1 Friday, 10 May 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning to everyone in and around the
7 Mr. Registrar, could you call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
9 IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic. Thank you.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
11 May we have the appearances, starting with the Prosecution,
13 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning
14 everybody in and around the courtroom. For the Prosecution this morning,
15 Alex Demirdjian with Lisa Biersay, our case manager Thomas Laugel, and
16 our legal intern Agnes Bugaj.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
18 For the Defence, Mr. Zivanovic.
19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. For the Defence of
20 Goran Hadzic, Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell. Thank you.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
22 If there is nothing else, the witness may be brought in.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning, Mr. Theunens.
25 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell, please proceed.
2 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]
4 Cross-examination by Mr. Gosnell: [Continued]
5 Q. Good morning, Mr. Theunens.
6 A. Good morning, Mr. Gosnell.
7 Q. Just a couple of follow-up questions on the topic I was asking
8 you about yesterday and your relations with the Office of the Prosecutor.
9 Did you review or assist in preparing any pre-trial briefs or final trial
10 briefs or appeal briefs during your eight years in your association with
11 the office?
12 A. Indeed, Your Honours, and my role in relation to these documents
13 was limited to reviewing the military aspects to see whether, for
14 example, military regulations were accurately reflected or the names of
15 individuals or the positions they held. So I was not involved in any
16 legal -- formulating of legal arguments, I was formulating -- I was
17 exclusively involved in what I would call factual issues within the field
18 of my professional expertise.
19 Q. And that involved interpreting volumes of documents and reaching
20 conclusions; correct?
21 A. Indeed, but I prefer to be more specific. Reviewing volumes of
22 military documents in order to draw or reaching military conclusions.
23 Q. Well, I didn't say -- I said "interpreting volumes of documents
24 and reaching conclusions." Would that include -- would that be part of
25 what you were doing?
1 A. What do you mean by "interpreting"?
2 Q. Well, what I mean by "interpreting," is assessing the
3 significance of -- and the meaning of documents in order to assess
4 responsibility of individuals in relation to events?
5 A. I would say that this is a bit of a narrow interpretation of my
6 role. My role provided, among other things, in explaining the military
7 context, for example, when the word "volunteer unit" would pop up then my
8 task would consist in explaining to the lawyers in the team what was
9 meant by that, not only in relation to SFRY armed forces doctrine but
10 also looking at the specific facts. Of course I would also look into
11 command and control issues. So if you talk about military -- about
12 responsibility, if you mean military responsibility, yes; if you mean
13 criminal responsibility, as I said, I did -- I was not involved in legal
14 issues because that is not what I've been trained nor educated in.
15 Q. What about international humanitarian law, have you been trained
16 and educated in that and did you provide advice on that?
17 A. Well, like any member of an armed force, I was trained in that.
18 I mean, we had a lot of law in the second year of military academy, but
19 while working here, even if my general knowledge of these issues that I
20 had acquired in my education at the military academy was for sure useful.
21 And of course I familiarised myself with issues like 7(1) and 7(3). I
22 did not express views in my work or in my reports -- I mean, if you
23 review all the eight or nine reports you will not see references to 7(1)
24 or 7(3) or related issues.
25 Q. But your interpretation - and I come back to that word - your
1 interpretation of documents for the purposes of providing assistance to
2 the formulation of pre-trial briefs and final trial briefs was informed
3 by your understanding of what we can broadly call responsibility;
5 A. Your Honours, I think I answered the question because I tried to
6 specify what I've done and in relation to the expressions you used
7 "interpretation" and "responsibility," and now you come back again to
8 your broad question. I mean, I've answered the question. I was here as
9 an intelligence analyst military, which means that I look -- I mean
10 general terms into military issues, whether it's command and control,
11 whether it's context, whether it's structures, organisations, roles of
12 military, that was my task. And that was focused on factual issues,
13 i.e., I look at documents. I may have been asked -- also I was also
14 asked to look at witness statements. I look at those factual issues and
15 then I explain what they mean from a military point of view and that's
16 it. And then whatever legal interpretation that may be derived from
17 that, that was not my task, I was not asked to do so, because there's
18 other people in the Office of the Prosecution who are much better
19 qualified than I to take care of these kind of matters.
20 Q. And in assessing command and control structures, organisations,
21 roles of the military, in a given week how often did you speak, exchange
22 an e-mail, pick up the telephone and speak with lawyers in the Office of
23 the Prosecutor during your eight years with the Tribunal?
24 A. Your Honours, I wasn't requested to keep statistics. I don't
25 want to give the impression that I want to argue, but one of your
1 colleagues once asked me how my salary was established. I think it was
2 in the Vukovar case, whether I was paid --
3 Q. Mr. Theunens --
4 A. -- whether I was paid in according to the results that were
5 achieved. Of course I had daily contacts with other team members and
6 these team members consisted of lawyers, I mean senior trial attorneys,
7 trial attorneys, junior lawyers, interns, as I had contacts with
8 investigators and criminal analysts.
9 Q. So the answer to my question is daily?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. How many times daily on average?
12 A. You know, from a physical point of view -- for example, when I
13 take lunch, I'm not going to take lunch in isolation in a corner - I
14 don't know where - in the park, so I may bump into people and I may even
15 talk to these people, but it's not like that -- I think you're trying to
16 suggest that the Office of the Prosecutor was maybe on a daily or
17 whatever frequency I will mention the Office of the Prosecutor and
18 especially the lawyers would use that time to give instructions to me as
19 to what I should write or what I should do -- I mean --
20 Q. Mr. Theunens, let me stop you there. I'm not suggesting
21 anything. All I'm doing is asking factual questions, and it's neither
22 for me nor you to come to these various interpretations or implications.
23 So perhaps we could just stick to the factual side of it and I think
24 you've answered my question and now I'm going to move to the next
25 question which is: Is the military analysis team of which you were a
1 part, is that organisationally part of the Office of the Prosecutor?
2 A. That is correct. The military analysis team was a part of the
3 Office of the Prosecutor.
4 Q. And who was signing your e-passes over the course of the eight
5 years that you were employed by the Tribunal?
6 A. My -- I mean, the first reporting officers I mentioned earlier,
7 those were the team leaders of the military analysis team, and then the
8 second reporting officer I believe it was in most cases Mr. Bob Reid and
9 I forget now the official job title he had -- but I mean he was a senior
10 investigator and then I think he -- whether he was a chief of
11 investigations or -- I think he was chief of investigations for most of
12 the time.
13 Q. In any event, he's a part of the Office of the Prosecutor; is
14 that right?
15 A. That is correct, yeah.
16 Q. Sir, I'd like to ask you, when would you say - because you
17 haven't been asked this question and it doesn't say in your report - when
18 would you say that the armed conflict started in Croatia? And by "armed
19 conflict," I mean sustained violence between two opposing and organised
21 A. Your Honours, I think that it's -- I won't say it's impossible to
22 answer. There are lots of answers to that question, but I think these
23 answers are also often based on personal interpretations. I would prefer
24 to look into -- to look at the official documents and then to say okay to
25 start from that. If I'm not mistaken it's addressed in the report end of
1 September 1991. What remains of the SFRY Presidency "establishes the
2 existence of an imminent state of war." There has been some debate about
3 the word -- about the use of the expression "establish," because why
4 would they use "establish," they could just declare the state of imminent
5 threat of war. I also know that for the Croatian side the conflict in
6 their view started much earlier, whereas on the Yugoslav or the JNA side
7 even the memorandum we saw --
8 Q. Mr. Theunens --
9 A. Can I answer the question, please.
10 Q. Well, I'm going to try to guide you to an answer to answering the
11 question --
12 A. No, I'm --
13 Q. -- because you're actually not answering the question, because if
14 you listen to my question I framed it as a matter of actual conduct of
15 hostilities not as a matter of declarations, legal pronouncements, and so
16 forth. And you've looked at many military documents indicating when
17 engagements occurred, and you've interviewed many witnesses who
18 presumably gave you information about that, and you've reported on that
19 in your report. So what I'm asking you is - and you certainly have
20 knowledge of all these issues - when would you say that there was
21 sustained violence between two opposing and organised forces in Croatia?
22 A. Well, again without wanting to argue, I think you formulate the
23 question now differently because initially you talk about an armed
24 conflict. I understand armed conflict as a legal concept whereby indeed
25 you may be able to, based on the contemporaneous documents, establish
1 when it was officially declared. If you talk about sustained violence
2 between two opposing and organised forces in Croatia, I mean there may be
3 some debate about the --
4 JUDGE HALL: If I may intervene, Mr. Theunens, if I understand
5 Mr. Gosnell correctly - and he would point out to me if I got it
6 wrong - the question is when do you say, and this arises out of all your
7 experience, all of your analysis and what not, but the nub of the
8 question is when do you say.
9 Is that correct? Yes, thank you.
10 MR. GOSNELL: Yes, thank you very much, Judge Hall.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you for the clarification, Your Honours. I
12 would say that in the course of summer 1991 we see a spreading of
13 hostilities in Croatia.
14 MR. GOSNELL:
15 Q. So would it be at least safe to say that your opinion is that
16 there was an armed conflict as of the 1st of August, 1991?
17 A. Yes --
18 Q. And by "armed conflict," I'm referring to the definition I gave
20 A. Yes, that would be correct.
21 Q. And on page 17 and 18 of your report - and now we're going to go
22 back, I'm afraid, to some potentially tedious discussions of legislation
23 but I'm afraid it has to be done, Mr. Theunens. And on page 17 and 18 of
24 your report you quote from the SFRY Constitution, which is L9 at
25 Prosecution tab 4 but it's fully set out in your report so we don't need
1 to bring the article up, and at Article 240 I'm interested in the second
2 or in the portion of the provision that reads:
3 "Any citizen who takes part in resisting aggression towards the
4 country is a member of the armed forces of the SFRY."
5 So am I right that this is the legal foundation for about I
6 believe what you said yesterday, namely, that if someone takes up arms in
7 defence of the country they're part of the armed forces of the SFRY?
8 A. Indeed, Your Honours, that is the general principle that is
9 further specified by the additional legislative and other documents we
10 have discussed.
11 Q. And isn't it true that a person who does so and who is not a
12 member of the JNA is considered to be a part of the Territorial Defence?
13 That could be a yes or no answer, Mr. Theunens.
14 A. I mean, if you allow me, I would say yes, given of course the
15 other provisions in the other articles that define who and how they can
16 join the armed forces.
17 Q. Well, let's look at page 21 of your report, and there it says,
18 quoting Article 102 of the Law on All People's Defence, and this is SFRY
20 "Territorial Defence shall comprise all armed formations that are
21 not incorporated into the Yugoslav People's Army."
22 That's the foundation for your statement that if someone takes up
23 arms in defence of the country they become part of the TO; right?
24 A. Yeah, but now -- okay, I didn't say it like that, but I mean you
25 can summarise it like that, but I would prefer to go to my own answer
1 because it's a bit more complicated.
2 Q. Well, let's go to your own answer in Milosevic --
3 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: I apologise for intervening. I don't mean to
4 interrupt, but the question could be potentially misleading if you don't
5 add at the end of the quote "and the police," not just the "SFRY." I
6 just wanted to bring that to your attention.
7 MR. GOSNELL: Yeah, that's a helpful addition. I thank my
8 colleague for that. That's right.
9 Q. So in the Milosevic case, just to be very precise about the
10 answers that you've given, at page 314081 [sic] this is Defence tab 1,
11 04850 for the record, you said:
12 "It's also noteworthy that the 1974 Constitution states that the
13 armed forces, the SFRY armed forces, consist of the JNA and TO and that
14 all other armed groups or individuals who want to participate in the
15 defence or the armed struggle will be considered members of the TO."
16 That's right, isn't it?
17 THE INTERPRETER: Please don't read fast because the interpreters
18 must keep up. Thank you.
19 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I mean I don't have the -- my testimony in
20 front of me but I -- I mean, I would agree with it because I still hold
21 that view now.
22 MR. GOSNELL:
23 Q. And the Law on All People's Defence is a very long document with
24 many provisions, sometimes difficult to reconcile and perhaps understand.
25 Would you just, first of all, agree with that general observation?
1 A. It's probably long -- I mean, but whether it -- sometimes
2 difficult to reconcile and perhaps understand, I can say that for the
3 issues I was -- I looked at, structure, command and control, and related
4 matters, I notice consistency between not only the constitution, the All
5 People's Defence law, but also the various doctrinal documents. At this
6 moment I don't recall any issues that were difficult to reconcile, but
7 maybe you can draw my attention to one.
8 Q. Well, that's a fair answer if you -- if you do believe that it's
9 an entirely coherent structure and we'll work our way through some
10 provisions. And perhaps we could just look at Article 1, and this is
11 L10, Prosecution tab 10. I bring this provision to your attention, sir,
12 because I believe it helps provide a flavour as to military doctrine in
13 the SFRY and -- I mean, this is the very beginning of the law. It says:
14 "This law shall regulate the basic rights and duties of working
15 people and citizens, basic and other organisations of associated labour,
16 local communes, and other self management organisations and communities
17 and socio-political and other social organisations in the defence of
18 independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the social order
19 established by the Constitution of the SFRY."
20 Now, my first question for you is very specific and that is: Do
21 you know what a socio-political and other social organisations, that
22 expression, do you know what that encompasses?
23 A. Well, these are basic entities -- no, I will rephrase that.
24 These are entities or structures that can play role or play a role in the
25 concept of All People's Defence, where basically the entire population is
1 involved or is used in order to defend the country.
2 Q. And for me as a -- perhaps from a different culture, I read these
3 provisions and I'm startled because we see all manner of
4 organisational -- almost informal organisational units being apparently
5 recognised in this law. Now, do I understand correctly that what this
6 law is doing is saying that total national defence can be organised
7 around these informal associations?
8 A. No, Your Honours, I wouldn't -- I have no recollection that we
9 are talking about informal organisational units. What I recall is that
10 there was a quite formal organisation; for example, in state-owned
11 factories there were defence structures and they would have exercises and
12 they would mobilise and there would be weapons and so on. But this was
13 all very well organised, at least before the dissolution of the SFRY.
14 The same for the TO, we looked at measures that are taken to increase
15 control of weapons or TO, so I wouldn't share the view that it was
16 informal. I would also highlight that no mention is made of any
17 political parties as one of these -- I'm just trying to find --
18 Q. I didn't say "political parties" and let's leave political
19 parties out of it, Mr. Theunens.
20 A. Okay.
21 Q. And maybe I used the wrong word in saying informal. Let's say
22 flexible. I mean, for example, could a student union be considered a
23 socio-political organisation?
24 A. As long as it is legally recognised, then it could be, but again
25 I would prefer to look at the specific documents. And again, in my
1 interpretation "flexible" has nothing to do whether something is official
2 or nonofficial or formal or informal. A military unit has to be
3 flexible, for example, to be able to handle different situations that may
4 arise not only on the battle-field but also, yeah, losses, different
5 missions, and so on, and military unit will be a very formal structure.
6 Q. Now, I do understand that military units are a formal structure
7 but what seems to be recognised here in Article 1 is a very flexible
8 approach to what you said was allowing the entire population to
9 participate in the defence. Do you see that Article 1 is an expression
10 of a -- let's start with a general question. Is Article 1 a means by
11 which the entire population, through organisations at a very low level,
12 can organise and participate in national defence?
13 A. Yes, but the difference in -- between what my answer is and then
14 you come back to your point, you say it's all informal and maybe
15 spontaneous even if I try to understand the gist of your question. What
16 I tried to explain is that indeed there are different organisations that
17 can play a role, but the prime condition is that these organisations have
18 been recognised, I mean there's a legal basis for their existence and for
19 their activities. And as a result of that legal basis, they will
20 accomplish a defined role in the concept of All People's Defence, whereby
21 obviously there will also be a way of co-ordinating the contribution of
22 these organisations, I mean the social organisations, the TO, the
23 military and so on, so that everybody fulfils his or her role in a
24 co-ordinated manner in the defence of the country.
25 Q. We'll get to the co-ordination issue in a moment. But the issue
1 here is: What are the basic units of people self organising in order to
2 participate in national defence? And I'm suggesting to you that this is
3 a very flexible notion. You say that these groups need to be legally
4 recognised, but on the other hand you say that it potentially could be a
5 student union, it could be a labour union, it could be -- could it be a
6 chess club?
7 A. Your Honours, I mean maybe there's a misunderstanding about the
8 expression of the word "self-management." Self-management was the -- I
9 wouldn't say economical but maybe the economical doctrine in that exists
10 in the SFRY, whereas in the west we had capitalism and in the former
11 Soviet union and other countries you had communism the way they defined
12 it. But self management - and again this is outside my expertise but
13 while working on the former Yugoslavia I had to study a little bit about
14 it - at the end of the day it was very much regulated and there was
15 central control and there was a central revision and so on or state
16 control and state revision. It's the same with these social entities and
17 organisations of associated labour. These are not spontaneous clubs
18 that -- I mean, like a -- I don't know, they didn't have Facebook then,
19 but that spontaneously develop and people come together and say hey we're
20 going to defend the country. It was all regulated for obvious reasons.
21 You cannot just have private groups establishing themselves, getting
22 weapons wherever they want, and then they just say we're going to defend
23 the country. I mean, that is chaos. And at least when President Tito
24 was still alive and the years after this kind of chaos didn't exist,
25 because that's why we have the laws and the laws are very clear on that
1 and the organisations.
2 Q. Thank you, that's a helpful answer. And yet if someone does,
3 nevertheless --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for the sake of the
5 interpreters. Thank you.
6 MR. GOSNELL:
7 Q. -- violate these structures and does take up arms in defence of
8 the country, under the constitution they are still deemed to be part of
9 the armed forces; correct?
10 A. Your Honours, I have answered -- I'm sorry, I'm too fast. I've
11 answered the question, that is, yes, but the but means they have to be
12 accepted into the armed forces, into one of the elements of All People's
14 Q. Well, earlier -- well, yesterday when I asked you if someone
15 showed up on the battle-field and they had no authorisation in the sense
16 of the legal benediction of being in an organisation and they started
17 participating on the battle-field or in the zone of responsibility on
18 behalf of, as a friendly force, on behalf of or with the army, you said
19 unequivocally that there was a duty to subordinate that individual; isn't
20 that right?
