1 Monday, 8 June 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
8 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-06-90-T, the
9 Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina, et al.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 I was informed that there was an issue to be raised by the
12 General Gotovina Defence, a procedural issue.
13 Can it be dealt with in open session?
14 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe.
16 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, there were several video-clips that
17 Your Honours reserved judgement on. This goes back to June the 24th, and
18 it's at page 5065, line 22, and they were two audio clips that were
19 played during the course of cross-examination of Ambassador Galbraith.
20 And Mr. Tieger asked for some period of time to look at that, examine
21 them, and -- delayed admission. I suspect that -- and these are audios.
22 I suspected that time has come and gone, and nevertheless it is just
23 something that slipped through the cracks.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, apparently no MFI number was --
25 MR. KEHOE: No, it has not.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Which explains why the matter has not been dealt
2 with before.
3 Mr. Waespi, when Mr. Tieger asked for some time, would you
4 consider almost a year sufficient time?
5 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I'll check with him, and I think at the end of
6 this break inform you of the result.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Any other matter?
8 MR. KEHOE: The last is that D1451, the video that we played at
9 the end of the day on Friday.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 MR. KEHOE: I do not believe -- if I didn't formally tender it, I
12 would like to do so now. It had been MFIed, but we would like to seek
13 admission into evidence.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
15 Or should I ask you, Ms. Gustafson.
16 Now was all of it played? Let me just --
17 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
18 MS. GUSTAFSON: Was this the video that was played right at the
19 end of the testimony of the speech? I had thought it had been tendered,
20 and then there was an issue because it had earlier been tendered from the
21 bar table, not admitted by the Trial Chamber in March. And I pointed
22 that out at the time but noted that the Prosecution didn't have an
23 objection to its admission on Friday.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Which means that it has a --
25 MS. GUSTAFSON: Its status is MNA.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Marked, not admitted.
2 We'll check that, and it's now clear on the record that there is
3 no objection. Mr. Kehoe will look at it, most likely during the first
5 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Any other matter?
7 MR. KEHOE: I think if we go back and check, and I'm not sure
8 exactly what it was, but the objection was because it was bar-tabled
9 during the Prosecution's case in-chief. I have to go back and take a
10 look at the transcript itself, but I think that was the objection at the
11 time. Nevertheless --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, well, now since you introduced it now through a
13 witness, that it seems that that objection does not apply anymore.
14 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
16 Then we'll check that. Any other matter?
17 MR. KEHOE: The other matter, just very briefly, is P448. And
18 that is the meeting between Ambassador Galbraith and President Tudjman.
19 And during the course of the weekend we noticed that, frankly, that the
20 back side of that is not complete. The transcript itself is not complete
21 because it continues with some comments by Ambassador Zuzul. And
22 yesterday afternoon during course of discussions, we put together a
23 transcript of that and sent it to the OTP. But -- the audio has been in
24 evidence already, Mr. President, and the transcript simply was not
1 And we add that because the comments made by Ambassador Zuzul on
2 the cusp of that meeting or at the end of that meeting, I should say, are
3 extremely significant.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If the audio is it complete, then -- I take it
5 that you want to it verify the accuracy, Mr. Waespi, or the completeness,
6 I should say.
7 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I will do that. The current transcript of that
8 video says the session was concluded at 1805. Does that mean that there
9 was a continuous?
10 MR. KEHOE: Yes. It goes on to say, as -- towards the end of it,
11 and if I can bring up -- 65 ter 1D2719, just for demonstrative purposes
12 at this point. It's the item that I sent to the Prosecutor yesterday, or
13 that Ms. Katalinic sent yesterday.
14 It is simply a continuation on and completes that meeting and is
15 just a recitation of the audio, the rest of the audio. And frankly
16 what --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Is there a possibility that you check this together
18 during the first break, so that we --
19 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, absolutely.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I mean, it is not very efficient to do this in
22 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ORIE: But the Chamber will hear from the parties on the
25 Any other matter, Mr. Kehoe?
1 MR. KEHOE: I believe that is it, Mr. President, at this point.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I see, but the Chamber has been copied on a
3 supplemental information sheet which points at an inaccurate translation
4 at P461.
5 MR. KEHOE: That's correct, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Now, if this is verified I would very much like it
7 to be verified not only in the translation but also in the audio so that
8 we have, first of all, accurate transcription of what was said in
9 Croatian and then, of course, it should be properly translated.
10 Mr. Waespi.
11 MR. WAESPI: Yes. We'll be objecting to this witness talking
12 about a translation, to a meeting he wasn't present. There has been
13 quite some litigation I think still outstanding on this transcript, P461.
14 And the last submission by the Defence, I think April of this year, said
15 that the accurate translation was supposedly.
16 So to come in now with a witness who wasn't present, a fact
17 witness, who just happens to listen to this tape with a totally new
18 version, I think is inappropriate.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if -- and I'm, of course, now reading from the
20 -- from the supplemental information sheet which, of course, is not in
21 evidence at this moment. The witness states that this is an inaccurate
22 translation. Well, he may have an opinion about the correctness or
23 accuracy of the translation as he wishes. Of course, if there's any
24 doubt, and I would say whoever comes and sheds light on what may be an
25 inaccuracy, it is always worth verifying. That is not to say that this
1 witness should testify about whether the -- what he hears -- I mean, he
2 is not the expert who is going to interpret for us nor the audio, nor he
3 is going to verify the accuracy of the translation. Nevertheless, if
4 someone who speaks both Croatian and English says such a thing, if this
5 sheds -- this sheds any new light on earlier -- or transcriptions in
6 evidence or translations of those transcripts, and the relevant portion,
7 I think I read it last Friday, was still, may I say, an old version, at
8 least a version which is, at this moment, in evidence, nothing more,
9 nothing less.
10 Then it should be thoroughly looked at. If there is nothing new
11 and, of course, I don't have on my mind at this moment all the
12 discussions we may have had on the transcripts. Of course, we have had
13 discussions about transcripts and whether they were accurate or not, and
14 I don't have that all ready. But if there's any serious remaining issue,
15 it should be resolved in a most thorough way, because it might be
16 important for this case.
17 MR. KEHOE: If I may, on that score, if I can just give the --
18 Your Honours and the Prosecution some background.
19 Apparently the word being used is "Toboze." And I'm not a
20 Croatian speaker as we all --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Let's not discuss it at this moment. If there is
22 anything which adds to any earlier discussion, it should be submitted to
23 people who can hear a Croatian audio, people who could verify whether the
24 transcript is correct, and if the transcript is correct, whether it's
25 correctly translated. If there is any inaccuracy in that or any possible
1 inaccuracy in that, what the Chamber needs is a report which points at
2 what may inaccurate, what may not be inaccurate. There's no need at this
3 moment to discuss it, and may I also take it, Mr. Kehoe, that there is no
4 need to -- to ask the witness about it. He's just as good as any other
5 person who can understand Croatian --
6 MR. KEHOE: If I may. That's where I -- I need just to add some
7 additional views concerning the actual terminology, which I understand
8 from talking to the witness is an archaic word used very, very
9 infrequently, and I think it is important, because going back and
10 checking the usage of that word, it is remarkable how many times in the
11 transcripts President Tudjman used that word. He alone. And I think it
12 is important and what --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Then make submissions on the matter.
14 Mr. Kehoe --
15 MR. KEHOE: Actually, I think, Mr. President, at this particular
16 juncture, I think it is significant as to how people that were working
17 daily, certainly quite frequently, with President Tudjman would have
18 interpreted that comment. And that is the question that I would put to
19 Mr. Zuzul.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Yes. Well, that's fine, and that can be then
21 submitted to those who will verify transcription and translation.
22 MR. KEHOE: Just asking for guidance, Mr. President. My
23 intention was to, during the course of my direct examination, to allow
24 him to explain how he would interpret that comment.
25 Is that something you do not want me to do or -- that is what I
1 intended on doing.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I will discuss this with my colleagues during the
3 first break.
4 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Any other matter?
6 MR. KEHOE: I do believe that's --
7 JUDGE ORIE: That's all for the morning.
8 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, are you ready to call your next witness.
10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE ORIE: -- who is -- no protective measures?
12 MR. KEHOE: No protective measures.
13 JUDGE ORIE: And it will be Mr. Miomir Zuzul, if I correctly
15 MR. KEHOE: That is correct, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, can you please escort witness into the
18 When we are still waiting for the witness, Mr. Kehoe, D1478 the
19 letter in the two versions --
20 [The witness entered court]
21 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I think on that particular version, we
22 can withdraw our submission because one is just signed, and the first one
23 is not signed, but they are -- they are the same letters, Mr. President,
24 so as opposed to cluttering up the record with yet another document, we
25 can just --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll vacate one, the relevant number.
2 We'll do that later.
3 Good morning, Mr. Zuzul, I take it.
4 Mr. Zuzul, before you give evidence, the Rules of Procedure and
5 Evidence require that you make a solemn declaration that you will be
6 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
7 The text is now handed out to you by the usher. May I invite to
8 you make that solemn declaration.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
10 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I heard you speak some French words.
12 First of all, asseyez-vous.
13 This becomes a bit complicated for our interpreters. I asked you
14 to be seated.
15 Mr. Zuzul, although you used one line of French, may I take it
16 that you want to give your testimony in your own language?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course, Your Honour,
18 Mr. President, I merely wanted to thank you in French.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, are you ready -- you will first be
20 examined, Mr. Zuzul, by Mr. Kehoe. Mr. Kehoe is counsel for
21 Mr. Gotovina.
22 Please proceed.
23 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 WITNESS: MIOMIR ZUZUL
25 [Witness answered through interpreter]
1 Examination by Mr. Kehoe:
2 Q. Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.
3 Sir, can you state your name for the record and spell your last
5 A. My full name is Miomir Zuzul, spelled M-i-o-m-i-r Z-u-z-u-l.
6 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, do you recall being interviewed by members
7 of the Defence team for General Gotovina on the 6th and 7th of May, 2009,
8 as well as the 18th, 19th, and 20th of May, of 2009?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. And do you recall signing a statement on the 20th of May of 2009?
11 A. I do.
12 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, if we could bring up 65 ter 1D2687,
13 and with the Court's permission, if we could give Ambassador Zuzul hard
14 copies of that document.
15 JUDGE ORIE: It seems practical.
16 MR. KEHOE:
17 Q. Mr. Ambassador, before you came to court today, did you have a
18 chance to review this document that's before you?
19 A. Yes, I did.
20 Q. And that is a document that you signed, sir, is it not?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, during the course of our discussions
23 yesterday, you noted that you thought it appropriate to add two items
24 concerning your work with the OSCE to this document and that you would
25 present it to the Trial Chamber here today.
1 Could you do that for us?
2 A. Yes. I observed that I omitted to introduce in my -- to include
3 in my CV two important official positions that I held and which had
4 directly to do with peace missions outside Croatia.
5 In 2005, I was appointed to a group of seven eminent individuals
6 representing the international community with the aim of developing a
7 proposal for reorganizing the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
8 in Europe
9 with my experience in the negotiations referred to in my statement.
10 Likewise, in 2007, I was appointed special envoy to the OSCE with
11 the task of launching an inquiry into the so-called rocket incident in
13 between Georgia
14 a report to the OSCE council on the matter which the council adopted.
15 Q. The other correction that I think you've brought to our attention
16 is in paragraph 16 of your statement concerning the regular press
17 briefing at the White House that notes that the press briefing says
18 3 August 1995
19 2 August 1995
20 Is that correct, Mr. Ambassador?
21 A. That's correct. I believe it was on the 2nd of August.
22 Q. Given those additions and corrections, Mr. Ambassador, if I asked
23 you the same questions today that you were asked during the interviews
24 through the course of the month of May of 2009 and that have been
25 embodied in this statement, would you give the same answers to those
2 A. I would.
3 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we offer into evidence
4 65 ter 1D2687.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
6 MR. WAESPI: Yes, we have no objections. I just wonder whether
7 one of the other conditions of 92 ter, that it's an accurate record has
8 been met. But ...
