1 Monday, 24 November 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- On resuming at 9.08 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
9 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-06-90-T, The
10 Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina, et al.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
12 The Chamber informs the parties that for a series of reasons
13 we'll not sit on Thursday, and I do understand that this accommodates
14 some of Defence counsel, especially that -- it's for your information.
15 Then Mr. Waespi, before we start, you do remember that the
16 Chamber wished not to be overloaded by exhibits, so therefore, I don't
17 know what you had in your mind, but, of course, the guidance of the
18 Chamber was only to tender to those documents that were referred to in
19 the examination-in-chief. But this is not to say that not -- perhaps a
20 very short list of documents to which reference was made can be tendered
21 from the bar table. But that really should be extremely limited, if
22 what is clear to you.
23 MR. WAESPI: It is, Mr. President. In fact, I will be focusing
24 on tendering a few remaining documents, I think about 12, and perhaps if
25 there's a balance of a few more, I would tender them by bar table, but I
1 will see how it goes.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that.
3 Mr. Theunens, I want to remind you that you are still bound by
4 the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony.
5 Mr. Waespi, please proceed.
6 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
7 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]
8 Examination by Mr. Waespi: [Continued]
9 Q. Good morning, Mr. Theunens.
10 A. Good morning, Mr. Waespi.
11 Q. Let's conclude the topic notice with four documents. The first
12 one is 65 ter 1998. And this is a document, a daily report, up to 1900
13 hours, dated 6th of August, by Colonel Ivan Zelic.
14 First of all, can you tell us who Ivan Zelic is?
15 A. Your Honours, Colonel Ivan Zelic is the assistant commander for
16 political affairs of political matters in the Split Military District.
17 Q. Let's go to English page 3, and I think it is the second page in
18 B/C/S. And I quote from the middle of the page:
19 "The entry itself of our members and the treatment of civilians
20 was proper and at the required level. However, the behaviour of our
21 members regarding property found was catastrophic. Immediately after
22 entry the devastation of buildings and uncontrolled collection of war
23 booty began, but VP units had already entered the town and manned the
24 main check-points preventing further destruction and devastation of
1 What's the significance of this document, in terms of notice,
2 Mr. Theunens?
3 A. Your Honours, this document, like any other document we have seen
4 so far should not be considered in isolation, and before answering the
5 question, I would like to come back to my testimony of Friday when I was
6 questioned in court about possible reasons for General Tolj to issue an
7 instruction on, was it on the 1st or 2nd of August, 1995, during or after
8 Ljeto, that the church in Glamoc should not be burned. I presented what
9 I described in my testimony as a quite likely option during my testimony,
10 obviously, I had not analysed or commented on Tolj's instruction in the
11 war diary or the operation diary in my report because it was just an
12 isolated information.
13 Analysis not about trying to draw conclusions from one line or
14 two-line entries in the document, but it is about distinguishing or
15 identifying patterns and trends. And in light of that, on Friday, it was
16 concluded that my comment or the -- what I described as the quite likely
17 option was outside of my field of expertise or maybe even lacking
18 neutrality. I think that is a serious issue. Because as a professional
19 intelligence analyst, one of the things you learn to be careful with
20 biased, and we are biased. We are biased by the area the part of the
21 world where we are born, the education we are undergo, the people we
22 meet, the people who influence us.
23 The most important to Be aware of that and to try to take
24 measures against it. And intelligence analysts are trained in that, at
25 least the analysts I know. One of the basic works in that area is the
1 Phycology Of Intelligence Analysis by Richard J. Hoyer.
2 To come back to this question, the document cannot be considered
3 in isolation. We have here the assistant commander for political affairs
4 who informs his superior along the professional line, General Tolj, about
5 the situation in Knin on the 6th of August. We know from the entries in
6 the war diary and other information which is discussed on page 127 in my
7 report, that it are the 4rd and 7th Guards Brigade who enter anyone in
8 the course of the morning of the 5th of August and then seize control
9 over the entire city.
10 The report by the assistant commander for political affairs is
11 useful, but it's not only the only source of information for the
12 operational commander to know what is happening. We know that he has to
13 be aware of the situation. He would have been informed also through
14 other channels. For example, the military police as well as the
15 commanders of the 4th and the 7th Guards Brigade when they inform the
16 commander about the degree of implementation of the orders he has
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
19 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, if I could just object, note an
20 objection to the forms of the question. I think given the answer, the
21 open ended question about what is the significance of this tends to
22 invite the witness to give rather long answers and to some extent a
23 speech at the beginning. And if we could focus the questioning to get a
24 focussed answer from the witness, that would be my objection.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
1 MR. WAESPI: That is a perfectly proper way to ask an expert
2 about a document. I think the witness, in this specific incident, wanted
3 to get back to a comment he made on Friday. That is the issue about the
4 perhaps length of this answer.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At the same time, if there is any reason to go
6 back to what he testified earlier, then would you please guide him.
7 And, first of all, the question was whether -- what the relevance
8 was, what the significance, but it was specified as far as notice is
10 Mr. Waespi, to the extent possible, please be focussed in your
11 questions, and there's some merit in Mr. Misetic says, although not such
12 a level that I am stopping you, but I invite you to put questions as much
13 possible focussed.
14 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to tender this
15 document, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
17 Mr. Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1132.
19 JUDGE ORIE: P1132 is admitted into evidence.
20 MR. WAESPI:
21 Q. Let's go to next document, which is 65 ter 2304.
22 Now, this is a document dated 10th of August, 1995, and it is an
23 overall report on the security situation in the zone of responsibility of
24 OG north, and it comes from the assistant commander for SIS, OG north,
25 Zeljko Pavic.
1 Now we have seen this author before. Can you tell us again who
2 he is.
3 A. Your Honours, Zeljko Pavic, as we can see on page 10 of the
4 report is the assistant commander for SIS, which stands for security an
5 information in OG north, and OG north is one of the four OGs that still
6 existed at the time of the report within Split Military District.
7 The main units ever OG north are the 4th Guards Brigade and the
8 7th Guards Brigade. There are other units included, and these can be
9 found on English page 101, as well as 106 in my report, second part.
10 Q. Let go to English page 7, B/C/S page 3. The English at the top
11 of the page. And I quote:
12 "As HV members entered the town of Knin, some of them did not act
13 in a civilized manner. They were demolishing shops and running tanks
14 over cars."
15 And the next quote is on page 9 in English:
16 "In keeping with an order of the Split ZP commander --
17 Colonel General Ante Gotovina. Military police officers are to regroup
18 their forces and assign enough members to secure all of the
19 aforementioned depots."
20 Now, does that confirm or not what you told us or not on Friday
21 about the subordination of the military police?
22 A. Indeed, Your Honours, we see that -- this is discussed in my
23 report, English part 2. English pages 206 to 223. I discussed the use
24 of military police by the Split Military District during and after
25 Operation Storm. And from the documents I have reviewed there, one can
1 conclude that prior to the 9th of August, military police are mainly used
2 for combat tasks, and in the regular -- for the regular military police
3 tasks, they are subordinated to the operational commander. The Military
4 District Commander General Gotovina or the Operational Group Commander.
5 And then after the 9th of August, 9th, 10th of August, we see
6 that military police forces of the 72nd and 73rd Military Police
7 Battalion are increasingly used for what I would describe as traditional
8 military police tasks, i.e., tasks that are also included in Article 10
9 of the 1994 military police rules which is here P880. And, yeah, this
10 entry, it states what is it states. It is General Gotovina who can issue
11 orders on the regular tasks of the military police.
12 I would also like to draw your attention to an entry that was not
13 addressed by Mr. Waespi, and this is an entry on English page 4. This is
14 an overall report, not just a 24-hour report covering 24 hours, but it
15 covers actually the conduct and the developments during Operation Storm
16 as well as the aftermath of Operation Storm. And if we go to English
17 page 4, there is a title, 3, Relations And Problems With UNCRO, and the
18 author of the report there states -- and I'm reading from the report:
19 "In the course of the operation, 11 foreign journalists who tried
20 to enter the zone of operations of OG north were sent back from military
21 police check-points in a number of locations."
22 And that I believe is important in light of my previous
24 Q. Thank you --
25 JUDGE ORIE: That seems to be page 2 or 3 in the English, rather
1 than page 4, isn't it?
2 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, okay, we're on the right side of my
3 monitor, I see the first page with the first title. Then the next page
4 should be summary of the operation coordination with SIS officers.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. What it should be, I -- here we have relations
6 and problems with UNCRO which, for me, appears on page 2 at the bottom.
7 Just for those who will consult the record at a later stage.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. WAESPI: I will correct that. I would like to tender this
11 JUDGE ORIE: I hear of no objections.
12 Mr. Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, I need make a correction to the
14 record. The last exhibit, which was 65 ter 01998, should have been
15 Exhibit P1133. The current exhibit, 65 ter 02304, becomes Exhibit P1134.
16 JUDGE ORIE: It is now put on the record what P1133 is, and that
17 was already admitted into evidence. P1134 is admitted into evidence.
18 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to move to 65
19 ter 5796. And, first of all, I'd like to orally move this document on to
20 the 65 ter list, because it's not yet there.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. -- I think the guidance was that if there were
22 any objections -- if there are no objections against admission, this is
23 understood to no objections against adding it to the 65 ter list. So we
24 do not deal with it, with this witness at least, separately.
25 Please proceed.
1 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
2 Q. This is a report dated the 9th of August, 1995 from Colonel
3 Mirko Klavic to Colonel General Ante Gotovina. And it is talks in the
4 first paragraph about "the area of responsibility of the 142nd Home Guard
5 Regiment that there were incursions into their zone by military and
6 civilian individuals from the direction of Drnis. This was followed by
7 raids on houses, torching, destruction, and the taking away of combat
8 hardware and other material means which, objectively, from their
9 positions, our soldiers were not able to and were not in a position to
10 stop. Similar occurrences, without the torching, took place in the
11 course of 7 and 8 August also."
12 Now, does that confirm or not what you told us earlier about
13 notice to the commander of the Split Military District?
14 A. It does, Your Honours, and I would like to add that we are
15 confronted with a particular problem here because these locations:
16 Miocic, Biocic, Kricke are small hamlets, which are located just east of
17 the Drnis-Knin road, and based on my understanding of deployment maps and
18 the zone of responsibility, this is on the limit between the zone of
19 responsibility of OG Sibenik, or Operation Group Sibenik, I apologise.
20 The 142nd Home Guard Regiment belongs to OG Sibenik which is located on
21 the western side, and then we have OG Sinj which is located on the
22 eastern side, whereby the 6th Home Guard Regiment belongs to OG Sinj.
23 So the commander of the 6th Home Guard Regiment complains with
24 the his superior, the commander of the Split Military District, about a
25 problem that he notices in his zone of responsibility which is created by
1 members of a neighbouring unit. So the limits between zones of
2 responsibility can be problematic in the military, in particular if
3 they're not clearly visible, and this is not only during the conduct of
4 operations but also afterwards, i.e., when consolidating control over a
5 particular area.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, before you continue you say that he is
7 complaining about problems created by members of a neighbouring unit.
8 Isn't he dealing with military and civilian individuals? Because before
9 you continue, what you are telling us now is that a purely -- a matter of
10 military from other units interfering, or is it a matter ever military
11 and civilian individuals?
12 THE WITNESS: That's correct, Mr. President. It is a matter of
13 military and civilians. However, again, based on the other documents I
14 have reviewed and also based on doctrine, a military commander is
15 responsible for his zone of responsibility.
16 When we discussed the plan of security, on Friday, there were
17 instructions given on the control of the access of civilians. It is my
18 understanding of military doctrine as well as the other documents I
19 reviewed, that certainly at that early stage, the military commander is
20 in charge, and he has to use his assets, his troop, military police. If
21 there is civilian police, he has to coordinate with them in order to
22 prevent people who are not authorized to be present in his zone of
23 responsibility from preventing to enter his zone of responsibility.
24 Because the civilians can be anyone. They can indeed be
25 displaced persons who want to go back to their house. They can be people
1 coming from somewhere elsewhere else with criminal motives. They can
2 also be members of the enemy forces who have stayed behind and want to
3 create problems.
4 So what I am trying to is that the military commander has all
5 interest in establishing the highest degree possible of control in his
6 zone of responsibility.
7 The fact that the commander of the 6th Home Guard Regiment
8 addresses his concern to General Gotovina indicates that he expected is
9 General Gotovina is someone who can assist him in solving the problem.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Where do you find this indication?
11 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, this document, this report, is based
12 on the address list only directed to the commander of the Split Military
13 District, Colonel General Ante Gotovina, as we see on the front page, top
14 right corner on the monitor.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see that. But is there any clear
16 expectation, please assist me in this or that way, or is he just
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, in the military reporting is done
19 with a particular goal. That's why there are templates for reports, and
20 that's why also instructions are given as to what has to be reported.
21 If the commander of the 6th Home Guard Regiment reports his
22 information to General Gotovina, he does it with a particular purpose.
23 Otherwise I assume there would be many other topics he could contact
24 General Gotovina about.
25 The commander of the 6th Home Guard Regiment knows that is he
1 responsible to General Gotovina for the situation in his zone of
2 responsibility. That is something we can derive from doctrine, as well
3 as earlier documents or orders we have seen where the superior commander
4 in the last paragraph of the order usually states that he holds the
5 addressee of the order responsible for the implementation of the order.
6 So the commander of the 6th Home Guard Regiment knows that
7 Gotovina, excuse me, General Gotovina will hold him responsible for the
8 situation in his zone of responsibility. The commander of the 6th Home
9 Guard Regiment feels, or has the opinion, that he is not able to maintain
10 order in his zone of responsibility because of problems created actually
11 by what he describes as military and civilian arriving from the zone of
12 responsibility of the 142nd Home Guard Regiment. So at least from the
13 military point of view, it is logical that he seeks assistance through a
14 report from his superior commander.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Or he reports that he has done everything he could
16 and that he failed to keep matters under control.
17 I do not see anywhere that he says, Please assist me or -- you
18 say that is all implied and that's logic, rather than ...
19 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, when we go to part 1 of the report, I
20 have a section on the planning and the conduct of commander operations.
21 We have discussed the importance of situational awareness, that a
22 commander has no know what is happening in his zone of responsibility.