21 A. I think my answer was there was a duty to subordinate or to
22 remove them. And the removal is exactly the issue of the recognition.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: I apologise, but the first part of my learned
24 friend's question at page 14, line 20, has not been recorded. And I
25 don't know if my learned friend has channel 4 on his headphones because
1 the interpreters were speaking at the same time as he was and I don't
2 know if he caught that.
3 MR. GOSNELL: I've turned to channel 4. I thank you.
4 Q. But either way, the mere fact that they're not part of a
5 recognised self-management organisation has no impact on the duty -- the
6 commander's duty to either take measures to discipline and bring them
7 into the fold, so to speak, or to exclude them from the zone of
9 A. Do you want me to give a theoretical answer or do you want me to
10 refer to the situation as it was in SBWS during fall 1991?
11 Q. I'm asking for a yes or no answer based upon your understanding
12 of the law.
13 A. Well, it's impossible because if they're not part of an
14 organisation that is one way or the other recognised, whether it's
15 self-management or, as we saw, a party-affiliated volunteer group as we
16 saw in fall 1991, they can only be recognised by the local commander if
17 they have been recognised at a higher level. And that's why we have
18 these various decisions that are adopted between August 1991 and December
19 1991 by the Republic of Serbia, the SSNO, and 10th of December the order
20 73 by the Presidency of SFRY.
21 Q. So you're saying that in that circumstance the obligation of the
22 commander in that zone of responsibility is to eject these non-recognised
23 persons; is that right?
24 A. Well, if they are not recognised, yes, indeed, they should be
25 removed. And if they commit crimes, they should be -- I mean, measures
1 should be taken against them.
2 Q. And if they are participating in conjunction with the zone
3 commanders's orders and operations, that would suggest to you, would it,
4 that that group has been accepted; correct?
5 A. If -- I mean, I understand "in conjunction" if they are, like,
6 identified in an order as having a task, yes, obviously then they have
7 been accepted.
8 Q. Let's move on and we'll get to some concrete examples and we'll
9 see what your answers are then. And am I right that any of these
10 self-management organisations that are accepted, that's -- they're
11 subject at the very top level to the SFRY Supreme Command; is that right?
12 A. I mean, based on the principle of unity and -- I mean of single
13 and unified command and control, yes.
14 Q. And just to get a full picture of the chain of command from top
15 to bottom, am I right in saying that the SFRY - and we're talking about
16 1991 under the law of the SFRY - the SFRY Supreme Command exercises that
17 command function through the Federal Secretary of National Defence, who
18 in turn relies on the SFRY General Staff to ensure that those orders are
19 executed. Is that correct?
20 A. Yes, that is correct.
21 Q. And in the late 1980s as you described earlier and as you talked
22 about in your report, it's right, isn't it, that Territorial Defence
23 organisations were directly subordinated to the commands of JNA military
24 districts; right?
25 A. That is correct. I mean, that is the general situation and -- I
1 mean, for specific operations obviously we have to look at specific
3 Q. Well, let's start with just the de jure situation, Mr. Theunens,
4 because you keep answering these caveats, qualifications, and conditions.
5 Is what I stated correct as a matter of law?
6 A. Yes, but -- I mean -- I'm sorry that I seem to be difficult in
7 your views, but you can find in military regulations specific military
8 operations where a TO commander may be in command of the JNA. It depends
9 of that -- of the tactical scenario that has to be implemented because --
10 I mean, this is all linked also to the nature of the TO, the TO were
11 local troops, so if it is about defending an external aggression and, for
12 example -- excuse me, defending against an external aggression, and then
13 recapturing terrain that has been lost to the "aggressor," then there can
14 be scenarios where after the main effort has been led by the JNA that the
15 TO commander will be in command of the control of the terrain. That is a
16 possibility. So that's why I try to be more specific in my answers.
17 Q. But that is in no way relevant at all, is it, to the fact that
18 the TO is subordinate to the command of the military district in which
19 that TO is located; correct?
20 A. No. I mean what you say is correct, but it -- again, it may be
21 that these --
22 Q. Mr. Theunens, I'd like to progress. I'll -- I'm in the Court's
23 hands --
24 A. No, I mean --
25 Q. I really do not wish to cut off an expert, but I do have a line
1 of questioning, I do have topics I want to get to. So I'm really at the
2 Court's pleasure as to how to proceed.
3 THE WITNESS: If it helps, you know, in general -- as a general
4 answer I would agree with you.
5 Q. Well, here's what you said in the Seselj case and this is at
6 transcript 4135. This is a question from Judge Antonetti. He asked you:
7 "So if there's one thing we should keep in mind, it's that
8 starting in 1987 the orders forwarded to the TO go through the head of
9 the General Staff, which was not the case before?"
10 Answer, this is your answer:
11 "That is correct, Your Honour, and also the TO becomes
12 subordinated to the -- what is called the strategic operational level
13 units, i.e., the military districts, whereas before they were on a
14 parallel level."
15 Do you stand by that statement?
16 A. I stand by that. And if you allow me, I try to explain because
17 you suggested there is a difference between what I answer now and what I
18 answered to Judge Antonetti. What I tried to say is that the general
19 principle confined to the 1987 Jedinstvo reorganisation remains. I mean,
20 I stand by my answer. I just want to be cautious in my answers here
21 today because I understand we are referring to the situation as it
22 existed in fall 1991 and subsequently in SBWS, but the general principle
23 is the same and as I said I stand by my answer.
24 Q. And do I understand that the implication of that answer and of
25 the Jedinstvo plan, which you referred to, was that the presidents of the
1 republics were removed from the chain of command between the SFRY
2 Supreme Command and the TOs in the republics; is that correct?
3 A. Yes, Your Honours.
4 Q. And that's true in peace and in war time; correct?
5 A. As far as I recall, that is correct, yeah.
6 Q. And an example of that was the fact that an order came down from
7 the General Staff saying that weapons should be removed from TO depots
8 and placed in JNA depots; right?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. And that order didn't go through the presidents of the republics,
11 did it?
12 A. No, it didn't. I mean, it didn't have to because it came --
13 initially the instruction came from the Supreme Command, i.e., the SFRY
14 Presidency -- I mean, the Supreme Command, sorry, had not been activated
15 then but came -- the initial directive came from the SFRY Presidency and
16 was accepted there by the republics, otherwise the Presidency could not
17 have instructed the SSNO and then the General Staff to issue that order.
18 Q. At page 189 of your report you say:
19 "When not participating in combat operation or operations the
20 local Serb TO in SAO SBWS is until at least December 1991 subordinated to
21 the local Serb police under the command of Radovan Stojicic, aka Badza."
22 What's the -- is there any legal foundation for that claim?
23 Let's just start with the legal foundation. Any legal foundation for
24 that claim?
25 A. Your Honours, at -- the issue -- the problem with the legal
1 foundation is that there was no legal provision or no provision in the
2 constitution or the -- I mean the 1974 Constitution or the 1982 All
3 People's Defence law or any other legal or doctrinal document until late
4 1991 that legalised the self-declared local Serb armed structures, be it
5 TO, be it volunteer groups, or be it police, so I mean obviously there is
6 then no legal foundation.
7 Q. You're surely not here disputing, sir, that all participants on
8 the Serb side accepted the SFRY law was in force on this territory
9 throughout at least the period up until well into at least 1992 and
10 certainly probably beyond, but let's just stick with the period prior to
11 the arrival of UNPROFOR, that the view of all participants on the Serb
12 side is that SFRY law continues to apply; correct?
13 A. My personal interpretation - and I'm not a lawyer - would be that
14 it is their interpretation of SFRY legislation. That is what they
15 continued to adhere to because, you know, unless you can show me an
16 article or a document that I have missed, I am not familiar with any SFRY
17 legal or any SFRY armed forces doctrinal document that talks about the
18 establishment of SAOs or local Serb TO units or local Serb -- and by
19 "local Serb," I mean SAO, so Serbs in Croatia, TO or MUP units. And this
20 creates a lot of confusion also among the JNA, as we see in the various
21 documents, for example, from the 1st Military District during fall 1991.
22 Q. But there were the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo
23 and no one would have suggested that there was any difficulty in
24 understanding the SFRY law applied in those autonomous provinces;
1 A. Yes, but the big and the key difference, Your Honours, in
2 relation to Kosovo and Vojvodina was that at the time they were
3 autonomous provinces, and I think one of the two was also an autonomous
4 region at one time, that was explicitly recognised in the legal
5 documents, the SFRY legal documents, and, for example, indeed they had
6 their own TO, but the big difference between those TOs, i.e., Kosovo and
7 Vojvodina and on the other hand SAO SBWS or SAO Krajina or SAO Western
8 Slavonia is that if the TOs of Kosovo and Vojvodina were legally
9 recognised and they existed as a structure and everybody accepted them
10 and the JNA - I mean from the top level to the lowest level - knew that
11 this was a legally recognised organisation and a part of the All People's
12 Defence concept, whereas for the SAOs - as we have seen - I mean there is
13 a document from -- I mean, there was the document by Colonel Trajkovic,
14 the Chief of Staff of the 12th Corps asking the 1st Military District,
15 like: What do we do with these people? And, okay, I believe we should
16 recognise them. But it shows the confusion that exists at the level of
17 the JNA as to what is the legal status and, therefore, what can we do or
18 what should we do with these people, I mean by that structures of the SAO
19 in this case SBWS. What do we do with these people and how do we treat
20 them? So that's the big difference.
21 Q. Mr. Theunens, the --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down. Thank you.
23 MR. GOSNELL:
24 Q. The difficulty I'm having with this assertion on your part, just
25 to be clear, is that the document that you cite in support of this claim
1 is not issued by Mr. Stojicic in the name of any police structure. The
2 certificate is issued in the name of a TO structure. And that's why I'm
3 asking you the question: Where do you get the conclusion that the TO is
4 placed under the police at any time?
5 A. We should -- I mean, it would be helpful if I could see the
7 MR. GOSNELL: Well, let's bring that up, please, that's 65 ter
8 794, Prosecution tab 234.
9 THE REGISTRAR: For the record this is Exhibit P198.140. Thank
11 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
12 THE WITNESS: It is correct that in this specific document there
13 is no reference to the police. I'm trying to recall, it must have been
14 my understanding that Badza, I mean Radovan Stojicic, had a position in
15 the local Serb police in the SAO SBWS, but I don't have a reference here
16 so that's what it is.
17 MR. GOSNELL:
18 Q. Does that mean that you're relying on information that you
19 haven't footnoted in your report?
20 A. Or it may have been that the footnote -- cutting and pasting or
21 something. I will check into this.
22 Q. But you were a participant in many witness interviews over the
23 years. Is it possible you heard someone say something and somehow that
24 coloured your interpretation as expressed on page 189?
25 A. I don't think so, Your Honours. It may have been that it was
1 open-source reporting. There were some articles which are not cited
2 here, but I think there was a JNA intelligence review article on the
3 local Serb defence or military and police structures.
4 Q. As a matter of SFRY law and doctrine, does it make any sense that
5 the TO is placed under the police?
6 A. It would be unusual, but I want to remind you of the various
7 documents and decisions that are adopted in the SAO Krajina during summer
8 1991 and especially the role played by Mr. Martic who was not only
9 minister of interior or becomes minister of interior and is also in
10 charge of the SAO Krajina self-declared police but also achieves certain
11 functions that could be or duties that could be defined as command duties
12 even if it was de facto, I agree on that, in relation to the TO.
13 Q. Well, of course that -- we're not talking now about the SAO
14 Krajina, we're talking about the SAO SBWS. And I think you'd agree in
15 Martic's case that was a question of double-hatting; isn't that right?
16 A. You may call it double-hatting, but it -- I put in the Martic
17 report and it was also my testimony that there was a power struggle
18 between Martic and Babic which also reflected itself in who was to be in
19 command over the TO. And there is a footnote on that issue, I mean 552,
20 for example, on same page here in the amalgamated report, page 189.
21 Q. Why don't you just take the document in front of you at face
22 value as reflecting the situation?
23 A. I mean, I agree with you -- I'm sorry. I agree with you that
24 this certificate does not mention the police, that's correct.
25 Q. Not only does it not mention the police, it suggests that what
1 we're dealing with is a Territorial Defence and that's Badza indicating
2 that he's the one at the head of that; correct?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Now, you testified earlier that there was a theoretical
5 possibility which is actually prescribed by the Law on All People's
6 Defence for JNA units to be subordinate to TO commanders. But would you
7 agree with me that there is no indication that that at all occurred in
8 the area of the SBWS?
9 A. You mean during fall 1991?
10 Q. Fall 1991 through the arrival of UNPROFOR.
11 A. Yes, Your Honours, that is correct.
12 Q. So that means that in that place and during that time-period we
13 have the JNA being superior to the TO; correct?
14 A. I mean, it's -- you cannot describe the situation -- I mean,
15 it -- the complexity of the situation by just giving a yes or no answer
16 to this very broad question --
17 Q. Well, let's stick to doctrine then, Mr. Theunens.
18 A. But the whole issue, Your Honours, here is about how the doctrine
19 was applied in the area. And this is exactly why I need to refer to so
20 many documents. If it was just a simple question of applying the
21 doctrine, I would have given -- I mean, a ten-page report would have been
22 sufficient. This is the doctrine and this is how it was. Sadly, the way
23 how things went, not only in SBWS but in other parts of Croatia and later
24 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was not always consistent with doctrine and that's
25 why I have done the effort to look at the specific documents and
1 comparing the two.
2 Q. So you -- what you're suggesting here, you're reserving for
3 yourself the possibility that you've seen documents or you've seen
4 indications that the TO is somehow superior to JNA soldiers or units in
5 the SBWS in 1991 and through the arrival of UNPROFOR; is that your
7 A. Not -- not at all, Your Honours. What I'm trying to suggest, and
8 I just wish to refer in that context to, for example, the Panic order you
9 brought up yesterday from the 15th of October, it's 161482-17 or -16
10 where he orders in very strict and very clear language JNA to remain in
11 charge in the area of -- the area they have captured and not to
12 abandoned -- I mean not to abandon, not to loosen control there, to stay
13 in control because of attempts of interference of what he calls local
14 organs of authority. This is why I put the caveat.
15 Q. Well, isn't that precisely an assertion of command and control by
16 the JNA over TO?
17 A. It is, but referring back to your general question to say that
18 the JNA was always in command, well, this Panic order as well as one that
19 he issues I think a week later shows that in some areas there have been
20 problems and these problems are due to the fact that once the JNA has
21 captured an area and if in a specific area combat operations as such have
22 finished even if there is still a state of armed conflict, then there are
23 difficulties whereby some people or groups apparently according to Panic
24 misuse that situation.
25 Q. Mr. Theunens, let's be very clear, I'm not in any way suggesting
1 to you that there were not acts of indiscipline or that the command and
2 control by the JNA was perfect. What I am attempting to ascertain is
3 whether it's your view that those groups that were engaging in that
4 indiscipline behaviour were subordinated to the JNA at the time?
5 A. You know, maybe I can clarify -- I have documents on events in
6 Dalj prison on I think on 21st of September, 1991, and I think the 4th of
7 October, 1991. We can go into these documents, but the JNA is not
8 mentioned in any of these documents and this is a typical example of what
9 Panic tries to highlight in his order of the 15th of October.
10 Hostilities in Dalj go back to, I believe, the 1st of August, 1991, the
11 JNA intervenes, interposes, and then the JNA establishes de facto Serbian
12 control over the area. There's even still during a very long time
13 forward command post of a corps located there, but still certain acts --
14 and I wouldn't call it just indiscipline but crimes, at least according
15 to the documents I reviewed, crimes occurred there. Is the JNA
16 responsible? Well, we would -- I mean, theoretically for sure because
17 this is -- there is a JNA unit in the area, but it doesn't -- it's not a
18 black-and-white situation where all responsibility is focused on one
19 organisation or one individual.
20 Q. Now you seem to be giving certain answers that do pertain to
21 Article 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute pretty directly even though you said
22 that that's not the scope of your expertise. In any event, let me move
24 Do you think that the commander's obligation in a zone of
25 responsibility is in any way limited by or related to combat? In other
1 words, is there a limit defined functionally to the commander's
2 responsibility in his zone of responsibility?
3 A. Well, he's responsible for the force operating under his command,
4 whatever the circumstances.
5 Q. And operating under his command, those words that you just used,
6 that's broader than just a soldier sitting in a trench shooting at the
7 other side; correct?
8 A. I'm not sure I understand the question, but I assume it is one --
9 a soldier of one of his units or --
10 Q. Well, my point is that -- and you've said this in previous cases,
11 and this is the point I'm trying to get at in terms of the -- the duty to
12 subordinate and the scope of the duty to subordinate, what I'm trying to
13 get at here and the question I'm asking you is: Does the duty to
14 subordinate come to an end when a soldier is not at the front line
15 shooting at the other side?
16 A. You know, Your Honours, I -- my memory may fail me, but I have
17 never used the concept "duty to subordinate" in those words. When I --
18 what comes the closest to "duty to subordinate" are these orders we have
19 been discussing now, whereby SSNO 1st Military District, also the
20 Presidency order 73, state that volunteer units operating in a zone where
21 the JNA is have to be subordinated or removed. That is the closest to
22 the concept to duty to subordinate.
23 Q. So they have a duty to do one or the other at least, duty to
24 subordinate or remove; correct?
25 A. Indeed, basically it's -- because it also depends -- I mean, who
1 has the initiative, because the order 73 talks about units that refuse to
2 be subordinated to the JNA have to be removed, but it comes back to the
3 same thing. So let's not --
4 Q. And if they don't remove that unit and that unit or those
5 individuals commit a crime, is the JNA commander responsible for that?
6 A. If they are in his zone of responsibility, yes.
7 Q. So that's -- you're saying now - and I just want to get this very
8 clear - you're saying it's immaterial whether or not the group is
9 engaging in functions that are related to defence, security, combat?
10 A. You know, I'm trying to understand or interpret your questions in
11 relation to the events in 1991, where obviously I mean JNA commanders --
12 and again this is also clear from Panic's documents, you don't
13 necessarily need my answer, but indeed if the JNA commander fails to
14 subordinate volunteers or whatever to his command or fails -- and if that
15 doesn't work, fails to remove them, then he will be held accountable by
16 in that case the commander of the 1st Military District.
