1 Friday, 20 November 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning
9 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-06-90-T, the
10 Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
12 WITNESS: MATE GRANIC [Resumed]
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, I would like to remind you that you're
15 still bound by the solemn declaration you have given at the beginning of
16 your testimony.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, if you're ready to continue your
19 cross-examination, you may proceed.
20 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Waespi: [Continued]
22 Q. Good morning, Dr. Granic.
23 A. Good morning.
24 Q. Let's talk about the issue of the return of the Serbs. In
25 paragraph 10 of your witness statement, you say that in April 1998, you
1 strongly supported the plan and programme of refugees return to Croatia
2 And in paragraph 24, you mention an intensive programme of return of
3 refugees and displaced persons. Now, that's three years after
4 Operation Storm that these intensive programmes are implemented or
5 discussed; is that correct?
6 A. Mr. Prosecutor, the process of talks about the return of refugees
7 began back in Dayton
8 was the Erdut Agreement on peaceful -- on the peaceful reintegration in
9 of Croatian Podunavlje. And then in January 1996 I visited Belgrade, and
10 with the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
11 Milan Milutinovic, I started talks about the principles of protecting
12 private property and the return of refugees, and we issued a joint
13 communique in Belgrade
14 agreement on the protection of minorities that included the turn of
15 refugees. Several years later that proposal was accepted. Then on the
16 1st of August, 1996, during talks of heads of state and foreign ministers
17 of the Republic of Croatia
18 so-called Athens
19 protection of property and the return of refugees. Then in August I
20 signed in Belgrade
22 principle of protection of property of both physical and legal persons,
23 and it also regulated the issue of the right of refugees to return, and
24 it was only then in 1997 that main agreements were reached with the
25 UNHCR. And finally in the beginning of 1998, the preconditions existed
1 for such a plan and programme. Prior to that President Tudjman and the
2 Croatian parliament adopted the decision on amnesty. Many trust-building
3 measures and security-building measures needed to be put in place for
4 that plan to be implemented.
5 As for the speed with which all this developed, we drew on the
6 experiences of other countries and the experience of the UNHCR, and they
7 believed that our pace was very reasonable and that we took these steps
8 at the right time.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Granic. When you talk about the fact that UNHCR
10 said it was a reasonable pace, Ambassador Galbraith testified here that
11 only enormous pressure of the US
12 Mr. Tudjman agree on paper that Yugoslavia
13 in relation to the return. Do you agree that it was the enormous
14 pressure from the US
15 think about these programmes?
16 A. Ambassador Galbraith had frequent talks with me. We talked both
17 as statesmen and as friends. It's true that he put pressure for this to
18 happen as soon as possible. However, I needed no pressure from
19 Peter Galbraith; on the contrary. I myself was making efforts and worked
20 for this. You must not forget that there were various opinions within
21 the government. Whether it was the right time, not for the return of
22 refugees, Serb refugees, as such, but whether the time was right in terms
23 of the general atmosphere and the security of these refugees when they
24 return. In these discussions I was helped by the position of
25 Peter Galbraith, and I valued them greatly.
1 Q. Let's talk about another government, not the US government but
2 the French government, and you agree with me that also the French
3 government had concerns about the property loss, famous property loss,
4 and concerns about the issue of the Serbs returning to -- to the Krajina.
5 Do you remember that?
6 A. I do.
7 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, if we could have 65 ter 7478.
8 Q. And this is a note of a meeting between you, Dr. Granic, and
9 French Ambassador Gaillarde on 19 September 1995 in Zagreb. And I'd like
10 to show you first the cover page.
11 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, at least I have a problem that it's
12 not shown on my screen. I don't know how about my colleagues. Now it's
13 shown. Thank you.
14 Q. Do you remember meeting Ambassador Gaillarde on the 19th
15 September in Zagreb
16 A. Now that I see this signature of my chef de cabinet, yes,
18 Q. Let's move to paragraph 2. In English -- sorry, page 2 in
19 Croatian and page 3 in the English. I want to read out what
20 ambassador Gaillarde said or how he's quoted:
21 "Ambassador Gaillarde thanked the minister for seeing him at such
22 short notice and stressed that he had been given an instruction by his
23 government to present a bilateral verbal demarche because of the concerns
24 felt in Paris
25 observers, humanitarian organisations, the ECMM, and the UN, about
1 frequent case of endangering private property and persons in the recently
2 liberated areas. In addition, he expressed concerns about various legal
3 acts and administrative acts and project related to the return of Serbs,
4 especially the one announced -- especially the one announced on 4
5 September, which leaves only 30 days for the refugees to register for the
6 return. They are afraid that this decree means actual disposition.
7 Friends of Croatia
9 things sometimes look as if everything is being done to prevent their
11 Then there is a piece of information about the visit of the
12 president of the republic, and then in the second paragraph you answer
13 that it was decided to extend the deadline for those who wanted to return
14 and the parliament will also adopt it.
15 Now, this is again a clear indication from one of your friends
16 that things are going wrong in Croatia
17 Serbs; is that correct?
18 A. Thank you for showing this record of the talks between me and the
19 French ambassador. I must stress that a clear distinction has to be made
20 between two things. One thing is the return of refugees, and the second
21 thing was the protection of the enormous amount of property that suddenly
22 became the target of criminals, looters, robbers in various groups. And
23 when the Croatian government make the decision to take over that property
24 for management and administration, it was the first time we were handling
25 such a problem. There was not even much international experience with
1 this sort of thing.
2 There were all sorts of ideas, totally unacceptable, somewhat
3 acceptable. And finally it was decided to place this property under
4 protection. That's what our lawyers suggested.
5 The term of 30 days was not designed to prevent the return of
6 Serbs, because realistically speaking, there were no conditions at the
7 time for a mass return of the Serbs. I tried to describe the timeline of
8 all the steps taken for the Serbs to return. At that time, only
9 individual family reunions were possible, not return on a massive scale.
10 However, we took on board very seriously all the suggestions of the
11 international community, such as those of Mr. Galbraith and
12 Mr. Gaillarde.
13 In this instance we said -- I said that we are going to accept
14 these suggestions, that the deadline needs to be postponed. I must
15 emphasise that four months later in Belgrade, at a press conference and
16 jointly with Milan Milutinovic, the Yugoslav foreign minister, we said
17 that all the refugees who were not responsible for grave violations of
18 international law may return and that private property is protected.
19 Q. Thank you, Dr. Granic.
20 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this document.
21 MR. MIKULICIC: No objections, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit P2670.
24 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
25 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. Dr. Granic, do you agree with me that if you make these public
2 speeches or these negotiations with Mr. Milutinovic to press conferences,
3 all these efforts on paper are worthless if President Tudjman and others
4 around him publicly say that it would be impossible for the Serbs to
5 return to the place where their families lived for centuries?
6 A. I want to avail myself of the opportunity to say in my answer the
7 following: President Tudjman was a historian and a statesman at the same
8 time. There is a clear distinction between the two personalities. I
9 know that best as his foreign minister and his close associate.
10 In all that I was doing, I had his support. Without him, I would
11 not have been able to do anything.
12 Tudjman the historian is something different. He frequently
13 addressed the international community, from various ambassadors to
14 Presidents Clinton and Chirac, and presented his positions as an
15 historian concerning the relations between Croats and Serbs and
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. He said that to everyone who wanted to
17 listen. However, Tudjman as a statesman was a pragmatic man who
18 throughout, until his illness, abided by the recommendations of the
19 international community.
20 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, this happens again and again that you
22 put a question which allows the witness to comment on matters which may
23 be slightly related but which are not a real answer to your question.
24 Why not ask the witness whether he's aware of such statements and then
25 ask him on the basis of those statements. Then we know the context of
1 the statements. We know the exact text of the statements to the extent
2 it is available, and then to ask whether this would or would not
3 undermine any commitment on paper, because that's apparently what you
4 would like to know. And we now know that President Tudjman was an
5 historian and statesman, but an answer to your question, we have not got.
6 MR. WAESPI: Thank you -- [overlapping speakers]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps this is not the first that time this
8 happens, not only yesterday, but today as well. I think that it would be
9 appropriate that if you ask whether something is a short period of time
10 or three months and you get a lengthy answer, that you'd guide the
11 witness to your question again and to ask him to respond to that question
13 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, could you please carefully listen to
15 what exactly Mr. Waespi is asking you and to start with -- with giving an
16 answer to that question. And if Mr. Waespi wants to know more or
17 background, then of course he'll ask for more information. If at the end
18 of your testimony you think that very important matters have not been
19 brought to our attention, you will have an opportunity to add whatever.
20 But at this moment I invite you to focus on the question when answering
22 Please proceed.
23 MR. WAESPI: Thank you for your guidance, Mr. President.
24 Q. Occasionally, Mr. Granic, I try to lift my hand, but I will put
25 it on the record.
1 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, can we move to 65 ter 7501, please.
2 Q. This is a press report that relates to an interview Mr. Tudjman
3 gave to a German magazine called "FOCUS." Do you know the German
4 magazine "FOCUS"? Did you read it at that time?
5 A. Yes. I followed "FOCUS," among other publications.
6 Q. And it's dated 4th of September, 1995. And if we go just to the
7 last part, second page in English and second page in Croatian. Last
8 question. The interviewer asks:
9 "Can the 150.000 displaced Krajina Serbs go back home?"
10 "Tudjman: If the Krajina Serbs wanted to stay home, they would
11 never have left in the first place. The return of all of them is
12 virtually unthinkable."
13 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, if we could have the witness -- it's
14 not on the B/C/S side. If he could be shown the B/C/S.
15 MR. WAESPI: Yes, certainly. I apologise. I hadn't noticed
16 that. Yes, we have it now.
17 JUDGE ORIE: There it is.
18 MR. WAESPI:
19 Q. "In any case, this does not lie in the interests of a
20 normalisation of Croatian-Serbian interests, but we will adhere to human
21 rights and permit the Krajina Serbs to return in individual cases."
22 Now, did you read this interview with Mr. Tudjman in "FOCUS" at
23 that time?
24 A. No. No, I did not discuss this interview, but I can comment
25 off-the-cuff. These are Tudjman's historical estimates based on the
1 amount of people who did not wish for a Croatian state, the amount of
2 people who participated in the insurgency, and the number of people who
3 had committed grave crimes, that it was unthinkable. That's Tudjman's
4 historical evaluation, which proved to be right to a great extent.
5 However, Tudjman as a statesman and I as foreign minister worked
6 exclusively on the basis of international law, international treaties,
7 and everything that was needed to achieve the return of refugees.
8 Q. Dr. Granic, there is no qualification in President Tudjman's
9 answer about war criminals. The question of the interviewer was about
10 the 150.000 displaced Krajina Serbs. And President Tudjman, whether as
11 an historian or statesman, publicly, in a German newspaper, said that:
12 "The return of all of them is virtually unthinkable. In any
13 case, this does not lie in the interests of normalisation of Croatian
14 Serb interests." That's what he said.
15 MR. MIKULICIC: Sorry to interrupt. Could we please place in
16 time that piece of document.
17 MR. WAESPI: 4th of September.
18 MR. MIKULICIC: 1995.
19 MR. WAESPI: That's correct.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This period was a time when there
21 were still plans for an attack to be launched from the Federal Republic
22 of Yugoslavia
23 terrorist groups that would come to Croatia
24 time when the so-called government in exile was established, and its goal
25 was to launch terrorist attacks. So in other words, we should consider
1 the period at which this was stated by President Tudjman.
2 In my capacity as the foreign minister, as soon as the Erdut
3 agreement was reached, I believed, and I received support from
4 President Tudjman for that, that I should make efforts to have the Serbs
5 who were refugees return to Croatia
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, could I ask you one question. You put
8 this in the context of danger and attacks still to be considered. Could
9 you tell us where in the words reported to have been the words of
10 Mr. Tudjman any reference to this as a reason for at that moment not all
11 the Serbs returning is found?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is my
13 interpretation of Tudjman's statement. He did not consult me, nor did I
14 consult him, nor did I read this statement at the time, but I know his
15 line of thinking at the time.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, I asked you where in the text you find a
17 point of reference which would support this part of your interpretation
18 that it -- that this --
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have never read
20 this interview, so I cannot answer this question, except for the last
21 quotation. I don't know. I haven't read the interview.
