1 Tuesday, 17 November 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
9 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-06-90-T, the
10 Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
12 Mr. Kuzmanovic, I was informed that you would like to address the
13 Chamber in relation to the disclosure issue you raised yesterday.
14 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Yes. Thank you very much, Your Honour.
15 Mr. Waespi and I talked this morning briefly. I wanted to make
16 the Chamber aware that we did endeavour to begin to looking at the
17 documents that were disclosed to us the other morning, early in the
18 morning. There are roughly 3.000 pages' worth of materials. Of those
19 3.000 pages, 1100 pages were documents that were not previously disclosed
20 to us and which we didn't have in our system.
21 So, as the Chamber is obviously aware, that is a lot to go
22 through. I was up till about 2.30 last night, plowing through some of
24 In light of that, we would request, in terms of the proposal that
25 was discussed yesterday, that with respect to these documents not
1 previously disclosed, and Mr. Waespi advises this morning there is an
2 additional much smaller disclosure of but of one document for which
3 they're waiting Rule 70 authority, that we would be allowed to meet with
4 the witness to discuss these documents only, after the witness is sworn
5 and testifies, because I think that is going to be necessary under the
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
8 MR. WAESPI: Yes. The good news is first two things. We just
9 checked in relation to that key document that we have received Rule 70
10 clearance in -- in another case, and I think that is safe to give it to
11 you. I have a hard copy here - I think it is an important document - so
12 it can be given to the witness.
13 And it's correct that we have finished the review now, so that's
14 the good news.
15 And as I said, there are 29 English documents, mostly open
16 sources, BBC
17 has not been disclosed, and also 175 B/C/S documents, again, mostly B/C/S
18 sources. We will review whether it has been disclosed. If not, you will
19 get it certainly today.
20 That's the status of disclosure.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So I do understand with that, Mr. Kuzmanovic,
22 although with great hesitation you are willing to start
23 examination-in-chief of the next witness but that you feel only able to
24 do so if you would have an opportunity to speak with the witness in
25 between about newly disclosed documents.
1 MR. KUZMANOVIC: That is correct, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's on the record. Thank you very much.
3 Mr. Waespi.
4 MR. WAESPI: In order to speed up the process, I can give the
5 hard copy to -- to Mr. Kuzmanovic of that one document.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your Honour, there is two very, not necessarily
8 minor, but issues that I would like to raise with the Chamber - thank
9 you - with respect to the next witness and -- or the current witness, and
10 there are not going to be any specifics but I think we should go into
11 private session for that.
12 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
13 [Private session]
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
13 Mr. Mikulicic, you said errare humanum est. I immediately wanted
14 to underline by forgetting to give an instruction to the witness. So I
15 fully agree with you. The parties are hereby informed that I asked
16 Mr. Registrar, within five seconds after that, to give the instruction to
17 the witness.
18 We move into closed session to continue hearing the evidence of
19 the witness who took the stand yesterday.
20 [Closed session]
11 Pages 24567-24606 redacted. Closed session.
18 [Open session]
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
21 We'll have a break, and we will resume at 20 minutes past 11.00,
22 and we'll then continue in open session --
23 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Next witness is here and should be ready,
24 Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So we'll -- then you'll start your examination
1 after the break.
2 As I said, 20 minutes past 11.00.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.53 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 11.23 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Since there are no preliminary matters to be raised,
6 I would ask Madam Usher to escort the witness into the courtroom.
7 The already admitted statements of Witnesses IC-12 and IC-16 have
8 now been uploaded in the way required by the Chamber. The only thing
9 that has to be done is that a number should be assigned to them.
10 Mr. Registrar.
11 [The witness entered court]
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 2D00793, which is 65 ter for
13 Witness IC-16's statement, that becomes Exhibit D1795. And then
14 65 ter 2D00794, which is the statement of IC-12, becomes Exhibit D1796.
15 JUDGE ORIE: And it's -- it is confirmed that they have been
16 uploaded, Mr. Cayley.
17 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, absolutely, Your Honour. And also the order
18 that you made in respect to the redaction, that was completed too. So
19 I'm obliged to you. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ORIE: So then D1795 and D1796 are admitted into evidence.
21 My apologies to you, Mr. Granic, for dealing with other matters
22 while you entered the courtroom.
23 Before you give evidence, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
24 require that you make a solemn declaration that you'll speak the truth,
25 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The text is now handed out
1 to you, and I would like to invite to you make that solemn declaration.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I solemnly declare
3 that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated, Mr. Granic.
5 Mr. Granic, you will first be examined by Mr. Mikulicic.
6 Mr. Mikulicic is counsel for Mr. Markac.
7 Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.
8 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 WITNESS: MATE GRANIC
10 [Witness answered through interpreter]
11 Examination by Mr. Mikulicic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Granic.
13 A. Good morning.
14 Q. Can you please state your full name for the record.
15 A. Mate Granic.
16 Q. And what is your current profession?
17 A. I am currently the head of the high journalistic school and also
18 the owner of a private consultant firm, Magra.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the last ...
20 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please repeat the name of your consultancy
22 MR. MIKULICIC: It's correctly in the transcript, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then there is no need to do it.
24 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would ask the Registrar for the
25 document 65 ter 3D00958.
1 Q. Mr. Granic, we will soon see on the screen a document which is
2 actually your statement, so I will ask you a few questions about the
3 statement which you gave to the Markac Defence team.
4 So, Mr. Markac [as interpreted], do you remember that you gave a
5 statement to the Defence of General Markac?
6 A. I remember that I gave a statement.
7 Q. And now when you see it on the screen, can you recognise your
8 signature in the Croatian version of the statement?
9 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would ask the Registrar to
10 scroll up the document a little bit. That's it.
11 Q. Is this your signature, Mr. Granic?
12 A. Yes, that is my signature.
13 Q. Do you remember that you gave this statement at the premises in
15 A. Yes, that is correct.
16 Q. Did you have a chance to review and have a look at this statement
17 after that, before coming to testify here?
18 A. Yes, I had the opportunity to do that, and this is the statement.
19 Q. Does this statement correctly reflect what you said to the
20 General Markac Defence team?
21 A. Absolutely correctly, and there is nothing I wish to add.
22 Q. While giving the statement, did you speak the truth, to the best
23 of your knowledge and recollection, and has it been recorded in the
25 A. Yes, everything is absolutely correct.
1 Q. If the same questions were put to you today, as the ones you were
2 asked when you were giving the statement, would you provide the same
3 answers relating to the facts?
4 A. Yes, I would.
5 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I ask for the statement to be
6 admitted into evidence.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
8 MR. WAESPI: Just a point of clarification. I now have three
9 dates for the witness statement. In the transcript it says the
10 19th of May, 2009. The English translation, at least the one I have now,
11 has 12th of May. And I think the B/C/S has 11th of May.
12 MR. MIKULICIC: Obviously in the transcript there was a wrong
13 translation, because I have in front me a Croatian version, the original
14 version of the statement, which is dated 12th of May, 2009.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Whereas apparently the English translation says the
16 11th of May.
17 MR. MIKULICIC: Well, it is a typo, obviously, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do not know exactly what happens at this
19 moment. I'm not even aware on who prepared these translations. But this
20 morning we had the issue of Croats and Serbs being mixed up in one of the
21 documents. And I would still --
22 MR. MIKULICIC: [Overlapping speakers] ... official translation,
23 Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Nevertheless, I express my concern without
25 looking at anyone, but my main concern is that we have the proper
2 Mr. Mikulicic, would you take care that the document we saw this
3 morning will be sent to be -- perhaps to be reviewed. We do not know
4 whether it is just that one mistake which we were able to identify, and
5 that is, of course, here the same. We can identify there is apparently a
6 problem with the dates here. What other problems there are, I am unable
7 to look at. So, therefore, if we find clear mistakes I would like to
8 have them at least reviewed, if only superficially, that we do not have
9 problems elsewhere.
