Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4394

 1                           Friday, 10 May 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around the

 6     courtroom.

 7             Mr. Registrar, could you call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case number

 9     IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

11             May we have the appearances, starting with the Prosecution,

12     please.

13             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning

14     everybody in and around the courtroom.  For the Prosecution this morning,

15     Alex Demirdjian with Lisa Biersay, our case manager Thomas Laugel, and

16     our legal intern Agnes Bugaj.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

18             For the Defence, Mr. Zivanovic.

19             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  For the Defence of

20     Goran Hadzic, Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

22             If there is nothing else, the witness may be brought in.

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good morning, Mr. Theunens.

25             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 


Page 4395

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gosnell, please proceed.

 2             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3                           WITNESS:  REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]

 4                           Cross-examination by Mr. Gosnell: [Continued]

 5        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Theunens.

 6        A.   Good morning, Mr. Gosnell.

 7        Q.   Just a couple of follow-up questions on the topic I was asking

 8     you about yesterday and your relations with the Office of the Prosecutor.

 9     Did you review or assist in preparing any pre-trial briefs or final trial

10     briefs or appeal briefs during your eight years in your association with

11     the office?

12        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, and my role in relation to these documents

13     was limited to reviewing the military aspects to see whether, for

14     example, military regulations were accurately reflected or the names of

15     individuals or the positions they held.  So I was not involved in any

16     legal -- formulating of legal arguments, I was formulating -- I was

17     exclusively involved in what I would call factual issues within the field

18     of my professional expertise.

19        Q.   And that involved interpreting volumes of documents and reaching

20     conclusions; correct?

21        A.   Indeed, but I prefer to be more specific.  Reviewing volumes of

22     military documents in order to draw or reaching military conclusions.

23        Q.   Well, I didn't say -- I said "interpreting volumes of documents

24     and reaching conclusions."  Would that include -- would that be part of

25     what you were doing?


Page 4396

 1        A.   What do you mean by "interpreting"?

 2        Q.   Well, what I mean by "interpreting," is assessing the

 3     significance of -- and the meaning of documents in order to assess

 4     responsibility of individuals in relation to events?

 5        A.   I would say that this is a bit of a narrow interpretation of my

 6     role.  My role provided, among other things, in explaining the military

 7     context, for example, when the word "volunteer unit" would pop up then my

 8     task would consist in explaining to the lawyers in the team what was

 9     meant by that, not only in relation to SFRY armed forces doctrine but

10     also looking at the specific facts.  Of course I would also look into

11     command and control issues.  So if you talk about military -- about

12     responsibility, if you mean military responsibility, yes; if you mean

13     criminal responsibility, as I said, I did -- I was not involved in legal

14     issues because that is not what I've been trained nor educated in.

15        Q.   What about international humanitarian law, have you been trained

16     and educated in that and did you provide advice on that?

17        A.   Well, like any member of an armed force, I was trained in that.

18     I mean, we had a lot of law in the second year of military academy, but

19     while working here, even if my general knowledge of these issues that I

20     had acquired in my education at the military academy was for sure useful.

21     And of course I familiarised myself with issues like 7(1) and 7(3).  I

22     did not express views in my work or in my reports -- I mean, if you

23     review all the eight or nine reports you will not see references to 7(1)

24     or 7(3) or related issues.

25        Q.   But your interpretation - and I come back to that word - your


Page 4397

 1     interpretation of documents for the purposes of providing assistance to

 2     the formulation of pre-trial briefs and final trial briefs was informed

 3     by your understanding of what we can broadly call responsibility;

 4     correct?

 5        A.   Your Honours, I think I answered the question because I tried to

 6     specify what I've done and in relation to the expressions you used

 7     "interpretation" and "responsibility," and now you come back again to

 8     your broad question.  I mean, I've answered the question.  I was here as

 9     an intelligence analyst military, which means that I look -- I mean

10     general terms into military issues, whether it's command and control,

11     whether it's context, whether it's structures, organisations, roles of

12     military, that was my task.  And that was focused on factual issues,

13     i.e., I look at documents.  I may have been asked -- also I was also

14     asked to look at witness statements.  I look at those factual issues and

15     then I explain what they mean from a military point of view and that's

16     it.  And then whatever legal interpretation that may be derived from

17     that, that was not my task, I was not asked to do so, because there's

18     other people in the Office of the Prosecution who are much better

19     qualified than I to take care of these kind of matters.

20        Q.   And in assessing command and control structures, organisations,

21     roles of the military, in a given week how often did you speak, exchange

22     an e-mail, pick up the telephone and speak with lawyers in the Office of

23     the Prosecutor during your eight years with the Tribunal?

24        A.   Your Honours, I wasn't requested to keep statistics.  I don't

25     want to give the impression that I want to argue, but one of your


Page 4398

 1     colleagues once asked me how my salary was established.  I think it was

 2     in the Vukovar case, whether I was paid --

 3        Q.   Mr. Theunens --

 4        A.   -- whether I was paid in according to the results that were

 5     achieved.  Of course I had daily contacts with other team members and

 6     these team members consisted of lawyers, I mean senior trial attorneys,

 7     trial attorneys, junior lawyers, interns, as I had contacts with

 8     investigators and criminal analysts.

 9        Q.   So the answer to my question is daily?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   How many times daily on average?

12        A.   You know, from a physical point of view -- for example, when I

13     take lunch, I'm not going to take lunch in isolation in a corner - I

14     don't know where - in the park, so I may bump into people and I may even

15     talk to these people, but it's not like that -- I think you're trying to

16     suggest that the Office of the Prosecutor was maybe on a daily or

17     whatever frequency I will mention the Office of the Prosecutor and

18     especially the lawyers would use that time to give instructions to me as

19     to what I should write or what I should do -- I mean --

20        Q.   Mr. Theunens, let me stop you there.  I'm not suggesting

21     anything.  All I'm doing is asking factual questions, and it's neither

22     for me nor you to come to these various interpretations or implications.

23     So perhaps we could just stick to the factual side of it and I think

24     you've answered my question and now I'm going to move to the next

25     question which is:  Is the military analysis team of which you were a


Page 4399

 1     part, is that organisationally part of the Office of the Prosecutor?

 2        A.   That is correct.  The military analysis team was a part of the

 3     Office of the Prosecutor.

 4        Q.   And who was signing your e-passes over the course of the eight

 5     years that you were employed by the Tribunal?

 6        A.   My -- I mean, the first reporting officers I mentioned earlier,

 7     those were the team leaders of the military analysis team, and then the

 8     second reporting officer I believe it was in most cases Mr. Bob Reid and

 9     I forget now the official job title he had -- but I mean he was a senior

10     investigator and then I think he -- whether he was a chief of

11     investigations or -- I think he was chief of investigations for most of

12     the time.

13        Q.   In any event, he's a part of the Office of the Prosecutor; is

14     that right?

15        A.   That is correct, yeah.

16        Q.   Sir, I'd like to ask you, when would you say - because you

17     haven't been asked this question and it doesn't say in your report - when

18     would you say that the armed conflict started in Croatia?  And by "armed

19     conflict," I mean sustained violence between two opposing and organised

20     forces.

21        A.   Your Honours, I think that it's -- I won't say it's impossible to

22     answer.  There are lots of answers to that question, but I think these

23     answers are also often based on personal interpretations.  I would prefer

24     to look into -- to look at the official documents and then to say okay to

25     start from that.  If I'm not mistaken it's addressed in the report end of


Page 4400

 1     September 1991.  What remains of the SFRY Presidency "establishes the

 2     existence of an imminent state of war."  There has been some debate about

 3     the word -- about the use of the expression "establish," because why

 4     would they use "establish," they could just declare the state of imminent

 5     threat of war.  I also know that for the Croatian side the conflict in

 6     their view started much earlier, whereas on the Yugoslav or the JNA side

 7     even the memorandum we saw --

 8        Q.   Mr. Theunens --

 9        A.   Can I answer the question, please.

10        Q.   Well, I'm going to try to guide you to an answer to answering the

11     question --

12        A.   No, I'm --

13        Q.   -- because you're actually not answering the question, because if

14     you listen to my question I framed it as a matter of actual conduct of

15     hostilities not as a matter of declarations, legal pronouncements, and so

16     forth.  And you've looked at many military documents indicating when

17     engagements occurred, and you've interviewed many witnesses who

18     presumably gave you information about that, and you've reported on that

19     in your report.  So what I'm asking you is - and you certainly have

20     knowledge of all these issues - when would you say that there was

21     sustained violence between two opposing and organised forces in Croatia?

22        A.   Well, again without wanting to argue, I think you formulate the

23     question now differently because initially you talk about an armed

24     conflict.  I understand armed conflict as a legal concept whereby indeed

25     you may be able to, based on the contemporaneous documents, establish


Page 4401

 1     when it was officially declared.  If you talk about sustained violence

 2     between two opposing and organised forces in Croatia, I mean there may be

 3     some debate about the --

 4             JUDGE HALL:  If I may intervene, Mr. Theunens, if I understand

 5     Mr. Gosnell correctly - and he would point out to me if I got it

 6     wrong - the question is when do you say, and this arises out of all your

 7     experience, all of your analysis and what not, but the nub of the

 8     question is when do you say.

 9             Is that correct?  Yes, thank you.

10             MR. GOSNELL:  Yes, thank you very much, Judge Hall.

11             THE WITNESS:  Thank you for the clarification, Your Honours.  I

12     would say that in the course of summer 1991 we see a spreading of

13     hostilities in Croatia.

14             MR. GOSNELL:

15        Q.   So would it be at least safe to say that your opinion is that

16     there was an armed conflict as of the 1st of August, 1991?

17        A.   Yes --

18        Q.   And by "armed conflict," I'm referring to the definition I gave

19     earlier?

20        A.   Yes, that would be correct.

21        Q.   And on page 17 and 18 of your report - and now we're going to go

22     back, I'm afraid, to some potentially tedious discussions of legislation

23     but I'm afraid it has to be done, Mr. Theunens.  And on page 17 and 18 of

24     your report you quote from the SFRY Constitution, which is L9 at

25     Prosecution tab 4 but it's fully set out in your report so we don't need


Page 4402

 1     to bring the article up, and at Article 240 I'm interested in the second

 2     or in the portion of the provision that reads:

 3             "Any citizen who takes part in resisting aggression towards the

 4     country is a member of the armed forces of the SFRY."

 5             So am I right that this is the legal foundation for about I

 6     believe what you said yesterday, namely, that if someone takes up arms in

 7     defence of the country they're part of the armed forces of the SFRY?

 8        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, that is the general principle that is

 9     further specified by the additional legislative and other documents we

10     have discussed.

11        Q.   And isn't it true that a person who does so and who is not a

12     member of the JNA is considered to be a part of the Territorial Defence?

13     That could be a yes or no answer, Mr. Theunens.

14        A.   I mean, if you allow me, I would say yes, given of course the

15     other provisions in the other articles that define who and how they can

16     join the armed forces.

17        Q.   Well, let's look at page 21 of your report, and there it says,

18     quoting Article 102 of the Law on All People's Defence, and this is SFRY

19     legislation:

20             "Territorial Defence shall comprise all armed formations that are

21     not incorporated into the Yugoslav People's Army."

22             That's the foundation for your statement that if someone takes up

23     arms in defence of the country they become part of the TO; right?

24        A.   Yeah, but now -- okay, I didn't say it like that, but I mean you

25     can summarise it like that, but I would prefer to go to my own answer


Page 4403

 1     because it's a bit more complicated.

 2        Q.   Well, let's go to your own answer in Milosevic --

 3             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I apologise for intervening.  I don't mean to

 4     interrupt, but the question could be potentially misleading if you don't

 5     add at the end of the quote "and the police," not just the "SFRY."  I

 6     just wanted to bring that to your attention.

 7             MR. GOSNELL:  Yeah, that's a helpful addition.  I thank my

 8     colleague for that.  That's right.

 9        Q.   So in the Milosevic case, just to be very precise about the

10     answers that you've given, at page 314081 [sic] this is Defence tab 1,

11     04850 for the record, you said:

12             "It's also noteworthy that the 1974 Constitution states that the

13     armed forces, the SFRY armed forces, consist of the JNA and TO and that

14     all other armed groups or individuals who want to participate in the

15     defence or the armed struggle will be considered members of the TO."

16             That's right, isn't it?

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Please don't read fast because the interpreters

18     must keep up.  Thank you.

19             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, I mean I don't have the -- my testimony in

20     front of me but I -- I mean, I would agree with it because I still hold

21     that view now.

22             MR. GOSNELL:

23        Q.   And the Law on All People's Defence is a very long document with

24     many provisions, sometimes difficult to reconcile and perhaps understand.

25     Would you just, first of all, agree with that general observation?


Page 4404

 1        A.   It's probably long -- I mean, but whether it -- sometimes

 2     difficult to reconcile and perhaps understand, I can say that for the

 3     issues I was -- I looked at, structure, command and control, and related

 4     matters, I notice consistency between not only the constitution, the All

 5     People's Defence law, but also the various doctrinal documents.  At this

 6     moment I don't recall any issues that were difficult to reconcile, but

 7     maybe you can draw my attention to one.

 8        Q.   Well, that's a fair answer if you -- if you do believe that it's

 9     an entirely coherent structure and we'll work our way through some

10     provisions.  And perhaps we could just look at Article 1, and this is

11     L10, Prosecution tab 10.  I bring this provision to your attention, sir,

12     because I believe it helps provide a flavour as to military doctrine in

13     the SFRY and -- I mean, this is the very beginning of the law.  It says:

14             "This law shall regulate the basic rights and duties of working

15     people and citizens, basic and other organisations of associated labour,

16     local communes, and other self management organisations and communities

17     and socio-political and other social organisations in the defence of

18     independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the social order

19     established by the Constitution of the SFRY."

20             Now, my first question for you is very specific and that is:  Do

21     you know what a socio-political and other social organisations, that

22     expression, do you know what that encompasses?

23        A.   Well, these are basic entities -- no, I will rephrase that.

24     These are entities or structures that can play role or play a role in the

25     concept of All People's Defence, where basically the entire population is


Page 4405

 1     involved or is used in order to defend the country.

 2        Q.   And for me as a -- perhaps from a different culture, I read these

 3     provisions and I'm startled because we see all manner of

 4     organisational -- almost informal organisational units being apparently

 5     recognised in this law.  Now, do I understand correctly that what this

 6     law is doing is saying that total national defence can be organised

 7     around these informal associations?

 8        A.   No, Your Honours, I wouldn't -- I have no recollection that we

 9     are talking about informal organisational units.  What I recall is that

10     there was a quite formal organisation; for example, in state-owned

11     factories there were defence structures and they would have exercises and

12     they would mobilise and there would be weapons and so on.  But this was

13     all very well organised, at least before the dissolution of the SFRY.

14     The same for the TO, we looked at measures that are taken to increase

15     control of weapons or TO, so I wouldn't share the view that it was

16     informal.  I would also highlight that no mention is made of any

17     political parties as one of these -- I'm just trying to find --

18        Q.   I didn't say "political parties" and let's leave political

19     parties out of it, Mr. Theunens.

20        A.   Okay.

21        Q.   And maybe I used the wrong word in saying informal.  Let's say

22     flexible.  I mean, for example, could a student union be considered a

23     socio-political organisation?

24        A.   As long as it is legally recognised, then it could be, but again

25     I would prefer to look at the specific documents.  And again, in my


Page 4406

 1     interpretation "flexible" has nothing to do whether something is official

 2     or nonofficial or formal or informal.  A military unit has to be

 3     flexible, for example, to be able to handle different situations that may

 4     arise not only on the battle-field but also, yeah, losses, different

 5     missions, and so on, and military unit will be a very formal structure.

 6        Q.   Now, I do understand that military units are a formal structure

 7     but what seems to be recognised here in Article 1 is a very flexible

 8     approach to what you said was allowing the entire population to

 9     participate in the defence.  Do you see that Article 1 is an expression

10     of a -- let's start with a general question.  Is Article 1 a means by

11     which the entire population, through organisations at a very low level,

12     can organise and participate in national defence?

13        A.   Yes, but the difference in -- between what my answer is and then

14     you come back to your point, you say it's all informal and maybe

15     spontaneous even if I try to understand the gist of your question.  What

16     I tried to explain is that indeed there are different organisations that

17     can play a role, but the prime condition is that these organisations have

18     been recognised, I mean there's a legal basis for their existence and for

19     their activities.  And as a result of that legal basis, they will

20     accomplish a defined role in the concept of All People's Defence, whereby

21     obviously there will also be a way of co-ordinating the contribution of

22     these organisations, I mean the social organisations, the TO, the

23     military and so on, so that everybody fulfils his or her role in a

24     co-ordinated manner in the defence of the country.

25        Q.   We'll get to the co-ordination issue in a moment.  But the issue


Page 4407

 1     here is:  What are the basic units of people self organising in order to

 2     participate in national defence?  And I'm suggesting to you that this is

 3     a very flexible notion.  You say that these groups need to be legally

 4     recognised, but on the other hand you say that it potentially could be a

 5     student union, it could be a labour union, it could be -- could it be a

 6     chess club?

 7        A.   Your Honours, I mean maybe there's a misunderstanding about the

 8     expression of the word "self-management."  Self-management was the -- I

 9     wouldn't say economical but maybe the economical doctrine in that exists

10     in the SFRY, whereas in the west we had capitalism and in the former

11     Soviet union and other countries you had communism the way they defined

12     it.  But self management - and again this is outside my expertise but

13     while working on the former Yugoslavia I had to study a little bit about

14     it - at the end of the day it was very much regulated and there was

15     central control and there was a central revision and so on or state

16     control and state revision.  It's the same with these social entities and

17     organisations of associated labour.  These are not spontaneous clubs

18     that -- I mean, like a -- I don't know, they didn't have Facebook then,

19     but that spontaneously develop and people come together and say hey we're

20     going to defend the country.  It was all regulated for obvious reasons.

21     You cannot just have private groups establishing themselves, getting

22     weapons wherever they want, and then they just say we're going to defend

23     the country.  I mean, that is chaos.  And at least when President Tito

24     was still alive and the years after this kind of chaos didn't exist,

25     because that's why we have the laws and the laws are very clear on that


Page 4408

 1     and the organisations.

 2        Q.   Thank you, that's a helpful answer.  And yet if someone does,

 3     nevertheless --

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly slow down for the sake of the

 5     interpreters.  Thank you.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:

 7        Q.   -- violate these structures and does take up arms in defence of

 8     the country, under the constitution they are still deemed to be part of

 9     the armed forces; correct?

10        A.   Your Honours, I have answered -- I'm sorry, I'm too fast.  I've

11     answered the question, that is, yes, but the but means they have to be

12     accepted into the armed forces, into one of the elements of All People's

13     Defence.

14        Q.   Well, earlier -- well, yesterday when I asked you if someone

15     showed up on the battle-field and they had no authorisation in the sense

16     of the legal benediction of being in an organisation and they started

17     participating on the battle-field or in the zone of responsibility on

18     behalf of, as a friendly force, on behalf of or with the army, you said

19     unequivocally that there was a duty to subordinate that individual; isn't

20     that right?