22 JUDGE ORIE: But in that last quotation, where do you find a
23 reference that Mr. Tudjman may have been hinting at the threat of an
24 imminent attack or terrorist activities which would temporarily --
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In this answer given by
1 Mr. Tudjman, one cannot see that. I do not see it here. As I said, I
2 explained the context of the period, but I don't see it here,
3 Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
5 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
7 MR. WAESPI: I'd like to tender this document.
8 MR. MISETIC: No objections, Your Honour.
9 JUDE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P2671.
11 MR. WAESPI: I'd like to move to --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Exhibit P2671 is admitted into evidence.
13 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to move on to
14 the next document which is 65 ter 7473.
15 Q. And, Dr. Granic, that's a meeting between the president and the
16 prime minister Nikica Valentic, other people, on the 24th of April, 1998
17 a meeting that you did not attend. And I'll read a relevant part on
18 page 3 in English and page 5 in Croatian. And the issue at stake between
19 President Tudjman and Mr. Valentic is an incident, a resent incident in
21 President Tudjman says:
22 "They attacked him, and they wouldn't allow the Croats attend
23 the mass ... therefore, I think that the developments in Bosnia are good
24 for us, because they will become aware how silly their request is that we
25 should have all Serbs return to Croatia
1 Serbs to Croatia
2 Now, you weren't at the meeting. Were you aware of comments to
3 that nature President Tudjman said?
4 A. I'm not aware of this meeting. I did not attend it, so it's very
5 difficult for me to comment on it. But I do know that
6 Mr. Nikica Valentic was not the prime minister at the time. He was prime
7 minister until the month of August 1995, and at this point in time he was
8 not the prime minister. However, I do know that in the month of
9 April 1998 there were big discussions about the plan and programme for
10 the return of refugees and that there were differences within the
11 Croatian government, not whether the return of the Serbs should be
12 allowed but whether this was the right time for their return. There were
13 different opinions voiced, and at the cost of resigning my position in
14 the government, I requested from President Tudjman that he should support
15 the plan for the return of refugees, and President Tudjman finally did
16 support my position. I believe that it was quite democratic to discuss.
17 There were various opinions voiced, but eventually I got the support of
18 President Tudjman for the plan for the return of refugees, and this was
19 probably part of the discussions about the return, but I am not aware of
20 this meeting.
21 Q. But I suggest to you that this quote from President Tudjman in
22 explicit terms reveals what his true intentions were in relation to the
23 Serbs. Do you agree with me?
24 A. I talked with the president on many occasions. He believed that
25 a return en masse would not happen because many Serbs - and time proved
1 him to be right - did not wish to recognise Croatia as their state. That
2 was what Tudjman believed as an historian, and he often repeated that.
3 However, Tudjman as the statesman, and that was most important, supported
4 all the plans that I have talked about, let me not mention them again,
5 and this is a historical fact.
6 Q. Thank you, Dr. Granic.
7 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this document.
8 MR. MIKULICIC: No objections.
9 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, I have an objection. The objection
10 is before we put it into evidence, we get these transcripts and what
11 somebody said at a private meeting. But I believe the burden is on the
12 Prosecution to tie the transcript to some act of the government or some
13 policy or something on the ground. That's their 90(H) obligation. And
14 if that's case, then let's put it to a witness who is clearly -- here has
15 relevant information and knowledge, but we're not talking -- we're not
16 trying people for, you know, what somebody said in a private meeting,
17 but, rather, for something concrete, and I believe they have a burden to
18 now tie this to something to show that the policies that the witness has
19 testified about in fact were not implemented or other policies were
20 implemented or ...
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
22 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, the witness here came to testify and
23 did testify about these plans to allow the return, about the will of the
24 Croatian government, about the meetings they had the international --
25 internationals. And it's the position of the Prosecution that it is only
1 on paper that there was no will from the Croatian government to
2 implement, to invite the Serbs back, and this goes to support this
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Objection is denied. Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
6 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to tender the
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit P2672.
10 JUDGE ORIE: P2672 is admitted into evidence.
11 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. Now, you, Dr. Granic, had, as early as September 1995, some
13 doubts about the return of the Serbs as well. And I'd like to show you a
14 document that's already in evidence. That's P2540, a meeting of
15 9 September 1995
16 page 27. And the context is that you, Dr. Granic, and Mr. Zuzul talked
17 to the president about Mr. Bildt and discussed, you know, his
18 relationships with the Serbs and others, and you also discuss
19 international media. And then you say as follows:
20 "That's right --" in the middle of the English -- "I have used
21 the opportunity to explain one thing more. The Figaro and La Croix and
22 everyone was there about the question of Serbs and their departure, that
23 in this respect it's not realistic to expect those participating in
24 fighting to return. They cannot return. They won't return. Their
25 families, they do not want to return. Besides, Martic has announced a
1 guerilla warfare to at least 50 years. We must consider it. Therefore
2 we cannot have this factor of instability again. I wish to say that it
3 is possible to use our brains in defending our standpoint."
4 Now, do you remember having made this comment to the president in
5 September 1995?
6 A. Yes, and it is very logical. It is completely correct. At the
7 time when Martic announced that there would be guerilla warfare for
8 another 50 years, those people who had killed 14.000 people and wounded
9 36.000 and who had taken part in the fighting, I said that it was not
10 realistic that all of them would return, and I think that this was a
11 quite logical statement from my part, and I think that I also this in
12 public to the media in the same period. So put it precisely. Those who
13 had participated in the fighting, it is not realistic that all of them
14 should return. And this was precisely what was going on.
15 President Tudjman and the Croatian parliament adopted the law on amnesty
16 and abolition, but it was logical that it was not realistic that all such
17 people should return, and I do not see anything in this that is
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, I noticed that after 80 per cent of your
20 answers you're seeking eye contact with the accused. That is not common
21 for a witness to do, and I would certainly not encourage you to continue
22 to do that.
23 Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
24 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. I'd like to move on to 65 ter 7471, and this is a meeting of
1 11 August 1995
2 discussing the upcoming election.
3 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, before we move on to another
4 transcript, is there a point that the Prosecution wishes to put to the
5 witness about the last passage? He just was asked, did you say this?
6 And then we don't have the Prosecution putting its case, whatever the
7 case was, on the excerpt. What's the point?
8 JUDGE ORIE: He asked an explanation. Apparently Mr. Waespi is
9 exploring the attitude of political leaders during this period of time,
10 that is, from before, but mainly after Operation Storm on their attitude
11 to Serbs remaining, and if they have not remained on the territory of the
12 former RSK, what efforts were made to make them return in view of the
13 claims that they were welcome to remain living there, that they should
14 not leave. And as a consequence he's exploring the -- I would say the --
15 to what extent these were expressions of what really was on the mind of
16 those who spoke these words. That's what Mr. Waespi is exploring, and --
17 MR. WAESPI: That's correct, Mr. President, and -- and I outlined
18 what other people said, and I went on to say that the witness himself had
19 doubts about that. And there's a lot of cover, Mr. President, and I
20 would really like to move on and not be interrupted by Mr. Misetic.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic, you asked a question more or less,
22 rather than raising an objection. If you want to raise an objection --
23 MR. MISETIC: It is an objection, Mr. President. It's an
24 objection that we're moving through this case without the Prosecution
25 putting its case to the witness. While I understand your comment,
1 Mr. President, I didn't understand that that's the case of the
2 Prosecution. So hence the confusion that you're understanding one thing;
3 I believe Mr. Waespi is attempting to put something else. I certainly
4 didn't understand that the issue is -- concerns the Serbs who remained in
6 who left. And all of this is precisely the reason why I believe the
7 Prosecution should put to a witness what their case is and not leave it
8 open to interpretation.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I did not consider exploring these -- this
10 attitude as being -- as being -- I did understand it as being a factual
11 element in the case that is put by the Prosecution. But, Mr. Waespi, it
12 wouldn't damage - I would say, it would perhaps even be good - if you
13 explain to the witness what your case in this respect is to the extent it
14 is not yet clear to him.
15 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Q. Dr. Granic, I put to you that there was no will by the Croatian
17 government to get the Serbs who had left for whatever reason in the
18 aftermath of Operation Storm back, and you were among these people who
19 had serious doubts about whether it would be realistic to invite the
20 Serbs back.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, now what is the Prosecution's case
22 exactly in this respect? I can imagine that -- and as I said before,
23 that the fact you're exploring may shed some additional light on -- but
24 isn't it true that it's the case of the Prosecution that Operation Storm
25 was an instrument to expel the Serbs rather than -- and that an
1 obstruction for their return may have some meaning in this context, but
2 these accused are not charged with obstructing the return, but, rather,
3 they're charged or they are accused of joining in an exercise to drive
4 them out.
5 MR. WAESPI: This is correct. It shows the intent. It
6 corroborative of the element of intent, that we say they expelled the
7 Serbs, and we have discussed that yesterday about this international
8 reactions, again the corroboration, and this shows that the Serbs didn't
9 leave on their own, and now the Croatian government makes all these
10 efforts to invite them back. It shows the intent of what was in the mind
11 of the JCE members before Operation Storm was launched.
12 JUDGE ORIE: You would say the events after they left which are
13 indicative for -- the attitude of the political, military, and other
14 leaders is indicative for what they had on their minds during
15 Operation Storm when Serbs left, and as the Prosecution puts it, that
16 they were -- through Operation Storm they were forced to leave.
17 MR. WAESPI: Yes. In particular since the defence is that there
18 was no JCE because the Croatian government, you know, made all these
19 appeals, come back, all these programmes, and we say this is just not the
20 reality. That's the Prosecution's case.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, I was actually going to raise then
23 the objection. I'm glad that's on the record, but now given that
24 Mr. Waespi has put Mr. Granic's comments in the context of the mens rea
25 overall of a JCE, that must mean that he considers that Mr. Granic was
1 part of it. Given that the comment now is indicative of intent or
2 mens rea of before and during Operation Storm, we have not yet heard the
3 case put to this witness about the existence of a JCE before or during
4 Operation Storm and what he knows about it. And I was going to raise the
5 issue at the break that under 90(H) he has now put him in the JCE. He
6 needs to put his case to him about that.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE ORIE: Whatever you may submit at this moment the Chamber
9 does not see that Mr. Waespi is under an obligation to further put or to
10 put in further detail its case in relation to the testimony of this
11 witness and this witness. Please proceed.
12 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. Let me move on to the next exhibit, I'm not sure I announced it
14 yet, 65 ter 7471, a meeting - I think I might have discussed that -
15 involving the upcoming elections. And this is on page 14 in English and
16 page 64 in B/C/S.
17 The president says as follows:
18 "Moving on to item 3. The Presidency of the Croatian Democratic
20 the autumn. In this connection all the necessary legal preparations need
21 to be put in place, and one of the important decisions is to prepare a
22 list of members of national minorities - not only Serbs, but all the
23 national minorities - in these parts."
24 Ivan Milas:
25 "Establishing the number, that is a better way of putting it."
2 "Yes, establishing the number, yes." Then in brackets: "(In
3 order to protect the rights)(laughter)."
4 Now, Mr. Granic, do you remember having attended this meeting?
5 A. I certainly attended it, it's visible in the minutes.
6 Q. Do you remember the laughter after the protection of the rights
7 of the Serbs and all the national minorities were discussed?
8 A. I do not remember the details, but I'm not surprised. It is
9 certain that at the meetings of the VONS -- and I said also when the
10 issue how to protect the property was discussed, there were unacceptable
11 ideas voiced, the less acceptable ones and more acceptable ones. So not
12 everything that was said at the VONS meetings is wholly writ, nor were
13 all the people who discuss this thinking the same about the strategic
14 interests of Croatia
15 was. It was the period immediately following the conclusion of the
16 Operation Storm. It was a moment at which it was very probable and
17 possible that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would launch an attack
18 against Croatia
19 no chance at that moment that someone would return in an organised
20 manner. So at that point in time when the president made the decision to
21 slate the elections, a comment like this was also made. In my view this
22 comment was certainly inappropriate, and I do not support it.
23 Q. Thank you, Dr. Granic.
24 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this document.
25 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
1 Therefore, Mr. Registrar.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit 2673.
3 JUDGE ORIE: P2673 is admitted into evidence.
4 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 I would like to move to a meeting between President Tudjman and
6 Croatian ambassadors of the 18th August 1995, and this is 65 ter 4103.
7 Q. Now, discussed here are, among other things, public and
8 international media perception of Operation Storm and its aftermath.
