Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 14650

 1                           Monday, 19 January 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around the

 7     courtroom.

 8             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

10     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, The

11     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina, et al.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

13             Mr. Konings, I will remind you again that you're still bound by

14     the solemn declaration you gave at the beginning of your testimony.

15             I further would like to remind you and you as well, Mr. Kehoe,

16     that we did not plan not to sit on Wednesday to give again an opportunity

17     to interpreters and transcribers to recover.  It was for other reasons.

18             Would you please keep that in mind.

19             Please proceed.

20             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President, thank you very much.

21                           WITNESS:  HARRY KONINGS [Resumed]

22                           Cross-examination by Mr. Kehoe: [Continued]

23        Q.   Good morning, Colonel.

24        A.   Good morning.

25        Q.   Colonel, when we left off last week, we were talking about the

Page 14651

 1     targets on P1271.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  If we could bring that up.

 3        Q.   And, Colonel, when you were asked some questions about this by

 4     Mr. Russo last week, and specifically talking about the first entry, the

 5     church in Knin, you noted on page 14432 at line 2 that:  "The basic

 6     answer is a church should not be on a target list."

 7             When you were asked that question, Colonel, you were presuming

 8     that it was just a church and just a house of worship, weren't you?

 9        A.   Yes, of course, because otherwise I would have -- I would have

10     thought to have seen another target description.

11        Q.   Let us go back to the mapping that we were engaged in on Friday.

12             MR. KEHOE:  That would be 1D65-0495.

13        Q.   And as we take these grid coordinates for the church in Knin, we

14     can see from the chart that that is, in fact, the ARSK special police

15     barracks, the St. Ante monastery.

16             Now -- do you see that there, sir?  You can see that --

17        A.   No, I can --

18        Q.   Look towards the bottom centre, KV 110.  That is the target.

19        A.   Yeah, I see that.

20        Q.   And over on the left-hand side in the "A" box is the description

21     that has been previously identified through evidence of this Court that

22     identifies A5 as the St. Ante monastery, the ARSK special police

23     headquarters.

24        A.   Well, through the colours, it is hard for me it read what is in

25     the red box especially.

Page 14652

 1        Q.   Okay.  Is it that any better, in the grey box down.  It's A5,

 2     sir.

 3        A.   Yeah, I'm trying to find it.  Yes, I see that, yes.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Now were you told that this was, in fact, a Catholic

 5     church?

 6        A.   I cannot recall that if the officer of the Prosecutor told me

 7     that.  But that in itself, that doesn't matter because whether it was a

 8     Catholic church, whether it's a mosque, that doesn't matter, because on

 9     the target list is a target which says church at Knin which says not that

10     is a Special Forces headquarters.  There is it no effect mentioned that

11     you want to have against that target.  So, to me, that is an utterly

12     strange way of identifying targets.  Because why not mentioning such an

13     important target like special forces headquarters on the target list and

14     mentioning the effect that you want to achieve there, because the

15     Croatian army was using more or less the same types of effects that we

16     use in NATO, so it is very easy if you want have that target either

17     destroyed, neutralised, harassed, interdict, to mention the proper name

18     of the target, the proper description, and not just -- well, leave it at

19     church at Knin because is that something that will cause a lot of

20     misunderstanding, will cause a lot of questioning afterward, and in a

21     battle that may cause real trouble.

22             I think it's very unwise to mention in the target list only

23     church in Knin.  I don't understand that.  I don't understand when you

24     want to attack a legal target, special forces headquarters, why

25     mentioning -- because you may have another purpose.  You may have another

Page 14653

 1     purpose.  If I think very bad, you may have another purpose in indeed

 2     attacking that church.  There is no proof of that.

 3        Q.   Colonel, the important thing in getting this target is the grid

 4     coordinate, isn't it?

 5        A.   Yes.  The important thing in that is the grid coordinate.  But

 6     last week we were discussing the other target, the hospital, and you

 7     mentioned that the hospital was -- was written wrong.  Somebody had

 8     miswritten something.  But in the same moment you can miswrite the grids.

 9     So actually when you say hospital or when you say church, you may mean

10     church, and you may write down some other grids and have some agreement

11     that the real target is hospital or church.  That comes across my mind.

12     And that is caused by the fact that you -- that in a target lists the

13     names the description of the target is not properly done.

14        Q.   But that would call upon the -- the people doing the shooting to

15     check these grids, wouldn't it, and make sure that they're correct?

16        A.   Of course, that has to be done.  But there can also be an

17     understanding because that actually you mean the hospital, but for the

18     purpose of a certain agreement, you write down grids that are in middle

19     of a forest, and you know where the grids are, but you don't write them

20     on a piece of paper.  Because what I tried to say is that the target list

21     that you show to me is a target list that mentions churches and

22     hospitals, and although the grids are in another area, the fact of

23     stating a church and a hospital and not mentioning the exact target that

24     you want to achieve, I cannot understand, and I hope you can explain that

25     to me, why in a military operation you mention on a target list the -- a

Page 14654

 1     church, a hospital, and not the proper targets that you want to attack

 2     because the proper targets, as you say, were known.  The Croatian army

 3     wanted to attack the Special Forces police headquarters, and I don't

 4     discuss with you about that because I think that is a legal target.

 5        Q.   Colonel, why would the Croatian want to shoot at a Catholic

 6     church?

 7        A.   I don't know.  I'm not here to answer that question, but I do

 8     know that that kind of facts happens all through the Balkans, and that

 9     can be a part of the overall order that was given to the artillery

10     shelling of the city of Knin because also there was no effect mentioned.

11     Also there was no explanation given.  So from my perspective - if I play

12     devil's advocate - if I read in a target list church, hospital, and I see

13     in the operational order for the artillery the order shelling the city of

14     Knin --

15        Q.   I don't want to cut you off, Colonel, but the answer to the

16     question is you don't know.  I have a limited amount of time.  The answer

17     to the question is you don't know.  Is that right?

18        A.   I don't know what?

19        Q.   You don't know why the Croatian would shoot at their own Catholic

20     church.  You don't know.

21        A.   I don't know.  I said that.  No, I don't know.

22        Q.   I don't mean to cut you off, Colonel, but I do have a limited

23     amount of time.

24        A.   I understand.  I have no problem with that.

25        Q.   You were talking -- previously you were talking about correcting

Page 14655

 1     grids.  Did you see evidence in the documents that was shown to you by

 2     the Prosecutor that the grids that we looked at at P1271 had been

 3     reviewed and had been corrected?

 4        A.   No.  But that's not what I said before it --

 5        Q.   That's my question, sir.

 6        A.   No, I didn't see that.

 7        Q.   Let me show you -- go back to P1271.

 8             And I ask you to take a look at the X grid reference for the

 9     cross-roads, KV 510.

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And is it -- in the initial documentation that the Prosecutor

12     presented, it is 76130.  Do you see that?

13        A.   Yes, I see that.

14        Q.   Let us turn our attention to Exhibit P1272, the third page of

15     this document, and this is the artillery prep document introduced by the

16     Prosecutor.

17        A.   Mm-hm.

18        Q.   And I go to page 3 of this document.  And we can see an X grid

19     reference for 510, the cross-roads as 7813.

20             Now, let us go back to 1D65-0495.  That should be -- the

21     cross-roads is 78130; I apologise, it says 7813.

22                           [Defence counsel confer]

23             MR. KEHOE:

24        Q.   Now we see the for KD 510, and it's difficult to see, but that

25     would put it right in the middle of the UN base.

Page 14656

 1             Let us go to the next slide, please.  And we see in the upper

 2     left-hand corner the initial grid coordinates in Exhibit P1271 which is

 3     76130 described as the cross-roads, and we look at the new coordinates

 4     that are -- or the changes grid coordinates that are on P1272, and we

 5     have put that in KV 510, which is -- I'm sure you know upon reviewing the

 6     map in Knin, is, in fact, the cross-roads.

 7             This would reflect to you, would it not, Colonel, that the HV

 8     went through the care of taking these grid references and checking these

 9     grid references for accuracy prior to the attack, would it not?

10        A.   Well, that's your conclusion.  What I'm a bit puzzled because

11     what I do have now is two documents, two different documents, which use

12     two different coordinates, two different X grids, for the same target.

13             Well, somebody corrected something, but I don't know what is the

14     real KV 510.  What was used in the actual attack on Knin.  I don't have

15     that information.  I only have two sets of different grids with the same

16     target number.

17        Q.   Colonel, as on the map you have before you, you have reviewed

18     Knin and been in Knin, as we look at KV 510 as it's corrected with the

19     green arrow, that is it, in fact, the cross-roads in Knin, isn't it?

20        A.   That's the cross-roads in Knin.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Let us go to the next map.

22        Q.   Colonel, the grid references for the cross-roads were checked and

23     changed.  Yet the grid references for the title hospital were not

24     changed.  And I'm sure that you know that the target KV 710 was, in fact,

25     this in field adjacent to the ARSK unit in the high school.

Page 14657

 1             So we can assume, can we not, sir, or you can conclude that

 2     someone went through these lists, corrected them, didn't correct the one

 3     targeted hospital because they wanted to fire on this field adjacent to

 4     this hospital where there was, in fact, a mortar unit observed?

 5        A.   Well --

 6             MR. RUSSO:  Objection.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 8             MR. RUSSO:  I'm sorry, Mr. Kehoe is putting a hypothetical that

 9     this -- where the KV 10 target is indicated on this map is actually are

10     where the mortar section was located.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I think that as a matter of fact it's on the basis

12     of the questions and the evidence led by Mr. Kehoe that he intended to

13     say that a mortar unit was served nearby.

14             MR. KEHOE:  Nearby.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

16             Please proceed.

17             MR. KEHOE:

18        Q.   Could you answer that, sir, or do you want to ask it again?

19        A.   Could you repeat the question, please.

20        Q.   Sure, absolutely.

21             So we can assume, can we not, sir, or you could conclude that

22     someone went through these lists and corrected them and didn't correct

23     the one targeted hospital because they wanted to fire on this field that

24     was near to the area where a mortar unit was observed.  Can you not

25     conclude that?

Page 14658

 1        A.   That's just one conclusion.  I have another conclusion for you as

 2     well.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer

 5     1D65-0495 into evidence.

 6             MR. RUSSO:  No objection.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  That's Exhibit D1271, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  D1271 is admitted into evidence.

10             MR. KEHOE:

11        Q.   Talking again about this St. Ante's monastery which is discussed

12     as number 6 in your list of targets in your addendum, you were told to

13     assume that the St. Ante's monastery was headquarters for the ARSK

14     special police.  Were you not, sir?

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   On page 5 of your hypothetical facts, I believe you were given a

17     fact on number five.  "ARSK police" -- special police headquarters, and

18     I'm reading from your Annex A to your addendum.  Do you have that, sir.

19     Do you have a hard copy?

20        A.   I don't have any hard copy here.

21             MR. KEHOE:  If I may, with the assistance of the usher.  Thank

22     you, Mr. Misetic.

23             This is P1260, and this -- is it as Annex A which is --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  To be find in the binder, I take it.

25             MR. RUSSO:  It was in tab 4 of the binder of the witness.

Page 14659

 1             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. Russo.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 3             MR. KEHOE:

 4        Q.   I know this is it a lot of information, Colonel, and there is a

 5     lot going on, so please take your time referring back to these reports.

 6             We read at number of your --

 7        A.   Yeah.

 8        Q.   That the ARSK special police headquarters was the St. Ante

 9     monastery, right?

10        A.   Yeah.

11        Q.   And the -- you also note that in here that the police were

12     attached to the military.  Right?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Were you told that there was police -- had also been deployed to

15     the front lines?

16        A.   That's what you -- what you told me last week, and that was what

17     I was reading in the information on the -- on the enemy, yes.

18        Q.   With regard to this headquarters, were you told that after

19     Operation Storm, 20 cases of ammunition was found at this -- this

20     headquarters, this ARSK special police headquarters at St. Ante

21     monastery.  And I'm referring to D57 for the record?

22             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, page 15853, entry 43 out of 95.

23        Q.   Were you told that, sir?

24        A.   No, I have been given the information that we have in front of me

25     which, by the way, also says also housed Serb civilian refugees.

Page 14660

 1        Q.   We'll get to that, sir, because I want to talk to you a little

 2     bit about that issue.

 3             But you realised when you were reviewing this that the HV was

 4     not, in fact, targeting a church but was targeting a headquarters for a

 5     special police, an ARSK special police, weren't they?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And we'll put aside some of the other issues, but given

 8     the fact that this was a headquarters of a special police unit attached

 9     to the military, it was, in fact, a legitimate military target.  We'll

10     put aside the possibilities of collateral damage.  But as purely a

11     military target, you would agree that this is in fact a military target,

12     a legitimate military target.

13             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, I'm sorry.  I'd like to clarify, just

14     clarification on what the term "legitimate military target" means.  Is

15     there such a thing as an illegitimate military target?  A military target

16     presumably is a military target.  Legitimate, I'm not sure if that is it

17     intended to convey the method of attack is legitimate.  I just want to be

18     clear about that.

19             MR. KEHOE:  I will change it.  And I think your intercession is

20     probably an accurate criticism of the question, Judge, and I think we'll

21     just go --

22        Q.   It was a military target, wasn't it?

23        A.   I would like to answer that question with yes but have the

24     opportunity to say something extra to that as well.

25        Q.   Please.

Page 14661

 1        A.   I just -- if you sketch the situation, as you sketch it, it is,

 2     to my opinion, first of all, not possible to do what you say, set aside

 3     all the other things of collateral damage because whenever you judge a

 4     military target -- no, please, let explain me, because you use that as

 5     set aside the things of collateral damage.  I cannot put that aside

 6     because in analysing a military target in a situation that was given in

 7     analysing a target was given to me with the information connected to it

 8     from the Office of the Prosecutor, I cannot disconnect it.  If you sketch

 9     me a different situation, then I have to analyse that different situation

10     carefully, and I cannot do that in one single minute.

11        Q.   Colonel, if we may, and I think that we have to segregate these

12     questions, or I think this is going to take longer than it should.  What

13     you're talking about is the rule of proportionality, whether or not the

14     military advantage gained is excessive in light of possible collateral

15     damage.  That is the rule of proportionality, is it not?

16        A.   I'm talking about the information.

17        Q.   Excuse me --

18        A.   No, I cannot answer it in that way because I'm talking about the

19     information that is it given to me by the OTP where it says that, Housed

20     approximately 30 members of Ministry of Interior special police who were

21     attached to the military, not present prior to the artillery attack.

22     Also housed Serb civilian refugees.  I cannot, in all honesty, disconnect

23     those factors given to me.  If you come up with the fact that there was

24     also ammunition found in that same building that adds extra factors to

25     it.  And then have you to analyse the situation all over again.  But that

Page 14662

 1     can be -- that can have been the ammunition that belonging to the 30

 2     soldiers.  And then I keep asking myself the proportionality of attacking

 3     with artillery a church where civilian refugees were housed and the real

 4     -- the real advantage to be gained by destroying or by neutralizing that

 5     church.  And by the way, I have never seen any effect mentioned anywhere.

