1 Wednesday, 1 September 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [Prosecution Rebuttal]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 10.07 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around the
8 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. Good morning, Your Honours.
10 Good morning to everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case
11 number IT-06-90-T, the Prosecutor versus Gotovina et al. Thank you,
12 Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
14 There were a few minor matters which we have to address.
15 Mr. Misetic was there something you would like to put on the record.
16 MR. MISETIC: Yes, Mr. President we were asked to clarify from
17 our argument at draft transcript page 8, lines 7 to 9, concerning the
18 footnote references to General Jones's cross-examination. Our position
19 is that the Prosecution's case on necessary and reasonable measures
20 through trial is as outlined in paragraph 605 of our brief and then the
21 specific portions of that which were put to General Jones are at
22 footnotes 1048, 1050 and 1051. And the other correction is at draft
23 transcript page 9, lines 11 to 14, I had misspoken as to the elements of
24 command responsibility that need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
25 Those elements are at paragraph 609 of our brief and it is our position
1 that each of the elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
2 Thank you, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
4 Then, Mr. Tieger, some mistakes to be corrected for the
6 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, thank you.
7 We'd like to make one correction to the record from the
8 submissions on Monday and that would be the reference at transcript
9 page 29, 118, line 5, and that's to Exhibit P1142. Which should in fact
10 be a reference to Exhibit P1141.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that correction.
12 Then I would like to put on the record that we had a delayed
13 start today due to the non-functioning of LiveNote on our computers. The
14 Chamber considered it's wiser, especially since closing argument is
15 important, not to start just with records but not accessible for us to
16 make any annotations. That's the reason why we had a late start.
17 And there a few matters, and I take it that the phosphoric shells
18 will find their way through argument today.
19 Mr. Tieger, to the extent I have not been clear, I intended -- I
20 felt that yesterday you -- no, the day before yesterday, that there was
21 insufficient time to make a general closing observation and you'll have
22 an opportunity to and take whenever you have some -- need some -- an
23 extra five or ten minutes for that, you have an opportunity to do that
25 MR. TIEGER: I appreciate that, Your Honour. I don't, at this
1 point, intend to -- I wanted to concentrate on the rebuttal primarily,
2 and --
3 JUDGE ORIE: I leave it to you.
4 MR. TIEGER: I appreciate that, but I wanted to express my
5 gratitude to the Court for that opportunity.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, Mr. Kay, I do understand that you
7 distributed a list of footnotes to the other parties. Has it been sent
8 to the Chamber already or ...
9 MR. KAY: Not to the Chamber. To the other parties first and
10 then when we have their agreement, we would then send it to the Chamber,
11 with Your Honours' leave.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, the other parties are invited to look at that
13 rather quickly so that the Chamber has access to the list of footnotes,
14 or give an unlimited consent already at this very moment.
15 MR. KAY: Thank you.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Finally, a feature not found in our Rules but, at
17 the same time, not uncommon in this Tribunal is to give the accused an
18 opportunity to briefly address the Court at the end of the hearings. No
19 applications are made for such brief statements. These are usually
20 unsworn statements and very much in line with, I would say, the civil law
21 tradition of the last word for the accused. No applications have been
22 made but if the accused would wish to apply for such an opportunity, the
23 Chamber would be sympathetic to granting it.
24 That's what I have on my agenda at this moment.
25 Mr. Tieger, is the Prosecution ready to present its rebuttal
1 final argument?
2 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
3 And, Mr. President, perhaps we can begin with a matter that the
4 Court raised and that's the issue of the phosphoric shells. The Court is
5 aware of the context in which this arose. That was a claim by the
6 Gotovina Defence asserting that it was incorrect to assert that
7 General Gotovina took steps to conceal his subordinates' crimes at
8 Grahovo by ordering report through a messenger that Glamoc and Grahovo
9 were shelled, citing in particular Exhibit D1980 and the Mladic diary at
10 the 2nd of August. I wanted to address that matter initially,
11 Your Honour.
12 The report that General Gotovina ordered was false, both in the
13 narrow sense and in the broader sense. In the narrow sense, let's look
14 at the two exhibits upon which the Defence relies. D1980 refers to
15 phosphorous shells fired on the "woods at Staretina" on July 27th, and in
16 that connection I would like to direct your attention to the map, place
17 it on the screen. That's a map that's cropped from P2417. And as you
18 can see at the bottom right, circled is Glamoc; the circle to the far
19 left is Grahovo; and the circle to the top left is Drvar. The oval is
20 the general area of the Staretina mountains and by way of -- I'm going to
21 indicate, Your Honour, by way of scale, this is a map that's taken from
22 two maps. The larger blocks to the right are approximately -- indicate
23 about 4 kilometres horizontally and vertically, and the ones to the left
24 about 2 kilometres. In any event, as you can see, the Staretina
25 mountains and the Staretina woods are some distance away and calculated
1 about 9 kilometres from the town of Glamoc
2 far away. And it is clear that no shells that were hitting the Staretina
3 woods would have had an impact on Grahovo or Glamoc.
4 As far as the Mladic diary is concerned, that's an entry of the
5 2nd of August:
6 "The enemy burned the villages on the approaches to Glamoc and
7 Grahovo and yesterday they started burning Grahovo. They are burning
8 some of the villages from Grahovo to Drvar with incendiary artillery
10 Now as the Court will recall, the Split Military District forces
11 had already occupied Grahovo on 28th of July, and it was clearly not
12 shelling its own units in Grahovo. In any event, this postdates the
13 period of time when the entire Grahovo was burning, as indicated by the
14 Split Military District diary.
15 So apart from the interesting information that villages are being
16 burned from Grahovo to Drvar, that is not relevant to the issue of the
17 report, and it's in that sense, that narrow sense, that the report that
18 was issued is false. But more importantly, Your Honour, even if it
19 technically been true in some respect, it was false in this sense. It
20 was intended, clearly, to cover up what was really happening in Grahovo
21 and what had really happened in Grahovo which was that most of the units,
22 all but two, were involved in the destruction of Grahovo.
23 And what happened, as the Court is aware from the evidence, is
24 that at a Split Military District working meeting, the political
25 department suggested that journalists not be permitted to come to Grahovo
1 and that cameras be controlled, and General Gotovina ordered to report
2 through a messenger that Glamoc and Grahovo were shelled by phosphoric
3 shells, clearly to explain the destruction, should journalists somehow
4 manage to become aware of that. That was cited by --
5 JUDGE ORIE: The context is clear. What I was mainly seeking is
6 further details as to the evidence whether phosphoric shells were used or
7 not, which, of course, is irrelevant for is whether the report is false
8 or not. You have explained that by drawing our attention to the fact
9 that what there is in evidence about the use of phosphoric shells could
10 not reasonably be interpreted as being related to Grahovo and Glamoc, and
11 apart from that, that the other evidence rather goes in a different
12 direction, because in order to establish that something is not there
13 means that we need that all -- that there are no positive indications
14 neither negative indications.
15 That's clear. Thank you for that answer.
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 I'd like to turn next to some comments yesterday by the
19 Markac Defence with respect to Mr. Janic. That would be found at
20 transcript 122, 13, through 123, 19. And the Markac Defence indicated
21 that Mr. Janic was never asked about Gracac and, in addition, indicated
22 that -- well, I'll turn to that in a moment.
23 The assertion was that he was never asked. In that respect, I
24 would note that this is, in fact, contradicted by Mr. Janic's testimony
25 at T6355 through 56. That's explicitly cited in the Prosecution's brief
1 at footnote 2108. Mr. Janic said in response to a question about Gracac:
2 "I know that near the town there were some military depots that
3 were legitimate targets but the town itself wasn't and there was no
4 fighting inside it, and there were no artillery strikes targeting the
6 In addition, the Markac Defence stated that Mr. Russo had ignored
7 other alleged key evidence about the shelling of Gracac, including
8 Exhibit P102, that's an UNMO report, which they stated:
9 "Reports that 15 shells fell in the area of Gracac on
10 August 4th."
11 In fact what the UNMO report states - and that should be on the
12 screen now - is that the shells fell not in the area of Gracac but in
13 Gracac town. And more importantly, Your Honour, these 15 rounds did not
14 represent the sum total of shells fired at the town but were recorded
15 between 2.00 p.m.
16 That's nine hours after the shelling attack on Gracac began.
17 So contrary to the assertions of the Markac Defence, this exhibit
18 does not contradict but is completely consistent with the evidence of
19 witnesses such as UNMO team leader Steenbergen and local resident Vida
20 Gacesa that tens of shells fell -- landed in Gracac in the morning of the
21 4th of August.
22 Let me turn next to an issue raised by the Gotovina Defence and
23 the Markac Defence, both of whom suggested that the unlawfulness of the
24 artillery attack was belied by General Forand and his presentation in
25 1996 asserting that the use of HV artillery was "excellent." And that
1 was found at transcript pages 32, and 123 through 24, respectively.
2 I think it's fair to say that based on his testimony that
3 General Forand could not be pleased to hear that he is being invoked on
4 behalf of the alleged legality of this shelling. The suggestion that he
5 believed, either at the time he observed the shelling or later, that it
6 was lawful is contradicted by his testimony before this Chamber, and that
7 would be found at P331, P333, and transcript 4114 through 5, by his
8 statements at the time of the shelling, P83, P341, and in fact by his
9 statements in the very same presentation that the Defence relies upon.
10 That's P401, in which he described "heavy barrages on towns and
11 villages." That's at page 22. That the HV shelled UN observation posts
12 in an effort to stop their reporting; page 28 and page 30. And that
13 there was heavy shelling of Knin on the 5th of August, when Knin "was
14 undefended and virtually empty."
15 And finally, as General Forand explained in his statement at
16 P330, page 4:
17 "Their use of artillery was excellent when being used against
18 military targets. However, the artillery was to a large extent used
19 against villages and towns like Knin and not against targets in the zone
20 of separation. This shelling created mass panic among the population and
21 forced it to flee."
22 A related matter, Your Honour, is the assertion by the
23 Gotovina Defence that the illegality of shelling was inconsistent
24 contemporaneous observations and that to believe the Prosecution's case
25 you would have to believe, for example, that the eyes of the ARSK
1 intelligence on the 4th of August were deceiving them. The
2 Gotovina Defence, at transcript 29188, said that D389, in that document,
3 the ARSK reported that the artillery attack was concentrated against the
4 northern barracks, the ARSK command, the Tvik factory, the railway
5 station, and others. What was not read from this document was the
6 remainder, which indicates that the fire was directed at "the Kaplara
7 barracks, the Tvik factory, the railway junction, residential buildings
8 at the foot of the Knin fortress and elsewhere."
9 Yesterday, Your Honour, the Gotovina Defence asserted that
10 because the Prosecution has not produced photographs of Knin in rubble or
11 evidence of massive deaths due to shelling, it has not established
12 unlawful shelling. Indeed, the Gotovina Defence, at T58, accused the
13 Prosecution of failing to produce evidence of an image it conjured up:
15 Now this grossly misrepresented this threshold by which a
16 shelling attack is considered to be without grounds in international law,
17 and I would remind the Court that at the very commencement of this case,
18 the Prosecution stated explicitly:
19 "This was not Stalingrad
20 reduced the city to rubble. It was not the most destructive shelling of
21 the war," but that is precisely the point. The intention was not to
22 destroy Knin, the city of Zvonimir
23 to resettle Croats, but to drive out Serbs.
24 Your Honours, the absence of concentrated damage and buildings in
25 rubble is wholly consistent with the Prosecution's case that more than
1 1.000 projectiles were fired into Knin but were not directed at military
2 objectives but, instead, widely dispersed throughout the city. A single
3 rocket or shell impact, as the Court has learned, and I would cite the
4 Court to Konings, T14314 through 15, will not demolish a building. And
5 that's also reflected in the evidence of UNMOs such as Kari Anttila, who
6 said that in the months after Storm, "it was possible to find out more
7 locations where artillery and mortar shells had landed," and that based
8 on these observations it is obvious that shelling did not concentrate
9 against military objectives; P171, paragraph 3.
10 Indeed, Your Honours, if the thousand projectiles were
11 concentrated, we just might have photographs or reports of the ARSK
12 headquarters or the northern barracks or the post office or other alleged
13 military objectives in rubble, but that was not the case.
