Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7229

 1                           Friday, 25 July 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 7             Mr. Registrar would you please call the cases.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 9     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, The

10     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12             Before we continue, Mr. Dangerfield, I'd like to remind you that

13     you are still bound by the solemn declaration that you gave at the

14     beginning of your testimony.  And I would also urge you to try to answer

15     the questions as precisely and as focussed as possible.

16             And Mr. Kehoe.

17             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  You may continue.  You received the message that

19     you're expected to finish your cross-examination by the first break.

20             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour, I received the message.

21                           WITNESS: ROLAND CHARLES DAVID DANGERFIELD [Resumed]

22                           Cross-examination by Mr. Kehoe: [Continued]

23        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Dangerfield.

24        A.   Good morning.

25        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, I just want to cover a few things just briefly

Page 7230

 1     on this attack, the artillery attack on the 4th of August.

 2             Now, in an interview to the Daily Mail on the 6th of August 1995,

 3     you told the Daily Mail that you had heard that that 1800 shells went

 4     into Knin by 6.30 a.m. on the 4th of August.  Did you not?

 5        A.   Yes, I did.

 6        Q.   And that was an exaggeration was it?

 7        A.   No, it was not.

 8        Q.   Well, who told you that?

 9        A.   Colonel Leslie.

10        Q.   And your experience was that you had 300 shells going in, in the

11     first half-hour.  Is that right?

12        A.   From my recollection, I believe that is the case.

13        Q.   So --

14        A.   I'll just have a look.  Yes.  It is also in one of my reports --

15     my statements.  Sorry, the report.

16        Q.   So, in your report, which is?

17        A.   The brief overview for Sector South on the 4th.

18             MR. KEHOE:  If we can just direct the --

19        Q.   Paragraph?

20        A.   Paragraph 1, general situation.

21        Q.   Now, so that's 300 shell in the first half-hour.  So it's your

22     testimony that 1500 shells fell between 5.30 and 6.30.  Is that right?

23        A.   I think shells and rockets would be fair to say.

24        Q.   1500?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 7231

 1        Q.   And did you count them?

 2        A.   No.

 3        Q.   So the information that you gave to the Daily Mail you got from

 4     Leslie that?

 5        A.   Would be correct.

 6        Q.   So if Leslie was wrong, of course, the information you passed on

 7     was wrong.

 8        A.   If Leslie was wrong, yes; but I don't believe he was.

 9        Q.   Well, let's stay with this article.  Leslie also told you that

10     the hospital had been hit, didn't he?

11        A.   That is correct.

12        Q.   Now, when you were driving around Knin, after the -- well, when

13     you first got out on the 7th, after the 7th of August, you saw that the

14     hospital had not been hit.  Isn't that right?

15        A.   I only saw one side of the hospital.

16        Q.   Didn't you --

17        A.   So I couldn't see whether the other three sides had been hit

18     or not.

19        Q.   So you're telling us that you didn't drive around to verify

20     whether or not the hospital had been hit.  Is that accurate?

21        A.   That is correct, because the special -- the UN special envoy was

22     there.  I didn't think it was my position to be driving around him.

23        Q.   Well, when did you go out with your guide in your Land Rover and

24     when did you travel all around Sector South?  When did that start?

25        A.   Two weeks -- well, as soon as I arrived in Sector South.

Page 7232

 1        Q.   No.  I'm talking about after the 5th of August, when did you and

 2     your driver and your Land Rover tool around, as you told us yesterday,

 3     when you saw everything that was going on in Knin and Sector South?  When

 4     was that?

 5        A.   I saw Knin specifically on the 7th, and then Sector South from

 6     the 9th onward, once freedom of movement was re-established.

 7        Q.   Okay.  So you're telling us, while you were driving around all

 8     that time, you never drove around the hospital to verify whether or not

 9     it had been hit?

10        A.   I didn't go back to the hospital, no.

11        Q.   Now, Leslie -- just staying with that for your second, Leslie

12     also told you - this is your first statement in 1995 in paragraph 17 -

13     that:  "Colonel Leslie told me that -- about 400 body-bags in the

14     mortuary."  Do you see that, the last sentence?

15        A.   Yes, I do.

16        Q.   Did he say he had actually seen that?

17        A.   Yes.  And I take it to clarify that 400 body-bags means bags with

18     bodies in as opposed to a pile of bags in the corner.

19        Q.   So Leslie said he had seen 400 -- the information he conveyed to

20     you was that he seen 400 body-bags with bodies in them?

21        A.   That was my interpretation of it, yes.

22        Q.   Okay.  Did he ever tell you that:  "In my previous

23     statements ..." -- and I'm referring to Leslie's statement to the Office

24     of the Prosecutor dated March 28th 2008.  Did he ever tell that you that:

25     "The number of bodies ..." -- in paragraph 7:  "The number of bodies that

Page 7233

 1     I personally observed, and also indicated that the casualties from

 2     shelling were estimated to be in the hundreds, this latter estimation

 3     does not reflect my personal observation of bodies."

 4             Did he ever tell you that?

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.  Mr. Kehoe, you're going at such a speed

 6     that, at a certain moment, I'm afraid that the interpreters have to

 7     translate from the transcript because their four or five lines behind,

 8     and that makes their task really far too difficulty.  So you have to slow

 9     down and take a breath now and then, so that the interpreters can do the

10     same.

11             Please proceed.

12             MR. KEHOE:  My apologies to the Court, the witness, and the

13     interpreters.

14        Q.   Did he ever tell you, sir, that this body count of 400 body-bags

15     did not reflect his personal observations?

16        A.   No, he didn't.

17        Q.   Now, staying with that, in your statement on -- not in your

18     statement, in your article, you note - and this is on page 4 of your

19     article, the fall of Krajina - at page 4:  "Throughout the day, people

20     went out to pick up bodies and take them into the mortuary in Knin."

21             Now, who told that you, sir?

22        A.   The Canadian soldiers who went out in the APCs to do it.

23        Q.   Which Canadian soldiers told you that they were picking up bodies

24     to take them to the mortuary?

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

Page 7234

 1             MR. KEHOE:  I apologise, Judge.  I apologise.  I'm sorry.  My

 2     apologies, again.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I think specifically Colonel Steve Ferrari, but I

 4     remember other Canadians being there.  I would not hazard a guess as to

 5     exactly which ones.

 6             MR. KEHOE:

 7        Q.   Other than Corporal Ferrari, can you give us any other name?

 8        A.   I can't give you other names that were there, but I could give

 9     you names of the other Canadians I had worked with in my time there, and

10     there is an possibility that they could have been amongst those who had

11     gone out.

12        Q.   So other than Corporal Ferrari, you don't have another name of a

13     Canadian military member who told you that he had gone out to pick up

14     bodies and take them to the mortuary?

15        A.   Well, I would be fairly certain that if others were there, it

16     would have been Geoff Hill, Phil Berikoff, Dan Hatchi [phoen], Steve

17     Ellis.  Those -- that was the group of Canadians that I had worked with.

18        Q.   So -- so, if we went back and talked to those individuals, they

19     would verify that they told you that they took bodies to the mortuary?

20        A.   No.  What I'm say is that I believe that they were the likely

21     ones who would have been there.

22        Q.   Did they tell you how many bodies they had taken to the mortuary?

23        A.   I don't recall a specific answer.

24        Q.   Well, let me read you something from an exhibit that is in

25     evidence, a video D329, and this is a statement by Colonel Leslie from

Page 7235

 1     July the 21st, 2003, talking about the shelling the Knin.  "It killed a

 2     lot of civilians, and we'll never know the exact number, but estimates,"

 3     estimates, "range from ten to 25.000 dead."

 4             During your entire time in the theatre, did you ever hear any

 5     estimates remotely coming close to ten to 25.000 dead, as Colonel Leslie

 6     told the folks in Canada?

 7        A.   No, I didn't.

 8        Q.   Now, you would agree with me -- do you believe that number is an

 9     exaggeration?

10        A.   I would accept that the higher end of 25.000 may be an

11     exaggeration.

12        Q.   Tell me about Leslie.  Was Leslie, when he was in UN Sector South

13     and thereafter, was he known as a person who exaggerated?

14        A.   I don't believe so.

15        Q.   Let me go back, if we may, briefly, and we're going back to

16     talking about the shelling of Knin.

17             MR. KEHOE:  We're going 1D42001.

18        Q.   And I direct you back to your statement of -- that's P695, your

19     1995 statement, at paragraph 26.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, no, that's -- you gave a seven-digit

21     number, where I would expect always to be the numbers eight digits.  But

22     I now do understand it is P695.

23             Please proceed.

24             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.  What is on the screen is

25     1D42-0001, and I was directing the witness back to his statement, which

Page 7236

 1     is P695, paragraph 26 for reference purposes.

 2        Q.   Now, just going through this, you gave six military targets in

 3     Knin, and if we can just take these on subsequently on the list, you

 4     noted, in your paragraph (c), it was the general supply depot and you

 5     gave a six-digit grid reference.

 6             Do you see that, sir?

 7        A.   That's correct, yes, I can.

 8        Q.   Were you surprised to learn that that six-digit grid reference,

 9     which is 100 metres by 100 metres, was incorrect?

10        A.   I'm not surprised by a disagreement, and may I explain why?

11        Q.   Certainly.

12        A.   Could I ask you which grid reference system you've overlayed on

13     there Google picture, please.

14        Q.   Well, sir, let me ask you this:  Does it make a difference?

15        A.   Yes it does.

16        Q.   And explain?

17        A.   Okay.  On your most basic GPS, most basic that a civilian has an

18     access to, there are 17 different grid reference systems.  These grid

19     references can run to hundreds.  I don't know whether the grid reference

20     system you are using is British, American, Dutch, Swedish, Maidenhead, or

21     anything else.  So it is key for me to know what grid reference system

22     you're using.

23             May I quote -- I made some notes last night whilst I was in my

24     hotel.  May I take a piece out of my pocket and quote, please?

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, if these are the words you wrote down yesterday

Page 7237

 1     by yourself, then you can consult them.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I'm preferred to give the reference where they can

 3     be found as well.

 4             The first is from -- the world headquarters for the GPS system,

 5     global positioning system, which is in Colorado in the United States, and

 6     this is from  I quote:  "Referencing geodetic

 7     coordinates to the wrong data can result in position errors of hundreds

 8     of metres.  Different nations and agencies use different datums as the

 9     basis for coordinate systems used to identify positions in geographic

10     information systems, positioning systems, and navigation systems."

11             I will also give you one shorter from Britain, the ordnance

12     survey web site:  "Standard conventions ensure only that different

13     systems tend to agree within half a kilometre, that is 500 metres or so."

14             So it is important that we use the right grid system on the right

15     paper.  And further to that, this is a photograph --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask you what grid system you used when you

17     gave the grid references.

18             THE WITNESS:  We used the WGS 84 which is the World Geodetic

19     System 84; and Google Earth uses MGRS, which is the military grid

20     reference system for America.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Is there any way, Mr. Kehoe, that we verify whether

22     there are such differences?  I make take it that it should not be too

23     difficult to verify.

24             MR. KEHOE:  It would be very easy that the grid reference system

25     used hear is the grid reference system that was used on the mapping in

Page 7238

 1     UN Sector South headquarters.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask you whether this the system you used was

 3     the grid references in the maps you used in Sector South.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I'm not sure because I was using British maps, sir.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  You were using British maps.

 6             MR. KEHOE:

 7        Q.   The British maps were the maps that were used in UN Sector South.

 8     All UN Sector South mapping was produced by MOD in Britain?

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, it appears that you're giving evidence at this

10     moment, Mr. Kehoe.

11             If the parties could agree on that or if the parties could look

12     at those maps in order to ensure that not by any technical differences in

13     similars we are misled.  I'm not saying intentionally misled, but

14     confused.

15             MR. KEHOE:  I understand.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Then please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

17             May I take it that it will be possible to make just a comparison.

18     The witness has said what grid references he used.  I think that can be

19     verified.  We can look at whether on the map we are seeing now in front

20     of us the same are used.  If not, Mr. Kehoe, I take it you could produce

21     another map and then we will find out whether the witness was accurate or

22     not when he gave the grid references at the time.