 6        Q.   So the assessment -- two issues based on what you said, so the

 7     assessment that you made is based solely on the assumptions given to you

 8     by the OTP; and you did no independent assessment yourself on other facts

 9     that you may have come up with.

10        A.   I did it, first of all, by the -- on the information that was

11     given me by the OTP, and on -- and including in that information was not

12     only this list of targets but were also the operational orders from the

13     Croatian forces in order to attack Knin, and in neither of those

14     information I could find that extra information that I was looking for.

15     And I do not doubt that in itself an ARSK special police headquarters is

16     a military target.  I do not doubt about that.  But I do have serious

17     questions about the fact that this target appears on a target list in --

18     with the name of only church without properly stating what it is, without

19     properly stating the effect that you want to achieve, and I seriously

20     have a problem with the fact that in that target, apparently there are

21     civilian refugees.

22        Q.   Let me stay with that.  And your concern about civilian refugees

23     goes to your concern about the possibility of civilian casualties if this

24     entity should be hit and targeted and hit.  Is that right?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 14663

 1        Q.   Were you aware or were you told prior to coming in here to

 2     testify last week that -- I'm referring to the report of Dr. Clark,

 3     P1251, that when he did the exhumation in the Knin cemetery, he could

 4     only account for one civilian that had died of a blast injury and

 5     possibly two.  One, and this is at page 9 of his report, paragraph 2.

 6     Were you made aware of that fact when you came in here?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   Now that is a significant issue when assessing collateral damage,

 9     is it not, that whether or not there was something improper with this

10     firing because you, when you're analysing this as an expert, have to

11     examine the issue of a military target and weigh the advantage, the

12     military advantage of hitting that target against potential excessive

13     collateral damage.

14        A.   Yes.  But there is more than only lethal collateral damage.

15        Q.   Let's just stay with the lethal.  Lethal collateral damage means

16     lives?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Is that the most important collateral damage, lives?

19        A.   No, I disagree with you.  I disagree with you in the fact that

20     collateral damage in large is, of course -- I'm sorry, I reacted too

21     quickly.  Yes, that is the most important thing.

22        Q.   And when someone like General Gotovina is weighing the military

23     advantage to be gained by hitting this entity, in this case the

24     St. Ante's monastery, the ARSK special police headquarters, he has to

25     weigh that possibility of collateral damage.  But as you sit here, you

Page 14664

 1     are unaware of exactly what factors he was weighing when the decision was

 2     made to hit that entity.  Isn't that right?

 3        A.   I was.  Of course, I'm not aware of his -- of his way of thinking

 4     and the factors that he weighed.

 5        Q.   Knowing what you know now of what the chief pathologist medical

 6     examiner noted about one civilian death, and knowing that this was a

 7     headquarters of an entity that was supporting the army of the Republic of

 8     Serb Krajina, you would agree with me, would you not, Colonel, that a

 9     reasonable commander could come to a different conclusion in weighing

10     those two items, come to a different conclusion on the propriety of

11     attacking this target.  Isn't that right?

12        A.   Not --

13        Q.   Not a question of who is right and who is wrong --

14        A.   Yes, I was thinking about it.  Yes, I can follow you, yes.

15        Q.   So you would agree that a reasonable commander could come to a

16     different conclusion.  Isn't that right?

17        A.   He can, of course, come to a different conclusion.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, could you explain to me how findings of a

19     pathologist, of which this witness is not aware -  or at least unless you

20     tell me that you are - how many, where, what circumstances, the totality

21     of his findings.  But apart from lack of knowledge of that, how finally

22     the number of blast victims could be something to have been taken into

23     account prior to -- let's -- let me just try to explain to you what my

24     problem is, so that you perhaps can deal with the matter.

25             If I'm shelling - I'm not saying that this happened - in an area

Page 14665

 1     full of civilian population, and if for whatever reason they all had been

 2     down in their cellars by -- for whatever reason, and only one stayed

 3     upstairs, would that be a -- would that be -- would that allow for a

 4     final judgement on whether it was appropriate or not when we have only

 5     one victim?  That's not the test would, it be?

 6             MR. KEHOE:  I --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  And you're suggesting this more or less to a witness

 8     who has got no idea about what exactly Dr. Clark investigated, what the

 9     results were, what -- and you are asking him a judgement which is, as far

10     as I can see now, is somewhat dependant on a lot of information where you

11     more or less implicitly have criticised this witness for not taking into

12     account information that was not presented to him, so he --

13             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

14             JUDGE ORIE:  But you're saying --

15             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  I want to be clear about

16     that, Judge.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  No, it's perfectly clear

18     that what you say is you can't form a full opinion on matters if you only

19     have half the information.  What we see now is that you're doing more or

20     less exactly the same by giving a bit of information here, a bit of

21     information there, and then ask the witness to draw conclusions on as

22     much, perhaps a defective basis, as you say, he formed his opinion upon

23     when he had only at his disposal the information given to him by the

24     Prosecution.

25             I just want you to be aware of what was on my mind so that you

Page 14666

 1     can take this into account in the continuation of your cross-examination.

 2             Please proceed.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Just one comment, and I will proceed quickly, which

 4     is the issue of collateral damage, and the Prosecutor did, in fact, bring

 5     forth questions before this witness on collateral damage issues and I --

 6     I refer Your Honour to the direct examination when Mr. Russo presented

 7     information on P64 which was Lieutenant-Colonel Hjertnes' report that the

 8     collateral damage issues, and of course, did not present this witness

 9     fairly, I believe, with the rest of that information on collateral

10     damages such as the information from Dr. Clark on the possible blast

11     victims, civilian blast victims.  Obviously there was some soldiers.

12     Civilian blast victims.

13             So when meeting what is presented by the Prosecution, I thought

14     it was incumbent upon me in fairness to the witness to develop the story

15     just a bit and give him some of the facts that have presented as a -- to

16     this Chamber as early as last week.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

18             MR. KEHOE:

19        Q.   Now we can move on, Colonel, and -- we did talk a bit about the

20     northern barracks, and I believe that in -- that's on page 1 of your

21     document, and you noted in -- it's number -- page 1 of your addendum,

22     number 2, on 2(c)(ii), you noted that was an item of low military value.

23     That was, of course, before you were told that the headquarters of the

24     7th Krajina Corps was in the northern barracks, and that was in D928.

25     That piece of information was not told to you.

Page 14667

 1             The other piece of information on that score, sir, is -- and if I

 2     could just bring up another item in P928.  If we can go to D928, excuse

 3     me, D928.

 4             Again, this is a General Sekulic's book, and the fact you were

 5     told to assume was that there approximately 30 soldiers were manning

 6     medical facilities, kitchen, and a technical workshop.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  I'm trying to get the exact page.

 8                           [Defence counsel confer]

 9             MR. KEHOE:

10        Q.   We'll come back to this exhibit when we find it.  It was a

11     provision I wanted to read you in D928, but we can find it and come back

12     in a bit.

13             The next item I wanted to talk to you about was the Knin police

14     station, and you talk about that on --

15             MR. KEHOE:  Oh, you have it?  Okay.  Good.  We're going back to

16     P928 in the northern barracks, sir.

17        Q.   That would be P61 in the English.  In the middle paragraph:  "The

18     key units."

19             In that second paragraph - if we can just blow that up a little

20     bit - you see that, the "key units," Colonel?

21        A.   Yes, I see that.

22        Q.   "The key units in the special units corps were the armoured

23     brigade and the guards brigade.  Before the Oluja started the guards

24     brigade and abandoned the combat assignment on Dinara.  They abandoned

25     Dinara without authorisation and assembled in the barracks in Knin where

Page 14668

 1     they were at the beginning of Oluja."

 2             Now, I take it from the facts that were given to you by the

 3     Prosecutor, you were not told that this special unit corps was in the

 4     northern barracks on the morning of the 4th?

 5        A.   That was not told to me by the OTP, and it's also not mentioned

 6     in the enemy paragraph of the operational order.

 7        Q.   Well, the fact that this particular corps is there is a

 8     significant issue for individuals that are deciding whether to fire on

 9     this facility, isn't it?

10        A.   In case you assume that the corps, and I don't have information

11     on the size, their weapon systems, their status, before attacking such a

12     target, you need to know that as well, you understand.  But take the

13     assumption that a corps -- that a -- sorry, a brigade from a certain size

14     and strength is located in northern barracks, that changes the situation

15     and then you need a new analysis on that situation, of course.

16        Q.   Now you could conclude, could you not, that -- well, let me

17     withdraw that.  A reasonable commander could conclude, could he not, that

18     in firing on the northern barracks his fire could very well deter or

19     suppress the activity of this special unit.  Is that not correct?

20        A.   I cannot answer that straightforward because as I said before I

21     do not know what is the composition of that brigade how many soldier it

22     were.  What was their status, what was their armament, what were their

23     intentions.  Only if I have proper information on that, that is the

24     proper information that a reasonable commander would require in order to

25     judge whether he will use his artillery against the northern barracks,

Page 14669

 1     yes or no.  And without all those information that you -- that a

 2     reasonable commander would use, I don't think I can answer that question.

 3        Q.   Well, given the fact that you have learned since have you been

 4     here that the northern barracks was the headquarters of the 7th

 5     Krajina Corps and was there on the morning of the 4th and that the --

 6     this special unit was located there, that you heard evidence that

 7     artillery -- the chief artillery officer for the ARSK couldn't get

 8     anybody to drive him into town because of that fire.  Would you not

 9     agree, based on the facts that you heard, that this was a military target

10     of very significant value?

11        A.   I received information from various sides.  I have received

12     information from the OTP which says that there is no headquarter in that

13     barracks, that there are only a few soldiers there manning the barracks.

14     That's one point, one side of the information.

15             If I look in the operational order from -- for the Operation

16     Storm, and if I look in the paragraph of -- which is stating what the --

17     what the enemy is, I cannot find the information on the presence of the

18     7th, HQ, ARSK in Knin, in the northern barracks.  There is no detailed

19     information on that.

20             So, given --

21        Q.   I really need to stop you, sir, because I really have a limited

22     time.

23             My question for you on line 20 was that -- and would you or would

24     you not agree based on the facts that you heard that this being the

25     northern bearings was a military target of very significant value.  Would

Page 14670

 1     you agree with that, or would you not?

 2        A.   I repeat, I cannot answer that with a straight no or yes because

 3     you don't give me the information that I require to give you that answer.

 4     If you give me that information --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Konings, Mr. Kehoe is asking you whether on the

 6     basis of the information you have now, whether on the basis of that

 7     information, you would consider it to be a military target of very

 8     significant value.

 9             Now --

10             THE WITNESS:  Okay, I understand.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  of course, if you would

12     have other information, you might come to a different conclusion, but

13     that is what he is asking you.

14             THE WITNESS:  I don't think it's -- it's a military target of

15     high value.

16             MR. KEHOE:

17        Q.   Let's move on, sir, and we'll talk about the Knin police station

18     that you referred to in -- page 2, number 17, of your addendum.

19             Now, the Chamber has received evidence that approximately 550

20     police officers were deployed on various positions on the Dinara and that

21     their communication between these officers on the front line and officers

22     in the Knin police station, until those -- there was communication

23     between those officers on the front line an officers in the Knin police

24     station until those communications were knocked out by Croatian forces.

25             Your Honour, I can give the record transcript cites for this, but

Page 14671

 1     I would have to go into private session just briefly.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  We move into private session.

 3                           [Private session]

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12                           [Open session]

13             THE REGISTRAR:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  Your Honours, we're

14     back in open session.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

16             MR. KEHOE:

17        Q.   Now, Colonel, when you came to your conclusion that the targeting

18     of the Knin police station was of no military value, did you consider

19     that these police officers were participating in the -- in the ARSK

20     defence up on the Dinara and that they were communicating back to their

21     headquarters in Knin?  Did you consider that?

22        A.   Give me one second, please.

23             No, I had no idea -- I had no information that they were

24     communicating with the police forces in the Dinara area.

25        Q.   Then let us explore this just a little bit more.

Page 14672

 1             Before that -- we go into private session for another question,

 2     would you agree that it would be to the military advantage of the HV to

 3     attack a headquarters that was in communication with their soldiers; in

 4     this case, police officers, on the front line.  Would you agree with

 5     that?

 6        A.   If you -- in case you -- no, let's assume you classify those ten

 7     police officers being a headquarters, which I -- which -- that

 8     information was not given to me, then I think that is -- well, attacking

 9     such a headquarters can -- can be of military advantage, yes.

10        Q.   Okay.  And it is, in fact, 550 policemen that were operating as

11     soldiers not 110.

12             MR. RUSSO:  I just want to clarify about that.  I believe the

13     witness is referring to the number of policemen he believes were in the

14     police station.

15             MR. KEHOE:  And I apologise.

16        Q.   Let us take this one step further on the military advantage

17     gained, and just briefly again in private session, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  We turn into private session.

19                           [Private session]

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 14673

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11                           [Open session]

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

14             MR. KEHOE:

15        Q.   Colonel, if we can turn to D923.  Without addressing ourselves to

16     the individual, you didn't know that those communications between the

17     police and the soldiers on the front line were knocked out or were lost

18     on roughly 10.00, did you, sir?

19        A.   I did know that -- I did not though that.  Sorry.

20        Q.   This is it an assessment on the screen by General Mrksic.

21             MR. KEHOE:  And if we can turn to page 6 of this document.

22        Q.   And in that paragraph that notes:

23             "The Ustasha breakthrough over the Dinara mountains during the

24     afternoon of the 4th of August represented the greatest threat for the

25     collective activities of the 7th corps."

Page 14674

 1             And I will tell you that's the 7th Krajina Corps part of the army

 2     of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

 3             The "the MUP" the MUP being the Ministry of Interior.

 4             " The MUP special unit leaving its positions on the Dinara around

 5     1100 offered the Ustasha forces a possibility for a swift breakthrough

 6     over the Dinara mountains towards Crvena Zemlja."

 7             Now, if we can take this sequentially, sir, we have a

 8     headquarters that is operating in support of -- or in excess of

 9     500 soldiers a headquarters that is manned by policemen, communications

10     are lost on the 10th, and thereafter, on the -- at approximately --

11     excuse me, communications are lost at 1000 hours.  At 1100 hours this

12     special unit breaks and left its position giving the HV a significant

13     breakthrough on the Dinara.

14             Would you agree, based on this additional information which you

15     didn't have, that the targeting of the police headquarters offered a

16     significant military advantage to the HV?

17        A.   By saying that, you should guess that there is a direct

18     connection between the targeting of the headquarters and the leaving of

19     the MUP special unit of the front line, and I cannot say anything about

20     that.

21        Q.   So are you telling me that you make no connection between the

22     loss of communications at 1000 hours with the police headquarters and the

23     -- as General Mrksic says, the MUP, the MUP special unit leaving its

24     position on Dinara mountains at 11.00.

25        A.   That's one of the possibilities.  I tried to -- to take into, to

Page 14675

 1     bear in mind that in a military world in operations, there is might be

 2     several other solutions or several other possibilities.  One other thing

 3     is, one observation that I offer you is that those MUP special units

 4     operating in the front line were apparently embedded inside other

 5     military units and must have had contact with other military units as

 6     well or being under command of other military units.

