Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 24658

 1                           Wednesday, 18 November 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 6             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning

 8     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, the

 9     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11                           WITNESS:  MATE GRANIC [Resumed]

12                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, good morning to you as well.  I would

14     like to remind you --

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  I would like to remind you that you're still bound

17     by the solemn declaration you've given yesterday at the beginning of your

18     testimony.

19             Mr. Mikulicic, are you ready to proceed?

20             MR. MIKULICIC:  I am, Your Honour.

21                           Examination by Mr. Mikulicic: [Continued]

22        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Granic.

23        A.   Good morning.

24        Q.   Today we will continue where we stopped yesterday.  Let us just

25     recall that yesterday we stopped while talking about the period of the

Page 24659

 1     Bihac crisis and the situation when there was a threat that the Bihac

 2     enclave and the UN security zone might fall, in the military sense of the

 3     word, and numerous letters were sent at the time and we saw your last

 4     letter of the 20th of July which you sent to Mr. Blanco, who was, at the

 5     time, the president of the UN Security Council.

 6             The international public was interested in the issue of Bihac and

 7     these events.  And I will show you the thoughts of Mr. Galbraith, and I

 8     will ask you whether, in context with Mr. Galbraith, you reached similar

 9     conclusions.

10             MR. MIKULICIC:  Can we please see the document D1791 on the

11     screen, please.

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Page 24660











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Page 24664

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 2                           [Open session]

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're become in open session.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

 5             Now you may proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

 6             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] So, Mr. Granic, it's the document under tab 14

 8     in your binder.  Do you remember President Tudjman's message of the

 9     4th of August, 1995?

10        A.   Yes, I remember it very well.

11        Q.   President Tudjman said that since all attempts for a peaceful

12     reintegration have failed from both the Croatian authorities and the

13     international community, including yesterday's talks in Geneva, and the

14     Croatian state is forced to take military and police measures after four

15     years of negotiations that yielded no results.

16             And on the second page, President Tudjman, on behalf of the

17     democratic authorities of Croatia, called upon members of Serbian

18     paramilitary units who were mobilised of their own free will, or

19     forcibly, to surrender their weapons to Croatian authority with the

20     guarantee that they will be given amnesty according to valid Croatian

21     laws.

22             Mr. Granic, did the state leadership discuss how the Croatian

23     state would treat Croatian citizens in the occupied territories who were

24     of Serbian ethnicity at the time and what would be the policy towards

25     them?

Page 24665

 1        A.   Yes.  All of this was discussed a lot, including the treatment of

 2     Croatian citizens of Serbian ethnicity and the relation of the

 3     international community to this.

 4             I remember very well a discussion from early June when our

 5     primary goal was peaceful reintegration, if that was possible.  That was

 6     a conversation with President Tudjman and Minister Susak.  And

 7     considering the experiences from Operation Flash when a great number of

 8     the citizens of Serbian ethnicity had left the area with the assistance

 9     of the UNHCR and ICRC, that our main goal, if there was a military

10     operation, was simply to reach the borders of Croatia and that it was in

11     our interest to have as many of Croatian Serbs who had rebelled to remain

12     in the area except those who had committed war crimes, of course, or

13     those who did not wish to recognise Croatia in any form as a state.

14             We discussed all that, and we were aware of the strong

15     indoctrination through the media and the policy conducted from Belgrade

16     in the previous years, at least since 1987.  We were also aware that

17     there had been plans for evacuation of citizens of Serbian ethnicity, and

18     we were aware that many of them did not wish to accept Croatia as a

19     state.  And we were also aware that many of them had committed crimes,

20     because during the war almost 14.000 people were killed and 36.000

21     wounded.  We knew all this.  However, we reached an agreement, and

22     President Tudjman decided, that once again we would invite everyone who

23     wished to stay to stay there, and so he addressed this letter to them.

24        Q.   Before that letter, as President Tudjman said himself, the

25     negotiations fell through on the previous day, that is to say the

Page 24666

 1     3rd of August, 1995, in Geneva.  In a few sentences, could you please

 2     tell us what it was about?

 3        A.   Under the circumstances of an acute threat to the UN protected

 4     area in Bihac, under the circumstances in which the rebelled Serbs

 5     received additional assistance from Belgrade and were amassing weapons

 6     further, it was only clear that the plan for peaceful reintegration was

 7     made even harder.  Had the plan been proposed by Mr. Stoltenberg six

 8     months before that, Croatia would have accepted it.  But at that point in

 9     time, it provided nothing save for the opportunity to the Serbs to

10     conquer Bihac.  That is why we could not accept it.

11             We knew through our permanent communication with the US - and I

12     personally communicated with the state secretary Mr. Christopher and the

13     US representative with the UN Ms. Madeleine Albright as well as

14     Mr. Holbrooke, especially Mr. Holbrooke, who was the special envoy of

15     Mr. Clinton, as well as through my contacts with the leading European

16     prime ministers - I was aware of what the reaction would be, the reaction

17     of the world, if we followed certain principles, primarily the protection

18     of UNCRO, protection of civilians, as well as honouring the laws of war

19     and international conventions.  And there was one other precondition, and

20     that was that we had to act swiftly.

21        Q.   The Yugoslav public, as well as the Krajina Serb and parts of the

22     international public, tried to speculate with the role of Milan Babic in

23     those events, because he, at the very last moment, agreed to peaceful

24     reintegration and peace talks.  Can you tell us, actually, what the role

25     of Milan Babic was in the negotiations and what was his importance and

Page 24667

 1     influence?

 2        A.   There was an attempt by Mr. Galbraith, US ambassador, to have an

 3     arrangement with Mr. Babic so that he would be forced to sit at the table

 4     and negotiate.  Mr. Babic, at that point in time, had no influence

 5     whatsoever over the rebelled Serbs.  The only real influence was

 6     exercised by Mr. Milan Martic.  And together with Karadzic, he was

 7     embarking upon the creation of a joint state, and they were attacking

 8     Bihac together.

 9        Q.   What was Babic's formal role in the so-called Republic of

10     Serbian Krajina?

11        A.   For a while, Babic was their prime minister.  However, he moved

12     to Belgrade, and, as of that time, he had absolutely no influence.

13        Q.   So the military operation Storm ensued, whereupon you assembled

14     the diplomatic corps representatives in Zagreb, and you explained to them

15     the model, the motives behind the operation, as well as its results.

16        A.   We had a meeting of the National Security Council on the

17     3rd of August at 6.00 p.m.  We agreed that after the meeting, when the

18     president made the official decision Operation Storm, to notify the

19     ambassadors of the US, France, the UK, of the Russian Federation, and the

20     Vatican.

21             I personally travelled to Split to inform the French Foreign

22     Minister, Mr. Juppe, at the Split airport.  I think it was around 9.00

23     p.m.  That was the time when we were supposed to inform them officially

24     on our decision to launch the police and military operation Storm.

25             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Presiding Judge, I seek to

Page 24668

 1     tender 3D00466 as evidence.  The president's letter.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1809.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  D1809 is admitted into evidence.

 6             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This Chamber already saw evidence on the development of the

 8     operation which took four days to complete.  The Serb population

 9     evacuated, and after Operation Storm, certain reactions arrived from the

10     international community.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

12             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  Just to be careful in characterizing.  I don't

13     know whether he's quoting the witness when he talks about the Serb

14     population evacuated.  Of course that's a highly disputed point in this

15     case.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic.

17             MR. MIKULICIC:  I could rephrase the question, Your Honour.

18        Q.   [Interpretation] After the departure of the Serb citizens from

19     the territory of the former so-called Serb Republic of Krajina, there

20     were international reactions.  Can you describe to us what sort of

21     reactions those were and what was the general atmosphere?

22        A.   The initial reaction came from the co-chairperson of the

23     conference for the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Carl Bildt.  He stated that the

24     shelling of Knin was excessive and random and that President Tudjman

25     should stand trial for that before the International Tribunal in

Page 24669

 1     The Hague, that is to say, this Tribunal.

 2             Personally, as the minister, I had difficulty accepting this,

 3     because after consultations with the leading generals, Mr. Miljevac and

 4     General Cervenko, I received information that there was no excessive or

 5     random shelling which lasted for two mornings before Knin was liberated.

 6     I was told that the operation was conducted by our best generals,

 7     Mr. Gotovina and Markac, as well as the Special Police.

 8             After having consulted those who were officially in charge of the

 9     operation at the headquarters, the persons being General Miljevac and

10     General Cervenko, I sent a very sharp note.  And I was also the war

11     deputy prime minister.

12             Today is the 18th of November, the day when Vukovar fell, when,

13     in only one day, there were between 6 and 8.000 shells landing daily on

14     civilian targets.  It was only understandable that I was distressed

15     because of that, because I was aware of the high morale level of the

16     people involved in it, and I was convinced that they would not target

17     civilians intentionally.

18             I went to Knin together with Mr. Tudjman at a later date.  I

19     can't say that I saw all of it, but on route between the football pitch

20     where the helicopter had landed to the place where we had a meeting and

21     lunch at the fortress, I basically did not see a single destroyed house.

22     That was the reason why I reacted so strongly to Mr. Bildt's letter.

23             Secondly, there were pressures exerted concerning the departure

24     of Croatian Serbs.  The figures presented varies; many were exaggerated.

25     It is true that a great deal of Croatian Serbs left.  However, they left

Page 24670

 1     in a planned way; they were stimulated to do so by their leadership.

 2     Those who left refused to recognise Croatia as a state.  Those who left

 3     had been indoctrinated.  And to include, those who left simply feared

 4     revenge for their earlier taking part in certain crimes.

 5        Q.   You described the overall events and you described the close

 6     contacts you had with the US representatives, in particular

 7     Mr. Galbraith, who was the then US ambassador to Zagreb.  I want to show

 8     you another thing.

 9             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] But I would kindly ask to move

10     into private session for that.  Could we please have document D1792.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

12                           [Private session]

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Page 24672

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13                           [Open session]

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're become in open session.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

16             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the Registrar

17     for P458 next.

18        Q.   Mr. Granic, we'll see a document which was already made an

19     exhibit, that is Mr. Galbraith's diary in which he noted on his

20     impressions.  Let us go to page 36 of the diary, which deals with the

21     events of the 7th of August.

22             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Page 36, please.  The ERN number

23     is 065.  The date, the 7th of August.  The ERN number of the page is

24     0649065.  Exactly.

25        Q.   Mr. Granic, in the middle of this paragraph Mr. Galbraith says as

Page 24673

 1     follows --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, in order to avoid whatever confusion,

 3     this is in the e-court numbering page 30 out of 76.  Please proceed.

 4             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Galbraith says as follows:

 6              "I talked to Susak.  He wants to keep going in Bosnia.  He says

 7     I told Granic that they should go forward, but Zuzul got the message that

 8     perhaps they should stop.  I said I could not offer an official view.

 9     However, Croatia's action was welcomed by many in Washington because of

10     its implications for Bosnia."

11             Further on, he says that he was interviewed by the NBC and BBC.

12     The BBC asked if Croats were engaged in ethnic cleansing.

13              "I said no, since ethnic cleansing is a practice organised from

14     Belgrade and carried out by Bosnian and Croatian Serbs aimed at the

15     systematic expulsion of a people, whether Muslim or Croat, by using

16     murder, mass rape, violence, and terror.  There's no evidence that the

17     Croatians are systematically driving out the Serbs, although there are

18     many reports of atrocities."

19             Next we can move to page 32 in e-court, which refers to the

20     9th of August.  Mr. Galbraith says as follows:

21              "I returned to Zagreb.  I found out that my ethnic cleansing

22     comments have caused controversy in the British press with the

23     'Independent' saying they have exacerbated US-UK tensions on Croatia.

24     Defence Minister Portillo had said that there was ethnic cleansing.  I

25     don't like the controversy.  I am right technically, but it looks as if I

Page 24674

 1     am apologising for the Croats."

 2             I'm interested in the following, Mr. Granic:  What was the

 3     relationship between the great powers in view of their assessment of the

 4     operation?  On the one hand we had the US view as articulated by

 5     Mr. Galbraith; and on the other, the view of the UK.  Did you sense any

 6     difference of opinion between those two great powers?

 7     A.  There was a difference, of course.  The Croatian military and police

 8   operation Storm was strategically very important for the American peace

 9   operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Without it, the initiative would have

10   almost completely died out. On the other hand, it should be noted that

11   Great Britain was in charge in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the American

12   peace initiative was launched through Lord Owen and, once Owen, Vance-Owen,

13   Owen-Stoltenberg plans failed, the United States of America led first to

14   the Washington and then the Dayton Accords. In other words, undoubtedly

15   there were certain differences, although they tried to reconcile them, and

16   to do so to a great extent, through the work in the Contact Group,

17   especially during the Dayton Accords.  It is beyond doubt that,

18   strategically speaking, the Operation Storm fitted fully within the

19   American peace initiative, and we were aware of it.

20   As for the media, the accusations coming from the British media that it

21   involved ethnic cleansing were not only inaccurate at that point but also

22   very damaging, because, at a later date, certain events that were indeed of

23   criminal nature on the part of the Croatian side were recognised as such

24   due to these accusations that were initially entirely unwarranted and

25   false, because initially the departure of the Serb population was planned,

Page 24675

 1   instigated, and organised due to the actual fears felt by those who had

 2   committed crimes and who had not accepted Croatia as their country.  So

 3   this media campaign was initially, by all means, counter-productive.

 4        Q.   Mr. Granic, can you give us your comments based on your extensive

 5     diplomatic experience?  There's one issue that I am not quite clear on.

 6     We saw an exhibit before - that was D1792 - and we saw the reasoning of

 7     the British ambassador to Croatia, Mr. Hewitt, who was the man in the

 8     field, if we can put it that way, who said that in the context of the

 9     departure of the Serb population this was not ethnic cleansing but an

10     evacuation of the Serb population which was encouraged and ordered by the

11     Republic of Serbian Krajina leadership.  So this was the thinking, the

12     reasoning, of a British diplomat in Zagreb.  On the other hand, we have

13     the reasoning of the defence minister, Mr. Portillo, who stated that it

14     was ethnic cleansing after all.

15             What is your interpretation of the these diametrically opposed

16     views, i.e., the assessment made by an ambassador in the field and, on

17     the other, an assessment made by a defence minister in London?

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

19             MR. WAESPI:  I'm not sure the witness is here to be an expert on

20     British politics.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, the witness was in the midst of the events at

22     the time, and assessments in this field are within his field of

23     knowledge.  Whatever weight to be attached to it is still to be

24     considered by the Chamber.

25             Please proceed.

Page 24676

 1             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Granic, can you tell us, briefly, what your comments are on

 3     this score?

