1 Monday, 31 August 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
8 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-06-90-T, the
9 Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina, et al.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Before Mr. Jones arrives and gives his testimony,
13 there is an objection dated 27th August, 2009; Prosecution's objection to
14 documents to be used with expert Anthony Jones. The Chamber also
15 received Gotovina Defence response to Prosecution's objection to the
16 documents to be used with expert Anthony Jones, dated 28th August. The
17 other parties have understandably not responded to the motion.
18 The Prosecution has requested first order to Gotovina Defence to
19 notify the Prosecution as to which, if any, of the 14 documents
20 identified in paragraph 1 were provided to Mr. Jones prior to the
21 drafting of his expert report. Second, to preclude the Gotovina Defence
22 from presenting any of the seven documents identified in paragraph 5 to
23 Mr. Jones during his testimony that were not provided to Mr. Jones at the
24 time he drafted his expert report and seek to preclude the Gotovina
25 Defence from presenting the two documents identified in paragraph 8 to
1 Mr. Jones during his testimony.
2 This motion is denied in its entirety. Not to say that some of
3 these matters are fit to be explored during cross-examination. The
4 reasons will follow.
5 Are there any other procedural matters?
6 MR. KEHOE: [Microphone not activated]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Kehoe, are you ready to call your next
9 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. We call
10 Lieutenant-General Anthony Jones.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
12 [The witness entered court]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Jones.
14 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jones, before you give evidence, the Rules of
16 Procedure and Evidence require that you make a solemn declaration, that
17 you will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
18 The text is now handed out to you by Madam Usher, and I would like to
19 invite to you make that solemn declaration.
20 THE WITNESS: Would you like me to raise my hand?
21 JUDGE ORIE: That's not necessary but you are free to do so if
22 you want.
23 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
24 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
25 WITNESS: ANTHONY JONES
1 THE WITNESS: That's it? Okay.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, please be seated, Mr. Jones.
3 Mr. Jones, you will first be examined by Mr. Kehoe. Mr. Kehoe is
4 counsel for Mr. Gotovina.
5 Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.
6 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Examination by Mr. Kehoe:
8 Q. Good morning, General.
9 A. Good morning.
10 Q. General, can you state your name for the record and spell your
11 last name?
12 A. Anthony R. Jones, Anthony Ray Jones. J-o-n-e-s.
13 Q. And, General, you are a retired military officer. Can you give
14 us your rank when you retired from the United States army and when you
16 A. Yes. I was lieutenant-general, and I retired in the end of
17 June 2006.
18 Q. And I take it from your statement that it's after 36 years of
19 military service and over ten years as a senior military officer?
20 A. That's correct.
21 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, if I could bring up 65 ter 1D2779.
22 Mr. President, this is Lieutenant-General Jones's report. I have
23 also for the ease of moving through this more quickly, put a binder
24 together of hard copies of these documents. With Your Honours'
25 permission if I could give them to Lieutenant-General Jones at this
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed as you suggest.
3 MR. KEHOE:
4 Q. General, what is on the screen is in tab 1 of your binder. Do
5 you recognise this as your report, sir?
6 A. I do.
7 Q. And if we can move to page 18 in e-court, which is your resume,
8 General, or curriculum vitae.
9 A. Okay. I'm not sure I understood. Tab 18?
10 Q. Page 18 of the same document, which is your resume.
11 A. Oh, okay.
12 Q. It is also on the screen in front of you, sir.
13 A. My pages are not numbered, so bear with me a second, okay?
14 Q. And do you recognise that as your resume, sir?
15 A. I do.
16 Q. And I would like to go to page 2 of that document which details
17 your work experience.
18 A. Okay.
19 Q. And, General, we're not going to go through your background in
20 detail because the Prosecution has not objected to your expertise, but I
21 would like to just -- can you give the Trial Chamber a brief view of your
22 experience on a tactical, operation, and strategic levels through your
23 career that enabled you to render an opinion not only here but previously
24 on the roles and duties of operational commanders?
25 A. Sure. Basically I had 36 years of service starting out in the
1 infantry. I commanded for over eight years of my tenure, I had command
2 both in peacetime and in combat. Battalion, brigade levels. I had a
3 wealth of experience both at the tactical level and in the Pentagon, and
4 particularly strategic level. Recognised at my operational experience to
5 include overseas assignments to include Bosnia, the Middle East
6 other places. I was positioned as the commander of the aviation war
7 fighting centre. I also then later on after being the Chief of Staff of
8 the US Army Europe was returned to training and doctrine command which
9 was responsible for developing leaders at all levels as well as the
10 doctrine of the US Army and it was at that time that I also was selected
11 to do the investigation of the 5th Corps leadership and -- at Abu Ghraib.
12 So through the course of my experience, not only in operational units but
13 in the training and doctrine command, I had an opportunity to witness
14 leadership at all echelons, and I feel that that positions me, based on
15 leadership that I have seen and experienced, to comment on this
16 particular situation.
17 Q. General, I probably should have mentioned to this to you at the
18 outset, but to the extent that I delay in responding to you at the end of
19 your answers it's because we're waiting for the translation to catch up.
20 A. Oh, I understand.
21 Q. Okay. General, I would just like to focus on one comment that
22 you made on your assessment of the situation in Abu Ghraib.
23 Can you explain that a little bit and explain to the
24 Trial Chamber if your focus was on command -- operational commander
25 issues at that time.
1 A. That's basically correct. I was selected because I was senior in
2 the time to the 5th Corps commander and I was to assess not only his role
3 as the commander in his culpability in the incidents but also that of his
4 staff, and my role is to look at the all the orders that was given to
5 him, his responsibilities and the actions he took which may have
6 precluded and/or prevented what happened at Abu Ghraib. That report is
7 classified but basically it was at the operational level of command.
8 Q. And thereafter -- let me ask you initially. What rank were you
9 when you conducted this investigation and when was?
10 A. I was a lieutenant-general, and I belive that was in 2005.
11 Q. And thereafter, General, were you called upon to give testimony
12 in various locales concerning your assessment of -- I believe it was
13 General Sanchez and his actions as an operational commander?
14 A. Yes, it was General Sanchez and his staff. That was 5th Corps
15 combined to the -- combined joint task force 7. Following our
16 investigation and our travel and interviews, numerous interviews, we
17 compiled a report and then we went and we had to back brief not only the
18 department army leadership but also the -- the office of the secretary of
19 Defence, then we briefed the intel select committees of the president,
20 followed by Congress and Senate, various committees to include
21 intelligence and/or the armed services committees, both Senate and the
22 House. Followed by that we did obviously the press releases and/or the
23 editorial boards of prominent newspapers both international and national
24 in the US
25 to respond to inquiries and questions about that report where we could.
1 I will try to speak slower. I'm sorry.
2 JUDGE ORIE: That would certainly help.
3 THE WITNESS: Okay. I'm sorry. I just ...
4 MR. KEHOE:
5 Q. One last question in this area, General. As you're moving
6 through the various chains of commands during your 36 years and your
7 experience as a senior officer for the past ten year, can you give the
8 Trial Chamber an idea of your different perspectives that you were
9 exposed to when you became aware of, through your various posts
10 throughout the world that enabled you to assess, not only in the case of
11 General Sanchez but here in the case of General Gotovina, what it means
12 to be an operational commander and what that individual's faced with and
13 what he exactly has to do during the course of his command.
14 A. Yes. I would say I was fortunate because starting out in the
15 infantry and then later going to other combat arms and branches I had the
16 opportunity to see firsthand at the tactical level being deployed to
17 different -- different theatres, and early on the opportunity to see what
18 the effects are of an untrained force. Obviously it was 1970s when I
19 started in the army. At that time our army was not that good and so we
20 had to work on the training, we had to work on the non-commissioned
21 officer corps and the junior officer leadership because that had to be
22 the foundation of our army for the future. So I saw that firsthand. As
23 I progressed up and had the opportunity to command soldiers, I saw very
24 quickly the importance of leadership at the lower level as well as at the
25 senior level and the ability and the clear guidance and how important
1 that was.
2 I learned how to take mission-type orders and how to understand
3 commander's intent and what -- what the ramification were at all levels
4 and all echelons of command.
5 As I progressed and saw that firsthand in combat, I realised, not
6 only in the period there in the late 1980s when I was in special
7 operations, the importance of training, the importance of leadership, the
8 importance of getting the whole team to focus and -- and the
9 indispensable requirement for discipline within the ranks and each
10 individual doing their own individual -- or upholding their own
11 individual responsibilities.
12 I then moved and used those lessons later on as I commanded a
13 brigade level and then had the opportunity a couple of times to work in
14 the Pentagon where I saw the formulation of national strategies and how
15 the selection of courses of actions and pushing those out to the
16 combatant commanders become very important from a strategic level. I
17 then came in the middle 1990s, 1997, had the opportunity to serve in
19 other armies and how they approached the leadership training and in some
20 cases lack of the non-commissioned officer corps and impact on the
21 readiness and ability of their forces to perform.
22 Given those experiences obviously I was selected to go back and
23 be the commander of the Fort Barker
24 the war fighting centre for all of army aviation. And I tried to impart
25 at that time to all levels and echelons of leadership the importance of
1 discipline, the importance of training, and being able to focus on the
2 key and important parts to do their mission. I talked to them about
3 experiences in combat and how leadership makes a difference. I talked to
4 them about the discipline within the ranks and being able to teach
5 their -- the lower level units and those leaders how to perform when they
6 really needed to focus.
7 Following that command tour, I returned once again to Europe
8 There I was selected to be the Chief of Staff of the US Army Europe.
9 Certainly operation and strategic level for the army command component of
10 the European command. There we had the opportunity to interface with
11 many armies, mostly land-based armies, land-based forces, from all across
13 as we trained with them maybe some of their voids and the experiences
14 they needed. I was deployed several times to war training exercises,
15 such as in Poland
16 into Bosnian and those areas to help guide it and mentor some of the
17 leadership we had.
18 So that wealth of experience then also led me to be selected to
19 return to be part of the army's training and doctrine command where we
20 used and have used over time our experiences to formulate our doctrine
21 which will lead our forces to the future.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jones --
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
24 JUDGE ORIE: If you take a breath now and then the interpreters
25 will have an opportunity to do so as well.
1 THE WITNESS: I'm sure it will work out in the future. I'm just
2 so familiar. I'm sorry.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
4 MR. KEHOE: [Microphone not activated]
5 THE WITNESS: Let me see if they're caught up. I'm sorry.
6 MR. KEHOE:
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. So it was the selection, then returning to the training and
9 doctrine of command. Based on my operational experience and observing
10 leadership at all levels, I was able then to impart what knowledge I had
11 and help formulate and develop the doctrine for our army, also to
12 formulate the training regiment of which leaders at all echelons were
13 then trained from their initial basic training all the way through senior
14 leader experiences to include the non-commissioned officer corps.
15 I trust that that answers your question.
16 Q. It does, sir.
17 General, I just would like to shift topics now to the actual
18 preparation of the report that you submitted to the Trial Chamber. And
19 the first item -- obviously we looked at the report, but if could you
20 turn to tab 2 in your binder, which is 65 ter 1D2944, a letter dated --
21 I'm going to do this via Sanction, a letter dated 20 May 2009.
22 A. Yes, have I it.
23 Q. And, General, if can you just page through this and go to the
24 next page and there is an appendix to this letter. Go to the third page,
25 if we can. And then the next page.
1 As the assumed facts, do you recognise this document, General?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. And did you use this document in the preparation of your report?
4 A. I did. First of all, I looked at what was asked of me to do in
5 terms of explaining the role of the operational commander, particularly
6 as we -- as related to General Gotovina. And then I looked at the facts
7 and utilised these facts as well as going back into the documents were
8 later provided to me to read there depth. First of all, the condition of
9 the Croatian forces, the history leading up to Operational [sic] Storm,
10 and then what actually happened during the course of events. I looked
11 particularly at the task organisation, the forces that were given to
12 General Gotovina, the level of training. I also, because of the
13 operational level, looked at how the force got to the readiness level
14 they were or the lack of readiness level and what I thought the risk
15 would be in any operations which the Croatian leadership had given to its
16 commanders. That was the level which I was used to.
17 The -- then I read, looked specifically at the orders. I looked
18 at specific tasks and implied tasks that were given to the command, and
19 then I looked at how, and probably the -- the strategies that were to be
20 used to achieve those missions. I don't know if you want me to elaborate
21 on what I saw.
22 Q. We will get to that in one moment, but before we do that,
23 General --
24 A. Certainly I used this document.
25 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into
1 evidence 65 ter 1D2944.
2 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1632
5 [Realtime transcript read in error "D1062"].
6 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
7 MR. KEHOE:
8 Q. And then if we could just flip back to tab 1, which is your
9 report, 65 ter 1D2779.
10 A. Okay.
11 Q. Just going to wait until it comes up on the screen.
12 And, General, I think you just said that you used this
13 information in this letter and the appendix as well as other documents in
14 formulating your expert report that's on the screen and is in tab 1 of
15 your book; is that correct?
16 A. That's correct.
17 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'll offer into evidence
18 65 ter 1D2779, the expert witness report.
19 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1633.
22 JUDGE ORIE: D1633 is admitted into evidence.
23 MR. WAESPI: Just going back to the previous exhibit.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, the number which appears on the transcript is
25 D1062 should be D1662. That's, Mr. Waespi, I take it you wanted to
1 raise. That's on the record.
2 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, now to add to the confusion. I gave a wrong
4 number. It's D1632 followed by the expert report, which is now D1633.
5 Please proceed.
6 MR. KEHOE:
7 Q. Now, General, if we can back up before we actually go into the
8 substance of your report, and if we can look at paragraph 4 where you
9 talk about the use of the military power being the last resort. And in
10 paragraph 6, you talk about the level of expertise, training, and
11 logistical capabilities of the HV. If you can, General, as a operational
12 commander prior to this series of actions that ultimately culminated in
13 Storm, Maestral, an Operation Southern Movement, as an operational
14 commander, General, can you give the Trial Chamber an idea of what
15 General Gotovina was facing and what his thought processes would have
16 been with this type of assignment?
17 A. Sure. As I reviewed the documents, obviously I saw that we had a
18 very young army, and I saw that it was the intent of the president of
20 after all things either diplomatic and political actions had evidently
21 not been successful. When I looked at that as being with my background,
22 I wanted to see, because I knew that Croatia had a young fledgling --
23 what force would be assigned to prosecute this offensive campaign given
24 that Croatia
25 and prior to this operation were basically a defensive homeland
1 defence-type force.
2 So as I looked at that, I looked to see what training schools,
3 what they were doing to train their force. I looked at how they had
4 requested assistance, trying to establish a corps curriculum for
5 non-commissioned officers and for junior leaders which would be obviously
6 essential if you were going to conduct this type of operation. It was
7 apparent to me that they had a very short time to prepare for this. You
8 cannot build a professional army in a period of three to four years. So
9 there was an issue there which later I saw would be a risk to the total
11 I looked at it in terms of the commanders selected and how they
12 had determined the sectors of operation, and then I looked specifically
13 who they had given responsibilities for, which pieces of the operation,
14 and I saw and looked at the task organisation General Gotovina was given;
15 and I tried to track that back to who was trained, who was not trained,
16 which forces he, in my estimate, he would be relying upon to do the main
18 As I looked at that, I did see that General Gotovina also
19 recognised early on that he had did not have a professional force. He
20 did not have the leadership at the junior levels, not only in officers,
21 but he certainly didn't have it in terms of the non-commissioned officer
22 corps, so he was going to have a very risky operation. I did see efforts
23 from him early on, as early as 1992, where he tried to emphasise that
24 point and tried to get training opportunities in terms of formal
25 schooling as they formulated their -- their army.
