1 Thursday, 20 June 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 8.59 a.m.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning to everyone in and around the
7 Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
9 This is the case IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Could we have the appearances, please, starting
11 with the Prosecution.
12 MR. STRINGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. For
13 the Prosecution, Douglas Stringer, Matthew Gillett, Thomas Laugel, and
14 Kathleen Childs.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
16 And for the Defence, Mr. Gosnell.
17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. It's
18 Christopher Gosnell for Goran Hadzic along with Liane Aronchick our legal
19 assistant. Thank you.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
21 On Monday, the 1st of July, the Trial Chamber has been instructed
22 not to sit due to the opening ceremony of the Residual Mechanism. I
23 would have the parties to note that we will not sit on Monday, the 1st of
24 July. Thank you.
25 The witness may be brought in.
1 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, just while that's taking place, a
2 waiver was filed, I believe, yesterday for Mr. Hadzic's absence for the
3 last session today. And -- and he would respectfully request permission
4 to be absent for that session.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Granted.
6 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, just in relation to not sitting on
7 the 1st of July, is it be possible the Chamber might be amenable to
8 sitting on Friday of that week which would not push us off schedule for
9 the following week with the witness logistics.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: We'll discuss that during the first break,
11 Mr. Stringer.
12 MR. STRINGER: Thank you.
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning, Mr. McElligott.
15 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Are you comfortable where you are?
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. May I remind you that you're still on
19 your oath.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
22 WITNESS: JOHN GERARD McELLIGOTT [Resumed]
23 Examination by Mr. Gillett: [Continued]
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gillett.
25 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honours.
1 Q. Good morning, Mr. McElligott. Are you hearing me loud and clear?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. And could I ask you again today to speak very clearly and slowly
4 again because we're speaking the same language and to leave a pause after
5 my questions. Thank you.
6 Now, at the end of the day yesterday, you were describing
7 measures that UNCIVPOL took to address crimes and you said that the
8 people with responsibility for addressing the crimes, the 7.000, as you
9 described them, could have made a significant impact on these
10 communities. This is transcript 6023.
11 What types of measures could the RSK police have taken to reduce
12 or prevent crimes?
13 A. The primary function of a policeman and of a police service is to
14 prevent crime. And to do that, you have to be visibly active in your
15 community, you have to be very much in contact with your community, and
16 you've got to have respectability of your community. And I think they
17 were deficient in many of those fields. It is clear that a minority
18 group were afraid to report crimes to them, they didn't report crimes to
19 them, and there is no doubt - only for the involvement of our monitors -
20 many crimes would have gone unrecorded, not to mind being investigated.
21 Q. Final question. Your evidence that you've provided has various
22 examples of the RSK police being involved in crimes against civilians.
23 What impact did the police involvement in crimes have on the non-Serb
24 inhabitants of these areas?
25 A. In this instance, we're talking about the special police. I'd
1 like to distinguish that there were what I would regard as two different
2 fields of people. And one were the professional police officers, and
3 many of them behaved in a very professional manner. There's no doubt
4 about that and we have to acknowledge that to them. But on the other
5 side of the house, there was a group and they did not function in a
6 policing way. In fact, I would say they were the problem. And we have
7 many instances where they are engaged in criminal activity, they have
8 been reported by witnesses as seeing in militia uniform, and there are
9 many accounts where they behaved improperly in the sense that we have
10 reports where they would go into a community or a town and literally
11 shoot up the place, discharge fire-arms, and that brought a reign of
12 terror. I have accounts of my own monitors where this happened at
13 night-time, and they would jump up from their beds and lie on the floor
14 until things settled down again. And that was happening inside of small
15 communities, and there's no doubt it had a terrible impact on people.
16 Q. Thank you. That completes the questions on direct examination.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Gillett.
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Gosnell:
20 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
21 Q. Good morning, Mr. McElligott.
22 A. Good morning, sir.
23 Q. As you know, Mr. McElligott, my name is Christopher Gosnell. I
24 represent Mr. Hadzic in these proceedings. I'm going to ask you a few
25 questions today. If anything is unclear, please feel free to ask me to
1 elaborate or clarify and I'll do my best.
2 A. Mm-hm.
3 Q. And always remember, sir, please to observe a pause after the end
4 of -- of my question and the start of your question [sic].