23             Please proceed.

24             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

25        Q.   Looking through these one by one with the grid reference, and if

Page 7239

 1     this is the grid reference used from the mapping system used in UN Sector

 2     South, the British mapping system, the grid reference is clearly the one

 3     you gave in "C" does not reflect that of the Senjak barracks.

 4             Now, in the Senjak barracks, you said that this -- it usually had

 5     few lightly armed soldiers wandering about.  Do you see that in your

 6     statement?

 7        A.   I do.

 8        Q.   Do you know that this was a -- sorry.

 9             Did you know that this was a rear command post from which troops

10     were being deployed on the afternoon of the 4th of August?

11        A.   No, I didn't.

12        Q.   Now, the next item is a grid reference that you gave which

13     was 960755.  And if that grid reference is the same -- comes from the

14     same mapping system you used in the UN, you put that grid in the middle

15     of the UN camp.  Did you intend to talk about the camp next to the UN?

16        A.   I believe that the grid I've given there would have been taken

17     off the map that I used at the time.  So, no, I didn't mean to talk about

18     the UN, because I would have been talking about the barracks next door.

19        Q.   Let us go to the next map, which is the northern barracks.  That

20     would be grid 961177.  It wasn't off by much.  And let us continue on

21     with grid reference 9534758, which is your "D," and you call it an

22     ammo dump.  Now, you call this an ammo dump, and why did you call it an

23     ammo dump, sir?

24        A.   Sorry.  Can you just tie it into the --

25        Q.   It's in paragraph 26, D.  You say --

Page 7240

 1        A.   As I said, as I continue to say there, I never saw ammunition or

 2     equipment enter or leave the storage area.  And I couldn't independently

 3     verify that site because the restriction on the freedom of movement meant

 4     that I couldn't physically drive up there and identify it.

 5        Q.   Well, you call it an ammo dump.  Now, did you mean that was an

 6     ARSK ammunition dump?

 7        A.   I would believe that's what I meant when I wrote it.

 8        Q.   Why did you describe it as an ammunition dump?

 9        A.   I think that's probably what we in the headquarters believed it

10     to be.

11        Q.   And when you came to that conclusion, did you have any idea what

12     the ARSK was storing in there?

13        A.   I couldn't have, because I hadn't physically identified it

14     myself.

15        Q.   Well, what was it about that location that indicated to you that

16     it was an ammunition dump if you never saw ammunition or equipment enter

17     or leave the storage area?

18        A.   Well, that's the information I gained from the headquarters.

19        Q.   Okay.  Let us turn to the next item.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, just for my information, you're putting

21     to the witness, more or less, that his grid references are inaccurate in

22     relation to the description.

23             Now, you put on the map where the ARSK air defence battery is.

24     Is it in evidence that it was exactly there?

25             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.  It's in -- those are taken from D131 in

Page 7241

 1     evidence, those locations.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  D131.  I have a look at it.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  That is a --

 4             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, pardon me.  D131 does indicate that

 5     there is an air defence battery there.  I don't know that it's in

 6     evidence that it actually was there; however, I do think that General

 7     Leslie did generally agree with the locations of the these air defence

 8     batteries in and around Knin.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  With this type of precision?  That means that --

10             MR. RUSSO:  I don't know that General Leslie was put to --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... check on D131.

12               please proceed.

13             MR. KEHOE:  If I may just briefly go into private session for

14     another frame of reference.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We go into private session.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 7242

 1   (redacted)

 2                           [Open session]

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 5             Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, this is, again, the air defence battery,

 7     which is at grid reference 953758.

 8             If we could move to the next one, the next slide, which is

 9     referred to in 26A.

10        Q.   That's again a reference point with this grid reference that you

11     have, sir.

12             MR. KEHOE:  And the last slide -- excuse me, last two slides.  If

13     we can go to the next slide.

14        Q.   That is it just the location of the police station which -- for

15     which you gave no grid references.

16             MR. KEHOE:  And if we go to the last slide.  Your Honour, I think

17     this will be more instructive, this last slide, vis-a-vis a comparison

18     with 131.

19             Those are the numbers I believe that we had in 131 limited to

20     that, and the yellow shade is the grid references given by the witness in

21     his report.

22             Your Honour, at this time, I will offer into evidence 1D42-0001.

23             MR. RUSSO:  No objection.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit number D716, Your Honours.

Page 7243

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  D716 is admitted into evidence.

 2             MR. KEHOE:

 3        Q.   Now, sir, I think you indicated to us yesterday that you didn't

 4     know where the headquarters were for the army of the Republika Srpska

 5     Krajina.  Were you familiar with buildings in -- in Knin that were used

 6     -- otherwise civilian buildings that you were used for military purposes?

 7        A.   Excuse me.  I'm not just getting the verbatim -- that's better.

 8     Thank you.

 9             No, I was not familiar.

10        Q.   Were you -- did you know about -- or you did know about troops

11     moving through Knin on the 4th, did you not?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And those are moveable targets, are they not?

14        A.   They are targets that are moving, yes.

15        Q.   And, of course, during the course of a military operation, those

16     movable targets, those troops going through Knin, are legitimate targets

17     for -- in a military operation, aren't they?

18        A.   Providing the risk of collateral damage is to a minimum.

19        Q.   Are they military -- is it a legitimate purpose in a military

20     operation to attack the troops on the other side?

21             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, first, I would like to point out the

22     fact that he is certainly asking the witness for a legal conclusion,

23     which I believe was the subject of a filing by the Defence that they did

24     not want fact witnesses making such conclusions.  Of course, if he wants

25     that conclusion from the witness, that's fine; but I think the witness

Page 7244

 1     gave his answer, that it's not a yes-or-no question and that there are

 2     other considerations to be taken into account.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I see that.  At the same time, is it a

 4     legitimate purpose in a military operation to attack the troops on the

 5     other side?

 6             Mr. Kehoe, that's the question.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  As a soldier, is it a legitimate purpose in a

 8     military operation to attack soldiers on the other side?

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  First of all, it is it, of course, a legal

10     question, but it is a totally unnecessary question.  It is the same as:

11     Is the purpose of being a milkman to deliver milk?

12             Please proceed.

13             MR. KEHOE:  I take that as a yes, Your Honour, and move on.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

15             MR. KEHOE:

16        Q.   Now you say in your statement, at paragraph 32, that you never

17     saw any other RSK military targets being hit.  When you say that, it's

18     because that you didn't actually observe individual military targets

19     being hit, not that they weren't hit.  Isn't that right.

20             Let me help you out, sir.

21        A.   I saw military targets.  Sorry.  Do you just want to rewind and

22     rephrase the question again, please.

23        Q.   Sir, you say, in paragraph 32, that -- in the middle of

24     paragraph 32:  "Apart from the police station, I never saw any other ARSK

25     military targets being hit."

Page 7245

 1             You're not saying that they weren't hit; you just didn't see

 2     them.  Right?

 3        A.   I think that may be the case.

 4        Q.   Now, you said that you took a ride around Knin on the 7th and

 5     thereafter.  And I -- I take it you were in communications with various

 6     individuals who were likewise riding around Knin and examining damage

 7     from the shelling.  Is that right?

 8        A.   That's not right.

 9        Q.   So you didn't talk to anyone else?

10        A.   No.

11        Q.   So, if the senior -- by the way, did you yourself do any crater

12     analysis on any of the shelling that you saw?

13        A.   Not whilst I was there.

14        Q.   Did you do it afterwards?

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   So you never did?

17        A.   That's correct.

18        Q.   So did you ever have a conversation with -- and let me go through

19     this.  This is it from P64, where the Senior Military Observer concluded

20     that, in general, the shelling was concentrated against military targets.

21     That was in his provisional report, and that was in P64.  And that there

22     was, likewise, a final assessment, and this comes from the statement of

23     Mr. Roberts on the 23rd of July, 2008.  This is page - I'm looking for

24     the page - 7022, from line 19, where he says:  "I am aware that a final

25     assessment was sent.

Page 7246

 1             "Question:  Are you aware that the final assessment was sent by

 2     UNMO.

 3             "Answer:  I think, at the time, a final assessment report was

 4     being sent to Zagreb headquarters.  I think we had several conversations

 5     in the UNMO office about the further assessment to be the one I was shown

 6     now in terms of August 18th."

 7             And in those -- this is moving on to 7022, line 1:  "And in those

 8     conversations with UNMOs, at the time, they told you that the further

 9     assessment was consistent with the initial assessment.  Isn't that

10     correct?"

11             "I think I recall seeing the final document ..." --  this was the

12     answer:  "I think I recall seeing the final document that went up and

13     that it concurred with their final assessment."

14             Were you aware of that assessment being done by the UNMOs?

15        A.   No, I wasn't.

16        Q.   And you would agree with me that it was their job to do such an

17     assessment, wasn't it?

18        A.   I'm not sure what the individual UNMOs -- or, rather, the UNMOs

19     mandate was because I was not an UNMO.

20        Q.   Well, were you aware that the UN CIVPOL did a similar assessment

21     with a similar result?

22        A.   No, I'm not.

23             MR. KEHOE:  If I might have one second here, Judge.

24                           [Defence counsel confer]

25             MR. KEHOE:  We will come back to this issue in a moment when we

Page 7247

 1     find a another exhibit, but let me just move ahead.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, perhaps, meanwhile, you referred me

 3     to D131, where, in a map prepared by the Defence, C3 is indicated on that

 4     map.  You said, well, that's the evidence of Mr. Leslie.

 5             I read on page 2134, line 8 and 9, as one of the answers of the

 6     then-witness:  "Yes, sir.  The only reason why I asked for a little bit,"

 7     let me just read it, "more specificity.  I can't recall if that is the

 8     exact location of C3.  I was pointing at differences, apparent

 9     inaccuracies."

10             Now you further referred me to another witness, and we don't have

11     to go into precise session, but it must be the evidence given on the

12     23rd, 26th, or 27th of May, and I'd like to have the page and line

13     reference for where that witness gave the exact location for C3.

14             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, I'm going have to get that.  But I will

15     say to Your Honour, at this point, that the reference in these grid

16     references that we've been looking at here in -- I will provide that to

17     you.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm not talking about grid references.  I'm talking

19     about what we exactly have in evidence as to the exact location of the

20     installations this witness referred to.  He gave grid reference whether

21     they are accurate or not.  Of course, on a map, if you compare that, it

22     should be beyond any doubt that the location indicated on the map where

23     they really were found is correct.

24             I asked:  Is this in evidence?  You referred me to the testimony

25     of Mr. Leslie.  And upon checking this, I primarily find that on the

Page 7248

 1     basis of a map the Defence has produced, Mr. Leslie says, "I'm not sure

 2     whether this is the exact location yes or no."

 3             So, therefore, the second source you gave me, which is three full

 4     days of transcript, I'd like to receive a bit more guidance on where we

 5     find that.  And I take it that are you not a position to immediately do

 6     that, and we'd like to receive that, for example, after the break.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, sir, after the break.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 9             Please proceed.

10             MR. KEHOE:

11        Q.   Now, by the way, sir, when you were in Sector South --

12             MR. KEHOE:  Let me pull up a photograph, and that would be D83.

13        Q.   Now, sir, that's you to the right in that photograph, is it not?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   It is not?

16        A.   No.

17        Q.   Okay.  So, if someone identified you to that regard, they would

18     be mistaken?

19        A.   I would say almost certainly.

20        Q.   Okay.  Now, let us -- when you were driving around, sir, in --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, could the witness perhaps tell us, if it

22     is not him, whether he knows who it is.

23             THE WITNESS:  I have no idea.  In fact, I have never seen them

24     before in my life.

25             MR. KEHOE:

Page 7249

 1        Q.   Now, when you were driving around, sir, in looking at the damage

 2     in Knin -- well, let me backtrack.  You said, during the course of your

 3     testimony on direct, that there was no fighting withdrawal.  Do you

 4     recall that?

 5        A.   Yes, I do.

 6        Q.   And when you were driving around, you noted for us that you saw

 7     damage, shelling damage.  How much of that shelling damage was caused by

 8     the ARSK firing toward Knin?

 9        A.   To my knowledge, the ARSK didn't fire towards Knin, nor did they

10     fire out of Knin.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Let us take a look at D89, a sitrep of 5 August 1995.

12     And if we could -- after the cover page, if we could go four pages in.

13     Can we blow up that -- at 5th of August at 1500.  It's the third

14     paragraph down.