23 It is not just an exchange of knowledge. The information that is being
24 exchanged has to serve a purpose because command and control is a
25 process, which means that there is a continuous flow of orders, and in
1 order to -- to issue those orders well, there has to be information,
2 situation on the situation in the area, relevant information that will be
3 on enemy situation, friendly situation, the terrain, and all other
4 aspects that are relevant in view of the eyes of the military commander
5 in order to be able to do his -- his job as a military commander. It is
6 clear and it is correct that the commander of the 6th Home Guard Regiment
7 does not ask General Gotovina explicitly to do something, but at least
8 from the military point of view, it doesn't make sense to just report
9 something without anybody acting upon that report or upon that
11 The military information that is being shared has to serve a
12 purpose. That's why it's shared.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
14 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to tender this
16 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
17 Mr. Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit P1135.
19 JUDGE ORIE: P1135 is admitted into evidence.
20 MR. WAESPI: And the last document I'd like to discuss in this
21 section is 65 ter 3461.
22 Q. And this is a document dated 23rd August 1995. Subject,
23 operative group north, evening briefing and intelligence data. And it's
24 authored by leader Zoran Lasic. And the specific entry I'd like to refer
25 you to is on page 2 in the English. In the middle, "... propaganda, the
1 problem of looting, and arson on the territory of municipality of Glamoc
2 and Grahovo is present again. Such behaviour causes a great damage to
3 the Croatian people and to the promotion of our state in the world. The
4 problem: Discipline an organisation."
5 Now first of all who is Zoran Lasic?
6 A. Mr. Zoran Lasic is the leader of the SIS in the operative team or
7 the OG north. On the 18th of August, and that is discussed in part 2 of
8 the English version of my report. On the 18th August, General Gotovina
9 issues an order to rename the operation groups in the Split Military
10 District. We have then an OG JUG.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
12 MR. MISETIC: I apologise. I think for the sake of clarity, if
13 Mr. Theunens could specify whether this is SIS of the Split Military
14 District or the SIS of the HVO. I think it could be important for the
15 Chamber to know.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you could include an answer to that question
17 in your answer.
18 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Mr. President.
19 So General Gotovina on the 18th of August, issues an order to
20 rename the existing OGs. This order can be find on 65 ter 3361. The
21 previously existing OG Sajkovic becomes OG JUG, south. OG Otric becomes
22 OG Zapad, west, and OG Vrbanja becomes OG north. Brigadier Zeljko
23 Glasnovic [phoen] is a general or an officer of the HVO. However, OG
24 north as well as all elements of OG north including the SIS section of OG
25 north, at that time are subordinated to General Gotovina.
1 As we can see from the document OG north consists of a number of
2 tactical groups which is in line with the doctrine, and in relation to
3 the entry on page -- English page 2, the reference -- the use of the word
4 "again," based on the other documents I reviewed in the preparation of my
5 report, refers to the events that occurred in Grahovo and Glamoc during
6 and after operation Ljeto, i.e., between 28 of July and early August.
7 And here we see that this HVO general expresses his concern about what he
8 describes as the great damage to the Croatian people and the promotion of
9 our state in the world. And I quote:
10 "The problem of looting and arson on the territory of Glamoc
11 Grahovo threatens to create."
12 JUDGE ORIE: So I do then understand that is the -- SIS is an
13 element in the HVO, but subordinated to Operational Group north. Is that
15 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Mr. President. In relation it to
16 this particular SIS cell because there is an SIS department in every
17 unit. There is an assistant commander for SIS in the Split Military
18 District, as well as in the other military districts.
19 JUDGE ORIE: So when you say SIS of the Split Military District
20 -- no. You said SIS, you mean one of the SIS's in Operational Group
21 north, and the one which is part of the HVO which was subordinated at
22 that time.
23 THE WITNESS: Exactly, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
25 Please proceed.
1 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to tender this
3 JUDGE ORIE: Since there are no objections, Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this becomes Exhibit P1136.
5 JUDGE ORIE: P1136 is admitted into evidence.
6 MR. WAESPI: And, Mr. President, I'd also like to tender the next
7 document on this list which is 348 without going into detail, but it is
8 referred to in the report of Mr. Theunens on page 344, and it deals with
9 the same topic.
10 I'd like to tender 65 ter 348, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE ORIE: I hear of no objection.
12 Mr. Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P1137.
14 JUDGE ORIE: P1137 is admitted into evidence.
15 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, Your Honours, I would like to move on
16 to the next topic. That is enforcement. And in this section I would
17 like to refer to approximately six documents.
18 Enforcement is dealt with by Mr. Theunens in paragraph 66 of his
19 executive summary. This is P1113, and I read just one sentence out of
21 "The number of orders the Split Military District Command and its
22 subordinate units issue to prevent arson and looting and the rate at
23 which these orders were released suggests that these orders, as well as
24 the measures by the Split MD
25 enforce them and verify their implementation lack effectiveness."
1 Q. Let's going to the first document, which is 65 ter 4446. And
2 this is a report dated 25th October 1995, titled: Inspection by PD at ZP
4 Lausic. And I would like to go to page 3 of this document, and I quote
5 from paragraph 6 on page 3:
6 "While discipline and order are at an appropriate level as
7 regards the level of responsibility for the execution of tasks, they are
8 not at the necessary level in relation to property (military and
9 civilian) and considering the inclination towards incidents (fights,
10 alcoholism, appropriate dress, et cetera).
11 The difficulty of the situation is exacerbated by a complete lack
12 of a functioning civilian authority (in the liberated areas) and
13 elementary infrastructure (utility services, water electricity
14 et cetera).
15 Due to indisciplined conduct of and a lack of sanctions against
16 what has occurred, the theft of property and arbitrary occupation of
17 structures still persists and could cause wider political damage."
18 What is the significance of this comment of lack of sanctions
19 against what has occurred?
20 A. Just as an introduction, on the first page we can see that these
21 are the findings of a member of the political administration at the
22 Ministry of Defence, findings of an inspection he and his team conducted
23 of the Split Military District Command, as well as two subordinate units.
24 To answer the question, what is described by the author by lack
25 of sanction, is a serious situation -- and this is also described in the
1 doctrines of various armies, and it goes from the lowest level command
2 even from the section leader, i.e., an NCO, to the highest level, that if
3 orders and in particular discipline are not enforced and if no measures
4 are taken against behaviour that is not in line with the regulations,
5 then actually that will be seen as an encouragements by the subordinates
6 to repeat the violations. And in that context, I wish to draw your
7 attention to -- if I remember well, it was Article 7 of the 1992 Code of
8 Discipline where the three goals of military discipline were explained,
9 i.e., to correct the perpetrator; secondly to serve as an example; and
10 thirdly, to allow the functioning of the armed forces.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, may I ask you, the report is about
12 inspection 17th to 20th of October. Could you tell us, for example,
13 where it is described here that the civilian -- the lack of a functioning
14 civilian authority, does that cover that period in October, or does it
15 cover a longer period, or is there any clue as far as the specific
16 time-frame of when specifically this paragraph 6 is concerned?
17 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, this document does not allow to draw
18 any conclusions as to which specific time-period the author is
20 As I mentioned at the beginning of my testimony, I have not
21 analysed the functioning of civilian authorities, expect for the
22 functioning of the Knin garrison command. However, the zone of
23 responsibility of the Split Military District covers a much wider area,
24 so I'm not in a position to draw conclusions on the functioning of
25 civilian authorities in other parts of that zone of responsibility. For
1 what the comments of the author on military discipline are concerned, I
2 have included in my report a series of documents and analysed them that
3 cover the situation prior to, during, and after Operation Storm. And
4 these conclusions that are drawn are in October are coherent with the
5 findings have I in relation to prior events.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
7 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.
9 MR. WAESPI: I'd like to tender this document, Mr. President.
10 MR. MISETIC: I do object to the admission of this document on
11 the basis that this is an attachment to a very detailed assessment that
12 was done by the Main Staff. I will be getting into cross-examination on
13 the Main Staff's overall, and it says it is part of an inspection. The
14 inspection was not by the PD, the Political Fairs Branch. It was by the
15 Main Staff. The PD was only one section. I don't know why the
16 Prosecution has taken out one attachment from one service out of an
17 overall global assessment, but it is my intent to tender everything in
18 cross-examination, and I believe that's the more appropriate way to do
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, if that would be result in this document
21 finding its way into evidence.
22 MR. WAESPI: [Overlapping speakers] ...
23 JUDGE ORIE: Would that --
24 MR. WAESPI: [Overlapping speakers] ... marked for
25 identification and see what happens.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but let's marked for identification as a
2 Prosecution Exhibit, and then we'll see whether we still need it at a
3 later stage.
4 THE REGISTRAR: This becomes Exhibit P1138, marked for
6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
7 MR. WAESPI: Let's move to the next document. This is 65 ter
8 2393. This is tab 49 on the list.
9 Q. This is an order dated 17 August 1995 by the chief, General
10 Zvonimir Cervenko. And it addresses the following topic, according to
11 the document taking security measures for units returning from the
12 battlefield. And in paragraph 2, it says, and I quote:
13 "Through the chain of command, prevent any unauthorised use of
14 infantry weapon, ammunitions, mines and explosives, and any other form of
15 endangering the lives and properties of the civilian population."
16 And paragraph 3:
17 "The commanders of the military districts and staff units are
18 personally responsible to me for the implementation of these orders -- of
19 this order."
20 Now, I'm specifically interested in the entry on paragraph 2,
21 where it says, "through the chain of command."
22 What's the significance of the chain of command in this respect,
23 Mr. Theunens?
24 A. Chain of command, Your Honour, means that General Cervenko
25 expects the military district commanders and all other addressees of the
1 order which can be found at the bottom of page 2. I think the English
2 document is a different one on the monitor.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Looks very much like a different document, yes.
4 Which gives me time also to point at page 16, line 6, where the name
5 Lasic is spelled as Lausic, and that could create confusion, although the
6 first name is different from the person with the name of Lausic.
7 Nevertheless, it should be Lasic.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President, I think that is my
10 mispronunciation of the name of Mr. Lasic.
11 Yes, I'm not sure whether we have uploaded the wrong translation
12 in English, and I'll certainly correct the record if that is the case.
13 Q. But if you could continue your answer, Mr. Theunens.
14 A. Yes, Your Honours. Through the chain of command, it means that
15 General Cervenko --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Still we do not have the English on the screen
17 in order to follow the answer.
18 THE WITNESS: If I -- I have a hard copy which can be put on the
19 ELMO if ...
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. There's one is looking at the document, the
21 other is to verify whether there is an English translation uploaded into
22 e-court which of course is ...
23 MR. WAESPI: [Overlapping speakers] ... for the mistake, and
24 we'll have it corrected as soon as we can.
25 I also have a copy for the ELMO although it is marked.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I don't know what secrets it reveals,
2 Mr. Waespi, but it's up to you.
3 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, when we go to the second page of the
4 document, at the bottom we see the list of addressees.
5 So it states the commanders of all the military districts. JB, I
6 was not able to establish which organisation that corresponds with, but
7 then the navy, the air force, and the aircraft defence, and this is the
8 copy as we could see on the first page which was received by the forward
9 command post of the Split Military District in Knin.
10 We would have to go to the first page again then.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any way that the Defence could assist us in
12 understanding what JB stands for? If so, we'll hear from you.
13 Please proceed.
14 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, when General Cervenko, the chief of
15 the Main Staff, refers to the chain of command, he expects that this
16 order be forwarded from the highest level to the lowest level, i.e., that
17 the military district commanders give corresponding instructions to their
18 operational group commanders, the operational group commanders to the
19 brigade commanders and regimen commanders, these commanders to the next
20 echelon, i.e., the battalion level, subsequently, the company level, the
21 platoon level, and then the section level. Why? Because this is it an
22 order that has to be implemented by everybody, and mainly by the
23 individual soldiers, who is as is it explained in the first paragraph,
24 upon their return from the battlefield, we see there is a rotation of
25 units, units which have been participating in Operation Storm --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Could we move it a bit so that we have a better look
2 at the content of -- move it. Yes, even a bit further.
3 THE WITNESS: This is everything.
4 JUDGE ORIE: There is it everything.
5 Well, I would like to read it before it is take away, if you
6 would not mind. I'd just like to read a couple of lines starting with
7 the: "On the basis of operational reports."
8 THE WITNESS: So the situation, Mr. President, is that we have
9 rotations of units, units are returning from the combat or the former
10 combat zone and are going to their peacetime barracks.
11 MR. MISETIC: If we could get foundation why he thinks they're
12 coming from a former combat zone.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens.
14 THE WITNESS: Maybe the word former is -- what I described to
15 describe is that Operation Storm has officially concluded on the 9th. Of
16 course, there are still skirmishes in the zone that has recently regained
17 control of. There are still search operations for remaining resistance
18 pockets and the like. But we also see, and this happens actually already
19 earlier, on the 9th, as far as the Split Military District is concerned,
20 on the 9th of August, an order is given by General Gotovina to reorganise
21 the Operational Groups. Whereby what is described as the first line
22 units, the professional units, like the 4th and 7th Guards Brigade, are
23 called back. They are sent on leave, even though some elements are kept
24 there reserve. For example, one battalion of the 4th Guards Brigade is
25 kept in reserve in Knin. But the units which are on the first line
1 during Storm are replaced by units which were like in the back during the
2 conduct of Operation Storm, in particular, Home Guard Regiments. And
3 this is a rotation process whereby units return to their peacetime
4 barracks or parts of units.
5 And based operational reports, as General Cervenko describes it,
6 some of these units, those who are left the battlefield, as he calls it,
7 to return to their peacetime locations, have opened infantry fire in
8 populated places and thus, as he described it, endangered the lives and
9 Safet of the population and disturbed public law and order.
10 I know it's not part of my testimony, but when I was in Zagreb
11 with UNPROFOR, we were aware -- and I don't recall which weekend it was,
12 but during one of the weekends, units came back, units from the Zagreb
13 garrison, for example, elements of the 1st and the 2nd Guards Brigade.
14 We had received instructions from the UNPF command to stay inside. We
15 could hear from our locations that during the night of Saturday and
16 Sunday, there was a significant amount of light arms fire which we didn't
17 hear during other nights. And therefore, we made the association of the
18 return of the units, which was covered in the media, and this increased
19 in fires incidents.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Were people shooting at the returning units?
21 THE WITNESS: No, Mr. President. The returning units as a matter
22 of expressing their joy, used weapons to fire in the air.
23 JUDGE ORIE: You will understand why I asked this question.
24 THE WITNESS: It is an obvious question, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: It makes a distinction between conclusion an
1 observation. You heard more than usual small-arms fire.