9 JUDGE ORIE: I think --
10 MR. WAESPI: [Overlapping speakers]...
11 JUDGE ORIE: Sorry to interrupt. The first question always is
12 does the statement reflect what you said? Second, although this is a bit
13 broader than we find the rule itself, the second issue is whether at the
14 time you gave your statement to the best of your knowledge in accordance
15 with the truth. And the third is would you give the same answers if the
16 same questions would be asked to you today?
17 Well, the second and the third question, of course, have some
18 overlap. But that's what we usually ask the witness, Mr. Kehoe.
19 MR. KEHOE: Absolutely, Mr. President. I will take care of that
20 right now.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 MR. KEHOE:
23 Q. Mr. Ambassador, going through this particular statement, does
24 this statement reflect what you told members of the Gotovina Defence team
25 during the course of these interviews?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And, Mr. Ambassador, just at the risk of repeating this question,
3 to the best of your knowledge, when you were giving those answers were
4 you giving answers in a truthful manner -- in the best way possible?
5 A. Correct. To the best of my knowledge.
6 Q. And lastly, once again, would you give the same answers today as
7 you gave to members of the Gotovina Defence team during the May 2009
9 A. Yes.
10 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we would re-offer 1D2687.
11 That would be 65 ter 1D2687.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1485.
14 JUDGE ORIE: D1485 is admitted into evidence.
15 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President -- I'm sorry.
16 Mr. President, I explained to the witness the summary and that
17 this would be just a summary of his statement, and that's the purpose of
18 informing the public of the nature of this witness's testimony. So with
19 the Court' permission, if I could read that now.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Please do, Mr. Kehoe.
21 MR. KEHOE: Ambassador Zuzul received a doctorate from the
22 University of Zagreb
23 professor at the university level at both the University of Zagreb
24 University of Pittsburgh
25 1992, Ambassador Zuzul accepted the position of assistant minister of
1 foreign affairs for the Republic of Croatia
2 In June 1992, Ambassador Zuzul became President Tudjman's
3 national security advisor.
4 In 1993, Ambassador Zuzul was appointed to be the ambassador and
5 permanent representative of the Republic of Croatia
7 with representatives of the international community and actively
8 participated in negotiations for a peace deal in Bosnia and Herzegovina
9 On June 27th, 1994
10 the president for peace negotiations with the Contact Group and other
11 representatives of the international community. Ambassador Zuzul has
12 testified that President Tudjman and the state political leadership gave
13 strong support to the peace negotiations.
14 In July 1995, Serb units, under the command of Ratko Mladic,
15 attacked Srebrenica and other Bosnian enclaves, at the same time as the
16 army of the Republic of Serb Krajina launched an attack from Croatian
17 soil on the Bihac pocket. The fall of Bihac was assessed to be
18 potentially a humanitarian and military crisis for Croatia. As a result,
19 Ambassador Zuzul was sent to an international conference in London to
20 seek the possibility of international or Croatian forces intervention in
22 Following the conference in London, Ambassador Zuzul went to
24 United Nations [sic] and the EU. The Split Agreement provided for
25 greater cooperation between Croatia
1 Croat forces in Bosnia
2 commander of the joint Croatian forces.
3 Following the Split Agreement, General Gotovina was involved in
4 four major military operations, Operation Summer 95, Operation Storm,
5 Operation Maestral, and Operation Southern Move which created the
6 conditions for peaceful negotiations and the signing of the
8 With respect to Operation Storm, Ambassador Zuzul testified that
9 the decision to go ahead with the operation was not made until the
10 evening of 3 August 1995
11 peaceful reintegration at Geneva
12 Ambassador Zuzul never heard of the existence of any alleged plan
13 to expel the Krajina Serbs. On the contrary, on numerous occasions,
14 President Tudjman expressed that he truly respected the international
15 warnings that in any military operation, Croatia must protect the Serb
16 civilian population.
17 And, Mr. President, that concludes the summary of
18 Ambassador Zuzul's testimony.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Kehoe.
20 Please proceed.
21 MR. KEHOE:
22 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to direct your attention to several
23 items in your statement, and starting with paragraphs 5 and 6, where you
24 begin to discuss the Contact Group and that you were the special envoy to
25 the Contact Group, and in paragraph 5, you said you received that
1 appointment on the 27th of June, 1994.
2 Can you explain to the Trial Chamber what exactly the
3 Contact Group was, how long you remained in that position, and what did
4 you do in that capacity?
5 A. My duty as an ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva
6 to participate in negotiations and to follow the work of the conference
7 on the former Yugoslavia
8 Sometime in late 1993 and early 1994, it became quite evident
9 that the conference had found itself in a crisis, that they lacked the
10 settlements and methods of negotiations that would stop the war in
12 JUDGE ORIE: Sorry to interrupt you. The question was not
13 describe the background of why the Contact Group was established. The
14 question simply was: Can you explain what exactly the Contact Group was,
15 how long you remained in that position, and what did you do in that
17 Could you please very much focus on the questions that are put to
19 Please continue your answer.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Contact Group was, in actual
21 fact, a reaction to the situation that had prevailed earlier on and which
22 was unable to find a solution. That's why perhaps I started a bit too
23 early in my answer.
24 It was set up at the initiative of the United States. It was an
25 ad hoc group consisting of five states which could use their influence to
1 the highest extent in order to bring about a solution. How efficient
2 that approach was became evident when the war was successfully stopped -
3 that's to say, the war between the Croats and Bosniaks - and when the
4 Washington Agreement was signed.
5 Thereafter, to some extent formally and actively, the work of the
6 Contact Group consisting of five states, continued. My role was to
7 maintain regular communications with the Contact Group, with the
8 Contact Group member states, and to report thereon, first of all, to the
9 president of the Republic, and also to convey the views -- the viewpoints
10 of the Republic of Croatia
11 work with the Contact Group, attains its strategic and, at the time, the
12 most important goals, which were to stop the war and the Serb aggression
13 and to reintegrate all the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia
14 MR. KEHOE:
15 Q. Before we get too far on that, I mean, the Contact Group itself,
16 and you said it was made up of countries. What were those countries that
17 made up the five states that were in the Contact Group?
18 A. These were the United States of America, France, Great Britain
20 Occasionally, other -- certain other countries of the
21 European Union became involved, depending on the rotation of the
22 Presidency of the European Union.
23 Q. Now, Ambassador Zuzul, you just talked about strategic goals.
24 And I will turn your attention to the first sentence in your paragraph 6
25 where you mention the three basic strategic goals of the Republic of
2 establish control within the internationally recognised borders of the
3 Republic of Croatia
4 Euro-Atlantic community.
5 Now, those three goals, I mean, were they co-equal goals? Was
6 one more important than the other? Can you just discuss those to the
7 Trial Chamber and explain the perspective, and what the Republic of
10 A. From its very beginnings, or to be more precise, from the start
11 of the Serbian -- of the Serb aggression, these three goals were, for the
12 Republic of Croatia
13 All the global activities of the Republic of Croatia
14 included all of the three goals.
15 Q. Staying with the first goal, which was to stop the war and
16 prevent the Serb aggression, from your -- the Republic of Croatia
17 perspective, what were you talking about when you wrote in your statement
18 "prevent Serb aggression."
19 What Serb aggression were you talking about, discussing?
20 A. Of course, I could tell you a great deal about this issue and
21 from different angles. What I could say, in the most global of terms, in
22 the -- in this particular context is that there existed a planned and
23 devised aggression with the aim of occupying and permanently seizing
24 large swathes of the territory of the Republic of Croatia
25 even larger territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was one and the same
1 idea of aggression, regardless of the fact that it was implemented in the
2 territories of two internationally recognised states.
3 The final goal of this idea was to create the so-called
4 Greater Serbia
5 aggression, to create a state which would include all the territories
6 inhabited by the Serbs.
7 Q. Let me just interrupt there and if we can just move through the
8 statement. You talk about the strategic goals and you talk about
9 stopping the aggression. And was -- during this period of time, was
10 there a relationship, as you moved forward here, between the diplomacy
11 and the military and how to achieve those goals?
12 A. The relationship existed throughout the time; otherwise, the
13 goals could not be coordinated.
14 Q. So --
15 A. Under the Croatian constitution in force at the time,
16 coordination took place at the level of the president of the Republic or,
17 that's to say the office of the president of the republic.
18 Q. Ambassador Zuzul, as we moved through this and you talked about
19 the strategic goals and you being on the diplomatic end and then, of
20 course, being a military component and part of the strategic goals, of
21 course, was the reintegration of occupied land as you said.
22 Was there a preferred path by President Tudjman to be used on how
23 to achieve these strategic goals? Was it diplomatically, militarily?
24 What was he interested in certainly achieving these goals with some
25 emphasis on the occupied areas?
1 A. I can, with full conviction, assert that President Tudjman
2 preferred a peaceful - in other words, diplomatic - or a negotiated
3 settlement. I heard him say that on many occasions. I heard his
4 statement several times, and therefore I dared to quote it from memory.
5 He would say, I would negotiate with the devil himself if that could save
6 lives and lead to a peaceful solution.
7 Naturally, I can also testify to the fact that all the
8 instructions that I received from him were of such a nature that they
9 sought a way of resolving the crisis through negotiations, as well as
10 attaining all of the three goals.
11 I can also testify to the fact that President Tudjman always kept
12 in mind the fact that the war would be over some day and that Croatia
13 would, sooner or later, have to be part of an integrated Europe or, as he
14 would put it at the time, of the western world.
15 Q. Mr. Ambassador, if I could ask you a question we --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, may I ask you.
17 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ORIE: We have now listened for some six minutes --
19 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE ORIE: -- as an answer to one simple question, where you
21 wouldn't expect anything else than what is already in the statement.
22 That is, that the primary focus was on reintegration through peaceful
23 means and that military solution was not the one sought by the Croatian
24 authorities, including President Tudjman.
25 Now this took me approximately 30 seconds to say. Why does the
1 Chamber has to listen to something which is meant to be in an efficient
2 way of introducing evidence, whereas from every line, paragraph 6,
3 paragraph 15, everywhere, let's not continue this way, because then the
4 -- I think four hours announced will certainly be cut. I mean, it is
5 repetitious and again, as you know, the Chamber does not mind to hear now
6 and then for a second time, the same statement.
7 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE ORIE: But, six, seven minutes to listen to something which
9 obviously appears in the statement, of course, not in exactly the same
10 wording, and it is for you, therefore, yo focus your questions.
11 MR. KEHOE: Absolutely.
12 JUDGE ORIE: And to interrupt the witness if he starts saying in
13 different words exactly the same as we find already in the statement.
14 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Please keep this in mind.
16 MR. KEHOE:
17 Q. Being guided by the president's admonitions, Ambassador Zuzul, if
18 we could move this along a little quickly, maybe turn this conversation
19 -- discussion into a bit more of a conversation where we can move through
20 this expeditiously, I think we will cover those goals.
21 You're talking about the diplomatic arm. You certainly were
22 aware of the military component to the negotiations and that
23 General Gotovina was in fact a military officer in charge of the combined
24 HV/HVO forces after the Split Agreement, as you note in paragraph 12 of
25 your agreement [sic].
1 My question for you at this point was, you know, you were at this
2 meeting in Split
3 was selected for this appointment? I mean, do you have an assessment of
4 the situation as someone who was intricately involved?
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Zuzul, in your statement, you say that it was
6 because he was not a former JNA officer, and that he was not involved in
7 politics if I understood it well, but --
8 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, that's in the proofing note, I
10 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, that's in the proofing note. Yes, yes, I
11 apologise. I read even what you send me in the morning.
12 Yes, so why not if that is what he said in the proofing notes, we
13 could --
14 MR. KEHOE: I'm trying not to lead him, judge.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I will help you.
16 Mr. Zuzul, is it because he wasn't a ex-JNA officer, and was it
17 because he was not involved in politics? Was that what made him such a
18 good choice for the job?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was my impression, and when I
20 said not in the statement but in the interview that he was chosen because
21 he was not involved in politics, it was my impression that a person was
22 sought who had military knowledge, military authority, but who was able
23 to achieve a good cooperation with the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
24 because that was precisely the idea of the Split Declaration and the
25 Split meeting.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
3 MR. KEHOE:
4 Q. Now let us direct our attention to July of 1995 and just talk
5 generally about the situation in the Bihac pocket.