15             Scroll that up gist a little bit.

16        Q.   "1500 ARSK soldiers of unknown strength seen occupying defence

17     positions in the general area of Strmica.  Tanks and mortars were in the

18     same positions.  On the 5th at 1815, they fired 12 rounds of artillery

19     from Strmica towards Knin."

20             Now, by that time, sir, by 1815, the HV was in Knin, weren't

21     they?

22        A.   I'm just going to read the paragraph again.  By 1815, on the 5th,

23     yes, I would agree, the HV were in Knin.

24        Q.   So, based on this UNMO -- excuse me, on this Sector South report,

25     reporting this shelling, you just didn't know about it?

Page 7250

 1        A.   Who made this report?

 2        Q.   If can I go to the front page, sir, of this.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Can we go to the front page, Mr. Registrar?

 4             THE WITNESS:  I mean which nation reported it, not who drafted

 5     the assessment.

 6             MR. KEHOE:

 7        Q.   If we can just page through this, page 1, page 2, and this is

 8     begins --

 9             MR. KEHOE:  Please go to the next page.

10        Q.   It starts with the Kenyan battalion.  Going on to the next page,

11     it is a continuation of the Kenyan battalion before it gets to the

12     Canadian battalion.

13        A.   So it has come from the Kenyan, the information?

14        Q.   Correct.

15        A.   I can't comment on that, because I didn't see it.  I didn't see

16     the artillery firing from the Strmica area, so I can't comment on that.

17        Q.   So if -- you also -- if there is shelling coming into Knin from

18     the RSK on the 5th, you don't know as you drive through Knin which damage

19     is caused by HV shelling and which damage is caused by ARSK shelling, do

20     you?

21        A.   I think you could have a good guess if you did the crater

22     analysis.

23        Q.   But you didn't do that --

24        A.   That's correct, that's correct.

25        Q.   So you -- I'm sorry.

Page 7251

 1             You didn't do that, so you don't know, do you?

 2        A.   I wouldn't be able to tell the difference.  That is correct.

 3        Q.   Let me ask you one final issue before we end, and I want to ask

 4     you a general question.  It emanates -- and I would like to read this to

 5     you.  It emanates from a London Times article of 19 December 1988.  --

 6     excuse me, 1998.  I apologise.  Thank you.

 7             And it talks about an investigation done by the Times, and reads

 8     as follows:  "A Times investigation has revealed that a man's real name,"

 9     this man Lawson, "appears nowhere in UN records -- UN records

10     headquarters.  He was never an official employee, was not recruited

11     locally, and was not an officer in any UN peacekeeping force."

12             By the way, this article discusses generally that MI6 agents

13     representing themselves as UN peacekeepers planted articles in the

14     British press in an effort to counter widespread sympathy for Bosnian

15     Muslims ..." --

16             MR. KEHOE:  Is it up there?  That's fine.  We can put it over on

17     Sanction, so that the witness can read it.  We can just have the witness

18     read this on Sanction.  We are not going to cover it, Judge, but it just

19     may be easier for the witness to read.

20             If we can scroll down that little bit.  That's fine.

21        Q.   What I just read for you is that matter beginning:  "The Times

22     investigation ..."

23             Continuing with the next paragraph :  "Balkans experts have

24     observed that the articles sought to counter widespread sympathy for the

25     Bosnian Muslims by pointing out that atrocities occurred on all sides, a

Page 7252

 1     point of view consistent with that expressed by many in the British

 2     military and the Foreign Office."

 3             Tell me, Mr. Dangerfield, during the course of your time in

 4     either Gornji Vakuf, Split, or Knin, were you ever instructed by any

 5     superior to play up, if you will, evidence of crimes committed by Croats

 6     or Bosnian Muslims in an effort to counter widespread sympathy for

 7     either?

 8        A.   No.

 9             MR. KEHOE:  If I might have just one moment, Your Honour.

10                           [Defence counsel confer]

11             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, I have no further questions.

12             Thank you Mr. Dangerfield.

13             THE WITNESS:  Can I clarify one point on the grid reference

14     system?  I think it is important to note, sir.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  If you think it would assist the Chamber, please

16     proceed.

17             THE WITNESS:  I do, sir.

18             Irrespective of whether the grid reference systems are the same,

19     the application of that grid reference system is used for a topographical

20     map, i.e., one that you and I would use to map read along a road.  It

21     doesn't matter what scale it is.  That grid reference system has been

22     applied to a photograph that doesn't take topographical inaccuracies into

23     account.  So the grid reference system, whether it is the same or not, is

24     being used incorrectly in this case, and that would account for any

25     inaccuracies in my grids, sir.

Page 7253

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  You say you have a kind of a general explanation for

 2     all inaccuracies.  Are there inaccuracies?

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes, there are.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  There are inaccuracies.  And you say it's the way in

 5     which, where you earlier said that the grid systems were not the same,

 6     that you say apparently now that they may be the same but are applied in

 7     a different way.

 8             THE WITNESS:  There are all sort of inaccuracies that can be

 9     accounted for, sir, so --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  So how are they applied in a different way?

11             THE WITNESS:  Well, it's all based around what type of map used.

12     If you look in an atlas, sir, there are a lot of different pictures of

13     the world and the countries, particularly at the beginning.  And they're

14     different projections of maps, and they're called Mercator,

15     Stereographic, Cylindrical, Conical.  The correct grid system has to be

16     applied to the correct map; otherwise, Rome could indeed be in New York,

17     and New York could indeed be in Rome.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, of course, I said that yesterday in

19     relation to scales.  By the way, I think I made a mistake because Rome

20     would then be in the same grid reference as New York.  If we're talking

21     about scales, Rome would still be different from New York.  But the more

22     precise the maps are, isn't it, the less the influence of technical

23     aspects of how the grid references are applied.  And we are talking here

24     about quite detailed maps.

25             So, if you say I have got a general explanation for all of the

Page 7254

 1     inaccuracies, then one of the things that strikes me first is that the

 2     inaccuracies seem to be of a different dimension, one time far away on

 3     the same map, relatively nearby.  So I would expect inaccuracies then to

 4     have a systematic effect on what we see, and not one time two, three, or

 5     four wrong grid references in the system we're using with six -- six

 6     digits and another time relatively nearby.

 7             Do you have an explanation for the differences in the

 8     inaccuracies you say are explained by a general explanation?

 9             THE WITNESS:  I think you make a very fair point, sir.  I think

10     another point to note is that when using my map, I would have been

11     working off kilometre grid squares and perhaps might not have used the

12     compass to tie it down to exact hundred metre positioning.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Now you have given three explanations.

14             THE WITNESS:  Absolutely.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  You started saying that we had different grid

16     systems.  The second explanation was that the grid systems may be the

17     same, when I asked the Defence to verify, but that they are applied in a

18     different way.  And now I asked you, whether this general explanation,

19     how that could apply where the inaccuracies are of a different dimension.

20     And now you say you might have made mistakes yourself.  So we have at

21     least now three different explanations for the inaccuracies.

22             The further explanation, does that need any further questions to

23     the witness, Mr. Kehoe.

24             MR. KEHOE:  No, Your Honour, not at this time.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

Page 7255

 1             So we're moving the furniture to whom Mr. Cayley brought his own

 2     furniture.

 3             Mr. Cayley, will you be the next one?

 4             MR. CAYLEY:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  You will you now be cross-examined by Mr. Cayley,

 6     who is counsel for Mr. Cermak.

 7             Please proceed, Mr. Cayley.

 8             MR. CAYLEY:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 9                           Cross-examination by Mr. Cayley:

10        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, I have now much to ask you, probably about half

11     an hours worth.

12             I'm right in saying that you were tasked by Brigadier-General

13     Alain Forand to gather intelligence or information in Sector South, is

14     that right, in pursuance of the mission of UNCRO in Sector South?

15        A.   That's correct.  He described me as his one-man reconnaissance

16     regiment.

17        Q.   And that headquarters, the UNCRO Sector South headquarters, would

18     also provide you with information of what was taking place in

19     Sector South.  Yes?

20        A.   Yes, it was a two-way process.

21        Q.   And that kind of information that they provided to you and you

22     provided to them would have been information concerning movement of

23     military personnel.  Yes?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And subject matter such as freedom of movement within

Page 7256

 1     Sector South.  Yes?

 2        A.   Correct.

 3        Q.   Now, what I wanted to you do now is actually direct your mind

 4     specifically to the issue of freedom of movement; and if could you,

 5     please, turn to page 3 of your statement.

 6             MR. CAYLEY:  This is P695.  It is actually number 2 at the

 7     bottom, but it is page 3 of the purposes of the document actually

 8     uploaded in e-court.

 9        Q.   It is paragraph 9.  Do you see that?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Now, you note, in your statement, that:  "Restriction of movement

12     between the 7th and 8th of August of 1995 remains fierce with many

13     UN personnel confined to camp."

14        A.   I see that.

15        Q.   Now, by all means, read the rest of that paragraph, if you want

16     to.  I don't want to ask you more questions about it, but I do actually

17     want to now show you a document.

18             MR. CAYLEY:  If, please, P29 could be brought up on the screen.

19        Q.   Do you recall the human rights action team, HRAT, do you remember

20     their activities in Sector South during your time there; Mr. Flynn?

21        A.   No.  I have never heard the name Flynn before.

22        Q.   Now you can see a report there from the Human Rights Action Team.

23     This is a daily report dated 8th of August, 1995.

24             MR. CAYLEY:  And if, please, we could go to the next page.

25        Q.   Now I'm not so much interested that you didn't know the existence

Page 7257

 1     of HRAT, but the paragraph in this report that I would like you to look

 2     at is the paragraph that beginnings:  "Freedom of movement."

 3        A.   I do, indeed.

 4        Q.   Could you read that, and I'm actually interested in the last

 5     sentence after that paragraph.

 6        A.    "Movement today has been restricted ..."  --

 7        Q.   You don't read to read it.  Just read it to yourself.  I'm sorry.

 8        A.   Okay.  I have read that.

 9        Q.   Now the last sentence will you see is stating that General Cermak

10     delivered a written statement to General Forand this morning that

11     movement tomorrow to Drnis would be possible and HRAT intends to test

12     this assurance.

13             Do you recall if around that time, the 8th of August, UNCRO and

14     another international organisations were authorised to travel between

15     Knin and Drnis?

16        A.   I don't remember that exactly.  I do remember at some stage a

17     written document.  I believe, from memory, it was signed by General

18     Cermak, and I -- referring to freedom of movement.  The actual detail of

19     that, I cannot remember.

20        Q.   Well, let's have a look at P513.

21             Can you look at that document?  Does that refresh your memory?

22             MR. CAYLEY:  Could we have the English version, please, next to

23     the Croatian version.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

25             This specific one, I don't recall.  I think it's too specific.  I

Page 7258

 1     remember one, I think, of a more general nature throughout the sector.

 2     So I don't recall this particular document.

 3             MR. CAYLEY:

 4        Q.   Just for clarity sake, do you recall around the 8th of

 5     August that the restrictions on movement were lifted on the road between

 6     Knin and Drnis?

 7        A.   No, I don't.

 8        Q.   Okay.

 9             MR. CAYLEY:  If, please, the witness could be shown map 21.  This

10     is the bundle, Your Honours, which is the Prosecution bundle of maps.  I

11     don't think it has been uploaded into e-court.

12        Q.   Just to clarify this issue, matters of freedom of movement like

13     this - I know you can't recall now - this was the kind of information

14     that you would have received from Sector South headquarters and General

15     Forand, if, indeed, he had been informed?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Now, I'm right in saying that on the 9th of August, you travelled

18     to Kistanje.  Yeah?

19        A.   Correct.

20        Q.   Now, can you orient yourself on this map.  Do you see Knin?

21        A.   I do, indeed.

22        Q.   And do you see Drnis?  It is south.  It's a blue dot to the

23     south, and we'll put it on the ELMO so the Judges can see once you've --

24        A.   Is that the blue dot to the right of Rivnik [phoen].

25        Q.   Are you looking at map 21?

Page 7259

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   To the south of Knin, you'll see Drnis.  It is just above the

 3     scale at the bottom.

 4        A.   Yes, I've got it.

 5        Q.   There's no grid references, thank goodness, on this map, so we

 6     don't need to go into that.

