donji Lapac, Strmica, Donji Srb, and Licko
16 Petrovo Selo. Police stations are prepared to receive the border police
17 in Dvor and Topusko.
18 "According to the constitutional law on human rights and
19 liberties, the rights of ethnic communities and minorities, police
20 administrations which must be organised according to these laws have
21 become operational. They are the Knin police administration and the
22 Glina police administration. Those are districts according to this
23 constitutional law which have special statutes. In those area, of
24 course, police stations have also been established for Knin, Donji Lapac,
25 Gracac, Korenica, Benkovac, and Obrovac. These are the police stations
1 which form part of this police administration.
2 "For the district of Glina, the police administration has been
3 established with the police stations of Glina, Vojnic, and Hrvatska
4 Kostajnica. The police stations the Vrgin Most and Dvor are ready to go
5 back to their areas of operation.
6 Immediately after the Croatian army and the special police of the
7 Ministry of the Interior completed the first part of their task and the
8 combat operations and activities ceased, members of the Ministry of the
9 Interior entered the populated localities and started securing the
10 populated localities and the communications connecting those localities
11 and controlling and directing the traffic. Concurrently with the
12 establishment of the police stations and the police substations, all
13 services of the Ministry of the Interior became operational as well.
14 That means the civilian protection, the fire-fighters have become
15 operational, and also preconditions are being created for the
16 establishment of services that conduct civil affairs, that is issuing
17 Croatian documents.
18 "The civil protection units commenced the sanitation activities
19 in the field, disposition of small livestock and cattle, taking care of
20 the abandoned moveable property, and any real estate left behind, first
21 in the settled areas and in the following days it shall begin also in the
22 non-populated areas, probably over the next couple of days. To all those
23 residing in the newly liberated areas, to those who remained, and to
24 those who will return, that is the displaced persons, we guarantee
25 personal safety, safety of their property, and we guarantee public law
1 and order. Thank you very much."
2 "Thank you, Minister Jarnjak."
3 MR. KEHOE:
4 Q. Now if I could move to an audio on this score, Mr. Ambassador,
5 from the 19th of October with you, Ambassador Holbrooke, and
6 President Tudjman, and this is President Tudjman speaking -- excuse me.
7 No, it's Mr. -- yeah.
8 This is 1D33-0474.
9 [Audiotape played]
10 "The third item is related, is the question of what's going on in
11 western Bosnia
12 a human rights problem, but it's really much, much more than that. It's
13 a political problem. It's a problem for the image of Croatia --
14 "Did you hear the -- information from my [indiscernible]
16 "Press conference. There was a press conference by Mr. Jarnjak
18 "No, I didn't.
19 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Our Ministry of Internal Affairs
20 notified -- do you have the information?" Tudjman speaking ...
21 "... figures will be.
22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "They clarified -- they elucidated
23 40 murders and turned over to court 13 perpetrators.
24 "13 persons have been taken into custody and --
25 "Oh, yes. I did see that. I didn't know it was your minister.
1 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Among them were Serbs.
2 "There were also criminals as well as drug addicts among them.
3 And out of 800 or something cases of looting, 619 had already been
4 clarified in terms of investigation. More than one. And certainly the
5 number of kills was not 100 plus as was reported; moreover some of these
6 killings took place within the scope of military operations, but as I
7 said, only 41 killings.
8 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "And the minister stated that he
9 received orders from me to take steps immediately during the operation to
10 prevent all conduct of this kind."
11 MR. KEHOE:
12 Q. One last item, if I may, Mr. Ambassador, before we go into this
13 area, and that is from P -- again P451. It is your book, your -- your
14 press conference with Secretary Shattuck of the 30th of September, 1995
15 And this would be page 06069735.
16 And if you could go to -- again, the second page of that and not
17 the carry-over paragraph but the second paragraph where it says:
18 "Second," at the top. If we could just blow that up a bit.