 7             So there might be, and I know I'm getting into the speculation

 8     area, there might have been other solutions.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's not get into speculation for whatever reason.

10     Your answer is clear, you say this -- there may have been a causal

11     relationship.  I might not have sufficient information to come to a final

12     conclusion on this.

13             Please proceed.

14             MR. KEHOE:  If I might have just one moment, Your Honour.

15                           [Defence counsel confer]

16             MR. KEHOE:

17        Q.   I'm reminded of one issue, sir, you noted -- did you not say that

18     during the reviewing, General Gotovina's attack order that there was no

19     mention that these Special Forces were going back -- that the special

20     forces were in Knin, and then when we were talking about the northern

21     barracks.

22        A.   There was mention that I said -- or it was mentioned that some of

23     the special forces were there, but the words "headquarters," there is no

24     detailed information.  The paragraph on enemy is very, very generic, and

25     it doesn't give you any detail that I would expect to be connected to an

Page 14676

 1     operational order.  It gives something like there were 800 conscripts

 2     inside the city of Knin.  But I do not have any specific information.  So

 3     you may be right that the headquarters was there.  I do not have the

 4     information.  I cannot read it from the operational order, nor do I find

 5     an annex to the operational order, which in a NATO situation, we have an

 6     annex to an operational order, the annex Bravo, which describes the exact

 7     disposition of the enemy as you know them.

 8             So if have you the information that several HQs are up and

 9     running inside the Knin of Knin, I was looking to find that information

10     somewhere specified.  I couldn't.  Maybe you have that information, but I

11     couldn't find it in the information begin to me by the OTP.

12        Q.   We'll get to that in a little bit more detail in a bit, but I

13     would like to finish some of the targets you have assessed.

14        A.   Okay.

15        Q.   And let's go back to the list and talk a little bit the Senjak

16     barracks which is of course on P1271 as KV 350.

17             And I take it you were told to assume that the logistics base

18     housing main logistics staff - I take this from your addendum - and it

19     also had some government offices.

20             Now, let me show you some of the activity that took place on that

21     day.  And were you informed about actually what was transpiring or given

22     a field for what was transpiring at the Senjak barracks on the 4th?

23        A.   I'm not quite sure, but maybe Your Honour can help me out what

24     the word transpiring exactly means.

25        Q.   That was taking place.

Page 14677

 1        A.   Okay.

 2        Q.   That was takes place at the Senjak barracks?

 3        A.   Okay.

 4        Q.   Because I don't see any in the actual facts as they were

 5     presented to you.  Were you told orally or in any fashion what was going

 6     on at the Senjak barracks?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   Let's just touch on a couple of them.  And if we go first to D61

 9     which is the diary of the chief logistics officer for the ARSK, senior

10     officer Bjelanovic.

11                           [Defence counsel confer]

12             MR. KEHOE:  D161.  I'm sorry.  D161, I apologise if I misspoke in

13     that fashion -- any fashion.

14             If we can go to page 6 in the English.

15        Q.   And this is one of the entries for the 4th of August where he --

16     that Bjelanovic notes at 1640 -- and by the way, it is page 5 in the

17     B/C/S -- page 5 in the B/C/S.  But at 1620:

18             "I went to the rear command post Senjak barracks, had a short

19     meeting with senior officers and deployed those [sic] senior officers to

20     various items -- to various tasks?"

21             He finishes that:  "This way I reduced the burden for the rear

22     command post.  Practically there were no conditions for work."

23             One other fact I'd like to bring to your attention is D923.

24     Again, this is General Mrksic's report.  And if we can go to page 24 of

25     29.  If we could just scroll down a bit more on that page, certainly in

Page 14678

 1     the English.

 2             And again General Mrksic is talking about the activities on the

 3     4th.  He notes in paragraph 3:

 4             "Due to incessant activity of the enemy artillery and rocket

 5     system, from the Senjak barracks in Knin, where at the ... beginning of

 6     the attack, three trucks had been destroyed and a driver... killed.  It

 7     was not possible to carry out any relocation of quartermaster or any

 8     other materiel supplies."

 9             Now, I take it you were not given that information either, prior

10     to coming here.  Is that right?

11        A.   I haven't seen this document, no.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo.

13             MR. RUSSO:  Well, Your Honour, that information was provided in a

14     hypothetical during direct examination.

15             MR. KEHOE:  My question is --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  The question was about another stage.  That

17     is, prior to coming to court.

18             Please proceed.

19             MR. KEHOE:

20        Q.   And maybe that question was not as precise as I might have

21     wanted, Colonel.

22             The question I have, prior to you writing your report or coming

23     here to testify, you did not have this information, did you?

24        A.   I did not.

25        Q.   Now would you agree with me that now that you know that there was

Page 14679

 1     activity - for instance, deploying forces - and that as a result of the

 2     -- the deploying officers in any event.  As a result of firing on this

 3     Senjak barracks, the ARSK was unable to move supplies, would you agree,

 4     sir, that the firing on the Senjak barracks offered a significant

 5     military advantage to the HV?

 6        A.   Well, the sentences that you showed me are not given that

 7     implication completely, because it doesn't say that this Senjak barracks

 8     was apparently what you are suggesting, a main army supply area.  It says

 9     any relocation of quartermaster or any other materiel supplies, in which

10     area?  In the whole region of the ARSK?  Does it mean that -- what you

11     are saying that by attacking the Senjak barracks that the whole supply

12     system of the ARSK in that area collapsed?  Because that is what you are

13     suggesting.  That is what you are saying to me.

14        Q.   What I'm asking you is a very simple question.  Based on the

15     information that you now know, number 1, that the head logistics office

16     of Bjelanovic was meeting there and deploying officers to various tasks.

17     But more importantly as a result of the attack or the firing on the

18     Senjak barracks, it was impossible to carry out any relocation of a

19     quartermaster or materiel supplies.

20        A.   In itself, that sentence doesn't say anything to me, unless you

21     can tell me what exactly is meant.  Is it meant relocation of

22     quartermaster and other materiel supplies in which area, to which forces?

23     In the whole area of the ARSK, or in a limited area?  Because that is of

24     significant importance to know that in order to be able to analyse the

25     new information and to analyse whether it is a very valuable target which

Page 14680

 1     contributes to -- to the -- to the defeat of a force.  If this is a main

 2     supply base, and if -- assume that this is a main supply base and assume

 3     that the artillery attack is capable of neutralizing this main supply

 4     base, well, that gives -- sheds another light on the situation, and I

 5     don't read that information in that paragraph, that you -- that you show

 6     me here.  That's the only thing I'm saying.

 7        Q.   Colonel, you know that the Senjak barracks is the main supply

 8     facility for the 7th Krajina Corps.  Isn't that right?

 9        A.   It says it is a rear logistic HQ.  So if that means that it is

10     the main supply for the 7th HQ, yes.

11        Q.   Okay.  Are you saying to this Court that firing on the main

12     supply depot for the 7th Krajina Corps to disrupt and suppress their

13     ability to move supplies, are you saying that that is not enough to --

14     for you to conclude that attacking the Senjak barracks on the 4th of

15     August offered a military advantage to the HV?  Are you saying that?

16        A.   I'm not saying that.  I ask you a question for further

17     information in the way --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  No.

19             THE WITNESS:  No -- I'm willing to answer yes, so I'm --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  No.

21             THE WITNESS:  I was --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm not saying that you should say yes.

23             THE WITNESS:  No, no.  I was preparing to.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  There is a question which includes the significance

25     of this target.  Now what we hear from you is that to say that get

Page 14681

 1     reliable assessment on the significance would have to know more.  It's on

 2     the basis of information which is of a not precise nature.  I have

 3     difficulties in coming to a conclusion that it was significant in this

 4     sense, as you include in your question.  That seems to be an answer to

 5     your question, Mr. Kehoe.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  So let's proceed.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

 9        Q.   Well, Colonel once again, on a reasonable commander standard, you

10     would agree that a reasonable commander could assess these facts

11     concerning the Senjak barracks, and its -- the fact that is the main

12     supply depot for the 7th Krajina Corps.  You could assess those facts and

13     could conclude that, A, attacking that would offer a significant military

14     advantage; and that, B, the only thing he had to do after that was assess

15     whether or not the value of that attacking and taking -- hitting that

16     target was outweighed by potential collateral damage.  Isn't that right?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And that is a weighing process -- that's a weighing process that

19     a reasonable commander does, and conclusions one way or the other can

20     differ?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Now, let us turn to your next target, which is the ARSK main

23     headquarters.  And let us first talk about the ARSK main headquarters,

24     which is the -- the main headquarters in the defence ministry.

25             Now, I want to -- we've been talking to some degree when we were

Page 14682

 1     at the 7th Krajina Corps about the targets at an operational level, and

 2     even when we were talking about the movements of the 4th Guards Brigade

 3     and the 7th Guards Brigade, we were operating at the operational and the

 4     tactical level.  I would like to take this one step further and talk to

 5     you about the strategic level.  And you know the difference, the

 6     strategic level being the most significant level moving from the macro to

 7     the micro.  Isn't that right, sir?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   So we go from strategic operational, tactical?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Now, the most strategic target in the Republic of Serbian Krajina

12     for the ARSK was their main headquarters in Knin, wasn't it?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And that is so because this is the place that the ARSK conducted

15     their war efforts throughout the Krajina, right?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   So hitting a strategic target of that fashion could offer a

18     significant military advantage to the HV, couldn't it?

19        A.   I do think so.

20        Q.   Now, you'd noted for us that there are -- and I note back in your

21     report, there are many reasons for artillery.  And I'm talking about

22     page 2 of P1259.

23             And one of those is suppression, another one is interdiction,

24     another one is harassment, and other one is destroy.

25             Now, attacking a headquarters such as the ARSK, it is a valid

Page 14683

 1     intent of the commander to attack that facility, not necessarily to

 2     destroy it, but to, as you say on page 2 of your first report, to

 3     neutralise the headquarters, suppress activity in that headquarters, and

 4     harass the command and control functions of the ARSK.  Is that right?

 5        A.   Right.

 6        Q.   And those are all legitimate goals of artillery as you described

 7     in your report, putting aside any effort to destroy that facility.

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Now that, of course, as you noted, would -- because of its

10     strategic value, would make this a very significant target.

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And in combat situations, the enemy cannot protect a target, a

13     strategic target of this value, merely by placing that target in a

14     civilian-populated area, can they?  Because if that were the case, nobody

15     would be able to fire on such a target.  They can't do that, can they?

16     And if you say they can, tell me where you find your written support for

17     that.

18        A.   Well, I would like to answer that question in saying that this

19     happens, not only here but all over the world.  These kind of targets are

20     placed inside the middle of civilian-populated areas, and I'm not the one

21     to judge whether that is legal, illegal, or whatever.  I have a personal

22     opinion about that, but I leave that for myself.

23        Q.   So what you're telling me is you can't answer that question?

24        A.   I cannot answer that question.

25        Q.   Fair enough, sir.  And at any point you say you can't answer the

Page 14684

 1     question, I don't want to take you out of your field of expertise.

 2             Let us turn to another set of targets, and that would be the

 3     railroad-related targets.  And basically I'm looking at the targets that

 4     are in your addendum, and I'm -- looking at them jointly as railroad

 5     targets 13, 14.  I believe those are the ones that we're talking about

 6     here.  I'll collectively refer to them.

 7             And you basically say that -- let me answer that.  The

 8     information that you were given about there railroad targets if we could

 9     go back in here and turn to page 12, you basically say that there was no

10     use being made of these railroad facilities, is that right?

11        A.   Information that was given to me doesn't state any actual use of

12     the railroad system during that days [sic].

13        Q.   Okay.  Let me show you a document that was presented by the

14     Office of the Prosecutor in P804, and this is an ECMM report of the 4th

15     of August of 1995.

16        A.   Mm-hm.

17             MR. KEHOE:  If we could bring that up on the screen.

18             And if we could go down to item 4.

19        A.   Mm-hm.

20        Q.   And you can see that -- under economical, industrial, and

21     infrastructural.

22             "Obviously a lot of damage during the day.  Trains are seen ...

23     moving in Knin ... presumably used for military purpose, but could these

24     be used for the evacuation of civilians?"

25             Now, I take it based on information that you were given that you

Page 14685

 1     weren't told that the Prosecutor had introduced evidence that trains

 2     were, in fact, moving?

 3             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, I am a going to object to that.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo.

 5             MR. RUSSO:  First of all, putting to the witness that the

 6     Prosecution put in particular evidence doesn't seem to me to be anything

 7     other than attempting to convince the witness that he should adopt

 8     whatever is put in front of him.  In any case --

 9             MR. KEHOE:  Can I answer that, Judge?

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, if you would it -- if you would ask the

11     witness whether he was aware of or whether he was informed about, let's

12     then forget about all the underlying and implicit suggestion of what was

13     appropriate or not, and then we -- because that's what we want to hear

14     from the witness.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. KEHOE:

17        Q.   Were you aware of that, sir?

18        A.   I was not aware of this information, so I was not aware of moving

19     trains.

20        Q.   Let's talk a little bit more about the movement and the use of

21     trains.

22             I referred just earlier in the cross, I believe on Friday,

23     concerning the ARSK's military supply depot at Golubic and the train

24     station nearby.  And if I could just refer you to, if I may, again, back

25     to D923, page 23 of 29.  And just towards -- if we could just scroll up

Page 14686

 1     just a bit.  We're talking about the relocation of materiel supplies.

 2     The General writes that:

 3             "Relocation of materiel supplies especially ammunition and mines

 4     and explosives store Golubic ... the activities were carried out in three

 5     directions.  Establishing a field store in Tiskovac tunnels, establishing

 6     a mobile ammunition store on the railway wagons, and relocation of part

 7     of ammunition from Golubic to the store Cerkezovac in Banja area.

 8             "The fall of Glava on 28 July and the Ustasha attack on the

 9     communications Strmica-Golubic-Knin slowed down the activities on

10     relocation of the store."

11             If I can just flip ahead a few more dates.  If we can go to page

12     25 of this document, and we'll bring it into focus for activities as

13     reported by the General Mrksic in Operation Storm.

14             MR. KEHOE:  If we can just scroll up the bottom.  I want to start

15     there on 5.

16        Q.   "On 5 August," that would be the second day of storm:

17             "1995 in the morning, the organs of the Main Staff logistics

18     found themselves in Srb where they established a rear command post and

19     made an overview of the logistics support system functioning.  Then it

20     was ordered to evacuate 14 railway wagons loaded with ammunition from the

21     tunnel on the axis of Stara Straza - Padjene and to relocate them to

22     Otric Malovan region in order to take them to Republika Srpska

23     territory."

24             Now, before I go on to the next sentence, Colonel, are you

25     familiar with these tunnels and their close proximity to downtown Knin?

Page 14687

 1        A.   I know that there were tunnels.  I have seen themselves in Knin,

 2     but I do not recall the names.

 3        Q.   Okay.  In these tunnels that were located around Knin, did you

 4     know that they were loaded with ammunition?

 5        A.   No, I did not know that.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Let's go on.

 7             "However the train personnel in the security left the wagons

 8     during night, but even if they had been at their work posts in the

 9     morning, it would not have been possible to do anything constructive

10     since Malovan had already been under enemy fire."