 7             MR. CAYLEY:  If could you put it on the ELMO.

 8        Q.   And can you just indicate to the Judges the road between Knin and

 9     Drnis.

10        A.   [Indicates]

11        Q.   Now, the previous document that we just looked at, but which you

12     were not aware of, appeared to give or at least lift restriction of

13     movement on the road between Knin and Drnis.  Yes?

14        A.   Yeah.

15        Q.   Can you point out to the judges the town of Kistanje which you

16     visited on the 9th of August.  It is, in fact, west.

17        A.   Yeah.

18        Q.   Keep going.  Down.  There.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Cayley, you ask the witness to show Kistanje to

20     the Judges.  The Judges have seen this map many, many times.  Then you

21     guide the witness to where Kistanje is, which is, of course, a bit of an

22     old exercise.

23             Please proceed.

24             MR. CAYLEY:  I don't think there is a dispute as to where

25     Kistanje is, Your Honour.

Page 7260

 1        Q.   Now you would accept that Kistanje is not actually on the road

 2     between Knin and Drnis, is it?

 3        A.   No, it's not.

 4        Q.   So, in fact, even though freedom of movement had not been granted

 5     in that area, it appears that you were unaffected by the restriction of

 6     movement that still existed in the Kistanje area.  Correct?

 7        A.   On the 9th, yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now, if we could please turn back to your statement,

 9     P695, page 4, paragraph 12.  And these are just some clarifications where

10     I want you to refer to your supplementary statement that you made to

11     Mr. Russo.  Do you recall?

12        A.   Yes, I do.

13        Q.   You made some additions.  I just wanted to get that on the

14     record.  That's all.

15        A.   Okay.

16        Q.   You'll see it says there on the 10th of August:  "UN personnel

17     met with General Cermak requesting complete freedom of movement

18     throughout Sector South.  He says he cannot authorise this.  It must come

19     from his higher commander."

20             Now, in your supplementary statement, you identify who you

21     believe actually passed that information to you.  Do you have a copy of

22     your supplementary information sheet?  I can give that to you.

23        A.   I've got it, I think.

24        Q.   It's on the second page of the supplementary information sheet.

25        A.   No.  I know the supplementary sheet, that is the one submitted

Page 7261

 1     two days ago?

 2        Q.   Well, it is actually not in evidence.  It is simply information

 3     passed to the Prosecution.

 4        A.   I don't believe that in my position.

 5             MR. RUSSO:  I'm sorry.  I didn't include that in the documents I

 6     gave to him.

 7             MR. CAYLEY:

 8        Q.   I can read it to you so we don't waste any time.  You say in that

 9     that supplementary information sheet that that piece of information on

10     General Cermak being unable to authorise freedom of movement came from

11     either Lieutenant-Colonel Tymchuk, Colonel Leslie, or General Forand.  Is

12     that right?

13        A.   Yes.  I would point more towards Colonel Tymchuk --

14        Q.   Who gave that you pieces of information?

15        A.   I would believe so, yes.

16        Q.   Now, in terms of the letter granting freedom of movement

17     throughout the Sector South area that was signed by General Cermak, you

18     said, in your supplementary information sheet, it was not worth the paper

19     that it was printed on.  Is that right?

20        A.   Yes.  Would you like me to clarify that?

21        Q.   Well, let me ask you some questions.

22             Is that because you were unable to pass through check-points with

23     a copy of that letter?

24        A.   In some cases, yes.

25        Q.   And by which type of personnel were those check-points manned by?

Page 7262

 1     Were they military personnel?

 2        A.   I think a combination of military and police.

 3        Q.   Yes.  Is there anything else --

 4        A.   Military police, as well.  Sorry.

 5        Q.   So the check-points that you couldn't get through with that

 6     letter were manned by HV military, HV military police, and civilian

 7     police.  Yes?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Is there anything else you would like to add to that, or is that

10     clear?

11        A.   No.  I mean, some check-point would say let you through, some

12     check-points wouldn't.  And, therefore, that, to me, indicated that

13     actually, I think, the message hadn't got out to everywhere, and that's

14     quite understandable when not everyone has a radio.  When not everyone

15     has a telephone, it is difficult getting that information out.

16        Q.   Okay.  Thank you very much, Mr. Dangerfield.

17             MR. CAYLEY:  Thank you.  I don't have any questions, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Cayley.

19             Before we continue, I have one question for you, Mr. Kehoe.  Let

20     me just find the ...

21             On page 19, line 15, we're talking about photograph D83, you

22     said:  "So if someone identified you to that regard, that would be

23     mistaken."

24             That puzzled me, because it raised on my mind a question whether

25     anyone had identified Mr. Dangerfield as the person on the right of the

Page 7263

 1     photograph.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, sir.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Who did that and when?

 4             MR. KEHOE:  My recollection, and I would have to look back

 5     specifically, but it was in talking to Mr. Munkelien and Mr. Anttila.  We

 6     asked who it was, and they said it was the British officer that was in

 7     the headquarters.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  What we have is we have the testimony of

 9     Mr. Munkelien, who said:  "It was the British officer, but I don't know

10     his name."  So "the British officer" is not for me the exactly the same

11     as "Mr. Dangerfield."  Now Mr. Hill testified that it was a Czech

12     captain.  So, therefore, it puzzled me what made you so positive to

13     already mention an identification.  Mr. Hill said it was a Czech captain

14     or it was a major pilot.

15             MR. KEHOE:  If I may, Judge, the issue is we have not been able

16     to identify this person, and this is the British officer --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  No, no.  My issue at this moment is that you suggest

18     that there was an identification on rather loose grounds.

19             Please proceed, but, of course, not you, at this moment.

20             Mr. Mikulicic.

21             Mr. Mikulicic, Mr. Dangerfield, is counsel for Mr. Markac, and he

22     will now cross-examine you.

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Mikulicic:

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Dangerfield.

25        A.   Good morning.

Page 7264

 1             MR. MIKULICIC:  I'm looking for my pen.  Yes.

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, again.  I would like to ask you a

 3     few questions on the topic that was indicated at the beginning and that

 4     remained, at least in my view, not completely clarified.

 5             Originally, you came to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina

 6     in the end of April 1995.  Correct?

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   In your statement, P695 - that's the first statement from 1995 -

 9     you stated that you had worked in section G2 with the British forces in

10     Gornji Vakuf.  Correct?

11        A.   I didn't work in the G2 section, no.

12        Q.   [In English] I will show you your statement on page 1,

13     paragraph 1, where it says:  "I was the British Army SLO based in Knin

14     working in the British G2 cell."

15        A.   Okay, I've got it.  Yeah.  I mean, I was sector liaison officer.

16     That was my prime role.  And as a by-product, the information I was

17     providing would have gone to the G2 cell to help build up the picture.

18     So, whilst not directly employed by the G2, I provided information to

19     them.

20        Q.   [Interpretation] I understand.  You now referring to the time

21     between the 4th and the 10th of August, 1995, when you were in Knin.

22     However, I'm asking after your arrival to the territory of the former

23     Yugoslavia, in end April 1995, to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina

24     that is, within which force did you act, which organisation, what was its

25     complement, and what was your position within it?  Could you please

Page 7265

 1     describe.

 2        A.   I was within the sector liaison organisation.  From recollection,

 3     there was probably a dozen of us from across -- mainly the army and

 4     mainly the Royal Marines.  In fact, I think all the drivers were from the

 5     Royal Marines.  And we were deployed initially as liaison officers.  I

 6     think we were more working directly for the brigadier, Brigadier Pringle,

 7     in Gornji Vakuf, and we went to the various battalions in Sector

 8     South West.

 9             So, initially, I worked in Tomislavgrad and I worked in Vitez and

10     the surrounding areas as a liaison officer, and my job was to try to set

11     up meetings between the senior military commanders and Brigadier Pringle.

12     So we had the credibility of having the brigadiers' ear, and the

13     important think was to try to cut through the bureaucracy, which we all

14     experience, to go straight to the senior military commanders and set up

15     those meetings.

16             So that was, initially, what I did until I was moved to Knin.

17        Q.   I understand.  Were you then working within the UNPROFOR in the

18     territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time?

19        A.   That's correct.

20        Q.   Would you agree with me that the mandate of the UNPROFOR at the

21     time was relatively vague in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and

22     was, in fact, to try to moderate between the warring sides to achieve a

23     cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities?

24        A.   I don't remember the exact mandate.  What I do remember was I was

25     a 25-year-old captain doing what his superior officers had asked him to

Page 7266

 1     do.

 2        Q.   You said that your superior officer was Brigadier Pringle.  Was

 3     he the one who sent you to Knin, to the commander of Sector South?

 4        A.   Yes, he was.

 5        Q.   Did that mean that, after your arrival at Knin, you transferred

 6     to the subordination of General Forand or did you remain subordinated to

 7     Brigadier Pringle?

 8        A.   I don't think that was a specific transfer of my subordination.

 9     I don't think you would -- I don't -- I am fairly certain there was no

10     documentation to support that, but I think it was -- I think in British

11     terms you would call it a gentleman's agreement between the two

12     Brigadiers, that I would work for General Forand, yet effectively still

13     be under the command of Brigadier Pringle.

14        Q.   Would I be mistaken if I said that your position within

15     Sector South at the UNCRO base in Knin was, in a certain way,

16     exceptionally?  And I am referring to the fact that you had your own

17     vehicle and a driver at your disposal.

18        A.   You wouldn't be mistaken.  I thought I was unbelievably lucky to

19     have such responsibility at that age.

20        Q.   You have told us that the vehicle you used to tour the terrain

21     was a Land Rover.  Could you tell us how it was marked.  What colour was

22     it and what were the licence plates?

23        A.   The licence -- wrong.  The colour of the Land Rover was white,

24     UN white.  I can't -- I'm fairly certain we probably had some shabby

25     looking UN stickers, blue ones on it.  And I simply can't remember what

Page 7267

 1     the registration of the vehicle was.  I can't remember whether it was

 2     British or, indeed, it had UN on.

 3        Q.   Apart from you, and, of course, General Forand, commander of the

 4     Sector South, was there any other person in the command who had a vehicle

 5     and a driver at their service?

 6        A.   I'm fairly certain people like Colonel Leslie and Colonel Tymchuk

 7     had those sort of assets.  I mean, there's nothing unusual about me

 8     having a vehicle and a driver.

 9        Q.   I'll refer back to your statement, P695, where, at the beginning,

10     you said that before coming to the territory of the former Yugoslavia,

11     you had undergone certain preparations; namely, you completed a one-week

12     UNMO course and a one-week sector liaison officer course.  That's a total

13     of two weeks of familiarizing yourself with the terrain you were going to

14     cover.  Was that all the education you received for that assignment or

15     was there anything else?

16        A.   No, that was it.  And I was fairly unique in having done both

17     those courses, and that's because they couldn't make up their minds as to

18     how they were going to deploy me.  Initially, they thought I would deploy

19     as an UNMO, because earlier on in the year, I think there were many

20     potential agreements between the warring factions.  And the British were

21     lining up to deploy ten or 15 UNMOs at short notice, and so I went on

22     that course.  Then the potential agreement fell apart, so I think I did

23     nothing for three months, until the brigade that I was with in Germany

24     deployed, and the Brigadier said, "I'll take Dangerfield as a sector

25     liaison officer."

Page 7268

 1        Q.   That course, among other things, included, as we can see in point

 2     "A," FRY vehicle/aircraft/weapon systems recognition.  At the time, it

 3     was the Federal Republic Of Yugoslavia, indeed.

 4             Did that course include recognition of the same, in the system of

 5     the Republic of Croatia, military vehicles, police vehicles, et cetera?

 6        A.   From recollection, yes.  I mean, I think the aim was it was to

 7     give an overview and identify the detail across all of former warring

 8     factions, and I think licence plates -- from memory, I think the Croatia

 9     plates were yellow with -- the Croatian military with yellow with black

10     numbers and letters.  I think they all had different ones, and I think it

11     pretty critical to be able to tell the deference between the two -- oh,

12     sorry, difference between the three different sides.

13        Q.   Within that course, were you made aware of the structure of the

14     Croatian army, the civilian police, military police, the special police,

15     the system of civil protection?  Did you familiarize yourself with the

16     structure and the composition of the organisations that I mentioned?

