1 Wednesday, 2 December 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
9 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-06-90-T, the
10 Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
12 Before we continue, Mr. Mikulicic, the Chamber noticed that the
13 Markac Defence has not joined in the good tradition to inform the public
14 about the content of 92 ter statements by giving a summary. Could you
15 please consider how to repair that and also to take into account that you
16 are expected to prepare a summary.
17 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour, what will be your guidance as it
18 refers to the previous witnesses that Markac Defence has been examined?
19 JUDGE ORIE: That you already prepare a summary and that we find
20 a suitable time where, perhaps, some time remains where we can't fill the
21 whole of the session and that you are then always prepared to read out
22 the summary of other witnesses.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: Okay, Your Honour. I will do so.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to you, Mr. Moric. I would like to
25 remind you that you are still bound by the solemn declaration that you
1 have given yesterday at the beginning of your testimony.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.
3 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 WITNESS: JOSKO MORIC [Resumed]
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 Examination by Mr. Mikulicic: [Continued]
7 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Moric.
8 A. Good morning.
9 Q. Yesterday we interrupted our discussions when we were discussing
10 your position as assistant minister of the interior, during which time
11 you witnessed the change of six ministers.
12 Can you please explain to us the difference between the posts of
13 an assistant minister and a deputy minister?
14 A. According to the Law on Internal Affairs and the decree on the
15 internal structure and manner of work of the Ministry of the Interior,
16 the assistant minister manages one of the sectors of the ministry;
17 whereas, the deputy minister stands in for the minister in all the duties
18 discharged by him; or, the duty -- the deputy minister has a very
19 well-defined responsibility relating to a very specific -- or, rather,
20 the assistant minister has a very specific responsibility for a given
21 sector of the ministry; whereas the deputy minister stands in for the
22 minister and acts on his behalf whenever there is reason for him to do
24 Q. When it comes to the political parties which make up the
25 government, what is the relation with -- what would the political
1 relationship be with regard to the assistant minister and the deputy
3 A. Depending on how the government has been formed, whether it is a
4 coalition government or a single-party government, the minister's
5 membership of the political parties will be based on that. This, in a
6 way, affected the position of ministers and deputy ministers on a
7 government -- of a government. Sometimes it also reflected itself on the
8 posts of assistant ministers in a given ministry.
9 However, in the case of the Ministry of the Interior, at the time
10 I was there as assistant minister, assistant ministers were prevalently
11 appointed from the ranks of specialists and professionals and not along
12 the political lines. Of course, there were exceptions to the rule.
13 Q. You were, thus, appointed assistant minister in the month of
14 April of 1991. At the time, the Republic of Croatia
15 the then Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
16 What was your main task when you were appointed assistant
17 minister? Which particular field of activity of the Ministry of the
18 Interior were you concerned with?
19 A. On the 1st of April, 1991, I was appointed assistant minister of
20 the interior, who was supposed to manage the sector of ordinary general
21 duty police. In other words, I was to deal with prevention. My basic
22 task at the time was to organise the ordinary police force in accordance
23 with the experience of democratic countries.
24 Unfortunately, the events that followed considerably restricted
25 my efforts to organise the police structure along those lines and not
1 only -- not only restricted by also thwarted my efforts.
2 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up D527, please,
3 page 2 of the document.
4 Q. Mr. Moric, I will show you now the decree on the internal
5 structure of the Ministry of the Interior where, in Article 3, the way in
6 which the ministry itself was organised is described.
7 We can see that the Ministry of the Interior, according to the
8 internal structure, is -- consists of the minister's office; the
9 Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order; and, under
10 numbers 3 through to 10, various sectors. Under 3, we have the police
11 sector. That was your domain of work, was it not?
12 A. That's correct. I was in charge of the police sector.
13 Q. The activities of the police sector are defined by the
14 Law on Internal Affairs.
15 MR. MIKULICIC: And that's D1077 for the reference of
16 Their Honours. Article 1, paragraph 2 of that law.
17 Q. Can you tell us briefly, what were the duties that the sector you
18 ran, the police sector, were supposed to perform?
19 A. The police sector was supposed to organise and then run the work
20 of the ordinary uniformed police across the country. This means,
21 initially, it was supposed to complete the transition that the police
22 force was supposed to undergo, in view of the fact that a transition was
23 taking place of a non-democratic society into a democratic society.
24 Furthermore, the work of the ordinary police force was supposed to be
25 organised in accordance with the specific geopolitical and geographic
1 features of the country and set up the organic structures of the police
2 that would be suited to the dramatic change that the Croatian society was
3 going through, including the police.
4 In that process, it was important to offset the internal
5 difficulties we were faced with which were brought on by the transition
6 process within the society and within the police force itself. A lack of
7 understanding or a reluctance to accept the country's transition from a
8 non-democratic to a democratic society and a lack of understanding for or
9 a reluctance to accept the fact that the federal unit of a former
10 federation was headed toward an independence and toward creating a state
11 of its own, as well as the traumatic experience the police force was
12 going through, such as terrorist attacks with fatal consequences, caused
13 a great number of police officers who had been involved in the job at the
14 time when Croatia
15 force; and I'm referring to more than 2.500 officers who left the police
16 force for all the aforementioned reasons.
17 However, this was also caused by political pressure and the risk
18 involved in the transition process for the police force itself.
19 Q. When discussing this process where the former policemen were
20 leaving the ranks of the police force, can this, in any way, be connected
21 to any ethnic reasons?
22 A. Yes. At the time, Croatia
23 on, as it acquired international personality, and still today it -- in
24 its makeup, it reflects the ethnic composition.
25 However, at the time when Croatia
1 composition of the country was to the detriment of the majority Croat
2 population. I'm stating this because it was a fact, and also to make the
3 subsequent developments more easily understandable.
4 The pressure brought on by the transition process and by the
5 political and legal and traumatic police experience of the time out of
6 the total number of persons who abandoned the police force, the majority
7 were, truth be told, of Serb ethnic background, but not solely. I am
8 convinced that that particular group of people included persons of all
9 ethnic backgrounds in the Republic of Croatia
10 of Serb ethnic background, since their number were, in the police force
11 at the time, was disproportionately high.
12 Q. In what way could that shortage of experienced policemen be
13 compensated for, if at all, who left the police force at the time that
15 A. There were two important reasons and a couple of other less
16 important why this had to be done:
17 The first reason was the intention for the Republic of Croatia
18 an independent and sovereign state to be organised in such a way that all
19 its state mechanisms, including the police force, had citizens whose
20 makeup would reflect the ethnic makeup of the country as a whole.
21 The second reason was that we needed to equip ourselves in order
22 to rise up to the challenge of stabilising security and the state of
23 security which was deteriorating by the day. Accordingly, we organised
24 courses at the police academy and other additional studies, through which
25 we recruited citizens of the Republic of Croatia
1 However, recruiting policemen from the ranks of the citizens of the
2 Republic of Croatia
3 problem. A far greater problem was to compensate for the shortage of the
4 police management personnel, a portion of whom had also left the Croatian
5 police force. The period required for this shortage to be offset lasted
6 much longer than the period needed for ordinary policemen to be
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, the witness earlier said that the --
9 there was a need to re-establish a balance because the Serbs were
10 over-represented in the police force.
11 Could you give us the numbers, how many, what was the percentage
12 of Serbs in the police force; and prior to the movement where people
13 abandoned the police force in relation to the Serb percentage of the
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I didn't say that it
16 was necessary to establish a balance in relation to the ethnic makeup of
17 the population. Rather, I said that it was only logical that among those
18 who left the police force, the majority were Serbs, because they were --
19 their numbers were disproportionally high in relation to the makeup of
20 the population.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, whether you call it logic or restoring a
22 balance or changing the situation, my question was: What was the
23 percentage of Serbs in the police force, and what was the percentage of
24 Serbs overall in the population, before this change took place?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, to the best of my
1 recollection and knowledge of the data, before the outbreak of the
2 conflict in the Republic of Croatia
3 of the Republic of Croatia
4 force of the then federal unit of the Republic of Croatia
5 65 per cent were Serbs, or, rather, citizens of Serb ethnic background.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that information.
7 And after this abandoning the police force by many police
8 officers, what -- well, let's say, on from -- the late 1995, how were the
9 percentages then?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1995, the percentage of citizens
11 who were ethnic Serbs on the police force of the Republic of Croatia
12 some 4 to 5 per cent.
13 JUDGE ORIE: And the percentage of the population of Serb
14 ethnicity was how much?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To us, it always remained the same,
16 Your Honours, because they were our nationals, regardless of what their
17 temporary residence was; in other words, 12 per cent.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that answer.
19 Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.
20 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Now, let's go back to the internal organisation of the
22 Ministry of the Interior and, particularly, to its sectors.
23 You said that your sector was dealing with uniformed police, and
24 all the other sectors had their own bosses, as it were; and they were
25 also assistant ministers, were they not?
1 A. Yes. In principle, except for the office of the minister, every
2 sector was headed by the chief of that sector. However, when it came to
3 the actual running, day-to-day running, of every of the sectors, an
4 assistant minister was appointed. In other words, chiefs of sectors were
5 also heads of personnel; whereas, assistant ministers were responsible
6 for the managing of the work of each of the sectors.
7 Q. Mr. Moric, let's imagine this situation: An assistant minister
8 for a certain sector had responsibilities for a different sector. For
9 example, you were an assistant minister and you were in charge of the
10 policing -- of the uniformed police sector. Did you have any
11 authorities, and did you use your authorities over the sector of the
12 crime police sector or special police sector? Was that -- was such a
13 situation possible?
14 A. No. That was not common practice, and there was no objective
15 need for any such thing. Not only was it not possible in former and
16 legal terms, and it would not have been proper, but, in factual terms,
17 there was no need for such practice. Every sector had its chief that was
18 also the head of personnel, as I just described; and if the assistant
19 minister was absent or was prevented from taking part in the daily
20 management of the sector, then his role would have been taken over by the
21 chief of sector. However, if there were special reasons, due to the
22 specificity of a situation or a task, there was a person who was in a
23 position to take over the responsible for the management of any of the
24 sectors instead of the assistant minister, and that would be the deputy
1 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce
2 Article 9 in the document that is on the screen. An Article which deals
3 with the internal organisation of the police sector, Article 9, which is
4 two pages after the one that we have on the screen at the moment.
5 Q. Article 9 of the Decree on the Internal Organisation of the
6 Ministry of Interior envisages the organisation of the police sector in
7 the following way: There are departments which composed the sector, for
8 example, the police department, the border police department, the traffic
9 police department, the maritime and airport police department, the duty
10 operations department, the explosion protection department, and, finally,
11 the reserves department.
12 Mr. Moric, how were the departments organised in view of the
13 hierarchy system? Who was at the head of each of these departments?
14 A. It was the chief of each of the departments, and those chiefs
15 were always appointed from the ranks of professionals with the longest
16 possible professional experience.
17 Q. As we're looking at the --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Stop.
19 MR. MIKULICIC:
20 Q. [Interpretation] -- authorities of the police sector, we can
21 notice that the -- it spans anything from the policing duties to the
22 reserves' duties, border, traffic, maritime, airport duties, and so on
23 and so forth. What kind of tasks are we talking about? What was their
24 scope? What was -- what were the police supposed to do?
25 A. I mentioned, at the very beginning of my testimony earlier this
1 morning, specific geographical characteristics of Croatia, especially its
2 very specific geopolitical position. These two positions, amongst other
3 things, very much dictated the scope of the tasks that the police would
4 not have had, or, rather, do not have in the countries which do not have
5 such a specific geographical and particular geopolitical position.