2 THE WITNESS: Yeah. Normally you didn't hear any small-arms fire
3 in Zagreb
4 JUDGE ORIE: I was asking whether somebody was shooting at these
5 humans --
6 THE WITNESS: So based on the reporting we received and previous
7 knowledge of the conflict, without going into too far details, but for
8 example, the British UNPROFOR troops, they had grid maps --
9 JUDGE ORIE: That's focus on this document and the question that
10 was put to you.
11 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, can I respond and tell that you JB
12 means in Croatian Juzno Brijeste which is the southern front, and it
13 refers to the area of Dubrovnik
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for assisting us, Mr. Misetic.
15 You were explaining about this order returning -- units returning
16 from the battlefield, and could we also have a look at the second page so
17 we can see what the order is about.
18 Please proceed, Mr. Theunens.
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. President. So now which see the
20 instructions given by General Cervenko to the commanders of the military
21 districts, the commander of the southern front as well as the commander
22 of the navy, the air force, and the anti-aircraft defence.
23 The first instruction is quite logical. That is that all weapons
24 ammunition, mines, and explosive have to be collected before the people
25 can return. And normally you only have ammunition on your weapon when
1 you go into an operation when you return from the operation before, and
2 this applies also to exercises, before people leave the zone of
3 operations or in case of training, the training area, or the -- they have
4 to hand in the ammunition. In this particular case, also weapons in
5 order to avoid all possible, not only accidents among the military
6 members but also as General Cervenko described it earlier in the order,
7 incidents of indecent firing.
8 In the second paragraph, we have the reference to the chain of
9 command, to prevent any unauthorised use of fire infantry weapons,
10 ammunition, mines and explosives or other activities that can endanger
11 the lives and properties of the civilian population. The civilian
12 population here is the civilian population in the peacetime locations of
13 these units, i.e., the locations to which these units return.
14 The last paragraph is -- is an implementation of doctrine. That
15 is that a superior commander, chief of the Main Staff holds his next
16 subordinate commander responsible, personally responsible, for the
17 implementation of the order. In this context it is also important to
18 note that Cervenko, in accordance with the doctrine, and the duties of
19 commanders that he holds the operational commanders responsible for the
20 implementation and the enforcement of military discipline because this is
21 an aspect of military discipline.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you in relation to 1 and 2, 1 says
23 return of units only if they have -- if all the weapons, ammunition,
24 et cetera, has been collected and warehoused, so no one is in possession
25 of any arms anymore.
1 Two, it says "unauthorised use of infantry weapons." I do
2 understand that nobody has use of infantry weapons anymore. How could
3 you reconcile 1 and 2?
4 THE WITNESS: We reconcile 1 and 2 by considering that in
5 paragraph 1 reference is primarily made to weapons that have been found
6 during or collected during the operations as a part of war booty. It is
7 true, and we'll see that later when she is records are discussed in my
8 report, that orders given through the chain of command for the collection
9 of war booty but -- it is difficult to prevent except if one has
10 continuous controls and orders that soldiers will try to keep their
11 personal souvenirs or war trophies.
12 And I remember again from when I was in Zagreb in August 1995
13 that very harmless souvenirs like road indication signs but also more
14 harmful souvenirs were taken from the areas that had been recaptured or
15 the recaptured partings of Croatia
16 view, 1 refers to war booty, and 2 refers to the weapons that are part of
17 the equipment of the soldier, whereby 1 and 2, I want to emphasise that
18 after returning from an operation or from an exercise, ammunition and
19 weapons are separated the in the military, at least the militaries I'm
20 familiar with. They are never transported together. Why? Because of
21 the risk of incidents or accidents.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mines as war booty is that usual or ...
23 THE WITNESS: Well, if mines are found, and I think we're talking
24 here about mines that have not been planted somewhere or used during
25 operations, but I am familiar with -- again from the documents that I
1 reviewed that the Serb forces, SVK left significant amounts of ammunition
2 and mines and explosives in warehouses. It is important that the
3 military establishes control over these facilities avoids that people who
4 have no right of access -- access these locations and that then this
5 ammunition and mines are transported and stored in accordance with
7 Now, the fact that General Cervenko includes it in his order, and
8 that he refers to previous reports indicates that there have been
9 incidents whereby mines, explosives, and ammunition and weapons have not
10 been treated in accordance with the regulations and have resulted in --
11 have been used -- yeah, used in incidents and resulted in injuries among
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now you explained to us that it is your
14 interpretation that 1 is mainly concerning war booty, and 2 is their
15 personal -- the weapons that were legitimately in the hands of -- of the
17 One talks about military conscripts. Is another interpretation
18 could that would that be 1 is about military conscripts, and 2 is about
20 THE WITNESS: That is indeed possible Your Honours.
21 Now, I have -- based on the documents I have seen I have not been
22 able to see whether if conscripts are still in service, whether they are
23 subjected to other regulations or not. Of course, and if the conscripts
24 have been demobilized, the regulations I have seen is that they do not
25 keep weapons let alone ammunition or mines as their personal equipment.
1 It is all handed in.
2 Indeed maybe that is something that I didn't see at first glance
3 now when looking at the monitor, but that is a very important aspect.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think the reason why I put this question to
5 you is that you give an explanation, I ask you about how to reconcile 1
6 and 2, you give an explanation, and as soon as I suggest another
7 explanation, you're quite willing to say that a that is a good
8 explanation as well which, of course, causes me some concern.
9 THE WITNESS: That is the problem that I have been facing from
10 the beginning. Drawing conclusions on single documents, it goes contrary
11 to the methodology.
12 JUDGE ORIE: No. That's why I'm asking you. I'm ask you what
13 the explanation is. I didn't ask you to limit the sources of your
14 explanation to this document. I just asked you how to I have to
15 understand 1 and 2 here. You could have referred to the totality of the
16 documents reviewed, but you give an explanation, and three minutes after
17 that, you -- you would cheerfully share my suggestion of another
19 THE WITNESS: Maybe, Your Honours, this is an fourth or fifth
21 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's -- when I said it is of some concern,
22 how to explain documents when there are four or five possible
23 explanations. I just wanted to share that concern with you.
24 Mr. Waespi.
25 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to tender this
2 JUDGE ORIE: I hear of no objection.
3 Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1139.
5 MR. WAESPI: And we do have an translated uploaded right now.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. P1139 is admitted into evidence.
7 MR. WAESPI: I'd like to move on to the next document, which is
8 65 ter 890.
9 Q. This is an order by commander Colonel Mladen Fuzul dated the 19th
10 August 1995. And it talks about the observed break down of order and
11 discipline and for the international reputation of the Republic of
12 Croatia. And then Colonel Fuzul orders:
13 "1. Establish control in all units and immediately take measures
14 against the torching of buildings and killing of animals.
15 "2. Take disciplinary and criminal measures against irresponsible
17 "3. The commanders of OG west units are responsible to me for the
18 implementation of this order."
19 Who is Colonel Mladen Fuzul?
20 A. As we can see on the top left corner of the document, he is the
21 commander of OG west. Now OG west was formally known as the OG Otric,
22 and during Operation Storm, i.e., between 4th and 9th of August, Colonel
23 Fuzul was the commander of OG Zadar.
24 Q. Now we are on the 19th of August, 1995. What is the significance
25 of this order at this point in time?
1 A. Just a small correction to the transcript. It is Zadar, with a D
2 like Delta, instead of Zapac.
3 The significance of the order is that I have attempted to explain
4 in the report by including earlier documents or earlier reports an orders
5 in relation to the events referred by Fuzul in the introduction of his
6 order. On the 19th of August there are still problems in relation to
7 what he describes as break down of order and discipline. The fact that
8 he issues this order indicates that personnel of his unit, i.e., OG west
9 as well as subordinate units are among those who are responsible for
10 these incidents.
11 If no one from his OG or no one from the military under his
12 command and control was involved in these incidents, there would be no
13 requirement to issue such an order.
14 And the addressees can be seen on the last page of the order.
15 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I would like to tender this document.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1140, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ORIE: In the absence of any objections Exhibit P1140 is
19 admitted into evidence.
20 MR. WAESPI: Next document, Mr. President, Your Honours, I would
21 like to discuss is 65 ter 2085. And this is a document dated
22 17 September 1995, and it's signed by Colonel General Ante Gotovina, at
23 least authored. And it reads in the relevant part as follows:
24 "On the basis of the order by the commander of the Split Military
25 District ... dated 17 September 1995, and in order to monitor ever Drvar
1 area by military and police and carry out the tasks from the
2 aforementioned order I hereby order: 1. The commander of the
3 72nd Battalion of the military police shall immediately transfer one
4 platoon of the military police to Drvar with the task of monitoring
5 access roads to Drvar by military and police and preventing torching and
6 other forms of destruction of property.
7 And 2 talks about the subordination of the military police. And
8 3, that Colonel Fuzul will be in charge of the work of the military
9 police platoon.
10 Now, first of all, this document obviously concerns incidents in
11 Bosnia. Now why do you include documents in your report that concern
12 incidents in Bosnia
13 A. Your Honour, I include these documents because based on the other
14 material I reviewed for the compilation of this report, I consider these
15 operations a continuation of the -- of Operation Storm whereby these
16 operations are conducted -- this is 17th of September is two days after
17 the ending of operation Maestral. So whereby these operations are
18 conducted by forces operating under the command of Colonel Gotovina, and
19 I consider these documents important not only because they are
20 continuation but because I wanted to see whether again applying the
21 methodology of identifying patterns and trends whether there were any
22 significant differences in relation to what I had observed during
23 Operation Storm and its immediate aftermath.
24 Q. And did you discover any significance differences in analysing
25 these documents?
1 A. Your Honour, this is one of the conclusions I draw. I emphasise
2 that based on the material I reviewed, I see a difference between the
3 nature of the orders that are issued during and after Operation Storm,
4 with after I mean the immediate aftermath, and orders that are issued
5 during the immediate paragraph math of Operation Maestral, whereby the
6 orders that issued after Maestral are much more forceful. I also, for
7 example, directed -- directly at the military police in order to have
8 them enforce discipline and order and prevent crime, whereby I have not
9 seen such specific and strong orders during Operation Storm, and its
10 immediate aftermath.
11 Q. Now in relation to the subordination of the military police, a
12 topic we discussed last week, what's the significance of this document?
13 A. Your Honours, this order is in -- is coherent with the doctrine,
14 Article 9 of the 1994 MP regulations, stating that the military police
15 for regular military police tasks are subordinated to the operational
17 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this document.
18 JUDGE ORIE: No objections, Mr. Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P1141.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. P1141 is admitted into evidence.
21 MR. WAESPI: The next document I'd like to discuss is 65 ter 709.
22 Q. And this is a similar document relating to events in Bosnia.
23 It's an order by General Gotovina dated 22nd September 1995. The subject
24 is establishment of intervention companies to establish order and
25 discipline in the town of Jajace.
1 And specifically it imposes in paragraph 1 a military curfew in
2 the town of Jajace
3 Again, Mr. Theunens, why did you select this document in your
5 A. Your Honours, this order by General Gotovina is -- is coherent
6 with what I described in my previous answer, that is, that during the
7 aftermath of Operation Maestral, we see that General Gotovina issues a
8 number of very strong or forceful orders, in order to maintain order and
10 Here we have one where he imposes a military curfew in the town
11 of Jajace which is located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and which put on the
12 HV/HVO control during Operation Maestral. I have not seen such a
13 document or an order imposing a military curfew during Operation Storm or
14 the immediate aftermath of Operation Storm. Imposing military curfew is
15 one of the tools the commander has in order to maintain order and
17 MR. MISETIC: Your Honour, again, with respect to foundation, if
18 Mr. Theunens could tell us if he could impose a military curfew in
20 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, it is my conclusion that even though
21 there is information that there was civilian police in the area, i.e., in
22 Croatia whereby I have not seen any information on the presence of
23 civilian police in these parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were put
24 under HV/HVO control, it is my conclusions that the goal, i.e., maintain
25 order and discipline, is the most important aspect.
1 Secondly we have to look who can achieve this goal.
2 We spoke briefly about the aspect of the role of the military in
3 establishing the rule of law. This was not part of my testimony, but I
4 was asked about that. Now when you consider -- when you consult
5 literature on that topic, one notices that immediately after a conflict,
6 and I'm talking now on previous observations I will come to Operation
7 Storm, that in other conflicts the military is usually or only the best
8 organised -- organisation to try to establish rule of law. Why? Because
9 you have the manpower, the organisation, the structure, the system of
10 internal discipline, and last but not least equipment, weapons of all
12 When I look now at Operation Storm, and I want to emphasise that
13 I have not systematically analysed all civilian police documents, but the
14 documents I reviewed and they consist mainly of correspondence between
15 assistant minister Mr. Moric, assistant minister of the interior, as well
16 as General Lausic, chief of the military police administration, the
17 conclusion that I draw is that the civilian police has difficulties in
18 imposing or -- law and order or doing his job in general in the parts of
19 Croatia that been recently recaptured. Moric, Mr. Moric explains --
20 JUDGE ORIE: You're engaging in a long journey.
21 Mr. Misetic, did you want the witness to explain whether there
22 was any formal authority to impose a military curfew, or were you seeking
23 to hear the background of why --
24 MR. MISETIC: I was not seeking the background, Your Honour, but
25 I will say that - again that is just the position of the Defence - one of
1 the few conclusions that are in the report is this precise point which is
2 the at page 314 paragraph S of Mr. Theunens' report which says:
3 "It appears that only and after launching Operation Maestral,
4 Colonel General Ante Gotovina takes more vigorous action to maintain
5 discipline and prevent or punish crimes."
6 That's his conclusion. I think the witness has now repeated, in
7 essence, that conclusion here. The Prosecution and the witness should
8 establish the foundation in Croatian law, and the witness indicated
9 before that he when challenged on his expertise in law said that any
10 citizen can have a basic understanding of the law, to cite to the law
11 that General Gotovina could impose military curfew on Croatian territory.
12 It shouldn't be a long answer. He should know. It's his conclusion.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Is there a legal basis on which you consider
14 General Gotovina in a position of authority to establish military curfew.
15 THE WITNESS: The only base I have, Your Honour, is my
16 interpretation of the Code of Discipline. I have no specific legal base.
17 JUDGE ORIE: So you --
18 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic.
20 MR. MIKULICIC: Could I speak now.
21 As we are dealing with this document, could the witness please
22 explain as to with regards to count 3 of the order where it says that
23 with the employment of the special police of MUP, Ministry of Interior,
24 does it refer us to the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia
25 or the Ministry of Interior of the republic of Herceg-Bosna
1 JUDGE ORIE: Exceptionally, I allow further questions since they
2 are just seeking an explanation or clarification, rather than a question
3 which would be more appropriately put during your cross-examination.
