1 Friday, 16 January 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
9 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-06-90-T,
10 The Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
12 Before we continue, yesterday when we had no transcript, this is
13 an audio, but I think there is no need to have this all transcribed
14 because nothing of any substance was dealt with, apart from one thing,
15 that is that the Prosecution expressed its preference for housekeeping
16 matters to be dealt with immediately after the conclusion of the
17 testimony of Mr. Konings.
18 So that is now on the record.
19 Mr. Konings, I would like to remind you again that you are still
20 bound by the solemn declaration you gave at the begging of your
21 testimony, that is that you will speak the truth, the whole truth, and
22 nothing but the truth.
23 Mr. Kehoe.
24 MR. KEHOE: Yes, thank you, Mr. President.
25 WITNESS: HARRY KONINGS [Resumed]
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Kehoe: [Continued]
2 Q. Good morning, Colonel.
3 Colonel, just before we begin, I'd just like to ask you, are you
4 familiar with the acronym --
5 JUDGE ORIE: I think know we have slight problems with the
6 screens, but I think we can continue.
7 MR. KEHOE:
8 Q. Are you familiar, Colonel, with the acronym the MEETC, M-e-e-t-c,
9 being mission: The E been enemy; T being terrain and weather; next T
10 being troops and support available; the TC, the T being time available;
11 and the C civil consideration. Are you familiar with that acronym as an
12 acronym for a short-hand version of a way a commander would assess a
13 battle situation and what he wants to do?
14 A. I would not use the word familiar because we use a slightly
15 different system, but I exactly know what you mean.
16 Q. I understand. So you -- maybe in the Dutch system they would use
17 different initials but the concept is basically the same?
18 A. I know the concept.
19 Q. Okay. So we might talk about it in a little bit and to the
20 extent the concept is different please advise me and we can go there.
21 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, before we go into some of this, I did
22 hand out those two documents yesterday. I do believe it may be
23 expeditious to provide Colonel Konings with those two copies because it
24 will allow us to move things a bit more quickly.
25 Mr. President, should I proceed or wait for --
1 JUDGE ORIE: If everyone has --
2 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, no that will be fixed.
4 Please proceed.
5 MR. KEHOE:
6 Q. Colonel, looking at your report you do take issue at some points
7 about the methodology and logic of attacking Knin, but before we get into
8 the specifics the Knin I'd just like to talk to you about some concepts
9 about attacks in general and the NATO philosophy on that. So that will
10 the first topic before moving from the macro to the micro before we move
11 down to Knin itself.
12 And just addressing your attention to land operations as a whole
13 you would agree, would you not, that the purpose of land combat is not
14 necessarily destruction of the enemy forces but you want to force
16 A. No, I wouldn't say that. There can be many, many objects that
17 you want to achieve through a land operation. We call that the end state
18 that you want to achieve and the end state that you want to achieve
19 doesn't necessarily mean capitulation.
20 Q. So you're saying in some sense you want total destruction of the
21 enemy and maybe in other cases you would just want capitulation?
22 A. No that is not what I'm saying. There are various opportunities
23 or various objectives in between. What we try to do is a land operation
24 is working on -- to influence the will and capabilities and the
25 understanding of an opponent. That's what we try to do, and if that
1 takes in certain moments or on certain places the use of violence, of
2 military violence, then you have to do so. And if that means that you
3 have to destroy certain parts of the society or of the military
4 capabilities of the -- I should not say society but of the military
5 capabilities of an opponent then you have to do so. But you have to
6 remind that you have to reach such an end state as is formulated to you
7 by the political -- by your own government or a coalition, political
9 Q. Pursuant to rules of engagement?
10 A. And there will always be rules of engagement but the end state is
11 not necessarily capitulation or destruction the end state can be that an
12 operation leads to a peace agreement between two parties. Doesn't need
13 to be, necessarily, two states; it can be a conflict in a country where a
14 piece enforcing or peacekeeping force is established by the international
15 community and such a peace force is a military operation as well.
16 I additionally I should say that in NATO and also in the
18 operations or between offensive operations or between defensive
19 operations. An operation is an operation, and it doesn't matter in which
20 context it is taken.
21 Q. Let us turn if we can to a bit of a discussion on NATO concepts
22 and I would like to direct your attention, Colonel, to 1D65-0227. That
23 is the I believe the hard copy there is the allied joint document for
24 land operations AJP 3.2. I believe you have that in front of you. And
25 I'd first like to just expand on your last several answers when we talk
1 about an operations, and I want to direct your attention to section 204
2 on the first page after that document, if we could. Towards the bottom
3 of that page and if we could just look at that:
4 "Land combat is a fundamentally human endeavour, and human
5 building decide rationally or irrationally when they are beaten.
6 Historically, the defeat of an enemy force has almost never come at the
7 point of a 100 percent loss to the loser. It normally occurs at some
8 earlier point which depends on the losers' will and cohesion. On an
9 individual or small unit level, emotions, such as fear, panic, shock, and
10 surprise are significant. These emotions adversely affect
11 decision- making in commanders. When an enemy feels is he beaten, he
12 withdraws his participation from the battle or engagement."
13 If you can turn to the next page, top of the page, second full
14 sentence in, actually it's the third full sentence in, "The
15 collective ...":
16 "The collective withdrawal of an enemy's participation in battle
17 is primarily a mental rather than a physical issue and may not be
19 Now, I think you touched on some of the concepts just a bit
20 certainly in a part of your answer, sir, about land concept. But you
21 would agree that that is an approach that you want to take in assuming
22 you're in land, combat and you're in facing an opposition that you try to
23 -- or you know that emotion such as fear, panic, shock and surprise are
24 very significant to your opponent, aren't they?
25 A. I'm trying to re-read what you said because I'm not quite sure I
1 understand your directed question to me.
2 Can you rephrase it because I don't know where you're aiming at.
3 Q. It may have been a terrible question, Colonel, and I'll rephrase
5 JUDGE ORIE: Please do not speak at the same time.
6 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry. My apologies to the reporter at quarter
7 after 9.00.
8 Q. You would agree fundamentally that in land operations that
9 emotions such as fear, panic, shock, and surprise are very significant
10 and oft-times they effect the decision making in a commander?
11 A. Yes, they are certainly very important aspects in a land
13 Q. And taking this one step further in a land operation, and going
14 back to the last sentence, generally the withdrawal of an enemy is
15 because primarily -- of a mental breakdown, as opposed to a purely
16 physical breakdown; is that not correct?
17 A. Well, I think it is a combination. It can be a combination of
18 both -- well, as I say it's probably a combination of both, but no
19 situation will be the same. A mental break down can be caused by
20 threatening of a force. If you as a country or as a coalition are able
21 to show the force that you have and that you have a certain -- not a
22 certain, but a full willingness to apply that force if necessary it may
23 already change the mental state -- the mental -- the mental position of a
24 state or a party or a country in such a way that they even don't dream
25 about using their own armed forces against a -- a -- a force that attacks
1 them or that wants to enter their country as an intervening force because
2 it is not only about attacking forces when you talk about applying
3 violence, it is also talking about forces that are established by the
4 international community to intervene in any conflict as we have had
5 numerous examples in the past.
6 So the mental position of a party of an army of a government is a
7 very important one, and I -- I had not deny that they will not by
8 influence by things like panic, shock, et cetera.
9 Q. And to -- to take that one step further, Colonel, as a commander
10 you would want to encourage that mental break down by your enemy,
11 wouldn't you, as a means of achieving your goals?
12 A. That is one of the possibilities that have you that you work on a
13 mental breakdown of enemy forces or opposition forces or even a whole of
14 society by working through the way of what we discussed yesterday
15 information operations to work on the hearts and minds of a population.
16 Q. Let us -- if we may stay on this page and just move down to --
17 MR. KEHOE: If we could just scroll up just a bit. Thank you,
18 and we talk about the manoeuvrist approach in paragraph 207:
19 "The manoeuvrist approach is one in which shattering the enemy's
20 overall cohesion and will to fight rather than his materiel is
22 Now, likewise you're familiar with this concept as well, are you
24 A. Yes, I'm familiar with that.
25 Q. If we just talk about taking that issue concerning the overall
1 cohesion and then just take it back to yet another UN [sic] document in
2 D1247. Again, this is the allied joint doctrine, AJP-01. And if we can
3 go to the --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe.
5 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: It -- on transcript it reads UN document.
7 MR. KEHOE: NATO document, I apologise.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes thank you.
9 MR. KEHOE: I apologise.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
11 MR. KEHOE: And if we could go to the next page and the attack on
12 the adversary's will and cohesion. I'm sorry, if I can ...
13 [Defence counsel confer]
14 MR. KEHOE: If we can turn to 1D65-0212, which is part of D1247.
15 This is ... under the rubric of attacking the adversary's will and
17 It notes that:
18 "All attacks against an adversary must comply with" --
19 JUDGE ORIE: What page are we.
20 MR. KEHOE: I'm looking at page -- in the hard copy it's 4-11, in
21 the hard copy.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes I found it.
23 MR. KEHOE: At the top of that page:
24 "All attacks against an adversary must comply with international
25 law; in particular, attacks may only be made against military objectives.
1 The decisive element of a campaign will usually involve some form of
2 offensive action against the will cohesion of adversaries."
3 Now that is generally standard NATO doctrine about an offensive
4 action that incorporates some form of attack against the will and
5 cohesion of your enemy; is that not correct, sir.
6 A. It is it exactly meant as it is written so I have nothing to add
7 to that. It says perfectly clear it involves some form of offensive
8 action against the will an cohesion, so I don't see the purpose of your
10 Q. We're going to go to the next point and maybe we can make that
12 In attacking the will cohesion of your enemy, NATO doctrine, and
13 under NATO doctrine -- in inducing shock in your enemy is an effective
14 means of breaking the will cohesion of your enemy, isn't it?
15 A. Well, you now step from offensive action to one of the
16 possibilities which is shock but offensive action is much more. I have
17 to remind you that when we write here, "offensive action" that
18 incorporates everything, especially including the use of non-lethal
19 means, so offensive action means also the use of psychological actions
20 that's what we mean about by offensive actions.
21 When we talk in this document about attacking the will and
22 understanding or influencing then we incorporate every mean that is --
23 that a coalition has available, and the mistake that people quite often
24 make is that when you read the word offensive action they immediately
25 think on the term iron against iron, or in other words the use of
1 armoured vehicles and fighting soldiers against other armoured vehicles
2 and armoured soldiers.
3 That is definitely not the red tape in this document. This
4 document describes the whole of capabilities that a coalition has in
5 order to enter a conflict and to bring that conflict the end state that
6 is described by the political committee of the coalition.
7 Q. And one of the ways just taking what you said, Colonel, to -- to
8 destroy the will and cohesion through your adversaries is a shock action,
9 a shock action by -- in this case the HV against the ARSK?
10 A. Well, I have not -- I have been asked yesterday not to repeat
11 myself by the President. I can only repeat that what you say, every --
12 every action that you can use is of course possible. So shock is one of
13 the possibilities, and I will not deny that destruction of enemy targets
14 is also one of the opportunities, is also one of the possibilities.
15 So we should not -- we should be very precise in that. An army,
16 a coalition force has all the means given them by the political community
17 available to use violence, if necessary, but it should be -- it should be
18 proportional and it should be in the way, it should be legal. That's the
19 whole -- the whole point. And I have to add that, if you are able to use
20 other means than violence in reaching the end state, and even if it takes
21 lives of your own side and even if it takes a longer period then that
22 could be your priority.
23 Q. Well, what you just said is the doctrine of the Dutch army. It
24 is not necessarily a reflection of the law on armed conflict is it?
25 A. I'm not saying that that is the reflection of the laws of armed
1 conflict. It is it the reflection of what we have on the screen here and
2 it's the reflection of what we have described in -- in the Netherlands
3 doctrine as well. But I can assure you that the reflection that I gave
4 you just before and the way how we have to inter -- how we have to read
5 the document as it is in front of you, because I do think it's quite
6 difficult to take out certain parts, and I understand fully why you are
7 doing that and focus on certain elements, the whole background of this
8 document is, that it is all about lethal and especially non-lethal use of
9 military means and --
10 JUDGE ORIE: May I intervene for a second.
11 From your question, Mr. Kehoe, I understood that you'd like to
12 know from the witness whether achieving a shock effect would be excluded
13 from legitimate means in combat operation or in -- in this type of
15 MR. KEHOE: Turned the other way, using shock effect is a
16 legitimate means in --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Well, yes, that may cause the problem. Of course, a
18 shock effect is an effect and I think what the witness told us that it
19 depends on the means used to achieve such a shock effect. I mean that is
20 not difficult to understand. But let's then put it in clear terms to the
22 MR. KEHOE: Yes, sir.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Is achieving a shock effect by whatever means always
24 legitimate, Mr. Konings?
25 THE WITNESS: Well, I think if you use -- let's put it in a way
1 that shock effects are not only purely destruction is also --
2 JUDGE ORIE: I'm just asking: Is shock effects achieved by
3 whatever means under all circumstances legitimate?
4 THE WITNESS: If it is aimed against a military target and if
5 it's done with the -- the military means that are --
6 JUDGE ORIE: So what you're saying if, if, if; so it is not under
7 all circumstances.
8 THE WITNESS: No, it is not under all circumstances.
9 JUDGE ORIE: That is it a clear answer.
10 Now, I understand this from your previous answer, to seek to
11 achieve a shock effect it may well be within the legitimate means, yes,
12 of operation.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
15 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, before we proceed with this line of
16 questioning on this document, I'd just offer into evidence 1D65-0227.
17 MR. RUSSO: No objection.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1254, Your Honours.
20 MR. KEHOE: If we could --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just see ...
22 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, D1254 is admitted into evidence.
24 MR. KEHOE:
25 Q. And using - thank you, Mr. President - D1254, if we could turn to
1 page 204 in that document, where we talk a little bit about shock. And
2 that is 1D65 -- the page is 1D65-0231. And it's under the rubric of
3 attacking the enemy's understanding will and cohesion, and I'd just like
4 to go through a few concepts with you to explain this a bit further,
5 Colonel, and ask your assistance in this matter.
6 In paragraph --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe -- you say page 2 out of 4 but the
8 numbering is different. It starts with 2 out of 1 out of 1, 2 out of --
10 MR. KEHOE: 2-4.
11 JUDGE ORIE: 2-4, yes, that is the 4th page -- under what section
12 you would like to --
13 MR. KEHOE: 0215, towards the top.
14 JUDGE ORIE: 0215, please proceed.
15 MR. KEHOE:
16 Q. It notes:
17 "When an army fights it should seek to attack the enemy's
18 understanding, will and cohesion. To direct attacks effectively requires
19 understanding the enemy, his system, ... his motivation. Whenever
20 possible a commander should attack his enemy systemically. Doing so" --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, it reads systemically.
22 MR. KEHOE: Oh, systemically, apologies.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
24 MR. KEHOE:
25 Q. "Doing so should leave it unable to respond effectively as the
1 situation develops. One ... way of achieving this is through ... shock
2 of which the classic symptoms are numbness and irrational behaviour."