14 Now the Gotovina Defence asserted that this slide used by
15 Mr. Russo showing that shells were observed landing all over Knin was
16 probative of virtually nothing. They asserted that the Chamber would
17 need to know the concentration of fire of objects within these circles
18 for it to be probative of anything.
19 Your Honours, over one thousand shells were fired into Knin by HV
20 forces. For argument's sake, even if 100 of these shells impacted
21 military objectives, something that is not asserted -- not supported by
22 the evidence as detailed at paragraphs 550 and 556 of the Prosecution's
23 brief, that still leaves 900 projectiles landing throughout Knin within
24 those red circles, and that is a breach of the principle of distinction.
25 Indeed as Professor Corn, who's been cited, said at transcript 21509 of
1 his testimony:
2 "Where you say one rounds hits what's been identified as a
3 high-value target, and this is the extreme hypothetical, if you could
4 show that 900 other rounds hit civilian population centres while military
5 objectives were ignored, I don't think you would need too much more
6 corroboration of that circumstantial evidence."
7 Further, Your Honour, the Gotovina Defence asserts at T3117 that
8 the Prosecution's case must fail for lack of dozens of crater analyses.
9 Now, the link between crater analyses and proving the illegality is
10 unclear. Crater analyses are intended to determine the origin of fire.
11 They are used in situations in which it is not clear which warring
12 faction is responsible for firing the projectile. The Defence has never
13 alleged that the HV were not responsible for an artillery attack on Knin.
14 Indeed, evidence from observers, HV reports, General Gotovina's chief of
15 artillery, and General Gotovina himself in his book, show that the HV
16 were responsible for shelling Knin and the other towns in the attack
17 order, rendering crater analyses superfluous. There is no question that
18 more than one thousand projectiles landed -- listed in the HV expenditure
19 reports were fired on Knin, and those are listed in footnote 1993. And
20 those were, in fact, were fired by the HV.
21 The Defence argue that the crater analysis in evidence shows that
22 the ARSK fired rockets into Knin. Prosecution addresses the relevancy
23 and accuracy of this assertion at paragraph 602 through 605 of its brief.
24 Yesterday, the Defence argued that Oganj rocket could not have been fired
25 by HV forces from the seized position at Vrhpolje because it was
1 implausible that HV forces would be firing on Knin at that time.
2 However, as the Gotovina Defence pointed out, the HV seized the Oganj
3 weapon at 0855 - that's 8.55 a.m.
4 Knin until 10.00 a.m.
5 into Knin. And the shelling of Knin by HV forces continued until
6 approximately 11.00 a.m.
7 The Defence's alternative suggestion is unreasonable, given their
8 continued reliance on D89, an UNCRO report that at 1800 hours on the
9 5th of August, there was an ARSK tank and mortar fire from Strmica
10 "towards Knin."
11 Now, this evidence is stretched to argue that it substantiates
12 Oganj rocket fire. Not just towards Knin but on Knin. And that argument
13 would require the Chamber to believe that the UNCRO observer confused
14 mortar and tank fire for an Oganj rocket-launcher, and that rocket fire
15 landed in Knin at 6.00 p.m.
16 nor the UN, observed or recorded such fire.
17 Maybe it's the Prosecution's turn to raise Occam's Razor. In a
18 situation where everyone who observes or is subjected to this artillery
19 attack or recognises, as it's happening, that it is directed at civilians
20 and civilian areas, where it is then found that that attack was the
21 result of an order that said, Shell the towns, where subsequently a
22 record of the meeting that trigged that order indicates that the subject
23 of civilian flight triggered by shelling was important, when there's the
24 use of weapons that can't discriminate between military targets and
25 civilian areas under the circumstances, when the commander of the
1 operation writes about the operation but omits to mention the use of the
2 most indiscriminate weapons, when the Supreme Commander of the military
3 forces is a person committed to the idea that too many Serbs in Croatia
4 is a danger to the long-term sustainability of that nation, where there
5 are efforts to keep those people out afterwards, the simplest solution to
6 what happened seems quite clear.
7 The Defence, Your Honour, cited with some interest and noted to
8 the Court paragraph 7 of the Prosecution's brief which referred to an
9 effort to plausibly deny, plausible deniability, and that was somehow
10 turned into the idea of invisible ethnic cleansing. We would suggest to
11 the Court that plausible deniability was quite rooted in the approach by
12 Croatian authorities. Plausible deniability or pretext. And in that
13 respect, the Court need only turn to the psy-ops "ostensibly guaranteeing
14 civil rights." The Markac shelling which was to be a pretext discussed
15 in P461. Obstacles to return. I have already shown you an exhibit
16 during our presentation referring to it as a pretext, and the Court is
17 aware of other evidence demonstrating that. The mask about negotiations
18 that President Tudjman referred to in P461; the report about the
19 phosphoric shells we have just looked at, and on and on. Plausible
20 deniability, as we've seen, is pervasive throughout some of the efforts
21 in this case.
22 Another matter, Your Honour, yesterday the Gotovina Defence
23 argued that it would have amounted to a "military coup d'etat against a
24 civilian government" if General Gotovina had imposed a military curfew in
1 That's General Gotovina's military curfew order in Jajce, cited in
2 footnote 642 as an example of one of the measures that General Gotovina
3 could have but failed to take to prevent HV crimes in the Krajina.
4 Let me show you quickly what P1142 states, just to remind you.
5 "During this time I prohibit the individual movement of members
6 of the Croatian forces in the street and at other public locations."
7 This order, Your Honours, has nothing to do with civilian
8 government. There's no reason he could not have imposed a similar
9 measure in the Krajina. It's an order imposed on his subordinates to
10 address "the increasing undisciplined conduct of members of the Croatian
11 forces in the town of Jajce
12 for the return of citizens."
13 Your Honours, I would like to turn next to the insistence by the
14 Gotovina Defence yesterday that the Chamber "must conclude" that
15 General Jones's opinion on necessary and reasonable measures is a
16 reasonable interpretation of the evidence.
17 Now, first of all, it's, of course, for the Trial Chamber to
18 determine whether, under the circumstances of the case, General Gotovina
19 took necessary and reasonable measures. But to the extent an expert's
20 views are relevant to that determination, it rests upon, among other
21 things, the accuracy of that witness's underlying factual assumptions,
22 since, of course, what constitutes necessary and reasonable measures
23 depends on the circumstances of the particular case. And General Jones'
24 conclusions were not based on accurate facts. They were based on
25 significant misconceptions and uncertainties about the scope and nature
1 of HV crime and the response to it. For example, the assumed facts that
2 the Gotovina Defence provided to Jones made no mention of General
3 Gotovina's subordinates committing any crimes before, during, or after
4 Operation Storm. That's D1632. And in his report, General Jones still
5 did not assume any facts involving HV crimes. He said:
6 "I cannot refute that there was undisciplined behaviour in the
7 area of operations," but stated that "whether this behaviour was
8 conducted by soldiers, criminals, or refugees is not for me to
9 determine." D1633, para 43.
10 In court he first claimed to have knowledge of the extent of HV
11 crimes prior to Storm, referring to the crimes in Grahovo as "isolated
12 incidents," and then contradicting himself by stating:
13 "I don't have the answer to the question, whether those were
14 isolated or whether they were routine." T21040 to 41.
15 And he disagreed with the proposition that General Gotovina's
16 repeated orders regarding crime were ineffective based on his claim that:
17 "Following this particular date you'll see an increase in the
18 number of -- of arrests, investigations, and finding people culpable for
19 all offences."
20 His purported source was a Lausic report:
21 "... stating the number of arrests, the number of convictions and
22 what they have been able to accomplish based on all things that happened
23 here to show control of the area and reinforcement of the rule of law."
24 As we pointed out in our brief, there is no such report. That is
25 found at paras 188 through 189. And we address General Jones's
1 conclusions in more detail at paragraph 152, 163, and 188 through 191.
2 So the problem with the Defence claim that "you must conclude
3 that General Jones's opinion is a reasonable interpretation of the
4 evidence" is that his opinions were not actually based on the evidence.
5 The Defence has asserted in its submissions that:
6 "The Prosecution also claims in its brief that there is no
7 evidence of a single demobilised soldier subsequently being prosecuted
8 for a crime."
9 That's at paragraph 233. That's false. Or -- it's not correct.
10 So see, for example, Your Honour, several of the examples contained
11 within Exhibit D1381. Moreover the Defence said Witness Perkovic was a
12 viva voce Defence witness who testified that he was demobilised while in
13 custody as a result of his involvement allegedly for the Varivode
14 murders, and was subsequently prosecuted for those murders.
15 Now the Gotovina Defence has made two mischaracterisations here.
16 First of all, the Prosecution did not claim that no demobilised soldier
17 was ever subsequently prosecuted. At paragraph 233 of the Prosecution
18 final brief, the point was made that the numbers of criminal proceedings
19 for property destruction between the 4th and 17th August are negligible,
20 and therefore that the "continuous" property destruction by the
21 134th Home Guard Brigade reported to the Split Military District on the
22 18th of August, crimes that the Defence claim were appropriately punished
23 through the demobilisation of much of that unit, did not result in
24 criminal sanctions, and none of the evidence cited by the Defence impacts
25 that assertion.
1 Beyond that, the Defence claim that Perkovic was "demobilised
2 while in custody as a result of his involvement allegedly for the
3 Varivode murders and subsequently prosecuted" suggests that Perkovic's
4 demobilisation was part of his punishment. To the contrary, the evidence
5 shows that Perkovic was demobilised and that his demobilisation date was
6 falsified in order to conceal the fact that he was an HV member at the
7 time of the crime. And that's in final brief footnote 304.
8 Your Honours, yesterday you saw -- you heard some comments about
9 Mr. Vanderostyne and a photograph. And the suggestion was that he'd said
10 he was scared but was grinning, and that he was possibly colour-blind
11 because he couldn't tell the uniforms of the special police from some
12 other uniforms.
13 Now first of all, Your Honours, you will recall that
14 Mr. Vanderostyne was another of the internationals who witnessed the
15 extensive and open destruction and crimes taking place and spoke about
16 that quite forcefully. But in his statement he explained that there was
17 no -- he was not confusing the uniforms of the special police. He
18 distinguished those expressly from the uniforms of the regular police.
19 And when he got into Gracac encountered the special police, and the Court
20 had seen photographs of the special police looting openly in Gracac. And
21 with respect to the photograph of Mr. Vanderostyne looking -- or with
22 some kind of smile on his face, he talked about that.
23 "We drove very slowly, not in aggressive mood and because it was
24 a quite intense situation. Then we drove very slowly, windows open,
25 nobody should feel threatened. And we parked the car and we tried to be
1 relaxed, so in a more or less relaxed way we went to a little group of
2 those soldiers that were drinking, that were relaxing under a tree."
3 The effort to suggest to the Court that this witness was
4 misleading the Court when he had, in fact, explained the very nature of
5 the circumstances in which he found himself was unfair to that witness
6 who -- whose testimony -- whose damning testimony could not be explained
7 through some kind of attack on his bias because Mr. Vanderostyne was very
8 explicit that he was someone who sympathised with the Croats because of
9 their victimisation from the beginning part of the war. It was also
10 significant to see those photographs to learn that Mr. Vanderostyne had
11 interviewed the lieutenant involved in that, to see how openly it was
12 done, to see a genuine manifestation of the climate of impunity.
13 It was also asserted that Mr. Vanderostyne is the only witness
14 upon whom the Court can find evidence related to Gracac and special
15 police crimes in Gracac. The Court can look to the testimony of
16 Mr. Steenbergen and also Annex A, pages 12 through 17.
17 There was some attention paid yesterday to the Ramljane incident,
18 and it was asserted by the Markac Defence that there's no evidence that
19 General Markac knew where Grubori was or had any way -- or knew what was
20 the Lucko Unit. No one identified the unit, nor is there any evidence
21 that General Markac knew which unit went through Grubori on the evening
22 of August 25th.