1 I saw few opportunities certainly because of time, as we may have
2 done it, to do more collective training at battalion brigade regimental
3 level to actually manoeuvre and see the forces manoeuvre, so his
4 preparation was constrained not only by formal schooling opportunities
5 for his leaders and individuals but also from the capability to do
6 collective-type unit training to prepare them for this operation. So as
7 I looked at that I obviously envisioned, and then I saw, as I envisioned,
8 that there was a lot of risk taken by the main Croatian staff as well as
9 the leadership to employ their military. So this obviously put a lot of
10 responsibility and a lot of burden on commanders across the sectors, and
11 in particular to the main effort which was General Gotovina.
12 So, that -- that was a very critical period leading up to the
13 selection by the -- President Tudjman and the country of Croatia
14 their commanders and their military to conduct an operation which they
15 had not heretofore done before and that put a lot of burden on the
16 commanders on leadership to execute this mission.
17 So it was leading up to the prosecution of the war and the
18 campaign. I could see early on that this was going do take dedicated
19 leadership and dedicated focus, and it would take, even then, some very
20 specific orders, such that at all levels they would understand the intent
21 of the operation and than then caused me to look at the orders, knowing
22 the task organisation.
23 Did that answer your question?
24 Q. It did, sir. If I can just ask a question based on one of the
25 comments that you made, and you refer to it just briefly in your
1 statement in paragraph 9 as well. And that is your distinction between
2 being on the defensive and going on the offensive, which you see in
3 paragraph 9. You say, "Offensive operations are normally the most
4 complex operations to execute."
5 Can you give the Chamber, given the fact that you stated we're
6 now moving from the defensive to the offensive, can you just give the
7 Chamber an idea of what type of transition is necessary there and frankly
8 why is it more complex to execute.
9 A. Well, the basic tenants which make it more complicated, you have
10 more dynamic components, more units moving. You have to control the
11 sectors of fires. You have to have good communications to be able to
12 track and see the battlefield. At the same time, you're looking,
13 especially an operational commander, you have got to look and anticipate
14 what's going on 48 hours, 72 hours ahead of you and anticipate the
15 reaction of the enemy forces. As you move forward and either achieve
16 success or do not achieve success, you have to arrange the priorities of
17 your subordinate units in terms of fires, in terms of a logistic support,
18 in terms of communications, and you have to have your intelligence really
19 focussed so you can -- the help you enable -- help enable you to see the
21 So, this -- when everything is moving versus sitting in a
22 defensive posture which you have people basically stationary, everything
23 becomes very more dynamic and you have then more cause to change your
24 orders while on the move, and that -- for someone that is not trained to
25 do that, it becomes very -- I don't say risky but I would say very
2 Q. But with the logical conclusion to that be that being on the
3 offensive puts yet more responsibility and burden on the operational
4 commander, in this instances, General Gotovina?
5 A. Not only on the operational commander but all his support
6 elements, also to include the logistics, and moving that forward,
7 clearing the routes and also the dynamics of what the enemy is going to
8 do because once you get through the first line of defence, there's
9 certainly a lot of unknowns because you don't see the enemy's playbook
10 and he has a vote in some of the operations, so you have to be able to
11 react. You have to keep some level of reserve so that you can counter
12 any movement by the enemy to counter your initial assault.
13 So there is certainly many more variables in play.
14 I would also say when you start doing something like this, you
15 may have a very good plan but that plan is subject to change based on
16 what happens on the battlefield, and you must continually adjust. That
17 relationship you have with subordinate leaders and them being able to
18 understand your orders and your intent and fulfil that also becomes very
19 important, and it is only through training and those relationships you
20 build over time do you develop the trust and confidence in your
21 subordinate leaders to be able to prosecute the way that you would expect
22 them to do.
23 Q. If I may, General, and I just want to follow up one of the
24 comments you made and this is, Mr. President, on page 14, line 24.
25 And you said that:
1 "I envisioned there was a lot of risk taken by the Croatian
2 Main Staff as well as the leadership to employ their military so there
3 are obviously -- put a lot of responsibility and a lot of burden on
4 commanders across the sectors and in particular the main effort which was
5 General Gotovina."
6 Now given this lack of training that you're talking about, how
7 did that translate into a risk for General Gotovina?
8 A. Well, he had a combination of some forces he was able to spend
9 some time with, I think particularly the 4th Regiment and some other
10 battalion elements, and witnessed their training. He tried to infuse
11 them with some of the non-commissioned officers trained in the academies
12 and officers but certainly far less than his requirement to fulfil those
14 So, he knew, I'm sure he knew, I can't speak for him, but I would
15 have known that I went into this -- this fight with a force that was
16 less -- had conducted less training than I would have wished them to do.
17 Now most commanders would say you never get enough training. But he knew
18 that he had elements he could count on and elements he could not count
19 on. He had also, what I would call, a high level of conscripts in his
20 organisation, his task organisation, that apparently forced him in to do
21 the -- to develop the plan and the strategic he did which was an economy
22 of force in some areas and then knowing also he was probably outgunned
23 and had less combat systems than the force he was going up against. He
24 had the priority -- or prioritise the resources he had to be successful.
25 So he knew he had a risky operation. He knew -- probably he knew
1 which commanders he could reply on, which units he could rely on, and he
2 had to manage those very carefully. He had to give the priority of
3 support to the units he knew had to lead the effort, and I think on
4 several times he emphasised the -- the issue of discipline in his ranks,
5 and knowing he didn't have professional force, he probably knew that was
6 also a risk.
7 So, when this happens, leadership is paramount. At the point in
8 time of the main attack or when a decision must be made at a critical
9 point in time in the fight, that's when leadership makes a difference,
10 and he, no doubt, realised that.
11 Q. General, with regard to this campaign, and I just -- for
12 reference in paragraph 40, you note that there were various operations of
13 the offensive campaign that took place before and after Operation Storm.
14 Is it -- my first question is: Is it important to look at, for instance,
15 Operation Storm in the context of the overall campaign that is under way
16 and why is it important? And why is it important to -- in viewing the
17 operational commander's actions.
18 A. If you go back to the mission that was given to the Croatian Army
19 in the first place, that set the stage because there were strategic
20 objectives at stake and so, as you went into a campaign to support those
21 strategic objectives, a commander can't lose sight of the ultimate goal.
22 So, as -- there's -- there's some goodness in that series of -- of -- of
23 engagement such as, you know, Operation Winter 94, Jump 1, he, at that
24 time, those experiences gained by those forces were building his force
25 as -- on the move.
1 So he knew that there was none of those individual objectives
2 were culminating points for this offensive campaign. He had to stay
3 focussed to the original mission given to him by the Main Staff and the
4 country, which was to re-establish the Croatian country and/or to defeat
5 the occupation forces.
6 So you can -- you know, you cannot sit back on each one of those
7 preliminary or intermediate [Realtime transcript read in error
8 "immediate"] objectives and think that you have achieved the end. You
9 had to stay focussed on the end state and what you were asked to do.
10 That is something that lower levels of command usefully don't understand.
11 They are seeing the tactical objective. So it's at the operational level
12 you must stay focussed on what your country has tasked you to do. That
13 is -- very few people see that when it comes to fighting the fight,
14 because they get oftentimes too wrapped up in the task at hand, and you
15 must continue to reiterate and focus them to the future. In that case,
16 the operational commander must be looking for 48, 72 hours out. What's
17 the next mission? What could happen with my forces now? What are my
18 vulnerabilities? What is my priority which I have to redistribute my
19 resources to make sure that I'm achieving my ultimate objective?
20 Q. Now, as -- as part of that, General, and that focus, that focus
21 of looking ahead, is your assessment that that focus also include the
22 movement into Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation Maestral and Operation
23 Southern Move?
24 A. No doubt. I would -- I think that Operation Storm was just an
25 intermediate [Realtime transcript read in error "immediate"] objective in
1 the course of events of an offensive campaign, in this case which was
2 leading to the strategic objectives. After the agreement signed with the
3 Bosnian forces by the Croatian government, there was no doubt that that
4 mission was going to continue with the pressure on the Bihac pocket in
5 the north. Something had to be done in conjunction with the time of the
6 Bosnian 5th Corps to continue that operation. I know that there was a
7 decision to go into a defensive posture at one time, but that defence
8 posture would have - if you didn't continue the momentum - probably would
9 have not enabled success because your forces, when you achieve that
10 momentum, would have probably set back and you would have not been able
11 to achieve strategic objectives.
12 I know that speaks very broadly. But what General Gotovina was
13 saddled with in the main effort by his country, I don't think a lot of
14 people realise the significance. If he didn't succeed, his country was
15 at risk, as was the future disposition of the whole area.
16 Q. I would like to get a little bit more specific, General, on the
17 fight within the borders of the Republic of Croatia
18 next set -- the next movement of the campaign, be it Maestral or Southern
19 Move. And in paragraph 8 you know that the Operation Storm was fought
20 virtually all within the internationally recognised territory of the
21 Republic of Croatia
22 In your analysis of the situation, General, how did that
23 situation, the fight within the Republic of Croatia
24 different from the next steps, the fights into Bosnia-Herzegovina, with
25 regard to the division of responsibilities and who was in charge of what,
1 and do you have some basis of that in some of the documents you looked
3 A. Yes. I noticed early on that, since they were still within their
4 own territory, the orders given and the responsibilities divided for the
5 forces, and I would -- I attribute this a lot to the fact that
6 General Gotovina, in his forces, were charged with the -- to attack
7 and/or achieve the objectives, that he was not given responsibility for
8 the rear area of operations and the re-establishment of civil law and
9 authority. To me, that probably assisted him because as he could move
10 through the area and then have someone take over the responsibility for
11 re-establishing the rule of law on the civil and/or to secure the rear
12 area allowed him to focus forward on offensive campaign.
13 Now whether that was the intent, it certainly, to me, was spelled
14 out in the orders given to him and given to -- from down through the
15 minister of defence, minister of the interior. That was probably a good
16 thing because the condition and readiness of his forces relied him to
17 focus forward continually to conduct this offensive campaign. As complex
18 as it was, as complex as the terrain was, the fighting through minefields
19 to achieve positional advantage with the terrain, as rugged as it was, to
20 focus on the objectives and the manoeuvre units, I mean, you notice all
21 the way up until objective Storm [sic] I don't think the Croatian Army
22 would ever deployed the two brigades abreast. It was always fighting
23 single brigades, and it's that time the change in manoeuvre and tactics,
24 the ability to use fires in support of manoeuvre units that was creating
25 doctrine for the -- this young Korean [sic] Army, and so he was
1 developing, as he went, his tactics. And he had to stay focussed, and he
2 had to ensure the units of -- were moving appropriately. I think he also
3 recognised a lot of his plan didn't all launch off at the same time
4 because he had approximately someone -- 250, 300 kilometres of front
5 lines. Although Knin was a very valuable target, the rest of his force
6 did not move probably as he would have liked it to. So there was a
7 lot -- lot of focus. He had to do -- across his front line and as they
8 moved, I think it was beneficial for someone else to pick up the
9 responsibility of the rear area and re-establish it within their legal
10 territory, re-establishing the security and the rule of law.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jones, there is a word missing on the
12 transcript. You said he was creating doctrine for the -- this young and
13 then you used an adjective before you used the word army, and it's my
14 recollection that you said Korean which I had difficulties to --
15 THE WITNESS: Oh, Croatian. Did I say Korean? I didn't mean to.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know whether I heard it well, but at least
17 it's now right on the record.
18 MR. KEHOE: If I may, Judge, if you can just ask one other
19 clarification on page 19, line 18, it reads: "So you can -- you know,
20 you cannot sit back on one of those preliminary or immediate objectives."
21 I think that that -- I'm not sure that that was the word immediate, but
22 I asked the Chamber if we can clarify that.
23 JUDGE ORIE: It's on the record now that you said:
24 "So you can -- you know, you cannot sit back on each of those
25 preliminary or immediate objectives," that's how it reads now, "and think
1 that you have achieved the end." Does that reflect what you said or ...
2 THE WITNESS: It should be intermediate objective.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Intermediate objectives.
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
5 Yes. I earlier referred to interpreters being able to take a
6 breath now and then but transcribers may have a similar problem.
7 THE WITNESS: I understand. My problem.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
9 MR. KEHOE:
10 Q. If I may, Mr. President I think that if we stay on the same page,
11 line 10 -- excuse me, page 20, line 10.
12 JUDGE ORIE: What we have at this moment, Mr. Jones, is, "I
13 would -- I think the Operation Storm was just an immediate objective."
14 There also I take it that you wanted to uses the word intermediate.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
16 JUDGE ORIE: That's then corrected as well.
17 Please proceed.
18 MR. KEHOE:
19 Q. Now, General, just looking at your binder and talking about this
20 responsibility for law and order in Croatia, I note that in tabs 3, 4,
21 and 5, you review a variety of documents. For record they're D409, the
22 20 August 1995
23 General Lausic regarding cooperation between the military police and the
24 Ministry of Interior. And I would like to focus on the -- tab 5, which,
25 if we can put that on the screen, that is 65 ter 1D374 which is the
1 minutes of a closed session of the Croatian government on 4 August 1995.
2 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry, it's 1D1374, if I misspoke.
3 Q. As you can see, these are the minutes that I just discussed with
4 a variety of ministers there, and I would like to turn to page 7 in the
5 English, where Minister Jarnjak, the minister of the interior, is
6 talking. And page 9 in the B/C/S.
7 And, General, I would just like to -- to focus you on the
8 comments that begin five lines -- the middle of the fifth line down, by
9 the minister of the interior:
10 "Because, as the army enters the area, the military police
11 follows which secures the line, and immediately after the regular police
12 enters the area and takes over, all those tasks that the regular police
13 is obligated to conduct, according to the constitution and the law and
14 those maintaining public peace and order, protection of life and
16 Now those particular comments in conjunction with the other
17 comments, did that give you the view that you just espoused about what
18 General Gotovina's focus was meant to be, after Operation Storm?
19 A. Well, certainly that responsibility as outlined there which they
20 were supposed to do to re-establish within the Croatian country the --
21 not only the courts, the jurisdiction, the police authority, certainly
22 the responsibility, so that -- that to me was a good thing because it
23 allowed General Gotovina to really look at what he had ahead of him, and
24 he was conducting an offensive campaign.
25 The things that he had to start looking for, obviously right
1 after Storm was what -- what is the next mission? That being an
2 intermediate objective, so he had a lot on his mind to focus himself
3 forward. This, in itself, allowed the responsibility for the rear area
4 to be under the over-sighted not only the other -- the ministers here but
5 the forces which they had the civil, military police. It appeared, you
6 know, how well they executed that is not in discussion but they certainly
7 had the responsibility.
8 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into
9 evidence 65 ter 1D1374.
10 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1634.
13 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
14 MR. KEHOE: May I proceed, Mr. President?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. KEHOE:
17 Q. General, I would like to -- to just go in a little bit more
18 deeply on what you just commented about, about the next responses and the
19 transition and the looking ahead after the attack on Operation Storm and
20 just explain to us a little bit the next sequence of responses, the short
21 responses immediately after Operation Storm, what those concerns were,
22 and then after those concerns were addressed, what happened after that.
23 A. Well, if you remember, as I think about Operation Storm, the --
24 obviously the Main Staff had given that operation four days to prosecute
25 which is a very short time-period.
1 As you look at it, I also noticed with the fall of Knin, you
2 know, I wondered at the time, and I asked the question: What was
3 General Gotovina doing, you know, if, in fact, Knin was such a centre of
4 focus it was a -- what I consider a key objective. However, if you think
5 about it, the remainder of his forces across the line were not doing very
6 well. So as it's operational commander, he had to be concerned across
7 all his front even though he had taken risk by -- my opinion, what was an
8 economy of force operation back in to the western part of his
9 responsibilities, area of operation. He could get those people moving,
10 because he become -- after Knin was taken by the 4th and the 7th there,
11 he had to be concerned about the success of the rest of his operation, as
12 well as the adjacent units although he been working out of Bosnia
13 envelopment-type operation, he had, with the HVO forces on his right
14 flank, he also had to be concerned about that. He did not know,
15 probably, in my opinion, the readiness of that force. So he had now, by
16 doing an envelopment, exposed the flank of his force, so he had to be
17 concerned about movement of the rest of the force back-up and their
19 He also had to look at his other flank and see the success of
20 that operation, to see if it was proceeding so that he would have kind of
21 a dual envelopment. So it became clear to me that he was probably
22 looking at the rest of the fight knowing that Knin was being taken by his
23 current forces. He then had to anticipate what was his vulnerabilities.