21        A.   I think my answer was there was a duty to subordinate or to

22     remove them.  And the removal is exactly the issue of the recognition.

23             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I apologise, but the first part of my learned

24     friend's question at page 14, line 20, has not been recorded.  And I

25     don't know if my learned friend has channel 4 on his headphones because


Page 4409

 1     the interpreters were speaking at the same time as he was and I don't

 2     know if he caught that.

 3             MR. GOSNELL:  I've turned to channel 4.  I thank you.

 4        Q.   But either way, the mere fact that they're not part of a

 5     recognised self-management organisation has no impact on the duty -- the

 6     commander's duty to either take measures to discipline and bring them

 7     into the fold, so to speak, or to exclude them from the zone of

 8     responsibility?

 9        A.   Do you want me to give a theoretical answer or do you want me to

10     refer to the situation as it was in SBWS during fall 1991?

11        Q.   I'm asking for a yes or no answer based upon your understanding

12     of the law.

13        A.   Well, it's impossible because if they're not part of an

14     organisation that is one way or the other recognised, whether it's

15     self-management or, as we saw, a party-affiliated volunteer group as we

16     saw in fall 1991, they can only be recognised by the local commander if

17     they have been recognised at a higher level.  And that's why we have

18     these various decisions that are adopted between August 1991 and December

19     1991 by the Republic of Serbia, the SSNO, and 10th of December the order

20     73 by the Presidency of SFRY.

21        Q.   So you're saying that in that circumstance the obligation of the

22     commander in that zone of responsibility is to eject these non-recognised

23     persons; is that right?

24        A.   Well, if they are not recognised, yes, indeed, they should be

25     removed.  And if they commit crimes, they should be -- I mean, measures


Page 4410

 1     should be taken against them.

 2        Q.   And if they are participating in conjunction with the zone

 3     commanders's orders and operations, that would suggest to you, would it,

 4     that that group has been accepted; correct?

 5        A.   If -- I mean, I understand "in conjunction" if they are, like,

 6     identified in an order as having a task, yes, obviously then they have

 7     been accepted.

 8        Q.   Let's move on and we'll get to some concrete examples and we'll

 9     see what your answers are then.  And am I right that any of these

10     self-management organisations that are accepted, that's -- they're

11     subject at the very top level to the SFRY Supreme Command; is that right?

12        A.   I mean, based on the principle of unity and -- I mean of single

13     and unified command and control, yes.

14        Q.   And just to get a full picture of the chain of command from top

15     to bottom, am I right in saying that the SFRY - and we're talking about

16     1991 under the law of the SFRY - the SFRY Supreme Command exercises that

17     command function through the Federal Secretary of National Defence, who

18     in turn relies on the SFRY General Staff to ensure that those orders are

19     executed.  Is that correct?

20        A.   Yes, that is correct.

21        Q.   And in the late 1980s as you described earlier and as you talked

22     about in your report, it's right, isn't it, that Territorial Defence

23     organisations were directly subordinated to the commands of JNA military

24     districts; right?

25        A.   That is correct.  I mean, that is the general situation and -- I


Page 4411

 1     mean, for specific operations obviously we have to look at specific

 2     documents.

 3        Q.   Well, let's start with just the de jure situation, Mr. Theunens,

 4     because you keep answering these caveats, qualifications, and conditions.

 5     Is what I stated correct as a matter of law?

 6        A.   Yes, but -- I mean -- I'm sorry that I seem to be difficult in

 7     your views, but you can find in military regulations specific military

 8     operations where a TO commander may be in command of the JNA.  It depends

 9     of that -- of the tactical scenario that has to be implemented because --

10     I mean, this is all linked also to the nature of the TO, the TO were

11     local troops, so if it is about defending an external aggression and, for

12     example -- excuse me, defending against an external aggression, and then

13     recapturing terrain that has been lost to the "aggressor," then there can

14     be scenarios where after the main effort has been led by the JNA that the

15     TO commander will be in command of the control of the terrain.  That is a

16     possibility.  So that's why I try to be more specific in my answers.

17        Q.   But that is in no way relevant at all, is it, to the fact that

18     the TO is subordinate to the command of the military district in which

19     that TO is located; correct?

20        A.   No.  I mean what you say is correct, but it -- again, it may be

21     that these --

22        Q.   Mr. Theunens, I'd like to progress.  I'll -- I'm in the Court's

23     hands --

24        A.   No, I mean --

25        Q.   I really do not wish to cut off an expert, but I do have a line


Page 4412

 1     of questioning, I do have topics I want to get to.  So I'm really at the

 2     Court's pleasure as to how to proceed.

 3             THE WITNESS:  If it helps, you know, in general -- as a general

 4     answer I would agree with you.

 5        Q.   Well, here's what you said in the Seselj case and this is at

 6     transcript 4135.  This is a question from Judge Antonetti.  He asked you:

 7             "So if there's one thing we should keep in mind, it's that

 8     starting in 1987 the orders forwarded to the TO go through the head of

 9     the General Staff, which was not the case before?"

10             Answer, this is your answer:

11             "That is correct, Your Honour, and also the TO becomes

12     subordinated to the -- what is called the strategic operational level

13     units, i.e., the military districts, whereas before they were on a

14     parallel level."

15             Do you stand by that statement?

16        A.   I stand by that.  And if you allow me, I try to explain because

17     you suggested there is a difference between what I answer now and what I

18     answered to Judge Antonetti.  What I tried to say is that the general

19     principle confined to the 1987 Jedinstvo reorganisation remains.  I mean,

20     I stand by my answer.  I just want to be cautious in my answers here

21     today because I understand we are referring to the situation as it

22     existed in fall 1991 and subsequently in SBWS, but the general principle

23     is the same and as I said I stand by my answer.

24        Q.   And do I understand that the implication of that answer and of

25     the Jedinstvo plan, which you referred to, was that the presidents of the


Page 4413

 1     republics were removed from the chain of command between the SFRY

 2     Supreme Command and the TOs in the republics; is that correct?

 3        A.   Yes, Your Honours.

 4        Q.   And that's true in peace and in war time; correct?

 5        A.   As far as I recall, that is correct, yeah.

 6        Q.   And an example of that was the fact that an order came down from

 7     the General Staff saying that weapons should be removed from TO depots

 8     and placed in JNA depots; right?

 9        A.   That is correct.

10        Q.   And that order didn't go through the presidents of the republics,

11     did it?

12        A.   No, it didn't.  I mean, it didn't have to because it came --

13     initially the instruction came from the Supreme Command, i.e., the SFRY

14     Presidency -- I mean, the Supreme Command, sorry, had not been activated

15     then but came -- the initial directive came from the SFRY Presidency and

16     was accepted there by the republics, otherwise the Presidency could not

17     have instructed the SSNO and then the General Staff to issue that order.

18        Q.   At page 189 of your report you say:

19             "When not participating in combat operation or operations the

20     local Serb TO in SAO SBWS is until at least December 1991 subordinated to

21     the local Serb police under the command of Radovan Stojicic, aka Badza."

22             What's the -- is there any legal foundation for that claim?

23     Let's just start with the legal foundation.  Any legal foundation for

24     that claim?

25        A.   Your Honours, at -- the issue -- the problem with the legal


Page 4414

 1     foundation is that there was no legal provision or no provision in the

 2     constitution or the -- I mean the 1974 Constitution or the 1982 All

 3     People's Defence law or any other legal or doctrinal document until late

 4     1991 that legalised the self-declared local Serb armed structures, be it

 5     TO, be it volunteer groups, or be it police, so I mean obviously there is

 6     then no legal foundation.

 7        Q.   You're surely not here disputing, sir, that all participants on

 8     the Serb side accepted the SFRY law was in force on this territory

 9     throughout at least the period up until well into at least 1992 and

10     certainly probably beyond, but let's just stick with the period prior to

11     the arrival of UNPROFOR, that the view of all participants on the Serb

12     side is that SFRY law continues to apply; correct?

13        A.   My personal interpretation - and I'm not a lawyer - would be that

14     it is their interpretation of SFRY legislation.  That is what they

15     continued to adhere to because, you know, unless you can show me an

16     article or a document that I have missed, I am not familiar with any SFRY

17     legal or any SFRY armed forces doctrinal document that talks about the

18     establishment of SAOs or local Serb TO units or local Serb -- and by

19     "local Serb," I mean SAO, so Serbs in Croatia, TO or MUP units.  And this

20     creates a lot of confusion also among the JNA, as we see in the various

21     documents, for example, from the 1st Military District during fall 1991.

22        Q.   But there were the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo

23     and no one would have suggested that there was any difficulty in

24     understanding the SFRY law applied in those autonomous provinces;

25     correct?


Page 4415

 1        A.   Yes, but the big and the key difference, Your Honours, in

 2     relation to Kosovo and Vojvodina was that at the time they were

 3     autonomous provinces, and I think one of the two was also an autonomous

 4     region at one time, that was explicitly recognised in the legal

 5     documents, the SFRY legal documents, and, for example, indeed they had

 6     their own TO, but the big difference between those TOs, i.e., Kosovo and

 7     Vojvodina and on the other hand SAO SBWS or SAO Krajina or SAO Western

 8     Slavonia is that if the TOs of Kosovo and Vojvodina were legally

 9     recognised and they existed as a structure and everybody accepted them

10     and the JNA - I mean from the top level to the lowest level - knew that

11     this was a legally recognised organisation and a part of the All People's

12     Defence concept, whereas for the SAOs - as we have seen - I mean there is

13     a document from -- I mean, there was the document by Colonel Trajkovic,

14     the Chief of Staff of the 12th Corps asking the 1st Military District,

15     like:  What do we do with these people?  And, okay, I believe we should

16     recognise them.  But it shows the confusion that exists at the level of

17     the JNA as to what is the legal status and, therefore, what can we do or

18     what should we do with these people, I mean by that structures of the SAO

19     in this case SBWS.  What do we do with these people and how do we treat

20     them?  So that's the big difference.

21        Q.   Mr. Theunens, the --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down.  Thank you.

23             MR. GOSNELL:

24        Q.   The difficulty I'm having with this assertion on your part, just

25     to be clear, is that the document that you cite in support of this claim


Page 4416

 1     is not issued by Mr. Stojicic in the name of any police structure.  The

 2     certificate is issued in the name of a TO structure.  And that's why I'm

 3     asking you the question:  Where do you get the conclusion that the TO is

 4     placed under the police at any time?

 5        A.   We should -- I mean, it would be helpful if I could see the

 6     certificate.

 7             MR. GOSNELL:  Well, let's bring that up, please, that's 65 ter

 8     794, Prosecution tab 234.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  For the record this is Exhibit P198.140.  Thank

10     you.

11             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12             THE WITNESS:  It is correct that in this specific document there

13     is no reference to the police.  I'm trying to recall, it must have been

14     my understanding that Badza, I mean Radovan Stojicic, had a position in

15     the local Serb police in the SAO SBWS, but I don't have a reference here

16     so that's what it is.

17             MR. GOSNELL:

18        Q.   Does that mean that you're relying on information that you

19     haven't footnoted in your report?

20        A.   Or it may have been that the footnote -- cutting and pasting or

21     something.  I will check into this.

22        Q.   But you were a participant in many witness interviews over the

23     years.  Is it possible you heard someone say something and somehow that

24     coloured your interpretation as expressed on page 189?

25        A.   I don't think so, Your Honours.  It may have been that it was


Page 4417

 1     open-source reporting.  There were some articles which are not cited

 2     here, but I think there was a JNA intelligence review article on the

 3     local Serb defence or military and police structures.

 4        Q.   As a matter of SFRY law and doctrine, does it make any sense that

 5     the TO is placed under the police?

 6        A.   It would be unusual, but I want to remind you of the various

 7     documents and decisions that are adopted in the SAO Krajina during summer

 8     1991 and especially the role played by Mr. Martic who was not only

 9     minister of interior or becomes minister of interior and is also in

10     charge of the SAO Krajina self-declared police but also achieves certain

11     functions that could be or duties that could be defined as command duties

12     even if it was de facto, I agree on that, in relation to the TO.

13        Q.   Well, of course that -- we're not talking now about the SAO

14     Krajina, we're talking about the SAO SBWS.  And I think you'd agree in

15     Martic's case that was a question of double-hatting; isn't that right?

16        A.   You may call it double-hatting, but it -- I put in the Martic

17     report and it was also my testimony that there was a power struggle

18     between Martic and Babic which also reflected itself in who was to be in

19     command over the TO.  And there is a footnote on that issue, I mean 552,

20     for example, on same page here in the amalgamated report, page 189.

21        Q.   Why don't you just take the document in front of you at face

22     value as reflecting the situation?

23        A.   I mean, I agree with you -- I'm sorry.  I agree with you that

24     this certificate does not mention the police, that's correct.

25        Q.   Not only does it not mention the police, it suggests that what


Page 4418

 1     we're dealing with is a Territorial Defence and that's Badza indicating

 2     that he's the one at the head of that; correct?

 3        A.   That is correct.

 4        Q.   Now, you testified earlier that there was a theoretical

 5     possibility which is actually prescribed by the Law on All People's

 6     Defence for JNA units to be subordinate to TO commanders.  But would you

 7     agree with me that there is no indication that that at all occurred in

 8     the area of the SBWS?

 9        A.   You mean during fall 1991?

10        Q.   Fall 1991 through the arrival of UNPROFOR.

11        A.   Yes, Your Honours, that is correct.

12        Q.   So that means that in that place and during that time-period we

13     have the JNA being superior to the TO; correct?

14        A.   I mean, it's -- you cannot describe the situation -- I mean,

15     it -- the complexity of the situation by just giving a yes or no answer

16     to this very broad question --

17        Q.   Well, let's stick to doctrine then, Mr. Theunens.

18        A.   But the whole issue, Your Honours, here is about how the doctrine

19     was applied in the area.  And this is exactly why I need to refer to so

20     many documents.  If it was just a simple question of applying the

21     doctrine, I would have given -- I mean, a ten-page report would have been

22     sufficient.  This is the doctrine and this is how it was.  Sadly, the way

23     how things went, not only in SBWS but in other parts of Croatia and later

24     in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was not always consistent with doctrine and that's

25     why I have done the effort to look at the specific documents and


Page 4419

 1     comparing the two.

 2        Q.   So you -- what you're suggesting here, you're reserving for

 3     yourself the possibility that you've seen documents or you've seen

 4     indications that the TO is somehow superior to JNA soldiers or units in

 5     the SBWS in 1991 and through the arrival of UNPROFOR; is that your

 6     position?

 7        A.   Not -- not at all, Your Honours.  What I'm trying to suggest, and

 8     I just wish to refer in that context to, for example, the Panic order you

 9     brought up yesterday from the 15th of October, it's 161482-17 or -16

10     where he orders in very strict and very clear language JNA to remain in

11     charge in the area of -- the area they have captured and not to

12     abandoned -- I mean not to abandon, not to loosen control there, to stay

13     in control because of attempts of interference of what he calls local

14     organs of authority.  This is why I put the caveat.

15        Q.   Well, isn't that precisely an assertion of command and control by

16     the JNA over TO?

17        A.   It is, but referring back to your general question to say that

18     the JNA was always in command, well, this Panic order as well as one that

19     he issues I think a week later shows that in some areas there have been

20     problems and these problems are due to the fact that once the JNA has

21     captured an area and if in a specific area combat operations as such have

22     finished even if there is still a state of armed conflict, then there are

23     difficulties whereby some people or groups apparently according to Panic

24     misuse that situation.

25        Q.   Mr. Theunens, let's be very clear, I'm not in any way suggesting


Page 4420

 1     to you that there were not acts of indiscipline or that the command and

 2     control by the JNA was perfect.  What I am attempting to ascertain is

 3     whether it's your view that those groups that were engaging in that

 4     indiscipline behaviour were subordinated to the JNA at the time?

 5        A.   You know, maybe I can clarify -- I have documents on events in

 6     Dalj prison on I think on 21st of September, 1991, and I think the 4th of

 7     October, 1991.  We can go into these documents, but the JNA is not

 8     mentioned in any of these documents and this is a typical example of what

 9     Panic tries to highlight in his order of the 15th of October.

10     Hostilities in Dalj go back to, I believe, the 1st of August, 1991, the

11     JNA intervenes, interposes, and then the JNA establishes de facto Serbian

12     control over the area.  There's even still during a very long time

13     forward command post of a corps located there, but still certain acts --

14     and I wouldn't call it just indiscipline but crimes, at least according

15     to the documents I reviewed, crimes occurred there.  Is the JNA

16     responsible?  Well, we would -- I mean, theoretically for sure because

17     this is -- there is a JNA unit in the area, but it doesn't -- it's not a

18     black-and-white situation where all responsibility is focused on one

19     organisation or one individual.

20        Q.   Now you seem to be giving certain answers that do pertain to

21     Article 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute pretty directly even though you said

22     that that's not the scope of your expertise.  In any event, let me move

23     on.

24             Do you think that the commander's obligation in a zone of

25     responsibility is in any way limited by or related to combat?  In other


Page 4421

 1     words, is there a limit defined functionally to the commander's

 2     responsibility in his zone of responsibility?

 3        A.   Well, he's responsible for the force operating under his command,

 4     whatever the circumstances.

 5        Q.   And operating under his command, those words that you just used,

 6     that's broader than just a soldier sitting in a trench shooting at the

 7     other side; correct?

 8        A.   I'm not sure I understand the question, but I assume it is one --

 9     a soldier of one of his units or --

10        Q.   Well, my point is that -- and you've said this in previous cases,

11     and this is the point I'm trying to get at in terms of the -- the duty to

12     subordinate and the scope of the duty to subordinate, what I'm trying to

13     get at here and the question I'm asking you is:  Does the duty to

14     subordinate come to an end when a soldier is not at the front line

15     shooting at the other side?

16        A.   You know, Your Honours, I -- my memory may fail me, but I have

17     never used the concept "duty to subordinate" in those words.  When I --

18     what comes the closest to "duty to subordinate" are these orders we have

19     been discussing now, whereby SSNO 1st Military District, also the

20     Presidency order 73, state that volunteer units operating in a zone where

21     the JNA is have to be subordinated or removed.  That is the closest to

22     the concept to duty to subordinate.

23        Q.   So they have a duty to do one or the other at least, duty to

24     subordinate or remove; correct?

25        A.   Indeed, basically it's -- because it also depends -- I mean, who


Page 4422

 1     has the initiative, because the order 73 talks about units that refuse to

 2     be subordinated to the JNA have to be removed, but it comes back to the

 3     same thing.  So let's not --

 4        Q.   And if they don't remove that unit and that unit or those

 5     individuals commit a crime, is the JNA commander responsible for that?

 6        A.   If they are in his zone of responsibility, yes.

 7        Q.   So that's -- you're saying now - and I just want to get this very

 8     clear - you're saying it's immaterial whether or not the group is

 9     engaging in functions that are related to defence, security, combat?

10        A.   You know, I'm trying to understand or interpret your questions in

11     relation to the events in 1991, where obviously I mean JNA commanders --

12     and again this is also clear from Panic's documents, you don't

13     necessarily need my answer, but indeed if the JNA commander fails to

14     subordinate volunteers or whatever to his command or fails -- and if that

15     doesn't work, fails to remove them, then he will be held accountable by

16     in that case the commander of the 1st Military District.