23 I would direct the Court's attention to the following. You will
24 recall, Your Honours, that before that search operation, the inner
25 control branch based in Gracac would brief units and give each unit a
1 package showing their precise axes of attack. And that included a map,
2 indicating such. The Court has seen such a map, P559. In addition to
3 the fact that inner control was there, the coordinator of the, operation
4 Janic, was based in Gracac, was there on the evening of August 25th. And
5 as I mentioned, inner control itself was there. All General Markac had
6 to do, upon learning of the burnings, killings in Gracac was to pick up
7 the phone, go down the road, and find out -- not in Gracac, excuse me,
8 Your Honour, in Grubori and find out which unit was deployed in Grubori
9 and ensure that that unit -- find out what had happened with that and
10 ensure, if necessary, that that unit was not deployed to the next village
11 which would be burned.
12 The Court will recall the effort by the Markac Defence yesterday
13 to focus on Mr. Celic because he implicates General Markac in the
14 creation of false reports. And, in that respect, I simply want to turn
15 the Court to the circumstances regarding the creation of that false
16 report, P563, and I would turn the Court to paragraph 444 of the brief so
17 as not to require going into private session and in particular see
18 footnotes 1632. That evidence indicates that the report was written in
19 Markac's immediate presence.
20 Your Honour, I want to mention one matter that was raised
21 yesterday. It's -- and that was the -- the restrictions of movement
22 chart which the Court had asked about in question number 5. Prosecution
23 noted that the focus of the submissions were largely on the footnoted
24 materials relating to the date that the restrictions of movement existed.
25 I would simply urge the Court to, in addition, look at footnote 1311.
1 That's Annex A. Or directs the Court to Annex A, wanton destruction and
2 plunder, to ensure that the Court is in a position to cross-reference the
3 dates of restrictions of movement with the crimes that were taking place.
4 Yesterday there was discussion by the Markac [sic] Defence
5 concerning the awareness of what had happened in Grubori, what Mr. Dondo
6 did -- knew and did, and the assertion that the entry in the Knin police
7 log requesting an urgent sanitation of bodies should not be attributed to
8 General Cermak. The suggestion was that the Prosecution was somehow
9 artificially trying to upgrade General Cermak's involvement and move the
10 Court away from the actual evidence.
11 I would like to correct the transcript I said there was a
12 discussion by the Markac Defence, that should have been the
13 Cermak Defence. What the evidence indicates, Your Honour, is the
14 following. That it was Dondo who requested an urgent clearing up of
15 bodies. That's listed at P764 at page 2 -- excuse me, listed at D57,
16 page 61, and in fact Dondo reported to Cermak at P764, page 2, that he
17 made the report and he made such a request.
18 Now, what the Court should also consider is the following. Of
19 course, as we learned at T27883 through 27884, and as we know from other
20 evidence, Mr. Dondo was General Cermak's subordinate, and both
21 General Cermak and Mr. Dondo knew, when Dondo went to make that report,
22 that the Knin police were already aware of the murders. Dondo tried to
23 say that he only went down to report that the murders had taken place and
24 that he hadn't ordered the sanitation and that -- had no idea how the
25 entry in the log had taken place. But the Court will look at
1 paragraph 438 of the Prosecution's brief and indeed paragraph 246 of the
2 Cermak brief, you will see that Cermak, who hosted the dispute that
3 existed about that issue regarding disposal, was aware of the -- aware
4 that Knin police knew and Dondo knew; see his statement at D1695,
5 paragraph 25. And as you'll see from the testimony, when you review it
6 again, at 27883 and 27884, others concluded or were aware that Dondo had
7 gone to the police station in the evening hours and there even said that
8 sanitation must be carried out. There would have been no other reason
9 for Dondo to go to the Knin police station other than for that purpose,
10 because he and General Cermak were aware that they knew about the
11 killings already.
12 Your Honour, let me turn to the issue of meetings with
13 President Tudjman by General Cermak.
14 Mr. Kay said that there was no evidence regarding Mr. Cermak
15 meeting with President Tudjman. That's at pages 78 through 79, so I
16 would simply direct the Court's attention, in addition to the -- the
17 obvious meeting on the 5th of August, meeting on the 6th of August in
18 Knin; P2526, page 91; P2525, page 176. Cermak travelled to Zagreb to
19 meet with the president; D1618, page 1. And General Cermak, of course,
20 met with President Tudjman at the Freedom Train speech; P1144, P5, P473.
21 Mr. Kay also discussed Exhibit P2527. That's the publication in
22 which General Cervenko described General Cermak as President Tudjman's
23 personal man of confidence. D1306 is the published retraction of that
24 article in which Cervenko said it was unauthorised, accidental and
25 disjointed, which was secretly recorded by the reporter. Mr. Kay
1 suggested that the Prosecution failed to address that exhibit but, in
2 fact, D1306 was cited in the Prosecution brief at footnote 892.
3 Now yesterday Mr. Kay called the contents of that original
4 article, which was recorded, gossip and of no real consequence. But it
5 is noteworthy that the Cermak Defence cited the same exhibit in the
6 Defence brief at -- in support of certain propositions it wanted to
7 advance at paragraph 121.
8 There was also discussion, Your Honours, about the Brioni meeting
9 and the discussion concerning the role that -- that General Cermak
10 assumed. And to demonstrate that there was no discussion at Brioni that
11 touched upon General Cermak's ultimate responsibilities Mr. Kay said that
12 he would read the exact text to the Court said: "The exact text is
14 I'd like to actually look at that text, Your Honour, very
15 quickly. What's in black is what was read by Mr. Kay. What's in red is
16 what is in the transcript and what was not read. And what we see is that
17 Minister Susak is referring to another staff and he had been talking
18 before about a kind of staff for the immediate operation and then
20 "We need another staff and that would be for relations with
21 UNCRO, someone who would be a permanent liaison, someone who would be in
22 touch with us and resolve things with them, for us to get instructions,
23 because matters will evolve too rapidly for us to start looking around
24 for them and calling them."
25 So the minister of defence is talking about one person who is to
1 be a permanent liaison for UNCRO on the ground. Unrelated to the issues
2 that might arise during the operation itself.
3 Now, on the heels of the psy-ops discussion, Minister Susak then
4 raised the issue of setting up a propaganda staff which would be
5 connected to the office of the president, and the head of that office was
6 Mr. Sarinic. And you see that in this slide. That's at page 29,
8 "We need someone -- would we need someone from your office in
9 order to reestablish this staff for propaganda. We need someone from
10 your office to be the contact person."
11 And President Tudjman responded:
12 "This is a question to be dealt with, what you just said, and
13 also in reference to UNCRO, and that [sic] means Sarinic."
14 So that was a matter to be dealt with. Sarinic was going to be
15 the contact person, and it is therefore instructive that when
16 Mr. Cermak -- or General Cermak, excuse me, was asked who was his
17 immediate superior while he was in Knin, he answered:
18 "My contacts with international organisations and delegations and
19 so on, I had contacts with the office of the president, with Sarinic,
20 with the president."
21 And that's all consistent with General Cermak's description of
22 himself as the "one contact person for the internationals." P2526
23 through 61 -- page 61. Everything came to him or went through him.
24 P2525, page 12, and P2526, page 9.
25 The Cermak Defence also suggested in its brief that the -- well,
1 suggested to you during the submissions that Mr. Dzolic's evidence was a
2 telling moment in the case and, in its brief, that the Prosecution had
3 improperly put words in his mouth. That's found at 46 -- paragraphs 465
4 and 475. Mr. Dzolic, as you will recall, was the first commander of the
5 Knin military police company.
6 We would submit, Your Honour, that the telling moment in respect
7 of Mr. Dzolic's evidence was when he was asked why the fact of his being
8 called into Cermak's office on occasions would not be recorded in his
9 log-book. And he explained why he was called in to General Cermak's
11 "I was invited by General Cermak to come there for a conversation
12 because I was subordinate to him in the daily tasks."
13 So focussed on the issue of explaining why it wasn't in the
14 log-book, he indicated in quick response what the reality was.
15 Your Honours, the Cermak Defence also suggested that the
16 Prosecution ignored evidence of General Cermak's experts and instead
17 focussed primarily on issues of credibility during its cross-examination
18 of those witnesses. Well, as the Court should recall, that's certainly
19 not entirely correct. Recall, for example, Mr. Albiston who was
20 cross-examined about the following. His testimony concerning
21 General Cermak's authority and the revelation that he had failed to
22 consider a key document that contradicted his opinion which demonstrated
23 that civilian police carried out General Cermak's orders. And that's
24 P510. That is an issue going very deeply to the substance of that
25 witness's testimony. But to the extent that there was a focus on
1 credibility during the course of those examinations, it was well founded
2 and well directed. And I will direct the Court's attention to the
3 testimony of Mr. Feldi, who did not disclose in his CV that he had been a
4 member of the Markac Defence team, as well as a member of the
5 Cermak Defence team before he wrote his report, and also failed to
6 mention his involvement in and reliance upon the blue book which also
7 came to light during his testimony.
8 Your Honours, the Gotovina Defence claimed yesterday that because
9 the Prosecution pleaded an armed conflict in the indictment, we are
10 precluded from "relying upon an armed conflict which may be international
11 in character," based upon their interpretation of the 21 February 2003
12 Hadzihasanovic Appeals Judgement. The Defence noted that there were no
13 Article 2 charges in that case, and suggested that the Chamber's ruling
14 was that the Prosecution is specifically required to plead an
15 international armed conflict even where the character of the conflict is
16 not relevant to the charges. That is not accurate.
17 In the context of that decision, the 21 February 2003
18 Hadzihasanovic decision, prior to the subsequent clarification of the
19 law, the character of the armed conflict was relevant because, at that
20 time, it was unclear whether the legal rules underlying Article 3 applied
21 in internal armed conflicts. Therefore, the absence of Article 2 charges
22 did not render that a dead or meaningless issue, and there was still a
23 question of whether or not the Prosecution needed to rely on the nature
24 of the conflict as international in order for the charges to be valid.
25 But in its 16 July 2003
1 found that the Article 3 charges apply to both internal and international
2 armed conflicts thereby rendering the pleading issue moot. And in this
3 case too, Your Honour, the nature of the armed conflict is legally
5 As we know from Article 5 charges, it's either an international
6 or a non-international armed conflict. The same is true of the Article 3
7 charges in this case. They're grounded in customary international law
8 which apply to all conflicts regardless of their classification. They
9 simply require a nexus to an armed conflict. There is no requirement
10 that that conflict be either international or non-international. We have
11 pled and proved an armed conflict. And there was no requirement for the
12 Prosecution to specifically plead the character of the armed conflict in
13 this case. Irrelevant and pointless.
14 Your Honours, I want to turn to one additional issue, and that's
15 the argument by the Gotovina Defence that the Prosecution cannot decide
16 whether General Gotovina was issuing effective or ineffective orders.
17 Cannot keep its story straight, I think the language was. They referred
18 several times to the political affairs attachment at D201, which states:
19 "Familiarising units with a need to eliminate all negative
20 occurrences that will surface in the course of combat operations with a
21 focus on preventing torching and destruction of larger populated areas
22 and towns."
23 According to the Defence it is illogical for the Prosecution to
24 argue that part of those "familiarising units with the need to eliminate
25 all negative occurrences that will surface" was ineffective, while
1 another part, "focus on preventing torching and destruction of larger
2 populated areas and towns," was effective. Yet this distinction is quite
3 clear and quite logical. What is illogical is the premise underlying the
4 Defence argument that a commander's order can only be all effective or
5 all ineffective. Whether a commander's orders are effective or not
6 depends on the extent to which that commander ensures compliance with
7 those orders. And, of course, he can choose to selectively enforce some
8 orders while allowing others to be disobeyed.