3 If we could just move down to the next paragraph, 0216, three
4 sentences -- three sentences in, five line.
5 "The tactical effects of shock may be perceived as local panic
6 or collapse."
7 If we could turn your attention before I go into this with a
8 question for you, back to D1247, the allied joint doctrine, AJP-01, and I
9 turn to paragraph 425, which is -- again back of 4-11, and it's
10 1D65-0212. And 425 subdivision a (2):
11 "In the physical sense, the psychological effect may be so great
12 as to render fighting unnecessary."
13 So, Colonel, just in layman's terms when you go through a shock
14 action and we'll go through exactly what that is, the goal, of course, is
15 to -- as the doctrine reads, to numb, infuse the enemy with some degree
16 of numbness or irrational behaviour and to break down the enemy
17 psychologically to essentially render fighting unnecessary.
18 Is that not one of the goals that NATO has of using shock methods
19 against your enemy?
20 A. Yes. It is clearly describes here that a possibility to use
21 inside your operation is to make use of shock action, yes.
22 Q. And one of the days to induce shock is through artillery fire;
23 isn't that right?
24 A. Yes, I think that artillery fire is -- is a possibility to bring
25 in shock, yes.
1 Q. Let us back to a little bit more of a sophisticated description
2 of a shock action according to the NATO doctrine that we have in D1257.
3 1254, excuse me, D1254. And turning to two out of five, 2-5, which is
4 1D65-0232, in paragraph 221, describing the shock action.
5 MR. KEHOE: If we can just scroll down this a little bit more.
6 Q. Under shock action, 0221:
7 "Shock action is a sudden, concentrated application of violence.
8 Shock action numbs, deters, and frightens. At the collective level ...
9 by concentrations of fire and indirect fire and a high tempo of advanced
10 [sic] employing closely coordinated fire and manoeuvre."
11 If we can turn just continue on before we go in here --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe you read advanced employing there. I
13 read, "A high tempo of advance employing closely coordinated ..." Yes.
14 MR. KEHOE: Did I misread that, Judge? If I did, I apologise.
15 "High tempo of advance employing closely coordinated fire and manoeuvre."
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, due to overlapping speakers, I'd like to repeat
17 what I said, is that you read "advanced" where I read, "A high tempo of
18 advance employing closely coordinated," et cetera. Please proceed.
19 MR. KEHOE: If we could turn to the next page and look at 0223,
20 that's two of six.
21 Q. First sentence there: "Shock effects can at times be observed as
22 collapse. Collapse may be either progressive or catastrophic."
23 If we go to the last sentence of that paragraph without reading
24 it all:
25 "Panic is a major indicator of catastrophic collapse ... is
1 infectious and is transmitted as much by rumour as by fact. Since bad
2 news travels fast perception of failure is the best mechanism to promote
3 actual failure."
4 Now if we can just turn one more page to two of seven, 0226 --
5 JUDGE ORIE: You apparently insist on saying two of seven where
6 it is seven in section 2.
7 MR. KEHOE: My apologies, Judge.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Well, now it is it approximately the third or the
9 fourth time so ...
10 MR. KEHOE: I'll do my best to correct that.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
12 MR. KEHOE: 2-7, 0226.
13 Q. Now, attacks on understanding will and cohesion can be carried
14 out by seizing and retaining the initiative pre-emption, location, and
15 disruption. I'm getting a bit ahead of myself. Let's just -- before I
16 go into that.
17 Before we go into dislocation and disruption. Going back to the
18 actual shock aspect and incorporating this, one of the significant
19 by-products of the shock action and in causing the collapse is inducing
20 panic in your adversary to assist the -- in the demise of your adversary
21 as quickly as possible.
22 Is that an accurate assessment of NATO doctrine?
23 A. It is one of the many ways that is described here in this
24 doctrine document, yes.
25 Q. Now, going yet further in the ways of that attack, and I got
1 ahead of myself a bit, talking about dislocation and disruption and let's
2 just talk about those concepts.
3 What is a dislocation and disruption? What are we talking about
4 in a military context? And maybe I can just help you out if we go down
5 to 229 --
6 A. I'm reading that.
7 Q. That's okay. [Overlapping speakers] ...
8 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... I've been the co-writer of this
9 document so I know where to find my text. And it just clearly says that:
10 "Dislocation is to dislocate the enemy, is to deny him the
11 ability to bring his strengths to bear, thus preventing him from fighting
12 on his terms. His purpose is wider than the frustration of the enemy
13 plan. It seeks to render his strengths irrelevantly by avoiding them or
14 fixing them so that they are ineffective. It may be deliberate or
15 [indiscernible] of other actions and deep penetration and envelopment are
16 two mechanisms of dislocation."
17 So that's what you try to do. You try to cut off elements. You
18 try to dislocate - as it says - enemy elements so that there -- you try
19 to break his complete organisation. That's what it says.
20 Q. Colonel you --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. --
22 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
24 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
25 Q. Colonel, on that score you just noted that you are one of the
1 co-writers of it this document. Can you explain that just a little bit.
2 A. I have been involved in a writing team that has been writing this
4 Q. Okay.
5 A. Or have I been a member of a writing team that was writing this
7 Q. Would that be the whole document or just -- the whole document?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. So are you very familiar with these concepts?
10 A. I am familiar with these concepts, yes.
11 Q. And staying on what you just read, one of the methods of attack
12 is deep penetration and envelopment, do you see that you just read that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Those are methods of dislocation, what are we talking about here?
15 A. You mean deputy penetration?
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. Or envelopment?
18 Q. Both.
19 A. Deep penetration can be done in many ways. It can be done by
20 sending out a force on the ground and trying to penetrate deep in the
21 enemy territory in order seize a very important element in that
22 territory. For example, a headquarter or important persons, but you can
23 do that also by -- by air. You can send in air mobile forces, you can
24 parachute troops, so that they're all means trying to dislocate enemy
25 forces that's the way you bring -- that's the way that you bring in a
1 disorganisation of his defence, his attacking forces in depth, whatever
2 is happening in that scenario.
3 Q. Just staying with the comment that you made about in depth, the
4 dislocation in depth is well inside the front line area. Is that not
6 A. That doesn't mean -- no. Depth did no given distance in that.
7 Depth can even mean depth in time. So there is no -- no -- no cypher
8 connected to the word depth. Depth can be -- well there is no cypher.
9 Q. Maybe my question was not accurate enough. We're talking about
10 in depth you also would consider an attack in depth well inside of the
11 enemy lines towards facilities that might support the enemy that might
12 not be at the front lines?
13 A. Yes, that's exactly what I mean with in depth that. Deep
14 operations are operations that can be on a certain distance from the
15 territory where you are in, for example, close combat with your enemy and
16 then you talk about actions that may dislocate reserve forces that may
17 dislocate supporting forces, et cetera, et cetera.
18 Q. Let's talk a little bit more about fixing the enemy.
19 MR. KEHOE: If we could move on this document to 0307 on pages
20 3-3, Mr. President.
21 Q. Just staying with this first sentence:
22 "To fix the enemy is to deny the enemy his goals, to distract
23 him, and thus deprive him of his freedom of action."
24 So taking this sequentially, sir, one of the considerations that
25 NATO has doctrine on is the use of a shock action sometimes at well
1 beyond, well inside enemy lines to fix the enemy, distract him, confuse
2 him and deprive him of his freedom of action; is that accurate?
3 A. Well, I'm not quite certain that shock actions will be used to
4 fix him, because fixing the enemy -- shock action is as we have seen
5 before is something of a concentrated use of violence during a short
6 period, while fixing the enemy and taking away his freedom of movement,
7 his freedom of action may take much longer time. And I do not think that
8 shock action is the things we would use in order to fix an enemy because
9 shock action is short, quick, heavy, and brings in panic, chaos on that
10 moment, while fixing an enemy is something of a long breath. You fix an
11 enemy for a long-term so that you concentrate -- that you force him, that
12 you do not allow him to move his forces in that area. So that takes a
13 long time. That is not coming from one minute to the other. So I had
14 not directly connect shock action to the possibility of fixing the enemy,
16 Q. I understand your thinking on this Colonel but just let's take
17 this one step further. Would you agree, sir, that during a shock action
18 you could very well simultaneously fix the movements of your enemy, could
19 you not?
20 A. But that's not meant here in the concept of fixing the enemy.
21 Q. I understand I'm asking you that question.
22 A. Once are you in contact with an enemy, of course, you fix that
23 element of the enemy when a platoon of infantry is in direct combat with
24 an enemy force, you fix that enemy, you fix your own force. But what is
25 meant to be here is on a large-scale. You don't have to -- we should
1 realise that this document describes the operational level, describes not
2 the lower levels. This describes an operation as a whole.
3 So one of the things you can do in your operation is to fix
4 important elements of the enemy, and it is not meant to be by -- by a
5 short moment in time or a one-short action because then you do not fix
6 the enemy. You fix the enemy only on that spot. What is meant here is
7 that you fix the larger portion of an enemy force for a longer period so
8 that you are able to manoeuvre with your own complete force around it to
9 achieve your objectives.
10 Q. And when you're talking about fixing, you're talking about in a
11 sense of artillery you can use artillery to fix the enemy over a course
12 of time, a day or days depending on how long you wanted to fix them?
13 A. No, you cannot. You definitely cannot fix an enemy force by
14 artillery alone.
15 Q. I'm not saying artillery alone, sir.
16 A. You said that.
17 Q. No, no. I'm not saying artillery alone but artillery and other
18 aspects and if I said that, I stand corrected.
19 A. I read here: "You can use artillery to fix the enemy over a
20 course of time or day or days depending ..." so you did not enter any
21 other force as well.
22 Q. And I stand corrected, Colonel, and we just take that a little
23 further. Artillery in conjunction with other forces can be used to fix
24 the enemy over the course of time be it a day, two days.
25 A. Artillery is always part of a manoeuvre force so if you talk
1 about fixing an enemy that is done by a manoeuvre force that includes all
2 weapon systems -- so including artillery.
3 Q. Colonel, let's talk a little bit as we move ahead of depriving
4 the enemy of his freedom of action let's go to the next page 0310 the
5 next page which is 3-4. This notes that:
6 "The enemy can also be fixed by a combination of methods which
7 deny him information, deny him the ability to pass orders, and inhibit
8 their execution. The enemy's information sources and his command system
9 are central to his ability to concentrate force."
10 Now, taking this out to a little bit more specific terms, one of
11 the methodologies to fix the enemy - and when I say fix the enemy your
12 description is depriving his freedom of action - is either -- is
13 neutralising or destroying his ability to communicate. Is that accurate?
14 A. Well you say neutralising and destroying, but there might be
15 other means, which you suggested here is -- is interfering in the
16 electromagnetic spectrum.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Konings, the question was not whether this is
18 the way to do it. But whether it was one of - as Mr. Kehoe said -
19 methodologies I take it that he wanted to refer to methods.
20 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Of -- to fix the enemy, if you neutralise or destroy
22 his ability to communicate.
23 THE WITNESS: That's one of the methods.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, Mr. Russo, is there any dispute about --
25 MR. RUSSO: Certainly not, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: -- such a thing?
2 Mr. Kehoe, is there any source which would even challenge that?
3 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, it's -- it's putting this -- first of
4 all making a record here, Judge, of exactly how we're building up to the
5 attack on Knin which is coming. I will move through this quickly.
6 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber was waiting impatiently to understand
7 where you would make what point.
8 Please proceed, and don't --
9 MR. KEHOE: Delay.
10 JUDGE ORIE: -- delay for us to understand.
11 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: -- what your point is, because we usually - at least
13 I hope - we're focussing on understanding the points that you want to
15 Please proceed.
16 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
17 If I can turn to page 2-7 of D1254 and we talk a little bit about
19 Q. And I just want to highlight this without bringing it to your
20 attention. We will go through some of these items on disruption and on
21 page 230 at the bottom of that, after dislocation:
22 "Selective disruption can be used to break and confuse those
23 assets that are crucial [sic] to the employment and coherence of an
24 enemy's fighting power.
25 JUDGE ORIE: I'm reading critical, but if you want to make it
1 crucial then -- please proceed.
2 MR. KEHOE:
3 Q. Critical. "Critical to the employment and coherence of the
4 enemy's fighting power. It aims to rupture the integrity of an enemy's
5 force and render him incapable of deciding and acting purposefully. The
6 identification of those assets whose destruction is most likely to
7 disrupt these enemy may not be easy. Military targets might include
8 communication networks, command centres, transportation nodes, or
9 logistic facilities."
10 So when we're talking about the dislocation and disruption we are
11 actually using these concepts in tandem and in this particular
12 paragraph we talk about disruption by once again attacking communication
14 Do these items go in tandem -- can they go in tandem during an
15 offensive operation?
16 A. Well, they certainly will be approached in an combined manner.
17 All these are aspects like preemption, dislocation, disruption, are
18 factors that a commander takes into account so there will be --
19 everything in a military plan will be in an combined manner.
20 Q. And a commander may have the option to attack these facilities
21 with an attempt to disrupt and dislocate at a place well in depth away
22 from the front line --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Now, you also talk in your report a little bit about simultaneous
3 MR. KEHOE: If we can stay on this report and go to page 2-9,
4 0235. I'm not going to read this whole matter, but the third sentence
5 in, "By acting simultaneously":
6 "By acting simultaneously against several levels of command the
7 effect of cohesion is cumulative."
8 Q. So is one of the options that we're talking about here, Colonel,
9 not only hitting front line positions but also, for instance,
10 communications centres or headquarters or logistics supply locations that
11 may be well in depth and away from the front line in the way to have this
12 cumulative effect against the enemy?
13 A. Yes, no doubt about that.
14 Q. Now lastly before we actually move to Knin, I just want to talk
15 to you about the effectiveness of fire-power in the scheme here and going
16 to paragraph 233 of the prior page, 2-8, of D1254.
17 "Fire power," excuse me, paragraph 0233 on 2-8:
18 "Fire pour destroys, neutralises, suppresses, demoralises and
19 influences. It can be delivered by sea, land, and air platforms. It has
20 physical, psychological and physiological effects. Fire-power provides
21 the force to amplify or enable the effects of tempo, simultaneity and
22 surprise. Its effectiveness depends on its volume, accuracy, and its
23 suddenness and predictability [sic]." One again in using the
24 combination --
25 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry, apologies.
1 MR. RUSSO: If I could interrupt, for just a second.
2 JUDGE ORIE: May I urge everyone, not you, primarily, at this
3 moment, Mr. Russo, to slow down.
4 Mr. Russo.
5 MR. RUSSO: Apologies. I thought Mr. Kehoe had read
6 predictability. It is now says unpredictability which is actually which
7 on the document.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
9 MR. KEHOE:
10 Q. So, Colonel, putting these concepts together and we're talking
11 about an option on the table for the commander is to use a possible
12 action, use a shock action, followed by -- after the shock action some
13 artillery to disrupt and dislocate and to conduct and use artillery in
14 that manner in a very sudden and unpredictable way to destroy the will
15 power of the enemy. Is that a short synopsis of the items we just read?