9 Now, Mr. Granic, I don't see a reference, although there is one,
10 actually, later in the document. Do you remember having been present?
11 A. You should show that to me so I could see it. It says here that
12 I attended it so I probably did. But I was a foreign minister for seven
13 years and another two and a half years under a different president, so a
14 total of more than nine years, and I attended numerous meetings. I see
15 my name here at the beginning, so it's certain that I was there.
16 Q. Thank you, Dr. Granic. Let's move to page 30, and in English and
17 in Croatian it's page 52 out of 58.
18 Now, President Tudjman says, and the sentence starts in English
19 at the end of page 29 in English:
20 "But in practice the essence of the problem is that it would be
21 normal that Banja Luka belongs to the west part, and Tuzla to the east.
22 And then the problem would be resolved, because it's not the issue of a
23 demarcation between Croatia
24 And Russia
25 not only unpleasant for Croatia
1 west like we have them within 30 kilometres of Zagreb, but it's
2 unpleasant for the west as well."
3 Do you remember this quote by President Tudjman to the Croatian
5 A. I do.
6 Q. Do you think that's an appropriate comment from the head of state
7 about a minority in one's own country to call them -- to have --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. --
9 MR. MISETIC: We can't get the B/C/S screen -- I think the
10 transcript should be shown to him in the original.
11 MR. WAESPI: Yes, certainly. It's page 57 out of 58. Yes.
12 That's the correct page.
13 MR. MISETIC: I don't see the words "Banja Luka" on this page.
14 MR. WAESPI: Sorry, 52. I misspoke. 52 in Croatian. Yes. The
15 comment starts at the very bottom "Prema tome."
16 Q. So please read these first three lines, and then we move on to
17 the second page in Croatian. Go to the next page.
18 A. I cannot really see the page.
19 JUDGE ORIE: I think we're now at the top of this page where it
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I comment now? It's true that
22 President Tudjman as a historian had certain thoughts about the strategic
23 interests of both the east and the west, but I must stress that as the
24 foreign minister, I was the main negotiator on behalf of Croatia with the
25 US in Washington
1 And in all these talks, Croatia
2 partner for the west in stopping the war and achieving peace, and
3 President Tudjman supported me in this all the way.
4 MR. WAESPI:
5 Q. Yes. I'm not going into that. My question was related to this
6 comment of the head of State of Croatia talking to his ambassadors,
7 ambassadors to the world, including you, saying that:
8 "It's not only unpleasant for Croatia to have Serbs in Banja Luka
9 and on the west like we had them within 30 kilometres from Zagreb, but
10 it's unpleasant for the west as well."
11 Do you think that's an appropriate comment?
12 A. It's a comment of President Tudjman, but you must bear in mind,
13 sir, the time when it was made, the brutal war, the crimes committed in
15 time horrible crimes were still happening, and the horrible aggression of
16 Milosevic, Karadzic, and Mladic was ongoing. Tudjman is talking within
17 that context. It was not peacetime. It was still the time of a brutal
19 Q. Dr. Granic, you were actually in cold sweat when you were
20 listening to the speech President Tudjman gave in Karlovac when he told
21 the Serbs who do not accept the Croatian state not to come back anymore.
22 Isn't that correct? That's what you said in your book.
23 A. That's correct. At that time, I was the foreign minister, and my
24 entire thinking was primarily about Croatia's relations with the world.
25 President Tudjman was head of state. That's when he started his
1 electoral campaign, and he put it very precisely: Those who do not
2 accept the Croatian state. And he also said that there were torchings
3 and crimes on our part that must stop.
4 In that case it was not convenient for me as the foreign minister
5 that he should speak about Serbs at all, except to say that we need to
6 prevent crimes after Operation Storm. However, Tudjman must have been
7 talking, carried away by the realisation that approximately 90 per cent
8 of the population of Croatia
9 around 30.000 people in split were appealing to him to resolve the
10 problem of Vukovar, which he promised he would do in a peaceful way. But
11 certainly I as the foreign minister was thinking more about international
12 talks. And for me diplomacy was the highest priority, and that meant
13 that not one more word must be said that could offend our friends in the
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat the last thing he
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, you're invited to repeat the last words
18 you said. I read to you what is now at the transcript:
19 "... and that meant that not one more word must be said that
20 could offend our friends in the world."
21 What did you say following the phrase I just read?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After that I said those who were
23 the target of Tudjman's message, namely Serbs who did not accept Croatia
24 as a state, did not really care at all about whatever Tudjman may say.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
1 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
2 Q. So are you saying that you were sweating cold because of the
3 image of Croatia
4 President Tudjman? You did not care about, you know, how the Serbs who
5 might be listening - after all, they were also addressed - to this speech
6 by President Tudjman, about how would feel about their head of state
7 talking about them?
8 A. Sir, I devoted a number of years of my life to accommodating
9 displaced persons, refugees, and the return of the Serbs. And at least
10 twice in my career I risked my entire career because I fought for the
11 return of the Serbs, and I offered my resignation even to
12 President Tudjman for the sake of this. I wanted every person who was
13 exiled from Croatia
14 fundamental principle of the UNHCR. Refugees must be returning of their
15 own free will. I'm the last person whom you can accuse of not caring. I
16 cared. I cared for every individual Serb to return, everyone who wanted
17 to, and I said many times. All of these are historical documents from
18 the Dayton Accords and the talks on the normalisation of relations, and,
19 finally, the plan for return of refugees. I succeeded. And finally
20 every Serb was enabled to come back to Croatia, everyone has guarantees
21 for their own private property, and I can say that I did succeed in the
23 Q. Actually, I wasn't asking about your concerns, but let's move
24 on --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, if you ask the witness whether he had --
1 was in cold sweat because he didn't care, you are asking him about his
2 feelings at that moment, and then if he explains that, you can't say, "I
3 wasn't asking about your concerns," because you were.
4 MR. WAESPI: I apologise, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
6 Q. Let's go to the next issue. This is Grubori. You were, I
7 believe, asked in chief already about the incident of Grubori, and we
8 have now D1812 in evidence, which you have been shown by Mr. Misetic. If
9 we could call D1812, please.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: Sorry to interrupt, Your Honour. If I remember
11 well, my examination-in-chief has never touched the issue of Grubori.
12 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I apologise as well for Mr. Misetic who showed
13 the document to the witness. It's -- it was 65 ter 7486, and I believe
14 it's now D1812.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
16 MR. MISETIC: This is not the document, I don't believe, that
17 Mr. Waespi's looking for.
18 MR. WAESPI: Yes, that's correct. Perhaps let's focus on
19 65 ter 7486. And hopefully we have a B/C/S translation. Otherwise, I'll
20 read briefly the key issues. This is an Associated Press document.
21 Date's 28 August 1995
22 "The new footage taken by the UN in southern Croatia
23 houses in flames and two Serb civilians slain in their homes."
24 Then the village of Grubori
25 Mr. Flynn saying that almost every structure in this hillside village is
1 in flames. And then we come to you, Dr. Granic:
2 "Following a meeting with European union diplomats on Monday,
3 Croatian foreign minister Mate Granic called the incidents isolated
4 events which express the frustrations of people whose property was
5 entirely destroyed.
6 "Granic told diplomats that the government shortly would issue
7 precise data related to Croatia
8 rebel-held land."
9 Now, do you remember the incident of Grubori and that you made a
10 comment stated or picked up a Associated President.
11 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your Honour, I'm going to object to that. It
12 was established yesterday that the comment was unrelated to Grubori, and
13 I think it's misleading to present this witness as stating that this
14 comment was related to Grubori.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi --
16 MR. WAESPI: I'm fine to ask him --
17 JUDGE ORIE: -- we have two -- Mr. Granic is reported and
18 questions were put to him to put clearly, and, of course, to put Grubori
19 in the context of a four-day blitz offensive needs at least further
21 MR. WAESPI: I can ask the witness directly.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but let's not repeat any questioning that has
23 occurred already at an earlier stage of his testimony.
24 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 If we could move to P602, please. P602 should be a letter by
1 Elizabeth Rehn to Dr. Granic. If we could move on to the next page,
2 please. Yes. That's the letter I'm interested in.
3 Q. Dr. Granic, this is a letter from Elizabeth Rehn the Special
4 Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, and it goes to you. And
5 she talks about the Grubori case.
6 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps if we could move to the second page in
7 Croatian as well. If there is one. Yes. Here we have it.
8 Q. Now, Mr. Granic, do you remember having received a letter from
9 Elizabeth Rehn in relation to the Grubori events?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. Now, this letter is fairly detailed, if you recall the letter or
12 you can briefly go through it. It discussed --
13 A. I've been through it.
14 Q. It discusses the number of civilians killed, states that the
15 entire hamlet was set ablaze, discusses the fact that a group of Special
16 Police had been observed, the time of the incident, registration plate
17 numbers, and Ms. Rehn is requesting information in paragraph 2 on page 2
18 of the actual letter. And in Croatian it's also the next page.
19 Ms. Rehn asks:
20 "Will you please let me know the identities of the persons who
21 used these vehicles?"
22 And Ms. Rehn asks other questions in this respect.
23 Now, I take it you remember that you did respond to Ms. Rehn's
24 letter. Do you remember that?
25 A. I do. When I received that letter I talked to my associates, and
1 I asked the chief of the section for human rights in my department to ask
2 for an official report from the Ministry of the Interior. I had heard
3 before that that a incident had occurred in Grubori, but in the Croatian
4 press it was described as a clash with terrorists. So until I received
5 the letter from Elizabeth Rehn, not much attention was given to it. So I
6 asked for an official report, and based on that official report I
7 answered the letter pursuant to the official information provided by the
8 Interior Ministry.
9 Q. So by the moment you received the letter 27 February 1996, not
10 much attention was placed on it, despite the fact that there were public
11 international media report about that as early as late August 1995.
12 A. First and foremost, I was foreign minister. I dealt with the
13 most important talks about war and peace, both on Bosnia and Herzegovina
14 on the process of peaceful reintegration, or normalising relations with
16 The letter was addressed to me as foreign minister, although we
17 had a vice-president for humanitarian issues. I answered courteously
18 based on official reports that I received from the interior ministry,
19 although it was not my area of competence.
20 Q. Let's look at your response to Elizabeth Rehn, which is a Defence
21 exhibit -- Defence document 3D00532, and it's a letter dated 26th of
22 June, 1996. So a few months after the letter you received from
23 Elizabeth Rehn. And I take it you read English, Dr. Granic.
24 A. It's all right.
25 Q. Now here you inform Elizabeth Rehn that:
1 "Regretfully the investigation of this serious crime has not
2 yielded any results, but efforts are made to identify the perpetrators.
3 As soon as any results are available, I will inform you of that."
4 Now, did you ever get back to Ms. Rehn about Grubori, about any
5 new results you might have been informed about?
6 A. I don't remember. I was in touch with her several times, but I
7 don't remember if we discussed Grubori again. I received Mrs. Rehn as
8 the foreign minister, and we co-operated very well, but humanitarian
9 issues were not my area of work apart from the fact that as foreign
10 minister I led negotiations with Belgrade
11 modalities of the return of refugees, but I was not in charge of
12 humanitarian issues or investigations.
13 Q. But do you agree with me that the letter of Elizabeth Rehn we
14 have seen a moment ago was really detailed and should have allowed you --
15 not you as a person, but the Croatian authorities, judicial authorities,
16 to pick that up and do a serious investigation?
17 A. I agree that these reports whether they are completely accurate
18 or not should have been enough to start a serious investigation. I agree
19 with that.
20 Q. Would there be an example of what you said yesterday, that the
21 German -- the Croatian judiciary didn't show enough perseverance in
22 addressing the crimes in the aftermath of Operation Storm?
23 A. Personally I was advocated a greater degree of firmness. For
24 instance, when we received reports about Varivode which was a clear case
25 of crime, we discussed it immediately at a cabinet session. I personally
1 believe that every case needs to be investigated through and through and
2 perpetrators found, and that it was very important for moral reasons,
3 that it was important for Croatia
4 MR. WAESPI: I'd like to tender the response of Dr. Granic.
5 MR. MIKULICIC: No objections, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P2674.
8 JUDGE ORIE: P2674 is admitted into evidence.
9 Mr. Waespi, I'm looking at the clock.
10 MR. WAESPI: Yes, it's a good moment.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 MR. WAESPI: I finished the Grubori incident.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Let me inquire whether you still -- whether you're
14 still confident that you'll conclude your cross-examination in the next
16 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I am.