17 Q. Let me come straight to the point then. Was Arkan's men and
18 Arkan himself, were they subordinated to the JNA from the time of their
19 arrival in August 1991 through the arrival of UNPROFOR in 1992? Were
20 they subordinated to the JNA?
21 A. Your Honours, we have seen I think one or two combat documents,
22 orders from the 12th Novi Sad Corps indicating that during operations in
23 Luzac, Arkan and his group operate under the command of the JNA in combat
24 units -- in combat operations, I'm sorry. There is also -- we saw the
25 document I think from December 1991 or January 1992 from the 12th Corps
1 providing a status of forces, whereby it is indeed confirmed that Arkan's
2 volunteers or TO detachment is subordinated to the JNA at that time.
3 However, the various reports by security organs of the 1st Military
4 District between October and -- 1991 and the course of 1992 suggest that
5 Arkan is not always subordinated to the JNA, and even if he should have
6 been, that he's acting on his own behalf and they attribute - I mean
7 "they" is the 1st Military District security organs - they attribute this
8 behaviour and the fact that he seems -- that Arkan seems to be able to
9 get away with that to his connections with local -- I mean with the
10 SAO SBWS authorities or even senior officials or members of the
11 Government of the Republic of Serbia.
12 Q. So your position is that he is stepping in and out of
13 subordination; is that correct?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Let's look at some documents now, and I know you want to and I'm
16 more than happy to oblige.
17 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 06198, which is Prosecution tab 665.
18 This is Prosecution Exhibit 1687.
19 THE WITNESS: Do you know whether that's in my report?
20 MR. GOSNELL:
21 Q. You mentioned it the day before yesterday.
22 A. Okay.
23 Q. But I don't believe it is in your report, sir.
24 A. Okay.
25 Q. To the best of my knowledge.
1 A. Yeah, it's a new document basically.
2 Q. Now, I just want to try to situate us tactically in this area and
3 understand what forces are present. And this is an early document which
4 is why I find it useful. It's from the 12th Corps. It states the date
5 is the 8th of July, 1991, and this is from Mladen Bratic, who is the
6 commander of the 12th Corps. And down there at paragraph 2 or item 2 it
8 [As read] "I have decided the 12th Corps forces (the 51st and
9 452nd Mechanised Brigades and parts of the 36th Mechanised Brigade) shall
10 advance through Slavonia in two marching columns in Slavonia and one in
11 Baranja on the following axes ..."
12 Now, I'm not interested in the axes as such, but can you just
13 help us understand how many forces by establishment should be encompassed
14 by the units that are mentioned there numerically?
15 A. I wouldn't be able to give a precise estimate because I don't
16 know the level of mobilisation of these units. I mean, there would --
17 when we talk about brigades, we're talking about several thousands of
18 troops. A brigade could be 5.000 troops or even more. But it all
19 depends -- I mean, from here, for example, I cannot say whether these
20 were level A, B, or C units. That was a classification that existed in
21 the JNA to, yeah, determine I wouldn't say the importance of the unit but
22 their level of permanent manning because some units would only exist as a
23 skeleton in peace time and they would have to be mobilised, whereas
24 others had a stronger peace time strength so I'm sorry I'm not able to
25 give a precise estimate.
1 Q. What's the range?
2 A. For a brigade I would say between 5- and 10.000, a mechanised
3 brigade between 5 - and 10.000 people.
4 Q. So we have two brigades here and parts of a third brigade so that
5 you're talking about over 10.000?
6 A. But it -- I mean it's a purely theoretical thing because on the
7 other hand when you look at the terrain, I mean you would have a major
8 traffic jam to try to move them over the three bridges. So I've seen
9 estimates that there were more -- like more than 70.000 JNA troops at one
10 given time in fall 1991 surrounding Vukovar or fighting in that area.
11 Other estimates were 20.000. You know, I find it hard to believe that
12 around 10.000 troops would move in July -- try to move over the three
13 bridges over the Danube because it would be a major, yeah, logistical
14 challenge. So I believe it's -- I would say it is less.
15 Q. Attachment 1 has some interesting information. If we could go to
16 page 5 in the English, it's the last page in B/C/S. In Eastern
17 Slavonia -- sorry, this is an attachment which is headed "intelligence
18 situation." There's no authorship but here is what it says:
19 "In Eastern Slavonia: In Erdut village there is a training
20 centre for around 300-400 members of the Croatian National Guard and
21 MUP ..."
22 Do you know anything about what training centre is being referred
23 to there?
24 A. It's most likely the same training centre that was taken over by
25 Arkan at one moment I think during fall 1991 and which was later
1 transformed in a training centre for the TO of the RSK, and I think it
2 was even at one time identified as a training centre for the special
3 units of the TO, the special police units of the RSK.
4 Q. And then a bit further down:
5 "In all settlements snipers have been deployed on church towers
6 and the sectors are fortified and positions consolidated for defence."
7 Is that corroborated by other information as far as you know,
8 namely, that there were Croatian positions being taken up in church
10 A. I've seen, Your Honours, other documents, I mean JNA documents,
11 mentioning that, but I haven't, for example, looked at Croatian documents
12 so there's not much I can say about it. I didn't analyse the activities
13 of the ZNG or the Croatian forces in SBWS. It's possible.
14 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 05995, please, which is Defence tab
16 Q. Now, this is coming up -- while this is coming up on the screen
17 in front of you, Mr. Theunens, this is a document, a report from the 12th
18 Corps command by Trajkovic, the Chief of Staff, and he's describing the
19 disposition of forces, and the date is the 22nd of September, 1991. And
20 we see here the same units that are mentioned in the previous document,
21 namely, the 51st and the 452nd, although I think in this document we see
22 that it's being referred to as 453rd instead of the 452nd. And then we
23 also see the 36th Brigade. But in addition to that we see the 18th
24 Mechanised Brigade, the remainder of the 36th Brigade, the 12th Motorised
25 Brigade which is now being stationed in Klis, the village of Klis which I
1 presume is Klisa, the village of Tenja, Betin Dvor; the 211th Armoured
2 Brigade has now been stationed in the villages of Erdut, Aljmas, Lipovac;
3 and the 16th Mixed Artillery Regiment is based in Klisa and the Klisa
5 Now, I generally understand your difficulty in coming to a
6 precise figure as to what -- how many people are in all these forces.
7 Can you give us a general ballpark figure as to how many soldiers you
8 think are comprised by these various units?
9 A. Your Honours, I'm very reluctant to make a guess here because, I
10 mean, you may have heard before in other trials that, for example, the
11 80th Brigade, the first attempt to mobilise it failed so they couldn't
12 march towards Eastern Slavonia -- sorry, a second attempt, and then also
13 the manning was still low. I can repeat the theoretical strength but I
14 don't think it's going to bring much, so the safest I can -- guess I can
15 make there were several thousands of JNA troops at that time in Eastern
17 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 00589 which is Prosecution tab 170,
19 Q. Now, this appears to be from the 1st Military District command
20 and this is in November 1991 so it's a little bit later, reporting to the
21 General Staff of the SFRY. And if we turn the page to page 11, it
22 indicates that there are -- I presume these are Serbian TO units that are
23 being attached to the 12th Corps?
24 A. You mean TO of the Republic of Serbia?
25 Q. Correct.
1 A. Yes, indeed.
2 Q. And we see 2.024.
3 A. Yeah, I don't have the page in front of me but I'm familiar with
4 the document, it's in my report. Yeah, I mean, it's possible, yeah.
5 THE REGISTRAR: There is no page 11 of this document.
6 MR. GOSNELL: Well, in any event it's not important. I have a
7 page 11 in my version.
8 Q. But in any event that's what that document indicates. Could we
9 have --
10 A. I'm sorry, I don't want to -- but just to clarify also the issue
11 in my answer in relation to Arkan when you said he would be coming and
12 going, it would be interesting to see whether Arkan's unit is now
13 mentioned on the strength of the 1st Military District because if he was
14 subordinated at that time he and his unit would have been included in
15 this overview.
16 Q. We're progressing step by step on that issue, Mr. Theunens, but
17 thank you for that comment.
18 A. Yeah, I understand.
19 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 05997, please, which is Defence tab
21 Q. Now, this is the document that creates OG North; correct?
22 A. Yeah, it's a new document, Your Honours. I would say it is a
23 document that creates an OG North because I've seen the -- I mean I
24 didn't have this document prior to -- or when the amalgamated report was
25 put together. I spoke in during examination about the difficulties to
1 obtain documents from the 12th Corps or OG North and we requested those
2 already in 2003 or 2004 prior to the Vukovar trial. I was always under
3 the understanding that there was an OG North which was based in the
4 12th Corps and which was commanded first by General Bratic and then when
5 he was killed in action by General Biorcevic. This document here talks,
6 in my view, about an OG North because it's much smaller than the initial
7 OG North or the -- that OG North I was thinking of under the command of
8 Biorcevic or Bratic prior to that.
9 Q. Although this document does say "the Operation Group North"?
10 A. Yeah, but I mean because it's at that given time. It cannot say
11 "an OG North." At that time there is only one OG North, that is this
12 one. So as OGs and TGs are ad hoc arrangements that can be disbanded,
13 re-established, changed, and so on, for OG North based on the documents I
14 have reviewed, it is difficult for me to establish what the exact
15 sequence of call it restructuring is because here we see, in my view, an
16 OG North. There is a document a few weeks later for a Tactical Group
17 North then only the 12th Corps is mentioned, whereas in a number of open
18 sources, as I mentioned, mention was made of the OG North, which was a
19 much bigger unit comparable to OG South, where the situation is much more
20 straightforward. Again, it's easier to analyse because of the documents
21 we have.
22 Q. Well, whatever the case may be, one thing we can I think agree on
23 is if you look at the list of units there, it includes a TO Panonic
24 Brigade and the TO detachment of Serbia. Do you know where the Panonic
25 TO is from?
1 A. I don't recall at this stage, but I can check. I mean, I assume
2 it is originating from Serbia.
3 Q. And we see there that the 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanised
4 Brigade is listed here in OG North but we know that they end up in the
5 command of OG South later; isn't that right?
6 A. I agree with the first proposition. For the second, I mean at
7 one moment -- at one moment in time the 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanised
8 Division which consists of proletarian guards mechanised brigades is
9 deployed south of OG South, so I don't recall exactly whether a
10 proletarian guards mechanised brigade is subordinated to OG South, but I
11 do recall that its parent unit, i.e., the Proletarian Mechanised Division
12 is deployed south of OG South at one moment in fall 1991.
13 Q. Item 6:
14 "Round up all personnel and materiel by 1200 hours on 29
15 September 1991 on the village of Brsadin-Trpinjska Cesta- Borovo Selo
17 Can you provide us any assistance as a military man as to what
18 the words "round up" means? What's being instructed here?
19 A. Just looking at what -- I mean, what I can see on the screen and
20 given the limited information I have on the 12th Corps, I would interpret
21 that as preparing all personnel of the mentioned units in order to be
22 ready to act and to do that in the locations -- in the location mentioned
24 MR. GOSNELL: Your Honours, I would tender this document, please.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this document is already admitted
2 on 8th of May as P1690. Thank you.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
4 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
5 Could we have 1D298, please, which is Defence tab 370.
6 Q. Sir, this is a map which purportedly was created by the
7 Central Intelligence Agency. Have you seen this map before?
8 A. Yes, Your Honours, and if you want I can explain more on the
9 background of what you call the Central Intelligence Agency involvement
10 in preparing the map.
11 Q. Well, I'm not particularly interested in that, but is there
12 something you can tell us briefly on that subject?
13 A. No, just to clarify -- I mean when people hear "Central
14 Intelligence Agency," they often think of -- that clandestine and covert
15 sources were used to prepare this information. Basically, I mean this is
16 part of a quite detailed report called: "Balkan Battlegrounds on the
17 Conflict in the former Yugoslavia," but it's all based on open sources.
18 Nothing wrong with open sources, but just to clarify potential
20 Q. And we know from the documents that we've just looked at that
21 they seem to have gotten correct a good number of the units that they've
22 got identified there on the map in the area of OG North. Would you agree
23 with that?
24 A. It would be helpful if maybe the map can go down a bit and I can
25 see the date. I think there must be a date somewhere maybe on the top or
1 somewhere else.
2 Q. If you look closely at the legend there, you'll see that the
3 inner lines of confrontation were allegedly reached according to this on
4 the 30th of September, 1991.
5 A. Yeah, mm-hmm. Okay. Yeah.
6 Q. But the general question is: Would you agree with me that they
7 have accurately represented the units that, based on the documents,
8 appear to be there?
9 A. I mean, I have no reason to doubt about what they are saying, but
10 from an analytical point of view and a methodological point of view, I
11 would first like to see their figures because I see only like icons of
12 units. And then compare that -- I mean their findings with my material
13 and then draw conclusions.
14 Q. And looking at this map, can we just get an overview of the
15 operations that occurred in OG North, starting on the 1st of August?
16 We've heard a lot of evidence that they crossed the bridge on the 1st of
17 August, they moved into Erdut and Dalj. We'll go to certain documents on
18 that, but let me ask you this specifically: Do you know that they
19 reached that confrontation line, the inner confrontation line, almost
20 immediately once they had crossed the bridges, based on the documents
21 you've looked at?
22 A. What -- excuse me, what do you mean by "inner confrontation
24 Q. By "inner," I mean the dotted line.
25 A. It's possible. You know, I cannot compare it -- I can read the
1 map and I have no reason to doubt about the accuracy of this map in
2 relation to the information the analysts or the people who compiled this
3 map had available to them. From my point of view as well as I answered
4 earlier, I would like to look at the documents I have, I mean the
5 official JNA documents which were not available to the people who drafted
6 or compiled this map and then compare the two, and then I could answer
7 the question.
8 Q. Can you agree with me that OG North is separated from OG South
9 until well into October, as seems to be reflected on this map?
10 A. I -- it's possible -- I mean, it's possible, yeah. It's what
11 the -- sorry, it's what the map seems to show. But again, I cannot draw
12 that conclusion from the documents I have reviewed, so I can draw that
13 conclusion only -- I mean, I can answer your question based on the map I
14 see in front of me and my understanding -- because apparently -- I mean,
15 there is the Vuka river between the two, but -- yeah.
16 MR. GOSNELL: We would tender this map, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Shall be assigned Exhibit D38. Thank you.
19 MR. GOSNELL: Could I have Prosecution Exhibit -- sorry, P1688,
20 Defence -- Prosecution tab 666.
21 Q. Now, this is the -- a report from the Chief of Staff of the
22 command of the 12th Corps dated the 9th of August, 1991, to the command
23 of the 1st Military District, General Mladen Maksimovic. And it purports
24 to describe the events in or around Dalj on the 1st of August, 1991. Can
25 I first of all ask you about the interval. Is it normal that there would
1 be an interval of eight days between a combat action and a report of this
3 A. Your Honours, it doesn't say "regular situations report," so I
4 don't know whether the 12th Corps prior to the 9th of August was
5 providing regular situation reports to the 1st Military District. This
6 seems to be a kind of a summarising or an overview report, so I would
7 want to check first whether other situation reports were sent or
8 submitted by the 12th Corps to the 1st Military District between the 1st
9 of August and the 9th of August. Maybe we should have -- would also look
10 at the war diary of the 12th Corps which unfortunately was not accessible
11 to me and then I would be able to answer your question.
12 Q. Let's say there were daily ongoing situation reports, why would
13 there be a report like this even if there were those types of reports?
14 A. Maybe because the commander or a member of the command of the
15 1st Military District asked the 12th Corps to provide such report, we
16 don't know. I don't consider it unusual.
17 Q. Let's go over to page 2 of the English, please.
18 "A tactical company of the 2nd Armoured Battalion started out
19 across the bridge and crossed it without having to open fire. During
20 this time, a white flag was put out on the 'Kula' installation in the
21 village of Erdut and ZNG members withdrew from the elevation."
22 Let's just stop there for a moment. Do you know of any
23 elevations in the town of Dalj?
24 A. You mean Erdut or Dalj?
25 Q. I'm sorry, Erdut. Do you know of any elevations in the village
1 of Erdut?
2 A. Yeah, I mean if I remember well, because I've been there for the
3 last time it's like 1997, when you cross -- I mean, if you come from
4 Serbia across the bridge, close to the bridge there is I think kind of
5 elevation but it's not very big. I mean overall the terrain in
6 Eastern Slavonia is flat.
7 Q. Can an elevation be a building in military parlance?
8 A. I haven't seen it, you know, I -- if it's a building, you would
9 expect that it's described as a building.
10 Q. It goes on:
11 "Then a tactical company of the 1st Motorised Battalion was sent
12 across the village of Dalj at 07:30 hours followed by a tactical company
13 of the 2nd mb, which headed towards the village of Erdut after crossing
14 the bridge but came under strong fire from the direction of the MUP
16 "As a result this unit was forced to return fire and prevent the
17 ZNG from firing upon them.
18 "At 09:30 hours a tactical company of the 1st mb entered the
19 village of Dalj and once it was there the unit commander asked the
20 warring parties through a spokesperson to cease firing ... both sides
21 agreed except for the forces positioned at the MUP station. Since these
22 forces continued firing not only on the other side but on the tactical
23 company of the 1st mb as well, they were given an ultimatum to cease
24 firing right away or tanks would be deployed to destroy them. Despite
25 the ultimatum and several warnings, forces positioned at the MUP station
1 continued firing on units of the 1st mb which was forced to return fire
2 and three shells from a tank gun were fired on the police station, after
3 which the conflict between the warring parties stopped and no more fire
4 was opened on units of the 1st mb.
5 "Under the protection of our units members of the MUP and the ZNG
6 then retreated towards the village of Aljmas and some were evacuated to
7 Osijek together with the refugees, also under the protection of JNA
9 Now, you testified that there was a shift in JNA -- in the JNA's
10 role in the conflict in 1991 from separating the sides to then actively
11 participating on one side against the other. Is this, in your view, a
12 clear indication of participating on one side against the other?