11             Next paragraph down:

12             "In order to initiate destruction of ammunition in the tunnels

13     near Stara Straza, the armoured train" --

14             By the way, are you familiar with the armoured train that the

15     ARSK had?

16        A.   No.

17        Q.   "The armoured train was pushed in order to insight an explosion

18     due to the inertia and crashed with the wagons loaded with ammunition.

19     This operation failed because the train turned over before the entry into

20     the tunnel.

21             "It was ordered to blow up to the mined ammunition store Golubic

22     and for that all preparations had been carried out previously.  But due

23     to the disruption of the communications it was not possible to forward

24     this order to the store commander."

25             Now, if, in fact, Colonel, the ARSK was using these railway lines

Page 14688

 1     to move ammunition, and if, in fact, there was some activity in these

 2     railway lines on the 4th, you would you agree with me that the HV could

 3     achieve a significant military advantage by attacking those rail lines

 4     and preventing the ARSK from moving any of this ammunition.  Isn't that

 5     right?

 6        A.   That is -- that is right.  But I think it's -- no, that's right.

 7     I leave it at that.

 8        Q.   I'm about to move into my last subject on this.

 9             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President.  I don't know if you want to take a

10     break now, or do you want me to conclude?

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Depends on how much time you need for the last

12     subject.

13             MR. KEHOE:  I don't think it will take too long.  If we can

14     just --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Too, too long.  It could be 5 or 25 minutes.

16             MR. KEHOE:  It would be five minutes.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Five minutes, and that would be your --

18             MR. KEHOE:  That would be the last part on this particular

19     segment before I move to a completely different topic.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then if you would use your next five minutes

21     to complete the subject, and after the break we'll move on with another

22     one.

23             Please proceed.

24             MR. KEHOE:

25        Q.   The next topic -- target I would like to talk to you about, sir,

Page 14689

 1     is the telegraph and post office that you referred to in the -- number 14

 2     where you note it is not a military target.

 3             The first issue is --

 4             MR. KEHOE:  If I can just briefly go into private session.

 5                           [Private session]

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 14690

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3                           [Open session]

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  And if we can put 1D65-0519 on the screen.

 7        Q.   This is an multi-page document, Colonel, that was written by

 8     General Mrksic or signed by General Mrksic, the head of the ARSK.

 9             MR. KEHOE:  I will tell you on dating, Mr. President, just so I

10     can date this.  The difficulty with dating this is that there is no date

11     on the document per se.  We do know it is signed by General Mrksic, and

12     we do know that General Mrksic took over as head of the ARSK

13     approximately mid-May of 1995.  So in the context we know it's

14     thereafter.  I wish I could hone it down more precisely, Mr. President,

15     but that's the best can I do with this particular document.

16        Q.   If we look at this document, and we go down to the third

17     paragraph, and -- actually -- the means of communication.  Do you see

18     that Colonel?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.    "The means of communication that the SVK," which is the army of

21     the Serb Krajina, "has at its disposition based at the PTT," post and

22     telecommunications and the railway, "it is possible to secure only 40

23     per cent of the necessary communications for the purpose [sic] of command

24     information and cooperation.

25             So you would you agree with me, Colonel, that based on this, it

Page 14691

 1     would appear that the ARSK is running at least some of their

 2     communications through the PTT facility?

 3        A.   That is stated here, yes.

 4        Q.   And as a consequence of that, it would make this facility or a

 5     military target, and knocking out that facility would quite possibly give

 6     a military advantage to the HV.  Isn't that correct?

 7        A.   I'm sorry, I have to go back to what I said before.  This is a

 8     mixture of military and civilian issues inside one target, and if you put

 9     the question forward like that, I cannot answer it.

10        Q.   Well, again on that score, the ARSK military cannot immunise

11     their assets by mixing them with civilian asset, can they?  Immunise

12     their assets from attack by mixing them with civilian assets, can they?

13        A.   You cannot completely immunise -- you cannot completely immunise

14     by putting military targets and combine them with civilian property or

15     civilians.  And again then you come back to the answer that I gave

16     before, then you come in a combination of military issues or military

17     assets with civilian assets, and attacking such a combination of issues,

18     military and civilian, brings you into a -- assessment of the situation

19     that has to be done by the appropriate commander on the scene, and that

20     might be either, in certain cases, the tactical commander or that might

21     be even the strategical commander in order to decide to attack that

22     specific target, yes or no.  And then what we discussed before, you come

23     back to proportionate damage, collateral damage, the value of that

24     target.  And with -- having said that, well, I cannot give you any

25     further -- further explanation on that.

Page 14692

 1        Q.   Apparently, you can envision a significant military advantage to

 2     the HV to knock out the communication facilities that the PTT that was

 3     used by the ARSK.  Isn't that right?

 4        A.   Well, I would not say not at all cost because I do think there

 5     are other possibilities.  There are more telegraph headquarters.

 6             If you want to knock down that specific facility against all

 7     cost, that is the decision of the tactical or operational commander of

 8     the attacking force.

 9        Q.   How many PTT facilities are there in Knin?

10        A.   There were more, I think.  Was also a railway -- a railway

11     system.  I'm not quite sure.

12        Q.   There was one main facility, wasn't there?

13        A.   Yes, you're right.

14             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into

15     evidence 1D65-0519.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo.

17             MR. RUSSO:  No objection.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1262.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Exhibit D1262 is admitted into evidence.

21             We'll have a break, and we will resume at five minutes past

22     11.00.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24                           --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.

Page 14693

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, I was informed that you would like to

 2     address me.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President, and the Chamber.  I just wanted

 4     to follow-up, Mr. President, on your comments concerning the collateral

 5     damage of civilians, and my understanding as part of the Prosecution's

 6     case was a presentation at least through P64 of the collateral damage as

 7     assessed by Lieutenant-Colonel Hjertnes.  Of course that is just one

 8     portion of the collateral damage.  The other portion of the collateral

 9     damage is obviously the human, collateral damage and in this case

10     injuries.  And in assessing whether or not this particular attack

11     violated the rule of proportionality, of course the assessment is whether

12     or not the military advantage was outweighed by the excessive damage to

13     civilians and property and civilian property.  And I trust that part of

14     the assessment that was made by Prosecution in showing P64 was at least

15     some degree presenting that type of evidence to support the argument that

16     their collateral damage was, in fact, excessive.  To counter that in

17     part, and of course we will address the other aspect, the damage to the

18     property, account of that in part, is assessment of the civilian costs

19     involved in Operation Storm.  And as we know from Dr. Clark the --

20     Dr. Clark was only able to ascertain one civilian death from blast

21     injuries.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Kehoe, the main reason I intervened at that

23     moment and to that extent, I think your comparison with what was done by

24     Mr. Russo in relation to the -- to the -- to Hjertnes is that the first

25     question Mr. Russo put to the witness is, Have you read this report?

Page 14694

 1     That was your first question.

 2             Now, to put to a witness a document which he is, A, not aware of;

 3     B, has apparently has no idea who was in graves, how many graves were.

 4     And then to say one blast injury, it could be -- Mr. Kehoe, let's be

 5     clear, I think an attack even without any casualty could be

 6     inappropriate, whereas in other cases where you have casualties, more

 7     than one, it could be that such an attack was -- was legitimate by

 8     objective, by means, et cetera, and we all know it's -- it's a complex

 9     question.

10             So what I was addressing was to put something to a witness who

11     has no idea about the document neither about the context and to put one

12     conclusion to him and then to seek to elicit from him conclusions on the

13     basis of that, and that is something -- and that's the reason why I told

14     you that that doesn't assist the Chamber.

15             MR. KEHOE:  And I --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Not to say that -- that there was only one blast

17     victim, casualty.  I can imagine that that's important for you.  It is

18     about the way in which you use this information and how you present this

19     to the witness.  I think that I -- and the Chamber has been critical and

20     even in the observations, I think I not only have some words for you, but

21     I think I also addressed at the same time the Prosecution on -- that's

22     the reason why I raised the issue not to say that it's an irrelevant fact

23     but whether it should be put to a witness who has got no idea about the

24     context, whereas it's a rather complex matter and whereas the questions,

25     the legal questions involved, should be carefully analysed not be mixed

Page 14695

 1     up with what could the expectations -- expectations and result is not the

 2     same thing.  Sometimes you can have very good expectations and the result

 3     can be very bad.  It could be the other way around.

 4             Now what role do expectations play in the legal context, and

 5     again, it is not -- it is not perhaps directly applicable.  I'm not

 6     expressing any opinion on that, but for the framework of mind, Protocol I

 7     of course gives quite some guidance for thinking on these matters, and

 8     I'm not always fully convinced by the way in which the questions are put

 9     in relation to the legal analyse that should be underlying these type of

10     questions because if you don't have a clear analytical legal view on the

11     matters then questions, possible consequences, causal relationships,

12     appropriate, inappropriate, what is an objective, is the objective the

13     same as a target?  All these questions might become blurred, and that

14     would be my concern, nothing else.

15             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, I appreciate the concern, and I know

16     that it's a difficult assessment, and I appreciate what Your Honour says

17     that a completely legitimate attack could, in fact, cause significant

18     collateral damage and vice versa, a otherwise illegal attack could cause

19     little or no damage and still nonetheless be illegal if the possibility

20     was excessive.  That being said, of course, the analysis of and the

21     after-the-fact analysis of an attack certainly takes into mind or calls

22     to mind the human cost that is involved, and I -- I do --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But then you have to know the context in order

24     to form an opinion on --

25             MR. KEHOE:  I'm giving him the context that was given to us by

Page 14696

 1     the Office of the Prosecutor.  That's the context.  The context is

 2     Dr. Clark.  And that's --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's not further argue about whether that is a

 4     proper and sufficient context.  But --

 5             MR. KEHOE:  I just wanted some clarity on it before I moved

 6     into --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I hope I have given that clarity.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  I will stay off the subject.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo.

10             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, Mr. President.  I just want to put something on

11     the record.  The Court had asked the Prosecution to find an unredacted

12     version of Exhibit P1272.  This was a target list that had what appeared

13     to be a redaction on it.  I indicated to the Court that those were

14     highlights.  I have now been informed that the highlighted version which

15     you can read is actually the original in the Croatian archive.  What was

16     sent to us and what is in our evidence room is also a copy with

17     redactions, so we will request the original.  It will take some time in

18     order to bring to the Court.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  If you have been presented with a highlight, my, and

20     I think the Chamber's main problem, is we couldn't read.  So if you make

21     a photocopy in colour or something like that so that you can distinguish

22     between the yellow or the green and what is the text below it then --

23             MR. RUSSO:  That's correct, judge, we just need to get the actual

24     highlighted copy from Croatia.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  You have received it in this --

Page 14697

 1             MR. RUSSO:  That's correct, Judge.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  If you can't read it, then it is very difficult to

 3     translate it, isn't it?  Must be someone who has been able to read it.

 4             MR. RUSSO:  I'm not sure if those particular lines have been

 5     translated.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  No, they were not translated.  I apologise for this

 7     mistake.  Try to get them as soon as possible.

 8             Then I have one other issue that is -- I think last week we,

 9     Monday, I think it was, we briefly discussed any further admissions on

10     what we call the Pittman letter.  Now I said that if possible any further

11     submissions to be made within still this week.  Now this week is -- it

12     was not a very firm deadline, but it was guidance to the parties --

13             MR. MISETIC:  I apologise, Mr. President.  We thought you meant

14     within one week, and we are filing that today.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  So that's therefore -- is that clear to the other

16     Defence counsel as well that the Chamber expects now not if possible

17     anymore but within a week, and we made a week now seven days so that the

18     deadline is today.  Thank you.

19             Any other procedural matters?  If not, could the witness be

20     escorted into the courtroom again.

21                           [The witness entered court]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Konings, Mr. Kehoe will continue his

23     cross-examination.

24             Please proceed.

25             MR. KEHOE:

Page 14698

 1        Q.   Colonel, just a couple of clarifying questions.

 2             Prior to the 4th of August of 1995, you did not review any

 3     evidence that the HV had been firing any types of artillery into Knin,

 4     had you?

 5        A.   I did not.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And that was a situation that was very different from what

 7     you observed in Sarajevo, where there was a regular firing into Sarajevo

 8     by the Bosnian Serbs, right?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Likewise, sir, that you would agree with me, one of the ways that

11     a military commander can attempt to ensure that collateral damage to

12     civilians is limited is by commencing an attack at a time when he may

13     believe that there would be very few civilians on the street.  Isn't that

14     right?

15        A.   Yes, seems to be a fair conclusion.

16        Q.   And in this particular instance, the attack on Knin commenced at

17     5.00 a.m.?

18        A.   You mean the artillery attack?

19        Q.   The artillery attack commenced at 5.00 a.m.?

20        A.   But lasts for more than 24 hours.

21        Q.   My questions to you was the did -- the initial artillery attack

22     commenced at 5.00, did it not?

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   And did you receive -- did you receive information at the time

25     that there was literally no civilians on the street at 5.00 a.m. on the

Page 14699

 1     morning of the 4th of August?

 2        A.   I have not received specific detailed information which was

 3     saying either one or the other.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, isn't it a notorious fact that the --

 5     unless there is any exceptional circumstance that at 4.00 in the morning

 6     there are considerably less people in the streets than during normal

 7     day-time.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  The only issue, Judge, is making a record on that

 9     issue.  I know Your Honour appreciates that.  Nevertheless for the

10     benefit of those -- if hopefully not that may read that at some point --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but if is a notorious fact, you can introduce

12     it in argument as a notorious fact, and then there is no reason to

13     present any evidence.  But of course, very theoretically speaking you

14     could as yourself whether Mr. Konings has taken this into consideration

15     when forming his opinions on the matter.

16             Please proceed.

17             MR. KEHOE:

18        Q.   Colonel, did you know there was, in fact, that there was a curfew

19     in Knin?

20        A.   I did not know that.

21        Q.   Okay.  So you couldn't help us with the hours or anything like

22     that --

23        A.   No.

24        Q.   Okay.  Now I want to talk about your alternative plan.  In your

25     report you disagree with the tactics employed by the HV, and you lay out

Page 14700

 1     a different plan or a different alternative --

 2             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  The transcript is not

 3     running.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  I was just trying to get it run, and it apparently

 5     is -- mine stops at page 47, line 23.

 6             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  The transcript is working on the middle monitor

 7     for us, Your Honour, but not on our individual screens.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And that is where I was looking at this

 9     moment.

10                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I was informed that it is a general problem in this

12     courthouse with the LiveNote server which will be re-booted from what I

13     understand.

14             Since the other screen works, I suggest that we continue up to

15     the moment where we have to scroll back and where we are finding problems

16     in referring to earlier portions of the transcript.

17                           [Defence counsel confer]

18             MR. KEHOE:

19        Q.   Before we move on, Colonel, I'd like to just follow up on -- on

20     your comment just now where you noted that while the attack commenced at

21     5.00 a.m., it continued throughout the day.