5 A. Okay.
6 Q. And I'll try my best as well not to -- to observe a pause after
7 your answers.
8 Now, before Mr. McElligott before we get into a discussion of the
9 crimes that you observed and your reporting of those crimes in some of
10 the documents indicating crimes, I'd like to talk about the context of
11 your mission. And at paragraph 13 of the your statement, you say:
12 "The role of the UN troops was to ensure that the area remained
13 demilitarised and that all persons in them would be protected from fear
14 and armed attack."
15 MR. GOSNELL: Now, if we could just please bring up L2, which is
16 Defence tab 5.
17 Q. Am I correct in characterising the overall concept of the
18 Vance Plan to be that there would be a military element of UNPROFOR whose
19 primary responsibility was to ensure protection for the United Nations
20 Protected Areas and that there would be a police element, UNCIVPOL, that
21 would monitor law enforcement within those protected areas? Is that a
22 fair overview of the Vance Plan?
23 A. That is -- yes, indeed, yeah.
24 MR. GOSNELL: If we could please go to page 11.
25 Q. Sir, I'd like to direct your attention there to paragraph 7. And
1 let's, first of all, look at the language that seems to be the basis for
2 what's in your --
3 A. Apologies, I just have a difficulty with the distance on sight.
4 So could it be enlarged a little. Could the size be enlarged.
5 MR. GOSNELL: Could we please zoom in on paragraph 7. A little
7 Q. Is that all right, Mr. McElligott?
8 A. If you could enlarge a little more. My apologies. Yeah go
9 ahead. Yeah, fine.
10 Q. Now, there, we see the -- the third sentence:
11 "The role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that
12 the areas remained demilitarised and that all persons residing in them
13 were protected from fear of armed attack."
14 Now, that language is a little bit strange. It says "protecting
15 them from fear" as opposed to protecting them from armed attack. Would
16 you agree, though, that for everyone on the ground the understanding was
17 to prevent those protected areas from coming under attack?
18 A. I think we have to take a step back before we look at that and
19 there was to be a demilitarisation before these things came into effect.
20 So, in other words, the conflicting parties were to withdraw and
21 demilitarise and then UNPROFOR took up its responsibility of managing a
22 demilitarised area. And it's within that environment the local police
23 would function as well.
24 So, in reality, we were never there at that beginning.
25 Q. Well, in an imperfect world, and UNPROFOR was certainly operating
1 in an imperfect effect world, and we're going to look at some documents
2 as we go along that address this, it was nevertheless - notwithstanding
3 that there had been insufficient withdrawal by Croatian forces from the
4 confrontation lines and insufficient or incomplete demilitarisation
5 within the protected areas - nevertheless, it was UNPROFOR's goal and
6 mandate to protect those areas; correct?
7 A. Once the initial commitment was given and undertaken by those
8 signing up to the agreement, they had a role to fulfil. And they didn't
9 do it. And we found ourselves in the middle of that conflict, trying to
10 handle a brand new situation and an extremely difficult situation.
11 So while we were there -- and negotiations were taking place from
12 the one man on the ground level to, I'm sure, at UN headquarters level to
13 try and bring people to a point where let's go back and start at the
14 beginning and try and achieve what you set out to do and what you agreed
15 to. In the meantime, we were functioning and running inside of that
16 environment where there was total conflict.
17 Q. Now, two sentences forward, it says here in paragraph 7 of the
18 Vance Plan:
19 "As the United Nations Force assumed its responsibilities in the
20 United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) all JNA forces deployed elsewhere
21 in Croatia would be relocated outside the republic."
22 Now looking at that formulation, would you agree with me that the
23 bargain that appears to be reflected here is that the JNA is withdrawing
24 in exchange for UNPROFOR coming and providing security for the UNPAS?
25 A. Naturally there is a transition period where when the place
1 becomes demilitarised and UNPROFOR establishes itself, and I think I have
2 set out some dates there in relation to UNPROFOR establishing itself in
3 Sectors North South, East and West. In reality, they were on the ground
4 prior to those dates, but being established takes a certain period of
5 time, and they declared it where they had taken responsibility even
6 though they were in there perhaps months in advance.