16 It's just one of the methods that a commander could employee.
17 A. Yes. But now you take some words out of this special
18 paragraph of 233, and before I say whether this is an option yes or no
19 you have to read that as well. Because I think that is quite honest and
20 the sentence that I aim at is the psychological and physiological effects
21 and of firepower are [indiscernible] and should be exploited by manoeuvre
22 before they wear off because that is the combination of when you want to
23 achieve something, either by shock action or by any action that you want
24 to do, you have to see artillery or fire support in direct combination
25 with manoeuvre in order to reach its effects that you want to have.
1 That's what I want to highlight in my answer. And if you take
2 that all combined then the combination of manoeuvre and fire-power is
3 a -- is one of the possibilities, of course, that a commander can take
4 into consideration to achieve his end state or his objective.
5 Q. Now just staying with the manoeuvres. Were you told by the OTP
6 that there were no -- there were manoeuvres or were not manoeuvres by the
7 HV on the 4th? What were you told about infantry manoeuvres on the 4th?
8 A. The information given to me was that on the 4th they were in the
9 proximity of Knin or inside Knin were no manoeuvres of infantry of HV.
10 There were of course manoeuvres in the front line on the moment that the
11 attacks started. Yes, of course.
12 Q. We will get into that, then.
13 Now before we go to actual Knin, let me turn our attention to the
14 next aspect here in D1247. And if we could go to 4-16, which is
15 1D65-0217, at the bottom of that page.
16 In the operational ideas in the last sentence there: "The key
17 to" --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, you provide us with a page with a code
19 which is not on the hard copy, but you do not provide us with the
20 paragraph you're referring to --
21 MR. KEHOE: 0434, operational ideas at the bottom, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE ORIE: 0434, thank you.
23 MR. KEHOE:
24 Q. The last sentence there: "The key to operational art is to
25 identify beforehand" --
1 MR. KEHOE: Next page, please.
2 Q. "What is going to be decisive in bringing about the down fall of
3 the adversary. Identifying that decisive act comes from an analysis of
5 And the COG is the centre of gravity. We get that acronym from
6 the prior page.
7 Now, just putting D117 on the screen just briefly, D117, second
9 In the upper right-hand corner -- excuse me, I think it's at the
10 bottom -- or the centre middle column. Centre of gravity.
11 "Centre of gravity, the NATO definition of the centre of gravity
12 is the characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a nation or
13 alliance a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of
14 action, physical strength, or will to fight."
15 You're familiar with that are you not?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And NATO doctrine upon many other aspects but NATO doctrine uses
18 the centre of gravity as the basis upon which military campaign plans are
19 built, don't they?
20 A. Not only military campaign plans. Centre of gravity is also used
21 for defining where the political and state should be, so the centre of
22 gravity can very well be a combination of political strategic level, and
23 inside the military operation there is the commander designates a centre
24 of gravity for his own forces, yes.
25 Q. The general idea in NATO doctrine, Colonel, is that the
1 neutralisation and/or destruction of enemy's centre of gravity leads to
2 the destruction and cohesion of the enemy to fight. That is the idea,
3 isn't it.
4 A. Well, you again talk about only about neutralisation and
5 destruction, and I cannot stress enough that that is only part of the
6 solution. You can aim at an enemy centre of gravity in another way, even
7 with diplomacy, so I -- I hate to repeat myself over and over again. But
8 the words to be used is not only neutralisation and destruction because
9 neutralisation and destruction are words that have a very physical sound
10 even currently nowadays in NATO. That means the use of physical means
11 and that's absolutely not the idea behind the books that have been
12 written and that are now subject of our discussion.
13 Q. So just adding diplomacy to the area -- to the discussion --
14 A. It's not only diplomacy, I'm sorry that I interfere. But there
15 are all the means that a coalition has, the comprehensive means, the
16 comprehensive approach are not limited to diplomacy or military means.
17 The economical, political, informational, social that are all the parts
18 that can you use in order to -- to influence the centre of gravity of any
19 party, opponent, or actor in a conflict.
20 I just want to be very specific and clear because you are only
21 focussing on the words neutralise and destruction and to my opinion that
22 doesn't give the correct overview that we are discussing about here.
23 Q. Colonel, assume we're in a war situation, assume that we are
24 planning to fight against the enemy that a war has been ongoing for
25 several years. As a NATO officer, you want to determine what the centre
1 of gravity is for your enemy, and you want to defeat your enemy and as a
2 way of defeating that enemy you want to take out in some fashion the
3 centre of gravity; isn't that right?
4 A. Yes. You want to take out in some fashion the centre of gravity
5 of your opponent, yes.
6 Q. Let's go with NATO doctrine yet further on the centre of gravity
7 and staying with 1D1247. Mr. President, it's the next paragraph. It
8 it's the next page 0434 -- it goes into centre of gravity analysis of
9 1247. I'm looking at the next page actually which is 1D65-0218.
10 Now, this goes to the centre of gravity analysis and I want to go
11 about the middle of that page where it says -- the paragraph actually
12 where it sayings: "It is possible."
13 Do you see that, Colonel?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. "It is possible that at strategic level the COG may be something
16 physical but it is more likely to be a morale entity related to a leader,
17 a ruling elite, or strong-willed population. It is an adversary's morale
18 strength to resist the alliance's end state and such morale resistance
19 needs to be undermined neutralised or defeated for a lasting peace."
20 Now, in this particular situation, Colonel, and you knew from
21 reading the operation orders that the idea of the attack on Knin was the
22 reintegration or the attack in the Krajina was the reintegration of the
23 Krajina into the Republic of Croatia. In this context, the centre of
24 gravity in this context for the ARSK was Knin, wasn't it?
25 A. I have been reading that the order, the operational order read
1 that the forces had to take control of Knin and the environment of Knin,
2 and you may come to the conclusion that that is a centre of gravity.
3 Q. Well, you came to that conclusion as well, didn't you?
4 A. Yes, I came.
5 Q. Now, I want to talk to you about the actual operation itself, and
6 I'm interested in your analysis of the particular operation. And with
7 the -- knowing that the Knin was the centre of gravity, you would have
8 planned unquestionably that Knin was -- should have been taken in some
9 fashion; is that not correct? In order for the HV to succeed?
10 A. Well, I'm not quite sure, because taking control of Knin can, of
11 course, mean various things. I haven't seen in that document what --
12 what the effect would -- would be -- what the effect would be that --
13 that would be needed. When you talk about an a populated area, an
14 urbanised area, I fully understand that control only can take place when
15 you have actual your own forces on -- on the spot, on the scene.
16 So I understand that troops will be sent or would be sent to Knin
17 in order to take control of that city. That's absolutely clear to me.
18 It is only the doubt that I have is in which way you -- can you
19 do that in which way you take control -- sorry.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Konings, carefully looking at the question it
21 says, You would have planned unquestionably that Knin should have been
22 taken in some fashion.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes.
24 JUDGE ORIE: So the question leaves it entirely open in what way
25 and you're know explaining there are many ways of doing it which I
1 understand to be a simple yes to the question.
2 THE WITNESS: The answer is yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
4 Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
5 MR. KEHOE:
6 Q. Turning to your report and this is it your addendum, P1260, that
7 you note in paragraph 1 a that in order to be able to answer the
8 questions of the Office of the Prosecutor an analysis of the information
9 inserted in Annex A is made in the same way an intelligence officer, S-2
10 of a formation, brigade, battle group would use such information to
11 sketch the situation of the enemy opponent forces and the environment
12 they are operating in.
13 The S-2 analysis is followed by an analysis of the own situation
14 executed by the operations officer, the S-3.
15 So I take it, Colonel, that when you were going through your
16 analysis you analysed the entire combat situation from both sides of the
17 equation; is that right both the ARSK and the HV side?
18 JUDGE ORIE: One second, one second.
19 Please answer the question.
20 THE WITNESS: I analysed both sides of the situation with the
21 help of the information that was given me by the OTP.
22 MR. KEHOE:
23 Q. Now in the information of the OTP, did you come to understand the
24 breadth of Operation Storm and the geographic area that it was in
1 A. Yes, I have -- I got an idea from that. That's correct.
2 Q. And what is that idea?
3 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry, Mr. President. I apologise. I apologise.
4 THE WITNESS: Well the overall action, the overall Operation
5 Storm was an operation as you already said to re-gain the country of the
6 Krajina and it was done through various axis. There were as I recall
7 there were I think three axes that the Croatian forces would say do their
8 attack. And one of these axis was from Bosko - I cannot recall the name
9 anymore - up to Krajina and from there I started concentrating on the
10 action that taken against Knin specifically the artillery operation
11 against Knin.
12 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me.
13 Q. Now you talked about the one axis. Where are the other two axes?
14 A. I would like to have the papers in front of me because then I can
15 point out what I mean.
16 Q. With the assistance of the usher can we provide the -- I take it
17 from your report, is that what you're referring to?
18 A. No. I refer to the operational order.
19 Q. You're referring to P1125?
20 A. I don't know what the number is.
21 Q. I understand.
22 MR. KEHOE: We can bring that up on the screen.
23 If we can bring P1125 on the screen. If we can go to the next
24 page. And the next page, please. Apologies. Another page after that.
25 I'm looking for the first page. That's it.
1 Q. Colonel, I take it that this is the document that you are talk
3 A. I do think so. I would prefer to have some time to read that
5 Q. Okay. And we can give you time at the break with the permission
6 of Mr. President, if he wants to take a look at it further. I can
7 continue to ask questions.
8 Now, that the three axes --
9 JUDGE ORIE: If the witness needs to read it for answering the
10 next questions, of course, of which we do not know yet what they are
11 then, of course, he is entitled to read it again. If he doesn't need
12 this information then he's invited to re-read the offensive operation
13 order during the break.
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. KEHOE:
16 Q. I turn to page 5 of this document or two more pages in and scroll
17 up just a little bit.
18 Are those the axes that you're talking about?
19 A. Yes, that are the axes I'm talking about.
20 Q. When you were analysing the actual facts concerning Operation
21 Storm you were only dealing with these three axes?
22 A. I have read this operational document and from the questions
23 asked to me by the OTP, I have taken the step to focus myself on the axis
24 Bosansko Grahovo-Knin and then specified on the questions asked by OTP on
25 the use of artillery in Knin that is my ultimate -- my ultimate focus
1 because that is my speciality that is the reason why I'm here.
2 MR. KEHOE: If I might just have one moment, Your Honour.
3 [Defence counsel confer]
4 MR. KEHOE:
5 Q. Now, did you review documents or information concerning the
6 activity -- activities, that were taking place in Sector North?
7 A. No, I did not.
8 Q. Let me show you a map that was provided by the Prosecutor,
9 65 ter 4898. And my apologies, Colonel, sometimes it takes a little bit
10 of time to bring these maps up.
11 [Defence counsel confer]
12 MR. KEHOE: Now, if we can go to the bottom of this document.
13 Q. Colonel, I'd like you to take a look at this document. This is a
14 document that has some broad strokes about the Operation Storm.
15 MR. KEHOE: If we can scroll up, please. Stop please.
16 Q. You see Knin at the bottom. And as we scroll up yet further, we
17 can see any number of items of offensive activity going on up through
18 Sector North.
19 Now, when you were doing your analysis of whether or not it was
20 necessary to attack Knin, I take it from your answer that you did not
21 factor in the fighting that was taking place in Sector North?
22 A. No. I don't have studied that because I was asked by the OTP to
23 focus on the city of Knin.
24 Q. Now, you do know that -- I think you mentioned yesterday you had
25 some degree of training in Warsaw Pact doctrine which you equated to JNA
1 doctrine and you do know that the entire staff or the Main Staff or the
2 Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina was being commanded from Knin.
3 You know that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So in neutralising and destroying the centre of gravity in Knin,
6 you would agree that you are affecting not only the fighting that is
7 taking place in the immediate geographic area of Knin but also the area
8 in Sector North where fighting was taking place; isn't that right?
9 A. That seems to be a fair possibility.
10 Q. This would certainly increase the necessity or the importance of
11 neutralising the ARSK headquarters within the centre of gravity, wouldn't
13 A. Yes. And I have nothing said against that.
14 Q. My only thing is you didn't analyse this entire operation on Knin
15 with this broader perspective in mind, did you?
16 A. Not with respect to the fact that -- that there was a complete
17 operation -- no, I realised -- I realised, of course, there was a
18 complete Operation Storm going on, and I have stated that the -- the fact
19 that there is an RSK headquarters and a president's office inside the
20 city of Knin are important factors. I don't deny that. That's very
21 valid and I have said they will be designated to be high value targets
22 and high payoff targets. That is it something that I don't deny. You're
23 absolutely right in that.
24 Q. And if during the attack communications at the ARSK headquarters
25 are damaged, destroyed or compromised it would affect the theatre of
1 operations into Sector North, wouldn't it?
2 A. It depends on the whole organisation. I assume that -- that
3 every army has its possibilities to de-route its communications and have
4 alternative communications once you take out certain of the important
5 points. So there would be alternative means. I would not compare
6 communication means directly with an RSK HQ or a president's office.
7 They are two different things, different in importance. So a military
8 communication centre - and I stress the word military - if you take out,
9 the military communications centre, it, of course, has its results for
10 the operation, a negative result for an operation. But I'm convinced
11 that as we have that any -- every army has alternative means to
13 Q. And just taking your answer that there are alternative ways to
14 communicate, as a commander, you would not only want to take out the
15 primary method to communicate or any -- you would also want to take out
16 any alternative ways to communicate, wouldn't you?
17 A. Yes. If, provided what I said before, that they -- that you aim
18 yourself at the military means of communications.
19 Q. One last question on this, Colonel. You know based on --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
21 MR. KEHOE:
22 Q. You know based on your training that the JNA trains their
23 officers in their headquarters to direct operations throughout the
24 theatres of operation, don't they?
25 A. That's what every headquarters does.
1 Q. So you would conclude that maybe like -- unlike other armies, in
2 an ARSK situation, destroying the communications of the ARSK headquarters
3 is absolutely crucial to the ability of the ARSK to successfully conduct
4 operations. Isn't that right?
5 A. Well, destroying a headquarters or destroying the communications
6 of a military headquarters is crucial to an operation, yes.
7 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, I'll offer 65 ter 4898
8 into evidence.
9 MR. RUSSO: No objection.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1255.
12 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
13 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I spent some time this morning and
14 yesterday on doctrine simply because the first part of the report that
15 Colonel Konings gave was just on doctrine in general and tried to flesh
16 that out a bit. I will be turning to the actual battle that began on the
17 4th in the next session I would take it, but I wanted to give
18 Mr. President, you, a road map of where I have come from and where I
19 intend do move into right now.
20 JUDGE ORIE: We'll have a break, and we resume at five minutes to
22 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
23 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. Kehoe, the Chamber was
25 informed that you had no objections against the admission of P1277 and
1 under those circumstances and since you're not contradicting P1277, it's
2 admitted into evidence.