6 MR. KEHOE: If we can bring up on the screen D1466 which is the
7 map of the area that had been admitted into evidence.
8 Q. And as this is coming up, Mr. Ambassador, just briefly, can you
9 just talk a little bit in your dealings with the -- President Tudjman and
10 with the international community, I mean, were you discussing the
11 economic effect of these -- the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina
13 the discussions, economically speaking?
14 A. Well, we've discussed this. From the time when the so-called
15 Serbian Krajina was set up, it divided Croatia de facto in two parts, or
16 almost. Travelling from one part to another was very, very difficult,
17 almost impossible at times, and the entire economy of Dalmatia and
18 southern Croatia
19 collapsing, let alone the fact that this economy based itself, to a great
20 extent, on tourism. That was common knowledge, and the international
21 community was unable to respond to it with any effective mechanism.
22 Q. Mr. Ambassador, you were aware -- were you aware of joint
23 military activities by the RSK and the Bosnian Serb army into the Bihac
24 pocket in July of 1995?
25 A. Yes, I was aware of that. We were very concerned over the
1 possible outcomes of that situation, especially since it held the seeds
2 of a great humanitarian catastrophe, greater, perhaps, than any one
3 before it.
4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
5 A. That was one thing. And second --
6 Q. Okay. You can give the second one, I'm sorry.
7 A. And, second, it was our evaluation that, if the Serb forces, that
8 is to say, forces from both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia
9 assisted by forces from Serbia
10 capture Bihac, that would be a military achievement of their strategic
11 goal, which was Greater Serbia. In that event, they would control a
12 compact territory, all the way form the borders of Romania and Bulgaria
13 well into Croatian territory on the west.
14 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... just looking at this, just
15 so -- D1466. You see the black line going up the railway going up from
16 Knin to Bihac back to Banja Luka. I know it goes -- there's been
17 testimony that goes on into Serbia
18 Based on your knowledge of the terrain and based on the -- the
19 railway itself, was that significant in your discussions with the
20 international community, as to what would occur if that railway line was
21 taken over?
22 A. That would have given Serb forces a relatively easy line of
23 communication; in other words, it would have enabled them to supply any
24 kind of arms without great difficulty. Otherwise, any communication
25 through Bosnia and Herzegovina is much harder than by rail, and
1 strategically speaking, that would have strengthened Serb forces
2 militarily, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the occupied
3 territories of Croatia
4 Q. Let me turn your --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, let's try to -- I think it is not the
6 first time that we hear about the strategic importance of getting control
7 over at least that portion of Bihac because of the railway line there.
8 Is this a matter in dispute, Mr. Waespi?
9 MR. WAESPI: No, it's not.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Then, therefore, I think apparently there's no
11 dispute about that, and since we heard repetitious evidence now on that,
12 there's no need to continue that or to repeat it.
13 Please proceed.
14 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. At this time I would just like
15 to show two documents, if can I bring up 1D2708, 65 ter 1D2708 which is a
16 report from Ambassador Zuzul concerning the London meeting on the 21st of
17 July of 1995.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Is this one where you applied for it having be added
19 to the 65 ter list?
20 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Let's first deal with that.
22 MR. WAESPI: No objections to neither of these documents that
23 were added.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Then the request to add - let me be sure about it -
25 I think there were five, Mr. Kehoe.
1 MR. KEHOE: That's correct, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just see how this was introduced because
3 I ...
4 There was a motion filed to add them to the 65 ter list, I think,
5 with five annexes, Croatian and English text, which was filed when
6 exactly? Because if I grant a request, I'd rather --
7 MR. KEHOE: 4 June 2009
8 JUDGE ORIE: The request to add, I think there were five.
9 MR. KEHOE: Yes, I believe that's correct.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Five documents to the 65 ter exhibit list which was
11 filed on the 4th of June, is granted.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. KEHOE: Yes. Just if this particular document,
14 Mr. President, is a report from Ambassador Zuzul for his meeting with
15 various officials of the United States government talking about Bihac.
16 And we would offer 65 ter 1D2008 into evidence.
17 MR. WAESPI: [Overlapping speakers] ...
18 MR. KEHOE: [Overlapping speakers] ... And in conjunction with
19 that, Mr. President, if we could add the other one too, which is 65 ter
20 1D2715, which is a report of, again, Ambassador Zuzul's meeting in London
21 with Klaus Kinkel and Ambassador Steiner of the German embassy.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, numbers, if you could give me dates, because
23 I've --
24 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE ORIE: The first one was 24th of July, if I'm --
1 MR. KEHOE: Correct.
2 JUDGE ORIE: The second one you mentioned was?
3 MR. KEHOE: The second one is undated. It is a note about the
4 meeting that says London
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see that.
6 No objections, Mr. Waespi?
7 MR. WAESPI: Yes, correct.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 1D2708 becomes Exhibit D1486. And
10 65 ter number 1D2715 becomes Exhibit D1487.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Both are admitted into evidence.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. Now after these meetings in London, if we go to paragraph 12 in
15 your statement, you then begin to talk about the Split Agreement. And if
16 you could just give us a very short synopsis of what the Split Agreement
17 was intended to do and what the goals were by executing the Split
19 A. To put it very concisely the objective of the Split Agreement was
20 to establish military cooperation between the Croatian army and the HVO,
21 on one hand, and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand,
22 primarily with a view to defending Bihac and stopping the Serb
24 Q. Now, you note in your statement in paragraph 13 that the first
25 operation thereafter was Operation Summer 95 which commenced on the 25th
1 of July, per paragraph 13 of your statement.
2 Were aware at that time that General Gotovina was the operational
3 commander conducting this operation on behalf of the combined forces?
4 A. Yes, I knew that.
5 Q. Now, after -- well, approximately at the same time -- when you
6 were in discussions here and this is the -- one point of some of those
7 letters. When you were discussing -- going into Bihac and -- or
8 executing the operation of Summer 95, were you in consultation with
9 international entities such as the United States and keeping them in --
10 up to date as exactly what was transpiring?
11 A. I think the best answer to that is that Ambassador Galbraith was
12 in Split
13 Chancellor Kohl had qualified in the presence of President Tudjman, as
14 his special envoy. So, of course, the international community was aware
15 of that.
16 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... turn to another note about
17 yours, Mr. Ambassador, 25 July 1995, and that's 65 ter 1D2709.
18 MR. KEHOE: If we could bring that up on the screen.
19 Q. And this is a note, Mr. Ambassador, after your meeting with
20 Ambassador Galbraith.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, while waiting, the last answer we find
22 every detail of that in paragraph 12, to some extent, and 13 of the
24 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Now what did you do in putting the question to the
1 witness to avoid that it was just a repetition of what is already in the
3 MR. KEHOE: Well, we're just carrying over to the next issue
4 which is the next line of questioning, so that's why I was moving to this
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
7 MR. KEHOE: [Overlapping speakers] ... set up to that.
8 If we can go to this document.
9 Q. Now, if we can go to the bottom of the page on the English, the
10 last paragraph, and it notes that:
11 "The demarche and the conversation that we had led me to believe
12 that the United States feels that Croatian intervention in Bihac is
13 necessary, and that they believe the Republic of Croatia
14 intervene relatively openly and from multiple directions."
15 Now, with regard to this, and I asked this question, Ambassador,
16 as a foundation for additional questions as we move through
17 Operation Storm and thereafter. In your dealings with President Tudjman,
18 was he sensitive to a report such as this, where, if the you states had
19 said, Don't attack, would he have taken that into consideration in making
20 any decision to do so?
21 A. I am certain that I would have taken that position into account
22 in making any kind of decision.
23 Q. Well, how about President Tudjman? Based on your dealings with
24 President Tudjman, would he have taken that into account in making any
1 A. [In English] That was my answer. Interpretaiton is wrong.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. [Interpretation] President Tudjman would have taken into account
4 any such reports all times.
5 Q. If we could turn to the next page which is a series of notes that
6 were made in conjunction with this meeting, being the third page in this
7 document. And if we go to right before -- above the specific -- it's
8 right before the specifically. It says:
10 by the Croatian government forces."
11 And as we move down into the specifically, and this is
12 Ambassador Galbraith giving this information to you. In the second
13 bullet point:
14 "Ensure discipline in the troops so that civilians and POWs are
15 treated in accordance with international law."
16 Now when you conveyed that to the president, was it your belief
17 that based on dealings with the president that he was, number one,
18 conscious that the United States wanted to make sure that civilians were
19 protected; and, number two, that he took that admonition from the
20 United States very seriously?
21 A. I think President Tudjman understood that.
22 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'll to offer into
23 evidence 65 ter 1D2709.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
25 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I have no objections. But if it could be made
1 clear what the last page is in relation to the first two pages. First
2 two pages appear to be something Mr. Zuzul drafted and then there's an
4 JUDGE ORIE: I understood from the testimony that these were
5 notes by Ambassador Galbraith, apparently handed over or at least
6 attached to the letter to be sent to President Tudjman.
7 Is that correct, Mr. Zuzul?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What is attached is the written
9 demarche that Ambassador Galbraith handed to me as a -- the position of
10 his government, and in diplomatic jargon I understood that is the
11 position of the government of the United States.
12 JUDGE ORIE: What you are talking about in paragraph 13 of your
13 statement; is that correct? And officially handed me the demarche of the
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand no objections, Mr. Waespi.
17 This willing clarified, Mr. Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1488.
19 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
20 Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
21 MR. KEHOE: Yes, thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. Now, if we move forward in your statement, Ambassador, going to
23 paragraph 13, and going to the last line in paragraph 13, it says:
24 "Several days after the successfully carried out military
25 operation, 29 July 1995
1 requested that the Republic of Croatia
3 And before I ask you the question, I'd like you to take a look a
4 portion of Ambassador Galbraith's diary, that would be P458. And I
5 believe this is for the entry of July the 29th - this is only in English,
6 Mr. President - and it would be page 17 at the bottom.
7 MR. KEHOE: If we can blow up towards the bottom, we're going to
8 go just to the bottom two paragraphs on -- the entry of 29 at the bottom
9 and -- yeah, okay.
10 Q. Starting this with the second paragraph, Mr. Ambassador:
11 "I received a demarche instruction to see Tudjman or the highest
12 available government of Croatia
13 should withhold on military action. This represented a slight change
14 from our earlier position that any Croatian action should be limited."
15 "Susak is the only senior government of Croatia official in town,
16 and I called on him at 11.30. He was exhausted but pleased with the
17 recent successes. He listened as I read out our points and then" --
18 If you can turn the page on that, please, go to the top.
19 "That the RSK troops appear to be pulling out of Bihac. I
20 jumped in, pointing out that the HVO/HV offensive had achieved its
21 results, and therefore was no longer a reason for immediate HV action
22 into Krajina. He replied" - he being Susak - "if we stop, then what?
23 They will be back to attacking in two weeks. He provided some other
24 military details."
25 Now, this discussion, Mr. Ambassador, I mean, were you aware of
1 this discussion, or did you become aware of this discussion, and what can
2 you tell the Trial Chamber about this dialogue between
3 Ambassador Galbraith and Minister Susak and what happened thereafter?
4 A. I first learned of these details during proofing. I'm talking
5 about details, I had never seen the demarche that Ambassador Galbraith
6 referred to, and I never knew that he submitted it to the Republic of
8 Minister Susak, he would not have handed it to the minister of defence.
9 What I do know from that time is that I was invited by President Tudjman
10 who told me that there existed certain unclear communications with the
11 United States, referring, I suppose, to this conversation between
12 Minister Susak and Ambassador Galbraith. President Tudjman asked me to
13 travel to Washington
14 find out the real meaning of these communications and the position of the
15 United States.
16 Q. Well, in paragraph 14 of your statement you note that you did in
17 fact go to Washington
18 MR. KEHOE: And if we could bring up on the screen 65 ter 1D1445
19 which is a note of your meeting with, on the 31st of July, with
20 Ambassador Holbrooke, Ambassador Frasure, and Ambassador Hill.
21 Q. Now, you have seen this note before, Mr. Ambassador, reflecting
22 your meeting with those individuals?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Now if we could go to -- that first paragraph is beginning: "At
25 the beginning."