10 Mr. Mikulicic --
11 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your Honour, just for your information --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kuzmanovic.
13 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Thank you. We will do so. Just for your
14 information the document we referred to this morning, our draft
15 translation was correct. So it is somehow in the -- when it got to CLSS
16 it got changed, so we will again double-check.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please do so.
18 Mr. Granic, I apologise for this. Apart from the date,
19 Mr. Waespi --
20 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
21 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
22 Mr. Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1797.
24 JUDGE ORIE: D1797 is admitted into evidence.
25 Mr. Mikulicic.
1 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, please be so kind and tell us in
3 several sentences --
4 MR. MIKULICIC: But before we begin I prepared for this witness,
5 for Mr. Granic, a folder with documents which are marked so that I could
6 refer to specific documents during my questioning so that Mr. Granic
7 could also see the hard copy of these documents. So, with you're
8 allowance, this is what I would like to use during the
10 JUDGE ORIE: Leave is granted.
11 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, very briefly, can you tell us
13 something about your education and your profession until the moment when
14 you entered politics.
15 A. Before I became involved in politics, and that was in 1991, on
16 the 3rd of August, I had a successful medical career. I was a professor
17 of internal medicine, and I was also the deputy director and chief of the
18 clinical department at the Institute of Diabetes
19 Disease of the Metabolism, Vuk Vrhovac. I was a short-term consultant
20 for the World Health Organisation in Asia, in India
21 and Thailand
22 in the USA
23 17 American universities. I also took some training at Harvard Medical
24 School and at the Munich University
25 Q. And after that, in 1990, as the summit of your medical career,
1 you became the dean of the medical faculty of the university in Zagreb
2 A. Correct. In 1989, I became the deputy dean, and in the fall of
3 1990, after the first free democratic elections, I became the dean of the
4 medical faculty of the University of Zagreb
5 Q. Mr. Granic, just for your information, the pauses which I am
6 making are motivated by allowing the interpreters to do their work, so I
7 will ask you to wait for a short while with your answer after I ask a
9 What was the motivation, Mr. Granic, to neglect a successful
10 medical career and to decide to enter politics?
11 A. The motivation was just one. I decided to become involved with
12 the democratic changes, and that was in late 1988, when I became a member
13 of the alternative commission for the constitution. After the democratic
14 changes, as a respected doctor and dean of the medical faculty, I became
15 a member of the constitutional commission which was established by the
16 president, Franjo Tudjman, but I didn't have any ambition at the time to
17 enter politics.
18 However, the aggression against my country and the danger for
20 formed, and I was well-informed about what was going on in the territory
21 of the former Yugoslavia
22 three days of deliberation, when the prime minister designate,
23 Franjo Gregoric and President Gregoric [as interpreted], offered that I
24 enter the government as the deputy prime minister, I accepted that
25 because I believed that, with my knowledge and experience, I could help.
1 In particular, in the field that I was especially qualified, and I became
2 the deputy prime minister for science, the education system, the health
3 system, the social care system, and that was why I accepted to join the
4 Croatian government.
5 Q. If we divided your political engagement in the Croatian
6 government into two stages, then the first one would be the one you just
7 told us about.
8 Can you tell us, as the deputy prime minister, what was your area
9 of responsibility in practice? What was the main field of your work,
10 what were your main tasks in the government of the Republic of Croatia
11 A. Well, this government, this so-called government of democratic
12 unity which all political forces in Croatia entered or supported it, once
13 we began working then we could see that we did not even have the legal
14 foundation for our work. So within a framework of 10 to 13 days, we had
15 to adopt 79 decree laws so that we could operate successfully as the
17 And after that, I saw that the chief problem was the mounting
18 number of expelled persons. The number really grew rapidly, and I
19 realised that my main task would be to care for the displaced persons and
20 victims of the war. Therefore, I established the government office for
21 displaced persons and refugees, and during the wars in Croatia
22 and Herzegovina
23 700.000 and 800.000 displaced persons and almost 1 million refugees from
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina passed through this office.
25 The biggest numbers of expelled persons at one moment was
1 485.000, and that was in late 1991 and early 1992. That was the biggest
2 number of displaced persons. And the biggest number of refugees at one
3 point was 325.000 from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was in early 1993.
4 We should note that these are such huge figures that, on two
5 occasions, more than 10.000 people came to the city of Zagreb in one day,
6 especially after the fall of Vukovar, and on four occasions this figure
7 was 5.000 people. And as for refugees, one should take note that during
8 two weekends, the first weekend was in late May 1991, and the other
9 weekend was between the 11th and 13th of July in 1992, during these
10 weekends, 60.000 refugees entered Croatia
11 I also have to say another thing. We -- if we had established
12 this office at the moment when the number mounted from one day to the
13 next and when we were not receiving any international aid, except that
14 received from the Croatian diaspora and the friendly towns and cities
15 from neighbouring countries, we established this office with the help of
16 UNHCR and practically we had excellent cooperation with them from
17 beginning to the end, especially with Ms. Sagato Ogata, but also those
18 who were the representatives for Croatia
19 government arrived for Christmas in 1991, and after Germany [as
20 interpreted] was internationally recognised, then we also received aid
21 from the European Union in early 1992. We received lots of aid from the
22 neighbouring countries, that was Austria
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
25 MR. MIKULICIC: Mr. President, I think just in terms of the
1 interpretation, I don't think there's going to be any dispute that at
2 page 53, lines 9 and 10, it refers to Germany's recognition of Croatia
3 and not Germany
4 says: "... and after Germany
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, not Germany
6 recognised by Germany
7 That seems to be clear.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. MIKULICIC:
10 Q. [Interpretation] Therefore, the Republic of Croatia
11 the person who was charged with this particular task, were faced with a
12 huge humanitarian effort. And how did it reflect itself on financial
14 A. It was an enormous cost for the state, and a relief toward that
15 cost came from the Croatian diaspora and the friendly towns that I
16 mentioned. Nevertheless, it was an enormous burden upon the Croatian
17 budget, especially in view of the fact that Croatia had at the same time
18 been exposed to a forceful aggression from the Federal Republic
20 instrument in the hands of Slobodan Milosevic.
21 Another matter that I dealt with as a member of the government
22 was that all of the victims of the war, all the captured soldiers of the
23 former JNA had immediately been released through the Red Cross, and the
24 number involved was at least 17.000. They were provided immediate relief
25 and were immediately enabled to reunite with their families and go home.
1 Another matter that was important for that period. On the
2 8th of October, 1991, I was appointed, by President Tudjman and the
3 Croatian government, the chief negotiator with the former Yugoslav Army
4 on the issue of the deblocking and evacuation of the barracks. On the
5 8th of December, 1991, after two months of negotiations, I brought the
6 negotiations to a close with the Dutch ambassador, van Houten, and the
7 American ambassador, Okun, or the American envoy Okun, and Admiral
8 Raseta, by signing an agreement with them at the level of Croatia
9 although there were local negotiations taking place at the time,
10 especially the ones led by Mr. Hebrang at the time, concerning a military
11 hospital. This was a success on our part and the agreement was
12 successfully implemented. The international community did not have any
13 objections to make with regard to the implementation of the agreement.
14 Q. Already at this stage, Dr. Granic, we were able to see that you
15 moved out of the refugee issues toward the task of negotiating with the
16 Yugoslav People's Army. At the close of these negotiations, what were
17 your next tasks within the government on this same issue?