17 JUDGE ORIE: You are.
18 Then I'm looking at the other parties. As matters stand now, how
19 much time would be needed for re-examination, Mr. Mikulicic?
20 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour, as matter stands now, I will need
21 20 minutes.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: At least half an hour -- at most half an hour,
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 I'm looking at the other parties.
2 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, I was going to ask for 15 minutes,
3 but I'll work with Mr. Mikulicic to make sure we can finish today.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll have a break, and we'll resume at five
5 minutes to 11.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 11.14 a.m.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, I'm regretting now that I asked before
9 the break whether you were confident that you could finish within the
10 next session.
11 Mr. Granic, you know that the breaks and the pauses and meeting
12 are often busier than the meetings themselves. Urgent Tribunal matters
13 kept me out up to the point where even the other Judges were considering
14 to sit under Rule 15 bis, but let's get started.
15 Please proceed.
16 MR. WAESPI: Thank you. I think I'll be done in half an hour or
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
19 MR. WAESPI: First of all would I like to tender the document we
20 discussed before the break which is 65 ter 4103 that related to the
21 meeting on the 18th August 1995.
22 MR. MISETIC: No objections, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P2675.
25 JUDGE ORIE: P2675 is admitted into evidence.
1 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I would also like to at
2 this point to tender the excerpt from Dr. Granic's book which was -- I
3 think it received an exhibit number.
4 JUDGE ORIE: It was MFI
5 like to add any portion selected by them, we'd hear from them. That's
6 the present situation.
7 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Before I continue, Dr. Granic, before testifying here in
9 The Hague
10 Gotovina Defence?
11 A. Before I came here I talked to them while I was in Zagreb when I
12 gave my statement and when we were making arrangements. And when we
13 received the materials as the Bench instructed me, that was when I talked
14 to them.
15 Q. Yes. I was interested in the Gotovina Defence, the Defence --
16 members of the Defence team of Mr. Gotovina, for instance Mr. Misetic or
17 Mr. Kehoe or some other members of the Gotovina Defence team. Did you
18 talk to them?
19 A. I talked with members of -- Mr. Mikulicic, Mr. Rendulic, and
20 Mr. Tom Kuzmanovic.
21 Q. So you did not talk to members of the Gotovina Defence.
22 A. [No interpretation]
23 Q. Thank you, Witness.
24 I'd like to go --
25 A. No.
1 Q. -- to an issue you discussed with Mr. Misetic about the refugees
2 and the speech by Ms. Ogata. Let me first show you 65 ter 7508, which is
3 an Agence France Presse report dated 26 September 1995, and it discusses
4 the joint Croatian-Bosnian plan to second tens of thousands of Bosnian
5 refugees in Croatia
6 Bosnian Serbs. And it apparently has upset humanitarian agencies. The
7 UN officials were, and I quote, "Extremely concerned at the prospect of a
8 mass repatriation of refugees given the unstable situation in Bosnia
9 And there's a comment by the UNHCR as well.
10 Now, where you aware that there was these concerns by
11 international organisations with Croatia
12 into Bosnia
13 A. I am aware of this, after the Operation Storm and after the
14 signing of the agreement, or to put it more precisely, after the
15 Washington Agreement was signed there was some discussion to the effect
16 that the Croats and the Bosniaks return to the area that were safe. I
17 know that the international community was actively involved in this and
18 wished that the return not be fast, but that it should proceed strictly
19 according to the plan. I know that there were some difficulties, and
20 personally I was in favour and I supported the positions of the
21 international community.
22 Q. And that relates to Bosnia
23 A. Yes, correct. It was the return of the Croats and the Bosniaks
24 to the territories within the federation that were safe.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. WAESPI: I'd like to tender this document, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
3 Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P2676.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
6 MR. WAESPI:
7 Q. Now if we could have D690, and that's the speech of Ms. Ogata you
8 were shown yesterday. And I'm sure you recall our discussion about that
9 or your discussion with Mr. Misetic yesterday.
10 Now, on page 2 of that document we have the heading of
11 "Refoulement." Here Ms. Ogata reports the following:
12 "In the past two months, more than 3.000 Bosnian and Muslim
13 refugees have been forcibly returned from Croatia to towns in Western
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina recently captured by Croat and Muslim forces such
15 as Glamoc, Bihac, Velika Kladusa, Bosanski Petrovac, and Kluj. Some of
16 these areas are close to front lines and are believed to be heavily
18 The next paragraph:
19 "Moreover, recently the government of Croatia has decided to
20 revoke the status of refugees originating from federation -- the
21 federation and newly captured territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina
22 part of a plan to begin returning them home."
23 Now, would you agree with me what Ms. Ogata is discussing here
24 are the so-called mass repatriations in Bosnia discussed in the article
25 which we saw a moment ago?
1 A. I know precisely what issue this was and what this was all about
2 so that I can answer all your questions relating to this.
3 Q. Yes. I'll just move on asking -- quoting a couple of parts from
4 the Ogata speech. But my question to you right now is: What Ms. Ogata's
5 talking about here is the same issue we have seen in the media article
6 just a moment ago?
7 A. Yes. More or less it is the same issue.
8 Q. Now, Ms. Ogata went on to say:
9 "I fully appreciate that the more than 200.000 Bosnian refugees
10 in Croatia
11 I also strongly believe that repatriating large numbers of them at this
12 time, when neither a comprehensive peace has been achieved, nor
13 rehabilitation work has yet begun, would be premature. The refugees have
14 already suffered enough in exile. Let us not compound their plight by
15 returning them to an area which is neither safe nor ready to receive
17 Would you agree that this reflects a concern about Bosnia and
18 that the numbers are too high?
19 A. After the Washington Agreement, the government of Bosnia and
21 should begin as soon as possible, and in particular the Bosniaks were
22 very sensitive, and they wanted the Bosniaks from Croatia not to leave to
23 third countries, and the plans were made at the appeal and at the request
24 of the government of the Federation for them to return as soon as
25 possible. However, then as we can see, Ms. Ogata and the high
1 commissariat intervened and they requested that the rules of return be
2 strictly adhered to, and that meant that there could be no quick return
3 until all the conditions had been met and the security was complete.
4 Personally, I supported Ms. Ogata's position. The plans were
5 made, and this position was fully taken into account, the position
6 expressed here by Ms. Ogata.
7 Q. And one of the concerns she had is that to a certain extent the
8 conflict in Bosnia
9 large numbers of refugees into Bosnia
10 A. In the areas where the refugees were supposed to return there was
11 no fighting any more, but it is a fact that a great part of Bosnia was
12 occupied and that according to the assessment of Ms. Ogata there was
13 still no conditions for all these refugees to return. Personally, I
14 think that this was correct, and I supported this position.
15 Q. Now let's go to page 4 of the document, speech by Ms. Ogata in
16 English, and I think Mr. Misetic drew your attention to that section
17 where Ms. Ogata discusses three phases of refugee repatriation. And this
18 is in the third paragraph on this page which starts with "Secondly."
19 A. Mm-hmm.
20 Q. And I read the last one or two sentences of that paragraph that
21 starts with "Secondly."
22 "Returning large numbers of refugees to areas which are not yet
23 ready to receive them can have very serious consequences not only for the
24 refugees themselves but for the stability in the area concerned. I am
25 thinking particularly of the still fragile situation ... of the
2 Now, what Ms. Ogata is talking about is -- the Federation is
4 A. Yes, that is correct.
5 Q. And that's what she was discussing in the first part of the
6 document when we looked at these comments about Velika Kladusa,
7 Bosanski Petrovac, and so on; is that correct?
8 A. The Bosanski Kladusa issue is completely different, and she
9 described it very nicely, so I would ask you to say a bit more about
10 this. This 100.000 people related to other areas within Bosnia and
13 The issue about Kladusa was that Mr. Abdic's forces fought, these
14 were the forces of Bosniaks headed by Mr. Abdic, against the 5th Corps of
15 the BH army, that is to say the official government of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And after the conclusion of the operations in which
18 these refugees fled before the 5th Corps into Croatia. So they just
19 crossed the border into Croatia
20 request of the official government of Bosnia-Herzegovina that they
21 returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the other hand there was the
22 wish of these people who were still under great influence of Mr. Abdic
23 that they remain in Croatia
24 So we were under pressure of the official government of Bosnia and
1 Ms. Ogata. Germany
2 remained in Croatia
3 Q. Yes. Thank you. The only issue I was interested in was whether
4 in your understanding Ms. Ogata was talking about events, the stability
5 of the area in -- in Bosnia
6 A. Yes. She was thinking about stability in Bosnia, in the area
7 around Bihac, because the 5th Corps of the BH Army had won, and she had
8 justified fears that there might be retaliation.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Granic. Let me turn to my last issue, and that's
10 something you have discussed yesterday.
11 You told us yesterday -- you remember when we were exploring your
12 knowledge about events, especially about when you heard for the first
13 time about crimes, torching, looting, killings, committed by members of
14 the Croatian Army. You remember that discussion?
15 A. Yes, I remember everything I said yesterday.
16 Q. Now, you said, and I quote you from yesterday's transcript --
17 unfortunately, I don't have the comprehensive numbering -- at pages 127,
19 "The first information I got as far as torching and looting is
20 concerned that they," members of the Croatian Army, "were involved I
21 began to receive sometime in September. I don't know exactly when. We
22 had what we call rumours. Rumours began to reach me that there was
23 involvement in individual cases of the army too."
24 Now, let me show you a couple of documents. The first one is
25 P2159, and this is a -- the witness statement which evidence of
1 Mr. Lausic. In e-court it's paragraph 45, in English. And I can already
2 read the last sentence of paragraph 212, and this discusses knowledge of
3 the Croatian leadership, about crimes. The last sentence in paragraph
5 "I can say with certainty that the highest level of the military
6 and state were informed on a daily basis of all the cases of crimes
7 committed and military indiscipline for the entire territory of the
8 Republic of Croatia
9 That's the first quote. Let me move to D49. And D49,
10 Dr. Granic, is a very urgent report from Josko Moric to police
11 administrations all over that area, Dalmacija. 18 August 1995. Now,
12 here's what Mr. Moric says:
13 "Written and oral reports by police stations and police
14 administrations show that there are daily cases of torching of houses and
15 illegal taking away of people's movable property in areas liberated in
16 Operation Storm.
17 "Most of these acts are perpetrated by individuals wearing
18 Croatian Army uniforms. The facts indicate that these individuals are,
19 formally and actually, members of the Croatian Army, but there are also
20 individuals who are not members of the Croatian Army but are wrongly
21 wearing Croatian Army uniforms."
22 This is 18th August, 1995. It goes to the chief of police
23 administrations, crimes committed by members of the army.
24 And the last document is D506. This is a document as early as
25 9 August 1995
1 Mr. Susak, Defence Minister; Zvonimir Cervenko, chief of the
2 General Staff; Miroslav Tudjman, the director of the Croatian
3 intelligence service; and other people including Mr. Tolj [phoen].
4 If we go to the second page, we see that Mr. Lausic reports that:
5 "There are grave problems because of the large number of HV
6 members in the settlements, and their commanders do not exert influence
7 over them so that there are attempts at random plunder and burning of
9 And then he proposes appropriate measures.
10 Now, you as the foreign minister selling the Croatian state of
11 affairs to the whole world, you were on the basis of rumours you say you
12 received in September that army members have been involved in these
13 crimes. That's your basis despite the fact that it was well known within
14 the Croatian authorities, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, that
15 almost from the outset members of the Croatian Army were involved in
16 crimes. How do you explain that?
17 A. Mr. Prosecutor, as you can see, none of these memos were
18 addressed to me. At the time, according to the constitution, we had a
19 semi-presidential system in which I as the foreign minister reported to
20 the president of the country about diplomacy and foreign affairs.
21 Mr. Susak, as the defence minister, reported about Defence. Mr. Jarnjak
22 as the interior minister reported about the internal affairs. No one
23 meddled with anyone else's affairs. This was not allowed.