4 Having heard your answer on the question of what the basis is for
5 the military curfew, could you please address the matter just raised by
6 Mr. Mikulicic.
7 Mr. Waespi, this is not part of the time you take.
8 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, based on my review of documents and,
9 in particular, documents concerning the operations of the special police
10 of the Republic of Croatia
11 so-called Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, CRHB and not the special
12 police of the Republic of Croatia
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for the clarification.
14 Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
15 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to tender
16 this document, which is 65 ter 709.
17 JUDGE ORIE: No objection.
18 Mr. Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1142, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE ORIE: P1142 is admitted into evidence.
21 MR. WAESPI: And the last document in this section, which perhaps
22 we could do before the break, but I'm in your hands, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we can deal with this --
24 MR. WAESPI: Last document in this series.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.
1 MR. WAESPI: Is 65 ter 851. A document dated the 18th of
2 August 1995, authored by the deputy commander of the Split Military
3 District, Brigadier Rahim Ademi. And it orders the set-up of military
4 police check-points at the Knin-Gracac-Otric cross-roads and has more
5 details about these actions, and in paragraph 5 it makes the commander of
6 the 72nd Battalion of the Split Military District police responsible for
7 the implementation of this order.
8 Now my last question. Again, the significance of these concrete
9 orders in what the military police has to do.
10 A. Your Honours, this is one of the orders that are included in the
11 section of my report dealing with orders issued by the chief of the HV
12 Main Staff or the chief of the -- the commander of the Split Military
13 District, pertaining to the treatment of war booty and goods described as
14 such. Starts on English page 374.
15 Here, this order, specific order, is important because we see the
16 use of the military police upon the orders of the Deputy Commander of the
17 Split Military District to establish a check-point, whereby this
18 check-point can only allow vehicles in that have an appropriate
19 authorisation. We see that in paragraph 3. And according to this order,
20 this check-point is also to prevent the entry of civilian vehicles, which
21 shows, together with the other documents I have reviewed that, at that
22 time, i.e., 18th August, the Split Military District is in a position to
23 exercise control, i.e., to determine who is allowed in and out of its
24 zone of responsibility, and paragraph 4 re-establishes that war booty or
25 goods described as such can only be transported if proper lists signed by
1 the unit commanders are provided.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you how you conclude from an order that
3 there was sufficient control. It says that a military check-point should
4 be set up.
5 Now, if someone would take the route next to where the military
6 check-point is, what about your conclusion, as far as the control on
7 entering and leaving that area is concerned?
8 THE WITNESS: The goal obviously of the order is not just to set
9 up a check-point but it is to use that check-point in order to maintain
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's obvious, yes. But now if you say
12 they -- and let me quote you literally.
13 THE WITNESS: I think it is on page 37, line 2, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. "Which shows together with the other documents
15 that I have reviewed at the time the Split Military District is in a
16 position to exercise control."
17 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours --
18 JUDGE ORIE: I'll tell you why I put this question to you. We
19 have heard quite some evidence where -- of course some witnesses may have
20 come to the same conclusion as you come. Others said, Well, it was very
21 easy to take another route and then you would just circumvent these
22 check-points and then no problem.
23 So the exercise of control, apparently you take this document
24 together with the other document, as you said, as a demonstration that
25 control could be exercised or was even exercised here.
1 THE WITNESS: For this specific order, Your Honours, one would
2 have to look at the map and see whether there are indeed manners or ways
3 in order to circumvent the military police check-point.
4 However, military police check-points are not the only tool for
5 the military to maintain control. They can also use their forces, for
6 example, to patrol. And even if, like, with most border controls there
7 is no 24/7 waterproof or water-tight regime possible, manning a
8 check-point also includes observing.
9 Now, if for example, the military police notice, well, there's
10 not traffic stopping here, or they see that vehicles are using another
11 road, well, then the chief or the person responsible for the check-point
12 will contact his commander to say, Look, my check-point here is not
13 effective. I propose to locate it somewhere else. The patrols, well,
14 they will report what they see. If people who want to enter the zone of
15 responsibility and who are not authorised to do so notice that there are
16 patrols, check-points -- I mean, here we're talking about a fixed
17 check-point - one can also have mobile check-points - that can serve as a
19 I think it is also important to keep in mind that there may still
20 be members of the former enemy forces residing in the area who may try to
21 enter or who may try to disrupt the activities of -- of the forces that
22 are now controlling the area, so the military commander again has all
23 interest in maintaining the strictest control possible.
24 There will always be -- there can always be somebody who can try
25 to get in, but then, well, we will have to look at what vehicle. If it
1 is about looting goods, yeah, I assume that happens with trailers or
2 bigger vehicles. I have seen the area. You cannot just use a trail
3 which may be mined, or a soft-surface road to move heavier vehicles. So
4 I think there is a number of factors the commander will take into account
5 before deciding on putting a check-point in a particular location, and
6 this will be part of a global plan on his side which is aimed at
7 controlling his zone of responsibility.
8 MR. MISETIC: Your Honour, I realize this is unusual, but in
9 light of how much time cross could take, I might as well just say it now.
10 Is the witness aware of any combat activities in this area and movement
11 of forces to a combat zone in Bosnia
12 check-point would be set up there.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens.
14 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I -- the order is -- is quite strict.
15 It is not stated that traffic will be interrupted in order to allow the
16 unimpeded move or movement of military convoys.
17 Paragraph 3 clearly states that only vehicles with proper passes
18 may enter into the zone of responsibility. If they're going to Bosnia
19 it's more like -- I mean, crossing the zone of responsibility. I don't
20 think that the military will use civilian motor vehicles in order to
21 redeploy its forces. I am aware that the HV used civilian trucks but
22 they had military licence plates, and I think paragraph 4 is also quite
23 clear as to one of the aims of the order, i.e., to control the flow of
24 war booty.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You would say you wouldn't take the war booty
1 to the combat zone.
2 THE WITNESS: For example, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
4 MR. WAESPI: I'd like to tender the document.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours that becomes Exhibit P1143.
7 JUDGE ORIE: P1143 is admitted into evidence.
8 We will have a break. Mr. Waespi, can you give us -- I am aware
9 that some time was taken by the bench. Could you give us an indication
10 as to --
11 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I have six more documents to cover, and I hope
12 to take 20 to 30 minutes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll have a break and resume at five minutes
14 past 11.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 10.43 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 11.18 a.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber apologises for the late start.
18 Mr. Waespi.
19 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Let's move to the -- a couple of issues around the Knin garrison
21 commander. And I'd like to first talk about 65 ter 3002. These are the
22 minutes of a meeting held on the 23rd of March, 1999, and we see here
23 President Tudjman talking and Ivan Cermak.
25 Q. And I'm interested in one part of the transcript, and this is on
1 page 11 in English, and page 5 in B/C/S. In English, it's at the bottom
2 -- sorry, at the top of page 4.
3 MR. WAESPI: I'm not sure that's the right -- in English. Yes.
4 Page 4 out of 11. It starts: "Then they asked me about Knin ..."
5 Yes, that's correct.
6 Let me quote there. So General Cermak says:
7 "Then they asked me about Knin and all those earlier stories.
8 What was my assignment in Knin? I told them that my assignment was
9 such-and-such, cooperation with the international community,
10 infrastructure, return, life, hospitals, this and that, et cetera.
11 "President: Keeping order.
12 "Ivan Cermak: Keeping order, preventing disorder, mine
13 clearance. I took a team with me, and we cleared 7.000 buildings and
14 that whole area, et cetera."
15 Mr. Theunens, does that confirm or not your conclusions as to the
16 role and responsibilities of General Cermak, as commander of the Knin
18 A. Indeed, Your Honours, on English page 245 in the second part of
19 my report, I stated, based on the documents that I reviewed, that the
20 areas -- excuse me. The role of General Cermak as the commander of the
21 Knin garrison covered two areas.
22 First of all, he exercised the powers of civilian/military
23 authority; and secondly, he was the point of contact for the
24 international community during the time-period he was the commander of
25 the Knin garrison, which, according to the documents I reviewed, starts
1 on the 6th of August, 1995, and lasts until approximately 15th of
2 November, 1995
3 MR. WAESPI: I'd like to tender this document, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit P1144.
6 JUDGE ORIE: In the absence of objections, Exhibit P1144 is
7 admitted into evidence.
8 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I am.
10 MR. MISETIC: Just sorry. Let me just note, and just to alert
11 Mr. Waespi, I believe that this document was part of a larger bar table
12 submission by the Prosecution, so there -- it may already have a number.
13 I'm not sure whether numbers were assigned to that bar table.
14 MR. WAESPI: Thank you very much. I will inquire.
15 MR. KAY: Yes. There was a proposed bar table submission by the
16 Prosecution. I added documents to it as well as comments, and it never
17 saw the light of day again, but this was one of the documents on it.
18 MR. WAESPI: Thank you. We will follow up in where we are in
19 relation to this.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and we will hear the results.
21 Well it has now been admitted into evidence anyhow, so if it
22 still appears on an extended bar table list, then it doesn't need to stay
23 there, it being admitted already.
24 MR. KAY: Many of the documents had already been put in evidence,
25 already, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps, Mr. Waespi, keep a close eye on that.
2 MR. WAESPI: I will do that, Mr. President.
3 The next document is 65 ter 5773, a document that we propose to
4 add to the 65 ter list. It's dated the 16th of August 1995, signed by
5 Colonel General Ivan Cermak. Subject: Information for the Split
6 logistics base commander, major Ivan Pavic.
7 And I am specifically interested in the second paragraph where it
8 says as follows:
9 "As you may well know it, Mr. Major Zeljko Jonjic has been
10 temporarily assigned to ZM command post in Knin in accordance with an
11 agreement endorsed by Split ZP commander lieutenant Ante Gotovina."
12 MR. KAY: This has been exhibited already, Your Honour, as D760
13 as part of a sequence of documents that I put to Mr. Liborius with a
14 number of other related correspondence, et cetera, with this document.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Kay. It's on the record. No need to
16 tender, Mr. Waespi, but of course you wanted to put questions to the
17 witness in relation to this document.
18 Please proceed.
19 MR. WAESPI: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. What's the significance of the quote about the agreement between
21 Generals Gotovina and Cermak, in relation to the relationship between
22 those two Generals?
23 A. Your Honours, in part 2 of the report, English page 258, and
24 following pages, I discuss the relations between General Gotovina,
25 commander of the Split Military District, and General Cermak, commander
1 of the Knin garrison, and as you can see in the report, I could not draw
2 a clear-cut conclusion as to their relationship. I mean by that, that
3 the relationship between the two is not a straightforward or as clear as
4 one would expect from the doctrine, whereby, for example, the service
5 regulations of the Croatian armed forces D32 state that the garrison
6 commander is subordinate to the Military District Commander, to which the
7 garrison belongs.
8 I have listed a number of document there and discussed them.
9 Basically I have seen only one, if I'm not wrong, order from
10 General Gotovina to General Cermak which is not sent to him personally,
11 but which is sent to the Knin garrison. This specific document here,
12 D760, General Cermak here contacts the superior commander of
13 Major Jonjic, whereby Major Jonjic is the chief or the commander of the
14 Sibenik section of the logistics base of the Split Military District. To
15 explain to the commander of the logistics base of the Split Military
16 District Pavic that the reassignment of one of the subordinates of Pavic,
17 i.e., Jonjic, to the Knin garrison is coherent with the decision or
18 agreement between Generals Cermak and Gotovina. And based on this
19 document, one can conclude that major Pavic was not aware of this
20 agreement or was not consulted -- or excuse me, does not agree with it.
21 Now, again this is it only one document. In my report I also
22 explained, for example, that General Cermak in the heading of the
23 decisions and the orders he issues - the heading which we can find in the
24 top left top corner - does not make any reference to the Split Military
25 District, whereby one would expect that if -- no, whereby one would
1 expect that as the commander of the Knin garrison, he would include
2 thinks immediate superior command, i.e., the Split Military District, in
3 the left top heading of the decisions an orders he issues.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
5 MR. MISETIC: May I ask, Your Honour, for foundation with respect
6 to the witness's reference to an order, if the witness knows specifically
7 which order he is referring to.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens.
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. President.
10 On the 20th -- I mean it's a document from 20th of September.
11 It's 65 ter 3411. Which is discussed -- actually, this is not a good
13 Yes, it's -- it's actually 65 ter 2389, which is included at
14 tab 71 in the binder. So I'm not sure whether we will address that. But
15 there --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, are you going address it?
17 MR. WAESPI: I wouldn't have, but we can go ahead.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 Please proceed, continue.
20 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, so this is 65 ter 2389. And it's an
21 order from General Gotovina to the garrisons that are subordinated to
22 him, and the Knin garrison is included. The orders dates from the 17th
23 of August, 1995. As I mentioned earlier, it is not a personal order to
24 Cermak; it is just a general order to the Knin garrison. And actually in
25 tab 72, we have the response of Cermak, General Cermak, I apologise, even
1 though in the subject section of the reply by General Cermak or the
2 introduction, the reference number does not refer to Gotovina's order,
3 and the date is incorrect, because it refers to an order by the commander
4 of the Split
5 reply by General Cermak is dated the 10th of October. So there is an
6 error somewhere. I checked the original B/C/S text or Croatian text and
7 the 9th of November is also there mentioned.
8 But tab 72, at least by its wording, is auto response or report
9 provided by General Cermak pursuant to an order of the commander of the
10 Split Military District.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have a 65 ter number for tab 72?
12 THE WITNESS: I apologise, Mr. President. 2804.
13 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I'd like to tender those two
14 documents that the witness referred to. This is 65 ter 2389 and 2804.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, 2389 would be ...
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that becomes Exhibit P1145.
17 JUDGE ORIE: And P2804.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1146, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
20 MR. MISETIC: Yes, Your Honour, let me just note for the sake of
21 the record. In light of this witness's answer and this witness's unique
22 position inside the Office of the Prosecutor, let me note that in
23 response to the General Gotovina Defence's initial motion pursuant to
24 Rule 72 on defects in form of the indictment back in April of 2006, one
25 of the issues we raised was that the indictment did not specify whether
1 the Prosecution was charging General Gotovina with command responsibility
2 over General Cermak. The Prosecution responded by saying that, in fact,
3 they were charging General Gotovina with command responsibility over
4 General Cermak. I would in light of this witness's testimony, and again
5 his unique in the Office of the Prosecutor, just note that fact for the
6 record, and I will seek further clarification from Mr. Waespi whether
7 that is still the position of the Office of the Prosecutor.