 4        A.   Ambassador Hewitt spoke on the basis of the information he had in

 5     the field.  Minister Portillo gave his comments on a strategic level.

 6        Q.   Thank you for your comments.

 7             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we have page ERN 649101 of

 8     the same document.  Give me a moment and I'll find the page number in

 9     e-court.  That's page 65 of Mr. Galbraith's diary, which relates to the

10     13th of October, 1995.

11        Q.   In the last paragraph, Mr. Galbraith says that he saw you and

12     that there was discussion on human rights in the Krajina, the right to

13     return, and that one needed to be serious about Eastern Slavonija

14     negotiations.  Mr. Galbraith says that you understood the message and

15     stressed that you did not make any statements about Krajina precisely

16     because of your concerns over what had happened there.  You said that the

17     Croatian government would be forthcoming on human -- on humanitarian

18     returns, family reunions, individual cases, but that en masse return

19     would have to wait a final settlement with Serbia.

20             Can you tell us, first of all, whether this indeed reflects your

21     conversation with Mr. Galbraith, and, if so, what is your position with

22     regard to the en masse return of the Serb population to Krajina?

23        A.   From this conversation, which is accurately depicted here, three

24     issues emerge quite clearly.  Firstly, I personally condemned crimes and

25     the criminal conduct on the Croatian side in the aftermath of the

Page 24677

 1     military police operation Storm.

 2             Secondly, in that period of time we were busy discussing a

 3     peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube area and seeking a model

 4     for such a peaceful reintegration to be implemented.  This means that in

 5     Dayton, before Bosnia-Herzegovina had been discussed, the Croatian

 6     leadership demanded that the issue of a peaceful reintegration of the

 7     Croatian Danube area be agreed upon.

 8             This was one of the -- one of many discussions that took place

 9     with Mr. Galbraith.

10             Thirdly, when the Serb population left for Belgrade and became

11     refugees - and do not forget that they all had -- were entitled to become

12     citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - that was the time when

13     terrorist attacks were being announced against Croatia, when government

14     in exile was being set up, and there was still a danger from -- for

15     Croatia from the FRY.  There was still instances of Croats and non-Serbs

16     being expelled from the Republika Srpska.

17             At that time, only individual cases of return were possible aimed

18     at family reunions.  But primarily, because of security and safety

19     reasons, no form of en masse return was possible.  An en masse return, in

20     agreement with the High Commissioner for Refugees and the international

21     community, was made possible in the spring of 1998 when we reached an

22     agreement over a plan for the return of refugees.  It was only then that

23     all conditions were met for such a return.  It required special

24     treatment, and it could be done only according to a detailed plan and

25     programme in co-operation with the UNHCR.

Page 24678

 1             MR. MIKULICIC:  [Interpretation] Can we call up 3D00538.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, could I -- I do not know whether you

 3     have dealt with it, but the concept of family reunion is not entirely

 4     clear in this context.  I don't whether you're going to deal with that or

 5     whether I could ask a clarifying question to Mr. Granic.

 6             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, I think it's the perfect time to ask

 7     the clarifying questions, although there's going to be our -- one the

 8     next witnesses who will be talking especially about the family reunion

 9     and all the other matters.  But I'm sure the witness is very well aware

10     what is this term.  So we could ask him, just to be informed of it.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, if we are talking about family reunion,

12     are we talking about reunion with family members which had stayed in the

13     Krajina, which remained in the Krajina, after Operation Storm; or are we

14     also talking about families being reunited in the place where they had

15     lived even if no family member had remained during and after

16     Operation Storm in the area?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We're referring to the family

18     members who stayed behind in Croatia wherever, whatever the place they

19     were, whether it be the liberated area, Zagreb, or elsewhere.  Their

20     reunion with those who left for Belgrade or for Republika Srpska.  In

21     other words, it involved any location.  And if there was such a request

22     by a family, then the ICRC and the UNHCR interceded there.  And we almost

23     always resolved such requests by granting them.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  But if no family member had left, if no grandmother

25     or no husband or -- had left, could there be any family reunion?  No, I

Page 24679

 1     say "had left."  I should have said "would have remained there."  So if a

 2     whole family left, there was no family reunion possible.  Is that well

 3     understood?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.  That's well understood,

 5     Your Honour.  If everyone left, then they came under the plan and

 6     programme of the return of refugees.  The plan was developed, I was

 7     personally in charge of it, and insisted that it be made.  There were

 8     large discussions going on within the Croatian government as to whether

 9     the time had come for such a plan to be made.

10             It was the time of April of 1998.  For security and psychological

11     reasons and other reasons it was being discussed -- the time was being

12     discussed, not whether the time was right for them to return, but whether

13     the time was right for them to return en mass.  I believe that the time

14     had come for that, and ultimately President Tudjman backed me up and the

15     Croatian government drafted and adopted a plan which related to the

16     return of all refugees.

17             All of this happened over a period of some two and a half years,

18     which is considered to be quite a short period of time, since it was a

19     time of reconstruction.  And already for ten years now this has no longer

20     been a political issue in Croatia; it is only an economic issue.

21     According to the current legislation, the houses of both Serbs and Croats

22     are being reconstructed.  Clearly, the houses of the Croats were

23     reconstructed earlier on because the Croats returned sooner.  But any

24     Serb who had left at the time is entitled to return.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Just for my understand, so if a whole family left,

Page 24680

 1     well, let's say on the 6th of August, there was -- they had to wait for

 2     two and a half years until plans would be developed for return?  Is that

 3     correctly understood, because it was not family reunion.  Is that

 4     correctly understood?  So apart from whether you consider that a short

 5     period of time or long period of time, I'm mainly focusing on the factual

 6     situation.  The whole family which left on the 6th of August, they could

 7     not apply, from what I understand, for family reunion.  And you explained

 8     to us that there were very good reasons why, only after -- or after two

 9     and a half years, a plan was put in practice for them to return not

10     earlier.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that's correctly

12     understood, although there were many cases where such matters were

13     resolved sooner.

14             As early as in September of 1995, I'm aware of a case where 50

15     Serb refugees, through Mr. Dzakula who interceded on their behalf, he was

16     the local leader of Serbs in Western Slavonia, and asked that they be

17     allowed to return.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm talking about the Krajina at this moment and

19     about nothing else.  I do see that the problems may have been linked, but

20     I'm focusing on what is primarily the subject matter of this case in

21     the Krajina.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You've understood that correctly,

23     Your Honour.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.  No, one

25     more question:

Page 24681

 1             Do you know the -- how many families left, all the members and

 2     from how many families what percentage one or more persons remained?  I'm

 3     talking about Serb families in the Krajina.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The total number of persons we were

 5     sure had left was around 140.000.  As for the number of those who stayed

 6     behind, I don't know the figures.  I wouldn't know if one family member

 7     stayed behind, two, or more.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

 9             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   The reaction on the part of the international community in the

11     wake of Operation Storm was that on several occasions the Croatian

12     government received requests concerning the deployment of monitors of the

13     international community to be allowed to go out into the field and see

14     for themselves what the situation was.

15             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] That respect, I would like the

16     Registrar to call up 3D00538.

17        Q.   There you will see your letter, Mr. Granic, of the

18     14th of February, 1996, which you sent to the headquarters of OSCE in

19     response to their request that they dispatch a fact-finding mission to

20     Croatia.

21             What was the position of the Croatian government that you

22     articulated in your letter?  Were you absolutely agreed to their request

23     to come and see for themselves what the situation in the field.  So what

24     was the position of the Croatian government with regard to the

25     EU monitoring?

Page 24682

 1        A.   My position and the position of the Croatian government was to

 2     allow the presence of all and any observers or monitors who wanted to be

 3     there.  The OSCE, Ms. Elizabeth Rehn, and all the other monitors, and

 4     there were many others.  The Helsinki Watch.  There were a great many of

 5     them.  There were various human rights committees.  And all of them were

 6     allowed to monitor.

 7        Q.   Were there any conditions imposed in the sense of restrictions on

 8     monitoring missions?

 9        A.   There were no conditions imposed.  At some point in 1996, we

10     wanted to discuss that so that we would know who was doing what, but,

11     even then, we granted absolute freedom to anyone who wanted to monitor.

12        Q.   Mr. President, I wish to tender this document into evidence.

13             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1810.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Exhibit D1810 is admitted into evidence.

17             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would ask the Registry for

18     document 3D00537.

19        Q.   Mr. Granic, now we shall see a note drafted by

20     Mr. Branko Socanac, approved by Ms. Dubravka Simonovic from the

21     Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approving the arrival the fact-finding OSCE

22     mission to Knin.  And that's tab 17A in your binder, but here we can see

23     it, and I will just point out the main things to you.  It says that in

24     Knin Mr. Pasic, who was the government commissioner to Knin, and

25     Marko Gojevic, who was the commander of the Knin Garrison, welcomed this

Page 24683

 1     delegation.  They informed them about the ethnic break-up of the

 2     population in Knin before the Operation Storm and what happened after it

 3     when 420 Serbs were left there and 250 had managed to return.  There was

 4     possibility for them to return.  And each day they received four to five

 5     requests for return, and only in one day the office for displaced persons

 6     and refugees had issued 17 return permits because of joining families.

 7             Further on it is stated that the importance of the project

 8     Save the Life was stressed when taking care of persons who had been left

 9     behind in newly liberated territories and that there were prosecutions

10     before relevant courts.

11             Mr. Granic, there were problems with events after the

12     Operation Storm.  There was an escalation of crimes such as looting,

13     house burning, even murders.  What was the political reaction, the

14     reaction of the Croatian state and President Tudjman?

15        A.   We were deeply concerned about these events.  In the beginning,

16     we believed that that was part of the media propaganda.  However, between

17     the 20th and 25th of August, we were certain that the scale of all this

18     was considerable and that we had to do -- we had to take the most radical

19     measures in order to prevent various criminal acts that were being

20     committed in the liberated territory, including looting, the burning of

21     houses, and individual murders committed by various criminal groups and

22     individuals.

23             We discussed this in the government, and we criticised it very

24     strongly.  I can say that after discussions with Minister Kinkel and many

25     friends from the international community but also with the

Page 24684

 1     Helsinki committee of Croatia and representatives of the media and

 2     foreign ambassadors, including Mr. Peter Galbraith, that I personally

 3     also held talks with Mr. Jarnjak, who was the interior minister and who

 4     told me what the scope of these incidents was, and told me that, firstly,

 5     he needed more policemen, between 1500 to 3.000, but at least 1500, and

 6     that it was possible that -- that it was necessary to remove the military

 7     as soon as possible from the area.  He said that the professional army

 8     was not committing any crimes or criminal acts and that it was necessary

 9     to carry out demobilisation as soon as possible and that there should be

10     joint military and police patrols.

11             I also discussed this with the prime minister, who supported the

12     prevention of all this.  I also had a long conversation with

13     President Tudjman who told me that almost 200.000 soldiers were on the

14     move, that it was very difficult to control the situation completely, but

15     he personally promised me that he would do anything he could to stop

16     these criminal acts and that he would issue an approval to Mr. Jarnjak

17     for more policemen, that he would speed up the demobilisation of the

18     military part of the army was already going to Bosnia-Herzegovina on the

19     basis of the Split Declaration, and I also talked with Minister Susak who

20     told me, Mate, these are not professional soldiers who are doing this.

21             Shortly I also personally talked to the media representatives,

22     and I urged them to report on this so that as soon as possible any crimes

23     on the Croatian side and any criminal acts might be stopped.  So this can

24     be seen from the government sessions that were held at the time what our

25     positions were.

Page 24685

 1             My personal position was that each one of us had to do anything

 2     that he or she could so that any criminal acts would be stopped as soon

 3     as possible.

 4        Q.   I would tender this document into evidence, Mr. President.

 5             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1811.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And since this is now in evidence, I tried to

 9     quickly scans through this document.  It apparently was a fact-finding

10     mission.

11             Mr. Granic, just scanning very quickly through it, is my

12     impression correct that it took one day, this fact-finding mission?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a fact-finding mission, and

14     they were really in Knin for just one day.  They also visited some other

15     areas in Croatia.  And, after that, a permanent mission for Croatia was

16     established.  The proposal of this mission was to establish a permanent

17     mission, and Croatia agreed to this, and it received a permanent OSCE

18     mission in Croatia, which had its special offices and one of them was

19     based in Knin.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And this one-day mission mainly consisted of

21     meetings with officials.  Is that -- but, again, I only quickly scanned

22     through it, so -- that that was actually what mostly filled the days.  Is

23     that...

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, but they also met

25     the representatives of the Serbian community.

Page 24686

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but, like I say, mainly office meetings.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, mostly it was like that.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, at the end it says that the weather was too

 4     stormy to visit villages like Kistanje.  Do you have any recollection of

 5     the serious impediments by the weather to look at villages in addition to

 6     having meetings in offices?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was not a member of their escort,

 8     so I do not remember what the weather was like.  I don't remember that.

 9     I don't even know.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

11             Perhaps one question, just ignorance.  This is the report as it

12     was produced by the Croatian authorities.  Is there a report of this

13     one-day visit, 22nd of February, produced by the ones who did the

14     fact-finding mission?  Are you aware of that?  And I'm also looking at

15     the parties, whether there's any OSCE report.  And it may well be that it

16     is already in evidence, but I have no recollection whatsoever on an OSCE

17     report on this specific fact-finding mission, early 1996.

18             MR. MIKULICIC:  I'm not sure, Your Honour.  I think it could be

19     maybe Ms. Ogata's report, but I'm not sure.  I could check it.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

21             MR. WAESPI:  We could try to find out.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Granic.  Yes.  The question was first of

23     all addressed to you, although I sought the assistance of the parties.

24     Could you -- do you have more information for us?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, such a report

Page 24687

 1     certainly exists, and on the basis of this report, the establishment of

 2     the permanent mission was proposed as something that would be very useful

 3     for Croatia and that would speed up the process of return and restoration

 4     of life in the liberated territories.  So such a report of the OSCE

 5     certainly exists, and I even remember a report of that sort which I

 6     received as the foreign minister and on the basis of which Croatia issued

 7     its approval for the establishment of the permanent mission of OSCE in

 8     Croatia.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

10             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I'm not sure whether I

11     got a number for this document.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  I think I said that it was admitted into evidence,

13     because I started my question by saying now it is in evidence.  So

14     therefore, I think we dealt with the matter.  Please proceed.

15             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would ask the Registry for

16     document 3D00539.