24 I never received any memos either from the Ministry of Defence or
25 the Ministry of the Interior except for official discussions at
1 government meetings and other official discussions at the meeting of the
2 VONS, or if we requested official written reports about certain specific
4 I have told this Tribunal that I was personally touched very much
5 when I heard in late August that the scope of crimes which occurred in
6 the ground was more widespread than I had known before that, thanks to
7 what I had heard through official reports. So this was the reason why I
8 could not have received such information except if I had heard them
9 officially expressed at the government meeting or at the meeting of the
10 council for national security.
11 And another thing, up until that time, around the month of
12 September, it was being talked about people in uniforms. It was then
13 that I heard that some members of the army also participated in the
14 torching, looting, and everything else.
15 Q. We heard yesterday from you, and it's part of your book, that you
16 had meetings with Mr. Susak, with Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Jarnjak, all these
17 people, throughout August, and they never informed you, despite fact that
18 you raised this issue with them, what information they had received from
19 the ground.
20 A. Say it very precisely, Mr. Prosecutor. It was a time when I met
21 Mr. Susak and Mr. Jarnjak at official meetings, because simply there was
22 too much work for me to hold any private meetings with them. This just
23 didn't happen. It was only at official meetings, and the only situation
24 when I requested to have a meeting with them was when I heard the
25 information from many sources, as I said yesterday, that the scope of the
1 problems on the ground was much greater than I had been aware of
2 previously. That was when I requested to hold separate meetings with
4 Q. The question I was asking you is whether Mr. Susak, as an
5 example, raised with you the information he received on 9th of August, in
6 relation to the army committing crimes. That should have been important
7 information for you to receive when you talked to your interlocutors at
8 the international level.
9 A. Before this Honourable Court I said very precisely yesterday, and
10 I wrote in my book exactly what I heard.
11 Q. Is it possible then that you were completely out of tune of what
12 was happening, that people did not inform you of what they heard or saw
13 or were informed about what was happening, really happening, on the
15 A. I have to repeat once again. I told what I had heard and what I
16 knew, but now I'm saying with hindsight that Minister Susak must have
17 believed he was capable of dealing with the problem himself on his own,
18 but that's what I'm -- what I can say only with hindsight.
19 You must remember that as the foreign minister I was simply
20 elsewhere every other day dealing with foreign affairs. My primary job
21 was communication with the international community, continuing the US
22 peace initiative, opening talks with Belgrade. The events following
23 Operation Storm and the crimes that occurred inflicted great damage to
24 all my efforts, that's certain. As a human being, as the foreign
25 minister, as a diplomat, I was inflicted. I was enraged over every
1 torched house, over every murder. I was deeply unhappy about all that.
2 I was doing all I could. And when I realised that this evil could not be
3 stopped with the speed that I thought necessary, I turned to the media,
4 and I wanted wide coverage in order to stop that evil as soon as
6 Q. Thank you, Dr. Granic. I have no further questions for you.
7 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Waespi.
9 Mr. Mikulicic.
10 Re-examination by Mr. Mikulicic:
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, you'll now be re-examined by
12 Mr. Mikulicic. Mr. Mikulicic, as you know, is counsel for Mr. Markac.
13 Please proceed.
14 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Granic. Yesterday in the course
16 of your evidence and the day before yesterday, on several occasions you
17 mentioned the number 3 or 4.000 crimes that were prosecuted and the
18 illegal nature of the acts that occurred after the liberation.
19 A. Yes, I remember.
20 Q. And when Judge Orie asked you where you got that number, said
21 you'd heard it at a cabinet session or in the media.
22 A. It was at an official cabinet session, and it was covered by all
23 the media.
24 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can I have D1339, please.
25 Q. Dr. Granic, we'll now see a document that has been exhibited, and
1 it provides certain information that the Defence of accused Markac
2 received from the Republic of Croatia
3 MR. MIKULICIC: I was asking for 1331. I'm sorry, I saw in
4 transcript that it was wrongly mentioned, 39. It has to be 1331. Sorry
5 for that.
6 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, through official channels we
7 received from the Ministry of Justice a document containing the numbers
8 for prosecutions and crimes that occurred after Operation Storm.
9 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can you open page 3 of this
11 Q. At the bottom we see a table showing the total number of crimes
12 and criminal proceedings. The first line is the number of indictees and
13 criminal acts, 3.978. The next line shows that there were 1.949
14 judgements; out of which 1.492 guilty verdicts, that is convictions;
15 179 acquittals; and 278 reversals of judgements.
16 The statistics that we got from the Ministry of Justice, does it
17 remind you of the sources that you used when you got that number, 3 to
18 4.000 crimes?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. MIKULICIC: Just for a reference, let me also call -- or,
22 rather, refer to D1392, which is the white paper containing the same
24 Q. Can we now call D429.
25 Mr. Granic, when you were cross-examined by the Prosecutor and
1 questioned by the Trial Chamber, there was also the issue of the total
2 number of refugees who returned eventually to Croatia. Let us wait for a
3 second to see the document.
4 This is a table made by the Ministry for Public Works and
5 Reconstruction, department for refugees. You see that up to 2nd December
6 1996, total returnees were 123.469. It's in column number five from the
8 Does this number correspond to what you mentioned in your
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Can we now call P2671. This exhibit that we will soon see was
12 discussed between you and the Prosecutor, and it's a document from the
13 4th of September, 1995.
14 Tudjman is quoted on the last page when he said regarding the
15 issue of whether 150.000 Krajina Serbs may return home, President Tudjman
16 answered it was unthinkable for all of them to return.
17 In your answer you explained your understanding of the context,
18 and then the question followed if military operations were still ongoing
19 and what the security situation was.
20 Can we see page 2 in the Croatian where the journalist asks
21 President Tudjman, What will happen if the conflict in Eastern Slavonija
22 cannot be ended peacefully, will there be a new offensive?
23 Tudjman says:
24 "Yes. In the following three months, we will do our utmost to
25 achieve a peaceful solution, but if that is impossible, we will have no
1 choice but to mount a new operation."
2 Mr. Granic, at the time of this interview in September 1995, in
3 the state political leadership was the military option still under the
4 consideration in order to recover occupied territories?
5 A. We hoped and we believed -- let me be very pragmatic. The
6 international community, especially the US, we hoped would help us
7 achieve a peaceful solution, but we were obviously prepared to go for the
8 military option if necessary.
9 Q. In that political environment at the time, when the military
10 option was still on the table, was it possible to proceed with a
11 systematic return of refugees?
12 A. Not only was it impossible, but even if we had wanted to proceed
13 we would not have received the support of the UNHCR. We had heard a
14 moment ago from the Prosecutor about the positions of Mrs. Sadako Ogata
15 concerning the federation. I supported them at the time. And the same
16 was true of Croatia
17 not the time to think about systematic return, only individual returns,
18 and individual returns proceeded very intensively as you can see from
19 that table.
20 Q. Could you place in the same context the events that occurred
21 after the liberation action of Storm concerning the regrouping of the
22 fugitive military conscripts from the occupied territories and from the
23 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
24 A. Certainly. Those were indisputable facts. Karadzic and Martic
25 were boasting that they were recruiting younger refugees into the Army of
1 Republika Srpska, that they were also setting up terrorist units, that
2 they had created a government in exile. So at the time the possibility
3 that a part of the Croatian territory would again be cut off by actions
4 mounted from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That was a high
5 priority for Croatia
6 foreign minister at UN Security Council sessions [as interpreted], I
7 think that about 14.000 [as interpreted] of our soldiers were deployed on
8 the front line facing the FR Yugoslavia.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic, you're on your feet.
10 MR. MISETIC: Yes. Just if you'll give me the leeway,
11 Mr. President. At page 48, line 7. It was interpreted as UN Security
12 Council sessions, and I believe the witness said --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Let's ask the witness.
14 You said: "If I remember well, the reports I had as the foreign
15 minister at ..." some sessions. What session were you referring to?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The National Security Council of
18 Thank you, Mr. Misetic.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
20 MR. MIKULICIC: I've just been advised by my colleagues,
21 Your Honour, that there is also doubt on number that witness mentioned,
22 so could we ask him again. Is it really number of 14.000 or some other
23 number he had in mind he had mentioned.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic --
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thirty thousand soldiers were
1 deployed on the eastern border.
2 JUDGE ORIE: This all being on the record, please proceed.
3 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Can I now ask for
5 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, there was also talk about a decree
6 of the Croatian government that was later written into law, the decree on
7 the provisional restriction over administration of abandoned property.
8 That decree gave course to great reservations and comments.
9 I'll show you the transcript of the 262nd session of the Republic
10 of Croatia
11 MR. MIKULICIC: Well, I'm afraid this document that we are
12 looking at the screen is not the right one that I'm looking for. This is
13 a, let's say, summary of that government's meeting, and I was asking for
14 the transcript of the meeting which is 3D00968. But let me check,
15 Your Honour, just a minute, please.
16 So we could go to the second page in English, and six page in
17 Croatian version, please.
18 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, at this session the cabinet
19 discussed the idea and the need to adopt a decree restricting the
20 disposal of property. And Mr. Misetic, whom you mentioned as deputy
21 prime minister in charge of this work is giving a statement of reasons in
22 the first passage.
23 I'd just like to repeat, there are several categories of property
24 and several categories of citizens involved. Page 3 in English. And
25 Mr. Misetic goes on to say what property this is, and he says, first of
1 all, this is the property of the citizens of Croatia who on that
2 notorious 17th of August, when the aggression against Croatia started,
3 left for the occupied territories.
4 What here does he mean when he says 17th August as the date of
5 aggression against Croatia
6 A. 17th August 19 --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat, please.
8 MR. MIKULICIC:
9 Q. Mr. Granic, the interpreters did not hear you.
10 A. 1990. 17 August 1990
11 Q. It is clear now. So this is one category of property that was
12 included in the decree, and then the deputy prime minister Misetic says
13 the following in the same paragraph:
14 "Then we are dealing here with the property of natural persons
15 and legal entities, citizens of the then republics of Serbia and
18 And in the next paragraph he talks about the third category which
19 was actually the subject of discussion here, and that was the property of
20 those citizens, primarily of those in the occupied territories, who left
21 the Republic of Croatia
23 All these three categories of property are rated by this law as
24 the property without the proprietor, as their proprietors left the
25 Republic of Croatia
1 And then Mr. Misetic talks about the purpose for adopting this
2 law. And he says the purpose of this law is to make this property
3 subject to proper management as the good governor would do in order to
4 avoid an unfathomable damage to this property, as well as to ensure that
5 through the proposed fashion of management and manipulation of this
6 property a number of Croatian citizens, primarily the Croats who were
7 expelled by the Serbs from other areas and from other countries, would
8 benefit from this property, primarily from the area of the former
10 And then if we turn the page in Croatian - the English page we
11 have is okay - Mr. Misetic further says somewhere around the top third of
12 the page, this is what he says:
13 "There have been quite a few proposals and opinions. The final
14 proposal of coordinating bodies for internal affairs and of all others
15 who took part in the creation of this law is that all this property is to
16 be sequestered by the Croatian state. Therefore, meaning that the State
17 of Croatia
18 in a law or in an enactment that this is property of the Republic of
20 Mr. Granic, is your recollection to this -- to these events in
21 accordance with this as it was expressed by the deputy prime minister?
22 A. Yes. My recollection is exactly the same. I'm not a lawyer, but
23 what I know precisely and what I advocated as the foreign minister was
24 that by this, the issue of property would not be resolved, but
25 exclusively the protection of property at that point in time. And of
1 course as it is noted here, there were between 25 and 30.000 refugees,
2 mostly Croats who had been expelled from Bosnia and Herzegovina, from
3 Republika Srpska, from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and who were
4 in the area. And another thing that was considered was to allow them to
5 use houses that had not been damaged in order to resolve the humanitarian
6 problem. So the priority was only to protect property rather than to
7 resolve the issue of the property. And I know this precisely for the
8 following reason: After several months, on the 10th of January, 1996
9 said in Belgrade
10 the 31st of August I signed the agreement on the normalisation in which
11 this was set out.
12 Q. Thank you for your answers, Mr. Granic. I have no further
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
15 MR. MISETIC: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
16 MR. MIKULICIC: Sorry, Your Honour, I forgot something.
17 Could I tender into the evidence the last document. It is
19 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1823.