6 We will understand this best if we take the example of the border
7 police. The Republic of Croatia
8 lengths, actually has a very low number of population. We have over
9 3.000 kilometres of state borders altogether which over 900 kilometres
10 are maritime borders. We have, or, rather, we had, I apologise, while I
11 was in office, we had 256 border crossings all together, and what I have
12 in mind when I say that are border crossings for international traffic,
13 interstate traffic, and border traffic; all the three categories are more
15 We also had seven airports at the time, and they were all
16 international airports. All that time, including the time of combat
17 activities, both offensive and defensives, were functioning without any
18 interruptions. We had 19 maritime harbours for international traffic.
19 Obviously, the geopolitical position of Croatia impacted the
20 organisation and work of the police and particularly the border police,
21 and even more so in cities close to the state border. Why was that? It
22 is not possible to organise the work of the police in the same way when
23 it comes to providing security and exercising control of the crossing of
24 the state borders if that state border is with a neighbouring friendly
25 state as compared to a neighbourly hostile state. In that context, the
1 geopolitical position of our country imposed additional burden to the
2 work of the police.
3 Q. In order to understand what you have just told to us, Mr. Moric,
4 let's try to focus on the control of the state borders that the police
6 You said that Croatia
7 borders --
8 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber considers the level on detail on these
9 matters not of assistance to it. No problem in saying that taking care
10 of maritime ports, airports, and a long coast-line caused a lot of
11 efforts; that's fine. But to know exactly whether it's
12 300 [sic] kilometres, how many airports there were, et cetera, is really
13 not necessary for understanding, apparently, what you would like to
14 elicit from this witness that it took quite a bit of work to deal with
15 these matters.
16 Would you please keep this in mind and be more focused in your
18 MR. MIKULICIC: I'll do, Your Honour.
19 Q. [Interpretation] You've described the tasks of the police and
20 what the police had to do. However, if we go back to the year 1991, we
21 will face the beginning of hostilities and the enemy activities which led
22 to the war.
23 How did the war start in the Republic of Croatia
24 impact the position of the police, and how did it reflect on the position
25 of the police?
1 A. In view of the transition from the legal state of a federal unit
2 towards the international and legal subjectivity of an independent state,
3 at that time, the Republic of Croatia
4 had its police as the only legal and legally-founded organisation which
5 was organised, armed, albeit with infantry weapons, but it was still
6 armed. And that's why, on the one hand, there were great expectations on
7 the part all citizens of the Republic of Croatia
8 that they had from the police. But not only the citizens, but also the
9 democratic authorities in the Republic of Croatia
10 because of that, because of the fact that the police was the only
11 organisation that was legal and legally founded, the war started by
12 attacks being launched against the police and then against the police
14 Police officers were attacked while performing their routine
15 patrols while performing their routine tasks. They were ambushed. They
16 were attacked during the night while performing their routine jobs. And
17 later on, there were also attacks on police stations.
18 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce
19 document D1088.
20 Q. Mr. Moric, I'm going to be show you a document that you yourself
21 issued towards the end of 1991; to be more precise, on the
22 12th of December of that year.
23 You sent that document to the Ministry of Defence of the
24 Republic of Croatia
25 document, you informed the Ministry of Defence about the number of police
1 officers segregated by police administrations who were engaged in combat.
2 The document goes on to mention those numbers, segregated by police
3 administrations. And if we turn to page 2 in that document, we will see
4 that, according to the document that you issued, a total of 3.000 police
5 officers were engaged in combat, of whom 1.793 were active policemen,
6 921 were policemen in reserve, and 286 special police unit policemen.
7 And they were all placed under the command of the Croatian Army.
8 Mr. Moric, could you please explain the trend, or, rather, that
9 situation in which police officers were placed under the command of the
10 Croatian Army to fight for the country?
11 A. That situation that I have just described, which involved great
12 expectations both on the part of the citizens and the authorities, for
13 us, professional policemen, was extremely traumatic. Professional
14 policemen everywhere in the world are educated to understand that the use
15 of arms is their last resort. And they are duty-bound that before they
16 pull a gun they have to estimate and assess whether there were any other
17 means and any other ways to achieve the same goal. And only if they
18 assess that there is nothing -- they can, only then, use a weapon but
19 only gradually. First there has to be a warning, then there has to be a
20 shot in the air, and so on and so forth.
21 Here, as a result of the circumstances, we were put in a reverse
22 situation, in a completely different situation. As we were defending
23 ourselves, or as we were in -- in -- defending our infrastructure,
24 primarily the police infrastructure and then the general infrastructure,
25 the police officers were put in a situation to pull their gun immediately
1 without any prior warning, and, thus, they became soldiers in a very
2 informal which. So within that context, I believe that I should say to
3 the Trial Chamber that over 350 police officers were killed; over 1500
4 were wounded. And many of them have become disabled as a result of that.
5 When I left the system of the Ministry of Interior ten years ago,
6 98 policemen were still considered as missing and their lot was not
7 known. Over 150 of them were taken prisoners. So those were the results
8 of the factual situation that the police force found itself in.
9 Q. Mr. Moric, in addition to combat tasks, the police still had to
10 perform its regular policing duties, to control the border crossings,
11 traffic, and so on and so forth. I'm not going ask whether that was
12 difficult or not because I believe it's obviously. But I'm going to ask
13 you: How did you organise yourselves in order to meet all the demands and
15 A. Obviously the law, the constitution, and the legal system
16 prescribes that the police have to perform their routine, typical
17 policing duties. And, at that time, we were in a situation to have to
18 follow rules; and, on other hand, we had to take part in the defence of
19 the country. It was very difficult to reconcile the two demands. It was
20 very difficult to meet all the expectations. However, we were in a
21 situation that there was nobody else to do that. The police had to be
22 involved in both, irrespective of the fact that it was both traumatic and
23 difficult to organise.
24 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce
1 Q. At the time when the Croatian Army was being created and when the
2 police had the role that you just described for us, there was also a need
3 to create a special police units.
4 What you see on the screen, Mr. Moric, is a letter, or a
5 telegram, dated 19 July 1991
6 MR. MIKULICIC: Could the Court please produce the second page.
7 And if we see that --
8 Q. You will see that you are the one who drafted this document. And
9 you say that pursuant to the decision of the minister, the National Guard
10 was being formed because a lot of police officers joined the police, --
11 the army. And in the third paragraph it says that units of should be
12 formed from the ranks of the active police officers, whereby different
13 administrations would form special police units. That was in mid-1991,
14 Mr. Moric.
15 Could you provide us with a context that provoked such an order
16 and decision on the part of the minister?
17 A. Since the initial stages of the transition from a non-democratic
18 into a democratic society in mid-1990 up until the date when the document
19 was sent, the police had to deal with its routine policing duties and
20 compensate for the shortages arising from the people leaving. It had to
21 rise up to the challenges of organising the police force, since there
22 were certain requirements that didn't need to be met by a federal unit
23 but had to be met by a state.
24 It was quite clear that the situation, as it was at the time, was
25 untenable. For this reason, the parliament amended the
1 Law on Internal Affairs, in order for it to provide for the setting up of
2 the National Guards Corps, which retroactively can be seen to have been
3 the beginning of the formation of the Croatian Army.
4 As the conditions were met for the setting up of the
5 National Guard Corps - Croatia did not have international personality at
6 the time and was unable to have an army - men who were members of the
7 reserve police force and some who were members of the professional police
8 force and others who were members of the special police force, which
9 wasn't very numerous at the time, joined the National Guard Corps in
10 order to man it but also to man the special police force which was part
11 of the police force I was in charge of.
12 As part of this transition process, men who were members of the
13 active and reserve police force joined the National Guards Corps, some
14 joined the ranks of the special police force as well. Among them -- or,
15 from their ranks, were people who gradually grew to become commanders of
16 the first National Guards Corps units and, later on, the first units of
17 the Croatian Army.
18 As far as I remember, there were seven Generals, or there are
19 seven Generals, who, at one time, used to be policeman. Among them is
20 the former chief of the military police, who used to be a policeman. The
21 former Chief of the Main Staff of the armed forces of the
22 Republic of Croatia, the former defence minister, all of them used to be
23 policeman. The current Chief of the Main Staff of the armed forces of
24 the Republic of Croatia was also a policemen at one time. The difficult
25 process of internal transition again lay on the shoulders of the police
1 force. However, the intention was to allow the professional police force
2 to continue dealing with routine policing work; whereas, for the purposes
3 of defence, which, by that time, it was clear to all was going to become
4 an all-out aggression on the Republic of Croatia, separate units were to
5 be set up that would take upon themselves the defence effort.
6 In doing so, we were limited by the fact that the
7 Republic of Croatia did not have an international legal personality at
8 the time and was still regarded as a federal unit which was not entitled
9 to its own armed force because there was, in existence, a joint armed
10 force whose name at the time was the Yugoslav People's Army.
11 MR. MIKULICIC: Can this document be assign add number.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, the Chamber gains the impression that
13 you have not understood the guidance I earlier gave. That is, to put
14 focused questions without details. Even if the Chamber would not be
15 aware of all the whys and the hows from what happened in 1990 and 1991,
16 the Chamber feels that it still, with summary information on the
17 background, could perform its function.
18 Therefore, I again stress that you should focus on basic matters,
19 because it's our impression that approximately 60 per cent of the -- if
20 not more, of the information we received over the last hour was of
21 hardly -- if at all, of any assistance.
22 Please proceed.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour, we all due respect.
24 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] ... yes.
25 MR. MIKULICIC: I think the historical context, especially as it
1 regards to the role of the police, is very important.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I'm talking about the --
3 MR. MIKULICIC: We never heard that type of testimony during the
4 entire trial. It is the position of the Markac Defence that this context
5 is very, very important. I will stay within my estimated time in
6 questioning this witness. And, Your Honour, I am almost finished with
7 this topic and I will go to another topic. But, with all due respect, I
8 simply stress that this part of testimony is of great importance for the
9 Markac Defence.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, I was talking about the level of
11 detail. If the Chamber would consider it totally without relevance, I
12 would not have said what percentage was not of assistance. Then I would
13 have said that nothing of it would have been of assistance. I said the
14 basics of the background, fine, but not the level of detail in which you
15 present it. And if you would be more active in intervening if the
16 witness goes to tells us exactly how many Generals, ones that had been
17 police officers or -- then if you keep better control of the examination,
18 then we would certainly use our time in a better way.
19 I think you asked -- the last thing you asked is whether the
20 document could be --
21 MR. MIKULICIC: [Microphone not activated]
22 JUDGE ORIE: -- admitted into evidence.
23 Ms. Mahindaratne.
24 MS. MAHINDARATNE: No objection.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1843.
2 JUDGE ORIE: D1843 is admitted into evidence.
3 Please proceed.
4 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Just for the reference of the Chamber, I could stress that the
6 document D1084 is another order from that minister -- that time minister,
7 Mr. Vekic, which deals with an organisation of the special police forces
8 at that time.
9 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, we have gone through the historic
10 events which have determined the course of subsequent events in the
11 Republic of Croatia
12 eventually found itself in, as you recount in paragraph 7 of your
13 May 2009 statement, where you say that the paramilitary and para-police
14 forces of the so-called Krajina, with the help of the JNA, occupied
15 almost a quarter of the territory.
16 Mr. Moric, what became of the police units, police
17 administrations, police stations which were located in what, at one
18 point, became occupied territory?
19 A. Even earlier on, and especially so once the area was blocked,
20 the -- through what was known at the time as the Log Revolution at the
21 time, these facilities were first exposed to attacks and then the
22 personnel was driven out. The fact that the personnel was driven out
23 meant that very little could be taken along. Whatever the policemen
24 could carry of the office stationery and personal belongings they had,
25 they took along. What remained of the inventory was destroyed, damaged,
1 and finally seized. Whatever was not damaged of the infrastructure, it
2 remained in the area. The personal was driven out to the free territory,
3 the territory under our control; we took them in; and we organised them,
4 initially, in order to ease their trauma; and subsequently to include
5 them on the police force.