9 To go back to the example raised by General Gotovina Defence
10 based on D201, let's recap the context. General Gotovina's subordinates
11 were burning and looting in Operation Summer. The Split Military
12 District Command ordered them to stop burning, they continued to burn,
13 and they were not punished. This created a situation where yet another
14 bald order not to burn, such as instruction in D201, would be
15 ineffective. But the Gotovina Defence did not mention the instruction in
16 P1126 to the OG commanders:
17 "Prevent burning and looting of facilities in the liberated
18 territory. Immediately station personnel of the MUP, special MUP units
19 and military police in large towns to secure the town and important
21 And here, Your Honours, he accompanied what would otherwise be a
22 bald and, under the circumstances, ineffective instruction to prevent
23 burning and looting with a concrete enforcement measure. And that is
24 where the difference lies. Furthermore, the fact that General Gotovina
25 felt the need to accompany a generic "don't loot and burn instruction,"
1 which the Defence says he intended to be effective, with a specific
2 measure to protect certain facilities from his own subordinates indicates
3 General Gotovina's awareness of the inadequacy of the generic measures
4 under the circumstances. More generally, the Defence asks:
5 "How a subordinate would know which are the orders which are
6 supposed to be followed and which are the orders that are supposed to be
8 The answer to that question is simple. A subordinate knows to
9 follow an order when his superior monitors and enforces his subordinate's
10 compliance and punishes or holds him accountable for failing to implement
11 it. On the other hand, where the superior doesn't monitor the
12 subordinate's implementation of the order, doesn't punish or hold the
13 subordinate accountable for not implementing the order, and doesn't
14 punish the underlying conduct when the disobedience involves criminal
15 behaviour, when the commander repeats the same order, that is a signal to
16 the subordinate that he need not follow the order. And the superior only
17 strengthens that signal through additional repetitions of the same cycle
18 of non-compliance and non-enforcement.
19 Finally, Your Honour, we have referred throughout the submissions
20 to the more detailed submissions in the Prosecution's final brief, per
21 the Court's guidance. As the Court is aware, our sentencing submissions
22 are found at paragraph 698 through 705. Those paragraphs detail relevant
23 factors, including the scale of the crimes, the vulnerability of the
24 victims and the impact on the victims. And in considering those factors,
25 the Prosecution simply notes that particularly in considering impact,
1 although it is often generic references to Krajina Serbs, these crimes
2 were visited upon individuals and each person suffered individually.
3 Your Honours, today's submissions, the submissions that preceded
4 those to this Bench, the Prosecution's final brief, and the evidence
5 adduced during the course of this case demonstrate beyond a reasonable
6 doubt that General Gotovina, General Markac, and General Cermak are
7 responsible under the law for those crimes.
8 Your Honours, thank you for your attention.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
10 I suggest that we take a break first.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Have the Defence teams agreed on a division of time
13 for ...
14 MR. KEHOE: We will discuss it at the break, Mr. President. We
15 just are preliminarily taking the Chamber's guidance from yesterday, but
16 I will chat with my colleagues to see if there is any change in that.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, I have, at this moment, a problem with my
18 computer. I hope that not everyone has it, but before we re-start, there
19 was one issue that came to my mind and perhaps before the break we -- I
20 briefly ask clarification, and again this is what I remember from the top
21 of my head rather than consulting my notes, my annotations in the
22 computer, which I will do during the break.
23 Mr. Kuzmanovic, yesterday you said, Well, the suggestion of a
24 pretext for attacking is fully in line with first protocol, Article 37,
25 paragraph 2, the ruses of war, as you said. Would you agree with me that
1 whether 37(1) applies or whether 37(2) applies, that the non-prohibited
2 ruses of war that much would depend on the existence of any cease-fire
3 agreement or any arrangement.
4 MR. KUZMANOVIC: That could be a factor, Your Honour. But there
5 is no evidence of perfidity, so my argument would that that is not
7 JUDGE ORIE: Now, isn't it true that Article 37 mainly aims at
8 protecting the functioning of the Geneva Conventions and the
9 Additional Protocols, and that specifically violation of a cease-fire
10 would fall within the scope of the prohibited acts.
11 MR. KUZMANOVIC: It could, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: It could?
13 Then I'd like to hear in further detail from you what then there
14 makes the distinction and perhaps on the basis of what the ICRC
15 commentary says about it --
16 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Sure.
17 JUDGE ORIE: -- in relation to violations of cease-fires.
18 Now one question, was there any -- I think, but again I can't
19 check it at this moment, but the cease-fire, the Zagreb Agreement, I
20 don't know whether it is in evidence. I know that there was some
21 evidence. We heard evidence from Galbraith about it, not very detailed.
22 We heard some evidence by Akashi
23 Do you consider the 29th of March, 1994, Zagreb Agreement and the
24 cease-fire included thereto, was it in effect at that moment? Apart from
25 whether it was -- whether it was observed by all parties always, that's a
1 different matter.
2 MR. KUZMANOVIC: My argument would at that point in time it was
3 not in effect.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Because?
5 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Of the Split
6 MR. MISETIC: Your Honour --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Misetic.
8 MR. MISETIC: -- if I could just on behalf of the Gotovina
9 Defence because this somewhat relates to our brief.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 MR. MISETIC: Our position is there certainly was no de facto
12 cease-fire agreement given that the whole now the issue of international
13 armed conflict we consider that the whole -- now the issue of
14 international armed conflict, we consider that the distinction between
15 ARSK, VRS and VJ is a -- perhaps a -- some kind of a pseudo-legal
16 distinction, but factually, they are the same organisation. And as the
17 Chamber is well aware, certainly the Split Military District forces,
18 combined with HVO, were engaged against those forces, including the ARSK
19 in the Grahovo operation, just days before, and including the day before
20 the Brioni agreement.
21 And secondly, the ARSK under the relevant agreements was
22 certainly not allowed to use the territory of the Republic of Croatia
23 launch attacks on the Bihac pocket which we would also consider then to
24 be the first move by the ARSK forces breaching any cease-fire agreement
25 that had been reached and justifying action by the Republic of Croatia
1 as we've said repeatedly throughout the trial.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Well, let's not go into further details there. I
3 have -- but I don't think it's in evidence but there is -- it's -- I have
4 a vague recollection of the -- at least the Zagreb Agreement saying that
5 the violation of that -- there were rules of procedure, something like
6 that, which would resolve any violation rather to allow for retaliation
7 if there was a violation.
8 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your Honour, I think your paraphrasing of that
9 is correct, but for all practical purposes, the document was only as good
10 as the paper it was written on, given what was going on.
11 And I guess to further -- as I was thinking about answering your
12 question, it would be -- I think it would also be -- in this particular
13 instance make a great difference if there was actually proof that
14 something like a provocation attack had even existed. There is no proof
15 of that. There was a discussion of it, but it never happened.
16 JUDGE ORIE: No, no, no. That's -- last question. This -- what
17 was said during the Brioni meeting in this respect, do you consider that
18 to deceive the opposite party in the armed conflict; or do you consider
19 that an attempt to deceive others who are observing what happens, because
20 70 -- 37, 2, specifically deals with deceiving the other warring -- the
21 enemy, the --
22 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Most definitely the enemy, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: So then I'm trying to follow your reasoning. Why
24 was there a reason to deceive the opposite forces?
25 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Well, they were spread at that time pretty thin.
1 It was a question of tactically what do you want to do? Given the fact
2 that Operation Storm was going to take effect within four or five days,
3 the tactical decision was such that -- where are they are going strike,
4 what's going to happen. Given what was going on in the whole situation
5 of Bihac and in -- just the whole tactical military situation at the time
6 I think prompted that kind of a discussion. And besides, if we want to
7 get specifically into the facts, I'll talk about that in my rebuttal,
8 Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. We'll then here from you.
10 Of course, our whole morning session due to the late start is --
11 has developed a bit differently. I suggest that we take a break of half
12 an hour.
13 MR. TIEGER: And could I take this opportunity before we break to
14 make a small correction to the transcript. I referred to -- on page 10,
15 line 10, to 21509, and that's transcript reference, and it should have
16 been 21 -- I referred -- it's the other way around. I referred to 21059.
17 It should have been 21509.
18 JUDGE ORIE: That's now on the record.
19 We'll take a break. We'll then resume at 12.00, and we will
20 continue, I would say, 1.30. Would that do? I'm looking at the parties.
21 If you inform the Chamber about how you would use that time.
22 We resume at 12.00.
23 --- Recess taken at 11.30 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 12.04 p.m.
25 JUDGE ORIE: A few matters still to be corrected, something on
1 the record, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: About the chart --
4 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: -- and freedom movement, yes.
6 MR. TIEGER: As the Court and the parties are aware, we sent an
7 e-mail yesterday advising that item 2 of the chart on page 148 of the
8 Prosecution's final trial brief in reference to restrictions of movement
9 imposed in Kistanje should have been removed and should now be considered
10 deleted from the chart.
11 JUDGE ORIE: That's on the record.
12 Mr. Kay, I do understand that none of the parties objects against
13 reading into the record your list of footnotes.
14 MR. KAY: I've been informed that that's the case, Your Honour.
15 We have now forwarded it to the Chambers.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then I take it, it will be forwarded to me
17 for reading it. I have not yet received it, but ...
18 MR. KAY: It's somewhere in the -- whatever it's called that
19 these things go down.
20 JUDGE ORIE: The digital highway, it's called, Mr. Kay. It's ...
21 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, so as not to lose time, if it's
22 helpful, we have a hard copy here.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then I read from the hard copy. Go back to the
24 ancient times.
25 MR. KAY: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
1 JUDGE ORIE: I'll read into the record the footnotes the Cermak
2 Defence wanted to draw the attention specifically to in relation to table
3 entry Strmica, 23rd of August, footnote 1316. And we're invited to
4 consider also D1002, P932, P821, D94, P815, and P233.
5 In relation to the table entry Srb, 24th of August,
6 footnote 1317. We're also invited to consider P813, P47, P126, P815,
7 P235, and P234.
8 In relation to the table entry Ramljane, 26th of August, our
9 attention is sought for footnote 1318. And we're invited to also
10 consider P766, P128, P239, P27, P129, P238, and P237.
11 In relation to Cicevac, 1st September, it's footnote 1319, and
12 we're invited to consider also P2514, P49, P246.
13 Last item. In relation to Otric, 11th of September, the footnote
14 referred to is 1320, and we're invited to consider also D1002, P954, and
16 That's all now on the record. Thank you, Mr. Tieger, for ...
17 Mr. Kay, just as consolation, the electronic highway does
18 function; it took two minutes.
19 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber was informed that the division of time
21 will be 45 minutes for the Gotovina Defence, and 20 minutes for each of
22 the other Defence teams.
23 Mr. Kehoe, is it you or is it Mr. Misetic who will kick off?
24 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, we again would like to cover the
25 issues raised in rebuttal by the respective counsel. I will start
1 preliminarily with Mr. Akhavan and then move to Mr. Misetic, and I will
3 Please do so.
4 Mr. Akhavan, you may proceed.
5 MR. AKHAVAN: Thank you, Mr. President. There are just two
6 points I wish to briefly address. The first relates to questions of the
7 distinction between operational commanders and occupational commanders
8 which, by extension, determines what this Trial Chamber can consider to
9 be necessary and reasonable measures within the scope of authority of
10 General Gotovina. Mr. Tieger, in his presentation, relates the evidence
11 of the curfew that was imposed in Jajce as an indication that it was
12 within the authority of Mr. Gotovina to take such measures. The basic
13 problem is that Jajce is in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is in a different
15 General Gotovina's situation and status in Bosnia and Herzegovina
16 is that of a commander from the army of another state in a situation of
17 foreign occupation which is fundamentally different than the situation of
18 General Gotovina in Croatian territory, which has been reintegrated. And
19 that is, I think, an indication of the fundamental mistake that the whole
20 necessary and reasonable measures argument rests on. And I wanted to
21 also turn back to the transcript of August 30 at page 99, lines 3 to 8,
22 where Ms. Gustafson states as follows:
23 "The Defence makes the unfounded claim that General Gotovina had
24 no duty to punish crimes, that the military police were aware of. This
25 argument is based on the alleged duty within the Croatian system which is
1 irrelevant to his duties under international law."
2 That was the statement that Ms. Gustafson made. The
3 Trial Chamber will be aware of the applicable law here. I refer to the
4 Hadzihasanovic Trial Judgement at paragraphs 137 and 138, and I quote:
5 "The national law of a state establishes the powers and duties of
6 civilian or military representatives of that state, but international law
7 lays down the way in which they may be exercised within the area governed
8 by it."
9 And is it on that basis that our arguments on General Gotovina's
10 relation to the military police have been set forth.