22 JUDGE ORIE: D1823 is admitted into evidence.
23 Further cross-examination by Mr. Misetic:
24 Q. Good afternoon again, Dr. Granic.
25 A. Good afternoon.
1 Q. First, let me clarify something because there may have been some
2 confusion. You did not meet with the Gotovina Defence after you began
3 your testimony. But prior to your testimony we did have a meeting,
4 Mr. Kehoe, me, and yourself, in the offices of the Markac Defence the day
5 you arrived in The Hague
6 A. Yes, that's correct.
7 Q. Now, you were asked some questions, and this is Exhibit P2675, it
8 is a presidential transcript, and you will recall that the -- that there
9 was a comment taken about President Tudjman speaking to his ambassadors
10 about his views concerning Serbs in Banja Luka and -- as well as Russia
11 influence and how the west would also be impacted by Serbs in Banja Luka
12 Now, I'd like to show you or play for you an audio of a meeting
13 between President Tudjman and Mr. Holbrooke on the 17th of September
15 Mr. Galbraith is also present, and again it's the same topic,
16 Serbs in Banja Luka, Russia
17 by this. So if we could take a listen to a broader context of that line,
18 and then I'll ask you some questions about that.
19 MR. MISETIC: Mr. Registrar, I believe this is 65 ter 1D357.
20 [Audiotape played]
21 "[Interpretation] To suggest to them such a territorial division
22 whereby Banja Luka would go to the Western part of the Federation and
24 humane solution, that they are not ethnically clean. Therefore, let the
25 Serbs remain in the Federation as well as the Muslims and the Croats in
1 the Serbian part. Based on the reciprocal guarantees of human and ethnic
2 equality. In that case we would have a boundary between the East and the
3 West, between Russian and Western influence for the future, so that we
4 wouldn't have to fear any future war."
5 MR. MISETIC: Now, Mr. Granic, what President Tudjman was talking
6 about is Serbs staying in Banja Luka, but being part of the Muslim/Croat
7 federation. And Tuzla
8 but becoming part of the part of the Republika Srpska. Is that accurate?
9 A. That's completely accurate. If I may give you a brief comment on
10 that. Your Honours, sometime around, I believe, the 14th or the 15th of
11 June 1995, in Geneva, the Contact Group at the level of ministers where I
12 was also present on behalf of the Republic of Croatia
13 that in the future Bosnia and Herzegovina there will exist
14 Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that
15 the relation would be 51 to 49 per cent, but nothing was decided about
16 the demarcation of borders between Republika Srpska and the Federation of
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
18 After the joint operations of the BH Army, the HVO, and the army
19 of the Republic of Croatia
20 was the time before the Dayton
21 borders, and President Tudjman was, therefore, talking about a very
22 legitimate option, legitimate because there was no demarcation of
23 borders. It was just talking in principle about the relations. And when
24 on the 14th of October, 1995, about which I testified, when the State
25 Secretary Christopher called me and so did embassy --
1 Ambassador Holbrooke to President Tudjman and told us to stop before
2 Banja Luka. They also called President Izetbegovic and
3 President Tudjman. It was only then that the Americans said, No, don't
4 go for that, and we are not in fair of this option. So up until that
5 time it was a legitimate option.
6 Q. Okay. Mr. Granic, on the basis of President Tudjman's comments
7 that what he wants is for the territory to be part of the federation, the
8 territory of Banja Luka, but he's prepared to accept that Serbs would
9 stay in Banja Luka -- the comment that was read to you in P2675 about how
10 "it would be unpleasant for Croatia
11 the west like we had them 30 kilometres from Zagreb, but it is unpleasant
12 for the west as well," is President Tudjman there referring to Serb
13 people, or is he referring to Serb entities like the RSK and the
14 Republika Srpska?
15 A. In that context he meant drawing the borders between
16 Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he
17 noted, and this was a well-known opinion that he held, that the Serbs in
18 Banja Luka were western oriented just like the Serbs in Tuzla
19 connected with Belgrade
20 mind at the time.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, I tender 65 ter 1D357 into evidence.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, no objections?
24 MR. WAESPI: I'm sorry, I -- this was which document?
25 MR. MISETIC: It's the audio with the transcript.
1 MR. WAESPI: Yes. No objections.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that becomes Exhibit D1824.
4 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence into evidence.
5 MR. MISETIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. Mr. Granic, you were asked quite a lot of questions about your
7 knowledge of crimes committed by members of the Croatian Army, and I'd
8 like to explore -- explore that topic a bit because it was put to you
9 that either you knew about them or that other people were lying to you
10 about this issue. So let's see if we can quickly go through that.
11 You've already seen, and we went through this yesterday so
12 there's no need to pull this up again, but the transcript of the
13 conversation between Mr. Radic and President Tudjman which took place on
14 the 22nd of August, which is Exhibit P463, at page 5 where Mr. Radic is
15 saying that it is not the Croatian Army but the 5th echelon that is
16 committing these crimes.
17 If we can move to another document, which is Exhibit D426. And
18 you will note that this is a closed-session meeting of the Croatian
19 government on the 23rd of August. We'll wait for the English translation
20 to come up, but, Mr. Granic, you will see at the bottom in the Croatian
21 you were not present for this meeting, but if we turn the page in
22 Croatian and stay on the first page in English, you'll see that present
23 was, in fact, your then deputy minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Sanader;
25 A. Yes, that is correct.
1 Q. And would -- if Mr. Sanader as your deputy attended a meeting, a
2 closed-session meeting of the government, would you receive a report from
3 him or from somebody else to you because you were absent telling you what
4 the meeting was about or what was discussed at the meeting?
5 A. If it was something very important, he would have told me.
6 Q. Well, let's -- let's take a look, if we may, at English page 21,
7 Croatian page 42. It's the bottom of the page in Croatian, the bottom
8 paragraph, and it's the third and fourth paragraphs on the English page.
9 Now, these are the words as recorded of the prime minister,
10 Mr. Valentic, and speaking to the government he says:
11 "Speeding up the procedure of solving citizenship issues, the
12 Ministry of Administration should speed up the procedure as much as
13 possible ..."
14 And if we could turn the page in Croatian, please.
15 "... of course the social and health care, as we have arranged,
16 have to be intensified in the areas where people live regardless of their
17 nationality. Special care has to be provided to the Serb population.
18 There is no need to mention how important this issue is today in both
19 political and humanitarian terms, and it has to be outspoken that all the
20 liberators who are liberating for the third time, those are the worst,
21 they must be prevented. After the army had passed and the war is
22 virtually over, some fake heroes emerged who are the most dangerous for
24 want to find" -- I think it says, "if they want to fight they should tell
25 us, and we will send them. There are several front lines where fighters
1 are needed, but we will not allow them to fight around Knin and around
3 Now, Mr. Granic, first, can you explain in case it's unclear,
4 when the prime minister says, "those who are liberating for the third
5 time," what is he really referring to?
6 A. All those who were committing crimes, and most of them were
7 wearing Croatian Army uniforms. And I have said this a number of times.
8 I was difficult to distinguish then because most of the people were
9 wearing the Croatian Army uniform in this area, and I think that it was
10 only logical that the criminals who went there in order to loot, it was
11 easier for them to enter these areas if they were wearing uniforms. What
12 I can also say is that the prime minister believed at the time that
13 whoever was committing crimes was doing this against Croatia, and he
14 never made any distinction who it was. Whoever was doing it was doing it
15 against Croatia
17 had been liberated and that they were causing the greatest damage for
19 Q. And is it correct to say that the assessment was as Mr. Valentic,
20 the prime minister, lays out, that it was after the army had passed and
21 the war is virtually over that that's when some "fake heroes" emerged,
22 that that was the assessment at the time?
23 A. Yes, that is correct.
24 Q. You'll note in the next paragraph, and -- he says -- now he's
25 talking about the decree on property. He says:
1 "... is very significant. We are aware of all the constitutional
2 restrictions. You are familiar with my position. We will not allow any
3 violence, but we have to do something. It is better to find a
4 preliminary solution than to allow anarchy. We will find a
5 constitutional and formal way to find a solution, a preliminary solution
6 which will lead us to a final solution of that issue. No one can keep it
7 under control. We do not have sufficient army and police to keep under
8 control 30 or 40.000 apartments."
9 Now, Mr. Granic, was that in fact one of the reasons for the
10 property law, the fact that Croatia
11 security of the housing that was placed under the law?
12 A. That was the main reason, Mr. Misetic.
13 Q. Now, would the prime minister, Mr. Valentic, would he have been
14 able to express these kinds of views and implement policies towards
15 fixing the security situation on the ground had that been in conflict
16 with President Tudjman's objectives?
17 A. No. That would have been impossible. If he had a different
18 opinion, then Prime Minister Valentic would go to see President Tudjman
19 and would have told him his opinion because he was a very independent
20 man. So this was really his sincere opinion, and it was not contrasted
21 with what President Tudjman believed.
22 Q. Let's look at another conversation on the same day. So these are
23 now -- this is the third conversation within the two-day period. This is
24 Exhibit D890. And you were asked several questions about whether
25 Mr. Susak or Mr. Jarnjak were lying to you.
1 And if we could go to page 9 in the English. This is a meeting
2 between Minister Susak, Minister Jarnjak, and the president on the 13th
3 of August. It's on page 9 in the English and page 17 in the Croatian.
4 Now, at the top in Croatian and the upper middle part in the
5 English, Mr. Jarnjak is speaking, and he says:
6 "There's a huge problem that now after Storm and after Flash" --
7 he says, "however, there's a huge problem that now after Storm and after
8 Flash there are now again so many weapons in private hands, explosives
9 uncontrolled, that is simply -- I don't know. We will now pass this law,
10 and we will have to launch a massive campaign for the return of these
11 weapons. Look, I know of rifles, automatic ones, anything you want."
12 And Minister Susak says:
13 "Mr. President, here in a house, a private house, to get in there
14 and find 100 kilogrammes of explosives, that's nothing."
15 Now, if we could turn the page in English, please, and in
16 Croatian. And then towards the bottom in English. Actually, if we could
17 scroll up to the top in English, please.
18 Mr. Susak says:
19 "We are doing this without a law. What we're dealing -- what
20 we're doing with the mobilisation, because we're simply taking away by
21 force ... there is no law saying what you're allowed to do and what
22 you're not.
23 "There was a law stating what is allowed and what is not," this
24 is Mr. Jarnjak, "but the problem is that nobody will report, nobody will
25 report anybody. You have plenty of grenades."
1 Now, if we scroll down a bit and turn the page in Croatian,
3 Mr. Susak then tells the president:
4 "But they hand in the weapons they were issued officially. But,
5 Mr. President, what they had now in the operation, especially the home
6 guard and the reserves, they wouldn't record anything they took. We gave
7 him a rifle, and he will return the rifle to us. But the fact that he
8 took two more on top of that, that's something we have no record of."
9 Now, Mr. Granic, the three conversation I've now referenced to
10 you took place over a period of two days, the 22nd and 23rd of August.
11 All of them are private conversations not for public consumption, not to
12 deceive the international community. Was it in the fact the case that
13 the assessment of the Croatian government which you were reporting at the
14 time was that these were being committed after Operation Storm by persons
15 not under the control of the Croatian government?
16 A. First of all, I see these talks for the first time, but I'm
17 familiar with the context, and the context is quite accurate. That means
18 there were problems with demobilisation and the retrieval of weapons,
19 there were many, many weapons out of any control. And of course these
20 men were wearing uniforms, they had weapons plenty, and it was easy for
21 them to get together into criminal gangs. That was a huge problem.
22 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, I have approximately ten minutes of
23 questions left.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll first have a break, Mr. Misetic. We'll
25 have a break, and we'll resume at five minutes to 1.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic, please proceed.
4 MR. MISETIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 Q. Mr. Granic, you were asked some questions about Bihac, and you
6 were shown the, as Mr. Waespi referred to it, the famous Brioni
7 transcript. The suggestion that was put to you was that Bihac had become
8 a pretext by the 31st of August, and I'd like to ask you some questions
9 on the following: First of all, were you aware that Mr. Akashi had, on
10 the night before the Brioni meeting, sent a fax to President Tudjman
11 where he had essentially claimed that Mr. Martic had agreed to a six
12 point agreement which included that he would withdraw from Bihac. Were
13 you aware that the president had received such a communication from
14 Mr. Akashi the night before the Brioni meeting which would be the 30th of
16 A. I know only in general terms about it, and President Tudjman told
17 me about it himself.