3 MR. KEHOE: And yes, Mr. President, that's right. My apologies
4 for not doing it over night.
5 JUDGE ORIE: No problem.
6 Please proceed.
7 MR. KEHOE:
8 Q. Colonel, I don't need to go to it, but what I'd like to explore
9 is the statement in your report on page 43 a of 1259. There are no
10 separate artillery operation. Fire support is an integral part of every
11 operation and therefore taken into account in the decision-making process
12 and the supporting targeting process.
13 I would first like to bring up P1274, which is the map that -- I
14 believe was discussed yesterday with Mr. Russo.
15 And, Colonel, this is the map provided by the Office of the
16 Prosecutor that has various targets located throughout the terrain.
17 Yesterday we talked about the spots that are in and around Knin on the
18 lower left-hand version.
19 You see that in the middle of the page. And what I'd like to do
20 is talk about the entire map. This is an artillery map -- or a map that
21 shows artillery locations - and if we can scroll up a little bit - well
22 in addition to those around Knin, does it not?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Let us turn to 1D65-0484.
25 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, there is a 11-page document that we
1 will be referring to at various times. I'm not sure how long it will
2 take to come up, but it may take just a bit.
3 Q. And, Colonel, just to give you reference points what we have done
4 here on this map is take P274 and lay it on a topographical map.
5 A. I assume with P247, you mean the map that you showed me before.
6 Q. P1274 was the initial map that you discussed yesterday with
7 Mr. Russo and we just had on the screen.
8 A. Okay.
9 Q. And we've taken the liberty in this particular situation to lay
10 1274 over a topographical map. I'm just trying to explain to you exactly
11 what we did.
12 MR. KEHOE: And if we could go to the next map.
13 JUDGE ORIE: I just ask you then, Mr. Kehoe, the map that was
14 shown, the artillery map, seems to be an a 90-degree projection was that
15 one adapted to what seems to be not the normal projection is that adapted
16 in any way or ... just trying to understand what I'm looking at.
17 MR. KEHOE: If we can go back --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Was it stretched as well or ...
19 MR. KEHOE: They were both -- the first map was, of course, on a
20 topographical map as well, and --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But do you understand what I mean. It seems
22 that you're looking at the terrain -- the coloured one not the map part
23 under a certain angle, which means that you get some - how do you say
24 it? - it is stretched more or less. I don't know what technique you
1 MR. KEHOE: I think that are you correct, Mr. President. I do
2 believe what we have attempted to do is in conjunction some other
3 documents taking these features. For instance, the red dots now portray
4 these squares that were on the other map and to the extent there is any
5 difference between the two, I think we can be adjusted or corrected, if
6 you will, based on those particular documents.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not seeking any corrections. I just would like
8 to understand what I'm looking at, and maps, Mr. Misetic, I do understand
9 that you --
10 MR. MISETIC: Yes, Your Honour. What this is, is the map has
11 been somewhat stretched points. The points on the two-dimensional map,
12 you can see the red dots were then found exactly on the three-dimensional
13 map and plotted exactly on to a three-dimensional map as they appear on
14 the two-dimension map in order to accurately make sure that in fact it is
15 stretched as necessary so that all the peaks are accurately depicted.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It looks as a fine result. I'm just
17 wondering, maps and pictures in which the terrain was stretched I always
18 want to know that we are talking about the same and that the combination
19 is accurate.
20 Please proceed.
21 MR. KEHOE:
22 Q. In this particular map, Colonel, all we did was take the squares
23 out, the artillery squares out and put dots on them so we could readily
24 see them on the various features geographically.
25 MR. KEHOE: If we could just go to the next page.
1 This is the actual targets, with the idea that you can better
2 able -- better see the topography of the area where the targets were.
3 Again the frame of reference the Knin targets are down in the lower
4 corner, and the ones up in the Dinara of course are towards the centre of
5 the page.
6 Q. Now, sir, when you were going through your considerations and
7 coming to your conclusions did you consider the topography in the area
8 when you were analysing it?
9 A. I have been shortly watching the topography yes.
10 Q. And, of course, we said previously that that is a significant
11 item when a military commander is making a decision how he is going to
12 deploy his forces and what the terrain is like?
13 A. Yes. Weather and terrain are two very crucial factors in
14 analysing the upcoming operation.
15 Q. If we can go to page 4 in this, and we'll get into some of
16 this --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Can I put one further question --
18 MR. KEHOE: We can go back --
19 JUDGE ORIE: -- because I want to understand what I'm looking at.
20 There is in the original map, there is a distinction between the
21 squares and the rectangles of approximately half the size of the square.
22 That's not reflected, and I haven't got the translation here anymore
23 about the agenda, but ... I get them now whether squares or whether
24 rectangles, I get them as dots without any further distinction.
25 MR. KEHOE: Yes. The only thing we were trying to depict there
1 are locations of where the artillery attack was aimed, and we will get
2 into the -- some of the reasons for that as we move forward. What we are
3 trying to engulf is this, is the broader perspective of this attack it
4 being in several different locations in addition to being some shelling
5 in Knin. What we're trying to do, Mr. President, especially when it
6 comes to these mountain peaks was getting some general areas as opposed
7 to specific targets.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
9 MR. KEHOE:
10 Q. Now this -- this next map, Colonel, is the actual movement of the
11 7th Guards Brigade on the morning of the 4th.
12 And again, Mr. President, this is a document received from the
13 Office of the Prosecutor and as we can see below the overlay -- excuse
14 me, the original map is ERN 0614-2289 which was provided to us by the
15 Office of the Prosecutor and, of course, we can put that into evidence
16 independently as well.
17 Now, Colonel, when the artillery attack -- when the attack ensued
18 on the morning of the 4th, you do know that the actual targets and the
19 artillery was fired on multiple positions against the ARSK on the Dinara
20 further in depth as well as firing on Knin, wasn't it?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And as we move up the Dinara, that -- those were the -- that was,
23 in fact, the confrontation line between the HV and the ARSK, right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. So we can get this and I know we just talked about firing on Knin
1 but I want to talk you about artillery fire on the confrontation line, on
2 a reserve line, and in Knin all going on at the same time, isn't it?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, let's look a bit about what they were facing, and they being
5 the HV. And we're talking about the 7th Guards Brigade, and this map
6 that is depicted in the 7th Guards Brigade.
7 The first goal of the 7th Guards Brigade was to attack after --
8 attack and take two very crucial mountain peaks, wasn't it?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And that artillery was -- or fire was put upon those mountain
11 peaks prior to or simultaneous with the advance, wasn't it?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, I want to talk to you a little bit about a document you
14 reviewed as we're going through this and that would be the operational
15 diary. You did review the Split operational diary during the course of
16 your review of -- or writing your addendum. I'm not sure you did it in
17 the first one, but certainly you -- actually you had prior to the first
18 one. Appendix B to the addendum reflects that you received the Split
19 Military District diary on 8 December 2006. I'm sure that's about right,
20 but you did review that diary?
21 A. Well, I -- I cannot recall that precisely. I have got the
22 document and I have used it but -- but reviewing is a large word. I have
23 used elements of that, yes.
24 Q. Well, Colonel, it is important -- it's important to -- when
25 you're getting a look at what is going on during the course of a battle
1 to get a view from the Split Military District level, what they're trying
2 to do, and what they're trying to attack as the day goes on; right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Let us turn to the next -- excuse me. The next slide here and
5 we're talking about again the 7th Guards Brigade again on their efforts
6 on the morning of the 4th, and if I may. Do you recall from reading the
7 Split Military District diary which mountain peaks that the HV were
8 trying to take first?
9 A. No, I don't recall that without having any document in front of
10 me. That's too long ago. I don't know the mountain peaks. I follow you
11 in your whole approach, knowing the general idea, but I cannot recall any
12 mountain name.
13 Q. Okay. Then maybe it might be easier just to go back to the diary
14 and we will go back to the document that's on the screen to the extent
15 that the diary can assist us with names and then we can go back and put
16 them on places in the document?
17 MR. KEHOE: And if we could just go back to the Split
18 Operational -- Split Military District war diary or operational diary,
19 P71, P71 -- no, no. We've got to tender it. And I'm looking for page 80
20 of 185. No? Excuse me, I stand corrected. It is 77.
21 Q. I'm told by courtroom deputy -- courtroom manager that it is page
22 40 in the B/C/S.
23 And, Colonel, bear with me, what I'm trying to do as we go into
24 this is put the artillery attacks and the infantry attacks together as
25 you suggest should be done in your report.
1 I'm interested in the -- it is the next column over to the right.
2 Okay. And that is for -- okay. If we go to the top of that page we can
3 see the actual date. It should be -- see the date there is it 4
4 August 1995. And if we go at 0500, you understood from reviewing this
5 that the fire began for attacks by the 7th Guards Brigade at 5.00 a.m.
6 Let's go down to the next -- two more pages in this document, at
7 the 0555 hours. And that should be in the left-hand column. That's 79
8 in the English and 42 in the B/C/S.
9 If we go to 0555, "Intelligence reports are reflects Chetniks," -
10 that is the word for Serbs - "reporting their positions on Dinara are
11 broken through. Orders to intensify pace of 7th Guards Brigade and
13 When you read that you understood that the artillery attack had
14 preceded an infantry attack that commenced at 5.00, and, at the same time
15 that the initial shelling was taking place in Knin. Is that clear in
16 your mind that that is what was going on between 0500 and 055 [sic] on
17 the morning of the 4th?
18 A. I'm quite clear that those aspects happened although I haven't
19 studied the operations of the 7th Guards Brigade in detail and I have not
20 studied everything single detail in this diary of 150 pages, but I
21 understand fully that this operation started on various places in trying
22 to breach through a defensive line by using manoeuvre and artillery.
23 That is absolutely understandable, and I understand also that the attempt
24 was done to use artillery in a form of -- let's say, let's put it in a
25 form of support -- of deep operation. Yes, I understand that.
1 Q. Okay. And did you likewise come to understand that -- that on
2 the 4th, of the movements of the 7th Guards Brigade were crucial to the
3 success of the HV operations on that day?
4 A. I cannot recall whether that was my memory of that. But I
5 understand that the focus was lying on the movement of the 7th Guards
6 Brigade during that morning, yes.
7 Q. Well, in fact, sir, the Office of the Prosecutor put your focus
8 on the 4th Guards Brigade, didn't they, and not the 7th?
9 A. Yes. The actual question from the OTP was to me to provide
10 information on the use of artillery inside the city of Knin and
11 general -- general background on the use of artillery in general. And by
12 that, I have been focussed on the operation of the 4th Guards Brigade,
14 Q. Did you come to learn that the crucial infantry ground manoeuvres
15 were completed by the 7th Guards Brigade and not the 4th Guards Brigade?
16 A. Well, that's depending on which phase of the operation you're
17 looking at, because if you focus on the 4th Guards Brigade, then that
18 phase of the operations was crucial for the 4th Guards Brigade.
19 So you cannot say that something is crucial because an operation
20 may well be faced, and I have been reading that 4th Guards Brigade was --
21 was ordered to focus on taking control of Knin.
22 So in order to do that, that seems to be a very important phase
23 as well, so I do not deny that the actions of the 7th Guards Brigade were
24 crucial in the total operation, but I do -- I'm convinced of the fact
25 that the actions of the 4th Guards Brigade were as crucial as that.
1 Because of -- that they had to take control of the city of Knin as we are
2 all aware of that that was one of the most important things to achieve
3 during the Operation Storm.
4 Q. What was the role of the 4th Guards Brigade at 0500 on the 4th?
5 A. They had their own area of operations in dong the first part of
6 the attacks and later on they would be relieved in order to be able to
7 take control of Knin.
8 Q. What did the 4th Guards Brigade attack on the morning of the 4th?
9 A. I don't know that from detail, so you should -- I should have the
10 operational order in front of me in order to be able to do that because
11 you can reference to all the paperwork, and I don't have that in front of
12 me. And I don't like to -- to recall all these details just purely from
13 my head. So I would prefer if we talk about that, about task of the
14 4th Guards Brigade or the 7th Guards Brigade that I am able to have this
15 operational order and to trade carefully because analysing an operational
16 order is not something that you do purely from your head.
17 Q. Colonel, do you know which units first broke through the ARSK
18 lines on the 4th, Colonel?
19 A. No, I have no recollection of that now.
20 Q. Do you know which unit first entered Knin on the 5th?
21 A. That was elements of the 4th Guards Brigade.
22 Q. The evidence that we have here, sir, is the 7th Guards Brigade
23 that entered first on the morning of the 4th, the 5th not --
24 A. Okay.
25 Q. Not the 4th Guards Brigade.
1 Let us stay with this document and going to 0625 hours. That
2 would be, 6.25, excuse me. That would be ... TS-3 says:
3 "The 7th Guards Brigade requests support for the area of
4 Pasalic Staja." And that is approved with Howitzer 155.
5 Do you know where that location is, sir?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Now, we noted before that at least this activity that we're
8 talking about shell activity, military activity, according to war diary
9 we just read through 6.25 and obviously there's more entities going down.
10 6.40 notes:
11 "The Chetnik noticed our Howitzers in the area of Vedro Polje?"
12 I would like to talk to you what is going on back in Knin, if I
13 may, while the shelling is taking place; and if I could bring up 65
14 ter 4518.
15 Now, sir, this is it a report of an intercept that was taken by
16 the -- or made by the Croatian authorities, as you can see, an
17 intelligence report. It's dated 4 August 1995. And if we can go to the
18 second page in the English. It discusses a conversation that was
19 intercepted from someone in President Milan Martic's office.
20 MR. KEHOE: Towards the bottom of that page in the English,
22 Q. It notes:
23 "From 0650 to 0705, a person named Dusko makes several private
24 phone [sic] calls from the Martic office and says HV have pounded all the
25 major towns and Knin is burning. He says that he is the only person on
1 duty and that everyone else is in shelters or at home. He adds that
2 nobody has arrived yet."
3 Now, obviously the attack from what we've seen in the Split
4 Military District diary and all the testimony to date commenced at 0500,
5 and two hours into the attack, there is still no one at
6 President Martic's or one person, excuse me, Mr. Dusko whoever he is,
7 Dusko, is only one person at headquarters and certainly not
8 President Martic.
9 Now, you would agree that given the fact that there was artillery
10 fire coming into Knin at this time, it's certainly, as a military
11 officer, you could conclude that that artillery fire curtailed the
12 movement and operation of -- of a very significant person to the Republic
13 of Serbian Krajina, Milan Martic, who was, of course, the
15 A. I don't know. It's your conclusion. I don't see that -- I don't
16 see the correctness of that conclusion.
17 Q. Well, how would you conclude?
18 A. I don't even know whether the president was present in the city
19 itself. So in general you speak with the statement of one person, that
20 everyone is in shelter or is at home. Okay, that is fine. But it
21 doesn't say anything about the presence of the president, yes or no. I
22 don't know that. That's your conclusion.