19 Maybe just move ahead.
20 You have a copy of that before you, Mr. Ambassador?
21 A. I do.
22 Q. Yes. And talking about the abuses. "Second, these abuses need
23 not have occurred on this scale if the Croatian government had taken
24 measures to prevent them, such as by arresting and prosecuting the
25 perpetrators, those who are guilty of these crimes and by deploying
1 civilian police rapidly enough to keep order in the period immediately
2 after the military actions. The Croatian officials with whom I met
3 assured me that steps are now being taken to address the security
4 situation and the human rights abuses and crimes that have occurred."
5 Now, if I may, the first video of Minister Jarnjak was the 8th of
6 August, 1995, and on the 9th of August, you called for his firing, so you
7 were aware of Minister Jarnjak and what his role was, were you not?
8 A. Yes, of course.
9 Q. I think you talk about that in your diary, in your discussions on
10 the 10th of August.
11 And you were aware that -- certainly as a result of your
12 conversations on the 19th of October that President Tudjman had told
13 Jarnjak to solve these problems down in the Krajina. Isn't that right?
14 A. As a result of the conversations on October 19th?
15 Q. Well, during the course of the conversations on the 19th,
16 President Tudjman told you and Ambassador Holbrooke that he had told
17 Jarnjak that -- solve these problems down in the Krajina that had come up
18 after Operation Storm.
19 A. Yes, that's -- that's what is in the audiotape.
20 Q. And I don't want to speak for you or Ambassador Shattuck, but in
21 this press conference you note -- maybe it's Ambassador Shattuck that
22 notes that civilian police -- they didn't deploy civilian police rapidly
24 Do you see that sir?
25 A. I do.
1 Q. And that was a fact, I mean, that they -- in your view and
2 Ambassador -- Secretary Shattuck's view is they didn't get enough police
3 down there quick enough to ensure that this activity didn't go on. Isn't
4 that right?
5 A. Well, I'm not going to speak for Secretary Shattuck. That is it
6 -- that is it not my view of the problem. My view of the problem is that
7 the personnel that there were did not and I believe there was no desire
8 for them to prevent the looting and burning and killing.
9 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, if I may offer into
10 evidence first the video, 1D33-0090, and then the audio, 1D33-0474.
11 JUDGE ORIE: First the video. Any objections, Mr. Tieger?
12 MR. TIEGER: No objection to the video, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit D411.
15 JUDGE ORIE: D411 is admitted into evidence. Then the audio. I
16 think we played several portions or was it just one portion?
17 MR. KEHOE: It was just one, Judge.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Just one, yes.
19 MR. TIEGER: If I could take the same -- if we could take the
20 same approach to this audio as the previous one.
21 JUDGE ORIE: That is, that we do not yet assign a number. I
22 think that is what we did the previous ones, and you are --
23 MR. TIEGER: And same --
24 JUDGE ORIE: -- same best to give a response by tomorrow.
25 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, yes. And same question again, if
1 there is an transcript available of that audio...
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I slowly start recognizing the voice, but ...
3 MR. KEHOE: There is a transcript that was given to the booths.
4 Q. And to clarify, the individuals who were talking on that tape,
5 the American voice was Ambassador Holbrooke, was it not?
6 A. Yes, it was.
7 Q. And the other individual talking in Croatian was
8 President Tudjman and his translator. Is that right?
9 A. President Tudjman was talking in English and Croatian, and then,
10 of course, it was his translator.
11 Q. Yeah. Now, with regard to -- to the activities of the Ministry
12 of Defence, do you know what steps the Ministry of Defence were doing to
13 control this activity?
14 A. No, since I don't believe it was controlled.
15 Q. How about the Ministry of the Interior? Do you know what the
16 Ministry of the Interior was doing to control this activity?
17 A. If you -- if I can answer the question what was the Ministry of
18 the Interior doing, the -- what Minister Jarnjak described in that press
19 conference was accurate, that is, the Croatian government had police and
20 indeed the entire municipal governments there in place, I guess, since
21 1992, but they certainly were ready to deploy, and I saw them deploying
22 within hours when I was in Petrinja, so they were deploying people into
23 the area.
24 Q. But with regard to investigations or pursuing cases, and I'm
25 talking about the Ministry of the Interior, you don't know what they were
1 doing? You don't know how many cases they were investigating; you don't
2 know how many cases were prosecuted, nothing?