7 So you can see there was a leeway to get to the point where you
8 could say, "I'm available and I'm ready now," and hopefully when they
9 were declaring that, the other parties would have come to the position
10 where they would leave them in a functional state. But that didn't
12 Q. Let me try to approach this from a different angle.
13 Amongst your Serb interlocutors, did you understand that they
14 were looking to UNPROFOR to provide protection, military protection, for
15 the UNPAs from Croatian attack?
16 A. I'll answer it probably in this way in the sense that I've said
17 it before. I'm there as a policeman with a particular role to play.
18 There were political levels to be engaged in, there were military levels
19 to be engaged in, and there I'm sure is plenty of evidence available as
20 to what measures they took along the way on those issues, so I don't
21 think I should go off into the politics of it or go into the military end
22 of it. There is lots I'm sure who can account for those things. So I --
23 I can look at it from my policing point, and all I can say to you is: We
24 were not where we expected to be when we got there.
25 Q. You were in the region for how long?
1 A. About 13 months.
2 Q. And how frequent were your contacts with Serb officials?
3 A. With Serb officials, I would say very -- very little with
4 officials because the commissioners of the day went to the meetings and
5 the only times I did attend specific meetings were in Geneva and Vienna,
6 and, again, I would have been there perhaps as an observer in a sense to
7 the negotiations and available in the event of issues arising in relation
8 to policing matters or policing plans that may emerge from the
9 negotiations so that would be my level of involvement, on the ground,
10 with people.
11 Q. You were --
12 A. Our commissioner and both commissioners, actually, attended. But
13 the political and civil affairs side of it was dealt with by civil
14 affairs so they focused on what would be the political end of the
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could --
17 MR. GOSNELL:
18 Q. You were kept abreast of the content of the contacts that your
19 bosses, namely the commissioner of UNCIVPOL, was having with the Serb
20 side; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And you could --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please move closer to the
25 MR. GOSNELL:
1 Q. And you were kept abreast of the contacts that the political
2 affairs, civil affairs people, were having with the Serb side; correct?
3 A. Would be reasonably familiar, yes.
4 Q. And many of the documents -- and let me ask one more question on
5 that line.
6 You were kept abreast as well of contacts that some of the people
7 on the military side, including the Force Commander, was having with the
8 Serb side; correct?
9 A. Yes. I would be aware of meetings, yes.
10 Q. And many of the documents that you have been asked to
11 authenticate and comment upon are indeed from the military side and the
12 civilian affairs side; is that correct?
13 A. Correct, Your Honours.
14 Q. All right. So are you in a position to comment on contacts that
15 the civilian affairs and military people were having with the Serb side;
16 isn't that right?
17 A. Yes, based on the documentation I've seen, yes.
18 Q. All right.
19 MR. GOSNELL: Could we please have 1367, please, which is Defence
20 tab 30.
21 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: You have seen the court reporter's note on the
23 screen, Mr. Gosnell?
24 MR. GOSNELL: I am going to do my utmost. I apologise.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
1 MR. GOSNELL:
2 Q. Now, this is a code cable, possibly, it's a communication, in any
3 event, from General Nambiar to Mr. Goulding at the United Nations in
4 New York.
5 MR. GOSNELL: Perhaps this should not be broadcast. I'm not sure
6 whether the Prosecution can assist me. It is on the Prosecution list,
7 and I -- I don't recall what the standard policy is on these documents.
8 MR. GILLETT: If you just give me 30 seconds, I can check. I
9 don't think there's a problem, but I'll just check that.
10 MR. GOSNELL: In the meantime, perhaps it's best not to broadcast
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Indeed.
13 MR. GOSNELL: And if we can go over to page 2, please. And this
14 is reflected also on the cover page.
15 Q. We see that this is a letter from the state committee for
16 co-operation with UNPROFOR of the RSK government.
17 Now, can I first ask you, Mr. McElligott, did you know that there
18 was a state committee for co-operation with UNPROFOR in the RSK?
19 A. There were a variety of committees. I would be familiar with the
20 fact that there were numerous committees of linking and talking to each
21 other, yes.
22 Q. And the date of this letter is the 10th of November 1992, so are
23 you in -- in country at this point; right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Now, if we can turn the page, please.
1 A. Could it be enlarged a little, please. Thank you. A little
2 more. Oh. Yeah.