6 The principle employed was that the police stations would be
7 organised in such a way as to be physically as close as possible to the
8 area they had been driven out of.
9 Q. In your statement, and I'm staying with paragraph 7, you state
10 that under the circumstances, the police work had to be organised in such
11 a way as to allow, as smoothly and as quickly as possible, for the law to
12 be enforced when conditions were met.
13 And in this sense, operative action titled "Return" was put in
14 place. Can you please explain to us what Operative Action Return was,
15 what its purpose was, and how it was implemented in practice.
16 A. Operative Action Return had two motivations:
17 The first one was to organise ourselves so that we may be able to
18 restore the police stations to their original locations as soon as may
19 be, whilst expecting that the conflict would be resolved peacefully.
20 The second objective of the operative action was to allow -- or,
21 rather, to organise the police in such a way that would be suitable to
22 the aspirations of the international community. Cyrus Vance was
23 appointed the special envoy by the UN Secretary-General at the time, and
24 he was the one who laid down the concept of a peaceful settlement to the
25 conflict. The objective was to peacefully reintegrate this particular
1 area into the legal and constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia
2 In this since, Mr. Vance envisaged what sort of police force would exist
3 in the area, what sort of ethnic makeup it would have, as well as the
4 scope of activity.
5 In this sense, we organised Operative Action Return, and the
6 minister appointed me as the person directly in charge, in order to
7 envisage all the operative procedures, personnel procedures, and means
8 and methods of providing logistical support, as well as professional and
9 psychological support, required to ensure that the policemen were able to
10 return to the occupied territory. Again, I repeat, in accordance with
11 the concept of a peaceful reintegration, which my government had received
12 by the UN special envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance.
13 Q. Can we set a time on this? When -- what was the date of the
14 commencement of Operation Return?
15 A. Unless I'm mistaken, perhaps I should be shown a document to that
16 effect, but I believe that it was the beginning of 1992.
17 Q. Mr. Moric, we will be skipping the period covering the
18 developments within the occupied territory at the time when Croatia
19 became recognised as an independent state and move on to mid-1995, the
20 period shortly preceding Operation Storm, which, as the Trial Chamber is
21 aware, started on the 4th of August.
22 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] And to that effect, can we please
23 call up 3D00690.
24 Q. Mr. Moric, this is a document you issued on the 3rd of August.
25 You will be seeing it on your screen presently. It's the
1 3rd of August, 1995, and in the top right-hand corner we can see that it
2 says OA Return. And you sent it to all police administrations for the
3 attention of the chiefs.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, it's an unusual time to take a break.
5 It was not announced. But due to circumstances unforeseen, I would like
6 to have a break immediately. And we'll then -- I apologise for this
7 rather unexpected interruption.
8 But I would like to have a break and resume at 20 minutes to
10 --- Recess taken at 10.09 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 10.48 a.m.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, please proceed.
13 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, when answering my previous question,
15 when discussing Operation Return, you said that you would like to be
16 shown that document. We will do this shortly. But while we're still on
17 this document, let's deal with it first.
18 The date is the 3rd of August, 1995. You sent it to all police
19 administrations, on the eve of Operation Storm, stating that measures
20 should be taken immediately in order to supervise important facilities
21 that are necessary for the defence of the country pursuant to government
22 decisions which are in the respective police administration areas.
23 Mr. Moric, can you tell us why did you send this letter to all
24 the police administrations in Croatia
25 A. When this document was created, actually, what preceded it were
1 four years of attempts to peacefully reintegrate the Krajina area into
2 the constitutional order of Croatia
3 attempts of international envoys, and it came after a number of
4 UN resolutions as well as two peace operations undertaken by the UN. The
5 first one was called UNPROFOR, and the second UNCRO.
6 Military -- a military liberation of the occupied territories was
7 looming, and the Operation Return was envisaged. The police goals of
8 that operation remained the same, although under different conditions of
9 return which would no longer be by peaceful means and reintegration. In
10 any case, once those areas were to be liberated, the police force was to
11 go back to their respective police stations in the same personnel
12 composition or in a composition close to that one, and in keeping with
13 the constitutional law on the rights of ethnic minorities. They were
14 supposed to exercise those duties in the newly liberated territories,
15 hence, the name Operation Return.
16 As for the need for this document, it was clear, based on the
17 previous experiences, that we could expect terrorist attacks attempts in
18 the liberated areas and in the area that was never occupied in Croatia
19 It was clear, from previous experience, that there would be attempts to
20 stretch out our forces by means of terrorist attacks against vital
21 infrastructure and facilities in the rest of Croatia.
22 The government of Croatia
23 country, decided upon a number of facilities which were important for the
24 defence of the country. These facilities were the facilities including
25 all types of infrastructure, such as road traffic, railway traffic,
1 air traffic, electricity supply, water supply, hydro-electric plants,
2 thermal plants, as well as energy facilities in general. This also
3 included water supply and security infrastructure. That is why I issued
4 this document in a timely fashion to caution the police administrations
5 to act pursuant to their obligations under the law in order to undertake
6 the necessary measures which had been planned beforehand to secure those
7 facilities and to prevent any possible terrorist attacks against those
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Moric, for this answer.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
11 MS. MAHINDARATNE: No objection.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1844.
14 JUDGE ORIE: D1844 is admitted into evidence.
15 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Presiding Judge.
16 Could we next see 1D610.
17 This document initiates Operation Return, referred to by
18 Mr. Moric. I did not put it on my list for examination-in-chief, but it
19 was on the list of General Gotovina's Defence. In the meantime, with my
20 learned friend Ms. Prashanthi, I agreed upon the use of this document;
21 she agreed do it. I have a hard copy of this document as well, and I
22 seek leave to provide the witness with it so that he could get his
23 bearings on it in an easier way. And I had, beforehand, provided a
24 similar hard copy to the Prosecution.
25 Q. Mr. Moric, on the screen before you is a document dated the
1 30th of January, 1992, which basically launches Operation Return. You
2 signed the document in the bottom right-hand-side corner. You sent it to
3 the police administrations across the territory of Croatia
4 explain that what was to follow was an overview of primary basic tasks of
5 the Ministry of Interior in a possible UN peacekeeping operation.
6 Towards the middle you say that the name of the operation was chosen for
7 practical reasons, rather than a method of encryption, to cover anything
8 for reasons of official secrecy.
9 You then say that the police administrations, on whose territory
10 there are no expelled stations or UNPA, UN Protected Areas, shall prepare
11 for staff, professional, and materiel as well as technical assistance to
12 other administrations.
13 You forwarded copies of the constitutional law in question and
14 the concept of the UN peace mission.
15 Mr. Moric, when, in my previous question, you referred to
16 Operation Return, you explained what the purpose of the operation was.
17 And now we have the -- a chance to see the document itself.
18 Did you have this document in mind when you referred to
19 Operation Return, its temporal framework, and goals?
20 A. I'd like to thank the Chamber for allowing me to see the -- a
21 copy of this document.
22 This is, indeed, the document I had in mind. I wished to see it
23 because I was concerned to see whether, as one of the attachments, there
24 was a concept of the UN peace mission prepared by Mr. Cyrus Vance in 1991
25 attached to this document.
1 Q. Mr. Moric, we won't go into any peace operation details, but for
2 the needs of the transcript and to inform the Chamber, it would suffice,
3 I believe, to just skim through the document to see what the obligations
4 were that you pointed out to the police administrations for their action.
5 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] For that purpose, I would kindly
6 ask that, in Croatian, we see page 1D70-1102, and in the English, that is
7 page 1D70-1128.
8 Q. In item 1.1, you define MUP obligations as part of the UN
9 peacekeeping operation in a way that would ensure that all staffing
10 levels be reached in order to have all police stations and departments
11 fully functioning. This is something you have already addressed,
12 Mr. Moric; therefore, we can move to the next page, to item 1.2, whereby
13 you order that accommodation and activating the expelled police stations
14 should be taken care of.
15 In item 1.3, you order that complete operative and forensic
16 processing of all former policemen who committed crimes should be
18 In item 1.4, you order that complete operative and forensic
19 processing of all citizens who have been indicated as perpetrators of
20 crimes in temporarily occupied parts of the territory should be
21 undertaken as well.
22 These tasks, Mr. Moric, were motivated by what? What was the
23 background to it?
24 A. The raison d'être of these tasks was the primary goal of this
25 operative action. That is to say, to prepare ourselves for a peaceful
1 reintegration of that area into the constitutional and legal framework of
2 the Republic of Croatia
3 operation, which is supposed to take place at the same time. The
4 perpetrators of possible crimes should be excluded from that model if
5 such perpetrators come from police circles or if they are Croatian
7 Q. Let us go to the next page in the Croatian where we see an order
8 to establish check-points on all types of roads leading into areas under
9 the protection of the UN.
10 These were actually types of border crossing, weren't they,
11 Mr. Moric?
12 A. For practical purposes, one could say so; but formally and
13 legally speaking, it is not. And even less so if we use political
15 Q. Why do you say that?
16 A. Because the area involved was not something that was disputed as
17 belonging to the Republic of Croatia
18 taken outside its constitutional framework. At that time, Croatia
19 still not an internationally recognised state, although its government
20 did not recognise the authorities in the occupied territories.
21 Perhaps a month after this, or -- sorry, I apologise. At about
22 the same time, the international recognition of Croatia actually took
23 place, turning Croatia
24 Therefore, we never consented to the use of the term "border crossings."
25 But, for practical purposes, these were points at which people who were
1 entering or leaving the area were checked.
2 Q. Thank you for this explanation, Mr. Moric.
3 Next, in item 1.6, it is stated that facilities need to be
4 allocated for the accommodation of police monitors of the Blue Helmets,
5 that is to say, the United Nations.
6 What was the relationship of the police of the
7 Ministry of the Interior of Croatia and UN personnel, as part of that --
8 of this project?
9 A. We, from the police of the Republic of Croatia
10 operation as a friendly attempt and assistance which would help us
11 peacefully reintegrate the occupied territories into the legal and
12 constitutional framework of Croatia
13 UN personnel involved as friendly. We believed it was our duty to help
14 them in the performance of their tasks and their work but, also, to
15 assist them in their daily routine situations, such as logistical
16 supplies, accommodation, and so on and so forth.
17 Q. On the other hand, in the same paragraph, it is stated that the
18 police monitors of the UN were there to put in place a double-layer
19 security arrangement. That is to say, that the police was to undertake
20 its duties without discrimination, and on the other hand, it was a
21 guarantee to the police that it won't be exposed to attacks.
22 Mr. Moric, in your understanding, does this accurately reflect
23 the importance and the role of the presence of the UN police monitors?
24 A. At that time, and as part of this concept of the peace operation,
25 that was the general idea. In practice, unfortunately, it didn't quite
1 work out that way.
2 Q. If we move to the next page, and if we look at item 1.7, we see
3 that preparations for the establishment of a local police force are
5 Which local police force is referred to?
6 A. In keeping with the concept of the peace operation, which, later
7 on, was translated into the relevant resolutions of the Security Council
8 of the UN but also in keeping with our constitutional law on the rights
9 of ethnic communities and national minorities in the Republic of Croatia
10 which corresponded with the concept of the mission and the relevant
11 resolutions of the Security Council concerning the UNPROFOR peace
12 operation, what is referred to are the local police forces in the
13 occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia
14 The ethnic makeup of that force was to reflect the population
15 makeup, and their authorities were supposed to be in harmony with the
16 concept and, later on, with the relevant resolutions of the
17 Security Council as well as with our constitutional law on the rights of
18 ethnic communities and national minorities.
19 Q. Let's go to item 3.3 next, Mr. Moric.
20 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] In Croatian it is 1D70-1107; and
21 in the English version it is 1D70-1132 and 33.