17        Q.   Let me come straight to the point then.  Was Arkan's men and

18     Arkan himself, were they subordinated to the JNA from the time of their

19     arrival in August 1991 through the arrival of UNPROFOR in 1992?  Were

20     they subordinated to the JNA?

21        A.   Your Honours, we have seen I think one or two combat documents,

22     orders from the 12th Novi Sad Corps indicating that during operations in

23     Luzac, Arkan and his group operate under the command of the JNA in combat

24     units -- in combat operations, I'm sorry.  There is also -- we saw the

25     document I think from December 1991 or January 1992 from the 12th Corps


Page 4423

 1     providing a status of forces, whereby it is indeed confirmed that Arkan's

 2     volunteers or TO detachment is subordinated to the JNA at that time.

 3     However, the various reports by security organs of the 1st Military

 4     District between October and -- 1991 and the course of 1992 suggest that

 5     Arkan is not always subordinated to the JNA, and even if he should have

 6     been, that he's acting on his own behalf and they attribute - I mean

 7     "they" is the 1st Military District security organs - they attribute this

 8     behaviour and the fact that he seems -- that Arkan seems to be able to

 9     get away with that to his connections with local -- I mean with the

10     SAO SBWS authorities or even senior officials or members of the

11     Government of the Republic of Serbia.

12        Q.   So your position is that he is stepping in and out of

13     subordination; is that correct?

14        A.   That is correct.

15        Q.   Let's look at some documents now, and I know you want to and I'm

16     more than happy to oblige.

17             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 06198, which is Prosecution tab 665.

18     This is Prosecution Exhibit 1687.

19             THE WITNESS:  Do you know whether that's in my report?

20             MR. GOSNELL:

21        Q.   You mentioned it the day before yesterday.

22        A.   Okay.

23        Q.   But I don't believe it is in your report, sir.

24        A.   Okay.

25        Q.   To the best of my knowledge.


Page 4424

 1        A.   Yeah, it's a new document basically.

 2        Q.   Now, I just want to try to situate us tactically in this area and

 3     understand what forces are present.  And this is an early document which

 4     is why I find it useful.  It's from the 12th Corps.  It states the date

 5     is the 8th of July, 1991, and this is from Mladen Bratic, who is the

 6     commander of the 12th Corps.  And down there at paragraph 2 or item 2 it

 7     says:

 8             [As read] "I have decided the 12th Corps forces (the 51st and

 9     452nd Mechanised Brigades and parts of the 36th Mechanised Brigade) shall

10     advance through Slavonia in two marching columns in Slavonia and one in

11     Baranja on the following axes ..."

12             Now, I'm not interested in the axes as such, but can you just

13     help us understand how many forces by establishment should be encompassed

14     by the units that are mentioned there numerically?

15        A.   I wouldn't be able to give a precise estimate because I don't

16     know the level of mobilisation of these units.  I mean, there would --

17     when we talk about brigades, we're talking about several thousands of

18     troops.  A brigade could be 5.000 troops or even more.  But it all

19     depends -- I mean, from here, for example, I cannot say whether these

20     were level A, B, or C units.  That was a classification that existed in

21     the JNA to, yeah, determine I wouldn't say the importance of the unit but

22     their level of permanent manning because some units would only exist as a

23     skeleton in peace time and they would have to be mobilised, whereas

24     others had a stronger peace time strength so I'm sorry I'm not able to

25     give a precise estimate.


Page 4425

 1        Q.   What's the range?

 2        A.   For a brigade I would say between 5- and 10.000, a mechanised

 3     brigade between 5 - and 10.000 people.

 4        Q.   So we have two brigades here and parts of a third brigade so that

 5     you're talking about over 10.000?

 6        A.   But it -- I mean it's a purely theoretical thing because on the

 7     other hand when you look at the terrain, I mean you would have a major

 8     traffic jam to try to move them over the three bridges.  So I've seen

 9     estimates that there were more -- like more than 70.000 JNA troops at one

10     given time in fall 1991 surrounding Vukovar or fighting in that area.

11     Other estimates were 20.000.  You know, I find it hard to believe that

12     around 10.000 troops would move in July -- try to move over the three

13     bridges over the Danube because it would be a major, yeah, logistical

14     challenge.  So I believe it's -- I would say it is less.

15        Q.   Attachment 1 has some interesting information.  If we could go to

16     page 5 in the English, it's the last page in B/C/S.  In Eastern

17     Slavonia -- sorry, this is an attachment which is headed "intelligence

18     situation."  There's no authorship but here is what it says:

19             "In Eastern Slavonia:  In Erdut village there is a training

20     centre for around 300-400 members of the Croatian National Guard and

21     MUP ..."

22             Do you know anything about what training centre is being referred

23     to there?

24        A.   It's most likely the same training centre that was taken over by

25     Arkan at one moment I think during fall 1991 and which was later


Page 4426

 1     transformed in a training centre for the TO of the RSK, and I think it

 2     was even at one time identified as a training centre for the special

 3     units of the TO, the special police units of the RSK.

 4        Q.   And then a bit further down:

 5             "In all settlements snipers have been deployed on church towers

 6     and the sectors are fortified and positions consolidated for defence."

 7             Is that corroborated by other information as far as you know,

 8     namely, that there were Croatian positions being taken up in church

 9     towers?

10        A.   I've seen, Your Honours, other documents, I mean JNA documents,

11     mentioning that, but I haven't, for example, looked at Croatian documents

12     so there's not much I can say about it.  I didn't analyse the activities

13     of the ZNG or the Croatian forces in SBWS.  It's possible.

14             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 05995, please, which is Defence tab

15     512.

16        Q.   Now, this is coming up -- while this is coming up on the screen

17     in front of you, Mr. Theunens, this is a document, a report from the 12th

18     Corps command by Trajkovic, the Chief of Staff, and he's describing the

19     disposition of forces, and the date is the 22nd of September, 1991.  And

20     we see here the same units that are mentioned in the previous document,

21     namely, the 51st and the 452nd, although I think in this document we see

22     that it's being referred to as 453rd instead of the 452nd.  And then we

23     also see the 36th Brigade.  But in addition to that we see the 18th

24     Mechanised Brigade, the remainder of the 36th Brigade, the 12th Motorised

25     Brigade which is now being stationed in Klis, the village of Klis which I


Page 4427

 1     presume is Klisa, the village of Tenja, Betin Dvor; the 211th Armoured

 2     Brigade has now been stationed in the villages of Erdut, Aljmas, Lipovac;

 3     and the 16th Mixed Artillery Regiment is based in Klisa and the Klisa

 4     Ekonomija.

 5             Now, I generally understand your difficulty in coming to a

 6     precise figure as to what -- how many people are in all these forces.

 7     Can you give us a general ballpark figure as to how many soldiers you

 8     think are comprised by these various units?

 9        A.   Your Honours, I'm very reluctant to make a guess here because, I

10     mean, you may have heard before in other trials that, for example, the

11     80th Brigade, the first attempt to mobilise it failed so they couldn't

12     march towards Eastern Slavonia -- sorry, a second attempt, and then also

13     the manning was still low.  I can repeat the theoretical strength but I

14     don't think it's going to bring much, so the safest I can -- guess I can

15     make there were several thousands of JNA troops at that time in Eastern

16     Slavonia.

17             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 00589 which is Prosecution tab 170,

18     please.

19        Q.   Now, this appears to be from the 1st Military District command

20     and this is in November 1991 so it's a little bit later, reporting to the

21     General Staff of the SFRY.  And if we turn the page to page 11, it

22     indicates that there are -- I presume these are Serbian TO units that are

23     being attached to the 12th Corps?

24        A.   You mean TO of the Republic of Serbia?

25        Q.   Correct.


Page 4428

 1        A.   Yes, indeed.

 2        Q.   And we see 2.024.

 3        A.   Yeah, I don't have the page in front of me but I'm familiar with

 4     the document, it's in my report.  Yeah, I mean, it's possible, yeah.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  There is no page 11 of this document.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:  Well, in any event it's not important.  I have a

 7     page 11 in my version.

 8        Q.   But in any event that's what that document indicates.  Could we

 9     have --

10        A.   I'm sorry, I don't want to -- but just to clarify also the issue

11     in my answer in relation to Arkan when you said he would be coming and

12     going, it would be interesting to see whether Arkan's unit is now

13     mentioned on the strength of the 1st Military District because if he was

14     subordinated at that time he and his unit would have been included in

15     this overview.

16        Q.   We're progressing step by step on that issue, Mr. Theunens, but

17     thank you for that comment.

18        A.   Yeah, I understand.

19             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 05997, please, which is Defence tab

20     320.

21        Q.   Now, this is the document that creates OG North; correct?

22        A.   Yeah, it's a new document, Your Honours.  I would say it is a

23     document that creates an OG North because I've seen the -- I mean I

24     didn't have this document prior to -- or when the amalgamated report was

25     put together.  I spoke in during examination about the difficulties to


Page 4429

 1     obtain documents from the 12th Corps or OG North and we requested those

 2     already in 2003 or 2004 prior to the Vukovar trial.  I was always under

 3     the understanding that there was an OG North which was based in the

 4     12th Corps and which was commanded first by General Bratic and then when

 5     he was killed in action by General Biorcevic.  This document here talks,

 6     in my view, about an OG North because it's much smaller than the initial

 7     OG North or the -- that OG North I was thinking of under the command of

 8     Biorcevic or Bratic prior to that.

 9        Q.   Although this document does say "the Operation Group North"?

10        A.   Yeah, but I mean because it's at that given time.  It cannot say

11     "an OG North."  At that time there is only one OG North, that is this

12     one.  So as OGs and TGs are ad hoc arrangements that can be disbanded,

13     re-established, changed, and so on, for OG North based on the documents I

14     have reviewed, it is difficult for me to establish what the exact

15     sequence of call it restructuring is because here we see, in my view, an

16     OG North.  There is a document a few weeks later for a Tactical Group

17     North then only the 12th Corps is mentioned, whereas in a number of open

18     sources, as I mentioned, mention was made of the OG North, which was a

19     much bigger unit comparable to OG South, where the situation is much more

20     straightforward.  Again, it's easier to analyse because of the documents

21     we have.

22        Q.   Well, whatever the case may be, one thing we can I think agree on

23     is if you look at the list of units there, it includes a TO Panonic

24     Brigade and the TO detachment of Serbia.  Do you know where the Panonic

25     TO is from?


Page 4430

 1        A.   I don't recall at this stage, but I can check.  I mean, I assume

 2     it is originating from Serbia.

 3        Q.   And we see there that the 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanised

 4     Brigade is listed here in OG North but we know that they end up in the

 5     command of OG South later; isn't that right?

 6        A.   I agree with the first proposition.  For the second, I mean at

 7     one moment -- at one moment in time the 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanised

 8     Division which consists of proletarian guards mechanised brigades is

 9     deployed south of OG South, so I don't recall exactly whether a

10     proletarian guards mechanised brigade is subordinated to OG South, but I

11     do recall that its parent unit, i.e., the Proletarian Mechanised Division

12     is deployed south of OG South at one moment in fall 1991.

13        Q.   Item 6:

14             "Round up all personnel and materiel by 1200 hours on 29

15     September 1991 on the village of Brsadin-Trpinjska Cesta- Borovo Selo

16     axis."

17             Can you provide us any assistance as a military man as to what

18     the words "round up" means?  What's being instructed here?

19        A.   Just looking at what -- I mean, what I can see on the screen and

20     given the limited information I have on the 12th Corps, I would interpret

21     that as preparing all personnel of the mentioned units in order to be

22     ready to act and to do that in the locations -- in the location mentioned

23     there.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  Your Honours, I would tender this document, please.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.


Page 4431

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this document is already admitted

 2     on 8th of May as P1690.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.

 4             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

 5             Could we have 1D298, please, which is Defence tab 370.

 6        Q.   Sir, this is a map which purportedly was created by the

 7     Central Intelligence Agency.  Have you seen this map before?

 8        A.   Yes, Your Honours, and if you want I can explain more on the

 9     background of what you call the Central Intelligence Agency involvement

10     in preparing the map.

11        Q.   Well, I'm not particularly interested in that, but is there

12     something you can tell us briefly on that subject?

13        A.   No, just to clarify -- I mean when people hear "Central

14     Intelligence Agency," they often think of -- that clandestine and covert

15     sources were used to prepare this information.  Basically, I mean this is

16     part of a quite detailed report called:  "Balkan Battlegrounds on the

17     Conflict in the former Yugoslavia," but it's all based on open sources.

18     Nothing wrong with open sources, but just to clarify potential

19     misunderstandings.

20        Q.   And we know from the documents that we've just looked at that

21     they seem to have gotten correct a good number of the units that they've

22     got identified there on the map in the area of OG North.  Would you agree

23     with that?

24        A.   It would be helpful if maybe the map can go down a bit and I can

25     see the date.  I think there must be a date somewhere maybe on the top or


Page 4432

 1     somewhere else.

 2        Q.   If you look closely at the legend there, you'll see that the

 3     inner lines of confrontation were allegedly reached according to this on

 4     the 30th of September, 1991.

 5        A.   Yeah, mm-hmm.  Okay.  Yeah.

 6        Q.   But the general question is:  Would you agree with me that they

 7     have accurately represented the units that, based on the documents,

 8     appear to be there?

 9        A.   I mean, I have no reason to doubt about what they are saying, but

10     from an analytical point of view and a methodological point of view, I

11     would first like to see their figures because I see only like icons of

12     units.  And then compare that -- I mean their findings with my material

13     and then draw conclusions.

14        Q.   And looking at this map, can we just get an overview of the

15     operations that occurred in OG North, starting on the 1st of August?

16     We've heard a lot of evidence that they crossed the bridge on the 1st of

17     August, they moved into Erdut and Dalj.  We'll go to certain documents on

18     that, but let me ask you this specifically:  Do you know that they

19     reached that confrontation line, the inner confrontation line, almost

20     immediately once they had crossed the bridges, based on the documents

21     you've looked at?

22        A.   What -- excuse me, what do you mean by "inner confrontation

23     line"?

24        Q.   By "inner," I mean the dotted line.

25        A.   It's possible.  You know, I cannot compare it -- I can read the


Page 4433

 1     map and I have no reason to doubt about the accuracy of this map in

 2     relation to the information the analysts or the people who compiled this

 3     map had available to them.  From my point of view as well as I answered

 4     earlier, I would like to look at the documents I have, I mean the

 5     official JNA documents which were not available to the people who drafted

 6     or compiled this map and then compare the two, and then I could answer

 7     the question.

 8        Q.   Can you agree with me that OG North is separated from OG South

 9     until well into October, as seems to be reflected on this map?

10        A.   I -- it's possible -- I mean, it's possible, yeah.  It's what

11     the -- sorry, it's what the map seems to show.  But again, I cannot draw

12     that conclusion from the documents I have reviewed, so I can draw that

13     conclusion only -- I mean, I can answer your question based on the map I

14     see in front of me and my understanding -- because apparently -- I mean,

15     there is the Vuka river between the two, but -- yeah.

16             MR. GOSNELL:  We would tender this map, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Shall be assigned Exhibit D38.  Thank you.

19             MR. GOSNELL:  Could I have Prosecution Exhibit -- sorry, P1688,

20     Defence -- Prosecution tab 666.

21        Q.   Now, this is the -- a report from the Chief of Staff of the

22     command of the 12th Corps dated the 9th of August, 1991, to the command

23     of the 1st Military District, General Mladen Maksimovic.  And it purports

24     to describe the events in or around Dalj on the 1st of August, 1991.  Can

25     I first of all ask you about the interval.  Is it normal that there would


Page 4434

 1     be an interval of eight days between a combat action and a report of this

 2     type?

 3        A.   Your Honours, it doesn't say "regular situations report," so I

 4     don't know whether the 12th Corps prior to the 9th of August was

 5     providing regular situation reports to the 1st Military District.  This

 6     seems to be a kind of a summarising or an overview report, so I would

 7     want to check first whether other situation reports were sent or

 8     submitted by the 12th Corps to the 1st Military District between the 1st

 9     of August and the 9th of August.  Maybe we should have -- would also look

10     at the war diary of the 12th Corps which unfortunately was not accessible

11     to me and then I would be able to answer your question.

12        Q.   Let's say there were daily ongoing situation reports, why would

13     there be a report like this even if there were those types of reports?

14        A.   Maybe because the commander or a member of the command of the

15     1st Military District asked the 12th Corps to provide such report, we

16     don't know.  I don't consider it unusual.

17        Q.   Let's go over to page 2 of the English, please.

18             "A tactical company of the 2nd Armoured Battalion started out

19     across the bridge and crossed it without having to open fire.  During

20     this time, a white flag was put out on the 'Kula' installation in the

21     village of Erdut and ZNG members withdrew from the elevation."

22             Let's just stop there for a moment.  Do you know of any

23     elevations in the town of Dalj?

24        A.   You mean Erdut or Dalj?

25        Q.   I'm sorry, Erdut.  Do you know of any elevations in the village


Page 4435

 1     of Erdut?

 2        A.   Yeah, I mean if I remember well, because I've been there for the

 3     last time it's like 1997, when you cross -- I mean, if you come from

 4     Serbia across the bridge, close to the bridge there is I think kind of

 5     elevation but it's not very big.  I mean overall the terrain in

 6     Eastern Slavonia is flat.

 7        Q.   Can an elevation be a building in military parlance?

 8        A.   I haven't seen it, you know, I -- if it's a building, you would

 9     expect that it's described as a building.

10        Q.   It goes on:

11             "Then a tactical company of the 1st Motorised Battalion was sent

12     across the village of Dalj at 07:30 hours followed by a tactical company

13     of the 2nd mb, which headed towards the village of Erdut after crossing

14     the bridge but came under strong fire from the direction of the MUP

15     centre.

16             "As a result this unit was forced to return fire and prevent the

17     ZNG from firing upon them.

18             "At 09:30 hours a tactical company of the 1st mb entered the

19     village of Dalj and once it was there the unit commander asked the

20     warring parties through a spokesperson to cease firing ... both sides

21     agreed except for the forces positioned at the MUP station.  Since these

22     forces continued firing not only on the other side but on the tactical

23     company of the 1st mb as well, they were given an ultimatum to cease

24     firing right away or tanks would be deployed to destroy them.  Despite

25     the ultimatum and several warnings, forces positioned at the MUP station


Page 4436

 1     continued firing on units of the 1st mb which was forced to return fire

 2     and three shells from a tank gun were fired on the police station, after

 3     which the conflict between the warring parties stopped and no more fire

 4     was opened on units of the 1st mb.

 5             "Under the protection of our units members of the MUP and the ZNG

 6     then retreated towards the village of Aljmas and some were evacuated to

 7     Osijek together with the refugees, also under the protection of JNA

 8     units."

 9             Now, you testified that there was a shift in JNA -- in the JNA's

10     role in the conflict in 1991 from separating the sides to then actively

11     participating on one side against the other.  Is this, in your view, a

12     clear indication of participating on one side against the other?