3 Q. And here we have Mr. Zecevic righting to Mr. Nambiar,
4 General Nambiar, and I want to draw your attention to a couple of
5 passages here.
6 "It should be repeated that the basic reason for accepting the
7 Vance Plan was a total security of the population in the protected
8 territory provided by the presence of the UN troops, i.e., your task
9 defined in Article 7 of the Vance Plan which we quote: 'The role of the
10 UN troops would be to ensure that these areas remain demilitarised and
11 that all the inhabitants in these areas be protected from the threat of
12 armed attack [sic].'"
13 "This provision of the Vance Plan was the main reason to accept
14 it. In my deepest conviction, this provision expresses the very essence
15 of the Vance Plan and this is why we insisted on it in all our contacts
16 with the representatives of UNPROFOR."
17 Now if we please go down the page:
18 "But what is unacceptable for us is your attitude that the
19 cease-fire is violated by the Croatian side because the total
20 demilitarisation has not been carried out in the protected areas. Such a
21 logic is completely unacceptable and absurd.
22 "Likewise, we insisted on having your answer and guarantees for
23 complete realisation of the obligation under point 7 of the Vance Plan,
24 and no adequate response has been given, least of all a positive one."
25 Now let me just start with the last point there. Were you
1 informed or do you know whether UNPROFOR told the Serb side that they
2 could not guarantee the territorial protection of the protected areas
3 from Croat attack?
4 A. I have to go back to the first point to perhaps address the issue
5 and it is -- starts with a point that it would remain demilitarised,
6 which would suggest that when UNPROFOR started, they were starting with a
7 demilitarised situation, and going forward you can see how complex it
8 was, how lacking in trust there was on both sides because you can see
9 where the Croatian side failure or threat of coming towards the Serbian
10 was an issue. And there's a total lack of trust being seen there, and
11 that's where UNPROFOR found themselves with having to negotiate. And
12 it -- they -- they start with remaining demilitarised which would suggest
13 it should have taken place. But neither side had moved and one was
14 saying, Well, if you move, I'll move, so it's -- where do we start?
15 Q. Well --
16 A. And they're setting out their position to say, "Look, we see a
17 problem on the far side of the fence." I'm sure the other people were
18 saying the same thing. And that's where UNPROFOR would have to sit in
19 and try and bring them to that point again. So that's the complexity of
20 it. That's the environment we were in.
21 Q. At this point, the JNA had withdrawn, correct?
22 A. My understanding is that the area was not demilitarised.
23 Q. Sir, that wasn't my question.
24 A. But -- I -- I -- as to who had withdrawn, I can't be specifically
25 sure. The military would know who specifically had done what. So that
1 can be obtained from them. I can't provided you with details on the
2 military element of it.
3 MR. GILLETT: Just a quick note, we checked. There's not a
4 problem with that document. It's been cleared to be used publicly.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
7 MR. GOSNELL: I thank my friend.
8 Q. Well, let me ask you this: In your time there, did you see where
9 UNPROFOR forces were deployed? How were they dispersed in the UN
10 protected areas?
11 A. We had -- UNMOs were basically on the front line, as I understand
12 it, on both sides as liaison officers. There was a battalion of
13 military, UN military in a very - how do you call it? - sector. In fact,
14 there may be a couple of battalions in some sectors so that they were
15 dispersed throughout the region, throughout the UNPAs.
16 Q. Were they in any way oriented towards the limits of the protected
17 areas? In other words, were they stationed in such a way that they
18 could, first of all, observe; and, secondly, protect or prevent
19 incursions into the UNPAs from the Croat side?
20 A. My knowledge of them is that they had a military base in all the
21 areas, that the troops were there. And how they actually deployed, I
22 don't know because we dealt with the policing side when we needed and
23 indeed we had drawn on the reserves to help us. They were available to
24 us, and we knew about that level of participation. And as for their
25 absolute functions and how they performed, I won't account for that nor I
1 do it -- can I do it. They were there and I have no doubt they were
3 Q. The reason I ask you and the reason I think you're in a unique
4 position to comment on this is that you had, if I'm not mistaken, 600
5 CIVPOL monitors scattered in some cases into the far reaches, I would
6 say, of the protected areas; isn't that right?