11 Finally, Mr. President, we note that the Prosecution has not
12 denied our characterisation of FRY-RSK citizens as enemy aliens under
13 international law. No arguments or explanations have been presented in
14 that regard. We consider that to be a concession that they were, indeed,
15 not citizens of Croatia
16 And the --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Akhavan, if I may just interrupt.
18 If something not specifically dealt with, to consider that as a
19 concession, the Chamber would prefer to verify whether that's correctly
20 understood or not.
21 MR. AKHAVAN: Of course.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Two things. This is rejoinder to our rebuttal, so I don't think
25 it's an opportunity to stray beyond the boundaries of what has been
1 addressed. And the answer to the Court's question is no, there is no
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Akhavan.
4 MR. AKHAVAN: I will clarify that nothing that has been presented
5 denies, in effect, that point that these individuals were not in fact
6 citizens of Croatia
7 contests that point. And the fact that they were FRY-RSK citizens is
8 also in the record.
9 We simply want to conclude by saying that that has a legal
10 consequence, that the Prosecution is no longer in a position to rely on
11 denial of immediate mass return as a basis for inference of unlawful
12 conduct, insofar as it is within the rights of sovereign states to deny
13 the return of enemy aliens during armed conflict.
14 I will now, with your permission, turn the floor to Mr. Kehoe --
15 Mr. Misetic.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Akhavan, I had a question in relation to this.
17 I might come back to that later. I had -- since my computer is
18 functioning again, I am better able now to consult my notes.
19 Mr. Misetic.
20 MR. MISETIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
21 Let me start off by addressing the point Mr. Tieger made
22 concerning the phosphoric shells. Mr. President, I think the evidence is
23 very clear, and we ask you to, first of all, look at the fact that the
24 two opposing military commanders, General Gotovina and General Mladic, in
25 both of their diaries, in one case a personal diary and in the other case
1 the officially Military District diary, both on the same day make
2 reference to HV use of incendiary munitions in the wider Grahovo-Glamoc
3 area. The entry that Mr. Tieger referred to in the Split Military
4 District diary is from the 2nd of August, which is, of course, the same
5 day that it appears in Mladic's diary.
6 I also would note that Mr. Tieger, while advancing an alternative
7 argument, did not suggest that his argument or the argument of the
8 Prosecution is the only reasonable interpretation of that evidence. And
9 we suggest to you that any reasonable person looking at two entries on
10 the same day by the opposing military commanders could, in fact, make a
11 reasonable conclusion that phosphoric shells were being used in that area
12 on that day or immediately prior to it.
13 We would also note that to the extent the Prosecution alleges
14 some sort of cover-up, we would ask the Chamber to consider, first, that
15 prior to the 2nd of August, both the military police had been seized of
16 the issue, and the minister of defence, in an entry on the 1st of August,
17 the day before, had already been fully seized of the matter. So in terms
18 of any allegation that General Gotovina was covering up within the
19 Croatian system, it is unfounded.
20 Moreover, saying that because General Gotovina didn't want media
21 in Grahovo on the 2nd of August in light of the -- both the prior
22 military conduct, which would include Operation Summer 95 but also the
23 tactical operation of the ARSK which had taken place on the
24 1st of August and which is referenced in our brief, and in light of the
25 fact that two days later, General Gotovina knew he would be launching
1 Operation Storm, to not invite the media into the war zone is hardly a
2 controversial decision by a military command. And indeed, I would argue
3 it is a common-place decision in wars, particularly on the eve of combat.
4 Turning next to the issue of General Jones. The bottom-line
5 point here, Mr. President, is, it is absolutely clear in any fair reading
6 of both his witness statement and his testimony, it is clear that he was
7 aware of the allegation of crimes being committed in the Grahovo area
8 and, in fact, he was specifically asked on direct examination whether
9 General Gotovina took all necessary and reasonable measures in response
10 to events in that operation and he testified that he did. So the
11 suggestion that his -- that he lacked knowledge to form an opinion is
13 Moreover, it was never put to General Jones that he is -- whether
14 his opinion would change if he were aware of certain information that the
15 Prosecution had which the Prosecution believes might impact his opinion.
16 It is expected when an expert is put on the stand and has an opinion that
17 if the Prosecution or a party wishes to challenge the opinion, then other
18 facts are put him and the expert is asked whether that would or would not
19 change that opinion. That didn't happen here.
20 And I would submit to you, Your Honours, that the Prosecution has
21 taken the position that the measures that General Gotovina failed to take
22 were "so obvious" that it's clear he didn't take necessary and reasonable
23 measures. Well, if that is the case, why weren't these "so obvious"
24 measures not only put to General Jones but, I repeat, many, if not most
25 of them -- I should say, most of them were never put to anyone. Why
1 wasn't General Jones asked whether, for example, he would have imposed a
2 military curfew in Croatia
3 Prosecution is now arguing that the military curfew should have only
4 applied to the military, the -- the terminology then is not being used
5 properly as to what a military curfew really means.
6 With respect to the issue of demobilisation, there is an
7 allegation that Mr. Perkovic was demobilised in order to cover up HV
8 involvement. That is not something that Prosecutor Galovic agreed with.
9 This is -- he testified on this point and it's transcript 19812,
10 beginning at line 14. Moreover, what is ignored is that, in fact,
11 Mr. Perkovic was prosecuted for the crime. So it is difficult to see
12 what it is exactly that was not done in terms of punishing or trying to
13 punish the perpetrators in the Varivode murders.
14 I would also asking on this point the Trial Chamber to keep in
15 mind that in Exhibit 2614, there were 120 cases of criminal charges
16 against members of the Split Military District for crimes committed in
17 the liberated territory and it was 120 cases for murder and looting.
18 Finally, Mr. President, Exhibit D201. I must confess that I am
19 pleased that I think we've come to some sort of inadvertent agreement.
20 We've now pushed the issue far enough that we not only have the
21 Prosecution conceding that General Gotovina issued orders to prevent
22 burning and looting and other crimes. We now have a concession from the
23 Prosecution that General Gotovina took steps to make sure at least one of
24 those orders was implemented. We have common ground here now.
25 Now, let us take a look at P1126, which Mr. Tieger relied on this
1 morning. And this is page 3. Let's see what the measure was.
2 "Prevent burning and looting of facilities in the liberated
3 territory. Immediately station personnel of the MUP, special MUP units
4 and military police in large towns to secure the town and important
6 Your Honours, first of all, our position is that what
7 General Gotovina was doing here was implementing the agreement that had
8 been reached between the minister of the interior and minister of defence
9 as to who was going to be responsible for security in the liberated area.
10 Second, I believe there is no dispute, and it will be an
11 uncontested fact, that General Gotovina had no command over the MUP and
12 no command over the special MUP units. What does this mean? The
13 Prosecution says that General Gotovina implemented his orders by relying
14 on the other institutions of the Republic of Croatia
15 including special MUP units and the military police, and that that made
16 his order effective. Now, we're not going to relitigate the issue of who
17 had the responsibility to continue to deploy the military police after
18 Operation Storm commenced. You will make that decision, and you know our
19 position on it very well.
20 If you agree with us, that it was Mr. Lausic and Mr. Juric who
21 were responsible for implementing that portion, then what we have this
22 morning is the Prosecution saying, When General Gotovina issues an order
23 and relies on the MUP and the military police, he should know that his
24 order is going to be effective. We ask to you keep that in mind. And
25 how many other orders General Gotovina could have issued relying on the
1 MUP and the military police and the political affairs branch and the SIS
2 to make sure that those orders get implemented.
3 Finally, Mr. President, we note that D204 was not addressed and
4 we -- with respect to General Gotovina taking measures. As Mr. Tieger
5 said, he took measures. It was not only to rely on the MUP, the special
6 MUP units, the military police, SIS, Political affairs, he also issued
7 D204 for disciplinary measures, P918, and we know that the result was a
8 151 per cent increase in disciplinary measures in the Split Military
10 Mr. President, Your Honour, I thank you very much for listening
11 to me today and for two and a half years, and I thank you, and I cede the
12 floor to Mr. Kehoe.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe.
14 MR. KEHOE: Good afternoon, Your Honours.
15 Once again in rebuttal argument by the Prosecution, we have
16 observed their use of this evidence to try to demonstrate the illegal
17 intent of General Gotovina. Yet in this task, they once again, as they
18 have done continuously, overlook what they describe as the context of
19 everything that happened. And we're not go to, at this juncture,
20 Mr. President, rehash the context of all of these items. But just a
21 couple of salient features and questions to be asked when the Chamber is
22 reviewing the rebuttal argument by Mr. Tieger directed to the intent of
23 General Gotovina.
24 His argument was that the activities of General Gotovina and the
25 HV were unlawful, along with the other alleged JCE members, because they
1 intended to drive the civilian population out of the so-called Krajina,
2 with most of the emphasis by the Prosecution on Knin. Well, the
3 questions to be asked that haven't been addressed by the Prosecution that
4 play into that are twofold. If not only officials within the Croatian
5 government but others, such as Ambassador Galbraith and Ambassador
6 Holbrooke, believed that no more than 20 per cent of the Serbs would come
7 back under any circumstances, why would this large entity within the
8 government risk losing relations or damaging relations with the
9 United States and other legal entities and countries throughout the
10 Western world?
11 Taking it down to the more specific, the position of the
12 Prosecution once again this morning is that after the Brioni meeting, the
13 artillery attack that was directed by General Gotovina was to force the
14 civilian population out of Knin. If that were the case, and this wasn't
15 a classic military offensive, as has been demonstrated by the evidence
16 put forth by the Defence, if that were the case, and the point was to
17 scare the civilian population and drive them out, why not just line up,
18 after the fall of Grahovo and Glamoc, and shell Knin?
19 Your Honour, Judge Orie, I know that you are quite familiar with
20 the facts in Sarajevo
21 Nevertheless --
22 JUDGE ORIE: No, apart from that, Mr. Kehoe. I'm not going to
23 rely on whatever I learned in the past about Sarajevo --
24 MR. KEHOE: I understand.
25 JUDGE ORIE: -- because it is not part -- to the extent it is not
1 part of the evidence in this case. Let that be perfectly clear.
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. KEHOE: And I understand, Mr. President.
4 The fact of the matter is, if you want to terrorise the civilian
5 population, you do what the Serbs did in Sarajevo and shell
6 intermittently three or four shells, how about on the 28th of July, the
7 29th of July, the 30th, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd of August. That would
8 terrorise the civilian population and drive them out. That didn't
9 happen. And certainly Your Honours are aware that they had more than the
10 capability to do it.
11 Secondly, if the shelling of Knin was so concentrated in civilian
12 areas on the 4th of August, why was the civilian population leaving front
13 line areas to go to Knin?
14 Next question. In going into the intent of the JCE, and the
15 intent being that this JCE was going to allow crimes to take place, that
16 they wanted those crimes to take place, because it was part and parcel of
17 this artillery plan to drive the Serbs out. Really? Why did the
18 Prosecution not address the fact that there were numerous meetings, both
19 before Operation Storm and throughout August of which we have numerous
20 documents to evidence, numerous meetings where the discussion was, How do
21 we prevent crime and how do we do a better job? None of which, I might
22 add, was attended by General Gotovina.
23 Let us move to the artillery issue as argued by Mr. Tieger this
24 morning. A thousand shells fell on Knin, per Mr. Tieger. 900 shells,
25 Mr. Tieger noted for us, were actually on civilians. There's absolutely
1 no evidence whatsoever of 900 shells falling on civilians. Nine-tenths
2 of the shells fired into Knin were allegedly -- without any evidence and
3 without any foundation from the Prosecution, they maintain fell on -- on
4 the civilians. Where is the evidence of that in the record?
5 They gave us a 300-page brief. We are now on our third day of
6 final arguments and there is no evidence to support that. And assuming,
7 assuming for the sake of argument that that was the case. Why would
8 Steiner Hjertnes go back and report, in his provisional report and his
9 final report, which I add was verified by Mr. Roberts, why did he tell
10 this Chamber that the shelling was concentrated on military targets?
11 Which, by the way, is consistent the ARSK intelligence report in D389
12 which was a contemporaneous record demonstrating the same thing.
