Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 2927

 1                           Wednesday, 6 February 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around the

 6     courtroom.

 7             Mr. Registrar, could you call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 9             This is the case number IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus

10     Goran Hadzic.

11             Thank you.

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

13             May we have the appearances, please, starting with the

14     Prosecution.

15             MR. STRINGER:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.

16             For the Prosecution, Douglas Stringer, Alex Demirdjian, and

17     Thomas Laugel.

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  And for the Defence.  Mr. Zivanovic.

19             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  For the Defence of

20     Goran Hadzic, it's Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

22             The witness -- the witness may be brought in.

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good morning again to you, Dr. Nielsen.

25             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honours.


Page 2928

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  May I remind that you you're still under oath.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes, of course.

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gosnell, please proceed.

 4             MR. GOSNELL:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, thank

 5     you.

 6                           WITNESS:  CHRISTIAN NIELSEN [Resumed]

 7                           Cross-examination by Mr. Gosnell: [Continued]

 8        Q.   Welcome back, Dr. Nielsen.

 9        A.   Good morning.  It's a pleasure to see you.

10        Q.   Good to see you too.  Now, during our --

11             MR. GOSNELL:  If we could have P370, please, brought up, which I

12     believe is a Prosecution tab but I don't have the tab number at hand.  In

13     any event, the exhibit number is P370.

14        Q.   And this was the document that we were discussing when you last

15     left us a couple of weeks ago, Dr. Nielsen.  And during our last exchange

16     of question and answer I was asking you whether this document, which just

17     to remind ourselves is a -- some kind of an instruction or an order,

18     guidance, from the 1st Proletarian Guards Division to unidentified -- an

19     unidentified town command, and we see there's a blank there.  It could be

20     a form being sent to several town commands or just one town command.

21     It's not very clear.

22             In any event, the signatory is Mico Delic who's the -- a

23     major-general, and he's the commander apparently of the

24     1st Proletarian Guards Division, and we were discussing this document and

25     I asked you whether this document reflected at least Mico Delic's view

Page 2929

 1     that it was necessary to put in place a procedure to permit the

 2     occupation of abandoned houses in order, as a means, of maintaining law

 3     and order.  And you answered in response to that question that that was

 4     the hope of some JNA officers as reflected in this document, and I quote

 5     you:  "That the establishment of such procedures could slow down if not

 6     eliminate illegal expulsions," and that's at page 2597.

 7             So just to wrap this up, you would agree that at least as far as

 8     this document goes, it does reflect an attempt to ensure an orderly

 9     occupation of abandoned houses; correct?

10        A.   Yes, that is correct.  And I think the two key parts of this

11     document are the four questions which are posed at the outset of the

12     document, which show what everyone is concerned about at this time.  And

13     also the -- at least in the B/C/S, it is the second-to-last

14     paragraph where they talk about the need to maintain public order,

15     security of the citizens, and that they should not under any

16     circumstances permit the harassment or mistreatment of citizens.

17        Q.   Right.  And you testified previously that the reason for this was

18     that there was a large influx of Western Slavonian refugees who were

19     putting pressure on local authorities, and they were in fact harassing

20     local residents on some occasions, and as you put it this was creating a

21     "a very volatile situation."  Is that right?

22        A.   Yes, that is certainly the picture that forms when we review the

23     newest documents that were provided by Belgrade.

24        Q.   And if we look at page 2 of the English, which I think is still

25     going to be on page one of the B/C/S, we see sort of a three-tiered

Page 2930

 1     decision-making process being laid out here by Major-General Delic.  And

 2     what he says is in the first instance the authority to determine which

 3     abandoned houses are to be occupied by whom should, in the first

 4     instance, "be fully transferred to the municipal organs of authority

 5     wherever they exist and then where no such municipal organs exist an

 6     opinion should be obtained from the commissioner of the municipality."

 7     And let me just stop there.  Would you agree that there appears there to

 8     be a distinction between, on the one hand, saying that transfer the

 9     decision making process, if possible, to the local authority, but on the

10     other hand where there's no local authority seek the opinion, the advice,

11     consultation, with the commissioner of the -- of the municipality.

12             Is that a distinction that you see in the B/C/S as well?

13        A.   Well, I think both as concerns the English translation and the

14     B/C/S original, there is a mistake in your question.  Because you said in

15     your question that where no such municipal organs exist an opinion should

16     be obtained from the commissioner of the municipality.

17             As I read it, it says if no such commissioner exists for the

18     specific municipality then an opinion is to be obtained from the

19     government of the Serb region or district of Slavonia, Baranja, and

20     Western Srem.

21        Q.   Well, if we take the whole paragraph what I see this paragraph as

22     saying is:  If there is a local authority in place, transfer the decision

23     to them.  If no local authority, then in the first instance seek the

24     opinion of the commissioner, and where there's -- if there's no

25     commissioner then seek the opinion of the district government.  Is that

Page 2931

 1     right or do you think I'm misreading that?

 2        A.   No, I think we agree that it's a three-step process.

 3        Q.   Right.  And the distinction that I was drawing your attention to

 4     was, on the one hand, if there's a local municipal civil organ they

 5     should essentially take care of it.  But on the other hand, where there's

 6     no such local authority, merely seek the opinion of the commissioner, and

 7     in the absence of a commissioner, the district government.

 8        A.   Is there a question?

 9        Q.   Do you agree with that.

10        A.   Yes, I agree with that.  And I think, just so I don't forget it,

11     that among the 370 or so documents that we obtained from Belgrade, given

12     that this document, if I recall from the top, it's from the 23rd of

13     December, 1991, that it might be very instructive at some point today to

14     also look at the letter that was sent on the very same day to the

15     military by Mr. Hadzic and to which a response was given by the military

16     on the 25th of December, 1991.  Those two documents are among the new

17     documents and in fact deal with precisely this matter.  That is, the

18     relationship between the civilian authority, the military authorities, et

19     cetera.

20        Q.   Would you agree with me that as far as this document is

21     concerned, the implication is that if there is no local municipal organ

22     of authority, it's still up to the town commands to make the final

23     decision on settlement of abandoned houses?

24        A.   As we agreed, there is a three-step process which culminates in

25     if the -- if there are no civilian organs of authority available from the

Page 2932

 1     municipality and if there's no commissioner, step two, available for the

 2     specific municipality, then an opinion is to be obtained from the

 3     government of the Serb district.

 4        Q.   Right.  And now I'm trying to discuss with you the implications

 5     of that, and what I'm suggesting to you is that even if you've then

 6     gone -- let's assume there is no municipal organ, the town command goes

 7     to the commissioner, seeks advice, receives some kind of suggestions, but

 8     then, at that point, in the absence of any local organs, it's for the

 9     town command to execute the decision and make the decision ultimately as

10     to who goes into which houses; right?

11        A.   That is correct.

12        Q.   And in fact even the next paragraph, we see that even where the

13     process of letting abandoned houses is actually assumed by the local

14     organs, the municipal civil organs, you'll see there that it says:

15     "Town commands should ensure, regardless of who issues the decision, and

16     especially if the commands do so," -- now just to divert there, it

17     doesn't specifically say town commands, "... and especially if the

18     commands do so, that the houses allotted to refugees from other areas to

19     move in, even on a temporary basis, are first and foremost of those who

20     will most certainly not come back because of the crimes they committed."

21             Now would you agree that this seems to reflect that the town

22     commands are supposed to exercise some ultimate and final authority, even

23     over decisions of the municipal organs in this respect?

24        A.   Well, I would agree, as I've stated previously, that this is an

25     attempt to impose a modicum of order and organisation upon what has,

Page 2933

 1     based on other documents, been a quite chaotic process.  So again, the

 2     town commands at this point are being told by the major-general that they

 3     are supposed to -- to the best of their ability regulate this to prevent

 4     the kind of irregularities that have been witnessed to date.  The

 5     emphasis is, of course, on permitting the return, as we see in the

 6     final -- or following paragraph, rather, permitting the return of persons

 7     who were loyal and who have not compromised themselves, which gets back

 8     to the four questions that are asked at the outset of the document.

 9        Q.   And if we look at the top of page 2 of the English it says, and

10     this is in response to the four questions on page one, it says:

11             "We have received the following reply from the command of the

12     1st Military District."

13             And then that reply is purportedly set out in this document.

14     Would you agree with me that that seems to imply that this document

15     reflects the policy that in fact is going to apply in all of the

16     1st Military District?

17        A.   That is certainly the aspiration of the command of the 1st

18     Military District in issuing this reply.  They, of course, also note that

19     they hope that the -- whatever organs of local authority and police might

20     exist in these municipalities will assist in preventing, as it says at

21     the bottom of the document, any eventual harassment of citizens by those

22     organs or their employees.

23        Q.   That's right.  And the second-last paragraph in this document,

24     which is on page three of the English, specifically says:

25             "Town commands are particularly responsible for ensuring law and

Page 2934

 1     order, security and safety of citizens."

 2             Does that bear out what you've just said?

 3        A.   That is correct.  And again as we discussed in January, that is

 4     to take place in so far as possible with whatever existing local organs

 5     of civilian authority, including the police, do exist in such

 6     municipalities.

 7        Q.   But this document is saying, Whatever the case may be, you shall

 8     ensure these conditions; correct?

 9        A.   That is correct.  But, again, that is not to say that the sole

10     responsibility for doing so was on the military.  From this and other

11     documents it is clear, again, we talked about this transitional process

12     in January, where power local authority is gradually being established in

13     various municipalities where it has been absent because of armed

14     conflict.  The military is observing a lot of irregularities.  In many

15     cases, unfortunately, those irregularities include harassment of

16     civilians or removal of civilians that is being perpetrated by the

17     police, so to the extent that all of these irregularities are occurring,

18     the military at this point is still very keen to say:  All other things

19     equal, we have a strong obligation to prevent such irregularities; we

20     have a strong obligation to implement a sense of public order and peace;

21     and if it is possible to do so, we do it in cooperation with municipal

22     and civilian authorities; if not, we still have to do it because no one

23     else is going to do it.

24        Q.   And as we discussed at the very beginning of your testimony, one

25     of the reasons we're looking at these JNA documents at all is that they

Page 2935

 1     reflect events on the ground.  So would you agree that when we see the

 2     JNA here saying that this shall be done, that the force -- the town

 3     commands should ensure this reflects that they perceive the need to

 4     fulfil that role; correct?

 5        A.   Yes.  And I apologise to the court reporter for speaking so

 6     rapidly.

 7             I agree with you.  There is a -- I can only say an irony present

 8     here because, again, the available documentation suggests that the

 9     military would very much like to transfer responsibility for these

10     matters to the -- to the civilian authorities, including the police.

11     However, the documents produced by the military, including by the

12     1st Command here, suggest -- or 1st Military District, suggest that in

13     many cases the police, where they did exist, or the civilian authorities,

14     where they did exist, or the district authorities, where they did exist,

15     were unfortunately involved in the type of harassments of citizens and

16     the removal of citizens that the military is keen to prevent here.

17             So the question - and we see this expressed by the military in

18     some cases - is how do we go about fulfilling our aspiration of

19     transferring authority to the civilian authorities when those civilian

20     authorities are, at least in part, engaged in behaviour which we want to

21     prevent.

22        Q.   Well, it may come as no surprise to you that I reject the claim

23     that this was a function of activities by the district authorities, and

24     we're going to come back to some documents to address that.

25             But what I'm driving at now is would you agree that this document

Page 2936

 1     appears to reflect that the only force capable of ensuring law and order

 2     in these areas shortly after significant combat operations, the only

 3     authority able to do that is the JNA; correct?

 4        A.   I think we're going in circles a bit here.  But, yes, I agree

 5     that the military is essentially positioning itself as -- as it were, the

 6     guarantor of peace as a last resort.  If the other organs are not in

 7     place, then the military, as I've said, still has a role to provide for

 8     the security of civilians and to prevent these irregularities.

 9        Q.   So, therefore, this suggests that the other organs are not in

10     place; correct?

11        A.   As I have stated repeatedly --

12        Q.   Well, if you can answer the question yes or no, all of your

13     answers are on the record.  I do understand the nuances that you are

14     placing on this, and the Judges I'm sure will as well, and the

15     Prosecution can follow it up, but now I'm just asking you that specific

16     question.

17        A.   It is not a question that can be answered by yes or no.  The

18     briefest answer is that it varied from municipality to municipality at

19     this time as we can see in the documentation, so the answer to your

20     question is yes, this suggests that in some municipalities the other

21     organs are not in place and therefore the military has to perform their

22     role.

23             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have P371, please, which is Prosecution

24     tab 350.

25        Q.   Now, you've addressed this document before, Dr. Nielsen, so I'm

Page 2937

 1     not going to go through it in its entirety.  I just have a couple of

 2     specific issues that I'd like to draw your attention.

 3             MR. GOSNELL:  If we could turn over to page 2 of the English.

 4     And just for context, this is dated 25th of December, 1991.  It's from

 5     Colonel Belic who is the commander of the Ilok town command addressed the

 6     1st Guards Brigade Command.

 7             And on page 2 we see here, in English, it probably is on page 1

 8     of the English, that in Ilok there are 800 vacant houses and flats.  Do

 9     you have any indication as to whether that is a approximately accurate

10     number or inaccurate number?

11        A.   I have no information at present that would allow me to verify or

12     doubt that number.

13        Q.   And then it says:

14             "About 150 have been moved into, without authorisation, which

15     will be emptied in the coming period and planned and organised settlement

16     will be required."

17             Would you agree that what seems to be going on here is that

18     Colonel Belic is saying that some people have moved into these houses

19     without the JNA giving what they consider the appropriate permission, and

20     they are now going to go into these houses, remove the people that are

21     there, and then resettle with new individuals.  Is that -- does that seem

22     to be what is envisioned?

23        A.   Yes, that seems to be what is envisioned.  I would also point out

24     that this is the document which, as you noted, we saw previously and at

25     the outset the JNA refers to the fact that unfortunately some of these

Page 2938

 1     problems which have emerged are at least in part due to the lack of care

 2     of the district authorities of the SAO as stated in the first paragraph,

 3     and that is also evident in the letter sent by the JNA command in Ilok on

 4     the same day to Mr. Hadzic.

 5        Q.   And this was the language that you noted as being somewhat

 6     obscure about unobjective difficulties and elsewhere, in fact, in -- in

 7     very paragraph 1, it refers to what this commander views as the

 8     unjustifiable indolence of the district government.

 9             Now, leaving aside the pejorative connotations, would you agree

10     that that reflects that there's no indication here that the district

11     government is trying to push aside the JNA's role in Ilok?

12        A.   Well, again, that's all spelled out much more clearly in that

13     exchange of correspondence between Mr. Hadzic and the Ilok town command

14     and the 23rd and 25th of December 1991.  Speaking on the totality of the

15     new documents obtained from Belgrade, it seems to me a reasonable

16     observation to state that what the JNA command is hinting at here is

17     something stated explicitly in other documents, which is that a number of

18     persons linked to the government of the district were allegedly - and I

19     state allegedly because this is -- I have not been able to verify this,

20     but this is what is stated in the military documents - had allegedly been

21     involved in the removal of citizens from their homes in some of these

22     municipalities.  So perhaps that is what the author of this document is

23     referring to.

24        Q.   It appears from this document indeed that they consider permits

25     issued by the district government to be unauthorised or improper.

Page 2939

 1     Wouldn't you agree with that?

 2        A.   It's a very interesting question because it goes back to the very

 3     first document you showed me in January from Srboljub Trajkovic where he

 4     is actually struggling with the question of whether he is supposed to

 5     regard the SAO district as legitimate -- a legitimate organ of authority

 6     or not.  So as of this date, at least at some levels or at some times

 7     they're still struggling with this question.

 8        Q.   Well, that's precisely my point, Dr. Nielsen.  When I read this

 9     document, and you can tell me whether you disagree or agree, agree in

10     part, when I read this document I get the impression that Colonel Belic

11     seems to view the district authorities with a certain level of contempt

12     and he does not appear to recognise that any permits that may have been

13     issued by the district government are, to him, valid.

14        A.   That may be the case for Ilok.  As I would again note in the

15     correspondence to which I refer, there is kind of a, for lack of a better

16     term, a dance between the military and Mr. Hadzic in which they both

17     assure each other of their highest mutual respect and desire for

18     co-operation but both, explicitly in the case of the military and

19     implicitly a bit in Mr. Hadzic's letter, suggest that they have not been

20     entirely on the same wavelength as regards this and other issues, and

21     hopefully that can be -- those kinds of difficulties and disagreements

22     can be eliminated in the period to come.

23        Q.   I mean, the reason that I -- and what I draw your attention to

24     specifically is that second last paragraph in the document which is --

25     starts on page 3 of the English and goes over to page 4, and what the

Page 2940

 1     document says is:

 2             "Unauthorised settlement of Ilok is widespread, although this

 3     command, i.e., this town command, has not issued a single permit.  There

 4     is no point describing -- in describing the various cases, but this might

 5     have been done by SAO ministers Bogunovic and Ljubo Loncarevic, a former

 6     policeman who is now in Backa Palanka, and on so."

 7             So what Belic appears to be saying is, here we have permits

 8     allegedly issued by Minister Bogunovic.  He seems to consider such

 9     permits unauthorised.

10        A.   Yes.

11             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 65 ter 6063, which is Prosecution

12     tab 353.

13        Q.   Now this appears to be some sort of a response to this previous

14     letter or correspondence from Colonel Belic.  And this is from the

15     Serbian district government -- well, it doesn't say government.  Serbian

16     district of SBWS, ministry of justice and administration, and the date

17     there is the 29th of December, 1991, and the place is mentioned as Ilok.

18             Now I first of all want to ask you, is this the first document -

19     and I put it to you that this is the case - the first document for anyone

20     associated with the district government that actually appears to

21     originate from the town of Ilok?