13        A.   Well, at that -- at this stage it's - and I think it's indicated

14     in the report, according to the report the main role of the JNA consists

15     of separating the parties and, as is put in this report, enforcing a

16     cease-fire.

17        Q.   Well, here's my point, sir.  On page 1 of this report the author

18     is giving the impression that this is a matter of the JNA separating the

19     two sides acting as an honest broker, so to speak, but then when you get

20     into the details, namely, a tank moves in, destroys the MUP station,

21     presumably killing a large number of people, isn't that participating on

22     one side against the other at that point?

23        A.   I think the best I can answer is that it depends of the -- which

24     side you're on.  For the Croatian side obviously it means that the JNA by

25     separating the parties and actually consolidating Serbian control over


Page 4437

 1     certain areas is actually participating on the Serbian side of the

 2     conflict.  For the JNA, as you can see in this document, it means

 3     separating the parties and using all necessary means to enforce or impose

 4     a cease-fire.  For myself, I think this document leaves room for

 5     interpretation.  Subsequent documents are much clearer as to the role of

 6     the JNA.

 7             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 9             Mr. Theunens, time for the first break.  We'll come back at

10     11.00.  The court usher will escort you out of the courtroom.  Thank you

11     very much.

12             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Court adjourned.

15                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

17                           [The witness takes the stand].

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Gosnell.

19             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you, Mr. President.

20        Q.   Now, Mr. Theunens, before the break you were disputing my

21     interpretation of this document as a crossing of the Rubicon I would say

22     of the JNA towards actively participating in this conflict on the Serb

23     side.  Now, let me direct you to the bottom of the page that's on the

24     screen there, where it says, if we can go down a little bit more in the

25     English:


Page 4438

 1             "The MUP and ZNG units stationed in the villages of Dalj and

 2     Erdut were the ones that caused the conflict with the JNA unit."

 3             Notwithstanding the higher aspirations of the JNA to act as

 4     policemen between the two sides, wouldn't you agree with me that this is

 5     in reality reflecting a shift towards acting on one side against the

 6     other, regardless of the reasons?

 7        A.   To be honest, I don't know.  I mean, I read the sentence

 8     according to the command of the 12th Corps indeed -- I mean, he states

 9     that the MUP and ZNG units caused the conflict with the JNA.  If we were

10     to analyse the attitude of the each of the parties at that moment in the

11     conflict, we would also have to look at documents from the Croatian side,

12     I mean if that was the purpose of our analysis, and then try to form an

13     opinion on that.  As I said earlier, to me this document leaves room for

14     interpretation and there are documents -- later documents from various

15     JNA units that are much clearer.

16             At the same time, when you look at documents concerning the

17     situation in Banija, Kordun, and Lika, for example, with the various OGs

18     and TGs that are set up, some of them as already as early as September,

19     there it is clear that the JNA is fighting on the Serbian side.  The same

20     happens in the wider Knin area that's around the same time-period.  But I

21     understood that you wanted to give me an interpretation based on this

22     specific document, and there I have tried to do that to my -- to the best

23     of my abilities.

24        Q.   The paragraph above that says:

25             "The unit also did not enter the village of Dalj during the


Page 4439

 1     day ..."

 2             But then a few paragraphs up it says.

 3             "At 09:30 hours a tactical company of the 1st mb entered the

 4     village of Dalj ..."

 5             Why do you think Trajkovic isn't being entirely honest here?

 6        A.   Your Honours, I don't understand the reference to whether

 7     Mr. Trajkovic is honest or not.  You could try to analyse Mr. Trajkovic's

 8     honesty or lack thereof of if you would have independent observers in

 9     Dalj who could express their views in relation to the views expressed by

10     Mr. Trajkovic or Colonel Trajkovic and then, yes, you could draw

11     conclusions.  Maybe he's dishonest, maybe not.  You know, I can't make

12     that -- draw any conclusions to that.

13        Q.   Last paragraph on this page:

14             "In the days after the conflict there were occasional incidents

15     between the Croatian and Serbian inhabitants and our units (mostly the

16     military police) entered the village of Dalj to prevent acts of

17     retaliation against the Croatian population."

18             Now, can you discern in this document that Trajkovic seems to be

19     sensitive or concerned about as of when or what date his forces are in

20     Dalj?

21        A.   Looking at the date of the document, I think it's from 1st of

22     September, if I remember well.

23        Q.   No, it's from the 9th of August.

24        A.   Sorry, 9th of August, I couldn't see that at the top of the

25     document.  I mean, linked to that paragraph it would suggest in the days


Page 4440

 1     after the 9th of August units of the -- I mean military police of the

 2     12th Corps enters Dalj, but it doesn't state how long they stay, whether

 3     they establish a permanent presence or whether they go in and leave

 4     again.  So we would have to look at other documents from the 12th Corps

 5     to see the -- their deployment at any given time during that time-period.

 6        Q.   Last paragraph of the document which is on page 3:

 7             "We believe that the situation in the settlement of Dalj is still

 8     very complex due to the mistrust that has been created there.  Both

 9     warring parties believe that JNA presence is necessary and useful and

10     that in the present situation the withdrawal of JNA forces would have

11     disastrous consequences."

12             So someone is providing Trajkovic with information on the

13     situation in the town; correct?

14        A.   Well, the paragraph shows that Trajkovic expresses his assessment

15     of the situation in Dalj.  What this is based on, we cannot establish

16     from this document, but it would be reasonable to assume that he is

17     gathering information and obtaining information on the situation in Dalj

18     at that moment in time.

19        Q.   No mention in this document, is there, of any participation by

20     Arkan in this event; correct?

21        A.   Which event, Your Honours, because it's a summarising report?

22        Q.   "Report on the armed conflict near the village of Dalj."

23        A.   No, no mention is made of Arkan.

24        Q.   No mention of Arkan in any of the three previous documents that

25     we looked at setting out the forces that were part of the 12th Corps;


Page 4441

 1     correct?

 2        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

 3        Q.   Even though those documents also listed certain TO units that

 4     were to be attached to the 12th Corps; correct?

 5        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

 6        Q.   And you said earlier today that that would be to you -- or you

 7     would look to those documents in order to determine whether or not Arkan

 8     is subordinated to JNA forces as of this date; correct?

 9        A.   Yes in the sense that the mentioning of Arkan among the own units

10     would indicate that at that moment in time Arkan is subordinate and his

11     group are subordinated to the JNA.  As we see from 1st Military District

12     security organs documents, the JNA units also report about the presence

13     of Arkan or other volunteer groups in certain parts of SBWS even if they

14     are not -- even if they do not appear to be subordinated to the JNA at

15     that time.

16        Q.   That's at a later time-period and we're coming to that.  I want

17     to focus on August 1991, and you said earlier that you would look to

18     these types of documents to determine whether Arkan was or was not

19     subordinated to the 12th Corps at this time.  So my question to you is:

20     Does the absence of mention in this document and the previous documents

21     inform your view - and I believe this is your view but please tell if

22     it's otherwise - your view that in August 1991 Arkan is not subordinated

23     to the 12th Corps in this area?

24        A.   Indeed, Your Honours.  I mean, based on the documents we have

25     seen and the absence of any mention of Arkan and his group in these


Page 4442

 1     documents, Arkan is not -- and his group are not subordinated to the 12th

 2     Corps at that time.

 3        Q.   Let's have P103, please, Prosecution tab 93.  This is an

 4     information signed by Colonel Stevan Mitrevski who apparently is part of

 5     a logistics sector of some unit, and this report has gone up -- you've

 6     discussed it before.  This unit has gone to very high levels, security

 7     administration of some units, the Federal Secretariat for -- I believe

 8     the security administration of the Federal Secretariat for National

 9     Defence at least and other units.  And down at the bottom of page 1 we

10     see information relating back to the initial arrival of the 12th Corps in

11     Erdut and it says:

12             "He said that using explosive Arkan had completely destroyed a

13     Catholic church in the village of Erdut and the church tower was

14     destroyed before that during the JNA take-over of Erdut."

15             No mention of that in Trajkovic's report, is there?

16        A.   No, there is not.

17        Q.   Would the information in this report be salient to your analysis

18     of whether or not Arkan is subordinated to the 12th Corps at this place

19     and at that time?

20        A.   I'm sorry, I mean, with the break -- could you remind me the date

21     of the Trajkovic document we looked at?

22        Q.   That's the 9th of August, 1991.

23        A.   Yeah, well, this document is dated the 1st of October so -- I

24     mean we can -- we can objectively state that there is no reference in

25     Trajkovic's document dated the 9th of August, but we don't know why there


Page 4443

 1     is no mention.

 2        Q.   Are you disputing that the last sentence on page 1 of this

 3     document means to refer to the take-over of Erdut on the 1st of August by

 4     the JNA?

 5        A.   I'm not disputing that, but I just compared the two documents

 6     like anybody would do that here information is mentioned that is not

 7     mentioned in the other document.  That's all I can observe or state at

 8     this stage.

 9        Q.   Do you mention that in your report?

10        A.   No, because as we saw I didn't have the Trajkovic document

11     available to me and I -- I assume from -- I mean when I was checking the

12     internet on the status of the report I compiled in October, that the

13     Defence was quite negatively oriented towards the second report, so again

14     I cannot analyse documents that I don't physically have.

15        Q.   How does this information in this report, now that I have drawn

16     it to your attention, affect, if at all, your assertion that Arkan is not

17     subordinated to the 12th Corps in this area at this time?

18        A.   From a doctrinal point of view, Arkan should have been

19     subordinated to the 12th Corps during their operations in Erdut.

20     However, when we look at the context and all the other military

21     documents, the situation is not entirely clear.  We do know that Arkan

22     develops a good relationship with the future or the later commander of

23     the 12th Corps, namely, General Biorcevic.  I haven't been able to review

24     sufficient documents of the 12th Corps to establish the nature of his

25     relations at the moment when units of the 12th Corps take over Erdut.


Page 4444

 1     But again, from a theoretical point of view there should have been

 2     subordination and there should have been co-ordination in their

 3     activities.

 4        Q.   You testified at page 4183 of this case a couple of days ago that

 5     you had made requests for documents from the 12th Corps and that you had

 6     received very few documents.  Now, am I correct in understanding that

 7     you've received far fewer documents from -- in relation to the area of

 8     responsibility of the 12th Corps as compared to documents in relation to

 9     the area of responsibility of OG South?

10        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

11        Q.   Can you explain that?  Why is there that difference?

12        A.   I -- no, Your Honours, I cannot explain.  I think maybe the

13     country or the -- I think the states holding these documents, they are in

14     a much better to -- position to explain than me.

15        Q.   Have you -- do you have personal knowledge of documents in

16     archives being destroyed or concealed?

17        A.   An argument that was often heard and I'm -- I mean I don't recall

18     specifically in which -- whether it was in the context of which request,

19     but that a number of documents held in archives in FRY were destroyed

20     during the bombing, aerial bombing, conducted by NATO in the context of

21     the operations in Kosovo in 1999.

22        Q.   What I meant by my question which I guess could have been

23     clearer:  Intentionally destroying in order to conceal events?

24        A.   I don't know, but again maybe it's not an answer to your question

25     but just for the -- it can assist the Trial Chamber.  When I was working


Page 4445

 1     on the Vukovar case, we submitted requests for similar documents at

 2     different times.  And documents that were, for example, reportedly

 3     unavailable at one moment suddenly were available four months later.

 4     Now, whether there was a particular intention to that or whether it was

 5     due to lack of organisation, I don't know.  Or we would request documents

 6     and then we obtained totally different documents.  But that was the

 7     situation.

 8        Q.   Have you ever come across a document that you were able to

 9     ascertain was forged that had been provided to you from any source that

10     was purporting to be a JNA document?

11        A.   There were a few documents -- and again, I can only talk about

12     the documents that I saw.  But there were a few documents I think related

13     to the JNA 2nd Military District or obtained from state archives in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time where there was certain doubts about

15     their authenticity.  And -- I mean, these documents had nothing to do

16     with Eastern Slavonia -- the situation in Eastern Slavonia or SBWS.  I

17     understood from my colleagues that they undertook efforts to verify the

18     authenticity from these documents, for example, by showing them to JNA

19     officers during witness or suspect interviews and that matter was then

20     clarified afterwards.

21        Q.   Well, JNA officers who themselves might have an interest in

22     engaging in that forgery; right?

23        A.   I -- I mean, those particular cases I would consider doubtful

24     because these documents were quite negative, hostile towards -- about the

25     JNA or towards the JNA and its activities during spring 1992 in the wider


Page 4446

 1     Sarajevo area or in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So -- and they all came from the

 2     same archive and they had this -- I mean, it was all like for specific

 3     time-period -- it was almost like sensational kind of information that

 4     was included, and referring to the methodology one had certain doubts

 5     about the reliability of the source, not so much the source indicated on

 6     the document but the provider of the document and the layout of the

 7     document and on the other hand the contents.  So then you apply the

 8     methodology.

 9        Q.   Have you ever come across a document in relation to the SBWS

10     region that you would say has been tampered with?

11        A.   I mean --

12        Q.   And by -- just to clarify my question, by "tampered with," I mean

13     someone after the creation of the document has altered its content for

14     whatever reason?

15        A.   I will qualify my answer, I mean I -- to the best of my

16     recollection I haven't seen any documents originating from the

17     1st Military District or its subordinate units where there are

18     indications that the document has -- the content of the document has been

19     altered.

20        Q.   What about the war diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade?

21        A.   Well, again based on -- I was I think I find privileged to be

22     involved in the interview of the drafter of the war diary.  And just also

23     to clarify one of your questions yesterday, the JNA officers I -- when I

24     say "I interviewed," when I participated in the interview by the

25     investigator, most of those became Defence witnesses.  So it was not just


Page 4447

 1     a matter of collecting information that was favourable to the Prosecution

 2     or, as you suggested earlier, that I would be influenced by views that

 3     were favourable to the Prosecution.  But as I mentioned, I participated

 4     in the interview of that officer.  That officer also testified.  And I'm

 5     not aware of any reservations being raised during or after the Vukovar

 6     trial by any witness or any other individual in relation to the

 7     authenticity of the war diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade.

 8        Q.   Is it credible there could be no mention of the evacuation

 9     agreement of Vukovar Hospital in that war diary?

10        A.   Your Honours, I don't know whether it was in his testimony in

11     front of the Trial Chamber or during his interview that one of the

12     drafters of the -- I mean the one we interviewed and at this moment -- I

13     mean I can find his name back but I don't recall his name.  He said that,

14     well, you know, once, I mean, we had the 18th of November and Vukovar had

15     "fallen," people became a bit sloppy in their -- in the reporting and the

16     war diary was not kept to the same level of discipline as before.  So,

17     again based on that and on the absence of any similar objections as the

18     ones you raise now, the absence during the trial and afterwards, I have

19     no reason to believe that the war diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade

20     has been tampered with.  I would agree with the fact that it's -- it

21     lacks maybe comprehensiveness is not the right word but it appears to be

22     incomplete.  Events happening after the 18th are not covered with the

23     same level of detail as it should have been.

24        Q.   Are you seriously suggesting that those omissions are a matter of

25     mere sloppiness?


Page 4448

 1        A.   Your Honours, I'm not suggesting anything.  To the best of my

 2     ability I tried to answer the question and reflect the views that have

 3     been expressed by me by those -- I mean by people who have drafted the

 4     document and also the one who is actually -- I mean, the Chief of Staff

 5     of the Guards Motorised Brigade who was responsible for the contents.  So

 6     he supervised the drafting of the war diary and this is what they said.

 7        Q.   I mean, isn't it an obvious example of a JNA document being

 8     written in such a way to avoid responsibility for certain events?

 9        A.   Well, it is possible, I don't know, but looking at military

10     doctrine and also the military discipline and justice system, a war diary

11     as such would not be sufficient to establish responsibility or the lack

12     thereof or avoid responsibility in a kind of situation as the one that

13     occurred in Ovcara on the afternoon and the evening of the 20th of

14     November, 1991.

15        Q.   Well, the individuals involved in -- I apologise for the absence

16     of a gap.

17             The individuals involved in keeping that war diary aren't being

18     contemporaneously advised by lawyers on that surely?

19        A.   Again, I mean I've answered the question.  You know, it's not

20     just an issue of the war diary.  There's also other documents that --

21     allow to establish who is in command of who and who is responsible for

22     what.

23        Q.   Let's get back to Dalj, see whether or not Trajkovic's report is

24     accurately reflecting events.

25             MR. GOSNELL:  Can we have 65 ter 892, Prosecution tab 246.


Page 4449

 1        Q.   I'm sure you're familiar with this document, Helsinki Watch to

 2     Milosevic dated the 21st of January, 1992.  If we go to page 3 in the

 3     English, please, under the entry "August 1st Dalj."  And here's what

 4     Helsinki Watch is reporting.  If we can go to the next page in English,

 5     please.  It seems we have B/C/S on both sides.

 6             [As read] "On August 1, Serbian insurgents attempted to take over

 7     the local police station in Dalj.  Police trapped inside the station

 8     refused to surrender to JNA troops and a battle for the town ensued.

 9     After the JNA occupied Dalj, Serbian paramilitary troops reportedly

10     searched the village for Croatian soldiers, police officers, and

11     civilians, and killed many of those who were found wounded."

12             Now, you notice that this document, Mr. Theunens, says that the

13     JNA occupied Dalj, whereas Mr. Trajkovic seems extremely insistent that

14     his forces didn't occupy Dalj on the 1st of August; right?

15        A.   That -- I mean comparing the two documents, I would agree with

16     your conclusion.

17        Q.   Which do you think is more reliable?

18        A.   Well, I mean as an analyst I would say, you know, I can't answer

19     the question now.  I would look for additional information.  And again, I

20     mean the report we saw, the Trajkovic report we saw, was a summarising

21     report and it's not always easy to follow the chronology because there's

22     very few dates mentioned in it but it mainly discusses events of several

23     days I think, whereas here we have a discussion of apparently an event on

24     one day.  It doesn't say so much whether the occupation -- it seems that

25     it occurs on the 1st, it could also be the subsequent days.


Page 4450

 1        Q.   Let's now, if we could, go back to 356, we were just looking at

 2     this document, it's Prosecution tab 93 also known as P103.  If we can go

 3     to page 2.  And it's the second-last paragraph there.

 4             "There is a rumour among the JNA members located in that area

 5     that Arkan goes into the action only after the JNA units mop-up the area

 6     and then he ... and that area and commits crimes.  They think that Arkan

 7     is doing it with a full support of the SDB of Serbia."

 8             Now, is that description of the participation of -- the method of

 9     participation by Arkan, isn't that consistent with what's being described

10     in the Helsinki Watch report that we just looked at, which for the record

11     is 00892?

12        A.   Indeed, Your Honours.

13        Q.   Let's have 00235, please, which is D27, and that's Defence tab

14     380.  And if we can turn the page to page 4 in the English and in the

15     B/C/S it's immediately after the chart or the table.  And, sir, I'm sure

16     you're familiar with this document.  This is a request by Arkan for

17     compensation for one of his men apparently.  And it says:

18             "This is to certify that Nenad Markovic ...," et cetera,

19     "participated in the liberation of Tenja as a member of our unit which

20     fought in co-operation with the JNA and we emphasize that he was

21     seriously wounded while carrying out the combat task."