17        Q.   The State of Croatia, faced with the fact of crimes which were

18     being committed after the completion of the operation, reacted certainly

19     through diplomatic channels as well, and now you will see that under

20     tab 18 in your binder, Mr. Granic.  This is an address of

21     Mr. Ivan Simonovic who was your deputy at the 52nd Session of the

22     United Nations Human Rights Committee in Geneva.

23             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] If we could see the second part

24     of this speech given by Mr. Simonovic.

25        Q.   In the last paragraph, we can see that he said that after a

Page 24688

 1     successful military operations, human rights were violated and the number

 2     of violations of human rights which were committed in the liberated areas

 3     of the Republic of Croatia against the remaining Serbian population, and

 4     that through legal processes initiated against these criminal acts and

 5     their perpetrators, the Croatian government has shown that the use of

 6     force was not the purpose, was not intended as retaliation, and to merely

 7     change the victims of human rights violations, but to ensure an efficient

 8     human rights protection for everyone through negotiations which began at

 9     the time; prosecution against over a thousand people for the alleged

10     crimes was launched; and in order to restore confidence, the president of

11     the Republic of Croatia pardoned 455 Croatian Serbs who participated in

12     the armed rebellion against Croatia.

13             Mr. Simonovic's speech in Geneva represents what sort of

14     position?  Was that his personal position, or does it articulate your

15     positions and the positions of the Croatian government?

16        A.   Here articulated my positions and the positions of the government

17     of the Republic of Croatia.  It is undoubted that we were critical of

18     everything that had taken place after the Operation Storm.  And we were

19     also taking steps, all steps that we could, in order to restore trust as

20     soon as possible.  I should note that this was taking place together with

21     peaceful reintegration in the Danube basin in Croatia.  And firstly we

22     should see that the president pardoned more than 400 people, which

23     resulted with a general amnesty and abolition for participation in armed

24     rebellion.

25        Q.   If we have a look at the penultimate paragraph on this page,

Page 24689

 1     Mr. Simonovic says there that the Croatian government will facilitate the

 2     return of those Serbs who fled during military operations and who would

 3     now like to return.

 4             "All Serbs, like 15 other ethnic minorities living in Croatia,

 5     are not only considered as equal citizens, but they are also entitled to

 6     use their own language and script and have the right to a cultural

 7     autonomy."

 8             Mr. Granic, does this articulate the attitude of the government

 9     policy to all ethnic minorities in the Republic of Croatia including, of

10     course, the Serbian ethnic minority?

11        A.   Yes.  That's absolutely correct.  This is a process that began,

12     as we can see, very early on and which resulted in the Serbian community

13     in Croatia having the highest level of legal protection.  For six years

14     it has been taking active part in the Croatian government.  So from the

15     very beginning it was a process that we believed in.

16             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can I please ask for a number to

17     be assigned to this document, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

19             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.  What's the date of this document?

20             MR. MIKULICIC:  15 of April, 1996.

21             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1812.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  D1812 is admitted into evidence.

25             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 24690

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, when we talked over the last few

 2     minutes about this, you said on several occasions that the positions and

 3     the attitude of the Croatian politicians and the policy, as it was

 4     articulated, were also expressed during the meetings of the government of

 5     the Republic of Croatia, and in connection with this I will ask you to

 6     look together with me through several minutes from the government

 7     sessions, and you were the prime minister at the time, and I will ask you

 8     to comment on these.

 9             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] First of all if we could please

10     see the document 3D00964, which is not on our 65 ter list.  If we could

11     please add it to our 65 ter list.  I previously discuss that had with my

12     learned friend Mr. Waespi who has no objections to my request.

13             MR. WAESPI:  This is correct and also applies to the other

14     documents that my friend would like to tender that have not yet been on

15     the 65 ter list.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Leave is granted to add to the 65 ter list the

17     documents you agreed upon with Mr. Waespi to include them in this list.

18     Please proceed.

19             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  [Interpretation] If we

20     could, please, see the document 3D00964.

21        Q.   This was the government session held on 4th of August, 1995.  So

22     this was the government session held on the first day on which the

23     military and police operation Storm was launched.

24             In the introduction, prime minister Mr. Nikica Valentic said - if

25     we could, please, see the second page of this document - at the bottom of

Page 24691

 1     the page we can see that he said -- and, Mr. Granic, it's tab 24 in your

 2     binder.  Near the bottom of this page, Mr. Valentic said that:

 3             "I think it needs to be said that everything was done to solve

 4     the crisis in peaceful manner, through negotiations, but there was

 5     unfortunately no way of solving the crisis through negotiations.  The

 6     more time passed, the more closed up the Serbs became and the more

 7     closely linked with both Bosnian Serbs, with Yugoslavia.  And so,

 8     unfortunately, war and this option lay ahead of us."

 9             Mr. Granic, the opinion of the prime minister and this comment

10     were in accordance with your recollection and your line of thinking;

11     right?

12        A.   Yes, absolutely.

13             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  I tried to get access to this document.  Can

14     it be first established whether the witness was present?

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  In the back of the document there is a discussion

16     of Mr. Granic who was obviously then present at the meeting.  So we will

17     come to it.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, would that -- first of all, the

19     question, of course, does not suggest his presence.  It may be

20     interesting to know, but it's put to the witness --

21             MR. WAESPI:  Well, that's --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  -- whether this is in line with his recollection of

23     the attitude taken.

24             MR. WAESPI:  I was just merely asking for foundation.  But if we

25     know he's present later, of course he can talk about what was happening,

Page 24692

 1     and in addition to whether it's in line with what he thought the

 2     government's --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 4             Mr. Mikulicic, perhaps you ask the witness -- of course, I've not

 5     seen the whole of the document, but if he appears in the transcript of

 6     the meeting at a later stage, I think we could directly ask him.

 7             Mr. Granic, do you have any recollection of being present during

 8     that meeting where, as Mr. Mikulicic tells us, your name appears at a

 9     later stage in the transcript?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I attended this meeting from

11     its beginning.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Until the end?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, until the end.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16        Q.   [Interpretation] On page 5 of the original document, and that's

17     page -- page 2 in the English version, the interior minister,

18     Mr. Jarnjak, is the one speaking, and he said that it was coordinated

19     with the Ministry of Defence, and they have prepared 3.500 police

20     officers in regular blue uniforms from the north-west to north of

21     Croatia, those who are not directly engaged in the war, 500 of them have

22     already been sent to Zadar, Gospic, and Sibenik because as the army

23     advances it is followed by the military police who are securing the line

24     and are in turn immediately followed by the regular police taking over

25     all tasks that are within their jurisdiction according to the

Page 24693

 1     constitution and the law such as upholding public law and order,

 2     safeguarding life and property.

 3             Mr. Granic, do you remember that there was talk about preparing a

 4     contingent of police officers who would, after the liberation of the

 5     territories and the military operation, enter these areas; and do you

 6     remember if it was mentioned what this number would be and how many

 7     police officers were necessary in order to cover the newly liberated

 8     territories?

 9        A.   Yes.  It was just the number that the then Minister Jarnjak

10     mentioned was being prepared, three and a half thousand police officers.

11     And it is very important that it's emphasised here that they were coming

12     from the north-west and northern parts of Croatia.  That was the part of

13     Croatia that was not touched by war and that the police officers from

14     these areas should not come to the liberated territories, that they

15     should be sent to the liberated territories rather than the police

16     officers from the parts of the country that were affected by the war and

17     the ravages of war.  So it was not an accident that the police officers

18     from the northern part of Croatia were being prepared for these tasks.

19        Q.   But as you said a moment ago, Mr. Granic, when the Croatian

20     government was faced with information to the extent that there were

21     crimes taking place after Operation Storm in the liberated areas, the

22     issue of additional policemen arose.  Did I understand you correctly?

23        A.   That is correct.  It became clear that the original number of

24     policemen was too small.  This was almost one-quarter of Croatian

25     territory, although sparsely populated, but the number of policemen was

Page 24694

 1     insufficient.  It became clear that we needed an additional police force.

 2             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have just one

 3     more question left, and perhaps I could deal with it before the end of

 4     the session and then we can take the break after that if that is

 5     acceptable to you.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  When you say you have just one more question left,

 7     would that be for your whole examination?  No.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC:  No.  On that topic, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  On that topic.  Please proceed.

10             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  [Interpretation] Can we

11     move to page 3 of the English, page 7 of the Croatian text.

12        Q.   In the minutes, we have you taking the floor at this government

13     session.  You mentioned the Split Declaration, which, after the

14     Washington Agreement, is certainly the strongest foreign affairs move it

15     created the conditions for the Grahovo-Glamoc operation, which has, in

16     fact, passed not only without any serious international consequences but

17     with, I'd say, US and German support.

18             You also say that the optimum conditions in terms of foreign

19     policy occurred seven days before, during the attack on Bihac, but that

20     this was actually not the best time because Stoltenberg's proposal in

21     Geneva and the agreement of the Serbs to accept it as well as the

22     arrangement between Galbraith and Babic, even though we know that these

23     agreements are all artificial, that after that they -- they are under

24     pressure and influenced even by Stoltenberg and that this presents an

25     international opinion on the matter.

Page 24695

 1             You also mention Mr. Babic before, Mr. Granic.  We needn't go

 2     into that again.  You also mention that by virtue of your position, you

 3     sent a letter to the Contact Group, to the EU, and President Clinton, as

 4     well as Mr. Kohl, and Mr. Sarinic received the ambassadors of

 5     Great Britain, whereas there would be a reception for the entire

 6     diplomatic corps at 5.00 p.m.  This is all a clear image of Croatian

 7     diplomatic activity, is it not?

 8        A.   Yes.  We addressed all the ambassadors on the first day of the

 9     operation.  I certainly spoke with at least 25 foreign ministers.  We

10     kept explaining to everyone what the reasons and the goals of the

11     operation were.  I repeated that the Stoltenberg proposal that was

12     accepted by the local Serbs as well as the initiative of

13     Ambassador Galbraith concerning Mr. Babic did somewhat worsen our

14     international political situation, but we kept explaining that this meant

15     nothing and that Babic had no influence whatsoever over the insurgent

16     Serbs, especially the army and Mr. Martic.

17             We also knew that they were amassing weapons and that they were

18     trying to buy time to occupy the UN-protected area of Bihac.

19             MR. MIKULICIC:  [Microphone not activated]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  That was your last question before the break.

21             MR. MIKULICIC:  Yes, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  We will have a break, and we will resume at 11.00.

23     Yes.

24             MR. MIKULICIC:  Just before the break, Your Honour, maybe if I

25     could have a number for that exhibit.

Page 24696

 1             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President, that is why I was trying to

 2     rise.  That Exhibit, 3D00964, is in evidence as Exhibit D1634.

 3             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, my learned colleague.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Under those circumstances, we'll have the break, and

 5     we'll resume at 11.00.

 6                           [The witness stands down]

 7                           --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we continue, I'd like to raise a few

10     scheduling issues.  First of all, the parties were consulted on a move

11     next week, Wednesday, the 25th of November, from afternoon to the

12     morning.  That has now been settled.  That means that we're sitting in

13     the morning.

14             Then the Chamber was informed that the Cermak Defence, at least,

15     would prefer to move to the morning as well on the 26th of November.

16     That's next week, Thursday.  That matter will be explored, and if any

17     party has any difficulties with that, would you please inform Chamber's

18     staff or our Registrar.

19             Then we also may have some problems in scheduling for the present

20     witness.  Mr. Mikulicic, could you give us an update on where you are at

21     this moment.  Are you on schedule or --

22             MR. MIKULICIC:  I am, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  The Chamber notes that there is quite a bit of

24     evidence where the Chamber wondered to what extent there is any dispute

25     about the evidence being presented.  A lot of background.  Not to say

Page 24697

 1     that it's irrelevant, but, of course, to some extent it's repetitious.

 2     To some extent it seems not to be very much disputed.

 3             I would like to keep that in mind for the parties.  And I'm

 4     addressing not only the Defence in this respect but also the Prosecution

 5     for cross-examination which is scheduled for quite some time.

 6             The problem may arise whether the witness can return home before

 7     the weekend.  That seems to be a serious matter at this moment, and the

 8     Chamber explored whether -- or at least it was suggested that we perhaps

 9     might find some time this afternoon, but I do understand, Mr. Waespi,

10     that that causes you some problems.  Is that --

11             MR. WAESPI:  That's correct, yes.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  That would be for the whole of the afternoon?

13             Yes, Mr. Kehoe?

14             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, I would have a problem for the afternoon as

15     well.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  The whole of the afternoon, or --

17             MR. KEHOE:  Well, I have, believe it or not, a court appearance

18     at 3.00 Hague time in a courtroom in the United States that I have to do

19     electronically, and I don't know how long that's going to take.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  No.  That creates quite a lot of -- bit of

21     problems.  So, therefore, it doesn't seem to be -- and how about

22     tomorrow?  I do not know whether we have courtrooms.  I'm just trying to

23     find ways to avoid that we have to keep Mr. Granic over for the weekend.

24             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, if I may offer one potential avenue

25     and that is that -- and perhaps we'll know more tomorrow morning in terms

Page 24698

 1     of courtroom availability, because it's my understanding that the Prlic

 2     case might not sit tomorrow afternoon, in which case we would be able to

 3     continue tomorrow afternoon.  But obviously that depends on what happens

 4     in their case today.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's availability of courtrooms.  That's one

 6     issue.  Of course availability of Judges and parties is another matter.

 7             Any further comments on the possibility or at least exploring

 8     tomorrow afternoon, the 19th?  Then, of course, our concerns about

 9     whether we could conclude the testimony of this witness this week also

10     depends on -- on how the other parties in cross-examination, whether they

11     still, in view of what we've heard until now, stick to their estimates on

12     how much time they would need.

13             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President.  I sent an e-mail saying that I

14     anticipate three, maybe a little bit more than three hours.  I know I

15     used the phrase sessions, but I note that the third session is usually

16     about a half an hour shorter than the first two, and I was referring more

17     to the morning and middle session than the end.  So it's roughly three

18     hours.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

20             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  I'll -- I'll keep it the way it is, but, of

21     course, I will reassess.  And it's certainly easier after the witness

22     finishes his testimony.  I'll really do my best to stick to the most

23     relevant issues in cross-examination.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I'm looking at the Cermak defence.

25             MR. KAY:  Your Honour, at this moment we're one session, but it

Page 24699

 1     depends very much what is covered by Mr. Misetic who goes before me

 2     because I anticipate there is a convergence of issues.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I think it's too early to make any final

 4     determinations.  We'll further explore the possibility of extending

 5     sessions tomorrow, the 19th, in the afternoon, and -- then there is

 6     another matter which I'd like to deal with later today, that is the

 7     92 bis matters, Cermak, OTP.