22        A.   I have no ability to answer that question.  I would have to look

23     at the -- all the documents to reach that conclusion.

24        Q.   Would you go with my characterisation that it seems to be some

25     kind of a reaction or response to the issues, if not directly the

Page 2941

 1     document, at least the issues that are being raised by Colonel Belic?

 2        A.   Yes.  And as I noted, there is a desire to have better

 3     co-ordination henceforth.

 4             MR. GOSNELL:  I would tender that document, please.

 5             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Just to make sure, is my learned friend

 6     tendering the cover page or the whole -- because it's a -- it's a bundle

 7     of about 30 or 40 pages with annexes, from my understanding.

 8             MR. GOSNELL:  Well, this -- the entire document is being

 9     tendered -- proposed for tendering by the Prosecution; is that right?

10             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  We didn't propose it, but we're perfectly happy

11     to have it in.

12             MR. GOSNELL:  Well, then I would suggest for simplicity

13     that we -- and we do tender the entire document.

14             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Your Honours, this is a document which will be

15     dealt also with our -- another expert, so the substance of it will be

16     discussed.  There are tables attached to it which show figures, I

17     believe, on the movement of population and the number of people left per

18     ethnic group before and after the conflict.  So I don't know if it is

19     appropriate at this time to deal with it with this witness.  But in any

20     case they can be admitted and another witness will look at the substance

21     of the annexes.

22             MR. GOSNELL:  In that case, Your Honour, perhaps it'd be simplest

23     just to tender the cover page.  Needless to say, the Defence doesn't

24     necessarily accept the reliability of all the figures in the annex.  This

25     is purely a matter of convenience.

Page 2942

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  So you are tendering the cover page only; is that

 2     right?

 3             MR. GOSNELL:  If that is logistically possible from the Registry

 4     perspective.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 6                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Your Honours, I apologise for having added a

 9     complication to the matter, but essentially I think that the document

10     does not make sense if it's broken apart.  The record reflects what

11     Dr. Neilsen has said about it.  And this, as far as the document itself,

12     I don't think would make sense to remove the cover letter separately

13     without the supporting document, so I think the whole document can come

14     in, and the record reflects what Dr. Nielsen has said and other witnesses

15     may comment later on as to the substance of the rest.

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  We just came to the conclusion that it would be

17     best to upload this document again and admit it then as such separately.

18             Would that be convenient?

19             MR. GOSNELL:  Perfectly appropriate as far as we're concerned.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.  So you'll upload the document again,

21     separately, Mr. Gosnell, and, for the moment, it is admitted and marked

22     for identification for that purpose.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  The first page of 65 ter document 6063 shall be

24     assigned Exhibit D28, marked for identification.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

Page 2943

 1             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Mr. Registrar.

 2             Could we have P372, which is Prosecution tab 361.

 3        Q.   Now, this is a letter from something called the central

 4     settlement committee, which appears to be part of the district government

 5     of SBWS.  And it's dated the 11th of February, 1992.  And you -- you did

 6     comment on this document during your previous testimony, so again I'm not

 7     going to go through it chapter and verse.  But somehow the Prosecution

 8     didn't ask you about paragraph 2 of this document, and you didn't have a

 9     chance to specifically comment upon it.  And paragraph 2 says -- and this

10     appears to be some kind of advice or instruction to a particular commune,

11     Mohovo, and what it says is:

12             "We would like to inform you that the government of the Serbian

13     district did not adopt any decisions regarding the moving out of persons

14     of Croatian nationality from the territory of the Serbian district

15     because it is more than obvious that the mere fact of whether or not

16     someone is a Croat or a member of another nationality doesn't represent

17     sufficient grounds for withholding from them the right to stay or reside

18     in the territory of the Serbian district."

19             Would you agree that that appears to reflect that individuals

20     should not be harassed or forcibly removed based on ethnicity.

21        A.   I agree that that is what the document says.  However, as an

22     analytical observation, it raises the question of whether we can take

23     this document at its face value given that the previous documents we

24     looked at seemed to indicate that at some -- at some level, the district

25     had been involved in perhaps not moving out of -- persons out of Croatian

Page 2944

 1     nationality but moving persons in of Serbian nationality, and in the

 2     totality of the documentation, particularly the new military

 3     documentation from Serbia that I've been able to review, there seemed to

 4     be indications in other documents that such moving out of persons of

 5     Croatian nationality did take place.  But, yes, at -- this document in

 6     its third paragraph has a clear statement prohibiting the harassment or

 7     forcible removal of persons based on their ethnicity.

 8        Q.   Well, in terms of the reliability of the content of this document

 9     as an indication of actual policy, one of the points that you made during

10     your previous testimony was that documents that don't have wide

11     circulation that are not going out to the public for public consumption,

12     you would say are entitled to all else being equal a higher level of

13     reliability.  And wouldn't you agree that this document is just going

14     from the central settlement committee to one commune?

15        A.   I think that is true that -- that it is only go to the local

16     commune.  However, I analytically treat this document quite differently

17     than a document of the Serbian State Security Service which is what we

18     were looking at earlier, which is state secret or at least -- at the very

19     least an official secret.  This is a document that bears no stamp of

20     confidentiality and there is no indication here that anything in this

21     document was designed to be kept confidential.

22        Q.   And then in the third paragraph, or the fourth paragraph

23     depending on how you count, you will see that what they're saying is that

24     individuals who -- that individuals could in fact be deprived of their

25     residency on two conditions:  If there is "reliable information that

Page 2945

 1     they've collaborated with the enemy and Ustasha authorities; and 2, if it

 2     is established that their actions are still motivated by such positions

 3     and beliefs."

 4             Now, would you say that that's also consistent with the position

 5     apparently being taken by the JNA in other documents that you've seen?

 6        A.   It does seem to be consistent with the position taken by the JNA.

 7     I would again note that the key word in what you just read is "reliable."

 8     And in this very difficult and very tense environment after the period of

 9     armed conflict, the indications that I have seen from documents are that

10     not a lot of energy was being devoted to verifying the reliability of

11     allegations that someone of Croat ethnicity had been assisting the Croat

12     authorities and that, unfortunately, led to a number of incidents in

13     which people were attacked or removed from their places of residence.

14        Q.   Well, that -- I mean, aren't you mixing apples and oranges there,

15     Dr. Nielsen?  I mean, one thing is to say that when -- that individuals

16     of Croatian ethnicity were just attacked as a matter of lawlessness,

17     including by this large number of Western Slavonian refugees who you

18     described as creating a very volatile situation.  It wasn't as if those

19     attacks were -- followed some sort of quasi-judicial examination by

20     municipal authorities; correct?

21        A.   It is correct that there was unfortunately no procedure, as far

22     as I've been able to tell, put in place to verify the veracity of those

23     allegations and therefore a number of people were subjected to arbitrary

24     treatment on the basis of such allegations.  And I would also agree with

25     you that this document, which is being issued in April -- in

Page 2946

 1     February 1992, aspires to prevent such things from occurring and notes

 2     that the mere fact that someone is of Croatian nationality is not

 3     sufficient to justify their expulsion from the territory of the Serbian

 4     district.  Indications are that from the military documentation that by

 5     this point, of course, the number of Croats left in the area is much

 6     smaller than it was in November or December of 1991.

 7        Q.   Is that because a large number of Croats had left simultaneous

 8     with the military operations?

 9        A.   The military documents indicate that, indeed, a very large number

10     of Croats left either prior to military operations or during the military

11     operations.  The military documents also indicate that in a number of

12     cases those -- that minority of Croats who did stay after military

13     operations had ceased were in some cases forced to leave or were unable

14     to stay because of the circumstances to which I have referred.

15        Q.   And would you agree that this document appears to suggest that

16     decision-making in individual cases resides at the commune level?

17        A.   That seems to be the indication.  And I would point out that the

18     newly available documentation actually includes lists of non-Serbs; that

19     is, not just Croat, also but Hungarians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, in which

20     those individuals are listed with comments made by local authorities

21     assessing their loyalty to the newly established authorities.

22        Q.   And that dove-tail with Prosecution Exhibit 370, which was the

23     one from the 1st Military District where they appear to place primary

24     importance on co-operation with commune authorities in terms of

25     settlement?

Page 2947

 1        A.   Yes.  I mean, to the extent that one accepts the legitimacy of an

 2     exercise, the point of which is to assess the loyalty of people, then the

 3     prevailing assumption was that the local authorities knew who everybody

 4     was and therefore were better placed to assess the loyalty of those

 5     persons than persons several -- authorities several rungs up the ladder.

 6        Q.   Well, I don't propose to explore with you the broader

 7     implications of the process itself, and I think that you've said that

 8     that wouldn't be within the realm of your expertise so I don't propose to

 9     do that.

10             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 65 ter 6094 which is Prosecution

11     tab 362, please.  And I believe, do I understand that to be under -- not

12     broadcast.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  The document has been already admitted as

14     Exhibit P329 under seal.  Thank you.

15             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you for that, Mr. Registrar.

16        Q.   Now this document appears to be from the 1st Mechanised Corps

17     Command from the assistant commander for civilian affairs, Colonel Novica

18     Gusic, and he appears to be based in Principovac which, I don't know if

19     you know this, but is just over the border in Serbia not far from Ilok.

20             And if we go to page 3 of the English, which is about the eighth

21     paragraph of the document, Dr. Nielsen.  I'm not sure if that would make

22     it on page 1 or on page 2.

23             And it says:

24             "At the end of the presentation, the president of the local

25     commune opened the debate, which reached the conclusion that there were

Page 2948

 1     two factions in the village:  One, Serbs from Western Slavonia; and, two,

 2     Serbs, locals, who worked to protect Croats."

 3             Now would you again view this as a further indication that there

 4     was this tension or cleavage between refugees moving into the area and

 5     local people, including local authorities, who had a much more protective

 6     view of their Croatian neighbours?

 7        A.   I agree that this is actually an excellent indication of a

 8     broader phenomenon that we also see in Bosnia, which is that local

 9     residents, all other things equal, are more tolerant of continued

10     co-existence with their long-standing neighbours of other ethnicity and

11     that often the appearance of outsiders, some of whom have, of course,

12     been radicalised in their views on multi-ethnic co-existence by the fact

13     that they were themselves expelled from other areas in Yugoslavia plays

14     in, and so we see that the long-standing local inhabitants, which are

15     also often referred to in military documents, actually try to insist that

16     whatever Croats, Hungarian, et cetera, may remain on the territory of the

17     commune or the municipality should be permitted to stay.

18             I should also note, however, though, that the previous

19     paragraph right before the one you read is quite interesting given that

20     this was the same local commune that issued a decision to change the name

21     of the village into Arkanovo, which seems to be somewhat indicative of

22     their views of Mr. Raznjatovic.

23        Q.   Well perhaps it suggests that those two sentiments are not

24     completely incompatible.

25        A.   That to me would be a complete non sequitur, but -- given what is

Page 2949

 1     known about the behaviour of Mr. Raznjatovic in this area, but certainly

 2     shows the respect in which he was held by some of the local inhabitants

 3     and, indeed, at times also by some members of the military.

 4        Q.   Now on page 4 of the English, and this is the part that I'm

 5     particularly interested in, and the English paragraph starts, "Having

 6     listened...," so I think it's about five paragraphs from the bottom,

 7     Dr. Nielsen, and it says:

 8             "Having listened to their discussion and debate the PK for CP,"

 9     and that is that's the assistant commander for civilian affairs, so in

10     other words that's the author of this document, "Having listened to their

11     discussion and debate the PK for CP assigned assign-posts and specific

12     tasks in the establishment and functioning of the civilian authorities,

13     the organisation and formation of TO units, and instructed them in the

14     method of resolving all the problems cited, emphasising in

15     particular ..."

16             And then it goes on to identify three aspects in particular:

17              "The settlement and evacuation committee," the need for newly

18     formed organs of the civilian authorities to organise life in the village

19     including "securing housing and food for people," and 3, "form a TO and

20     police force unit as soon as possible and build the security of the

21     village, the safety of individuals, and the implementation of legal

22     decisions on that foundation."

23             Now we've seen other documents that reflect the same theme, but

24     just to ask you again:  Does this reflect that there are few, if any, of

25     these institutions up and running and that the town command or the JNA

Page 2950

 1     officer for civilian protection, civilian affairs, is taking a lead role

 2     in ensuring that those organisation -- organs are set up?

 3        A.   Yes, it does.

 4             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have P373, which is Prosecution tab 363.

 5        Q.   Now this is a fairly high-level document.  It emanates from the

 6     1st Mechanised Corps Command.  It's dated the 16th of February 1992.  So

 7     it's from the 1st Mechanised Corps Command to the Military District, and

 8     it's from the assistant commander for civilian affairs to the

 9     corresponding organ for civilian affairs at the 1st Military District, so

10     I would just suggest that this is a fairly high-level document going from

11     the corps to the Military District.

12             And you did look at this document during your testimony.  But one

13     paragraph that you did not address during that testimony is on page 2 of

14     the English, the last full paragraph:

15             "It is indicative that in many cases the relocated Serbs wished

16     to impose their will on long-time residents and to control decision

17     making and power.  In someplace -- places there have been unsolved

18     murders and pressure to have the Croatian population move out regardless

19     of whether they are loyal or involved in the Croatian Defence Forces."

20             Now, again, do you see that there -- appears to be in this

21     document as well a recognition of that distinction between refugees

22     moving in and the local population, in terms of their attitudes towards

23     Croats?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And on page 4, under point 4, it says that -- there's an

Page 2951

 1     allegation.  It says:

 2             "Relocated persons have been putting great pressure on the local

 3     population because they are inciting the relocation of the Croatian

 4     population and of other nationalities.  They state that there can be no

 5     co-existence there and that they should be relocated and treated like the

 6     Croats treated the Serbs.  Their incitement has the tacit support of all

 7     the organs of authority, ranging from the government to the local

 8     commune."

 9             Now I assume that you would interpret "the government" to mean

10     the district government, would you?

11        A.   Yes, I would.  And the district government is, of course, also

12     referred to in the following paragraph.

13        Q.   And if we can just turn back to the bottom of page 2 of the

14     English and the top of page 3.  And it refers to a very specific problem.

15     It says:

16             "Croatian houses are being occupied and their property is being

17     misappropriated.  There are frequent instances of relocated Serb families

18     occupying two or three houses per family.  CP," that is civilian affairs,

19     "organs of the 1st Mechanised Corps in co-operation with the town

20     commands, local commune executive councils, and the police are making

21     great effort to prevent such situations."

22             Now do you note that there is a contradiction there.  On the one

23     hand he is saying, on pages 2 to 3, the police and the local commune

24     authorities are making great efforts to prevent such situations.  And

25     then, over on page 4, he says, their incitement, i.e., the incitement of

Page 2952

 1     these refugees who are putting pressure on the Croats, their incitement

 2     has the tacit support of all the organs of authority ranging from the

 3     government to the local commune.

 4             Can you explain how in the same document the author can express

 5     two such apparently contradictory opinions?

 6        A.   I would say that these are only contradictory opinions if we

 7     assume that the authorities to which the author refers are monolithic,

 8     which they are definitely not.  In all of the authorities we have the

 9     local commune in, for example, Bapska, which we also saw earlier, where

10     there is an evident power struggle ongoing between the long time

11     residents and the newly arrived persons, perhaps those are the persons

12     who are pushing for the renaming of the commune, and in the police where

13     there were police officers who had worked there for decades.  It was the

14     area in which they had grown up and had their entire professional lives,

15     but there were also police officers who had arrived more recently, some

16     of them from Western Slavonia as well, some of them from Serbia or even

17     Montenegro, in some cases, or Bosnia, as well as, of course, the presence

18     of paramilitary forces and various ill-defined nebulous police forces

19     that seemed to be roaming the area and making appearances here and there

20     during this period.

21             So I read this document as a rather accurate reflection of a

22     situation, a very dynamic situation of the type that we discussed in

23     January in which there are certainly a number of the police and a number

24     of the local residents and a number of the local authorities, including

25     probably also members of the district government who wish to prevent such

Page 2953

 1     situations, but there are others who are actually and actively

 2     contributing to creating these problems that are deplored in this

 3     document.

 4        Q.   And would you agree that this diversity of attitudes is possible

 5     because the institutions of power, at least on the civilian side, are

 6     rather weak?

 7        A.   I agree.  And, unfortunately, it seems to be the case that in

 8     some municipalities and communes in this period, decisions were taken

 9     with a view to protecting Croats, Hungarian, Ukrainians, and others, but

10     those decisions were then overturned or counteracted violently by those

11     forces who enjoyed superiority of fire-power.

12        Q.   And would you agree with me that in some cases individuals simply

13     appropriated titles for themselves and said, I am now this or that, I'm

14     holding this or that office, and on the basis of this or that authority

15     I'm going to engage in such activities?

16        A.   There are such instances.  I would point to one of the military

17     documents that became available in which a person is said to have

18     suddenly proclaimed himself to be, and I quote, "an idol" for the local

19     municipality and asks that everyone treat him as an idol and obey his

20     decisions, despite the fact that he has barely finished secondary school.

21     And he makes a number of decisions which the military view as

22     ill-informed, violent, and completely counter-productive to the

23     maintenance of co-existence between various nationalities.  Again, such

24     instances are -- are to be found in the documentation.  It is

25     unfortunately the case that after the civilian authorities are

Page 2954

 1     established one can find little trace of any effort to actually rectify

 2     those wrongs that were committed or to prosecute those persons who

 3     arbitrarily asserted such authority and made such decisions.