3 A. Actually, I certainly had some idea of it, but I felt that -- we
4 believed that only a small part -- number of the cases were actually
5 prosecuted, and what President Tudjman explained in that audiotape, that
6 -- it was criminals, drug addicts, and Serbs who were doing it was in my
7 view an absurd and untrue explanation.
8 Q. Mr. Ambassador -- I will take a break.
9 During the course of your consultations with the various
10 officials of the Republic of Croatia
11 or Minister Jarnjak in the Ministry of the Interior, did they make you
12 aware of orders that were being given and instructions that were being
13 given and discussions that were going on to get these issues in the
14 Krajina under control?
15 A. Certainly Minister Susak and I discussed this. But the issue,
16 again, was not what orders were being issued or what orders I was told
17 was being issued. It was what was happening.
18 Q. No, my question is --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Could I seek clarification of one of your previous
20 answers, which appears to me --
21 You were earlier asked about the activities of the Ministry of
22 Defence, whether you knew what steps the Ministry of Defence were doing
23 to control this activity.
24 Your answer was: "No, since I don't believe it was controlled."
25 Now, whether something is controlled seems to be the result of
1 possible efforts. Linking the "no" to "since there was no control"
2 leaves me with the puzzle whether you were aware of any activities,
3 whether effective or not, and this seems to be the same issue as touched
4 upon by the last question.
5 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it is not a question of whether the
6 activities were effective or not. It is whether the activities were
7 intended to control or not.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Could you first in factual terms describe whether
9 you were aware of any activities, and then we could go on and to see
10 whether these activities were an effort. An effort to what?
11 THE WITNESS: Certainly at the time, I was aware of activities.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Such as?
13 THE WITNESS: I'm going to be -- I mean, it's been some time, so
14 the -- this included, as I recall, the deployment of police - of course
15 that would be interior - promises that -- that they -- that efforts would
16 be made to stop the looting; promises to prosecute people; promises to
17 secure areas. These were the kinds of promises that were made to me by
18 the Croatians as I raised the question of what was going on in the
20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
21 MR. KEHOE: Thank you.
22 Q. With all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, were you aware of orders
23 either by the minister of the interior or the Ministry of Defence to make
24 all efforts to curtail criminal activity in the Krajina? Were you aware
25 of those orders?
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, let's try to get it step by step, first
2 of all, whether there were --
3 MR. KEHOE: I'm trying, Judge.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Because you are -- orders and then you mention two
5 ministries, and you also say that the orders were to make all efforts.
6 Let's first see whether Mr. Galbraith is aware of orders given, first of
7 all, by the ministry or minister of the interior.
8 THE WITNESS: I was -- I'm sure I was told that the Ministry of
9 the Interior had given orders.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Same for the Ministry of Defence?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Do you know what these orders were about?
13 THE WITNESS: I'm -- I'm sure I knew in more detail in 1995 than
14 I do now, but the general thrust of it would be the -- would be to secure
15 the area to -- to arrest perpetrators to stop the illegal activity that
16 the I was -- that the US
17 JUDGE ORIE: And that was true for the orders from both the
18 ministries you learned about?
19 THE WITNESS: That would have been the thrust of both the orders.
20 As to the specifics of what each ministry was doing, I don't at this
21 point recall.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
23 MR. KEHOE:
24 Q. So I know that you didn't see that that -- there was a
25 curtailment on the ground, but, Mr. Ambassador, if orders were being
1 given to stop criminal activities in the Krajina, then permitting these
2 criminal activities was not state policy, was it?
3 A. Let me make my answer a bit more precise. I was told that orders
4 were given by these ministries.
5 Q. And if I can take that just one step further. If you were told
6 and if in fact there were such orders - and are in evidence, Your Honour
7 - if there were in fact such orders, then the burning of these residences
8 that you discussed on your direct would not be state policy, would it?
9 A. I do not agree with -- with what you've just stated. I have
10 enough experience over the years that I served in Croatia with Croatian
11 officials and Serb officials, giving orders and saying they'd given
12 orders that they had -- and making promises that they had no intention of
13 keeping, and I do not believe that the Croatian government made a serious
14 attempt to bring this destruction under control until such time as it was
15 basically -- there was nothing left for the Serbs to return to.