18 A. The conditions for the international commission of Croatia
19 had been agreed upon at the meeting of EU ministers, on the night between
20 16th and 17th of December, with special engagement of the German foreign
21 minister and German politicians Genscher and Kohl, it was agreed that
23 minorities. It should make sure that the barracks were deblocked and
24 evacuated. A truce agreement was to be signed, which was, in fact,
25 signed by -- on -- by Minister Susak on the 3rd of January, 1992
1 European observers who were in Zagreb
2 view on it. All these conditions were met, and on the 15th of January,
4 Now, going back to the question of what I personally did at the
5 time, I predominantly dealt with refugee issues, with the issue of
6 exchanging prisoners and providing for the victims of war. In addition
7 to all the other regular duties I had as the deputy prime minister for
8 the social portfolio, which included negotiations with trade unions,
9 et cetera, that -- those were my main tasks in the first half of 1992, as
10 well as throughout 1992, although I was increasingly developing the
11 so-called humanitarian diplomacy since we cooperated and dealt with
12 almost all the United Nations specialised agencies.
13 Q. Mr. Granic, in the multitude of displaced persons, refugees,
14 expelled persons, there were individuals of various ethnicities. Did you
15 ever run any sort of policy that would favour one group over the other,
16 among the multitude of the victims of war?
17 A. Absolutely not. Let me state that of -- even among the displaced
18 persons, 3 per cent were Serbs, and this is not a fact well known.
19 As for the refugees, the vast majority were Bosniaks. There had
20 never been any serious incident there, even though it was far from easy
21 to deal with such a throng of people. When you compare it with some
22 other large countries, this was an enormous number of people for Croatia
23 which was a country of 4 million people, and even fewer people, since a
24 third of the country was occupied. In other words, this was an enormous
25 number of people which practically claimed 10 per cent of the state
1 budget in order for us to be able to provide care for all of victims of
3 Q. Following the international recognition of Croatia which you have
4 just described, there followed a period, where, in fact, in the territory
5 of the Republic of Croatia
6 war spilled over to the territory of the Republic of Bosnia
8 A. Perhaps I should first note that, together with
9 President Tudjman, I took part in the talks concerning the deployment of
10 UN peacekeeping forces to Croatia
12 rejected. This was one of the tasks that I performed.
13 As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
14 independence and was the first to dispatch its ambassador to Sarajevo
15 It was quite clear that a war was brewing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There
16 was hardly a single representative of the international community whom I
17 didn't discuss this issue with. It was very unfortunate that the
18 international community was unable to muster strength or at least find a
19 negotiator in order to bring about a consensus on the issue in the face
20 of this threat of a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to avert the
21 aggression forged by Slobodan Milosevic, to be carried out also against
23 Q. In this second stage of your activity, as it were, the primary
24 task was to avert a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What was your
25 attitude toward these activities; and what was exactly the job you did at
1 the time?
2 A. Up until the 1st of June, 1993, my primary concern were refugees,
3 displaced persons, and victims of war. We had, I believe, two or three
4 shelters for women victims of rape from Bosnia-Herzegovina that we set up
5 with the considerable assistance from the international community. That
6 was my primary concern.
7 At the time, I did not participate in the political talks over
8 peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so I am not your best witness for the
9 negotiations concerning the restoration of peace or preservation of peace
10 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 However, when I became foreign minister, because of the
12 unfortunate conflict between Croats and Bosniaks, the -- the
13 international position and reputation of Croatia was greatly undermined.
14 In my discussions with Madam Albright, who was a representative
15 of the US
16 Klaus Kinkel, the German foreign minister, Jean Leuterand [phoen], or the
17 person who became in charge of relations with the individual who was
18 there on -- on behalf of the Vatican
19 these discussions had the result of me actually being involved in those
20 months in the effort to stop the conflict between Bosniaks and Croats in
22 international credibility of Croatia
23 my efforts were engaged in that direction.
24 Q. Can you please set a time on these events you're talking about.
25 A. I'm talking about the period starting from the 1st of June, 1993,
1 when I became minister, through to the end of the year, and the
3 In addition to the care for refugees, this was one of the most
4 important tasks I performed in my life. I also have to state that I
5 faced this cruel reality, where sometime around the 16th or 17th of June,
6 1993, I was foreign minister and I was informed one morning by the
7 spokesperson that the "New York Times" and another paper, I think
8 "Le Monde", but definitely the "New York Times," wrote an article stating
9 that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina had collection centres or camps
10 where civilians were held. I was shocked by the news.
11 I rang Mate Boban right away and asked him if it was true. He
12 said that it was not. I then asked Mr. Jadranko Prlic if this was indeed
13 true and he confirmed that it was indeed true that there was a collection
14 centre, and I heard only of this one in that instance.
15 I phoned Boban again and I strongly protested. I almost shouted
16 at him. I called President Tudjman and informed him of it. He gave his
17 full support and told me that I do everything in my power to press the
18 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina into closing the collection centre, and this
19 was to be done unilaterally, without waiting for any sort of bilateral
21 Twenty days later, I organised a meeting in Makarska, attended by
22 the highest representative of the government at the level of the deputy
23 prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the BiH army, HVO, the Croatian
24 Defence Council, and representative of the ICRC and the
25 High Commissioner, where the following was agreed. The Makarska
1 Declaration was signed, whereby free passage was to be ensured for all
2 convoys and where by all the detainees, all the prisoners were to be
4 Q. Let us return to the topic which you touched on.
5 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] In the meantime if we could
6 please see 3D00464.
7 Q. Dr. Granic, it is tab 1 in your folder. It is undoubted that the
8 issue of relations between the Republic of Croatia
9 was of utmost importance, as said yourself, and I will ask you to focus
10 your attention on 1992, when the president of the Republic of Croatia
11 the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
12 Dr. Tudjman and Mr. Alija Izetbegovic signed an appendix to earlier
13 Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation.
14 As the deputy prime minister at the time, did you know about this
15 agreement and this importance? Can you please comment on this document.
16 A. This is the addendum to the agreement which was signed in early
17 July; I think it was the 11th of July, 1992. And on the basis of it, the
18 Croatian army could enter to up to 20 kilometres within the territory of
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina, because aggression against Croatia
20 been carried out by Croatian Serbs from the territory of Bosnia
22 was the addendum to the agreement that was signed in New York City during
23 the UN General Assembly. I think that that was when the meeting took
25 I have to note that the real negotiations about stopping the
1 conflict between the Croats and Bosniaks were started by
2 Mr. Haris Silajdzic, who was firstly the minister and then the foreign --
3 firstly the foreign minister and then the prime minister of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the month of August 1993, for seven days we met
5 every day. The last day, that was together with President Tudjman, and
6 that was when it de facto agreed that several things would take place.
7 One thing was that the war between the Croats and the Bosniaks would be
8 stopped, that peace would be restored, that groups would be established
9 to rebuild trust, that humanitarian issues needed to be resolved, and I
10 have to note that the result was the signature in Geneva to the new
11 agreement between Izetbegovic and Tudjman. That was on 16th September.
12 Unfortunately, two days, later, Lord Owen organised a meeting of Bosniaks
13 and Serbs who signed a similar agreement which, to a certain extent,
14 annulled the effects of this agreement.
15 This was a very difficult time, a time of conflict, and of
16 negotiations but I was very persistent. I visited Sarajevo during the
17 war. I signed the Sarajevo Declaration. And when the Vance-Owen Plan
18 and then the Vance-Stoltenberg Plan did not work, it was obvious that
19 European Community and the negotiators did not have enough strength to
20 establish lasting peace.