 4        Q.   Well, let's take a more pedestrian example than someone declaring

 5     themselves an idol, and in fact it's on this very page, and I consider it

 6     very significant because it refers to someone who is alleged to be a part

 7     of the district government.  And you've been referring to allegations of

 8     misfeasance and criminal behaviour by such individuals.  And it says:

 9             "There are also self-proclaimed representatives of the SAO

10     government and the secret police has been appearing, but it is difficult

11     to determine their legitimacy.  We have one example in particular.  The

12     Serbian police group has been staying in the sector of Bapska village,

13     the wine cellar, and Marko Loncarevic, aka Chetnik, has been introducing

14     himself as the minister of defence of the government and is arming the

15     relocated Serbs with the aim of forming his own groups and detachments."

16             Now, sir, I assume that you know, having looked at the documents,

17     that Ilija Kojic is the minister of defence in the SBWS at this time;

18     correct?

19        A.   Correct.

20        Q.   Have you ever seen any documents suggesting that Marko Loncarevic

21     had a position in the Ministry of Defence of the district government?

22        A.   No, I have not.

23        Q.   Wouldn't you expect the author of this document to be fully aware

24     that that claim was false by Marko Loncarevic?

25        A.   If the author is aware of the falsehood of that claim, he does

Page 2955

 1     not make that awareness explicit in this document, but I am sure that the

 2     author of this document was quite aware of the situation to which you

 3     referred, which is that there were a number of self-proclaimed

 4     commanders, leader, et cetera, who were roaming around this area and

 5     undertaking such activities at this time.

 6        Q.   One additional observation of interest in this document is over

 7     on page 5.  It says:

 8             "Another fact is that all levels of," presumably, "civilian

 9     authority organs from the local commune to the government do not respect

10     each other and are criticising certain solutions and positions."

11             Would you agree that there was a very fractious relationship

12     between various organs of government?  And I believe that you've already

13     said this, but I'll put the question to you squarely:  Do you think that

14     there was not only a fractious relationship between levels of government

15     but fractious relationships even within the same government institutions?

16        A.   Yes, I agree that there were a lot of disagreements and a lot of

17     conflicts between various personalities during this period including in

18     the district government.

19        Q.   Would you agree with me that of all the documents that we've

20     looked at from the JNA, both today and last time, that there's no

21     indication at all that the JNA, at any time, views itself as subordinate

22     to the district government authorities?

23        A.   I agree.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have L38, which is Prosecution tab 128.

25             If we could have page 4 of the English, which, I believe, should

Page 2956

 1     be near the end of the document.  Yes, it is -- it should be on the last

 2     page of the B/C/S as well.

 3        Q.   And this is the minutes of the 17th Session of the Government of

 4     the District of SBWS held on 19th of November in Erdut.  And item 5

 5     says -- and these are the conclusions that have been purportedly

 6     unanimously adopted at the session.  It says:

 7             "JNA units are subordinated to the government of the Serbian

 8     district on its territory."

 9             Have you -- have you seen any evidence that this conclusion was

10     ever communicated to the JNA?

11        A.   I have not seen any direct evidence that this conclusion was ever

12     communicated to the JNA.  I would, again, note that the correspondence

13     almost precisely a month later between Mr. Hadzic and the JNA command in

14     Ilok is, to me, the best indication of the SAO district government and

15     the military trying to actually hash out what their mutual relationship

16     is supposed to be given a number of misunderstandings that have occurred

17     on -- in the field.

18        Q.   Well, do you have any indication that the JNA subordinated

19     itself, in practice, to the government?

20        A.   I have no evidence that the JNA subordinated itself in practice

21     to the government based -- pursuant to this decision.  Again, it is

22     perhaps, again, necessary for me to underline that I looked primarily at

23     the police organs in the SAO and, therefore, did not specifically focus

24     on this question, and I'm sure the military expert will be able to speak

25     to this point.

Page 2957

 1        Q.   Well, he might or might not.  I think that's speculation at this

 2     point.  But what's important is that in the realm of police matters where

 3     we've seen a great number of JNA documents, and you've looked at them,

 4     there is no indication that in respect of those areas the JNA placed

 5     itself -- subordinated -- it subordinated itself to the district

 6     government; correct?

 7        A.   That is correct.

 8        Q.   Now I'd like to move to your discussion of Arkan, and during your

 9     previous testimony --

10             MR. GOSNELL:  We're done with that document, thank you.

11        Q.   During your previous testimony, at page 2521, you said, and I

12     quote you, quote your words:

13             "That there were training centres that seemed to have been

14     exclusively under the control of organs affiliated with Belgrade."

15             And then at 2522 you identified those two training centres as

16     being the one at Golubic and at Erdut.  And then you went on to testify

17     at 2523 that Arkan, in your view, had exclusive control over that

18     training centre because there was a "general perception" that "he was a

19     person who enjoyed the protection and favour of federal or Serbian

20     organ -- of a federal or Serbian organ based in Belgrade."

21             MR. GOSNELL:  Now could we have P194.140.  Which is a Defence

22     document on our list.

23        Q.   Now you hadn't given the testimony that I just quoted to you when

24     you were shown this document during your direct examination by the

25     Prosecution.  But the Prosecution was asking you about how it was

Page 2958

 1     possible to reconcile this document with information that Arkan was in

 2     the employ of the DB of Serbia.  And in the context of that situation,

 3     you testified as follows, at page 2509:

 4             "I am not certain how I would personally reconcile it other than

 5     to simply state that as an analyst this is the documentation that has

 6     become available to me and, therefore, I saw fit to include it in my

 7     report."

 8             Now that answer was -- was interesting to me because it was

 9     somewhat different from the answers that you give in respect of some

10     other documents.  In respect of some documents you say that you gave

11     theme credence because they were corroborated by other documents, for

12     example, at page 2439 of your testimony; or that they exemplify a general

13     proposition that you know is supported by other documents, and you said

14     that at 2453.  So my initial question to you is:  Do you have any

15     hesitation or doubts about the authenticity of this document?

16        A.   Well, I do not have any hesitations about the doubts or about the

17     authenticity of this document, and I cite it in footnote 323 of my report

18     on page 51.

19        Q.   And that's at paragraph 201 of your report, I believe.  And what

20     you say there is -- and it is rather unequivocal, I must say:

21             "As noted previously, Goran Hadzic had in September 1991 in his

22     capacity as the president of the government of the SAO SBWS appointed

23     Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, commander of the TO centre in Erdut."

24             And equally unequivocally you then say in the next sentence:

25             "Arkan had until that point served as the commander of special

Page 2959

 1     units of the TO of SAO SBWS."

 2             Have you -- do you know whether there actually was any such thing

 3     known as special -- the -- the TO AO SBWS special forces?  Did any such

 4     unit exist, to your knowledge, in September 1991?

 5        A.   I would note that the reason I write this in the report in

 6     footnote 3 -- and cite this document in footnote 323 is that, first of

 7     all, I'm stating what -- what this document says on its face value.

 8     Second of all, there are a number of documents, not a lot but I think two

 9     or three in the new batch of documents, also that indicate that there

10     were -- that -- that Arkan was commander of the TO of the SAO SBZS as I

11     call it here, SBWS, during this period.  So there are references to such

12     special units having existed.  I cannot personally verify whether those

13     special units did exist and I have not seen documents generated by those

14     special units if they did generate such documents.

15        Q.   So you're saying that there are documents that you've seen that

16     refers to TO special forces in the SBWS prior to the 21st of September,

17     1991?

18        A.   They refer to those special forces existing.  As to whether they

19     specifically refer to the date of the 21st of September 1991, I cannot

20     state at this present point in time.

21        Q.   Sir, our view is that this document is a forgery.  And I want to

22     take you through a few specific elements of this document in comparison

23     with other documents.  So to start this process I just want to look,

24     focus on a couple of individual aspects of it.

25             You'll first of all see a reference at the top to the secretariat

Page 2960

 1     of the president.  Do you see that?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3        Q.   Is that a formulation, as you sit there now, that you can recall

 4     ever having been used in any other document issued by the district

 5     government of the SBWS?

 6        A.   I cannot recall such a formulation having been used elsewhere.  I

 7     would also point out that as we previously discussed we have very, very

 8     few documents from the government as a whole.

 9        Q.   And we see there the number at the top 1/91, and I'll just ask

10     you to take note of that.

11             One thing I noticed about your report was a fairly strange

12     nomenclature that you referred in your footnote to this document.  You

13     referred to 65 ter 1D1630.  Now that's not a 65 ter number from this

14     case, so where did you get this document?

15        A.   I believe this was among the documents that, if not the initial

16     batch of documents, then one of the batches of the documents that was

17     given to me by the Office of the Prosecutor when I started to prepare

18     this report.  I recall a small number of such documents had no ERNs but

19     had only 65 ter numbers, including a small number of documents that had

20     65 ter numbers from the Defence.

21        Q.   All right.  We're about to turn away from this document, so are

22     you fully familiar with it now that you've had it on the screen in front

23     of you?

24        A.   Yes, I am.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 2961

 1             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we now have L43, please, which is Prosecution

 2     tab 137.

 3             Actually, this wasn't the document that I was hoping for.  Could

 4     we have 65 ter -- 65 ter 00754, which is Prosecution tab 137.

 5             Sorry, 65 ter 00754.  This is the document?

 6             Your Honours, could we take a break and I'll make sure that I

 7     have the correct document for you when we return?  I apologise for that.

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Nielsen, we'll take the first break.  We'll

 9     come back at 11.00.  The court usher will escort you out of the

10     courtroom.  Thank you.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Court adjourned.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

15             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Your Honours, while the witness is being brought

16     in, may I address you with a very small kitchen sink matter.

17             I spoke to my learned friend.  I believe he needs the full

18     session now and the third session as well.  I was informed that he will

19     try to go as fast as possible, but if needs be would we be capable of

20     sitting an extra half-hour for the purposes of re-examination?  As you

21     know, Mr. Nielsen has to fly today.

22                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 00248.  Which actually is a document

Page 2962

 1     that appears in another document that is on the Prosecution list.  And I

 2     consulted with my learned friend opposite, who has kindly agreed not to

 3     object to this one not being on either of our lists.

 4             Well, somehow, that, again, is not the right document.  So what

 5     I'm going to do is bring it up in the document that is listed.  It's

 6     01939.  That's Prosecution tab 292, and we're looking for page 63 of the

 7     English.  It should be approximately page 226 of the B/C/S.  Perhaps page

 8     225.

 9             Yes, this is it.  It's under -- under item 69.

10        Q.   Now, sir, I understand from your report you do refer to this --

11     to this document at footnote 51 of your report.  And you generally

12     consider the documents that are included in Mr. Petrovic's book to be

13     authentic; is that right?

14        A.   Yes, in those cases where I have been able to examine the

15     documents because the OTP also possesses other versions of them.  They

16     corroborate what are put in this book.

17        Q.   That's quite right in respect of this document.  I was trying to

18     put you to the gazetted version.  In any event the form is the same.  But

19     I draw your attention there to the number.  It says log number 1/91?

20             Do you see that?

21        A.   Yes, I do.

22             MR. GOSNELL:  And if we go down to the next page in English.  And

23     if we can go to the subsequent page in English, please.

24        Q.   Now you'll see that Mr. Hadzic signs as prime minister, that

25     document.

Page 2963

 1             MR. GOSNELL:  And if we can just go back now to the top of this

 2     document, which is two pages prior.  Yes, that's it.

 3        Q.   Now you'll see there that there is no reference to the

 4     secretariat of the president.  He refers -- or the heading of the

 5     document is "prime minister"; correct?

 6        A.   Yes.  Although I would point out just so we are clear on this

 7     that the term "prime minister" in B/C/S can also be translated into

 8     English as "president of the government."

 9        Q.   That's quite right.  I thank you for that clarification.

10             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we now move to 00261; Prosecution tab 88.

11        Q.   And just to follow up on that last question, it doesn't say the

12     office of the prime minister or the secretariat of the prime minister,

13     does it?

14        A.   No, it does not.

15        Q.   Now, this is a decision on the implementation of regulations.

16     And the number given to this document is you see down -- the date is the

17     30th of August, 1991.  Before the date it says, "in Dalj."  And the

18     number given is a quadruple-barrelled number 02-3-2/1-1991.  Do you see

19     that?

20        A.   Yes, I do.

21        Q.   And do you consider this document in its form and content to be

22     authentic?

23        A.   Yes, I do.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  We tender this document, Mr. President.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

Page 2964

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Shall be assigned Exhibit D29.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 3             MR. GOSNELL:  Now the next document in chronological order is

 4     P19410 [sic], which is the document in question that we're most concerned

 5     with.  It's P194.140.

 6        Q.   Now, in this case you will see the secretariat of the president,

 7     and we see the number 1/91.  We saw that number in the second-last

 8     document, didn't we?

 9        A.   Yes, we saw that number.

10        Q.   And this document is now coming the 21st of September, 1991,

11     which is approximately three weeks after the -- the previous document we

12     looked at, which was on the 20 -- the 30th of August, 1991; right?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And you'll see that there isn't any quadruple-barrelled numbering

15     in terms of the tracking number of this document; right?

16        A.   Correct.

17             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have P260.253, which is Defence tab 53.

18        Q.   Now, this is the -- is the next document in our chronology of

19     district government documents.  There's no number here.  It's left blank

20     apparently.  This comes six days after the -- the vital document that

21     we're focussing on.  And you'll see that the nomenclature used is not the

22     secretariat of the president but the secret of the government; correct?

23        A.   Correct.  There was a secretariat of the government and in the

24     page you showed me earlier from the gazette of the district,

25     the secretary -- you mean the secretariat of the government was also

Page 2965

 1     referred to.

 2        Q.   Yeah, thank you for that information.

 3             And, at the bottom we see someone signing for the prime minister,

 4     Mr. Hadzic, and then there's a signature; do you see that?

 5        A.   Yes, I see that it is someone signing for Mr. Hadzic.  That is

 6     correct.

 7             MR. GOSNELL:  May we have P196.14 --

 8        Q.   And just before we leave this document, and this is a technical

 9     matter, I'm not sure whether you've captured it.  But this is after the

10     constitution has been promulgated and the name of the SBWS has changed to

11     the Serbian District instead of the Serbian Autonomous District, and

12     you'll note that they've left the name "autonomous" in there.  Would you

13     agree that that's simply a mistake on their part?

14        A.   There were many such mistakes.  They were not particularly

15     meticulous in their attention to such details.

16             MR. GOSNELL:  If we could have P196.140, which is Defence tab 31.

17             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Gosnell, excuse me.  Before

18     showing us another document, I would like to a question to the witness.

19             Witness, you have studied the different institutions, and is it

20     possible to have, on the one hand, a secretariat of the government and on

21     the other hand a secretariat of the president of the government?  Is that

22     possible?  Because you've done quite a few research.  Did you notice

23     this?

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, that is possible, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] But did you find any examples?

Page 2966

 1     Because you have -- you have analysed several texts.  If I understood

 2     well, this is what Mr. Gosnell is doing now.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I agree with you, Your Honour.  That is precisely

 4     what the exercise that we're going through now.  I have, however, not, as

 5     I responded to Mr. Gosnell, seen a significant number of documents issued

 6     by the secretariat of the president of the president of the government,

 7     whereas I have seen a significant number of documents issued by the

 8     secretariat of the government.

 9             Again, unfortunately the state of documentation that we have from

10     the district authorities is very incomplete, and I cannot conclude based

11     on the available documents whether a secretariat of the president of the

12     government existed or not.

13             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  It is very

14     clear and I will not ask you any further question about this now.

15             MR. GOSNELL:

16        Q.   Now this is P196.140 in front of us.  It's dated 2 October 1991.

17     It appears to be a decision.  It's number 1/91.  And if we can scroll

18     over to page 2, or perhaps just the bottom of the page, we'll see that

19     it's signed by the prime minister, Goran Hadzic; is that correct?

20        A.   That is correct.  And if I may be so bold as to jump ahead and,

21     as I can clearly see where this is going, there are a number of documents

22     with the registration number 1/91.  There are, of course, a number of

23     different institutions within the district that exist and some of those

24     have sub-offices.  It is entirely consistent with the operation of

25     government authorities that each such office has at least one set of

Page 2967

 1     registration numbers, sometimes more than one, and, therefore, different

 2     entities within the government are able to issue numbers with the

 3     registration number 1/91.

 4        Q.   But these are all coming from the prime minister, Mr. Hadzic;

 5     correct?

 6        A.   Close examination of these documents indicates that the

 7     letterhead on these various documents is not identical.  There are

 8     deferences in nomenclature, which mean that even though the signatory may

 9     be Mr. Hadzic, he can be signing documents that are issued by various

10     units, as it were, of the authorities of the district.

11        Q.   Let's go back to the top of the page, please.

12             This is coming from the government of the Serbian District of

13     SBWS; correct?

14        A.   Correct.  And if memory serves, one of the previous documents we

15     saw, which also had the number 1/91, was also issued by the government of

16     the Serbian district of the SBWS but, in that case, was -- the header

17     also included the words "secretariat of the government."

18        Q.   Yes.  Just so you understand and we all understand now, we don't

19     place great reliance on the numbering.  It's a factor that may be of

20     interest, relevance.  What we do place reliance on is the anomalous

21     reference to the secretariat of the president which is found on one and

22     only one of these various documents, the one in question.  I'm just

23     letting you know that now.  That's not a question.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  Can we go on to the next document, which is

25     P251.245.  P251.245, which is Defence tab 52.  And I believe it's not to

Page 2968

 1     be broadcast.

 2             This document is signed by the prime minister, Goran Hadzic.  And

 3     here we see a reference to the government secretariat again.  There's no

 4     number.  And it's Dalj, the 16th of October, 1991; is that correct?

 5        A.   That's correct.

 6        Q.   And you have no reason to believe, based on its form or content,

 7     that this is not an authentic document, do you?

 8        A.   It is probably a copy of a document and it is somewhat odd that

 9     there's no number issued for this order, but I have no reason to doubt

10     that it's authentic.  Again, for the reason that they were not very

11     meticulous in issuing such documents.