17        A.   I'm fairly certain I did.  I wouldn't be able to do for you now.

18     I think that is a standard procedure for the British Army whenever it

19     deploys, as it would do for Iraq, as it would do for Afghanistan.  It is

20     part of our general education and preparation to make sure that we are

21     equipped mentally and physically to deal with whatever is thrown at you.

22        Q.   Were you able at the time to distinguish among members of

23     different agencies according to uniform or vehicle they were driving?

24        A.   Could I clarify agencies as battalions and brigades?

25        Q.   When I mentioned agencies I meant, on the one hand, Croatian

Page 7269

 1     army, on the other hand, military police, as opposed to special police

 2     and regular police.  Were you able to distinguish between members of

 3     these various agencies, according to their appearance?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, I'm looking at the clock.

 6             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, I think it is it a good moment to

 7     make a pause.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we will have a break, and we resume at five

 9     minutes to 11.00.

10                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, you may proceed.

13             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Dangerfield, I will now refer to paragraph 2

15     of your statement from 1995 - that's P695 - where you described your

16     duties from the 4th to the 10th of August, 1995.  You say that you were

17     supposed to report on every incident, an action by both HV and ARSK

18     troops; that you were working with both UK and SS G2 cells; that you were

19     trying to build up a certain picture of HV intentions, ARSK reactions and

20     future operations by both sides.  And this would help the British G2 in

21     Gornji Vakuf to work out what effect this would have on western Bosnia.

22             Do you agree with this description of your assignments in your

23     statement?  Would you still say the same today?

24        A.   On the whole, I would agree with it.  I would say, perhaps, that

25     the last sentence, "This would help the British G2 in Sector South West

Page 7270

 1     work out what effect this would have on western Bosnia," is a little bit

 2     grand perhaps, and perhaps not accurate.

 3        Q.   Could you elaborate on that?  Why do you think so today?

 4        A.   I suppose one would like to think I have matured over 13 years,

 5     and when I read that again, I was looking at gathering information, to be

 6     honest wherever I was and wherever I went.  And to suspect that the

 7     G2 cell could work out what strategic effect this would have on western

 8     Bosnia is perhaps a little bit grand.

 9        Q.   As you arrived in Knin - that is, before Operation Storm - I

10     suppose you were made aware of the UNCRO mandate, and that was to

11     demilitarise the area of the so-called Serbian Republic of Krajina,

12     putting it under control, and monitoring military movements along the

13     border of that area.  Were you made aware that mandate of the UNCRO in

14     the Republic of Croatia?

15        A.   I think I was probably made aware of it by the Sector South

16     headquarters.  I think, specifically, I would have been interested in the

17     aspect of monitoring military movements along the border area, I think

18     known as the Zone of Separation.

19             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] May I ask the registrar to pull

20     up D28.

21        Q.   We will now see, Mr. Dangerfield, one document that has been

22     exhibited already, and that's the agreement between the government of the

23     Republic of Croatia and the peace forces of the United Nations.  The

24     UNCRO concluded on the 6th of August, 1995; that is to say, after

25     Operation Storm had been launched on the 4th of August.

Page 7271

 1             Were you familiar with this document?  Have you had the

 2     opportunity to see it or read it before?

 3        A.   I'm not familiar with it, and I don't believe I've seen it

 4     before.

 5        Q.   I would like us to focus on paragraph 2 of this document - that's

 6     page 2 in Croatian - describing the mandate.

 7             Please look at it, Mr. Dangerfield.  In this paragraph, the

 8     definition of the UNCRO mandate at the level between the Republic of

 9     Croatia and the peace forces of the UN was signed by Mr. Saranic on

10     behalf of the Croatian government and by Mr. Yasushi Akashi on behalf of

11     the UN.  You mentioned that the latter had visited Knin.

12             This agreement actually changes the mandate of the UNCRO, and

13     reorients it towards humanitarian affairs and human rights -- the human

14     rights situation.

15             Were you informed by anyone in Sector South of this change of

16     mandate of the UNCRO, beginning with the 6th of August, 1995?

17        A.   I think I probably had been made aware of it, yes.

18        Q.   However, despite that, you continue to perform duties such as

19     monitoring military movements of the HV and the RSK army, trying to

20     deduce their intentions in various military interventions and how that

21     would reflect on the situation in western Bosnia.

22             That does not seem to be in conformity with this changed mandate

23     of the UNCRO as specified in this agreement.  Do you agree with that?

24        A.   In part.  I conformed with my superior officers.

25        Q.   Thank you for this answer.

Page 7272

 1             Para 11 of your statement of 1995, you say that from the European

 2     Monitors you received certain information about various personalities in

 3     the Croatian army, and you mention General Gotovina, General Cermak.  And

 4     in paragraph -- in item C, that is, you refer to officer Ivan Juric,

 5     Major Ivan Juric.  You say that he drove a black Mercedes with a certain

 6     registration plate, that he was working at the barracks in Zagreb, and

 7     you mention his phone number.

 8             Mr. Dangerfield, have you ever met personally with Major Ivan

 9     Juric?

10        A.   No, I haven't.

11        Q.   Could you explain what you intended when you said he was chief of

12     police?  What does that mean?  Which police do you mean?

13        A.   I don't know.  That's the information I got from the

14     European Community monitors.  So I don't know which police, special

15     police, military police, civilian police.  I don't know.

16        Q.   Paragraph 22, in your statement, says that on the 27th of July,

17     Radio Knin announced a full mobilisation of the army of the RSK, and you

18     go on to say what it included in points A through D.

19             Did you hear this announcement yourself?

20        A.   No.  It would have been in the B/C/S, and, therefore, it would

21     have been a translation that was handed to me.

22        Q.   Can you remember who gave you information about this

23     announcement?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   In paragraph 23, you say, at that time, Knin was almost empty as

Page 7273

 1     far as men of military age are concerned, and that you had very good

 2     freedom of movement in view of the panic that occurred, and you say that

 3     on the 27th, all the fire engines seemed to be filling up at the petrol

 4     observation.  Was that your personal observation or was it taken from a

 5     sitrep or another report?

 6        A.   No.  I believe if it is written like that.  I would have seen

 7     that personally.

 8        Q.   What is your explanation for this behaviour by the firemen on the

 9     27th?

10        A.   It would be my assessment, and opinion only, that the fire

11     brigade were preparing for some kind of attack.  It is unusual for fire

12     engines all to be filling up at the same time, and so I assess that they

13     were expecting something.  And there was a shortage of fuel, I believe,

14     in Knin, so I would assume they were filling up whilst they still had

15     fuel available.

16        Q.   Very well.  There's just one thing that I won't say bothers me,

17     but makes me curious.

18             In paragraph 29, you say that there was a restriction of movement

19     and UN personnel was confined to camp.  What do you mean by "confined "?

20        A.   None of us were allowed out.

21        Q.   When you say that you were not "allowed out," who was it that did

22     not allow you to leave the UN base?

23        A.   As this was on the 4th of August, it would have been the ARSK

24     soldiers who were at the front gate.

25        Q.   However, in paragraph 9, reference is made to the period of the

Page 7274

 1     7th and 8th of August; in other words, at the time when the Croatian army

 2     troops enter the Knin.

 3             Would you like me to reiterate my question, Mr. Dangerfield?

 4             We've placed this statement of yours in a time-frame, and my

 5     question was:  When you said that you were not allowed to leave the camp,

 6     who was it that did not allow to you leave the UN base?

 7        A.   On the 4th, and I suppose up to the early hours or the early

 8     morning of the 5th of August, it would have been the ARSK soldiers, and

 9     then it was either the soldiers who were killed or the soldiers which you

10     will have read in my statement, or it would have been soldiers who had

11     left shortly prior to the Croatian soldiers' arrival.

12             So, whilst there was probably no overlap between the two by

13     minutes, I suspect the time-frame between the two was not that long.  So,

14     for the 1st, I suppose, up until the middle of the 5th, it would have

15     been ARSK soldiers preventing us from getting out; and when the Croatian

16     soldiers arrived on the 5th, it was they who prevented us from getting

17     out.  Indeed, they tried to get into the camp.

18             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see document

19     3D00-1760.

20        Q.   We will see, in a moment, Mr. Dangerfield, an article published

21     on the 6th of August, 1995 in the Sunday Mail or Mail on Sunday.  And in

22     this article, reference is made to your statements.

23             And if we now turn to page 2 of this document, the

24     paragraph before last, we can see that it states the following.  Your

25     statement is quoted here, and it reads as follows:  [Previous translation

Page 7275

 1     continues] ... [In English] "... agreed no one would leave the compound,

 2     and the Croats promised not to enter the camp."

 3             [Interpretation] Am I wrong if I conclude based on this that the

 4     issue of UN personnel and their confinement to the UN base in Knin was

 5     agreed in a mutual agreement between the Croatian army and the command of

 6     Sector South?

 7        A.   I remember this incident very well because the Croatian soldiers

 8     tried to force their way into the camp.  And it was the first time in my

 9     military career that I had been told to cock my weapon and be required to

10     use it if necessary, and the reason for why is that the British Army

11     rules of engagement were more robust than the Canadian army rules of

12     engagement.  So, if necessary, I would have used the force required of me

13     by the superior officer to prevent that happening.

14             Once it was understood by the Croatian soldiers the enormity of

15     the situation, my superior officers and whoever the senior Croatian

16     soldier or officer who was at the front gate, I believe this agreement

17     came into force.

18        Q.   I understand.

19             How, then, am I to interpret in this context the quotes in the

20     paragraph before this one where you state, speaking of Croatian soldiers:

21     "They were friendly [Previous translation continues] ...

22     [In English] ... and that sort of thing."

23        A.   I think the appearance of the soldiers overall was that they were

24     happy with their achievements, and, therefore, their demeanour was

25     friendly, they were firing their rifles into the air, and that's how they

Page 7276

 1     behave.  But it's different --

 2        Q.   Thank you for your answer.

 3             I would now like to refer you to your second statement --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  The witness had not finished his answer where you

 5     said:  "But it's different ..."

 6             Could you please complete your answer.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 8             But it is different to when you have a UN compound with a whole

 9     load of civilians in who are not under the UN badge, and that, I believe,

10     was the issue which caused the standoff at the front gate to the camp.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

12             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Be that as it may, however, is it correct that

14     when you said that agreement was reached between the Croatian army and

15     the UN, according to which the Croatian army would not enter the base and

16     the UN personnel would not leave the base, so was this agreement reached

17     or not?  Yes or no.

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, would you please take a look at paragraph 8 of

20     your 2008 statement, the statement of January of this year.

21             In paragraph 8, you say that you personally observed HV soldiers

22     standing around in towns and villages where houses and crops or stables

23     were burning, and also that you saw members of the Croatian special

24     police preventing access to areas that were burning.

25             I would now like to us to talk about this part of your statement.

Page 7277

 1             First of all, could you tell us when was it that you observed

 2     this situation?  What time-period was this in?

 3        A.   This would have been the two weeks after August the 9th, from

 4     August the 9th onwards.

 5        Q.   Can you tell us what area you're referring to when you say

 6     "around in towns and villages."

 7             Which areas do you have in mind?  Which town precisely or which

 8     village?

 9        A.   All of them in the area that was known as Sector South.  I mean,

10     it was throughout Sector South; and as I said in the previous paragraph,

11     80 to 90 per cent.

12        Q.   I apologise if I wasn't quite clear, so I will reiterate my

13     question.

14             Are you referring here to -- are you saying that the special

15     police prevented entry into or access to villages and towns in the entire

16     area?

17        A.   I think they probably dealt with one -- well, I mean, I don't

18     know how many special police there were, but I think they probably dealt

19     with each village or town when they could; and, therefore, I couldn't be

20     in the whole area at the same time.  But they certainly seemed to be

21     present in quite a few areas that I visited.

22        Q.   So you're unable to tell us how many members of the special

23     police there were.  You cannot tell us where these things happen.  You

24     say probably throughout the area.  And, of course, you're also saying

25     that you could not be present in all these places that you have -- that

Page 7278

 1     you visited.  Is my understanding correct?

 2        A.   You are correct when you say how many -- I can't tell you how

 3     many members of the special police there were.  And, in fact, I haven't

 4     given specific grid references in this statement to everywhere that I saw

 5     on fire because they were too numerous to list.

 6             And if I could give an analogy, after the Iraq war, the oil wells

 7     were set on fire and I think we probably all saw those on television.  If

 8     you were to replace those oil wills with a village, a town, a settlement,

 9     that is what the area looked like.  It was all on fire.