13 A. Well, at that -- at this stage it's - and I think it's indicated
14 in the report, according to the report the main role of the JNA consists
15 of separating the parties and, as is put in this report, enforcing a
17 Q. Well, here's my point, sir. On page 1 of this report the author
18 is giving the impression that this is a matter of the JNA separating the
19 two sides acting as an honest broker, so to speak, but then when you get
20 into the details, namely, a tank moves in, destroys the MUP station,
21 presumably killing a large number of people, isn't that participating on
22 one side against the other at that point?
23 A. I think the best I can answer is that it depends of the -- which
24 side you're on. For the Croatian side obviously it means that the JNA by
25 separating the parties and actually consolidating Serbian control over
1 certain areas is actually participating on the Serbian side of the
2 conflict. For the JNA, as you can see in this document, it means
3 separating the parties and using all necessary means to enforce or impose
4 a cease-fire. For myself, I think this document leaves room for
5 interpretation. Subsequent documents are much clearer as to the role of
6 the JNA.
7 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
9 Mr. Theunens, time for the first break. We'll come back at
10 11.00. The court usher will escort you out of the courtroom. Thank you
11 very much.
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
15 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
17 [The witness takes the stand].
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Mr. Gosnell.
19 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. Now, Mr. Theunens, before the break you were disputing my
21 interpretation of this document as a crossing of the Rubicon I would say
22 of the JNA towards actively participating in this conflict on the Serb
23 side. Now, let me direct you to the bottom of the page that's on the
24 screen there, where it says, if we can go down a little bit more in the
1 "The MUP and ZNG units stationed in the villages of Dalj and
2 Erdut were the ones that caused the conflict with the JNA unit."
3 Notwithstanding the higher aspirations of the JNA to act as
4 policemen between the two sides, wouldn't you agree with me that this is
5 in reality reflecting a shift towards acting on one side against the
6 other, regardless of the reasons?
7 A. To be honest, I don't know. I mean, I read the sentence
8 according to the command of the 12th Corps indeed -- I mean, he states
9 that the MUP and ZNG units caused the conflict with the JNA. If we were
10 to analyse the attitude of the each of the parties at that moment in the
11 conflict, we would also have to look at documents from the Croatian side,
12 I mean if that was the purpose of our analysis, and then try to form an
13 opinion on that. As I said earlier, to me this document leaves room for
14 interpretation and there are documents -- later documents from various
15 JNA units that are much clearer.
16 At the same time, when you look at documents concerning the
17 situation in Banija, Kordun, and Lika, for example, with the various OGs
18 and TGs that are set up, some of them as already as early as September,
19 there it is clear that the JNA is fighting on the Serbian side. The same
20 happens in the wider Knin area that's around the same time-period. But I
21 understood that you wanted to give me an interpretation based on this
22 specific document, and there I have tried to do that to my -- to the best
23 of my abilities.
24 Q. The paragraph above that says:
25 "The unit also did not enter the village of Dalj during the
1 day ..."
2 But then a few paragraphs up it says.
3 "At 09:30 hours a tactical company of the 1st mb entered the
4 village of Dalj ..."
5 Why do you think Trajkovic isn't being entirely honest here?
6 A. Your Honours, I don't understand the reference to whether
7 Mr. Trajkovic is honest or not. You could try to analyse Mr. Trajkovic's
8 honesty or lack thereof of if you would have independent observers in
9 Dalj who could express their views in relation to the views expressed by
10 Mr. Trajkovic or Colonel Trajkovic and then, yes, you could draw
11 conclusions. Maybe he's dishonest, maybe not. You know, I can't make
12 that -- draw any conclusions to that.
13 Q. Last paragraph on this page:
14 "In the days after the conflict there were occasional incidents
15 between the Croatian and Serbian inhabitants and our units (mostly the
16 military police) entered the village of Dalj to prevent acts of
17 retaliation against the Croatian population."
18 Now, can you discern in this document that Trajkovic seems to be
19 sensitive or concerned about as of when or what date his forces are in
21 A. Looking at the date of the document, I think it's from 1st of
22 September, if I remember well.
23 Q. No, it's from the 9th of August.
24 A. Sorry, 9th of August, I couldn't see that at the top of the
25 document. I mean, linked to that paragraph it would suggest in the days
1 after the 9th of August units of the -- I mean military police of the
2 12th Corps enters Dalj, but it doesn't state how long they stay, whether
3 they establish a permanent presence or whether they go in and leave
4 again. So we would have to look at other documents from the 12th Corps
5 to see the -- their deployment at any given time during that time-period.
6 Q. Last paragraph of the document which is on page 3:
7 "We believe that the situation in the settlement of Dalj is still
8 very complex due to the mistrust that has been created there. Both
9 warring parties believe that JNA presence is necessary and useful and
10 that in the present situation the withdrawal of JNA forces would have
11 disastrous consequences."
12 So someone is providing Trajkovic with information on the
13 situation in the town; correct?
14 A. Well, the paragraph shows that Trajkovic expresses his assessment
15 of the situation in Dalj. What this is based on, we cannot establish
16 from this document, but it would be reasonable to assume that he is
17 gathering information and obtaining information on the situation in Dalj
18 at that moment in time.
19 Q. No mention in this document, is there, of any participation by
20 Arkan in this event; correct?
21 A. Which event, Your Honours, because it's a summarising report?
22 Q. "Report on the armed conflict near the village of Dalj."
23 A. No, no mention is made of Arkan.
24 Q. No mention of Arkan in any of the three previous documents that
25 we looked at setting out the forces that were part of the 12th Corps;
2 A. That is correct, Your Honours.
3 Q. Even though those documents also listed certain TO units that
4 were to be attached to the 12th Corps; correct?
5 A. That is correct, Your Honours.
6 Q. And you said earlier today that that would be to you -- or you
7 would look to those documents in order to determine whether or not Arkan
8 is subordinated to JNA forces as of this date; correct?
9 A. Yes in the sense that the mentioning of Arkan among the own units
10 would indicate that at that moment in time Arkan is subordinate and his
11 group are subordinated to the JNA. As we see from 1st Military District
12 security organs documents, the JNA units also report about the presence
13 of Arkan or other volunteer groups in certain parts of SBWS even if they
14 are not -- even if they do not appear to be subordinated to the JNA at
15 that time.
16 Q. That's at a later time-period and we're coming to that. I want
17 to focus on August 1991, and you said earlier that you would look to
18 these types of documents to determine whether Arkan was or was not
19 subordinated to the 12th Corps at this time. So my question to you is:
20 Does the absence of mention in this document and the previous documents
21 inform your view - and I believe this is your view but please tell if
22 it's otherwise - your view that in August 1991 Arkan is not subordinated
23 to the 12th Corps in this area?
24 A. Indeed, Your Honours. I mean, based on the documents we have
25 seen and the absence of any mention of Arkan and his group in these
1 documents, Arkan is not -- and his group are not subordinated to the 12th
2 Corps at that time.
3 Q. Let's have P103, please, Prosecution tab 93. This is an
4 information signed by Colonel Stevan Mitrevski who apparently is part of
5 a logistics sector of some unit, and this report has gone up -- you've
6 discussed it before. This unit has gone to very high levels, security
7 administration of some units, the Federal Secretariat for -- I believe
8 the security administration of the Federal Secretariat for National
9 Defence at least and other units. And down at the bottom of page 1 we
10 see information relating back to the initial arrival of the 12th Corps in
11 Erdut and it says:
12 "He said that using explosive Arkan had completely destroyed a
13 Catholic church in the village of Erdut and the church tower was
14 destroyed before that during the JNA take-over of Erdut."
15 No mention of that in Trajkovic's report, is there?
16 A. No, there is not.
17 Q. Would the information in this report be salient to your analysis
18 of whether or not Arkan is subordinated to the 12th Corps at this place
19 and at that time?
20 A. I'm sorry, I mean, with the break -- could you remind me the date
21 of the Trajkovic document we looked at?
22 Q. That's the 9th of August, 1991.
23 A. Yeah, well, this document is dated the 1st of October so -- I
24 mean we can -- we can objectively state that there is no reference in
25 Trajkovic's document dated the 9th of August, but we don't know why there
1 is no mention.
2 Q. Are you disputing that the last sentence on page 1 of this
3 document means to refer to the take-over of Erdut on the 1st of August by
4 the JNA?
5 A. I'm not disputing that, but I just compared the two documents
6 like anybody would do that here information is mentioned that is not
7 mentioned in the other document. That's all I can observe or state at
8 this stage.
9 Q. Do you mention that in your report?
10 A. No, because as we saw I didn't have the Trajkovic document
11 available to me and I -- I assume from -- I mean when I was checking the
12 internet on the status of the report I compiled in October, that the
13 Defence was quite negatively oriented towards the second report, so again
14 I cannot analyse documents that I don't physically have.
15 Q. How does this information in this report, now that I have drawn
16 it to your attention, affect, if at all, your assertion that Arkan is not
17 subordinated to the 12th Corps in this area at this time?
18 A. From a doctrinal point of view, Arkan should have been
19 subordinated to the 12th Corps during their operations in Erdut.
20 However, when we look at the context and all the other military
21 documents, the situation is not entirely clear. We do know that Arkan
22 develops a good relationship with the future or the later commander of
23 the 12th Corps, namely, General Biorcevic. I haven't been able to review
24 sufficient documents of the 12th Corps to establish the nature of his
25 relations at the moment when units of the 12th Corps take over Erdut.
1 But again, from a theoretical point of view there should have been
2 subordination and there should have been co-ordination in their
4 Q. You testified at page 4183 of this case a couple of days ago that
5 you had made requests for documents from the 12th Corps and that you had
6 received very few documents. Now, am I correct in understanding that
7 you've received far fewer documents from -- in relation to the area of
8 responsibility of the 12th Corps as compared to documents in relation to
9 the area of responsibility of OG South?
10 A. That is correct, Your Honours.
11 Q. Can you explain that? Why is there that difference?
12 A. I -- no, Your Honours, I cannot explain. I think maybe the
13 country or the -- I think the states holding these documents, they are in
14 a much better to -- position to explain than me.
15 Q. Have you -- do you have personal knowledge of documents in
16 archives being destroyed or concealed?
17 A. An argument that was often heard and I'm -- I mean I don't recall
18 specifically in which -- whether it was in the context of which request,
19 but that a number of documents held in archives in FRY were destroyed
20 during the bombing, aerial bombing, conducted by NATO in the context of
21 the operations in Kosovo in 1999.
22 Q. What I meant by my question which I guess could have been
23 clearer: Intentionally destroying in order to conceal events?
24 A. I don't know, but again maybe it's not an answer to your question
25 but just for the -- it can assist the Trial Chamber. When I was working
1 on the Vukovar case, we submitted requests for similar documents at
2 different times. And documents that were, for example, reportedly
3 unavailable at one moment suddenly were available four months later.
4 Now, whether there was a particular intention to that or whether it was
5 due to lack of organisation, I don't know. Or we would request documents
6 and then we obtained totally different documents. But that was the
8 Q. Have you ever come across a document that you were able to
9 ascertain was forged that had been provided to you from any source that
10 was purporting to be a JNA document?
11 A. There were a few documents -- and again, I can only talk about
12 the documents that I saw. But there were a few documents I think related
13 to the JNA 2nd Military District or obtained from state archives in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time where there was certain doubts about
15 their authenticity. And -- I mean, these documents had nothing to do
16 with Eastern Slavonia -- the situation in Eastern Slavonia or SBWS. I
17 understood from my colleagues that they undertook efforts to verify the
18 authenticity from these documents, for example, by showing them to JNA
19 officers during witness or suspect interviews and that matter was then
20 clarified afterwards.
21 Q. Well, JNA officers who themselves might have an interest in
22 engaging in that forgery; right?
23 A. I -- I mean, those particular cases I would consider doubtful
24 because these documents were quite negative, hostile towards -- about the
25 JNA or towards the JNA and its activities during spring 1992 in the wider
1 Sarajevo area or in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So -- and they all came from the
2 same archive and they had this -- I mean, it was all like for specific
3 time-period -- it was almost like sensational kind of information that
4 was included, and referring to the methodology one had certain doubts
5 about the reliability of the source, not so much the source indicated on
6 the document but the provider of the document and the layout of the
7 document and on the other hand the contents. So then you apply the
9 Q. Have you ever come across a document in relation to the SBWS
10 region that you would say has been tampered with?
11 A. I mean --
12 Q. And by -- just to clarify my question, by "tampered with," I mean
13 someone after the creation of the document has altered its content for
14 whatever reason?
15 A. I will qualify my answer, I mean I -- to the best of my
16 recollection I haven't seen any documents originating from the
17 1st Military District or its subordinate units where there are
18 indications that the document has -- the content of the document has been
20 Q. What about the war diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade?
21 A. Well, again based on -- I was I think I find privileged to be
22 involved in the interview of the drafter of the war diary. And just also
23 to clarify one of your questions yesterday, the JNA officers I -- when I
24 say "I interviewed," when I participated in the interview by the
25 investigator, most of those became Defence witnesses. So it was not just
1 a matter of collecting information that was favourable to the Prosecution
2 or, as you suggested earlier, that I would be influenced by views that
3 were favourable to the Prosecution. But as I mentioned, I participated
4 in the interview of that officer. That officer also testified. And I'm
5 not aware of any reservations being raised during or after the Vukovar
6 trial by any witness or any other individual in relation to the
7 authenticity of the war diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade.
8 Q. Is it credible there could be no mention of the evacuation
9 agreement of Vukovar Hospital in that war diary?
10 A. Your Honours, I don't know whether it was in his testimony in
11 front of the Trial Chamber or during his interview that one of the
12 drafters of the -- I mean the one we interviewed and at this moment -- I
13 mean I can find his name back but I don't recall his name. He said that,
14 well, you know, once, I mean, we had the 18th of November and Vukovar had
15 "fallen," people became a bit sloppy in their -- in the reporting and the
16 war diary was not kept to the same level of discipline as before. So,
17 again based on that and on the absence of any similar objections as the
18 ones you raise now, the absence during the trial and afterwards, I have
19 no reason to believe that the war diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade
20 has been tampered with. I would agree with the fact that it's -- it
21 lacks maybe comprehensiveness is not the right word but it appears to be
22 incomplete. Events happening after the 18th are not covered with the
23 same level of detail as it should have been.
24 Q. Are you seriously suggesting that those omissions are a matter of
25 mere sloppiness?
1 A. Your Honours, I'm not suggesting anything. To the best of my
2 ability I tried to answer the question and reflect the views that have
3 been expressed by me by those -- I mean by people who have drafted the
4 document and also the one who is actually -- I mean, the Chief of Staff
5 of the Guards Motorised Brigade who was responsible for the contents. So
6 he supervised the drafting of the war diary and this is what they said.
7 Q. I mean, isn't it an obvious example of a JNA document being
8 written in such a way to avoid responsibility for certain events?
9 A. Well, it is possible, I don't know, but looking at military
10 doctrine and also the military discipline and justice system, a war diary
11 as such would not be sufficient to establish responsibility or the lack
12 thereof or avoid responsibility in a kind of situation as the one that
13 occurred in Ovcara on the afternoon and the evening of the 20th of
14 November, 1991.
15 Q. Well, the individuals involved in -- I apologise for the absence
16 of a gap.
17 The individuals involved in keeping that war diary aren't being
18 contemporaneously advised by lawyers on that surely?
19 A. Again, I mean I've answered the question. You know, it's not
20 just an issue of the war diary. There's also other documents that --
21 allow to establish who is in command of who and who is responsible for
23 Q. Let's get back to Dalj, see whether or not Trajkovic's report is
24 accurately reflecting events.
25 MR. GOSNELL: Can we have 65 ter 892, Prosecution tab 246.
1 Q. I'm sure you're familiar with this document, Helsinki Watch to
2 Milosevic dated the 21st of January, 1992. If we go to page 3 in the
3 English, please, under the entry "August 1st Dalj." And here's what
4 Helsinki Watch is reporting. If we can go to the next page in English,
5 please. It seems we have B/C/S on both sides.
6 [As read] "On August 1, Serbian insurgents attempted to take over
7 the local police station in Dalj. Police trapped inside the station
8 refused to surrender to JNA troops and a battle for the town ensued.
9 After the JNA occupied Dalj, Serbian paramilitary troops reportedly
10 searched the village for Croatian soldiers, police officers, and
11 civilians, and killed many of those who were found wounded."
12 Now, you notice that this document, Mr. Theunens, says that the
13 JNA occupied Dalj, whereas Mr. Trajkovic seems extremely insistent that
14 his forces didn't occupy Dalj on the 1st of August; right?
15 A. That -- I mean comparing the two documents, I would agree with
16 your conclusion.
17 Q. Which do you think is more reliable?
18 A. Well, I mean as an analyst I would say, you know, I can't answer
19 the question now. I would look for additional information. And again, I
20 mean the report we saw, the Trajkovic report we saw, was a summarising
21 report and it's not always easy to follow the chronology because there's
22 very few dates mentioned in it but it mainly discusses events of several
23 days I think, whereas here we have a discussion of apparently an event on
24 one day. It doesn't say so much whether the occupation -- it seems that
25 it occurs on the 1st, it could also be the subsequent days.
1 Q. Let's now, if we could, go back to 356, we were just looking at
2 this document, it's Prosecution tab 93 also known as P103. If we can go
3 to page 2. And it's the second-last paragraph there.
4 "There is a rumour among the JNA members located in that area
5 that Arkan goes into the action only after the JNA units mop-up the area
6 and then he ... and that area and commits crimes. They think that Arkan
7 is doing it with a full support of the SDB of Serbia."
8 Now, is that description of the participation of -- the method of
9 participation by Arkan, isn't that consistent with what's being described
10 in the Helsinki Watch report that we just looked at, which for the record
11 is 00892?
12 A. Indeed, Your Honours.
13 Q. Let's have 00235, please, which is D27, and that's Defence tab
14 380. And if we can turn the page to page 4 in the English and in the
15 B/C/S it's immediately after the chart or the table. And, sir, I'm sure
16 you're familiar with this document. This is a request by Arkan for
17 compensation for one of his men apparently. And it says:
18 "This is to certify that Nenad Markovic ...," et cetera,
19 "participated in the liberation of Tenja as a member of our unit which
20 fought in co-operation with the JNA and we emphasize that he was
21 seriously wounded while carrying out the combat task."