12        Q.   It's not the only document without a number, though, is it?

13        A.   No.  And, in fact, you can also find documents without numbers

14     that are issued on, for example, non-existing dates, such as the 31st of

15     November.

16             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have L43, please.

17        Q.   This is your report at tab -- at footnote 60, so it's a

18     Prosecution document on their list.

19             And, again, this is a decision signed by the president of the

20     government, Goran Hadzic, and it -- it appears to involve the appointment

21     of an individual to an Executive Council of a municipality.  And you'll

22     see there the number 0 -- again, we see this quadruple-barrelled

23     formulation, 02-3-25/1-1991.  Do you see that?

24        A.   Yes, I do.

25             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have P51, which is Defence tab 55.

Page 2969

 1        Q.   This is a decision dated the 21st of January, 1992, again signed

 2     by Mr. Hadzic.  And again we see that quadruple-barrelled formulation.

 3     And it appears to involve some kind of facilitating the

 4     operationalisation of an activity plan to establish civilian authorities.

 5             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I don't think we have the right document on the

 6     screen.  We have a list of the members of the SDS here.

 7             MR. GOSNELL:  That's not what it should be.  Is this P51?

 8             Well, I'm going to have to skip that one and I'll come back to

 9     it.

10        Q.   I understand that your position is that the documentation that

11     comes out of the government is, in relative terms, relative to, for

12     example, the Republika Srpska, is sparse, but here we have a half-dozen

13     or so documents that are decisions signed by Goran Hadzic as the prime

14     minister.  Sometimes there's not always a reference to the government,

15     although there usually is a reference to the government.  Sometimes there

16     is a secretariat of the government referred to, I think in two of the

17     documents.

18             But I put it to you that in none of these documents, and actually

19     there are more, in none of these documents that are produced from the

20     period between August and early 1992, is there ever a reference to the

21     secretariat of the president?

22             Now I know that you don't have all the documents at your

23     fingertips, but would agree that that level of anomaly is at least

24     significant in assessing the authenticity of the document?

25        A.   I am happy to agree with you that I have not been able to view


Page 2970

 1     any other documents issued from a secretariat of the president, and that

 2     given that the document cited in footnote 323 is, to date, the only

 3     document that refers to such a secretariat, that should be taken into

 4     consideration in considering the reliability and authenticity of that

 5     document.

 6        Q.   But you didn't mention that in your report, did you?

 7        A.   That is correct.  I did not mention any concerns about the

 8     reliability or authenticity of that document in the report.

 9             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 1D186, please, which is Defence

10     tab 9.

11        Q.   Now, sir, we in the Defence wrote to the government of Serbia to

12     see whether they had this document anywhere in their archives.

13             MR. GOSNELL:  And I'm not sure whether we need to be in private

14     session, but perhaps we ought to go into private session.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Private session, please.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 2971











11 Pages 2971-2972 redacted. Private session.
















Page 2973

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3                           [Open session]

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session, Your Honours, thank

 5     you.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:

 7        Q.   Now what I put to you, Dr. Nielsen, just to put a conclusion on

 8     this discussion, is you have an anomalous - and we say flatly erroneous -

 9     reference to the secretariat of president.  We have a reference to what

10     we say is a unit that doesn't exist.  You have a reference to Arkan being

11     the commander of that non-existent unit, whereas he never was such a

12     commander.  You have a potentially, although we wouldn't place much

13     reliance on this, errant reference number, and when you look at that

14     altogether, and then we will be discussing some contextual factors as

15     well, when you put all that together combined with an absence for the

16     origin for this document, does all that give you any pause as to whether

17     this -- you should have wrote -- you should have given what I say is

18     implicit credence in your report that this is all true?

19        A.   I would like to separate my answer into two parts.  The first

20     part is a direct response to your question.  The second part is a more

21     general observation which, with the Court's permission, I think we would

22     have to discuss in closed session.

23             But the first part which I can deal with in open session is to

24     state that I agree with you that there are many points that you raise

25     which are valid concerning the possible credibility of this document.


Page 2974

 1     And those are things that I hope that you and the Court will take into

 2     consideration in weighting this document compared to other available

 3     documentation.

 4             I would, however, point out that in the totality of documents

 5     that I have been able to review, we do have a very interesting document

 6     from November 1991 from General Biorcevic, who was based in Novi Sad, in

 7     which he issues a -- I believe it is a machine-gun as a present to

 8     Mr. Raznjatovic, and in that particular document in issuing the gun to

 9     Mr. Raznjatovic, Mr. Biorcevic or General Biorcevic states that Arkan had

10     held this function as a commander of the TO of the district of Slavonia,

11     Baranja, and Western Srem, and he also refers to special forces.

12             So that's one document that should also be taken into

13     consideration.

14             As for whether I should address the second more general point,

15     again, we would need to go into closed session for that.

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Private session, please.

17                           [Private session]

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 2975

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14                           [Open session]

15             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session, Your Honours.  Thank

16     you.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

18             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 65 ter -- I'm now finished with that

19     document and I'm going to move on to a new subject.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gosnell.

21             MR. GOSNELL:  Yes?

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Are you moving to another topic?

23             MR. GOSNELL:  Yes, we are.

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Then I would like to get this document.  Ask

25     Mr. Nielsen --


Page 2976

 1             Dr. Nielsen, we are discussing at length now the word "president"

 2     and "secretariat of the president" here.  President, government

 3     president, that's -- those are the terms on -- on the -- the words on

 4     this document.  But you said that in B/C/S there might be a similarity.

 5     Could you explain that, please.

 6             THE WITNESS:  My -- my only point was to make sure that everyone

 7     understands that the term "prime minister" in English in B/C/S is most

 8     often "predsednik vlade" which literally means president of the

 9     government.  In this case, on the B/C/S original, Mr. Hadzic's name and

10     signature appear below the Serbian words "president of the government."

11     That is in the vast majority of cases the term that would be used to

12     refer to a prime minister.

13             In this case, if and - I stress if - a secretariat of the

14     president did exist, then it would in this case seem to refer to not a

15     president but to the secretariat of the president of the government,

16     i.e., the president -- the prime minister.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  And is -- are these words in this document, in

18     B/C/S, different in an important way from all the others we've seen?

19             THE WITNESS:  There is nothing in the document at -- at the

20     bottom where Mr. Hadzic's signature appears that differentiates it from

21     other documents.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.  And in the term -- in the -- in the words

23     in the top, the secretariat of the president?

24             THE WITNESS:  As was correctly noted by Mr. Gosnell, and I agree

25     with him, this is a, to date, unique case in which we see this term being

Page 2977

 1     used.  I do not see this term, "secretariat of the president," in other

 2     documents.

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  What is the -- what is the term in -- in B/C/S.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Well, the term in B/C/S as it appears in this

 5     document is "sekretarijat predsednika," secretariat of the president.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 7             You may proceed, Mr. Gosnell.

 8             MR. GOSNELL:

 9        Q.   So just to clarify the president's -- or to take one step further

10     the president's question, the similarity in translation is between the

11     term "prime minister" and "president"; is that right?

12        A.   Yes.  I just wanted to avoid any confusion because, for example,

13     in the translation of this particular document, I think we have a

14     suboptimal translation.  It says "government president."  A government

15     president does not mean anything in English.  The correct term would be

16     either president of the government or prime minister.

17        Q.   And the anomalous aspect of this -- or the heading of this

18     document is that this is the only document that says either the

19     secretariat of the president or the secretariat of the prime minister;

20     correct?

21        A.   Yes, that is correct.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like to move to another subject that is

23     mentioned in you previous testimony.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  And could we have 65 ter 1028 which is Prosecution

25     tab 188.

Page 2978

 1        Q.   And during your testimony at page 2510, you said that:

 2             "Arkan was supported by very significant powers in Belgrade and

 3     that he was untouchable."

 4             Now would you agree with me that at least as of the 21st of

 5     September, 1991, and given your review of the documents, it's not very

 6     likely that anything Goran Hadzic could have done would have made Arkan

 7     untouchable; correct?

 8        A.   I find that a very difficult question to respond to.  First let

 9     me make it clear that it was -- what you quoted from page 2510 was I

10     believe my perception that -- or my observation that it was the general

11     perception in the area that Arkan was supported by very significant

12     powers in Belgrade and that he was untouchable, and it is true that when

13     the military or other authorities refer to the power of Arkan, the aura

14     of untouchability, as it were, that surrounded him, they do generally not

15     tend to refer to that aura existing because of association with

16     Mr. Hadzic but rather to the view that he was supported by authorities in

17     Belgrade, in particular the State Security Service of the Republic of

18     Serbia.

19             MR. GOSNELL:  And if we could go to page 71 of the document on

20     the screen.  And this is the 194th SFRY Presidency minutes.

21        Q.   And at this stage can you remind you what is General Panic's

22     position?

23        A.   At this particular point in time, if memory serves, he was the

24     Chief of Staff I believe.  I'm not entirely certain on -- on a particular

25     date here, but I believe he was the Chief of Staff of the JNA.

Page 2979

 1        Q.   Would you agree that he might have been the commander of the

 2     1st Military District at this stage?

 3        A.   That could also be true.  Again, I'm not an expert on military

 4     positions at this point in time.  But I do refer to this -- Mr. Panic's,

 5     or General Panic's, participation in the SFRY Presidency in

 6     paragraphs 205 of my report.

 7        Q.   Yes.  And this is where you refer to Mr. Panic, General Panic

 8     saying that Hadzic suns Arkan like some body-guard; is that right?

 9        A.   That is correct.  That's what I have stated.  He then goes on:

10     It is necessary to ask Hadzic and tell him to remove that Arkan from that

11     area.  And he also mentioned that he had discussed this topic with

12     Mr. Milosevic who was doing, quote/unquote, everything to help resolve

13     the problem.

14             I should note that Mr. Panic, despite concerns about Arkan's

15     activities at this time, also noted, as I state in paragraph 205, that

16     the military had earlier accepted Arkan and thought that he had been

17     carrying out tasks that were of a positive nature, which perhaps also

18     explains why General Biorcevic saw fit in November 1991 to award Arkan

19     with a trophy weapon.

20        Q.   Now, what I'd like to do is put General Panic's word in a broader

21     context as they appear in these minutes.  And what we see, I believe, on

22     page 71 -- I'm just trying to find the exact start of the passage.

23             Well, let me read it out.  And I don't see the exact start, but

24     this is quoted in your report.  And this is General Panic saying:

25              "We also must have a serious showdown with Arkan and the White

Page 2980

 1     Eagles and all those who are destroying what we are trying to do today.

 2     Arkan is led by Hadzic.  I was in Knin yesterday, and they were all

 3     wondering in way or another what Arkan was doing in the area.  He has

 4     brought with him as some sort of body-guard.  We should call

 5     President Hadzic and tell him to remove Arkan from the area.  This young

 6     man probably wants to prove himself in some way.  You know yourselves

 7     that he is an international criminal and that he cannot hold this

 8     position.  While he is good, it is okay to keep him, but when is he not

 9     good anymore, he should be removed.  This also goes for Jovic."

10             Now if we can skip to page 73 of the English.  Let's -- it's

11     actually enumerated at the bottom as page 70.  And in this case, it's

12     Borisav Jovic speaking.  And Borisav Josic says:

13             "As for these Eagles and Arkan, I think that the army should

14     arrest them pursuant to our order."

15             And then Panic responds:

16             "MUP should do that."

17             And Borisav Jovic says:

18             "No, that is not the starting point.  Our position here is that

19     nobody should be expelled."

20             And then he goes on.  And then if we skip down to the middle of

21     page -- what is enumerated as page 71, Jovic says:

22             "We did not prevent them from fighting against the Ustashas but

23     we forbid them from expelling innocent people, that's the point."

24             And he goes on at the bottom of the page to say:

25             "So if the army could take up this task, I would gladly assign

Page 2981

 1     this task to it, and if they catch him -- if they catch them in the act,

 2     they should disarm then and arrest them.  Why do they need weapons

 3     there ..."

 4             And then Panic responds on the next page:

 5             "There is no task that the army cannot accomplish as long as the

 6     Supreme Command orders it.  If the Supreme Command orders us to move out

 7     of Bosnia tomorrow, we will do it very simply.  We will declare a state

 8     of alert and turn our back across the Drina.  If we get such an order, we

 9     will carry it out."

10             Now just to pause there, reading that response by Panic, do you

11     see that he is -- let me just put it like this.  Do you think that

12     Panic's response means that he wants to go along with such an order or is

13     he saying, Well, you can give us any order you want but that would be

14     catastrophic?  Or not desirable, let's put it that way.

15        A.   Well, I can see how you could arrive at that reading of Panic's

16     comments, but I also think that requires a rather high level of reading

17     into read his, the subtext, if you will, or is presumed subtext of what

18     he is saying.  I think the significant thing is, and you read it aloud a

19     little bit earlier, is Panic's initial response which is MUP should do

20     that.  I mean, Arkan is a -- is a hot potato, mind you a hot potato that

21     they have themselves created, sponsored, armed, et cetera, and financed,

22     who has now become undesirable, and they're basically passing this around

23     the table.  No one seems to want to take responsibility for shutting

24     Arkan down, as it were.  And, of course, unfortunately, the historical

25     record shows that Arkan remained active in that area until well into the

Page 2982

 1     mid-1990s.

 2             MR. GOSNELL: [Microphone not activated]

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.  Microphone for the

 4     speaker.

 5             MR. GOSNELL:

 6        Q.   And at the bottom of page 72, as it's enumerated, Kostic says:

 7             "Zivota, at a session here I once asked what was the relationship

 8     between Arkan and the JNA, and you were the one who told me that he was a

 9     good."

10             Jovic says:

11             "In matters of war."

12             Kostic says:

13             "We should avoid any major clashes now.  This should be done in a

14     nice way so that these lads of his can stay, if they want, in the army."

15             Panic:

16             "Arkan carried out missions in the area very efficiently.  At one

17     point he broke away, but they brought him back, et cetera.  However, he

18     is doing Yugoslavia a disservice.  He should be called and given a task.

19     Those who sent him there should call him.  I do not know who sent him.

20     However, Arkan was present in Bijeljina, Zvornik, around Sarajevo, Knin

21     et cetera.  Someone is leading him and issuing tasks to him.  We should

22     see who is doing this.  It is certain that it is not us.

23             "Arkan is very disciplined when performing tasks.  However, his

24     patrons should be the ones to call him."

25             When you read this -- well, let me just ask you generally:  What

Page 2983

 1     do you think is going on here?  Why is Panic -- how is Panic responding?

 2     And I couldn't agree with you more in your description of this as a hot

 3     potato.  Do you think Panic is speaking at face value or do you think

 4     that he has a close association with Arkan and is attempting to un --

 5     understate it?

 6        A.   First, I would just like to point out that in the first passage

 7     you read, the quote was -- in the B/C/S he says, "Here once I asked what

 8     the relationship between Arkan and the JNA and was and you were the one

 9     who told me that he was good," not "a good."

10             And in response to your question, there's, again, a clear

11     indication that the army knows who Arkan is.  I have a document somewhere

12     in the report from 1982, I believe, almost ten years before this meeting

13     takes place, in which they already knew at that point in time that Arkan

14     was a career criminal who had, in fact, also done a very unpatriotic

15     thing of avoiding compulsory military service in socialist Yugoslavia.

16     So there was no beating around the bush in terms of Arkan was.

17             What I read Panic as saying here, and it's significant to me that

18     he's having this discussion with Borisav Jovic, who is very proximate to

19     Slobodan Milosevic, to me the subtext here is you, the political

20     leadership and the police - which is very much seen as a rival by the

21     military - you unleashed this person and for a while we all agreed that

22     this was desirable.  As long as he was helping us with what we deemed to

23     be patriotic and noble activities of asserting our control over that area

24     of Yugoslavia, we were all on the same page and so far so good.  But

25     lately he has become a problem and you created this problem so you should

Page 2984

 1     clean it up.  That is what the military is saying to the civilian

 2     leadership because they know -- everyone around this table knows that the

 3     State Security Service is not under the control of the military but is

 4     rather under the control of the political leadership of Serbia.

 5        Q.   Do you think the military is saying that to the civilian

 6     authorities or do you think the civilian authorities are saying that to

 7     the military?  And I say that because we have Jugoslav Kostic saying,

 8     "Zivota, at a session here, once I asked you what was the relationship

 9     between Arkan and the JNA," and you've helpfully corrected the rest of th

10     translation, the point being that Kostic's view appears to be, as

11     reflected here, that Panic had something to do with at the very least

12     blessing his involvement in Croatia.

13        A.   I again think that the point is slightly more narrow than that.

14     I think what is going on here is that they are saying at one point you,

15     the military, had no problems with Arkan, and we were all agreed that

16     Arkan's presence out there was desirable and that what he was doing was

17     for the common good.  That time has passed.  And I think the civilian

18     leadership is chiding Panic, if you will, and saying perhaps there's a

19     bit of hypocrisy involved in suddenly him turning around and saying no,

20     this person is a criminal.  But as is clear from the comments here

21     several times, and again this is borne out by many other documents, they

22     all knew, if we go a year back in time before Arkan ever deployed to this

23     area, everyone knew who Arkan was and that they were making a very, very

24     dangerous bargain by engaging this person as part of the armed forces.

25             The other thing that needs to be seen here, and it's reflected in

Page 2985

 1     the new military documents, is that the military is, of course, not very

 2     happy with and quite intolerant of armed formations that do not subject

 3     themselves to their chain of command.  And at this point they are trying

 4     with mixed success to assert or, rather, resubordinate all so-called

 5     volunteer formations, including Arkan's formations, to the military chain

 6     of command.