10        Q.   So, in your 2008 statement, when, in paragraph 8, you speak of

11     these events, you were, in fact, in a way, motivated by what you

12     experienced in Iraq a few years later.  Is my understanding correct?

13        A.   No, because I wasn't in Iraq at that time of the war.

14        Q.   When were you in Iraq, Mr. Dangerfield?

15        A.   Let me just work it out.  I have to think back where I've been.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, the witness compared what he saw with

17     what he now says he apparently saw on the television as oil wills

18     burning.

19             Now, is there any specific reason why we -- because that has got

20     nothing to do, I understand, with his presence in Iraq.

21             Is there any specific reason why we have to explore his presence

22     in Iraq.  If there is, please proceed; if there's not, let's move on.

23             MR. MIKULICIC:  From my point of view, a very strange experience

24     that someone experience, which took place after the events that he is

25     talking about in his statement, could be relevant for the references in

Page 7279

 1     the statement of the events that happened long before the period that he

 2     has talk about his experience.

 3             So this is kind of odd for me, but I will pass on.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  But the witness only today explained to us that it

 5     had a similar look as what he once saw, apparently after the events.  It

 6     could be before as a matter of fact.  Because while the Iraq war, I take

 7     it that Mr. Dangerfield is referring to the war where Iraq was attacking

 8     one of its neighbouring countries, and not the war in which Iraq was

 9     attacked later.

10             But apart that from that, he is just referring to what it looked

11     like, and I think there's -- I was already a bit surprised that you said,

12     Did it inspire you?  He just made a comparison.  Nothing more, nothing

13     less, as far as I'm concerned.

14             Please proceed.

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  I will go on, Your Honour.  Yes.  Thank you.

16        Q.   [Interpretation] In your supplement statement to the Prosecutor a

17     few days ago, you also referred to this paragraph of your 2008

18     January statement, and you said there that members of the special police

19     personally prevented you from getting out.

20             Was this -- does this mean that this is your own personal

21     experience and not something that you have learned about second-hand?

22        A.   Yes.  And I think I explained it at the end of the Prosecution's

23     questioning, and that was specifically in the area of Cetina.

24        Q.   [In English] Of?

25        A.   Cetina.

Page 7280

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Could you tell us when this was?

 2        A.   Now, I think I refer to it in - I think - in the article I wrote,

 3     The Fall of The Republic Of Serbian Krajina.  I think I probably refer to

 4     it in there, and I think I call it on one occasion.

 5        Q.   Maybe can you help us with this, because I can't recall seeing

 6     anything, any mention of this topic in your article?

 7        A.   Page 6, paragraph 2, that begins:  "Other patrols saw us ..."

 8        Q.   [In English] Okay.  [Interpretation] But I can't see here that

 9     you make mention of the special police.

10        A.   That's true.

11        Q.   As you said, then, you had personal contact with them.  Could you

12     tell us, then, whether you spoke with any of these members of the special

13     police who prevented you from accessing this area?

14        A.   My -- I only had a limited grasp of B/C/S, as did my driver.  I

15     had no interpreter.  It's amazing what you can understand through sign

16     language and gestures with the hands and the small amount of B/C/S that I

17     spoke.

18        Q.   That is, of course, quite clear.

19             How was this person that you say was a special police member, how

20     was he dressed?

21        A.   I think I said earlier on under cross-examination that whilst

22     during the deployment or prior to the deployment, we had been briefed and

23     taught what people wore; and, of course, I knew that throughout my tour.

24     Thirteen years on, I can't -- I can't remember.

25        Q.   Can you at least remember whether he was wearing civilian

Page 7281

 1     clothing or a uniform?

 2        A.   It almost certainly was a uniform.

 3        Q.   Can you remember, just in general terms, what the pattern on the

 4     uniform was?

 5        A.   No.  And I'm not going to guess.

 6        Q.   Was this person of whom you say was a special police officer

 7     armed?

 8        A.   I think you always respect someone who has -- is equipped with a

 9     weapon; and, therefore, if I was escorted out of the sector, if I was

10     prevented from going somewhere, it normally meant they were armed.

11        Q.   What kind of weapon did this person have?

12        A.   Again, I was briefed prior to deployment on all sorts of various

13     different weapons; and, of course, there are weapons that are prolific

14     throughout the world, and so it was likely to have been weapons of small

15     calibre.

16        Q.   Do you mean a short barrel or long barrel?

17        A.   I think everyone was equipped with pistols and rifles.  When I

18     say "everyone," I mean generically throughout the Balkans.  I cannot tie

19     to special police different units whether they had a pistol or a rifle.

20     My memory simply isn't that good.

21        Q.   Of course, a lot of time has passed.  Do you recall this event

22     that you say was in Cetina, an event where you were stopped and prevented

23     to enter this area by a unit that you say were special police?  Was this

24     a check-point where you were stopped, or were you stopped by some other

25     means?

Page 7282

 1        A.   I think somewhere I refer to not being noticed for a while, which

 2     may have meant that I hadn't got as far as a check-point, I was short of

 3     a check-point.  Just because I wasn't at a check-point, it doesn't mean

 4     there was no check-point.  I had got myself into a position where I could

 5     view what was going on.

 6        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, do you remember whether, during your stay and

 7     mandate in Sector South, you had contacts with any official officers of

 8     the special police?

 9        A.   No, I didn't.

10        Q.   Do you know what the role of the special police was in

11     Operation Storm and following Operation Storm?

12        A.   No, I don't.

13        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, of course, it's been a long time, and it's quite

14     understandable when you say that you cannot remember today all the things

15     that you knew at that time; in other words, in August 1995.

16             However, could you please explain why it is that you mentioned

17     this event, where you were prevented by the special police to enter

18     certain areas; whereas, in your statement of January of this year and

19     your supplemental statement of July of this year, no mention, not a

20     single word, is said about these events in 1995 in your statement of

21     1995, where, of course, your memories would have been much fresher.

22             Could you please explain there?

23        A.   Yes.  The reason why I mentioned it initially is because it was,

24     to me and my driver, an event that was potentially life threatening, at

25     the time.  But it was an event, and over the years one just moves on from

Page 7283

 1     these things.  It is no longer an event, it's an event in my past.  One

 2     moves on.  It's history .  It's as simple as that.

 3        Q.   I understand that, Mr. Dangerfield, but you still haven't

 4     answered how come you don't mention it in 1995, when it was fresh in your

 5     mind and when you would have been able to describe that person, both in

 6     terms of appearance, uniform, the weapon he was carrying, and other

 7     details.  But 13 years later you do mention it in your statement to the

 8     Prosecution; and in doing so, you referred to the member -- to a member

 9     of the special police, although you can't any longer remember what the

10     attributes of the special police were.

11        A.   I think we're getting muddled here.  I mentioned this event in

12     Cetina.  Yes, I don't mention the special police specifically.  But this

13     article which was written no less than ten days afterwards was a general

14     account of my experiences.  It was, as can you read, written by a young

15     man who was very impressionable and keen to partake of his experiences

16     with other people.

17        Q.   I understand.  Let's move on to a different subject.

18             That's precisely the article you were talking about, P699.  You

19     authored this article which was written, as you said, some ten days after

20     the event in Knin for a -- the British Army Review.  What kind of

21     publication is that, just to give us a picture?  What is the readership

22     of this review?

23        A.   It's a magazine that is printed, I believe, a couple of times a

24     year, and it's where officers and soldiers of the British Army can write

25     about military affairs, whether past, present, or future.  It's a medium

Page 7284

 1     for discussion.  And, at the time, some people described me as the most

 2     shelled officer, i.e., the man who had been under the most incoming

 3     rocket and artillery fire since the Second World War.  So it was of

 4     interest to people.  And whilst I wrote this account for myself, I

 5     decided to send it in to the editor of the magazine to share that

 6     experience.

 7        Q.   You've just answered a question I haven't yet asked.

 8             So it was on your own initiative that you sent the article to

 9     that magazine.  Nobody asked you to do so, right?

10        A.   That's correct.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, however, the witness has not answered

12     the question that you did put to him; that is, what is the readership.

13             Who are the readers of this magazine?

14             THE WITNESS:  Members of the armed forces and the wider defence

15     community.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

17             Please proceed.

18             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I appreciate that

19     intervention.

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Let's go through this article.

21             In the introduction, you say that starting with May of that year,

22     1995, your job was to monitor the build-up of Croatian forces in the

23     south and south-east of Sector South, and in the west as well of

24     Sector South.  And you had also been monitoring the response to this by

25     the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Page 7285

 1             However, what I am interested in is your reference to the fact

 2     that negotiations had begun between Croats, led by Franjo Tudjman, and

 3     the Serbs, led by Milan Martic.

 4             Mr. Dangerfield, do you know, at least the basic features of

 5     plan Z-4?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   If I told you that plan Z-4 was an attempt, a joint attempt at

 8     the time by the European Community, Russia, and the US, to reintegrate

 9     peacefully the territory of the so-called RSK into the Republic of

10     Croatia, would that jog your memory a bit?

11        A.   You're asking me strategic and political question, which I can't

12     possibly answer.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Dangerfield, Mr. Mikulicic is asking you whether

14     you knew what plan Z-4 was.

15             THE WITNESS:  I didn't --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Please.  Mr. Mikulicic, then gave a little sketch of

17     what Z-4 was in his view, and asked whether that refreshed your

18     recollection.  That's not a political question.  That is not a strategic

19     question.  That is a question about whether this refreshes your memory,

20     whether you have any knowledge yes or no.  If have you, please tell us;

21     if it doesn't refresh your memory, please tell us as well.

22             THE WITNESS:  I think I refer in the article somewhere that I

23     talk about the peaceful reintegration of the Republica Serb Krajina.  I

24     didn't know it was specifically Z-4.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

Page 7286

 1             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Nevertheless, even if you didn't know it was plan Z-4, you were

 3     aware that some sort of negotiations were -- peace negotiations were

 4     going on between Zagreb and Knin, and I'm referring to paragraph 2 on

 5     page 2 of your article.

 6        A.   I was aware.

 7        Q.   Do you know, Mr. Dangerfield, who Mr. Leonid Kerestedzijanc was

 8     at the time?

 9        A.   No, I didn't.

10        Q.   Mr. Kerestedzijanc was the first Russian Ambassador to the

11     Republic of Croatia; and along with Mr. Peter Galbraith, he played a

12     major role in the attempt to realise the Z-4 plan.

13             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can I have 3D00-0777 called up,

14     please.

15        Q.   I will now show you an article published in the Croatian press,

16     in February last year, an interview with Mr. Kerestedzijanc where he

17     mentions the plan Z-4 and the reaction of Milan Martic to the

18     negotiations about this plan.

19             I'll refer you just to one portion of that article that is

20     relevant for our purposes, where it is said that upon his arrival to

21     Knin, Mr. Kerestedzijanc, who had previously talked to Mr. Tudjman as

22     well, had wanted to hand over the plan for reintegration without any

23     conflict to Mr. Martic; whereas, the latter answered briefly, "We just

24     won't take that into our hands," and that put[paid to any peaceful

25     negotiations.

Page 7287

 1             Do you know from any other source about the response of

 2     then-authorities in Knin to the peace negotiations?

 3        A.   No, I don't know.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, I think I earlier expressed that this

 5     courtroom is not a place where we inform witnesses about events, but that

 6     this is a place where witnesses still the Court what they've observed so

 7     that the Court can make the determinations.  I must say the quantity of

 8     rather long questions, including documents, including plans, et cetera,

 9     which ones asked to the witness if he knows anything about and the answer

10     is "no" and then the next series, is not something that the Chamber

11     considers to be of great assistance.

12             Please proceed.

13             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I will go on, Your Honour.  I

14     will tender this as a document, please, as evidence.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo.

16             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, I think, under the standard the Court

17     applied with respect to the Fisk article, I don't know that this article

18     really has any foundation to come in.  The witness doesn't know anything

19     about it, doesn't indicate that he is quoting anything, a party of the

20     case.

21             So, on that basis, I would --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, in what respect is this different

23     from the Fisk.