24 As I said in my report, once an objective is taken and you learn this
25 from your initial training, once you have taken objective, you know,
1 if -- if you're not a professional force and trained to do this very
2 readily, you must go quickly and posture yourself for a counter-attack
3 from the force of which you just pushed off that objective, because that
4 is a time which you are very vulnerable. And a lot of times a
5 non-professional force will set back, so you must focus those people and
6 get them prepared for potential counterattack.
7 Q. Why are you the most vulnerable after you achieve an objective?
8 A. Because a lot of times, and in our army we saw this earlier on,
9 going back to Vietnam
10 anticipated your attack and probably has a reserve at some point. He's
11 prepared now to commit that reserve against critical nodes and he would
12 mass his forces at a point in time to counter what you just achieved.
13 So, at the same time as you just achieved your objective, at lot
14 of times your artillery is moving, repositioning, your forces are
15 repositioning; and your command and control is not as good as it was
16 because people have a tendency to have a letdown and go into this -- this
17 probably -- I call it self-satisfaction that they have achieved something
18 without being able to look ahead but they have to stay focused and
19 leadership must keep them focuses in going forward. That's the
20 difficulties in an offensive campaign versus defensive campaign.
21 Defensive, you may have kicked the force back, you're still in the same
22 position. You get some re-arm, refuel, but now you're moving and you're
23 on terrain that you didn't heretofore hold and you're not familiar with
24 it, so you have to keep focussed and keep moving. The enemy has been on
25 that terrain. He knows that terrain and he probably knows his avenues to
2 Q. Let me turn your attention to a document that -- it is in your
3 binder as P20, and it is the war diary that you looked at, and if you can
4 turn to page 87 in the English.
5 MR. KEHOE: If we can call P71 up and 87 in the English. If we
6 can spin that around.
7 Q. This is talking about 5 August 1995, the day that they took Knin.
8 And General Gotovina notes:
9 "I am warning that the battle is still on until we carry out our
11 Is that consistent with what you're talking about at the time,
13 A. Yes, for sure. I mean, the comment there musn't be euphoria is
14 right on. That shows you how he still sees the battlefield. He still
15 sees the fight and you cannot develop complacency. You must continue to
17 Q. General, how does this looking forward then exhibit itself, for
18 instance, in terms of setting up an active defence. What's that
19 interplay between taking your objective, active defence and then moving
20 ahead from there?
21 A. Sure. Well, leading up to this, if you think back from the
22 winter of 1994 and then this movement through this very difficult
23 terrain, commander knows that those forces that have led the main effort
24 obviously -- not only they develop casualties, they probably have both
25 some level of mental and physical fatigue; and he has to keep that in
1 mind as he prepares for the next fight. So normally when would you go
2 into an active defence, it would bring some of the forces forward to
3 defend the lines where you gave those forces which -- who have been
4 fighting for the last 48, 72, one week, whatever it may be, whatever the
5 period may be, to give them a little bit of rest, an ability to regroup,
6 get a couple of hours of sleep before going into the next fight. At the
7 same time, you have to enable that commander and his staff to plan the
8 next fight and take the orders you are passing to them, re-task, organise
9 for the next phase. So all that must happen, and it's easier to do if
10 you go into an active defence and bring some of the reserve forces on to
11 the line, who may be a little bit fresher, and enable them to hold that
12 line, while you reset the forces who have just been fighting for the
14 It's a calculated risk if you are able to do that and afford
15 yourself where those units 12, 24 hours, whatever it may be, to reset
16 before you start the next operation. And in this particular case, as I
17 saw in the orders, he elected to take that risk rather than to continue
18 to deplete his forces, give them an opportunity to reset and rest before
19 he -- he -- what he saw was the next operation.
20 Q. Did you also see that there was, in fact, a counter-attack
21 several days after the active defence order was implemented on the 9th of
23 A. I'm not surprised.
24 Q. I want to talk a little bit about the actual planning of
25 Operation Storm before we move into some of the other aspects of your
1 report. And if we could just go back to your binder, and we're going to
2 go through all these documents, but in tab 6, 7, 8, and 9, and we have a
3 series of documents that you reviewed, the first being D956, directive
4 from the Main Staff, HV Main Staff, 26 June 1995; D957, order for Storm
5 to General Gotovina, 26 June 1995
6 attacking, 27 June 1995
7 2 August, by General Gotovina for the offensive operations for the Split
8 Military District.
9 And you noted previously there was a very short period of time
10 between the actual issuance of the attack order and the onset of
11 Operation Storm, and if we could pull up on the screen, P1125, which
12 would be tab 9 in your binder, General, which is the Kozjak order of
13 2 August 1995
14 And if -- if we could actually go to the next page of this
15 document. And then one more page in, please.
16 Now, General, you have reviewed this document, have you not?
17 A. I have.
18 Q. Now, General, looking at this order and General Gotovina as an
19 operational commander, what is the role of General Gotovina as the
20 operational commander with respect to the planning of a major operation,
21 such as this?
22 A. I think, as you see in this order, he has selected and
23 task-organised the units. He's given an axis of advance by his lead
24 elements and then he also would designate the reserve and who would
25 follow on that main effort. So, as operational commander, he has
1 oriented his forces towards their next objectives and the avenues and
2 intent at which he wants them to manoeuvre. He has then aligned the
3 supporting priorities to support the main effort as well as take into
4 consideration what he sees or pictures the enemy disposition to be.
5 So the operational commander, in this very short period of
6 time -- this is almost more like a frag order than a detailed order. But
7 now he is continuing to fight. He is orienting those forces on the axis
8 of advance and task-organising very quickly to be able to prosecute as he
9 sees as the next objective, and that is his role. He has to think about
10 what could go wrong, obviously, if he is not successful. It is not as
11 easy as just giving his regiments an orientation. What if they are not
12 successful? What is his reserve? What is his other courses of action if
13 he is not successful? Anticipating what the fight will be and what other
14 orders he may have to give to ensure that they are successful.
15 Q. General, if I can just clarify one thing. I understand what
16 you're talking about, but heretofore in this case, I don't think we've
17 heard the terminology, "frag order." Can you explain that for me?
18 A. Usually you will have a large base order for an offensive
19 campaign which would detail, just as we saw in the original orders, all
20 the annexes for logistics, intelligence, communications, rear area OPs,
21 if it pertains to them and so forth. You take that base order and then
22 as you go through the campaign and you're given very quick orders from -
23 as you see in this sequence - the Main Staff to continue the fight, or to
24 change directions, you use that base element and then you order -- you
25 publish a fragmentation order which is a piece order to supplement your
1 original order, and it usually just re-prioritises the supporting
2 elements, the priorities of fires, the axes and direction of advance. So
3 you don't have to rewrite a 100-page document. You just give very
4 concisely what's changed from the base orders, and that is generally
5 referred to as a frag order. I'm sorry.
6 Q. General, we talked about General Gotovina's role in drafting or
7 involving himself in the attack order that we have before. What's the
8 role of the subordinate commanders in this planning of this military
10 A. Okay. What he would do was give the priorities of effort, and
11 then the subordinate commanders, if it's in their area of
12 responsibilities, would provide a detailed plan, for example, the
13 artillery, the fires annex. He would give priorities of fire to
14 different categories. Then the commander -- or the chief of the fires
15 brigades would then take those priorities and develop a detailed target
16 list. If the logistics priority set was priority to 4th Guards Regiment,
17 the logistics commander would then orient his supply trains to give them
18 the priority, in terms the ammunition, water, food, whatever it may be,
19 as supplies.
20 So he would -- he would then dictate and approve the priorities
21 of effort for his subordinate commanders. For his manoeuvre commanders,
22 you saw he would give them an orientation or an axes of advance. They
23 would figure out in detail how then to manoeuvre their forces,
24 subordinate forces, through that area oriented on where he told them to
1 Q. General, let's use just an example. If you can go to page 7 --
2 section 7 of this document, which is page 14 in the English, and I will
3 check it on the artillery section.
4 As is this is coming up in the B/C/S, General, you just mentioned
5 the artillery aspect, and you said the chief of the fire brigades. I
6 take it you mean the artillery brigade would then take those priorities
7 and develop a detailed target list. That is at page 32, line 4 and 5.
8 Using this information that's in -- concerning artillery support,
9 just can you explain that in a little bit more depth. This information
10 goes out from General Gotovina and what does the chief of artillery then
12 A. Okay. As you see here, the other thing he has done is
13 task-organised the supporting artillery to re-enforce the Operations
14 Group North by giving them more assets, so not only has he determined the
15 priority of fires, he has told them to wait a different subordinate
16 command with what forces he has. So he has that within obviously his
18 The -- then you see what's happening. He has told them where to
19 orient their fires and the priorities. Now the artillery group commander
20 must take that information and do his targeting and make sure that he has
21 assigned different batteries and different guns, the capability to
22 prosecute those priorities. And so he would then plan in detail the
23 targeting, the allocation, the rounds per target, and those kind of
24 details and which element was going to fire on those targets.
25 Q. Now, in General Gotovina's orders would you expect to see
1 specific targets listed in this order, and if not, why not?
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
3 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I didn't object to the first point about
4 artillery because it was fairly general. But now we going to target
5 lists. There is nowhere in the report any mentioning of target lists,
6 and as Mr. Kehoe pointed out, I think, last week, on Tuesday, he said
7 that on transcript page 2887:
8 "The opinions that this expert are going to employ are in the
9 actual report. There is not going to be any divergence from these
10 opinions. We are simply giving the array of documents that could
11 potentially come up during direct examination."
12 So this is a total new area developed now on the stand which
13 there is no foundation also about -- documents, other documents that the
14 witness has seen, so I object to continuing.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe.
16 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, if I may, these documents, of
17 course, were disclosed to counsel as documents that we were going to use
18 with regard to the duties and responsibilities of an operational
19 commander in executing a plan such as Operation Storm or any other plan,
20 are outlined in this report. The only thing we're doing here is taking
21 documents in evidence, digging one step down, and asking that question:
22 As the operational commander, would you expect to see these specific
23 targets set forth in this order?
24 That's all it is. It's just an extension of what the duties and
25 responsibilities were of an operational commander as opposed to his
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you would leave it to that one question?
3 MR. KEHOE: Yes, sir.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then the witness may answer the question.
5 THE WITNESS: Back to your question, I would not expect to see
6 the target list in General Gotovina's orders. I would expect to see a
7 detailed target list down in subordinate orders, of which, you know, they
8 would take the intelligence and then apply the target list and
9 coordinates and what weapons system would fire on those. So, no, I would
10 not expect that at the operational level.
11 MR. KEHOE:
12 Q. And you mentioned previously matters like logistics and
13 communications. Would you likewise expect more detailed orders at the
14 more subordinate level outlining exactly how logistics were going to be
15 taking care of communications?
16 A. I would. I would also -- I would expect in the operational order
17 level to re-establish the priority of support, based on the changes and
18 task organisation. I would also -- that priority support may also
19 dictate things like priority of air support, priority of intelligence,
20 and other things, which could enable the success of the main effort.
21 MR. KEHOE: A couple of more questions on the beginning of a --
22 of a separate topic, Mr. President. I think we do some preliminaries
23 before we move into the meat of it because I note we have five minutes
24 more, so if I may.
25 Q. I'd like to shift gears, if we may, and talk about items that you
1 discuss in paragraphs 19 and 28 of your report, and it has to do with the
2 command climate and you note that the commander - this is in
3 paragraph 19 - establishes the culture and command climate within his
4 subordinate units. And in paragraph 28, you elaborate on that just a bit
6 Talk a little bit about the command climates and how would an
7 operational commander such as General Gotovina convey the command
8 climate. What would he do on a general level and a more specific level?
9 How is it done, General?
10 A. Well, it starts with training. When the commanders is assigned
11 to a unit, obviously the units ask themselves, Can I trust this leader?
12 So he has got to -- by his actions, his words, his emphasis on key
13 elements, he has got to set the conditions of: Who am I, what's
14 important, and what are my expectations by leaders at all echelons? He
15 does that not by sitting behind and writing documents to -- professes
16 that. He does that by his presence at key places, such as key training
17 events. He does that by holding key forums of his leadership, to really
18 make sure that they understand what his intent is, by his actions, what
19 he does or fails to do is observed by his subordinate leaders. So -- and
20 it also -- by being at key events which dictates that leadership should
21 be there, his presence makes a difference.
22 So that's why you see, irregardless of the battlefield, but it
23 would be training, would it be sometimes when the situation is tough,
24 leadership must be present, must be supporting subordinate leaders but
25 also must be able to make sure that when they're not there, they're
1 carrying out his intent.
2 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I'm about to go into a series of
3 documents that may be easier for the Chamber to view as a whole as to
4 opposed to breaking it up. On that score, it may be a logical time for a
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we will have a break, and we will resume at
7 five minutes to 11.00.
8 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
9 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.
11 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. General, staying with the command climate issue, I'd like to talk
13 to you just a bit about the element of discipline in command climate, and
14 the reference point that'd like to take off from is the last sentence in
15 paragraph 43 of your report where you note, based on the directives and
16 commander's intent as propagated in the written and verbal orders, "...
17 this type of activity" -- I'm talking about undisciplined activity, "...
18 this type of activity was not to be condoned by the military or
19 leadership at any level."
20 And on that score, General, I'd like to discuss with you a series
21 of documents, beginning with the -- again the operational diary, P71,
22 which is tab 20 in your binder. And if we could turn to page 47 of the
23 English, and we are focussing here, General, on the period of time just
24 after Operation Summer 1995 in the Bosanski, Grahovo, and Glamoc area and
25 prior to Operation Storm.
1 What I would like to do, General, is just discuss a few series of
2 entries here so we can move through this relatively quickly and then ask
3 you a question based on the items that we will discuss.
4 And the first entry as I noted is the Ademi meeting, under the
5 entry for 1820, General Ademi, being General Gotovina's Chief of Staff.
6 And it notes midway through that paragraph: "After command related
7 problems in the units, looting and arson reported in the area of Glamoc
8 and Bosanski Grahovo."
9 I would like to turn you ahead to paragraph -- to page 49 where
10 towards the top of the page, 72nd VP, that is the 72nd Military Police
11 Battalion, warning that last night about setting fires in houses.
12 We move ahead to paragraph -- excuse me, page 56 in the English,
13 and this is an entry on 29 July 1995
14 middle of that page, General Gotovina said: "It is required to prevent
15 arson," and the rest.
16 And the rest. And the bottom of that is illegible.
17 Again, moving ahead to page 62 in the English for an entry on the
18 31st of July, this is an entry by the 72nd military police -- it's
19 brigade but ...
20 Towards the bottom of the page.
21 MR. KEHOE: Can I scroll that down a little bit in the English,
22 and we'll just wait for it to come up in B/C/S. I understand we're just
23 going to work with the English.
24 It notes that the military police say that the phenomenon of
25 arson in Grahovo is under control.
1 The last two entries are on the 1st of August and there are in
2 fact two entries, the first being on page 69 at a meeting on the 1st of
3 August of 1995, midway through that entry for General Gotovina: "The
4 biggest problem in OG Sjever, which is OG North, is the lack of
5 discipline, so we ordered to the commanders of the units to pay attention
6 and strictly forbid looting and burning."