 7             MR. GOSNELL:  Well, on that point let's have 0247, please,

 8     Defence tab 12, page 3.

 9        Q.   And while we're --

10             MR. STRINGER:  Pardon.  I apologise for the interruption,

11     counsel.  Just -- I was just listening to the two other channels, and

12     again it's a highly complex discussion.  Words are being said very

13     swiftly, and I'm watching the court reporter, and I have the impression

14     that people in the booth might be struggling a little bit to stay on top

15     of it.  And because it's a rather complicated subject matter, it might be

16     useful just to keep in mind the pace.

17             MR. GOSNELL:  I'll do my best.  So I was calling 02437.  Page 3.

18        Q.   And this concerns an attack on a place called Luzac, which is

19     around the middle of November 1991.  Does this reflect what you were just

20     saying; namely, that not only are there attempts to subordinate Arkan's

21     groups, Arkan's group, they are actually even expressly listed in the

22     order of battles being undertaken by the JNA?

23        A.   I just want to be careful here because I think you're asking me

24     to comment on what, based on my initial reaction to the document, appears

25     to be a page that is not a page produced by the Yugoslav authorities but

Page 2986

 1     rather from some kind of report that was filed before this Court either

 2     the OTP or the Defence.  But I'm happy to agree with you that there were

 3     attempts to subordinate Arkan's group during the fall of 1991.  Those

 4     attempts were unsuccessful.  But there were also many operations, as far

 5     as I can see from the military reports, where the two co-operated side by

 6     side to general satisfaction for both the JNA and Arkan.

 7             MR. GOSNELL:  Well, the origin of this document is attested to by

 8     a witness.  And I don't propose to go into that with you.  However, in

 9     light of what you said, I would nevertheless tender the document now.

10             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Your Honours, I don't think this is the

11     appropriate witness to tender this document.  You may -- well, I'm not

12     going to go into who's the author and all - this is for my learned

13     friends to know, but we have a military expert who will be testifying at

14     a later stage.  The witness does not -- hasn't seen the document before

15     and cannot attest to the veracity of what's in there or can't comment

16     about what units are being used, what is this attack on Luzac.  So I

17     think that the foundation is very weak at this stage.

18             MR. GOSNELL:  I --

19             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  This -- it will be coming up, though.

20             MR. GOSNELL:  I withdraw the tendering of the document.  Thank

21     you, Mr. President.

22             Could we have P152, please.

23        Q.   Now, this is a document that actually you've referred to a couple

24     of times now today.  And this is Major-General Andrija Biorcevic,

25     commander of the 12th Corps, and he awards small-arms as a war trophy to

Page 2987

 1     the most successful leaders of what he characterises the Serbian District

 2     of SBWS Territorial Defence as follows:  Radovan Stojicic,

 3     Zivko Trajkovic, Zeljko Raznjatovic.  Would you regard this as a further

 4     indication that Biorcevic views these individuals as subordinated to him?

 5        A.   No.

 6        Q.   Well, are you suggesting that the TO is not under federal

 7     Yugoslav law subordinated to the JNA at the very least in combat

 8     operations?

 9        A.   I was responding to your very specific question, which is whether

10     this document provides further indication that Biorcevic views these

11     individuals as subordinated to him.  There's nothing in this particular

12     document that indicates that these persons were subordinated to

13     Biorcevic.  Other hand, there is the phrase most successful leaders of

14     the Territorial Defence of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja, and

15     Western Srem.  It is my experience both in examining documents from the

16     SAOs and from Bosnia and Herzegovina that just because someone sees fit

17     to award a trophy weapon to someone else, that does not necessarily

18     indicate subordination.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now I would like to move to a new topic entirely, and

20     this concerns the emergence of the conflict in Croatia.  And you

21     testified on page 2423 that, and I quote:

22             "The very notion of an independent Croatian state was, even under

23     the best of circumstances, likely to create enormous anxiety among at

24     least a substantial portion of the Serb population in Croatia."

25             And you also testified that the historical background to that

Page 2988

 1     anxiety was the fact that the only previous precedent of an independent

 2     Croatia was the independent state of Croatia created during World War II

 3     which you said adopted extremely discriminatory policies against Serbs,

 4     jews, and Roma and other minorities and, in your words, "culminated in a

 5     genocide against the Serbs and these other minorities on the territory of

 6     NDH."

 7             Is that correct?  Is that your view?

 8        A.   Yes.  And as indicated that is not only my view that is, I

 9     believe, an accurate reflection of the scholarly consensus regarding the

10     so-called independent state of Croatia that existed from 1941-1945.

11        Q.   And at page 2423 you said that Franjo Tudjman had "dabbled in

12     revisionism."

13             Can you tell us what exactly he said that you would characterise

14     as revisionism?

15        A.   Where to begin?

16        Q.   Perhaps you could just briefly elaborate on what you meant when

17     you said that he dabbled in revisionism?

18        A.   Franjo Tudjman was, during a significant portion of his career, a

19     professional historian who directed the institute for the history of the

20     working movement or workers' movement, rather, in Zagreb.  By

21     approximately the early 1960s, he began to produce work, the gist of

22     which was to probe what had happened during the the Second World War,

23     during this so-called independent state of Croatia, and he began to

24     suggest - very controversially - that despite its very nauseous policies,

25     this state had, after all, been the reflection of a true desire of the

Page 2989

 1     Croat nation to have their own independent state.  And so he gradually

 2     and in great depth elaborated this thesis stating that notwithstanding

 3     its genocidal policies, which he also then proceeded to minimalise, and I

 4     believe in many cases cast even into doubt, he stated that, We have to

 5     after all regard this as a success in that we got a state, we Croats

 6     obtained our own state.  So there is something to be salvaged in this

 7     history of the independent state of Croatia.

 8             That thesis of his, which he elaborated in numerous works, was

 9     not only an anathema to the ruling Communists in Yugoslavia and therefore

10     he was removed from his post, and he eventually also served a prison

11     sentence in Croatia, but also earned him a reputation among many scholars

12     and also later more popularly among Serbs in Croatia as a revisionist or

13     denialist of the crimes that had been committed against Serbs in Croatia.

14        Q.   Do you recall whether he said anything specific in terms of

15     negating, denying, minimizing that these events had occurred?  The

16     genocide I mean.

17        A.   Well, to mention but one thing, he was among a number of Croat

18     scholars who, in the 1980s in particular, tried to revise downwards

19     significantly the number of Serbs who had perished in the concentration

20     camp Jasenovac.

21        Q.   Do you remember what was the difference between the historical

22     consensus as to how many victims there were there and Mr. Tudjman's view

23     of that?

24        A.   I'm just waiting for the translation.

25             The numbers that were used in the former Yugoslavia as this

Page 2990

 1     historiographical debate raged in the 1970s and 1980s, and I believe --

 2     perhaps Your Honours are familiar with the term "historikerstreit" from

 3     Germany.  This was a Serbo-Croat "historikerstreit," a dispute among

 4     historians with certain Serbs inflating the number to very large

 5     proportions and certain Croats by contrast reducing it as far as

 6     possible, I think even to below 60.000 at one point.  And for that

 7     reason, there were attempts by what I would call more objective scholars,

 8     more reasonable scholars to re-examine all the evidence and come up with

 9     the most reliable figures, and they indeed produced a figure that was

10     significantly higher than the figure that Mr. Tudjman was willing to

11     entertain.

12        Q.   What is that figure?

13        A.   Again, I think -- and I don't have all of my sources in front of

14     me, obviously.  But as I said, based on my recollection at this moment,

15     Tudjman at the very least had reduced the figure to, I think, 60.000 or

16     below, which is significantly less than those scholars I would refer to

17     as being more objective arrived at and by further logic much much less

18     than the most -- well, for lack of a better term, nationalist Serb

19     scholars on the other end of the spectrum had arrived.

20        Q.   What is the consensus now amongst historians as to the numbers

21     who were killed?

22        A.   I think the best numbers were those provided by the scholar

23     Vladimir Zerjavic, and I do not have the exact number in my mind right

24     now, but I believe it's at least above 250.000 if not above that.

25        Q.   And you also testified when you were here last that Tudjman

Page 2991

 1     engaged in "inflammable political rhetoric."  What did you have in mind

 2     when you referred to inflammable political rhetoric?  Can you give us

 3     some examples of what he may have said.

 4        A.   Well, as I stated, Tudjman's views on the Second World War and,

 5     in particular, the policies of the independent state of Croatia towards

 6     the Serbs, Jews, and Roma, were very controversial and were, in the

 7     context of the changes going on in Croatia, quite inflammable.  I would

 8     also note that Tudjman's - what shall we call it? - strong interest in

 9     the state symbols of Croat nationhood and statehood, including his

10     fondness for uniforms, emblems that in many cases resembled those used by

11     the Second World War puppet state, the independent state of Croatia, were

12     also seen by not just Serbs but also by non-nationalist Croats as being

13     controversial and provocative.  And those, again, were therefore likely

14     to create significant disquiet among the Serb population and made it

15     difficult, if not impossible, for President Tudjman to position himself

16     as someone who would be a leader of all citizens of Croatia regardless of

17     ethnicity.

18             MR. GOSNELL:  I see the clock, Mr. President.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Yes, Mr. Gosnell.  I was thinking about adding 15

20     minutes to this session and 15 minutes to the next one so we can perhaps

21     proceed like that.

22             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23        Q.   Now, you also testified that, and this is at page 2423:

24             "The very notion of an independent Croatian state was even under

25     the best of circumstances likely to cause enormous anxiety."

Page 2992

 1             And then you went on to testify that:

 2             "More Serbs might have been willing to accept the idea of an

 3     independent Croatia if," and I quote, "had the HDZ gone about propagating

 4     this policy in a more conciliatory manner.  Again, this is, I have to

 5     say, speculation because the HDZ did anything but that."

 6             Now I've heard what you've just said in response to the previous

 7     two questions, and there's no reason to recapitulate that, but I was

 8     wondering if there's anything else that you have in mind aside from

 9     Franjo Tudjman's inflammatory rhetoric and genocide denial that, to you,

10     was relevant to your answer there?

11        A.   Well, we referred in January to Mr. Josip Boljkovac, the first

12     minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia, and he is one of

13     a number of actors who have written memoires about this period and who,

14     notwithstanding their involvement in the government that was created in

15     1990, have noted with regret and sadness that the HDZ as the ruling

16     party, and president Tudjman in particular, were not willing to or not

17     able to extend a conciliatory branch of reconciliation and friendship to

18     the Serbs and that this -- therefore, as it were, turned many Serbs away

19     from the possibility of accepting more autonomy for Croatia, if not

20     outright independence for Croatia.

21             I think because we are focussing very heavily on the Croat side,

22     it also is, in the interests of objectivity, that we note that there were

23     a number of scholars and intellectuals on the Serb side, both in Serbia

24     proper and among Serbs in Croatia, who were, as it were, stoking the fire

25     from the other side and also calling into question whether any mutual

Page 2993

 1     ethnic co-existence could be possible under a government that was led by

 2     the HDZ.  But I think, as a matter of historical record, it is clear that

 3     the possibilities that did exist for the HDZ to try to make Serbs feel

 4     comfortable in Croatia were not exploited by that party and unfortunately

 5     certain actors in the party contributed to creating a very hostile

 6     atmosphere to Serbs in Croatia.

 7        Q.   And just to underline, sir, we're not here to litigate the merits

 8     of one side or the other.  The only purpose of my question is to

 9     understand what informed the reactions of -- in particular, Mr. Hadzic,

10     which, of course, the Prosecution has been asserting in various ways in

11     its case.  And so that's the purpose -- that's the reason why I'm asking

12     you these questions, just so you understand that.

13             And would you agree with me that in terms of what is the origin

14     or at least what starts the conflict - and I don't mean armed conflict, I

15     mean political contact - is, in effect, the desire to change the status

16     quo by the Croatian government from a republic to in effect, a fully

17     independent state?

18        A.   I would like to quite simply avoid answering that question

19     because I do not think that - and in fact I teach my students at

20     university - that it's very unproductive to try and find out who started

21     what, when.  This is a -- the process of the disintegration of the

22     Yugoslav state is incredibly complicated and there are many things --

23     many antecedents to what happened in 1990 that we can go back and follow.

24     Just to mention one thing, the desire of Croatia and Slovenia to move

25     towards independence had in and of itself been influenced by what they

Page 2994

 1     viewed, correctly or incorrectly, as an attempt by Serbia to impose a

 2     recentralisation of the federal Yugoslav state and revise the

 3     constitution that had existed since 1974 which had granted significant

 4     autonomy to the six socialist republics of Yugoslav.  So it's very

 5     difficult to see where precisely it begins.

 6        Q.   That's' very fair point and I don't in any way disagree with you.

 7     The reason I asked you the question was because at page 2426 of your

 8     previous testimony, which you don't have in front of, the impression was

 9     created that perhaps the Serbs were starting six months before the

10     adoption of the constitution to, in effect, militate for a greater

11     autonomy which created the impression of a cause and effect or a sequence

12     of events.  But am I correct in understanding that in effect that's --

13     there's either no point or it's impossible to find an answer to that

14     question; is that right?

15        A.   That's right.  We could go back another six months and find

16     another point and another six months and find yet another point, but I

17     had to start somewhere.

18             Let me just state categorically that it is not the intent of my

19     report to apportion blame for anything that transpired.  My report is

20     about stating what we can understand about the process in Croatia based

21     on the available documentation.

22        Q.   And also during your previous testimony at page 2428, you said

23     that the referendum that was held in September -- August and

24     September 1990 was self-selective on the part of the Serbs who were

25     trying to conduct that referendum.

Page 2995

 1             Now would you agree with me that the reason why it was

 2     self-selective wasn't in order to inflate the -- those in favour of

 3     greater autonomy.  It was simply because the Croatian government would

 4     have arrested anyone who had walked into an area where the police had the

 5     authority to do so?

 6        A.   I would not agree that that is the sole reason.  That's certainly

 7     part of the reason, and as I noted some of this was done quite covertly.

 8     But I think there is a significant degree of self-selection here.  It is

 9     my understanding, based on reading Mr. Petrovic's book, that no one,

10     neither Mr. Petrovic or anyone else involved in this organisation process

11     at the time on the Serb side, had any reasonable expectation that the

12     Croats would support them in such a referendum.  It was a moot point and

13     why go about picking a fight at this point with the Croats.  Why not

14     instead demonstrate, which they then did, that there was robust support

15     for remaining in Yugoslavia among the Serbs of Croatia.

16        Q.   Regardless of the final numbers of the referendum, would you

17     agree that that position, the support for greater autonomy as an anecdote

18     or a reaction to the move towards independence, that the vast majority of

19     Serbs would indeed have supported that greater autonomy under the

20     circumstances?

21        A.   As I stated before, I think we have a chain reaction process that

22     is set into place which, again, can be best summarised by that question I

23     raised in January:  Why should be I a minority in your country if you can

24     be a minority in my country?  The ethnic demographics, one need only look

25     at the census from 1991 in Croatia or for that matter of fact, Bosnia, to

Page 2996

 1     realise that it was impossible both politically, legally, and

 2     demographically to create ethnically homogenous states.  Once one or more

 3     actors started moving down that road, particularly given the past very

 4     negative experience of the Second World War that were being manipulated

 5     on both sides, it was a tragedy waiting to happen.

 6        Q.   But would you agree with me that it's possible to have a project

 7     of independence, autonomy, separation, whether it be on the Croatian side

 8     or on the Serbian side that doesn't necessarily involve ethnic

 9     discrimination?

10        A.   In theory, yes.  And, again, had everyone, for lack of a better

11     term, been on their best behaviour and had this entire process been done

12     with legal assurances, international observation, and full respect of

13     various international and European conventions on civil and political

14     rights, then things could have ended very differently.  As we all know

15     that's unfortunately not the case, and I think it's rather academic,

16     unfortunately, to speculate about that.

17        Q.   Well, the reason that I ask that question is because there is the

18     topic, the issue of what kind of rhetoric is appropriate and what kind of

19     rhetoric is designed to encourage discrimination.  And -- and I would ask

20     you in respect -- ask you about one specific example.

21             Do you think that the amendment to the Croatian constitution

22     in -- at the Christmas of 1990, I believe it is, in which Serbs were

23     eliminated as a founding nation or a constituent nation of Croatia,

24     whereas Croats became the sole recognised people, in a sense, with

25     constitutional status, do you think that that encouraged -- or do you

Page 2997

 1     think that that was in any way attempting to discourage discrimination

 2     against Serbs?

 3        A.   What I think, and I believe I wrote this in the report, is that

 4     it certainly reinforced, and among some Serbs created, for the first time

 5     the strong feeling that they were going to be second-class citizens in

 6     Croatia, that their rights would come after the rights of ethnic Croats.

 7     And in that sense, and I believe this is the opinion of a number of Croat

 8     politicians, I believe the former president of Croatia, Stjepan Mesic has

 9     gone on the record stating as much, that this was a mistake made by the

10     Croatian leadership at the time.  It was completely unnecessary.  It

11     would have cost them nothing to have kept the Serbs as a constituent

12     nation in the constitution, that this was one of many signals that was --

13     that contributed to the disintegration of the relationship between Serbs

14     and Croats in Croatia.  I would also point out again that and -- and an

15     additional significant concept that exists at this point is the notion of

16     victimisation.  And so while I understand that there was concern and

17     displeasure among the Serbs that they were no longer a constituent nation

18     among -- according to the constitution of the Republic of Croatia, it is

19     conversely or was conversely a grave and in my eyes highly problematic

20     exaggeration for Serb leaders in Croatia at the time, as some of them

21     did, to assert that this was a road that was going to lead directly to

22     the establishment of concentration camps for Serbs.

23             MR. GOSNELL:  I see the clock now Mr. President.

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Gosnell.

25             Before we take a break, let's see where we are going and what is

Page 2998

 1     possible.