1 MR. KEHOE: If we could scroll up on that, Mr. Registrar. I'm
2 interested in the last sentence in that paragraph, beginning with
4 I'm not certain if that is exactly -- is consistent with the
5 Croatian. It's on the same page.
6 Do you see that sentence "therefore ..."?
7 It then says: "Therefore the Republic of Croatia
8 its efforts to make their military successes and military initiative a
9 trump card for negotiations with the aim of, if possible, primarily the
10 peaceful reintegration of all occupied area of the Republic of Croatia
11 Do you see that, Mr. Ambassador?
12 A. I see that.
13 Q. Mr. Ambassador, even after Operation Summer 95, had President
14 Tudjman and the Republic of Croatia
15 peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas of the Krajina?
16 A. No. At no point was the idea of peaceful reintegration of the
17 occupied territories given up on. And if you allow me to add,
18 everywhere, and at all times when we discussed occupied territories, we
19 always had in mind there was another occupied territory of the Republic
20 of Croatia
21 Q. Now let us just begin to talk about that just briefly, and we
22 will come back to that at the end.
23 Was -- were the negotiations concerning Eastern Slavonia and
24 Baranja significant to President Tudjman as well as the reintegration of
25 the Krajina?
1 A. Both were of equal significance to him.
2 Q. And when we talk about significance, did he, based on your
3 conversations with him, want to peacefully reintegrate all of those lands
4 back into the Republic of Croatia
5 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I think that's leading.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
7 It seems it is. However, not a question came into my mind what's
8 -- especially the reason that you object against leading, where it seems
9 that here, again, it's to some extent repetitious, and to some extent it
10 transpires from the statement.
11 MR. WAESPI: Well, then it's a repetition of the statement and
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You don't have to adapt your reasons for
14 objecting to my questions.
15 Mr. Kehoe --
16 MR. KEHOE: [Overlapping speakers]... I can just move on to the
17 next topic. We will get back to some of those discussions as we go
18 through these documents, and I can just withdraw the question and just
19 move on.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I can't say that you have taken fully away my
21 concern about the way in which time is used.
22 Please proceed.
23 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
24 Q. Now if we can turn to page 2 of this document.
25 And if we go to the second paragraph beginning with: "In
2 Actually it's the first full paragraph, yes.
3 And in that -- we need to change the page in the B/C/S, please.
4 In that paragraph, it notes:
5 "In connection with Stoltenberg and Mr. Akashi's initiative for
6 future [sic] negotiations with the Croatian Serbs from the occupied
7 territories, Ambassador Zuzul just now while emphasizing Croatia
8 willingness for negotiations at any given time, expressed his doubts
9 regarding his sincerity for the wishes of constructive talks and stating
10 that this may be an attempt to stall the situation and win more time."
11 What are you talking about there, sir, I mean, what is your
12 perspective when you were saying this during the course of these
14 A. As far as I can remember now, it was my impression that all at
15 once the Serb side sent out a signal that it was now ready to negotiate
16 in a way in which it had not been hitherto. Our assessment was that the
17 signal did not mean that they wanted to approach the negotiations
18 seriously. Rather, that they merely wanted to prevent their military
19 position from weakening any further.
20 MR. KEHOE: If we can go to the next page in this document which
21 is the last page. And in the first full paragraph it's his discussion
22 with regard to Ambassador Holbrooke's requests. And without reading the
23 entire matter, Mr. Ambassador, when you finished these meetings with
24 Ambassador Holbrooke could you tell us, in plain terms, what was your
25 take-away from this meeting as to what the position of the United States
1 was concerning any future military action.
2 A. At risk of repeating myself, I can tell you that on the basis of
3 this meeting as well as on the basis of a number of other informal and
4 formal meetings that I had in Washington
5 conclusion that the United States of America fully understood that
6 without Croatian intervention, there would ensue a humanitarian tragedy
7 in the area of Bihac. I understood that they knew that the joint action
8 of the Croatian and Bosnian forces were very successful in their military
9 actions and that these successful military actions could first lead to a
10 breakdown in the Serb military force and, secondly, in the strengthening
11 of the Federation of the Croats and Bosniaks which is what they pointed
12 out on several occasions.
13 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
14 A. However, by the same token --
15 Q. Sorry, if can I correct this. Specifically towards the potential
16 offensive into the Krajina and Operation Storm. I mean, based on these
17 meetings with him - with Ambassador Holbrooke and others, what was your
18 sense as to what the position of the United States was on future military
19 actions to retake the Krajina?
20 A. I believe that the position was as follows. Regardless of the
21 course the military actions might take, and it was never specifically
22 stated what course it was that they should not take, that they had to
23 take care of the international forces that were present in the area and
24 to make sure that they protect the civilians.
25 MR. KEHOE: If we go to -- just one last question on this
1 document, Mr. President. And I know we're a little bit over time, just
2 to move through this.
3 If we go to the bottom of the page and point 4, Where you note
5 "They recognised that the initiated operations are leading toward
6 a final solution, and they, themselves, warned not to fall for the
7 attempts to use the negotiations as an excuse in order to prevent their
9 Q. Can you elaborate on that just briefly. I mean, what was your
10 sense as to what Ambassador Holbrooke and others were telling you
11 concerning the delaying the negotiations as an excuse to prevent the
12 realisation of any completed military action? What was your sense of
13 this, sir, that you were trying to deliver to President Tudjman and
15 A. My impression over all was that, on the one hand, we should never
16 give up on the idea to resolve the problem through negotiations; and on
17 the other, in a situation where there was a chance to solve the problems
18 in actual terms through a military victory over the Serb forces, any sort
19 of pretense at negotiations which would only place obstacles in the way
20 of a military activity could only prove to be counterproductive in that
22 Q. Thank you. Sorry, did you finish your answer?
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Zuzul, we will have a break --
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's all there in the transcript
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Zuzul, we'll have a break, and we have to deal
2 with another procedural matter totally unrelated to your testimony which
3 has to be done in private session, so I will ask the usher to escort you
4 out of the courtroom.
5 [Witness stands down]
6 We briefly, very briefly, go into private session.
7 [Private session]
23 [Open session]
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
1 The issue of the two documents D1478 and D637, which I just
2 touched upon before the witness entered the courtroom, D1478, that
3 number, will be vacated.
4 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: It was -- the difference with D637 was that D637 had
6 a cover page and apparently was an unsigned telefax copy of the letter.
7 And I take it, Mr. Waespi, that there's no dispute about a signed letter
8 which, apparently, was sent, because that's what the cover page of the
9 telefax copy says, sent on that day, that it was sent and that it was
11 Under those circumstances, we leave it to D637.
12 We will resume at ten minutes past 11.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.43 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.14 a.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, the Chamber has considered the way in
16 which the examination proceeds, and considers in view of many factors,
17 such as repetitious to the statement, repetitious to other evidence, how
18 focussed the questions are, well, many of these what is foreground and
19 what is details of background, that you should finish the testimony of
20 this witness today. You claimed four hours. We take three and a half
21 effective hours apart from procedural matters on an average day, and the
22 Chamber considered that even with this decision, it -- that there's still
23 a bit of again generosity in it.
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. KEHOE: If can just put my comment on the record, so we can
1 -- for future review.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 MR. KEHOE: I will attempt in all possibilities to finish in this
4 time. I will note for the record, Mr. President, not once during the
5 Prosecution's case did such an instruction come from you, Mr. President,
6 to the OTP. As can you see I am attempting to move this along,
7 interrupting the witness pursuant to Your Honours' instructions and
8 trying to get to the core of this as quickly as possible. I have -- the
9 Defence has no desire to make this any more lengthy than we think is to
10 get this information is concerned. And on a pure fairness issue,
11 Your Honour, I will point out, Mr. President, that not once did such an
12 instruction -- was any cutting of time given to the Prosecution.
13 If I can, at this time, move ahead and move into evidence 65 ter
14 1D445, which was the 31st July 1995 note from Mr. Zuzul concerning the
15 meeting in Washington
16 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter number 1D1445 becomes
19 Exhibit D1489.
20 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
21 MR. KEHOE:
22 Q. Ambassador Zuzul, if I may, if we could pick up the pace as you
23 heard the instruction coming from the President. My time is now limited,
24 if we could pick up the pace in our comments, I think it would expedite
25 matter, number one. Number two, you need not worry about the translation
1 and wait for the translation before you begin your response, translators
2 are in fact having a difficult time because it is moving to slowly. So
3 if we could move things along a bit more quickly, we could finish through
4 this, and I can abide by the order that I have just been given to the
5 Trial Chamber.
6 Okay, sir?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, in paragraph 16 of your statement you note the three
9 conditions in Washington
10 first - and this is the middle of 16 - first that the operation had to be
11 carried out quickly. Second, during the operation, maximum care must be
12 taken of the safety and human rights of the civilians in the occupied
13 area, and third guarantee the safety of UN.
14 And you also note that the White House spokesperson conveyed
15 these statements in a press briefing. And I will turn to 65 ter 1D2631.
16 If we could just go to page 1 first and then we go to the second page, I
17 just want to show you the initial briefing, and this goes to the
18 correction that you made to the statement.
19 This is only in English, Mr. President, as we can see from --
20 it's not up yet. As we can see this is a date of the 3rd for a press
21 briefing of the 2nd by Mr. McCurry, the press office of the White House.
22 And if we can turn to page 2 of this document, towards the bottom of the
23 page, we can note the areas that of discussion - and it is the
24 second-to-last paragraph - talking about the discussions with Croatian
25 officials. And --
1 Is that the particular comment you were referring to in your
2 statement, Ambassador Zuzul?
3 A. That's right.
4 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into
5 evidence 65 ter 1D2631.
6 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1490.
9 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
10 MR. KEHOE:
11 Q. Ambassador Zuzul, I'd like to direct your attention a
12 paragraph 20 of your statement. In the first line of that statement, you
13 note that the final decision on launching the military operation for
14 liberation was brought on the VONS session on 3 August 1995.
15 We have heard testimony that VONS is the Defence and national
16 security council that was established within the government, and we've
17 heard some testimony on that before.
18 Now if I can ask you some preliminaries. Prior to this
19 discussion, were you aware there were in fact military meetings prior to
20 this VONS meeting, were plans had been made militarily for the liberation
21 of the so-called Krajina?
22 A. I can't say that I knew of these meetings in any precise terms,
23 but it was only logical and an expected matter that they would be held
24 and that preparations would be made.
25 Q. Well, with those preparations that you just referred but don't
1 know the specifics, explain to the Trial Chamber why you have concluded
2 in your statement that the final decision on the launching of
3 Operation Storm was made at this VONS meeting on the 3rd.
4 A. I would like to point out that the VONS was not an ad hoc body.
5 Rather, under the then constitution of the Republic of Croatia
6 defined the state as a semi-presidential state, VONS was the body where
7 decisions were made that were of strategic importance and related to
8 various levels of the state. This was not the first and certainly not
9 the last case of the sort. There were many other such cases where that
10 type of decisions were taken by VONS.
11 Q. Now, Ambassador Zuzul, were you aware of the talks going on in
13 time as this VONS meeting?
14 A. I was aware of that. Negotiations took place before the VONS
16 Q. Now, sir, I'd like to talk you just briefly about the
17 international acceptance or the international importance of the
18 international community accepting any military operation such as
19 Operation Storm.
20 When you were in Washington
21 experience as a diplomat these many years, Ambassador Zuzul, and dealing
22 with President Tudjman. If Washington
24 Storm, do you believe that Operation Storm would have gone forward?
25 A. My opinion is that the -- had the response from Washington been
1 to abort the operation, President Tudjman would have aborted it at the
2 time. I base this opinion of mine not only on the experience from my
3 work, my dealings with President Tudjman but on a number of similar cases
4 as well.