22             MR. KEHOE:  And if I could call up 1D65-0512.

23                           [Defence counsel confer]

24             MR. KEHOE:

25        Q.   Now, Colonel, this is the meteorological forecast for -- it

Page 14701

 1     should be August.  And if we look at -- obviously there is nothing for

 2     Knin.  If we look at Zagreb -- excuse me, if we look at Gospic and Split

 3     for the 4th, we note that the sunrise was at 5.48.

 4             Now, that's also for Split.  Is it 5.47, but we're talking, you

 5     know, approximately quarter to, ten to 6.00.

 6             Now, the video that we examined during the course of your direct

 7     examination, you noted that when it was still dark, what was had was what

 8     you described as harassment fire.  Is that right?

 9        A.   The part of the video that we saw, yes, that was a kind of, yeah,

10     harassment interdiction fire, yes.

11        Q.   So the initial barrage of fire was over by that point, wasn't it?

12     And what we had after that was what you termed to be harassment fire?

13        A.   Yes.

14             MR. KEHOE:  Now if we could move this into evidence,

15     Mr. President.  1D65-0512.

16             MR. RUSSO:  No objection, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  That's Exhibit D12634, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  And it is admitted into evidence.  I could have

20     imagined that parties would have stipulated that the sun went up quarter

21     to 6.00.  But if we need documents for this, then fine.  Is admitted into

22     evidence.

23             Please proceed.

24             MR. KEHOE:

25        Q.   Colonel, what I'd like to explore with you at this point was your

Page 14702

 1     alternative plan and what you maintain that the HV should have done as

 2     opposed to conducting the artillery attack in Knin and up in the Dinara

 3     and elsewhere in conjunction with the infantry fighting.

 4             And I'd like to turn your attention to page 4, and this is your

 5     addendum, 3(A)(i).  It goes from page 4 over to page 5.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  And this is -- for the record this is in P1260.

 7        Q.   If we can read that just briefly.  I think you have that with

 8     you, sir.

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   "With the exception of the shelling of two or three military

11     targets," see analysis, "the use of artillery against the city of Knin is

12     of no direct military essence of limited effectiveness and could have

13     been avoided by entering the city with combat troops from various

14     different directions, having the information that there would be

15     practically no defence.  The 4th Guards Brigade that had received the

16     order to take control of the city counted around 1900 personnel.  And can

17     be classified to be a larger combat unit capable of taking control of the

18     city by means of a fast, well coordinated, and controlled action.  Doing

19     so, collateral damage to civilians than their property could have been

20     minimised as much as possible."

21             Now, just taking that last sentence, "doing so, collateral damage

22     to civilians and their appropriate could have been minimised as much as

23     possible."  You don't, in fact, don't know what that collateral damage

24     was, if any, do you?

25        A.   No.

Page 14703

 1        Q.   I'm interested in various portions of your proposal, and I'm

 2     interested in the information that you had.  And I want to start with

 3     that sentence that you noted that:

 4             "That the HV could have avoided -- by entering the city with

 5     combat troops from various directions."

 6             Now, you told us last week that you looked at the 4th Guards

 7     Brigade, but that you didn't analyse the activities of the 7th Guards

 8     Brigade.  What other directions are you talking about?  What information

 9     did you have upon which you based your conclusion that they could have

10     entered the city from various directions?

11        A.   I do not have specific information.  I know the general direction

12     that the Croatian troops were coming from, which was from -- I have to

13     recall that roughly, north, north-east.  But doing such an approach to a

14     city, a commander has the possibility to explore the surrounds, the

15     environment, of Knin and could have been offered the possibilities to

16     enter the city from more than one side because there are more roads

17     running into the city.  And I'm not trying to explain here a complete

18     solution.  I only try to offer a possibility that is described in our

19     doctrine that when you have the task in taking control of a urban

20     environment, in this case, Knin, that the preference is there to do that

21     in a, let's put it in a way, in a -- in an action of surprise, where you

22     use your weapon system in a minimum as possible.  And, of course, when

23     it's a heavily defended city with defence lines on the outside that then

24     you take another direction.

25             What I've tried to do here is offer you -- offer the Court a

Page 14704

 1     generic idea about an alternative, not based on specific detailed

 2     information.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, before we continue, the LiveNote computer

 4     has been re-booted.  Everyone can connect again so that you can use both

 5     screens.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Can I just continue.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, please.

 8             MR. KEHOE:

 9        Q.   Well, the fact is, Colonel, when Operation Storm began, HV troops

10     faced stiff resistance throughout the area from the ARSK, didn't they, on

11     the front line?

12        A.   They did.  But I was also reading in the information that I had

13     that they were able to breakthrough that stiff resistance quite quickly.

14        Q.   And which units was able to breakthrough the stiff resistance on

15     the 4th.

16        A.   That's -- I cannot recall whether -- I'm not quite sure that the

17     7th Brigade already went through the resistance on the 4th.

18        Q.   Well, the 7th Brigade stopped at Pljesevica on the 4th, weren't

19     they?

20        A.   I think so, yes.

21        Q.   So you don't know who, if any unit got through on the 4th, do

22     you?

23        A.   But that not what I suggest here.

24        Q.   I'm asking that you question, sir.

25        A.   I don't know that.

Page 14705

 1        Q.   Let us turn to P698.  And this is a report from

 2     Captain Dangerfield who was a sector liaison officer in UN Sector South.

 3             And I'd like to just talk you -- have you seen this report

 4     before, Colonel?

 5        A.   No.

 6        Q.   Okay.  I'm not going to read through the whole thing.  But if we

 7     go to -- this is it an assessment of what is transpired on the 4th with

 8     2200 hours as the time.

 9             Do you see the top line there, sir?  Brief overview for

10     Sector South for 04, 0500 Bravo to 04, 2200 Bravo, August 1995.

11             He notes in paragraph 2 -- he talks about the attack in

12     paragraph 1.  "It was a long time before the HV/HVO made any headway on

13     the ground."  He talks about the areas of attack.  In number 3:  "By

14     mid-afternoon there were five main axes of attack."

15             But let us turn to assessment in paragraph 10 which is the next

16     page.

17              "Saturday 05 August should see another initial heavy artillery

18     barrage of HV objectives.  G2 assessment is that Knin may fall by dark

19     05 ...  in order [sic] to do so, I believe that the HV will require a

20     more successful day than today.  Troops approaching from the south face a

21     stiff opposition."

22             Now what is that stiff opposition that the HV was facing in the

23     south?

24        A.   I don't know.

25        Q.   Did you get any information - and this is SLO reccys last week so

Page 14706

 1     considerable evidence of road use by ARSK tracked vehicles?

 2             Those are mechanised units be they tanks, APC's, et cetera; is

 3     that right?

 4        A.   Yes, yes.

 5        Q.   Did you have any idea of the amount of track vehicles the ARSK

 6     had and where they were deployed?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   Paragraph 11:

 9             "In the west HV advances face problems of indirect major routes

10     and that times difficult terrain in the approaches towards Knin.  With

11     the reports being unclear on the successes of these axes of advance and

12     the distance still required to cover it -- to cover, it is unlikely that

13     Knin will come under direct fire from them."

14             Now, tell me about the problems in the west of the HV advance and

15     how it was stalled on the 4th.

16        A.   Well, this -- this report describes that there were heavy

17     problems, but I have no details about that.  I haven't got the

18     information, so I cannot tell you that.

19        Q.   Well, Colonel, going back to your report, if I said that combat

20     troops could have entered the city from various directions, and maybe you

21     weren't provided this information, I trust you weren't.  If you -- combat

22     troops were supposed to come in from various directions, wouldn't it be

23     important to know what type of resistance the various units of the HV

24     encountered as the attack ensued?

25        A.   The statement that I made in my report, as I tried to explain

Page 14707

 1     before but maybe I was not quite clear is that I offered you a -- that I

 2     offered a possibility to be used as an alternative.  Which is described

 3     in our doctrine is you try to take a city, take control of a city without

 4     using any heavy weapon system in doing a kind of surprise action early in

 5     the morning, in the night, and -- let's put it in a way that is a kind of

 6     theoretical approach.  I did not connect that to any information to the

 7     troops outside the city of Knin.

 8        Q.   What you're advocating as this alternative is dispense with an

 9     artillery attack and engage in a full frontal infantry attack, pushing

10     the ARSK lines further and further back towards Knin, aren't you?

11        A.   No.  Looking to the situation that I was trying to depict for

12     myself is that you see on a certain moment in time, and that may have

13     been on the 5th, that the 7 Brigade broke through the lines of the enemy,

14     that the 4th Brigade came in line with the 7th Brigade and that both

15     brigades were directed together towards Knin.  And from there you can

16     think about the situation that you -- that you try to enter the city as

17     soon as possible in one quick push without using -- without using any

18     further artillery barrage at all.  Seeing the fact that there was no

19     communated [sic] combined defence and that to the information given to

20     me, there were hardly any -- that there was resistance possible in Knin.

21             I just offered that as a possibility and the commander on the

22     spot has made his own choices based upon the actual information that he

23     had.

24        Q.   Well, Colonel, were you made aware of what the ARSK plans were

25     for the defence of Knin?

Page 14708

 1        A.   I have no information on that.

 2        Q.   Well, let's explore that just a bit and see if it will factor

 3     into your equation as to what was planned.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  And if I can --

 5        Q.   By the way, do you know who General Commander Kovacevic is for

 6     the ARSK?

 7        A.   No.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  If I can just go into private session, just briefly.

 9                           [Private session]

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 14709











11  Page 14709 redacted. Private session.















Page 14710

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

13             MR. KEHOE:

14        Q.   We turn to P923 [sic] at page 3.  Excuse me, D923.  If I said P,

15     D923, at page 3.  I'm interested in the "aggression was expected --"  No,

16     just down in the middle paragraph.  There we go.

17             This is General Mrksic talking:

18             "The aggression was expected, and the Main Staff directed the

19     main focus of their work on preparing the units to defend their positions

20     regions and areas resolutely for five to seven days, believing that that

21     would be enough for the international factors, and, if necessary, even

22     the Yugoslav army, to react ..."

23             Did you know, sir, that that was the plan of the ARSK should they

24     be attacked?

25        A.   No, I haven't -- I haven't read this document.

Page 14711

 1        Q.   Let us turn your attention to D106.

 2             Now D106 that comes on the screen, colonel, is a radio interview

 3     with General Mrksic on the 4th of August, at 2130 hours with

 4     Radio Belgrade.  And to the question second -- one, two, third down:

 5     "Does that mean our lines have been penetrated?

 6             Mrksic says:  "No.  We are maintaining contact; our forces

 7     withdrew to the positions for the direct defence of Knin."

 8             One last entry before we talk about this, and that would be D28,

 9     General Sekulic's book.  And if I can call 928, D928 -- excuse me, it's

10     D928.  And if can I call 1D44-0119 in the English, and 1D44-0029 in the

11     B/C/S.

12             MR. KEHOE:  I have been told by my case manager it's page 24 in

13     the English and page 27 in the B/C/S.

14        Q.   And that 2000 hours meeting -- Colonel, that I just want to

15     address you to that 2000 hours paragraph.  There is a meeting at the

16     Main Staff.  Without reading the whole matter, midway down it notes that

17     Commander Mrksic's position that the evacuation was a matter for the

18     authorities indicates that:

19             "The army ought to continue with defence and facilitate the

20     evacuation of the population.  The commander also decided to narrow the

21     fronts of defence and continue with decisive defence.  This was to apply

22     to all corps.

23             "In order to defend Knin, the army of the Republic of Serbian

24     Krajina Main Staff ordered that the commander of the 7th corps, General

25     Kovacevic to" --

Page 14712

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President?  I'm sorry.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Please continue.

 4             MR. KEHOE:

 5        Q.    "To pull out of the 75th brigade by morning and deploy it in

 6     positions for the defence of Knin at Bulina Strana."

 7             I will tell you that Bulina Strana is that bluff that we talked

 8     about just right above Knin.

 9             Now are you familiar with this term "decisive defence?"

10        A.   We don't use the term "decisive defence," but I have a -- I think

11     I understand what is meant.

12        Q.   And what do you think is meant?

13        A.   Decisive defence, well, I would like to use another name.  It can

14     be seen as -- no, the defence has to take place in such a way that --

15     that it brings the decision in either a specific battle or an operation.

16     And for the defending party that means that when it goes the wrong

17     direction that the battle or the operation is lost.  That's quite clear.

18     That's my recollection from decisive defence.

19        Q.   And would it also the decisive defence be what we read before, a

20     defence that it was down to the last man?

21        A.   That is a recollection from the nation or the army involved.  I

22     don't think that that applies to -- to every army in the world because

23     decisive defence can also mean that a reasonable commander or a commander

24     decides when he sees that his operation is not successful anymore, in

25     order to spare lives or further destruction that he decides either to

Page 14713

 1     withdraw or to surrender.

 2        Q.   So it would be, if we can go back to P698, paragraph 15.  Again,

 3     this is a Captain Dangerfield's comment.  And go to paragraph 15, the

 4     last page.  Second sentence in:  "With the advancing HV/HVO troops

 5     looking at Knin as their final objective and ARSK --

 6             Let me pull that up first.  Paragraph 12 is at the top of the

 7     page.  I'll read that first:

 8             "While Knin may come under heavy artillery attack again, the

 9     considerable presence of ARSK forces in the area will require more time

10     before they come under direct fire from HV tanks."

11             Now let's go back down to paragraph 15.

12             "With the advancing HV/HVO troops looking at Knin as their final

13     objective and ARSK troops remaining, Milan Martic will have to surrender

14     or face a bloody last stand in the capital of Krajina."

15             Now, when you engage, Colonel, in an option for a decisive

16     defence, those are your two options:  Surrender or a bloody last stand.

17     Aren't they?

18        A.   There is another option, which is withdraw and leave the city as

19     an open city.  Withdrawal is always an option.  Surrender is an option,

20     withdrawal is an option and fighting to the last man is also a option.

21        Q.   And what I read to you about these parties and the comments from

22     the witness that I read to you concerning the decisive defence, there was

23     discussion among the ARSK as relayed about the witness that I talked to

24     you about fighting to the last man.  And General Mrksic, as noted by

25     General Kovacevic told his troops at 2000 hours on the 4th, to continue

Page 14714

 1     with the decisive defence.

 2             Now, with that information, you, as a senior military officer

 3     would conclude that the ARSK intended to make their last stand in Knin.

 4     Didn't they.

 5        A.   That's not said.  Because a decisive defence can also take -- it

 6     is not necessary that a decisive defence will be taken indirectly in the

 7     city because as in Knin the environment offers perfect opportunities to

 8     make a choice and to do your decisive defence outside the city, because

 9     everybody knows that drawing a battle into a city will cause a lot of

10     trouble, not only for the attacking party but also for the defensive

11     party.  And a decisive defensive can, of course, be related directly to

12     the city itself, but it can also be built up in depth around the city

13     using the terrain outside the city.

14        Q.   Let's go into that because what you're talking about is the

15     concept of fighting in built-up areas, isn't it?

16        A.   It has to do with that.

17        Q.   And when you fight up in built-up areas, the advantage in

18     fighting in built-up areas is the defender, not the attacker; isn't it?

19        A.   I think the defender has a better advantage in a city if you can

20     call that advantage at all, but, yes, he is probably in a better position

21     than the attack.