7 If I may, just round that particular day out, if we can go up to
8 page 73, if we can spin that towards the left hand column, where
9 Minister Susak, the Minister of Defence is at the bottom of the left-hand
10 side page saying: "Past Glamoc and Grahovo. Very disappointed by
11 burning and looting. Especially noticeable in the 4th and 7th Guards
13 The evidence that we've had to date, General, as we discussed
14 outside the Court was that the 4th and the 7th was part of OG North or OG
15 Sjever. Now, likewise - and this is on the 1st of August - but I would
16 also like address with you some of the planning documents for Operation
17 Storm and turn to D201, which is tab 10 in your binder.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, you're going at a high speed. The Susak
19 entry is for what date?
20 MR. KEHOE: It's for the 1st of August.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, oh yes. You said two entries are on the --
22 MR. KEHOE: 1st of August.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 MR. KEHOE:
25 Q. Now tab 10 are operational orders for Kozjak 95. And if we can
1 turn to page 2 and 3 of this document, focussing on the items 5, 6, and
2 then 8. 5 being familiarise members with conduct and occupied
3 settlements and handling of war booty. 6 being familiarizing units with
4 the need to eliminate all negative occurrences that will surface in the
5 course of combat operations with a focus on preventing torching and
6 destruction of larger populated areas and towns.
7 Moving down to item 8, advising members of units on conduct with
8 civilians and POWs, in accordance with the Geneva Convention.
9 Lastly before I move into the questions, I would like to turn our
10 attention to D793, which is tab 11 in your book. We have the order of 1
11 August 1995 -- excuse me, 3 August, 1995
12 different item. Of 3 August 1995
13 the commander of the Split Military District, giving the reference
14 numbers, and with the purpose of having a uniform command and control of
15 the units ... Staff Rahim Ademi -- "Staff Brigadier Rahim Ademi is
16 temporarily appointed commander of OG North. He shall perform the said
17 duty alongside his establishment duty. The outgoing commander of
18 OG North, Colonel Slave Zdilar, is to resume his duty as acting chief of
19 infantry at the Split
20 "This order shall come into effect immediately."
21 Signed General Gotovina.
22 Now, General, prior to coming in to day you have reviewed all
23 these documents, have you not?
24 A. I have, yes.
25 Q. Can you explain to the Trial Chamber your analysis culminating in
1 this change of command for OG North less than 24 hours from -- from the
2 beginning of Operation Storm, and how it plays into your conclusions in
3 paragraph 43 about conduct, improper conduct not being condoned.
4 A. If you think about it, what's going on here from an operational
5 commander's standpoint, the questions you have to ask yourself: What
6 were the rules set in place before operations started. And a good
7 example is your Exhibit 10 where you talk -- where the orders talk about
8 preparations prior to operations, during operations and post-operations.
9 So, clearly, this annex in itself talked to the fact of reiterating and
10 re-emphasising the important of not only control of civilians but
11 disciplined behaviour.
12 The second part of that also talked about during the execution of
13 not condoning it, and the third part then talked to assisting with the
14 stabilisation and post-combat activities. That is a normal sequence.
15 So in the course of the events the documented orders obviously
16 outline what the expectations and the commander's intent was.
17 Now --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Before you continue, you're referring to your
19 exhibit number 10?
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, the one just in here.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But I think -- are you referring to the
22 tab numbers?
23 MR. KEHOE: No, that's a tab number, Judge.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 MR. KEHOE: D201 is the --
1 JUDGE ORIE: D201, D201.
2 MR. KEHOE: My apologies, D201.
3 THE WITNESS: Of course, the work got put on the left part of
4 that document.
5 JUDGE ORIE: D201, yes.
6 THE WITNESS: It says preparation for combat, and then the second
7 sequence is in the course of combat operations, and the third and from a
8 -- the way I look at that is a sequence of events of expectations.
9 So clearly the commander's intent was outlined.
10 Now, no doubt, as I looked at the different exhibits burning and
11 looting was happening and had happened and this was in the period before
12 Storm. From the operational commander's standpoint, the question arises,
13 did he communicate to his subordinate leaders his expectations, and, of
14 course, as a professional force, a commander is always concerned about
15 disciplined behaviour and to see indisciplined behaviour is no doubt
17 So, as you look at that from the operational level, you have to
18 think in terms of everything else that's going on, was this a trend, was
19 this a pattern, was it focussed in certain units, and what was being done
20 about it. And it appears, leading up the events where the commander of
21 Operational Group north was replaced, it obviously appears to me that, in
22 that particular organisation -- or the subordinate units of that
23 organisation were not executing the commander's intent. And this was a
24 very critical period. This was on the eve almost of Operation Storm, so
25 to take actions to replace the commander, the Operational Group
1 commander, on the eve of the next fight, tells me that obviously the
2 trust and confidence in that commander was no longer there to prosecute
3 the orders or his ability to lead his subordinate elements and get the
4 right discipline and execution that was demanded.
5 You know, you think about this at the time. General Gotovina
6 didn't have a lot of resources to replace commanders with, and this is
7 one of his -- his direct reports, as he has established the four
8 Operational Groups at this time. So it's a significant event to replace
9 one of those four, sending back to Split
10 interpretation is the school house in the rear, and then take his Chief
11 of Staff and put him in charge of that group.
12 So, to me, he obviously, though I can't -- wasn't -- I can't
13 speak for him, was disappointed in the effectiveness of that leader and
14 therefore he replaced him, even though he knew it was the eve of the next
15 major fight.
16 So that was a significant event for the total force.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, would you allow me to seek some
19 You're giving an interpretation of why you think this order to
20 replace, let me just, for argument's sake let me give you an alternative.
21 Colonel Slave Zdilar had reported that he was not in a very good
22 physical condition, suffering from kidney stones or whatever, and had
23 reported that he might have difficulties in performing his task. I mean,
24 that's an alternative possibility. What makes your alternative stronger
25 than mine.
1 THE WITNESS: Well, my focus is on prosecuting the war. There's
2 no doubt to me there's -- at this time after fighting for 18 months,
3 numerous commanders had either mental or physical problems they had to
4 deal with. That comes with, you know, personal courage and being able to
5 step up and -- because this is a very critical time in this offensive
7 My -- and, of course, did I not read anything that showed me that
8 was a -- was a consideration, but it appeared to me, as any commander
9 would be, there was a series of indisciplined behaviour in some units of
10 which General Gotovina was relying on to be his main effort, and he was
11 not going to tolerate that, nor would have I, and obviously his -- the
12 person next to him who was responsible was not carrying out his orders or
13 his intent.
14 JUDGE ORIE: I have understood your explanation. That's not my
16 THE WITNESS: Yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: My problem would be, how does that appear from this
18 document? I mean, the document saying something about uniformed command
19 and control of the units but not giving any further details. What -- I
20 mean, you are linking more or less the -- and that's what we talked
21 about, indisciplinary behaviour with perhaps what happens here, and --
22 now, I'm trying to find out where in this document that link is supported
23 by the language of this document, apart from I can see that if the
24 situation was, as you think it was, then it's quite logic to do what you
25 have done here. But I'm asking myself: Could there be other situation
1 in which it would be as logic to take a similar action.
2 THE WITNESS: I think if it was -- well, we're hypothesizing a
3 little bit here, but --
4 JUDGE ORIE: We or I or you?
5 THE WITNESS: Sir, what you just proposed to me was an
6 alternative way of looking at this.
7 JUDGE ORIE: And of course, I'm asking myself to what extent --
8 THE WITNESS: Yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE -- your explanation is hypothetical as well.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: That's, of course, the issue I'm raising.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes. I would suggest to you that not only the
13 series has documented incidents of behaviour or indiscipline within the
14 units was a -- a good indication of the effectiveness of this commander
15 to take the orders and/or the intent of the commander and pass those to
16 his subordinate leaders.
17 So, the trust that General Gotovina had probably most likely in
18 this commander to command and control his elements and/or to garner the
19 trust and confidence of them in his decision authorities was probably in
20 doubt, and therefore he wanted to make sure that someone was in charge
21 who he had the trust and confidence to prosecute the war.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
23 Please proceed.
24 MR. KEHOE:
25 Q. Staying with that document, General, in the prefatory language,
1 does the comment "with the purpose of having a uniformed command and
2 control of the units," if you see that on the screen. It's on the screen
3 right now, the document we just looked at. In keeping with order for
4 a -- the attack order of the commander of the Split Military District
5 with the purpose -- and with the purpose of having a uniformed command
6 and control of the units, you find -- did you find that particular
7 comment of some significance in coming to your conclusion?
8 A. Yes. I think that's a documented way of saying, I've lost the
9 trust and confidence in a subordinate leader, and I want someone who will
10 prosecute my direction, my orders, and my intent, which allows you to
11 have that uniformity of command all the way down through all echelons and
12 that's what he was after, to make sure that his guidance and direction
13 was not only getting to his immediate commanders or sub-commanders but
14 also down to the lowest levels.
15 Q. General, under these circumstances, on the eve of Operation
16 Storm, and being confronted with allegations of looting and burning by --
17 the 4th and 7th were part of Operative Group North, and the removal of
18 this commander on the eve of Operation Storm, literally less than 24
19 hours, putting yourself in the position of General Gotovina as an
20 operational commander would have you done anything else, to set this
21 control climate or the --
22 A. Command climate.
23 Q. Command climate, excuse me.
24 A. Had I been in that position, and I had seen the events leading up
25 to me that would -- we would -- it necessitated me to take that action,
1 first of all I would regret that I would have to do that as I entered
2 into combat the next day. But, clearly, it showed that he had the
3 courage to do it, because he did not have the faith in that commander to
4 lead his soldiers into a fight, so he took that burden on his shoulders
5 to take the risk, relieve the commander, and then put one of his own
6 people into that position and therefore he had to go without a Chief of
7 Staff obviously for the fight, that was a -- a courageous move as far as
8 keeping, you know, his command team intact a -- a destructive move but
9 obviously something he seen that had to happen.
10 Now, once he did that, he must move on. The fight's the next
11 day. So I think that sent a signal to subordinate commanders that he did
12 not tolerate indisciplined activities, but, at the same time, he expected
13 his subordinate commanders to -- to prosecute his intent as well as his
14 orders, and he had to put that behind him and focus on the fight, because
15 the next day, they -- he and all his forces were entering into objective
16 Storm and that mission.
17 So, at that time, I don't see anything else he would need to do,
18 because he just sent a strong signal that someone who had been with him
19 and he had appointed him to a position, he's now relived him of his
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, you were on your feet.
22 MR. WAESPI: Yes. The first part was the responsive if he was
23 asked whether he would have done anything else, and then he mentioned
24 into -- again his assessment of what he thought General Gotovina did.
25 But I think the last sentence cleared it up.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. KEHOE:
4 Q. So to conclude this, General, as an operational commander in
5 reviewing the sequence of events prior to Operation Storm but after
6 Summer 95 and the events in Grahovo and Glamoc, do you believe that
7 General Gotovina took all necessary and reasonable measures to address
8 these discipline problems?
9 A. At that point in time, yes. I think you will see later that he
10 followed up with re-emphasising the points as he continued operations
11 that he was not going to tolerate and he needed some help in creating the
12 law and order needed in the rear areas.
13 Q. If we can move on to another aspect of the command climate in
14 addition to the items that we just talked about in D201 and D793. And on
15 the subject of NCOs, which you talk about to some degree in paragraph 25
16 of your statement, and the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of
17 non-commissioned officers - I'll give you a second to get to that - now
18 without going into this in detail you do speak about the necessity of
19 effective -- non-commissioned officer leadership at a small unit level
20 and how important that is.
21 And I would like to -- to talk with you just about one exhibit
22 that you've reviewed, and it's in tab 12 of your binder, which is D1596.
23 General, I think this is the document you alluded to previously
24 from February of 1995, but we'll bring it up on the screen.
25 [Defence counsel confer]
1 MR. KEHOE:
2 Q. Now, General, you have seen this document before you came here
3 today, did you not, sir?
4 A. I have.
5 Q. And if we can go to the seconds page of this document, and, of
6 course, we're not going to read it. But when you read this document and
7 the concerns that General Gotovina expressed to the Ministry of Defence,
8 the Main Staff, tell us what you took from this document in assessing
9 where General Gotovina was vis-a-vis the -- not only his operational
10 commander responsibilities but what kind of issues and problems he was
12 And this is the document talking about NCOs and the shortage of
13 NCOs, et cetera, and training.
14 A. No doubt, at this time, and if you think back, General Gotovina
15 just finished the winter campaign, and he was looking ahead to
16 prosecute -- or continuing the offence. He realised that as he had saw
17 prior, in the years prior, that the Croatian Army did not have a
18 competent professional force, particularly in non-commissioned officers
19 and junior officer leadership. And this point here we -- as I looked at
20 this, reinforced the fact that not only were they not training or had a
21 sufficient training programme that was producing non-commissioned
22 officers or junior officers quick enough to support their needs, he was
23 using an example, the current status of his forces, and the subordinate
24 forces in the subordinate forces in these functional areas, not only the
25 infantrymen and so forth but in the communications, the logistics, and
1 the other areas of transporters, show what their shortages were on the
2 eve of continued operations. So he was re-emphasising to the leadership
3 of the main support staff and the ministers, ministers of defence, the
4 need to build this capability within their army, if they were going have
5 a professional force.
6 Now, the results of this obviously was a field commander speaking
7 to the highest levels to resource the training aspect continued to
8 develop doctrine and provide me the resources I need, if you're going to
9 give me the responsibility to fight this fight. So this was, I think,
10 documentation from the standpoint of recognising that he did not have the
11 junior leadership that he needed with the tasks he saw ahead of him.
12 Q. Again in paragraph 25, you talk about the need for effective
13 non-commissioned officers as a part of team-building and growing together
14 as a unit. How important is that trained NCO corps when it comes to
15 executing orders concerning discipline of those lower level troops?
16 A. Well, it's -- it's essential. If you think about it, as you --
17 you know, you got General Gotovina up here at the operational command
18 level. The ones who were actually conducting the small unit tactics,
19 manoeuvring individuals on the battlefield or the non-commissioned
20 officers and the young officers. So the direct contact with those people
21 and how they are trained, how they react to the orders and fight and
22 execute their mission is a direct result of the ability of that team
23 which has been built by the non-commissioned officer to do that.
24 Likewise, it's that person at the point of the spear who would
25 ensure that discipline is within the team and that each individual is
1 doing his or her individual responsibilities. That's how you build a
2 team, and you discipline that team to execute in accordance to the orders
3 given you.
4 So, at the point of the spear, so to speak, that is the people
5 who are executing the plan at the lowest level.
6 Q. And I take it -- the logical conclusion that without that proper
7 training, that executing of discipline would be compromised?
8 A. Yes. Initially you're trained at -- in the school house or in
9 those -- as General Gotovina was telling to the minister, I need the
10 school house producing these people who understand that, and then when
11 you get to the unit, it's that team that's built within the unit by those
12 junior leaders and the soldiers who work for them to execute that through
13 the tough times.
14 Q. General, I would like to move ahead in the document and turn
15 to -- it is P822, which is tab 13 in your binder, and it is a
16 European Commission Monitoring Mission report for 27/28 October 1995.
17 MR. KEHOE: If we can bring that up on the screen.
18 Q. And we'll go on to talk about the bottom thereafter page. And
19 looking at the military situation, this is a discussion that is
20 chronicled, a discussion with General Gotovina that is chronicled. And
21 towards the bottom of the page, it says:
22 "The General expected cooperation and joint training with
23 countries like the US
24 Croatian cause."
25 If we can go to the next page at the top. And this is the item I
1 would like to emphasise to you:
2 "About lessons learned in Operation Storm both positive and
3 negative. The latter being the lack of control with undisciplined
4 soldiers of professional [sic] units doing extraordinary things" --
5 excuse me, "non-professional soldiers":
6 "...undisciplined soldiers of non-professional units doing
7 extraordinary things. The general stated that the HV lacked and still
8 lack the level of skilled NCOs and medium level commanders able to
9 control the soldiers."
10 Now, when you looked at these two items together in conjunction
11 with your other assessment of the military operations that were under way
12 both prior to Storm and after that, what did you conclude, as an
13 operational commander in General Gotovina's possession -- position both
14 before, during, and after, concerning problems that were in existence
15 under his command?