7 A. Yes. We had monitors literally in every community right up to
8 the -- right inside the pink zone. We had several stations.
9 Q. So your monitors and you, when you toured --
10 A. Mm-hm.
11 Q. And can I just ask you, how often did you yourself tour
12 [Overlapping speakers]?
13 A. It would be of a random nature. Initially, I went for two weeks
14 just to establish myself on the ground and know what was out there, and I
15 went to every police station we had and met, I would say, most of our
16 people. So when I got back I knew what I was looking at when people
17 spoke to me. So I would -- apart from that, then I would have gone, I
18 would say, quite often in a sense. You know, that if something happened
19 that needed to be seen, and I talked about going down to Benkovac. I was
20 in Medak pocket, I was in -- come to various other places, other sectors,
21 so I would have a reasonable input into travelling around the sectors.
22 Q. You've just referred to pink zones. What were the pink zones?
23 A. The pink zones were -- they were established by way of an
24 additional resolution to the UN Protected Areas. That there were areas
25 outside the UNPAs and they were in Croatia, and they were up to the full
1 confrontation line, and basically they were occupied by the JNA and were
2 the dominant or -- not dominant, but the overall -- the majority
3 population was Serbian. So their resolution then was that the UN mission
4 could function there.
5 Q. And there were CIVPOL monitors in the pink zones right?
6 A. Yes, we had several stations pink zones.
7 Q. And it was UNPROFOR's view, as with the protected areas, that
8 there should be no military attack from the Croatian side on the pink
9 zones, correct?
10 A. Correct, yes. And if can I recall correctly, there was a -- the
11 confrontation line, I think there was a 5 kilometre, let's say, no man's
12 land between the two parties to create a vacuum or to divide, keep them
14 Q. Would a fair summary of the disposition of UNPROFOR forces be
15 that their battalions to a very large extent were located centrally in
16 some major centre in the sectors, and that they, in effect, sent out
17 patrols towards the confrontation lines, right?
18 A. The barracks were located in -- I suppose in the simple sense
19 they -- they -- they were provided with barracks because of -- that's
20 where the space was and the scope was to locate them. How they
21 patrolled, that is what they do, and I suppose in a sense they were
22 looking at their operational matters and patrolling in an effective way
23 to meet that desire. We were doing it to meet our results, and I'm sure
24 they can account for how they did it. But you can see from the military
25 reports the activities they engaged in.
1 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, we would tender this document.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gillett.
3 MR. GILLETT: It is -- are we talking about the document 1367,
4 the Zecevic --
5 MR. GOSNELL: That's correct.
6 MR. GILLETT: The witness hasn't confirmed any of the contents.
7 He hasn't really adopted this document. In fact, he's said on a number
8 of occasions that he couldn't offer comments on it.
9 So we don't think the sufficient nexus has been established for
10 this. We don't have a problem in terms of the format as it is attached
11 to a document, but we don't think the witness has added any particular
12 value and his evidence is clear enough on the record.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell.
14 MR. GOSNELL: That as may be, but I am surprised that the
15 Prosecution - and this isn't the first time - is objecting to the
16 admissibility of documents on its own exhibit list.
17 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me, Mr. President. I apologise for
18 interjecting here, but on that point, we've got a 65 ter list in this
19 case that consists of over 6.000 documents put together during a time of
20 intense trial preparation. Yesterday, the Chamber declined to allow the
21 Prosecution to add an exhibit to its list.
22 The point being that simply because something's on the list
23 doesn't mean that it's admissible by either side. And so the suggestion
24 simply that it's on the list does not signify that it's admissible or
25 that it is otherwise stands on its own. It's within the universe of
1 potential exhibits. That's all.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Objection sustained for failure of nexus with
5 this witness.
6 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Q. Now, Mr. McElligott, at paragraph 55 of your statement, and
8 perhaps we could bring that up. This is 6363. It's now P2168. And I --
9 I suppose -- do you have it there in front of you, sir?
10 A. I do. Yes, Your Honours, I have it. Yeah.
11 Q. So at page 17 there's a heading entitled: "Incursions into the
12 Sectors by All Sides to the Conflict." And it reads:
13 "There were incursions over the UNPA demarcation lines by all
14 parties to the conflict. The incursions by the Croatian side included
15 operations in Benkovac in January 1993 and in Maslenica and the
16 Medak pocket in September 1993."
17 Now I note you say there were incursions by all sides but then
18 the only examples you give are incursions by Croatian forces?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. Is there a clarification that you would wish to make in respect
21 of that?