21 Lasting peace was established when the United States became
22 involved. That implied the strong administration of the Bill Clinton.
23 The first of the meetings was organised on the 16th or 17th of January,
24 1994, in Geneva
25 was present there. He was the special envoy of President Clinton. And
1 Ambassador Zuzul was our ambassador in Geneva at the time, and I was
2 there myself, and practically that was the moment when the concept about
3 restoring peace and creating the federation of Croats and Bosniaks was
4 decided, and this was completed with the negotiations in Washington
5 But before that, some other important things took place as the
6 precondition for this agreement. Namely, the departure of Mate Boban and
7 the group of people around him. They had left the political scene.
8 Q. Dr. Granic, this document before you, the addendum to the
9 agreement on the friendship, implicitly talks about the effort to find a
10 political solution and to stop the war and to have a union, a joint
11 effort of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
12 these efforts.
13 Does the text of this agreement reflect the position of the
14 government of the Republic of Croatia
15 and finding resolution apart from the unnecessary problems that the war
17 Can you please go back to tab 1.
18 A. Yes. It was certainly so. I said that I'm not the best witness
19 about all the negotiations that were conducted as part of the conference
20 to establish peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But it is a fact that
22 Vance-Owen Plan and supported it, and so did the Croats in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also accepted and supported the Vance-Owen Plan
24 and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan.
25 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could this document please be
1 admitted into evidence.
2 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1798.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
6 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. [Interpretation] Following the policy aimed at peaceful solution
8 and adhering to international law relating to refugees, which we just
9 saw, the president of the Republic, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, in late
10 November 1994, gave a speech before the General Assembly of the United
12 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] And I would ask the Registry to
13 show the document 3D00476. If we could please see page 9 of this
15 Q. While we are waiting, Dr. Granic, it is under tab 2 in your
16 binder, page 9, the paragraph at the bottom of the page. While we are
17 waiting for it to appear on the screen, were you present in New York
18 before the General Assembly, on this occasion when General Tudjman
19 addressed the General Assembly by this speech in late 1994?
20 A. In 1994, absolutely, yes. And I remember well this speech.
21 Q. Mr. Granic, I will focus your attention to the last paragraph on
22 page 9, where President Tudjman says that Croatia proposes the provision
23 of a permanent peacekeeping force for intervention - I'm not reading
24 directly this text; I'm just interpreting - in accordance with the
25 requirements of the Security Council, and that the mandate of such forces
1 should even include using force in order to implement their mandate and
2 not just to protect themselves.
3 My question is: What is your experience with the mandate that
4 the international organisations, whether it was UNPROFOR or the
5 European monitors, had in the territory of the Republic of Croatia
6 there an issue with the structure of the mandate as compared with the
7 real needs on the ground?
8 A. We were happy about the arrival of peacekeeping forces, and we
9 have to thank everyone who participated in this operation, and in
10 particular, those who were -- gave their lives or who were wounded or who
11 had any kind of problems during this operation.
12 Finally, the peacekeeping forces helped Croatia to become a
13 sovereign and territorially integrated country. However, it needs to be
14 noted that the mandate of these forces was not clearly defined and that
15 the peacekeeping forces did not manage to control the border between the
16 Republic of Croatia
17 were the operations of the rebelled Croatian Serbs, the so-called
18 Krajina, against the Bihac area.
19 In addition to this, the peacekeeping forces never managed to
20 disarm completely the local Serbs who had rebelled.
21 During the UNPROFOR's mandate, the Croats and non-Serbs who were
22 killed were between 6 and 700 in number, around 650, and a great number
23 of people were expelled, practically ethnic cleansing was carried out.
24 It's a historical fact.
25 So regardless of the good intentions, and regardless of the
1 commitment of many of these soldiers, these are the historical facts.
2 Q. Dr. Granic, you mentioned the situation that - and we're talking
3 about late 1994 - the situation in the territory of the Republic of
5 Serbian Krajina, and how the rebelled Serbian citizens in the territory
6 conducted themselves.
7 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] If we now move to page 16 of this
8 document. I would ask the Registry to show that on the screen.
9 Q. We will find a paragraph in which President Tudjman, in his
10 speech, refers to this situation, and he says in the second paragraph:
11 "We realise that both sides, after any conflict, have to invest
12 much time and effort into restoring and strengthening mutual confidence.
13 We are also quite aware that no long-term stability and progress is
14 possible in Croatia
15 Serbian and other minority groups. We have indeed guaranteed such rights
16 by a special constitutional law ... but we urge the international
17 community to create conditions for the implementation of this law in
18 accordance with Security Council resolutions."
19 Dr. Granic, this is the position of the president of the
20 republic, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, before the General Assembly of the
21 United Nations, in which he reflects the position of the Republic of
23 Please tell me, considering that you were in the government, you
24 held the position of the foreign minister at the time, what was the state
25 policy of the Republic of Croatia
1 of the president of Franjo Tudjman, and does this correspond with your
2 experience and your recollection?
3 A. In 1994, several important things happened, and they all reflect
4 the government policy of the Republic of Croatia
5 was on the 19th of January, in Geneva
6 Granic and Jovanovic. And this agreement was the first step by which
8 just that as the government we were conducting negotiations with the
9 local Serbs, but that Belgrade
10 established in Zagreb
11 easily, and that we should try to reach a peaceful resolution.
12 After that, on the 3rd of March, 1994, the Washington Agreement
13 was signed. That was the key agreement for the peace in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, for stopping the war between the Croats and Bosniaks,
15 and for the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
16 that was done with the patronage of the United States. And on the
17 Croatian side, I was the main negotiator.
18 After that, I also visited Belgrade
19 President Simic. He visited Zagreb
20 economic agreement was also signed with the local Serbs about opening up
21 the highway, the oil pipeline, the power supply problems, and so on. The
22 local Serbs accepted that, partly because they were under pressure of the
23 international community, partly from Belgrade, to negotiate about
24 economic issues. But never, absolutely never did they accept to talk
25 about political issues and their reintegration in the state and legal
1 system of Croatia
2 And in that year there is another fact which is historically
3 important. In December of that year, the UN General Assembly adopted a
4 resolution, that was 43/44, in which it was said that the UNPA
5 territories were the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia
6 that Belgrade
7 in these areas. That is a very important document which was adopted by
8 the UN General Assembly.
9 Q. Let us put it in a geographical context.
10 When you said that the agreement was signed with the local Serbs
11 on the opening up of the highway, which part of the Republic of Croatia
12 did that concern?
13 A. The primary focus was on Sector West and the highway between
15 sector, Sector North. We also discussed the opening up of the railway
16 and all those elements of importance.
17 There was, indeed, hope at the time that the issue of
18 reintegration could be resolved peacefully.
19 Q. Dr. Granic, what was the position of the Croatian government that
20 were a part of as a foreign minister and deputy prime minister about
21 minority issues and the protection of human rights as well as the
22 principle of ethnic protection, primarily the Serbs who resided in the
23 territory of Croatia
24 A. There were never any dilemmas or doubts about the fact that the
25 Serbs were Croatian citizens and that they should enjoy the highest
1 possible degree of protection in terms of their human, ethnic minority,
2 cultural, and all other rights pursuant to the highest standard of
3 European rights protection. There was never any discussion about that in
4 Croatian government. There was never any doubt.
5 However, one needs to mention that the core problem was that, on
6 the one hand, the local rebelled Serbs, and I don't mean those Serbs
7 residing in urban areas throughout the Republic of Croatia
8 stayed. I have in mind the rebelled Serbs who were exposed to --
9 powerfully indoctrination for a number of years, and at least as of 1997,
10 when Milosevic assumed power, their leadership practically rejected any
11 kind of Croatian state. That was the main problem which, later on,
12 resulted in the departure of those people after Operation Storm.