16 Q. So dealing with your last answer on if these orders were given,
17 if these orders were given to cease this activity by either the Ministry
18 of Defence or the Ministry of Interior, those orders would have been
19 given contrary to state policy. Is that right?
20 A. I don't -- I do not believe that the -- that the -- the orders
21 that I was told about were -- constituted a serious effort to -- to bring
22 this violence and destruction to an end because I believe that the top
23 Croatian leadership wanted Serb property to be destroyed so that -- that
24 -- there would be no possibility of Serbs -- of significant number of
25 Serbs returning. I believe that was their -- their policy, and -- so
1 that the orders -- that is the context in which I -- I saw these orders,
2 and that's really what I can testify to.
3 Q. Mr. Ambassador, you knew Minister Susak, and you knew Minister
4 Jarnjak. Is it your testimony that Minister Jarnjak and Minister Susak
5 would issue orders contrary to Tudjman's wishes? Yes or no.
6 A. Again, you're asking me to assume that the orders constituted a
7 sincere effort to bring this to an end, and certainly in -- at the time
8 that much of this destruction was taking place, I suppose,
9 mid-August/September, I do not think that the Croatian state authorities
10 wanted this violence brought to an end probably by October, once it had
11 -- everything that -- so much had already been destroyed, then, yes, and
12 there was so much criticism, probably they did want it brought to an end.
13 But you know, that is my -- my statement, and it is very hard for me to
14 get into what -- which almost seems Mr. Kehoe, to be semantics here. My
15 point is, and I believe this, and I -- it comes from very extensive
16 observation of -- on my own part at the reporting of the embassy and lots
17 of other sources that the destruction that took place was something that
19 purposes of the top Croatian leadership.
20 Q. Well, Mr. Ambassador, I asked you the question on line 18 of page
21 89: "Is it your testimony that Minister Jarnjak and Minister Susak would
22 issue orders contrary to Tudjman's wishes? Yes or no."
23 Let me ask this question: Did you ever know of Minister Susak or
24 Minister Jarnjak issuing orders contrary to Tudjman's wishes, ever?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Now, let us turn to the comment that you were talking about about
2 the burnings and preventing burnings -- to prevent people from returning.
3 Now, you mentioned to us in your testimony earlier today that there was
4 some 2 to 300.000 Croatian displaced people within Croatia. Is that
5 approximately correct?
6 A. Someplace in that range. I mean, 150.000 to 300.000. I can't
7 pull the figure out of the air right now, but there were a significant
8 number of Croatian towns within the Krajina, and of course there were a
9 lot of people from Eastern Slavonia.
10 Q. And we also had the displaced people -- well, then they were
11 refugees from Bosnia
12 A. And there were Bosnian Croats who were not refugees but who came
13 to Croatia
14 Q. Now, in your diary at -- on September the 15th at the bottom of
15 page 52.
16 Do you see that, sir? And we're talking at the bottom of that
17 page --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. You said: "I also noted that not many would want to return."
20 What we're talking about is Krajina Serbs. Isn't that right?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. "At most, 20 per cent. Using his own low-ball figures for the
23 number of refugees, I pointed out that this would be fewer than 20
24 per cent and Croatia
25 Now --
1 MR. TIEGER: Just a small correction. The diary doesn't say 20
2 per cent.
3 MR. KEHOE:
4 Q. 20.000. Excuse me. 20.000. I'm sorry. "Fewer than 20.000 and
6 obviously, of the 100.000 refugees or displaced people. Is that right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, while this burning and looting is going on, Mr. Ambassador,
9 we have -- we talked about somewhere, 150, 200.000, however many Croatian
10 displaced people there were within Croatia
11 that right?
12 A. I think at this point -- these people had been displaced in 1991,
13 so by 1995 they were they were all housed.