22        Q.   And let's go through some of the reasons for that.  Because when

23     you are talking about three's troops walking into Knin, you're

24     essentially -- and you refer this to your transcript at page 14409.  You

25     noted that this entering the city is very tricky.  And that's 14409 at

Page 14715

 1     page -- line 18 and 19.  When you are saying that it was very tricky, you

 2     were thinking about how dangerous it is if you engage in fighting in a

 3     built-up area, aren't you?

 4        A.   Yes.  You should not forget, and I'm sorry I cannot answer only

 5     with yes, that I came up with the proposal that I described given the

 6     information that the OTP has given to me.  If you describe me another

 7     scenario where -- where combat troops are located in Knin or in the

 8     direct environment of Knin, defending the city itself, so signs of road

 9     blocks, signs of trenches, then you get a different situation.  But even

10     then our first rule in the doctrine in urban environment is avoid battle

11     in an urban environment.  That's our first rule what we use.

12        Q.   Well, and I agree with you, and we will get into some of the

13     reasons for that, but I hasten to add that there are troops in Knin which

14     you mentioned.  There are troops on the Dinara.  If those troops for the

15     ARSK are on the Dinara were withdrawing, where were they going to

16     withdraw to?  Were they going to go in a different direction, or were

17     they going to do as General Mrksic said, Withdraw to our positions for

18     the direct defence of Knin, as he mentioned in D106?

19        A.   I think that is it very logic, and I don't deny that.  The point

20     we are talking about is that the decisive defence can also be done in the

21     complete environment outside the city, which the environment is extremely

22     well for that because of the hillsides, because of the possibility that

23     the defender has to build up trenches, to use his forces there.  A

24     defence does not necessarily mean a single line.  A defence can be in the

25     form of an area defence.

Page 14716

 1             So there are so many possibilities.  And one of them is, of

 2     course, that you build up a defence inside the city and that you use

 3     everything single brick there to defend yourself.  But I have to repeat

 4     myself, I have been given information by the OTP, and that is the

 5     analysis that I did.

 6        Q.   And, Colonel, I understand that you've been given just a limited

 7     amount of information, but given your expertise, I want to explore some

 8     of the ramifications of possible proposals accepting that possibly you

 9     didn't have information concerning other lines of resistance by the ARSK.

10             If we are talking about dispensing with the artillery, and if we

11     are talking about the withdraw of forces in defence of Knin, and if we

12     are talking about the defence of Knin being a decisive defence down to

13     the last man, we essentially are talking about an encirclement of Knin

14     and the troops moving into Knin with the very strong possibility of

15     fighting within the city limits of Knin, aren't we?

16        A.   If you take -- if you start from the assumption that the combat

17     troops -- that the ARSK combat troops are withdrawing into the city of

18     Knin, then you end up in a very tricky situation.  I admit that, yes.

19        Q.   Let's talk a little bit just because I want -- I certainly know

20     what you're talking about, Colonel, but I'd like to use some of the

21     literature we have to explore exactly what a tricky situation means.

22             MR. KEHOE:  And I'd like to call 1D65-0464.

23        Q.   1D65-0464, Colonel, is a United States army infantrymen's guide

24     to combat in built up areas.  I understand this is -- it may in part be

25     American doctrine.  I have some additional information to show you

Page 14717

 1     concerning Dutch doctrine, so you can help us out about how you differ

 2     from anything that's in here.  But basically when it comes to fighting in

 3     built up areas, FIBUA, I think they cal it, F-I-B-U-A, we're going to be

 4     talking about some of the broad strokes.

 5             And the first page I'd like to you about is page 7 of this

 6     document.  Section 1-5, and just going to -- and just going with further

 7     explanation of your combat comment that it's tricky:

 8             "Built up areas consist mainly of man-made features such as

 9     buildings.  Building provide cover and concealment, limited fields of

10     observation and fire, and block movement of troops, especially mechanised

11     troops.  Thick-walled buildings provide ready-made fortified positions."

12             During the course of your -- some your analysis, you noted that

13     there are strong structures in Knin that can't be destroyed by artillery

14     fire.  These same strong structures likewise provide excellent cover for

15     defending troops when they're fighting in built up areas, don't they?

16        A.   Yes.

17             MR. KEHOE:  If we can --

18        Q.   I'll just show you the analogue to that which is --

19             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, I would like this.  I'm going to refer

20     to it again, but I would like to tender 1D65-0464.

21             MR. RUSSO:  No objection, Mr. President.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  How long is that document, Mr. Kehoe?

23             MR. KEHOE:  The document that I have uploaded is 15.  I will be

24     referring to the document again, Mr. President.  There are other items in

25     there.

Page 14718

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1264.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Exhibit D1264 is admitted into evidence.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  I'd like to call up 1D65-0282.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, is it true that the document we just

 6     admitted into evidence that we have no --

 7             MR. KEHOE:  B/C/S.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  We only have an English version?

 9             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  I would like the parties to spontaneously inform the

11     Chamber if they are tendering documents.  I mean, I'm now checking these

12     things, but I think it would be appropriate if a party is aware of any

13     shortcoming on what is regularly required for admission, that they draw

14     the attention of the Chamber to it.

15             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Is there any problem as far as the other Defence

17     teams or the Prosecution is concerned in relation to this infantryman's

18     guide to combat.

19             If not, then ...

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber will consider whether we would at any

22     further moment insist on translation because apparently the parties in

23     this courtroom have no problem with it.  At the same time, the whole of

24     the public on the documents is doing without, and the public character of

25     this trial is important for this Chamber.  We'll consider whether we'll

Page 14719

 1     ask for a translation to be provided.

 2             Please proceed.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Just turning to a -- the

 4     next document on the screen, which is the combat operations.  And going

 5     to paragraph 12094, Mr. President, there is not an English translation --

 6     excuse me, a B/C/S translation of this document either.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But it is it admitted into evidence already,

 8     isn't it?

 9             MR. KEHOE:  I believe it is a different section.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Oh, it's a different section.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Yeah.

12                           [Defence counsel confer]

13             MR. KEHOE:  Page 91.  And if we could go 12094.

14        Q.   I'm interested in those first two sentences.  This is I take it,

15     you know, Dutch doctrine.

16             "Depending on their size and location, built-up areas can

17     represent key terrain.  The obstacle value and the concealment and cover

18     make built-up areas an ideal backbone for defensive operations."

19             And that is basically what you were talking about previously,

20     sir, that the defender has an advantage under these circumstances,

21     doesn't it?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And if we hypothetically use street-to-street combat in Knin, we

24     would be talking about the ARSK would have that advantage.

25        A.   Yes.

Page 14720

 1        Q.   Now, let us turn back to D1264 and go into a couple of more

 2     aspects and go to section 1-8.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  By the way, Mr. President, I would offer into

 4     evidence the document that I just presented to Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  But only the page or the section you just referred

 6     to.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  I'm going to refer to multiple sections in that

 8     document so ... there would be --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  It is 100-page document.

10             MR. KEHOE:  Do we have 100 pages, I believe?

11             JUDGE ORIE:  At least I've got 103.  But ... which is -- which

12     asks for a very selective approach --

13             MR. KEHOE:  I will select those pages that I will use and just

14     revamp the -- as opposed to putting 100 pages up.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I know that I have seen this document before,

16     but I do not know what portions exactly are in evidence and what portions

17     are not.  If you could upload the relevant sections and then an

18     opportunity to Mr. Russo to consider whether he would like to add

19     anything do it, and then a decision will be made on admission.  But

20     perhaps we could already reserve an exhibit number.

21             Mr. Registrar.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this becomes exhibit number D1265.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  D1265, which is a selection of relevant pages from

24     the publication by the Royal Netherlands Army on combat operations, is

25     marked for identification.

Page 14721

 1             MR. KEHOE:  The other document that looked similar, Judge, is

 2     D1248.

 3        Q.   But just staying with this 1-8 target engagement, it notes that:

 4             "Targets are usually briefly exposed at ranges of 100 metres or

 5     less.  As a result, combat in built-up areas consists mostly of close,

 6     violent combat."

 7             Would you agree with that, sir?

 8        A.   Yes -- sorry, yes.

 9        Q.   Let us continue on to section 2-6 in the same manual.  Several

10     pages up, you will see, it is four pages up.  And if we can just go one

11     more page, to paragraph 12.

12             On paragraph 12 talking about fighting in built-up areas:

13     "Ammunition consumption is five to ten times greater in urban

14     environments than in-field environments."

15             Do you agree with that?

16        A.   I know it is greater, whether it is it five to ten times, that is

17     up to this publication.

18        Q.   If we go back to D1265, the Royal Netherlands doctrine.  1265.

19     And go to paragraph 937 [sic].  Talking about fighting in urbanised

20     areas, 0937.

21             MR. KEHOE:  That's it.  Page 19.

22        Q.    "Urbanised areas."  Going to the second sentence.  "These areas

23     should be avoided if possible."

24             Going down to the next paragraph.  "The operation in built-up

25     areas has a delaying effect on tempo."

Page 14722

 1             Staying with 938.  This is -- going on to the next page:

 2     "Physically and mentally exhausting."

 3             MR. KEHOE:  And going ahead to paragraph 11109.

 4        Q.   I'll just tried, sir, and this is a lot of the same doctrine.

 5              "An attack in a built-up area usually gives rise to prolonged

 6     combat actions with heavy losses."

 7             So all those, sir, the defender having an advantage it being very

 8     violent, ammunition consumption high, it has a delaying tactic, being

 9     mentally and physically exhausting, and prolonged combat in fighting in

10     built-up areas brings with it heavy losses.  Do you agree with all the

11     factors?

12        A.   I agree with all the factors, so that is the major reason to

13     avoid in all cases to get drawn into an urban combat.

14        Q.   When we go into an urban combat area as a senior officer, sir,

15     you know historically that fighting in built-up areas is also extremely

16     harmful and detrimental to the civilian population?

17        A.   Yes, that's true.

18        Q.   Because when we are fighting house to house in a town, history

19     has told us that that fighting is taking place in civilian residences,

20     isn't it?

21        A.   That's true.

22        Q.   Now, likewise if we stay with Netherlands doctrine on this area

23     and we go back to paragraph 0939, and I can -- 0939.  That's good.

24             Now when we're talking about 0939, talking about fighting in

25     built-up areas, the infantry fighting in built-up areas supported by

Page 14723

 1     engineers and where possible by tanks, artillery, and air support.

 2             So according to Dutch doctrine where possible when you send your

 3     guys into fighting in a built-up area, you also want to soften up that

 4     terrain but using artillery when possible, don't they?

 5        A.   With the very clear pronunciations when possible.  And that when

 6     possible is dependent on main factors, especially on the close proximity

 7     of civilian population.

 8        Q.   And when -- just for the record, we are talking about the US army

 9     manual that notes that -- that section 3-5 in the document we have

10     included, those types of offensive operations might require extensive air

11     and artillery bombardment.

12             And you would agree that when you're fighting in a built-up area,

13     the use of artillery would be done trying to restrict an enemy's position

14     in that area while also destroying his position.  Isn't that right?

15        A.   Using artillery in any fight, including in an urban environment

16     depends on the -- the effect that you want to achieve.  That can be

17     destruction, that can be -- there are no so many possibilities that you

18     do that in support of the actions of your own forces.

19        Q.   What I'm trying to get at, sir, here is that when your going

20     through fighting in a built-up area and are you fighting house to house

21     against the enemy and an enemy using civilian structures, and you as the

22     attacks Force Commander are moving through that area, you are going to be

23     firing on what otherwise would be civilian structures simply because the

24     enemy is housed in there, and you not dispense with the option of

25     likewise using artillery in this entire endeavour.  Isn't that right?

Page 14724

 1        A.   When you do an urban operation, you have all your weapon systems

 2     and all area military means available, and you can choose to use them or

 3     not to use them.  That is up to the overall commander, and further on, to

 4     the commanders on the scene.  That means the platoon commanders, the

 5     company commanders that do the actual fight.  So they are able to send in

 6     a fire -- a request for a fire mission.  That fire mission can be done by

 7     artillery, that can be done by mortars, that can be done by close air

 8     support.  That's up to the commander on the scene to decide how to do

 9     that within his rules of engagement and within his possibilities, yes.

10        Q.   Now, and when he is -- he is obviously history has shown us as

11     you said when those decisions have been made historically, the entire

12     operation of fighting in built-up areas, as you noted before, brings the

13     possibility of significant -- of danger to the civilian population much

14     higher, doesn't it?

15        A.   Yes, because -- yes, in an urban environment there is an

16     extremely high risk for the civilian population.

17        Q.   And when you're fighting in a built-up area -- I mean, let's just

18     go -- before we ask that question, let's just go to D1264, section 3-3.

19             MR. KEHOE:  Page 13.

20        Q.   It says:

21             "Due to the nature of combat in built-up areas, more troops are

22     normally needed than in other combat situations."

23             And that's because, Colonel, would you agree with that, firstly?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And that's because when you're in continuous close combat, there

Page 14725

 1     is a tremendous amount of fatigue, psychological strain, and most

 2     importantly, casualties.  Isn't that right?

 3        A.   I haven't heard anything new so far.

 4        Q.   I'm just asking you --

 5        A.   You're right, you're absolutely right.

 6        Q.   So if we look at what General Gotovina was faced, he was faced

 7     with the issue of the actual battle he conducted or faced the very

 8     possibility of, as Captain Dangerfield noted, a bloody last stand in

 9     fighting in an urban environment such as Knin, Which would have brought

10     with it, a tremendous amend of casualties.  Those are two very viable

11     options that the General had to consider.  Isn't it?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And a reasonable commander under those circumstances could quite

14     validly pick the first option, i.e., artillery followed by the infantry

15     assault as we saw in Operation Storm.

16             Isn't that right?

17        A.   That's one of the options, absolutely.

18        Q.   Now, one of the issues that I'd just like to address you briefly

19     and ask --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, just for me to understand, the two

21     options you gave in your previous question, the one is that

22     General Gotovina was faced with the issue of actual battle; or the very

23     possibility of Captain Dangerfield's notion of a bloody last stand in

24     fighting in an urban environment.

25             MR. KEHOE:  Or face the actual battle he conducted.

Page 14726

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Where when it's not clear to me what the two options

 2     actually are.  I don't know.

 3             Could you tell us how you understood the two options to be, when

 4     you answered the question, Mr. Konings?

 5             THE WITNESS:  Well, the last option I understand is -- is the

 6     defence until the last man --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  The possibility.

 8             THE WITNESS:  The possibility of a defence until the last man,

 9     but in that option it is not clear to me whether that only concerns

10     specifically the area -- the urban environment of Knin or the -- the

11     whole environment, including the mountains around Knin, because that --

12     and the other possibility is that -- well, to be honest, I don't see the

13     other option now as well so ...

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, it might be good that have you a clear

15     understanding when asked if you answer a question.

16             MR. KEHOE:  I can rephrase that, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, of course if could you clarify the issue

18     that would be appreciated.

19             MR. KEHOE:

20        Q.   The other option that I was talking about, Colonel, is the option

21     that was actually employed by General Gotovina in Operation Storm, those

22     two options, conducting the operation as conducted in operation storm, or

23     the other option of dispensing with artillery and moving solely with

24     infantry with the possibility of engaging in a fight in an urban area.