22 A. Yes, Your Honours. In that matter, I referred to "by all sides,"
23 and in doing that, I was also including the - what would you call it? -
24 the -- the -- what do you call it? Explosions or attacks by military
25 operations. Not just personal attacks by individuals.
1 Q. You mean --
2 A. Shelling -- sorry. Shelling is what I mean, yes.
3 Q. Violations of the cease-fire?
4 A. [Overlapping speakers]... shelling, yeah. So I generalised it in
5 that sense by both sides, but in this instance I'm referring to
6 incursions of the type I am specifying here which would be on the ground.
7 Q. But during the entire period of 1992 and 1993, isn't it true that
8 the only side that crossed confrontation line with troops that that been
9 established was Croatian forces; is that right?
10 A. I have cited what I know here, and on recall, I would think - and
11 I remember reading it again - there was one minor one at the front line,
12 and I think it just got to the front line before again it was headed off
13 in some fashion probably by negotiation and discussions, but it wouldn't
14 have got into a serious situation. Not to the scale we're looking at
15 here. It was of a minor nature, I would think.
16 Q. Let me put the question again because I don't think I got a clear
18 A. Okay.
19 Q. And that's understandable, sir, I'm not criticising you.
20 As far as you know, the only side that crossed the confrontation
21 line that had been established at the time of the Vance Plan with troops
22 were Croatian forces --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. -- in 1992 and 1993. Correct?
25 A. Correct. Yes, that's my situation.
1 Q. And in addition to the examples you've cited, did you know there
2 was an attack on a place called Miljevacki Plateau in June of 1992?
3 A. I have heard of it referred to and perhaps read something about
4 it somewhere along the way. But, yes.
5 Q. Were Croatian forces still in Miljevacki Plateau when you were
7 A. I can't be sure. I can't. I don't know. I don't recall.
8 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 1D468, please, which is Defence
9 tab 39.
10 Q. Now, sir, this is a video which I believe and hope we should be
11 able to broadcast. And can you see on the screen in front of you?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And let's -- let's just play it and then I'll ask you some
14 comment, some questions.
15 [Video-clip played]
16 "THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Where is Niper? What do you mean
17 you didn't? I am left without everything. What are you talking about?
18 Take him with us. The Croatian army in the hinterland of Sibenik
19 completed a successful action of the liberation of Miljevac. We got
20 these -- this footage later.
21 "He has two golden teeth."
22 MR. GOSNELL:
23 Q. Have you ever seen that footage?
24 A. No, Your Honours.
25 Q. Now, my understanding is that this video was shot by Croatian
1 forces. They took the video. And apparently in 1992, it was
2 subsequently shown on television and it became somewhat infamous,
3 certainly on the Serb -- amongst the Serb population in the protected
4 areas, particular in Sector South as being one of the incidents that
5 occurred during the Miljevacki Plateau operation.
6 Did you ever hear any of your monitors or did you yourself hear
7 from the Serb side that they were concerned about the manner in which
8 Serbs had been abused during this operation?
9 A. Yes. And we referred to the report yesterday of the 27th of July
10 where there was a substantial volume of crimes recorded in respect of
11 Croats. I know that our monitors also interviewed numerous, indeed, I
12 think all Serbian people who came from outside of the United Nations
13 protected area on -- when they arrived and documented accounts from them.
14 And, again, there are horrific accounts. You know, we have some terrible
15 stuff in that report of 27th of July. I think you will find the same in
16 the other one. And you can see the level of abuse. We saw an account
17 yesterday from Kjel Johansen, where he met a man who had been beaten. He
18 was in bed and in a terrible state. So the human brutality is visible.
19 It's appalling.
20 Q. And what kind of impact did this have, as far as you were able to
21 learn, on the confidence of the Serb side in the UN's ability to protect
22 either the pink zones or the protected areas?