 8             How much time should I reserve for that?

 9             MS. HIGGINS:  Your Honour, I would need approximately ten minutes

10     to outline the chronology and the issue.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

12             Mr. Waespi, I take it that you --

13             MR. WAESPI:  Five minutes' response, not knowing what my friend

14     will say.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  No.  I'll reserve, later today, 15 minutes for that

16     purpose.

17             Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom again.

18             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, while we're waiting for the witness

19     to come, I'm turning back to the previous document that was announced as

20     D1634 as already been included into the evidence.  It seems that this is

21     concern and this is related to another document, not this one.  So

22     3D00964 is not a D1634.  1634 is a document from 257th session of the

23     Government Republic of Croatia, and this one is 256th session of the same

24     government.  So it seems that there is -- there have been a confusion.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, you were the one who suggested that it

Page 24700

 1     would be already in evidence.

 2             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I'll check it.  I'm reasonably sure

 3     that the content was the same, which is what caused us to believe it is

 4     the same document, but I will check to see if it's the same document.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  If you'd please check that.

 6             Meanwhile, Mr. Mikulicic, you're invited to proceed.

 7                           [The witness takes the stand]

 8             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 9             [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the Registrar for 3D00962.

10             It is another document that is not on our 65 ter list, and I

11     would kindly ask for the Chamber's permission to include it on the list.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  I think that permission has been given already.

13     Please proceed.

14             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you.

15        Q.   [Interpretation] In the English, page 2, please.  Re: the

16     contribution of Minister Susak.  In the English version, it is page 5.

17     Interpreter's correction:  In the B/C/S version it is page 5.

18             Mr. Granic, that is tab 26 in your binder.

19             Mr. Susak says the following at this government session of the

20     7th of August, 1995:

21              "In keeping with the state policy, the plan of action was to

22     criss-cross the territory, avoiding residential areas, in the hope that

23     those citizens of Croatia would surrender and allow themselves to be

24     included into the constitutional legal framework of the

25     Republic of Croatia."

Page 24701

 1             In this address of Mr. Susak, does he reflect to the state policy

 2     that you were -- you were aware of at the time?

 3        A.   Yes, in full.  That was the goal of the operation.  As the

 4     foreign minister, I was not familiar and didn't need to be familiar with

 5     any military operation details.  However, regarding the goals

 6     Minister Susak discussed, that is something that I was well acquainted

 7     with.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could we go to page 4 in the

 9     English and --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  I had not find yet the -- I had not found yet the

11     part you were quoting, and I was --

12             MR. MIKULICIC:  Mr. Susak --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  First we saw only three lines at the bottom of

14     Mr. Susak, and now where in this page do we find the quote?

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  In the English version it's page 2, on the bottom

16     of the page, where Mr. Susak had been addressing to the --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Just --

18             MR. MIKULICIC:  -- in the Croatian version this is page 2 and

19     then page 6 where the quoted speech of Mr. Susak has been -- it's page 3

20     in English, on top.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, let me just have a look.  It starts in the

22     English on page 11, which is page 1 out of 26 in e-court.  So let's first

23     try to --

24             MR. MIKULICIC:  It should be page 3 on top, Your Honour, in

25     English.

Page 24702

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Page 3 --

 2             MR. MIKULICIC:  On top.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  -- e-court?

 4             MR. MIKULICIC:  In e-court.  In English version.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Well, the quote you read - let me just

 6     see - started with the words --

 7             MR. MIKULICIC:  It concerns of the state policy.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  "In keeping with the state policy..."  where exactly

 9     do we find it?

10             MR. MIKULICIC:  I will try to find it, Your Honour.  Just a

11     minute.

12             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, it's on the screen.  It's the fourth

13     line down.

14             MR. MIKULICIC:  Yes.  It starts with "In keeping with the state

15     policies..."

16             JUDGE ORIE:  I've found it.  Thank you.  Yes.  I see now that the

17     language is as you read it, and I think it was, you said, criss-cross

18     where it says this in English, but I found it.  Please proceed.

19             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20             [Interpretation] Next I would kindly ask the Registrar to move to

21     page 4 of the English where we have Mr. Granic taking the floor.

22        Q.   In the Croatian, that is -- Dr. Granic says -- or, rather, you

23     say, Mr. Granic, that:

24             "The political decision was to launch a military and police

25     action, and that was brought after the failure of the four-year

Page 24703

 1     negotiations with the Croatian Serbs in the occupied areas after the

 2     failure of both the UNPROFOR and UNCRO in the exercise of their mandates

 3     and in order to help Bihac which had been vitally endangered."

 4             This is already what we heard during your testimony about what

 5     you thought about it and what you said at that government session.  That

 6     is correct, is it not?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, I, nevertheless, come back to what

 9     you quoted.  There are considerable differences between the language we

10     find in the official translation.  It's something "those who have been

11     led astray for a period of four years," I do not -- I don't know what

12     causes it.  I have not looked at any original, but what you read is not

13     by one or two words but is really not the same as what we see in the

14     English translation of --

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, you are referring to the text which

16     begins with "The political decision to launch a military and police

17     action..."  You're referring to that part of text?

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I was told to -- that I would find the part

19     you quoted on line 4 from the top.  "In keeping with the state

20     policies..."  That's how it started.

21             MR. MIKULICIC:  That was the previous one, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  That was the previous one, yes.

23             MR. MIKULICIC:  Now I was citing speech of Dr. Granic which is --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  No, but I'm still -- let me just -- I'm referring to

25     page 42, starting on line 4.  There you apparently quote what Mr. Susak

Page 24704

 1     had said, and you read:

 2             "In keeping with the state policy, the plan of action was to

 3     criss-cross the territory, avoiding residential areas, in the hope that

 4     those citizens of Croatia would surrender."

 5             Now, if I look at the document, it reads:

 6             "In keeping with the state policies, the operation was supposed

 7     to dissect the territory without touching populated settlements, hoping

 8     that the Croatian citizens who had been led astray during these four

 9     years..."

10             Now, the last ten words do not appear in the quote you gave us.

11             Now, it could be a translation issue.

12             MR. MIKULICIC:  Yes.  It is, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  If that's the case, then at least quite a number of

14     words were not translated to us.  If that's the issue, then we leave it

15     as it is.  It has now been corrected.  And you might consider this an

16     encouragement to slow down when reading.

17             MR. MIKULICIC:  I will do my best, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

19             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you.

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, in the rest of your discussion,

21     you -- you mentioned some media pressure whereby you say that it was

22     stated that the columns were fired upon and the whole thing was a large

23     ethnic cleansing operation with the figures being manipulated with and

24     that there were more and more of those congratulating and saying that

25     this operation was supposed to help resolve the problem in Bosnia as

Page 24705

 1     well.

 2        A.   Precisely.  At that time, there was some media pressure, and

 3     there was a mention of the words ethnic cleansing, irrespective of the

 4     fact that the Serb population left voluntarily in a way that was planned

 5     and instigated by their leadership.  And I have in mind specifically the

 6     time up to the 7th of August, 1995.  There were no serious objections to

 7     our operation up to that time, save for the complaint that there -- that

 8     fire was opened on a column.  That was rejected on our part.

 9             As for any political assessment, most expressed their

10     satisfaction with the results of the operation.  Why was that?  Because

11     it opened up new avenues to resolve the issue of the war in

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina and the creation of a lasting peace.  And of course,

13     needless to say, Bihac was saved as well.

14        Q.   After this, Dr. Granic, also on page 5 in the English text, you

15     say in the discussion that President Tudjman invited our citizens of

16     Serbian ethnicity to stay from the first moment and accepted also the law

17     on amnesty, abolition, to surrender their weapons, and after that the

18     government followed suit.  And you conclude:

19              "Therefore, we did everything to have the Serbian population

20     remain in their homes, and we shall also invite all those who have not

21     violated the norms of the International Law of War, that is to say those

22     who have not committed war crimes, to return."

23             Mr. Granic, this was the session held on the 7th of August.  Did

24     this interpretation continue later on after the completion of the

25     Operation Storm?

Page 24706

 1        A.   That was still the time when the Operation Storm was in progress,

 2     and it was our absolute strategic interest that the Serbian population

 3     who wished to stay and who had not committed any war crimes, that they

 4     should stay after the completion of the Operation Storm, and of course

 5     after the liberation of these areas, after the departure of one part of

 6     the Serbian population either to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or

 7     Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is to say Republika Srpska.

 8             It was quite clear that with our citizens of Serbian ethnicity

 9     who were refugees that we could treat them in accordance with the

10     international law and the international conventions and the experiences

11     of the UNHCR.

12             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would ask, Mr. President, that

13     a number be assigned to this document.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi?

15             MR. WAESPI:  No objection.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1813.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

19             Would you allow me one clarifying question?

20             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Your Honour, I just want -- we've since found

21     out that the previous document is not D1634.  It actually is a different

22     document.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Then that still needs a number.

24             Mr. Misetic.

25             MR. MISETIC:  So I can be fully transparent on it, D1634, at

Page 24707

 1     page 5, contains, as a subset of it, the 3D document.  So, hence, that's

 2     where the confusion comes from.  I don't know how the Chamber wishes to

 3     proceed, because the pagination is now different in terms of how it was

 4     referred to with the witness, but I'll leave it to the Chamber.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  I think it would be better to assign a new number,

 6     because otherwise we -- there's a fair chance of confusion.

 7             Mr. Registrar, the previous document which, if you could please

 8     repeat the 3D number.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that was 3D00964, and it becomes

10     Exhibit D1814.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  D1814 is admitted into evidence.

12             Mr. Granic, on question:  This meeting, 7th of August, bottom

13     line being "We wanted the Serbs to stay," isn't it?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Yes.  At that moment, yes.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, this Chamber received evidence, I'm not

16     going to evaluate all of that, but that some people say that all the

17     Serbs that left had already left at that time, or at least if not for the

18     full 100 per cent but that at least a great majority of the Serbs that

19     did leave had left already on the 7th of August or were on their way to

20     leave.

21             Now, how do I have to understand the message "You Serbs stay" if

22     they have departed already, if that would be correct?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The majority had left, Your Honour.

24     That is correct.  However, as some of them were slowed down in the

25     northern part of the territory, it made sense to send out a message to

Page 24708

 1     some of them who had not left yet.  But it is true that the majority had

 2     left.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  If you're talking about the northern part of the

 4     territory, which territory are you referring to exactly?  Would that

 5     include Sector South, northern parts of Sector South, or ...

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Primarily it was the so-called

 7     Sector North.  That was the UNPA area.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because in this area the operations

10     were slowed down, one entire corps had surrendered, and that was the

11     reason why we were sending out such message, because there was still a

12     chance that a part of the Serbian population would stay.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And you especially had on your mind at that

14     time those in that areas that had not yet left the territory of Croatia.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

17             Mr. Mikulicic.

18             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour. [Interpretation] I would

19     ask the Registrar to show the document 3D00961.

20        Q.   And, Mr. Granic, that's tab 30 in your binder.  We will see that

21     these are the minutes from the 261st government session held on the

22     23rd of August.

23             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] And if we could move on to page

24     10 of the English version and page 5 of the Croatian text where the words

25     of Dr. Jure Radic are recorded.

Page 24709

 1        Q.   So Dr. Jure Radic, who talks here, as we can see on the previous

 2     page, says in the second paragraph of the text in English:

 3              "Secondly, both the president of the state and the prime

 4     minister and all of us together pointed out and called upon the Serbian

 5     population, citizens of the Croatian state, to stay in their areas.  But

 6     it is worthwhile pointing out that many of them were expelled by the same

 7     aggressors who also expelled Croats from these liberated areas."

 8             Further, Dr. Radic talks about the majority of Croatian houses

 9     being destroyed, particularly in Kijevo, Lovinac, Skabrnja, Polaca, and

10     Sveti Rok.  And he says that -- he says Croatian houses, conditionally,

11     houses which belong to the Croats in these areas, and further he says:

12              "I would like here and now on behalf of the headquarters staff,

13     and I'm certain the entire government shares my opinion, to distance

14     myself from those individual cases of destruction of property, of

15     Croatian property, even though it belonged to Serbs."

16             And which has been taking place over the last few days, maybe the

17     last week.  Maybe not on a large scale but a scale which is visible, and

18     I would ask the government to adopt very precise decisions about this

19     that the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence would be in

20     charge of so that that kind of destruction would be prevented and the

21     perpetrators of these, as I call them, crimes be punished.

22             Mr. Granic, that was the 23rd of August, so the government was

23     obviously informed about unlawful acts being committed.  And this was

24     discussed at a government session.  This was the proposal of

25     Dr. Jure Radic that the Ministry of the Interior and the

Page 24710

 1     Ministry of Defence should become more involved in the prevention of

 2     these crimes.

 3             According to your recollection of this period, what did the

 4     government do along these lines in the political sense and also at the

 5     diplomatic level?

 6        A.   Well, it was a time when I would say during that particular week

 7     we received the first serious information from the ground that there were

 8     numerous incidents of criminal acts - and Jure Radic rightly called them

 9     crimes - that they were being committed on the Croatian side as well.

10     And that this caused much damage to the Croatian government and the

11     credibility of Croatia as a whole, and on the other hand, the proportions

12     of the damage were great.

13             The Ministry of the Interior was then charged to do everything

14     that was necessary to stop this negative tendency, that is to say they

15     were ordered by the government and the president of the republic to do

16     everything they could to stop this development.  That meant that they

17     were entitled to increase the number of regular police officers in the

18     area and that, in addition to that, the demobilisation was being stepped

19     up at the time.

20             I think that during two months the number of soldiers was reduced

21     from 190.000 to 50.000.  So that was a stepped-up demobilisation.  Of

22     course there were professional soldiers who were being sent to

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time in accordance with the Split Declaration,

24     and these were also the strategic goals of the American peace initiative.

25     And, of course, at the time, we also launched the media campaign, that

Page 24711

 1     this be reported about and that nothing should be covered up or hushed

 2     up -- none of the things that were happening on the ground.

 3             An additional factor at the time was that all the monitors who

 4     wished to go into this area were allowed to do so.  We never prevented

 5     anyone from doing that because, regardless of how painful and difficult

 6     all of this was for us, we wished everyone from the international

 7     community to be able to go into the ground.  Even though there were

 8     tendentious reports and there were exaggerations, it was a fact that this

 9     is what we requested.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, would you please take care that if

11     you continue a quote which does not appear any more on our screen, that

12     we move to the next page, because I now checked that what you read was a

13     quote.  It doesn't appear as a quote on the transcript itself.