14 Just to come back to the previous question. That figure 20.000
15 is using Sarinic's low figure for the number of Serbs who had left. I --
16 I believed -- we believed that the number who left -- that left was more.
17 I think we think it was about 180.000. But since Sarinic had said it was
18 20 -- it was 100.000, then I -- and that 20 per cent might return, I then
19 -- that's where the 20.000 -- I'm reporting on a conversation I had with
21 Q. Well, hadn't Tudjman told you previously that 100.000 had left
22 and that he said only 10 per cent were going to return and you said 20
23 per cent would return? Do you recall that?
24 A. Tudjman had said in one meeting that 10 per cent would return,
25 but our belief was that the number that had left was about 180.000 as I
2 But here, you see, I'm -- I'm making an argument to Sarinic in my
3 role as a mediator. He's telling me 100.000 people have left, so I say,
4 okay, what's the big deal if 20 per cent return? I'm accepting for that
5 -- because it is going to be more persuasive to Sarinic if I say that'
6 it's 20 per cent of 100.000 will return. Okay, that's your figure. Then
7 if I say, no, no, we believe the figure's 180.000, and therefore 36.000
8 will return.
9 Q. Let me turn to --
10 A. But our principle, our principle is we wanted everybody to
12 Q. I understand. Let us turn to P455, which is a Prosecutor's
13 transcript of 10 August 1995
14 meeting which you participated in with President Tudjman.
15 I'm not sure you have that, Mr. Ambassador, but if you do, I
16 gladly invite you to go to page 3 of -- it's on the screen.
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. If we could turn to page 3 of this -- the third page in, and this
19 is President Tudjman talking at the top of the page. He tells you on 10
20 August 1995 -- oops, excuse me.
21 Can we go to the -- the pagination you received is a little bit
22 different. If we can go to the prior page in the English. Go to the
23 bottom of that page, please.
24 He notes: "On the 10th of August, 1995, in certain moment we had
25 over 400.000 refugees from" --
1 Go to the next page.
2 -- "the Croat area." Goes to the top of the next page, if we can
4 Now, Ambassador, whether it's 400 refugees, 300 refugees, 200.000
5 -- excuse me, 200.000, 300.000, 400.000 refugees, there was a serious
6 housing problem in Croatia
7 A. Well, the serious housing problem in Croatia took place in 1991,
8 really, and incidentally the 400.000 figure -- there were people who were
9 dislocated because of the fighting in 1991 who were in 1991 able to
10 return to their homes because there was -- there was more or less a
11 cease-fire, and also the Croatians re-took some areas that had been taken
12 by the JNA in 1991.
13 Q. Well, Mr. Ambassador, did you not know of the serious housing
14 problem for refugees in Croatia
15 A. Of course. It was a problem that was created in 1991 but, yes,
16 it certainly existed in 1995. I just testified that there were -- about
17 people being in the hotels.
18 Q. And given these hundreds of thousands of people that were looking
19 for places to live, is it still your position that it was the state
20 policy of the Republic of Croatia
21 put people in to live?
22 A. Yes. It was the policy of the top Croatian leadership. That is
23 -- that is what I have testified to.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, I'm looking at the clock.
25 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: We are beyond 7.00.
2 MR. KEHOE: Sorry, sir.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Therefore, we adjourn. But have I one puzzle on my
4 mind, Mr. Galbraith. I'm not asking you to answer the question now, but
5 today we talked about this 10 per cent, and we learned from you that 10
6 per cent is -- 10.000 is 10 percent of from 100.000. Yesterday, the
7 issue was raised in the context of what the goals were, and you then
8 answered that you would first like to make the point that Tudjman, when
9 really pressed, spoke about, you know, maybe 10 percent of the Serb
10 population being there. Today, the same issue was raised, but now it was
11 -- it looked more as would they return? That seems to be an expectation
12 rather than a goal set. It was unclear to me whether, when talking about
13 the 10.000, the 10 per cent, whether you meant as I understood more or
14 less yesterday to be the goal or not more than 10 per cent being the
15 goal, or whether it was a realistic expectation as it appeared to be more
16 from your text today.
17 If you could think that over overnight, and we can adjourn for
18 the day.
19 We adjourn until tomorrow morning -- no, I got my note but ...
20 9.00 in the morning, Mr. Galbraith, in Courtroom I.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.
22 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 25th of June,
23 2008, at 9.00 a.m.