22 Do you know that information to be reliable based on the other
23 documents you've reviewed, not with respect to this specific individual
24 but that, A, there were JNA operations there; and B, that Arkan
1 A. I mean, I've -- don't recall seeing other documents on operations
2 in Tenja specific, so -- otherwise the document seems fine with me. So I
3 could only answer your question if I would see other documents concerning
4 the operations in Tenja.
5 Q. It goes on:
6 "On 2 August 1991 he was transported in an army vehicle to the
7 Sombor hospital, where he had an operation.
8 "On 7 August ... he was transferred to the VMA in Belgrade where
9 his left lower leg was amputated."
10 So we have somebody who is apparently wounded on the 2nd in an
11 operation with the JNA. He's then transported in a JNA ambulance away
12 from the front line and then he's treated at a JNA hospital. What does
13 that tell you about subordination, if anything, of Arkan's forces in this
14 area at this time?
15 A. Basically nothing because, again looking at the doctrine they
16 should have been if -- sorry, if Arkan and his group were operating in
17 the area where the JNA was conducting operations in accordance with
18 doctrine they should have been subordinated to Arkan -- to -- excuse me,
19 to the JNA. But the fact that somebody 's evacuated in a military
20 vehicle and transported to a military hospital does not give any
21 indication of subordination relation at that time.
22 Q. It could be that right now we're having a terminological problem
23 because what I understand you to be saying when you say that he's not
24 subordinated, do I understand you to say that he's not -- well, let me
25 simply ask you: What is your view -- how are you using the term
1 "subordination" in the last answer?
2 A. Well, you used the word "subordination," so I answered your
3 question. It means that when -- that Arkan and his group when they were
4 conducting activities there, that they were conducting activities that
5 had been ordered to them or that they had been ordered to do by the JNA.
6 That is what I understand under subordination.
7 Q. And you don't find the fact that they're engaging in combat at
8 the same place as the JNA and that this document is claiming that it was
9 in co-operation with JNA, you don't find that in any way probative or
10 indicative of the issue of the issue of subordination as you've used it?
11 A. As I said, I would look -- I mean from the doctrinal point of
12 view, he should have been subordinated, there is no doubt. However, I
13 would want to look at other documents and, for example, the orders that
14 the -- the written or the orders that determined the mission of the
15 various JNA units and subordinate units in the area of Tenja in order to
16 see whether Arkan and his unit are identified as one of these subordinate
17 units and what their task was. I don't say that it's hundred per cent
18 sure that he was not subordinate, that's not my claim. My answer is --
19 or that's not my answer. My answer is this document does not allow to
20 draw hundred per cent clear conclusion given the context of the other
21 documents I have looked at which show that the situation is quite
23 Q. But the absence of a formal order of subordination doesn't mean
24 that he's not subordinated; is that right?
25 A. Indeed, not necessarily.
1 Q. So "subordination" is a concept that can be analysed in terms of
2 what's actually happening on the ground in terms of co-ordination of
3 forces, executing orders, and so forth; right?
4 A. If two units have to co-ordinate, it doesn't mean that one is
5 subordinate to the other. It means, however, that there is a third
6 entity or command level involved to which these -- at least one of these
7 two units is subordinated because, for example, you have to co-ordinate
8 between neighbouring units but they may have a different superior and
9 executing orders, indeed, involves subordination. You execute orders
10 because you are subordinated to somebody.
11 Q. I shouldn't have used the word "co-ordination" because I know
12 that's a term of art in military parlance. Let's say in layman's terms
13 if they're acting together with the JNA forces, isn't that indicative,
14 probative of, not necessarily conclusive, indicative of subordination?
15 A. I would agree, Your Honours, and again we would try to look at
16 additional documents and the kind of documents I mentioned earlier in
17 order to establish with the highest degree of accuracy, highest possible
18 degree of accuracy what the relations between the units is.
19 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 05993, please, Defence tab 378.
20 Q. This is a -- again, another Trajkovic document as the Chief of
21 Staff of the 12th Corps command, dated the 21st of September to the
22 1st Military District command, and there's a lot in this document,
23 Mr. Theunens, that I would like to discuss with you. And then just to
24 let you know where I'm going with all this, I'm then going to come back
25 to Arkan specifically. But there's just a few general situational issues
1 that I'd like to ask you about in this report first. It says under --
2 under the heading there:
3 "Pursuant to your order, strictly confidential ... of 6 August
4 1991, we are hereby submitting to you the situation report as
5 follows ..."
6 Now, we were discussing this earlier, this sentence seems to
7 imply that there has been an order from the 1st Military District for
8 situation reports. How often are situation reports supposed to be
9 submitted, given this particular circumstance?
10 A. Your Honours, it will depend of the orders that have been given.
11 Looking at the OG South documentation covering the time-period of its
12 existence that was available to me, their regular situation reports were
13 submitted on a daily basis each evening between 1800 and 2000, but it
14 would have been explained in the orders for the 1st Military District for
15 the operations in the area because there is a paragraph on -- it's not
16 called communications, but there is a paragraph on the location of the
17 command post and also on the frequency of -- for the submission of
18 regular and extraordinary situation reports.
19 Q. Under the situation in the units, it describes the fact that
20 they're carrying out operations deployment according to the mission
21 assigned to them for the forthcoming operations. Is "operations
22 deployment" a term of art in military parlance; and if so, can you help
23 us understand what it means?
24 A. Well, my understanding -- I mean, I don't recall any use of
25 this -- of the words in this combination, but I mean operations and
1 deployment, but my understanding is that it's -- operation -- deployment
2 in preparation of further operations.
3 Q. And it says the 12th Corps command has come out to the command
4 post in the area of PG, the Dalj village."
5 Is "come out" a term of art in military parlance or does this
6 just mean that they temporarily arrived and had a meeting with the
7 commanders listed and that's what occurred?
8 A. You know, this is one of the new documents. I reviewed it but I
9 didn't have the opportunity -- I mean, I reviewed it in September/October
10 2012, but I didn't have the opportunity to look at it with a language
11 assistant because when I -- I mean, looking at it now I would ask a
12 language assistant to check the B/C/S with me and then we would discuss
13 it. We know that the 12th Corps establishes a command post, it could
14 have been a forward command post, in Dalj village. At this moment I
15 don't recall exactly when, but I believe it was prior to the 21st of
16 September, 1991. Now, not everybody -- not the whole command is present
17 at a forward command post, so it could be that the remainder part of the
18 12th Corps has indeed come to that forward command post, that's a
19 possible interpretation, but I don't know whether maybe the translators
20 can clarify the issue.
21 Q. That's fine. And then we see discussion of TO units and that
22 starts on page 1. It says:
23 "The TO units which have already been deployed and are now
24 abandoning their positions without authorisation, thereby leaving units
25 alone in the combat formation, represent a particular problem ..."
1 And then if we turn the page and go over to page 2.
2 "All the TO units of the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the
3 Republic of Serbia which make part of the forces of the 12th Corps have
4 almost completely abandoned their positions and gone back. They are not
5 units, but a mob behaving in a really arrogant and undisciplined way,
6 looting property and houses, which has a negative effect on the morale
7 among our units and the people watching that."
8 Now, are we clear that these TO units being referred to in this
9 report, they're subordinate to the 12th Corps in this area at this time;
11 A. That is correct, Your Honours.
12 Q. Down at point 3 -- just to follow-up on that, it follows from
13 that that the JNA has a duty to prosecute any crimes committed by those
14 subordinated TO members; correct?
15 A. I mean, I agree with your proposition, but I think it's best to
16 use more specific language; that is, that indeed in accordance with the
17 procedures or the doctrine -- or no, sorry, the regulations for military
18 discipline and military justice and the 1988 regulations on the
19 implementation of the laws of war, the JNA should, indeed, have at least
20 reported these activities and have them investigated. And when I mean
21 reported, not just in a regular situation report but also specific
22 reports on the actual events and incidents.
23 Q. Let's go to page 103 of your report. We don't need to bring that
24 up. This is just your reference, Mr. Theunens. And this sets out
25 Article 1 of the Law on Military Courts. And Article 1 of that law says:
1 "Military courts as regular courts try criminal acts committed by
2 military persons."
3 Now, the question is: Are these subordinated TO soldiers
4 military persons and is that why there is JNA jurisdiction over them?
5 A. Well, there are -- I mean, I agree again with what you say, but
6 just to be precise there is SFRY armed forces jurisdiction over them.
7 From this document we don't know which measures the 12th Corps has
8 undertaken, have they informed the military prosecutors -- I mean, have
9 investigations taken place with security organs, military police --
10 Q. Mr. Theunens --
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. -- that wasn't my question. I'm not blaming the JNA at this
13 point. I'm not blaming you. I'm not blaming anyone. Just a simple
14 factual question about the interpretation of this provision.
15 A. Mm-hmm.
16 Q. Does military persons -- because it's not self-evident, but does
17 "military persons" encompass TO soldiers while -- who commit crimes while
18 subordinated to the JNA?
19 A. Yes. And sorry to be more again specific, but it's recognised TO
20 units and, okay, TO of Vojvodina and Serbia, recognised TO units, so
21 there's no -- I mean, I agree with your proposition.
22 Q. Well, I'm not going to go back to our long earlier discussion.
23 I'm just going to leave it there in respect of this particular issue.
24 A. Yeah.
25 Q. Now, further down the page there's something -- a description
1 here that you as a military person might be able to help us understand
2 because I as a lay person don't understand what's going on. Under 3(a)
3 it says:
4 "The units of MUP and ZNG are being prepared and they are active
5 from the fortified buildings and bunkers, which makes the carrying out of
6 combat operations more difficult, without a detailed search of the
7 terrain and facilities at the rear of the combat formation."
8 Now, why would the presence of opposing enemy forces in fortified
9 buildings and bunkers have anything to do with conducting a detailed
10 search of the terrain and facilities at the rear of the combat formation?
11 A. Well, ideally we would have a map in order to see the deployment
12 of the JNA and the intelligence assessment concerning the deployment or
13 the locations where ZNG and MUP are included in these fortified buildings
14 and bunkers because then I think it would be easier for me to answer the
15 question. Because it -- one option could be -- but maybe this is
16 speculative, that is, that -- I mean the JNA is arriving there,
17 deploying, and at the same time there are certain buildings, apparently
18 of a not specific military nature, where members of the ZNG and the
19 Croatian Ministry of Interior are allegedly present. And perhaps these
20 buildings are located in the rear area, i.e., the part of the zone of
21 operation of the JNA where -- I mean, not combat operations are taking
22 place but where their logistic support units and so on are located. I
23 mean, not everybody is obviously on the front line. Logistical support,
24 communication centres, and similar units and facilities are located in
25 depth because they are otherwise exposed to hostile activities, so that
1 could be an explanation but ideally we would have a map.
2 Q. And providing security to forces in the depth is vitally
3 important to combat operations; right?
4 A. Yes, to prevent -- I mean enemy infiltration and enemy disruption
5 of your logistical support.
6 Q. How do you define "infiltration"?
7 A. Entering -- sorry. Entering without being authorised to do so
8 and with hostile intentions.
9 Q. Are there concerns by the JNA at this time-period that the
10 Croatian civilians have hostile intentions towards JNA units in this
12 A. I don't know where civilians are mentioned in the report --
13 Q. Mr. Theunens, I'm not asking you about this document, just to
14 clarify. I'm asking you in general based on your review of documents.
15 A. Well, my answer would be as follows. The JNA doesn't recognise
16 the MUP or the ZNG and often in documents talk about Croatian
17 paramilitary formations, i.e., illegal formations that use military
18 structure -- have a military structure or use military techniques or
19 tactics to conduct actually military activity. And even they use the
20 term Ustashi. So I think -- I mean, so there is no clear recognition of
21 combatants on the Croatian side and this also creates suspicion towards
22 any Croatian including, I mean, civilians.
23 Q. So the answer is yes?
24 A. The answer could be yes but it's -- I think -- I mean, it's too
25 general. You know, we have to look at the specific document, but if it
1 makes you -- I mean I would say yes.
2 Q. Item 6:
3 "In the zone of responsibility of the 12th Corps, the security
4 organs established contact with the security organs of the TO and the
5 police in Dalj. Following a notification from the Dalj defence staff
6 that they discovered that a radio transmitter was active in the immediate
7 vicinity of the command post, the military police organs carried out a
8 detailed search of the terrain and houses for which they had some leads
9 that they had a radio transmitter. The search did not uncover anything."
10 Now, throughout your report you use an expression when describing
11 TO units you say "local Serb TO." Can you help us understand why you use
12 that particular expression, local Serb TO, when you're talking about TO
13 units in the SBWS?
14 A. Your Honours, I use the expression "local Serb TO" or
15 "self-established local Serb TO" or "SAO TO" because this is not the
16 regular TO of the Republic of Croatia as it existed under the system of
17 All People's Defence. So these are self-established units, and the
18 documents -- I mean now talking about SBWS, the JNA military documents
19 show that there is some confusion as to the legal status of these units.
20 However, in other documents these SAO or local TO units are considered TO
21 units as such by JNA commanders. So there is no standard view on them.
22 Q. And when you say self-established - and the Chamber has heard
23 plenty of evidence on this already, so I don't want to belabour the point
24 for too long - but when you say "self-established," do I understand
25 correctly that these are essentially units that are being created at the
1 town level initially as village guards and then many of them declare
2 themselves to be TO units?
3 A. Yes -- I mean, there are certain units like that. There are
4 others in areas where there was a Serb majority prior to the conflict
5 where the Croats leave or they are kicked out or whatever and the Serbs
6 take over the existing structures. And -- I mean, this is for example
7 discussed on pages 182 and following. In different parts of Croatia with
8 a significant Serb presence we see that such units are established and
9 even attempts are made to create some kind of a structure with staffs at
10 a later stage.
11 Q. And given the situation described in this document, given the
12 security needs of the JNA that you've described in respect of units that
13 are there, given the fact that local TO units are -- well, just that,
14 they're locals, they've been there for a long time, does any of that
15 suggest to you that the JNA is going to rely on the local Dalj TO to
16 assist them in discharging these security tasks?
17 A. It's possible, but one doesn't necessarily imply the other. And
18 again, when I say "local, "I say "local Serb TO units," because the
19 "local" refers to Serb, not to TO. These are -- these units consist, as
20 far as I remember from the documents I reviewed, almost exclusively of
21 Serbs or maybe some non-Serbs, i.e., the people considered "loyal."
22 Obviously it is useful for the JNA to rely on the regional knowledge of
23 these units, but on the other hand - and again I refer to the documents
24 that I mentioned in my report - there are instances where members of
25 these units take, for example, Petrova Gora and Leva Supoderica local
1 Serb TO units and JNA documents, sorry, OG South, they are called TO
2 detachments, that they are involved in acts of -- I mean, lack of
3 discipline and even criminal behaviour.
4 Q. And the JNA unit in the area is directly subordinating those
5 local TO units; correct?
6 A. I've answered that before. They should do so. Now, the key
7 issue then comes -- I mean, they should do so during combat operations.
8 The key issue is what happens when there are no operations anymore. This
9 is not so much a matter for OG South because their operations continue
10 until -- I mean, Vukovar falls on the 18th but then there are still
11 resistance pockets that have to be dealt with and the structures that
12 have been defined, i.e., OG South continues to exist until the 23rd of
13 November, but for other parts of Eastern Slavonia, like, for example,
14 Dalj, where after the initial, call it separation of forces and
15 take-over, the areas under JNA control, there the situation is more
17 Q. You know, Mr. Theunens, this is why at the very beginning of the
18 cross-examination I asked you so many questions about your definition of
19 zones of responsibility, and I specifically asked you whether you had any
20 functional limitation that would qualify the territorial definition of
21 the zone of responsibility. And now for the first time, I believe,
22 you're introducing this concept that the duty - and I will use the term
23 if you don't want to - the duty to subordinate is somehow confined by
24 what the TO units are doing in the area. Do you have an answer to that?
25 A. No -- I have -- maybe I wasn't clear in my answer. During combat
1 operations led by the JNA, the TO units should be under the command of
2 the JNA. That's the doctrine and I stand by that answer. Once combat
3 operations are finished, I say the situation is more complex, I don't say
4 that the TO is not subordinated anymore to the JNA, that's not my answer.
5 But we have to look at the specific documents because we see, for
6 example, in parts of Eastern Slavonia where there are no more operations,
7 I mean the events in Dalj 21st of September, 4th of October, there is
8 still a JNA presence there for sure, the 12th Corps still has a command
9 post there, but incidents occur and no mention is made of the JNA. This
10 can mean several things. Now, from a doctrinal point of view the JNA
11 commander will still -- in the area of Dalj will still be held
12 responsible, but the responsibility will -- I mean, the - how you call
13 it? - the actual case of military discipline or justice proceedings, the
14 situation will be taken in -- the nature of the situation will be taken
15 into account in a sense whether or not combat operations formally
16 subordinating the TO to the JNA were ongoing or not.
17 And just to finish, the Panic orders, 15th of October and there
18 is also one of November, clearly state that the JNA remains in command
19 and is responsible for what is happening and shouldn't leave an area out
20 of control of the JNA. So I think -- I mean, this is as specific as I
21 can be, and I think it's good to be specific given the complexity of the
23 Q. Well, when do combat operations stop according to you in the area
24 of OG North? And when I say "OG North," I'm referring to that map that
25 we looked at and the area in the -- to the north of the corridor
1 separating OG North from OG South. When, according to you, just so I can
2 understand your position, Mr. Theunens, when according to you are there
3 combat operations in that area?