16 A. Well, if you think about this, this is now October 1995.
17 Q. After Southern Movement.
18 A. Right. So from the initial recognition, if the Croatian Army was
19 going to have a professional army, you needed a supporting foundation of
20 schools to produce the junior leaders, non-commissioned officer corps,
21 and so forth. Re-emphasised from the fact after the initial parts of the
22 offensive campaign by General Gotovina in February reiterating the fact
23 to the minister of defence in February. Now he has firsthand experience
24 over a period of 15, 18 months of seeing his units, his subordinate units
25 and listening to commanders at the lower levels talk about the need for
1 these disciplined leaders as well as disciplined soldiers at the lowest
3 So this to me says: As I look back as the operational commander,
4 if we want to continue for the future, we must not let this happen to our
5 forces in the future. We must build the force now with the supporting
6 institutional schooling and capabilities to make us a professional force.
7 So this is a realisation, to me, of what he has seen and the
8 recognition of those problems he initially thought he would have come to
9 fruition and he thinks back on what had happened, he probably at the same
10 time - and I again I can't speak for him - was recognising the fact of
11 what they accomplished with the force he had and the lack of training and
12 lack of probably preparation he would have liked to had.
13 Q. General, I'd like to again stay on this topic of command climate,
14 and again going back to the paragraph 43, your last sentence concerning
15 undisciplined behaviour not being condoned.
16 And I'd like your assessment, General, of a -- several videos.
17 Now you did view several videos from the 6th of August, 1995, before you
18 came here today, did you not?
19 A. I did.
20 Q. I'm just going to play the first video if we can, General, and
21 I'd like to give your previously assessment of that video as an
22 operational commander. I'd like to bring up Exhibit D792.
23 MR. KEHOE: I will say for the record, Mr. President, I know it's
24 been sometime since we have looked at this video. There are, in fact,
25 two videos as Your Honour may have recalled. This is the initial video
1 and then there's another video that is a continuation of this that the
2 parties have agreed is a continuation where General Gotovina is going to
3 the map and talking about the next level of operation. I -- I focus,
4 Your Honour, on that so we don't have to play both of them, but just so
5 the record is clear, there are, in fact, two. And I didn't want the
6 Court to think I was just speaking of that in isolation nor have we just
7 viewed -- have a -- given this video to -- to General Jones.
8 The other video is -- the second video is D979, for the record.
9 But if we could play this particular clip which is got -- I believe it's
10 got the commentary or the translation at the bottom of the page.
11 [Video-clip played]
12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "And all the rest that was tasked,
13 the tasks that were issued lasts night and I'm not calling upon you to
14 account for yourselves. Security services, Generalic, did he pass it on
15 to Loza? First, did the political affairs department do its job? No, it
16 didn't. Ceko, you were at the meeting, weren't you? Zelic was here; he
17 had other tasks. You were at the meeting. What have you dont since last
18 night? Was the county prefect contacted? Did you verify whether the
19 counter prefect was contacted? Was civilian protection requested? Were
20 the firefighters requested?
21 "They have been requested, General.
22 "And where are they then? Do you realise that everything has to
23 be ready by 5.00 this afternoon, everything? Was it that difficult to
24 find just a single cross here? A single cross. Skoric where is the
1 "We couldn't find one. It should be coming --
2 "You didn't find a cross, you fucking imbicile. Had you stopped
3 in Sinj by the church there and asked the friar there to give you a
4 cross, he'd have given you ten of those. Because you're idiots,
5 incompetent. But you're good enough to pose in front of those cameras,
6 those screens to be photographed. You're good enough for that. Just one
7 example, you weren't even able to get hold of a single cross.
8 "Let me not even begin to mention what I could see in the town.
9 It's a disgrace. A disgrace. Barbarians and vandals act like that,
10 those who are paid with war booty and wage war for war booty.
11 "The unit commanders from Sinj to Knin, with the help of the
12 engineers, have the task today to get the entire road in order.
13 Everything, the vehicles, all that dirt, throw it out, clean it up.
14 Clear it. The army is not to be seen in the streets. The military
15 police is not in groups but is deployed at all check-points. They took a
16 map of the town as planned and systematically set up check-points and is
17 in control of the town. The military police commanders are patrolling.
18 Patrol vehicles are patrolling the town. Cooperation with the civilian
19 authorities in the form of the civilian police is to be established until
20 General Cermak, who has just arrived this morning, can take over these
21 matters and take matters into his own hands. And until then, if he is
22 left alone, by 5.00 tonight nothing will be ready but we will have chaos
23 again. What a disgrace. Do you realise that prime minister is coming,
24 the ministers, the minister of transportation and all that. Everybody
25 arriving today will enter into a town that the Croatian Army went through
1 and which it still had under its control because the civil authorities
2 haven't taken over yet. Who are you trying to embarrass? You are
3 embarrassing yourself and those under your command for whom you are
4 responsible. And all of our people who died, who were killed, you are
5 responsible, people who gave their lives for this, you should have a
6 little respect because people have died for the sake of Knin and all the
7 way from Dinara since this winter, last October. Not to mentioned the
8 recent operations and how many perished and how many are still in
9 hospital to this very day and those maimed for life. And yet you behave
10 like this and you call yourself commanders. Security. What is security?
11 Security must be organised. It's in control of the situation. The
12 military police must obey. They are the executors, the technical
13 executors. They are the guardians of the Code of the armed forces. It
14 guarantees the implementation and application in the field. Political
15 affairs department. I don't see any posters in the street. No flags at
16 any of the major facilities, installations. Nothing. Where is -- where
17 is all of that?
18 "Being put up, even as we speak, General.
19 "What's being put up? Where is it? It's 11.30, since this
20 morning, since 4.00, in fact, you should have been doing this all through
21 the night. A helicopter is available. Everything is available to pursue
22 this with total efficiency and yet you don't know how to make use of all
23 of this. If you don't know how to work, do your job, something,
24 whatever. Since nobody dragged you by your hair to become what you are,
25 then gentlemen, go ahead and join the infantry, go into battle. You will
1 end up saying, Well, I was -- I am a warrior. The fuck you are. Every
2 day is a new day for a warrior and every day a warrior has to prove
4 MR. KEHOE:
5 Q. General, you did --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe.
7 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry, Mr. President. I thought -- Mr. Misetic
8 is giving me bad information here.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, the transcript is now complete.
10 Please proceed.
11 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. General, just for the record, did you view yet another tape where
13 General Gotovina is at the map shortly after this giving instructions
15 A. Yes, I did. I saw two, this one and the other one.
16 Q. Now, General, just looking at this situation as an operational
17 commander, how do you interpret what is going on here? What is
18 happening, what's General Gotovina doing?
19 A. Thank you. Well, he's obviously not pleased. If you remember,
20 he did not come in to Knin till the day after or so forth that actually
21 the fight had fought. He had been back looking at the overall progress
22 of his operation, not only at that point in time but also through the
23 other sectors, and he had seen lack of progress in the other sectors as
24 he made his assessment. So that was on his mind and -- his -- to him, I
25 think, in my mind, he was thinking, We have a very fragile situation.
1 Yes, we have taken this key terrain, this key city, but there's a lot of
2 other things that are still at risk. And if his forces didn't continue
3 to move, then this may be short lived.
4 At the same time, he was thinking they were also vulnerable to
5 what the enemy would do to probably counter the action they had just done
6 in Knin and try to retake that city. So then, as he -- he finally
7 arrived in the town, what I saw in the video he was no doubt very
8 disappointed in what commanders had do done to not only secure the town
9 and continue the operation but also prepare for the defence and/or a
10 possible counterattack, so in his mind, he had seen obviously the lack of
11 command presence by his subordinate commanders, and that has caused him,
12 first of all, to try to refocus them on just what the hell was going on
13 and the importance of what was going on, and, you know, not to rest on
14 your laurels, as I said earlier, or be complacent about taking just an
15 intermediate objective, but preparing and continuing to prepare your
16 soldiers in getting them focussed for the next fight, and they obviously
17 had not done that.
18 He used several, what I would consider, examples by the political
19 affairs and so forth, bus those were just points to show them very
20 vividly where they had not prosecuted their operation, turned the area
21 over to the military police, and continued to prepare for the next fight.
22 That was -- in my opinion, a -- they were very much at risk at that point
23 because there was no leadership going on in the units there that had just
24 taken Knin, and he had to get them turned around, and if he didn't, and I
25 think you see in there, there was statement about getting the soldiers
1 out of the town. He needed to get them out to where they needed to be
2 not to be consumed with the euphoria of just what they accomplished and
3 that also reinforces -- to me, he had probably as one of the few in this
4 situation, a view of what had to happen next and the -- still the
5 responsibility was upon him to be prepared to continue the fight, you
6 know, given the ministers and others who were coming in to visit that
7 afternoon and the person who was supposed to be in charge of the sector,
8 okay, understand, but his primary concern was making sure his units and
9 his commanders continued to follow his orders and get their soldiers
10 moving. If they didn't they were very vulnerable at that point in time,
11 and I think he realised it.
12 Q. The particular venue that General Gotovina used, I mean, was
13 that -- where he has all of his commander there, is that a venue that
14 would have the most influence on the group as a whole?
15 A. Yeah. I mean, that's where you can very efficiently at one point
16 in time, because if you think about it, it was not only the leadership
17 right there in Knin there, he had the leadership across his front. He
18 pulled them in for that period of time so they could directly hear what
19 he had to say.
20 When you get to an event like that, then the commander obviously
21 has some concern. If he -- you know, if it was focussed on just these
22 two or three commanders here, he would have grabbed those two or three
23 commanders, but he wanted to make sure every one of his commanders heard
24 directly from him what his expectations are. That's what I took out of
25 that. As I looked around the room, I also -- in my case, I watched the
1 body language of those commanders, and you could tell who -- who probably
2 felt that they had not done what they were supposed to just by their body
3 language. That's my experience.
4 But he wanted to get them together because he to focus them on
5 continuing the operation, and he could not allow complacency to set in in
6 his ranks or his commanders at that point in time, a very critical event
7 because he realised, I think, that he was shouldered with the burden and
8 responsibility for the Croatian country based on the orders given him and
9 he better be moving. That's what you face, you know, you see directly at
10 the operational level being able to satisfy the strategic objectives, and
11 he was probably one of the few people in that room that realised it.
12 Q. On that --
13 A. I'm sorry, I talked too fast.
14 Q. On that realisation of the strategic objectives, as we move
15 forward we noted that this particular video was on the 6th of August. I
16 would like to show you a cable -- a US
17 General, that's tab 14 in your binder.
18 A. Could I say one other thing?
19 Q. Absolutely, sir.
20 A. What I didn't address is the other part of your question was the
21 second video. So reinforcing what I just said, I think if we'd have
22 watched the second video, you've seen him transition with the commanders
23 after he had, obviously vividly, told them of his disappointments and
24 where they had failed, to get their head back in the game, and he stepped
25 to the map and he started outlining the next operation. That's when you
1 transition from okay -- I got your -- if I'm sitting there as a
2 subordinate commander who says, okay, I got it, I didn't do well or we
3 didn't do well, but then he's saying we have another fight to fight, and
4 then he stood and started giving guidance for the next operation, that to
5 me was very timely also, as I looked at.
6 I'm sorry, go ahead.
7 Q. That's fine, sir. I don't know if you wanted to view that again,
8 but --
9 A. No, I remember it.
10 Q. Okay.
11 A. I'm sure you all have seen it several times.
12 Q. We have.
13 On that score, if we can just take a look at this cable, 6th
14 August 1995. United States code cable. And if we could go to page 2,
15 paragraph -- or should be point 2 or paragraph 2 of this document where
16 it notes that:
17 "The Croatian foreign minister, Mate Granic, told the ambassador
18 that the government of Croatia
19 would cooperate militarily in Bosnia
20 Krajina, the government of Croatia
21 5th Corps by raising its strength from 15 to 25.000. And the 5th Corps
22 would begin a drive towards Prijedor. Granic said that the
23 Bosnian-Croatian militia, HVO supported by the Croatian Army, would
24 continue military campaigns towards Drvar, Donji Vakuf, and Jajce. They
25 would then move to push Serb artillery away from Mostar and Dubrovnik.
1 Afterwards they will, in consultation with the international community,
2 mainly the United States, help to open the Sarajevo corridor."
3 Now, this is the 6th of August, General, the same day as the
4 speech that you have. Can you interpret these two items together on a
5 strategic level and General Gotovina's actions coming down on an
6 operational and tactical level, given this information?
7 A. Well, my first -- my first several thoughts about this. I -- let
8 me look at this. First of all, the game has just changed. The
9 responsibilities have just escalated because the Croatian president has
10 agreed obviously with the Bosnian force to join forces and move on an
11 axis within the Bosnia-Herzegovina area. That, in effect, is a very
12 strategic issue, and then it -- it's obvious me that probably
13 General Gotovina had this information when he talked to his commanders
14 and he started mapping the direction for the next operation.
15 There's a lot of responsibilities for an operational commander
16 now with your moving into Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory, plus you have
17 now multiple -- on your flanks armies of the 5th Corps and/or whoever
18 would be on your other flank, he also assumes more responsibilities for
19 this sector even though his -- I think his sector narrowed to about a 100
20 kilometres, he assumed more responsibility for moving at a pace now which
21 would be coincident with the 5th Corps which would be on his left.
22 So this also made him the main attack for what Croatian forces
23 would be in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he shouldered that responsibility
24 that was given to him, and probably selected by the trust and confidence
25 put in by Tudjman and others in his leadership.
1 So increase in responsibility, continue the fight, your offensive
2 campaign now has continued into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you've got these
3 forces to prosecute that with and move out today. I mean, this is -- and
4 this happened on the 6th, you know, Operation Storm is not finished. So
5 he is completing -- trying to finish the fight he was in, now focussed on
6 moving forward to a larger probably unchartered territory.
7 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time, we'll into evidence 65 ter
9 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1635.
12 JUDGE ORIE: D1635 is admitted into evidence.
13 MR. KEHOE:
14 Q. General, you referred to this to some degree before, and if we
15 could just move to -- and I want to just talk about this briefly in the
16 spirit of moving ahead, and if you turn to tab 15 in your binder, that's
17 D281, the order for active defence. If you take a look at that. And is
18 that the first step in the moving ahead?
19 A. Yes, I'm going look at it real quick.
20 Q. It is -- it's your tab 15, sir.
21 A. Yes. Obviously -- I know I say obviously to anybody, but having
22 secured the intermediate objectives, now he must posture himself for the
23 next fight. Normally when you do that, you go into a hasty defence to
24 allow the opportunity for you to re-set your forces, move logistics
25 forward, and then be prepared to -- to either pass the orders and the
1 guidance down to your subordinate units in terms of priority of work. If
2 you think back, these -- these guys, these subordinate units have been
3 going through some very rugged terrain, the lead effort -- the main
4 effort of them, and he knows he has got to count on the leadership and/or
5 those units to continue this fight. He's also got to do extensive
6 coordination with those who are going to be on his left and right flank,
7 and that takes a little bit of time. So that it -- allow him that time
8 to reset those forces and/or to do adequate preparation and coordination
9 with now moving into new territories, I mean, you're getting in
10 specificity, like, he probably doesn't even have maps of this terrain
11 he's been asked to go fight over. He's got to get all that out to his
12 units, so elects, it appears, to go into a operational pause, which is a
13 defensive-type posture, across where he -- the current forces have gained
14 and stabilized, and that's, to me, this is the next step in preparation
15 for his next offensive operation.
16 Q. And while you're in this -- I just want to see if the translators
17 have caught up.
18 While you're in this -- this pause, or this active defence mode
19 is one of the concerns you have a possible counterattack coming from the
20 opposing side?
21 A. Yes. Yes, for sure. I mean, if I think about it, again, the
22 operational forces for the total Croatian Army have been engaged.
23 There's not another division or another large element you can bring
24 forward, you know, to reinforce your lines with per se.