 2             Mr. Gosnell, how long would you need to finish your

 3     cross-examination?

 4             MR. GOSNELL:  I believe another hour should be sufficient.  I

 5     believe that I have an hour and a quarter, that was my prediction.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  The 15 minutes you have had now.  So you still

 7     have --

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  I'm sorry.

10             So the 15 minutes you have had and there is still 60 minutes

11     left, if we have to reserve 30 minutes for re-direct.  Is that more or

12     less what you expect, Mr. Demirdjian.

13             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I will try to be as prompt as I can,

14     Your Honours.  Maybe even 20 minutes, but ... yeah.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.  So then we'll take the break now until --

18     we come back at 1.00.  And then we'll sit until 2.30 at the utmost.  I

19     think that would suit your travel plans, Mr. Nielsen; is that right.

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes, thank you, Your Honour.  I'm very grateful for

21     that.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Court adjourned.

25                           --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

Page 2999

 1                           --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

 2                           [The witness takes the stand]

 3             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, just to save time I can take care of

 4     a housekeeping matter, if I may.

 5             At page 62, line 25 of today's transcript, I erroneously referred

 6     to transcript page 2343.  The proper transcript page is 2423.

 7             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 8             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 6059, 65 ter 06059.

 9        Q.   And Dr. Nielsen, I hope you will forgive me.  I'm going to jump

10     around a little bit discursively between one topic and the next to make

11     sure I approach things in the sequence that's most important for us, so I

12     just wanted to let you know that.

13             And I'm now calling up a document that was on neither party's

14     list of exhibits but that you've now mentioned, I think, three times, and

15     this is the letter from Mr. Hadzic to the town commander of Ilok.  And

16     it's dated the 23rd of December, 1991.  And I'm correct in saying this is

17     not referenced in your report; correct?

18        A.   Yes.  And, Mr. Gosnell just before I respond to this document

19     which I mentioned earlier, can I just say that so that I do not misinform

20     the Court I just wish to very briefly revise the statement I made about

21     the numbers of victims in World War II, in particular Jasenovac, because

22     rather I, as I noted to Mr. Gosnell, didn't feel confident in stating

23     such numbers spontaneously based on memory, I have a book with me that I

24     consulted during the break and I would therefore like to briefly inform

25     you and the Court that the figures cited by Mr. Tudjman for deaths in

Page 3000

 1     Jasenovac were I believe 20- to 30.000.  That is lower even than I had

 2     stated.  The figures that Zerjavic, who is regarded as one of the more

 3     objective historians on this point, lists for Jasenovac are 80- to

 4     90.000.  And that the high figures on the other end of the spectrum cited

 5     by certain Serb historians, for example Mr. Milan Bulajic, are over

 6     600.000.  So that gives you range.

 7             But I think the upshot of this whole discussion is that one could

 8     ask why in the context of Yugoslavia in 1990 it was even necessary to

 9     have such a discussion about such a painful topic.  And I would again

10     also mention that another, in my view, mistake by Mr. Tudjman was that he

11     tried to rename the square for the victims of fascism in Zagreb into the

12     square of Great Croats which also caused a great deal of controversy both

13     among Serbs and Croats.

14             Lastly, I would just point out that I have the 25th

15     December document in front of me, not the 23rd December document on the

16     screen.

17        Q.   I believe the correct number should be 06055.  I see my learned

18     friend nodding.  Well, before or while this document is coming up,

19     Dr. Nielsen, I have one other small matter that I can address with you.

20     And it was your reference to Arkan becoming a hot potato certainly by

21     April 1992, and you may recall the last time we were here, I put it to

22     you that some individuals might have had a tendency or the urge to use

23     Arkan, references to Arkan, as a way of discrediting, in particular,

24     Mr. Hadzic.  And would you agree that in fact those two are related,

25     that, indeed, by a certain date everyone was trying to wash their hands

Page 3001

 1     of Arkan and that indeed there was not a claim for Arkan or approval of

 2     Arkan, but that there was general disapproval and that tying him to, for

 3     example, Mr. Hadzic, was a way of discrediting, Mr. Hadzic?

 4        A.   I agree that a point arises at which many people, many actors

 5     view Arkan as a negative presence and that a number of these actors are

 6     trying to wash their hands of him, despite their previous approval of his

 7     actions.  However, it is not my reading that the documents in which I see

 8     Mr. Hadzic's name mentioned together with Mr. Raznjatovic, or Arkan's

 9     name, were produced with the motivation or at least not solely produced

10     with the motivation of discrediting Mr. Hadzic.  I would also note that I

11     was not able to find instances in which Mr. Hadzic who, I believe, was

12     aware that other people were associating Arkan with him, I did not find

13     any instances in which Mr. Hadzic publicly distanced himself or spoke

14     disapprovingly of Mr. Raznjatovic.

15        Q.   Well, for example, if we had an allegation from Milan Martic or

16     for that matter from some -- any other politician who was seeking to

17     discredit Mr. Hadzic, and a convenient way to do that would be to invoke

18     Arkan as a close ally or friend or colleague or someone under the

19     authority of Mr. Hadzic?

20        A.   Again, if there's a specific case of such a mention of Arkan in

21     his association with Mr. Hadzic that you are referring to made by

22     Mr. Martic or anyone else, I'm happy to discuss that.  But the ones that

23     I cite in the section on Arkan, I do not see any, again, of -- one of

24     those documents as being motivated solely or even primarily by a desire

25     to disparage Mr. Hadzic.

Page 3002

 1        Q.   Well, the document I have in mind, I don't propose to do to -- to

 2     go to it is the report, the DB report, which is based on a source whose

 3     initials you note in your report as VDZ.  And I believe you've referred

 4     to that document before.  Would you agree that where we're dealing with

 5     someone like that, there would, indeed, be a motivation to do just what

 6     I've said?

 7        A.   I agree that such a motivation could exist particularly on the

 8     part of that person.  And I believe that for precisely that reason that

 9     document needs to be read with that in mind and -- but again, also needs

10     to be compared to numerous other documents in which an association

11     between Mr. Hadzic and Arkan is mentioned.

12        Q.   Could we look at page 2 of this document which is the one that

13     you have referred to several times which is a letter to the town

14     commander of Ilok, dated 23rd December, 1991.  He says there at the top

15     of the page in English:

16             "I hope that you know that we did not for a moment challenge the

17     army's presence in our area and its involvement in all matters,

18     appreciating it to be a part of a comprehensive process from liberation,

19     through stablisation of the area, to creating conditions for our

20     ministries and civilian authorities to take over and assume full

21     responsibility for their work.

22             "Admittedly, we were never officially informed about the

23     conditions under which the so-called military rule was established in a

24     part of our Serbian district and what it really means in drawing a line

25     between military and our jurisdiction, but the fact is that our efforts

Page 3003

 1     were often limited by citing its existence and conditions."

 2             Would you agree that what we seem to see here, and, of course,

 3     I'm sure that you -- your -- there's always a possibility of ulterior

 4     motives, but when you read this, do you have the impression that

 5     Mr. Hadzic is expressing some discontent with having been shut out by the

 6     army in Ilok?

 7        A.   I certainly think that there is some dissatisfaction expressed

 8     here.  It is at least implicitly a criticism of the military when he

 9     states that he and the others on the civilian side were not officially

10     informed about the conditions.  I read that as a criticism of the

11     military.  Why was I not informed?

12        Q.   And down at the bottom of the page 2 -- down at the bottom of

13     page 2, it says:

14             "We hope and expect our minister of finance to be given an

15     opportunity to check the situation and the flow of funds on transfer

16     accounts, hoping for your assistance in the matter, all the more so,

17     since economic activity in Ilok was revived, in part through the direct

18     engagement of military organs."

19             And just to go down to the middle of page 3, and this is the last

20     passage I'll bring to your attention:

21             "The government has been told that the settling of Ilok went on

22     rather well and that your commands was competent in all matters.

23     Naturally, we are not bothered by this, but in the spirit of co-operation

24     we would appreciate at least being informed about the criteria according

25     to which it was done, with a possible remark that our approval does not

Page 3004

 1     go without saying."

 2             Do you have any observation in respect to that passage?

 3        A.   When read together with the answer that Mr. Hadzic receives later

 4     from the military command in Ilok, it becomes clear that the military, on

 5     the one hand, and Mr. Hadzic and his government, on the other hand, have

 6     clashed over various matters on several occasions, that they have not

 7     even eye to eye on at least some matters, and they are referring to that

 8     somewhat elliptically but with the overall message that we now need to

 9     henceforth better co-ordinate our efforts so that these problems will not

10     recur.

11        Q.   Would you say in fact he is trying to use diplomatic language to

12     mitigate or lessen what appears to be some kind of conflict with the JNA

13     in terms of jurisdiction and just information about what's going on?

14        A.   He is, I think, indeed, trying, and largely succeeding in using

15     diplomatic language to do as you indicate.  Other hand, the military,

16     perhaps as is the case with career military officers, is somewhat less

17     diplomatic in indicating their disgruntlement with the way things have

18     been running up to the present point in their letter two days later.

19        Q.   I don't propose to take you to that letter, but that is a, in our

20     opinion, a correct characterisation.

21             MR. GOSNELL:  We would tender 65 ter 06055, please.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Shall be assigned Exhibit D30.  Thank you.

24             MR. GOSNELL:

25        Q.   Dr. Nielsen --

Page 3005

 1             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have to P37, which is Prosecution tab 171.

 2        Q.   Dr. Nielsen, this concerns the discussion that occurs at one of

 3     the SFRY Presidency meetings which you refer to at paragraph 206 of your

 4     report and which you discussed at page 2486 of your testimony.

 5             And this is about Mr. Hadzic's comments in respect of what you

 6     refer to as "the topic of forced removal of the civilian population."

 7             Now I'll just for it to come up.  Could we have the B/C/S

 8     version, page 92; and the English version, page 68.

 9             That's -- that's nicely centred.  Thank you.

10             Dr. Nielsen, I was not clear as to what your actual

11     interpretation is of Mr. Hadzic's words.  Could you clarify what you

12     think Mr. Hadzic is saying here?

13        A.   Well, I thank you for the opportunity to clarify this.  I agree

14     with you.  I don't think I was very clear when we discussed this last

15     time.

16             Just to provide a bit of context because we cannot see it on this

17     page, but immediately preceding Mr. Hadzic there is a long passage in

18     which Radovan Karadzic speaks and he talks about the movement of peoples,

19     and he refers - as I state in paragraph 206 - he asks, "Who will force

20     the Croats from Vojvodina to go to Krajina.  Those are nebulous ideas and

21     the word is shocked by them, although India and Pakistan even did also

22     such things.  At this moment in Europe it is questionable whether that

23     would be feasible."  And to me that -- that is -- the point of departure

24     that Karadzic is essentially saying, You know, at certain points in world

25     history there have been mass movements of people and the world currently

Page 3006

 1     views that as abhorrent and it would be therefore doubtful that those

 2     kinds of movements would be feasible in Europe at this moment.

 3             And then when we get to Mr. Hadzic's comments, his first sentence

 4     is, at least the way I translated it, this is not nebulous.  And then --

 5     and it's very fragmentary in B/C/S, if we could -- could we have the

 6     translation scrolled down so I can see.  These are -- I will just read

 7     the words that follow the sentence.

 8             "This is not nebulous.  Serbs from Zagreb should resettle and

 9     Serbs from Belgrade, and now from this terrain," or "this area, there

10     is" -- that is -- there's many ways you can translate it, "it is out of

11     the question," "that's not to be discussed."  But the part I would point

12     out in the translation, the part when Mr. Hadzic says, "And now from this

13     terrain" or "from this area" is missing from the English translation.

14             So as the first order of business, I definitely would say that

15     the statement that he makes, at least the second sentence of his

16     statement, is at the very least ambiguous.  But the first sentence to me

17     is very clear.  Mr. Karadzic or Dr. Karadzic has just said, "This is a

18     nebulous idea," and Mr. Hadzic -- in referring to population movements,

19     and Mr. Hadzic then says, "This is not nebulous."

20        Q.   I'm informed, Dr. Nielsen, that the word "from" does not appear

21     in the B/C/S as being attributed to Mr. Hadzic.

22        A.   That is correct.  It says -- but it uses the -- if I may be

23     slightly technical, the genitive case, "of this terrain."  As you well

24     know, these stenographic records are in many cases imperfect, and indeed

25     as we unfortunately, and again I apologise to the court reporter we see

Page 3007

 1     here, sometimes participants at these meetings or sessions speak so

 2     quickly that even a word or even a part of a sentence is bound to go

 3     lost.  But I would again focus my attention, as I did in the report, on

 4     the first sentence of Mr. Hadzic's response, which -- where I don't think

 5     there's any ambiguity.  I translated it as "that is not nebulous."  The

 6     official translation we have here is, "There is nothing nebulous in it."

 7     And if we go back to Mr. Karadzic's statement, the only thing to which he

 8     can be referring is this notion of resettlement or population exchanges

 9     with -- with certain historical precedents mentioned by Mr. Karadzic.

10        Q.   Well, just to try to take this shortly and to summarise, we have

11     Dr. Karadzic allegedly saying it is rather questionable.  And then we

12     have Mr. Hadzic saying, No, it's not questionable.  It's out of the

13     question.  It can't be done.  That's not nebulous.  Isn't that right?

14        A.   Can I please have the previous page of the B/C/S?

15             And I ... if we see in the English, it says, "First of all, the

16     Serbs of Krajina must not be favoured here.  On the contrary, they have

17     to be stimulated to go back there."

18             And then slightly later, we have the question:  "But who is going

19     to make the Croats from Vojvodina go to Krajina?  These are nebulous

20     ideas."  "To su maglovit ideje."  And my point is that the notion of what

21     is or is not nebulous here, to me, when Mr. Hadzic responds, "There is

22     nothing nebulous in it," to me that is a reaction to Mr. Karadzic's

23     rhetorical question -- or his statement, "These are nebulous ideas."  But

24     I'm, again, happy to -- my point is to draw the attention of you and the

25     Chamber to this exchange, and I think with the caveat that I think it

Page 3008

 1     might be worth asking for a revised translation, I -- I -- I would hope

 2     that everyone reads this and draws whatever conclusions they see fit.

 3        Q.   Well, looking at the entire context, is it your view that it --

 4     that Mr. Hadzic is in any way advocating forcible transfer of civilian

 5     populations?

 6        A.   My reading, my view of this document is that Karadzic is saying

 7     historical circumstances and European public and political opinion mean

 8     that forcible transfer or exchange of civilian populations cannot occur

 9     and that Mr. Hadzic questions whether this is, indeed, true.  That is my

10     reading of it.

11        Q.   Well, sir, I'm going to give you my interpretation which involves

12     the broader context of the entire passage.  And when you read the entire

13     passage, starting with, "I reckon," and there are even some earlier

14     references, but we can see just from this page what is going on I submit

15     to you.  And what we see is that Dr. Karadzic is lamenting the departure

16     of Serbs from the Krajina to Serbia and elsewhere which thereby, in his

17     view, weakens the position of the Serbian minority in Croatia.  And then

18     he believes -- or then he discusses what I believe he suggests,

19     Dr. Karadzic, that is, is a highly distasteful alternative which is --

20     which he believes has actually been proposed by the Croats, and that

21     distasteful alternative is the full transfer of Croat and Serb

22     populations between the SBWS or Croatia and Vojvodina.  At least that's

23     how I read his -- this -- when he refers to "they," when he say, "I

24     mentioned this only to make you cognisant of their way of thinking," he

25     must be referring to someone.  Would you agree with me that in saying

Page 3009

 1     "their" he may be referring to the Croats?

 2        A.   That is a possibility.

 3        Q.   And doesn't the interpretation I've just given accord with

 4     Mr. Hadzic's response which otherwise seems anomalous.  He says, "Serbs

 5     from Zagreb and Belgrade should resettle"; in other words, we would like

 6     Serbs who have left or who are elsewhere to come to the Serbian Krajina?

 7        A.   Well, I think that, first of all, we have agreed on -- by my

 8     count the vast majority of items that we've discussed.  But on this

 9     particular instance I'm going to, for now, stand by my interpretation in

10     page -- in paragraph 206 with, again, the observation that I think it's

11     important that we all read this passage and draw our own conclusions.  So

12     as far as we are concerned, we're going to have agree that we disagree.

13        Q.   Well, let's just focus on the top two paragraphs on this page

14     where we see Dr. Karadzic saying that:

15             "There should be a centralised service which would take care of

16     the attainment of national goals.  This service should be primarily

17     linked to Krajina and should be economically motivated.  I do not know

18     much about the laws and maybe you have already discussed this matter, but

19     when it comes to the investment legislation, the taxation, et cetera, I

20     reckon that situation there will be more favourable so that there will be

21     no need for companies from Serbia to send gifts there.  They have to be

22     motivated to develop things there based on ownership as the labour will

23     be cheaper down there, the taxes will be lower, et cetera."

24             Now, doesn't it seem to you that there Dr. Karadzic is saying

25     let's figure out a policy that will encourage people to go back to this

Page 3010

 1     area from which many Serbs are leaving because they view it as an

 2     undesirable place to live?

 3        A.   I agree that that is -- where the discussion initially comes

 4     from, yes.

 5        Q.   And you're not willing to allow that context to inform your

 6     interpretation of Mr. Hadzic's response?

 7        A.   Well, when we're on the topic of context, I'm also looking at

 8     this statement in the context of a much larger series of discussions that

 9     take place at these Presidency meetings and where the topic of forcible

10     removal or more euphemistically expressed population exchange is not a --

11     is not -- is discussed frequently or at least at several meetings of this

12     Presidency.  And so that is part of the context overall that informs my

13     reading of this passage.  But as I stated, I think that I have my

14     interpretation of this.  You have your interpretation.  And we'll have to

15     leave it at that time.