22 Q. In item 3.3, mention is made of the need to assist the
23 Blue Helmets in the demilitarisation of those areas which were protected
24 by the UN.
25 It is stated that:
1 "After the withdrawal of the federal army and associated
2 paramilitary groups, the disarmament of those who have not pulled out and
3 gathering of discarded and hidden weapons, lethal assets, and equipment,
4 shall ensue. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare a sufficient number
5 of policemen for assisting the Blue Helmets in these tasks."
6 Mr. Moric, can you briefly comment on the background of item 3.3?
7 A. This is a preparation -- or, rather, my request to police
8 administration to get ready for the task at hand, the task that was
9 envisaged by the concept of the peacekeeping mission and the relevant
10 resolutions of the Security Council.
11 Unfortunately, we have never been given an opportunity to carry
12 out the task because the demilitarisation never happened. The federal
13 troops never withdrew completely, and where they did, the military left
14 their weapons and other military equipment and tools to paramilitary and
15 para-police forces that were left behind in the area.
16 In other words, the factual demilitarisation of that area never
17 took place.
18 Q. To be perfectly clear, Mr. Moric, when you say "army" or
19 "troops," what troops do you have in mind; what army do have you in mind?
20 A. The term is federal, and the implication is the
21 Yugoslav People's Army, of course.
22 Q. Under the following item, which is 3.4, there is a reference to
23 site inspection and undertaking of other operative technical measures and
24 actions with a view to document legally relevant facts about the crimes
25 committed against humanity and international law and war crimes committed
1 in UNPA areas and in other parts that had been or were still temporarily
3 Mr. Moric, did the Croatian police ever manage to act in keeping
4 with this obligation?
5 A. As we were faced with the fact that in these areas, at the time,
6 we had numerous violations of international laws, numerous violations of
7 the basic provisions of human rights and freedoms, crimes against
8 humanity, war crimes, and within the context of the concept of the
9 subsequently relevant resolutions issued by the Security Council about
10 the peaceful resolution of the crisis, we knew from the police experience
11 that such persons should be eliminated from such processes in order to
12 facilitate the peacekeeping operation and, also, in view of the fact that
13 they were the ones who had committed those grave crimes.
14 In the police administrations, we had departments that were
15 dealing with the elucidation of terrorist acts and war crimes. However,
16 that task was never completed, at least not to the extent as it was
17 envisaged. However, we are all encouraged by the fact that war crimes do
18 not have the statute of limitations.
19 Q. Under 3.5, there is a reference to the establishment and the
20 implementation of the function of the local police within the zones under
21 the control of the United Nations or UNPA zones.
22 Could you comment upon that task, please?
23 A. The organisation of the local police force, the authorities and
24 powers of that police, were envisaged and laid out by the constitutional
25 law on the rights of ethnical communities and national minorities in
2 envisaged by the concept and the subsequent resolutions by the Security
3 Council about the peacekeeping operations.
4 From the international as well as national points of view, we
5 sought a peaceful solution to the problem. And within that context, we
6 wanted to organise a local police force in compliance with international
7 standards. On the one hand, that are applicable to such cases, and on
8 the other hand, in compliance with our own national laws. A mitigating
9 factor was the fact that our own legal solutions and international
10 standards very much corresponded.
11 Q. And, finally, Mr. Moric, let's look at page 8 in the Croatian
13 MR. MIKULICIC: This is 1D70-1109 in e-court, in the Croatian
14 version; or 1D70-34 in the English version of the same text.
15 Q. A reference is made in the second paragraph that the
16 Ministry of the Interior wanted to carry out its tasks in a consistent
17 way and that's why the ministry organised their Operation Return?
18 The MUP personnel is hereby tasked to send all the correspondence
19 and official documents arising from the UNPA peace operation to designate
20 such documents as actions, and you are made responsible for the integral
21 implementation of the action.
22 Mr. Moric, we're going to see some other documents during your
23 testimony. Some of them are marked by letters OA, which stands for the
24 Operation Return. And tell us whether these markings have any other
1 A. Counsel, this is an accompanying letter to this document, and
2 this document was sent to all the police administrations, and here I draw
3 everybody's attention that the name of the operation arises from very
4 practical terms, and it is not something that was intended to mask some
5 tasks that should be considered a state secret. The name was devised for
6 practical reasons. The code was known to the department in the ministry
7 that was in charge -- in charge of following the tasks so that all the
8 documents covering that action should -- could be grouped together; There
9 was no other reason at all.
10 And since I am answering this question, allow me to say also
11 this: I would be very happy if we had been able to care out the
12 Operative Action Return the way we had planned it. I would be happy if
13 we had been able to achieve its goal, and the goal was peaceful
14 reintegration of these areas into the constitutional and legal order.
15 However, after four years of consistent attempts, we were still unable to
16 achieve that goal.
17 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... I think it is
18 now the fifth or sixth time that you explain that all was planned in the
19 context of a peaceful reintegration. That is understood by now.
20 Whatever you say will be understood as being efforts made in this
21 context. There is no need to repeat it again and again and again.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] could we please get the number
24 for this document, Your Honour.
25 MS. MAHINDARATNE: No objection.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1845.
3 JUDGE ORIE: D1845 is admitted into evidence.
4 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. Mr. Moric, let us go back to the times on the eve of the
6 Operation Storm, or, rather, at its very beginning.
7 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could the Court please
8 produce D41.
9 Q. You've already told us that the police were faced with some
10 special tasks, tasks in connection with Operation Storm. I'm going to
11 show you a document dated the 4th of August, 1995, the one that you
12 yourself issued as part of the Operative Action Return. And you sent
13 that document to all the police administrations to the attention of their
15 You say that the enemy is expected to try and launch sabotage
16 actions in the liberated areas of Croatia, in order to instill disorder
17 and the general feeling of unrest in those areas. And you order that the
18 police should all immediately organise work in three shifts.
19 Mr. Moric, please be kind and explain what did working three
20 shifts mean when we're talking about a police organisation?
21 A. This document containing this order was sent by myself to all the
22 police administrations because I had had very clear indications that
23 there would be attempts of terrorist acts. This was indicated to me by
24 our secret services. And when we are talking about work in three shifts,
25 in practical terms, that meant that there would be a lot more burden on
1 all of our police officers who would be required to work longer hours in
3 To be more precise, the normal mode of work is in four shifts.
4 The first shift is in the morning; the second shift is in the afternoon;
5 the third shift is during the night hours; and the fourth shift is the
6 one that had just finished their night shift is -- and is resting.
7 Let's say we're talking about 1.000 police officers in every
8 shift, this gives you a number of 4.000. When there is a requirement for
9 all of them to work in three shifts, that means that they will no longer
10 be working eight but, rather, 12 hours in every shift. Therefore, the
11 first shift will be during the day; the second shift will be during the
12 night; the third shift will be the one that has just completed their
13 night shift; the fourth shift has been completely eliminated. And this
14 has given us a surplus of a thousand police officers who could then be
15 engaged on other tasks because they don't have to work in any shifts.
16 But that means that everybody has to work longer hours.
17 Q. Under item 3 of this order you issued, you asked for the security
18 to be stepped up at the state borders, particularly in order to prevent
19 illegal infiltration of groups or individuals, and bringing in weapons
20 and explosives.
21 Under number 4, you also ask for the stepping up of monitoring of
22 vehicles and passengers. And under number 5, you ask for a stepping up
23 of the services in all patrol and [indiscernible] duty sectors,
24 particularly in places that you assess might be the object of terrorist
25 attacks: bus and railroad stations, ferry terminals, and so on.
1 If we turn to the next page in the Croatian version and look at
2 item 6, we will see that you also requested that during alert, due do
3 artillery or other attacks, citizens should be cautioned of danger of
4 staying in the open area; and, at the same time, while they are in
5 shelters, observation of residential buildings shops and other buildings
6 of interest must be stepped up in order to prevent crimes such as theft,
7 break-ins, and so on.
8 Mr. Moric, could you just tell us briefly what motivated you to
9 include item 6 in your order when you refer to the periods of alerts due
10 to artillery or other attacks? What did you mean by that?
11 A. When this document was created, we had already had four years of
12 occupation behind us. Quite a huge area of Croatia had been occupied for
13 four years, and there were daily artillery and mortar attacks and attacks
14 from multi-rocket launchers from those areas, shelling 12 or even
15 14 towns in the vicinity of the separation line or the contact line.
16 The town of Zupanja
17 For 506 days, that town was under constant alert. People spent all that
18 time living in cellars, leaving the cellars only when they absolutely had
20 So the meaning of this instruction under item 6 was as follows:
21 When people had to spend some time in shelters during artillery attacks,
22 on the one hand, they had to be cautioned to go there, to go to the
23 shelters, because the experience had proved that some citizens had an
24 increased level of tolerance, and although there was the sound of alert,
25 they still did not obey measures that they should have applied in order
1 to protect their own lives and the lives of their families. And, other
2 hand, that while people were sheltered in cellars and other such
3 premises, that the police should look after the protection of their
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, even without the example, the Chamber
6 would have understood approximately what was said here.
7 You asked first what motivated the witness, what he meant by it,
8 and then the obvious explanation came: You have to tell the civilian
9 population to properly take care of themselves under those circumstances,
10 which is, even without any further explanation, perfectly obvious from
11 the text.
12 Please move on.
13 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up 3D06-0965, please.
14 Mr. President, this is a document which is not on our 65 ter
15 list. But given the good cooperation we have with our learned friend,
16 Mr. Waespi, I request that it be allowed to be included on 65 ter list so
17 that we may present it to the witness.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Leave is granted to add it to the 65 ter list, as is
19 leave granted to the previous document, where you said Ms. Mahindaratne
20 agreed to have it in evidence.
21 MR. MIKULICIC: Well, in fact, it was Mr. Waespi, but --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but the previous time, I think, you -- this is
23 the second time today that this happens. Well, I'll check that then.
24 But leave is granted in relation to this document.
25 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, you said that, on the eve of
2 Operation Storm, you were expecting terrorist actions to occur at the
3 other end of the country in free territory. What I'm showing you now is
4 a criminal report from the month of August 1995, where an unknown
5 perpetrator is reported to have -- or, rather, who is reported to have
6 been involved in an incident which was reported in the morning of the
7 7th of August, 1995, including a large amount of explosives that had been
8 activated at the south-east side of the bearing wall of a bridge spanning
9 the Bid Canal
11 Now, Mr. Moric, this is one of the incidents that you expected to
12 occur. Was this an isolated incident, or were there more such incidents
13 taking place in that time-period?
14 A. Unfortunately, if I remember correctly, this was first in a
15 series of terrorist attacks which occurred in the period between the
16 7th of August and sometime in the end of August. This attempt to blow up
17 a bridge, which constitutes a segment of the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway,
18 which continues on to southeastern Europe, was followed by two similar
19 attacks on the railway line to the south-east of Slavonski Brod. This is
20 the railway line between Zagreb
21 The second terrorist attack on the railway line involved a
22 detonation of explosives placed on the track, which blew up the train --
23 a train engine in the process.
24 The other attack was thwarted because the 110 kilograms' worth of
25 explosives were detected and neutralized.
1 Q. I'm sorry I'm interrupting you, Mr. Moric, now. But in
2 accordance with His Honour's guidance, could you please focus on the
3 facts without filling in all the details.
4 You told us that this was merely an example that was to be
5 followed by several other incidents.
6 My question is as follows: To what extent did such examples of
7 terrorist attacks on infrastructure in the free territory of the
8 Republic of Croatia
9 A. To a great extent, did they [as interpreted] have a bearing on
10 the police work and not only on the work of the police but on the work of
11 the other sectors of the Ministry of the Interior. This resulted in the
12 attacks on the police. There was an attack in Rijeka where a suicide
13 bomber careened a car into the police building in Rijeka.