22             Do you know that information to be reliable based on the other

23     documents you've reviewed, not with respect to this specific individual

24     but that, A, there were JNA operations there; and B, that Arkan

25     participated?


Page 4451

 1        A.   I mean, I've -- don't recall seeing other documents on operations

 2     in Tenja specific, so -- otherwise the document seems fine with me.  So I

 3     could only answer your question if I would see other documents concerning

 4     the operations in Tenja.

 5        Q.   It goes on:

 6             "On 2 August 1991 he was transported in an army vehicle to the

 7     Sombor hospital, where he had an operation.

 8             "On 7 August ... he was transferred to the VMA in Belgrade where

 9     his left lower leg was amputated."

10             So we have somebody who is apparently wounded on the 2nd in an

11     operation with the JNA.  He's then transported in a JNA ambulance away

12     from the front line and then he's treated at a JNA hospital.  What does

13     that tell you about subordination, if anything, of Arkan's forces in this

14     area at this time?

15        A.   Basically nothing because, again looking at the doctrine they

16     should have been if -- sorry, if Arkan and his group were operating in

17     the area where the JNA was conducting operations in accordance with

18     doctrine they should have been subordinated to Arkan -- to -- excuse me,

19     to the JNA.  But the fact that somebody 's evacuated in a military

20     vehicle and transported to a military hospital does not give any

21     indication of subordination relation at that time.

22        Q.   It could be that right now we're having a terminological problem

23     because what I understand you to be saying when you say that he's not

24     subordinated, do I understand you to say that he's not -- well, let me

25     simply ask you:  What is your view -- how are you using the term


Page 4452

 1     "subordination" in the last answer?

 2        A.   Well, you used the word "subordination," so I answered your

 3     question.  It means that when -- that Arkan and his group when they were

 4     conducting activities there, that they were conducting activities that

 5     had been ordered to them or that they had been ordered to do by the JNA.

 6     That is what I understand under subordination.

 7        Q.   And you don't find the fact that they're engaging in combat at

 8     the same place as the JNA and that this document is claiming that it was

 9     in co-operation with JNA, you don't find that in any way probative or

10     indicative of the issue of the issue of subordination as you've used it?

11        A.   As I said, I would look -- I mean from the doctrinal point of

12     view, he should have been subordinated, there is no doubt.  However, I

13     would want to look at other documents and, for example, the orders that

14     the -- the written or the orders that determined the mission of the

15     various JNA units and subordinate units in the area of Tenja in order to

16     see whether Arkan and his unit are identified as one of these subordinate

17     units and what their task was.  I don't say that it's hundred per cent

18     sure that he was not subordinate, that's not my claim.  My answer is --

19     or that's not my answer.  My answer is this document does not allow to

20     draw hundred per cent clear conclusion given the context of the other

21     documents I have looked at which show that the situation is quite

22     complex.

23        Q.   But the absence of a formal order of subordination doesn't mean

24     that he's not subordinated; is that right?

25        A.   Indeed, not necessarily.


Page 4453

 1        Q.   So "subordination" is a concept that can be analysed in terms of

 2     what's actually happening on the ground in terms of co-ordination of

 3     forces, executing orders, and so forth; right?

 4        A.   If two units have to co-ordinate, it doesn't mean that one is

 5     subordinate to the other.  It means, however, that there is a third

 6     entity or command level involved to which these -- at least one of these

 7     two units is subordinated because, for example, you have to co-ordinate

 8     between neighbouring units but they may have a different superior and

 9     executing orders, indeed, involves subordination.  You execute orders

10     because you are subordinated to somebody.

11        Q.   I shouldn't have used the word "co-ordination" because I know

12     that's a term of art in military parlance.  Let's say in layman's terms

13     if they're acting together with the JNA forces, isn't that indicative,

14     probative of, not necessarily conclusive, indicative of subordination?

15        A.   I would agree, Your Honours, and again we would try to look at

16     additional documents and the kind of documents I mentioned earlier in

17     order to establish with the highest degree of accuracy, highest possible

18     degree of accuracy what the relations between the units is.

19             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 05993, please, Defence tab 378.

20        Q.   This is a -- again, another Trajkovic document as the Chief of

21     Staff of the 12th Corps command, dated the 21st of September to the

22     1st Military District command, and there's a lot in this document,

23     Mr. Theunens, that I would like to discuss with you.  And then just to

24     let you know where I'm going with all this, I'm then going to come back

25     to Arkan specifically.  But there's just a few general situational issues


Page 4454

 1     that I'd like to ask you about in this report first.  It says under --

 2     under the heading there:

 3             "Pursuant to your order, strictly confidential ... of 6 August

 4     1991, we are hereby submitting to you the situation report as

 5     follows ..."

 6             Now, we were discussing this earlier, this sentence seems to

 7     imply that there has been an order from the 1st Military District for

 8     situation reports.  How often are situation reports supposed to be

 9     submitted, given this particular circumstance?

10        A.   Your Honours, it will depend of the orders that have been given.

11     Looking at the OG South documentation covering the time-period of its

12     existence that was available to me, their regular situation reports were

13     submitted on a daily basis each evening between 1800 and 2000, but it

14     would have been explained in the orders for the 1st Military District for

15     the operations in the area because there is a paragraph on -- it's not

16     called communications, but there is a paragraph on the location of the

17     command post and also on the frequency of -- for the submission of

18     regular and extraordinary situation reports.

19        Q.   Under the situation in the units, it describes the fact that

20     they're carrying out operations deployment according to the mission

21     assigned to them for the forthcoming operations.  Is "operations

22     deployment" a term of art in military parlance; and if so, can you help

23     us understand what it means?

24        A.   Well, my understanding -- I mean, I don't recall any use of

25     this -- of the words in this combination, but I mean operations and


Page 4455

 1     deployment, but my understanding is that it's -- operation -- deployment

 2     in preparation of further operations.

 3        Q.   And it says the 12th Corps command has come out to the command

 4     post in the area of PG, the Dalj village."

 5             Is "come out" a term of art in military parlance or does this

 6     just mean that they temporarily arrived and had a meeting with the

 7     commanders listed and that's what occurred?

 8        A.   You know, this is one of the new documents.  I reviewed it but I

 9     didn't have the opportunity -- I mean, I reviewed it in September/October

10     2012, but I didn't have the opportunity to look at it with a language

11     assistant because when I -- I mean, looking at it now I would ask a

12     language assistant to check the B/C/S with me and then we would discuss

13     it.  We know that the 12th Corps establishes a command post, it could

14     have been a forward command post, in Dalj village.  At this moment I

15     don't recall exactly when, but I believe it was prior to the 21st of

16     September, 1991.  Now, not everybody -- not the whole command is present

17     at a forward command post, so it could be that the remainder part of the

18     12th Corps has indeed come to that forward command post, that's a

19     possible interpretation, but I don't know whether maybe the translators

20     can clarify the issue.

21        Q.   That's fine.  And then we see discussion of TO units and that

22     starts on page 1.  It says:

23             "The TO units which have already been deployed and are now

24     abandoning their positions without authorisation, thereby leaving units

25     alone in the combat formation, represent a particular problem ..."


Page 4456

 1             And then if we turn the page and go over to page 2.

 2             "All the TO units of the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the

 3     Republic of Serbia which make part of the forces of the 12th Corps have

 4     almost completely abandoned their positions and gone back.  They are not

 5     units, but a mob behaving in a really arrogant and undisciplined way,

 6     looting property and houses, which has a negative effect on the morale

 7     among our units and the people watching that."

 8             Now, are we clear that these TO units being referred to in this

 9     report, they're subordinate to the 12th Corps in this area at this time;

10     correct?

11        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

12        Q.   Down at point 3 -- just to follow-up on that, it follows from

13     that that the JNA has a duty to prosecute any crimes committed by those

14     subordinated TO members; correct?

15        A.   I mean, I agree with your proposition, but I think it's best to

16     use more specific language; that is, that indeed in accordance with the

17     procedures or the doctrine -- or no, sorry, the regulations for military

18     discipline and military justice and the 1988 regulations on the

19     implementation of the laws of war, the JNA should, indeed, have at least

20     reported these activities and have them investigated.  And when I mean

21     reported, not just in a regular situation report but also specific

22     reports on the actual events and incidents.

23        Q.   Let's go to page 103 of your report.  We don't need to bring that

24     up.  This is just your reference, Mr. Theunens.  And this sets out

25     Article 1 of the Law on Military Courts.  And Article 1 of that law says:


Page 4457

 1             "Military courts as regular courts try criminal acts committed by

 2     military persons."

 3             Now, the question is:  Are these subordinated TO soldiers

 4     military persons and is that why there is JNA jurisdiction over them?

 5        A.   Well, there are -- I mean, I agree again with what you say, but

 6     just to be precise there is SFRY armed forces jurisdiction over them.

 7     From this document we don't know which measures the 12th Corps has

 8     undertaken, have they informed the military prosecutors -- I mean, have

 9     investigations taken place with security organs, military police --

10        Q.   Mr. Theunens --

11        A.   Yeah.

12        Q.   -- that wasn't my question.  I'm not blaming the JNA at this

13     point.  I'm not blaming you.  I'm not blaming anyone.  Just a simple

14     factual question about the interpretation of this provision.

15        A.   Mm-hmm.

16        Q.   Does military persons -- because it's not self-evident, but does

17     "military persons" encompass TO soldiers while -- who commit crimes while

18     subordinated to the JNA?

19        A.   Yes.  And sorry to be more again specific, but it's recognised TO

20     units and, okay, TO of Vojvodina and Serbia, recognised TO units, so

21     there's no -- I mean, I agree with your proposition.

22        Q.   Well, I'm not going to go back to our long earlier discussion.

23     I'm just going to leave it there in respect of this particular issue.

24        A.   Yeah.

25        Q.   Now, further down the page there's something -- a description


Page 4458

 1     here that you as a military person might be able to help us understand

 2     because I as a lay person don't understand what's going on.  Under 3(a)

 3     it says:

 4             "The units of MUP and ZNG are being prepared and they are active

 5     from the fortified buildings and bunkers, which makes the carrying out of

 6     combat operations more difficult, without a detailed search of the

 7     terrain and facilities at the rear of the combat formation."

 8             Now, why would the presence of opposing enemy forces in fortified

 9     buildings and bunkers have anything to do with conducting a detailed

10     search of the terrain and facilities at the rear of the combat formation?

11        A.   Well, ideally we would have a map in order to see the deployment

12     of the JNA and the intelligence assessment concerning the deployment or

13     the locations where ZNG and MUP are included in these fortified buildings

14     and bunkers because then I think it would be easier for me to answer the

15     question.  Because it -- one option could be -- but maybe this is

16     speculative, that is, that -- I mean the JNA is arriving there,

17     deploying, and at the same time there are certain buildings, apparently

18     of a not specific military nature, where members of the ZNG and the

19     Croatian Ministry of Interior are allegedly present.  And perhaps these

20     buildings are located in the rear area, i.e., the part of the zone of

21     operation of the JNA where -- I mean, not combat operations are taking

22     place but where their logistic support units and so on are located.  I

23     mean, not everybody is obviously on the front line.  Logistical support,

24     communication centres, and similar units and facilities are located in

25     depth because they are otherwise exposed to hostile activities, so that


Page 4459

 1     could be an explanation but ideally we would have a map.

 2        Q.   And providing security to forces in the depth is vitally

 3     important to combat operations; right?

 4        A.   Yes, to prevent -- I mean enemy infiltration and enemy disruption

 5     of your logistical support.

 6        Q.   How do you define "infiltration"?

 7        A.   Entering -- sorry.  Entering without being authorised to do so

 8     and with hostile intentions.

 9        Q.   Are there concerns by the JNA at this time-period that the

10     Croatian civilians have hostile intentions towards JNA units in this

11     area?

12        A.   I don't know where civilians are mentioned in the report --

13        Q.   Mr. Theunens, I'm not asking you about this document, just to

14     clarify.  I'm asking you in general based on your review of documents.

15        A.   Well, my answer would be as follows.  The JNA doesn't recognise

16     the MUP or the ZNG and often in documents talk about Croatian

17     paramilitary formations, i.e., illegal formations that use military

18     structure -- have a military structure or use military techniques or

19     tactics to conduct actually military activity.  And even they use the

20     term Ustashi.  So I think -- I mean, so there is no clear recognition of

21     combatants on the Croatian side and this also creates suspicion towards

22     any Croatian including, I mean, civilians.

23        Q.   So the answer is yes?

24        A.   The answer could be yes but it's -- I think -- I mean, it's too

25     general.  You know, we have to look at the specific document, but if it


Page 4460

 1     makes you -- I mean I would say yes.

 2        Q.   Item 6:

 3             "In the zone of responsibility of the 12th Corps, the security

 4     organs established contact with the security organs of the TO and the

 5     police in Dalj.  Following a notification from the Dalj defence staff

 6     that they discovered that a radio transmitter was active in the immediate

 7     vicinity of the command post, the military police organs carried out a

 8     detailed search of the terrain and houses for which they had some leads

 9     that they had a radio transmitter.  The search did not uncover anything."

10             Now, throughout your report you use an expression when describing

11     TO units you say "local Serb TO."  Can you help us understand why you use

12     that particular expression, local Serb TO, when you're talking about TO

13     units in the SBWS?

14        A.   Your Honours, I use the expression "local Serb TO" or

15     "self-established local Serb TO" or "SAO TO" because this is not the

16     regular TO of the Republic of Croatia as it existed under the system of

17     All People's Defence.  So these are self-established units, and the

18     documents -- I mean now talking about SBWS, the JNA military documents

19     show that there is some confusion as to the legal status of these units.

20     However, in other documents these SAO or local TO units are considered TO

21     units as such by JNA commanders.  So there is no standard view on them.

22        Q.   And when you say self-established - and the Chamber has heard

23     plenty of evidence on this already, so I don't want to belabour the point

24     for too long - but when you say "self-established," do I understand

25     correctly that these are essentially units that are being created at the


Page 4461

 1     town level initially as village guards and then many of them declare

 2     themselves to be TO units?

 3        A.   Yes -- I mean, there are certain units like that.  There are

 4     others in areas where there was a Serb majority prior to the conflict

 5     where the Croats leave or they are kicked out or whatever and the Serbs

 6     take over the existing structures.  And -- I mean, this is for example

 7     discussed on pages 182 and following.  In different parts of Croatia with

 8     a significant Serb presence we see that such units are established and

 9     even attempts are made to create some kind of a structure with staffs at

10     a later stage.

11        Q.   And given the situation described in this document, given the

12     security needs of the JNA that you've described in respect of units that

13     are there, given the fact that local TO units are -- well, just that,

14     they're locals, they've been there for a long time, does any of that

15     suggest to you that the JNA is going to rely on the local Dalj TO to

16     assist them in discharging these security tasks?

17        A.   It's possible, but one doesn't necessarily imply the other.  And

18     again, when I say "local, "I say "local Serb TO units," because the

19     "local" refers to Serb, not to TO.  These are -- these units consist, as

20     far as I remember from the documents I reviewed, almost exclusively of

21     Serbs or maybe some non-Serbs, i.e., the people considered "loyal."

22     Obviously it is useful for the JNA to rely on the regional knowledge of

23     these units, but on the other hand - and again I refer to the documents

24     that I mentioned in my report - there are instances where members of

25     these units take, for example, Petrova Gora and Leva Supoderica local


Page 4462

 1     Serb TO units and JNA documents, sorry, OG South, they are called TO

 2     detachments, that they are involved in acts of -- I mean, lack of

 3     discipline and even criminal behaviour.

 4        Q.   And the JNA unit in the area is directly subordinating those

 5     local TO units; correct?

 6        A.   I've answered that before.  They should do so.  Now, the key

 7     issue then comes -- I mean, they should do so during combat operations.

 8     The key issue is what happens when there are no operations anymore.  This

 9     is not so much a matter for OG South because their operations continue

10     until -- I mean, Vukovar falls on the 18th but then there are still

11     resistance pockets that have to be dealt with and the structures that

12     have been defined, i.e., OG South continues to exist until the 23rd of

13     November, but for other parts of Eastern Slavonia, like, for example,

14     Dalj, where after the initial, call it separation of forces and

15     take-over, the areas under JNA control, there the situation is more

16     complex.

17        Q.   You know, Mr. Theunens, this is why at the very beginning of the

18     cross-examination I asked you so many questions about your definition of

19     zones of responsibility, and I specifically asked you whether you had any

20     functional limitation that would qualify the territorial definition of

21     the zone of responsibility.  And now for the first time, I believe,

22     you're introducing this concept that the duty - and I will use the term

23     if you don't want to - the duty to subordinate is somehow confined by

24     what the TO units are doing in the area.  Do you have an answer to that?

25        A.   No -- I have -- maybe I wasn't clear in my answer.  During combat


Page 4463

 1     operations led by the JNA, the TO units should be under the command of

 2     the JNA.  That's the doctrine and I stand by that answer.  Once combat

 3     operations are finished, I say the situation is more complex, I don't say

 4     that the TO is not subordinated anymore to the JNA, that's not my answer.

 5     But we have to look at the specific documents because we see, for

 6     example, in parts of Eastern Slavonia where there are no more operations,

 7     I mean the events in Dalj 21st of September, 4th of October, there is

 8     still a JNA presence there for sure, the 12th Corps still has a command

 9     post there, but incidents occur and no mention is made of the JNA.  This

10     can mean several things.  Now, from a doctrinal point of view the JNA

11     commander will still -- in the area of Dalj will still be held

12     responsible, but the responsibility will -- I mean, the - how you call

13     it? - the actual case of military discipline or justice proceedings, the

14     situation will be taken in -- the nature of the situation will be taken

15     into account in a sense whether or not combat operations formally

16     subordinating the TO to the JNA were ongoing or not.

17             And just to finish, the Panic orders, 15th of October and there

18     is also one of November, clearly state that the JNA remains in command

19     and is responsible for what is happening and shouldn't leave an area out

20     of control of the JNA.  So I think -- I mean, this is as specific as I

21     can be, and I think it's good to be specific given the complexity of the

22     situation.

23        Q.   Well, when do combat operations stop according to you in the area

24     of OG North?  And when I say "OG North," I'm referring to that map that

25     we looked at and the area in the -- to the north of the corridor


Page 4464

 1     separating OG North from OG South.  When, according to you, just so I can

 2     understand your position, Mr. Theunens, when according to you are there

 3     combat operations in that area?