23 A. I think you have to look at it in this way is that both sides had
24 endured the situation. UNPROFOR was coming in as a new pair of hands to
25 try and start a new beginning and stop this and put -- start again and
1 hopefully get people to see a new -- a new vision of where they wanted to
2 go. And I think that's where UNPROFOR was coming from, is to get people
3 to stand back, enter negotiations, I know it's going to be -- it won't
4 happen in a week or it won't happen in ten years, I go back to my own
5 country. Perhaps it took 15 years to get to an agreement. But we got
6 there. And it's still been [inaudible]. So, you know, you are dealing
7 with an appalling situation with a historical background and there is no
8 simple answer. All you could hope is that the leaders would lead and
9 that they would work in the direction of gaining peace.
10 Q. But this occurs in June 1992, almost immediately after the
11 arrival of UNPROFOR.
12 A. Absolutely --
13 Q. Isn't that right?
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q. So the first time that the entire structure or the bargain of the
16 Vance Plan, so to speak, is tested, there's a failure in -- in -- and
17 when I say "failure," I -- I don't know mean to impugn any one person. I
18 mean to say that the objectives, the laudable objectives that you've just
19 described, those objectives were not being fulfilled in this incident;
21 A. In this environment, you're going to take one step forward and
22 two steps back very frequently. And you know, that is the way you had to
23 go. You're not going to have a magic wand and say, "Everything changes
24 today." You are -- the change you are about to make is monstrous and all
25 you can do is hope that UNPROFOR would get in there, give the guidance,
1 give the leadership, and leadership would come from other places, and
2 eventually over time that you can build -- you're looking at something.
3 Not sorting a problem out today, you're looking at sorting out the
4 future. And it has to be looked at in that scope. And the UN being
5 there for six months is only getting your leg in the door. You could be
6 there for 20 years and still working at it.
7 So the change you have to make and indeed -- you can see how
8 people would be terrorised on the ground. I mean, looking at it was
10 Q. How did this incident in particular or more generally the events
11 of Miljevacki Plateau affect based on what you were able to observe or
12 learn intercommunal, interethnic tensions in Sector South and
13 Sector North?
14 A. There was an amazing environment. On the ground in the
15 community, before I suppose the troubles broke out there was a -- an
16 interrelationship between communities in -- in a friendly sociable way,
17 and we have had many monitors who have been approached in the sector when
18 they were going on breaks outside of it to say, "My neighbour has been
19 kicked out. When you go to wherever you're going, would you convey my
20 greetings." They never fell out.
21 Now, when you go to other levels, the levels of hatred came in,
22 politics came in, and the dynamics changed. But on the ground with
23 society, there was still a bond of friendship and a bond of good
25 Q. Mr. McElligott, could you look back on the screen to my question?
1 And I -- I was just wondering if you could focus on that specific point.
2 A. The film is still in display.
3 MR. GOSNELL: Could we please assist the witness with the
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Which question?
6 MR. GOSNELL:
7 Q. It's at line 21, sir.
8 A. I'm in difficulties with my eye-sight. Apologies.
9 Q. I'm sorry. Let me just repeat it then.
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. The question was how did this event and the other events that
12 people knew about as having occurred at Miljevacki Plateau, how did that
13 impact upon intercommunal tensions in Sector North and Sector South in
15 A. Of course, they have a very destabilising effect. You know,
16 there's a -- people would not sleep in their bed at night when they know
17 that there's a risk of attack from one corner or another. That --
18 that's -- it has a serious impact on the community, and again you're back
19 to trust, mistrust. You know, there's total -- the place is just totally
21 Q. And that impacted on the ability of both you and the police to
22 maintain law and order in Sector South, in particular, correct?
23 A. It made things extremely difficult.
24 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, we would tender the video.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gillett.
1 MR. GILLETT: No objection. We note there's no transcript in
2 e-court for this. On a previous occasion where this has come up, I noted
3 that it got MFI'd pending a translation being added. So I'd suggest if
4 we follow that, that procedure, would be -- we'd have no objection to
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Perhaps the parties know now -- know more than we
8 do, but do we have any elements to know what this video is, when it has
9 been filmed, who the people are on the -- on -- on ...
10 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, my -- I was only able to rely on
11 open sources for this information, so I cannot vouch for its -- for the
12 reliability of the information I have. I can only say that I have a
13 good-faith basis to belive that it is what I described it to be in court,
14 and if Your Honours are not comfortable with that, then we'll tender it
15 at a later time.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Unless I suppose parties agree on what it is and
17 where it comes from and when it has been taken.