25             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, I would ask Mr. Kehoe to be a bit for

Page 14727

 1     specific.  The witness has clearly been given several versions, both from

 2     the Prosecution side and from the Defence as to what General Gotovina

 3     actually did.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me, excuse me, excuse me.  [Overlapping

 5     speakers] ...  if there is a speaking objection, I would ask that it be

 6     done outside of the witness.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  It depends on what the objection is, Mr. Kehoe.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Since Mr. Russo has not -- did not go into any

10     further details, do I understand that the two options you are putting to

11     this witness the one, the option of what Mr. Gotovina finally did.  And

12     the other option which I do not understand which did not take place was a

13     street-to-street, man-to-man fight in the city of Knin.

14             Now, even if you would not know in any way what Mr. Gotovina did,

15     you could say, These are two options.  The one what he did, and what he

16     didn't do.  But if we want to further explore these matters, then, of

17     course, we would have to get into further details as what actually was

18     done, because this witness has no personal observation, no personal

19     knowledge of what happened and gathered his information partly from what

20     he was told by the Prosecution, partly by what you told him, partly on

21     the basis of documents.

22             So if you want to pursue this matter, I think it would be good to

23     know exactly what we're talking about.

24             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, to be honest, the second option

25     presented by counsel is not the option that I was trying to describe in

Page 14728

 1     my document.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  No, I think it is it put to you by Mr. Kehoe.  And

 3     he -- on the basis of some of the documents he had shown to him [sic], he

 4     apparently -- the Defence considers it is likely that that is what one

 5     could expect.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  That is how I understood your final question.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  That's correct.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

10             MR. KEHOE:

11        Q.   With these documents -- and as Judge Orie said, one without the

12     attack employed during Operation Storm, one could expect that a fight in

13     the -- urban environment would ensue.  The course employed by

14     General Gotovina as a reasonable commander -- as a military commander was

15     a reasonable attempt to avoid that, avoid civilian casualties while

16     likewise bringing about the demise of the army of the Republic of Serb

17     Krajina.

18             Isn't that a valid analysis of exactly what transpired with the

19     two options that you have put forth in your report?

20        A.   Well, in itself, that sounds very likely, and I don't deny that

21     the use of artillery against military targets, the high value military

22     targets even when in a civilian environment.  That is up to the commander

23     that that is it a possibility.  But it's still leaves me with the fact

24     that artillery has been used for more than 24 hours, and it leaves me

25     with the fact that I still do not have any explanation for the point that

Page 14729

 1     I was asked to address by the OTP, is the order that was given to shell

 2     the city of Knin.

 3             And there are many aspects in the operation described in -- in

 4     documents that are absolutely belonging to a military operation, and I

 5     don't deny that, and we have debating that.  We have been talking about

 6     the use of troops, we have been talking about the use of artillery

 7     against military targets in conjunction with the military operation.  We

 8     have extensively been debating about the risks of urban environment,

 9     competent urban environment.  I tried to develop a scenario that -- based

10     on the information given by the OTP where it says that there was inside

11     Knin no defence, no coordinated defence, no combat forces, no nothing,

12     only 4 to 500 individual soldiers that had no defence.  I tried to

13     develop an option that once the 4th or the 7th Brigade is broken through

14     the Serb lines that that brigade could have moved quickly in an open

15     formation to Knin, in order to take possession of Knin.

16             Doing so they take risks.  I understand that, but sometimes the

17     commander has to lay the risk at his own forces in order to avoid

18     civilian casualties.

19             So, for me, there is still a disconnection between the order

20     given, especially shelling the city of Knin and the way that was

21     performed during the 24 hours.

22        Q.   We will get to that order, Colonel.

23        A.   Okay.

24             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, I don't think if you want to take the

25     break now.

Page 14730

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We'll have a break, and we will resume at five

 2     minutes to 1.00.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.  Thank you.

 7        Q.   Colonel, I'd like to address with you now at this point, you

 8     know, some additional logic concerning the attack on Knin in the fashion

 9     that it was conducted by looking at the actual effect and -- and the --

10     while also looking at that damage that it did cause and the goals

11     achieved.  Obviously we talked before about Knin being the centre of

12     gravity, but I'd like to go through a series of documents with you and

13     just discuss them in the context of the success or failure of the

14     operation, as you see it, in light of these documents.

15             And first I'd like to talk to you about D389.

16             Now, Colonel, D389 is an ARSK intelligence report from the ARSK

17     General Staff accounting what happened on the morning of the 4th.

18             And if we can go to the fourth paragraph down, it notes that:

19             "Knin was attacked from Livanjsko Polje from several directions

20     and by the time this information was drafted between 200 and 300 rounds

21     of different calibers impacted on the town.  The first strike was carried

22     out on the building of the SVK General Staff ..."

23             Now that is the location that we mentioned -- or you mentioned,

24     Colonel, is the most significant strategic target for the ARSK in Knin.

25     Correct, sir?

Page 14731

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And frankly the most significant strategic target for the ARSK

 3     throughout the Krajina, right?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   This said:

 6             "... which suffered great ... damage with the fleet of vehicles

 7     almost completely destroyed.  Later the fire was transferred on the

 8     military barracks 1300 Kaplara, the Tvik factory, the railway

 9     intersection, residential buildings in the area beneath the Knin

10     fortress," et cetera?

11             If we could turn our attention to 65 ter 1006.  This is an

12     intelligence report by the HV for the 6th of August after Storm.  Just

13     dealing with the first page of this:

14             "The enemy communication system has been completely disabled and

15     there by the command system on almost all levels which increased the

16     level of chaos in the remaining units of the routed army of the Serb

17     Krajina in the Republic of Croatia except ... 11th eastern Slavonia

18     corps."

19             Now, when you were going through the purposes of artillery and

20     you wanted to create a degree of confusion and suppression, this would

21     appear to be a successful conclusion at least in part of the artillery

22     operation, wouldn't it?

23        A.   If this entry here suggests that the disabling of the

24     communication system was done by artillery, then your conclusion is

25     correct.  But that doesn't state it.

Page 14732

 1             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, we'll like to offer into evidence 65 ter

 2     1006.

 3             MR. RUSSO:  No objection, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1266, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Is admitted into evidence.

 7             Please proceed.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  And one last report on this score, which is 65 ter

 9     1666.

10        Q.   This is an intelligence report by the HV of 5 August 1995.

11             MR. KEHOE:  If we can turn to the second page in the English, and

12     I believe it is the -- if I may, still the first page in the B/C/S.

13        Q.   And it notes about the successes -- at the top of the page.

14             MR. KEHOE:  Can we just scroll that up a just little bit to the

15     top of the page.  There we go.

16        Q.   Two SVK corps were completely broken up, 7th Knin and 15th Lika

17     corps.

18             Now, are you familiar with the lotion of the ARSK 15th Lika

19     corps?

20        A.   No, I'm not.

21        Q.   I will tell you that evidence is that the 15th Lika corps was in

22     the Gospic Military District which was to the north of the Split Military

23     District.

24             Now, this reflects that both of these corps were destroyed.  To

25     the --

Page 14733

 1        A.   It doesn't say that, it says broken up.  It is not the same time.

 2        Q.   Broken up?

 3        A.   Well, it is quite a difference.

 4        Q.   We'll just stay with the terminology there.

 5             "The state and military structure was completely deprived of its

 6     leadership by the liberation of Knin which had a significant effect on

 7     the collapse of the morale of the civilian population and military

 8     units ..."

 9             Moving down the page, just to the -- if you can scroll down:

10             "The single system of commanding has been broken up including the

11     communications system so that the SVK is no longer functioning."

12             Now you know from the documents that you reviewed that the HV's

13     artillery directed its fire on the communication system of the ARSK.

14     Isn't that right?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And from this document, you can conclude that that ARSK

17     communications system was destroyed and that these two Corps defending

18     the ARSK were broken up?

19        A.   Well, again, the document does not talk about -- specifically

20     about artillery.  It talks about, in generic, about the results that were

21     contain, and I assume that the use of artillery was a part of that, but

22     that indeed the whole Operation Storm achieved this -- the goal or the

23     end is that is described here.

24        Q.   Okay.  Let me show you one last document on this score, D819

25     which is a sitrep or a message, I take that back, from UNCRO.

Page 14734

 1             MR. KEHOE:  By the way, Your Honour, we'll offer 65 ter 1666 into

 2     evidence.

 3             MR. RUSSO:  No objection, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1267.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  D819.

 8        Q.   If you can just look at this front sheet.  I'm not saying -- you

 9     may not be familiar with this document, Colonel, but you are familiar

10     with these types of messages going from UNCRO, the formatting in any

11     event?

12        A.   I know these messages.  I have been writing them myself.

13        Q.   And in the message they deal with what happened with the ARSK.

14             MR. KEHOE:  And if we can turn over to the next page.  Scroll

15     that down a little bit.

16        Q.   "The rapid collapse of ARSK after the initial breakthrough can be

17     explained as follow [sic]:

18             "Poor leadership at intermediate levels has been observed.

19     Absence of a counterattack reserve armour has been observed in only one

20     echelon."

21             Paragraph 4-3:

22             "Total lack of theatre 3CI capacities and leaders were not

23     trained for coordinated theatre level OPs."

24             Now when they say, "total lack of 3CI capacities," what is that?

25        A.   That means that there is in old theatre no command and control

Page 14735

 1     and communications and information capacity is available.  That is a

 2     statement.

 3        Q.   So from this assessment made by UNCRO on the 7th of August, in

 4     part, the collapse of the ARSK came down to a lack of command, control,

 5     communications, and intelligence capacities.

 6        A.   Not only, there is much more.  The assessment of the UNCRO says

 7     much more.

 8        Q.   I understand.  I'm just in that paragraph, sir.

 9        A.   Which paragraph are you talking about?

10        Q.   4-3?

11        A.   That paragraph says it says more than only C3 capacities, and it

12     says leaders were not trained for coordinated theatre level OPs.  That is

13     not something that is in place already quite long.

14             What I want to say, you focus on point 43, that's fine.  But when

15     he read through this, then this is an extensive array of possible

16     reasons, only possible reasons that the breakthrough was explained by,

17     and that is much more than only the follow-up of one Operation Storm.

18        Q.   I understand, sir.

19        A.   Okay.

20        Q.   But would you agree with me that if an entity's command, control,

21     communications, and intelligence abilities are destroyed or significantly

22     damaged, that will give to the attacking force a significant benefit?

23        A.   That's absolutely true.

24        Q.   Now, I know that you have been shown P64 which was the

25     intelligence assessment -- excuse me, the damage assessment by

Page 14736

 1     Lieutenant-Colonel Hjertnes.

 2             Were you shown any other reports on that score about -- for

 3     instance, the CIVPOL report?

 4        A.   I first try to recollect the report that you -- the P64 that you

 5     are referring.

 6        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

 7        A.   I assume that is the UNMO report from the city in Knin.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Let me bring that up on the screen, P64.

 9             MR. RUSSO:  Tab 23 in the witness's binder.

10             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. Russo.

11        Q.   This is the document that I'm talking about on the screen, that

12     in paragraph 2 that the:

13             "In general, shelling was concentrated against military

14     objectives.  The damage [sic] caused by shelling to civilian

15     establishments is concentrated to the close vicinity of military

16     objectives.  Only three to five impacts is observed in other urban

17     areas."

18             MR. KEHOE:  Let's will turn to P228, which is a CIVPOL

19     assessment, UNCIVPOL.

20        Q.   Again an assessment of 18th of August 1995.  He notes -- a survey

21     of a Knin town to assess the damage done in Knin town caused by shelling,

22     arson, and wilful damage.

23             "We covered the whole township and observed several impacts of

24     shells and rockets around the Tvik factory.  Milicija headquarters,

25     general of the northern barracks ... government house, Knin radio, TV,

Page 14737

 1     and the hillside below Knin ...  We found roughly -- excuse me.  The

 2     compound of the northern barracks was not checked.  Observations done

 3     from the street [sic].

 4             "We counted roughly 20 houses, buildings hit by shells and ...

 5     another 20 presumable damaged by arson."

 6             Now with the items that are set forth in paragraph 2, those are,

 7     in fact, the targets that we reviewed before and that you described as,

 8     in some instances military targets, right?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Okay.  And without being exact, the assessment by UNCIVPOL seems

11     to be in line with what the UNMO, Lieutenant-Colonel Hjertnes said was

12     the damage in P64?

13             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, I'm going object to that.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Russo.  The objection would be?

15             MR. RUSSO:  That -- the fact that this is consistent in terms of

16     the damage with P64.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  It is the objection that it misrepresents -- could

18     you then go into further details.

19             MR. KEHOE:  He can say yes or no.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Well ...

21             MR. KEHOE:  I mean, the answer is --

22             MR. RUSSO:  He is not asking him if it is consistent.  He is

23     putting to him that it is it consistent.

24             MR. KEHOE:  It's a question.  It's cross-examination.  The

25     question is --

Page 14738

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, sir.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Would you please point exactly to the language where

 4     you say that the assessment is the same, so that where Mr. Russo

 5     apparently may have some problems, that we know exactly what we are

 6     talking about.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Let me rephrase the question.

 8        Q.   Colonel, would you agree that the damage as reflected in P64 from

 9     shelling is consistent, not exactly the same but consistent with the

10     analysis of the damage done by UNCIVPOL in P228.

11        A.   It is it consistent with respect to the level of damage that is

12     -- that is it reported, nothing more.

13        Q.   Let us turn our attention to D66.

14             This is a United States government cable after a visit to Knin,

15     and I believe the evidence is that it was on the 7th of August.  The

16     cable is dated the 14th.

17             MR. KEHOE:  And if we go to the bottom of this page.

18        Q.    "Downtown Knin.  Although Knin was reportedly heavily shelled in

19     the early hours of the hostilities, few downtown buildings and

20     residential areas showed signs of shell damage."

21             Now, had you seen this document, sir?

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   When you put these documents together, sir, can you not conclude

24     or do you conclude, number 1, that the shelling by the HV on the 4th and

25     the 5th was directed towards military targets, or military objectives;

Page 14739

 1     let me say that.

 2        A.   Well, insofar as you go along with the UNMO document, but the

 3     UNMO document is not completed.  That's stated at the end.  It is only a

 4     preliminary investigation which was done to an -- apparently a certain

 5     area of the city, and focussing on that document, it says indeed that

 6     most of the shelling was done on military targets, we have had our

 7     discussion about military targets, and that there was caused damage to

 8     the civilian property close to the military targets.

 9        Q.   Let me help you out that Colonel Hjertnes gave a statement to the

10     Office of the Prosecutor in January of this year.  In paragraph 33 of

11     that statement, where he noted that his final report was consistent with

12     the provisional assessment, and an UN public informations officer,

13     Alun Roberts, previously advised this Chamber in a trial transcript 7079,

14     line 19, through 7081, line 8, that the final assessment that was

15     conducted was consistent with the provisional assessment.

16             So the evidence that's before the Chamber is that that

17     provisional assessment was consistent with the [indiscernible].