8 Thank you.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Do you expect this information to be given
10 right away now or --
11 MR. MISETIC: Sometime this week, I would hope during
12 cross-examination, so that we could cross-examine if it is, in fact,
13 still a life issue.
14 Thank you.
15 MR. WAESPI: I will do that.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
17 P1145 and P1146 are admitted into evidence.
18 Please proceed.
19 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. Let's move to 65 ter 510,
20 and this is a letter from General Cermak dated the 8th September of 1995
21 to Mr. Philippe Augarde, ECMM. And it states here in the second
22 paragraph on the first page:
23 "I sincerely regret the cited impermissible behaviour by a person
24 in the uniform of a Croatian soldier. I have issued an order to the
25 military police to investigate the case and make every attempt to
1 discover the perpetrator."
2 Q. Does that confirm or not your conclusions about the authority of
3 General Cermak?
4 A. Yes, it does, Your Honour. It would of course be -- have been
5 useful if we had the initial letter by Auguarde, maybe that is going to
6 be tendered by another witness, so I don't know. I haven't seen it in
7 any event. But at least the fact that General Cermak says that he has
8 issued an order to the military police shows that he is in a position to
9 do so. That's in line with doctrine. And also that he wants the
10 military police to investigate the matter.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.
12 MR. WAESPI: I would like to tender this document, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit P1147.
15 JUDGE ORIE: P1147 is admitted into evidence.
16 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Let's conclude with a couple of documents in relation to the
18 special police.
19 The first one is 65 ter 6104. And this is a decree on internal
20 organisation and operation of the Ministry of the Interior of the
21 Republic of Croatia
22 on page 12 and 13, and hopefully we can find the English page. Yes.
23 Thank you very much, Mr. Registrar.
24 Q. It's entitled this article: Special Police Sector. And talks
25 about the assistant minister who is in charge of sector chief runs
2 Now based on this Article, who is in command and control -- who
3 has command and control, also based on your analysis, Mr. Theunens, of
4 the special police?
5 A. As the Article state, it's the assistant minister for special
6 police was - the minister of interior for special police - Colonel
7 General Mladen Markac who is in charge of the special police sector,
8 whereby the special police sector is led by Mr. Zeljko Janic.
9 This is it what the doctrine states. Now when we consider
10 documents that I reviewed in part 2 of the report, in particular section
11 6 -- excuse me, section 4 on special police which starts on page 265, we
12 can see that the orders to the special police units come from
13 General Markac through Mr. Janic or directly from Mr. Janic referring
14 to an order from General Markac.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.
16 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President I would like to tender the document
17 but only the cover page and Article 27.
18 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour, I believe these documents has
19 already been tendered as D527.
20 MR. WAESPI: I'm very grateful. Thank you very much.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Then there's no need to assign a number. Could the
22 parties please verify whether this is -- you said D527. I will verify as
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. Let's move to P588. And here I'm interested in page 35 in
2 English and also B/C/S. The English is on the right side of the page;
3 and the B/C/S on the left side.
4 MR. WAESPI: If we can move to the top of the page.
5 Q. Now, I quote:
6 "Police administrations stations substations. Police
7 administrations are the organisational units of the Ministry of Interior,
8 carrying out the already mentioned duties of the Internal Affairs Act,
9 Article 1, items 2, 4, and 5?"
10 Obviously item 3 of Article 1 is missing. So let's go to -- in
11 the -- Internal Affairs Act.
12 MR. WAESPI: And this, Mr. President, is 65 ter 3305. There I'm
13 interested in the first page. The formal title of this document is the
14 Decision On The Promulgation Of The Law On Amendments To The Law On
15 Internal Affairs. And there we see, if we scroll down, in the English
16 and also in B/C/S, item 3, or number 3 on Article 1, has the special
18 Q. Now, Mr. Theunens, based on your review of the documents, the
19 doctrine, how are the police administrations on one side, and the special
20 police on the other side related to each other?
21 A. As I discussed in the special police section in part 2 of the
22 report, section starts on English page 105, special police units are
23 organised per district. Whereby these special units are located in these
24 -- in these district -- I mean administrative areas, have the name of
25 this district, or zupanje in Croatian, but doing operations, in
1 particular Operation Storm, these units are subordinated to the chief of
2 the special police sector as I explained before. And in that context I
3 can also refer to a document which has been tendered as P554, which is
4 discussed on English page 297, in part 2 of my report.
5 P554 is the order to establish a staff of the joint forces of the
6 special police. It is dated the 22nd of July, and it identifies
7 General Markac as the action commander and Brigadier Zeljko Sacic as
8 chief of the staff of the special police joint forces.
9 And I -- I realize I made an error earlier. I used the name
10 Janic, but it should have been Sacic, Zeljko Sacic.
11 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I would like to tender the cover page
12 of 65 ter 3305 that was the Law on internal affairs we discussed a moment
13 ago. Just the cover page.
14 JUDGE ORIE: The handwritten brackets which also appear on the
15 same page, does that have any meaning or is it just a mistake?
16 MR. WAESPI: No. The original as it was entered into the system
17 had a handwritten brackets, so that is not part of the original additions
18 by somebody. I don't know who that was, but it is not part of the
20 JUDGE ORIE: So it is without any meaning. Yes. Perhaps it
21 might have been preferred to have a -- to have a copy without handwriting
22 on it. If it is just added by an individual unknown to us. But I think
23 it's understood by everyone that it is without any meaning.
24 MR. MIKULICIC: Yes, Your Honour, we can stipulate it, and we
25 have no objections.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1148, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE ORIE: P1148 is admitted into evidence.
4 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 The last document I want to discuss, it's already an exhibit, is
6 D530. D530. And this is a document dated 3rd of October by assistant
7 minister Colonel General Mladen Markac. And it has two addressees, if
8 one can state so. The first one is on the right side, to "SJP
9 commander," and on the left side is to "chief of the Zadar-Knin police
10 administration." And there it adds, "personally deliver to the SJP
12 And the subject is the "Request for verification of information."
13 And the last paragraph:
14 "In keeping with the above, you are to investigates the above
15 claims and submit in writing the results of the investigation to the
16 special police sector."
17 And the issue at hand here are for members of the special police
18 as described in the first substantive paragraph.
19 Now my question, Mr. Theunens, what's the significance of this
20 document in relation to the issue of who commands the special police?
21 A. Well, from the person who signs -- the name of the persons who
22 signs the document, we can see that Colonel General Mladen Markac is in
23 command of the special police sector. He sends an order to the SJP
24 commander of the of the SUP
25 through the chief of the Zadar-Knin police administration, based on the
1 documents I reviewed, in particular those dealing with the role and the
2 use of special police units during and after Operation Storm. The
3 inclusion of the chief of Zadar-Knin police administration is not related
4 to command and control but is an administrative matter.
5 And again the chain of command goes from the assistant minister,
6 to the chief of sector, to the special police units.
7 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. That concludes my
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
10 Could I ask one -- you said this is an order that reads subject:
11 Request for verification of information. Could you explain why you
12 consider it an order, rather than a request?
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, in simple terms, when a superior, and
14 in this case it is the highest person within the special police, has a
15 request it is interpreted as an order by the subordinates. In addition,
16 I would like to draw your attention to the last sentence. In the wording
17 of the last paragraph, it sates, "In keeping with the above you are to
19 For me that is the language one uses in orders. Even if it is
20 called a request, the result or the aim is actually to have the
21 subordinate carry out an activity or undertake an activity. And in this
22 case the activity consists of investigating, I quote, "the above claims."
23 And also the second action the subordinate is required to do
24 following this request is to submit in writing the results of the
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me try to understand also your reasoning
2 behind it.
3 You say in simple terms when a superior and the highest person
4 within the special police has a request is interpreted as order by the
6 To what extent are you reasoning in a circle, because you use
7 this document to say that it is sent to a subordinate. To what extent
8 are you reasoning in circles? Because you say the word "request" should
9 be interpreted as an order because that is how it is understood by a
10 subordinate, but at the same time you use this document as evidence that
11 there was subordination.
12 So your interpretation of the document is based on the outcome of
13 your exercise, so some extent, not in every respect, but as far as the
14 interpretation of the word "request" is concerned that is what you
15 apparently told us.
16 THE WITNESS: I understand what you mean, Mr. President.
17 Now, I didn't use that specific document in my report in the
18 context of command and control because I saw it more important in the
19 context of the disciplinary authority of the command of the special
20 police, i.e., when he receives an information - and I will not go into
21 detail because it drags us too far - he uses powers to request
22 information. But in the first year of Military Academy, we received a
23 brochure for junior officers. And one of things I remember from that
24 brochure is that it stated well, a request by a superior or a wish by a
25 superior should also be -- always be consider add order.
1 Okay. I realize that has no power of law. But that's at least
2 how as a junior person sees or is educated in the military and is trained
3 in order to interpret information, in particular requests or orders he
4 receives from a superior. So --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But isn't it true that the issue raised here
6 is whether the Zadar-Knin police administration is subordinated to
7 Mr. Markac. That's the issue, isn't it? At least you -- that's what you
9 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honours. The issue is -- this document
10 shows together with other documents that the special police unit of the
11 Zadar-Knin police administration is subordinated to Markac, General
12 Markac. It is it not the Zadar-Knin police administration as such
13 because that is the regular police which follows a different chain.
14 We are talking about the SJP unit. And the --
15 JUDGE ORIE: And because you say personally delivered to SJP
17 THE WITNESS: Indeed --
18 JUDGE ORIE: It says both, isn't it?
19 Now the handwriting comes from whom? Because it's in the
20 handwriting -- no, let me just try to see in the original.
21 No, you say I should focus on the SJP commander more than the
22 chief of the Zadar-Knin police administration.
23 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I'm sorry that I cannot explain why
24 the chief of the Zadar-Knin police administration is included here. But
25 from the wording of the order and of the request, and the contents, I
1 conclude that actually he just operates as a letter box, and of course
2 that conclusion is also based on the interpretation and the analysis of
3 the documents dealing with the activities of special police units prior
4 to, during, and after Operation Storm.
5 So when we look again at the request and analyse it from the
6 military point of view, we know who sent it. It's Markac. The
7 addressees, chief of the Zadar-Knin police administration, however, it
8 states: "Personally delivered to the SJP commander."
9 So the chief of the Zadar-Knin police administration has no role
10 to play in connection to this request, except that he or somebody under
11 his command has to personally deliver the request to the SJP commander,
12 i.e., the commander of the Zadar-Knin police administration,
13 Secretary-General P unit. So the SJP unit that is located in the area of
14 the Zadar-Knin police administration.
15 And then because of the wording of the last paragraph, the last
16 paragraph clearly gives instructions: "You are to investigate, and you
17 are to submit," I interpret this request as an order.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that answer.
19 MR. WAESPI: On Friday you asked me to list the 65 ter numbers
20 that the witness referred to, and I do have a list here. We can deal
21 with it now so that these seven documents can be entered into evidence as
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Do you have a hard copy of the list, or would
24 you just -- seven is a limited number so perhaps we --
25 MR. WAESPI: Yes.
1 The numbers are as follows: 419; 1072; 3382; 4581; 3111; 5712;
2 and 1618.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe.
4 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour, in theory I don't think we have an
5 objection to the documents. If we can just take a look during the break
6 and just consult with our colleague.
7 JUDGE ORIE: That's fine.
8 This concludes your examination-in-chief Mr. Waespi. What will
9 be the sequence, order, in which --
10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour, I will begin.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 Mr. Theunens, you will first be examined by Mr. Kehoe. Mr. Kehoe
13 is counsel for Mr. Gotovina.
14 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Kehoe: [Continued]
16 Q. Good morning, Mr. Theunens.
17 A. Good morning Mr. Kehoe.
18 Q. I'd like to explore with you an issue that we talked about
19 briefly last week that you addressed on page 180 and 181 of your report,
20 and that would be part 2 of your report, concerning the shelling
21 conducted by the Split Military District during Operation Storm.
22 The focus of this will begin on paragraph 9(A), the last sentence
23 9(A)(i) where you write:
24 "Duties of the Split Military District artillery include:
25 'Putting the towns of Drvar, Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, and Gracac under
1 artillery fire without indicating any specific targets in Drvar, Knin,
2 Benkovac, Obrovac, and Gracac, the Split Military District artillery is
3 to engage.'"
4 You carried that yet further on the next paragraph:
5 "The fact that the orders of subordinate units, the operative
6 group Zadar, orders for artillery dated 3 August 1995 instructs that you
7 put the following towns under artillery fire Benkovac, Obrovac, Gracac
8 that were reviewed during the preparation of this report do not contain
9 more specific targeting information, either suggests that the Split
10 Military District commander and its subordinate commanders regard these
11 Serb controlled towns as military targets that can be engaged with
13 And on the next page you support this conclusion with an order
14 from Brigadier Ademi dated 7th of May, 1995.
15 And I would like to explore that conclusion that you've made.
16 But preliminary I'd like to ask you, when you were given instructions --
17 by the way let me just backtrack for a second, just to put this in
18 sequence. When was the first time you received instructions from a
19 member of the Office of the Prosecutor as to what they wanted you to do?
20 A. In -- if I remember well, it was in January 2007. We had -- I
21 apologise for the transcript.
22 In December we had this first inform meeting where I spoke about
23 my experience. So December 2006, where I spoke about my experiences in
24 the UNPROFOR UNPA headquarters, and then in January 2007, I believe at
25 the end of the month, I received the ten-point tasking which has been
1 addressed at the beginning of my testimony.
2 Q. At that time, were you given instructions or were you told by the
3 Office of the Prosecutor that the Office of the Prosecutor would argue in
4 this trial that Knin and other towns in the Krajina were indiscriminately
5 attacked with artillery by the HV?
6 A. No, Your Honour, I was not given any instructions whatsoever in
7 relation to what I was to write in my report. I only received the
8 ten-point and subsequently the 17-point list which basically dealt with
9 or covered the topics I was to deal with. I did not receive any
10 instructions or guidance whatsoever in relation to the contents of my
12 Q. Okay sir. Let's maybe put a little bit of a finer point on this
13 without taking it too far.