13 But why is that discussion -- question never answered, that given
14 these -- and I say outlandish, and I don't mean to say that lightly but
15 that's exactly what it is. This outlandish allegation that 900 shells
16 fell on civilians, that that fact was lost on experienced military
17 officers, as well as the media, as well as the international community,
18 when they came to visit Knin after the 5th of August.
19 Even Forand, General Forand, when he gave his first speech on
20 this in 1996, noted that the use of artillery was excellent. It was only
21 until that statement, that speech was put in the hands of Mr. Robertson
22 that things changed. Let's take a look at exactly what he said. This is
23 P339, page 4. Excuse me, D339 page 4.
24 Now I note for Your Honour, I know it's been some time since this
25 was actually looked upon or viewed. It notes and I add -- I note for you
1 just to reference you back, is the stuff in blue underline is the
2 information that was inserted after this statement or speech was
3 gotten -- was in the hands of Mr. Robertsson. But initially, he noted
4 that: "Their," being the HV, "use of artillery was excellent." He noted
5 that there were problems with the tanks and infantry, but I note, the use
6 of the artillery was excellent.
7 Why was that so dramatically, dramatically changed by
8 Mr. Robertson? And why has there never been any explanation by the
9 Prosecution for this?
10 Let us turn to the discussion of craters and the evidence of
11 craters, because, of course, crater analysis has been used not only by
12 military but, of course, by courts to demonstrate any number of things.
13 Nevertheless, today, Mr. Tieger noted at page 10, line 18:
14 "Crater analyses are intended to determine the origin of -- of --
15 for the use in situations in which it is not clear which warring faction
16 is responsible for firing the projectile."
17 That's true. That is one of the reasons. It's also
18 preliminarily used to demonstrate that shelling actually took place. The
19 reason we look for crater analyses at various locations evidentiary-wise
20 is to show that it took place and how many shells were actually shot at a
21 particular target or an area. Moreover, those shelling analyses, the
22 crater analysis is also done to determine what the munition is, what type
23 of cannon, what type of gun, what type of piece of artillery fired this.
24 And, of course, where was it located.
25 None of those items, none of those pieces of evidence, those
1 crucial pieces of evidence to substantiate an illegal attack on the
2 civilian population has been presented to this Chamber, barring one
3 crater analysis by Mr. Munkelien and Mr. Anttila, and when you go back to
4 the record, they have three different locations for where the actual
5 rocket was found. There's one in the report, there's one in the
6 testimony of Mr. Munkelien and one in the testimony of Mr. Anttila. All
7 three are different. They can't even agree. And that is even before we
8 engage in a discussion as to what type of munition this was and who fired
10 The principle of distinction. Mr. Tieger noted that
11 General Gotovina violated the principle of distinction by the use of the
12 weaponry employed and deployed during Operation Storm. Well, that's
13 interesting, Mr. President, and we discuss that in our brief, but I asked
14 that question of Colonel Konings, specifically directed on the use of --
15 on the principle of distinction and the use of MRLs and cannons as well
16 as T130s. And he -- I asked him, Can this weaponry be used to hit this
17 target, a target? He said yes. He confirmed, as we outline in our
18 brief, that he -- the violation -- that the principle of distinction was
19 not violated by the use of MRLs and other pieces of artillery.
20 Suffice it to say, the OTP never addresses, never addresses, the
21 consistent and sophisticated use of artillery both at the point of
22 contact on front lines as well as in depth. Nor have they contested the
23 fact that it worked. In their zeal to try to prove that this was an
24 attack against the civilian population, they overlook a very crucial
25 issue: That the purpose of this artillery, among other things, was to
1 comprise the three C/I capabilities of the ARSK; command, control,
2 communication, and intelligence.
3 And the evidence that's before this Chamber directly from
4 General Mrksic was that it worked. His ability to communicate with the
5 front lines on the Drina
6 his troops in the Velebit, compromised. All as a result of the use of
7 artillery which led to the decision that to avoid encirclement to
8 evacuate the area.
9 So, if the OTP's analysis is to be true -- is to followed, this
10 was simply an illegal attack on the civilian population, which, by the
11 way, happened to compromise the intelligence and communication
12 capabilities of the ARSK headquarters, and that was just an ancillary
13 benefit. That is a specious argument that there is no basis in reality
14 and no basis in the evidence of this record.
15 Lastly, this argument with regard to what General Gotovina should
16 have done. Both my colleagues addressed this at some point concerning
17 Jajce, and I don't quite know if they don't understand what a military
18 curfew is or have overlooked that but a military curfew is not just a
19 curfew against military, Mr. President, Your Honours. When you employ a
20 military curfew in occupied territory, that means everybody is under
21 curfew. Everybody in the occupied territory is under the curfew.
22 Something that General Gotovina could not do given the fact that after
23 the 6th of August, the constitutional order of Croatia was restored and
24 civilian authorities took over. Nevertheless, as just mentioned by my
25 colleague Mr. Misetic, General Gotovina took steps to implement as best
1 he could those measures of controlling his troops by ordering on the 10th
2 of August, in D204, as mentioned by Mr. Misetic, that arbitrary movement
3 of troops should stop and be avoided, and to take resolute measures
4 against anybody who conducts himself in an undisciplined manner.
5 Mr. President, in conclusion, General Gotovina is not going to
6 speak to the Chamber. He -- we will speak on his behalf. I think what
7 we see through the evidence in all this and I submit to the Chamber is a
8 soldier, a patriot, who acted honourably under very difficult
9 circumstances with an attempt to do the right thing, to restore democracy
10 to his country by the use of the military and the soldiers under his
11 command. These were very difficult times, as this Chamber knows. The
12 war in the former Yugoslavia
13 difficult problems came before those involved in that endeavour that have
14 now been sent to this Court to be revisited and discussed.
15 But I submit to Your Honours that when the Chamber reviews the
16 evidence in this case and the conduct of General Gotovina throughout, the
17 Chamber will found that conduct to be both honourable, correct and right.
18 We understand these are difficult issues. We have been here two and a
19 half years. We understand that the Chamber has many, many questions to
20 be answered over the months that it takes to render this decision. But
21 we submit to the Chamber that when Your Honours reviews this evidence,
22 you will find that not only General Gotovina acted in the right but so
23 was the Defence that was presented to this Chamber.
24 In history we're all -- have experience with difficult times. Of
25 course, we look back at this difficult time in Croatia and in the former
2 difficult times, and certainly the worse time was the American Civil War,
3 where any number of individuals were killed, 650.000, to be exact. And
4 somehow throughout all this, right and the truth willed out under those
5 very difficult circumstances. And on the eve of that war, the horrible,
6 horrible war, Abraham Lincoln stood at the Cooper Union in February of
7 1860, and he spoke these words:
8 "And so let us have faith that right makes might, and in that
9 faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it."
10 This is a difficult case. We submit to the Chamber, at this
11 point, on behalf of General Gotovina, is that the right thing is to find
12 General Gotovina not guilty of these charges and send him home to his
14 Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Kehoe. I'll a bit puzzled by one of
16 your lines. That is that you submit to the Chamber when we review the
17 evidence that we will find that not only General Gotovina acted in the
18 right, I take it that our verdict will give an answer to that question --
19 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: -- but so was the Defence that was presented to this
21 Chamber. I -- are you expecting us to include in the judgement --
22 MR. KEHOE: No.
23 JUDGE ORIE: -- apart from what --
24 MR. KEHOE: No, no --
25 JUDGE ORIE: -- whether Mr. Gotovina was right or wrong, whether
1 your Defence was right or wrong ...
2 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, what we have tried to do throughout
3 all this was just to give you what you needed to make this decision.
4 JUDGE ORIE: In your Defence you have drawn our attention to
5 everything which you say demonstrates that General Gotovina did the right
6 thing. That's what you --
7 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you, sir.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, then I have understood you well, a bit
9 perhaps beyond to what you literally said.
10 Mr. Kay, are you next in line?
11 MR. KAY: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
13 MR. KAY: I will address the issues raised by Mr. Tieger today.
14 And, first of all, the first place to start is the issue of the Brioni
15 meeting. Paragraph 347 in the Prosecution final brief where they clearly
16 state that there was an envisaged role, and a planned role, for the
17 person who eventually went to Knin in relation to tasks to be performed
18 and that, ultimately, Mr. Cermak was chosen.
19 This requires us, I believe, to go carefully to that exhibit,
20 P461, consider the language now, because we say this clearly is not the
21 case, that at the alleged JCE meeting, Mr. Cermak's role was envisaged.
22 Page 27 of P461. They are talking about the planned combat
23 operation. Susak says:
24 "I'm talking about is when they start shelling. We might have up
25 to 100.000 refugees. Panic might arise. They might shell him so heavily
1 that a stampede might occur overnight."
2 And goes on to say:
3 "We must be organised in such a manner so as not to provoke panic
4 here. Otherwise, they will have achieved a countereffect."
5 And the president talks about stopping them at Dakovici. Susak
7 "Second, we must give clear instructions to the commanders on the
8 ground, Mr. President, about how to react if UNCRO becomes involved."
9 And refers to the Canadians:
10 "We must give them clear instructions. That's one thing.
11 Second, I was thinking, Mr. President, that would be one staff."
12 So one staff, the commanders on the ground, reacting to what was
13 happening and dealing with UNCRO, plainly applies to the combat.
14 "Another staff would be for relations with UNCRO. Someone who
15 would be a permanent liaison. Someone who would be in touch with us and
16 resolve things with them. For us to get instructions because matters
17 will evolve too rapidly for us to start looking around for them and
18 calling them. That's the second problem, as I see it." It's another
19 member of staff for the combat operation.
20 They go on to discuss matters. The Court will see that.
21 Page 28, they discuss the operation. Page 29:
22 "Can we have your agreement provided that we will face risks if
23 we lose."
24 That's what Susak said. No certain outcome for them in Brioni
25 that they were going to win this war, this battle. They go on to talk
1 about it, the need for leaflets, the need to try and present their
2 operation as being a victory.
3 Let go to where Susak speaks again. Number 3:
4 "Another matter, Mr. President. In that case, would we not need
5 someone from your office, in order to re-establish the staff for
6 propaganda? We established this staff in Posusje but now this is being
7 returned to Zagreb
8 contact person."
9 President Tudjman says:
10 "This is a question to be dealt with."
11 And that's to do with the propaganda leaflets.
12 "With what you just said and also in reference to UNCRO," and
13 that refers to the UNCRO reference on page 27. "And this means Sarinic.
14 What I'd like to know is whether it is safer to coordinate and manage
15 affairs from Brioni or Zagreb
16 And the advice was given by Susak that it would be better to
17 coordinate in Zagreb
18 "It would be bad to coordinate from here," meaning Brioni. And
19 that decision was made as we know. On page 30, the matter is further
20 discussed concerning the operation.
21 Page 31, Susak:
22 "And, last, Mr. President, if it were Sarinic who's already in
23 contact with the main commander here, they would each, at their own
24 level, have to establish some kind of contact to tell the ones over here
25 how far ahead they should give it."
1 There is an interjection from Mr. Markac:
2 "They didn't want to give it on time. This time we should just
3 give them an hour, just enough to take cover."
4 And that refers to giving notice to the international
5 organisations concerning notice of the attacked, and Sarinic was to
6 establish, through his contact at his level, and pass on that
8 There it is in full. In our submission, it quite clearly does
9 not refer to Mr. Cermak's role in post-Operation Oluja in Knin. He was
10 never envisaged in Brioni, and a role was not carved out for him, as is
11 attempted to be alleged, to take part in the alleged JCE.
12 Moving on now to a further issue that arose concerning Grubori.
13 Mr. Tieger referred to the false reports and the special police this
14 morning and referred to Witness Celic.
15 We want to stress one matter, first of all. It's clear through
16 P607, Exhibit P607, that on the 25th of August, the Split special police
17 unit had reported to Janic and filed a report, certainly by 4.00, which
18 was sent to Zeljko Sacic, concerning the finding of a body in Vundici
19 village, near the little bridge by the main road. The deceased had
20 military boots, and his hands were tied.
21 "I reported hourly to Mr. Janic on my position. There were no
22 injured workers in the task."