25 So he is very thin on the -- on the frontal lines. Now, he is
1 also -- the ratios of major combat systems which he is now, at this point
2 in time, is confronted with when you have not only the Krajina Serbs but
3 you have the regular Serb forces and Mladic's Operational Groups, they --
4 they should be able to move along those lines of communications very
5 rapidly with their -- their combat compatibilities and focus them on a
6 point in time, and penetrate your lines.
7 Now whether they did that or not, is, you know, another story.
8 But certainly at the point you went into a hasty or into a defensive
9 posture, you've got to be very concerned, especially on the main
10 corridors leading into your lines that a counter-offensive could happen.
11 I think that's reinforcing the fact that Knin just fell which was a major
12 military centre of gravity and command post for the Serb forces.
13 Q. Let's talk with a series of maps just very briefly. I'm sorry.
14 Let's start with a series of maps very briefly about this setting of the
15 active defence and the counterattack by the Serbs.
16 MR. KEHOE: If we could bring up a series of maps in D728.
17 Q. Now, General, these are a series of maps that you reviewed.
18 MR. KEHOE: And if we could turn to the -- page 12 of this
20 General, it's only on the screen though; it's not in your binder,
21 so -- because we couldn't get the colour.
22 We see the -- the lines set as of 8 August 1995 with the order of
23 active defence being on the 9th.
24 And if we could turn to the next map, this shows the
25 counterattack by the Serb forces on the 12th of August, 1995.
1 Now, what's going on here, General? What's going on in the mind
2 of an operational commander. He sets his line, he gives the order for
3 active defence, and lord and behold there's a counterattack several days
4 later where he takes significant casualties. Talk to us about this.
5 A. Well, this is his worst nightmare. Obviously, when he made the
6 turn towards Knin he exposed his flank and he did have some forces there,
7 but his focus was back down to the south-west. And knowing that the
8 orientation of those force would not be towards, at least with his main
9 combat elements, not be back towards Drvar, which primarily some of the
10 avenues approached leading into the sector were.
11 At the same time, if you look over there at OG Ostric, I don't
12 know how much he knew at the time, but you have a seam right there
13 between your forces -- I'm sorry. So you are very vulnerable at the
14 seams between two of your Operational Groups. So what's happened here is
15 an attack right into those seams, at the same time right into your flanks
16 of your -- of the focus of those main elements going into Knin. So that
17 is probably the most vulnerable point and that's where obviously the
18 enemy figured to attack, and then that would have oriented them also in
19 retaking of Knin.
20 So a commander right after you get ready and you go into that
21 defensive posture has to look to see where he is vulnerable and get the
22 forces into those areas. In this particular case, Serb forces strike
23 within a couple of days, obviously they had some limited advantages and
24 at the time -- but were successful in a limited manner initially.
25 Q. If I can just go through some of these maps quickly just to
1 emphasise one.
2 MR. KEHOE: If we go to the next map on page 14.
3 Q. This is the counterattack the next day by the Split Military
5 Go to 15. And the settling in the lines on the 18th.
6 And, once again, to page 16.
7 Now, General, we have the setting of the lines, the
8 counterattack, the retaking the ground, and then we have Operation
9 Maestral which takes place a short time thereafter.
10 MR. KEHOE: If we can go to the next map.
11 Q. From 8 -- 8 September to 15 September.
12 Now, General, when the setting up of the active defence and the
13 counterattack and fighting off the counter-attack and the planning for
14 Operation Maestral, which takes place approximately, well, 30 days or so
15 later or less.
16 Is all this going on at the same time, and what's the operational
17 commander doing with these various tasks?
18 A. If you remember back when we started earlier this morning, I
19 talked about an offensive campaign being probably the most operationally
20 complex that there is, this is indicative of why it is complex. You have
21 completed taking an intermediate objective, tried to move to a -- a
22 tactical pause in the operation, you're counterattacked, you have to mass
23 the forces at the point of that attack, and then you must continue the
24 fight to -- because you've achieved momentum, which you want to do,
25 you're within the decision cycle of the opposing commander, having him
1 now be in a reactionary mode, you want to seize that momentum and
2 continue the fight to gain ground and gain your next objectives.
3 So what you're seeing is that continual push forward, seizing the
4 momentum, and achieving not only tactically but operationally strategic
5 objectives. You can't at that time lose sight of the fight, but you must
6 also continually prioritise your support, priorities your main effort,
7 priorities the fires, prioritise the intelligence collection because
8 you've got to be able to see that battlefield, and you've got to be
9 anticipating what's going to happen next, and at the operational level
10 that's 48/72 hours as you make those plans and give those directives
11 their priorities.
12 Q. Let's stay with that -- those priorities, for just one second,
13 General. If I could stay with those priorities for a second -- a minute.
14 And with General Gotovina, specifically, I mean, what are his
15 tasking priorities given everything that's happening in this offensive
17 A. Well, first of all, he has got to give -- and if you look as you
18 get into Maestral, he now has HVO and his own forces, those of which he
19 has been accustomed to. He has got to spend some time in making sure all
20 his subordinate commanders understand his priorities. Those who may or
21 may not been with him, those who have now joined him, so he's got to
22 orient those forces on where he wants them to go, give them those
23 manoeuvre units, give them supporting fires to prosecute what he wants
24 them to do, give them the logistic supportability, ensure that he has
25 communications with those units, and he's got to move about the
1 battlefield to make sure that they understand, because his presence as he
2 continues the operations at the decisive points in this operations are
3 probably more important than ever.
4 Q. If we can move ahead in the maps to Southern Move. Just move
5 ahead to the next one. I'm sure ... and one more map ahead where we look
6 at the Southern Move offensive from 8 11 to October -- 8th and 11th of
7 October of 1995. Would this continuous prioritising of tasks for General
8 Gotovina and his subordinates continue through this October time-frame,
9 until they achieve the results that they wanted?
10 A. Well, no doubt. I mean, my first impression is you look at
11 Southern Move and there you have got Operational Group North. If you
12 remember, that was the commander he relieved. So his decision back on
13 the eve of Operation Storm must have been the right decision, because now
14 this -- this group has become effective.
15 So he has to continue to do that. I would say the other thing he
16 has to do is now that he is in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he
17 probably also has to maintain some contact with the -- his operational
18 commanders on his left and right to make sure that he is also keeping
19 pace and so he has another dimension because he is outside the Croatian
20 territory to make sure that everything of which has been agreed to
21 politically and diplomatically, as far as the use of military force, is
22 being prosecuted and executed it based on those orders and missions. He
23 now has also, unlike he may have had in Croatia, he has got some
24 responsibility for his rear because he's now in -- turning over to
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, working in their area, so he's got to make sure that
1 his rear area is secure.
2 The other thing that I think he is doing, he must stay constantly
3 engaged with the defence minister and/or the president to make sure that
4 what is he doing is in line with their strategic objectives.
5 Q. Let us turn to the last page in this sequence so we can summarise
6 this entire operation from winter 1994 to October 1995, in terms of
7 General Gotovina's actions as an operational commander. This is one of
8 the maps that we viewed, General. It shows the various movements in
9 those time-frames.
10 Would the comments and analysis that you discussed regarding the
11 taskings and responsibilities of General Gotovina have basically stayed
12 constant from the winter of 1994 up in and through Southern Move in the
13 latter part of October 1995? And I'm talking in terms of battle focus.
14 A. I think early on General Gotovina realised the responsibility he
15 was given by his country. I think he was one of the few that also
16 realised that his success or his failure probably dictated what would
17 happen to the future of the country. And he also probably realised the
18 risk that was at hand based on the forces of a combination of probably 20
19 per cent professional, 80 per cent conscript, which was dealt him.
20 So his -- his focus and his battle with them, his relationships
21 with subordinate commanders and his work with his subordinate units,
22 those relationships were developed over time from the winter of 1994 all
23 the way through Southern Move. I think it's his presence and his
24 leadership, probably as it also reflected down through his subordinate
25 commanders, and I'm -- there's probably no doubt there is some small unit
1 leaders that really stepped up, although, obviously, not in -- part of
2 this -- subject of this conversation, but the presence -- the leadership
3 presence that he was able to -- to project, and the focus he gave them
4 through his orders both verbally and written, and his ability to -- to
5 see the battlefield and what he had to achieve and how he communicated
6 that to his commanders, was probably exemplary.
7 I would not have projected, from my assessment of what I read,
8 his ability to prosecute and be the -- move his forces knowing what I
9 knew based on reading the background of information. You know, there's
10 other things that played into this which obviously is -- what the
11 reaction or what the enemy did or did not do, or the lack of probably the
12 same intestinal fortitude and focus, because they weren't fighting for
13 their own land. They were fighting for somebody else's. Sometimes that
14 makes a difference. But I would say in conclusion this, his focus and
15 his ability to lead these units of to achieve this level of success was
16 probably not predictable.
17 Q. General, I have one last area that I would like to talk to you
18 about, and again it goes back to the paragraph 43 concerning the
19 undisciplined behaviour and that activity not being condoned by the
20 military or leadership at any level.
21 And we reviewed the video on the 6th of August that we talked
22 about, and I would like to go through a series of documents with you, and
23 the first I'd like to discuss with you and then ask you some questions on
24 that score --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
1 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President just to make things clear.
2 Mr. Kehoe quoted, I think, verbatim from paragraph 43, and there -- when
3 it comes to condoning, it says, just the last few words: "This type of
4 activity was not to be condoned by the military or leadership at any
6 Not to be condoned.
7 JUDGE ORIE: If you were quoting, I take it that you are grateful
8 for Mr. Waespi to give you the accurate language.
9 MR. KEHOE: Yes. Yes. I apologise if I misread that, counsel,
10 and I meant to read what you wrote, General, so ...
11 Q. Anyway, if we could turn to D981, and this is a day after the
12 meeting at the Knin castle on 6th where it is talking about the fact that
13 General Gotovina requires war booty to be registered, and he establishes
14 a committee to register that booty and to record the matters.
15 On the 9th, and I would tell you that there is a translation
16 before the parties on the 9th where General Gotovina, and in the war
17 diary, General, notes that the military police -- and you can assume this
18 for the sake of this argument. But assume that in the war diary on the
19 9th, General Gotovina states that the military police must take all
20 measures for the security of people and for the control of war booty. He
21 also states that all law breakers, for all law breakers it is important
22 to record via photo and video cameras and that after the completion of
23 the tasks they will be called to the military disciplinary court.
24 Next, I would like you to take a look at D207, an order by
25 General Gotovina on 10 August 1995
1 General Gotovina on 10 August 1995
3 MR. WAESPI: I'm sorry, counsel. I may have missed something,
4 what's the source of -- you quote about military police was must take all
5 measures of for the security of people.
6 MR. KEHOE: It is the e-mail that we sent you last week on the
7 revised translation of the August 9th, 1995
8 MR. WAESPI: Is that in evidence already?
9 MR. KEHOE: No, we sent it to you and that's why I asked the
10 witness to assume that that took place.
11 MR. WAESPI: Assuming that is correct.
12 MR. KEHOE: That's correct. That's why I said assume for the
13 sake of this discussion that it says that.
14 Q. D204 on the 10th August 1995, General Gotovina issues this order
15 prohibiting arbitrary movement of HV members and discusses implementing
16 military discipline.
17 In paragraph 2 he notes that take all necessary measures and
18 fully engage in the implementation of the military discipline conduct and
19 the maintenance of order in the area of responsibility and prevent arson
20 and other illegal acts. Take resolute measures against anyone who
21 conducts himself in an undisciplined manner.
22 Now reviewing just these items, General, what type of effect do
23 these types of orders or should those orders have on the subordinate
24 commanders and the soldiers that were answerable to those subordinate
1 A. Well, what you see right now happening is the -- even though this
2 is concurrent and at the end of Storm, it's now obviously to him that he
3 has got to preclude or re-emphasise, first of all, to the military police
4 what their responsibilities are. Two, he's got to direct his units to --
5 in such a way that would assist him and execute the responsibilities.
6 The one piece in here which says, I think, limited movement --
7 Q. That's paragraph 1 of --
8 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... to train movement and members. That
9 means, obviously, why his people were -- in some of subordinate units,
10 maybe not on the front lines, were arbitrarily moving about the area and
11 he's gonna tell them to knock it off. So he's trying to help them get
12 control in the rear. At the same time, he is re-emphasising to the
13 military police to take action. He's telling them to document acts of
14 indiscipline so that they can be acted on in the future. So this is
15 another case in a series here where he's trying to make sure his forces
16 act as a professional force not as a -- as he said back in the tape, as
17 those who operate for war bounty.
18 Q. I want to turn your attention to a couple of other exhibits, and
19 this would be P1140, an order on 19 August 1995, and that would be tab 17
20 in your binder. And this was given by a commander for operative Group
21 West, Colonel Fuzul. It notes due to the observed breakdown of order and
22 discipline for the international reputation of Croatia, I hereby order:
23 Establish supervision in all units and immediately take measures against
24 the torching of buildings and killing of animals. Take disciplinary and
25 criminal measures against responsible [sic] individuals. I think it's
1 irresponsible individuals, excuse me. The commanders of OG West units
2 are responsible to me for the implementation of this order.
3 If I could turn my attention to the next tab in your binder,
4 tab 18. Likewise, on the -- it's D884.
5 [Defence counsel confer]
6 MR. KEHOE:
7 Q. So based on the order of Deputy Commander of Split Military
8 District Staff Brigadier Ademi, with the purpose of improving the control
9 and reinforcing discipline of the Split Military District units, all
10 commanders of the units in the zone of responsibility of operative Group
11 West can, according to their own judgement, dismiss part of the soldiers
12 from the units.
13 Principally dismiss individuals or groups who are behaving in a
14 manner that causes disturbance of discipline and order."
15 If I can turn to the next tab in your binder, which is D885 in
16 tab 19, General, and this is an order of the 19th of August from the
17 commander, Major Cerina of the 134th Home Guards Brigade.
18 "Based on the memo of the commander of operative Group West, I'm
19 issuing the following notification: A part of the conscripts may be
20 dismissed from the unit. Primarily dismiss the individuals in groups,
21 who, with their behaviour, disturb the order and discipline within the
22 unit and as such significantly impair the implementation of combat tasks.
23 "3, it is necessary that the commanders of the units, according
24 to their personal assessment, propose to the Manning and Staff Divisions,
25 the names of conscripts who need to be demobilised."
1 This last sequence of orders on the 19th, General, was on the
2 19th of August, 1995, and you can assume likewise that the Prosecution's
3 expert noted, and this is on page 12847, lines 7 to 10, that:
4 "After the 19th, the war diary reflects no further instances of
5 learning -- of burning and looting on the territory of the Republic of
7 MR. KEHOE: For the record, Mr. President, the last entry on
8 burning and looting is on -- in P71, page 115 and that's on 18 August.
9 And as I noted the transcript of Mr. Theunens's testimony was page 12842,
10 lines 7 to 12. Excuse me, it's 12847, is that -- that's right.
11 Q. Now, General, this is a -- going from his first speech on the 6th
12 and this the 19th. Going back to the command climate discussion that we
13 had previously, what -- what do you conclude based on this, from the
14 operational commander level and how it's filtering down to his -- General
15 Gotovina's subordinates?
16 A. What I was just thinking is, you were looking at these exhibits,
17 this is a point in time where I think the Croatian forces have achieved
18 their intermediate objective to re-establish and regain control of their
19 recognised territory. At that point in time, you also see a
20 re-emphasise -- re-emphasising by General Gotovina and/or also his
21 subordinate commanders to get control and discipline in all areas,
22 reinforcing the fact that they don't want -- there are soldiers who have
23 just been part of this offensive operation, to continue to be cited as of
24 the -- those who are doing indisciplinary acts. At the same time, I
25 think you see during this period a -- an area where the military police
1 and civilian police are finally able to start getting control of the
2 areas in the rear. There is a time where they have been, and obviously
3 following the military forces, and now it's time to reconstitute the
4 local police stations, reconstitute the authority over the given areas
5 now that have been liberated. So it takes a little time for that to take
6 hold because if you remember, the military police and/or civilian police
7 that were available to move into an area which is heavily populated with
8 non-combatants and other personnel, not to mention the military passing
9 through, this was a major traffic. So now you see them able to start
10 getting control. This is also a transition period where in the offensive
11 campaign as we start moving out of Croatia
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, I see this as a re-emphasising and -- and
13 putting the importance of re-establishing the security and the rule of
14 law in the former Croatian territory into being, emphasising that down
15 through their command. And then the other thing I see is a little bit of
16 a transition starting to transition on demobilisation of forces that are
17 no longer needed who may have been mobilised from all walks of life, who
18 probably did not have the training and discipline in -- in -- early on in
19 any case, and so it's time to have those people moved back to the
20 communities they were called from in the first place.