14 When did you first learn that the Office of the Prosecutor was
15 going to argue that Knin and these other towns in Krajina were
16 indiscriminately fired upon with artillery? When did you first learn
18 A. I don't remember exactly. Maybe it is included in the
19 indictment. I read the indictment once, in the beginning of this whole
20 project to find out the time-frame and the geographic areas I was to
21 cover. I am aware and I heard that from Dai Morris that there is it
22 going to be an artillery expert, but that is how far my knowledge on this
23 issue goes. And if you allow me, I don't claim that the shelling was
24 indiscriminate --
25 JUDGE ORIE: That is not the question you have been asked.
1 MR. KEHOE:
2 Q. Let us talk about this entire matter a bit further and go through
3 the methodology, if you will, and look at some of the issues that you
4 looked at.
5 And I note on page 81 and 82 of your report -- and again if I
6 don't mention it, Mr. Theunens, I'm talking about part 2 of the report.
7 I think that's for clarity's sake.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, perhaps I started talking when the
9 witness had not yet finished his answer, and this has caused some loss in
10 the transcript. I think the witness started explaining that it was not
11 his position that there was indiscriminate shelling, and then I
12 intervened and said that as far as I was aware that was not the question
13 you had put to him. That was missing on the transcript due to me not
14 waiting, and I would like to correct that.
15 Please proceed.
16 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour.
17 Q. Let us go to what -- your report itself. And I am informed that
18 this at page 339 in e-court. You note at the bottom of the page that the
19 HV Main Staff in June, July issues several directives an orders to
20 Military Districts including the Split Military District, to launch and
21 conduct operation called Oluja, taking into account the launching of
22 Operation Ljeto, or Summer 95 on 25 July 1995.
23 "It can be included that these directives and orders are amended
24 over time and implemented in a modified form."
25 Let us start that, and let's just explain that just a bit
1 further, Mr. Theunens, with regard to the implementation of these orders
2 that commenced Operation Storm. And I'm most interested in your comment
3 that these directives an orders are amended over time and implemented in
4 a modified form.
5 Can you help us with that a little bit and just explain that a
7 A. When I was reviewing the material, I came across orders from the
8 HV Main Staff which mentioned the name Oluja, which as those quoted in
9 the pages listed by Mr. Kehoe, date, for example, from the 26th of June.
10 When you review the contents of these orders, one will note that some of
11 the instructions included in these orders were actually already achieved
12 or implemented during operation Ljeto. And that's why -- I mean, I still
13 included them as background, but in my view, the authorative order for
14 Operation Storm, on the level of the Split Military District, is the
15 order for attack Kozjak which used to be 65 ter 3119, has been tendered.
16 I don't have the exhibit number, which can be found on English page 96.
17 Q. We will get to those, Mr. Theunens, in a little bit. But what
18 you were trying to convey during this type when orders were coming out
19 from the Main Staff and going down to the middle -- Military District,
20 there was a constant exchange of information both up and down from the
21 General Gotovina Military District Commander level that caused these
22 plans to change, given new intelligence coming in, new information coming
23 in, you mentioned changes in the terrain after summer 1995. All of those
24 elements come into play for a military commander to constantly monitor,
25 and orders change.
1 Is that accurate?
2 A. That is accurate and that is what called the command process in
3 part 1 of my report. And again, it relates to situational awareness.
4 Q. Let's just take this and go through with the Chamber with the
5 assistance of your report because some of the reports are in different
6 places, and I would like to go through a sequence with you. And I will
7 tell you, Mr. Theunens, I believe that absent one or two which I will
8 identify for you all of the documents that we will go through have been
9 set forth in footnotes of your report. You can question me if I am
10 incorrect, but I believe I have done that to the best of my ability.
11 MR. KEHOE: Let us go to 65 ter 4481.
12 Q. This is, in fact, a document that you discuss on page 82 of your
13 report or page 340 in e-court. I will talk episodically about some other
14 issues here, but I want to focus mostly on the artillery issues. And
15 this is an order that came from General Bobetko on the 26th June 1995.
16 And for all intents and purposes, Mr. Theunens, this is the first
17 directive focussed on Storm. Although it had been discussed in other
18 capacities, this is the first one; isn't it?
19 A. It's the first one I am aware of.
20 Q. As early on in this report, if we could turn to page 6 of 11 in
21 this report. Before we get to it, what is this? What is this directive?
22 Just explain it to the Chamber generally.
23 A. Your Honours, in the hierarchy of orders and commands, if I can
24 express myself in that way, as I have addressed in part 1 of the report
25 directives is the second highest level. The highest level are
1 instructions. Then you have directives, and subsequently, you go down
2 until you have, at the end commands which are the most simple forms of
3 orders, so a directive is an order from -- which is issued by the highest
4 military level, i.e., the Main Staff, and it contains detailed
5 information and instructions as to the tasks of the units of the HV. In
6 this context this is a directive which includes tasks for the Split
7 Military District, in relation to the conduct of an operation identified
8 as Storm or Oluja.
9 Q. And if we can turn to page 6 of this document, and we will go
10 through the whole document because we will put it into evidence for
11 review by the Chamber. But I'm interested in on page 6 of 11,
12 paragraph 7, the artillery and rocket support. It notes that artillery
13 and rocket support will be provided by the 14th and 20th. And then next
15 "The support should focus on neutralizing the Republika Srpska
16 Main Staff and the 7th corps command post in Knin, the brigade command
17 posts, concentrations of enemy manpower, armour and artillery in the area
18 of Knin and Benkovac, including ammunition depots, while supporting the
19 main forces in attack and preventing an enemy counterattack from the
20 direction of Knin, Kastel Zegarski, and Benkovac."
21 And if we could just turn to page 9, I just want to ask you a
22 couple of questions on this artillery issue. In the middle of the page:
23 "On the basis of the newly collected information ..."
24 Do you see that, Mr. Theunens?
25 A. I can see that, Mr. Kehoe. Thank you.
1 Q. "On the basis of the newly collected information about changes
2 on the enemy's side, you are to update the plans of operation,
3 particularly the plans for the use of artillery and HRZ as well as the
4 other plans, all of which are to be submitted to the Main Staff -- the HV
5 Main Staff."
6 When you reviewed this you concluded, did you not, that very
7 early on that the HV Main Staff had specific military targets in mind in
8 planning Oluja and that those plans were to be updated with additional
9 information concerning the use of artillery as time went on.
10 Is that right?
11 A. That's correct, Your Honours. But at the beginning of the order,
12 we also see that the order is based on the plans that have been proposed
13 by the commander of the Split Military District.
14 Q. I understand, sir.
15 A. Mm-hm.
16 Q. But this is a specific idea that the Main Staff has on military
17 targets and that is to be updated, especially the use of artillery, has
18 to be updated. Correct?
19 A. Yes, that is how command and control is implemented. It is then
20 up to the commander of the Split Military District in this case to
21 determine the specific targeting information and provide that specific
22 information to his artillery units.
23 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into
24 evidence 65 ter 4481.
25 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that becomes Exhibit D956.
3 JUDGE ORIE: D956 is admitted into evidence.
4 MR. KEHOE:
5 Q. Now the order that we just viewed is just a small example of the
6 complexities that are involved in conducting a military operation, like
7 Oluja or any such operation. Would you agree with that, Mr. Theunens?
8 A. Yes, I agree with that.
9 Q. And if we turn your attention to -- well, in addition to the
10 order that came down from General Bobetko on the directive, there is an
11 specific order that General Bobetko sends to General Gotovina on the 26th
12 June 1995.
13 MR. KEHOE: And if we could bring up 65 ter 1283.
14 Q. Now, the first order -- the first directive that we just talked
15 about previously is a directive being sent to one person specifically.
16 This document appears just to be send to General Gotovina. Can you help
17 the Chamber out just a bit as to the distinction between these two,
18 Mr. Theunens? If you want to review the document, we can scroll through
19 it but ...
20 A. No. It is logical that orders, or actually all correspondence
21 from the superior commander is send to the -- to the commander of the
22 subordinate unit -- no, I will rephrase that. I apologise.
23 If a superior wants to send information or requests something
24 from a subordinate unit, he will send his request or his order to the
25 commander of that unit, so it is logical that an instruction or an order
1 for the Split Military District from the HV Main Staff is sent to the
2 commander of the Split Military District.
3 Q. Let's -- in fairness, let's just look through the document. It
4 will be a little easier to have you answer these questions.
5 MR. KEHOE: If we can to the next page.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, could I seek some clarification in
7 relation to this directive. I think your first questions were about
8 specific towns or villages, and what you just read to the witness in this
9 artillery and rocket support, 7, deals with Knin only. Whereas elsewhere
10 in the document I think I read something about artillery access.
11 Now what I like to clarify with the witness is you said, is it
12 true that from this directive we learned that they had specific targets.
13 To what extent is that true for the whole of the operation or for Knin or
14 for -- in view of your conclusions, I'm trying to understand exactly what
15 we can learn from this document.
16 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, you wish me to comment on the
17 previous document we saw?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The previous document. You were asked
19 questions. Mr. Kehoe asked you whether you would agree whether there
20 were specific targets, and I think in relation to 17 that they had to be
21 updated. And you were taken from one portion was about Knin and to a
22 more general portion about updating of targets.
23 What I'd like it know is -- let me just see what Mr. Kehoe
24 exactly --
25 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, it would be helpful if we flipped back
1 to that document.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Or the line exactly where you put it.
3 You were asked by Mr. Kehoe, "Once you had been taken to the
4 targets, which as far as I understood were limited to Knin, you were
5 asked when you reviewed you concluded that that very early on that the HV
6 Main Staff had specific military targets in mind in planning Oluja and
7 that those plans were to be updated with additional information
8 concerning the use of artillery as time went on? "
9 That was question was put to you after you had been taken to the
10 artillery support, which was about targets in Knin, and when you had been
11 taken to this paragraph which said, Well, we have to update on the basis
12 of new information.
13 Now the conclusion that was put to you by Mr. Kehoe was not in
14 any way limited to Knin but was rather general in nature. When you said,
15 "that's correct," and then you said something about the plans were
16 proposed by the Split Military District commander, did you mean to agree
17 with Mr. Kehoe that this was in general the case; or did you agree with
18 Mr. Kehoe on the basis of what he had put to you, that is, about Knin,
19 and if I could say so, the update paragraph.
20 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, my answer applied to the general
21 situation. That is that in the directive from the Main Staff, specific
22 targets as to the nature of the targets. The directive talks about
23 command posts, concentrations of enemy manpower, or concentrations of
24 armour and artillery in the area of Knin and Benkovac, including
25 ammunition and fuel depots, so in the directive of the HV Main Staff,
1 these are the types of targets that are identified. Obviously the
2 Main Staff does not -- or General Bobetko does not state where the
3 targets are exactly located in Knin and Benkovac. Then it is up to the
4 subordinate commander based on the intelligence and information he has to
5 use this guidance or this instruction actually from his superior to
6 determine well, which of these targets -- first of all, where are these
7 targets located which --
8 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand. My question was mainly focussed on
9 whether you agreed this to be the general approach or whether it was
10 limited to the areas which were specifically put to you by Mr. Kehoe, and
11 I do that you take that this was a general statement about the approach
12 taken at the time.
13 If that is the case, then --
14 THE WITNESS: It is indeed the general approach. I think we both
15 -- we all observed that there is an distinction between what is stated in
16 4481 and what is stated in the order for attack, because there we just
17 see well, just take the city of Knin
18 or engage artillery fire against these towns, whereas an earlier
19 instruction from the higher echelon is much more specific. That is the
20 only observation I can make when I compare these two documents.
21 Just to conclude it is illogical that the instruction from the
22 lower level appears to more general and more vague or less specific than
23 the instruction that is coming from the higher echelon.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
1 MR. KEHOE:
2 Q. So just taking your last answer, your contention is that the
3 information coming from a higher level is more specific than the
4 information at a lower level, and that's where you find, as you know,
5 that it is illogical for it to be way. Is that your statement?
6 A. I tried to say the opposite, Your Honours.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. That is that the higher echelon, the Main Staff gives the general
9 information. For example, in this specific case, determines the types of
10 targets that are to be engaged, whereas the lower echelon, in this case
11 the Split Military District, will then identify each and every target,
12 and I have included examples of targeting lists in this my report. We
13 discussed that earlier with the X, Y, Z coordinates, the physical
14 identification or name of the target, and so on and so on.
15 This is not for the Main Staff. This is for the Military
16 District and its subordinate units to determine.
17 Q. Thank you for the clarification, Mr. Theunens. Let us go back to
18 the document on the screen, 65 ter 1283, the order from General Bobetko.
19 I believe it is of the same date, or the 26th of June. And this order
20 notes several informational items to bring to General Gotovina's
22 MR. KEHOE: If we could scroll up on that first paragraph.
23 "In the last month the enemy has carried out a number of
24 operations that have result in the significant changes in the military
25 and political situation in the occupied territories of the Republic of
2 the forces of the 39th Banija, 21st Kordun, 15th Lika, and the 7th Knin
3 Corps of the SVK of the army of the Serbian Krajina.
4 "The recruitment is being done with the materiel help of the
5 Yugoslav Army and through a mobilisation of the conscripts in the
6 territory of the FRY."
7 Can you explain that a little bit in the sense of is, in fact,
8 the ARSK building up their forces with the assistance of the Yugoslav
9 Army at the time of this order.
10 A. Mr. President, I have not specifically analysed the activities of
11 the SVK during that time-period. I am familiar with the fact that early
12 June General Mrksic is sent from Belgrade
13 SVK, and I'm also familiar with the parade on the Slunj training ground
14 which took place on the 28th of June 1995.
15 I cannot draw further conclusions as to whether or not the SVK
16 was stepping up its combat readiness or taking other measures. I do
17 remember information from when I was working the UNPROFOR headquarters
18 that there were a lot of expectations from the arrival of Mrksic as to
19 the improvement of the overall capabilities of the SVK.
20 Q. Before we go into this just a bit further, you noted on page 69,
21 line 8, "that I have not specifically analysed the activities of the SVK
22 during that time-period."
23 In P1011, on point ten, point 9, you were instructed that -- by
24 Mr. Tieger in the categories that were to provide information on the pace
25 and progress of Operation Storm, including mop-up operations SVK
1 deployment and activity.
2 So you -- according to the instructions that you received and the
3 exhibit introduced into evidence by the Prosecution, you were given
4 instructions concerning, provide information on SVK deployment and
5 activity. Are you now saying that you didn't do that?
6 A. I don't remember the specific wording of point 9, but I believe
7 it refers to the situation after Storm when we talk about mop-up
9 I'm not sure -- I don't remember being tasked with a systematic
10 analysis or a detailed analysis of SVK activities prior to Storm.