14             And, also, I noticed that what we seen in the original language

15     apparently has got nothing to do with what is in the English language.  I

16     see numbering 1 to 8.  So, therefore, for those who are following the

17     proceedings in B/C/S, they would be confused as well.  Could we take care

18     that we always, on the screen, are focused on what you're asking the

19     witness and what you're putting to the witness.

20             MR. MIKULICIC:  I will do so, Your Honour.

21             [Interpretation] Could we please move to page 21 of the English

22     version, and that is page 32 of the Croatian version of this document.

23        Q.   What we can see on the top of the screen are the words of

24     Mr. Bosiljko Misetic, which you can see several pages earlier.

25     Mr. Misetic had what position in the government at the time?

Page 24712

 1        A.   He was the deputy prime minister in charge of the interior.  The

 2     internal policy.

 3        Q.   And then he says -- it is at the top of the page both in the

 4     Croatian and English version.

 5             "The Croatian state showed its goodwill as far as these citizens

 6     are concerned, that they be citizens of Croatia which means and

 7     presupposes that it will protect every civil and human right of each

 8     citizens of the Croatian state with instruments of state authority and

 9     with other instruments in keeping with the provisions of the law, the

10     constitutional law on the rights of the ethnic groups.  And here some

11     division or somewhere before, or somewhere before, the abolishing in

12     places of whomever for his will to act.  Every citizen of the

13     State of Croatia had and still has the opportunity to become a Croatian

14     citizen.  Being a citizen means certain rights and certain obligations.

15     The minimum they are asked to do is to accept the State of Croatia.

16              "Every Serb who left had the opportunity.  And the Croatian

17     state is still giving them the opportunity to become citizens of the

18     Croatian state.  Those who do not want this will not do so of their own

19     choice.  It will be their own political will."

20             Mr. Granic, for someone to be a citizen of the

21     Republic of Croatia he has to possess certain documents; right?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Can you tell us what were the measures that the State of Croatia

24     took so that the population of the liberated territories who had remained

25     in these areas be issued personal documents?  And we could see from the

Page 24713

 1     evidence that these were mostly elderly people.

 2        A.   For those who had remained there and who were elderly, regardless

 3     of the fact that we had some problems, because the land registers and the

 4     registers of births from many towns and municipalities had simply been

 5     taken away when the Serbian population departed during the

 6     Operation Storm, they could immediately be granted Croatian citizenship.

 7     And there was also another humanitarian operation to assist these people

 8     who had stayed there.  That was a separate operation that was conducted.

 9     And when I say "assistance," that was how to provide them with medical,

10     social, health care, how they could be issued documents.  It was an

11     organised and planned activity.

12             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document

13     into evidence, Mr. President.

14             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1815.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

18             May I seek clarification of part of your quote.

19             "Every citizen of the State of Croatia had and still has the

20     opportunity to become a Croatian citizen."

21             That's the quote, and I would like to ask you, Mr. Granic, what

22     that line means.  That if you're a Croatian citizen you have an

23     opportunity to become a Croatian citizen.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, simply, every citizen of

25     Serbian ethnicity who was living in the occupied territories had the

Page 24714

 1     right to become a Croatian citizen.  They did not use this right.

 2     Practically they had the citizenship of the

 3     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  But considering where they had been

 4     born, that is to say in Croatia, they had a right to become Croatian

 5     citizens.  And later on, all of them who wished so really were granted

 6     Croatian citizenship.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So "every citizen" means every born inhabitant

 8     of Serbian origin being born in Croatia, living in Croatia, has an

 9     opportunity to become a Croatian citizen.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I earlier asked you about the family reunion --

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, Your Honour.

13     Precisely so.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, I earlier asked you about the return where no

15     family member had left, how to reconcile that.  First some plans had to

16     be finalised, and you said it took two and a half years.  You said this

17     was a short period of time.  And this language which suggests that if

18     you're born here, just apply for citizenship and you're back -- you're

19     back in town.

20             How should I understand your previous answer in relation to this

21     matter?

22        A.   That is all correct.  Those Serbs who remained in the

23     Republic of Croatia could be awarded citizenship immediately, and

24     assistance was offered in particular to the elderly to have them enjoy

25     that right as soon as possible.

Page 24715

 1             Those Croatian Serbs who left the occupied territories, becoming

 2     refugees, and who were also citizens of the Federal Republic of

 3     Yugoslavia, for them this entailed a process in the plan of refugee

 4     return.  We had to work on that in particular.  There was one process of

 5     being issued with documents and another one having to do with the issue

 6     of return.  We enclosed all that within that plan of refugee return.

 7     That was done together with the international community as well as the

 8     UNHCR and the ICRC.

 9             In the meantime, during the period when only the humanitarian

10     issues of family reunion were being resolved, we also had individual

11     return cases.  There were quite many of them, although I don't know the

12     exact figures.  Someone specialised in that could be of more use.  And I

13     do know, however, that most of such requests were granted.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  So to become a Croatian citizen, for those who had

15     remained in the Krajina area, that was quickly to be done; but those who

16     had left --

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  -- there were two issues.  First, getting the right

19     papers to gain or perhaps regain -- most likely gain Croatian

20     citizenship, and then that did not automatically mean that they then

21     could immediately return, because the mass return, as you said, had to be

22     prepared by agreements first and that took approximately two and a half

23     years.  Although, in individual cases, some people could return.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, Your Honour.  Most

25     of the individual cases were dealt with that way.  If they provided any

Page 24716

 1     guarantee that they would be received by other family members in Croatia,

 2     such cases were automatically granted.

 3             In addition to that, the international community took part as

 4     well.  This was an ongoing return process.  However, the impetus was

 5     created only once the plan and programme for return was -- once it was

 6     put in place.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That refers to one of your previous answers

 8     you've given.  Yes.  Thank you.

 9             Please proceed.

10             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Let's stay with this topic a bit longer, Mr. Granic, although

12     you're not a specialist in administrative matters, although, you may be

13     able to answer some of my questions, and this in relation to the

14     President's questions.

15             After Croatia became an independent state in 1991, is it correct

16     that all Croatian citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, were

17     supposed to ask for new documents in keeping with the fact that this was

18     a new state?

19        A.   Yes.  That applies to everyone.  No distinction was made from the

20     very beginning.  Quite the contrary.  We would have been quite happy had

21     the Serbs in occupied territories asked for the new documents.  So we

22     would have been very happy to grant them that.

23        Q.   But the Serbs who lived in the territory of the so-called

24     Republika Srpska Krajina physically could not ask to be issued with

25     Croatian identity papers because they had no point of contact with the

Page 24717

 1     Croatian authorities; correct?

 2        A.   Yes.  Simply put, the Serbs in the occupied territories and their

 3     representatives were ready, during the talks, to discuss different

 4     economic issues under the pressure of the international community, I

 5     believe; but they were never ready to discuss political matters such as

 6     the issue of reintegration and bringing the territory within the

 7     framework of the Republic of Croatia.  Although, there were such

 8     individual instances of people approving of that but never en masse.

 9        Q.   Another thing, you've already mentioned it before, but perhaps it

10     wouldn't hurt to go back to it.  There was an important problem in that

11     all registry books with citizen data in the newly liberated area of the

12     former Serbian Krajina were either taken away or destroyed.  There were

13     grave problems with the identification of persons; correct?

14        A.   Yes.  Most of the books were taken away.  As far as I know, it

15     wasn't always the case, but for the most part it was so.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

17             MR. WAESPI:  I think it's about the third leading question in a

18     row.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Oh, I would say for today, in counting, I'm far

20     above three, as a matter of fact, Mr. Waespi, but you did not object to

21     many of them.

22             Mr. Mikulicic, I noted that -- and, of course, I asked myself why

23     there were no objections often raised by Mr. Waespi.

24             MR. MIKULICIC:  Because it's obvious, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Or if it is obvious and if Mr. Waespi doesn't

Page 24718

 1     disagree, it might be that these are mainly matters which are not that

 2     much in dispute.

 3             MR. MIKULICIC:  I don't know in advance whether Mr. Waespi will

 4     disagree or not.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I think it's for the first day that we're

 6     hearing evidence in this case.  So what is in dispute and what is not in

 7     dispute on these matters may be clearer than you suggest at this moment.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, I can assure you my only intention

 9     was to speed up the proceedings, nothing else.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  I do understand that.

11             MR. MIKULICIC:  So I'm apologising, of course, to Mr. Waespi, and

12     I'll try to avoid any leading questions in the future, especially when

13     I'm just about to finish my direct examination.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm trying to seek clarification.  When you said

15     that it was physically impossible for persons of Serb ethnicity, once

16     Croatia had become an independent state, to apply for Croatian papers,

17     was the same true for citizens of Croatian origin?

18             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, I'm sorry to interrupt, but that was

19     referring only to those Serbs who were living in the Krajina territory,

20     so the occupied territory --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, and I am --

22             MR. MIKULICIC: -- not for the other Serbs who were living on

23     the --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  That's clear to me.  I'm also referring to the

25     Croatians who remained to live in the area of the -- as is often said,

Page 24719

 1     the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina.  Did they have similar

 2     problems?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I understood your

 4     question perfectly well.  That is correct.  The same applied to both

 5     Croats and Serbs.  We would have been happy for the Croats from that

 6     territory to ask for those documents, much as the Serbs, for them to be

 7     able to get out of the territory and ask for such documents.  That would

 8     have been a sign to us indicating that the Serbs were looking to reach a

 9     solution on peaceful reintegration.

10             There were such rare and individual situations but never

11     en masse, because in the occupied territory there was the Martic

12     government as well as that of his associates.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  So once the Republic of Croatia had regained power

14     in the Sector South in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the situation was

15     that both persons of Serb ethnicity but also persons of Croat ethnicity

16     were not registered as Croatian citizens at that time.  So the Croats had

17     to register again and apply for papers as well.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.  Correct.  Those who did

19     not do it earlier, although the number of remaining Croats was not great.

20     This was practically an ethnically cleansed area.  It is true, however,

21     there were a number of them, but the same procedure applied to both

22     Croats and Serbs.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

24             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Granic -- before that I would like to have

Page 24720

 1     this document admitted.  No, it seems it was admitted already.  No, it

 2     wasn't.

 3             So first I ask permission to include it on the 65 ter list, and

 4     then I would like to ask for an exhibit number.  It is 3D00961.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi?

 6             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC:  It's already an exhibit, Your Honour.  I'm sorry.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You're right, Mr. Mikulicic.  And there's no

10     need to ask again leave to add documents to the 65 ter list, because I

11     think at the beginning of today I said that all the documents not on the

12     65 ter list, that leave is granted in advance in view of the absence of

13     any objections by Mr. Waespi.

14             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

16             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Mr. Granic, I'm nearing the end of my examination.  I'd like to

18     ask you now to answer the following question:  Having been present at

19     government meeting and various other meetings, be it with the president

20     of the republic, be it the meeting of the National Council --

21     National Security Council, was there ever raised the issue of

22     Special Police at these meetings and any sort of misconduct on the part

23     of the Special Police Units?

24        A.   I had not heard that.  The Special Police Units were highly

25     esteemed.  Since I was the prime minister [as interpreted] since the

Page 24721

 1     3rd of August, 1991, I knew that the Special Police Units had been

 2     involved in very difficult missions as an elite unit.  And even later on

 3     it was reputed to be a highly disciplined force which carried out some of

 4     the most difficult tasks.

 5        Q.   Did you personally know General Markac at the time?

 6        A.   Yes, I did.  I knew him as of 1991 as an honourable individual of

 7     moral integrity who headed the Special Police force and was highly

 8     esteemed.

 9        Q.   Did you have a chance to talk to him personally?

10        A.   Yes, on several occasions.

11        Q.   In your conversations with General Markac, did you ever notice or

12     observe on his part any sort of animosity or prejudice toward Croatian

13     citizens of Serb ethnicity?

14        A.   No.  I never heard anything of the sort.  Had I heard something

15     like that, I would have reacted right away, but I did not.

16        Q.   Thank you for your answers, Mr. Granic.  I've finished my

17     examination.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Mikulicic.

19             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, just for the transcript, I don't

20     think it's in dispute, but page 61, line 16, the witness was deputy prime

21     minister, and I believe that's what he said.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  There seems to be no confusion about that.

23             Then next in line.  Mr. Misetic, it will be you?

24             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, you'll now be cross-examined by

Page 24722

 1     Mr. Misetic.  Mr. Misetic is counsel for Mr. Gotovina.

 2             Please proceed.

 3                           Cross-examination by Mr. Misetic:

 4        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Granic.  I should say good afternoon.

 5        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. Misetic.

 6        Q.   Mr. Granic, I'm going to take you through the events, focusing

 7     mostly on August 1995?

 8             MR. MISETIC:  But first let me call up Exhibit P462, please.

 9     Actually, I'm sorry, P456.  I apologise, Mr. Registrar.

10        Q.   This is a meeting, Mr. Granic, where you were present.  It's

11     dated 11 August.  And present with you are President Tudjman,

12     Minister Susak, Minister Jarnjak.  And as someone who participated in the

13     meeting, I'd just like you to read one section of the document and tell

14     us what your interpretation of it was?

15             MR. MISETIC:  And this is at page 6 in the Croatian and page 3 in

16     the English, please.

17        Q.   Now, I'd ask you if you could review Minister Jarnjak's comment

18     there at the paragraph that you see now on your screen that starts "From

19     Zagreb, Pupovac was making a fuss..."  if you could read that.  It says:

20              "Pupovac called around saying it's a catastrophe there.  They're

21     killing them with clubs, beating them, pounding.  He got a call from a

22     woman who said that 99 per cent of all Serbs who went through Sisak were

23     beaten.  That's horrible and we need to do something about that.  They

24     called everybody.  Djukic called me yesterday.  I wasn't there.  He

25     probably wanted to say something about that too.  And Dzakula, that son

Page 24723

 1     of a bitch, is right on Pupovac's line and he does everything that

 2     Pupovac tells him."

 3             Can you explain, Mr. Granic, the context there and why is

 4     Mr. Jarnjak -- or what was your understanding of why Mr. Jarnjak was

 5     upset with Mr. Pupovac and Mr. Dzakula?

 6        A.   Mr. Jarnjak was the minister of the interior, and he believed

 7     that representatives of the Serb community at that time, on the

 8     11th of August, were snowballing the problems.  They were exaggerating

 9     them at that point in time with regard to the departure of the Serb

10     population and the alleged attacks on them.  The minister wanted to say

11     that they took the issue out of all proportion, and that's the all -- the

12     only way that I can understand it.

13        Q.   Did you have any understanding that Minister Jarnjak was upset

14     with them because they were being truthful in their allegations?