21 So I see -- I see a couple of things. Securing -- securing the
22 area; 2, continuing the fight; 3, right-sizing the force and allowing the
23 conscripts who were mobilised, maybe a couple of years ago or within a
24 year ago, to go back to where they should be.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, I'm looking at the clock. At the same
1 time, asking himself how much more time you would still need.
2 MR. KEHOE: Just 15 minutes, Judge, I think, and I'll be done.
3 This is a logical place for a break.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we will have a break and --
5 Could I also inquire with the other Defence teams how much time
6 they would need.
7 Mr. Cayley.
8 MR. CAYLEY: We won't have any questions for this witness,
9 Your Honour. Thank you.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kuzmanovic.
11 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Neither will we, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: That means that you will start your
13 cross-examination after the break, approximately 1.15.
14 We will have a break and we resume at five minutes to 1.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.
18 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Q. General, just a couple of final questions in this area, and we're
20 talking about the issues that came up, the undisciplined conduct that
21 came up after Operation Storm, and we looked at the orders and we looked
22 at some of the demobilisation of problem units, et cetera. And looking
23 at what General Gotovina did from an operational commander point of view,
24 is there any other steps that General Gotovina should have taken that you
25 would have taken in a similar situation?
1 A. Quite frankly, at the time and with my staff, probably not.
2 The only thing I might have done, given the opportunity in
3 talking with the Main Staff and my bosses was to re-emphasise the point
4 that those people who were charged with the rear operations and
5 re-establishing the civilian control to try to get them some support
6 because at the time I would be getting the reports, and obviously I'm not
7 pleased about it. But at the point in time his emphasise with his
8 commanders, and his focus being the offensive operation, I did not see a
9 specific additional action he would have -- probably should have taken.
10 Q. So to conclude in that area, General, do you believe that
11 General Gotovina took all necessary and reasonable measures to address
12 the disciplinary problems that he received notice of?
13 A. Yes, I do. I mean, have you to -- to have to consider what he
14 has been tasked to do and where his focus should have been and his
15 priority of effort was the offensive. And noted he was not pleased. He
16 told them to -- he told his subordinates to clean it up and issued orders
17 to that effect. And I think you see them probably a little bit of laten
18 effectiveness of his orders coming after say, 12, 14 days after the
19 orders came out, you started to see a response, and you saw accumulation
20 from the military police and other records that arrests were happening,
21 disciplinary measures were taken, and so the -- he was starting the --
22 the theatre was -- and the country and territories that they had
23 liberated were starting to mature then in terms of discipline and legal
24 authority. So that's -- that was a good thing.
25 Q. General, one final question, and I would like to address your
1 conclusory paragraph in -- in paragraph 48 of your statement.
2 In the last sentence in paragraph 48 you note that:
3 "In the final analysis, I do not believe that the Croatian forces
4 would have been as successful had they had not had an operational
5 commander such as General Gotovina directing his efforts towards
6 accomplishing the strategic goals of the Republic of Croatia
7 I'd like to broad than a bit, General, and just ask you, can give
8 the Trial Chamber an assessment of General Gotovina's overall
9 performance, after your analysis in all aspects of the operation. Could
10 you give the Chamber your assessment in that regard?
11 A. First of all, let me say one of the key parts of that sentence
12 was directing his efforts towards the accomplishment of the strategic
13 goals of the country. He was saddled with a responsibility I think few
14 of the other commanders understood. And I think he understood it. I
15 think his subordinates didn't understand it all the time. I think you
16 must look at his overall performance based on the responsibilities he was
17 given and the focus he was given to conduct an offensive campaign which
18 would liberate the Croatian territory and/or lead to then a more of a
19 strategic goal of settling through the Dayton Accords a future posture of
21 If you take that in that context of the operational and strategic
22 responsibilities given to this leader, you would have to come to the
23 conclusion that he did an admirable job. When I first looked at this, I
24 will tell you the outcome was probably far better than I would have
25 predicted, based on the training, the level of professionalism of his
1 forces, and training of his leaders, and probably how they created their
2 army as far as assimilating forces and assimilating people of different
3 backgrounds who didn't have the experience, in terms of military service
4 and/or didn't have the experience that you would need to go into an
5 offensive operation. You also lacked doctrine, you also lacked a
6 training base to continue to support your force, and when you resource
7 your army with a number of conscripts who do not even have an oath of
8 enlistment and therefore a commitment to what you are trying to ask them
9 to do, I was very interested in how you overcome that risk. And
10 obviously the way you do it is through some very courageous leadership
11 and some focus and some leadership who understand what is at stake for
12 their country and continues to focus ahead.
13 So I think he did a tremendous job in executing the
14 responsibilities given to him by his country.
15 Q. General, thank you very much.
16 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Kehoe.
18 Mr. Jones, since the other Defence counsel have no questions for
19 you, you will be cross-examined by Mr. Waespi. Mr. Waespi is counsel for
20 the Prosecution.
21 Mr. Waespi, you may proceed.
22 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Waespi:
24 Q. Good afternoon, General.
25 A. Good afternoon.
1 Q. Let me start with asking you a number of questions about the
2 process of drafting of the report.
3 Now, we now from D1632, the letter of the 20th of May, when
4 the -- the formal tasking, the written tasking was given to you.
5 Now, when you were you first approached by the Defence?
6 A. I would say I was first approached in April, where I -- I met
7 with the Defence, and they asked me about my background and my interests
8 in being able to write a paper about the operational concept of war, the
9 command level. So that was an introduction to the Defence and trying for
10 them to understand my background, I think, and whether or not I had
11 enough information or enough experience to write such a paper.
12 Q. And do you know why you were retained? Did -- did you know or
13 one of the members of the Defence team know you from prior contact?
14 A. No, they did not.
15 Q. When did you start drafting your report?
16 A. I did not start drafting my report until -- as you know, I work
17 currently for an aerospace company, and I had to go through the legal
18 measures to make sure there is not a conflict of interest in me
19 supporting this, and obviously their desire is to make sure that I did
20 not support it on company time. So it was after we -- we -- I got the
21 letter and after I clarified exactly what it is, in terms of what I
22 thought I outlined what I thought they were asking me to do in terms of
23 the role of the operational commander. It was at that -- it was after
24 that time that I start sitting down and writing my paper.
25 Q. Now, at that first meeting in April, do you remember what kind of
1 information was relayed to you about what you were supposed to do, what
2 was expected from you?
3 A. Only in general. Nothing specific. That's why I asked for
4 clarification and a paper to tell me exactly what was wanted. We
5 basically talked about my experience, my background, where -- you know, I
6 think from their -- from the Defence's standpoint, before they entered
7 into any type of contract with me, they wanted to know if I could execute
8 what they thought they needed.
9 Q. Were you given a deadline to complete your report?
10 A. I'm sorry?
11 Q. Were you given a deadline to complete the -- the paper, the
12 results of your work?
13 A. Well, initially we -- we talked about the paper, and I told them
14 when I thought I could get it done, and they, you know, obviously told me
15 that the trial was ongoing, and the sooner, the better, but they would
16 allow me the time to read the documents and do the research and do it
18 Q. And when did you deliver your draft to the Defence?
19 A. I want to say on or about ...
20 Q. Approximately is fine.
21 A. About the second week of July.
22 Q. And did you get any feedback from the Defence? Did they ask to
23 you make changes, amend something?
24 A. No. What they did do is reference for me, in terms of, This is
25 the document you're referring to, and I would say, This is where I got
1 the information.
2 Q. Yes. Let me talk to you about that.
3 What kind of documents did you receive? How many; in what form?
4 A. I received most of the documents we referred to today. I got a
5 binder sent to me which showed -- and which a lot of it I had asked for.
6 I asked for the task organisation. I asked for the orders and the
7 documents, and I also got the CIA
8 chronicle of the Bosnian campaign. I asked for some subsequent documents
9 on -- to include the maps in the sequence of the fight and the different
10 campaigns. I asked for the number of non-combatants which were populated
11 in the areas and the reports of -- so I could see the actual dimensions,
12 the terrain and area of responsibilities that we were talking about so I
13 could actually conceive that. I asked for information on -- on -- not
14 only the task organisations but the number of conscripts and the training
15 that the soldiers and the leaders went through.
16 So I got an initial, obviously, receipt of the documents you had
17 all been using here, and then I asked for additional information so I
18 could understand the details.
19 Q. Approximately how many documents did you look at?
20 A. I would say somewhere in the neighbourhood of 30 different
21 documents, and I would say that was probably in the neighbourhood of 900
22 to a thousand pages of information.
23 Q. And I take it you looked at documents that aren't cited in your
24 report. You only cited a selection of them.
25 A. I looked at additional information. Obviously some of the things
1 that were brought out today were things that I also read.
2 Q. Did you discuss the assignment given by the Defence with anybody
3 outside the Defence team?
4 A. No. In my agreement, I was precluded from doing so.
5 Q. So you didn't discuss with any of your colleague, staff members?
6 A. No. I'm in a civilian firm now. I'm not too sure so many of
7 them understand what we're talking about.
8 Q. In preparation for your report, did you ever go do Knin or the
9 wider Knin area, the -- the Krajina?
10 A. No, I did not.
11 Q. And were you ever in that area before or after providing the
13 A. When I was assigned to Bosnia
14 most of the areas of Bosnia
16 largely on the western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Q. So you were in Knin at that time or not?
18 A. I did not physically step foot in Knin. I flew over it, and I'm
19 familiar with the area and the terrain.
20 Q. From flying over the terrain?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Not from actually being there?
23 A. That's correct. That's by helicopter, so we're not very high.
24 Q. Just a couple of issues about your expertise. I heard today,
25 although I think it's not mentioned in your report or CV, that you
1 testified in the cases following your Abu Ghraib investigation?
2 A. That's correct. I testified about my report. I testified to the
3 department in the army, the office of the secretary of defence, obviously
4 the secretary of defence and then to our Congress and Senate, as well as
5 the president's Intel Select Committee.
6 Q. Did you ever testify in any other case?
7 A. Yes. I testified in Geneva
8 far as implementing the Dayton Accords and the zone of separation.
9 Q. Did you ever testify in a criminal trial, whether, local,
10 domestic, or internation?
11 A. A civilian crime trial?
12 Q. Or military.
13 A. Of course, I have experience in military trials. In some cases,
14 I was -- my -- may have been the presiding -- as a special court martial
15 or military trial, and so I have military experience, mostly in terms
16 of -- I guess you would say the special court martial level of authority,
17 which could be felonies in that cases.
18 JUDGE ORIE: May I just seek clarification there.
19 Are you talking about appearing as a witness?
20 THE WITNESS: Yes.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 THE WITNESS: A witness and/or as the convening authority.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So two quite different capacities.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
1 Please proceed.
2 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. Why did you convene a special court martial, if that's what you
4 had convened? Do you remember the --
5 A. Yes, if it was in the purview of my authority, I would do that
6 for a soldier who would violate the uniform code of military justice, and
7 his offence would have required that level of -- of adjudication.
8 Q. Do you recall what he did wrong?
9 A. No, I don't recall. I mean, there's several incidents of which
10 someone could be raised to that level of the uniform code of military
12 Q. But going back to the point I'm after, you never testified as an
13 expert, other than today?
14 A. No, I haven't.
15 Q. So that is also your first expert report that you -- you drafted.
16 A. Well, if you look at it in terms of what I did in terms of
17 Abu Ghraib, in that report, I was selected based on my experience to make
18 an assessment of the execution and responsibilities of the commander.
19 That was very comparable. In the military, we don't have expert
20 witnesses as per se.
21 Q. And the result of that Abu Ghraib expert report was what -- in
22 relation to -- I think you mentioned General Sanchez?
23 A. Yes. Well, my conclusions at that time -- I'm trying to think of
24 whether I can state on an unclassified manner what my conclusions were.
25 In general, my conclusions were that phase 4 of that operations
1 [sic] were not planned adequately, and that General Sanchez was burdened
2 with a lot of responsibilities beyond his control, and I'll leave it at
3 that unless you want to research that report.
4 Q. I think we have it on the -- we just found the [overlapping
5 speakers] --
6 A. Yeah, I think could you find a lot of things for the unclassified
8 Q. Yes. So Sanchez, General Sanchez was responsible yes or no?
9 A. In -- in that instance, you know, a commander is always
10 responsible for what happens within his command. He was not culpable and
11 he was not negligent because of the actions he took which, very similar
12 in this case, which he issued orders, he went down to the place and told
13 his subordinate commanders. Plus he held his subordinate commanders
14 responsible for anything that would happen. Some of the recommendations
15 was to reinforce his staff with people that could oversee particularly
16 the prisoners of war and or the interrogation process, and that happened
18 Q. Thank you, General. Did you publish anything on, you know, the
19 subject you are testifying today, on command and control, on any other
20 related issues?
21 A. Publish for public consumption?
22 Q. Yes, in a review, army review of the -- the air force?
23 A. Not for public domain. I have written papers in the schools
24 about leadership, as we all have, in terms of our military education.
25 Q. And you left the army approximately four years ago to go into --
1 into commercial business?
2 A. Three years ago. 2006.
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. In July.
5 Q. I'd like to now go through a number of -- of parts from your
6 report and also your testimony --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Could I first ask two clarifying questions.
8 You talked about CIA
9 parties - that's not in evidence?
10 MR. KEHOE: It's -- it's -- we're going to bar table. It's -- we
11 just need to talk to counsel. It is called "Balkan Battle Grounds."
12 It's written by the CIA
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MR. KEHOE: That is --
15 JUDGE ORIE: We haven't seen it before --
16 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: -- and it's not in evidence at this moment.
18 MR. KEHOE: That's right.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Did you rely on any of the facts described in that
22 MR. WAESPI: I think it is Mr. President, and --
23 JUDGE ORIE: And I missed --
24 MR. WAESPI: -- I'll into that. It's white --
25 JUDGE ORIE: You'll go into it.
1 Yes, perhaps it is referred to by a 65 ter number. Is that ...
2 MR. WAESPI: Yes.
3 MR. KEHOE: It's footnoted Judge, routinely.
4 MR. WAESPI: "Balkan Battle Grounds."
5 JUDGE ORIE: "Balkan Battle Grounds." It's --
6 MR. KEHOE: That's it. That's the document.
7 JUDGE ORIE: If that's the one, yes, yes. Then, it's clear that
8 it's footnoted not just once.
9 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 The other thing you said was that you had sources for documents
12 given the number of non-combatants. What did you have in mind there.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, I asked for the -- and part of that comes out
14 of the Balkan report. I asked for the numbers that were populated from
15 the previous fights that had happened since 1991 and so forth, give me an
16 estimate of how many people were -- were non-combatants in the area of
18 General Gotovina. That was for my understanding of what -- what had to
19 be dealt with, to re-establish security and control in the rear area.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then you're talking about non-combatants
21 of --
22 THE WITNESS: Refugees, people with illegal crime, displaced
23 persons, just do give me the magnitude of how many people were --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Serbs and Croats.
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, total population.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Total population after Operation Storm?