23 Q. Assume, Colonel, that Milan Martic was in Knin on the morning of
24 the 4th, 1995 [sic]. Assume that.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Fire by the HV on targets in Knin commences at 0500. Two hours
2 into the operation, the Commander-in-Chief is not at his headquarters.
3 You, as a military officer, could conclude based on that, that that fire
4 had the effect of suppressing movements of a very important RSK official.
5 Could you not conclude that, sir?
6 A. If you assume that what you state that he is there, the
7 suppressing fire probably will have excluded a lot -- the most, the
8 bigger parts of the movements, yes, that's true. Okay, I'll leave it at
9 that for the moment.
10 Q. And that suppression of movement would bring with it a
11 significant military advantage to the HV, at least for that two hours
12 where the Commander-in-Chief could possibly not be found, or was as
13 Duskan says in shelters or at home.
14 MR. RUSSO: Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Russo.
16 MR. RUSSO: I'm going to be the question. I believe the document
17 simply indicates that the president is not where Dusko is in the
18 president's office. Mr. Kehoe asked the question about the
19 Commander-in-Chief not being in his HQ. We all know from the other
20 evidence that this is an HQ which is not the president's office and this
21 document doesn't indicated whether he is there or where he is.
22 JUDGE ORIE: There are -- in the answers, and that's not for the
23 first time that this happens, it is clear from the description of certain
24 circumstances that a potential effect would be A, B, C, or D.
25 Now what you are asking the witness, Mr. Kehoe, is on the basis
1 of the assumption whether that would be the effect, yes or no. I think
2 that hardly anyone would deny that if you are pounding town that people
3 would be affected in their freedom of movement apart from what -- I would
4 say it is to some extent common knowledge and then we add a lot of
5 hypothetical data and if Mr. A would have been in town would have
6 affected his freedom of movement as well, most likely yes, of course, if
7 it has the potential why not against Mr. A, unless there is a good reason
8 to consider him to be an exception.
9 It's -- your point is clear. You deduce from this document where
10 apparently the witness has no additional personal --
11 MR. KEHOE: I understand.
12 JUDGE ORIE: -- observation about what happened or he can't add
13 anything about the factual circumstances. This is a conclusion you
14 consider reasonable to draw from that and you're inviting Mr. Konings to
15 do that.
16 As far as we're talking about potential, fine, no problem.
17 Whether it affected or did not affect of course therefore you need to
18 know more factual information.
19 MR. KEHOE: And I understand, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: The point is clear. Please proceed.
21 MR. KEHOE: My issue is, of course, is that the direct
22 examination was hypotheticals and I was presented --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I think you're perfectly right in that -- that
24 that's certainly not a strong point in the examination-in-chief.
25 Now, whether it becomes any better to repeat that in
1 cross-examination is -- well, at least could be subject for --
2 MR. KEHOE: Debate.
3 JUDGE ORIE: -- debate, yes.
4 Please proceed.
5 MR. KEHOE: Yes. Your Honour, at this time, I'll offer into
6 evidence 65 ter 4518.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Russo.
8 MR. RUSSO: No objections Mr. President.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1256.
11 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
12 [Defence counsel confer]
13 MR. KEHOE:
14 Q. Now, let me again --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
16 MR. KEHOE: Hard to believe I couldn't be heard.
17 Q. During this general time-frame, sir, and I'd like to show you
18 another intelligence intercept, 1D65-0272.
19 This is it another intercept from the 4th of August, 1995,
20 Colonel, by Croatian intelligence service. It's involving several people
21 but I'm most interested in talking about the intercept on the next page,
22 where General Kovacevic is talking to Lieutenant-Colonel Radic, who is a
23 commander of a battle group on the Dinara.
24 And just as a time sequence, sir, this report was sent at 0830 on
25 the 4th. And Kovacevic is talking to Radic:
1 "Radic you can only come back dead. You must not come back if
2 you leave your position. Here is trouble. They have hit the barracks
3 (probably the Slavko Rodic barracks in Knin), they are shooting at
4 everything and go eff yourself. Keep it in any way you can. You do not
5 have another country by the great Serbia, and you eff their mother any
6 way you know. I am telling you in Serbian. Go eff yourself, hold on my
7 son, my falcon and this corps will progress once we have stabilised our
8 state. Do [sic] you understand, you can only come back dead, you cannot
9 come back alive?"
10 Colonel you have been a military officer for a very long time. I
11 think you would you agree that is not a very professional planner in
12 which to address a subordinated, would you agree with that, sir?
13 A. I'm not familiar with the way that other armies are dealing with
14 their people. In my army that would not be acceptable.
15 Q. Now do you know that General Kovacevic is a senior military
16 officer in the ARSK?
17 A. I might have seen his name, but I cannot recall that exactly on
18 this moment.
19 Q. Just assume that he was, for the sake of the next question and
20 your reading this. If you were listening to this in real time, Colonel,
21 would you have concluded, knowing what was going on in Knin, that this
22 shelling had induced a level of panic in a -- in a senior military
23 officer of the ARSK?
24 A. You can come to the conclusion when you read this or when you
25 hear that, but you take out one message of probably several ones,
1 focussing on a certain issue, which seems to resemble a sort of -- which
2 seems to -- to represent panic. But that might not be -- might not give
3 directions to what will happen afterwards.
4 I fully agree with that you that this reflects panic but it
5 cannot directly be an indication -- one message cannot be an indication
6 how a force will act later on, because for that you need a more
7 deep-going analysis because one message is in itself is nothing. It --
8 it says something about the state of the mind of the general on that
9 moment, on that moment in time; but there might be things happening later
10 on, shortly after that might change it. I cannot judge a total situation
11 on one message of one general telling very nasty things to one of his
13 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, I'll offer into evidence
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Russo.
16 MR. RUSSO: No objection.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1257, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: D1257 is admitted into evidence.
20 MR. KEHOE:
21 Q. Let us turn to another item on this score, and if we could go to
22 D930 in evidence. If we can just show the first sheet -- first page.
23 Mr. Vrcalj is a -- if I can just go to the first page, first and
24 so the witness can just get a frame of reference for this document.
25 Thank you very much.
1 Mr. Vrcalj was a senior officer again with the ARSK, and he
2 writes about this incident as well as others; and I would like to turn
3 page 7 of this document. And focussing towards the top of that page.
4 I'm sorry, one more page. Towards the top of that page, first
5 paragraph there. We jumped -- can you read that okay, Colonel Konings?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. "We [sic] jumped over the fence in a casern," which is the
8 barracks, sir, "and entered the building where I worked up until four
9 months ago. My Holster had been broken and I had given it to be resewn,
10 so I came to reclaim it. The shells were landing in the casern.
11 However, one needed to be particularly lucky for them to fall on your
12 head. I asked the people present there if there were any volunteers to
13 take me to the GS, the main headquarters. Nobody wanted. They didn't
14 have courage or didn't want to gamble with their lives."
15 Now, just by frame of reference, Mr. Vrcalj was the highest
16 ranking artillery officer of the ARSK and based on some of the doctrine
17 and some of the items that we have been speaking about this morning,
18 would you agree with me that shelling by the HV would want to induce this
19 type of fear by people such that it would suppress their movement. Here
20 we have nobody wanting to go take General Vrcalj back down to the
21 headquarters. That is, in fact, a goal that you would want to achieve,
22 isn't it?
23 A. In general spoken is the use of artillery fire is bringing,
24 denying your movement is bring fear in order to do things which are in an
25 unprotected area. I think that is a normal human thing to want to do
1 when projectiles are falling around you, to try to protect yourself and
2 not to move, if not necessary. Although for soldier it might be
3 necessary to get out and do their job. That's something that is needed
4 to be done. But I do like to stress that the same effects occur against
5 civilian population as well.
6 Q. Well, taking this particular incident, you would agree that
7 suppressing movement of soldiers by artillery fire would be to the
8 military advantage of, in this case, the HV?
9 A. Well, that is a very broad conclusion that you take now because
10 that has to be connected to the military value of the targets that you're
11 aiming at because I can hardly imagine that -- let's assume that the
12 military targets inside Knin were of low military value as is my
13 conclusion in my report based on the information that was given to me, I
14 can hardly assume that -- well, I cannot find the right word, I'm sorry
15 about. That that limiting or even prohibiting the movement of those very
16 low-value military units inside Knin would be of any military advantage
17 at all of the whole -- of the Croatian operation. That's what I -- the
18 connection between that, I cannot make.
19 In general spoken, you are right. When you are able to prohibit
20 movement of troops, then you will -- that can be of advantage but then
21 those troops have to bring something to the battlefield. If you were
22 talking in this case about prohibiting reserves, and then I mean real
23 reserves like combat, troops, to be -- to prohibit them their movement to
24 the front line, where the 7th Guards Brigade was making its move and
25 where the 7th Guards Brigade was pushing forward in order to stop that,
1 that movement, then I think you will have a very good point. But as I
2 know that -- or let's assume that the information given by the OTP is the
3 correct information, the military value of the targets in there, in Knin,
4 I cannot see the military advantage of that. And then we come back to
5 the point of proportionality, the value of targets, and the risk for the
6 civilian population.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Konings, you earlier said that you could hardly
8 assume and then you said you couldn't find the word. If I can assist
9 you. I don't know whether you explained it or whether how important it
10 is. If you'd like to use that word in your own language I can see
11 whether I assist you. If you say, I explain sufficiently then we just
12 move on.
13 THE WITNESS: When I said I cannot find the right word, then I
14 used after that the word limiting or even prohibiting the movement. I
15 was looking for the word prohibiting. I couldn't find that.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 Please proceed.
18 MR. KEHOE:
19 Q. Colonel, did I hear you correctly that you didn't see any
20 military logic of shelling the northern barracks. Is that what your
21 statement is?
22 A. No. I didn't say that. I did say that I did not see the direct
23 connection between the military targets inside the city of Knin because
24 of their low value, and the operation as a whole, in reaching military
25 advantage through stopping the movement of those troops inside Knin by
1 using artillery. That's what I said, and part of that is, of course, the
2 shelling of the northern barracks.
3 Q. The 7th Krajina Corps was up on it's front line in the Dinara,
4 weren't they?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Where was their headquarters in Knin?
7 A. Well, I have to look at the list where it was.
8 Q. It was in the northern barracks, wasn't it?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Okay. So the 7th Krajina Corps -- not -- not the ARSK Main Staff
11 headquarters, the 7th Krajina Corps was fighting up on the Dinara against
12 the HV had their headquarters in the northern barracks and is it your
13 testimony here or your opinion here that there was no military advantage
14 to be gained by attacking the headquarters of the 7th Krajina Corps?
15 MR. RUSSO: I'm going make an objection, Mr. President. I think
16 there's something that needs to be added to the question. The
17 information that was provided --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Usually -- Mr. Russo, Mr. Russo.
19 I don't think that objection against the question should be
20 clear. If you say the question gives limited information and to that
21 extent will lead the witness in a certain way then that may be true or
22 not be true, but that is part, I would say of the latitude in
23 cross-examination which is larger than -- and if there is anything you
24 consider so important then we have to ask Mr. Konings to leave the
25 courtroom to see whether -- because, of course, if there's -- if the
1 question really is clearly misleading or -- then -- but then we have to
2 discuss this in the absence of the witness.
3 MR. RUSSO: I think perhaps -- what I'm seeking is a
4 clarification of the question --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 MR. RUSSO: So if the Courts want to do that outside the presence
7 of the witness then ...
8 JUDGE ORIE: Well, the question has been put to the witness. If
9 he doesn't understand the question, we'll hear from him. If he gives an
10 answer and if you have some doubts whether he has understood the question
11 properly, you can further pursue this matter in re-examination.
12 Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe. Perhaps it would be good to repeat
13 the question.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
15 MR. KEHOE:
16 Q. Page 56, line 5. So the 7th Krajina Corps not the ARSK
17 Main Staff headquarters, the 7th Krajina Corps was fighting up in the
18 Dinara against the HV had their headquarter in the northern barracks; and
19 is it your testimony here or opinion here that there was no military
20 advantage to be gained by attacking the headquarters of the 7th
21 Krajina Corps?
22 A. Let's assume for the answer that -- the Krajina headquarters
23 corps -- the headquarter of the Krajina Corps is there. I don't deny
24 that a headquarter of a corps is a military target, and it is even a -- a
25 very valuable military target.
1 So if you attack the northern barracks in the assumption what you
2 state that the headquarters is there, I can understand why you do that.
3 The only thing I want to add to that is that we have discussed that
4 before, seen the construction of a headquarters like it was stationed
5 there, you can have serious doubts in the use of artillery in trying to
6 take that headquarter out in such a way that it will be out of action.
7 That is my -- my serious doubt about that.
8 And, at the other hand, the information given to me was that the
9 corps headquarters was -- that practically nobody was there. But
10 that's -- I think up to you and to Mr. Russo to talk about that
12 Q. So the discussion we have here is one -- and your answer is one
13 of proportionality and when you look at this on a proportionality scale
14 your doctrine would dictate that you couldn't fire on the northern
15 barracks under these circumstances. That's where you come out; right?
16 MR. RUSSO: Objection, Your Honour.
17 THE WITNESS: No, no.
18 JUDGE ORIE: You're misrepresenting.
19 MR. KEHOE: I'm asking a question in that fashion.
20 JUDGE ORIE: No, no, no, no, no. You're summarising more or less
21 the answer of the witness, and then I think you should at least include
22 that rather important part of his answer was that an artillery attack
23 would not be the appropriate means of firing at the northern barracks.
24 MR. KEHOE: That is part of the proportionality equation, Judge.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Then make that part of your question. If you are
1 summarising then you should do it properly.
2 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
4 MR. KEHOE:
5 Q. In your proportionality equation there could be decisions alter
6 than absolute destruction. It could be a desire to suppress activity as
7 we see in the paragraph on the page. There could be a desire to
8 interdict activity or disrupt operations of the military. Those would
9 not encounter or bring into bear destroying the building, but even with
10 these ideas of just suppressing the activities of the ARSK in the
11 northern barracks not destruction just suppressing activity you conclude
12 on the proportionality scale that your doctrine would preclude or
13 question an artillery attack on the northern barracks.
14 Is that accurate?
15 A. No, that is not accurate at all. I'm sorry to say that.
16 What I tried to explain is that when you take the assumption that
17 in the northern barracks is a fully operating headquarter of the 7th
18 Corps, let's take that as an assumption, then the conclusion cannot be
19 other than that, that is a valid military target of high priority, and
20 the conclusion can be for a military commander or even for a -- a
21 political decision that you want to take that headquarters out of action.
22 You have various ways in doing that. That can be destruction, as you
23 describe, that can be neutralisation, that can be interdiction. The only
24 thing that I say is that achieving those as facts with artillery is not
25 the most likely way because destruction is out of the question.
1 Neutralisation is out of the question because you will not do any harm to
2 the building. You may hope for interdiction or you may hope for
3 psychological effects inside that headquarters, which may cause panic in
4 that headquarter. That's up to -- and that depends on the information
5 that you have on what is the morale of the people over there. That can
6 differ from situation to situation. And then, of course, then comes into
7 the proportionality and then, of course, comes into account the presence
8 of the civilian population in that area.