4 A. Well, ideally, we would look at the documents and -- because they
5 will explain, I mean the regular situation reports, the orders for combat
6 operations, they will clearly state when operations start, when they end,
7 which objectives are achieved, when, and how, and who participated and
8 whatever resubordination of units may have taken place. My
9 interpretation overall is that these operations -- I mean, for example,
10 for Dalj, the JNA takes over control of Dalj, I think that was the 1st of
11 August we saw, that quite soon the JNA has achieved control over the
12 municipality of Dalj because otherwise they wouldn't put a first -- a
13 forward command post there, it wouldn't make sense. And then we would
14 have to look at other municipalities, so it's -- I cannot give a
15 categorical answer because other parts of OG North or units that are
16 sometimes -- at one moment in time part of the OG North but then continue
17 to operate as part of the 12th Corps, well, they continue to operate to
18 conduct combat operations towards Vukovar until at least the 18th of
19 November, so we have to look at specific documents.
20 Q. Notwithstanding the need to look at specific documents, I'm not
21 sure I understand your position. If a TO unit from Serbia is present in
22 Dalj on September 15th, the town has been in the JNA control for a good
23 six weeks, it's about 10 kilometres from the front line with
24 Borovo Naselje, it's about 20 kilometres from the front line with Tenja,
25 is there a duty to -- again, I keep using my terminology and I apologise
1 that, but you know what I'm saying --
2 A. Yeah, yeah.
3 Q. -- is there a duty to subordinate and discipline those TO units
4 from Serbia for starters?
5 A. You know, I have answered the question. According to doctrine
6 there should be, according to the orders of the 1st Military District
7 there should be, that's all I can say.
8 Q. And does the same apply to the local TO units?
9 A. To the local Serb TO units you mean?
10 Q. Correct.
11 A. The same applies to them. But of course -- I mean, you could --
12 I mean the TO of the Republic of Serbia, you can still remove them. With
13 the local Serb TO it becomes more complicated because if these are people
14 from that village it's a bit of a challenge for the JNA to remove them,
15 and then I think there would be difficulties with the SAO SBWS
16 authorities, whereby as we see from the documents the attitude that
17 needed to be adopted towards them is not clear either, so it was a bit of
18 a challenging situation for a JNA commander, but the fact that there is a
19 challenge doesn't reduce his responsibility.
20 Q. Thank you for that clarification. Now, going back to page 1, and
21 this is the part that I say is extremely relevant to Arkan, down at the
22 bottom of paragraph or section (a) it says:
23 "All the garrisons are working in an organised fashion on the
24 induction and on dealing with the September contingent of soldiers."
25 Now, what do you think that means?
1 A. Your Honours, it means that there were still conscript service in
2 what remained of SFRY and that -- so young men were called up to do their
3 military service, at regular times they were called up.
4 Q. So these are JNA conscripts not volunteers?
5 A. Yeah, that would -- they would be JNA conscripts.
6 MR. GOSNELL: I tender this document, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Shall be assigned Exhibit D39. Thank you.
9 [Defence counsel confer]
10 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 65 ter 343 which is Prosecution tab
11 89, please.
12 Q. This is a document by someone named Lieutenant -- for the
13 Lieutenant-Colonel Ivan Metosevic [phoen] who may have something to do
14 with -- well, actually, I can't determine where exactly the unit is
15 coming from, but this report is sent to the SSNO OB department and the
16 12th Corps OB department amongst other addressees and it's an
17 information, and it says -- it's dated the 30th of September and it says
18 as follows:
19 "On 27th September 1991, four volunteers, who had set off to join
20 the JNA units, allegedly returned ... from the territory of Dalj and
22 Now, let me first of all ask you this question: Is it possible
23 to volunteer for a JNA unit?
24 A. It is possible given the -- I mean, the legal provisions that
25 redefine volunteers as people who had no military obligations, because if
1 they had military obligations they would have been most likely mobilised.
2 There were also several mobilisations during that time-period.
3 Q. "On the same day at the office of Stevan Malesevic, the president
4 of the Ruma Municipal Assembly and in the presence of the secretary of
5 the Ruma MSUP and his OB ... an interview was conducted with Knezevic and
6 Jovanovic who left an impression of being a little inebriated."
7 Over the page.
8 "In the course of the interview, they stated that on 21
9 September, together with other volunteers and conscripts who had
10 responded to the call-up, they had been transferred from the Ruma
11 garrison to Dalj in the organisation of Major Vuckovac. Around 80 of
12 them arrived and approximately half of them were left that night at
13 around 2300 hours in the middle of the village until Vuckovac found a
14 unit to turn them over to. Ten minutes later, Arkan, who in the opinion
15 of interlocutors, is connected with the JNA superior officers and SUP
16 officials, came along. "
17 Now, just reading that, does that seem to relate to or could it
18 relate to the September contingent of soldiers? Ruma, for your
19 information, is in Serbia. I think it's about 40 kilometres south of
20 Sremska Mitrovica. Is this referring to the same group?
21 A. It's possible, Your Honours, but I think it's unlikely in a sense
22 there was -- there are the regular call-ups for people to join the JNA
23 conscripts, but they wouldn't go directly to unit, they would first go
24 through some kind of a recruitment or selection centre in order to look
25 at -- to consider their physical and mental ability. Maybe some people
1 are more fit for infantry and others are more fit for armour or for
2 airborne or whatever, and so a selection would be made based also on the
3 requirements of the various JNA units, and then obviously people would be
4 given training before being assigned to a specific unit. Here we seem to
5 see a situation where people are brought in by a person, a Major
6 Vuckovac, and they move -- apparently they move directly to -- from Ruma
7 to Dalj, which I would say is unusual. I know there was a lot of chaos
8 at the time, limited response to call-ups or mobilisations, limited
9 response to the -- I mean the conscript service. At the same time you
10 have politically motivated volunteers or individuals who say whatever
11 their status is, I want to go and defend the country. So, yeah, it's --
12 for me it's a different situation than the regular conscript contingents.
13 Q. Further down the page [Microphone not activated] --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
15 MR. GOSNELL:
16 Q. Further down the page:
17 "Through the hitherto checking, a statement was received from
18 Major Vuckovac from Ruma," so that's the individual who escorted these
19 individuals, these conscripts or volunteers, "from Ruma asserting that on
20 21.09," so that's the 21st of September, "he had handed over this group,
21 which Knezevic and Jovanovic are talking about to the commander of the
22 headquarters administration, Captain First Class Jovan Konjevic ..."
23 Now, what is a headquarters administration and which headquarters
24 administration would be in Dalj at this time?
25 A. Yeah, I'm looking at the B/C/S text. It is -- I mean, the only
1 headquarters that is in Dalj at that moment is the headquarters of the
2 12th Novi Sad Corps, i.e., the forward command post.
3 Q. [Microphone not activated]
4 So what's being described in this document is that someone from
5 Ruma, either part of the JNA or the TO, accompanies a group of conscripts
6 and/or volunteers, brings them to the headquarters administration of the
7 12th Corps in Dalj, leaves them there, and then apparently they're handed
8 over to Arkan and Arkan takes them to the training centre and trains
9 them; is that right?
10 A. Apparently, yeah. This is the -- I mean, what the report is
12 Q. Would that be indicative to you that Arkan is subordinated to the
13 JNA at this time?
14 A. On face value, it doesn't give any indication in relation to
15 the -- any subordination or other relation Arkan and his group may have
16 with the JNA. What it's -- indicates that there is at least co-operation
17 between the 12th Corps and Arkan, whereby Arkan is used to train
18 volunteers/conscripts that are to serve in the 12th Corps. So there is
19 at least co-operation which also involves recognition by the 12th Corps
20 of Arkan and his role in the training of volunteers.
21 Q. Does the fact that Arkan attended the funeral of the first
22 commander of OG North and for that matter the 12th Corps, General Bratic,
23 in early October, does that provide any indication that he was acting as
24 part and parcel of the JNA at this time?
25 A. I mean, from a military point of view not because attendance to
1 funerals or ceremonies can mean anything.
2 Q. Does the fact that General Panic said - and you're well familiar
3 I think with the quotation - and actually I need to read the entire
4 quotation because I suggest to you, Mr. Theunens, that you incorrectly
5 interpret this passage as being only a reference to Arkan's participation
6 in OG South or on attacks in Vukovar. And I'll -- and it's in your
7 report at page 464, you locate it in a section on Vukovar, but let me
8 read the passage for you and I suggest it's a little bit broader. In a
9 question to General Panic, speaking in 1994 -- and for the record this is
10 04931, Prosecution tab 462.
11 "Q. Was this chaos, was this chaos" -- and, yes, this is in
12 relation to Vukovar that the questioner is asking.
13 "The reason why so many -- there were not so many but these
14 groups of um Serb volunteers, Serb volunteer forces, paramilitaries
15 turned up on the scene in September. Was that the reason -- was that how
16 it all happened?"
17 Panic's answer was:
18 "I think the operative units did their job correctly, but the
19 mobilised did ... units were not prepared adequately for action, and when
20 you don't prepare them adequately you have er ... you encounter the
21 problems that you just mentioned. And that's how volunteers started
22 appearing and we trained them for action er for combat action in Belgrade
23 and they were fighting together with our units er ... they included
24 Arkan's Tigers and er ... Seselj's Chetniks. They were not big groups,
25 say in Arkan's case between 80 and 120 persons and in Seselj's case um
1 between 90 and 120 men. But the people who wanted to act," and here's
2 the key phrase, "all these formations were under command but the people
3 who wanted to act independently were being removed from that area and
4 disarmed and returned home."
5 Now, do you agree with me that when you look at the entire
6 context it certainly seems as if General Panic is talking more -- well,
7 he's talking about the period starting in September; correct?
8 A. He doesn't -- Panic doesn't give a specific time-frame, but
9 it's -- as you mention -- because I'm a bit confused, you seem to suggest
10 that I incorrectly described or identified something. I'm trying to
11 figure out what you mean by that. Panic doesn't --
12 Q. Well, let me just clarify before you embark on an answer because
13 I don't want to impute to you something that you haven't done, but at
14 page 464 that quotation from Panic appears only in relation in a section
15 about Vukovar.
16 A. Well, you know, this happens when you have amalgamated reports
17 that parts are cut out of -- or cut and pasted of other reports. The
18 Hadzic report I compiled in September /October 2012 when I had the new
19 documents attempted also to cover operations in other parts of SBWS, but
20 this -- the section which you are now discussing comes from the report on
21 the Vukovar operations which, I mean, in my view it's quite obvious that
22 I relate to Vukovar. And you yourself when quoting from this BBC
23 interview given by Panic refer to the Vukovar area. So I don't see the
25 MR. GOSNELL: I'm past time, Mr. President. Sorry.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you for that, Mr. Gosnell.
2 Mr. Theunens, we take the second break and come back at 12.45.
3 Thank you.
4 [The witness stands down]
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.
8 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, perhaps before the witness is
9 brought in, I have some information with respect to the document which
10 was MFI'd pending translation, this was Exhibit P1692. And if you
11 remember, it was the item number 3 which Mr. Theunens was requesting a
12 revision as to whether the word "officers" should be "superiors." We
13 have received an answer from CLSS that they stand by their translation
14 and that it should not be amended or changed in any way.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
16 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: So at this stage should we -- there's no further
17 translations needed, can we exhibit it in full?
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes, of course, admitted and marked.
19 [The witness takes the stand]
20 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, just while the witness is taking his
21 seat perhaps we could bring up 04 -- oh, I suppose that's ...
22 Could we have 04931 which is Prosecution tab 462.
23 Q. Now, Mr. Theunens, I'm sorry for that last passage. I should
24 have had it up on the screen and instead I just read it to you and that
25 wasn't completely fair. So now I would like to have it on the screen in
1 front of you, and the page is the page number ending 7848. I think this
2 the B/C/S it's around 4968.
3 Now, Mr. Theunens, so you're clear, I wasn't suggesting that you
4 were attempting to slant your report in a particular way. It's just that
5 the report that actually was submitted to the Judges, this quotation
6 appears in that particular section on specifically Vukovar. But when you
7 read this passage as a whole, would you agree that he does, you know, in
8 his description of how it is that volunteers started appearing in the
9 theatre, that he's describing a broader phenomenon here than merely which
10 units are there on the front with Vukovar.
11 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours. I mean, this is what General Panic
12 states in the interview for BBC Death of Yugoslavia.
13 MR. GOSNELL: We would tender that, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked -- Mr. --
15 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: We don't have any objections, but this document
16 is part of the package that we would be offering. I think for the time
17 being we could admit it but just as a marker. This is part of the
18 documents that are footnoted.
19 MR. GOSNELL: Whichever way is most convenient for the Registry.
20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
21 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: If I may assist, Your Honours, the record shows
22 that the Defence does not object to the admission of this document which
23 is on our list, so when the time comes for deliberation perhaps on the
24 matter of our motion that could be taken into consideration.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes, let's keep it in the package then. Thanks.
1 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 65 ter 1028 which is Defence tab 304.
2 And if we could please go to page 72 of the English, and I believe it's
3 around page 68 of the B/C/S.
4 Q. Now, again, Mr. Theunens, this is a transcript of the -- of a
5 session of the SFRY Presidency. Their Honours have seen this before and
6 so I'm not going to read the entire passage, but I just want to put a
7 very specific passage to you. And it's the part where Kostic is speaking
8 down at the bottom of the page. And he says:
9 "Zivota," and that's Zivota Panic, "at a session here once I
10 asked what was the relationship between Arkan and the JNA and you were
11 the one who told me that he was good."
12 And then we get a response not from Panic but from someone else,
13 Borisav Jovic, and the answer is or comment is:
14 "In matters of war."
15 And then Kostic says:
16 "We should avoid any major clashes now, this should be done in a
17 nice way so that these lads of his can stay, if they want, in the army."
18 Panic's response:
19 "Arkan carried out missions in the area very efficiently. At one
20 point he broke away, but they brought him back, et cetera. However, he
21 is doing Yugoslavia a disservice. He should be called and given a task.
22 Those who sent him there should call him. I do not know who sent him.
23 However, Arkan was present in Bijeljina, Zvornik, around Sarajevo, Knin,
24 et cetera. Someone is leading him and issuing tasks to him. We should
25 see who is doing this. It is certain that it is not us."
1 And then he -- at the end of his passage he says:
2 "Since I have to attend talks with Vance at 1700 hours, could I
3 leave, please?"
4 Do you believe what Zivota Panic is saying here, that he doesn't
5 know who has sent Arkan or who is sending him?
6 A. Could I just ask a question. Can you remind me what the time of
7 this meeting is, I mean the date?
8 Q. Certainly. This is the 194th Session of the Presidency -- yeah,
9 and that occurred on the 16th of April, 1992?
10 A. 1992, yeah. From a contextual point of view, this is after the
11 SFRY presidential order of the 10th of December, 1991, so the
12 presidential order number 73 on the engagement of volunteers during an
13 imminent state of war -- or imminent threat of war, I'm sorry. I mean,
14 one of the points in that order is that all volunteers should be
15 subordinated to the JNA within the ten days -- all volunteer formations,
16 actually, and that's an important clarification, or they shall be
17 removed. My understanding of the context is and given the date of this
18 meeting is that Panic is referring to the appearance of Arkan and his
19 volunteers during operations in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina like
20 Bijeljina and Zvornik and these operations, as I have addressed in other
21 reports for other trials, were focused at implementing some of the six
22 strategic goals, in this particular context establishing a corridor
23 between Semberija and Krajina. And -- I mean Panic -- I think he's -- he
24 asks a number of questions because he knows that -- and again this is
25 corroborated by JNA documents concerning these -- the events in
1 Bijeljina, Zvornik, and so on during that time-period. It's not the --
2 Arkan is not operating under JNA command or is there and has not been --
3 I mean not systematically and has apparently, based on what Panic says,
4 not been sent by the JNA, so the question is, well, who is doing it then.
5 And I think the fact that Panic raised these questions during a meeting
6 of the SFRY Presidency suggests that Arkan -- that Panic expects that his
7 interlocutors there may be in a better position to provide him with an
8 answer to that question.
9 Q. So the answer to my question was yes?
10 A. Well, it -- I mean, it is reasonable to assume that Panic was in
11 a position to make an assessment or to draw certain conclusions as to who
12 had sent Arkan because there were also security organs discussing -- I
13 mean reports discussing this matter, i.e., the relations between Arkan
14 and the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia. But
15 probably - and I don't know the context, further context that is
16 discussed in this meeting - probably he wants the members of the SFRY
17 Presidency to formally state to him who is giving these assignments to
18 Arkan. Given indications Panic has -- this is a continuation of the
19 sentence, given the indications Panic has concerning relations Arkan
20 enjoys with the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia.
21 MR. GOSNELL: If this is part of the package, I'll just say for
22 the record we don't have an objection, or if it's not part of the package
23 we would tender that.
24 THE REGISTRAR: This document was admitted yesterday through
25 Witness Nielsen, though yet without an exhibit number. Thank you.
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay.
3 MR. GOSNELL:
4 Q. So just to put a point on General Panic's attitude as you can
5 discern it in this transcript. It seems that what you're saying is that
6 he's being slightly disingenuous, that he has information but he's not
7 sure. Is that a fair summary of your answer?
8 A. No. I think -- I wouldn't use the expression disingenuous. I
9 don't know what Panic's state of mind was at the time. But it is -- I
10 mean JNA reports talk about presence of Arkan. The documents -- the JNA
11 documents I have seen don't clarify or don't indicate how Arkan is
12 appearing in which circumstances he's appearing in Bijeljina, Zvornik,
13 and other locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina spring 1992, and Arkan and his
14 people are conducting certain activities there. In the absence of JNA
15 documents concerning -- I mean orders to Arkan to do these activities or
16 to be there, the question can be raised: Well, who is it then that has
17 given these assignments to Arkan. That is one element.
18 The second element is that already from security organ reports
19 from the 1st Military District covering the October 1991 to, say, January
20 1992 time-period, the security organs gather information indicating the
21 existence of special or specific relations between Arkan and officials of
22 the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia. So I think it
23 would be logical even for Panic to assume that if he hasn't ordered Arkan
24 to be in Bijeljina and Zvornik, then it should have been or then it would
25 have been the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia -- of other
1 members of the Government of Serbs. But he -- now he wants to, at least
2 according to these minutes, he wants to check with the remaining members
3 of the SFRY Presidency whether they can explain to him why and how it
4 comes that Arkan is involved and is conducting military activities in
5 these locations, Bijeljina, Zvornik, and others. Because maybe it has
6 been approved by the SFRY Presidency. I haven't seen any such documents,
7 but these are all assumptions Panic can make and my understanding from
8 his questions during the minutes is that he seeks clarification from --
9 well, actually, the Supreme Command, i.e., the highest command organ in
10 existence in SFRY.