13 Q. We are still to get to that topic.
14 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] For the time being, I would seek
15 to tender 3D00476.
16 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1799.
19 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
20 MR. MIKULICIC:
21 Q. [Interpretation] In the introductory part, we mentioned,
22 Mr. Granic, the war in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina which posed a
23 significant security threat. And we discussed the relationship between
25 Could we please look at another document. It is tab 3 in your
2 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the Registrar
3 to display 3D00475.
4 Q. It is dated around mid-November 1994. To be more correct -- more
5 precise, it was on the 12th of November. It was signed by
6 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, the then president of Presidency of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And he sent it to Dr. Franjo Tudjman, Croatian
8 president. Implicitly what is mentioned is that there was a powerful
9 attack on the protected area of Bihac, stating that the main direction of
10 attack was from Croatia
11 Mr. Izetbegovic says -- or, rather, invited Mr. Tudjman, in
12 keeping with the spirit of provision of Article 8 on cooperation between
13 the two countries and the agreement on friendship, that he should act in
14 such a way that all measures be taken to prevent any such further attacks
15 on Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatian territory.
16 Mr. Granic, what do you recall about this period?
17 A. I recall this period fully.
18 On the 11th of November, 1994, I received a call from
19 Mr. Sacirbey, who was the foreign minister, and told me that the
20 situation was dramatic regarding Bihac. He was asking me to do
21 everything possible to at least make the defence of Bihac more easy,
22 because the focus of attacks was from the side of the rebelled Serbs,
23 from the area where Martic was in power.
24 That day, I had a meeting with the defence minister, Mr. Susak.
25 We agreed that we should, together, propose to President Tudjman that
2 alleviate the situation in Bihac and to prevent its fall.
3 We also agreed that we should consult with the American
4 ambassador. We arranged a meeting with him. The ambassador was
5 Mr. Peter Galbraith, who was delighted with the idea. However, he was
6 supposed to seek advice from President Clinton and the State Department.
7 Minister Susak and myself went to see Mr. Tudjman the next day. The
8 prime minister, Mr. Valentic, was in attendance as well. We discussed
9 the topic and the president, in principle, accepted our idea. He warned
10 us, though, that this could mean the opening up of the entire front line,
11 which, at that moment, Croatia
12 liberate that territory by military means was not something that Croatia
13 could undertake at that point in time. Although he did not completely
14 refuse the idea of helping Bihac. We decided that we should wait for the
15 American official position.
16 On the 12th, Alija Izetbegovic also addressed President Tudjman
17 on the issue, after which the American ambassador arrived, who informed
18 us officially that it was the position of the American government that it
19 will do its utmost through Security Council, but that, at that point in
20 time, advised against any military operations. And President Tudjman,
21 indeed, followed the American advice.
22 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I seek to tender
23 this document into evidence.
24 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1800.
2 JUDGE ORIE: D1800 is admitted into evidence.
3 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the Registrar
4 for 3D00474.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Before we move to the next exhibit. I'm looking at
6 the clock, Mr. --
7 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I will complete it within two
8 minutes, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then we'll --
10 MR. MIKULICIC:
11 Q. [Interpretation] It is tab 4, Mr. Granic, in your binder.
12 You mentioned that you waited for the official position of the US
13 regarding the Bihac issue. You mentioned that Mr. Galbraith arrived and
14 said that they advised against that but, however, that they would try to
15 act through the UN Security Council.
16 Please have a look at this document of the 16th of November,
17 1994. It is a note of a discussion between Mr. Tudjman and the
18 ambassador, Peter Galbraith. In the right-hand corner, I believe I
19 recognise your signature.
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. You authored this document, did you not?
22 A. Yes, I did.
23 Q. In it, you state that an urgent meeting of Security Council
24 should be held, during which the US
25 measures to prevent the fall of Bihac and to stop any further aggression
1 by the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.
2 Mr. Granic, the issue of Bihac, why was it of such importance at
3 that point in time, and indeed it was so important that US intervention
4 was sought through Security Council. Why was it such an important issue?
5 If can you put it in a few sentences because we already heard some
6 evidence about it.
7 A. The issue of Bihac was important because it may have resulted in
8 mass crimes. Over 100.000 people were in encirclement, and had Bihac
9 fallen, it would have been the greatest disaster in an already disastrous
10 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, Bihac was surrounded and
11 attacked by both Karadzic and Mladic, that is to say, they -- their army,
12 as well as by the army of Martic's Serbs. In other words, it was a joint
14 Q. I thank you for your answer.
15 MR. MIKULICIC: I think that's appropriate time for taking a
16 break, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: We will have a break, and we will resume at ten
18 minutes to 1.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 12.52 p.m.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, please proceed.
22 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 [Interpretation] Your Honour, can we call up 65 ter document,
24 3D00474 -- or, rather, can we have it admitted into evidence.
25 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1801.
3 JUDGE ORIE: D1801 is admitted into evidence.
4 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, before the break, we discussed the
6 situation in Bihac and the note you made during the talks between
7 Ambassador Galbraith and President Tudjman.
8 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we can call up 3D00471.
9 Q. Which is T5 in your binder.
10 Therefore, there are further developments to follow.
11 President Tudjman, because of the situation in the Bihac/UN protected
12 zone, addressed Madam Madeleine Albright who was the chairperson of the
13 UN General Assembly. This was the 22nd of November, 1994.
14 And if we look at President Tudjman's letter, we can see that she
15 [as interpreted] draws the attention of Madam Albright to the situation
16 in the protected area of Bihac and around it. The situation was further
17 aggravated because of the Serb forces who, from the UNPA zones from
19 On the second page of this letter President Tudjman states:
20 "For this reason, appeal to you as the president of the Security
21 Council of the United Nations to take resolute measures to ensure that
22 all UN resolutions be adopted that may ensure a lasting political
23 solution to the crisis and a lasting peace in the region."
24 Mr. Granic, as a minister of foreign affairs, were you aware of
25 this letter by President Tudjman?
1 A. Absolutely, yes. In fact, this was my proposal to
2 President Tudjman, and the American ambassador was informed accordingly.
3 We also informed President Izetbegovic and Minister Sacirbey.
4 Q. What was the reaction to the initiative?
5 A. We truly believed that the United States of America were doing
6 everything to ensure a lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we took
7 an active part in the process.
8 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, can the document
9 be admitted into evidence.
10 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1802.
13 JUDGE ORIE: D1802 is admitted into evidence.
14 MR. MIKULICIC:
15 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, we spoke of the role UNPROFOR
16 played, and under the documents, it was supposed to be deployed to the
17 borders of the Republic of Croatia
18 differently than there was general discontents in the Republic of Croatia
19 with regard to the role and activities of UNPROFOR.
20 We are now in the first half of 1995.
21 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] And can we call up 3D0047 --
22 468 --
23 Q. Which is also to be found in your binder.
24 There is a letter where President Tudjman addresses the
25 General Secretary of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, dated the
1 12th of January, 1995.
2 This is tab 6.
3 In the letter he refers to the UNPROFOR mandate and the role it
4 played. At page 2 of the letter, President Tudjman states that for the
5 two years during which UNPROFOR was present in Croatia, the process of
6 ethnic cleansing of Croats and non-Serbs in the occupied territories was
7 completed. Before the arrival of UNPROFOR, the Serb rebels, with the
8 assistance of the JNA, drove out and ethnically cleansed of the occupied
9 territory 390.000 non-Serb citizens - these were Croats, Hungarians,
10 Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, et cetera - and killed several thousand of
11 them in the process. Around 600 Croats were killed and 12.000 were
12 forcibly removed ever since UNPROFOR was deployed to the area.