18 Q. Well, were you aware that in fact Mr. Akashi had not reached an
19 agreement because Mr. Martic had backed out of the agreement.
20 MR. MISETIC: And for the reference of the parties and the
21 Chamber, this is the testimony of Mr. Akashi at transcript page 21690,
22 beginning at line 10.
23 Q. That in fact Mr. Akashi had sent that message to
24 President Tudjman even though he knew at the time that Mr. Martic had not
25 agreed to the six-point plan including the withdrawal of his forces from
1 the Bihac area? Did you subsequently learn that?
2 A. Yes. We had precise information that Mr. Martic was not
3 intending to accept any kind of agreement, that his intention was to join
4 Karadzic's forces and move forward to capture the occupied territory of
6 Q. Now, Mr. Granic, Mr. Galbraith testified in this case, and an
7 audio of his meeting with President Tudjman on the 1st of August, which
8 would be the day after the Brioni meeting, was played in court, and this
9 is at transcript page 8 -- sorry. Transcript page 5029, beginning at
10 line 8. And the audio shows that Mr. Galbraith had reported to
11 President Tudjman the day after the Brioni meeting:
12 "Today, however, we see little sign that the Serbs are
13 withdrawing from their siege of Bihac, little sign that they are
14 honouring previous agreements, that is, the oil -- opening the oil
15 pipeline, little sign that they are engaged on the issues that you have
16 raised, opening the railroad connection or beginning negotiations on
17 political summit, and little sign that they are prepared to allow UNCRO
18 to exercise its full mandate, and if so, we have no immediate optimism
19 about negotiations on a political settlement."
20 Now, were you aware, in fact, that after the Brioni meeting, the
21 day after, the ambassador to the United States advised President Tudjman
22 that the United States saw little sign that the RSK Serbs were
23 withdrawing from their siege of Bihac and little sign that they were
24 honouring previous agreements? Were you aware that the ambassador had
25 told the president that?
1 A. Yes. Yes, I am aware. President Tudjman told me so himself.
2 Q. Now, the decision to actually launch Operation Storm was reached
3 at the VONS meeting on the 3rd of August and not the Brioni meeting on
4 the 31st of August -- 31st of July; correct?
5 A. Quite correct.
6 Q. By that time, I believe you've already testified, but let's
7 confirm, by that time Bihac was in fact one of the strategic objectives
8 of launching Operation Storm.
9 A. One of very important strategic objectives. I, as the foreign
10 minister, was in daily contact either with the foreign minister Sacirbey
11 or with Haris Silajdzic who was the prime minister or with President
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Granic.
14 And the final topic is this issue of Mrs. Ogata, the UNHCR, and
15 the turn of refugees.
16 MR. MISETIC: If we could please have on the screen Exhibit D690
17 again, please. And if we could again go to page 4, please.
18 Q. Now, you were shown the portion in the paragraph that begins
19 "Secondly," and in the middle of the page there's the following two
21 "Returning large numbers of refugees to areas which are not ready
22 to receive them can have very serious consequences not only for the
23 refugees themselves but for the stability in the area concerned. I am
24 thinking particularly of the still fragile situation in the area of the
1 Now, when you were asked about whether Mrs. Ogata meant -- was
2 she exclusively referring to the federation in your understanding of what
3 UNHCR's policies were in terms of when large numbers of refugees should
4 be repatriated, or was this a principle of UNHCR that applied to all of
5 the republics of the former Yugoslavia
6 A. Quite certainly it applied equally to the federation and the
7 Republic of Croatia
8 Q. And on this point as someone who dealt extensively with the
9 issue -- well, let me ask you the question. As minister of foreign
10 affairs you've talked about you dealt with the issue of refugee returns.
11 You were familiar with that issue as it connected to -- as that issue is
12 interconnected throughout the countries of the former Yugoslavia. In
13 other words, the issue of refugee returns to Croatia was related to the
14 issue of refugee returns to Bosnia
16 A. As deputy prime minister, I worked intensively for accommodating
17 refugees and displaced persons for almost two years. As a foreign
18 minister, I discussed the topic frequently, although Professor
19 Albert Rebic, who was a member of the cabinet and directly in charge of
20 displaced persons and refugees was the main person dealing with it. But
21 since this was often the topic of international discussions, I was
22 well-versed with the whole issue and the problems involved as a foreign
24 MR. MISETIC: Mr. Registrar, if we could have Exhibit D691,
1 Q. Mr. Granic, this is a record of the meeting of the
2 Security Council on the 5th of September, 2002, and I'd like to use this
3 just to discuss the principles that we've discussed now, and this will be
4 my last question.
5 If we could go to page 5 in this document, please.
6 The discussion is about Kosovo. It is three years after the
7 conclusion of hostilities in Kosovo, and this is an address to the
8 Security Council by the assistant -- Assistant Secretary-General for
9 peacekeeping operations, Mr. Annabi, A-n-n-a-b-i.
10 And if we could scroll down, please.
11 If you look on your screen, Mr. Granic, on the left-hand column,
12 Mr. Annabi says:
13 "In this context, recent statements by Kosovo Serb internally
14 displaced persons that they are planning to block the crossing points on
15 the administrative boundary line with Kosovo later this month if they are
16 not allowed to return en masse are cause for concern. Although the
17 impatience of internally displaced persons is understandable, given the
18 still delicate state of intercommunal relations, any action along those
19 lines would only be counter-productive and would be harmful to the return
21 The next paragraph says:
22 "There cannot be artificial mass return. UNMIK's return policy
23 is based on the right of individual return in an organised way so that it
24 can be sustainable. This requires careful preparation on the ground to
25 ensure that the physical infrastructure - meaning houses, employment, and
1 access to public services - is in place to welcome the returnees. It
2 also requires a careful handling of relations with the neighbouring
3 Kosovo Albanian communities to diminish the potential for return-related
4 security incidents."
5 Now, you were -- it was put to you this morning by Mr. Waespi
6 that the Croatian plan was passed in June 1998, and it was suggested to
7 you that this was an unreasonable delay in enacting this Croatian
8 government programme. We see here that even three years after the Kosovo
9 conflict was over the United Nations itself was opposed to mass return,
10 and instead was espousing certain principles in the Security Council.
11 Were these the principles upon which Croatia's return policy were
12 based as outlined by Mr. Annabi concerning Kosovo? Are these
13 international principles?
14 A. Yes, the very same principles that Mrs. Sadako Ogata referred to.
15 And when we were making the programme, we were making it together with
16 the UNHCR and with the international community. Of course the
17 international community was impatient for as many people to return as
18 soon as possible, but we stuck to the recommendations of the UNHCR.
19 And there's another thing. As this report clearly says, it was
20 necessary also to achieve an internal consensus. That was not an easy
21 thing to do. A consensus that the time has come for massive returns.
22 And I believe that at that time the unanimous consensus in Croatia
23 finally reached that an organised massive return of refugees is possible.
24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Granic, for your answers.
25 MR. MISETIC: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Misetic.
3 Any questions from the Cermak Defence?
4 MR. KAY: No, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: If you'd give me one second.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 Questioned by the Court:
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, I would have a few questions for you.
9 You remember that you were asked about what President Tudjman said during
10 a meeting with Mr. Holbrooke, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Galbraith.
11 Could I have P449, page 17 English, page 33 B/C/S.
12 I think you explained to us that President Tudjman, when saying
13 that he'd be very content if about 10 per cent of them returned, that he
14 meant to say at least 10 per cent, not more than 10 per cent. That's --
15 and you explained that you could interpret this on the basis your
16 knowledge of the thoughts of President Tudjman.
17 A. Correct, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Could I take you -- no. Let me -- you also told us
19 that human rights, that it was always intended that human rights would be
20 observed in relation to minorities, including Serbs. Is that also
21 correctly understood? It's very much a --
22 A. Correct. Correct, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Could I take you to -- could I take you to P461,
24 page 54 in the B/C/S. And I'm not interested at this moment in the
25 English version, I would say for obvious reasons.
1 This page 54 out of 64? Could we then move to page 55.
2 Could I invite you to read the portion at the top of the page
3 where Mr. Susak is speaking, and then after that to read the words of
4 President Tudjman after that. Just read them for yourself.
5 A. I've read it.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Could you comment on what President Tudjman says
7 here in relation to human rights.
8 A. I did not attend that meeting, so I'm not the best person to
9 comment. I think this is a transcript from Brioni, isn't it?
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 A. I know only what I discussed myself in the break with
12 President Tudjman, and I know one thing, that even our friends in the
13 world were saying -- not the Americans, but let's say the Germans, they
14 were saying we don't have the forces for a rapid military operation. The
15 president talked to the soldiers --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, if you want to say at any later stage
17 something you discussed during the break, that's fine. But I'm asking
18 you your comments of this part of the transcript in relation to the words
19 used by President Tudjman. And if you would like to add anything at a
20 later stage, you're free to do so.
21 A. The president -- and I repeat I wasn't there at the meeting. The
22 discussion was about a flyer inviting local Serbs to stay and
23 guaranteeing their civil rights. Quite certainly that was not -- it was,
24 in fact, a time before a military operation that had yet to be won. I
25 cannot really comment, because in my discussions with Tudjman, it was
1 never questioned that we would guarantee civil rights to the Serbs. I
2 cannot say any more because I did not attend that meeting. And this
3 thing, I guarantee ostensibly civil rights, that that's not something
4 that Tudjman ever told me.
5 JUDGE ORIE: You do understand his words then, although you
6 explain to us that this comes as a surprise that President Tudjman here
7 expresses that the rights of Serbs might or would not be observed. Is
8 that ...
9 A. Your Honour, that's right. This is a discussion before the
10 military operation with the military leaders. It's not a discussion with
11 the government or the foreign minister or with those officials in charge
12 of human rights or international conventions and treaties. This is a
13 discussion with the army. Since wasn't there, I can't say any more.
14 JUDGE ORIE: If you would have seen these words, would you have
15 spoken with President Tudjman, and would you have explained to him that
16 you could not agree with this? Is that ...
17 A. If I had seen this or if I had been there, then I would have
18 said, "Mr. President, we have to honour human and civil rights very
19 honestly and sincerely." That's how I would react in any other
21 But I think -- I mean, you see this is a different context, and
22 this is a sentence that's really cut off, that trails off. I cannot say
23 with any certainty what President Tudjman meant 15 years ago. I think he
24 was speaking exclusively about a flyer that may help achieve military
1 As for human rights, if anyone in my hearing ever said ostensibly
2 in connection with human rights, my reaction would always have been the
3 same. We have had honour human rights always, everywhere, and that's our
4 supreme principle.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, which would contradict ostensibly observing
6 human rights.
7 A. I think, Your Honour, that the president certainly didn't mean
8 that we would ostensibly respect human rights. I think this sentence
9 belongs in the context of a conversation to which I was not present, and
10 I cannot give any further comments.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, apparently the president used the word
12 "toboze." Is there anything you would like to tell us about the use of
13 that word by the president? Did he often use that? Do you have no
14 recollection of him using it?
15 A. Yes, he used it sometimes. I said that the president was not a
16 diplomat, although he was a statesman. He was an expert in the modern
17 understanding of human rights, but it's indisputable that every move I
18 made -- and I did all I did to protect the Serb minority and all
19 minorities, the protection of property and the return of refugees. Every
20 movie made was supported by Tudjman. And as for his communication
21 skills, he had been an outcast from public life for a -- for a long time,
22 and he was not an expert in international treaties or human rights.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Is it true that you earlier said that he was not an
24 expert in the modern understanding of human rights, because on the
25 transcript it appears as if he was an expert, but you told us he was not
1 an expert. Is that correctly understood?
2 A. I said, and I stand by it, the president was not a diplomat, and
3 he was not an expert in modern understanding of human rights, but he had
4 a very good basic understanding that the highest standards of human
5 rights must be guaranteed to Serbs in Croatia. He understood that very
7 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have any idea, if you know, please tell us,
8 what was good about the confusion that was apparently the chaos that was
9 apparently sought? If you know. If you've got no idea, then please tell
10 us as well.
11 A. No. No, I know nothing about this. I cannot comment.
12 JUDGE ORIE: From any other conversation, because you were not
13 present here, have you gained any understanding of how showing people the
14 way out would encourage them not to leave?