11 Q. One thing is clear, he's denying that he's the one who sent
12 Arkan; right?
13 A. Yes, because otherwise the question would seem rather unusual,
14 and then I think when you look at the rest of the minutes they would have
15 answered to him: Well, you know, Zivota, you sent him.
16 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have P101, Prosecution tab 244.
17 Q. Now, this is a document that you refer to in your report on
18 several occasions, so you're well familiar with it. And it's one of
19 these security organ reports you have been referring to addressing the
20 issue of Arkan.
21 A. I think it's another document we have. I mean at least here on
22 the screen we have something from the SAO SBWS.
23 Q. It should be 65 ter 00873.
24 THE REGISTRAR: This is Exhibit P1004. Thank you.
25 MR. GOSNELL: Sorry, I called for P101.
1 THE REGISTRAR: What I meant is that 65 ter document 873 is
2 admitted as the Prosecution Exhibit P1004. Thank you.
3 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you very much. That's clearly my handwriting
4 failing me.
5 Q. Now, this is from some time in January, and if we could please go
6 to page 4.
7 MR. GOSNELL: And, sorry, just for the record that's written by
8 chief Colonel Milic Jovanovic. Or it's for Milic Jovanovic. If we could
9 have page 4 of the English. We seem to be on page 6 of the English.
10 Well, let's see if we can go back in the English and see if we get to the
11 right passage. And back one more page, please. There appears to be a
12 page missing or out of order. Well, could we just go down to the bottom
13 of that page, please. There it is. Thank you very much.
14 Q. Now, here we see midway through the paragraph that says "it is
15 known." It says:
16 [As read] "Our assessment is that certain" possibly "JNA leaders
17 accept him on the - illegible - and influence of these circles. It is a
18 telling fact that although Raznatovic has small forces at his disposal,
19 he attends meetings of the 1st Military District command with the corps
20 commanders ..."
21 Who is the commander of the 1st Military District for most of
22 this time-period up between August and up until the date of this document
23 which is January 1992?
24 A. This is general -- Colonel-General Zivota Panic.
25 Q. So the same individual who in the previous document is claiming
1 he doesn't know who is sending Arkan to the area?
2 A. Well, Your Honours, I think we're talking about two different
3 issues. In the previous document General Panic was inquiring about the
4 involvement of Arkan in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least two or
5 three months after this document. So the situation is -- I mean, I'm not
6 here to defend Panic whatsoever, but it -- I mean, from a methodological
7 point of view, drawing analytical conclusions is something else than just
8 comparing two different documents and saying then saying it must be this.
9 So the situation is different. It is clear again in the context of the
10 JNA and the events in Vukovar that Arkan enjoys good relations with the
11 12th Corps and in particular with General Andrija Biorcevic who becomes
12 commander of the 12th Corps I think at the latest early November or maybe
13 in the course of November 1991 already, I mean after the previous
14 commander, General Bratic, is killed in action. And I've mentioned that
15 a few times, but that is the most telling example, the famous video of a
16 reception where Biorcevic is praising Arkan clearly shows that there are
17 good -- not just on a personal level but also on a professional level
18 good relations between General Biorcevic on the one hand and Arkan on the
19 other hand. So referring to this meeting, it may well be that Biorcevic
20 has brought Arkan with him to that meeting or several meetings, I mean
21 meetings of the 1st Military District, or maybe that Panic invited him, I
22 don't know, but there are different explanations possible and so again
23 I'm alone, but what I tried to clarify is there is not necessarily a
24 contradiction between what Panic says at a meeting of the SFRY Presidency
25 in relation to events three months later and what is stated in this
1 security organs report of the 2nd of January, 1992.
2 Q. As a military man what does it tell you that an individual with,
3 say, 100, 150 troops under his command is attending a meeting with corps
5 A. I could say size doesn't matter, but I don't want to, I mean, try
6 to be witty. It shows that Arkan and his group is considered an
7 important component, and this is also reflected through other documents.
8 Whether that is because of the value, the combat value, of his forces or
9 the relations Arkan has with, as I mentioned, Biorcevic - and this is
10 also indicated in other documents, security organ's reports, I mean the
11 relations Arkan enjoys or allegedly enjoys with members of the Serbian
12 government, in particular MUP and MOD - that I cannot establish. Maybe
13 both played a role.
14 Q. From a military perspective, don't you view it remarkable that a
15 man with a company-strength unit appears to be attending meetings of
16 corps commanders at the district level?
17 A. Well, we could try to give some military flavour to it in stating
18 that maybe the 12th Corps was using Arkan and his group during combat
19 operations as a kind of strategic reserve, which would actually be quite
20 consistent with General Biorcevic's assessment of the role and of the
21 role of Arkan's volunteers during operations. And that assessment I
22 refer to the video.
23 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 00356, please, Prosecution tab 93,
25 Q. And we've looked at this document earlier today. Now I'd like
1 you to look at a different part of it and it's on page 2 of the English.
2 [As read] "While staying in the forward command post of the 12th
3 Corps, agricultural estate in Dalj on 29 and 30 September, the source saw
4 Arkan armed and coming to the area of the IKM in the off-road vehicle two
5 times and entering the building where the command was located."
6 So you'd agree here we see an indication he's also visiting the
7 command of the -- the forward command post of the 12th Corps; right?
8 A. Indeed, Your Honours, and that's consistent with what I said
9 concerning his relations -- I mean, Biorcevic is at that time not yet
10 commander of the 12th Corps, but relations between Arkan and the 12th
12 Q. And that command post is at the agricultural estate in Dalj;
14 A. Yes, as is stated in the document, the forward command post.
15 Q. Now, if we could go back again to 873 to the same area where we
16 were in the document before, which I think is page 2. And, sir, you rely
17 on this -- as I said before, this particular document and this passage.
18 If I could just pose my question. It says there at the bottom of the
19 page in this report:
20 [As read] "It is known that it," so the centre, even though the
21 document doesn't expressly say which centre, but it says "the centre is
22 financed in ways that are not fully known. It is known that it is
23 financed by the socialist party of Serbia from within the country and
24 from abroad as well as by numerous enterprises. Accordingly, a
25 characteristic example is the Dalj farm which," and then it says
1 illegible question mark, "written order of Goran Hadzic was paid out
2 7.088.674 dinars and 50 cents for the needs of the illegible guard while
3 illegible for free."
4 Now, you've recited that information in your report. Do you
5 consider that claim reliable?
6 A. I do for several reasons. In the Milosevic trial we had a
7 financial analyst preparing a report on financial aspects of role of
8 Mr. Milosevic in relation to certain events. And I remember seeing
9 documents, I mean payment orders from several agricultural enterprises or
10 state-owned enterprises in SBWS signed by members of the SAO SBWS
11 government for payments or the transfer of goods to the Erdut training
12 centre at different moments in time, including even if I recall well end
13 of 1991 as well as 1992 and subsequent. So what I'm trying to say is
14 that I've seen other documents including copies of payment order that
15 corroborate this passage.
16 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 05135, please, which is Prosecution
17 tab 538.
18 Q. And just while that's coming up, if I can just ask you to go back
19 a little bit and that was yesterday or perhaps it was earlier today, you
20 suggested that there might be a contradiction in the documents to the
21 extent that on the one hand we see JNA documents showing that Arkan has a
22 close relationship with various people and then on the other hand we see
23 various OB reports in which his activities are being reported upon. Now,
24 I wonder if you could accept that contradiction is one interpretation,
25 but isn't it also true that if he's subordinated to the JNA that actually
1 it's precisely the obligation of the OB organs to ascertain whether he is
2 engaging in criminal activity, and then if there is credible evidence
3 about that to pass it on for prosecution to the military prosecutors?
4 A. Your Honours, and maybe I misexpressed myself yesterday or the
5 previous days. I didn't want to suggest that the documents are
6 contradictory. I do believe when looking at all the documents that
7 different elements of the JNA enjoy different relations with Mr. Arkan,
8 summarising in two lines, okay, General Panic reportedly orders to
9 subordinate all elements that are on the battle-field to the JNA, that
10 also implies Arkan but there are problems with that so there are several
11 orders for that. The 12th Corps enjoying quite close relations with
12 Arkan, including also their use during combat operations under the order
13 of the 12th Corps. And then indeed at the same time security organs of
14 the 1st Military District writing reports on the activities of Arkan.
15 The fact that they write reports on the activities of Arkan and his group
16 does not necessarily mean that Arkan is subordinated to the JNA or not.
17 I mean, wasn't doesn't imply the other, one doesn't exclude the other.
18 So coming back to the question then -- but of course if Arkan and
19 his group are committing crimes or other activities that are prohibited
20 by SFRY armed forces doctrine, then it's up to the security organs to
21 report about that and we would expect the implementation of the military
22 discipline or mainly the military justice system. And on --
23 Q. So just to put a fine point on it --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- and I apologise for interrupting, the existence of these
1 reports is perfectly consistent with his subordination; right?
2 A. Your Honours, I said that one does not imply the other. The
3 existence of these reports --
4 Q. Mr. Theunens, that wasn't my question. My question was: Is it
6 A. Well, I don't understand the question. What do you mean it is
7 consistent? What does -- why -- what do you mean by the use of the word
8 "consistent," given my answer?
9 Q. The question is whether or not the existence of those reports is
10 consistent with his subordination to the JNA? That's all.
11 A. I'm sorry, I mean, I've answered the question. In my view it is
12 as I explained, the reports where the security organs on a group do not
13 suggest whether or not this group is subordinated to the JNA. Of course,
14 if the report states that he is subordinated to the JNA, that would be a
15 useful element of information in order to establish his relations with
16 the JNA, but at face value a security organ report as such without -- and
17 that doesn't mention whether or not he's subordinated to the JNA, doesn't
18 give us any useful information as to whether or not he's subordinated to
19 the JNA.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell, Mr. Theunens asked you what you mean
21 by "is consistent with." It could be a language problem. And when you
22 answer that question, in fact you didn't answer, you just repeated it.
23 MR. GOSNELL: You're right, Mr. President.
24 Q. I'm sorry about that, Mr. Theunens. It could be we're just using
25 two different concepts of the word. And let me put it a slightly
1 different way. It does not negate that there was a subordination
2 relationship, the existence of these OB documents? It does not disprove
4 A. I think I've answered the question. You know, it doesn't negate
5 it, it doesn't confirm it, unless there are elements that allow to draw
6 conclusions in relation to his subordination relationship with the JNA in
7 the security organs reports and then it would be useful elements of
8 information that would require other elements of information, situation
9 reports or orders, in order to confirm the nature of the relation.
10 Q. Assuming that there is a subordination relationship with the
11 unit, is it understood as a matter of JNA practice, doctrine, or any
12 rules that are in existence that logistical support needs to be provided
13 to that subordinated unit?
14 A. You want me to give a general answer or to focus the answer on
16 Q. It could be hazardous but I'll ask you to first start generally
17 and then perhaps we can go to Arkan.
18 A. I mean the general answer is yes, and this is also reiterated in
19 different, I mean, documents of the 1st Military District. We have
20 discussed these and they are in my report that the JNA was responsible
21 for providing supply, I mean logistics supply, to all subordinate units.
22 Q. All right. And now let's move on to Arkan.
23 A. For Arkan the matter is slightly more complicated because we
24 know - and I think that's also addressed in security organ's
25 reports - that Arkan, for example, has more sophisticated weapons, I'm
1 not talking about heavy weapons, but like, for example, more
2 sophisticated infantry weapons, even of Western origin, that are not
3 available in the inventory of the SFRY armed forces. So where it would
4 be impossible for the JNA to provide specific logistics support for those
5 weapons, is it ammunition or for their maintenance. For other parts,
6 yes, the JNA would be required, I mean if Arkan is operating under their
7 command, to provide logistics support for the items they are in the
8 position to do so.
9 Q. All right. So now let's take a look at the document in front of
10 us. And it's written by Arkan. Apparently it is addressed to the Dalj
11 socially owned enterprise and the director thereof. And it says:
12 "During a review of expenses specified as the expenditures of the
13 Territorial Defence Special Training Centre, we found out that according
14 to your breakdown the total expenses for December were as follows ..."
15 And then there's a listing of payments or -- I would say
16 invoices, they've been charged a certain amount of money and this is --
17 and he is setting that out. And then he says:
18 "Two factors participated in spending the amount of 3.4 "and some
19 odd million "dinars. The government and its ministries and the special
20 training centre of the Territorial Defence of the SO SBWS. We maintain
21 that the expenses of these two factors must be separated, which is what
22 we did for December 1991. We thus come to the conclusion that the
23 expenses in the amount mentioned above could be broken down as
24 follows ...
25 "We therefore kindly request from you that in the future our
1 expenses be specified separately, whereby we will be able to determine
2 our expenses more easily."
3 Isn't this, in fact, a letter of complaint from Arkan to the Dalj
4 farm saying: Stop overcharging us?
5 A. I mean, this is one of the elements of information you can find
6 in the letter. There are also other ones. I mean, it's remarkable in my
7 view given the focus of my report that Arkan - and I forgot the date but
8 I think it's January 1992 if we can go to the top again --
9 Q. It is January 1992.
10 A. Yeah. That Arkan then signs as apparently the commander of the
11 special -- sorry, if you can go back to the heading, as a commander or as
12 in having an official capacity in relation to the special training centre
13 of the TO of the SAO SBWS. I find it remarkable given the various
14 allegations that have been made in 1st Military District reports but, I
15 mean, there is also information in open sources at that time about his
16 role in combat and his alleged involvement in crimes. He and his
17 group -- sorry.
18 Q. Well, we're certainly going to come to that issue, but now let's
19 focus on the point which I'm trying to raise with you which I don't think
20 you answered. Do you agree with me that this is a letter of complaint
21 about being overbilled?
22 A. Yeah, he complains that he's -- I mean, that expenses by other
23 official organs of the SAO SBWS are charged to him or to the training
24 centre where in his view they should be charged to these other official
1 Q. Now, looking back or thinking back to P101, you remember that's
2 the security organ report which you rely on in your report repeatedly for
3 the claim that Goran Hadzic has ordered the Dalj farm to support Arkan.
4 Does it make any sense that on the one hand there's going to be an order
5 for the Dalj farm to support Arkan or subsidize Arkan and then in January
6 Arkan is complaining about being overcharged by that very same
8 A. Your Honours, maybe it's an issue of accounting and that is
9 outside my area of expertise that in order to ensure that their accounts
10 are clear they check with Arkan: Okay, these and these expenses have
11 been made for you, and that would be consistent with the claim in the
12 security organ's report, and, yeah, they want to have this clarified.
13 Q. So you're saying that they're receiving some kind of a -- you're
14 hypothesising that they're receiving a credit of some sort from the Dalj
15 farm, then they've somehow been overcharged, and then now they have to
16 write this letter complaining about it?
17 A. Yeah, and also I think now we are talking about the situation
18 that Arkan is in charge of the Territorial Defence special training
19 centre. I'm not sure whether in the security organ's report we're
20 already talking about the Territorial Defence training centre or just
21 Arkan's training centre in Erdut. Yeah, I mean -- I don't have the two
22 documents in front of me, but I would say that okay if the Dalj farm or
23 socially owned enterprise has to provide or provides financial -- I mean
24 provides support, supplies or whatever, to Arkan, they need to put that
25 somewhere in their books, the numbers and so on. And the next question
1 would of course be: Who would pay? Would Arkan pay or is somebody else?
2 Now, if Arkan is paying, where does he get the money from in order to pay
3 these bills because the Territorial Defence training centre doesn't
4 produce any use any economical revenue, so the payment Arkan has to
5 provide according to these documents to the Dalj socially owned
6 enterprise has to come from somewhere.
7 Q. It probably isn't coming from the very socially owned enterprise
8 that is overcharging him though. Wouldn't you agree with that?
9 A. I don't -- I haven't analysed how the SAO SBWS was organising its
10 budget and ensuring if, for example, Arkan received certain services or
11 supplies, how those -- that provided those services were reimbursed and
12 how Arkan whether he got his money from. The money has to come from
14 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, we would tender this document,
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
17 THE REGISTRAR: It was already admitted and marked as P215.140.
18 Thank you.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
20 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you very much, Mr. Registrar.
21 Q. Now, after that rather long and perhaps taxing journey through
22 documents about Arkan 's direct connections with very senior levels of
23 the JNA, Arkan's direct operations in conjunction with JNA forces, I say
24 starting at the beginning of August and continuing for months,
25 considering what Panic says both when he's being a little more honest and
1 when he's being a little bit less honest, given what we see in the report
2 about the engagement in Dalj and Trajkovic's lack of honesty, I suggest
3 to you, and given all the other information about how Arkan is
4 interacting with JNA forces, in the area of responsibility of the
5 12th Corps, are you willing to agree with me that Arkan is subordinated
6 to the 12th Corps, let's start with throughout the period of 1991?
7 A. Your Honours, I have answered the question. I'm not going to --
8 I don't see a reason to change my answer. I could just clarify -- I
9 mean, Mr. Gosnell is suggesting that senior officers of the JNA are
10 lacking honesty. Again, I cannot express a view on that. I can only
11 refer to doctrine, that is, that it was a violation of military
12 discipline and maybe even more serious for an officer to provide
13 inaccurate reporting. And given the system or procedure that a commander
14 has to be familiar with the activities or the situation of his units two
15 levels down, there were ways to find out if somebody was providing
16 inaccurate reporting, especially in a context of such a serious issue
17 like the presence of Arkan and his volunteers and their activities in
18 SBWS during fall 1991. I -- for sure I don't dispute that Arkan was
19 subordinated to the JNA, i.e., to units of the 12th Corps at particular
20 moments in time, but there are also activities conducted by Arkan where
21 his relation with the JNA is not entirely clear, even if - and I fully
22 agree - according to doctrine and according to Panic's orders, 15th of
23 October, 16th of November, the JNA was -- should have subordinated all
24 units or remove them.
25 Q. And when you refer to activities, I assume you're referring to
1 criminal activities; correct?
2 A. For example, Your Honours, yeah. I mean, the Dalj prison events
3 is one example.
4 Q. The fact that a subordinate soldier is or let me not use the word
5 "subordinate." The fact that a soldier is committing a crime in
6 violation of all the laws of war and the regulations of the army, that's
7 surely not indicative that the person isn't subordinated; right?