24             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, I would say that on his article, in

25     page 2, the witness is referring to the peace negotiations between

Page 7288

 1     Krajina officials and representative of the Croatian government, and he

 2     is also referring to the visit Mr. Akashi to Knin, and he is also

 3     referring to the Geneva peace talk negotiations, which are all very, very

 4     close connected to the Z-4 plan.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 6             MR. MIKULICIC:  Although the witness is not ware specifically of

 7     what the Z-4 plan means, but the subject of this negotiation is, in fact,

 8     the framework is Z-4.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Do I understand that whatever press publication

10     there has been, written by whomever, published wherever, which deals with

11     these matters is for that reason where the witness could not add anything

12     to that admissible evidence.

13             MR. MIKULICIC:  No necessary, Your Honour, of course.  But I

14     would also refer to the witness testimony of Ambassador Galbraith on that

15     portion as well, when he also said about the -- how Milan Martic was

16     refusing the Z-4 plan.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber will consider whether or not to admit

18     this in evidence.

19             Mr. Registrar, the number?

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit number D717,

21     marked for identification.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  D717 keeps that status for the time being.

23             Please proceed.

24             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Dangerfield, more than once in the course of

Page 7289

 1     your evidence, you emphasised that at the time of these events you were

 2     only 25, and that you experienced and viewed certain things differently

 3     from the way you do today.

 4             In that context, I would like to refer you to your own article,

 5     paragraph 3 on page 2, where you refer to the peace negotiations in

 6     Geneva, and you say:  [In English] "My personal feelings were that I

 7     would actually like to be in war."  Then you said:  "I had missed out on

 8     the Gulf War; and if you do nothing else in the armed forces, it is

 9     undoubtedly the pinnacle of your career."

10             [Interpretation] How are we to understand that you were actually

11     wishing for a war and the breakdown of peace negotiations, in view of the

12     duties you were performing for the forces of the United Nations which, by

13     their nature, are peace forces?

14        A.   That is why I joined the army.  I didn't join the UN.

15        Q.   Further on, in paragraph 4, you said:  "I sat listening to the

16     BBC World service news bulletin [Previous translation continues] ... [In

17     English] "... watching the BBC World news programme on Sky television,

18     almost hoping that the talk would fail and break up.  That way, I would

19     almost certainly get the war that I hoped for."

20             [Interpretation} Would you give us the same explanation for this

21     statement?

22        A.   Yes.  I would give the same explanation and I wouldn't change my

23     mind today.  After 16 years in the army, I left and I still didn't

24     experience war.  It is a regret that I never experienced it.  I spent 16

25     years training, to do what?

Page 7290

 1        Q.   And when the bombing of Knin began, so that was the war that you

 2     were wishing for and hoping for, then it must have been fun to you.  At

 3     least on page 3, in the penultimate paragraph, you said:  "It was,

 4     however, amusing eating my breakfast with helmet and a flak jacket on.

 5             Can we ascribe this statement to your youth, or was it really

 6     amusing to have a helmet and a flak jacket on during breakfast, during

 7     bombing?

 8        A.   I think the word "fun" would be wrong.  I thought it was

 9     fantastic, and I thought it was quite an odd experience eating my

10     breakfast wearing a helmet and flak jacket.  I suppose the amusing part

11     was when the initial bombardment came, I ran for the bunker clad only in

12     a towel.  That is the amusing bit.

13        Q.   Well, then, Mr. Dangerfield, you have raised this story yourself,

14     this story with the towel, that is mentioned throughout different

15     articles.  But the fact is you had a jacket on.  In fact, you had a

16     jacket and your shoes that were carrying and that you had taken off

17     before taking a shower, right?

18        A.   We'll get the order right.  I got up, I had a shower, I was

19     getting dry in my bedroom when the bombardment started.  To save my

20     dignity, I put a towel round myself, and I grabbed my helmet and my flak

21     jacket and my webbing and my rifle and my pistol and my boots and my

22     uniform, and I ran for the bunker.

23        Q.   All right.  This topic is not so important as to waste precious

24     court time on it.

25             Let us move to another subject, which is important, and that's

Page 7291

 1     Grubori village.

 2             Mr. Dangerfield, page 6, paragraph 3 of your article from 1995,

 3     you say that:  "In the morning on Saturday, 26 August, Andy ..." --  that

 4     was your driver.  Correct?

 5        A.   That's correct.

 6        Q.   You went to the Serb village Grubori in Plavno valley to the

 7     north-east of Knin.  My first question about this would be:  Why did you

 8     go to Grubori village, you and Andy, your driver?

 9        A.   I'm fairly certain that we weren't the first members of the UN

10     forces to go there, but I think there were either rumours or someone knew

11     of it, and, therefore, I went up there for independent verification.

12        Q.   Did you go to Grubori because it was your only decision or you

13     received an order from your superior officers?

14        A.   I don't remember, to be honest.

15        Q.   You go on to say that you were accompanying Mr. Richard Bremford,

16     who was working for UN Television.  Was anyone else, apart from you, your

17     driver Andy, and Mr. Richard Bremford, among the persons who arrived at

18     the Grubori on the morning of the 26th of August?

19        A.   Yes.  I'm fairly certain I had a Canadian with me.  It would

20     almost certainly have been Phil Berikoff.

21        Q.   [In English] "As we draw into the village, you could smell the

22     rancid fumes of houses that had been burned not 12 hours earlier.  We

23     were greeted by the most distressing site that I have ever witnessed.

24     All women crying and wailing accompanied by three old men."

25             [Interpretation] Do you recall how many they were, those elderly

Page 7292

 1     women you saw at Grubori?

 2        A.   No, I don't.

 3        Q.   [In English] "We knew at once that something was dreadfully

 4     wrong.  We discovered that night before the Croats had come, they had

 5     burned the village and slaughtered the men and livestock."

 6             [Interpretation] How did you discover that, that Croats had been

 7     in the village the night before?

 8        A.   Because Richard Bremford spoke fluent Serbo-Croat and Russian, I

 9     believe, and he had spoken to the villagers and that was the answer that

10     he had got.

11        Q.   Had you received a report or did you observe personally how many

12     men had been killed?

13        A.   Two men had been killed, and I describe that in the next

14     paragraph.

15        Q.   In the last paragraph, you say that when you entered a house, a

16     woman showed you her husband lying face down on the floor in a pool of

17     blood and that you saw two 7.62-millimetre casings.

18             Then you go on to say:  "The corpse was still fresh," and I will

19     quote you:  [Previous translation continues] ... [In English] "... seeped

20     slowly across the floor."

21             [Interpretation] Is this a good description of what you have

22     seen, Mr. Dangerfield?

23        A.   I think so.

24        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, in the course of your training, were given any

25     lectures on the basic of forensics and crime investigation?

Page 7293

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   You say towards the end of this paragraph, the man lying on the

 3     floor, [Previous translation continues] ... [In English] ... had had his

 4     throat slit."

 5             [Interpretation] How did you infer that the wound you describe

 6     occurred as a result of slitting the throat, not something else?

 7        A.   The man was on the floor, there was a huge line across his

 8     throat, the flesh was parted, there was blood coming out of it, and that

 9     was a natural assumption for me to take.

10        Q.   Have you ever in your military service - and that includes later

11     events; I mean later than 1995 - have occasion to see a wound caused by a

12     bullet when it grazes the skin?

13        A.   Yes.  We are given fairly regular medical training within the

14     British Army, particularly prior to deploying on operations.  We're shown

15     all sorts of various different potential injuries, and we're all taught

16     how to deal with them.  Some of our young soldiers go on to do some

17     fairly specialist training to deal with all sorts of different injuries

18     that not everyone is capable of - not necessarily capable of - but

19     particularly wants to do.

20             So the standard of training has improved over the years and is

21     very high; so, yes, I have.

22        Q.   When you observed this scene, were you aware that you were

23     actually on a scene that needs to be investigated by the police and their

24     forensic teams?

25        A.   No, I wasn't, and that's where I refer to the improvements in our

Page 7294

 1     standard of train.  The experiences learned by the British Army in

 2     Northern Ireland have been transferred over to the training that we have

 3     for all other theatres of operations; and.  Therefore, in this day and

 4     age, yes, with the experience I have now, I most certainly would not have

 5     gone in there.  I would have sealed the scene off for specialists to

 6     come in.

 7        Q.   Who else entered the room where this man was lying on the floor?

 8        A.   I think Richard Bremford with the television cameras was first in

 9     there; but I don't know who had been in before us in the morning, the day

10     before, or, indeed, who went in there after us.  I cannot account for

11     those individuals.

12        Q.   [In English] Fair enough.  [Interpretation] I apologise if my

13     question was not understood; that means I did not put it very well.

14             My question was and in fact, it should have been:  At the moment,

15     how many people were in the room where the corpse was lying on the floor?

16        A.   Well, there was the dead man.  I think there was the two women.

17     They were there for certain.  I think standing at the doorway was the

18     camera team, so I don't believe they were actually in the room at the

19     time.  And I would have been there with my driver, at the doorway

20     possibly.  And there would have been the other people who had met us as

21     we arrived Grubori.  But I'm fairly certain this Court would have seen

22     the UN TV footage of the scene anyway.

23        Q.   How long did you stay in Grubori?

24        A.   I think it would have been approximately an hour but I cannot be

25     certain.  I didn't spend all that there, that was for sure.

Page 7295

 1        Q.   Do you remember where you went after Grubori?

 2        A.   No, I don't.

 3        Q.   Did you inform anyone, any of your superiors or civilian

 4     authorities in Knin, about this?

 5        A.   If I hadn't been asked to go there by any of my superiors in

 6     Knin, and I had discovered this place myself, I would have almost

 7     certainly informed them.  But I had no liaison with the authorities in

 8     Knin.  That was not for me; that was for the Canadian headquarters to

 9     establish.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, before we continue with the aftermath

11     of the visit, I would like it ask a few clarify questions.

12             Mr. Dangerfield, you went to Grubori because there were rumours

13     or you said there was something was happening there.  How much time did

14     it take to you get there, approximately?

15             THE WITNESS:  To be honest, sir, I can't remember whether it took

16     an hour or two hours.  I just don't know which route I took there, and I

17     can't actually remember where it is in relation to Knin on a map.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  So you say anything between one and two hours.

19             THE WITNESS:  Well, I can't remember the road I went along and

20     the tracks because, obviously, a good road could be very quick, a very

21     poor track can take some time.  I just simply can't give you an accurate

22     answer on that, sir.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then my next question is:  Did you learn from

24     the people, Mr. Bremford was able to speak with, about when this had

25     happened, this killing of the man that was found in his bedroom.

Page 7296

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  I think we established that happened on

 2     the evening of the night before when we went there.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now you described the corpse.  May I take it

 4     that approximately what time did you leave; do you remember.  You said in

 5     the morning, but it can be --

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  I mean, I think we got there at 8.00 or 9.00

 7     in the morning, something like that; and we would have been there an

 8     hour, so leaving --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  So you were looking at a corpse which as you

10     describe was still fresh; but from what you tell me now, it must have --

11     the person must have been killed at least four to five hours, if not more

12     before that.

13             THE WITNESS:  Absolutely.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now you're describing that the blood seeped

15     slowly across the floor.  Is that what you actually saw, that the blood

16     was still -- I'm not a native speaking, but "seeping" means going taking

17     a very slow course.  After five six hours of a person had died, you saw

18     the blood still slowly moving?

19             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, there was very thick pool of blood, and I'm

20     fairly certain that it was moving slowly across the wooden floor.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We might have to verify that with data on

22     coagulation of blood, which I just shared this with the parties.  From

23     what I learned about this in the past, in order to accept this, that

24     would certainly need expert opinion.

25             Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

Page 7297

 1             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  By the way I'm looking at the clock.  How long --

 3             MR. MIKULICIC:  I will be finished within five minutes.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Five minutes, that's accepted.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 6             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, while you were on the territory of the former

 8     Yugoslavia, let me ask you, first of all, how long -- how much time did

 9     you spend in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

10        A.   Two to three months.

11        Q.   In those two or three months, did you get to know some people

12     that you had contact with, the locals as it were?  I don't mean here

13     members of the peacekeeping forces or some other agency which was not

14     local on the territory of --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter is not sure whether it was

16     Croatia or Bosnia.

17             MR. MIKULICIC:  Both.  Croatia and Bosnia.

18        A.   Within the British Army, we have always had a policy of getting

19     to know the people whose country you're in, so it was important for me to

20     establish relations within the community with anyone really.  So, in the

21     cafes, I would go in and have some particularly strong coffee.