5 Let me give you the most evident example, where
6 President Tudjman, who was not only a statesman and politician but also a
7 general, aborted a military operation that was carried out in direction
8 of Banja Luka which was a very difficult situation for him, because he
9 believed that the arrival of the Croatian and Bosniak forces in
10 Banja Luka would constitute a complete breakdown of the Serb army. As a
11 general, of course, he wanted to defeat the other side. However, despite
12 that, and solely with the purpose of sending a clear -- because a clear
13 message was sent from the United States that the operation should be
14 aborted, he did abort the operation. This is one of the reasons why I
15 feel so certain in my conclusion that reports -- had the reports from
17 to be halted, President Tudjman would have been done so.
18 Q. Now, Ambassador, you spoke to us about several conditions, and it
19 is -- what we're talking about are the conditions that are set forth in
20 your statement in paragraph 16 about conditions under which
21 Operation Storm would proceed.
22 Based on your dealings with President Tudjman over these years,
23 as a diplomat -- and as a diplomat, would President Tudjman have
24 authorised Operation Storm to proceed in a manner that violated the
25 conditions that had been set out by the officials in Washington? And by
1 that I include taking care of civilians and the other conditions that
2 were set forth.
3 A. I don't think that President Tudjman would order anything of the
4 sort or allow it, for that matter.
5 If you will allow me to briefly comment on this. I knew
6 President Tudjman very well, and I knew that he was, of course, very
7 familiar with the terms being used in the former socialist system which
8 were used in a different way. I know that President Tudjman himself
9 sometimes had his suspicions of the concepts of the western world such as
10 human rights, freedom of the press and the like. However, as a strategic
11 statesman, President Tudjman knew very well what sort of significance
13 character, which had been formed the way it had been formed, did not
14 understand fully the terms as they were meant by other countries. He
15 would never have done anything that would be contrary to the positions of
16 other countries, especially those of the United States of America.
17 Q. Let us turn our attention back again to the 3rd of August, and
18 this is a meeting with Ambassador Galbraith prior to the VONS meeting.
19 MR. KEHOE: And if I can bring up P458. And this would be page
20 25 in the English, and it is the insertion on that date, second
21 paragraph for August the 3rd.
22 Q. Now, in that second paragraph, Mr. Ambassador, it notes a
23 discussion about a meeting with -- ultimately a meeting going through
24 there with President Tudjman. It goes to the other page. And you in
25 fact came into that meeting, did you not?
1 A. That's right. I attended the meeting.
2 Q. And in this particular discussion, they talk about -- it speaks
3 for itself, but Ambassador Galbraith asking for some guidance coming from
4 Secretary Tarnoff, you can see in the middle of the page:
5 "I called the department to seek a stronger statement. I
6 specifically -- I urge that we warn the Croatians that a military
7 solution now in lieu of waiting to see if Babic delivered within a week
8 would harm our bilateral relationship."
9 And he says: "I spoke to Tarnoff."
10 In then in fact at the bottom of the that page we see what he was
11 authorised to say.
12 Nevertheless, if we can turn our attention to P448 which is a
13 tape of that item. And I want to focus on this issue of harming our
14 bilateral relations.
15 If we could bring this up, and I first turn to page 3 in the
16 English of this. That is at P448.
17 [Defence counsel confer]
18 MR. KEHOE: If we can turn to the next page in the English.
19 I will point out to you, Mr. President, and it -- obviously, it
20 speaks for itself. In 448, page 24, that what is he asking for, military
21 option, urge that we warn that a military option -- that military
22 solution now in lieu of waiting to see if Babic delivered within a week
23 could cause harm -- would harm our bilateral relationship."
24 Your Honours can read what the rest of it is. But what he was
25 authorised to by Secretary Hill, did not include any comment that any
1 such operation would hurt bilateral relationships, but it speaks for
3 I'm sorry. I was just told by -- this is it P458, page 25.
4 Turning our attention to the transcript itself is P448, and you
5 can see at the bottom of that page -- excuse me, right before the
6 president, Ambassador Galbraith says in the last sentence:
7 "I have to tell you, since have I spoken with people in
9 is not given a fair chance, if military action ensues in the days to
10 follow without giving this a chance, then this could significantly and
11 adversely affect our relationships."
12 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, you were present when you heard that
13 comment, and I would like to turn your attention to -- we -- we have
14 discussed this with the Prosecutor, Mr. President, concerning the balance
15 of the transcript which ends of saying, by Mr. Galbraith:
16 "It is it true that the beginning of operation is set to
18 President Tudjman says: "Yes, if the Geneva talks fail."
19 Peter Galbraith: "Thank you, Mr. President."
20 And it goes on yet further -- and if I might have one second as
21 to the what the number is here.
22 I want to bring up on screen the 65 ter 1D2719 which is,
23 Ambassador, the balance of this particular conversation where you make
24 some comments?
25 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time if I could play 65 ter
1 1D2719. And a transcript has been given to the booths. And we're going
2 to do this via sanction, I apologise.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 "Tudjman's Interpreter: Well, you see, Belgrade is invoking in
5 his assembly. Milosevic says he is controlling --
6 "Tudjman: No, Babic is invoking ...
7 "Tudjman's Interpreter: Babic, I'm sorry, is invoking his
8 assembly. Milosevic says he is controlling the generals. And yet he
9 would not receive Babic and talk to him. Belgrade has appointed Mrksic
10 for the commanding officer in Knin, and yet they are sending Novakovic
11 down to Geneva
12 again, led on. Moreover as Mr. Sarinic just stated, one of the members
13 of that delegation is Prijic who is the grey eminence of Martic.
14 "Galbraith: I understand the dilemma, but I believe that Babic
15 is very sincere. This is what Stoltenberg has" --
16 JUDGE ORIE: We have to stop for a second. I heard on the French
17 channel that the interpreters were not able to catch up the beginning.
18 So since we need the French translation of the entirety of the portion
19 played, I suggest that we restart the audio tape.
20 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, did you want us to -- we can do it
21 here -- but do you want us to pause it at some certain points? Might
22 that be more helpful to the interpreters?
23 JUDGE ORIE: One second, Mr. Kehoe.
24 I think the procedure is that one of the interpreters reads the
25 transcript and sees whether that is in line with what he hears, and that
1 the other interpreter is then translating, because you never can catch up
2 with the speed of speech. So at the end we wait until the translation is
4 The audio could be restarted.
5 [Video-clip played]
6 "Tudjman's Interpreter: Well you see Belgrade is invoking his
7 assembly, Milosevic says is he controlling.
8 "Tudjman: No, Babic is invoking.
9 "Tudjman's Interpreter: Babic, I'm sorry, is invoking his
10 assembly. Milosevic says he is controlling the generals. And yet he
11 would not receive Babic and talk to him. Belgrade has appointed Mrksic
12 for the commanding officer in Knin, and yet they are sending Novakovic
13 down to Geneva
14 again led on. Moreover as Mr. Sarinic just stated, one members of that
15 delegation is Prijic who is the grey eminence of Martic.
16 "Galbraith: I understand the dilemma, but I believe that Babic
17 is very sincere. This is what Stoltenberg has proposed and what I
18 believe that the Serb delegation is prepared to accept.
19 "Tudjman: One from Serb delegation, and another not, and so on,
20 and so on. But we'll see.
21 "Galbraith: Is it true that the operation is scheduled to begin
22 tomorrow morning?
23 "Tudjman: If the negotiation is not satisfied in Geneva
25 "Galbraith: Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. President ...
1 Robert Finn.
2 "Tudjman: Finn.
3 "Galbraith: So you may see him when I am out of town.
4 "Zuzul: Mr. President, may I only one sentence. In my talks in
6 Ambassador Galbraith expressed, but neither in one moment it wasn't said
7 that our bilateral relations can be jeopardized.
8 "Galbraith: I think that this is a result of the feeling that
9 there is an genuine opportunity for peace, and that is why I added that
10 point. I want you to know candidly what the situation is."
11 MR. KEHOE:
12 Q. Mr. Ambassador, turning to this particular comment by
13 Ambassador Galbraith, as you sat there and even today, sir, do you
14 believe that Galbraith's additional warnings about harm to bilateral
15 relations, do you think that accurately reflected the United States'
17 A. Now when I see all this and even back then, and that's why I
18 intervened, it seemed to me that Mr. Galbraith is adding certain things
19 or interpreting them differently from what was expressed by other
20 representatives of the United States.
21 Here, it is clear that he added a certain tone to this. My
22 interpretation was that Mr. Galbraith, who was and remained my friend,
23 wanted to play a personal role in all that, pushing a peace plan that he
24 had co-authored, but it was my impression then and now that he wasn't
25 succeeding in presenting this peace plan successfully, not even in
2 Q. And is the peace plan that you referring to the Z-4 plan?
3 A. Correct. That was the Z-4 plan.
4 Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into evidence 65
5 ter 1D2719.
6 MR. WAESPI: We have no objections.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1491.
9 JUDGE ORIE: D1491 is admitted into evidence.
10 MR. KEHOE:
11 Q. I would like to turn our attention to D1454 which is a transcript
12 of the VONS meeting. And this VONS meeting took place directly after the
13 meeting with Ambassador Galbraith, did it not?
14 A. Correct. I'm sorry, I think that between the meeting and the
15 beginning of VONS, he was received. I think that -- he was received in
17 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me one second.
18 [Defence counsel confer]
19 THE WITNESS: I may the English correction.
20 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, that is what Mr. Misetic was just
21 telling me, that there has been some mistake, so if we could have some
22 clarification on that score.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you would please, well, approximately the
24 witness himself has identified a translation issue.
25 Could you explain to us what is not reflecting what you said in
1 Croatian in the English transcript.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said in Croatian that, to the
3 best of my recollection, President Tudjman received an invitation from
5 Serbs, and he was informed -- he received a call saying that those
6 negotiations had fallen through. I think that call was after our meeting
7 with Galbraith and before the meeting of VONS.
8 MR. KEHOE:
9 Q. Thank you for the clarification, Mr. Ambassador. As you can see
10 this the -- the cover page of this VONS meeting from the 3rd of August,
11 beginning at 1800 hours. You, of course, can see your name on there as
12 the last one. I trust it is in alphabetical order. It is.
13 And if we can move to page 3 in the English of this document
14 which -- and just address the particular point that you just made
15 concerning a call from Geneva
16 [Defence counsel confer]
17 MR. KEHOE:
18 Q. And I would address the point that you just made right after the
19 meeting that we not be outplayed.
20 It notes: "Pasalic just called me five minutes ago from Geneva
21 and told me that the Serbs did not want to consent to our proposals."
22 I can see that in the English. Can you see that, Mr. Ambassador?
23 A. I see that.
24 Q. Staying with that particular item, based on your dealings with
25 President Tudjman, the VONS, and as a diplomat of many years, and you
1 note that in paragraph 19 that -- the last sentence that
2 President Tudjman always gave priority to a peaceful solution if there
3 was a minimum prospect of the same. You also note above that:
4 "If the Serb decision had agreed to the Croatian demands on 3
5 August, peace negotiations would have started and reintegration of all
6 occupied areas would have been carried out."
7 Consistent with that, after this phone call, you are the first
8 person who was called to talk at this meeting after a series of comments
9 by the president.
10 And I address you to -- it would be page 4 and 5 in the English.
11 I believe it is the same in the Croatian.
12 You were called upon to talk by President Tudjman. Now, when you
13 were in Washington
14 come back and talk to VONS?
15 A. Correct. The president talked to me, asked me when I was coming,
16 and if I remember correctly, he asked me to come as soon as possible,
17 because just after my arrival, a VONS meeting was supposed to take place.
18 Q. Now, based on -- on your experience and going back to some of the
19 strategic goals that you had talked about previously concerning using
20 diplomacy, why do you think -- why do you think Ambassador -- Tudjman
21 turned to you and then to Minister Granic first to talk about the
22 international assessment of this? Why?
23 A. It is my opinion that Tudjman, at that time of making an
24 important decision considered all the three strategic goals of Croatia
25 He was aware of the reports that Granic and I were about to give him.
1 But he wanted that everyone should take into account the positions of the
2 international community and the relations of Croatia with the
3 international community at that time of making an important decision.