 4        A.   Well, ideally, we would look at the documents and -- because they

 5     will explain, I mean the regular situation reports, the orders for combat

 6     operations, they will clearly state when operations start, when they end,

 7     which objectives are achieved, when, and how, and who participated and

 8     whatever resubordination of units may have taken place.  My

 9     interpretation overall is that these operations -- I mean, for example,

10     for Dalj, the JNA takes over control of Dalj, I think that was the 1st of

11     August we saw, that quite soon the JNA has achieved control over the

12     municipality of Dalj because otherwise they wouldn't put a first -- a

13     forward command post there, it wouldn't make sense.  And then we would

14     have to look at other municipalities, so it's -- I cannot give a

15     categorical answer because other parts of OG North or units that are

16     sometimes -- at one moment in time part of the OG North but then continue

17     to operate as part of the 12th Corps, well, they continue to operate to

18     conduct combat operations towards Vukovar until at least the 18th of

19     November, so we have to look at specific documents.

20        Q.   Notwithstanding the need to look at specific documents, I'm not

21     sure I understand your position.  If a TO unit from Serbia is present in

22     Dalj on September 15th, the town has been in the JNA control for a good

23     six weeks, it's about 10 kilometres from the front line with

24     Borovo Naselje, it's about 20 kilometres from the front line with Tenja,

25     is there a duty to -- again, I keep using my terminology and I apologise


Page 4465

 1     that, but you know what I'm saying --

 2        A.   Yeah, yeah.

 3        Q.   -- is there a duty to subordinate and discipline those TO units

 4     from Serbia for starters?

 5        A.   You know, I have answered the question.  According to doctrine

 6     there should be, according to the orders of the 1st Military District

 7     there should be, that's all I can say.

 8        Q.   And does the same apply to the local TO units?

 9        A.   To the local Serb TO units you mean?

10        Q.   Correct.

11        A.   The same applies to them.  But of course -- I mean, you could --

12     I mean the TO of the Republic of Serbia, you can still remove them.  With

13     the local Serb TO it becomes more complicated because if these are people

14     from that village it's a bit of a challenge for the JNA to remove them,

15     and then I think there would be difficulties with the SAO SBWS

16     authorities, whereby as we see from the documents the attitude that

17     needed to be adopted towards them is not clear either, so it was a bit of

18     a challenging situation for a JNA commander, but the fact that there is a

19     challenge doesn't reduce his responsibility.

20        Q.   Thank you for that clarification.  Now, going back to page 1, and

21     this is the part that I say is extremely relevant to Arkan, down at the

22     bottom of paragraph or section (a) it says:

23             "All the garrisons are working in an organised fashion on the

24     induction and on dealing with the September contingent of soldiers."

25             Now, what do you think that means?


Page 4466

 1        A.   Your Honours, it means that there were still conscript service in

 2     what remained of SFRY and that -- so young men were called up to do their

 3     military service, at regular times they were called up.

 4        Q.   So these are JNA conscripts not volunteers?

 5        A.   Yeah, that would -- they would be JNA conscripts.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:  I tender this document, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Shall be assigned Exhibit D39.  Thank you.

 9                           [Defence counsel confer]

10             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 65 ter 343 which is Prosecution tab

11     89, please.

12        Q.   This is a document by someone named Lieutenant -- for the

13     Lieutenant-Colonel Ivan Metosevic [phoen] who may have something to do

14     with -- well, actually, I can't determine where exactly the unit is

15     coming from, but this report is sent to the SSNO OB department and the

16     12th Corps OB department amongst other addressees and it's an

17     information, and it says -- it's dated the 30th of September and it says

18     as follows:

19             "On 27th September 1991, four volunteers, who had set off to join

20     the JNA units, allegedly returned ... from the territory of Dalj and

21     Erdut."

22             Now, let me first of all ask you this question:  Is it possible

23     to volunteer for a JNA unit?

24        A.   It is possible given the -- I mean, the legal provisions that

25     redefine volunteers as people who had no military obligations, because if


Page 4467

 1     they had military obligations they would have been most likely mobilised.

 2     There were also several mobilisations during that time-period.

 3        Q.   "On the same day at the office of Stevan Malesevic, the president

 4     of the Ruma Municipal Assembly and in the presence of the secretary of

 5     the Ruma MSUP and his OB ... an interview was conducted with Knezevic and

 6     Jovanovic who left an impression of being a little inebriated."

 7             Over the page.

 8             "In the course of the interview, they stated that on 21

 9     September, together with other volunteers and conscripts who had

10     responded to the call-up, they had been transferred from the Ruma

11     garrison to Dalj in the organisation of Major Vuckovac.  Around 80 of

12     them arrived and approximately half of them were left that night at

13     around 2300 hours in the middle of the village until Vuckovac found a

14     unit to turn them over to.  Ten minutes later, Arkan, who in the opinion

15     of interlocutors, is connected with the JNA superior officers and SUP

16     officials, came along. "

17             Now, just reading that, does that seem to relate to or could it

18     relate to the September contingent of soldiers?  Ruma, for your

19     information, is in Serbia.  I think it's about 40 kilometres south of

20     Sremska Mitrovica.  Is this referring to the same group?

21        A.   It's possible, Your Honours, but I think it's unlikely in a sense

22     there was -- there are the regular call-ups for people to join the JNA

23     conscripts, but they wouldn't go directly to unit, they would first go

24     through some kind of a recruitment or selection centre in order to look

25     at -- to consider their physical and mental ability.  Maybe some people


Page 4468

 1     are more fit for infantry and others are more fit for armour or for

 2     airborne or whatever, and so a selection would be made based also on the

 3     requirements of the various JNA units, and then obviously people would be

 4     given training before being assigned to a specific unit.  Here we seem to

 5     see a situation where people are brought in by a person, a Major

 6     Vuckovac, and they move -- apparently they move directly to -- from Ruma

 7     to Dalj, which I would say is unusual.  I know there was a lot of chaos

 8     at the time, limited response to call-ups or mobilisations, limited

 9     response to the -- I mean the conscript service.  At the same time you

10     have politically motivated volunteers or individuals who say whatever

11     their status is, I want to go and defend the country.  So, yeah, it's --

12     for me it's a different situation than the regular conscript contingents.

13        Q.   Further down the page [Microphone not activated] --

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

15             MR. GOSNELL:

16        Q.   Further down the page:

17             "Through the hitherto checking, a statement was received from

18     Major Vuckovac from Ruma," so that's the individual who escorted these

19     individuals, these conscripts or volunteers, "from Ruma asserting that on

20     21.09," so that's the 21st of September, "he had handed over this group,

21     which Knezevic and Jovanovic are talking about to the commander of the

22     headquarters administration, Captain First Class Jovan Konjevic ..."

23             Now, what is a headquarters administration and which headquarters

24     administration would be in Dalj at this time?

25        A.   Yeah, I'm looking at the B/C/S text.  It is -- I mean, the only


Page 4469

 1     headquarters that is in Dalj at that moment is the headquarters of the

 2     12th Novi Sad Corps, i.e., the forward command post.

 3        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

 4             So what's being described in this document is that someone from

 5     Ruma, either part of the JNA or the TO, accompanies a group of conscripts

 6     and/or volunteers, brings them to the headquarters administration of the

 7     12th Corps in Dalj, leaves them there, and then apparently they're handed

 8     over to Arkan and Arkan takes them to the training centre and trains

 9     them; is that right?

10        A.   Apparently, yeah.  This is the -- I mean, what the report is

11     stating.

12        Q.   Would that be indicative to you that Arkan is subordinated to the

13     JNA at this time?

14        A.   On face value, it doesn't give any indication in relation to

15     the -- any subordination or other relation Arkan and his group may have

16     with the JNA.  What it's -- indicates that there is at least co-operation

17     between the 12th Corps and Arkan, whereby Arkan is used to train

18     volunteers/conscripts that are to serve in the 12th Corps.  So there is

19     at least co-operation which also involves recognition by the 12th Corps

20     of Arkan and his role in the training of volunteers.

21        Q.   Does the fact that Arkan attended the funeral of the first

22     commander of OG North and for that matter the 12th Corps, General Bratic,

23     in early October, does that provide any indication that he was acting as

24     part and parcel of the JNA at this time?

25        A.   I mean, from a military point of view not because attendance to


Page 4470

 1     funerals or ceremonies can mean anything.

 2        Q.   Does the fact that General Panic said - and you're well familiar

 3     I think with the quotation - and actually I need to read the entire

 4     quotation because I suggest to you, Mr. Theunens, that you incorrectly

 5     interpret this passage as being only a reference to Arkan's participation

 6     in OG South or on attacks in Vukovar.  And I'll -- and it's in your

 7     report at page 464, you locate it in a section on Vukovar, but let me

 8     read the passage for you and I suggest it's a little bit broader.  In a

 9     question to General Panic, speaking in 1994 -- and for the record this is

10     04931, Prosecution tab 462.

11             "Q. Was this chaos, was this chaos" -- and, yes, this is in

12     relation to Vukovar that the questioner is asking.

13             "The reason why so many -- there were not so many but these

14     groups of um Serb volunteers, Serb volunteer forces, paramilitaries

15     turned up on the scene in September.  Was that the reason -- was that how

16     it all happened?"

17             Panic's answer was:

18             "I think the operative units did their job correctly, but the

19     mobilised did ... units were not prepared adequately for action, and when

20     you don't prepare them adequately you have er ... you encounter the

21     problems that you just mentioned.  And that's how volunteers started

22     appearing and we trained them for action er for combat action in Belgrade

23     and they were fighting together with our units er ... they included

24     Arkan's Tigers and er ... Seselj's Chetniks.  They were not big groups,

25     say in Arkan's case between 80 and 120 persons and in Seselj's case um


Page 4471

 1     between 90 and 120 men.  But the people who wanted to act," and here's

 2     the key phrase, "all these formations were under command but the people

 3     who wanted to act independently were being removed from that area and

 4     disarmed and returned home."

 5             Now, do you agree with me that when you look at the entire

 6     context it certainly seems as if General Panic is talking more -- well,

 7     he's talking about the period starting in September; correct?

 8        A.   He doesn't -- Panic doesn't give a specific time-frame, but

 9     it's -- as you mention -- because I'm a bit confused, you seem to suggest

10     that I incorrectly described or identified something.  I'm trying to

11     figure out what you mean by that.  Panic doesn't --

12        Q.   Well, let me just clarify before you embark on an answer because

13     I don't want to impute to you something that you haven't done, but at

14     page 464 that quotation from Panic appears only in relation in a section

15     about Vukovar.

16        A.   Well, you know, this happens when you have amalgamated reports

17     that parts are cut out of -- or cut and pasted of other reports.  The

18     Hadzic report I compiled in September /October 2012 when I had the new

19     documents attempted also to cover operations in other parts of SBWS, but

20     this -- the section which you are now discussing comes from the report on

21     the Vukovar operations which, I mean, in my view it's quite obvious that

22     I relate to Vukovar.  And you yourself when quoting from this BBC

23     interview given by Panic refer to the Vukovar area.  So I don't see the

24     problem.

25             MR. GOSNELL:  I'm past time, Mr. President.  Sorry.


Page 4472

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you for that, Mr. Gosnell.

 2             Mr. Theunens, we take the second break and come back at 12.45.

 3     Thank you.

 4                           [The witness stands down]

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Court adjourned.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

 8             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Your Honours, perhaps before the witness is

 9     brought in, I have some information with respect to the document which

10     was MFI'd pending translation, this was Exhibit P1692.  And if you

11     remember, it was the item number 3 which Mr. Theunens was requesting a

12     revision as to whether the word "officers" should be "superiors."  We

13     have received an answer from CLSS that they stand by their translation

14     and that it should not be amended or changed in any way.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.

16             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  So at this stage should we -- there's no further

17     translations needed, can we exhibit it in full?

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Yes, of course, admitted and marked.

19                           [The witness takes the stand]

20             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, just while the witness is taking his

21     seat perhaps we could bring up 04 -- oh, I suppose that's ...

22             Could we have 04931 which is Prosecution tab 462.

23        Q.   Now, Mr. Theunens, I'm sorry for that last passage.  I should

24     have had it up on the screen and instead I just read it to you and that

25     wasn't completely fair.  So now I would like to have it on the screen in


Page 4473

 1     front of you, and the page is the page number ending 7848.  I think this

 2     the B/C/S it's around 4968.

 3             Now, Mr. Theunens, so you're clear, I wasn't suggesting that you

 4     were attempting to slant your report in a particular way.  It's just that

 5     the report that actually was submitted to the Judges, this quotation

 6     appears in that particular section on specifically Vukovar.  But when you

 7     read this passage as a whole, would you agree that he does, you know, in

 8     his description of how it is that volunteers started appearing in the

 9     theatre, that he's describing a broader phenomenon here than merely which

10     units are there on the front with Vukovar.

11        A.   Yes, indeed, Your Honours.  I mean, this is what General Panic

12     states in the interview for BBC Death of Yugoslavia.

13             MR. GOSNELL:  We would tender that, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked -- Mr. --

15             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  We don't have any objections, but this document

16     is part of the package that we would be offering.  I think for the time

17     being we could admit it but just as a marker.  This is part of the

18     documents that are footnoted.

19             MR. GOSNELL:  Whichever way is most convenient for the Registry.

20                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  If I may assist, Your Honours, the record shows

22     that the Defence does not object to the admission of this document which

23     is on our list, so when the time comes for deliberation perhaps on the

24     matter of our motion that could be taken into consideration.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Yes, let's keep it in the package then.  Thanks.


Page 4474

 1             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 65 ter 1028 which is Defence tab 304.

 2     And if we could please go to page 72 of the English, and I believe it's

 3     around page 68 of the B/C/S.

 4        Q.   Now, again, Mr. Theunens, this is a transcript of the -- of a

 5     session of the SFRY Presidency.  Their Honours have seen this before and

 6     so I'm not going to read the entire passage, but I just want to put a

 7     very specific passage to you.  And it's the part where Kostic is speaking

 8     down at the bottom of the page.  And he says:

 9             "Zivota," and that's Zivota Panic, "at a session here once I

10     asked what was the relationship between Arkan and the JNA and you were

11     the one who told me that he was good."

12             And then we get a response not from Panic but from someone else,

13     Borisav Jovic, and the answer is or comment is:

14             "In matters of war."

15             And then Kostic says:

16             "We should avoid any major clashes now, this should be done in a

17     nice way so that these lads of his can stay, if they want, in the army."

18             Panic's response:

19             "Arkan carried out missions in the area very efficiently.  At one

20     point he broke away, but they brought him back, et cetera.  However, he

21     is doing Yugoslavia a disservice.  He should be called and given a task.

22     Those who sent him there should call him.  I do not know who sent him.

23     However, Arkan was present in Bijeljina, Zvornik, around Sarajevo, Knin,

24     et cetera.  Someone is leading him and issuing tasks to him.  We should

25     see who is doing this.  It is certain that it is not us."


Page 4475

 1             And then he -- at the end of his passage he says:

 2             "Since I have to attend talks with Vance at 1700 hours, could I

 3     leave, please?"

 4             Do you believe what Zivota Panic is saying here, that he doesn't

 5     know who has sent Arkan or who is sending him?

 6        A.   Could I just ask a question.  Can you remind me what the time of

 7     this meeting is, I mean the date?

 8        Q.   Certainly.  This is the 194th Session of the Presidency -- yeah,

 9     and that occurred on the 16th of April, 1992?

10        A.   1992, yeah.  From a contextual point of view, this is after the

11     SFRY presidential order of the 10th of December, 1991, so the

12     presidential order number 73 on the engagement of volunteers during an

13     imminent state of war -- or imminent threat of war, I'm sorry.  I mean,

14     one of the points in that order is that all volunteers should be

15     subordinated to the JNA within the ten days -- all volunteer formations,

16     actually, and that's an important clarification, or they shall be

17     removed.  My understanding of the context is and given the date of this

18     meeting is that Panic is referring to the appearance of Arkan and his

19     volunteers during operations in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina like

20     Bijeljina and Zvornik and these operations, as I have addressed in other

21     reports for other trials, were focused at implementing some of the six

22     strategic goals, in this particular context establishing a corridor

23     between Semberija and Krajina.  And -- I mean Panic -- I think he's -- he

24     asks a number of questions because he knows that -- and again this is

25     corroborated by JNA documents concerning these -- the events in


Page 4476

 1     Bijeljina, Zvornik, and so on during that time-period.  It's not the --

 2     Arkan is not operating under JNA command or is there and has not been --

 3     I mean not systematically and has apparently, based on what Panic says,

 4     not been sent by the JNA, so the question is, well, who is doing it then.

 5     And I think the fact that Panic raised these questions during a meeting

 6     of the SFRY Presidency suggests that Arkan -- that Panic expects that his

 7     interlocutors there may be in a better position to provide him with an

 8     answer to that question.

 9        Q.   So the answer to my question was yes?

10        A.   Well, it -- I mean, it is reasonable to assume that Panic was in

11     a position to make an assessment or to draw certain conclusions as to who

12     had sent Arkan because there were also security organs discussing -- I

13     mean reports discussing this matter, i.e., the relations between Arkan

14     and the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia.  But

15     probably - and I don't know the context, further context that is

16     discussed in this meeting - probably he wants the members of the SFRY

17     Presidency to formally state to him who is giving these assignments to

18     Arkan.  Given indications Panic has -- this is a continuation of the

19     sentence, given the indications Panic has concerning relations Arkan

20     enjoys with the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia.

21             MR. GOSNELL:  If this is part of the package, I'll just say for

22     the record we don't have an objection, or if it's not part of the package

23     we would tender that.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  This document was admitted yesterday through

25     Witness Nielsen, though yet without an exhibit number.  Thank you.


Page 4477

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.

 3             MR. GOSNELL:

 4        Q.   So just to put a point on General Panic's attitude as you can

 5     discern it in this transcript.  It seems that what you're saying is that

 6     he's being slightly disingenuous, that he has information but he's not

 7     sure.  Is that a fair summary of your answer?

 8        A.   No.  I think -- I wouldn't use the expression disingenuous.  I

 9     don't know what Panic's state of mind was at the time.  But it is -- I

10     mean JNA reports talk about presence of Arkan.  The documents -- the JNA

11     documents I have seen don't clarify or don't indicate how Arkan is

12     appearing in which circumstances he's appearing in Bijeljina, Zvornik,

13     and other locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina spring 1992, and Arkan and his

14     people are conducting certain activities there.  In the absence of JNA

15     documents concerning -- I mean orders to Arkan to do these activities or

16     to be there, the question can be raised:  Well, who is it then that has

17     given these assignments to Arkan.  That is one element.

18             The second element is that already from security organ reports

19     from the 1st Military District covering the October 1991 to, say, January

20     1992 time-period, the security organs gather information indicating the

21     existence of special or specific relations between Arkan and officials of

22     the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia.  So I think it

23     would be logical even for Panic to assume that if he hasn't ordered Arkan

24     to be in Bijeljina and Zvornik, then it should have been or then it would

25     have been the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia -- of other


Page 4478

 1     members of the Government of Serbs.  But he -- now he wants to, at least

 2     according to these minutes, he wants to check with the remaining members

 3     of the SFRY Presidency whether they can explain to him why and how it

 4     comes that Arkan is involved and is conducting military activities in

 5     these locations, Bijeljina, Zvornik, and others.  Because maybe it has

 6     been approved by the SFRY Presidency.  I haven't seen any such documents,

 7     but these are all assumptions Panic can make and my understanding from

 8     his questions during the minutes is that he seeks clarification from --

 9     well, actually, the Supreme Command, i.e., the highest command organ in

10     existence in SFRY.