15 A. I know nothing about the session itself except that it was held
16 and that President Tudjman discussed the military readiness of the army
17 to execute the task of liberating the occupied territory of Croatia
18 emerging at the borders as well as the military assistance to Bihac. And
19 of course the third point was the assistance to the US peace initiative.
20 Now, I spoke to the president myself that day --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Until now you have told us what the meeting
22 was about. I asked you whether you had any conversation. So I see that
23 you now come to that point. Please proceed with your answer.
24 A. I spoke to him that day myself. The president asked me to give
25 him a precise evaluation at the international level, the US evaluation,
1 and the evaluations of the leading states in the world. I shared with
2 him those appraisals, and I said that the presidential statement will be
3 heard at the Security Council, and I repeated this: We have to honour
4 the international conventions on the laws of warfare. We have to respect
5 civilians. We have to respect the UNCRO soldiers, and the operation has
6 to be swift. That's the same thing our friends are recommending,
7 especially the US
8 everyone will have as much respect for us as we have respect for
9 international convictions and the international humanitarian law. And he
10 said, Okay. I'll convey this to the soldiers and to Minister Susak.
11 JUDGE ORIE: I understand this answer that you had no
12 conversation in which, as I asked you, that you gained any understanding
13 of how showing people the way out would encourage them not to leave,
14 because I do not find any response to that question in your answer.
15 May I take you now to P463.
16 A. No. That is correct, Your Honour. I did not talk to him about
17 this, and I cannot say anything.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's -- could I take you to P463. Page 14
19 in the B/C/S and page 10 in English.
20 Now, let me see. Did I make a mistake? Is this 46 -- there we
22 This is a transcript of a conversation between the president and
23 Mr. Radic. Could I ask you to read the words spoken by Mr. Radic, but
24 perhaps we should move to page 15. No. Perhaps I'll invite you to start
25 reading at -- no. We are here at 14. Could we move to page 13. When
1 I'm talking about pages, I'm referring to e-court pages, and this seems
2 to be a problem.
3 Could you start reading the observations at the bottom of -- next
4 page, 14 e-court.
5 Could I ask you to read the last portions of what Mr. Radic said.
6 Once you finish this page, please tell me so we can move to the next
8 A. Yes, we can move to the next page, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: You earlier told us that because of your knowledge
10 of the thoughts of President Tudjman, you could interpret his reference
11 to being happy with 10 per cent to return, that that would be -- not less
12 than 10 per cent.
13 The text you've just read where Mr. Radic said:
14 "We should by no means let more than 10 per cent of Serbs be here
15 ever again, because that's where we were cut off."
16 Where the president said "not even 10 per cent," I have some
17 difficulties in reconciling your interpretation of what President Tudjman
18 said to Mr. Holbrooke, Clark, and Galbraith with what he says to
19 Mr. Radic. Could you help me out?
20 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
22 MR. MISETIC: I'm not sure if -- well --
23 JUDGE ORIE: No. Let --
24 MR. MISETIC: I think we established yesterday what we were
25 talking about.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I would like to -- yes. Nevertheless, would I
2 like to put this to the witness.
3 A. Your Honours, I can assist you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Please.
5 A. Thank you, Your Honour.
6 This was, of course, a private conversation between Jure Radic
7 and the president that I was not familiar with. This is the first time I
8 see the transcript. But in the transcript it says very clearly that
9 Jure Radic says that in that area there should be no more than
10 10 per cent of Serbs, rather than only 10 per cent of Serbs or less
11 should return to the Republic of Croatia
12 Jure Radic is saying here that as many Croats as possible should be
13 returned to this area so that the number of Serbs in the area would be
14 less than 10 per cent. And, frankly, there was not a session of the
15 government or the VONS, the security for the protection of national
16 security, where this was mentioned. These are the positions at the time
17 of the minister who was in charge of demographic reconstruction and who
18 believed that this area that had been vacated by both Serbs and Croats
19 should be repopulated by as many Croats as possible. That was the issue,
20 rather than the issue of return of Serbs to Croatia, but that as many
21 Croats should be brought to this area as possible. And of course, these
22 were the views that were never realised, and there was never any session
23 of the Croatian government where any conclusion of this kind was adopted.
24 JUDGE ORIE: What was the percentage of Serbs in the area
25 referred to before Operation Storm?
1 A. In that area, and it was an area with mixed population, so
2 probably there were equal per cents. I don't know exactly, but I suppose
3 that in the wider area there were equal numbers of Serbs and Croats,
4 perhaps even some more Serbs. It depends on the area that Jure Radic had
5 in his mind. And I don't know which exact area he had in his mind here,
6 but it was an area with a mixed population of Serbs and Croats. I don't
7 know exactly because I cannot see from this which area he had in mind and
8 how large an area.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Do the words "We should by no means let more
10 than 10 per cent of Serbs be here ever again," is that just mathematics,
11 or is it more?
12 A. I think this only refers to mathematics. Obviously, Jure Radic
13 had an idea that as many Croats as possible should inhabit this empty
14 area. And let me also say that none of these ideas ever came into being,
15 and no topic similar to this one was ever addressed at the meeting of the
16 Croatian government. There were discussions about the return of Croats
17 from the world, but I should note that the Croats who had fled Serbia
18 most of them ended up in big cities and the majority of them in Zagreb
19 JUDGE ORIE: So you say that limiting Serbs to live in the area
20 referred to by the number of 10 per cent never was government policy.
21 A. Yes, absolutely so. The government never made any such decision
22 nor discussed that, at least as far as I can remember, and so far I have
23 quite a good recollection.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Do you agree that from what we read here that the --
25 President Tudjman was even more strict where he said "not even 10
1 per cent"? Even if it's not -- I'm now talking about his personal
2 attitude and his personal approach to the matter.
3 A. Of course, Your Honour, I'm commenting on something that I see
4 for the first time now. However, I know that President Tudjman had the
5 idea that as many Croats as possible from around the world should return
6 to Croatia
7 was one of his sincere ideas that never came into being in any respect.
8 Another idea was that the area that was empty, and that continues
9 to be empty to this day, should be populated by as many Croats as
10 possible. This is another idea that never came into being in any way,
11 but it was not an idea or -- and it did not have anything to do with
12 preventing the return of Serbs to Croatia. He just wanted more Croats to
13 live there.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now let's -- if you have a room where there's
15 place for ten people, if I say I want nine places for ethnicity A,
16 wouldn't it true that there's only one place left for the other
17 ethnicity? I mean, I'm just trying to understand --
18 MR. MISETIC: Judge, this is outside the context of the
19 transcript. If we could refer to the transcript --
20 JUDGE ORIE: I'm asking -- I'm testing the reasoning of this
21 witness, not specifically in relation to this.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Granic.
23 A. Your Honour, this has been an empty space. It was empty, and it
24 is still empty. It's poorly developed economically. And the president's
25 thoughts were certainly focused on strategic issues, because this was an
1 area where the Serbs in Croatia
2 seen 14.000 casualties and 36.000 wounded. And the first assessment was
3 that the damage was 37 billion US dollars. And when president was
4 thinking about this, this was what he had in mind, rather than that he
5 was against the return of the Serbs. These were his thoughts.
6 That is what, I suppose, the president was thinking. And after
7 the Operation Storm and after some time, we introduced some areas where
8 special care was needed, where we stimulated both Croats and Serbs to
9 live in these areas. The taxation was reduced. There were special
10 stimulants introduced in the municipalities, and still it did not
11 contribute to an increase of the number of Croats who would return to
12 these areas, not at all.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for those answers, Mr. Granic.
14 Mr. Waespi, you were the last for re-cross, and as often, the
15 Chamber put the questions. Any need to put further questions to the
17 MR. WAESPI: Thanks for the invitation. No questions.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Any further questions from any of the Defence teams?
19 MR. MIKULICIC: No questions, Your Honour.
20 MR. MISETIC: Yes, Mr. President, if I may quickly.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. In we could limit to --
22 MR. MISETIC: Five minutes.
23 JUDGE ORIE: That's fine. Then at least I'm saying yes, but I'm
24 hoping to get the support from those assisting us. Please proceed.
25 MR. MISETIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Further cross-examination by Mr. Misetic:
2 Q. Mr. Granic, the transcript on the screen, you were asked about
3 limited space. And if we look at what's actually discussed, we talked
4 about this yesterday. First of all, the territory in question is the
5 Petrova and Zrinska Gora, which you circled on the map; but secondly,
6 what Radic says is, "There where we have to establish some kind of a city
7 sooner or later." Mr. Radic is actually talking about not using -- not
8 simply using the available facilities there, but actually building a city
9 right in that location, and it's -- because it's a strategic area of
12 A. Correct. That's what the first area to be cut off.
13 Q. Okay. Now --
14 A. Together with Knin, that was the first area.
15 Q. Let's put everything back in the context of this war. And let me
16 point out something that General Mrksic testified about when he was here
17 in front of the Chamber, and he said this three times. I'll refer to it
18 just once, which is at transcript page 1905, line 20, is where it begins.
19 And General Mrksic's theme was:
20 "We didn't have an army and a people; we had an armed people."
21 Now that was the perception of -- two weeks after Operation Storm
22 of many in the Croatian government; correct?
23 A. Yes, correct.
24 Q. Now, you were asked about the Brioni meeting.
25 MR. MISETIC: And if I could please have Exhibit D1454, please.
1 Mr. Granic, what's going to be shown to you is a transcript of
2 the VONS meeting on the 3rd of August. You are present at that meeting.
3 Also present is every important minister of the government as well as the
4 prime minister, and you've already testified this is where the decision
5 to launch Operation Storm happened. We talked about civil rights,
6 toboze, civil rights, et cetera. But let's quickly take a look at what
7 was discussed about that issue. If we can go to page 5 in the English,
9 This is -- and I'm going to go through this quickly, Mr. Granic.
10 This is where Mr. Zuzul talks about the American conditions and the need
11 to protect civil rights.
12 If we could go to page 8, please. Towards the bottom Mr. Jarnjak
13 is speaking, and he says -- I'm sorry, this is where you were speaking,
14 and you also convey the messages concerning the need for protection and
15 respect of human rights. That's there.
16 If we go -- there are several other entries, and I'll just for
17 the record to save time, they are at page 9, page 11, and page 12 of
18 the -- this transcript concerning the issue of protection of human
19 rights. Mr. Susak in the transcript says that he had met with
20 Mr. Jarnjak and the security plan was prepared. And if we go to page 22,
22 The president there says, towards the bottom:
23 "Very well let's go to work. I haven't heard the opinion on
24 this. I said I thought I should address the Serb population. We would
25 call the Serbs to lay down their weapons. At the same time, we could say
1 that we would vouch for their civil rights, and after that the
2 implementation of the elections in the spirit of the law and so forth.
3 We would also tell the international community that the Serbs do not
4 accept a peaceful solution. So do you think that it would be sufficient
5 to address only the Serbs? I have to sign that appeal to them."
6 Then there's people interrupting saying, "Only the Serbs for
8 Now, the meeting of VONS, Mr. Granic, the only -- as it concerns
9 civil rights, the only discussion was about protecting security,
10 providing security, and appealing for people to stay, and guaranteeing
11 their civil rights; correct?
12 A. Yes, correct. And I remember well this meeting, and I said
13 myself that our friends from the world are mentioning this as the
15 Q. Last question: Have you ever seen a document of any kind from
16 any ministry, police, army, anywhere, an order that would indicate that
17 the Croatian government was issuing orders or implementing plans to do
18 anything other than protect and guarantee civil rights?
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
20 MR. WAESPI: That doesn't arise of --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, to some extent it does, but at the same
22 time -- please answer the question, Mr. Granic. It could be a short
23 answer. Yes or a no would do, as far as I'm concerned.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have never seen anything like
1 MR. MISETIC: Thank you, Mr. Granic.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, this concludes your evidence. I'd like
3 to thank you very much for coming to The Hague, for spending quite a
4 couple of days with us and for having answered all the questions that
5 were put to you and by the parties and by the Bench, and I'm happy that
6 you're able to leave on this Friday, and I wish you a safe return home
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I don't think that at this moment there's any
10 procedural issue to be raised. Therefore, we then adjourn, and we will
11 resume on Monday, the 23rd of November, 9.00, in Courtroom III.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.52 p.m.
13 to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day
14 of November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.