4 Tudjman never improvised anything at such moments. It is obvious
5 that he placed great weight on Croatia
6 wanted us to consider that carefully before moving on to other aspects of
7 a possible decision.
8 Q. Now, in page 5 of this transcript --
9 MR. KEHOE: If we turn the page.
10 Q. -- you continue to talk and you lay out the conditions that the
11 United States has set forth for you in your discussions with Holbrooke
12 and Leon Firth.
13 In the centre of that page you note:
14 "However, the second point is that attention should be paid to
15 the civilians and what will happen to them. All the more so, because
16 that was mentioned a number of times, the closer we came to the end of
17 the [sic] talks."
18 Once again, Mr. Ambassador, based on your experience with
19 President Tudjman, would he have taken that admonition from you very
20 seriously before agreeing to the execution of Operation Storm?
21 A. Quite certainly he would have taken that into account. As you
22 see, I emphasise certain points that I had heard in Washington and
23 elsewhere, but primarily in Washington
24 But what is more important, Mr. Tudjman knew what I was about to
25 say, because I had already told him. He wanted me to emphasise those
1 points so that all the others should hear them and take them into
2 account, all those who were about to take part in making the decision,
3 but also implementing that decision.
4 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, it would be at this juncture that I
5 would ask the assistance of the Ambassador in discussing the comments in
6 the Brioni transcript, because as you understand this is a logical place
7 to get an interpretation based on his experience with President Tudjman.
8 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber has considered the matter, and
9 Mr. Kehoe, during the break, and the Chamber came to the conclusion that
10 we'd like to hear from the witness what he personally experienced as far
11 as the use of language is concerned in his meetings with -- with
12 President Tudjman. But, on the other hand, that the Chamber -- that is
13 -- will not be assisted but then hearing from the witness how he
14 interprets what was said at a meeting he did not attend.
15 MR. KEHOE: I will say in response to that, Mr. President, that
16 -- and I accept the admonition, I just want to put what I say on the
17 record. Obviously, the cross-examination we saw for most of Friday was
18 an interpretation called upon by the OTP concerning issues that
19 Ms. Skare Ozbolt was not in.
20 I would say with regard to this particular -- if Your Honours
21 want to dispense with down the line as being of no consequence, I would
22 ask the Court to at least hear at this point because it has to do with
23 the various adjective/verb usage here and the usage of the operative word
24 by the president --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Well, we would not mind. I think I earlier used
1 already the word exegesis as not something that the Chamber would like to
2 focus on. And that was totally apart from what we heard from this
4 Ms. Gustafson, you'd like to --
5 MS. GUSTAFSON: Your Honour, if I could just respond to the one
6 point about comparing this to the cross-examination on Friday.
7 JUDGE ORIE: You may, yes, please.
8 MS. GUSTAFSON: That was a completely different context. The
9 purpose of putting those transcripts to the witness was for impeachment
10 primarily, and the fact that she was there was -- either went to -- it
11 was either for impeachment or to show that she had a lack of knowledge
12 about what was at those meetings. It is a different context than what is
13 going on here on direct.
14 Thank you.
15 MR. KEHOE: Well, it is consistent with this question of how a
16 Tudjman associate and person that worked with him would have interpreted
17 this comment. Those are the questions that were asked. And than would
18 simply be the question asked of Ambassador Zuzul. If you heard this, how
19 would you interpret it? And that is relevant and significant,
20 Mr. President.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I think it was in response to answers given by
22 the witness about -- the knowledge of the witness about the way of
23 thinking, of, if I could summarize it that way, it's not a very accurate
24 summary of President Tudjman or his approaches. And, of course, in
25 cross-examination that makes a difference.
1 I would not disallow. But I said the Chamber thinks it will not
2 be assisted by it. If there will be a short question on that and a short
3 answer, then -- but what the Chamber wants to avoid, and that's again, is
4 not limited -- is not specially focussing on this witness. I earlier
5 said we should avoid that everyone who comes in and knows or has seen
6 Mr. Tudjman on television starts explaining what -- without knowing the
7 whole of the context of it, without knowing all of the other evidence
8 that this Chamber received so that we are overloaded with five, ten, or
9 fifteen different interpretations of what people think he may have meant.
10 And the Chamber would like you then to focus -- and that's the issue.
11 You said would -- could specifically add to what others might say about
12 this is the use of a certain word.
13 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: That's -- that's, as I said before, that certainly
15 adds. But no lengthy because this happened a half year ago, three months
16 ago, this, therefore we have to understand this language in such and such
17 a way, that is not really what will assist the Chamber.
18 Please proceed.
19 MR. KEHOE:
20 Q. It will be two minutes, Mr. President. I would like to show you
21 this one line, Ambassador Zuzul in P461. It is page 29 in the English
22 and page 55 in the B/C/S. And I understand this is the Brioni meeting
23 that you were not in attendance.
24 In the second insertion down concerning -- directing to the
25 president's comments, Ambassador Zuzul, it notes that a leaflet of this
1 sort, general chaos, the victory of the Croatian army supported by the
2 international community and so forth. Serbs you already withdrawing and
3 so forth, and we are appealing to you not to withdraw. We guarantee ...
4 The way it's been interpreted in this exhibit is this means giving them a
5 way out while pretending to guarantee civil rights, et cetera.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi is on his feet, therefore I would like to
7 instruct the witness to wait to answer the question once Mr. Kehoe has
8 finished it.
9 Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
10 MR. WAESPI: Sorry, I'm just suggesting to the witness to read
11 the B/C/S version.
12 MR. KEHOE: I think it is on the screen, sir. I would suggest
13 that we read the B/C/S version.
14 Q. Now, in our discussions, Mr. Ambassador, in reading the B/C/S
15 version you have a different interpretation of that line by
16 President Tudjman. And I believe you said that you heard that line --
17 that word used before, once significant word. Briefly can you explain
18 this to the Trial Chamber?
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
20 MR. WAESPI: Sorry, I might have not been clear. That the
21 witness reads the B/C/S, so we get an interpretation from the booth.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MR. KEHOE: If that is satisfactory, if you can --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Well, it is a first start. It will not be the final
25 resolution of either a transcript issue or a translation issue, but we
1 could invite the witness to read it aloud and then --
2 Could you please read the relevance -- relevant line; that is,
3 the last line of the intervention by the president, starting with a
4 leaflet of this sort, that's the beginning of the paragraph, the
6 Could you read the last line after the dots.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "That means give them a route in
8 that way, while ostensibly guaranteeing their civil rights, et cetera."
9 MR. KEHOE:
10 Q. And the particular word that was used in that fashion, do you see
11 the English translation, sir?
12 A. I see two different translations of that particular word, which
13 does not surprise me. The translation in the transcript of this meeting
14 is different from the translation given from the booth.
15 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... answer the
16 question that was put to by Mr. Kehoe. The Chamber will, as we earlier
17 said, will pay very precise attention to any transcription or any
18 translation issue.
19 So if you could please answer Mr. Kehoe's question.
20 Perhaps you can briefly repeat what you asked the witness.
21 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
22 Q. I asked you, and then that particular word was used in that
23 fashion, do you see it in the English interpretation? And I'm asking you
24 how you interpreted it, how you interpret that word?
25 A. Your Honour, Mr. President, although I'm not a linguistic expert,
1 I do know the Croatian language well, and I have a relatively good
2 knowledge of the English language, and I knew Mr. Tudjman very well. I
3 dare to say that the way the word "toboze" was translated in writing does
4 not correspond even lexically, and it certainly doesn't correspond to the
5 way in which Mr. Tudjman used this word.
6 If you allow me to explain, Mr. President, the word "toboze" or
7 "tobozni" is used infrequently in the Croatian language. I know few
8 people who would use it in common speech. However, President Tudjman
9 used the word rather often in various situations. The most common
10 situation where he would use it, this word "toboze," or "tobozni," would
11 be when he spoke about certain ideas that he was aware of but was not
12 fully convinced or fully confident about them. And oftentimes, as I
13 believe you can find in documents, he would say freedom of the press; he
14 would say, toboze, freedom of the press; civil rights, he would say,
15 toboze, civil rights. And a number of such examples exist.
16 From what I know, he took a distance, speaking from the viewpoint
17 of the previous system in which we used to live, and if you allow me to
18 say one more thing. I think it is completely wrong to translate
19 "toboze," which is an adjective in Croatian, to translate it as an active
20 verb, pretending to. You can't translate it that way. It can be
21 translated in various ways, but not as a verb in active form. I believe
22 you are able to check that with better experts than I am.
23 JUDGE ORIE: You are invited to give your comments, so tell us
24 what would be the right thing, the right translation. How you understand
25 the line. This would be done in two minutes from what I understood from
1 Mr. Kehoe. But there's no need at this moment to say what others did
2 wrong. The Chamber will, as I said before, will pay thorough attention
3 to the matter, so just tell us what your understanding of this line would
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps the simplest way would be,
6 in view of the limitations of my knowledge of English, for me to say how
7 I understand it in English: "[In English] Guarantee so-called human
8 rights or civil rights."
9 [Interpretation] And I believe that gives different meaning to
10 this sentence.
11 If you use in English "to pretend," then the English version
12 would be guaranteeing pretended human rights, which would be a passive
13 form of the same meaning. But it doesn't mean we will pretend to
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.
16 MR. KEHOE:
17 Q. If we can move back to D454 [sic] which is the VONS meeting and
18 go back where we left off. And if we could turn to page 8 of the English
19 at the insertion of Mr. Granic being asked to speak. This is at D1454.
20 [Microphone not activated] As we're waiting for the B/C/S version
21 to come up, I know that you can speak English, Mr. Ambassador. But it --
22 it's a translation of -- the president says:
23 "Who would like to take the floor next? Mate, please."
24 And then Dr. Granic begins to speak. He is the foreign minister.
25 And he talks about having talks with Kinkel and van den Broek. And who
1 are those two individuals, Kinkel and van den Broek?
2 A. Mr. Kinkel was the German minister of foreign affairs at the
3 time. Mr. van den Broek was at a certain point in time the Dutch
4 minister of foreign affairs. However, at that point in time I believe he
5 was the representative of the European Commission. He performed several
6 international duties which led him to be in contact with the developments
7 in former Yugoslavia
8 Q. If we move down to the next paragraph. And why did -- based on
9 your diplomatic experience would the president want to hear what
10 Dr. Granic has to say in his discussions with Mr. Kinkel and
11 Mr. van den Broek?
12 A. Well, evidently the president wanted to have the whole
13 international picture or, rather, what the international situation would
14 be in case Croatia
15 Q. And if we move down to the next paragraph, Mr. Granic says:
16 "None of them said anything to the contrary as far as any
17 possible military action on our part is concerned. They only warned that
18 we should be careful."
19 Do you say that, sir?
20 A. I do.
21 Q. Now, as we move through this, Ambassador, the president asked if
22 anybody was going to dissent, did he not? Did he not ask the people in
23 the VONS meeting whether or not they would agree or disagree?
24 A. I don't know how he formulated the question, but he did ask if
25 everybody agreed with the decision to launch a military action.
1 Q. And given this discrepancy that has been put forth in this
2 translation as opposed to your report about cautioning civilians, when
3 you look at this picture, sir, and you are here today, I ask you, would
4 President Tudjman have wanted military -- Operation Storm planned in a
5 way that violated the conditions set forth by the United States or the
6 international community?
7 A. I am deeply convinced that he would not have. He -- or, rather,
8 President Tudjman wanted the operation to be carried and he believed that
9 it would be carried out in a way that would only reinforce the support of
10 the international community and the consideration it showed. I would
11 like to note that we here -- here see only snippets of the situation.
12 However, President Tudjman at all times and everywhere kept in mind the
13 fact that there was another part of the Croatian that was occupied,
14 namely, Eastern Slavonia and Baranja. I heard this from him oftentimes,
15 and we negotiated this matter with the international community on several
16 occasion, and that was that he could resolve the reintegration of that
17 part of territory only through cooperation with the United States of
19 President Tudjman, I am personally convinced that he would not have made
20 a decision which would be contrary to the clear messages we received from
22 countries as well.