15        A.   Certainly.  There certainly were incidents, especially on the way

16     through Sisak.  There quite certainly were, however, none of the

17     incidents resulted in death.  At any rate, we took note of it.  And one

18     of the pieces of information that Jarnjak took into account and everyone

19     when deciding what needed to be done next in order to make sure that on

20     the one hand these incidents do not happen again and that on the other

21     the international community be informed properly.

22             Of course, we were under enormous pressure from the international

23     community, because the general belief was that ethnic cleansing was being

24     carried out, which was not the truth.  It is certainly true that the Serb

25     population was leaving because they were encouraged to do so.  There were

Page 24724

 1     among them those who didn't accept the Croatian state and who had been

 2     absolutely indoctrinated for the previous ten years.  At least until --

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter didn't catch the year.

 4             MR. MISETIC:

 5        Q.   Could you repeat the year that you mentioned at the end of your

 6     answer, Mr. Granic?

 7        A.   1987.  Ever since Milosevic came to power.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar if we could have on the screen,

10     please, Exhibit D1635, please.

11        Q.   Mr. Granic, this is a US code cable, and if you look at the

12     fourth line from the top you'll see that there is a date there which is

13     6 August 1995 at 1530 hours is when it's sent.

14             MR. MISETIC:  And if we turn to page 2, please.

15        Q.   It says -- and, again, this is 6 August:

16              "Croatian foreign minister Mate Granic told the ambassador that

17     the government of Croatia and the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina would

18     co-operate militarily in Bosnia ..."

19             And then towards the middle it says:

20             "Granic said that the Bosnian-Croatian militia, HVO supported by

21     the Croatian Army, would continue military campaigns towards Drvar,

22     Donji Vakuf, and Jajce.  They would move -- then move to push Serb

23     artillery away from Mostar and Dubrovnik.  Afterwards, they will, in

24     consultation with the international community, mainly the United States,

25     help to open the Sarajevo corridor."

Page 24725

 1             Now, if we could turn to Exhibit D296, please.  This is a

 2     presidential transcript from the 7th of August, which would be the next

 3     day after that US code cable.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  If we turn, sorry, to page 15 in the English and

 5     page 31 in the Croatian, please.  Sorry.  If we could go to page 14 in

 6     the English, please.  I believe it should be the previous page in the

 7     B/C/S then, please.

 8        Q.   Dr. Granic, if you look at the middle of the page in the

 9     English - we're having trouble finding it in the B/C/S, in the Croatian -

10     but it says, you report that:

11             "The US will be extremely interested now, and that is of why it

12     is of vital importance that you hold your talks with Izetbegovic as soon

13     as possible to strategically handle the overall situation.  And now every

14     day from tomorrow on, every day will be precious as far as that is

15     concerned.  I think we have to reach, as soon as possible, a final

16     strategic ..."

17             MR. MISETIC:  And then if we could turn to the next page in

18     English, please.

19        Q.   There is a discussion then that continues about consultations

20     with the Bosnian government.  And then at the bottom Dr. Zuzul says in

21     that paragraph at the bottom.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Page 31 in the Croatian please.

23        Q.   Dr. Zuzul says:

24             "Yesterday, I explicitly asked what was going on in the southern

25     part.  There's no problem with the HVO going down there, but, if

Page 24726

 1     possible, not the Croatian Army."

 2             And he's referring here to his consultation was the United States

 3     government.

 4             "And their discussion was to --"

 5             MR. MISETIC:  If we turn the page in English, please.

 6        Q.   "Their discussion was to do Donji Vakuf and Jajce together with

 7     the Muslims."

 8             Now, Donji Vakuf and Jajce are towns in Bosnia; correct?

 9        A.   Correct.

10        Q.   And it continues on:

11             "They even suggest that, just make sure that our army don't cross

12     now that we've liberated this area towards Bihac, make sure they don't

13     cross over ... I didn't ask about Drvar, but this was because this story

14     about how Bosnia and Herzegovina will now actually be divided with the

15     help of the Americans is looming large and how they let us do that."

16             Now, Minister Granic, today at transcript page 46,

17     lines 13 to 16, you said that:

18             "Operation Storm opened up new avenues to resolve the issue of

19     war in Bosnia and the creation of lasting peace."

20             Now, I'd like to ask you -- having reviewed what your comments

21     were to Ambassador Galbraith on the 6th and this discussion on the 7th

22     internally at the top of the Croatian leadership about moving into Bosnia

23     and operating then to take towns in Western Bosnia, elaborate further.

24     Explain more specifically what was it about Operation Storm that created

25     the conditions to resolve the issue of war in Bosnia and -- that's the

Page 24727

 1     first question.  The second question is:  What was the strategic aim of

 2     the government of Croatia in immediately planning on operations in Bosnia

 3     before Operation Storm had even finished?

 4        A.   Everything I have seen here is correct.  Our first strategic goal

 5     was to help lift the blockade of Bihac.  The other strategic goals were

 6     to help the Croats and Bosniaks liberate the occupied areas in

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This was the goal of the American peace initiative,

 8     too, because without it Milosevic would never have agreed to negotiate.

 9     And this was especially true for Karadzic.  He would never have agreed to

10     negotiate without it.

11             Every day we were in contact with the highest ranking officials

12     of the United States on the diplomatic level, which was done by myself

13     and the then Ambassador Zuzul.  On the ministry level, that was Mr. Susak

14     with William Perry, the Defence Secretary at the intelligence level and

15     many other levels.  Therefore, not a step was taken after without these

16     consultations.  And the consultations had to do with which town should be

17     headed toward by the BH army rather than the Croat army in terms of Vakuf

18     and so on and so forth.  But, at any rate, strategic agreements were made

19     about how far one could go.

20             Let me raise one issue which I believe will be helpful to the

21     Trial Chamber.  When the Croatian Army, the BH Army, and the HVO reached

22     Banja Luka, the State secretary Christopher, and I think it was around

23     the 14th of October, 1995, I think it was round about that time, called

24     me, and Mr. Holbrooke called President Tudjman.  He told me, "Mate,

25     please stop there."  I told him that I was not the supreme commander and

Page 24728

 1     that I could merely convey my opinion to President Tudjman as the supreme

 2     commander.  The state secretary told me in reply that if we should not

 3     stop, and we only needed two days to liberate Banja Luka and Posavina, as

 4     he put it, a humanitarian catastrophe would ensue.  350.000 persons would

 5     leave.  Almost 100.000 of them would go to Eastern Slavonija and Baranja

 6     as well.  Milosevic would be destabilised as a partner, and the Dayton

 7     Accords were already being prepared.  After that, the state secretary

 8     Christopher and Holbrooke called the president who accepted their

 9     suggestion.  This was only one of the indications and absolute evidence

10     that we fully co-operated with the international community and with the

11     US in particular.

12        Q.   Mr. Granic, let me ask you, from the Split agreement in late

13     July, until the operation stopped on the outskirts of Banja Luka as

14     you've now mentioned, was it understood what General Gotovina's role

15     would be in implementing these strategic objectives in Bosnia?

16        A.   Although I was the minister of foreign affairs and this was not

17     my duty, but, diplomatically speaking, Bosnia-Herzegovina was my primary

18     task, hence I am quite familiar with these issues as well.

19             General Gotovina was reputed to be an excellent general, a

20     disciplined general who was suitable for the most difficult of missions.

21     So I wasn't -- it didn't come as a surprise to me at all when the

22     president said that the southern axis, the most important, would be would

23     be headed by General Gotovina as would be the operations in

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This was something that I expected, and I found

25     perfectly normal.  These were the most significant operations to be

Page 24729

 1     carried out by the Croatian Army.  So it doesn't come as a surprise to me

 2     at all.

 3        Q.   Would it be fair to say that what you were agreeing with the

 4     United States and discussing with the United States at a strategic level

 5     was actually being implemented on the ground by General Gotovina?

 6        A.   Yes.  That's completely true.  As you can see from the American

 7     sources, what I said on the 6th, and I think that that was precisely what

 8     this particular source referred to, it was a strategic objective which

 9     enjoyed full support of the United States of America.  Had it been

10     otherwise, I would have received a caution right away.  We didn't -- we

11     didn't make a single move without co-operation with the USA.

12             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I don't know when we're going to

13     address the matter that the Cermak Defence wishes to raise, whether it's

14     now or at the beginning of the next session.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  We could do it now.

16             Mr. Granic, we have to deal with a procedural matter.  I,

17     therefore, will ask that you be escorted out of the courtroom.  It also

18     means that your break will be a bit longer than ours, but ...

19                           [The witness stands down]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Higgins, is it you who will raise the issue?

21             MS. HIGGINS:  Yes, Your Honour.  The issue that I wish to raise

22     briefly concerns the Martic schedule of agreed facts which Your Honour is

23     already aware of.  A dispute arose two days ago, and it's perhaps worth

24     setting out a brief chronology so that the Bench is aware of the efforts

25     that have been made by the Defence in this regard.

Page 24730

 1             Your Honour will be aware that on the 2nd of October, 2009, the

 2     Cermak Defence team filed seven motions which ran to a total of 1.374

 3     pages, six of which were under Rule 92 bis and one of which was under

 4     Rule 92 quater.

 5             Under Your Honours' guidance, on the 9th of October, 2009,

 6     transcript page 22866 to 22869, the Defence and the Prosecution were

 7     invited to explore other avenues for admission of that evidence.  And the

 8     Chamber indicated that it considered that the most appropriate way for

 9     the Cermak Defence to present the relevant and important portions was

10     through the route of agreed facts.

11             Now, subsequent to the guidance that we received, we sent the

12     Prosecution the first version of the schedule of evidence on the

13     16th of October of this year.  The Prosecution responded on the

14     22nd of October, suggesting that we perhaps only rely on what we could

15     have supported from the Martic judgement as opposed to citing witness

16     evidence and testimony and transcript.

17             We took that suggestion on board, and we spent several days

18     reworking the entire schedule itself so that it would reflect the Martic

19     judgement references.  Our revised schedule was then sent to the

20     Prosecution on the 26th of October.  And on the 28th of October,

21     Prosecution suggested that we add a map so that it was clear to everyone

22     where these locations could be found for ease of reference.

23             A final version of the evidence schedule was agreed and cleared

24     of any typographical errors on the 10th of November, and that was agreed

25     between ourselves and Mr. Waespi on behalf of the Prosecution.

Page 24731

 1             So far so good.  However, from that stage, we then tried to put a

 2     brief motion together that could accompany the table in which we proposed

 3     that the table itself should, of course, be admitted into evidence and

 4     form part of the trial record and given an exhibit number.  That brief

 5     proposed motion was sent to the Prosecution on the 11th of November, and

 6     it's our recollection that we didn't get any response to that until the

 7     deadline set by Your Honour, which was the 16th of November, several days

 8     ago.

 9             Unfortunately, it seems that this marked the start of the dissent

10     in which it was the first time raised by the Prosecution that Appendix A,

11     which is the schedule of agreed facts, should not be admitted into

12     evidence but simply that the Bench should take note of the facts.

13             Our position is very much that the schedule that came from

14     evidence constitutes evidence as agreed facts and should be admitted by

15     the Trial Chamber as well as the map over which there is no dispute.  The

16     map, however, simply being geographically reflective of the contents of

17     the agreed facts.

18             As we understand it, as I've said, the position of the

19     Prosecution is that the schedule itself should not be admitted.  We pray

20     in aid, in support of our approach, two decisions, one of which is the

21     Perisic decision, dated the 30th of September, 2009, in which the Chamber

22     there admitted the agreed facts under Rule 65 ter (H), 65 ter (M), and

23     Rule 89(C) as it deemed that the agreed facts were relevant and probative

24     to the case.  And it, therefore, admitted the facts as part of the

25     record.

Page 24732

 1             The second case which we pray in aid is the Blagojevic decision

 2     of the 19th of December, 2003.  Again it concerned, in fact, issues of

 3     judicial notice and agreed facts.

 4             At paragraph 13 of that decision, the Trial Chamber found that

 5     the recording of points of agreement during the trial phase results in

 6     the acceptance of those agreed points as evidence under Rule 89(C).

 7             Now, in the event that we have not been able to, ourselves,

 8     determine how the Chamber should deal with this issue, I have set out our

 9     proposal.  And we can, of course, provide the Bench with copies of the

10     decisions upon which we rely.  And we would ask the Bench to simply admit

11     both schedules, the agreed facts and the map.

12             Mr. Waespi was on notice of this point yesterday as it was,

13     unfortunately, a rally of e-mails between ourselves during the course of

14     which it became clear that our approaches differed.  And I'm sorry that

15     this matter has had to come before the Bench, as it should have been

16     something that we should have been able to work out.

17             I hope our submissions are clear, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  They are.  But if they still are after we've heard

19     Mr. Waespi, still remains to be seen.

20             Mr. Waespi.

21             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I agree with my colleague

22     that a lot of effort went into these project but not just on the Defence

23     side, also from the Prosecution side.  We created a map.  A lot of errors

24     had to be corrected just to make that clear.

25             The Prosecution would like to emphasise up front that we have no

Page 24733

 1     ill-intent in regard to the debate over how to treat agreed facts.  The

 2     only intention from our side it to ensure that the record is clear and to

 3     preserve the integrity of the evidentiary process.

 4             In our submission, the parties' agreed facts are not evidence.

 5     On the contrary, the purpose of the agreement between the parties is to

 6     obviate the need for evidence on points that are not in dispute.

 7             Since the agreed facts do not constitute evidence, it would be

 8     improper to tender this document, the agreed facts, not the map, into

 9     evidence and to give it an exhibit number.  Instead, this document should

10     be filed.

11             Filing the document does not change its status as part of the

12     trial record.  The Defence may still refer to the agreed facts in setting

13     forth its legal arguments in the final brief or closing statements.  Even

14     though the agreed facts are not marked as an exhibit, the Defence should

15     be assured that the Prosecution will not dispute the facts or seek to

16     introduce evidence contrary to the facts.

17             Indeed, the Trial Chamber would surely reprimand the Prosecution

18     if it made any attempt to undermine these agreed facts.  The procedural

19     difference between filing the agreed facts and tendering it as evidence

20     does not change the undisputed nature of the facts, nor does it undercut

21     the extent to which the Defence may rely on these facts.

22             Your Honours, I've looked randomly yesterday at the few trial

23     judgements, how they deal with agreed facts or stipulation in their

24     footnotes, and I looked at the Blagojevic, the case my colleague cited.

25     In footnote 650 of the Blagojevic trial judgement of 17 January 2005, we

Page 24734

 1     have a reference to agreed facts para 135.  So it's not been exhibited.

 2     Similarly, in the Dragomir Milosevic case, footnote 17, also trial

 3     judgement.  Galic case, footnote 344, as regards the stipulations.  And

 4     the Krajisnik judgement, footnote 259, again trial admissions by the

 5     accused.