2 THE WITNESS: Yes. Well, I really wanted to know what it was
3 before and then afterwards because what was happening in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina was also an influx of refugees moving from that area,
5 from operations that were ongoing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so they had to
6 go somewhere. So they were obviously migrating also into Croatia as well
7 the other inhabitants and/or people moving throughout the areas. So I
8 wanted a feel of what the magnitude was, displaced persons in the area.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I don't think I found in your report
10 calculations on how you came to conclusion in this with respect. For
11 example, one of the things I would be interested to know about, whether
12 you formed any opinion about the Serb population on this Krajina-Croatian
13 territory after Operation Storm.
14 THE WITNESS: You know, I did not form a conclusion on a specific
15 Serb population, whether they were there or not. What I was looking for
16 is the number of military police, civilian police, that were allocated to
17 re-establish the rule of law and if those were adequate. I think you
18 will note in my report where I say sometimes we failed to plan for the
19 post-operation, combat operations, and it requires -- just like in Iraq
20 and the US
21 and following the military forces to re-establish the rule of law and
22 provide adequate resources for that, we set ourselves for failure in
23 terms --
24 JUDGE ORIE: If I may stop you there. What I was trying to find
25 out is if you're talking about non-combatant population.
1 THE WITNESS: Mm-hm.
2 JUDGE ORIE: You said, "I did not form a conclusion as to a
3 specific Serb population whether they were there or not." And then you
4 went on to see whether the number of police officers, whether military or
6 THE WITNESS: Yes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: -- civilian were adequate numbers to deal with the
9 THE WITNESS: Right.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Now, if you do not know what the non-combatant Serb
11 civilian population is, how can you establish the adequacy of police
12 forces --
13 THE WITNESS: Well --
14 JUDGE ORIE: -- if you do not know whether the Serbs are there or
15 are not there.
16 THE WITNESS: I was not concerned about the Serbs per se. I
17 wanted to know the total population of non-combatants in the area of
19 JUDGE ORIE: Which includes Serbs.
20 THE WITNESS: Which includes the Serbs.
21 JUDGE ORIE: So --
22 THE WITNESS: Yes.
23 JUDGE ORIE: And the Serbs would be what percentage of the whole
24 of the non-combatant population in the area?
25 THE WITNESS: I didn't go down to that level. I went -- if
1 you're, from a military standpoint, if you have to move through the area
2 and you have to move your logistics through a given area which is
3 restricted because of geography, certainly the roads and so forth are
4 problematic because of the numbers of people trafficking on the roads and
5 that movement of displaced persons causes, obviously, problems for
6 military operations. So I wanted to get some kind of idea, not on
7 specificity of how many Serbs were displaced, but how many people were in
8 the rear areas that -- which you would -- if you were moving in to secure
9 the area or you had to control as a military or civilian police force.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, this seems to be two different matters.
11 The one is how many non-combatant people are living there to police the
12 area and this population; and you touched upon another subject which
13 seems to me quit different. That is, to what extent is the movement of
14 non-combatant population bothering military operations, and -- which are
15 two quite distinct matters, if I understand you well.
16 THE WITNESS: This -- two areas which are problematic but both
17 caused by the number of non-combatants and displaced persons in an area,
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 THE WITNESS: So that's --
21 JUDGE ORIE: For both very important to establish --
22 THE WITNESS: Right.
23 JUDGE ORIE: -- how many there were.
24 THE WITNESS: That's right.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Actually --
1 THE WITNESS: Just to --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Because it's --
3 THE WITNESS: I just wanted an idea of what was, you know, the
4 Population of an area looked like.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But if you do not know whether they were
6 there, you wouldn't know how much they would bother you, and you wouldn't
7 know what would be an adequate force to police them, isn't it?
8 THE WITNESS: That's right.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 THE WITNESS: And the other, Your Honour, the only other thing I
11 was concerned with, if you look at the way the military operation was
12 laid out, how did General Gotovina get his logistic support. It had to
13 be either moved by sea, offloaded at Split and moved up, or it had to
14 transit all the way around Croatia
15 envelopment that he was doing. So my first question is where did his
16 logistics come from, and so you can imagine the difficulty of moving
17 logistic support to his forces or moving his artillery or whatever combat
18 forces he had to prosecute his plan.
19 So that's -- that was just some of my thoughts.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
21 Mr. Waespi, I was only seeking the -- some further details on
22 these two sources apparently used by the witness.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: But you are exactly right. You could go into
25 detail looking at that. I just got a general idea and moved forward.
1 THE INTERPRETER: For the sake of the interpreters kindly don't
2 overlap. Thank you.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes I have to apologise both to transcribers and
4 interpreters, and I'll improve my performance.
5 Mr. Waespi.
6 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
8 MR. WAESPI:
9 Q. We'll talk about these numbers, I guess, tomorrow when we discuss
10 paragraph 36, where you talk about, I think, 700 -- the figure of 700
11 police officers.
12 But let me go back actually to the observation of the
13 Presiding Judge about the multiple entries on the -- in your footnotes
14 about "Balkan Battle Grounds," the CIA book. I take it you relied
15 heavily on that book in drafting your report, certainly these background
16 parts of your report?
17 A. I would say I didn't rely as heavily as I did based on what the
18 points were as far as the task, organisation, and military orders, but it
19 certainly -- "Balkan Battle Grounds" reinforced a lot of the points and
20 it was the only documented evidence I had of the -- of the larger picture
21 of condition of forces and their estimates at the time of both the VRS
22 and -- and -- and the Croatian forces, the readiness and so forth.
23 Q. Now let's look at just one entry, and I would like to go to
24 Defence 65 ter -- actually, not even sure whether I can do that, 1D590.
25 MR. WAESPI: And if the document will be bar tabled, we have no
1 objections to that. And perhaps it can be tendered as a whole. And it's
2 page 18 in e-court.
3 JUDGE ORIE: It's the size of the document.
4 MR. WAESPI: It's fairly large.
5 MR. KEHOE: It's pretty large which is the reason why we were
6 going to give our shaved down version to the Prosecution and come to some
7 idea of what we jointly want together. There is a lot in this book that
8 is of no consequence, so I thought it would be better to shave it down a
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Parties are invited to agree on the relevant
11 portions to be --
12 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: -- in evidence and then the Chamber will further
14 consider it.
15 Please proceed.
16 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Q. Now, in your report, and I want do leave this document on the
18 screen. But in your report, in paragraph 6, you say in the middle of
19 this paragraph, and I quote: "With respect to the Croatian Army, HV, it
20 appears that it was created as a defence force in 1991 that was poorly
21 trained and minimally disciplined. As a result, the institutional
22 capabilities do not exist within the HV to act in an organised fashion
23 until after August 1992."
24 And then you go on to say that: "Over time the HV raised into a
25 professional army, intensely training its troops and developing its
1 Guards Brigades."
2 Now, as we see from your footnote, it refers to the document we
3 have on the screen, and it finishes your thought as contained in the
4 report and says, and I quote from the left column, the middle of that
5 paragraph, right above chapter 65: "And developing its Guards Brigade
6 into the finest combat formations in the Balkans. All of this was for
7 one purpose: The reconquest of the Republic of Serb Krajina."
8 So, in 1995, General Gotovina had as part of his fighting force
9 the finest fighting combinations in the Balkans. You were aware of that?
10 A. I would say he didn't have the finest Guards Brigades at the time
11 and he probably realised that. This basically says the intervening years
12 provided an opportunity to do that, but I don't think they had developed
13 to the finest brigades, although you could challenge the fact of all the
14 brigades in the Balkans area, their level of training and their level of
15 readiness compared to a professional force.
16 Q. So you are disagreeing with the authors of this report?
17 A. No. I think they're -- you know, what they're saying is, if you
18 look at that -- during the intervening years, the question had raised
19 itself on its own bootstraps, you know, and so forth, and it was
20 developing its guards brigades into what they envisioned to be the finest
21 combat formations in the Balkans. They had not achieved that in my
23 Q. Well, you are --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Excuse me, may I ask you, just looking at the text.
25 THE WITNESS: Mm-hm.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Does the text in view of, you say they had an
2 opportunity to do so, but they didn't do it; or does the text say that is
3 what they did? Just -- because, we have to clearly find out where your
4 opinion as to what the standard to which it finally developed is, and
5 what this report says.
6 THE WITNESS: Right.
7 JUDGE ORIE: And it seemed to me that you started answering that
8 the document would say that the intervening years provided an opportunity
9 to do that but you don't think they had done it. Whereas, although not
10 being a native English-speaking person, I get the impression that the
11 text, true or not, tells us that they did take that opportunity and that
12 they developed the Guards Brigades into the finest combat formations into
13 the Balkans.
14 Again, whether true or not, but I'm just trying to find out
15 whether we read the text in a very different way or that it is that you
16 disagree with what is written here, which are two different --
17 THE WITNESS: In this particular case, the level of maturity at
18 which they have done that, I disagree with.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 THE WITNESS: Their statement of that perspective at the time,
21 the [indiscernible] was read in 2002, it may have been from a perspective
22 of where they started to where they achieved, was developing those
23 brigades into one of the finest brigades in the Balkans at the time in
25 I will tell you, just as General Gotovina said in February 1995,
1 he still lacked non-commissioned officers. He still lacked junior level
2 leadership. So --
3 JUDGE ORIE: If you will not mind, I'll interrupt you because my
4 question was exclusively and primarily focusing on the following.
5 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Is it that we read something entirely different in
7 the same text or is it just that you disagree what is written here and I
8 want to clearly distinguish between the two options and I think --
9 THE WITNESS: Yes.
10 JUDGE ORIE: -- that is clear to me --
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
12 JUDGE ORIE: I think you disagree with what is written here as a
13 result of what happened between 1991 and the later stages.
14 Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
15 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Q. Let's go on the same page, left column to the bottom and look at
17 another aspect, a similar one. Last two lines talks about
18 General Bobetko, who was the commander in chief of -- chief of the HV
19 Main Staff from November 1992 onwards, and it says:
20 "Bobetko's appointment confirmed that preparing the HV to retake
21 the Krajina from the Serbs would be the army's unifying mission. He
22 moved quickly to halt the demobilisation, create additional Guards
23 Brigades and shuffle the officers serving on the Main Staff, the corps
24 commanders, and the Guards Brigades. Bobetko appointed officers loyal to
25 him and his objective, forming a team that would develop a HV way of
1 doing business in doctrine, training, and attitude."
2 Do you agree with me that, at least according to this report,
3 already from 1991/1992, they were preparing for actions in the Krajina,
4 whenever that's going to -- to be taking place?
5 A. My interpretation of this is: As I look at General Bobetko and
6 what he was trying to do, he probably realised the fact that they did not
7 have a professional army, no matter the mission in the future would be.
8 He was probably one of the earlier general officers that saw the need for
9 training, an institutional training base, and he was trying to get people
10 who realised that -- that need, to help him put that together. And I
11 think his initial efforts towards writing doctrine was the right thing to
12 do if, in fact, he was going to have a professional force. I don't see
13 that a direct correlation to the Krajina or the other particular mission
14 at hand we saw in the winter of 1994 and so sort.
15 Q. So can you disagree that everything what the HV did according to
16 plans by General Bobetko both focusing on to retake the Krajina. You
17 would disagree with that?
18 A. I would disagree with that.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 A. At that point in time, he had no way of having the insider
21 capability of doing that because they were trying to create a force
22 completely and defence would have been the first mission.
23 Q. Yes. I didn't say he already had the capability at that time.
24 What's in the report was working towards that, ending up with the
25 [indiscernible] brigades in the Balkans, but we have discussed that
2 MR. WAESPI: Now, I can tender this document for transparency
3 purpose or we can do it altogether. I leave it in your hands.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I suggest that the parties sit together to see what
5 portions of this document will be used and that the relevant portions
6 with sufficient context will be tendered.
7 Mr. Waespi, I'm also looking at the clock and since I have two
8 minor procedural matters, I wonder whether this would be an appropriate
9 time to --
10 MR. WAESPI: It is.
11 JUDGE ORIE: -- stop.
12 But before doing so, Mr. Jones, first I'd like to instruct you
13 that you should not speak with anyone, whomever about your testimony,
14 whether the testimony that you have given already today or the testimony
15 still to follow tomorrow. And we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning
16 at 9.00, although in a different courtroom. It will be Courtroom III.
17 Madam Usher, could you please escort Mr. Jones out of the
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 [The witness stands down]
21 JUDGE ORIE: Just for the record, we do understand that
22 Mr. Markac wants to waive his right to be present in court on the 4th of
23 September. That's put on the record. The message was rather short. I
24 take it that will be for personal reasons and that we do not have to
25 explore in any further detail.
1 That's on the record.
2 Second, the Chamber was still informed that there were still some
3 questions about a non-proofing of guidance of 92 bis witnesses. The
4 Chamber also understood that the Defence might have some problems with
5 that if cross-examination would deal with matters, other than what one
6 would primarily expect it to do with. Of course, the Chamber is not in a
7 position to give any further guidance, not knowing what areas will be
8 covered in cross-examination; so, therefore, I don't know whether there
9 has been an exchange of views or whether it has been inquired already by
10 the Defence, whether the Prosecution would want to cover areas which the
11 Defence considers such that it would need to proof the witness.
12 Has such a communication taken place?
13 MR. MISETIC: It has not, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Then perhaps that is the logical first step to take.
15 And if then any problem remains, Mr. Russo, then, of course, the Chamber
16 will hear from you again.
17 Mr. Russo.
18 MR. RUSSO: Mr. President, we do intend do go into matters
19 pursuant to our obligations under 90(H). However, since the Defence
20 doesn't know what those areas will be, it seems to me that there 's no
21 connection between what we may go into and what they can proof the
22 witness on so ...
23 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Let's see. Your obligations under 90(H), but
25 correct me whether I'm wrong - I was not raised in a common law
1 environment - your obligations arise once you have established that
2 there -- the witness has knowledge on matters which would support your
3 case and then you have certain duties.
4 Is that what you had in mind?
5 MR. RUSSO: I think respect to matters with which the witness is
6 competent to testify, if he testifies contrary to the Prosecution's case
7 then we're required to put the nature of our case to him. The other
8 obligations of seeking to elicit evidence from him which may support our
9 case is permissive and not obligatory.
10 JUDGE ORIE: But the primary purpose still being to establish the
11 presence of, I would say, the witness and another witness who has
12 testified in this court at certain moments, at certain places. That's
13 still the primary focus.
14 MR. RUSSO: Yes, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
16 MR. MISETIC: Just so I can put our position on the record.
17 If he testifies in direct in a manner that -- in direct, which I
18 don't think there is going to be a direct that's contrary to their
19 position, and it's already in the statements, then the Prosecution
20 already knows whether they intend to go beyond the issue for which the
21 witness has been called.
22 From our position, if that is in fact the case, there is no need
23 or reason that we should be precluded from proofing a witness, because as
24 the Chamber knows and the case law is clear, we also have the opportunity
25 to test the credibility of our witnesses on any matter. And if we were
1 to find in proofing that there was a lack of credibility, we can always
2 withdraw the witness.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Still seems to be something to be discussed by the
4 parties whether serious address should be made to the Chamber, whether or
5 not to change the guidance given until now. The Chamber, at this very
6 moment, remains passive, expects the parties to -- to exchange their
7 views on what exactly Rule 90(H) requires them to do and what one could
8 expect in cross-examination, the witnesses being 92 bis witnesses and not
9 92 ter witnesses.
10 MR. MISETIC: I will have to check the Rules, but that was an
11 additional question I had, Mr. President, is that under 92 bis, I must
12 confess, I haven't looked it up yet, but whether cross-examination is
13 allowed under 92 bis and if not, does that mean --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Then it becomes 92 ter. I do agree, but what I
15 wanted to express, although not very clearly, is that we expect these
16 witnesses to be cross-examined briefly on the matters which we find in
17 the 92 bis or 92 ter statement.
18 We then will adjourn for the day and we'll resume tomorrow, the
19 1st of September, 9.00, Courtroom III.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.
21 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 1st day of
22 September, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.