9 So there are numerous factors that you have to take into account
10 in doing this.
11 Q. Thank you Colonel. Let's move down on this page and just go to
12 the next paragraph:
13 "I entered the building and, boy, was there a lot for me to see
14 [sic] two shells landed in the parking area between the buildings,
15 exploded and destroyed the entire car park of the GS, the general
16 headquarters. It must have been that one good artillery operator has
17 stuck them precisely at that location."
18 Had you reviewed this item at all prior to coming here today?
19 A. I haven't read this document. I don't know the document.
20 Q. Okay. Let us continue on, towards the bottom of the page:
21 "I asked around ... the other commanding officers from the GS
22 since they were not present. There were just a few of us. Some didn't
23 report throughout the day although their sleeping quarters have been
24 situated in the retirement home which was located some 400 metres away.
25 They succumbed to fear. Inability of a commanding officers to react in
1 hard situations had had," I'm reading directly, "had had to be revealed
2 before, not there and then when those who were supposed to help others
3 required helping themselves. A good part of them wasn't prepared for the
4 war, neither physically nor psychologically."
5 Now recognising that you had not read that before, Colonel, you
6 would agree with me, based on what General Vrcalj, the senior artillery
7 officer for the ARSK, notes in his book that the attack by the HV clearly
8 succeeded in suppressing the activities of officers in the ARSK would you
9 not conclude that from this?
10 A. Well, not directly because what -- you come up with single
11 statements from single people, which in itself might be correct, which
12 might be wrong, I don't know. I haven't been reading them before. And
13 it states also on some places that I ask around about the other
14 commanding officers from the GS since they were not present. That
15 doesn't say anything. That could also mean that the whole HQ was not
16 manned properly and that they had reserve HQ somewhere in the field
17 somewhere from where they were doing directions.
18 Those statements here don't give me any direct lead into the fact
19 that there was panic. I can assume there was panic. Of course, I can.
20 But the conclusion that from this writer, and he might have been a
21 high-ranking officer in the army, but they succumbed to fear and ability
22 of commanding officers to react in hard situations had to be revealed
23 before not there and then when those were who were supposed to help
25 That could already mean that those people already were gone for a
1 long period. So when you attack a headquarters and again I don't deny
2 that that is not a military thing to do, then as an attacking force you
3 have you to be sure, have you to be -- have you to have the information,
4 what the -- the headquarters is doing, what is the real military value
5 and what is are all the ins and outs around that headquarters.
6 And such a single presentation of some sentences of an artillery
7 chief of that army, okay, fine.
8 Q. Colonel, if I can correct once I think you put a not in there and
9 if you can look on the screen, starting on line 15:
10 So when you attack the headquarters -- and, again, I don't deny
11 that you say this is not a military thing to do, did you say it is a
12 military thing to do?
13 A. It is a military thing to do, I'm sorry.
14 Q. I just thought there was a not in there that was not supposed to
16 A. No, no.
17 MR. KEHOE: If I might have one moment.
18 [Defence counsel confer]
19 MR. KEHOE:
20 Q. I have been -- you noted in the course of your testimony that you
21 were told that the headquarters of the 7th Krajina Corps was not in the
22 northern barracks. I would like you to take a look at D928, page 33.
23 This is another book by another senior-ranking officer of the ARSK,
24 General Sekulic. This is it 33 in the English, 38 in the B/C/S.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, I may have missed it but you said in the
1 course of your testimony that you were told that the headquarters were
2 not in the northern barracks, could you give me the reference.
3 MR. KEHOE: I can find it in a second. I heard it, Your Honour.
4 I will find it.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic apparently knows where to find it so
6 that I can verify it. Mr. Misetic.
7 MR. MISETIC: I'm looking it up right now I am virtually certain
8 he just said it within the last ten minutes but --
9 MR. RUSSO: I agree with that, Your Honour, and that was the
10 information provided to him.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then that is clear.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. KEHOE:
14 Q. This is General Sekulic's book, and if I can just go with the
15 third paragraph in the second full paragraph the third paragraph down:
16 Colonel Stevo Draskovic. Do you see that, Colonel?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Colonel Stevo Draskovic, 7 Corps, it is actually 7 Dalmatian
19 Corps, assistant commander for morale confirmed that the command post had
20 been in the barracks, in the context, this is the northern barracks in th
21 barracks in Knin until midnight on 4/5 August and was then moved to
23 Now the information that was given to you by the Office of the
24 Prosecutor was given from that; is that right?
25 A. Yes, different.
1 Q. Let us move to -- back to P71, which is the diary, Split Military
2 District war diary, and going to page 79 in the English in that document
3 and page 42 in the B/C/S.
4 MR. KEHOE: If we can spin that, please. Going down to the
5 bottom -- yes.
6 Q. 7.45 at the bottom, HV artillery hit the barracks in Knin. So
7 that is the kind of items that would you expect to be coming back to
8 General Gotovina that his artillery is hitting what you even state is a
9 military target, the headquarters of the 7th Krajina Corps?
10 A. Well, this particular point doesn't say me anything. Being a
11 commanding general or an artillery commander, I immediately would go back
12 to the source that gives me that information because there are various
13 crucial factors misting. This only states that you hit the barracks,
14 point, end of discussion; and what as a commander, I need to know, what
15 are the effects that I have achieved what does that bring to my whole
16 operation because building that operation is a continuous analysing of
17 the things that are happening.
18 So with all due respect, this type of reports doesn't say me
20 Q. No. Colonel, this is a war diary, isn't it? I mean it is
21 actually --
22 A. Sir, I was --
23 Q. Excuse me. Chronically events, not on a minute by minute basis
24 but events that take place on regular intervals during the course of the
25 battle to keep the commander up to date, isn't it?
1 A. Yes. But I would have -- I with would have -- I except this kind
2 of reports is underpinned by other reports where they say what the
3 effects are that you achieve because that is what we're talking about
4 here. We're not talking about the report system of an army or how a
5 diary is built. I know very well what a diary is. But if you present me
6 this and you ask my opinion about this diary, I say you, quite clear,
7 this doesn't say me anything and I, as an artillery officer, as a
8 commander, would like to -- I would expect to see also those documents or
9 those radio communications that underpin what is happening here, because
10 it doesn't say anything.
11 Q. Colonel, we're in the middle combat here. In addition to this
12 particular piece of information you don't know what was told to
13 General Gotovina at this time in conjunction with this, do you?
14 A. No. It is it crucial that you know that. It is crucial for a
15 commanding officer once you attack a -- such apparent important
16 headquarters because that's your -- that's the discussion that we have.
17 The northern barracks were occupied by the headquarters of the 7th corps.
18 And as assume that the headquarters was there because we were reading
19 that in that book what you presented that they were there until the 5th
20 in the morning so they were there. Let's assume that during the moment
21 of the attack.
22 If I would be a commanding officer of an attacking force I would
23 be very interested and even if I would be the commander of the overall
24 operation I would be very interested in knowing what the effect would be
25 of the actions of my artillery in trying to take out that headquarters.
1 And a diary, as is presented here, is not used for that. But I
2 would be very interested in first of all what is the effect that you try
3 to achieve by attacking that barracks, neutralisation, destruction,
4 whatever and what is the effect that is done, what is the real effect.
5 And so that that is crucial for the further -- the further
6 overall operation, because what you stated is that, if this is a high
7 priority target, the taking out of that high priority target will
8 influence the whole operation, being a commander of an operation, I would
9 like to know this at first what is happening.
10 Q. Let's continue the time sequence, Colonel, this is at 7.45 and
11 let's see what is reported back at 7.55 which is on the next column, if
12 we can just shift is it over.
13 Chetniks starting the counteroffensive in -- in defence of the
14 area of the 81st Guards Battalion HV. 81st Guard Battalion informed.
15 TRS-3 ready for support.
16 Now you had this diary, and I am sure you read that. Tell us
17 about this counteroffensive up by the Serbs and where it took place?
18 A. I don't know that. I didn't read any single detail in this diary
19 so I used it as a general background information, and I told you that
20 this type of diary does not bring you so much information. But I didn't
21 study the counteroffensive of the Serbs.
22 Q. Well, Colonel, when we are getting the lay of the battlefield and
23 what is transpiring it is very important for you looking at this entire
24 operation to understand what's transpiring on the battlefield not just in
25 Knin but all the up to the Dinara on the confrontation line, isn't it?
1 A. It is -- it is part of it. I understand the general outlines of
2 the operation. That's what was given to me. That's what I have been
3 studying. The next step was to concentrate on the actions, specifically
4 the actions by artillery that was taken towards Knin. I did not study
5 every single counterattack of either -- of both parties. That was not
6 requested to me by the OTP, so I did not do that. I know what the aim of
7 Operation Storm is, was, and I focussed from there on the use of
8 artillery against Knin.
9 Q. But, sir, you said in your document that fire support is a
10 integral part of every operation?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. So you're telling us that you didn't study the infantry part of
13 the operation but only studied the artillery part?
14 A. That's not what I'm saying.
15 Q. Explain please?
16 A. I said that I focussed on the activities that were taken against
17 Knin. That's what I said.
18 Q. Up in the Dinara were you aware if casualties were being taken by
19 the HV?
20 A. Well, throughout the diary, you -- you can read that there were
21 casualties taken.
22 Q. Let's go down to 9.55 at the bottom of that page.
23 JUDGE ORIE: When we're hearing this noise it is because the
24 steps in front of the building are in need of repair and that is not
25 pleasant but, just for you to explain that it nothing else and please
2 MR. KEHOE:
3 Q. Notes that helicopter for Piketa to collect there an is an
4 illegible word and go to Veli Vrh to pick up casualties. Approved by
5 General Gotovina.
6 Now you noted -- that is one of the series of items where its
7 described the casualties that the HV is taking during this fighting up in
8 the Dinara, isn't there?
9 A. Apparently, yes.
10 Q. Your assessment in going through the documents was that the
11 fighting on the Dinara was quite intense, wasn't it?
12 A. Yes. I don't deny that. I haven't been there, but I assume that
13 breaking through a defence line takes casualties. That is unfortunately
14 a part of a military operation.
15 Q. Let's go through the sequence of events as to what transpired
16 thereafter, and if I may, if we can turn to D923, which is a document
17 that is signed -- that is written by General Mrksic on the 26th of
18 August, recounting the events of the day.
19 If we can just go to the first sheet of that.
20 I don't believe this is the correct document. D923, did I
21 misspeak there?
22 [Defence counsel confer]
23 MR. KEHOE: Yes, that's the correct document, D923. It's page 6
24 in the English.
25 Q. Do you know, Colonel, who General Mrksic is?
1 A. No, I cannot recall his name directly, no.
2 Q. I think you can assume for the sake of this discussion that he is
3 the senior commanding officer of the ARSK at this time.
4 A. Okay.
5 Q. Third paragraph in:
6 "The Ustasha breakthrough over the Dinara mountains during the
7 afternoon of the 4th of August represented the greatest threat for the
8 collective activities of the 7th corps. The MUP special unit leaving its
9 positions on the Dinara mountain [sic] around 11.00 offered the Ustasha
10 forces a possibility for a swift break through over the Dinara -- over
11 the Dinara mountains towards Crvena Zemlja. In that way the defence in
12 the rest of the Dinara mountains and the dense of the 1st Light Brigade
13 in the wider area of Vrlika were compromised. The appearances of the
14 Ustashas in the area of Knin endangered the rear of the 7th Motorised
15 Brigade and the defence of their [sic] Drnis axis?"
16 First before we move of off this Colonel, were you aware that
17 members of the Ministry of Interior, the MUP special unit that is
18 described here, were operating in conjunction with the ARSK on the front
19 line in the Dinara?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Well, that particular issue, if in fact they were -- and by the
22 way this MUP special unit is police. There has been much evidence in
23 here that the ARSK unit that was up there were policemen.
24 So were you made aware that these policemen took on military
25 roles at various times and in combat settings?
1 A. Not in this particular case. I know from my -- from the whole
2 conflict in the Balkan in the 1990s that police forces were used in that
3 role. But I'm not aware of this in this specific case.
4 Q. Well, assuming that the police officers became parts -- part of
5 the ARSK during times of combat they would no longer have their civilian
6 aspects but would become like any other soldier on the front line; isn't
7 that right?
8 A. Well, I don't know the specific legal arrangements about that.
9 That is up to you to conclude. We don't know in my army the system of
10 militarising police officers. We have military police. If these special
11 forces, these special units were military police, then they are military.
12 I'm not familiar with the system that you militarise civilian police
13 officers for use inside the military organisation and what their rights
14 and their constraints are in that case whether they can be used as full
15 military forces.
16 Again, in NATO, we have, in our country, we have military police
17 officers and they are entitled -- they are acting as military forces but
18 they are not used as combat forces whatsoever. They have special duties
19 inside our army.
20 So I cannot give you a proper answer on that.
21 Q. You can assume for the sake of this discussion that this MUP
22 special unit was a minister of the interior police force that was made
23 part of the military. And you can also assume that this police force
24 that was up on the front line were headquartered in the police station in
1 Now, under those circumstances, where this police force was now a
2 fighting force for the ARSK, their otherwise civilian police headquarters
3 then becomes a military target, doesn't it?
4 A. If you assume under those assumptions that you say, and if that's
5 the regulation inside the ARSK, I don't know the legal side of that, it
6 seems to be that they are part of the military, and for that reason a
7 military target.
8 Q. Now let's turn our attention to the sequence of events as they
9 unfolded on the 4th with the 7th Guards Brigade and the ARSK, and to
10 assist us in that, let us go back to P71.
11 MR. KEHOE: It is 80 in the English and 43 in the B/C/S.
12 [Defence counsel confer]
13 MR. KEHOE: It's in the second column, 12.55, yes, the column
14 over. If we can go through these relatively quickly.
15 Q. 12.55, 7th Guards Brigade reports that positions were taken in
16 the Bancica [phoen], K6794240, Samar, Igla, Brezovac, Crnacka Draga
18 Now, are you familiar with about those particular locations, sir?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Let me give you a quick frame of reference then and go back to
21 1D65-0484, which is the map.
22 And I'd like to go to page 5 of that document and focus on Samar
23 and Igla. And if we can just -- I don't know if we can blow up the
24 centre of that at all.
25 Now you see those ridges, those two mountain points that are in
1 there. Do you see that, sir?
2 A. I see many mountain points.
3 Q. With the names S-a-m-a-r up at the top and I-g-l-a next to it.
4 A. I don't see that.
5 Q. I-g-l-a is, if you go to Samar and you just move to the right.
6 Do you see that?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Right in the middle of the page.
9 A. Yes.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Looking at the blue more or less Frank Tango [phoen]
11 plate over it, it is on the left side, the left top side approximately in
12 the middle you see Samar, do you see that?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, I see it Samar.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and Igla is to the right of that.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, I see that.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
17 MR. KEHOE:
18 Q. Now those two peaks are taken, it notes in the diary at 12.55.
19 Let -- and we don't need to put this on the screen, but if I can just
20 read it at a risk of not flipping back and forth too much and this is
21 P71. The time entry on the 4th is 1330.
22 It notes from the 7th Guards Brigade that the enemy first line
23 broken enemy chaotically running away.