8 A. I'm not sure I understand the question, Your Honours.
9 Q. Well, then let me put it a different way. If an artillery
10 commander takes direct aim at a town and blows it to pieces, surely it's
11 no argument to say the person isn't subordinated because they violated
12 the laws of war; right?
13 A. No. I mean ...
14 Q. And if someone purporting to enforce security in a zone of
15 responsibility unlawfully walks around, loots houses, beats people, kills
16 them, that's no indication that the person isn't subordinated, is it, to
17 the unit in the area of responsibility?
18 A. It is not, but do you want me to refer to -- I mean, is this
19 referring to Arkan or are these just general questions?
20 Q. Well, shouldn't the answers to both be the same?
21 A. Not exactly when seen in context of who Arkan was and what he was
22 doing and the various security organs' reports or other reports. I mean,
23 there's -- I haven't addressed those in my report, but there were so many
24 reports in the media about him kind of glorifying his activities, the
25 activities of him and his group, he's not the ordinary soldier or the
1 ordinary artillery commander. From the reports I've reviewed, I'm
2 repeating myself, I'm sorry for that, but it is reasonable to conclude
3 that Arkan enjoys particular relations with senior officials in Serbia
4 and also in the SAO SBWS. And maybe the existence of these relations
5 prevented or, I don't know, discouraged certain JNA officers to really
6 enforce military discipline and military justice as they should have
8 I discussed I think also with Mr. Demirdjian. We have these
9 security organ reports. Unfortunately, we don't have the follow-up.
10 What did the competent authorities, military prosecutor, others, or the
11 civilian prosecutor in Serbia, do with these reports? Did they act upon
12 them? I'm not aware that Arkan or any members of his group were ever
13 arrested in Serbia, at least not between 1991 and 1993. Arkan was even
14 allowed to establish a political party and he participated in the
15 political -- in the elections.
16 Q. Mr. Theunens --
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. -- thank you. I'm going to move on now.
19 A. Okay.
20 Q. I think earlier - and you should correct me if I'm wrong in
21 making this statement - but earlier we established that a president of a
22 republic, whether in peace or war time, has no command authority over the
23 TO in that republic; is that right?
24 A. After 1988 that is correct.
25 Q. And in the area of the 12th Corps, what does have that command
1 responsibility over the TO?
2 A. It's the commander. Sorry, the commander of the 12th Corps.
3 Q. Does that mean that when we see references to the -- to
4 individual TO units, it's the 12th Corps that has command authority over
5 those various TO institutions?
6 A. Yes, with, again, two clarifications, that is, according to
7 doctrine they should have and when we're talking about TO I'm talking
8 about the TO -- I mean, the republican TO and the TO of the two
9 autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, as it was defined in SFRY
10 armed forces doctrine. The situation becomes much more complex when we
11 are talking about the self-established SAO SBWS or SAO Krajina or SAO
12 Western Slavonia. I call them local Serb, but TO.
13 Q. The Erdut training centre as a matter of let's start with
14 doctrine, given the circumstances, that is supposed to be subordinated to
15 the 12th Corps; correct?
16 A. I'm not sure. I think maybe you can refresh my memory, when it
17 is -- when the Erdut training centre starts to be officially called a
18 SAO -- I mean, SO Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem training centre --
19 sorry, SAO SBWS TO training centre. And then -- because indeed that's
20 also complexity because then we have to look at what are the relations
21 between the SAO SBWS TO and the 12th Corps? As long as the 12th Corps is
22 in the area, then I would agree with you. I mean is present in SBWS,
23 then I would agree with you. A lot of time the situation is more complex
24 especially also, just coming back to the beginning of my answer, when the
25 Erdut training centre is only used by Arkan, I think, for training and
1 when his group is there and when at least based on my review of the
2 documents the link or the relation with the SAO SBWS TO is not entirely
4 Q. Have you ever seen a JNA document that refers to the SAO SBWS TO
5 dated 1991?
6 A. You mean that uses the three words in that connection, SAO SBWS
8 Q. That refers to an overarching TO that unites the subordinate or
9 individual town TOs, have you ever seen such a document that refers to
11 A. Not exactly. I mean, I think -- what I mentioned in examination
12 this is for the SAO SBWS civilian authorities, there it's for the first
13 time actually on the 20th of November in his order I think it was 2436-1
14 that General Panic explicitly recognises these authorities. I mention
15 this because this is the only context that I remember that SAO SBWS is
16 used in an official document and as a recognised entity by the JNA.
17 Q. You can't tell from looking at that header whether or not the
18 training centre has been set up by the district government, can you?
19 A. No, I can't. I mean, if I would make abstraction of the context
20 then I would say, you know, since according to the legislation in the
21 SFRY, the republics are responsible for training the TO, then I would say
22 well it has to be the republic but then the question arises, well, it's
23 for sure not the Republic of Croatia. Then we end up in the context, so
24 you could say from a purely theoretical point of view it has to be the
25 SAO SBWS or the RSK. But as I highlighted, the situation is quite
1 complex so it may well be that the centre was established by the Ministry
2 of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia.
3 Q. Well --
4 A. I haven't -- sorry, I haven't seen a document that is
5 establishing the centre and for sure I haven't seen a JNA document to
6 that effect.
7 Q. Well, here's the fallacy in your reasoning, Mr. Theunens, and I
8 do understand why I believe you're engaging in this fallacy. Why can't
9 it be that just as there are neighbourhoods in Vukovar like the
10 Leva Supoderica neighbourhood where there is a TO, just as there is a
11 town called Dalj where there is a TO set up by local people, just as
12 there is a Bapska TO that is basically a formation that comes out of
13 village guards, various other TOs, why is it necessary or why should you
14 assume, because I think that's what you're doing, that there is an
15 overarching provincial or district TO headquarters General Staff that
16 somehow is organising all of those individual TOs?
17 A. You make several suggestions in your question. I mean, my
18 reference to the existence of a SAO SBWS TO -- well, you know, in the
19 heading of the document in front of us, it is mentioned special training
20 centre of the Territorial Defence of the SO - sorry, I touched the
21 screen - SO Baranja, Western Srem in Erdut. I didn't invent that. It's
22 on the document. It's a contemporaneous document. The certificate we
23 discussed this morning signed by Radovan Stojicic talks about the
24 Supreme Command or the supreme headquarters of the TO of SAO of the SBWS.
25 Those I would say that's the situation how it is in practice. And what I
1 was explaining earlier with the legislation is de jure aspect. Of
2 course, everyone can establish his own unit, but then it's a matter of, I
3 would say, recognition because otherwise you get chaos. And we see --
4 Q. And who does the recognising?
5 A. Well, that is -- that is in -- a complex matter in the context of
6 the situation in SAO Krajina or SBWS in fall 1991 because as you remember
7 the document we discussed during examination where the Chief of Staff
8 Trajkovic of the 12th Corps asks the commander of the 1st Military
9 District: Well, what is the attitude we should adopt towards these SAO
10 authorities and the -- maybe he didn't use "local Serb TO" but local TO
11 and the 1st Military District? Well, until the 20th of November states
12 that no interference should be allowed by these "self-declared" or local
13 organs of authority. And this is, for example -- this is discussed on
14 pages 491 to 496 of my report. And I agree with you, at the same time
15 you see that the 12th Corps enjoys close or uses Arkan and so on during
16 its operations so --
17 Q. Mr. Theunens --
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. -- you raise a very interesting point. Here we have a document
20 which you're referring to from the 15th of October, 1991, where
21 General Panic is saying: Don't pay any attention yet to this -- these
22 SBWS civilian structures at the same time, as we know well having looked
23 at the documents, that he has sent Arkan, he has been involved in Arkan's
24 presence in the area of the 12th Corps and obviously is operating with
25 him and involved with him. Now, that being the case, who do you think is
1 providing the authority to put that letter-head right there in that
3 A. Your Honours, again, these are for me totally different matters
4 because as I mentioned earlier I haven't seen any JNA document -- I mean,
5 maybe you can show me one, but I don't recall seeing any JNA document
6 whereby the JNA establishes training centres for the TO. When we go back
7 to the de jure situation, the republics and the autonomous provinces,
8 i.e., Kosovo and Vojvodina, when they had that status, are responsible
9 for the training and equipping and organisation of the TO, so it would be
10 their responsibility. And again, when we look at the situation as it
11 develops in fall 1991, the JNA may have provided assistance but then
12 again I would like to see specific documents, but I cannot draw from any
13 conclusions based on your suggestion that given the fact that Arkan at
14 times operates under the command of the 12th Corps in command operations,
15 that therefore the 1st Military District must have been responsible for
16 establishing the training centre. I cannot draw that conclusion.
17 Q. So you'd like to see specific documents indicating that, but as
18 you said there are a lot of OG North documents that appear to be missing
19 or have never been provided?
20 A. Maybe -- yeah, maybe there are some documents included there, but
21 we have a fairly detailed -- I mean, we have a quite substantial -- or
22 "we," the Office of the Prosecutor had a quite substantial collection of
23 documents concerning the operations of OG South and also, for example,
24 for other parts of Croatia, the Krajina, where indeed the JNA provides
25 support to the local Serb TO, and I'm talking now about fall 1991, I'm
1 not talking about the situation after January 1992 where, indeed, as we
2 have seen, the JNA, I mean the SSNO, provides substantial support to
3 organising local Serb TO units. But prior to that -- I mean including
4 their training. But prior to that, I haven't seen a document for the
5 establishment of a training centre, so -- and it has not been reported by
6 any of the documents of the 1st Military District I have seen concerning
7 the training centre Arkan is -- I mean is in charge of in Erdut in
8 January 1992.
9 Q. Prior to starting your testimony here, did you review the
10 transcripts of Mr. Nielsen's -- Dr. Nielsen's testimony?
11 A. No, I did not, Your Honours. From time to time when I look at
12 the Sense Tribunal web site and there was a -- I think they paraphrased
13 Mr. Nielsen's testimony, but I find it difficult to understand because
14 also I review what they write in other cases of my testimony and I'm
15 sometimes also surprised. I have the impression that they're not always
16 fully versed with the details or the specific aspects of military
17 doctrine or in the case of Dr. Nielsen, MUP, I mean Ministry of Interior
18 activities and police doctrine.
19 Q. Have you heard the thesis expressed that the training centre in
20 Erdut was controlled by one or another organ from Belgrade?
21 A. You know, from my work at the Belgium Ministry of Defence, I
22 started to look at the Balkans in September 1992. I went for the first
23 time to Erdut in August 1993. At various times obviously and since
24 Belgian troops were deployed in Baranja since I think April or May 1992
25 until the course of 1997, the presence of Arkan and his activities was of
1 relevance for us, not to the least for force protection issues. And
2 various information concerning Arkan's relations with Belgrade as well as
3 with Mr. Hadzic were available, but obviously I haven't used them for my
4 report. For my report I rely on JNA and other official documentation.
5 Q. Why are you mentioning it here if it's not part of your report?
6 What relevance is that?
7 A. Because I tried to answer your question.
8 Q. Did you take that into account in preparing your report?
9 A. I took it into account -- I mean, I haven't explained the
10 methodology, so if you want I can explain the methodology. But
11 interpretation of the information is a step in the processing phase of
12 the intelligence cycle. Interpretation means that you compare new
13 information that you have obtained or information you were not aware of
14 before with the existing "body" of knowledge and then you draw certain
15 conclusions. So in this particular context, imagine that I assumed or
16 that I was convinced that Arkan -- say that Arkan was sent by
17 President Milosevic, assuming that. Well, before I would put that on
18 paper, I would look for information in order to establish or to see
19 whether I would be in a position to establish who sent Arkan on the basis
20 of the information in front of me. Since I didn't see any such JNA
21 documents except for the security organ reports who do not answer that
22 question I think very clearly, but they make suggestions as to the nature
23 of relations Arkan enjoys with officials in Belgrade, so I was not able
24 to answer that question so I haven't made any statement in the report or
25 statement by me that Arkan was sent by President Milosevic, for example.
1 Q. But your report does frequently mention his connections with the
2 Serbian MUP; correct?
3 A. Indeed, and as you will see from the footnotes --
4 Q. And if I can just pose the next question. Isn't it also true
5 that Badza, Radovan Stojicic, is also in your view and in your report
6 closely associated with the Serbian MUP?
7 A. When you use -- sorry. You say "in your view," well, that is my
8 conclusion based on the documents I have reviewed, and I think I do it in
9 a very transparent manner because these documents --
10 Q. And if -- I'm just --
11 A. Sorry. I mean, this is the second time you interrupt me.
12 MR. GOSNELL: Well, I'm in the President's hands.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Well, Mr. Theunens, you should consider from time
14 to time to answer just with a yes or a no when it is possible and --
15 THE WITNESS: I will do, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: It would be helpful.
17 THE WITNESS: Okay.
18 Yes, what I want --
19 MR. GOSNELL:
20 Q. And if I can just ask -- just let me pose a few questions and
21 then I promise, Mr. Theunens, if you then want to elaborate or give
22 further answers, I'll be more than happy to allow you or to give a
23 general question so you can do that. But if I can just ask you a few
24 specific questions and then we'll get to the broader -- the broader
25 answer. And my question is: Radovan Stojicic was, in your information,
1 a fairly senior member of the Serbian MUP in 1991; right?
2 A. Yes, Your Honours.
3 Q. And did you have any information that he controlled the border
4 guards connecting the area of the SBWS with Serbia? Do you know that?
5 A. I have no specific recollection. Probably I saw something to
6 that effect, but I haven't -- I don't believe I have mentioned that in my
8 Q. And if Radovan Stojicic and Arkan show up at around the same time
9 in the area of the SBWS, do you really think that they didn't on their
10 own authority have the power to create a stamp referring to the TO of the
12 A. I mean, anyone can create a stamp, but the question is: Why
13 would you do it?
14 Q. Well, for the simple reason that there was a situation of chaos,
15 confusion, and war. And in a time of war, the authorities that are
16 powerful and who have the means will arrive and create institutions.
18 A. I mean, it's a possibility, yeah. It can happen anywhere. I
19 mean ...
20 Q. And this is all going on during a time of armed conflict; right?
21 A. Yeah.
22 Q. In an area of operations by SFRY armed forces?
23 A. Yeah, but then the problem arises -- I mean I understand now that
24 you want to ask a specific question. I don't know how many footnotes
25 there are in the -- I'm sorry to elaborate, but I don't know how many
1 footnotes there are in the -- in the amalgamated report or let alone in
2 the non-accepted report. But the volume of footnotes reflecting the
3 volume of material I reviewed, and that material consists of official
4 documents, one of the conclusions I drew in the report when I talk about
5 OGs and TGs shows that there is a functioning system of command and
6 control and a functioning system of reporting, so even if there is some
7 chaos in relation, for example, to groups moving in and moving out, given
8 the doctrine it's the task then -- I mean the JNA has to intervene and
9 raise the issue and this is done by Panic and others.
10 So there is no permanent chaos and I don't think -- I mean coming
11 back to your question, if they fabricate the stamp themselves and maybe
12 they established the training centre themselves, it needs to be equipped,
13 people need to be fed there, people need to -- they need ammunition and
14 so on, and this is something where sooner or later given also the
15 location in Erdut and the isolation of Eastern Slavonia at that time that
16 the supplies they need can only come from Serbia. And I don't think you
17 could just cross one of the bridges with a truck with ammunition or
18 rifles or whatever equipment that was used in the training centre and
19 everybody would close his or her eyes so that of course the authorities
20 were aware of that. So I think I would moderate or qualify the use of
21 the term "chaos" in its correct proportions.
22 Q. And the institution that's imposing order in this situation and
23 that has a mechanism of reporting and command is the JNA?
24 A. That is correct, Your Honours. And the difficulties they face
25 are also reflected in the various orders they issue where they actually
1 repeat the same order to enforce control over the area throughout fall
3 Q. Perhaps just one document before we finish, 00658. Prosecution
4 tab 188. This is from Mrksic dated the 21st of November, 1991, and I'm
5 interested in the language being used in this document and the
7 A. Mm-hmm.
8 Q. Now, the first thing is there is no reference at all to any
9 overarching TO staff of the autonomous district; right?
10 A. This is correct and if you allow me I can provide my explanation
11 for that or potential explanations for that.
12 Q. Well, let's go through a few more subordinate questions and then
13 if you want to provide an answer, that's fine.
14 A. Okay.
15 Q. But we do see that the addressees include apparently the
16 commander of Seselj's forces volunteer detachment. There's a JNA unit
17 listed there. There appears to be a TO Serbia unit listed there from
18 Kragujevac. And then there is another JNA commander. Then there is the
19 TO Vukovar commander and I don't know what the last -- who the last two
20 addressees are. And it concerns the Leva Supoderica volunteers. Now, if
21 the Leva Supoderica volunteers are in any way within a provincial staff
22 or a provincial TO organisation with any strength or reality, wouldn't
23 that staff have been addressed?
24 A. As I've -- I mean, as I've explained, I haven't seen any
25 documents from OG South referring to an SAO SBWS TO or a TO -- an SAO
1 SBWS TO staff. So of course it's -- if such a staff existed, it should
2 have been referred to in this document. Now, the issue here is what -- I
3 mean whether OG South command recognised, even if an SAO SBWS TO staff
4 may have existed - and I'm not answering that now, I'm not trying to
5 answer that now - OG South obviously did not recognise these structures.
6 And we have -- I'm not sure whether in the amalgamated report, but we
7 have security organs reports also for OG South providing information on
8 alleged interference and so on. And I agree with you that mentioning of
9 the volunteer unit Seseljevci in a JNA document is unusual and, as I
10 mentioned in the examination, it demonstrates the perception OG South
11 command, i.e., the Guards Motorised Brigade command had over -- no,
12 sorry, of, perception of the relations between these volunteers and
13 Mr. Seselj and his party.
14 MR. GOSNELL: I see we're over time again.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes, indeed, Mr. Gosnell.
16 Mr. Theunens, the end of today's hearing. We'll see you again on
17 Monday morning, 9.00. I wish you a good weekend.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
20 [The witness stands down]
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.03 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Monday, the 13th day of
24 May, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.