13 By way of conclusion, the president, Tudjman, said that the
14 Croatian parliament adopted a resolution on the 23rd of September,
15 whereby it decided that the UN Protection Forces, that's to say UNPROFOR,
16 no longer should have their term of office or mandate extended.
17 Mr. Granic, from what you remember of UNPROFOR, its mandate and
18 the issue of it being extended or not extended in the occupied
19 territories, what can you tell us about it?
20 A. We simply did not want to have the mandate of UNPROFOR as it had
21 been by that time anymore. It was the sort of mandate which served to
22 freeze the state of affairs as it was, and the state of affairs was that
23 Serbs were ethnically cleansing Croats. UNPROFOR did not control the
24 border. The attacks on Bihac from the territory of the Republic of
1 heavy weaponry, which had been one of its major tasks.
2 In addition, not even the economic agreement from December 1994,
3 which had been signed, was being adhered to. By working toward the
4 cancellation of the mandate as it was, Croatia did not want to cause a
5 conflict with the United Nations. Quite the contrary. By raising the
6 issue of the UNPROFOR's mandate, we opened a decision on the matter.
7 Ultimately, with the assistance of the US, especially the state
8 secretary, Christopher, Madeleine Albright, the representative in the
9 United Nations, and Vice-President Al Gore, we managed to find a common
10 language with the United Nations and bring about a new mandate of UNCRO,
11 which applied to Croatia
12 We believed that the new mandate with tasks that were closely
13 defined would help implement what was, in fact, the basic task of the
15 Q. In that same letter addressed to Mr. Boutros-Ghali, and this is
16 page 4 of the document, President Tudjman says that the Republic of
18 the peaceful reintegration of the territory, and continued to offer all
19 Croats in Croatia
20 autonomy in those areas and counties where the Serbs were in the
21 majority, in accordance with the population census, with full respect of
22 all human rights, especially the rights of minorities, this is the view
23 which representatives of the international community can take into
25 And this is what President Tudjman wrote in the letter.
1 Was this the sort of position that reflected the state policy of
2 the Republic of Croatia
3 A. Yes, that's true. The position was to try at all costs to find a
4 peaceful solution and to peacefully reintegrate the occupied areas into
5 the state and legal system of Croatia
7 letter by President Tudjman to Secretary-General of the United Nations,
8 did in fact yield definite results because the international community,
9 following the letter, started working intensely on the so-called
10 Z-4 plan. This was the first time that the international community
11 worked on a plan that envisaged a peaceful reintegration of that area
12 into the legal and constitutional framework of Croatia.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Counsel didn't switch the microphone on.
14 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, can the document
15 be admitted into evidence, please.
16 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1803.
19 JUDGE ORIE: D1803 is admitted into evidence.
20 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can the Registrar call up
21 document 3D00465, please.
22 Q. Dr. Granic, in your testimony so far, you said several times that
23 an agreement had been reached in Sector East with the rebel Serbs to open
24 up roads or a road, namely, the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway.
25 You also stated that there were certain problems in the
1 implementation of the agreement on the part of rebel Serbs. Can you give
2 us a few more points on that, by way of introduction to Operation Flash?
3 A. Before dealing with Operation Flash, it is important to say that
4 the Z-4 plan, which had been worked on jointly by the ambassadors of the
5 US, Russia
6 in fact, it provided Serbs with a state within a state. Croatia,
7 regardless of the fact that it found it hard to accept it, did take part
8 in negotiations for it, and discussing it; whereas, the rebel Serbs,
9 Martic himself, refused to take the agreement -- to physically take it in
10 his hand.
11 The economic agreement which had been signed with the local
12 Serbs, Serbs in general, not the ones in Krajina, was supposed to ensure
13 the opening up of the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway. However, there were
14 everyday incidents provoked -- provoked by them, nearly each and one of
15 them had fatalities as their results. They wanted to make it clear,
16 through these incidents, that the motorways was highly unsafe for use.
17 This caused major discontent among the citizens of Croatia, as it showed
18 them to be unreliable partners for any sort of economic, let alone
19 political, settlement. They didn't want to discuss that one at all.
20 Q. Under such circumstances where you say Croatia had to provide for
21 an enormous number of refugees and was under heavy financial strain, the
22 economy was an important part of its functioning, as it normally is, but
23 especially under those circumstances. How significant, in that context,
24 was the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway, and did it have to do with the bringing
25 about of this agreement with the local Serbs?
1 A. It was very important, of course, for economic reasons. Both the
2 railway lines Zagreb-Belgrade, Zagreb-Split were cut off, as well as the
3 pipe -- as the oil pipeline. This caused enormous damage to Croatia
4 in fact the closed Zagreb-Belgrade motorway did. This showed that the
5 local Serbs did not want to seriously engage in any sort of talks,
6 including the ones on economic matters, and it showed them that they were
7 unreliable partners for any sort of dialogue.
8 Q. Under the circumstances following the discussions in the UN, and
9 following the letters that you and President Tudjman sent, and following
10 the signing of the economic agreement which failed, the military and
11 police Operation Flash followed on the 3rd of May, 1995.
12 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can the Registrar call up
13 3D00465, please.
14 Q. This is tab 7 in your binder, Mr. Granic.
15 This is the message that president of the Republic of Croatia
16 Franjo Tudjman, addressed Croats and other citizens of the Republic of
18 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we turn to page 3 of the
20 3D00465, we can see it on our screens. Page 3 of the document.
21 [In English] The left side is accurate; but the right side is
22 previous document, as I can see. Okay. It's okay now. Thank you.
23 Q. [Interpretation] In this document, somewhere in the middle, the
24 president says at the same time, as president of Croatia, I invite the
25 Croatian Serbs to renounce those who are leading them and to accept the
1 peaceful integration of the still occupied areas into the constitutional
2 and legal and economic system of the democratic Republic of Croatia
3 The Croatian authorities guarantee the Serb ethnic community all
4 the rights provided for by the Croatian constitution and the special
5 constitutional law, in accordance with all international conventions.
6 If they desist from armed resistance, Croatia will know how to
7 establish its authority throughout its territory within its
8 internationally recognised borders in the way this was done the day
9 before yesterday and yesterday in Western Slavonia.
10 Mr. Granic, we can see that President Tudjman, in this address of
11 the general public, on the 3rd of May, 1995, called upon the Serb ethnic
12 community to agree to a peaceful reintegration of that area into the
13 Republic of Croatia
14 Is that the sort of state policy that you were part of at the
15 time as a minister of -- as the minister of foreign affairs and -- what
16 can you tell us on this message?
17 A. The military and police Operation Flash had as its primary role,
18 or objective, the opening up of the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway. The second
19 major goal was, once the first goal was achieved, was to liberate the
20 occupied area and the so-called -- UNPA West. There had been no
21 violations of human rights or international conventions. We had an
22 excellent cooperation with all the institutions of the United Nations,
23 with all the specialised agencies, such as the High Commissioner for
24 Refugees, the ICRC. The cooperation we had was excellent.
25 In short, over some 34 hours, over the period of some 34 hours,
1 the operation was finished and it showed the resolution of the state to
2 indicate that, unless it was able to do it so peacefully, it was able to
3 ensure that the area was reintegrated into Croatia in -- in an armed way.