14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter missed the date.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were so concerned about these
16 attacks that, on this score, the minister of the interior --
17 JUDGE ORIE: The Rijeka attack took place when?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as far as I remember,
19 on the 20th of October, 1995.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
21 Please proceed.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were so deeply concerned over
23 these terrorist attacks that, following the series of attacks I have just
24 referred to, the minister of the interior called upon me to shoulder some
25 of the burden and resign.
1 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can this document be assigned a
2 number, please.
3 MS. MAHINDARATNE: No objection.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1846.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 Ms. Mahindaratne, could I inquire with you. Is there any dispute
8 about these terrorist attacks which took place, from what I understand,
9 the one on which -- which we see on the document far away from
10 Sector South and the other one in Rijeka
11 Is there any dispute about that?
12 MS. MAHINDARATNE: No, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, therefore, half a word would have
14 done that you could have agreed with Ms. Mahindaratne and then to say,
15 without even showing the document, that there was a terrorist attack on
16 the train bridge on that date. That was, in Rijeka, there was an attack
17 such. And then you can ask the witness what caused this, and that is it
18 that he would have to resign. That takes 45 seconds, and -- instead of
19 going through all these documents.
20 But please proceed.
21 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up D583, please.
22 Q. Despite the fact that you cautioned the police structures to
23 heighten their alert because of the imminent terrorist attacks, they did
24 ensue. But on the 8th of August, you sent another memo to police
25 administrations where you state that despite the heightened measures,
1 attacks were taking place. At the end of the document, you order that
2 essential facilities and road infrastructures ought to be secured, and
3 that facilities of importance to the state are to be also secured better,
4 as did the infrastructure belonging to the police.
5 How did this memo fit into the overall effort put in by the
6 police to implement these heightened measures?
7 A. This meant that we had to step up our engagement in providing
8 security to these facilities, including the facilities that were owned by
9 us, on the one hand. And other hand, in view of the manner in which the
10 terrorist attacks were carried out and the assets they involved, it was
11 clear that they were directly linked and had a direct bearing on the
12 liberation of the country. This, of course, added the pressure that had
13 already been there for the police in carrying out their duties.
14 Q. Next ensued Operation Storm. It was envisaged that police
15 stations would have to be restored to the liberated area. As you said,
16 they had already been on stand-by and in the proximity --
17 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up D465.
18 Q. -- because personnel had to be secured as well. This is your
19 memo, dated the 3rd of August, 1995. We will be seeing it shortly.
20 Mr. Moric, you, as assistant minister in charge of police, you
21 sent an order to the police administrations, listed herein, that they
22 should immediately proceed to gather personnel, 100 strong, in order to
23 man these facilities.
24 Now, what was the purpose behind this order, Mr. Moric?
25 A. I would only like to first draw a distinction between separate
1 police units of the uniformed police and the special police force. This
2 isn't one and the same thing.
3 What we are discussing here is the ordinary uniformed police.
4 The request is that each of the police administrations listed here should
5 place, at our disposal, 100 men who, depending on what the assessments of
6 the developments would be, and depending on what the needs expressed by
7 chiefs of police administrations would be, would be deployed to the
8 liberated areas as assistance to the police stations that had been
9 expelled earlier on and were about to return to the areas where they
10 originally belonged.
11 Q. If we count them all together, we see that there are 16 police
12 administrations, each was to provide 100 men, so it's 1600 men. And
13 let's look at the date again; it's the 3rd of August. Or perhaps, rather
14 than me telling the story, you should be the one telling us.
15 Since this was ordered -- since this was then ordered that the
16 police administrations received on the eve of Operation Storm, what sort
17 of -- what is the character of the document in view of the time-line?
18 A. Evidently, this is part of preparations. We will -- we have yet
19 to see what is to come. This was not the final step when it comes to the
20 efforts that we invested in relation to the liberated area. That's to
21 say, the needs will arise for a more frequent rotation of men and for
22 greater numbers of men.
23 Q. Mr. Moric, where did all these men -- these policemen come from?
24 You said that there had to be heightened supervision of all these
25 facilities, calling for a greater numbers of men, and yet we -- you had
1 to set aside what numbers of men for the territory covered by
2 Operation Storm? How did the police structure cope with all these
4 A. Well, it was difficult. It depended on -- of course, it -- it
5 had an adverse impact on the state of security for the police
6 administrations that had to second these men to the liberated area. We
7 expected the criminality rate to rise in the areas covered by these
8 police administrations, but we decided to proceed this way, nevertheless,
9 because we deemed that this damage would not outweigh the advantage.
10 Q. This document details the way in which manning was supposed to be
11 carried out, and the penultimate paragraph contains your order, whereby
12 the members of the separate police units to be deployed there had to wear
13 a official police uniform, a summer shirt, berets, and boots.
14 Now, Mr. Moric, what is the colour of the trousers and the summer
15 shirt of the separate police units?
16 A. The ordinary uniformed police has a blue uniform at all times.
17 However, for situations that were not typical situations, grey colour
18 could be used as well. However, the insignia on the grey background was
19 always colour blue. That's to say, the coat of arms and the logo of the
20 police always indicated, even where grey uniforms were concerned, that it
21 was the ordinary uniformed police.
22 MR. MIKULICIC: Let's turn to the second page of the document.
23 Q. In the third paragraph there, you order that the policemen had to
24 ready themselves with the necessary gear and the hygiene kit that they
25 normally had that would last them at least ten days.
1 Can you explain this reference to what was to be at least a
2 ten-day engagement of the policemen, in accordance with your memo? Did
3 it have to do with the rotation of the forces or with something else?
4 A. My associates and myself, when preparing to help out the police
5 stations, restore their authority in what was, by then, expected to be
6 liberated territory, and expecting that the process of stabilising
7 security in the area would not be a short one, but, rather, would be
8 developed over time, in order to give an idea to the policemen who were
9 preparing for this duty, we told them that they would be engaged for at
10 least ten days.
11 At the time we were conceiving this, we did expect the whole
12 exercise to last some 10 to 15 days.
13 Q. In the meantime, Mr. Moric, police stations were set up in the
14 newly liberated areas. This is something that has been established in
15 this case. So the Knin police administration and the Knin police station
16 were set up and became operational with the assistance of the separate
17 police forces, as you put it just now.
18 However, the Ministry of the Interior took another measure in
19 this respect, and I will ask for your comments on this. This is the
20 measure of dispatching a coordinator. Can you give us the context and
21 the purpose behind this measure employed by the Ministry of the Interior?
22 A. Of course. As the very title of the post in Croatian says,
23 "coordinator," their role was to coordinate the work of police stations,
24 to coordinate work among them, and to coordinate their work with police
25 administrations. Their work was to be coordinated, and, under some
1 specific serious situations, where the local police management had
2 insufficient experience or had such experience for the first time. Given
3 their background that they had in the ministry, they were supposed to
4 help out the local police management in their day-to-day work. They were
5 supposed to back their requests and decisions. Generally speaking, their
6 role was to be of -- be professional and organisational support to the
7 local police management.
8 Q. Do you remember the names of some of the coordinators that acted
9 in the territory of the police administration of Knin, Mr. Moric?
10 A. There were quite a number of them. I don't remember their names.
11 I don't remember the names of the coordinators, but I remember the names
12 of my two collaborators who coordinated or, rather, acted as their
13 support. Their names were Mr. Tomurad and Mr. Franjo. I believe that,
14 among the coordinators, were Mr. Baric, Mr. Buhin, and I apologise for
15 not being able to remember the names of any of the others.
16 Q. Were the coordinators, sent to the field by the ministry,
17 entrusted with some authorities to issue orders to the police stations in
18 the areas which they were supposed to support?
19 A. Counsel, this would be directly in breach of the law, or, rather,
20 the provisions of the Law on the Interior. The Law on the Interior
21 provides that police stations, and police administrations as well,
22 monitor the situation and occurrences in the areas where they exist, and
23 they implement measures with a view to upholding law. In other words,
24 the chiefs of the police stations, the chiefs of police administrations,
25 all, in their respective, areas are the ones who implement the law; they
1 undertake measures; they monitor a situation; and they take measures with
2 a view to upholding the law. Or, in other words, the subordination
3 structure starts with the chief of the police station, who is responsible
4 to the chief of the police administrations. The chief of police
5 administrations report to the assistant ministers for their respective
6 sectors. And when it comes to the implementation of all the laws and
7 tasks identified by the law, the chiefs of the police administrations
8 report to the minister of the interior.
9 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce
10 document P494.
11 Q. Mr. Moric, after the Operation Storm was carried out, the
12 Croatian authorities managed to regain the territories that they had not
13 controlled for four years. During that operation, there were various
14 contacts with the population and members of the army -- the so-called
15 Army of Serbian Krajina. Within that context, I'm showing you a document
16 dated the 4th of August, also part of the Operation Return. You issued
17 it, and you sent it to all the police administrations. And the subject
18 of that document are collection centres.
19 This document elaborates the organisation of collection centres,
20 the reception of people, and so on and so forth.
21 Could you please explain the context and motives which prompted
22 you to sent this document to the police administrations?
23 A. Based on previous experiences and cases when some parts of the
24 occupied territories had been liberated, and particularly based on the
25 most recent experience at the time of the liberation of Western Slavonia,
1 it was very easy to foresee that we would be faced with a number of
2 citizens of the Republic of Croatia
3 find it very difficult to decide what to do in the given circumstances,
4 who would not be able to decide whether to stay on living in their houses
5 or whether they would embark on a -- a journey together with other
6 refugees. That's why we came up with an idea of collection centres as
7 places where people would be able to gather; and where they would be
8 received in compliance with the Geneva Conventions; where they would be
9 provided with the basic conditions of life and work; and where they would
10 be interviewed, in order to find out what their intentions were, what
11 they actually wanted to do.
12 As a result of that, those who wanted to stay in the
13 Republic of Croatia
14 accommodated in such areas where their safety could be guaranteed. At
15 the same time, such places had to receive the former members of
16 paramilitary and para-police forces who had taken off their paramilitary
17 uniforms and removed paramilitary insignia from their clothes and, thus
18 changed, their visual identity. It was a notorious fact.
19 We knew, from before, that among them there were also people who
20 were not citizens and nationals of the Republic of Croatia
21 been citizens of Croatia
22 nationals. At that time, the penal law prescribed penalties for
23 participation in armed rebellion. The police's tasks, amongst other, was
24 to collect information about any persons who had committed that type of
25 crime. Thus, the idea of reception or collection centres was to receive
1 all categories of people and to provide all of them with the basic
2 conditions fit for a human being. And, also, the intention was to
3 interview all those people. And then, in keeping with our possibilities
4 their wishes, allow them to achieve their goals.
5 Q. You have mentioned a category of people who requested additional
6 engagement on the part of the crime prevention police.
7 In this document, you say, under C, which is on the third page of
8 the Croatian version of the document, that information should be
9 collected and that that information should be analysed. The person in
10 charge is the chief of the crime prevention sector in the police
11 administration. And that those people had to act in concert with crime
12 prevention military administration in order to collect material evidence
13 and other facts.
14 And you say that, in connection with the given tasks, plan for a
15 sufficient number of forensic technicians with appropriate equipment and
16 supplies. And, finally, you say that the person in charge will be the
17 chief of the police administration.
18 Mr. Moric, the role of crime prevention police is what I'm
19 interested in within this context. What was its role, in terms of the
20 collection of information from persons who had been received in such
22 A. Counsel, I'm not sure that I understood your question properly.
23 However, if you had in mind as to how things were done in operative
24 terms, in collection centres, I can tell that a customary procedure was
25 followed, the one that is normally followed by crime prevention police.