23 Q. Let me be very direct with you, Mr. Ambassador, concerning
24 certain of the allegations that have come forward in this case.
25 During all of your meetings, all of your discussions with
1 President Tudjman and other leaders of the Republic of Croatia
2 ever hear any discussion where it was planned to drive the Serb
3 population out of the Krajina?
4 A. Discussions which would have aimed at planning the expulsion of
5 the civilian population were not something I was ever part of, nor was I
6 aware of such discussions ever having taken place. I, or the majority of
7 the individuals who were the top leadership of Croatia at the time and
8 who had expertise, would have agreed to something like that.
9 Let me be precise. I never heard from President Tudjman anything
10 of the sort, and I never received any instructions from him that would
11 have led to the expulsion of the civilian population from Croatia.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, just to avoid whatever confusion, you
13 said: "I or the majority of the individuals were the top leadership of
15 like that."
16 May I take it that if you were referring to planning of the
17 expulsion of Serbs that you intended to say: Would not have agreed to
18 something like that?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, Mr. President. Thank you
20 for your interpretation, because I may have speeded up too much now, and
21 the sentence was given an erroneous meeting -- meaning.
22 What I wanted to say that was VONS was composed of a number of
23 experts, intellectuals --
24 JUDGE ORIE: I wanted to put on the record that there was an
25 apparent mistake by whomever. I did not make a new translation of your
1 words. I just tried to understand them. I have understood them by now.
2 Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.
3 MR. KEHOE: Yes, thank you, Mr. President.
4 Q. Mr. Ambassador, with concern to information coming back on
5 burning and looting, did you ever hear any approval, agreement, to -- by
6 the authorities of the Republic of Croatia
7 to take place in the Krajina after Operation Storm as a way to drive out
8 the Serbs and to keep them out.
9 A. I heard concerns, but I never heard any approval.
10 Q. And tell us about what the concerns were.
11 A. Since I primarily communicated with the international community,
12 I can say, to the best of my recollection, that in the immediate
13 aftermath of Operation Storm, I never learnt that the international
14 community or anyone else should have information to the effect that these
15 events took place on a mass scale. That was not the sort of information
16 I had. Quite the contrary. There was an intervention on the part of
17 Ambassador Galbraith, when he joined a group of departing Serbs, possibly
18 in an attempt to prevent any adverse effects it may have.
19 I invited Ambassador Galbraith, and he was accompanied by an
20 entire high-level US
21 large public event. My intention was for him to simply see what sort of
22 a reaction the simple folk would have upon seeing him and the American
23 delegation and that nobody would perceive his calls for the protection of
24 the civilians in a negative way.
25 As a matter of fact, President Tudjman knew that they were
1 invited and in fact attended this particular celebratory event.
2 Q. Let us move ahead to some of the negotiations from post-Operation
3 Storm and directing your attention to paragraph 24 concerning the
4 diplomatic efforts for Eastern Slavonia. And I'd like to draw your
5 attention to some comments concerning a -- P449.
6 But before we do that, and as that is coming up on the screen,
7 when the reports of these looting and burning was taking place,
8 Ambassador, you know, were there concerns inside the Croatian government,
9 and what were they?
10 A. I already said that I was aware of these concerns, and I
11 discussed these matters with Minister Granic in particular.
12 Both of us told the president that we should keep in mind the
13 reactions of the international community, since that was our duty. I can
14 tell you now that President Tudjman, too, was concerned over that.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, whenever the word concern is used, do you
16 have any concerns that could, from my understanding of the English
17 language, mean two things? Concern about this to happen, or concern
18 about this happening.
19 Could we always try to clearly identify which of the two we're
20 talking about.
21 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
22 Q. Mr. Ambassador, taking the lead from the President and talking
23 about these concerns, can we talk about these concerns in the two
24 capacities that the president just highlighted. Concern that it was
25 happening -- concern that it was in fact happening and concern about this
1 to happen. I mean, those two issues. Can you explain what the concern
2 was coming from not only you and Dr. Granic but President Tudjman? And
3 if you could include in that the potential impact on international
4 relations with entities such as the United States.
5 A. I think that we can use the term "concern" to denote both
6 meanings, the concern about what was happening and the concern about the
7 impact it might have that was undesirable for everyone, including
8 President Tudjman.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Make that more concrete. I mean, you talked about
10 -- apparently you agree that on a factual basis where I was making the
11 distinction, of course, on the basis of a theoretical distinction, could
12 you tell us what you learned about the concerns, expressed about burning
13 and looting to take place and what you learned or what you observed about
14 concerns or even experienced yourself about looting and burning occurring
15 within a concrete way, rather than in an abstract way.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Neither then nor now can I claim
17 that I knew specifically what was happening in the field. To put it
18 candidly, it was not my duty to inform the president about something I
19 know little of. However, as reactions from the international community
20 started coming in, and that was, unless I'm mistaken, sometime in late
21 August, these were warnings to the effect that should events that are
22 unacceptable continue to happen in the field, it might affect the
23 relations we had with the United States. At some point, I don't recall
24 when exactly, I discussed the matter with -- with the president, and it
25 was my impression - I emphasise it was my impression - that he was
1 concerned about what was happening in field. It was also my impression -
2 and this is something we discussed at greater length - that it concerned
3 him in relation to how this might affect our future relations with the
4 international community, since, at that point in time, President Tudjman
5 wanted to seize the point of victory, in the subsequent negotiations.
6 That's how I perceived his position. He didn't want the situation in the
7 field to threaten the attainment of our goals at a point in time which he
8 perceived as a good negotiating position for the fate of Eastern Slavonia
9 and Baranja.
10 MR. KEHOE:
11 Q. So, based on your discussions with him, if there was some
12 alienation of relations with the United States, did he believe that that
13 would have affected the negotiations on the peaceful reintegration of
14 Eastern Slavonia
15 A. At the time President Tudjman firmly believed that we accepted
16 the position expressed by the United States that they would assist us in
17 finding a settlement of the problem in Eastern Slavonia and Baranja. I
18 discussed this point with him extensively. Unlike others in Croatia
19 was certain that this reintegration could take place only through
20 peaceful and not military means. He was definitely aware of the fact
21 that he should not in any way risk or threaten to undermine this position
22 held by the United States at the time [In English] unlike others in
24 Q. So that would be line 14, you would say, unlike some others in
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Let us go to another subject which is the post-Operation Storm
3 negotiations that you begin to discuss in paragraph 24. And on the
4 screen, we have before us a meeting, the 18th of August, 1995, with
5 Ambassadors Holbrooke, General Clark, and Ambassador Galbraith.
6 MR. KEHOE: And if can I turn to page 7 of that document.
7 Q. I might add I have been informed that they have updated this
8 translation, and that it should be page 4.
9 Now, Mr. Ambassador, you are present at this discussion, are you
10 not? And --
11 A. [Interpretation] Correct.
12 Q. And I have also been informed it is page 31 in the B/C/S.
13 And if we can just review going to the middle of that wage which
14 is: "I understand."
15 Ambassador Holbrooke says: "I understand. I would like to be
16 very honest because our administration has been giving you different
17 signals about military activity in the past month."
18 When you heard that, Mr. Ambassador, what did you interpret that
19 to mean? What did you think he was talking about?
20 A. It was my impression that he referred to the channel of
21 communication that went through Ambassador Galbraith at times, through
22 Ambassador Holbrooke at times, and through me. I think he referred to
23 something that we discussed earlier on; namely, certain messages which
24 were not identical at all times.
25 Q. Continuing on:
1 "In November we asked you not to attack, and you did not. In
2 March I flew over here and we agreed, and then you and Gore announced it
3 in Copenhagen
4 What are we talking about there, Mr. Ambassador?
5 A. Well, by way of General interpretation, this refers to what I
6 pointed out on a number of occasions.
7 Every time the position of the international community, or
8 specifically of the United States of America, was that we should not
9 launch a military operation. And if that position was expressed in such
10 a way that it was believed that such a military operation would threaten
11 our good relations, it was followed up on. It was agreed to, and this is
12 something that Ambassador Holbrooke referred to here. In fact he
13 referred to two very important meetings where, as I frequently point out,
14 discussions were held with the United States about the issue of Eastern
16 said that President Tudjman always kept in mind the issue of the
17 reintegration of Eastern Slavonia and Baranja.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe.
19 Could I just briefly inquire with you, Mr. Waespi, the issue of
20 no attack if there would be a signal of the United States not to attack,
21 is that a matter in dispute?
22 [Prosecution counsel confer]
23 MR. WAESPI: I don't think it's in dispute, but there was quite
24 some back and forth with Ambassador Galbraith on green light, yellow and
25 red light.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That is another matter. That is anther
2 matter, what they said. But we have dealt with the issue whether there
3 would have been an attack, if there would be a clear signal, do not
5 My question is whether that is in dispute. Not to say what --
6 what happened.
7 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I would love to consider it over the break and
8 [Overlapping speakers] ...
9 JUDGE ORIE: And you see the distinction I make. Between whether
10 there was such a signal is a different matter, might well have been no
11 signal or an ambiguous signal. I'm just asking about whether the
12 position taken apparently by Mr. Kehoe, and at least which appears from
13 his questioning, that if there would have been a signal, you should not
14 attack, coming from the United States, whether nevertheless, it was the
15 intention of President Tudjman or whether it could be feasible that there
16 would nevertheless be an attack. That's the issue.
17 Then we will hear from you after the break.
18 Mr. Kehoe, shall we give Mr. Waespi immediately time to -- or
19 at --
20 MR. KEHOE: Absolutely Judge. If we could take his issue off the
21 table, I would be very happy. I go back to addressing this because of
22 Mt. Tieger
23 Mr. Tieger, and he got the result which gave an answer which causes me to
24 go through this. So if we're taking that off the table, I will be -- I
25 will move ahead. I will be very content.
1 JUDGE ORIE: I will have to verify whether I put exactly the same
2 question to him, but I will --
3 MR. KEHOE: [Overlapping speakers] ...
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course, that might be of some importance.
5 Mr. Zuzul, we have another break.
6 We will resume at ten minutes to 1.00.
7 And could I already inquire with the parties about time needed
8 for cross as matters stand now?
9 Mr. Waespi.
10 MR. WAESPI: I think one session, certainly, and perhaps a bit
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 Mr. Cayley.
14 MR. CAYLEY: I anticipate either about 15 minutes or nothing at
15 all, and I will certainly let you know at the end of the session today.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kuzmanovic.
17 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Roughly the same, Your Honour. And I probably
18 won't let you know a the end of today but tomorrow morning.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Which means that we -- yes.
20 Then we resume at ten minutes to 1.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.
24 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
25 Q. Ambassador Zuzul, just staying on this page in the English
1 towards the bottom, and I believe it is the next page, page 32 in the
2 B/C/S, there's a comment by Ambassador Holbrooke that I would like to
3 direct you to.
4 MR. KEHOE: If we can scroll that down a bit.
5 Q. On that page, Mr. Ambassador, at the bottom of the English,
6 Ambassador Holbrooke says:
7 "As you know, we were publicly saying we were concerned, but
8 privately you knew what we wanted."
9 Now going back to your statement, I just would like to point out
10 some things in your statement and ask some general questions.
11 You are had noted for us previously, and you also note in
12 paragraph 24 that President Tudjman wanted the -- insisted on the
13 involvement of the United States in the negotiations for
14 Eastern Slavonia
15 successful, ultimately with the assistance of the United States?
16 A. Those negotiations were very successful. They concerned the
17 peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia. And that was one of the
18 rare, complete successes of the international community in resolving the
20 Q. I would like to broaden the question out a bit and take it from
21 Ambassador Holbrooke's statement and talk about the wider conflict in
23 and the HVO. Did the United States continue to stay involved? And did
24 the president and others in the government continue to meet with the
25 United States to get their assistance and guidance through the rest of
1 the fighting prior to Dayton
2 A. This communication prior to the Dayton Accords continued at
3 various levels all the time. I think it was carried out very well, and I
4 think it was very important to the preparation of the Dayton Accords.