4 However, at the same time, we hoped that this would be a warning
5 to Martic and others to engage in serious talks with Croatia about a
6 peaceful reintegration into Croatia
7 numerous cities, including Zagreb
8 seven killed and 196 wounded, including as one of the targets the
9 children's hospital Klaiceva, which I visited in the company of several
11 We showed that what could immediately follow was a co-existence
12 with the Serbs who remained through direct assistance and protection.
13 Let me repeat that this operation did not meet with any objections from
14 the international community, since I, as the minister of foreign affairs,
15 visited, together with ambassadors, the relevant area, and I think it was
16 precisely on the 3rd or on the 4th. I spoke to all the relevant foreign
17 ministers from the neighbouring countries and the world at large. I
18 explained the reason why the operation was carried out. There had been
19 no pressure exerted from the international community on Croatia to speak
21 Q. Can --
22 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, I rise just to -- if we can check
23 the interpretation at page 79, there's a sentence that starts on line 4
24 and continues on to line 5, I believe there's an adjective that was left
25 out that might be important.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Granic, if would you carefully listen, then
2 I will read to you what appears on our transcript. And if there is any
3 word missing which you'd like to bring in, please tell us.
4 I read: "We had an excellent cooperation" -- is that the line?
5 MR. MISETIC: The previous sentence.
6 JUDGE ORIE: The previous sentence.
7 I -- I again start reading: "There had been no violations of
8 human rights or international conventions."
9 Is there any word missing?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were no serious violations of
11 human rights or any violations of international conventions.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So the word "serious" was missing.
13 Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.
14 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you.
15 [Interpretation] Mr. Presiding Judge, I seek to tender this
16 document into evidence.
17 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1804.
20 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
21 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, your diplomatic activity during the
23 crisis period went on.
24 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would next ask for 3D00497.
25 Q. That is tab 9 in your binder. Thereby, you are responding to the
1 Japanese Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Kono. Could we move to page 2 of the
2 letter, please. The penultimate paragraph where you say:
3 "The Republic of Croatia still believes - and we shall persevere
4 in this direction for as long as possible - that negotiations and
5 peaceful resolution are the best way out of this crisis. We intend, for
6 example, to turn Western Slavonia into a window of peaceful reintegration
7 and to continue to fully cooperate with the international community at
8 all its efforts aimed at bringing a just and lasting peace to south-east
9 of Europe
10 understanding and support from the international community."
11 Mr. Granic, first of all, do you recognise this letter of yours?
12 Perhaps if we scroll up we may be able to see the signature.
13 What type of contact with Mr. Kono was this?
14 A. He visited the Republic of Croatia
15 preceding Operation Storm [as interpreted]. Of course, at that time, I
16 could not mentioned the operation itself, because only during the next
17 day, at the National Security Council meeting, the decision was made to
18 undertake the operation.
19 As I mentioned, that decision was made due to constant
20 provocations and serious incidents resulting in a number of deaths. I
21 believed it to be my duty to inform my colleague by rank, that is to say,
22 the minister, Kono, about the operation, its reasons, its goals, and what
23 we intended to do following that operation. We still believed that all
24 indications were to the effect that the local Serbs would choose a
25 rational way out, thereby choosing to seriously negotiate the political
1 issues and peaceful reintegration into the legal system of the state of
3 THE INTERPRETER: Counsel's microphone, please.
4 MR. MIKULICIC:
5 Q. [Interpretation] When you referred to the operation, Dr. Granic,
6 which operation do have you in mind?
7 A. Operation Flash.
8 Q. I say that, because in the transcript, page 81, line 22, it said
9 Operation Storm. I believe Mr. Granic did not mention that. Hence, the
11 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Presiding Judge, I seek to
12 tender this document into evidence.
13 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1805.
16 JUDGE ORIE: D1805 is admitted into evidence.
17 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 [Interpretation] Could we please have 3D00503.
19 Q. Dr. Granic, the diplomatic activity of Croatia was conducted via
20 the president's office on the one hand, and on other hand, through the
21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs; correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. At that time, Mr. Sarinic was around. What was his position?
24 A. He was the head of the President's office, and, as such, he was
25 also tasked with communicating with the UN office in Zagreb
1 had certain separate tasks during a certain period when he frequently --
2 or on several occasions met with Mr. Milosevic, when a peaceful solution
3 to the conflict was sought in the area of the former Yugoslavia.
4 Q. On the screen, Dr. Granic, you see his letter sent on the
5 28th of June, 1995. It was sent to Mr. Yasushi Akashi. It is tab 11.
6 He addresses Mr. Akashi by saying that, I quote:
7 "With great surprise I received the answer which was ... sent by
8 General Bernard Janvier, about you not having information on the entry of
9 the army and heavy weaponry from SR Yugoslavia into occupied territories
10 of the Republic of Croatia
11 Dr. Granic, what was the background to these events which caused
12 Mr. Sarinic's letter to be sent? And you will see a follow-up letter
13 from yourself as well.
14 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, counsel. I'm sorry to interrupt, but I
15 think Mr. Mikulicic mistakenly said June 1995. It's July. Just so the
16 witness can -- the letter is July 1995, and on line 10 of page 83,
17 Mr. Mikulicic said June, so ...
18 MR. MIKULICIC: Yes, we have obviously another problem with the
19 translation, because I have the original in front of me, in Croatian
20 language, where it states 28th of June, so ...
21 MR. KEHOE: Okay.
22 MR. MIKULICIC: We will ask the witness whether he can say
23 something about it.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.
25 MR. MIKULICIC:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, in the Croatian original that is
2 before you, the date is the 28th of June. In the English translation
3 made by the interpretation service -- the translation service of this
4 Tribunal the date is 28th of July. Can you tell us the right date?
5 A. I'm quite positive that it was the 28th of June.
6 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us more about the background of
7 these events.
8 A. During that period of time, Milosevic sent General Mrksic to
9 reorganise the army. There was heavy weaponry involved. They conducted
10 exercises and stepped up military activity. They did not concede to any
11 serious talks or negotiations but a peaceful reintegration.
12 On the contrary, they stepped up their military activity. At
13 that time, the Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, Karadzic's
14 Serbs and Martic, were negotiating and making decisions on the creation
15 of a common state. During that time the Serbs from Croatia actively
16 participated in the encirclement of Bihac, and Belgrade offered its
17 active assistance. Mr. Sarinic cautioned or tried to inform Mr. Akashi
18 about the routes through which heavy weaponry was being introduced into
19 the area.
20 Q. And all that was happening in -- in, so to say, the face of
21 the -- of UNPROFOR which was supposed to control the Croatian border?
22 A. That is completely correct.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Presiding Judge, I seek to
24 tender this document into evidence.
25 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1806.
3 JUDGE ORIE: D1806 is admitted into evidence.
4 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 [Interpretation] Could we now please see the document 3D00495.
6 Q. And that is tab 12 in your binder, Mr. Granic.
7 On the same day, that is to say, the 28th of June, when
8 Mr. Sarinic sent the letter to Mr. Akashi relating to the arrival of
9 Serbian army and weapons to the occupied territory of Krajina
10 sent a letter but to the Secretary-General of United Nations,
11 Mr. Boutros-Ghali, in which, on page 2 of this letter - if we could
12 please see page 2 - you specified what were the high officers of the
13 Yugoslav army who had crossed over to the occupied territory of the
14 Republic of Croatia
15 Uros Despotovic and others.
16 Tell us, what was your intention in sending Mr. Boutros-Ghali
17 such a letter as this?