24 1445, 7th Guards Brigade notes seized Badanje and Visibaba.
25 Now do you see those locations, the two that are directly in the
1 centre of that page?
2 A. Yes, I see them.
3 Q. Okay. These -- this -- these particular features, these features
4 that we are talking about, the diary reflects took from 0500 in the
5 morning until 1525 in the afternoon. Did you ask the OTP for any
6 addition detail about the level of fighting that was taking place in
7 order for the HV to successfully take these locations?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Would that not have been important for the greater upon text for
10 you to understand what was going on in the entire battlefield and not
11 just Knin but all the way up in the Dinara?
12 A. No I don't see the connection between this specific part of the
13 battlefield in relation to the use of artillery in Knin because this is
14 a -- I'm sorry, this is it a description of how on a part of the
15 battlefield a battle unfolds, apparently very successful for the HV
16 forces with the conclusion that the Serb forces are running away. In
17 itself I don't see this is an direct connection between that and the --
18 the use of the artillery in the whole operation towards Knin. I think
19 you can clarify that to me.
20 Q. Well, sir --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, before you consider whether or not to
22 clarify, I'm looking at the clock.
23 MR. KEHOE: This is a appropriate time.
24 JUDGE ORIE: I have a small procedural issue to deal with totally
25 unrelated to this witness. Therefore, Mr. Konings, I will ask you
1 already to leave the courtroom, escorted by Madam Usher when I raise this
3 [The witness stands down]
4 JUDGE ORIE: There were translations issues raised by both the
5 Cermak and the Markac Defence. It was Mr. Kay and Mr. Kuzmanovic who
6 dealt with it in relation to the Turkalj statements. It was then agreed
7 that you would -- where an example was given only that you would give a
8 list of your concerns to the Prosecution. Mr. Kuzmanovic joined in that
9 exercise. The Prosecution would then look at it and we would hear
10 whether there was any agreement on inaccuracies in the translation.
11 We've not heard from the parties since then, and since the
12 Chamber would very much want to avoid using material which is not
14 MR. CAYLEY: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
15 We in fact sent our suggestions to the Prosecution several days
16 ago and my understanding is that they're in fact reviewing it at the
17 moment, and they will come back to us.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kuzmanovic.
19 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your honour, ours is expected to be ready by
20 Monday to be sent to the Prosecution.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 MR. RUSSO: I agree with all, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: You agree with all, yes.
24 I don't think it makes much sense to first deal only with the
25 Cermak inaccuracies and not to take them all together. The Chamber, of
1 course, would like to resolve this, because we're working on the material
2 as well, and we would like to know whether we are facing inaccuracies in
3 the material which would, of course, stop us from further looking at.
4 How long is your list, Mr. ...
5 MR. CAYLEY: My understanding is, Your Honour, is it is about
6 four pages.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Four pages.
8 Mr. Kuzmanovic.
9 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your Honour, we're looking at about the same
10 amount. The only reason it is delayed for me is I need the audio
11 transcript and it took a while for me to find our version of it because
12 it was submitted to us last year.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Russo, could we invite the OTP to give full
14 priority to verifying the complaints by Defence teams.
15 MR. RUSSO: Certainly, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: And you said you expect to give it on Monday to
17 Mr. --
18 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Yes, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Could you give us a first impression well, let's
20 say, I was inclined to say next week, Wednesday, but we're not sitting on
21 Wednesday. So next week Thursday.
22 MR. RUSSO: We'll endeavour to do that, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll hear from you.
24 We will have a break, and we resume at ten minutes to 1.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, you may proceed, slowly.
4 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
5 Q. Colonel, just looking at the map that's on the screen, and we
6 talked about from the diary positions taking from Samar, Igla, Badanj,
7 Visibaba, and we note the 7th Guards Brigade took those in the every
8 afternoon of the 4th.
9 And when you were looking at that, sir, you understood that there
10 was a military logic to shell those spots prior to them actually being
11 taken because they were in fact resistance points for the ARSK, were they
13 A. You refer now to the hilltops that you were referring before --
14 before the break.
15 Q. I'm referring to the hilltops, and I'm referring to as we look at
16 this map of the activities of the 7th Guards Brigade on the 4th, and we
17 look at the dots which are the locations according to the map that the
18 Prosecutor put into evidence were targets of artillery --
19 A. Mm-hmm.
20 Q. -- you can in fact conclude that there was military logic behind
21 hitting those locations with artillery. Isn't that right?
22 A. Yes. That in itself is right. They seem to be part of a --
23 let's say defence line. I assume that they are all military targets, so
24 this is an complete logic in doing manoeuvre and fire-power together in
25 order to break a defence line.
1 Q. Likewise as we go this map Pljesevica and Anica Glava obviously
2 that had not been taken as of that day, those were likewise resistance
3 points for the ARSK, and there was in fact military logic behind shelling
4 those as well, wasn't there?
5 A. Yes. Can I only repeat there is a full military logic in the
6 combination of the use of manoeuvre all types of fire-power in order to
7 break a defence line.
8 Q. And if we look at the dots that were shown to you by the
9 Prosecutor that we have just in this map there was a military logic to
10 shell each one of these ARSK resistance points, wasn't there?
11 A. Provided they are military targets, then I don't think that there
12 is any doubt about that.
13 Q. Did you check if they were?
14 A. I haven't checked that. I haven't been asked to do that. As I
15 told you I only have a rough overview of what the 7th Brigade did. I
16 have not been tasked by the OTP to study the operations of the
17 7th Brigade with respect to these specific military targets.
18 Q. But this was in fact the defence line for the town of Knin,
19 wasn't it?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now let's talk to yet another aspect of the shelling, and I'm
22 interested in a couple of issues. We noted, and if we go back to P71,
23 page 80. 80 of the English; 43 of the B/C/S. And if we can go to the
24 right hand column please.
25 These are the two entries we talking about just briefly prior to
1 the break. More specifically, the one at 1330: "Enemy fire line broken.
2 Enemy chaotically running away as reported by the 7th Guards Brigade at
4 I want to bring up yet another document 1D65-0515. If we can
5 spin that.
6 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, unfortunately, I don't have a B/C/S
7 translation of this yet.
8 Q. And this is a B/C/S interview, Colonel, that -- I know that I
9 said -- it was a B/C/S document that incorporates a Belgrade radio
10 interview that notes at -- this is at 1300 Greenwich mean time which, of
11 course, is 1500 in Knin at the time. And if we can just go down to
12 General Mrksic talking at -- at 0500, we can see the comparison there
13 with Greenwich meantime.
14 "This morning, 4th August, the Croatian army attacked the
15 Republic of Serbian Krajina by massively bombarding all populated places
16 particularly Knin. The bombardment is still in progress our army is
17 still firmly in control of the forward front line, the Croatian army was
18 unable to seriously breach our like except on the route leaving from
19 Grahovo to Cvrnje Smelje [phoen] to Knin."
20 Now that's the line that we were talking about, Colonel, was it
21 not 1330?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now --
24 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'll to offer 1D65-0515
25 into evidence.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Russo.
2 MR. RUSSO: No objection.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1258.
5 JUDGE ORIE: D1258 is admitted into evidence.
6 MR. KEHOE:
7 Q. Now, Colonel, as a commander, and you are being informed that the
8 enemy line is broken and that part of the enemy is chaotically running
9 away, you as a commander would try to prevent them from going to a place
10 where you didn't want them to go; isn't that right?
11 A. Well, that might be a possibility, yes.
12 Q. And that's called shaping the battlefield, isn't it?
13 A. No, sir necessarily.
14 Q. What is shaping the battlefield?
15 A. It's -- shaping the battlefield according to such requirements or
16 such conditions that is in favour of your own operations. And, again,
17 trying to -- well, I would expect in this -- no. Leave it at that. I
18 assume have you a follow-up question.
19 Q. I do. Well, in shaping the battlefield, you as a commander, with
20 -- giving orders to artillery asset, if you saw the enemy fleeing, and
21 you wanted them to go right and to not go left, because it was to your
22 military advantage, you would consider laying down fire in that left-hand
23 location to prevent them from going there, wouldn't there -- wouldn't
25 A. Well, that's -- that's a possibility but I would not use my
1 artillery alone for that because you need a combination again from
2 manoeuvre and artillery in order to prevent completely what you went them
3 to do because it is just not possible to move a whole force only with the
4 use of artillery in a direction that you want.
5 Q. Well, let's be broader then. You would use assets at your
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. To convince them for own health and well-being that they better
9 go right and not left?
10 A. That's just one of the possibilities that you have in a given
11 scenario. That's up to a commander to decide, because if that happens
12 when an enemy force is retreating from a defence line, a commanding
13 officer of the attacking force has various possibilities and on the spot,
14 he will analyse together with his staff the situation and will come up
15 with a possible cause of action that can be -- that can be a combined
16 course of action that does not necessarily mean only to be trying the
17 enemy forces to go left or right. You can also try to stop them, but you
18 can also take advantage of the situation in focussing your force on
19 achieving the end goal that you want to achieve. You may decide even to
20 leave the enemy where he is, let him flee, let him go, and I focus now,
21 in this case on going towards Knin and trying to end the situation as
22 soon as possible.
23 So there are numerous possibilities of which the one that you
24 describe makes part of, yes.
25 Q. There are multiple points.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And I don't mean to preclude one as opposed to the other. But
3 when you read this in your diary, did you ask the Prosecutor for any
4 information as to where these enemies forces, these ARSK forces had run
6 A. No.
7 Q. Well, let's go back to P1268 that was received in evidence
9 Now, the last entry there at 1500 you were asked questions about
10 that by Mr. Russo, and it notes: At 1500 hours, in the time of
11 General Mrksic's radio interview with Serb radio, Belgrade, D1258, there
12 were -- in irregular intervals a total of 18 projectiles, T-130s in this
13 instance, were fired from a T-130 at the general area of Knin.
14 Now, when you were shown this document and you had the diary to
15 review, did you ask the Prosecutor whether or not he had any information
16 that these projectiles were being fired upon soldiers that were
17 retreating back to Knin?
18 A. No, I cannot recall that we had this type of discussion.
19 Q. Let's assume for the sake of argument that they were in fact
20 retreating back to Knin at 15 00. The firing of 18 T-130 projectiles in
21 their direction would certainly deter these soldiers from coming into
22 Knin, wouldn't it?
23 A. No, it wouldn't. I don't think so. It depends on -- it is all
24 assumption what are you doing now because how many soldiers were fleeing,
25 how were these rounds used? It says at irregular intervals. It says at
1 a T-130-millimetre. Was it a concentrated fully of more than one gun?
2 Was it only one gun that fired single rounds somewhere in the terrain
3 because the effect that you want to achieve is something that diminishes
4 immediately because if the effect to be achieved, especially against
5 soldiers that are in chaos or that are flee in the open is when you fire
6 one or two rounds, they will be -- they are be scared. They will be
7 able -- maybe casualties. But if these irregular intervals are taking
8 more time, then they will coming together and they will have the
9 opportunity to flee again because the effect of artillery is diminishing
10 very fast very quickly. And I don't deny that even one round can
11 bring -- can build up more chaos and more panic, but the information
12 here, in this point, as I stated yesterday, doesn't say me anything about
13 the use of this 18 rounds of -- a T-130 at the general area of Knin. To
14 me, it is just a number of saying we fired 18 rounds somewhere. It is
15 useless information.
16 Q. I understand, sir.
17 Let move on a little bit and let's move to the next day of the
18 battle, and before we do that if we could go back -- I would put on the
19 screen 1D65-0484, and if we could go to -- to number 5, map 5 in this
21 MR. KEHOE: Can we just blow that up a bit, Mr. Registrar.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Russo, I should address you, I think. P1268,
23 time in the original seems to be 2000 hours whereas in the English
24 version it seems to be 2.00, 2.00.
25 MR. RUSSO: Yes, Mr. President, we can correct that in the file
1 in the amended translation.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
3 MR. KEHOE:
4 Q. Now this is again the situation based on the map that we looked
5 at page P1274, do you know from reviewing of the documents that part of
6 the goal for the 7th Guards Brigade was to take Pljesevica and
7 Anica Glava but they were unsuccessful on the 4th because of pretty stern
8 resistance by the ARSK. Were you aware of that?
9 A. Yes, I'm not quite sure, so the answer is, on this moment, no.
10 Q. Well, okay. If we can move to the next slide. And before we do
11 this, I mean -- again, I did talk about some of these other topics but,
12 of course, if one of the goals for the 7th Guards Brigade on the 4th was
13 to take Pljesevica and Anica Glava there were certain that those high
14 ground features this certainly would have been military logic going for
15 the shelling of those targets, wouldn't there?
16 A. Provided they are military targets. I assume that you aim at
17 that then shelling those targets is in itself no problem.
18 Q. Let's assume for the sake of this argument that in fact the line
19 was stopped and -- well, it was a goal of the HV they failed to take
20 Pljesevica and Anica Glava and let's move to the operations of the 4th.
21 Than would be in the next map.
22 Excuse me, I'm sorry, the 5th, my apologies. I'll saying the 5th
23 of August. If we could have the next map up. Actually, two maps up.
24 That's it.
25 Now, Colonel, you talked to some degree about the advance on the
1 5th, and, Mr. President, what we have done in this point is to take two
2 additional items that were provided to us by the Office of the Prosecutor
3 and the underlying documents are an incorporation of the 7th Guards
4 Brigade commander's decision map and that is reflected in blue; and the
5 4th Guards Brigade operations map which is reflected in pink. And,
6 again, we have overlayed it on this topographical Google map.
7 Now --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Again, Mr. Kehoe, we are talking about artillery
9 fire and targets and type of fire the coordination with ground manoeuvres
10 but as I said before no distinction in your reflection has been made
11 between, at least, we could ask the witness is described in different
12 ways, the one being preparation fire and the other apparently -- well, at
13 least not called preparation fire and from what I understood from
14 Mr. Konings, preparation fire is to clear the ground so that ground
15 troops can move forward.
16 Now, that seems to me if we go into such detail as you do, to be
17 something to also consider, so I'm a bit troubled by red dots, where we
18 started with rectangular and squares.
19 MR. KEHOE: What I did in this point and of course we can go back
20 and bring in the rectangular square with the originals, Mr. President,
21 what I was just attempting to do, what we are attempting to do at this
22 point is going through the maps as provided by the Office of the
23 Prosecutor showing these individual targets and the logic behind hitting
24 these targets as it moves in conjunction with the infantry movement on
25 the 7th and the 4th Guards Brigades because it directly bears on the
1 Colonel's statements in his --
2 JUDGE ORIE: I see what you do, but you are ignoring a
3 distinction which is made in the original maps and especially with the
4 last -- we, until now, we were dealing with -- I would say the
5 rectangular targets and are coming close to or are already at the square
6 ones which appear to be different.