5 Q. And just summing up, in paragraph 24 you talk about the
6 operations after the Split Agreement, Summer 95, Operation Storm,
7 Operation Maestral, and Operation Southern Move. Do you see that
8 reference, sir. It's in paragraph 26, I said 25, I meant 26.
9 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] ... I think you said 24, but
10 we have now the whole range of --
11 MR. KEHOE: [Overlapping speakers] ... It's 26, I apologise.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.
14 MR. KEHOE:
15 Q. And you say in here that General Gotovina played a crucial role
16 in these operations. Do you know that he was, throughout all of these
17 operations, the operational commander and in charge of the joint HV/HVO
19 A. I cannot claim that I have accurate information about it, but
20 what I knew and what I heard as a diplomat was precisely as you say, that
21 he was in charge of that, and that he was extremely important in all
22 these operations.
23 Q. In these operations and when you ultimately went to Dayton
24 you do refer to this to some degree, in paragraph 27, did any of the
25 peace negotiation -- negotiators, either prior to Dayton or during
2 General Gotovina and the armed forces in bringing about the defeat of the
3 Bosnian Serbs? Did they ever mention that to you, and what were their
5 A. All that I heard at that time about General Gotovina were praises
6 for his military capabilities and his abilities in conducting military
7 operations. I really can't remember hearing anything at the time that
8 would run counter to that assessment.
9 Q. And -- paragraph 27, this is one last question, you say that the
10 Split Agreement, Summer 95, Storm, were not only responsibile for the
11 liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, initiation of the peace process in
13 created to reintegrate Eastern Slavonia peacefully without a single drop
14 of blood spilled.
15 Would you add to that Operations Maestral an Operation
16 Southern Move as a intricate part of the whole formula to bring about
17 peace in Dayton
18 A. Certainly. I was not the only one who said that. All the
19 analysts who spoke about Dayton
21 and the Bosniak army and the definitive defeat of the Serbian aggression.
22 Q. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much.
23 Mr. President, I have no further questions. Thank you.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Kehoe. You have joined with other
25 Defence teams in beating the clock.
1 Mr Cayley.
2 MR. CAYLEY: I will beat the clock even more, Your Honour. I
3 don't have any questions for the witness, thank you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Beat the clock or you don't beat it, more or less.
5 Mr. Kuzmanovic.
6 MR. KUZMANOVIC: [Microphone not activated]... Your Honour, I have
7 no clock, so I don't have any questions.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
9 Mr. Waespi, are you ready to start your cross-examination of the
11 MR. WAESPI: I would actually prefer to start tomorrow morning if
12 that is possible. I'm a little bit surprised that the Defence didn't
13 take the whole session today. I -- I could start, of course, if ...
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps let's try to use our time. It will
15 not be dramatic because I foresee that there will be some gaps perhaps
16 later this week, especially on Thursday, but, at the same time, I'll --
17 let me just ...
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, you're invited to start. I already
20 announce that I have a decision to deliver and which I will do at the end
21 of this session. It's a relatively short one, so you have approximately
22 half an hour.
23 The Chamber never knows what happens. The next witness could
24 have a headache tomorrow. Everything is possible. Therefore, let's use
25 our time to moment that we have it. But, again, I not push you too hard.
1 Half an hour.
2 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Waespi:
4 Q. Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.
5 I'm sure you experience with this cross-examination will be less
6 painful than the hard-talk cross-examination you had with Mr. Sebastian a
7 couple of years ago.
8 Let me start with a point you made in your witness statement that
9 was at paragraph 23. This is now D1485. And that deals with the
10 warnings or conditions you say the Americans put you in relation to the
11 attack of Operation Storm.
12 Now in paragraph 23, it says that towards the end of the
14 "Moreover, the necessity to protect the Serb civilian population
15 was specifically emphasised at the meetings. We, from diplomacy
16 constantly warned that the international community was going to pay the
17 highest attention to this, and I can testify to the fact that
18 President Tudjman truly respected this."
19 Now, in the previous sentence, the meetings that you talked
20 about, was that the VONS meeting of the 3rd of August, 1995, where these
21 concerns about the protection of the Serb civilian population was
23 A. No. What I referred to in paragraph 23 concerned the period
24 afterwards, not just after the VONS meeting. To be precise, at the VONS
25 meeting, I presented the views of the international community. These
1 concerns -- this concern relates to a more permanent state of affairs,
2 where we conveyed what the international community was thinking.
3 Q. And by "we," you mean whom?
4 A. In this context, when I say "we," I mean Mr. Granic, who was the
5 foreign minister; Mr. Sanader who was then deputy foreign minister;
6 several ambassadors, who had direct communication. Not only myself but
7 the ambassador to Brussels
8 position to have direct communication either international organisations
9 or with host countries on one hand, and the Croatian government on the
11 Q. Okay. I understand now. So these were concerns that were
12 expressed by the internationals at meetings with you; is that correct?
13 A. I'm not sure it is exactly what you say. I think it is exactly
14 as I wrote here. At meetings with representatives of the international
15 community, the necessity was emphasised to protect civilians. And we
16 cautioned the government and President Tudjman in our talks with the
17 government, that the international community would be paying special
18 attention to this, and I believe that both the government and
19 President Tudjman took this into consideration, and it was my belief that
20 if things would happen contrary to the wishes of the international
21 community, then the steps taken by the international community would not
22 agree with Croatia
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
24 Let me move on to a different issue; that is, what you testified
25 about Bihac.
1 Now, it's true, is it not - and we can get P461, page 1, on the
2 screen - that President Tudjman told everybody during that meeting in
3 Brioni that there was no more pretext given by the situation in Bihac to
4 go ahead, because the situation in Bihac actually relaxed?
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, I think you're asking the witness what
6 President Tudjman told everybody during a meeting where the witness was
7 not present and where the Chamber has expressed its concerns about asking
8 to interpret what was said at that meeting. That's the situation I find
9 myself in at this moment receiving the evidence.
10 Is that really what you intended to do?
11 MR. WAESPI: I believe the witness testified that -- and maybe we
12 can go back to Exhibit P458.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But you were asking him what President Tudjman
14 told everyone during that meeting and, at the same time, presenting to
15 him the text of what he said. A meeting where he was not present.
16 Do you really think that it would add to the information in a
17 meaningful way?
18 I'm not saying that the subject, as such, should not be touched
19 upon. I'm just saying something about the way in which you're doing it.
20 I would -- if I -- I have never been at the Brioni meeting. If someone
21 would give me the text and say, This is what was said at the Brioni
22 meeting, and then ask me, Is it true that they said this and this? Then
23 I would say, If the transcript is correct, yes; If the transcript is not
24 correct, no.
25 I mean, what else, what does it add?
1 MR. WAESPI: Because I believe the witness testified earlier that
2 the -- can I have a moment, Mr. President?
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm not saying that you could not touch upon
4 the Bihac and whether that what role they played, and whether that was
5 the same at 3rd of August, after the 3rd of August, before the 3rd of
6 August. I have no problems; it's just the way in which you do it.
7 That's my main concern.
8 Mr. Waespi, you earlier said you could start. On the basis of
9 that, the Chamber decided, but to make a start and then to wait for
10 another 20 minutes to see that nothing follows is -- is, of course, a
11 type of torture the Chamber would not exposure to you to. If you say,
12 But now a bit clearer, I'm just not prepared, then we could consider
13 whether we would accept that, I wouldn't say positively receive that, but
14 nevertheless, reality is reality. If you say, I just couldn't continue,
15 then perhaps next time better.
16 MR. KEHOE: If can I come to the defence of my colleague, I did
17 indicate that I was going take a day in defence of Mr. Waespi. He had
18 full and ample right to rely on the fact that I was going to take the
19 full day. So to that extent --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for the support, Mr. Kehoe. In view of
21 your observations, after I said that had you to finish today, I, for a
22 rather long period in time, had the impression that you would -- that you
23 would finish --
24 MR. KEHOE: Well --
25 JUDGE ORIE: -- at 30 minutes to 1.00.
1 MR. KEHOE: Frankly, Judge, there was -- you know, given the
2 admonitions by the Chamber, there was a sea-change that subjects had to
3 be cut out. So given what I told Mr. Waespi, I just want to pass that on
4 to the Chamber.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think that it's -- Mr. Waespi, you get the
6 support of Mr. Kehoe.
7 Would it be wiser for the Chamber to decide that you would
8 continue tomorrow?
9 MR. WAESPI: Thank you. I appreciate that.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Then the Chamber decides that you will be -- that
13 you will continue your cross-examination tomorrow.
14 Mr. Zuzul, you see, a courtroom is part of life.
15 Mr. Zuzul, we'll finish for the day, and we will resume tomorrow
16 morning, and I'd like to instruct you that you should not speak about
17 your evidence, your testimony, whether you've given it already, or
18 whether still to be given tomorrow, so you should speak with no one about
19 that, and we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.00 in a
20 different courtroom, Courtroom III.
21 I will invite Madam Usher to escort the witness out of the
23 [The witness stands down]
24 JUDGE ORIE: Which gives us time to deliver a decision. It's not
25 actually a decision but reasons for a decision, because these are the
1 Chamber's reasons for its decision on protective measures for Witness 13.
2 On the 12th of February, 2009, the Prosecution requested the
3 protective measures of testimony in closed session and pseudonym for
4 Witness 13.
5 On the 23rd of February, the Cermak Defence responded that it
6 opposed the Prosecution's request. On the same day, both the Gotovina
7 Defence and the Markac Defence joined this response.
8 On the 24th of February, 2009, the Chamber granted the
9 Prosecution's request, with reasons to follow.
10 As the Chamber has held in previous decisions on protective
11 measures, the party seeking protective measures for a witness must
12 demonstrate an objectively grounded risk to the security or welfare of
13 the witness or the witness's family, should it become known that the
14 witness has given evidence before the Tribunal. The question of whether
15 to grant protective measures involves a delicate balance between the
16 right of the accused to a public trial, on the one hand; and the
17 interests and need for protection and privacy for victims and witnesses
18 on the other. In this respect, the Chamber is mindful that the granting
19 of protective measures does not negatively affect an accused's other fair
20 trial rights, such as the right to examine witnesses against him. Even
21 though the granting of protective measures is, and should be, the
22 exception to the rule of a public trial, the threshold for when it should
23 be granted cannot be set too high. For example, to exclude persons who
24 have not experienced threats and harassment would defy the purpose of the
25 measures; namely, protection for risks that might occur as a result of
1 the testimony. The Chamber must therefore make a risk assessment, and
2 inherent in such an assessment is applying a certain level of caution and
3 erring on the safe side. The Chamber adds these words as an explanation
4 to the approach it has taken with regard to protective measures in this
5 case in general.
6 Witness 13 expressed concerns about testifying publicly. She is
7 a Serb who does not live permanently in Croatia but returns there
8 regularly from her country of residence. The subject of Witness 13's
9 testimony involves a particular crime incident allegedly involving a
10 number of Croatian soldiers, and it took place in the area where the
11 witness lives when she is in Croatia
12 was temporarily back in Croatia
13 in civilian clothes visited her and asked about her experiences in 1995
14 and about one of the accused. According to the witness, that same police
15 officer came back some weeks later, but, on this occasion, the witness
16 was too afraid to talk to him. These events left the witness fearful of
18 For the aforementioned reasons, and bearing in mind the general
19 considerations mentioned earlier, the Chamber found that the Prosecution
20 had demonstrated an objectively grounded risk to the security of
21 Witness 13, should it become known that she has given evidence before the
22 Tribunal. The Chamber considered, that, in light of the nature of the
23 anticipated evidence of this witness, any protective measures, short of
24 testimony in closed session, would be insufficient.
25 For these reasons, the Chamber granted the motion for protective
1 measures for Witness 13.
2 And this concludes the Chamber's reasons for its decision to
3 grant protective measures for Witness 13.
4 We adjourn for the day. We will resume tomorrow, the 9th of
5 June, 9.00, Courtroom III
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.26 p.m.
7 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 9th day of June,
8 2009, at 9.00 a.m.