 6             The only case I found again that was really a random selection

 7     was the Oric case, Trial Chamber, footnote 146 ter.  Agreed facts have

 8     received and are referred to as exhibits, although I only looked just at

 9     the footnote itself.  I didn't look at the actual exhibit.

10             The case my colleague mentioned, the Perisic case, the agreed

11     facts were eventually not given exhibit numbers, as I understand it.

12     It's correct that the decision itself refers to having it exhibited, but

13     apparently it has not received an exhibit number.  That's what our

14     inquiry resulted.  Obviously the Perisic case is still ongoing.

15             These are my submissions, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me try to understand what keeps you apart.

17             You, Ms. Higgins, you say these -- this document in which we have

18     described jointly what we agree upon should be admitted into evidence.

19     And you, Mr. Waespi, you say, We still agree on these facts, but they

20     should not be evidence.

21             Let me first then go back to what apparently evidence is.  Isn't

22     it true that evidence information in whatever form, either contained in

23     documents or in oral testimony or on video, whatever, material

24     information in that specific format as presented which can be considered

25     by the Chamber if it deliberates on factual findings?  Would everyone

Page 24735

 1     agree on this to be the basic notion of what evidence is?

 2             Second step is admission into evidence, I would say primarily

 3     gains its -- gets its meaning in allowing this information in that

 4     specific format to come to be accessible to the trier of facts and the

 5     admission of evidence primarily is matter which plays a role in

 6     adversarial and I would even say jury trials.  That is the decision.

 7     This is information, material, video, whatever, which is available to the

 8     jury in its -- for its fact-finding purposes.

 9             Do we agree on that?

10             MS. HIGGINS:  Yes, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Now let's go to agreed facts.  Isn't the basis for

12     the agreed facts that the parties say that, "We consider that the Chamber

13     can establish the facts we agreed upon without any evidence, that is,

14     information supporting the finding of those facts.  We parties, having

15     looked at either evidence which was presented, or having considered

16     material which has not been presented as evidence to the Court, on the

17     basis of that, we both agree that a Chamber could make a factual finding

18     of the following sort."

19             And then you set out the agreed facts.

20             Therefore, an agreement on facts may find its basis in material

21     which is admitted into evidence but also may find its basis in material

22     which is not in evidence or even exclusively on material which is not in

23     evidence.

24             Then finally, it is for the Chamber to see whether it adopts,

25     either on the basis of the agreement of the parties or in the context of

Page 24736

 1     evidence, to adopt or not to adopt a factual finding, as the parties

 2     suggest the Chamber could, perhaps even should, adopt.  Do we agree on

 3     that?

 4             MS. HIGGINS:  Yes, Your Honour, that it is evidence that the

 5     Bench must then take as evidence and draw its own conclusions therefrom.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now the only thing that keeps you apart is

 7     whether you call that evidence or not.  In my analysis, I said that the

 8     Bench would have to consider, on the basis of the totality of the

 9     evidence or on whatever basis, whether these facts, which it could adopt

10     without hearing any further evidence on it, whether it adopts it, yes or

11     no.  It's finally for the Chamber to decide.

12             Now, it seems that you give a different meaning to what the

13     latitude would be of the Chamber to -- to consider that material or not

14     to consider that material, and that apparently seems to be your concern,

15     Ms. Higgins.  Is that correctly understood?

16             MS. HIGGINS:  It is, Your Honour.  My concerning lies, if I may

17     just elaborate a little, on the fact that my learned friend speaks of

18     transparency of the proceedings.  And for us to understand the

19     transparency of the proceedings, the best way to proceed, we say, is to

20     follow prior examples of where the agreed facts have been stated to be

21     evidence which has been admitted under Rule 65 ter (H) and (M) and

22     Rule 89(C).  We say it's clear evidence.  And, therefore, whether

23     Your Honour admits the schedule or has the document as a filing, we are

24     just concerned that it is given the label of "evidence," particularly

25     given that it came from an abundance of evidence which we were seeking to

Page 24737

 1     initially put before this Chamber.  We feel that we have been restricted

 2     down to the bear minimum.  And then to have the other party say that this

 3     is not going to be admitted onto the record seems to be disingenuous and

 4     seems to have restricted our hand in the way we best present our

 5     evidence.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, earlier I tried to understand what it

 7     means that something is admitted into evidence.  That is that it comes to

 8     the jury.

 9             Now, isn't it a semantic issue that whether the matter comes to

10     this Trial Chamber upon an invitation to agree on these facts where it's

11     clear to both parties that exclusively on the basis of that agreement the

12     Chamber can, the parties may even think should, adopt those facts as

13     facts it found, even if there's no further basis for that?

14             At the say time, the Chamber - and I think the parties agree on

15     that as well - is not bound by the agreement of the parties if, for any

16     good reason - I'm not saying for any reason but for any good reason - we

17     would choose not to adopt such facts, we're free to do so, just as we

18     would be on the basis of the evidence underlying, whether known to us or

19     unknown to us, to adopt similar conclusions as the parties apparently

20     have done.  We're free to finally decide what to do and what not to do.

21     But the way in which it is presented, whether as evidence or whether as a

22     filing of agreed facts, I cannot - but I will discuss the matter with my

23     colleagues - I cannot see yet what difference it would make.  That would

24     mean that accepting it as evidence is a bit odd in the context of the

25     definition of "evidence" I just gave, that is, evidence is information

Page 24738

 1     which is used to establish facts.  We're already beyond that, because a

 2     logic -- the evidence, known or unknown to the Chamber, already led the

 3     parties to draw conclusions that this is sufficient to establish or to

 4     find facts A, B, or C.

 5             Now, therefore, I see that -- I see your concerns, and these

 6     concerns, I think, depend on the way in which the Chamber would look at a

 7     difference.  Up until this moment, I do not see that we would approach

 8     either through the one technique - I call it technique - or the other

 9     technique, that we would make any difference.  But I will discuss this

10     with my colleagues.

11             Any further submissions in this respect?  First --

12             MS. HIGGINS:  No, thank you, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

14             MR. WAESPI:  No, Mr. President.  Just in relation to the

15     deadline, that was, I think, today, we need directions on how to -- to

16     sign it, obviously.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  You may know my approach to these matters, that if

18     there is a matter which I'd consider the parties could settle but are

19     unable to settle, I always offer my good services at meetings at 7.00 in

20     the morning where we certainly will find a solution for them.  That offer

21     is a standing offer, is always there, but I saw that Mr. Kehoe was on his

22     feet.

23             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.  Given this position by the

24     Office of the Prosecutor, it certainly has given me pause, because we

25     have entered into any number of stipulations with the Office of the

Page 24739

 1     Prosecutor on any number of facts.  And up until this morning or until

 2     the rally of e-mails back and forth that my learned friend Ms. Higgins

 3     alluded to just moments ago, we were of the belief that that was

 4     stipulated facts that were part of the evidentiary record which the

 5     Chamber could accept or reject as it decided.  But never were we thinking

 6     that the stipulations or agreements on certain issues were somehow

 7     outside of the evidentiary arena, and frankly, Mr. President, given the

 8     position by the Prosecution, I don't know what category these stipulated

 9     facts or the facts that Ms. Higgins was discussing fall into if they are

10     not evidence.

11             So with regard to the Chamber ultimately make a decision, with

12     the caveat, of course, that the Chamber can accept or reject any

13     stipulated fact as it so chooses, it seems to me that this change of

14     position is giving the Prosecution some way to opt out of the evidentiary

15     arena as opposed to putting this in the evidentiary arena.

16             So, while I appreciate, Your Honour, that the discussion may be

17     some exercise in mental gymnastics, and you appreciate what Your Honour

18     is saying in that regard, it gives me some pause as to where we are with

19     regard to all of these other issues that we have been discussing since

20     March of 2008, because this is clearly a different position articulated

21     by the Prosecution.  And frankly, Your Honour, I don't know what the

22     answer is, I just want to raise those concerns and echo the concerns

23     raised by my learned friend Ms. Higgins.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  As I said before, I will consult with my

25     colleagues.  I'll try to see whether we agree, more or less, on the basis

Page 24740

 1     of evidence and factual findings.

 2             Mr. Kehoe, it is as with the flu:  If we find a problem here,

 3     immediately all the rest is affected by it as well.  So, therefore, we

 4     try to resolve it so that no one gets ill.

 5             MS. HIGGINS:  Very briefly, Your Honour.  Your Honour may be

 6     assisted by the Blagojevic decision, which I'm happy to provide copies to

 7     the Bench, because it deals with not only the methods by which evidence

 8     may come before the Court at paragraph 9, which includes the admission of

 9     facts under 65 ter (H), but it also defined in paragraph 12 what it means

10     to admit facts, thereby removing those points from the spheres of

11     judicial inquiry during trial.  They are accepted into the proceedings,

12     and the matter to which the agreed facts relates ceases to be a disputed

13     issue.  If that would assist the Chamber, I can, of course, hand up the

14     two decisions I referred to.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  In order to save paper and since it is my preference

16     to look at -- perhaps if you have one copy, that would assist.

17             Now, my last observation is that, of course, Rule 65 ter (H),

18     although quoted, doesn't say anything about whether that is evidence or

19     is not evidence, it's just that points of agreement, and disagreement, by

20     the way, on matters of law and fact shall be recorded by the

21     Pre-Trial Judge.  It doesn't say much more.  And that the Chamber could

22     order to -- order the parties to file written submissions on the matter.

23             Now, I would say this is a rather typical lawyer situation.  It

24     seems that there's agreement on at least the substance, but we, of

25     course, always find procedural ways to see whether there's any

Page 24741

 1     disagreement.

 2             The Chamber will consider the matter and will come back to the

 3     parties.

 4             Mr. Waespi.

 5             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  Because I'm a lawyer, I have to make clear

 6     that there was no change in position as advocated by Mr. Kehoe in

 7     relation to whether agreed facts shall be trial exhibits or not.  Just to

 8     make that clear.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  The deadline is not the matter that is of

10     greatest concern at this moment.  The Chamber appreciates that at least

11     the parties have agreed on a formulation of facts they agree upon.

12             We will have a --

13                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  I was informed by Mr. Registrar that a courtroom is

15     available tomorrow afternoon.  Staffing is there as well.  Whether the

16     Judges are available is still to be seen.  I certainly need for another

17     matter at least half an hour, but then still there would be quite some

18     time available.

19             At the same time, I repeat what I said earlier to making these --

20     to engage in these exercises claiming more courtroom time, et cetera,

21     et cetera.  First of all, we'll only do it if the parties commit

22     themselves to finishing the testimony of Mr. Granic this week.  Of

23     course, with all reservations that unforeseen -- unforeseen circumstances

24     can never be excluded, but I then expect a firm commitment.

25             The second is that I also would not appreciate if the parties

Page 24742

 1     would claim additional time in court and then to find out that, by the

 2     end of this week, that there actually had been no need to do all this.

 3     So we do it if it achieves a goal, and then we need the parties to commit

 4     to achieving that goal, and if that goal can be achieved without this

 5     additional exercise, we should do without.

 6             We have a break, and we resume at quarter past 1.00.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 12.51 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 1.15 p.m.

 9                           [The witness takes the stand]

10             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber would like to inform the parties, first

11     of all, that we will give you the guidance needed, Ms. Higgins and

12     Mr. Waespi, soon.  Give us a bit more time.  But from what we discussed

13     until now, there will not remain any problem as far as the Chamber is

14     concerned.

15             Then the second issue is scheduling for this week.  We checked

16     the availability of tomorrow in the afternoon.  First of all, if we would

17     sit tomorrow in the afternoon, it would be under 15 bis because all of

18     the Judges is not available.  The Chamber prefers not to sit under

19     Rule 15 bis, but we'll do so if that would contribute in achieving the

20     aim of finishing the testimony of Mr. Granic.

21             The Chamber also made an assessment.  One the other Judges, by

22     the way, is temporarily not available, which means that most likely we

23     couldn't start any earlier than 3.30 or 3.45, and in assessing the

24     times -- the time estimates given by the parties, the Chamber takes the

25     view now that most likely two sessions tomorrow in the afternoon would

Page 24743

 1     more or less do the job, but again we'd rather do without and conclude

 2     the testimony anyhow, but our assessment is that at least with two

 3     session tomorrow afternoon we might be able to conclude the testimony

 4     this week.

 5             Finally, the Chamber invites the parties, Prosecution and

 6     Defence, to work out a further schedule in order to see whether it's

 7     really needed, as I said before, and also that there is a clear schedule,

 8     then, this party until that moment that party from 2.00 to 5.00,

 9     whatever, so that we have a clear schedule, that you agree upon it.  If

10     you can't reach any agreement, of course, the Chamber will finally settle

11     the matter.  But the parties are invited to deliver such a schedule by

12     3.00 this afternoon.  So to work that out immediately after this session,

13     because the Registry should know whether they should reserve time,

14     whether they should have everyone ready to assist us.

15             Mr. Waespi.

16             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.  There are just a lot of

17     uncertainties also.  I'm thinking about redirect.  Obviously my

18     cross-examination will be substantial, and so there is a potential for --

19     for some redirect.  And it's -- I'm just wondering whether it wouldn't be

20     an option that the witness could stay longer on Friday afternoon, that we

21     are committed without tomorrow's session to finish by lunchtime tomorrow

22     as planned, and if not go into -- into Friday afternoon if we really need

23     that.  And I don't know exactly what the witness's plans are also, you

24     know, for Monday, but this is -- it's, as you know, an enormous strain on

25     all participants to then work morning, afternoon, Friday without

Page 24744

 1     interruption.  Of course we'll do it and I'm happy to talk with the

 2     Defence after court, but it's very difficult to assess and actually

 3     allocate what the parties -- the time the parties end.  That's just my

 4     suggestion.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  At the same time, of course, we all have

 6     sufficient experience to calculate, even on a provisional basis, some

 7     time for re-examination.  That -- we'll ask the witness, but, of course,

 8     the Chamber, apart from this witness, also has some concern to lose pace

 9     in the presentation of evidence.  And I think three witnesses were

10     schedule for this week.  Then we lose already one.  We then lose more

11     time even in the beginning of next week.  And the Chamber is really

12     determined to move on as efficiently as possible, of course always within

13     the context of the frame of the fair trial issue.

14             The strain is felt not only by the parties but by the Chamber as

15     well.