11 Q. Let's pull it up, so maybe we talk -- bring up P1011, page 2,
12 point 9, maybe you can point us out on this.
13 If you can read with me point 9 which is part of your categories
14 to provide information. "Pace and progress of Operation Storm, including
15 mop-up operations; SVK deployment and activity."
16 A. Your Honour, my understanding -- and again as you see I have not
17 specifically addressed it in my report. I never -- I didn't hear any
18 comments of the Prosecution in relation to that, but my understanding
19 here is that it actually refers to SVK deployment and activity during and
20 after Operation Storm, and there I can frankly answer that I didn't have
21 access to specific information as to that -- as to the SVK deployment and
22 activity during and after Operation Storm in Sector South.
23 Q. Is it your testimony, sir, that while you were providing this --
24 I think it's described as a road map for the Chamber, you did not analyse
25 SVK documents concerning deployment and activity during Storm, and
1 thereafter. Is that your testimony?
2 A. Your Honour, I came across such documents but -- no, I will
3 rephrase. I came across a few documents indicating there was actually
4 there was not so much - at least in former Sector South - there was not
5 so much anymore of a SVK deployment and activity -- I mean there was
6 isolated activities. That's again based on the information I remember
7 from working UNPROFOR, but I have not come across documents here
8 indicating that in the course of Operation Storm there was still a
9 functioning command and control and reporting system, the SVK would that
10 provide sufficient documents and reports and orders allowing me to
11 analyse the activities of the SVK in Sector South during that
13 Q. Mr. Theunens, is it your testimony that in the OTP archive there
14 were no -- I don't want to overstate the point, sir - there was an
15 insufficient number of SVK documents in the possession of the Office of
16 the Prosecutor to allow to you review matters before, during and after;
17 or are you just saying that you didn't review any of those?
18 A. The key words are "during and after Operation Storm." What
19 happened before I have addressed in very general terms in the report
20 because I thought it was important as background. I have also spoken
21 about, for example, what I'm trying to is a say is that during and after
22 there were not sufficient documents, i.e., documents covering SVK
23 activities in Sector South during and after Operation Storm.
24 I have come across VJ documents covering these issues, but that
25 was long after the filing of the addendum in the framework of the
1 compilation of the an addendum from former Martic report for the Perisic
3 Q. Well, sir, when you were putting your documents together, and you
4 received this instruction for whatever it means, did you ask the OTP for
5 any further SVK documentation? And if so, when?
6 A. No, Your Honours, I did not ask the OTP for additional SVK
7 documentation because I didn't consider it of such a high relevance for
8 my report.
9 Q. So when you were providing -- got instructions to provide the
10 Chamber with a road map of what was happening in Operation Storm, you
11 made a decision not to consider SVK documents because you didn't think
12 they were of a high relevance to your report.
13 A. Your Honours, I don't think that is what I'm saying. What I'm
14 saying is that I came across documents, including SVK documents, but in
15 relation to the SVK documents not in sufficient number that would allow
16 me to provide a picture that corresponds with the methodology I apply for
17 the operations conducted by SVK the during and after Operation Storm. I
18 remember - and that is not addressed in my report - that the units of the
19 SVK in Sector South quite soon -- at a quite early stage started to
20 withdraw. I also remember that for Sector North there is a cease-fire
21 agreement which is concluded by General Stipetic, Petar, and I'm not sure
22 whether it was Bulat [phoen], or another SVK General on the 8th or 9th of
23 August which resulted in the withdrawal of what remained of (organised
24 SVK units from Sector North).
25 The ten-point list I received from the Prosecution, it was not
1 stated to me that this was a road map for the Trial Chamber. It was
2 followed by 17-point list, then by my proposal of a table of contents.
3 And this proposal which did not cover SVK during and after Operation
4 Storm was accepted by the Office of the Prosecutor.
5 Q. If we can just flip back to page 1 of this document, just for
6 clarity sake, Mr. Theunens, so you and I are speaking on the same page
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, if your point is that the witness,
9 despite the instructions in point 9, did not pay specific attention to
10 the SVK, then that point is made approximately four to five times.
11 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour, I show him one sentence. That's
13 JUDGE ORIE: I leave it to you.
14 MR. KEHOE: I'll drop it, Judge. I think we can go back into the
15 direction we were going. I don't know if Your Honour wants to have a
16 break at this juncture.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I was thinking about that.
18 We'll have a break until 1.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 12.38 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.
22 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you. If we can just go
23 back to 65 ter 1283, please. And if we could go to the next page,
25 Q. As we note at the bottom of this paragraph, it notes the issue
1 that the VRS, the army of the Republika Srpska, and the SVK army of the
2 Serb Krajina will carry out an operation to crush the 5th corps of the
3 army of Bosnian and Herzegovina
4 the Bihac enclave where 5 corps was; is it not, sir?
5 A. Indeed. I would just like to emphasise that this is the
6 intelligence, the SV Main Staff has. So contrary to their intelligence,
7 those are the intentions of the SVK and the VRS in relation to Bihac.
8 Q. That, in fact, did happen that the SVK and the VRS engaged in a
9 joint operation at Bihac, did they not?
10 A. Your Honour, not at that time. They had done at earlier
11 occasions but the operations from early July only included forces of the
12 SVK together with elements of the forces of the so-called autonomous
13 province of western Bosnia
14 chief in the G2 in the military office in Zagreb, we had to give a
15 briefing to go Mr. Akashi, and we considered the involvement of the -- of
16 the VRS a key indicator as to the intentions of the SVK and the APWB
17 forces in relation to Bihac.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, you have a tendency to explain a lot
19 even matters which are not specifically asked, because Mr. Kehoe wanted
20 to know whether it did happen, and apart from your answer is that you
21 explain why you remember. If there's any doubt as to your recollection,
22 Mr. Kehoe certainly will address the matter.
23 THE WITNESS: Okay.
24 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. Mr. Theunens, just turning to the next page, if we go into the
1 order itself from General Bobetko, which I'm sure that you are familiar
2 with. That puts the 4th Guards Brigade and the 7th Guards Brigade in
3 readiness. I believe it's at the bottom of the B/C/S version on page 2
4 and the English version. And if we can go to the next page. It notes in
5 paragraph 6 that the troops -- have the troops ready to carry out their
6 task at by 29 June 1995
7 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer 65 ter
8 1283 into evidence.
9 JUDGE ORIE: No objections?
10 MR. WAESPI: That's correct, Mr. President.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number D957.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Exhibit number D957 is admitted into evidence.
13 MR. KEHOE: There is just one further question or two on this
14 document. This document informs General Gotovina of a potential
15 offensive with -- against 5 corps in western Bosnia as well as
16 information concerning the recruitment of additional soldiers. And would
17 you agree that this was information that important because the Split
18 Military District commander or any military commander has to know what he
19 is facing; isn't that right?
20 A. Yes. He has to know what he is facing, and he has to know his
21 own forces in situational awareness.
22 Q. And in that situational awareness, he makes decisions based on
23 the information he has on the other side?
24 A. He makes a decision based on all the information he has, and the
25 activities of the enemy or the assessed activities of the enemy is only
1 one element of information a commander is considering in order to
2 implement command and control.
3 Q. Mr. Theunens, when you were going through your methodology and
4 trying to make a decision whether General Gotovina was operating as a
5 reasonable military commander under the circumstances, how did you make
6 that decision when you didn't know what General Gotovina was facing at
7 the time?
8 A. Your Honour, I have not been requested to conclude whether or not
9 General Gotovina was operating as a reasonable military commander.
10 Q. So -- that's fine, sir. The Defence will accept that answer.
11 Let us --
12 MR. KEHOE: If I might have one moment, Your Honour?
13 Q. Just so can we be clear, so, Mr. Theunens, based on the work that
14 you did, you have no opinion as to whether or not General Gotovina was
15 operating as a reasonable military commander during Operation Storm?
16 A. Your Honours, I have drawn conclusions which can be found in the
17 executive summary. Now, obviously some of these conclusions are relevant
18 or may be relevant for the question whether or not General Gotovina acted
19 as a reasonable military commander, but my -- for my own concern, I was
20 not requested to formulate a specific conclusion as to whether or not
21 General Gotovina acted as a reasonable military commander.
22 Q. Well, can you help us, sir, based on your answer, where you say:
23 "I have drawn conclusions which can be found in the executive
24 summary." Now obviously some of these conclusions are relevant or may be
25 relevant for the question of whether or not General Gotovina acted as a
1 reasonable military commander."
2 Now on those issues where that becomes relevant, my question
3 remains for you how could you come to those conclusions in any fashion
4 without knowing what General Gotovina was facing on the other side?
5 A. First of all, I would like you to explain what you mean by
6 without knowing what General Gotovina was facing on the other side, and,
7 secondly, as I explained before - and it can also can be found in part 1
8 of the report - enemy situation is only one aspect a commander has to
9 consider in order to implement the command and control process.
10 Q. Mr. Theunens, I think so we can be clear, I think you know full
11 well that I'm talking about the enemy forces that General Gotovina was
12 facing, be the SVK or the VRS or any other force. I think you know that
13 is what I'm talking about.
14 My question goes back to any conclusion that you could possibly
15 make, how could you make that or make a determination whether or not
16 General Gotovina operated as a reasonable military commander without the
17 assessment, an assessment, as to what he was facing and what he was
18 facing against enemy forces.
19 A. Your Honour, one of the conclusions I draw in the executive
20 summary is that there is prior to, during, and paragraph Operation Storm
21 a functioning command and control system in the Split Military District
22 that also applies to other forces that operate under the command of
23 General Gotovina during that time-period.
24 I believe that from the military point of view, that is a very
25 important conclusion. And such a conclusion does not have to rely on any
1 information whatsoever in relation to enemy activity, yes or no, because
2 it only refers to the activities of the forces under the command of
3 General Gotovina.
4 If you want, I can give other examples.
5 Q. Well, you would agree with me that when making a decision on
6 whether artillery was used properly or improperly, by a reasonable
7 military commander, it is important for you to assess what that
8 reasonable military commander was facing when a decision was made to use
9 artillery. Would you agree with that?
10 A. Well, I have included in my report at different locations in part
11 2 documents indicating that the Split
12 intelligence it received from the HV Main Staff, as well as from its own
13 intelligence organs, i.e., those at the Split Military District Command
14 level, including, for example, unmanned aerial vehicles which were quite
15 sophisticated for that time, as well as the intelligence organs of its
16 subordinate units. I have concluded from these documents that the Split
17 Military District immediately prior to Operation Storm has updated
18 information as to the location of enemy units, facility, command posts as
19 well as the intentions and activities of these enemy forces.
20 Q. So, then, taking that one step further, you would agree that
21 General Gotovina based on that information operated as a reasonable
22 military commander because he had specific targeting information to use
23 artillery against, right?
24 A. Your Honours, the tasking I received and the documents I was able
25 to review do not allow to conclude what General Gotovina and his -- and
1 the members of the Split Military District commander operating under his
2 orders did with that intelligence. I can only conclude that they have
3 the intelligence. I have some entries, but I would consider them rather
4 sketchy of subordinate units indicating, for example, as I mentioned on
5 English page 187 that indeed there exists target lists, which I
6 established in accordance with the doctrine I am familiar with. I have
7 an entry that's on English page 188 this is from a report compiled by the
8 134Th home regiment -- Home Guard Regiment which is 65 ter 4600, and I
10 "Corrections by the means of artillery were done in good time.
11 In the first few hours, we had no support from the Zadar operation group,
12 except for shelling of the area of Benkovac without monitoring. And the
13 message at 0530 hours of the following contents is anything falling on
15 Now I did not draw any overall conclusion for the use of
16 artillery by the Split Military District from that information because I
17 had, in my view, not sufficient information available as to the
18 implementation of the use of artillery firing during Operation Storm.
19 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, I think that I can -- given this
20 concession, I think I can cut this -- not concession, but statement. I
21 think I can cut through it a little more quickly.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me just try to understand what exactly
23 happened over the last two minutes.
24 You asked several times, totally valid question whether you would
25 need knowledge of what the opposite party would do in order to -- to act
1 as a reasonable commander. The witness thought about it a while, and
2 finally instead of directly answering your question, he started
3 explaining to us that in the report, we find elements where apparently,
4 at least, the witness concludes that there was information, perhaps not
5 everything but at least he gave examples of that.
6 And then you said, To therefore you agree that he acted as a
7 reasonable commander. The problem in the line of questioning - and I
8 just want you to know at least what was on my mind --
9 MR. KEHOE: Yes, sir.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Is that simplified it says, Do you need information
11 to act as a reasonable commander? Let's just assume the answer is yes.
12 Second, did he have information. He had some information. Third,
13 therefore you agree that he acted as a reasonable commander. Which, of
14 course, totally depends. Even if you need information, it doesn't mean
15 that if you have that information that by that reason alone, you act as a
16 reasonable commander. You can act totally unreasonable with that
17 information. It took the witness a while to struggle himself through
18 that. But that is, as a matter of fact, what you strongly suggested in
19 your questions. And whatever the witness would have said, the logic
20 which you presented to the witness is - unlike your first question - is
21 not valid logic.
22 I just want you to be aware of if you -- if you more or less use
23 logical thoughts, then of course the Chamber will apply its own valid
24 logic on these matters. To that extent, I think the factual information
25 that might have assisted the Chamber could have elicited rather quickly.
1 Please proceed.
2 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour. I took that exercise in an attempt
3 to make a curtail of this a bit. I will try to get through it as quickly
4 as possible.
5 If I can turn to 65 ter 3054, and this a order from
6 General Bobetko dated 27 June 1995
8 Q. And in the first paragraph, it notes in the second-to-last line:
9 "You are to start preparing and making combat documentation as per
10 enclosure number 5 ..."
11 MR. KEHOE: If you can scroll it over so they can see the number
12 a bit. You can see it says enclosure, but there's a number 5 there.
13 If we can go to page 4 of 20.
14 Q. Now, sir, this is a list of documents that are prepared for this
15 offensive. Obviously the order of attack, the decision to attack with
16 maps 1:100.000. And it numbers any number of items up to 31.
17 And the -- number 7 is the plan of artillery operation on a map
18 with textual and tabular presentation. What is that, sir?
19 A. It should be like it is explained on the document because I don't
20 see the annex in front me. I would expect that there will be tables
21 indicating the targets, and identifying them. And the map will be used
22 as supportive element.
23 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into
24 evidence 65 ter 2411.