23 And that was sent on the 25th of August, a special police
24 operations team with 102 people involved, hourly in contact with Janic,
25 who we know went back to Gracac and he was in possession of that
1 information. The special police at Gracac, on that 25th of August, had
2 the information they needed to supply Cermak with a false story which he
3 gave on the morning of the 26th of August, giving what he had been told
4 by them to the UNTV. An important document in relation to a sequence of
5 difficult documents as to who wrote what, when. But the time a document
6 arises is not necessarily the time of the conception of the deceit within
7 the document. That is something we stress. Documents may arise later,
8 after the conception of the deceit.
9 Just moving on to issues raised concerning Mr. Dondo's report.
10 Mr. Dondo reported to the police five killings had taken place.
11 That we know. It is D57 which is the record that states that the
12 sanitation had been ordered. That is to civilian protection from the
13 local police. There are distinct lines of hierarchy here, and from what
14 we know of the Croatian system, that is certainly not something that
15 Dondo, a Croatian army liaison officer, had any power or authority to
16 order to the MUP. We do know, however, that the villagers in Grubori
17 were concerned about the dead bodies and concerned about the effect it
18 was having.
19 On the 25th of August, P874, one of the Grubori villagers said to
20 the journalist:
21 "What am I to do now? Are you going to bury him? Who is going
22 to bury him, my husband? We don't have anybody to do the burial."
23 Dondo mentioning the need for sanitation was clearly in response
24 to the attitude and position of the villagers. Transcript page 22593.
25 P237, Mr. Romassev's note, the chief of the UNCIVPOL. He was
1 aware that the villagers wanted the bodies buried. Linking the
2 sanitation or the burial of the bodies with an attempt to thwart an
3 investigation, in our submission, is taking a far more complicated and
4 wrong position on this evidence. Not only that; we know that when Dondo
5 went to the police, Mr. Cermak had not been involved with this matter
6 since earlier in the afternoon, when the president came to Knin, and he
7 went off to Split
8 completely wrong. Dondo didn't know he was going to find five bodies
9 when he went up there. The MUP report at 3.00 in D57, is of the two
11 Let us consider, then, the position of Dondo in the report that
12 he wrote; Exhibit P764, referred to by Mr. Tieger. The line he writes
14 "Most probably the bodies will be cleared up on the
15 27th of August."
16 Not "will be," not as a result of an order. But just passing on
17 a factual answer of "most probably." And we know that on the
18 26th of August, the on-site investigation had been booked. That was in
19 the police log in Knin. And we know that the entries for the civilian
20 protection to also attend are part of a conjoined procedure for dealing
21 with deaths, as is usual within the Croatian system.
22 I only have a few minutes now. The issue concerning Mr. Albiston
23 re the document 510, the Trial Chamber is invited to completely consider
24 all the transcript on this matter. Because, first of all, the document
25 that was produced was not a correct translation when questioned by the
1 Prosecutor, and we can see that at 23957. And what the expert witness
2 Albiston said was that he had considered this document. He had seen it.
5 (redacted) And on the totality of the
6 document that he was considering --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Gustafson.
8 MS. GUSTAFSON: Can we go into private session for a moment.
9 MR. KAY: I've just realised, I'm sorry.
10 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
11 [Private session]
11 Page 29439 redacted. Private session.
18 [Open session]
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session. Thank
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
22 MR. KAY: Back in public session now, Your Honour, and I'm just
23 making a closing remark.
24 That passage of transcript that I've just read from Mr. Albiston,
25 a police officer of great experience, like General Sir Jack Deverell, an
1 army officer of great experience, in our submission, brings to bear some
2 common sense in relation to the facts in this case. Our submission is
3 that Mr. Cermak was a man put into Knin with a distinct mission which he
4 tried to fulfil without any criminal intent or motivation in his mind. A
5 position that was not well thought out, that was not clearly defined, but
6 he attempted to do his best. Our submission is the verdict of this Court
7 on all counts in relation to him should be one of not guilty.
8 And we thank the Court for hearing us during this trial, and our
9 colleagues from all parts of the courtroom, Prosecution, fellow Defence
10 counsel, and those who have helped in the background during the course of
11 this trial. And we leave the verdict to be announced in the hands of
12 Your Honours.
13 Thank you.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Kay.
15 Mr. Mikulicic, are you ready to proceed?
16 MR. MIKULICIC: I am, Your Honour. Thank you.
17 [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will very briefly dwell upon two
18 issues raised by the Prosecution. It is about the alleged provocation
19 that was carried out just before Operation Storm and which was discussed
20 on the 31st of July in Brioni. I'm referring to P614.
21 The Defence certainly does not say that initiating certain
22 activities as a precondition for launching Operation Storm that
23 certain -- doesn't say that these things were not discussed. But the OTP
24 is going one step further and claims that based on P831, this provocation
25 was, indeed, carried out and that my client, General Markac, took part in
2 The Defence denies such an interpretation of P831 and claims that
3 there has been no provocation either by General Markac or by anybody
4 else, and would like to point out that this exhibit does not lend itself
5 to such interpretation.
6 In paragraph 3(C) of the ECMM says that Gospic was shelled. And
7 I will continue in English.
8 [In English] The UN and UNMOs believe the explosions heard may
9 have been caused by the HV.
10 [Interpretation] Finally there is a comment which says:
11 [In English] Indeed, why should I, at the present moment.
12 [Interpretation] If a sensible observer wants to interpret that
13 document, he or she will arrive at the conclusion that this is
14 speculation and that there is no reliable evidence showing, A, that there
15 were indeed explosions; B, what the -- the intensity, the qualification
16 and the location of those explosions were; and C, what the cause of these
17 explosions was.
18 Linking this to considerations raised at a meeting actually is
19 speculation in the interpretation of the evidence which the Defence
20 naturally opposes. Mr. Kuzmanovic had earlier spoken about the
21 importance of the creation of certain preconditions and about the tactics
22 employed in that military operation, but that is something that I don't
23 want to go into. I do want to say, though, that a conversation and
24 considerations about some military activities that did not happen cannot
25 be incriminated because that would be a thought crime.
1 Another issue is the testimony of Mr. Vanderostyne and based on
2 his testimony the OTP bases the conclusion that it has been proven that
3 the members of the special police looted the abandoned property of the
4 Krajina Serbs. First of all, the OTP relies on P324 in reaching this
5 conclusion. I will add that these are photographs taken on the
6 8th of August, 1995, on the streets of Gracac. The Defence submits that
7 Witness Vanderostyne is unreliable in his memory and his interpretation
8 of the events and that, therefore, his words are not a reliable basis for
9 approving some facts.
10 I would like to say that Mr. Vanderostyne, having arrived in
12 through the Croatian towns of Karlovac and Otocac of which he said that
13 they were considerably damaged due to shelling and that the population
14 was -- was upset. But he fails to say that these are towns that for four
15 years had been shelled by the forces of the so-called Army of the
16 Serbian Krajina.
17 So Mr. Vanderostyne is unaware of the context as well as the
18 political and factual situation in which he was.
19 The contentious photograph, which you will remember, showing a
20 person putting on or taking off a truck a rectangular object is the
21 basis -- is taken as evidence by the OTP that members of the special
22 police stole things. Mr. Vanderostyne, in his statement, said that he
23 noticed uniformed persons stealing property from houses, and he describes
24 the uniforms as grey, greyish blue or khaki, respectively. The Chamber
25 is aware that the special police didn't wear such uniforms, and evidence
1 has been led to show that.
2 That photograph does show a member of the special police wearing
3 his standard green uniform.
4 However, Ms. Mahindaratne, when she was examining the witness,
5 was the one who suggested to him, who put to him, that the object in the
6 photograph was actually a TV set. Witness Vanderostyne never said
7 himself or never volunteered the opinion that it might be a TV set. I
8 refer to transcript page 4028, line 23.
9 After some time in the continued examination,
10 Witness Vanderostyne said that he personally never saw the scene which
11 was photographed, that the photograph was taken by his photographer, and
12 that, at the time, he was not with the photographer.
13 Your Honours, what is the value of his testimony? An
14 interpretation of a photograph that anybody here can interpret because he
15 was not personally present, nor did he see the context in which the
16 photograph was taken. So that his interpretation, which, by the way, was
17 put it him by the OTP, saying that it was a TV set is one possible
18 interpretation only.
19 To the question of the Defence whether in that particular case
20 that may have been a cardboard box for documents or anything of that
21 kind, the OTP protested and said that it was a fact to be established by
22 the Trial Chamber. I agree with that, Your Honours. Let the
23 Trial Chamber, by looking at the photograph, draw the conclusion whether
24 it is, indeed, evidence of special police looting, or whether another
25 conclusion can be drawn from that in accordance with the submission of
1 the Defence, such as the removal of the staff of the special police from
2 Gracac and the loading of equipment and materiel.
3 Your Honours, by way of conclusion at the end of this lengthy
4 procedure, I wish to thank you, first of all, as well as all
5 representatives of this Tribunal who assisted in the trial, by which I
6 mean Registry staff and the interpreters as well as court reporters. I
7 would like to thank you for your patience and for your -- for your
8 listening to us. And all our argumentation boils down to something very
9 simple, that our client was an honourable person who devoted the best
10 years of his life to one goal: The defence of his country and the
11 defence of the democratic system of that country, the Republic of
13 we were unable to go there so that the Trial Chamber see for themselves
14 what it's like there. That it's a person -- we're talking about a person
15 who carried out his duties honourably and honestly, who led highly
16 trained professionals in the special police who went about their job in
17 accordance with their ethics and their convictions.
18 I don't believe that my client ever acted dishonourably, let
19 alone in a way that can be characterised as committing a crime. Hence, I
20 claim that the OTP has not led any evidence based on which the Trial
21 Chamber can convict my client. As I said yesterday, that is the absence
22 of legal prerequisites for convicting my client. It is the position of
23 the Markac Defence that the only possible decision that can be taken by
24 the Trial Chamber after duly considering all facts will be the acquittal
25 of General Markac. And that will be a satisfactory outcome which will
1 return General Markac to his family and friends in Zagreb, although in
2 spite of the great sacrifice he has made.
3 Thank you very much once again, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Mikulicic.
5 Mr. Kuzmanovic.
6 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
7 There are three areas I'm going to cover. The first deals with
8 Mr. Celic; the second deals with Ramljane; and the third deals with
10 Mr. Tieger in his rebuttal argument discussed paragraph 444 of
11 the Prosecution brief by telling you that the second report relating to
12 Grubori, P576, actually it wasn't relating to Grubori, it was relating to
13 the Plavno mop-up operation, was written in Markac's presence. But not
14 even Mr. Celic says that. The report at issue is alleged to have been
15 dictated to Celic by Sacic at Gracac HQ outside of Markac's presence.
16 The information, as I talked about yesterday, that are in the
17 reports of General Markac are all information that he receives from
18 subordinates, and in the case of Grubori, it's misinformation. And all
19 of this misinformation starts with Celic. Markac isn't present in
20 Grubori. He's provided information by his subordinates regarding this
21 mop-up operation, and what's interesting is that, as I described
22 yesterday, Mr. Celic has somewhat of an uncanny ability to agree with
23 everyone. He agrees that nothing happened. Then when he's confronted in
24 cross-examination or by questions from the Bench about the alleged role
25 of Sacic and Sacic dictating to him what happened, and whether or not he
1 believed what Sacic was telling him was the truth, he says, Absolutely.
2 Again, when Josip Turkalj, on September 1st, after General Markac
3 requests reports, orders a report from the group leaders, what happens?
4 Again, the same thing. Misinformation. Not just from the group leaders
5 but again from Celic. What evidence is there that General Markac ever
6 influenced or obstructed information relating to Grubori? None.
7 Zeljko Zganjer testified to that effect, the state prosecutor, who
8 investigated this in 2001.
9 Now -- and we need to go into private session for this,
10 Your Honours.
11 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
12 [Private session]
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: Sorry, counsel. I just need to indicate that we
12 are now in open session. Thank you, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Are you thanked for that. Please proceed.
14 MR. KUZMANOVIC: I apologise for that. Thank you.
15 I would now like to move to the discussion on Ramljane. Again,
16 unlike the event in Grubori the day before, Markac did arrive in
17 Ramljane. And yesterday I cited from Janic's testimony that he, as the
18 responsible commander, looked into Ramljane and decided that there was no
19 need to conduct any kind of disciplinary measures.