11        Q.   One thing is clear, he's denying that he's the one who sent

12     Arkan; right?

13        A.   Yes, because otherwise the question would seem rather unusual,

14     and then I think when you look at the rest of the minutes they would have

15     answered to him:  Well, you know, Zivota, you sent him.

16             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have P101, Prosecution tab 244.

17        Q.   Now, this is a document that you refer to in your report on

18     several occasions, so you're well familiar with it.  And it's one of

19     these security organ reports you have been referring to addressing the

20     issue of Arkan.

21        A.   I think it's another document we have.  I mean at least here on

22     the screen we have something from the SAO SBWS.

23        Q.   It should be 65 ter 00873.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  This is Exhibit P1004.  Thank you.

25             MR. GOSNELL:  Sorry, I called for P101.


Page 4479

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  What I meant is that 65 ter document 873 is

 2     admitted as the Prosecution Exhibit P1004.  Thank you.

 3             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you very much.  That's clearly my handwriting

 4     failing me.

 5        Q.   Now, this is from some time in January, and if we could please go

 6     to page 4.

 7             MR. GOSNELL:  And, sorry, just for the record that's written by

 8     chief Colonel Milic Jovanovic.  Or it's for Milic Jovanovic.  If we could

 9     have page 4 of the English.  We seem to be on page 6 of the English.

10     Well, let's see if we can go back in the English and see if we get to the

11     right passage.  And back one more page, please.  There appears to be a

12     page missing or out of order.  Well, could we just go down to the bottom

13     of that page, please.  There it is.  Thank you very much.

14        Q.   Now, here we see midway through the paragraph that says "it is

15     known."  It says:

16             [As read] "Our assessment is that certain" possibly "JNA leaders

17     accept him on the - illegible - and influence of these circles.  It is a

18     telling fact that although Raznatovic has small forces at his disposal,

19     he attends meetings of the 1st Military District command with the corps

20     commanders ..."

21             Who is the commander of the 1st Military District for most of

22     this time-period up between August and up until the date of this document

23     which is January 1992?

24        A.   This is general -- Colonel-General Zivota Panic.

25        Q.   So the same individual who in the previous document is claiming


Page 4480

 1     he doesn't know who is sending Arkan to the area?

 2        A.   Well, Your Honours, I think we're talking about two different

 3     issues.  In the previous document General Panic was inquiring about the

 4     involvement of Arkan in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least two or

 5     three months after this document.  So the situation is -- I mean, I'm not

 6     here to defend Panic whatsoever, but it -- I mean, from a methodological

 7     point of view, drawing analytical conclusions is something else than just

 8     comparing two different documents and saying then saying it must be this.

 9     So the situation is different.  It is clear again in the context of the

10     JNA and the events in Vukovar that Arkan enjoys good relations with the

11     12th Corps and in particular with General Andrija Biorcevic who becomes

12     commander of the 12th Corps I think at the latest early November or maybe

13     in the course of November 1991 already, I mean after the previous

14     commander, General Bratic, is killed in action.  And I've mentioned that

15     a few times, but that is the most telling example, the famous video of a

16     reception where Biorcevic is praising Arkan clearly shows that there are

17     good -- not just on a personal level but also on a professional level

18     good relations between General Biorcevic on the one hand and Arkan on the

19     other hand.  So referring to this meeting, it may well be that Biorcevic

20     has brought Arkan with him to that meeting or several meetings, I mean

21     meetings of the 1st Military District, or maybe that Panic invited him, I

22     don't know, but there are different explanations possible and so again

23     I'm alone, but what I tried to clarify is there is not necessarily a

24     contradiction between what Panic says at a meeting of the SFRY Presidency

25     in relation to events three months later and what is stated in this


Page 4481

 1     security organs report of the 2nd of January, 1992.

 2        Q.   As a military man what does it tell you that an individual with,

 3     say, 100, 150 troops under his command is attending a meeting with corps

 4     commanders?

 5        A.   I could say size doesn't matter, but I don't want to, I mean, try

 6     to be witty.  It shows that Arkan and his group is considered an

 7     important component, and this is also reflected through other documents.

 8     Whether that is because of the value, the combat value, of his forces or

 9     the relations Arkan has with, as I mentioned, Biorcevic - and this is

10     also indicated in other documents, security organ's reports, I mean the

11     relations Arkan enjoys or allegedly enjoys with members of the Serbian

12     government, in particular MUP and MOD - that I cannot establish.  Maybe

13     both played a role.

14        Q.   From a military perspective, don't you view it remarkable that a

15     man with a company-strength unit appears to be attending meetings of

16     corps commanders at the district level?

17        A.   Well, we could try to give some military flavour to it in stating

18     that maybe the 12th Corps was using Arkan and his group during combat

19     operations as a kind of strategic reserve, which would actually be quite

20     consistent with General Biorcevic's assessment of the role and of the

21     role of Arkan's volunteers during operations.  And that assessment I

22     refer to the video.

23             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 00356, please, Prosecution tab 93,

24     P103.

25        Q.   And we've looked at this document earlier today.  Now I'd like


Page 4482

 1     you to look at a different part of it and it's on page 2 of the English.

 2             [As read] "While staying in the forward command post of the 12th

 3     Corps, agricultural estate in Dalj on 29 and 30 September, the source saw

 4     Arkan armed and coming to the area of the IKM in the off-road vehicle two

 5     times and entering the building where the command was located."

 6             So you'd agree here we see an indication he's also visiting the

 7     command of the -- the forward command post of the 12th Corps; right?

 8        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, and that's consistent with what I said

 9     concerning his relations -- I mean, Biorcevic is at that time not yet

10     commander of the 12th Corps, but relations between Arkan and the 12th

11     Corps.

12        Q.   And that command post is at the agricultural estate in Dalj;

13     right?

14        A.   Yes, as is stated in the document, the forward command post.

15        Q.   Now, if we could go back again to 873 to the same area where we

16     were in the document before, which I think is page 2.  And, sir, you rely

17     on this -- as I said before, this particular document and this passage.

18     If I could just pose my question.  It says there at the bottom of the

19     page in this report:

20              [As read] "It is known that it," so the centre, even though the

21     document doesn't expressly say which centre, but it says "the centre is

22     financed in ways that are not fully known.  It is known that it is

23     financed by the socialist party of Serbia from within the country and

24     from abroad as well as by numerous enterprises.  Accordingly, a

25     characteristic example is the Dalj farm which," and then it says


Page 4483

 1     illegible question mark, "written order of Goran Hadzic was paid out

 2     7.088.674 dinars and 50 cents for the needs of the illegible guard while

 3     illegible for free."

 4             Now, you've recited that information in your report.  Do you

 5     consider that claim reliable?

 6        A.   I do for several reasons.  In the Milosevic trial we had a

 7     financial analyst preparing a report on financial aspects of role of

 8     Mr. Milosevic in relation to certain events.  And I remember seeing

 9     documents, I mean payment orders from several agricultural enterprises or

10     state-owned enterprises in SBWS signed by members of the SAO SBWS

11     government for payments or the transfer of goods to the Erdut training

12     centre at different moments in time, including even if I recall well end

13     of 1991 as well as 1992 and subsequent.  So what I'm trying to say is

14     that I've seen other documents including copies of payment order that

15     corroborate this passage.

16             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 05135, please, which is Prosecution

17     tab 538.

18        Q.   And just while that's coming up, if I can just ask you to go back

19     a little bit and that was yesterday or perhaps it was earlier today, you

20     suggested that there might be a contradiction in the documents to the

21     extent that on the one hand we see JNA documents showing that Arkan has a

22     close relationship with various people and then on the other hand we see

23     various OB reports in which his activities are being reported upon.  Now,

24     I wonder if you could accept that contradiction is one interpretation,

25     but isn't it also true that if he's subordinated to the JNA that actually


Page 4484

 1     it's precisely the obligation of the OB organs to ascertain whether he is

 2     engaging in criminal activity, and then if there is credible evidence

 3     about that to pass it on for prosecution to the military prosecutors?

 4        A.   Your Honours, and maybe I misexpressed myself yesterday or the

 5     previous days.  I didn't want to suggest that the documents are

 6     contradictory.  I do believe when looking at all the documents that

 7     different elements of the JNA enjoy different relations with Mr. Arkan,

 8     summarising in two lines, okay, General Panic reportedly orders to

 9     subordinate all elements that are on the battle-field to the JNA, that

10     also implies Arkan but there are problems with that so there are several

11     orders for that.  The 12th Corps enjoying quite close relations with

12     Arkan, including also their use during combat operations under the order

13     of the 12th Corps.  And then indeed at the same time security organs of

14     the 1st Military District writing reports on the activities of Arkan.

15     The fact that they write reports on the activities of Arkan and his group

16     does not necessarily mean that Arkan is subordinated to the JNA or not.

17     I mean, wasn't doesn't imply the other, one doesn't exclude the other.

18             So coming back to the question then -- but of course if Arkan and

19     his group are committing crimes or other activities that are prohibited

20     by SFRY armed forces doctrine, then it's up to the security organs to

21     report about that and we would expect the implementation of the military

22     discipline or mainly the military justice system.  And on --

23        Q.   So just to put a fine point on it --

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   -- and I apologise for interrupting, the existence of these


Page 4485

 1     reports is perfectly consistent with his subordination; right?

 2        A.   Your Honours, I said that one does not imply the other.  The

 3     existence of these reports --

 4        Q.   Mr. Theunens, that wasn't my question.  My question was:  Is it

 5     consistent?

 6        A.   Well, I don't understand the question.  What do you mean it is

 7     consistent?  What does -- why -- what do you mean by the use of the word

 8     "consistent," given my answer?

 9        Q.   The question is whether or not the existence of those reports is

10     consistent with his subordination to the JNA?  That's all.

11        A.   I'm sorry, I mean, I've answered the question.  In my view it is

12     as I explained, the reports where the security organs on a group do not

13     suggest whether or not this group is subordinated to the JNA.  Of course,

14     if the report states that he is subordinated to the JNA, that would be a

15     useful element of information in order to establish his relations with

16     the JNA, but at face value a security organ report as such without -- and

17     that doesn't mention whether or not he's subordinated to the JNA, doesn't

18     give us any useful information as to whether or not he's subordinated to

19     the JNA.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gosnell, Mr. Theunens asked you what you mean

21     by "is consistent with."  It could be a language problem.  And when you

22     answer that question, in fact you didn't answer, you just repeated it.

23             MR. GOSNELL:  You're right, Mr. President.

24        Q.   I'm sorry about that, Mr. Theunens.  It could be we're just using

25     two different concepts of the word.  And let me put it a slightly


Page 4486

 1     different way.  It does not negate that there was a subordination

 2     relationship, the existence of these OB documents?  It does not disprove

 3     that?

 4        A.   I think I've answered the question.  You know, it doesn't negate

 5     it, it doesn't confirm it, unless there are elements that allow to draw

 6     conclusions in relation to his subordination relationship with the JNA in

 7     the security organs reports and then it would be useful elements of

 8     information that would require other elements of information, situation

 9     reports or orders, in order to confirm the nature of the relation.

10        Q.   Assuming that there is a subordination relationship with the

11     unit, is it understood as a matter of JNA practice, doctrine, or any

12     rules that are in existence that logistical support needs to be provided

13     to that subordinated unit?

14        A.   You want me to give a general answer or to focus the answer on

15     Arkan?

16        Q.   It could be hazardous but I'll ask you to first start generally

17     and then perhaps we can go to Arkan.

18        A.   I mean the general answer is yes, and this is also reiterated in

19     different, I mean, documents of the 1st Military District.  We have

20     discussed these and they are in my report that the JNA was responsible

21     for providing supply, I mean logistics supply, to all subordinate units.

22        Q.   All right.  And now let's move on to Arkan.

23        A.   For Arkan the matter is slightly more complicated because we

24     know - and I think that's also addressed in security organ's

25     reports - that Arkan, for example, has more sophisticated weapons, I'm


Page 4487

 1     not talking about heavy weapons, but like, for example, more

 2     sophisticated infantry weapons, even of Western origin, that are not

 3     available in the inventory of the SFRY armed forces.  So where it would

 4     be impossible for the JNA to provide specific logistics support for those

 5     weapons, is it ammunition or for their maintenance.  For other parts,

 6     yes, the JNA would be required, I mean if Arkan is operating under their

 7     command, to provide logistics support for the items they are in the

 8     position to do so.

 9        Q.   All right.  So now let's take a look at the document in front of

10     us.  And it's written by Arkan.  Apparently it is addressed to the Dalj

11     socially owned enterprise and the director thereof.  And it says:

12             "During a review of expenses specified as the expenditures of the

13     Territorial Defence Special Training Centre, we found out that according

14     to your breakdown the total expenses for December were as follows ..."

15             And then there's a listing of payments or -- I would say

16     invoices, they've been charged a certain amount of money and this is --

17     and he is setting that out.  And then he says:

18             "Two factors participated in spending the amount of 3.4 "and some

19     odd million "dinars.  The government and its ministries and the special

20     training centre of the Territorial Defence of the SO SBWS.  We maintain

21     that the expenses of these two factors must be separated, which is what

22     we did for December 1991.  We thus come to the conclusion that the

23     expenses in the amount mentioned above could be broken down as

24     follows ...

25             "We therefore kindly request from you that in the future our


Page 4488

 1     expenses be specified separately, whereby we will be able to determine

 2     our expenses more easily."

 3             Isn't this, in fact, a letter of complaint from Arkan to the Dalj

 4     farm saying:  Stop overcharging us?

 5        A.   I mean, this is one of the elements of information you can find

 6     in the letter.  There are also other ones.  I mean, it's remarkable in my

 7     view given the focus of my report that Arkan - and I forgot the date but

 8     I think it's January 1992 if we can go to the top again --

 9        Q.   It is January 1992.

10        A.   Yeah.  That Arkan then signs as apparently the commander of the

11     special -- sorry, if you can go back to the heading, as a commander or as

12     in having an official capacity in relation to the special training centre

13     of the TO of the SAO SBWS.  I find it remarkable given the various

14     allegations that have been made in 1st Military District reports but, I

15     mean, there is also information in open sources at that time about his

16     role in combat and his alleged involvement in crimes.  He and his

17     group -- sorry.

18        Q.   Well, we're certainly going to come to that issue, but now let's

19     focus on the point which I'm trying to raise with you which I don't think

20     you answered.  Do you agree with me that this is a letter of complaint

21     about being overbilled?

22        A.   Yeah, he complains that he's -- I mean, that expenses by other

23     official organs of the SAO SBWS are charged to him or to the training

24     centre where in his view they should be charged to these other official

25     bodies.


Page 4489

 1        Q.   Now, looking back or thinking back to P101, you remember that's

 2     the security organ report which you rely on in your report repeatedly for

 3     the claim that Goran Hadzic has ordered the Dalj farm to support Arkan.

 4     Does it make any sense that on the one hand there's going to be an order

 5     for the Dalj farm to support Arkan or subsidize Arkan and then in January

 6     Arkan is complaining about being overcharged by that very same

 7     institution?

 8        A.   Your Honours, maybe it's an issue of accounting and that is

 9     outside my area of expertise that in order to ensure that their accounts

10     are clear they check with Arkan:  Okay, these and these expenses have

11     been made for you, and that would be consistent with the claim in the

12     security organ's report, and, yeah, they want to have this clarified.

13        Q.   So you're saying that they're receiving some kind of a -- you're

14     hypothesising that they're receiving a credit of some sort from the Dalj

15     farm, then they've somehow been overcharged, and then now they have to

16     write this letter complaining about it?

17        A.   Yeah, and also I think now we are talking about the situation

18     that Arkan is in charge of the Territorial Defence special training

19     centre.  I'm not sure whether in the security organ's report we're

20     already talking about the Territorial Defence training centre or just

21     Arkan's training centre in Erdut.  Yeah, I mean -- I don't have the two

22     documents in front of me, but I would say that okay if the Dalj farm or

23     socially owned enterprise has to provide or provides financial -- I mean

24     provides support, supplies or whatever, to Arkan, they need to put that

25     somewhere in their books, the numbers and so on.  And the next question


Page 4490

 1     would of course be:  Who would pay?  Would Arkan pay or is somebody else?

 2     Now, if Arkan is paying, where does he get the money from in order to pay

 3     these bills because the Territorial Defence training centre doesn't

 4     produce any use any economical revenue, so the payment Arkan has to

 5     provide according to these documents to the Dalj socially owned

 6     enterprise has to come from somewhere.

 7        Q.   It probably isn't coming from the very socially owned enterprise

 8     that is overcharging him though.  Wouldn't you agree with that?

 9        A.   I don't -- I haven't analysed how the SAO SBWS was organising its

10     budget and ensuring if, for example, Arkan received certain services or

11     supplies, how those -- that provided those services were reimbursed and

12     how Arkan whether he got his money from.  The money has to come from

13     somewhere.

14             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, we would tender this document,

15     please.

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  It was already admitted and marked as P215.140.

18     Thank you.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

20             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you very much, Mr. Registrar.

21        Q.   Now, after that rather long and perhaps taxing journey through

22     documents about Arkan 's direct connections with very senior levels of

23     the JNA, Arkan's direct operations in conjunction with JNA forces, I say

24     starting at the beginning of August and continuing for months,

25     considering what Panic says both when he's being a little more honest and


Page 4491

 1     when he's being a little bit less honest, given what we see in the report

 2     about the engagement in Dalj and Trajkovic's lack of honesty, I suggest

 3     to you, and given all the other information about how Arkan is

 4     interacting with JNA forces, in the area of responsibility of the

 5     12th Corps, are you willing to agree with me that Arkan is subordinated

 6     to the 12th Corps, let's start with throughout the period of 1991?

 7        A.   Your Honours, I have answered the question.  I'm not going to --

 8     I don't see a reason to change my answer.  I could just clarify -- I

 9     mean, Mr. Gosnell is suggesting that senior officers of the JNA are

10     lacking honesty.  Again, I cannot express a view on that.  I can only

11     refer to doctrine, that is, that it was a violation of military

12     discipline and maybe even more serious for an officer to provide

13     inaccurate reporting.  And given the system or procedure that a commander

14     has to be familiar with the activities or the situation of his units two

15     levels down, there were ways to find out if somebody was providing

16     inaccurate reporting, especially in a context of such a serious issue

17     like the presence of Arkan and his volunteers and their activities in

18     SBWS during fall 1991.  I -- for sure I don't dispute that Arkan was

19     subordinated to the JNA, i.e., to units of the 12th Corps at particular

20     moments in time, but there are also activities conducted by Arkan where

21     his relation with the JNA is not entirely clear, even if - and I fully

22     agree - according to doctrine and according to Panic's orders, 15th of

23     October, 16th of November, the JNA was -- should have subordinated all

24     units or remove them.

25        Q.   And when you refer to activities, I assume you're referring to


Page 4492

 1     criminal activities; correct?

 2        A.   For example, Your Honours, yeah.  I mean, the Dalj prison events

 3     is one example.

 4        Q.   The fact that a subordinate soldier is or let me not use the word

 5     "subordinate."  The fact that a soldier is committing a crime in

 6     violation of all the laws of war and the regulations of the army, that's

 7     surely not indicative that the person isn't subordinated; right?