18 A. During Operation Flash and after it, we received documents which
19 showed that all the soldiers of the so-called Republika Srpska were
20 receiving salaries from Belgrade
22 new high officers which Belgrade
23 Republika Srpska. We warned him, the Secretary-General of the
24 United Nations, about the situation which was getting worse, and how the
25 rebel Serbs were becoming more radical. And the new mandate of UNCRO was
1 beginning, and practically at the same time, the rebel Serbs were
2 obtaining new weapons, becoming radical. New top-ranking officers of the
3 Yugoslav Army were coming to the territory of the Republic of Croatia
4 the territory of the so-called Krajina.
5 Q. At the beginning of this page, in the first paragraph, you note
6 that this is a direct violation of the resolutions of the
7 Security Council, because the soldiers are being transported with weapons
8 across the border in Raca, since the 14th of June, 1995, and entering the
9 occupied territories of Croatia
10 Please tell us, Mr. Granic, what was the reaction to this letter
11 of yours?
12 A. There was no doubt that this letter was received with great
13 concern. We know that the Secretary-General was concerned and, in
14 particular, Mr. Akashi was concerned. Unfortunately, nothing specific
15 was done. None of these soldiers were returned, no weapons were seized,
16 so nothing happened. That is a fact.
17 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
18 evidence, Your Honour.
19 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I took it, Mr. Waespi, that you wanted to say that
21 you had no objections, which doesn't appear on the transcript. And on
22 this assumption, Mr. Registrar, the number would be.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1807.
24 JUDGE ORIE: D1807 is admitted into evidence.
25 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, the whole situation, warning about
2 the stepping up of the military forces in the so-called Krajina, in the
3 occupied part of the Republic of Croatia
4 situation around Bihac, in the neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that
6 A. Yes, absolutely, around Bihac, but not only around it.
7 I have to say that, at that time, a tragic event occurred which
8 conditioned to a great extent our conduct, my own conduct, and the
9 conduct of the Republic of Croatia
10 and I could say a few words about that too, Your Honours.
11 Q. Mr. Granic, this Tribunal has heard a lot about the fall of
12 Srebrenica and the tragic fate of Bosniaks until now --
13 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] So unless you insist on that,
14 Mr. President, I think there is no need to discuss that event anymore.
15 JUDGE ORIE: I do not see direct relevance to discuss in any
16 further details the events of Srebrenica.
17 Please proceed.
18 MR. MIKULICIC:
19 Q. [Interpretation] Perhaps we should only note, Mr. Granic,
20 Srebrenica was a protected UN zone, right?
21 A. Srebrenica was a protected zone, and Mr. Yasushi Akashi, as the
22 UN representative, was directly in charge of it.
23 On the 10th of July, as the foreign minister, I took ambassadors
24 to the opening of the summer games in Dubrovnik, and when we arrived in
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, I take it that your offer to tell us
2 something about Srebrenica, which was considered, and where we decided
3 that there was no need to hear about Srebrenica, that you, nevertheless,
4 start telling us about it. Is that correct? Because the only question
5 that was put to you, whether Srebrenica was a protected UN zone,
6 Mr. Mikulicic added to that, that that's the only thing we should note.
7 You started your answer that Srebrenica was a protected zone, so
8 you have answered that question.
9 Would you please wait what next question Mr. Mikulicic will put
10 to you.
11 Please proceed.
12 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 [Interpretation] If we could see the document 3D00486, please.
14 Q. And that's tab 13 in your binder, Mr. Granic.
15 We have come near the end of July 1995. The situation around
16 Bihac was serious. And you addressed a letter on the 20th of July, 1995
17 to Mr. Martinez Blanco who was the president of the Security Council of
18 United Nations.
19 You said in the letter that your government was seriously
20 concerned about the events in the ongoing offensive against the safe area
21 of Bihac. And, further, you state here that there are operations carried
22 out from the Croatian territory across the border. And further, on the
23 second page of your letter, you say that this is a violation of
24 resolutions, that the UNCRO which is active in this area, in accordance
25 with the mandate that it has, is facing serious problems relating to the
1 limitation and restrictions of movement and its monitoring of the border,
2 and you wish your letter to be understood as an expression of the
3 Croatian government who wishes the resolution to be implemented and so
5 Dr. Granic, do you remember this letter?
6 A. I remember exactly.
7 Q. Can you tell us what the reactions were.
8 A. After the fall of Srebrenica and the crime, the scope of which we
9 were not aware of at the time, though we knew that men had been taken
10 away, we had great fear that something similar could happen in Bihac.
11 And Bihac was also being attacked from the territory of the Republic of
13 17th or the 18th of July, the president of Turkey, Demirel, visited
15 president and myself to do everything we could to save Bihac and to help
16 the Bosniaks in this difficult situation. And I personally promised that
17 I would do that.
18 I did everything I could to organise a meeting of
19 President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic. I called
20 President Izetbegovic and I told him that President Tudjman would like to
21 meet him. I also called President Tudjman, and I was supported by both
22 of them. I organised this meeting in Split. I prepared the Split
23 Declaration in detail, very carefully, with a closest circle of my
24 associates from the foreign ministry. And after that, only when the
25 presidents with the presence of the American and German ambassadors, I
1 only then gave them the text of the resolution. They looked at it with
2 some technical improvements that were introduced. They signed it and
3 that was the best way to help Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is to say, we
4 ensured legal assistance of Croatia
5 presence of Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although this was
6 regulated in the border area by the first agreement on friendship and
7 cooperation signed by presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic in 1992.
8 Four days after that, we met at the Split airport, the
9 top-ranking military and political officials from Croatia and
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the invitation of President Izetbegovic, the
11 Croatian Army, together with the BH army and HVO, participated in the
12 first military operations, that was the Grahovo-Glamoc operation, n order
13 to help to relieve the pressure on Bihac. And that was practically the
14 greatest help and assistance that would -- forestalled the fall of Bihac.
15 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1808.
21 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
22 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, I'm looking at the clock. First of
24 all, could you inform us as to whether you are on schedule? Your
25 estimate was four sessions, I think.
1 MR. MIKULICIC: I think, Your Honour, I could complete my direct
2 examination in next two sessions tomorrow.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Because the Chamber notices that, in certainly
4 relevant background, that we hear a lot of details, so we expect you to
5 certainly stay within your assessed time-limits, and even make a serious
6 effort to make it even shorter.
7 MR. MIKULICIC: I will do my best, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I don't think we have received assessments yet
9 from the other parties.
10 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, I will be approximately two
12 JUDGE ORIE: Two sessions.
13 Mr. Cayley.
14 MR. CAYLEY: We will be one session or less, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: One session or less.
16 Mr. Waespi.
17 MR. WAESPI: I think our communicated assessment was four to six
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it may be that I have overlooked that.
20 What I said about details and background is something all parties
21 should carefully consider.
22 Mr. Granic, I usually instruct witnesses not to speak with anyone
23 about their testimony, whether it is testimony already given or still to
24 be given. I make a small exception, which is the following. Due to the
25 fact that the Markac Defence has received certain documents at a very,
1 very late stage, the Chamber allowed the Markac Defence team to discuss
2 with you such new documents, so not to discuss with you documents you may
3 have discussed already in the past but exclusively new documents, and the
4 Markac Defence is hereby under an order not to discuss any other matters.
5 To that extent, you're free to discuss it. Apart from that - that means
6 other subjects or anyone else - you are prohibited to speak with anyone
7 else about your testimony and to speak about any other subject with the
8 Markac Defence.
9 Then we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this
10 courtroom, because we adjourn for the day, and we will resume tomorrow,
11 Wednesday, the 18th of November, 9.00, Courtroom III.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
13 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of
14 November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.