16             Mr. Granic, you may have noticed that we discussed to some extent

17     also some of your fate.  The Chamber is trying hard to push the parties

18     to see that we can conclude your evidence this week.  If we would not

19     achieve that, would it cause you major problems to stay over the weekend

20     and to remain available on Monday?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that would present a

22     significant problem to me.  If possible, I would prefer to have my

23     testimony concluded by Friday afternoon so that on Friday afternoon I

24     would be able to travel, if in any way possible.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's a strong preference.  We share that

Page 24745

 1     preference with you, but it would not be totally impossible.  You said

 2     this would cause you major problems, but major problems are not always

 3     insurmountable.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I have to consult with

 5     Zagreb first in order to be able to give you an answer tomorrow.  I would

 6     prefer, nevertheless, if possible, to have it concluded by Friday

 7     afternoon.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  That's clear, Mr. Granic.  Let's then try to move

 9     forward as quickly as possible.

10             Mr. Misetic.

11             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12             Mr. Registrar, if we could have Exhibit P453 on the screen

13     please.  And I'm particularly interested in page 2 in the English and

14     page 4 in the B/C/S.

15        Q.   Mr. Granic, this is a transcript of a conversation with --

16     presidential transcript of 16 August between Mr. Holbrooke, Mr. Fraser,

17     General Clark, Mr. Galbraith, President Tudjman, yourself,

18     Minister Susak, and others.

19             First I'm interested in -- let's see.  Yes.  There's a sentence

20     in the original --

21             MR. MISETIC:  And if we could go to page 4 in the Croatian.  The

22     bottom of page 2 in the English.  Next page in the Croatian, please, and

23     the bottom of page 2 in the English.

24        Q.   Now, he's -- Mr. Holbrooke is discussing --

25             MR. MISETIC:  Could we scroll to the top of the Croatian, please.

Page 24746

 1     There we go.  Yes.

 2        Q.   You see the word Czechoslovakia in the upper middle part of the

 3     page.  Mr. Holbrooke is discussing the future of Bosnia, and he says:

 4              "However, whatever the outcome, we think that the present

 5     borders, the present international borders in that area should not be

 6     altered unless they are altered voluntarily as in the case of the

 7     'divorce' of Czechoslovakia.  That is all right.  The manner in which

 8     Czechoslovakia parted is all right, but non-voluntary changes in the

 9     borders are a mistake and this is vitally important when we talk about

10     Slavonia."

11             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn to the next page in English

12     please.

13        Q.   And I'll come back to this entry in a moment.

14             MR. MISETIC:  But if we could now go to page 7 in the Croatian

15     and page 4 in the English, please.  And this is at the very top in the

16     Croatian.  Sorry, page -- numbered page 7, so one more page forward in

17     the Croatian, please.

18        Q.   And in the English it's the paragraph that begins "Fourthly."

19     And in the Croatian it's the first full sentence at the top of the page.

20     In the middle of the English page, Mr. President Holbrooke says:

21              "We have read contradictory reports of abuses at the local level

22     in connection with the departure of Serbs from the Krajina, reports of

23     burning houses, mistreatment, et cetera.  I know that many of these --

24     those reports are exaggerated.  Journalists tend to exaggerate, but the

25     accusations of ethnic cleansing in this regard harm our goal as regards

Page 24747

 1     constitutional arrangements."

 2             Now, in your testimony today, Mr. Granic, you have also made

 3     reference several times -- at transcript page 25, lines 18 to 19, you

 4     said that with respect to these reports of crimes, we believe this was

 5     propaganda.

 6             At transcript page 18, line 16, you stated that the British

 7     minister of defence's comments that were in contradiction to the British

 8     ambassador to Croatia's assessment, was because Portillo gave his

 9     comments on a strategic level, and I'd like to explore this issue a

10     little bit.

11             Mr. Holbrooke indicated to President Tudjman that he felt these

12     reports were exaggerated, and he then connects it to how these reports

13     are harming our goal as regards constitutional arrangements.  You've

14     indicated that Mr. Portillo may have had a strategic reason for claiming

15     that Croatia was engaged in ethnic cleansing.

16             Can you explain that a little bit more?  Why are exaggerated

17     reports or claims of ethnic cleansing -- why would they be in someone's

18     strategic interest?

19        A.   Both of these reports indicate the same thing, and that is that

20     during and immediately after Operation Storm, we had two things on our

21     mind.  Firstly, how to peacefully reintegrate Eastern Slavonija on the

22     one hand; and on the other, how to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in order

23     to stop the war and establish peace there.  Croatia was an important part

24     of the American peace initiative.  The American peace initiative went

25     contrary to the previous efforts of the international community under the

Page 24748

 1     leadership of the co-chairpersons Owen and Stoltenberg.  That plan, the

 2     Owen-Stoltenberg Plan fell through.

 3             I have to say here that as early as 1994 in New York, Lord Owen

 4     told me once that it was impossible to achieve peace and reintegration of

 5     the occupied territory without territorial concessions by Croatia.  This,

 6     in turn, meant to give an exit, open exit, to the sea to the Bosnians as

 7     well as to open up a corridor of at least 20 kilometres in which just

 8     below Zupanja and that parts of Eastern Slavonija either be part of

 9     Croatia or that a condominium arrangement be put in place.  That was the

10     reason why Ambassador Holbrooke clearly stated that he was against the

11     change of borders.  And Croatia stood firmly behind that.

12             By the same token, the strategic goal in Bosnia and Herzegovina

13     was to have a powerful functioning B and H federation when we negotiated

14     in Washington.  Our goal was to expand the model across the entire

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina as a decentralised single state, and that state was

16     supposed to encompass the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina and would be based

17     on a federation model.

18             There were differences between the UK and the US in terms of

19     their strategic views of how the war should be stopped and peace achieved

20     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  As for the model of the equation of guilt is

21     something which went to the detriment of Croatian interests as well as

22     its credibility.  The credibility of Croatia was very important to the US

23     in order to achieve the strategic goals in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including

24     the joint military operations of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

25     HVO, and the HV.

Page 24749

 1        Q.   Can you explain further how -- I'm going to assume that -- I

 2     asked you specifically about Minister Portillo's comments, and you've

 3     indicated that the equalisation of guilt - and I assume by that you meant

 4     equalisation of guilt between the Serb side and the Croatian side - that

 5     this would harm the credibility of Croatia.

 6             Let's take it the next step.  Why -- how does the discrediting of

 7     Croatia then affect or promote someone else's strategic aim?  Let's take

 8     the concrete example of Minister Portillo.  Can you explain what some

 9     people had to gain by discrediting the Croatian side?

10        A.   At that point in time, almost 70 per cent of the territory of

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina was controlled by Karadzic's Serbs.  There was no

12     chance for a peaceful settlement without the B and H federation, or, in

13     other words, a federation of Bosniaks and Croats freeing at least part of

14     that territory.  That was crystal clear.  By reducing the credibility of

15     Croatia, this possibility of joint operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina was

16     supposed to be diminished.  And, in turn, the US support to those

17     operations would be reduced accordingly.

18             I must state yet again that concerning the Srebrenica crisis,

19     there was no use of NATO military force in order to prevent it from

20     happening.  This was not allowed by either the generals or by Mr. Akashi.

21     In turn it proved to be tragic.  We know the results of the UN

22     investigation which was an objective investigation.  We are all familiar

23     with its results.  In other words, we were aware that we had to embark

24     upon this operation alone if we wanted to help Bihac and liberate Croatia

25     and if we wanted to assist the strategic intentions of the American peace

Page 24750

 1     initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.  Since we've opened up this topic, let me

 3     jump, right now, to a document, that is, 65 ter 4606.  And I'll be making

 4     references to this document both today and tomorrow.

 5             Mr. Granic, this is a presidential transcript recording a

 6     telephone conversation between President Tudjman and

 7     German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the 25th of August, 1995.

 8             MR. MISETIC:  If we could go to page 2 in the English, please.

 9     That's correct.  And scroll to the bottom in the English and to the

10     bottom in Croatian as well.

11        Q.   As you can see and read, they greet each other, and

12     Chancellor Kohl says -- he says actually in the middle:

13             "However, you have a lot of friends, I have three things that I

14     would like to discuss with you today."

15             The president says:

16             "Yes, please?

17             "The first one is something which is worrying me and that is this

18     international campaign, campaign at the international level in connection

19     with alleged or, rather, actual violations of human rights in the past

20     few weeks.  I think it is very important to prevent the creation of some

21     kind of anti-Croatian climate or atmosphere here, and actually, I have

22     been familiar with that for quite some time.

23             "I know, actually" --

24             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in Croatian.

25        Q.   "I know actually what all was going on behind my back here in my

Page 24751

 1     country in connection with my policy.  In connection" --

 2             MR. MISETIC:  If you could turn the page please, yes.

 3        Q.   "... with the recognition of Croatia.  I would therefore like to

 4     ask you, Mr. President, and I would like to ask you explicitly for your

 5     personal engagement in connection with this first thing that I mentioned

 6     and to do something resolutely against, in other words, ensure that

 7     something is done against such criticism in connection with human rights

 8     violations.  And if such criticism is justified, that you also engage

 9     personally on it.  This is a matter which is very important, and I would

10     gladly help you on that.  This campaign must not succeed.  An impression

11     must not be created in the forthcoming negotiations, within the framework

12     of the forthcoming negotiations, that Croatia actually does not wish to

13     take on the obligation, or rather, does not wish to observe all the

14     provisions of human rights."

15             President Tudjman responds:

16             "Mr. Chancellor, as you yourself have said, the reasons for that

17     campaign are known.  They are all those who are disinclined to Croatia.

18     It goes without saying that there were certain incidents over that, but

19     not on the part of the Croatian Army or official organs, you understand.

20     I had 400.000 Croats expelled, from those areas which have now been

21     liberated, 120.000.  Therefore, the bitterness of these people following

22     the liberation, following the departure of the army, could not be

23     restrained here and there.  As you can see, dear Chancellor, Ghali's

24     report in the United Nations is more objective already.

25             Mr. Granic, we will go back to the report of the

Page 24752

 1     Secretary General that President Tudjman references, but let me continue.

 2             Chancellor Kohl then says:

 3             "Once again, Mr. President, I understand that quite well.

 4     However, as a German, on the basis of my own experience, I know how it is

 5     with international campaigns, and, unfortunately, I had to realise that

 6     there was no benefit for me getting angry."

 7             Now, let's stop there because we're running short on time,

 8     Mr. Granic.  But you were someone, obviously, who was a very close

 9     advisor to President Tudjman.  You had a lot of experience were foreign

10     diplomats and politicians.  And let me ask you what -- when

11     Chancellor Kohl refers to a campaign and that campaign must not succeed

12     and then connects this with the issue of further negotiations, is this

13     related to your comments already about the strategic goals, and can you

14     explain how you would understand what Chancellor Kohl was warning

15     President Tudjman about with respect to a campaign and its impact on

16     future negotiations?

17        A.   This conversation and the attitudes of Chancellor Kohl were also

18     the attitudes of a sincere friend of Croatia who warned about certain

19     developments he had heard about and this campaign because he told me --

20     Mr. Kinkel told me at least 50 times that whatever happened in Croatia,

21     great -- blame Germany for it.  Was Germany the country that too early

22     supported the international recognition of Croatia, which happened

23     practically after the war ended?  In other words, this correctly

24     reflected the situation at the time, which means Croatia was about to

25     begin negotiations about the peaceful reintegration of the Danube basin

Page 24753

 1     and also the final resolution in Bosnia-Herzegovina was something that we

 2     were waiting for and Croatia was to be an important factor there.  It was

 3     difficult to achieve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina without Croatia, and

 4     that was the main reason why Chancellor Kohl talked in this manner to

 5     President Tudjman.

 6        Q.   And if I understand you correctly, these allegations would

 7     have -- would have hindered or hurt the possibility of the Croatian Army

 8     then getting support to engage in military operations in Bosnia; correct?

 9        A.   Undoubtedly.  Yes, that is correct.  Of course, if someone is

10     carrying out ethnic cleansing, he would not receive support for their

11     army conducting operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.  Let me finish up with this page here.

13             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in Croatian, please.

14        Q.   He says in the middle of the page in English:

15             "I'm giving you as a friend, as a friend who feels sympathies

16     towards your country, in your place I would actually invite some first

17     class, serious international, that is, foreign journalists, and then I

18     would personally talk to them, and within the framework of that

19     discussion, I would speak very openly, completely openly, about the

20     problems which you mentioned also, that means about the psychological

21     situation but also your resolve to represent the position that human

22     rights must be respected.  Think about my proposal, and if you decide

23     that you are going to do this, do it very soon because that is very good

24     for the reputation of your country."

25             The president says:

Page 24754

 1             "I will do something in that direction."

 2             And then he continues on after a comment by Mr. Kohl:

 3             "I was already intending I will speak tomorrow on the

 4     Zagreb-Split journey.  I will speak about that in Karlovac.

 5             Mr. Granic, you were with President Tudjman in Karlovac, and

 6     we'll take a look at that video tomorrow, but President Tudjman then, the

 7     next day in fact, did give a statement, a public statement in Karlovac on

 8     the Zagreb-Split journey condemning the burning and looting of property;

 9     correct?

10        A.   Yes.  President Tudjman gave such a statement, but the presidents

11     also notified me in conversation about this, and I had a series of

12     conversations when I talked openly to the media about what was happening,

13     that meant that there was burning and looting without any doubt, and that

14     this should be reported but that two things should be sharply divided.

15     One category were the incidents and even crimes, individual crimes that

16     did happen and ethnic cleansing is something else.  And I know perfectly

17     well what ethnic cleansing is and what Croatia had gone through during

18     four years of occupation and what was the planned and instigated

19     departure of the Serbian population which either did not recognise the --

20     the Croatian state or left because of fear and because they had

21     participated in the rebellion and had committed crimes.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I would tender 65 ter 4606.

23             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1816.

Page 24755

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 2             I'm addressing the Markac Defence.  Is there any need for further

 3     conversations with the witness in relation to late released ...

 4             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Your Honour, I will address that.  Yes, there

 5     is, and it will probably take less than an hour.  And that would be the

 6     last session, unless we get another disclosure.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, I'd like to give you the same

 8     instruction as I did yesterday, that is, that you should not speak with

 9     anyone about your testimony already given or still to be given with one

10     exception that you may speak to the Markac Defence about documents they

11     have received at a very late stage.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will strictly

13     adhere to your instructions.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And the Markac Defence knows already that it

15     is under an order, as I said yesterday --

16             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  By all means, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  And in order to avoid that I will be -- that this

18     Chamber will be put to the record as being the cause of the delay for

19     other Chambers, we now immediately adjourn and resume tomorrow, Thursday,

20     the 19th of November, 9.00, Courtroom III.

21                           [The witness stands down]

22                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

23                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day

24                           of November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.