22     Occasionally, I was offered some slivovitz, just one.  So, yes, it was

23     very good to meet people, and, actually, you get a much better

24     understanding of the situation.  And I was fairly unique because I had

25     had the experience with the Bosnians, I had had the experience in the

Page 7298

 1     Serb Krajina, and I had the experience with the Croatians.  So I got to

 2     met everyone, and I felt very privileged to have had that opportunity.

 3        Q.   I will quote your words, Mr. Dangerfield.  This is on page 7 of

 4     your article, Exhibit P699, second paragraph.

 5             You say the following:  [Previous translation continues] ... [In

 6     English] "... have behaved like animals.  I do not side with the Serbs.

 7     The people from the Balkans are all bad as each other.  Everything is

 8     about revenge."

 9             [Interpretation] Mr. Dangerfield, you wrote this when you were 25

10     years old.  Now, from this perspective, have you been able to put a

11     distance between your words then, that the Croats behaved like animals

12     and that everybody was as bad as each other in the Balkans, meaning the

13     people there?

14        A.   When I wrote this, I didn't expect it to be picked over 13 years

15     ago -- 13 years later, rather.  Some of the language is, indeed, strong;

16     but, as I said, I was 25 and impressionable.  So 13 years on, would I

17     change what I had written, do I have a softer view?

18        Q.   [In English] okay.  [Interpretation] All right.  Now -

19             JUDGE ORIE:  I was waiting for an answer to the question whether

20     the witness had a softer view.  He started thinking about it, and I think

21     he wanted to share with us the outcome.

22             MR. MIKULICIC:  I was impressed with the clock hands.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I do understand.

24             Could you tell us whether you developed a softer view?

25             THE WITNESS:  This is my personal opinion only:  I think you

Page 7299

 1     meddle in other people's business at your own peril.  I have an

 2     understanding as to why people do things, but it's not for me to get

 3     hooked up in those views in this forum.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So you are not answering the question.

 5             Mr. Mikulicic, you have one minute extra.

 6             MR. MIKULICIC:  I only one question, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Please.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   In this paragraph, you also quote Lord Clarendon, and you say the

10     following [Previous translation continues] ... [In English] " ... a half

11     ago, Lord Clarendon wrote:  'We are willing to do anything for the

12     maintenance of peace, except committing ourselves to a policy of

13     action.'"

14             [Interpretation] And this is where your quote ends; however, Lord

15     Clarendon's quote continues, and it reads [Previous translation

16     continues] ... [In English] "... after the policy of action," the

17     quotation goes like this:  "... that we could not justify and which would

18     not be sanctioned by public opinion at home."

19             [Interpretation] Is there any particular reason, Mr. Dangerfield,

20     that you omitted the last portion of this quotation in your article?

21        A.   No, there isn't.

22             MR. MIKULICIC:  I have no further questions, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Mikulicic.

24             Mr. Russo, could you give us an impression of how many time you

25     would need.

Page 7300

 1             MR. RUSSO:  Probably not more than five minutes, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Other parties, no.  That means we will have

 3     some time left.  And since today is the last day before the recess and

 4     since there is still quite a lot of MFIs to be dealt with, we will see

 5     how much time remains.  So if every could be as prepared as good as

 6     possible, because we have not by received the final list by

 7     Mr. Registrar, to se what we can do.  If we can't do it, perhaps we do it

 8     after the recess.

 9             We have a break until five minutes to 1.00.

10                           --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, are you ready to re-examination the

13     witness.

14             MR. RUSSO:  I am, Mr. President.  Thank you.

15             Mr. Registrar, if we could please have Exhibit D89.

16                           Re-examination by Mr. Russo:

17             JUDGE ORIE:  While we are waiting for it, Mr. Kehoe, I think you

18     still owed me a page and line reference.

19             MR. KEHOE:  I do.  The page and line reference was, in fact,

20     the -- well, first of all, with regard to the witness --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm talking about C3, and then the protected

22     witness.

23             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour, and I checked.  The Witness 56, he

24     did not talk about C3, but C2 and C4.  And with regard to Colonel

25     Leslie's, the reference point, it was started off from his statement

Page 7301

 1     where he laid that out as this air defence battery being 300 metres

 2     south-west of the UN compound which led to the designation.

 3             Your Honour, you're 100 percent correct that he says with regard

 4     to that, on page 2130, at line 8 to 10:  "The only reason I ask for a

 5     little bit of more specificity is I can't recall if that's the exact

 6     location of C3, the rebel anti-aircraft facility, but, yes."

 7             That is the high ground, Judge, and --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm not seeking argument at this moment.  It's just

 9     where I could find the first point of reference you gave and where I

10     informed you about what I found there.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, sir.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  I had difficulties in going through three days of

13     transcript to find the other reference, but now it's there, or it is not

14     there, but that's clear.

15             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, sir.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, we have now the document on the screen.

17             Apologies, Mr. Dangerfield, but --

18             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19             Mr. Registrar, if we could take this to the fourth page of the

20     exhibit.

21        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, if you recall, you were shown this exhibit by

22     Mr. Kehoe and specifically directed to the second paragraph there, where

23     it indicates ARSK soldiers of unknown strength were seen occupying

24     defensive positions in general, area of Strmica, with the grid reference.

25     Tanks and mortgages were seen in the same positions.  And then at 05,

Page 7302

 1     1815, they fired 12 rounds of arty from Strmica towards Knin.

 2             Mr. Dangerfield, you were a regimental tank commander.  Is that

 3     right?

 4        A.   That's correct.

 5        Q.   And you had been to Strmica prior to Operation Storm.  Correct?

 6        A.   On numerous occasions.

 7        Q.   Are you able to tell the Court whether or not a tank firing from

 8     Strmica could reach Knin?

 9        A.   In the direct fire roll, no; in the indirect fire roll, extremely

10     unlikely.

11        Q.   Can you explain the distinction, please?

12        A.   In the direct fire role, that would have been the tank commander

13     being able to visually see his target, so he has to have line of sight.

14     And, certainly, from my experience, that maximum range is about two

15     kilometres in the direct fire role.

16             In the indirect fire role, you would elevate the gun to an angle

17     of evaluation similar to how an artillery fire piece fires up in the air.

18     This is a technique certainly in the British Army we don't practice

19     anymore; but I know that if we were to fire out that range, the maximum

20     range we could achieve is ten kilometres, and I believe the distance from

21     Strmica to Knin is considerably more.

22        Q.   Are you able to tell the Court whether mortars could reach from

23     Strmica to Knin?

24        A.   I know an 80-millimetre mortar probably has a range of

25     about 5.650 metres; 120-millimetre mortar might go out to about ten or 12

Page 7303

 1     kilometres.  But, again, a mortar, I don't believe, could reach Knin from

 2     Strmica.

 3        Q.   And did you have occasion to speak with any of the Kenyan

 4     Battalion officers who had manned the Strmica point any time after

 5     Operation Storm?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Dangerfield.

 8             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. President, Your Honours, I have no further yeses.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Any need for further questions.

10             Mr. Kehoe.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Just briefly.

12                           Further cross-examination by Mr. Kehoe:

13        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, you don't even know what weapons systems when it

14     comes to mortars they were using because this report doesn't have it,

15     does it?

16        A.   That report that I have just seen says "mortars."

17        Q.   You don't know what type of mortar -- what -- what level of

18     mortar they had, do you?

19        A.   The maximum size mortar they could have had was 120-millimetre,

20     and that was --

21        Q.   Excuse me, excuse me, excuse me.  The question is --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, could you please allow the witness to

23     finish his answer.

24             You said the maximum size of mortar they could have had was.

25             THE WITNESS:  Was 120-millimetre, sir, so that couldn't have

Page 7304

 1     reached Knin.

 2             MR. KEHOE:

 3        Q.   The maximum mortar size was 120, and who had 120?  Is it your

 4     testimony that the ARSK had a 120 -- the maximum range of an ARSK mortar

 5     was with 120-millimetre.  Is that your testimony?

 6        A.   Could you say that, again, please.

 7        Q.   You said to us, in direct examination, that the maximum range on

 8     a mortar was ten to 12 kilometres, didn't you?

 9        A.   I said approximately, yes.

10        Q.   And do you know -- do you know, as you sit here, if those mortars

11     were being fired into Knin from a range of ten to 12 kilometres?  As you

12     sit here, do you know that?

13        A.   I don't know whether they were.  I was questioned on the report

14     that you put up.

15        Q.   And based on the report, you have no idea what the ARSK was

16     actually firing, do you?

17        A.   I'm saying that at the range, they couldn't have reached Knin.

18     I'm not saying I knew what they were firing; I'm just saying the range

19     was too great for them to reach Knin.

20        Q.   My question to you, sir, is:  Based on the report, you have no

21     idea what of ARSK was actually firing?

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.  Mr. Kehoe, that's what the witness said

23     several times.

24             MR. KEHOE:  I understand, Judge.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Then the apparent issue was whether the projectiles

Page 7305

 1     that were fired at that moment could have possibly reached Knin.

 2             Now we have two categories.  One was dealt with, that's the tank

 3     direct fire, indirect fire; then we have mortars.  Now, the witness, for

 4     one reason or another, tells us that the maximum range for a mortar -

 5     that means whatever mortar you fire, it could never reach any further -

 6     would be ten to 12 kilometres, and he referred to 120-millimetre mortars.

 7             Mr. Dangerfield, are you aware of any higher calibre mortars than

 8     120-millimetre.

 9             THE WITNESS:  I'm not, sir.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Is that on which you base your answer that with the

11     heaviest charge of 120-millimetre, that the range would be at a maximum

12     ten to 12 kilometres, and that, therefore, considering tanks and/or

13     mortars, that neither of them could have fired and have reached Knin from

14     the position where they were observed to have been seen firing?  Is that

15     right?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is my answer, sir.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Now we have a clear answer.

18             Mr. Kehoe, any further questions about this matter to the

19     witness.

20             MR. KEHOE:

21        Q.   Just one last question:  Mr. Dangerfield, you do not know what

22     the ARSK was actually firing at, do you?

23        A.   No, apart from the report that says towards Knin.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. KEHOE:  Nothing further.

Page 7306

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  The Bench has no further questions to you,

 4     Mr. Dangerfield.  You may have noticed that they came already in between.

 5             Since the party have no questions either, this conclude your

 6     testimony in this Court.  I would like to thank you for coming to

 7     The Hague and for answering the questions put to you by the parties and

 8     the Bench, and I wish you a safe trip home again.

 9             Madam Usher, could you please escort Mr. Dangerfield out of the

10     courtroom.

11             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

12                           [The witness stands down]

13             JUDGE ORIE:  I said, before the break, that I would like to try

14     and deal with some MFIs.  Having reviewed this during the break, the

15     lists that were provided to the parties were provided to them only very

16     recently.  I did not find time to go through the lists and having all the

17     details ready to further discuss them with you.  Therefore, I think, as a

18     matter of fact, that if we would deal with the MFI at this moment, that

19     we would waste more time in being confused than that we would get quickly

20     to a result.

21             If the parties consider that there's any specific document that

22     we should deal with before the recess, then I'd like to hear.  Otherwise,

23     I'd like to invite the parties to well prepare for any moment shortly

24     after the recess to deal with that and get the list again as short as the

25     list once was.

Page 7307

 1             Is there any other procedural matter which needs attention at

 2     this moment, and I remind you of the fact that we'll not see each other

 3     for four weeks.

 4             Nothing.  Mr. Russo, Mr. Waespi.  Mr. Tieger is not there to

 5     spoil the quiet atmosphere.

 6             This means that we will take an early break.  We then will

 7     adjourn and we'll resume in four weeks from now.  That will be, if I'm

 8     not mistaken, Mr. Registrar, the 25th of August.  Yes, it is Monday, the

 9     25th of August and we'll be in at quarter past 2.00 in the afternoon in

10     Courtroom II.

11             I wish you at least some relaxation during the recess.  Of

12     course, I'm aware that, for the accused, that that is not the situation

13     which you wish to be in during the summer holidays.  The Chamber is fully

14     aware of that.

15             I hope to see you all back in good health on the 25th of August.

16                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.13 p.m.,

17                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 25th of August,

18                           2008, at 2.15 p.m.