16        Q.   Was Mr. Hadzic a party to those other meetings and conversations

17     that you're referring to?

18        A.   He was on some occasions, but I don't have the ability to tell

19     you off the top of my head how many Presidency meetings he attended.

20        Q.   None of those are mentioned in your report as substantiating your

21     conclusion about Mr. Hadzic's words, are they?

22        A.   It is correct that I do not mention other Presidency meetings in

23     this paragraph of the report.

24        Q.   Now, I'd like to move to another topic, and that is paragraphs --

25     about 150 to 170 of your report, concerning police and the RSK.

Page 3011

 1             MR. GOSNELL:  And we're done with this document.

 2        Q.   And by my count, there are exactly two documents that show that

 3     Mr. Hadzic issued any orders to the police in the RSK.  Would you agree

 4     that that's the number?

 5        A.   That is probably correct.  I have definitely been able to note

 6     that there are very, very few instances of Mr. Hadzic issuing any orders

 7     to the police in the RSK, at least as we can determine based on the

 8     available documentation.  I would, however, just remind the Court that at

 9     least according to Mr. Martic in the video that we viewed in January, the

10     participation of the RSK MUP in the the corridor operation in Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina in the summer of 1992 also took place pursuant to

12     instructions issued by Mr. Hadzic.

13        Q.   On the instructions and the decision of the Supreme Defence

14     Council of which Mr. Hadzic was a part; correct?

15        A.   I would assume that's correct.  I do not have the instructions or

16     the decision.  I was paraphrasing what Mr. Martic said at the event that

17     we viewed on the video.

18        Q.   And the two orders that we see that Mr. Hadzic is involved in

19     concern on the one hand this issue of currency detailers - at least

20     that's our position, your position was that it was narcotics dealers -

21     and about securing the radio and television facilities of the RSK;

22     correct?

23        A.   Yes, I believe that's correct.

24        Q.   And that's referenced, for the record, at paragraphs 156 and 161

25     of your report.  And would you agree with me that those are both areas

Page 3012

 1     that could be termed issues of national or strategic significance;

 2     namely, regulating currency flows and securing television and radio

 3     stations?

 4        A.   Well, as you mentioned, we have our outstanding disagreement on

 5     the first issue.  But as regards the securing of the radio television

 6     company of RSK, I agree that in the eyes of the RSK authorities, control

 7     over the radio/television was a matter of strategic significance.

 8        Q.   Well, actually, Dr. Nielsen, I recall that we didn't disagree at

 9     the end in respect of deliry [phoen].  You did concede that it could well

10     have been a reference to currency speculators; correct?

11        A.   I stated that it was one possible interpretation, and I recall

12     that I also stated that the persons who were, based on my experience of

13     examining police documents, involved in elicit currency dealing were

14     typically also involved in other illegal activities, such as narcotics.

15        Q.   But you didn't exclude the interpretation that it may have been

16     directed squarely and exclusively at currency speculators?

17        A.   I did not exclude the interpretation.

18        Q.   And would you say given your expertise as an analyst of police

19     affairs specifically in the former Yugoslavia, that it's in no way

20     surprising that the president of the republic would not be involved in

21     giving operational instructions to the police?

22        A.   Just trying to see whether you posed the question in a negative

23     or a positive way.

24             I would state that based on my expertise, certainly in Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina there are instances in which the president of the republic

Page 3013

 1     would be involved in giving operational instructions to the police.  But

 2     that in the majority of cases, also in Bosnia-Herzegovina, those

 3     decisions tend to be issued through the competent minister of internal

 4     affairs and not by the president directly unless it involves urgent

 5     national security matters.

 6        Q.   And whatever may be the case in respect of other republics, we

 7     don't see that in respect of Mr. Hadzic in the RSK, do we?

 8        A.   As I stated, the available record, as you also described it,

 9     indicates that we have only those orders that you mentioned available to

10     us that were issued by Mr. Hadzic directly to the police, and then with

11     the caveat that you also mentioned, the instructions, orders, or whatever

12     they may have been precisely, issued with respect to the operation in the

13     corridor in the summer of 1992.

14             So there is absolutely not a significant amount of documents that

15     indicate that Mr. Hadzic directly issued orders to the police.

16        Q.   And in respect to that operation in the summer of 1992, you

17     recognise, surely, that that's a military operation not a law enforcement

18     or typical police operation; correct?

19        A.   That is correct.  The corridor operation was primarily a military

20     operation, and, again, it is one of a number of cases in which various

21     strategic considerations mean that the police are, for all intents and

22     purposes, treated as an armed or combat force.

23        Q.   When placed in combat; correct?

24        A.   Yes.  When deployed in the primary function of defending what are

25     identified as vital national interests of the republic.

Page 3014

 1        Q.   Right.  So none of these three orders emanating from Mr. Hadzic

 2     in any way reflect that he's involved in traditional law enforcement

 3     activities by the RSK police; correct?

 4        A.   It is correct that after the establishment of the RSK, there are

 5     no indications, as I have been able to see it in the available

 6     documentation, that indicate that Mr. Hadzic is involved in law

 7     enforcement activities or other routine issues of internal affairs.

 8        Q.   I'd now like to move to another topic which is a series of

 9     questions you were asked by the Prosecution about Bapska, and in

10     particular whether it was the agenda of the SBWS government to take over

11     municipalities that, as of 1941, had a Serb majority but may not have had

12     such a majority in 1991.  And at one point you testified at page 2451

13     that it would have -- "It would not surprise me if they had been to the

14     archives and determined that, for example, Bapska had been a Serb

15     majority area prior to 1941."

16             And you were shown a list of population figures suggesting that

17     the population of Bapska included only a relatively few Serbs?

18             Do you remember that testimony?

19        A.   Yes, I do.

20        Q.   Now isn't it possible in respect of Bapska, and let's just keep

21     our focus on Bapska for the moment, that the reason that the jurisdiction

22     was extended to Bapska is that it's surrounded on all sides by areas that

23     are substantially majority Serb?

24        A.   If there was an area, an enclave, as it were, if that is what

25     you're suggesting, and I'm not familiar with the -- as I stated

Page 3015

 1     previously, the ethnic demographics of individual villages, settlements,

 2     or municipalities in this region, but if there was an indication that

 3     Bapska was an enclave of persons of ethnicity other than Serbian,

 4     surrounded by areas that, as you call it, were -- had substantial Serb

 5     majorities, then it would not surprise me that some of the actors

 6     involved in the military operations in the Autumn of 1991 would have

 7     taken a decision to include Bapska in the area over which they wished to

 8     exercise jurisdiction.

 9        Q.   And you'd agree, wouldn't you, that it's not even possible for

10     Serb forces to enter the eastern part of SBWS without going through

11     Bapska, from Serbian territory.

12        A.   For me to answer that, honestly I would have to have a map in

13     front of me.  So I'm willing to take your word for it, if -- if that is

14     what you are stating, but I do not have a mental map of these settlements

15     in my head.  At least not Bapska in particular.

16        Q.   So you don't know where Bapska is?

17        A.   I know where Bapska is in terms of its location generally

18     speaking, but I do not -- I cannot point to Bapska and tell you right now

19     which particular area of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, or Srem it is in.

20        Q.   Sir, I want to ask you briefly about your reliance on

21     Ilija Petrovic's book.  And do you accept that his book is reliable as a

22     whole?  Are there parts that you consider less reliable?  What's your

23     general approach to that book and its reliability.

24        A.   I think that I've answered that question quite precisely already.

25     My whole -- my view on the book is that where he describes events in the

Page 3016

 1     region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem during the period

 2     that I examined, and where I have been able to see those events described

 3     elsewhere in other documents that were made available to me, it is my

 4     view that, in general, his recollection of those event seems to be quite

 5     in conformity with those other documents.

 6        Q.   So you appear to place emphasis on the fact that you would accept

 7     Petrovic's accounts and information to the extent they are corroborated;

 8     is that right?

 9        A.   My preference is, of course, always to have the ability to

10     compare his accounts or anyone else's accounts to other sources.

11     However, again, because of the deplorable state of documentation, there

12     are a number of things that he or others describe that cannot be

13     corroborated because we simply do not have documents about that

14     particular incident.  And in those cases, in the absence of such other

15     documentation, and in the absence of an abundant number of instances in

16     which his account does conflict with existing documentation, I included

17     his version here making it clear, of course, that this stemmed from him

18     as a source.

19        Q.   Well, let's just take a look at a few examples.  At paragraph 21,

20     your sole source for saying that Goran Hadzic was the president of -- I'm

21     sorry, let me find the reference here.  Yes.  The sole source for your

22     claim that Goran Hadzic was appointed president of the Serb National

23     Council of the SBWS on the 17th of March, 1991, is, at paragraph 45,

24     Ilija Petrovic's claim that's the case.

25             You do include two or three other sources in that footnote but

Page 3017

 1     none of them are relevant to that claim; correct?

 2        A.   That is correct.  The sources that I include are in respect of

 3     being able to corroborate, for example, his position within the SDS in

 4     Vukovar but not in -- in terms of his position as the president of -- or

 5     his role in the Serb National Council of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western

 6     Srem.

 7        Q.   Do you think the fact that Ilija Petrovic correctly identified

 8     Goran Hadzic as a member of the Vukovar SDS Executive Board makes his

 9     claim that Goran Hadzic was the president of the the Serbian national

10     council more likely?  Is that your proposition?

11        A.   No.  I think you are mischaracterising what I just stated.  I'm

12     not making any judgement about Ilija Petrovic's correctness or lack of

13     correctness in identifying Mr. Hadzic in that particular function based

14     on the fact that Petrovic correctly identifies Mr. Hadzic's role in

15     the -- alone in the SDS Executive Board, but again based on a number of

16     additional other events which Mr. Petrovic does explain correctly.  This

17     is not the sole instance in which Mr. Petrovic says something that I have

18     been able to corroborate elsewhere.  In this particular case, I do not

19     have any other corroboration for it.

20        Q.   And despite being president apparently, as discussed in

21     paragraph 22, Goran Hadzic's approval was not required for the

22     declaration of autonomy because as we know at the time that declaration

23     was issued he was in the hospital; isn't that right?

24        A.   That is correct.  He was in the hospital after the events at

25     Plitvice Jezera.

Page 3018

 1        Q.   And concerning paragraph 23, which I presume you would agree was

 2     a very important letter from the Serbian national council to the SFRY

 3     Presidency seeking assistance, dated the 28th of May, that document was

 4     not signed by Goran Hadzic.  It was signed by Ilija Petrovic; correct?

 5        A.   I do not have the document in front of me, but, yes, I believe

 6     that, as I state here in paragraph 23, it was Ilija Petrovic who was

 7     writing on behalf of the Serb National Council.

 8        Q.   Well, footnote 48 clearly says:  "Forwarding letter of

 9     Ilija Petrovic at 28 May, 1991," correct?

10        A.   Yeah, written -- so writing on behalf of the Serb National

11     Council, Ilija Petrovic.

12        Q.   So Goran Hadzic as the president of the Serb National Council is

13     not involved in the declaration of autonomy of March 31st, and there's no

14     indication he's involved in this letter of the 28th of May, 1991, is

15     there?

16        A.   No.

17        Q.   Do you ever get the impression that in respect of some of the

18     documents that are appended in Mr. Petrovic's book that he might simply

19     have been sitting at a type writer and producing documents to aggrandise

20     his own role in events?

21        A.   Well, I think Mr. Petrovic is certainly a person who is very fond

22     of highlighting his own role in events in this area and in these

23     political procedures that lead to the establishment of a Serb Autonomous

24     District.  Again, I have, at least based on the documents that I have

25     been able to examine, not found an indication of a -- an instance in

Page 3019

 1     which Mr. Petrovic has produced a document that I would be able to, based

 2     on other documents, adduce to be a forgery.  If that's what you're

 3     suggesting.

 4        Q.   Have you noticed that many of the documents that are attached to

 5     his book are not gazetted?

 6        A.   Yes.  Although I would also note that based on my requests for

 7     the gazettes of the Serb Autonomous District, as far as I recall, the

 8     collection of Serb Autonomous District gazettes that is in the possession

 9     of the OTP is incomplete.  We do not, as far as I know, have the full

10     collection of the gazettes.

11        Q.   Well, on what basis do you assert that it's not complete?

12        A.   On the basis that, at least looking at the numbers of the

13     gazettes that I received, when I requested the gazettes from the OTP, I

14     do not recall that I received every single number so that I could build a

15     full collection.

16        Q.   Would you agree with me that there are a great number of

17     footnotes in your report that rely exclusively on Ilija Petrovic's book?

18        A.   Yes, that is correct.  There are a great number of instances in

19     which I did rely on Ilija Petrovic's book, for the reasons that I have

20     previously stated.

21        Q.   Namely, the inadequate state of documentation?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   One issue that you didn't discuss in your report or at least not

24     with any degree of specificity is what was going on in the police in the

25     lead-up, in the Croatian police in the lead-up to August 1991.  Is there

Page 3020

 1     any reason why that was not part your report?

 2        A.   I refer just as a rather brief background to the fact that there

 3     were tensions in the Croatian police and that a number of people, for

 4     example, in paragraph 8, I refer to the Croatian police were deploying to

 5     police stations in areas populated by a Serb majority.  And I refer to

 6     the suspension of several employees of the public security station in

 7     Knin; that is, the actions that the Croatian police chose to take to

 8     thwart what they viewed as illegal attempts to organise an exclusively

 9     Serb rule on certain territories of the Republic of Croatia.

10             However, I did not produce - and it was not within the ambit of

11     this report - to produce a section on the ministry of internal affairs of

12     the Republic of Croatia for the period from the multi-party elections in

13     Croatia until the outbreak of armed conflict.

14        Q.   One thing that you do opine on, somewhat obliquely at times is,

15     the reasonableness, for example, of Ilija Petrovic raising the specter of

16     the HDZ wishing to establish a regime bearing certain similarities to the

17     independent state of Croatia.  And I believe you suggest that's -- that

18     was irresponsible on his part.

19             Wouldn't you agree that in making that suggestion you're relying

20     on assessments about what changes were or were not occurring in the

21     police at that time?

22        A.   Well, if you would direct me to a specific portion in the report,

23     then I'm happy to comment on that.

24             However, as we dealt with -- right before the previous break, we

25     dealt with at length my views of the irresponsible activities of various

Page 3021

 1     actors on the Croatian side, including the president, and I would also

 2     state in that, including certain officials in the police, that -- I -- I

 3     do not have a difficulty accepting that the police in Croatia, that is

 4     ethnic Croats in the police in Croatia, were using the police to try to

 5     move towards an autonomous or independent Croatia and that the police in

 6     Croatia played an important and, indeed, crucial role in the formation of

 7     an independent Croatian state.  Where I believe I differed with

 8     Mr. Petrovic, and again I'm speaking a bit from memory here, is that

 9     Mr. Petrovic on at least one occasion in his book seems to indicate or

10     believe that Croats, police officers, were drawing up lists of persons

11     who would be executed or incarcerated from the Serb side.

12        Q.   But you would agree that there was very serious cause for alarm,

13     given the basis of events that were going on, in particular, in the

14     Croatian police in early 1991.  If you were a Serb.

15        A.   Yes, I agree that there was very serious cause for alarm.  Given

16     the basis of events that were going during that period, and I believe

17     that I also stated that quite clearly earlier today.

18        Q.   And you'd agree that it would be reasonable under those

19     circumstances to, as a politician, openly discuss political solutions

20     that would reassure the population; correct?

21        A.   Yes.  Although that begs the question of what are political

22     solutions that would reassure the population.

23        Q.   Well, of course it's very hazardous to speak about entire

24     movements, but at times you have testified - and you did testify last

25     time - that politicians manipulated public opinion in the SBWS.  You

Page 3022

 1     didn't say that Goran Hadzic manipulated public opinion.

 2             But would you agree with me that there were those and it was

 3     perfectly possible to espouse a desire for autonomy, greater

 4     independence, authority over policing, as a meaningful response to what

 5     was going on in early 1991?

 6        A.   I would agree that in terms of the second half of 1990 or early

 7     1991, there were -- there was a possibility to discuss how policing was

 8     going to be structured.  There were many discussions, for example, about

 9     ensuring that the police in various municipalities in Croatia should

10     reflect the ethnic distribution of the population in those

11     municipalities.  There were also, at least theoretically, possibilities

12     for discussing how the police could be controlled in a way that if such a

13     way were indeed possible and the possibilities for that were rapidly

14     disappearing as time advanced, in a way that both, for example, Belgrade,

15     Zagreb, and Serbs in Croatia would be satisfied with it.  And I would

16     also agree that at least until the events in Borovo Selo, if we are to

17     take Josip Bojkovac's word for it, and I stress this is based on the

18     minister of internal affairs of Croatia's memoirs, according to his

19     memoirs Mr. Hadzic was among those who were involved in such discussions

20     until the events at Borovo Selo.

21        Q.   Dr. Nielsen, thank you very much for your testimony.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Demirdjian, re-direct.

23             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Yes, Your Honours.

24                           Re-examination by Mr. Demirdjian:

25        Q.   Good afternoon, Dr. Nielsen.


Page 3023

 1        A.   Good afternoon.

 2        Q.   I will try to be as brief as possible to make sure that can you

 3     catch your plane this afternoon.  So let me get right to it.

 4             Today -- no, sorry, in January during the first day of

 5     cross-examination, my learned friend was asking you about your access to

 6     OTP databases in the context of the methodology applied in preparing your

 7     report, if you recall that.

 8             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  This was at page 2532 for everyone in the

 9     courtroom.

10        Q.   And I would like you to explain to the Chamber, just for the sake

11     of completeness, what other, if any, sources did you use for the

12     preparation of your report and in the information gathering efforts?