1 In police terminology, this is called the interview technique.
2 During interviews, information is obtained more or less relevant
3 when it comes to seeking evidence about somebody having committed a
5 Q. In other words, a procedure which involved members of the crime
6 prevention police working in collection centres also demanded additional
7 efforts on the part of the police officers?
8 A. Yes, of course.
9 MR. MIKULICIC: Let's now look at D1840.
10 Q. After Operation Storm, there were many people in the
11 Sector South, military personnel, police officers, civilians, all of them
12 moved about the area. What we have before us is your letter dated
13 8th August, 1995
14 traffic all roads on which traffic was banned due to the liberation of
15 the occupied area without any limitations or bans exactly at 2200 hours.
16 My question to you, Mr. Moric, in view of this order of yours to
17 the police administrations, is: How did you proceed to re-establish
18 traffic and transport in the newly liberated areas? Were there any other
19 restrictions with this regard?
20 A. Of course, this document suggests that there had been a ban on
21 traffic for very clear and obvious reasons. The restriction of movement
22 of people in a certain area has to be implemented if there are very
23 compelling reasons for such a ban, because the freedom of movement is one
24 of the basic human rights and freedoms. And that is why, within the
25 existing legal system, a decision on that could be taken only by the
1 minister of the interior.
2 The beginning of the operation to liberate the occupied parts of
3 the country was a good enough and a strong enough and a valid reason to
4 impose a ban on traffic on some of the roads, until the moment there was
5 no longer any danger for participants in the traffic on those roads.
6 When there was no longer any danger, then the freedom of movement
7 had to be allowed with a logical caveat or a logical reservation, if you
8 will, and that was that, in some areas, reasons may reappear, security
9 reasons may reappear, and that, in some areas, there could still be a
10 temporary restriction of movement of people imposed for those reasons.
11 However, I repeat something very important: All those decisions were
12 within the purview of the minister of the interior and the Ministry of
13 the Interior.
14 MR. MIKULICIC: Could the Court please produce document D1762.
15 Q. After Operation Storm, and after the withdrawal of the enemy
16 troops from the territory, you sent, on the 9th of August, 1995, as part
17 of the Operation Return, a letter to all the police administrations,
18 including the Zadar and Knin Police Administration, and you say to them
19 that some elements of the Chetnik units are still on the run in the
20 forests and than that there was a strong possibility that police forces
21 might come under attack. You drew the attention to all the police
22 officers who are performing their duty at check-points and those in
23 patrol -- patrols of the territory to stay alert to such a possibility.
24 You draw their attention to the possibility of attacks on check-points
25 and patrols, and you task all police officers to inform the special
1 police sector of any such attempts.
2 Mr. Moric, check-points and patrols are mentioned herein. Which
3 forces were maintaining law and order at those check-points and in those
5 A. Our main intention initially was to establish check-points on
6 roads and cross-roads. We wanted our police to control people,
7 irrespective of their mode of transport.
8 During those first few days, we did not know what might have been
9 happening alongside those roads. We didn't know whether there were any
10 discarded weapons or mines. Later on, the practice showed that there
11 were a lot of booby-traps laid around the roads. This document also
12 refers to something that was later proven on by practice that there were
13 also elements of the paramilitary and para-police of the so-called
14 Krajina and that also some elements of the paramilitary and the
15 para-police of the so-called Krajina infiltrated from the neighbouring
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is why it was important to establish police
17 control of the roads during the first days, and monitor any movements of
18 people along those roads.
19 By the very nature of the distribution of tasks within the
20 Ministry of the Interior, that task was within the purview of the
21 uniformed police or the blue police. However, among people moving
22 through the area, there were also people wearing military uniforms or
23 sporting the visual identity of the army. It was clear that the most
24 practical solution for the check-points was to employ military police
25 alongside the civilian police. This had been envisaged during the
1 preparations for Operation Storm. I was the one who sought such
2 cooperation from the chief of the military police.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, since we had a bit of an earlier
4 re-start, I think we should take this break a bit earlier as well.
5 Could you tell us how much time you would still need?
6 MR. MIKULICIC: Till the end of the day, Your Honour. So that
7 means three sessions all in all.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Well, more than three sessions.
9 MR. MIKULICIC: Well, not counting five minutes from yesterday.
10 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber will consider this.
11 I further -- when I earlier said something about the 65 ter list
12 and Ms. Mahindaratne, I was referring to 1D610, which was not on your
13 65 ter list but which was on the Gotovina 65 ter list. I, therefore,
14 granted leave to add it to your 65 ter list where you said that
15 Ms. Mahindaratne had been kind enough to make no objections to that.
16 MR. MIKULICIC: Sorry for misunderstanding, Your Honour, I was
17 thinking that this document is not on my direct list for this witness.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I have not yet delivered a decision on
19 the admission of D1846, transcript page 40.
20 D1846 is admitted into evidence.
21 We'll have a break, and we will resume at 25 minutes to 1.00.
22 --- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, the Chamber, although with great
25 hesitation, grants you the next session. The Chamber, however, would not
1 like to hear, again, questions like, What was the purpose of sending 100
2 people from every police administration, and then to hear the answer,
3 There was lot of work to be done, and, if needed, we would use them.
4 I mean, of course, no one would expect them to original bridge
5 drives. So, therefore, it is really the obvious, a document which we had
6 seen already, and where it is clear that, after Operation Storm, that
7 there may have been a need to have more policemen available to do the
8 difficult task.
9 But why spend a couple of minutes on that? It's really useless,
10 because it's the obvious. And the Chamber would like to you focus on
11 matters which are really in dispute.
12 Therefore, the Chamber expects you to refrain from any such
13 questions, and, as I said before, with some hesitation, and with great
14 hesitation even, grants you the next session. And this is not only to be
15 kept in mind for today but also for the witnesses still to come.
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, while we still have this document on
19 the screen, please focus on its second paragraph, whereby you say that,
20 in case of an enemy attack on supervisory control points or patrols as
21 well as intelligence security information, the events or occurrences, you
22 are obliged to urgently inform the special police sector.
23 To what end, Mr. Moric?
24 A. So that they could intervene in order to protect the lives of the
25 policemen at that check-point who had come under attack.
1 Q. Let's go to D49 next.
2 After Operation Storm was concluded, Mr. Moric, which is at the
3 core of this case, there was an increase in the number of crimes in the
4 newly liberated territories. When did you get any information on the
5 increase in the number of crimes in those areas? Or let me put it this
6 way: When did you realize that that became an issue?
7 A. If I rely on the date of this document, which is the
8 18th of August, then my assessment would be that my co-workers and myself
9 realised that we are facing a deluge of crimes, and that pattern began a
10 few days before that date; let's say around the 15th of August.
11 Q. According to this document of the 18th of August, as part of
12 Operation Return, you order the police administrations as follows: At
13 the beginning you say that written and oral reports show that there are
14 daily cases of torching of houses and illegal taking away of people's
15 movable property and that these were mostly committed by persons in
16 military uniform which were not necessarily members of the army.
17 You also point out that this conduct inflicts political damage to
18 the reputation of Croatia
19 police administrations are to set up meetings with the military police
20 battalions asap.
21 In item 2, you say that at those meetings it should be pointed
22 out that there was a decision that the burning of houses and looting of
23 other people's property, which had taken place before that date, would
24 not be processed as such but that the pattern has to be stopped
1 Mr. Moric, you authored this document. Therefore, I would kindly
2 ask you to explain to us item 2 and the reasons behind it.
3 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Mr. President, if I could just
4 [Microphone not activated] since Mr. Mikulicic read out the paragraph,
5 the second paragraph, it doesn't say not necessarily members of the army.
6 Some of which, so --
7 JUDGE ORIE: It's -- it's -- he summarized it, Ms. Mahindaratne.
8 And by saying "not necessarily" means that, I see this written in this
9 paragraph, that where, formally and actually, they would be members of
10 the army, that there are others which are not.
11 I thought that this summary was adequate.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, could you please answer the question
15 I put to you.
16 Since you authored this document, what was your motivation to
17 phrase item 2 the way you did?
18 A. My co-workers and I had to face the facts, and -- a few days
19 preceding this date, that there was a great increase of crimes that was
20 on the increase. It became clear that the method of work of the police
21 and the military police no longer provided the expected result, as it had
22 been planned in the preparation for Operation Storm. We -- that is to
23 say, the way we had planned it with the chief of the military police and
24 his team.
25 Despite of numerous daily telephone and personal contacts, up to
1 that point in time, we were unable to correct the situation. Hence, the
2 deluge in the number of crimes. The idea in the order was to focus on
3 stopping that pattern from developing further, in a way, so as not to
4 concentrate on the events which had already taken place, and could not be
5 corrected as such, but to focus, rather, on preventing the occurrence of
6 any further incidents of that nature.
7 I must say that as the person who signed this document, before I
8 drafted it and sent it on, I had a dilemma to face which lasted for a
9 number of days; the dilemma was the professional and police one. That is
10 to say, to keep everyone involved in each and every particular incident
11 until some light is shed on it; in a situation when it was beyond any
12 doubt that, in the meantime, there would be many more similar incidents.
13 The other end or the other issue of the dilemma was to whether I
14 should focus and dedicate new personnel in order to prevent and further
15 incidents; and once that has been achieved, to go back to shed light on
16 those which had taken place.
17 Q. Mr. Moric, one could hear an opinion in this courtroom that, by
18 virtue of item 2, you, in a way, pardoned all perpetrators of crime
19 before the 18th of August. Was that your intention, and did you have any
20 authority in that regard to issue pardons?
21 A. Counsel, one, first of all, clearly needs to say that that could
22 not have been my intention. By vocation, I am a professional policeman.
23 This would not be part and parcel of police work. Even more importantly,
24 legally it would have been impossible; namely, I was in the sixth tier of
25 the executive branch at that time. The executive branch, in particular,
1 its sixth tier, cannot grant pardons for anything. This, perhaps, can be
2 done by the legislative branch; and, indeed, it happened once the
3 Croatian parliament adopted the law on general amnesty, by virtue of
4 which --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Moric, the Chamber doesn't need any further
6 explanation that you, in your position, were not entitled to pardon. The
7 real issue is whether the affect of this order not to investigate - for
8 those who had committed already those offences - whether the effect could
9 have been that, without an investigation, that the chance that they would
10 be punished for those acts would be minimum; that's the issue,
12 Would you agree with that; or would you not agree with that?
13 And, if so, please explain us why.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it was not possible to
15 use this document to pardon the perpetrators of the crimes --
16 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Moric, that
17 was not my question. My question is that if you order not to
18 investigate, whether that would have the effect that those who may have
19 committed offences are likely not ever to be punished. That's my
20 question, whether you would agree with that or not.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, I do not.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Then please explain why, apparently, you think that,
23 despite the fact that matters will not be investigated, that,
24 nevertheless, there is a reasonable chance - that's at least how I
25 understand your answer - that those will, nevertheless, be punished.
1 Please proceed -- tell us.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. I didn't want to
3 say that there was no longer any possibility for them to be punished.
4 There was a possibility that, by subsequent investigations, one would be
5 able to detect the perpetrators and that they would, indeed, be punished
6 for the crimes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Was there ever an order given at a later stage
8 that those crimes, which you ordered at this moment not to be
9 operatively -- to be investigated, that they should, in contrary to the
10 earlier orders, should, nevertheless, be investigated?
11 Was there ever such an order issued by you?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I did not issue such
13 an order because there was no need for it.