7 MR. KEHOE: Yes, sir. I can clarify with regard to those
8 particular targets and the differences between those. We can certainly
9 over the weekend clarify any points in that regard that the Chamber would
10 like. For the purpose of just this, I just complete going through the
11 next day with an effort just to show is there is a logic to using
12 artillery generally be it T-130s or Howitzers or MRLs on these various
13 locations. These were individual places that had been focussed upon by
14 the 7th Guards Brigade and the 4th Guards Brigade and that there was a
15 military logic by hitting these locations and that was the effort that I
16 was trying to get through with the expert, because, of course, he
17 reviewed these documented and he reviewed some of the background material
18 as to these particular targets.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, you repeatedly stressed how important it
20 is for an expert to look at all the information available to him. What I
21 see here in this exercise we are losing some information. I leave it to
22 that at this moment.
23 Mr. Konings, from my remarks you may be aware that the red dots
24 on the original map do not all appear in a similar same and with similar
25 agenda with it.
1 Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
2 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour and we will put the actual
3 underlying documents into evidence, Mr. President, which will reflect the
4 rectangles and the squares, so there would be some clarity as to which is
6 Q. Turning to the 5th, sir, and the 5th, as you know, was a joint
7 operation with the 4th and the 7th Guards Brigade with the 4th taking a
8 flanking manoeuvre to the right, or, in this case, I believe it would be
9 towards the north; is that right, sir?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Let me show you an order, 65 ter 2199, and then we can move back
12 to the map.
13 And -- this is an order of General Gotovina, 3 August 1995, and
14 on the second page it notes the introduction of the 4th Guards Brigade to
15 be given maximum fire support on the right flank.
16 Had you seen this document prior to today?
17 A. I don't know. I have seen many documents, so it is hard for me
18 to recall all of the documents that I have been given.
19 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, I'll offer into evidence
20 65 ter 2199.
21 MR. RUSSO: No objection, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1259, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Is admitted into evidence.
25 MR. KEHOE: And can we go back again to 1D65-0484 which is at
1 page 7.
2 Q. And again, sir, I would like to ask you, when you looked at this
3 particular map and looked at the movements of the 7th Guards Brigade and
4 the 4th Guards Brigade, did you discuss the strategy or did you analyse
5 the strategy of hitting the various targets that we have before us in
6 dots as part of the overall strategy of the HV?
7 A. What do you mean we discussed? Discussed with the OTP.
8 Q. Let's look at this in a little bit more detail.
9 When you look at these particular items that had been shelled
10 according to the underlying maps, did you analyse the reasons why these
11 items had been shelled?
12 A. I analysed very briefly because my first job asked by the OTP was
13 not focussing on the actions of all these brigades that you are
14 presenting now but focussing on the actions that were done in -- in the
15 preparation of taking and taking control of Knin and especially focussing
16 on the use of artillery inside Knin. But, of course, I have had a
17 general view, and I will not call it a complete analysis of the whole
18 operation. I have created myself a general view of what happened, and
19 when you see the actions develop as you present them here on the screen,
20 I will not deny that this is, in itself, a regular, military operation,
21 which under folds along certain lines, which unfolds partly as it was
22 planned but which falls party as it wasn't planned. Because that is
23 normal for a military operation when are you not able to break a defence,
24 you take alternative action by flanking manoeuvres or whatsoever.
25 So in that context, the red dots or the rectangulars that were
1 presented are estimated being military targets and form part of the
2 military potential of the force that is attacked.
3 So for me there is no need to analysis that further and again I
4 was not asked to analysis that further, and if you ask me to analysis all
5 those single situations I only can say then have you to give me time.
6 Q. Well, sir, you just said on page 85 at line 22:
7 "My first job asked by the OTP was not focussing on all these
8 brigades that are you presenting now but focussing on the actions that
9 were done in preparation of and taking control of Knin."
10 Now, how could you analyse information on the taking -- taking
11 control of Knin without analysing the activities of the brigade that
12 actually took over Knin, that being the 7th Guards Brigade? How could
13 you do that?
14 A. I said to you that I have a general overview of the operation as
15 it run up until the moment that Knin was approached and from that moment
16 on, I took my detail analyses on the facts that were given me by the OTP,
17 which was the assumption about all the targets that were in Knin that we
18 discussed before, and on the fact that there was the entering of Knin was
19 only on the 5th of -- of August. And of course, I had a general idea
20 about what was happening, but I have not analysed the whole operation in
22 Q. Let me just ask one simple question. Did the OTP tell you that
23 it was the 4th Guards Brigade that took Knin on the 5th?
24 A. Yes. I stated that before.
25 Q. Let's go back to this and looking at the targets putting aside
1 your discussion of Knin, the rest of the red dots, which are targets on
2 the underlying map did you find any information to lead to you conclude
3 there was not a logical reason for attacking all of these targets? And
4 if so, what was the reason for not attacking them, if you found any?
5 A. No, I have no reason to doubt these targets. Because they are
6 apparently in connection with defence forces. The things that I have
7 doubt from the beginning on is those aspects in the order that were given
8 in shelling cities, like Benkovac, like Knin. That is the problem that I
9 raised in the discussion with the OTP.
10 Q. We'll get to that, Colonel. We'll get to that.
11 Let's go to the next slide and follow up -- focus a little bit
12 more on the activities of the 5th.
13 If we look at the activities of the 5th, sir, and this is a blow
14 up of this map and the idea was to move to the Golubic depot as well as
15 the railway station in Golubic. You can see in the dots as were it Crni
17 Now if we can go to -- actually we can stay here. With regard to
18 the Golubic depot -- I mean are you familiar with the Golubic depot and
19 exactly how large it was --
20 A. No, I'm not.
21 Q. Are you familiar with how far away the Golubic supply depot was
22 from the railway station?
23 A. No, I don't know the scale of this map.
24 Q. No, putting aside the map. I'm talking about generally --
25 A. No, then I have to guess, no.
1 Q. No idea how far the ammunition depot is from the train station?
2 A. No. I don't guess about that so if you want me to give you that,
3 I cannot recall that out of my head without having a proper map in front
4 of me with where I can see the scale. I don't know from -- from my head
5 all these single possible targets in one of the operations of one of the
7 Q. Were you familiar or given any information about munitions being
8 taken from the Golubic depot and being brought to the Golubic railway
9 station and being transported on the rail line between Golubic and Knin?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Do you know how far Golubic is from Knin?
12 A. I estimate it must be under ten kilometres.
13 Q. So we're talking about a relatively short distance --
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. -- to move things by rail?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Let us go to the next slide.
18 Now, we can see the Golubic depot moving up to the left from the
19 red dot.
20 MR. KEHOE: The next slide please.
21 Q. This is again another set of maps that was put together from the
22 items given to us -- to the Defence by the Prosecution. They are listed
23 below. And it has targets of the ARSK, a junction, and Bulina Strana;
24 and if I can just go to next page in this.
25 Now, Bulina Strana, the shelling of Bulina Strana, were you given
1 any information as to what the ARSK was using Bulina Strana for?
2 A. No.
3 Q. So you don't know that it was going to be used as a position to
4 defend Knin on the 5th of August?
5 A. Not that I'm aware of.
6 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'll offer into evidence
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Russo.
9 MR. RUSSO: Is that the Google Earth presentation?
10 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
11 MR. RUSSO: Yes, no objection.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1260.
14 JUDGE ORIE: D1260 is admitted into evidence.
15 MR. KEHOE:
16 Q. Now just staying with Bulina Strana, would it have been important
17 for you to know that that is, in fact, a high ground feature that the
18 ARSK was going to use for the defence of Knin in making a determination
19 whether or not the shelling of that location was proper?
20 A. Yes, that's valid information to have a that available, no
21 problem about that.
22 Q. But you weren't given that information?
23 A. Well, I cannot recall that. I don't think so but ...
24 Q. Well, let us turn to some targets in Knin because I know that in
25 your table on P260 [sic] and also in various commentary on documents
1 presented by the Prosecution, you were asked about targeting and your
2 specific opinions about various targets. And I would like to bring up
3 the targets or the list of targets on P1271 that Mr. Russo discussed with
5 Now, this is the -- you recall this document, Colonel, discussed
6 with Mr. Russo and you were asked about the first entry, the church in
7 Knin; and Mr. Russo at page 14434 at line 12 to 15 asked:
8 "And I will ask you the same question, Colonel Konings, given
9 your training and experience whether or not you believe it is appropriate
10 to include a hospital, any hospital, on a target list."
11 And your answer is: "No."
12 Now, your answer was based on your belief, sir, that it was in
13 fact a hospital at that location --
14 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me. That was the church, no, no, I'm sorry
15 the ...
16 Can we move down to ... there it is the hospital, the third from
17 the bottom. Apologies. Not the church, see the hospital is the third
18 from the bottom KV10, 710 I'm talking about the one that's at the bottom,
19 Colonel, I was referring to the -- mistakenly the beginning one.
20 Q. I believe that is what you were asked about by Mr. Russo and you
21 gave the testimony that I just discussed.
22 Now, you said that you were familiar with Warsaw Pact countries
23 and also, by extension, some of the JNA activities. Do you recognise
24 this target coordinate system that the -- was used by the HV?
25 A. Well, it's a similar target system that we use in our army. It
1 can be based upon another kind of mapping but it says just a grids where
2 a target it and the heights of a target. So it is very obvious what it
4 Q. And in this vein, sir, that in order to know exactly what you're
5 talking about, obviously you have to take the grids and plot it out? I'm
6 talking about the hospital to begin with those grid coordinates of 79300,
7 95530 and 230?
8 A. Yes, when you want to use any information that is on a map the
9 first thing to do is it, of course, you start using those -- those
10 information, those target coordinates and plot them on a map.
11 Q. Did you do that?
12 A. We did that together with the OTP. They presented me that list
13 and I have not been checking all the grid because I take the information
14 as it is.
15 Q. No. My question is: Did you actually take these grid
16 coordinates for the hospital and plot them on the map using the X/Y grid
18 A. No, I did not.
19 Q. Well, let me bring up, to begin with, 1D65-0495. As this is
20 coming up, you would agree with me the obvious solution to this is to be
21 sure exactly what you are firing upon you need to plot out the grids,
22 don't you?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now what we have dont in this case, Mr. President, is take a map
25 that has been received in evidence, D131, with any number of targets.
1 And we have taken the grid coordinates for each of these items, as you
2 can see 710 which is in quotes, a hospital.
3 MR. KEHOE: Judge, I think there's a problem with the transcript.
4 [Technical difficulty]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Is it a similar problem as we had yesterday? I do
6 understand that it has been fixed, Mr. Kehoe. Another reminder that not
7 only human beings but even technical equipment may suffer from our speed
8 of speech.
9 Please proceed.
10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I think my last question is
11 missing from the transcript, and if I can just re-ask that question
12 again, Mr. President because I don't think it made it.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes, of course, you can put to the witness.
15 MR. KEHOE: I know this is repeating the question, Colonel, but
16 it didn't make it to the transcripts. My question was in order to be
17 sure of the particular location that is being fired upon, you have to go
18 to the grid coordinates and actually map it out, that's the way you do
19 it, isn't it.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, looking at this map, and we know from KV 10. If I can just
22 explain, Mr. President, what was done here that likewise didn't make it
23 to the transcript before we move actually to KV10 -- excuse me KV 710,
24 apologies. We have taken a document that is previously received in
25 evidence, D131. Within D131, we have overlaid the grid coordinates for
1 the KV -- the target list, the KV numbers as presented in P1271.
2 Now, looking at KV 710, sir, the one that -- you see that
3 location that is up at the top part of that page?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now in this item, A 4 which is right next to it. A 4 has been
6 testified to as a RSK unit base mortars that was near this high school.
7 MR. KEHOE: If we could go three items -- three maps up.
8 Q. Now, what we have here, sir, is an area that was identified by a
9 witness as a mortar location. The grid coordinates for 710 and the
10 hospital which is off to the right.
11 Now, as can you see, sir, that even though this is some writing
12 calling this the hospital, the grid coordinates place it in a field next
13 to an ARSK mortar battery. Are you with me on this, sir?
14 A. Yes, so far.
15 Q. And under the circumstances with a military position in that
16 location, that is certainly -- excuse me, that is certainly a proper
17 place for artillery to fire; Isn't it?
18 A. Well, I -- I do not -- the ARSK mortar unit deployment which is
19 apparently in the red dot where the arrow is pointing, I don't see then
20 that is in itself a logic military target to be fired upon. Although, I
21 made my remarks upon firing upon a single mortar unit. But that's one
23 But the target titled hospital somewhere in the middle of a
24 forest apparently has no military value to me in this thing all. But I
25 cannot understand then for that reason why it occurs in a target list
1 mentioning the name hospital, because that is something that is
2 absolutely impossible for me to read in a target list that you have the
3 name hospital there.
4 Q. It looks like someone inaccurately described that area, isn't it?
5 And that's why you rely on the grid coordinates, right? Ht.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Because the grid coordinates are the single most important thing
8 in targeting right.
9 A. Grid coordinates are very important, absolutely true.
10 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me a second, Your Honour.
11 [Defence counsel confer]
12 MR. KEHOE:
13 Q. And with regard to actual mortar position, sir I think you said -
14 and I don't have the actual reference - but correct me if I'm wrong,
15 mortar positions are positions that can move, right? People pick their
16 mortars and go to another location; isn't that right?
17 A. That's not the only thing I said about the mortar position.
18 Q. I understand. That's just one of them?
19 A. Yeah, but it is important to remember all of the things that I
20 said, because, first of all, they can move very quickly; and, secondly,
21 it's only one small mortar unit that has no military value in the whole
23 Q. I understand. Let's go back to P1271.
24 [Defence counsel confer]
25 MR. KEHOE: Now, I just noticed that we're almost completed, Your
1 Honour. I don't know if you want me to go into this line of inquiry on
2 this particular exhibit.
3 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know how much time you think it will take,
4 but if it would be more than two or three minute, I would rather adjourn
5 for the day.
6 MR. KEHOE: It would be more than two or three minutes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Then ...
8 [Defence counsel confer]
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Kehoe, but I'm also addressing the other
10 Defence teams, are your estimates as far as the time needed for the
11 cross-examination of Mr. Konings still valid?
12 I see Mr. Cayley nodding yes. That is zero.
13 Mr. Kuzmanovic.
14 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Yes, Your Honour, same.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe.
16 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour. Yes, they are the same.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that information.
18 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Konings, might not come as a surprise that I
20 give you the same instructions that I did before, that is, not to speak
21 with anyone about your testimony. We adjourn for the day, and we'll
22 resume on Monday, the 19th of January, 9.00 in the morning, in this same
23 Courtroom I; and I would like to especially thank transcribers and
24 interpreters and wish them full recovery over the weekend.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Monday, the 19th day of
2 January, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.