13        A.   Well, first of all I would be remiss if I did not thank

14     Mr. Gosnell and his co-counsel for the very stimulating questions that

15     they posed.  So thank you for that.

16             As I stated earlier, I believe that in addition to the access

17     that I had to OTP databases that I used in preparing my report, I also

18     used a number of books that I identified, for example, the book by

19     Nikica Baric, in preparing this report.

20        Q.   And -- yes.  As an expert on history and police-related matters,

21     how would you qualify your reliance on documents provided by the Office

22     of the Prosecutor?

23        A.   Well, from the point of view of methodology, I -- I was of

24     necessity reliant upon the documents provided by the Office of the

25     Prosecutor simply because with the possible exception of certain still

Page 3024

 1     unaccessible archives in the former Yugoslavia, there is no repository of

 2     relevant documentation that I have access to besides that which the OTP

 3     possesses.  But I would also state, as I believe I did earlier, that in

 4     all cases, in -- when I did identify documents that I thought were

 5     relevant or were missing from the documents in -- that I had initially

 6     obtained from the OTP, I was in touch with the OTP and asked for those

 7     documents to be provided for me if they were available if I could not

 8     myself retrieve them from the EDS database.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Now on this issue of availability of documentation, this

10     is an issue that was raised by the Defence at page 2537 in January, and

11     you were asked about the confidence that you placed in the conclusions

12     reached in your report having considered, and I quote from Mr. Gosnell,

13     "the combination of a very sparse documentary foundation with the

14     exclusion of witness evidence."  At the time you were discussing the fact

15     that you did not rely on witness evidence.

16             Now, this was asked to you in a general matter without -- manner,

17     sorry, without referencing specific parts of your report, and I would

18     like you to look at the table of contents of your report.  I don't know

19     if you have a copy with you.

20        A.   Yes, I do.

21        Q.   And this is, just for reference, 65 ter 2837.  I believe the

22     table of contents is at page 2.  And I'd like to remind you that at page

23     2506, during your examination-in-chief, when you were asked whether you

24     had seen documents relating to the organisational structure of the MUP

25     and the RSK or the SBWS, your answer was that as far as the SBWS was

Page 3025

 1     concerned, the documentation was very, very sparse.

 2             Now looking at the table contents, I would like you to look at

 3     Roman numeral number II, the general historical and political background.

 4     Could you tell the Chamber for this chapter how you would qualify the

 5     availability of sources relating to the general and historical

 6     background?

 7        A.   Well, as we see Roman numeral II consists of four points, and the

 8     state of the documentation is such, if I were to rank the various SAOs

 9     hierarchically, the state of documentation for the SAO Krajina is by far

10     the best in terms of its completeness and in terms of its availability,

11     followed by the amount of documentation available for the SAO of

12     Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, and by far the worst or most lacking

13     set of documentation is that pertaining to the SAO Western Slavonia.

14        Q.   And putting aside for a moment MUP-related matters, how would you

15     qualify the availability of sources in relation to the historical

16     background of the conflict in the early 1990s?

17        A.   If you are speaking of the entire political context of the

18     conflict in the early 1990s, then, the source base, I think, is -- is

19     quite good, not least because a number of key discussions took place in

20     Belgrade and those have been made available in -- in the form of

21     stenographic records from meetings of, for example, the Federal

22     Presidency.  However, if we look at the meetings that took place, the

23     discussions that we know must have transpired in, for example, the SAO of

24     Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, then we possess very few sources

25     that stem directly from those meeting, and therefore I had to rely

Page 3026

 1     primarily on the available gazetted decisions and, of course, the book of

 2     Mr. Petrovic as well.

 3        Q.   Okay.  I will not go through each -- each chapter of your report

 4     one by one, but perhaps could you confirm for the Trial Chamber when you

 5     were talking about the fact that you had -- that the documentation was

 6     very sparse, which -- which chapter or section of your report would you

 7     have in mind?

 8        A.   Well, again, I refer to my context as counsel for the Defence

 9     has -- has pointed out, my context is that I come to this subject from

10     preparing an expert report previously on the MUP of Republika Srpska.

11     And when one is used to such an abundance of sources as are existing for

12     the MUP of Republika Srpska, then the available sources for the Krajina

13     area of Croatia are, by contrast, already quite sparse.  But as I noted,

14     even within the available sources for the entities created by the

15     Croatian Serbs, the vast majority of available sources pertain to the

16     SAO Krajina and, later, to the RSK MUP, whereas -- and even during the

17     RSK MUP phase to the Knin or western Krajina area and very -- by contrast

18     relatively little documentation exists that enables one to reconstruct

19     what transpired in the SAO SBWS and Western Slavonia.  I think it is

20     indicative that both in the direct examination and in the

21     cross-examination we spent by my count the vast majority of the time

22     discussing documents that were more recently obtained from the Serbian

23     military archives, many of which cast great considerable additional light

24     on this subject and that -- that -- that those 370-odd documents give us

25     so much additional information says a lot about how little we had before

Page 3027

 1     they arrived.

 2        Q.   And looking at the last chapter of your report which we -- deals

 3     with the co-operation between the police of Serb-controlled entities in

 4     Croatia and the MUP of Serbia, again, how confident are you in relation

 5     to the availability of material in relation to that chapter?

 6        A.   Again, there we are assisted by the fact that a substantial

 7     amount of that documentation has become available more recently as

 8     Belgrade has been more generous with permission to its -- to access its

 9     archives, but I also have to state, again, that based on the number of

10     reports we have and something we discussed repeatedly, the numbering of

11     reports, one can easily as an analyst conclude that there must be many

12     many more relevant reports in Belgrade that, if they exist, have not yet

13     been provided to this Court.

14        Q.   Very well.  Now, this morning, I'm moving to another topic now,

15     we spent a considerable amount of time dealing with Exhibit P194.140

16     which was Goran Hadzic's order appointing Arkan as commander of the TO

17     training centre in Erdut, and this was on page 46 and 47 of today's

18     transcript.

19             Now, in one of the questions put to you by my learned friend, he

20     referred to the fact that there's an absence in relation to the origin of

21     the document.

22             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Just for the Trial Chamber's information, there

23     was a request from the Defence to -- to find out what was the origin of

24     this document to the Office of the Prosecutor, and the OTP did inform the

25     Defence that this was obtained from the Defence team of the -- of Jovica

Page 3028

 1     Stanisic.

 2        Q.   Now, you note that -- several times that the authorities at the

 3     time were not very meticulous in their way of drafting documents,

 4     reports, letters, et cetera, and I would like you to look at Exhibit D30

 5     which was just shown to you by my learned friend.  This is the letter of

 6     the 23rd of December, 1991, by Goran Hadzic to the town commander in

 7     Ilok.  And it's Exhibit D30.

 8             And if we look at that cover page, first page, sorry, can you,

 9     first of all, tell us if there is a number on this document?

10        A.   No.  As previously stated, there is no document number here.

11        Q.   And you are aware, and we will come to that in a moment, that

12     there was a response to this document, to this letter.

13        A.   Yes, I am aware of that.  That response came on the 25th of

14     December, 1991.

15        Q.   While we're on this document, I would like you to turn to page 3

16     in the English version, which, by my calculations, should be page 2 in

17     the B/C/S version.  And this is a paragraph that my learned friend

18     referred to which starts with:

19             "The government has been told that the settlement of Ilok went on

20     rather well."

21             Are you able to locate that paragraph, Dr. Nielsen?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Now, the sentence here says that:

24             "Naturally we're not bothered by this, but in the spirit of

25     co-operation, we would appreciate at least being informed about the

Page 3029

 1     criteria according to which it was done, with a possible remark that our

 2     approval does not go without saying."

 3             Now, this last of the sentence, what is Goran Hadzic suggesting

 4     here, in your view, when he says that our approval does not go without

 5     saying?

 6        A.   Well, I read it as, first, Mr. Hadzic suggesting that they do

 7     need to arrive at joint criteria, that they take umbrage at the fact that

 8     they have not been informed what criteria are being used, but that he's

 9     also asserting his own authority in stating that just because the

10     military has a certain criteria or because the military propose a certain

11     criteria, this does not necessarily mean that the SAO district government

12     will accept those criteria, that they may have to negotiate.

13        Q.   And looking two paragraphs down, the paragraph beginning with:

14     "In connection with this," here it appears that -- well, it does not

15     appear, it is written that Hadzic informs the town commander that the

16     government adopted a decision during a session of the government granting

17     temporary residence to these persons.

18             Now, again in relation to the previous answer you just gave, what

19     can you say about how the government viewed its decision-making on these

20     matters.

21        A.   Well, again, as I see it, especially in light of what the

22     military subsequently writes.  There had been a number of instances where

23     the military had expressed dissatisfaction with decisions made by the

24     district and vice versa, and in the spirit of better co-operation, they

25     are now trying to initiate a more direct dialogue so that they can engage

Page 3030

 1     in solving these problems together.  As also discussed, this is in the

 2     general context at this time where the military has repeatedly expressed

 3     its desire to divest itself of matters that it views as better relocated

 4     to civilian authorities, and obviously from the point of view of the

 5     district it is of -- in their interest to assert control over such

 6     activities and to demonstrate that they can carry them out properly.

 7        Q.   Now let's look at the answer, which is at 65 ter 6059.  And again

 8     as pointed out by my learned friend, these two documents were not on our

 9     lists but I think we have agreement on -- yes.

10             MR. GOSNELL:  Well, I'm not actually sure that we have an

11     agreement, and I -- I apologise if I may appear to be not be taking a

12     consistent position.  It's just that now I'm in a position where I don't

13     have an opportunity to look at this document with Dr. Nielsen.

14             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Well, this is a document that was referred to as

15     you mentioned -- as the Defence mentioned three times by Dr. Nielsen this

16     morning.  Mr. Gosnell decided to show the letter that Goran Hadzic sent

17     to the town command, and what I wish to do here is to show the response

18     to complete the picture of what was that relationship between the

19     government and the town command.

20             MR. GOSNELL:  I would withdraw the objection if I would be

21     granted some latitude, depending on the questions, to ask one or two

22     follow-ups.

23             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Demirdjian.

24             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

25        Q.   So this is 65 ter 6059.  Dated 25th of December, you can see at

Page 3031

 1     the top left it reads:  "Reply to your letter."  And it is addressed to

 2     Mr. Goran Hadzic.

 3             In the English version -- well, we can see the introduction on

 4     the first page.

 5             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Can we go to the second page, please, of the

 6     English version, which -- I believe in the B/C/S version we'll have to

 7     scroll down to the bottom.  Yes.  Thank you.

 8        Q.   Dr. Nielsen, do you see the paragraph which begins:  "I must

 9     admit that I expected ..." Do you see that?

10        A.   Yes, I do.

11        Q.   Okay.  Here, there's a discussion going on about how to deal with

12     the issue of -- in resolving the issue of a settlement of refugees from

13     other parts of the country.  And if you could see in the middle of that

14     paragraph, at least in the English version - we may need to go to the

15     next page in the B/C/S version.  It says here:

16             "I am disappointed to have to say and inform you that the people

17     you entrusted with the resolution of the most important civilian matter

18     at the moment have not demonstrated any shred of necessary skills,

19     resourcefulness, knowledge, and most devastating of all, good will."

20             Now, what is the town commander informing Goran Hadzic of at this

21     stage?

22        A.   Obviously the town commander is, first of all, expressing at the

23     beginning of the paragraph his disappointment that the government

24     authorities of the district had not acted as quickly in dealing with the

25     settlement issue as the military might have desired.  And then he goes on

Page 3032

 1     to state that these assumptions not having been borne out that the

 2     civilian authorities would do this.  He was also disappointed in those

 3     cases where persons were appointed to deal with the -- what he calls the

 4     most pressing civilian matter, those persons were not capable and did not

 5     perform in a way that the military regarded as being positive.

 6             I would just point out that in the B/C/S original it talks about

 7     a lack of will.  Good well is not mentioned.

 8        Q.   Lack of well.  Okay.  We'll submit that for a revised

 9     translation.  And Dr. Nielsen, if we go to page 3 in the English version,

10     my learned friend read to the part of Goran Hadzic's letter which stated

11     that they are not contesting -- the government is not contesting the

12     presence of the army.  And you can see the beginning of that paragraph in

13     the middle of the page:

14             "As you are not contesting the presence of the army in the area,

15     this leads to the conclusion that the army is there not because it is a

16     zone of combat activity and because it is carrying out combat tasks but

17     because you are graciously allowing it to be there."

18             Now, how do you read this comment, that the government is

19     graciously allowing the army to be there in light of the other documents

20     that you have seen?

21        A.   Well, it's -- it's -- to me it's a puzzling statement, not least

22     because he then goes on to state that everyone knows that the army

23     arrived before the authorities of the Serb district.  So I have no idea

24     whether he is trying to sound facetious or not, but it is certainly the

25     case that the army arrived in many cases before the district authorities,

Page 3033

 1     and this term of "graciously permitting us to be there," again, to me, it

 2     simply sounds facetious.

 3        Q.   Now by this stage, and this is something that I believe

 4     Goran Hadzic in his letter indicated earlier, that military operations

 5     were a thing of the past, and these are letters -- an exchange of

 6     lettering at the end of December 1991.  Again, in relation to all the

 7     documents that you have seen and having regard to the fact that this is

 8     at a stage where combat activities are not ongoing, are you able to say

 9     anything about the government's position in relation to the presence of

10     the army on its territory at the end of 1991 and early 1992?

11        A.   I don't think I would like to make any general comment other than

12     that, as previously discussed, there seems to be some consensus which is

13     not without tension and indeed continues to be with quite tense into the

14     spring of 1992 where the army wishes to divest itself of civilian matters

15     but, at the same time, views with suspicion and, at times,

16     disappointment, the efforts being made by the civilian authorities to

17     take over the burden of performing those tasks.

18        Q.   You were mentioning that this may have sounded a bit facetious on

19     the part of Colonel Belic.  If we go to the bottom of page 4 in the

20     English version, and we may have to move to page 3 in the B/C/S version,

21     if you look at the bottom of the page in the English version, it says

22     here:

23             "Mr. President, in order to overcome these problems," et cetera

24     et cetera, "I place my command at your disposal with the wish for life to

25     be restored to normal as soon as possible."

Page 3034

 1             And again, I mean, what can you make out of this exchange of

 2     letters between Hadzic and Belic in terms of what their relationship

 3     seems to be and again in light of what the army is saying here?  They're

 4     placing their command at his disposal.

 5        A.   I don't want to make, on the one hand, too much out of these two

 6     letters.  It is one exchange of letters, though it is a very important

 7     one because we also don't have a lot of other such exchanges that go

 8     directly between an army command and Mr. Hadzic.  But, again, is the case

 9     that there have been, as we see in many other documents, an abundant

10     number of irregularities in this area, and they have now decided - this

11     military officer and Mr. Hadzic - to initiate a written dialogue with a

12     goal of better co-operation in the future.

13             As a more general comment, the unfortunate aspect of the totality

14     of the military documentation that stretches into the spring of 1992 is

15     that it in many cases makes clear that these irregularities persisted for

16     quite some months and that also there are no clear indications at all

17     that anyone, paramilitaries, civilian leaders, military leaders, or

18     otherwise were held to account before a court of law or in any other way

19     for the irregularities that had taken place in the preceding period,

20     including as regarded the resettlement issue.

21             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Your Honours, I have one last topic which will

22     last two, three, minutes.  If I may have your indulgence.  Thank you.

23        Q.   A very different topic.  Dr. Nielsen, this morning you were also

24     asked about the number of orders issued by Goran Hadzic to the Ministry

25     of Interior.  This was at page 84 of today's transcript where you

Page 3035

 1     answered in the following way:

 2             "It is correct that after the establishment of the RSK there are

 3     no indications, as I have been able to see it, in the available

 4     documentation that indicate that Mr. Hadzic is involved in law

 5     enforcement activities or other routine issues of internal affairs."

 6             Now as an expert on police institutions in the former Yugoslavia,

 7     if Goran Hadzic as president of the RSK did not involve himself as you

 8     say personally in law enforcement or other routine internal affairs

 9     issues, is this an indication that he did not have the authority or the

10     power to intervene or involve himself in such matters?

11        A.   Well, I refer in the report to the constitutional powers that are

12     vested in Mr. Hadzic in his capacity of president of the RSK.  I believe

13     that's on pages 17 and 18 of my report.  And certainly as regards his

14     abilities to propose members of the government and to proclaim laws by

15     decree, for example, also one could argue to a lesser extent by even

16     giving awards and recognitions, Mr. Hadzic did have the ability to

17     influence the ministry of internal affairs.  As to whether he exercised

18     and how often he exercised those constitutionally-given powers, that is

19     another matter.

20             I would very quickly, however, point out that I at least on one

21     occasion in the report refer to conflicts involving personnel disputes in

22     the police in the RSK after it was formed in February 1992 where at least

23     some of the actors involved tried to get Mr. Hadzic to be involved as a

24     mediator in resolving those very pronounced personnel conflicts.

25        Q.   Very well.

Page 3036

 1             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I note the time, Your Honours.  This concludes

 2     my re-examination.  I believe that we can leave to tomorrow morning the

 3     issue of the admission of the report and the exhibits given that

 4     Dr. Nielsen has to depart.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  All right.

 6             If there's nothing else for Dr. Nielsen ...

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Nielsen, this brings your testimony to an

 9     end.  You're now released as a witness.  We thank you very much for

10     coming to The Hague one more time, and we wish you a safe journey back

11     home.

12             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

13                           [The witness withdrew]

14             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  And, Your Honours, if I may thank Your Honours

15     for your indulgence, as well as those of the interpreters and everybody

16     else in and around the courtroom.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

18             Court adjourned.

19                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.32 p.m.,

20                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 7th day of

21                           February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.