14 The context within which document falls is clear. Once the
15 pattern of new crimes is stopped, the crimes which had been committed
16 were to be investigated. In the reports from the various police
17 administrations which arrived in the days following this document, there
18 is a clear confirmation that this change of strategy produced results;
19 that the number of crimes decreased; they reported on the number of
20 crimes; and the statistics of the number of crimes which were resolved.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And any specific reporting, at a later stage,
22 on more or less retroactively investigating those crimes, of which you
23 said here that they were not to be operatively investigated?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was quite a large number of
25 them. Specifically I can now recall a report of the chief of the
1 Zadar Police Administration, Mr. Cetina, dated around the
2 23rd, 24th, or the 25th of August, in which he reports that the new
3 approach produced results, i.e., that in the territory of his police
4 administration, there was a significant decrease in the number of crimes
5 and that they keep investigating crimes of all types, including those
6 which had taken place earlier.
7 JUDGE ORIE: That is prior to this decision.
8 We'll have a look at that.
9 Mr. Mikulicic, please proceed.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 [Interpretation] For reference for Their Honours, D568 is the
12 document that was bar tabled, and it's a list of the prosecutor's offices
13 about the criminal reports filed and their attendant prosecution.
14 Q. Mr. Moric, what next followed were reactions from -- or responses
15 from police administrations.
16 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] And can we call up D584.
17 Q. To that end, this is a telegram sent by the chief of the
18 Zadar-Knin Police Administration, Mr. Ivan [as interpreted] Cetina; and
19 it's addressed to you; and the date is -- are the following day, the
20 19th of August. There, he informs you that a meeting was held with
21 deputy commander of the 72nd Military Police Battalion when their
22 attention was drawn to the fact that it was impossible to ensure that the
23 joint civilian and military police check-points are adequately manned
24 because of the shortage of MP personnel.
25 Mr. Moric, we will yet see a number of other documents, which
1 indicate that it was almost impossible to man joint check-points and to
2 dispatch joint patrols because of the shortage of MP personnel.
3 Were you aware of this problem; and, if so, what did you do to
4 remedy it?
5 A. Counsel, of course, I was aware of the problem because I was in
6 daily contact with chiefs of police administrations. I also received
7 their written reports, such as this one, for instance. It was precisely
8 for this reason that I was daily in touch with the management of the
9 military police administration, including its chief, General Lausic.
10 My request was that, in accordance with our agreements reached at
11 the preparatory stage, the joint activity of civilian and military police
12 be allowed wherever it was -- or enabled wherever it was necessary. And
13 the locations where it was necessary were the ones that were indicated in
14 the reports coming in from the field, where movements of uniformed
15 persons were expected, regardless of whether these were actual members of
16 the Croatian Army, or merely wearing the Croatian army uniform or
18 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up 65 ter
19 document, 5979.
20 Q. Mr. Moric, you will see your memo now, dated the
21 22nd of August, 1995.
22 There, you refer back to your previous memo of the
23 18th of August.
24 [Defence counsel confer]
25 MR. MIKULICIC: It should be 65 ter 02979, not 5979. So -- no,
1 no -- yes, okay. [Interpretation] 65 ter document 02979.
2 Q. This is a follow-up on your own telegram of the 18th of August,
3 which we've looked at, where you're asking that the civilian and military
4 police work together in order to prevent the torching of homes and theft
5 of property. You also state therein that you sent a letter to the
6 military police administration and that the administration, in turn, sent
7 an order to all the MP battalions to efficiently link up with all the
8 police administrations and police battalions in order to effectively deal
9 with the problems.
10 At page 2 of the document, you state -- or, rather, you request
11 that the police administration report back to you on whether cooperation
12 established was satisfactory or insufficient; to inform you of the units
13 involved; to inform you whether there was still occurrences of torching
14 and looting; whether crime-scene examinations were carried out jointly by
15 the civilian police and the military police; and how many such
16 examinations were carried out; and whether, under 6, forensic examination
17 was carried out of the deeds committed.
18 Please focus on item 6. What was your intention behind the
19 request for information and, more precisely, behind this particular
20 query, whether forensic examination was done of the crimes committed?
21 A. Before I answer your question with Court's leave, can we go back
22 to page 1 of the document?
23 Q. Yes.
24 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we go back to page 1, please.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Clearly the intention was to receive feedback on whether this
2 particular activity was carried out or not. The intention was to make
3 sure whether the instruction was clear in its terms. Had we received
4 feedback to the effect that such activities were not being carried out,
5 then my conclusion would have been that my first document was
6 misunderstood, and I would have intervened.
7 According to the reports which we received in response to this
8 document, it was clear that the former document was not misunderstood,
9 and that the activities were carried out as planned. That's to say, to
10 prevent the commission of further crimes and then to deal with the crimes
12 Accordingly, in item 7, a request was made to specify whether
13 this was, indeed, the case involving actual members of the Croatian army,
14 and, if so, how many, or whether it involved Croatian citizens who --
15 whose assumed identity was that as a member of the Croatian army.
16 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we receive an exhibit number
17 for this document, Mr. President.
18 MS. MAHINDARATNE: No objection.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1847.
21 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
22 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, can we call up
24 Q. Mr. Moric, a moment ago you mentioned Mr. Cetina, chief of the
25 Zadar-Knin Police Administration. I will now be showing you his report
1 in response your telegram, the one that we saw first, dated
2 22nd of August. And two days later, on the 24th of August, under the
3 heading: Operation -- or Action Return, he is sending you a letter, a
4 report, where he says that cooperation between the police administration
5 and police stations and the military police was satisfactory for the time
7 He goes on to say that in the area covered by his police
8 administration, that is to say, Zadar-Knin Police Administration, there
9 was still occurrences of torching of houses and theft of property but to
10 a far lesser extent than had been the case before the 18th of August. In
11 other words, before your 18th of August order.
12 These occurrences refer to the entire area. And the perpetrators
13 were, for the most part, individuals wearing HV uniforms, civilians,
14 although there were instances where policemen wearing uniform were
15 registered. And that there were three requests for disciplinary
16 proceedings, and another case involving discipline. And it is also
17 stated that the military police has been involved, to the greatest extent
18 possible, to deal with perpetrators wearing uniforms. All the other
19 cases are dealt with by the civilian police.
20 On the issue of crime-scene examinations, Mr. Cetina states that
21 they were conducted independently, for the most part, by the civilian
23 He goes on to say that the total of nine crime-scene examinations
24 of torching of houses and nine crime-scene examinations of thefts of
25 property had been carried out since your last telegram and that, in all
1 these cases, forensic examination was undergoing as far as possible or as
2 far as the circumstances permitted it.
3 It is stated that 15 perpetrators in civilian clothes, four in
4 civilian police uniforms were identified; whereas, they did not have
5 precise data concerning soldiers, because it was the military police that
6 dealt with them.
7 Mr. Cetina goes on to say that they were busily working on the
8 prevention of such occurrences, which yielded results to a certain
9 extent. And he goes on to say that Croatian army members were found
10 torching houses; they were identified; and the 72nd [as interpreted]
11 MP Battalion was engaged in examining -- in investigating this incident.
12 So this is the feedback, the report in response to your
13 22nd of August telegram.
14 As a policeman, a specialist, what is your conclusion based on
15 these reports and in relation to the tasks contained in your order
16 addressing police administrations?
17 A. My conclusion is that the 18th of August instructions were
18 properly understood, and, more importantly, that they were yielding the
19 desired results.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
21 MR. MISETIC: Sorry. I just want to finish -- let the witness
22 finish his answer.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, would you please finish your answer.
24 You say they yielded the desired results. And then ...
25 Please complete your answer.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What is particularly important:
2 that the tasks were being carried out in accordance with the law, because
3 the law applied to members of the police force who were, unfortunately,
4 perpetrators of this sort of crime.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic.
6 MR. MISETIC: Yes. Mr. President just as a -- to correct the
7 transcript, page 63, line 24, actually, line 23 in the centre e-court
8 transcript, I think if the Court looks at the document - and I believe I
9 heard Mr. Mikulicic also say - it was the 71st Military Police Battalion.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: Yes.
11 MR. MISETIC: And it's in Korenica, which just -- so that,
12 geographically, we know what -- which areas we're talking about.
13 MR. MIKULICIC: That's correct, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Reference should be to the 71st rather than to
15 the 72nd.
16 Ms. Mahindaratne, you would agree with that, I take it?
17 MS. MAHINDARATNE: I do, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 Then please proceed.
20 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Mr. Misetic.
21 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, I'm going to show you another
22 document which is D574.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could the Court please
24 produce D574.
25 Q. Despite the feedback, or, rather, judging by the document that
1 you are going to have on the screen very soon, dated the
2 30th of August, 1995, also, as part of the Operation Return and sent to
3 the police administrations stated herein, you say in paragraph 2 that the
4 first responses were not segregated by items and that they were not very
5 concrete, so that you were forced to seek additional information from
6 certain police administrations. That's why you are giving a new deadline
7 to the police administration for feedback in response.
8 Mr. Moric, why did you intervene by this letter dated the
9 30th of August? What was the cause of your dissatisfaction that prompted
10 this letter?
11 A. The reason for my dissatisfaction was not only of statistical
12 nature, although I warned them that in their reports they did not specify
13 and itemise things as I requested them to do.
14 The fact that they were sending me very general responses, I --
15 made me realize that some chiefs of administrations and the management at
16 a very high level were not properly involved with the problem, and the
17 nature of the problem was such that they should have been deeply
18 involved. And that is the reason why I requested from the chiefs of
19 police administrations to draft very concrete reports, to specify data,
20 and to get immersed in the problems, if that was not the case. I wanted
21 to seek confirmation for the reports that I had already received. That
22 was an additional reason for this letter.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: And let's look at D575. That's the next
24 document, I would kindly ask the Court to produce.
25 Q. That document is dated 1st of September and was sent to you by
1 the police administration of Sibenik. And the immediate reason for this
2 letter was your request dated the 30th of August.
3 In this letter, everything is itemised, as you requested. Under
4 item 1, it says that the cooperation between the police administration
5 and the police stations is not adequate in terms of manning check-points
6 with members of the military police. It says that military police are
7 present only two out of the total of 15 check-points.
8 Under item 2, it says that the reason for that, according to the
9 explanation provided by the commander, Mr. Markota was the lack of
10 personnel and their involvement with other tasks.
11 Furthermore, it says that there are occasions of arson but that
12 houses were not being blown up; that there are still instances of looting
13 and thefts of other people's property; and that, among perpetrators,
14 there are a -- a higher number of civilians and a lower number of
15 military personnel.
16 It says, also, that 48 on-site investigations were carried out,
17 and that, in 36 cases, there had been a theft of property, and in 12,
18 there -- there was a matter of arson. And, in all the cases, there is an
19 ongoing investigation, and that a total of 38 perpetrators are known, of
20 whom eight are members of the military, the HV, and the rest are
22 Mr. Moric, would you say that a report of this kind by the police
23 administration of Sibenik was something that you were hoping to receive?
24 A. Yes, this is exactly what I wanted. I wanted things to be
25 specified. I wanted full feedback in order to be able to try and excerpt
1 influence on the administration of the military police.
2 The key information in this report is contained under item 3
3 where it says that in the liberated areas there have been minor numbers
4 of looting, much less than before.
5 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can the Court please
6 produce 3D00706.
7 Q. Mr. Moric, you will remember that --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Can we first see paragraph 3 because we -- it was
9 not shown in English.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: It's on the next page in English version.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.
12 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I kindly ask the Court to produce
14 Q. Mr. Moric, we spoke about police units that were sent to assist
15 in the liberated areas. After a certain while, those units returned and
16 were replaced by others.
17 This document is dated the 30th of August, and you issued it as
18 part of the Operation Return, and it regulates the procedure of units
19 coming from the field.
20 And you say as follows:
21 At the beginning of September, there is an large-scale
22 replacement of special police units.
23 And you say in paragraph 2 that, during former change-overs,
24 there were attempts on the part of the police officers to unlawfully take
25 away other people's property when leaving the area.