25 MR. WAESPI: No objections, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
2 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry, 65 ter 3054.
3 THE REGISTRAR: That becomes Exhibit D958.
4 JUDGE ORIE: D958 is admitted into evidence.
5 MR. KEHOE:
6 Q. Now, sir, in your review of the documentation, you did note that
7 General Gotovina did go through the exercise of preparing information in
8 accordance with this order by General Bobetko; did he not?
9 A. Could you please tell me on which page of my report I discussed
10 this order? Because I'm not sure whether I have seen it.
11 Q. You talk about it in - let me see --
12 A. We were talking about something on the 27th, and this is the 19th
13 of June.
14 Q. I believe it is page 84.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Part 1 or part 2?
16 MR. KEHOE: I'm not sure what 84 is.
17 A. Okay. I have it now. I could not conclude from this document
18 what actions that General Gotovina undertook.
19 Q. Let us stay with this document and just go into things like maps.
20 And let's give the Chamber an idea of what we're talking about here and
21 what type of maps are -- the Main Staff expects to be prepared. And let
22 just look at 65 ter 5039. We will look through a series of these.
23 MR. KEHOE: This is map 14 in the Court binder, Mr. President.
24 Q. Now without going into this document specifically, these are the
25 types -- this is the type of map that is prepared, is it not, when you
1 are going through a planning operation to make a decision how to conduct
2 an offensive. Is that right?
3 A. This is not the best example, Your Honours, because this is
4 actually a summarizing map which --
5 Q. I understand. It is a summary, but what I'm getting at is this
6 the type of planning map that is done at the Split Military District
7 level that is sent up to the Main Staff, isn't it?
8 A. Well, according to doctrine it should be -- maps are prepared at
9 all command levels in order to visualize the order and, yeah, it can be
10 sent upwards. But I have no knowledge what this maps actually means. I
11 believe it means that it shows the progress of the units of the Split
12 Military District during Operation Storm. In addition I'm not familiar
13 with the maps that were produced by the Split Military District Command
14 as a result of the order or the directive of General Bobetko.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Let me try to cut this short. Is there any dispute
16 about preparing such an operation by the use of maps on which you set out
17 what your plans are?
18 If that is issue --
19 MR. KEHOE: [Overlapping speakers] ... just the visual, Judge,
20 that's right.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yeah. Let's move on.
22 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, I think we'll just offer into evidence
23 this 65 ter 5039, as a similar map 65 ter 5047, and a last map for Kozjak
24 prepared by Brigadier Ademi, D63005.
25 MR. WAESPI: No objection. I would like to see them of course.
1 JUDGE ORIE: If they are just introduced into evidence for the
2 purpose of establishing that maps were used for planning purposes.
3 MR. KEHOE: That's right.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Might perhaps even have accepted it without looking
5 at them, but since there are no objections, at least not for the time
7 Mr. Registrar.
8 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
9 JUDGE ORIE: Put them -- in view of the common purpose, we put
10 them under one exhibit number.
11 MR. KEHOE: I have noted one correction. On the last map it is
12 1D630052. My apologies, Mr. Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, these three maps become Exhibit
14 number D959.
15 JUDGE ORIE: D959 is admitted into evidence.
16 MR. KEHOE:
17 Q. You note at page 89 in part 2 of your report that there was a
18 meeting in Brijuni that President Tudjman called, and this is a
19 transcript, P461 - no need to bring it up - where were the president
21 "Gentlemen I have called this meeting to assess the current
22 situation to hear your views before I decide what our next steps should
23 be in the forthcoming days."
24 I would like to play a short clip for you, and the clip itself
25 from the tape is 1D63-0001.
1 [Videotape played]
2 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
3 "President: Is an attack on Knin possible without hitting the
4 camp, anyone UNCRO over there, UNPROFOR ...
5 "Ante Gotovina: At this moment we can engage in extremely
6 precise operations in Knin in a planned manner without aiming at the
7 barracks in which UNCRO is located.
8 "Davor Domazet: Mr. President, we have all the photographs. It
9 is precisely known where who is ... UNPROFOR in the southern barracks, in
10 those southern barracks, and all of their forces are north. Therefore we
11 can fire very precisely without hitting the UNPROFOR camp. It is
12 separate. A bit south of Knin, it is possible to attack precisely.
13 "Ante Gotovina: At this moment none of our weapons operate
14 without guidance, meaning, direct guidance."
15 MR. KEHOE:
16 Q. I will note for you, Mr. Theunens, that in your report you note
17 that at this moment we can engage in extremely precise operations in Knin
18 systematically, whereas this translation is in a planned manner.
19 Now let us take this, sir, when you read this, and you noted
20 General Gotovina talking about the attack on Knin being an extremely
21 precise manner what did you understand -- what did you believe as an
22 intelligence analyst him to mean?
23 A. It means that the targets -- I mean for what artillery is
24 concerned that the targets you intend to engage are also the targets that
25 are engaged and that any dispersion of fire is purely within the
1 technical limits of the weapon and that no untended targets are hit.
2 Q. So did you understand General Gotovina when using the words
3 "extremely precise," that he was -- as an intelligence analysis, did you
4 conclude that he was discussing extremely precise targets?
5 A. Maybe it is the nuance in English, but I would say extremely
6 precise targeting, i.e., the act of engaging a target.
7 Q. Now there is also a notation that he notes that we have
8 photographs. Now when you saw that, sir, what did you conclude that
9 General Gotovina -- as an intelligence analyst, what did you conclude
10 General Gotovina was talking about when he said, We have photographs?
11 A. Well, as I mentioned earlier, I link that to the entry in General
12 Gotovina's book where he talks the availability of imagery collected from
13 UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles, and I concluded from that that it would
14 allow him to have access to very precise information as to the locations
15 of targets and the identification of targets as long as these photos are
17 Q. Now, we noted that he says extremely precise operations with
18 photographs. And the translation as we've presented to you says, "in a
19 planned manner." And I must tell you that is different that what is in
20 your report which uses the word "systematically."
21 Now I understand that you are not a B/C/S linguist, sir, but if
22 the translation is, "in a planned manner with precise locations and
23 photographs," as an analyst would you conclude that General Gotovina is
24 telling President Tudjman that we have photographs; we a precise targets
25 in mind; we have a plan to operate in an organised way and in a very
1 planned manner.
2 Would that, as an intelligence analyst, be your assessment from
3 this tape?
4 A. Yes, I answered the question. I discussed this actually on page
5 182, English page 182 of part 2 of the report, where I included an
6 excerpt of the minutes of this meeting during which General Gotovina
7 addresses actually the capabilities of his forces in relation to Knin.
8 And that can be found on English page 10 of P461.
9 And systematically, did not change anything -- I mean the word
10 "systematically," to my understanding because I understood it as if you
11 can do it in a manner that -- that is planned and organised, i.e., there
12 is an system behind it.
13 MR. KEHOE: Now -- Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer
14 into evidence 1D63-001.
15 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I'd first like to see the tape. That obviously
16 relates to a tape that we have in evidence, and we just need to compare
17 the two versions.
18 So I'd like to reserve my final judgement.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, on the basis of a balance of
20 probabilities, may I take it that's fair chance that it is not something
22 MR. WAESPI: Yes that's correct.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Under those circumstances, and I didn't give you a
24 time-limit for the maps earlier which you wanted to look at, you have 24
25 hours to look at the maps. You also have 24 hours to check whether this
1 material is what you expect it to be, and we already decide on admission.
2 Mr. Registrar.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D960.
4 JUDGE ORIE: D960 is admitted into evidence, with the proviso I
5 just gave.
6 Please proceed.
7 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Mr. Theunens, I just want to cover one area quickly before we end
9 the day, and I believe it has to do with the intelligence-gathering
10 compatibilities and work that was done by the HV. I do believe during
11 the course of this morning or possibly this afternoon's discussions you
12 talked about the intelligence capabilities -- or the intelligence
13 gathering by the HV and said information -- it was in fact done. And so
14 for a reference point, if you can, if I may, you in fact talk about this
15 on page 87 and 88 of your report. Again, that is part 2 of the report.
16 My apologies that I don't have the e-court number but -- so you could
17 follow with me.
18 But I think we can move through documents on the
19 intelligence-gathering quite quickly. And if we can start with -- again,
20 these are documents absent one I might talk to you about that are in your
21 report, the first being on 65 ter 609 that you referred to on page 88, I
23 MR. KEHOE: If we can bring that up. And it's an intelligence
24 report of 14 July.
25 Q. Just scrolling down a little bit, that first paragraph has to do
1 with conscripts or -- conscripts in and around Benkovac, talking about
2 2.250 conscripts. And in the last sentence in that paragraph, it says:
3 "... majority of the forces are grouped in Benkovac ..."
4 Information such as this, and I don't want to be specific and put
5 too fine a point on this, Mr. Theunens, but this is information that a
6 commander at General Gotovina's level would want to know, i.e., where the
7 ARSK is not only gathering their troops but possibly positions those
8 troops might take.
9 A. Yes. I just want to add that this is a report from a source,
10 i.e., it's a HUMINT report, and as a commander, I would like for
11 corroborative information and, for example, use my other intelligence
12 assets in order to seek confirmation of that information.
13 Q. And just taking what you just said, I mean, you would get this
14 piece of information from a source and then you would go back and see
15 whether or not it was correct.
16 A. Indeed, Your Honours.
17 Q. Now, the next page of this document, it's a piece of information
18 coming from someone from UNCRO, which is kind of interesting. You see:
19 "According to the statement of UNCRO."
20 "The positions of SA 6 rocket systems.
21 Now SA rocket systems are mobile rocket systems, surface-to-air
22 rockets, aren't they?
23 A. Yes, they are. And even without being an air defence expert,
24 they were quite old already by the mid-1990s.
25 Q. But as a commander, sir, be they old or -- you as a commander
1 would want to know where they were, such as in the last insert here being
2 in Knin?
3 A. Of course. And I would like to obtain more precise information
4 as to the exact location --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Is that the issue? The issue apparently is that
6 the -- in preparing for Operation Storm that you would need information
7 and there would be a wish to obtain such information, and that there was
8 the capacity and ability to obtain such information.
9 Now my question is: Is that in dispute?
10 MR. WAESPI: Not from our side, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE ORIE: So, therefore, I'm listening to all of it --
12 MR. KEHOE: I just wanted to -- I have a series of documents, if
13 I could just get through them quickly.
14 JUDGE ORIE: No. But there is -- if there's no dispute about the
15 matter, Mr. Kehoe, why -- I mean, first of all, apart from how logical
16 that is, why spend time on matters which are not in dispute? And I
17 hear -- and I formulated in a rather general way, so, therefore, if that
18 is not in dispute, let's move on to matters --
19 MR. KEHOE: In some of the documents here concerning the
20 methodology that was employed, there is a dispute, not that they were
21 gathering information, but the specificity information, because it then
22 follows down from, for instance, the next document --
23 JUDGE ORIE: No problem. Then focus your question on that.
24 MR. KEHOE: I will.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Do not then ask the witness whether would one would
1 wish to have this information; but if it is the specificity of the
2 information, ask him about that. Because if that is in dispute, then the
3 Chamber, of course, would like to hear what the witness can tell us about
4 a matter which is in dispute.
6 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. We can turn to 1D63-0002.
7 Q. And I will tell you that I do not believe, Mr. Theunens, that
8 this is a document that was in your report.
9 Mr. Theunens, this is again an intelligence report from 17 July,
10 and it notes it's information received from the civilian police who are
11 in contact with UNCRO.
12 MR. KEHOE: If we can just give the witness a little better view
13 of that, if we can.
14 Q. And tell me, Mr. Theunens, when you're satisfied, we'll go to the
15 next page, if we can.
16 A. Yes, please.
17 MR. KEHOE: Can we go to the next page.
18 Q. And this is in fact the issue that -- as it comes to, targeting
19 that I would like to discuss with you. We see in the first paragraph the
20 intelligence information talks about radar systems. As we move down the
21 page, concentration of troops. And further down the page, there's a
22 presence of tanks and then some mortar batteries.
23 And in each one of those there are the coordinates, the X/Y
24 coordinates, where it shows the locations as to where they are.
25 Now, on those locations -- are you with me, sir?
1 A. Yes, yes.
2 Q. On those locations, that's the type of information someone that
3 is engaged in picking targets for an artillery attack want [sic]. Isn't
4 that right? The actual coordinates, so you can be a little bit more --
5 you can be as precise as possible.
6 A. Indeed. And the information has to be timely. And in this case,
7 again, it seems to HUMINT report.
8 For the air defence systems, well, when they are active, they
9 will send out electronic signals. And I assume that the Split Military
10 District has electronical intelligence assets which allow, based on these
11 electronic signals, to exactly determine where this weapon system is
12 deployed and whether it's active.
13 So you will not just rely on a HUMINT report, but you will
14 collect from different sources as much information as possible in order
15 to have the best, precise information in a timely fashion and up-to-date,
16 available at the time you need it.
17 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into
18 evidence 1D63-0002.
19 MR. WAESPI: No objection, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number D961, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE ORIE: D961 is admitted into evidence.
23 Mr. Kehoe, I'm looking at the clock.
24 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, I give you the same instructions that
1 I gave you before; that is, that you should not speak with anyone about
2 your testimony, irrespective of whether it has been given already or
3 still to be given, and we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.00
4 in this courtroom.
5 Yes, Mr. Theunens.
6 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Mr. President. I have a slight
7 practical question. I understood initially that my testimony was to last
8 until 28 of November, and I accepted an invitation from University of
10 have checked the court schedule for December, and I understand that this
11 Trial Chamber sits in the afternoon that week. Now, maybe my testimony
12 has been -- has concluded by that time, but it would be helpful to me if
13 I could inform the people at the university in Amsterdam as soon as
14 possible about my availability, whether I have to be here or whether --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Your lecture would be in the afternoon.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: So there are two issues. The first one whether it
18 should necessarily be in the afternoon or whether it can be moved; I
19 don't know whether there's any way of changing that. And second is
20 whether you have already then by then finished your testimony.
21 Well, the last question is rather difficult to answer for me.
22 But the parties have also heard your question. They'll certainly inform
23 the Chamber about the timing they have on their mind, but to be quite
24 frank to you, I don't know whether I expect information which makes me
25 very optimistic.
1 We'll consider the matter and -- Mr. Theunens, and we'll see what
3 We adjourn, and we resume tomorrow, 25th of November, 9.00,
4 Courtroom I.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.
6 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 25th day of
7 November, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.