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo.

19             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, I'm going object to the last portion of

20     Mr. Kehoe's question.  Without going into the additional evidence, the

21     information he put to him may suggest that but ...

22             JUDGE ORIE:  You say this evidence before the Chamber is not

23     necessarily the evidence that's before the Chamber, because there may be

24     more evidence, so Mr. Kehoe that's -- and would you also have the exhibit

25     number for me the statement, paragraph 33.

Page 14740

 1             MR. KEHOE:  It has been read into evidence during the course of

 2     Alun Roberts's testimony.  He has not testified yet, so it has not been

 3     offered into evidence yet.  I'm talking about -- that's Colonel Hjertnes.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me just see.  One second.

 5             The statement of Hjertnes is ...

 6        Q.   January 15, 17th.  Paragraph 33, January --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  There is no exhibit number?

 8             MR. KEHOE:  No, because as far as making it as an exhibit when

 9     the witness has not testified yet with something that could be -- the

10     Chamber gave some guidance on that --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, yes.  I remember the problem.  Therefore that

12     is not in evidence at this moment.

13             MR. KEHOE:  I have a 1D number on, though.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but no, it's just ... so the evidence that is

15     before the Chamber, you said in the next paragraph.

16             MR. KEHOE:  That, in fact, was used during the course of the

17     testimony.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, and I'll check -- that's on you said 7079.

19             MR. KEHOE:  7079, line 19.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, thank you.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Through page 7081, line 8.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

23             Now let's go back to where we were.

24             MR. KEHOE:  And the e-court --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And we've ruled the objection.

Page 14741

 1             So that is in the evidence that is before this Chamber.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps you put the question again to the witness in

 4     order not to -- he may have forgotten what it really was about.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  Just for the record, Mr. President, the

 6     Steinar Hjertnes' statement that is in e-court is 1D10 --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  We have no access to --

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Oh, I'm sorry.  Apologies.  Apologies.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

10             MR. KEHOE:  If can I just go back and read that question.

11        Q.   Now, my question, and we just go back through this, Colonel, is

12     that -- and I think you answered this in the sense of the evidence that

13     was set forth in both the provisional assessment that we now know is a

14     final assessment, was not the same but consistent with what happened --

15     the evidence in CIVPOL and likewise was consistent with the report by the

16     United States monitors in the 7th of August that few downtown buildings

17     and residential areas showed signs of shell damage.

18        A.   I don't think I have said that.  I said that the consistency is

19     lying in the level of damage because the UNMO uses the word military

20     targets.  The CIVPOL report does not use that as far as I recollect, nor

21     does the report -- the report of the US representative.  So there are

22     some differences in there.

23        Q.   Turning our attention to the -- if we can go back to the

24     provisional assessment, P64.  And looking at the paragraph 2, were you

25     shown any documents by the OTP that indicated that the shelling was more

Page 14742

 1     widespread than that as described by Colonel Hjertnes in paragraph 2?

 2        A.   No.

 3        Q.   So would you agree with me that in looking at what actually

 4     transpired in this shelling endeavour that the centre of gravity Knin was

 5     taken out for the entire Krajina, not just in Sector South, that they

 6     didn't engage in something akin to fighting in built-up areas, and that

 7     very quickly the communications for the ARSK was so damaged that it

 8     ultimately led to the deadline and fall of the RSK?

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo.

10             MR. RUSSO:  I'm just going to ask that it broken up.  It's

11     compound in several ways.  I'm just going to ask that that be broken up

12     into individual questions.

13             MR. KEHOE:  If the witness can look at and disagree or nuance any

14     version, any form of it that he so desires.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me re-read the question.

16             Before you answer that question, Mr. Konings, I would invite you

17     to carefully read the question which is a composite question on the

18     screen in front of you and to see whether you, in its entirety, you would

19     agree with everything Mr. Kehoe put to you.

20             THE WITNESS:  Well, I have the idea that this is -- this

21     conclusion of Mr. Kehoe is now directly connected to this -- this sole

22     UNMO report.  And reading his conclusion, if that is true what I'm

23     saying, that is going, to me, way too far.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  So the answer is simply no.

25             THE WITNESS:  No.

Page 14743

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Then if you want to know more, Mr. Kehoe, then

 2     splitting up the question might assist you.

 3             MR. KEHOE:

 4        Q.   You would agree that the artillery attack -- you would agree the

 5     artillery attack successfully brought down the centre of gravity for the

 6     Republic of the Serb Krajina.

 7             You would agree with that, don't you?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And you agree that this centre of gravity was a location that was

10     important, essential not only for Knin but for the entire Krajina.

11     Correct?

12        A.   I would like to go back to your previous question where I said

13     yes.

14             THE WITNESS:  That possible Mr. --

15             MR. KEHOE:  Absolutely.

16        A.   Because to bring it in splendid isolation that the artillery

17     attack successfully brought down the centre of gravity, I don't think

18     that is a pure yes.  If you talk about that, then the artillery attack

19     has a role in that, and I don't deny that can be a large role, but I do

20     think that we have way we have described Operation Storm that the

21     complete operation is -- is the basis for the total breakdown of the Serb

22     forces.

23        Q.   Thank you for that additional explanation.

24             And as a result of the actions taken in Operation Storm, Knin

25     both on the ARSK side and the HV side, was not forced to fight in a

Page 14744

 1     built-up area taking on significant casualties on both sides as well as

 2     the civilian population.

 3        A.   You could say that.

 4        Q.   And the speed with which Operation Storm compromised the

 5     communications facilities of the ARSK in Knin led to a significant damage

 6     to the combat capabilities of the ARSK.  Again, not only in Sector South

 7     but throughout the Krajina.  Is that right?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Would you conclude, based on this, Colonel, that this was a very

10     successful operation by the HV?

11        A.   As far as the military part is concerning [sic], yes.  But I

12     still have one burning question left before I say -- before I give you

13     any answer.

14        Q.   Well, sir, with regard to -- we talked about this previously, and

15     have you no knowledge as to any collateral damage to the civilian

16     population, do you?

17        A.   That is not my burning question.

18        Q.   I understand.  That is my question.

19        A.   I have no -- I have no information about collateral damage.

20        Q.   Let's talk to the issue that you raised concerning the order

21     itself, and I trust your burning questions comes from your disagreement

22     with the phraseology employed in the combat order, P1125.

23             MR. KEHOE:  So let's turn to that.  And if we can turn to the

24     next page.  Actually, two pages.

25        Q.   I want to give you the front page, Colonel, just so you see it.

Page 14745

 1             Now this is the order with which you take issue.  Is that right?

 2        A.   I do think so.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  I don't know, Mr. Russo, is this a tab in the

 5     Colonel's book?  If I may, it may be easier to deal with it in paper.  If

 6     it is not, we can just deal with the screen but ...

 7             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, it's, tab 6.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Okay.  Thank you very much.  I appreciate it.

 9        Q.   Now, colonel, just paging through this order, I mean, it -- just

10     going through it, the first page, I mean, there is extensive information

11     on the status of the enemy.

12             MR. KEHOE:  Can we turn to page 2.  Can we go to the next page in

13     this document.

14        Q.   And it gives very -- it gives tasks at the bottom of the page to

15     the entities of the Split Military District.

16             "The Split Military District shall prepare and carry out joint

17     offensive operation in the following [sic] areas."

18             And gives the areas, northern Dalmatia, western Bosnia, Kupres

19     with the following task, and he tells them what to do.  This is

20     General Gotovina.

21             "A vigorous attack with intense artillery and air support on

22     direct axes directed at main military and political transportation

23     features in the enemy's operational depth, break up the enemy on the

24     forward defence line, and decisively advance and take control of the key

25     land transportation military and political features, thus putting the

Page 14746

 1     enemy in a no-exit situation and forcing him to surrender or withdraw."

 2             Now, Colonel, that's a very specific task that General Gotovina

 3     is giving to his -- or the soldiers in the Split Military District, isn't

 4     he?

 5        A.   I don't have any problem with that.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Now, this individual task that he is ordering is not only

 7     going out to the infantry.  It's an order that is going to artillery

 8     units as well.  Right?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   So he is telling them what he wants them to do.

11        A.   Absolutely clear.

12        Q.   Then he notes:  "What he has decided to do."

13             And have you read -- going through paragraph 4 --

14        A.   Yes, I have read that.

15        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... the detail with which he

16     phases this operation?

17        A.   Yes, I have read it.

18        Q.   Then he gives very specific detail in paragraph 5 as --

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... 6, excuse me, paragraph 5 on

21     page 6, 7.

22             MR. KEHOE:  Let's go to the next page.  Page 8.  Page 9.  Next

23     page.  Next page.

24        Q.   At the bottom of the page 10 is task for Operative Group Sibenik.

25             Page -- two pages up is Operation Group Zadar.  As is page 13.

Page 14747

 1             Now, he is telling them the particular areas that he wants them

 2     to move on, isn't he?

 3        A.   With all respect, sir, this is up so far in what you are saying,

 4     I have nothing to disagree with because it is a regular normal military

 5     order which in NATO we would have worded in another way, but it is an

 6     order that specifies the tasks for the underlying brigades of the various

 7     operational groups.  I have no problem with that wording or with the

 8     specification of the task.

 9        Q.   Let stay with that, Colonel.  And let's look at a portion --

10     another portion of a document that we received -- part of it we received

11     in evidence.  We didn't receive this portion, but it is 1D65-0481.

12             Can you recognise this document, do you not, sir?

13        A.   I recognise that, yes.

14        Q.   And what we're dealing with is just chapter 6 or a portion of

15     chapter 6 on plans and orders, and I would like to direct your attention

16     to 0654, which is the next page.

17             "0564, an operation order should include only such detail as is

18     necessary for commanders of subordinate formations or units to act

19     purposefully, to issue their own orders and to ensure coordination.

20     Mission command requires orders that concentrate on imparting an

21     understanding of the context of the operation and what needs to be done

22     rather than how it is to be achieved."

23             Now you recognise that, that is what an operational commander

24     will do?  He will tell his subordinates, as General Gotovina does in this

25     document, what, in fact, should be taken but leaves it to the individuals

Page 14748

 1     exactly how they are going to -- their infantry, for instance, is going

 2     to operate?

 3        A.   Certain -- in many cases he will -- mission command means that

 4     underlying or lower commanders are allowed to fill in the -- to use their

 5     own initiative in order to meet the commander's intent.  But there are

 6     also other things that have to be arranged very carefully ahead and that

 7     are not directly falling under the aspect of mission command.  So

 8     everything that's concerning rules of engagement, that kind of

 9     information, might be specified up to the fucking detail, I'm sorry that

10     I used that word, in annexes of operational orders, in target lists,

11     et cetera.

12             So on the one hand, you are absolutely right.  That is the

13     purpose of mission command, and on the other hand, also with mission

14     command, you have to arrange a lot of aspects in detail and write them

15     down so that everybody knows exactly what the commander means in that

16     operation.

17        Q.   Well, I mean, let's look at -- let's turn our attention to the

18     area.  I mean -- by the way if we can tender this into evidence

19     Mr. President.

20             MR. RUSSO:  No objection, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  That is Exhibit D1268, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Exhibit D1268 is admitted into evidence.

24             Mr. Kehoe, I'm looking at the clock.  I don't know whether --

25             MR. KEHOE:  It might take a while to go through this document.

Page 14749

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, then perhaps we should wait until tomorrow.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  I would already would ask Mr. Konings but already to

 4     leave us, but I would first like to give you the same instruction as I

 5     gave you before, that is that you should not speak with anyone about your

 6     testimony.

 7             And we would like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.00 in

 8     this same courtroom.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

10                           [The witness withdrew]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I would like to inquire with the parties about

12     timing.

13             Mr. Kehoe, I think tomorrow after the first session you will be

14     done with your three days.

15             MR. KEHOE:  Absolutely.  I will be done well before that, sir.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

17             Mr. Kuzmanovic, I am informed that you might need approximately

18     one session.

19             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  That's correct, Your Honour, probably less, but

20     I will take the full session if I need it.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Cayley, same as far as the Cermak defence is

22     concerned.

23             Mr. Russo, could you give us an estimate as matters stand now how

24     much time you will need for re-examination.

25             MR. RUSSO:  Approximately half an hour, Your Honour.

Page 14750

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Approximately half an hour, which gives a fair

 2     expectation that we will not have to have Mr. Konings to come back on

 3     Thursday and that he can finish his testimony tomorrow, perhaps even

 4     before the end of tomorrow's hearing.

 5             Mr. Russo, will that cause you problem in relation to your next

 6     witness?

 7             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, I believe we had intended to call the

 8     next witness on Thursday.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  On Thursday, yes, which is then -- we'll see to what

10     extent question deal with other procedural matters.  Otherwise, we might

11     have to delay that until Thursday.  But I'll see to what extent I can

12     prepare and have a full oversight on the list, but there are matter we

13     can deal with tomorrow.

14             Then finally, Mr. Kehoe, I was a bit lost in reference to your

15     pages 7079, line 19, through page 7081, line 8.  I am not fully aware

16     what I am supposed to find there.

17             MR. KEHOE:  I believe that during the cross-examination by Mr.

18     Misetic of Mr. Roberts, Mr. Roberts said that there was a provisional

19     assessment and a final assessment and that the final assessment was

20     consistent with the provisional assessment.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, what I found until now is that on the first

22     line you mention that Mr. Misetic put Exhibit P228 to the witness and

23     that a part of that was read to him, and that he mainly emphasised that

24     reports that were put to him were certainly not the only ones.  And there

25     is one thing where he was asked whether this P228 suggests this or that

Page 14751

 1     and then he said, The document does not say so or suggest that, but there

 2     were more -- I did not find as a matter of fact, consistency between

 3     provisional assessment and final assessment.  That's what I found and

 4     that is the reason why I'm asking you --

 5             MR. KEHOE:  If I can go back and take a look the transcript

 6     again, I will present it first think in the morning.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I'd like to --

 8             Mr. Misetic.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  It is it actually at page 7082.  Actually it starts

10     at 7081, line 13 and goes through 7082, line 6, and actually at lines 4

11     and 5 of page 7082 he says:

12             "I think I recall seeing the final document that went up and that

13     it concurred with their initial assessment."

14             And then I will find you Mr. --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  No, no, you now draw my attention to another portion

16     of the -- of course, you will understand that if Mr. Kehoe gives me a

17     source that I'm not going through all of the -- not going through all of

18     the -- how many are there at this moment?

19             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, let me also say that by tomorrow

20     morning I will get you -- I know Mr. Waespi did a re-direct examination

21     on this point where the witness was even more explicitly clear on this

22     point [Overlapping speakers] ...

23             JUDGE ORIE:  That's fine.  I'm just inquiring, but if I get

24     sources, then of course I'm not going through the 14.000 other pages but

25     rather focus on the sources given to me.  And as I said, I didn't say

Page 14752

 1     nothing more than I couldn't find it there.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  My apologies, Mr. President, for the wrong page.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We will we adjourn for the day, and we'll

 4     resume tomorrow, Tuesday, the 20th of January, 9.00 in the morning, in

 5     this same courtroom, I.

 6                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

 7                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 20th day of

 8                           January, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.