 8        A.   I'm not sure I understand the question, Your Honours.

 9        Q.   Well, then let me put it a different way.  If an artillery

10     commander takes direct aim at a town and blows it to pieces, surely it's

11     no argument to say the person isn't subordinated because they violated

12     the laws of war; right?

13        A.   No.  I mean ...

14        Q.   And if someone purporting to enforce security in a zone of

15     responsibility unlawfully walks around, loots houses, beats people, kills

16     them, that's no indication that the person isn't subordinated, is it, to

17     the unit in the area of responsibility?

18        A.   It is not, but do you want me to refer to -- I mean, is this

19     referring to Arkan or are these just general questions?

20        Q.   Well, shouldn't the answers to both be the same?

21        A.   Not exactly when seen in context of who Arkan was and what he was

22     doing and the various security organs' reports or other reports.  I mean,

23     there's -- I haven't addressed those in my report, but there were so many

24     reports in the media about him kind of glorifying his activities, the

25     activities of him and his group, he's not the ordinary soldier or the


Page 4493

 1     ordinary artillery commander.  From the reports I've reviewed, I'm

 2     repeating myself, I'm sorry for that, but it is reasonable to conclude

 3     that Arkan enjoys particular relations with senior officials in Serbia

 4     and also in the SAO SBWS.  And maybe the existence of these relations

 5     prevented or, I don't know, discouraged certain JNA officers to really

 6     enforce military discipline and military justice as they should have

 7     done.

 8             I discussed I think also with Mr. Demirdjian.  We have these

 9     security organ reports.  Unfortunately, we don't have the follow-up.

10     What did the competent authorities, military prosecutor, others, or the

11     civilian prosecutor in Serbia, do with these reports?  Did they act upon

12     them?  I'm not aware that Arkan or any members of his group were ever

13     arrested in Serbia, at least not between 1991 and 1993.  Arkan was even

14     allowed to establish a political party and he participated in the

15     political -- in the elections.

16        Q.   Mr. Theunens --

17        A.   Yeah.

18        Q.   -- thank you.  I'm going to move on now.

19        A.   Okay.

20        Q.   I think earlier - and you should correct me if I'm wrong in

21     making this statement - but earlier we established that a president of a

22     republic, whether in peace or war time, has no command authority over the

23     TO in that republic; is that right?

24        A.   After 1988 that is correct.

25        Q.   And in the area of the 12th Corps, what does have that command


Page 4494

 1     responsibility over the TO?

 2        A.   It's the commander.  Sorry, the commander of the 12th Corps.

 3        Q.   Does that mean that when we see references to the -- to

 4     individual TO units, it's the 12th Corps that has command authority over

 5     those various TO institutions?

 6        A.   Yes, with, again, two clarifications, that is, according to

 7     doctrine they should have and when we're talking about TO I'm talking

 8     about the TO -- I mean, the republican TO and the TO of the two

 9     autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, as it was defined in SFRY

10     armed forces doctrine.  The situation becomes much more complex when we

11     are talking about the self-established SAO SBWS or SAO Krajina or SAO

12     Western Slavonia.  I call them local Serb, but TO.

13        Q.   The Erdut training centre as a matter of let's start with

14     doctrine, given the circumstances, that is supposed to be subordinated to

15     the 12th Corps; correct?

16        A.   I'm not sure.  I think maybe you can refresh my memory, when it

17     is -- when the Erdut training centre starts to be officially called a

18     SAO -- I mean, SO Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem training centre --

19     sorry, SAO SBWS TO training centre.  And then -- because indeed that's

20     also complexity because then we have to look at what are the relations

21     between the SAO SBWS TO and the 12th Corps?  As long as the 12th Corps is

22     in the area, then I would agree with you.  I mean is present in SBWS,

23     then I would agree with you.  A lot of time the situation is more complex

24     especially also, just coming back to the beginning of my answer, when the

25     Erdut training centre is only used by Arkan, I think, for training and


Page 4495

 1     when his group is there and when at least based on my review of the

 2     documents the link or the relation with the SAO SBWS TO is not entirely

 3     clear.

 4        Q.   Have you ever seen a JNA document that refers to the SAO SBWS TO

 5     dated 1991?

 6        A.   You mean that uses the three words in that connection, SAO SBWS

 7     TO?

 8        Q.   That refers to an overarching TO that unites the subordinate or

 9     individual town TOs, have you ever seen such a document that refers to

10     that?

11        A.   Not exactly.  I mean, I think -- what I mentioned in examination

12     this is for the SAO SBWS civilian authorities, there it's for the first

13     time actually on the 20th of November in his order I think it was 2436-1

14     that General Panic explicitly recognises these authorities.  I mention

15     this because this is the only context that I remember that SAO SBWS is

16     used in an official document and as a recognised entity by the JNA.

17        Q.   You can't tell from looking at that header whether or not the

18     training centre has been set up by the district government, can you?

19        A.   No, I can't.  I mean, if I would make abstraction of the context

20     then I would say, you know, since according to the legislation in the

21     SFRY, the republics are responsible for training the TO, then I would say

22     well it has to be the republic but then the question arises, well, it's

23     for sure not the Republic of Croatia.  Then we end up in the context, so

24     you could say from a purely theoretical point of view it has to be the

25     SAO SBWS or the RSK.  But as I highlighted, the situation is quite


Page 4496

 1     complex so it may well be that the centre was established by the Ministry

 2     of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia.

 3        Q.   Well --

 4        A.   I haven't -- sorry, I haven't seen a document that is

 5     establishing the centre and for sure I haven't seen a JNA document to

 6     that effect.

 7        Q.   Well, here's the fallacy in your reasoning, Mr. Theunens, and I

 8     do understand why I believe you're engaging in this fallacy.  Why can't

 9     it be that just as there are neighbourhoods in Vukovar like the

10     Leva Supoderica neighbourhood where there is a TO, just as there is a

11     town called Dalj where there is a TO set up by local people, just as

12     there is a Bapska TO that is basically a formation that comes out of

13     village guards, various other TOs, why is it necessary or why should you

14     assume, because I think that's what you're doing, that there is an

15     overarching provincial or district TO headquarters General Staff that

16     somehow is organising all of those individual TOs?

17        A.   You make several suggestions in your question.  I mean, my

18     reference to the existence of a SAO SBWS TO -- well, you know, in the

19     heading of the document in front of us, it is mentioned special training

20     centre of the Territorial Defence of the SO - sorry, I touched the

21     screen - SO Baranja, Western Srem in Erdut.  I didn't invent that.  It's

22     on the document.  It's a contemporaneous document.  The certificate we

23     discussed this morning signed by Radovan Stojicic talks about the

24     Supreme Command or the supreme headquarters of the TO of SAO of the SBWS.

25     Those I would say that's the situation how it is in practice.  And what I


Page 4497

 1     was explaining earlier with the legislation is de jure aspect.  Of

 2     course, everyone can establish his own unit, but then it's a matter of, I

 3     would say, recognition because otherwise you get chaos.  And we see --

 4        Q.   And who does the recognising?

 5        A.   Well, that is -- that is in -- a complex matter in the context of

 6     the situation in SAO Krajina or SBWS in fall 1991 because as you remember

 7     the document we discussed during examination where the Chief of Staff

 8     Trajkovic of the 12th Corps asks the commander of the 1st Military

 9     District:  Well, what is the attitude we should adopt towards these SAO

10     authorities and the -- maybe he didn't use "local Serb TO" but local TO

11     and the 1st Military District?  Well, until the 20th of November states

12     that no interference should be allowed by these "self-declared" or local

13     organs of authority.  And this is, for example -- this is discussed on

14     pages 491 to 496 of my report.  And I agree with you, at the same time

15     you see that the 12th Corps enjoys close or uses Arkan and so on during

16     its operations so --

17        Q.   Mr. Theunens --

18        A.   Yeah.

19        Q.   -- you raise a very interesting point.  Here we have a document

20     which you're referring to from the 15th of October, 1991, where

21     General Panic is saying:  Don't pay any attention yet to this -- these

22     SBWS civilian structures at the same time, as we know well having looked

23     at the documents, that he has sent Arkan, he has been involved in Arkan's

24     presence in the area of the 12th Corps and obviously is operating with

25     him and involved with him.  Now, that being the case, who do you think is


Page 4498

 1     providing the authority to put that letter-head right there in that

 2     document?

 3        A.   Your Honours, again, these are for me totally different matters

 4     because as I mentioned earlier I haven't seen any JNA document -- I mean,

 5     maybe you can show me one, but I don't recall seeing any JNA document

 6     whereby the JNA establishes training centres for the TO.  When we go back

 7     to the de jure situation, the republics and the autonomous provinces,

 8     i.e., Kosovo and Vojvodina, when they had that status, are responsible

 9     for the training and equipping and organisation of the TO, so it would be

10     their responsibility.  And again, when we look at the situation as it

11     develops in fall 1991, the JNA may have provided assistance but then

12     again I would like to see specific documents, but I cannot draw from any

13     conclusions based on your suggestion that given the fact that Arkan at

14     times operates under the command of the 12th Corps in command operations,

15     that therefore the 1st Military District must have been responsible for

16     establishing the training centre.  I cannot draw that conclusion.

17        Q.   So you'd like to see specific documents indicating that, but as

18     you said there are a lot of OG North documents that appear to be missing

19     or have never been provided?

20        A.   Maybe -- yeah, maybe there are some documents included there, but

21     we have a fairly detailed -- I mean, we have a quite substantial -- or

22     "we," the Office of the Prosecutor had a quite substantial collection of

23     documents concerning the operations of OG South and also, for example,

24     for other parts of Croatia, the Krajina, where indeed the JNA provides

25     support to the local Serb TO, and I'm talking now about fall 1991, I'm


Page 4499

 1     not talking about the situation after January 1992 where, indeed, as we

 2     have seen, the JNA, I mean the SSNO, provides substantial support to

 3     organising local Serb TO units.  But prior to that -- I mean including

 4     their training.  But prior to that, I haven't seen a document for the

 5     establishment of a training centre, so -- and it has not been reported by

 6     any of the documents of the 1st Military District I have seen concerning

 7     the training centre Arkan is -- I mean is in charge of in Erdut in

 8     January 1992.

 9        Q.   Prior to starting your testimony here, did you review the

10     transcripts of Mr. Nielsen's -- Dr. Nielsen's testimony?

11        A.   No, I did not, Your Honours.  From time to time when I look at

12     the Sense Tribunal web site and there was a -- I think they paraphrased

13     Mr. Nielsen's testimony, but I find it difficult to understand because

14     also I review what they write in other cases of my testimony and I'm

15     sometimes also surprised.  I have the impression that they're not always

16     fully versed with the details or the specific aspects of military

17     doctrine or in the case of Dr. Nielsen, MUP, I mean Ministry of Interior

18     activities and police doctrine.

19        Q.   Have you heard the thesis expressed that the training centre in

20     Erdut was controlled by one or another organ from Belgrade?

21        A.   You know, from my work at the Belgium Ministry of Defence, I

22     started to look at the Balkans in September 1992.  I went for the first

23     time to Erdut in August 1993.  At various times obviously and since

24     Belgian troops were deployed in Baranja since I think April or May 1992

25     until the course of 1997, the presence of Arkan and his activities was of


Page 4500

 1     relevance for us, not to the least for force protection issues.  And

 2     various information concerning Arkan's relations with Belgrade as well as

 3     with Mr. Hadzic were available, but obviously I haven't used them for my

 4     report.  For my report I rely on JNA and other official documentation.

 5        Q.   Why are you mentioning it here if it's not part of your report?

 6     What relevance is that?

 7        A.   Because I tried to answer your question.

 8        Q.   Did you take that into account in preparing your report?

 9        A.   I took it into account -- I mean, I haven't explained the

10     methodology, so if you want I can explain the methodology.  But

11     interpretation of the information is a step in the processing phase of

12     the intelligence cycle.  Interpretation means that you compare new

13     information that you have obtained or information you were not aware of

14     before with the existing "body" of knowledge and then you draw certain

15     conclusions.  So in this particular context, imagine that I assumed or

16     that I was convinced that Arkan -- say that Arkan was sent by

17     President Milosevic, assuming that.  Well, before I would put that on

18     paper, I would look for information in order to establish or to see

19     whether I would be in a position to establish who sent Arkan on the basis

20     of the information in front of me.  Since I didn't see any such JNA

21     documents except for the security organ reports who do not answer that

22     question I think very clearly, but they make suggestions as to the nature

23     of relations Arkan enjoys with officials in Belgrade, so I was not able

24     to answer that question so I haven't made any statement in the report or

25     statement by me that Arkan was sent by President Milosevic, for example.


Page 4501

 1        Q.   But your report does frequently mention his connections with the

 2     Serbian MUP; correct?

 3        A.   Indeed, and as you will see from the footnotes --

 4        Q.   And if I can just pose the next question.  Isn't it also true

 5     that Badza, Radovan Stojicic, is also in your view and in your report

 6     closely associated with the Serbian MUP?

 7        A.   When you use -- sorry.  You say "in your view," well, that is my

 8     conclusion based on the documents I have reviewed, and I think I do it in

 9     a very transparent manner because these documents --

10        Q.   And if -- I'm just --

11        A.   Sorry.  I mean, this is the second time you interrupt me.

12             MR. GOSNELL:  Well, I'm in the President's hands.

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Well, Mr. Theunens, you should consider from time

14     to time to answer just with a yes or a no when it is possible and --

15             THE WITNESS:  I will do, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  It would be helpful.

17             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

18             Yes, what I want --

19             MR. GOSNELL:

20        Q.   And if I can just ask -- just let me pose a few questions and

21     then I promise, Mr. Theunens, if you then want to elaborate or give

22     further answers, I'll be more than happy to allow you or to give a

23     general question so you can do that.  But if I can just ask you a few

24     specific questions and then we'll get to the broader -- the broader

25     answer.  And my question is:  Radovan Stojicic was, in your information,


Page 4502

 1     a fairly senior member of the Serbian MUP in 1991; right?

 2        A.   Yes, Your Honours.

 3        Q.   And did you have any information that he controlled the border

 4     guards connecting the area of the SBWS with Serbia?  Do you know that?

 5        A.   I have no specific recollection.  Probably I saw something to

 6     that effect, but I haven't -- I don't believe I have mentioned that in my

 7     report.

 8        Q.   And if Radovan Stojicic and Arkan show up at around the same time

 9     in the area of the SBWS, do you really think that they didn't on their

10     own authority have the power to create a stamp referring to the TO of the

11     SBWS?

12        A.   I mean, anyone can create a stamp, but the question is:  Why

13     would you do it?

14        Q.   Well, for the simple reason that there was a situation of chaos,

15     confusion, and war.  And in a time of war, the authorities that are

16     powerful and who have the means will arrive and create institutions.

17     Correct?

18        A.   I mean, it's a possibility, yeah.  It can happen anywhere.  I

19     mean ...

20        Q.   And this is all going on during a time of armed conflict; right?

21        A.   Yeah.

22        Q.   In an area of operations by SFRY armed forces?

23        A.   Yeah, but then the problem arises -- I mean I understand now that

24     you want to ask a specific question.  I don't know how many footnotes

25     there are in the -- I'm sorry to elaborate, but I don't know how many


Page 4503

 1     footnotes there are in the -- in the amalgamated report or let alone in

 2     the non-accepted report.  But the volume of footnotes reflecting the

 3     volume of material I reviewed, and that material consists of official

 4     documents, one of the conclusions I drew in the report when I talk about

 5     OGs and TGs shows that there is a functioning system of command and

 6     control and a functioning system of reporting, so even if there is some

 7     chaos in relation, for example, to groups moving in and moving out, given

 8     the doctrine it's the task then -- I mean the JNA has to intervene and

 9     raise the issue and this is done by Panic and others.

10             So there is no permanent chaos and I don't think -- I mean coming

11     back to your question, if they fabricate the stamp themselves and maybe

12     they established the training centre themselves, it needs to be equipped,

13     people need to be fed there, people need to -- they need ammunition and

14     so on, and this is something where sooner or later given also the

15     location in Erdut and the isolation of Eastern Slavonia at that time that

16     the supplies they need can only come from Serbia.  And I don't think you

17     could just cross one of the bridges with a truck with ammunition or

18     rifles or whatever equipment that was used in the training centre and

19     everybody would close his or her eyes so that of course the authorities

20     were aware of that.  So I think I would moderate or qualify the use of

21     the term "chaos" in its correct proportions.

22        Q.   And the institution that's imposing order in this situation and

23     that has a mechanism of reporting and command is the JNA?

24        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.  And the difficulties they face

25     are also reflected in the various orders they issue where they actually


Page 4504

 1     repeat the same order to enforce control over the area throughout fall

 2     1991.

 3        Q.   Perhaps just one document before we finish, 00658.  Prosecution

 4     tab 188.  This is from Mrksic dated the 21st of November, 1991, and I'm

 5     interested in the language being used in this document and the

 6     addressees.

 7        A.   Mm-hmm.

 8        Q.   Now, the first thing is there is no reference at all to any

 9     overarching TO staff of the autonomous district; right?

10        A.   This is correct and if you allow me I can provide my explanation

11     for that or potential explanations for that.

12        Q.   Well, let's go through a few more subordinate questions and then

13     if you want to provide an answer, that's fine.

14        A.   Okay.

15        Q.   But we do see that the addressees include apparently the

16     commander of Seselj's forces volunteer detachment.  There's a JNA unit

17     listed there.  There appears to be a TO Serbia unit listed there from

18     Kragujevac.  And then there is another JNA commander.  Then there is the

19     TO Vukovar commander and I don't know what the last -- who the last two

20     addressees are.  And it concerns the Leva Supoderica volunteers.  Now, if

21     the Leva Supoderica volunteers are in any way within a provincial staff

22     or a provincial TO organisation with any strength or reality, wouldn't

23     that staff have been addressed?

24        A.   As I've -- I mean, as I've explained, I haven't seen any

25     documents from OG South referring to an SAO SBWS TO or a TO -- an SAO


Page 4505

 1     SBWS TO staff.  So of course it's -- if such a staff existed, it should

 2     have been referred to in this document.  Now, the issue here is what -- I

 3     mean whether OG South command recognised, even if an SAO SBWS TO staff

 4     may have existed - and I'm not answering that now, I'm not trying to

 5     answer that now - OG South obviously did not recognise these structures.

 6     And we have -- I'm not sure whether in the amalgamated report, but we

 7     have security organs reports also for OG South providing information on

 8     alleged interference and so on.  And I agree with you that mentioning of

 9     the volunteer unit Seseljevci in a JNA document is unusual and, as I

10     mentioned in the examination, it demonstrates the perception OG South

11     command, i.e., the Guards Motorised Brigade command had over -- no,

12     sorry, of, perception of the relations between these volunteers and

13     Mr. Seselj and his party.

14             MR. GOSNELL:  I see we're over time again.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Yes, indeed, Mr. Gosnell.

16             Mr. Theunens, the end of today's hearing.  We'll see you again on

17     Monday morning, 9.00.  I wish you a good weekend.

18             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

20                           [The witness stands down]

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Court adjourned.

22                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.03 p.m.,

23                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 13th day of

24                           May, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.

25