1 Under item 3 you say that such attempts impair the credibility
2 and the significance of the overall system of the interior --
3 JUDGE ORIE: [Microphone not activated]
4 MR. MIKULICIC: Obviously the English version is not the real
5 one -- the right one, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's what I was verifying.
7 Is it an e-court problem, or is it --
8 MR. MIKULICIC: No, here we are.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Now it seems that we have the right English
11 Yes, please proceed.
12 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. [Interpretation] And then you order, in view of the observed
14 instances under item 2, that commanders of separate units must constantly
15 monitor the level of discipline and responsibility during the execution
16 of assignments in the field.
17 You also say that police administrations receiving assistance, in
18 whose areas the separate units are operating and the commanders of those
19 separate units have to establish the supervision and guidance service
20 whose purpose will be to eliminate this problem, and that every attempt
21 of unlawful appropriation of other people's property should be punished
22 by returning the goods and returning the police officers to their mother
23 unit and instigating disciplinary proceedings against them.
24 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we now, please, see page 2 in
25 both the Croatian and English versions of the same document.
1 Q. Under item 5, you ordered as follows: In preparing the -- the
2 return of the separate units to their original areas, an inspection must
3 be carried out of the police officers, equipment, their private and
4 personal items, and the vehicles the unit is returning in.
5 Mr. Moric, we have seen from a previous report by the Sibenik
6 Police Administration that some police members were caught in the
7 perpetration of crime. And you said that, unfortunately, there were such
9 This order of yours dated the 30th, is it an attempt to put paint
10 to such an unlawful activity?
11 A. Before I answer your question directly, I would like to correct
12 something that you said about the police administration of Sibenik: I
13 believe it was the police administration of Zadar that reported those
15 However, having said that, I would also like to say that such
16 events among the police officers were something that all the police
17 personnel is ashamed of. Unfortunately, things did happen. It was just
18 the way things were. People of low morale were tempted.
19 In order to prevent any possibility for police officers -- or,
20 rather, the whole police force to be compromised as a result of the
21 actions of a handful of people, I issued this order and gave task to
22 police commanders. I wanted to make sure that police officers, who were
23 returning back home, to be exposed to a certain decree of humiliation.
24 However, when they realised what the whole thing was all about, it was
25 easy to implement my order because everybody understood that it was a
1 matter of prevention and protection, the protection of their own dignity,
2 as well as the dignity of the police as an institution. It was
3 necessary. I had to do it, unfortunately.
4 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I please be
5 given a number for this document.
6 MS. MAHINDARATNE: No objection.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1848.
9 JUDGE ORIE: D1848 is admitted into evidence.
10 MR. MIKULICIC:
11 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, in keeping with the Trial Chamber's
12 instructions, I am going to move on to a new topic. And I would kindly
13 ask of you to answer the following questions.
14 When we were looking at document D527, which was the decree on
15 the internal organisation of the Ministry of Interior, we said that the
16 law regulated the division of that ministry into the sector.
17 You were the assistant minister for the police. As the assistant
18 minister for the uniformed police, did you have the right to issue any
19 orders to your subordinates to, for example, carry out a crime
21 A. I'm not sure that I understood your question properly. However,
22 if you wanted to ask me whether a crime would be investigated or -- or
23 not until I said something, then my direct answer to that question is
24 this: It doesn't matter what I think. What matters is what the law
25 prescribes and that the police know what they're supposed to do in
1 certain cases under the law.
2 Q. When it comes to the internal organisation of the
3 Ministry of the Interior and its division into the sectors, which sector
4 was in charge of crime investigation?
5 A. The sector of crime prevention police was established in the
6 ministry in order to regulate or manage the work of crime prevention
7 police departments in the police administrations.
8 Q. Was there another sector within the Ministry of Interior? For
9 example, the sector for uniformed police, the sector for special police,
10 the inspection police or the personnel? Was there any other sector which
11 had the personnel, the technical and other equipment to carry out
13 A. No, there was no such sector. And it was not within the remit of
14 any other sector but the sector of crime prevention police.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, in one of the previous answers, the
16 witness says that he is not sure that he understood your question
17 properly. I got the impression that the answer was not an answer to the
18 question as I understood it to be.
19 Could you please clarify this issue.
20 I understood your question to be whether Mr. Moric had any
21 authority to --
22 MR. MIKULICIC: [Overlapping speakers] ...
23 JUDGE ORIE: -- issue an order to his subordinates to carry out a
24 crime investigation. Whereas, his answer seems to be that certainly no
25 one had to wait for any instruction, but they had to follow the law.
1 Which is, not yet, an answer to the question that, as I understood it,
2 you put to the witness.
3 MR. MIKULICIC: Yes, Your Honour. And, therefore, I put some
4 other questions from which, I suppose, clarified that question.
5 But I can repeat, if you wish so.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I did not find immediately an answer to your
7 initial question in the follow-up questions and the answers to those
9 But please proceed, as you deem fit.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, I apologise if I didn't put a clearer
12 question to you.
13 My question had to do with the following: In view of the powers
14 discharged by the various sectors of the Ministry of the Interior, was
15 there another sector, save for the crime police sector, which could have
16 engaged in the criminal and forensic examination and investigation of a
18 A. No. No other sector could have done that. And the duty to
19 engage in that sort of activity is provided for by the law.
20 Q. In response to my question, you explained the role of the
21 coordinators who were sent to the liberated territories. Did these
22 coordinators have any sort of powers in relation to crime investigations?
23 A. No, they didn't.
24 Q. Mr. Moric, unlike the criminal investigation, the disciplinary
25 proceedings to be carried out within the Ministry of Interior, were they
1 supposed to be conducted by the sectors or at the level of the ministry?
2 A. I think it was provided for in the Law on the Internal Affairs
3 and the decree on the internal organisation of the ministry, whereby
4 every police administration had its disciplinary court. The headquarters
5 of the ministry in Zagreb
6 The disciplinary court within the police administration had the
7 competence, had the jurisdiction, of hearing disciplinary cases in the
8 first instance; whereas, the ministry's disciplinary court had the
9 jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings in the second instances, as
10 well as in the first instance when it came to the employees of the
11 ministry at the headquarters.
12 For these employees, the second-instance disciplinary court was
13 in the ministry of administration, unless I'm mistaken. Since, of
14 course, the Ministry of the Interior was part of the state
16 The disciplinary courts at police administrations were seized of
17 disciplinary actions against all its members.
18 Q. Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Moric, we've heard quite a lot about
19 disciplinary proceedings, and I'm pressed for time.
20 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] For reference, I refer
21 Their Honours to D1080, D1081, and D1082. These are decisions rendered
22 by first-instance and second-instance disciplinary courts, as courts
23 having jurisdiction.
24 Q. Mr. Moric, by way of introduction, you said that it was solely
25 the crime police sector that was charged with criminal investigation.
1 Let's look at the following example: If a chief of some other
2 sector or an assistant minister charged with some other sector -- could
3 they have ordered the crime police sector to carry out any sort of
4 criminal investigation?
5 A. No, they couldn't have. And there was no reason for it either.
6 Criminal inquiries are launched automatically in the cases
7 envisaged by the law. Information could have been sent by someone who
8 received notice of -- of it to the crime police sector. And this sort of
9 flow of information would then trigger an inquiry. However, the law does
10 not provide for a possibility for someone to order that such an inquiry
11 be launched.
12 Q. Mr. Moric, Mr. Mladen Markac was assistant minister for the
13 special police sector. Could he have ordered the crime police or prevent
14 the crime police from engaging in a criminal investigation?
15 A. No, he could not have.
16 Q. If, nevertheless, such an order is issued, pursuant to which
17 regulations or rules would a crime policeman act?
18 A. He may take the order as a piece of information, as notice of a
19 crime committed, regardless of who the perpetrator is, as a basis on
20 which he will decide whether there is a reason to suspect that a crime
21 has been committed; and, if so, it will help him to decide to launch an
22 investigation and the way in which he is going to approach it.
23 Q. If it so happens that a member of the Ministry of the Interior is
24 a suspect of a crime, is a suspect perpetrator of a crime, which state
25 agency would conduct a criminal investigation against such a member of
1 the Ministry of the Interior?
2 A. In the event that information is received and it is established
3 to a higher degree of certainty that a perpetrator of a crime is an
4 employ of the Ministry of the Interior or a policeman of whatever sector,
5 the same rules would apply as normally apply when the perpetrators are
6 ordinary citizens.
7 This means that the police would gather relevant information that
8 a crime police force can normally gather and that the case would be left
9 in the hands of the individual who normally is in charge of an
10 investigation, and that is an investigating magistrate. In that case,
11 the police would meet the additional requirements expressed by the
12 investigating judge, if any, and cooperate on the case.
13 Q. If the investigating magistrate launches an investigation into
14 what this member of the -- or employee of the Ministry of the Interior
15 has done and informs his superior accordingly, be it a chief of the
16 police administration, or whatever, what is the obligation? What sort of
17 a procedure should apply in relation to an employee of the ministry who
18 is the subject of a criminal investigation?
19 A. Since, at this stage, there is already a criminal investigation
20 ongoing, which means that there is a reason to suspect that a crime was
21 committed, and since the commission of a crime is an obstacle preventing
22 an individual from getting employment in the police, the first step that
23 the employee's superior must do is to suspend him from duty and to enable
24 the investigating judge to carry out his duties smoothly, as he would
25 have had to in relation to any ordinary citizen.
1 Q. Mr. Moric, you have been working for the Ministry of the Interior
2 for many years. Did you have occasion to meet and cooperate with
3 Mr. Mladen Markac?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. What is your assessment of your cooperation with
6 Mr. Mladen Markac within the Ministry of the Interior?
7 A. We had a long-standing cooperation. We had good cooperation with
8 good results. Mr. Mladen Markac is a sort of person who was completely
9 aware of the context in which we were working as well as of the legal
10 framework in which we had to act; I in charge of the ordinary uniformed
11 police, and he in charge of the special police.
12 Q. In your contacts with Mr. Markac, did you ever observe or
13 perceive any discriminatory conduct on the part of Mr. Markac in relation
14 to individuals of specific religious affiliation or ethnic background?
15 A. Counsel, I did not observe anything of the sort. And I think
16 that our cooperation made it quite plain that it was irrelevant to both
17 of us. I have -- I even had this one instance of a personal matter in
18 which I had his support, I had his full support.
19 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Moric. I have no further questions.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Mikulicic.
21 Could I already seek information from the other parties as to
22 their assessment of the time needed for cross-examination.
23 MR. KAY: Your Honour, we've agreed that I will go next, and I
24 will be three sessions.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Three sessions for you, Mr. Kay.
1 Mr. Kehoe.
2 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Your Honour, I'll be two sessions.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Two sessions.
4 And then, of course, it's perhaps too early.
5 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Yes, Mr. President, I could give an assessment
6 tomorrow morning, first thing tomorrow morning.
7 Right now I have given an assessment of six sessions,
8 Mr. President, but I believe it will be much less.
9 JUDGE ORIE: It will be much less.
10 Mr. Moric, three sessions is a day. Today we are Wednesday; I
11 here already Thursday and Friday being filled for most of the time and
12 then, certainly, substantial additional time for the Prosecution, which
13 would mean that there's a fair chance that we would not conclude your
14 evidence this week.
15 Would that cause you any problems?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have organised my
17 private and business affairs in such a way that it will not cause a
18 problem. Thank you for your concern. I am at your disposal.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Moric.
20 We will adjourn for the day. But I first instruct you, as I did
21 yesterday, Mr. Moric, that you should not speak with anyone about your
22 testimony, whether already given or still to be given.
23 And we resume tomorrow, Thursday, the 3rd of December, at 9.00 in
24 the morning in this same courtroom.
25 And we'd like to see you back at that moment.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.
2 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 3rd day
3 of December, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.