20 What I did not include and what I will include out of Janic 's
21 testimony at 6193, beginning at line 23 to 6194, and he's talking about
22 Ramljane. And Janic says:
23 "Later on before departure or before we went other own separate
24 ways, the general," referring to General Markac, "trusted me with
25 verifying all this information and to interview the commander of Lucko
1 and other commanders in order to verify whether the reports were true.
2 After these interviews, I established that this is exactly what
4 Now it's the Office of the Prosecutor's position that the inner
5 control now of the special police was somehow the source for Markac to
6 know at 5.00 on August 25th that out of the six special police units of
7 580 members, it was Lucko that was in Grubori, and because of that, he
8 shouldn't have sent Lucko into Ramljane. Well, I didn't -- I believe I
9 adequately explained yesterday how that was not possible under the
10 evidence that's been admitted in this case. There's no evidence where
11 General Markac was on August 25th, was he in Gracac, was he elsewhere?
12 Now there is no reason for him to call Sacic to go down there if he
13 already knows that it's the Lucko Unit -- if he has all the information
14 by 5.00 on August 25th, what reason is there for him to ask Sacic to go
15 down and find out what happened, as Sacic said. And we still -- the
16 Prosecution has still not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that
17 Markac knew Lucko was in Grubori before the Ramljane Freedom Train
19 Let's talk about Gracac for a moment.
20 Mr. Russo yesterday said -- or two days ago said that the Janic
21 reference he provided discussed Gracac and targets in Gracac. Well,
22 that's not what it discussed. I showed you the transcript that he
23 referred to. Now they bring us to another transcript, and says, well,
24 yes, Janic does refer to Gracac and targeting and targets. Well, that
25 reference is page 6355 to 56. And when we go to that reference, at
1 line 19, Mr. Janic is asked:
2 "To the best of your recollection of the days spent in Gracac,
3 can you tell us what the situation in town -- what was the situation in
4 town? Were there -- was there any damage on the buildings? Just in a
5 couple of sentences.
6 "A. Since after I reached the road near Prezid, I entered Gracac
7 and I can confirm that the town was intact. There was no damage caused
8 by artillery. There was no immediate fighting over this particular town.
9 Therefore, that there was no reason, and I know that near the town there
10 were some military depots that were legitimate targets. But the town
11 itself wasn't. And there was no fighting inside it. And there were no
12 artillery strikes targeting the town."
13 Mr. Janic doesn't talk about military targets in the town. He
14 says the town itself wasn't targeted. There's a big difference. The
15 Prosecution is very critical of various orders saying put certain towns
16 under fire. Well, here's Mr. Janic saying, There were no artillery
17 strikes targeting the town.
18 Of course, the Prosecution has conveniently ignored the citations
19 to Turkalj yesterday that I made and the other witnesses that I
20 identified, and I will not go over them. However, I will refer to
21 Mr. Vurnek, his testimony at 26257, asking him:
22 "Did you see any craters from shelling in various parts all over
23 the town, as Mr. Steenbergen says in his statement?
24 "A. No. I saw several craters at the cross-roads just outside
25 the town. As for the town itself, I don't recall there being any."
1 The Court will recall that Mr. Vurnek was a witness of the
2 Defence from the special police.
3 Mr. Vitez, similarly a Defence witness, from 25988 through 25989,
4 talks about damage. But he says:
5 "In Gracac, as far as I remember, they had been destroyed a long
6 time previously. There had been vegetation growing out of the ruins. I
7 don't remember any other damage.
8 Witness Cvrk also describes, 25375 through 25376.
9 Witness Turkalj, in a reference that I didn't make yesterday,
10 states at 13772:
11 "I was surprised at that fact at that there was no civilian
12 population there," and he is referring to Gracac. "It was already said
13 that the targets engaged in Gracac were engaged with an exceptionally
14 small number were projectiles, in view of the number of targets in
15 Gracac. To draw a comparison, I was present in the area of the town of
16 Karlovac, where hundreds or even thousands of rounds landed on Karlovac
17 and the population never abandoned it. It was always there. So the
18 movements of the population can never be correlated with the activities
19 of shelling. Or at least I could not when it came to the shelling of
20 towns that came from our side."
21 Witness Herman, also a Defence witness, transcript reference
22 26435 through 26436, describes, apart from some craters that could be
23 seen on the tarmac, he talked about the main road in Gracac. It was in
24 fair condition.
25 So as far as the citation references regarding Gracac, they're
1 either non-existent or completely misinterpreted.
2 The last thing I wanted to state, Your Honour, in conjunction
3 with my colleague Mr. Mikulicic is, while I thanked many people yesterday
4 I didn't thank the three of you, Judges, for listening to us, for your
5 patience, for your obvious engagement in the case, and for at times
6 knowing certain portions of the case better than the Defence lawyers or
7 the Prosecution. I join my colleague Mr. Mikulicic in seeking our
8 client's acquittal because the Prosecution has not proven its case beyond
9 a reasonable doubt.
10 Thank you very much, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Kuzmanovic.
12 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, before you conclude, one small
13 housekeeping matter. I just wanted to indicate in keeping with what we
14 have done thus far, should the Court wish the Prosecution to provide the
15 slides shown today we're prepared to do so but leave it to the Court.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Let's resolve this in the following manner. If any
17 of the parties would like to receive it, they will address you,
18 Mr. Tieger, and once you send a hard copy or an electronic copy to any of
19 the Defence teams, the Chamber would like to receive a similar copy.
20 We're not yet at the end. I just want to have a few matters
21 clear for myself.
22 Mr. Akhavan, you've more or less assumed that silence would be
23 understood as -- as an expression of a position. Did I miss something,
24 and that is very well possible, that you did not explicitly respond on
25 the Hadzihasanovic argument raised by Mr. Tieger, that where the
1 character of the conflict may have been of some importance in the
2 Hadzihasanovic case that it does not anymore, is that a matter which you
3 would like to further address?
4 [Defence counsel confer]
5 JUDGE ORIE: You'll understand that I was hesitant to consider it
6 to be -- having acceded to the position of the Prosecution. Yes.
7 MR. AKHAVAN: Yes, Mr. President. First of all, the
8 Hadzihasanovic case did not deal with the scope of application of
9 international versus international armed conflict, a matter which, as you
10 appreciate, was resolved in a Tadic jurisdiction decision quite some
11 earlier. It dealt with the allegation that Article 7(3) does not apply
12 in internal armed conflict. But the point from that decision is that
13 the Trial -- the Appeals Chamber clearly stipulates that in order to rely
14 on international armed conflict, it must be expressly charged in the
15 indictment, and to the extent that the Prosecution is relying on an
16 international armed conflict to vest this Court with jurisdiction, it
17 must have expressly stipulated that in the indictment. That is the
19 And I would add also that the Dragomir Milosevic case in 2005, I
20 believe, had a similar finding as Hadzihasanovic. Unfortunately, I
21 haven't had time to find that precedent for you. So we do not concede
22 the point.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's clear. I took it from Mr. Tieger's
24 position that he doesn't not rely on anything you say he should then
25 present or put to the Chamber. But that's at least clarified.
1 I have one also for you, a small question. You pointed at the
2 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. Would you agree with me that the way
3 in which you presented that was more or less a one-liner. You see how
4 broad the powers are of a belligerent state to expel a mass expulsion of
5 enemy aliens. You relied on Lauterpacht, the 1996 edition. Would you
6 agree with me that that matter is far more complex as explained by the
7 study of the ILC in 2006, and that have to fully appreciate the matters
8 that apart from your one-liner pointing at the broad -- the broad powers
9 that for a Chamber to --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Please switch off all unnecessary microphones.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. My microphone is on necessarily at this
13 Would you agree with me for a Chamber to have a broader and a
14 more balanced view on the matter that it should consider these elements
15 as well, and would you consider that to be appropriate in dealing with
16 the matter, which, by the way, was only a subsidiary argument for you
17 because you said we would -- Croatia
18 although that was not the reason why the Serbs left the territory.
19 MR. AKHAVAN: Yes, Mr. President. We did not invoke that
20 authority to justify a nonexistent mass expulsion, as I tried to explain.
21 The point is that it is permissible for a state to deny the mass return
22 of enemy aliens in armed conflict, and that the issue here, that the
23 Prosecution is relying on a policy of no immediate mass return in order
24 to infer criminal intention, and we believe that is inappropriate. The
25 International Law Commission study that you refer to, of course, is
1 relevant and there was also a study prepared by the secretariat prior to
2 that which was submitted to the International Law Commission.
3 I referred briefly in my presentation to the fact that in the
4 cases of state succession, which is what we have before us, the customary
5 rule arguably is that habitual residents of the new successor state must
6 have the right to citizenship of that state, at least where they become
8 Now, in this case, you have an armed rebellion against a state
9 and those who are supporting the armed rebellion are in effect citizens
10 of the predecessor state, the SFRY. And in that context, none of them
11 had Croatian citizenship, none of them wanted Croatian citizenship, and
12 they were involved in an armed conflict and occupation of a state which
13 the SFRY did not recognise.
14 In those circumstances, we would submit, it is clear that they're
15 enemy aliens, apart from the question of whether they had the right to
16 apply for Croatian citizenship, and I'm not going to speak here about my
17 own knowledge of what, in fact, happened subsequent to the armed conflict
18 for those that wanted to acquire Croatian citizenship. But the
19 Eritrea-Ethiopia case is actually far less forceful than this cases
20 because those that were lawfully expelled were in fact dual citizens.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes. I'm not now asking you to compare the one
22 because that's the case you mentioned -- you referred to Lauterpacht when
23 you referred to that case in your oral argument. I was just wondering
24 whether the reference to that case, to Lauterpacht, which is, of course,
25 already 14 years ago, that whether that would be the guiding principles,
1 but you say this case is even stronger. That's clear.
2 Then, finally, one question for Mr. Mikulicic.
3 Mr. Mikulicic, you -- when arguing the -- the jurisdiction you
4 said the following, and you were talking about armed conflict. You said:
5 "As a matter of fact, in these cases," and you had referred to
6 the IRA and the ETA
7 In some cases they even controlled parts of that territory. That is to
8 say, there were some elements that could meet the criteria of customary
9 international law that are applied for defining armed conflict."
10 And then you said:
11 "However, that never happened, and no international court ever
12 established jurisdiction," which was then followed by, "and the
13 jurisdiction of national courts was never brought into question."
14 Your last remark suggests that if there's an armed conflict, that
15 national courts would lose their jurisdiction because national courts -
16 and that's perhaps my question to you - can exercise their jurisdiction,
17 whether there exists or does not exist an armed conflict, of course,
18 depending on what kind of cases they're dealing but that could include
19 war crimes or crime against humanity.
20 Would you agree with that or would you further explain what the
21 last part of this sentence, "jurisdiction of national courts was never
22 brought into question" what that exactly means in this context?
23 MR. MIKULICIC: Indeed, Your Honour, I completely agree with your
24 position and that was not my intention to provoke that questions [sic].
25 It is obviously that national courts has jurisdictions, no matter whether
1 it's a context of the armed conflict or it's not. In fact, if the
2 national courts did their duty in the very present case, I supposed we
3 wouldn't be here today.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for this clarification.
5 We will conclude hearing this case at this moment. I wanted to
6 join in the appreciation expressed by the parties already for the work
7 done by all those who have assisted us; interpreters, technicians,
8 transcribers, Registry. They've all made it possible to hear this case
9 which kept us for quite a while in this and other courtrooms.
10 I want to extend also on behalf of the Chamber my appreciation to
11 the parties because a Chamber is limping and paralysed if it is not
12 assisted by committed and dedicated parties which present their cases
13 before the Chamber. It is to a large extent also because of the parties
14 that a Chamber can perform its duties, and I would like to express my
15 appreciation for that very specifically.
16 I will adjourn in a minute. The Chamber is aware that there is a
17 pending motion by the Gotovina Defence which doesn't need an immediate
18 answer now. It will -- from what will follow, it will -- it can be
19 concluded whether or not the Chamber has granted or has not granted that
21 The Chamber adjourns, sine die, and will deliver its Judgement in
22 due course.
23 We stand adjourned.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.53 p.m.
25 sine die.