18 MR. GILLETT: No, we're not aware of that information. As I
19 said, we haven't had a transcript in e-court either, so, yeah, we're in
20 the dark, just as Your Honours are.
21 MR. GOSNELL: For the time being, Mr. President, we'll put this
22 on the back burner.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
24 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 01273, please. Defence tab 25.
25 Q. Now, this is a crypto-cable from General Nambiar to
1 Marrack Goulding. The date is the 22nd of September. The third sentence
3 "In these circumstances, you might perhaps feel able to impress
4 upon Tudjman, as we sought to do yesterday with Milas in Zagreb, the
5 imperative necessity of the Croatian army pulling well back from Peruca
6 and behaving immaculately for a change."
7 First of all, let me ask you: Do you know -- do you have any
8 information that would help us understand why General Nambiar would use
9 that particular expression, namely, that the Croatian army should behave
10 immaculately for a change?
11 A. I would suspect that he grounding it on a previous profile of
12 activities and that he is seeking a higher standard in how things are
14 Q. Well, in general did you observe provocative actions while you
15 were there or did you learn about provocative actions by the Croatian
17 A. I wasn't --
18 Q. Sir, let me just finish my question.
19 A. Okay.
20 Q. Other than the specific incursions that we've already talked
21 about and that you've mentioned in your report?
22 A. Personally I'm not familiar with any that I can recall right now.
23 If there were activities, say, in the pink zones where our monitors would
24 be close to the front line, they would be reported in our sitreps. But
25 asking me that right now, I just can't say.
1 Q. And can you recall anything about this incident being referred to
2 in Peruca?
3 A. I suspect you're referring to the Peruca dam here, so that's what
4 became a serious area of contention in the sense that from what I'm aware
5 it was mined with perhaps the objective of blowing it and that would
6 could caused major flooding and destruction of property and people.
8 Q. Was Peruca in Sector South.
9 A. It was, yes.
10 Q. And do I understand correctly that Croatian forces threatened
11 frequently to seize the dam by force?
12 A. I know that it was a contentious issue and that it was mined. As
13 to the politics of it, I'm not too sure. But I was very aware of it, the
14 risks of it. Let's put it that way.
15 Q. Generally, did you learn from your monitors in their contacts
16 with Serbian police that they were concerned about an incursion by
17 Croatian forces in Peruca?
18 A. Yes, I believe there was a situation there. It was -- let's put
19 it, always a risk of heightening the tensions.
20 Q. Can I ask you, were police, regular police now, I'm talking
21 amongst the 7.000, were those regular police liable to perform duties
22 other than law enforcement?
23 A. Looking --
24 Q. -- at any time?
25 A. Looking at the situation reports and accounts given by them for
1 not being available or performing would indicate that they were
2 being sent -- some were being sent to the front line.
3 Q. So the regular police could be sent to the front line; is that
5 A. I don't know but I know it has been presented as a reason for not
6 being available. So I take it on face value that they may have.
7 Q. In any event that occurred?
8 A. That account has been given to us. Yes.
9 Q. By -- your own monitors reported that?
10 A. Our mon -- yes, it would -- it would be seen in situation reports
11 that on occasions they called to a station and there was nobody -- I
12 think there is one specific one there for Sector South where there was
13 nobody available on a particular day, and I think the account given was
14 everybody was on the front line or engaged. I think that could go around
15 to the Maslenica bridge occasion. And I think I referred to it earlier,
16 that we thought they would have at least left one person behind to honour
17 the Vance Plan.
18 Q. So let me just understand this. You're saying that there was a
19 situation when all or most or all of the regular police officers in a
20 police station left that station, left their regular duties, and were
21 sent to the front line to respond to whatever threat may have been
22 occurring there; is that correct?
23 A. I do not know if they went there or what happened, but that was
24 presented as the reason why they didn't engage on a particular day. And
25 I made the point at the time as saying that they thought -- we thought
1 somebody would be left behind or at least somebody would be available to
2 deal with it.
3 So I don't know where they went, but they certainly weren't
4 available. One could take the view as well that in view of hostilities
5 they were just going in another direction at that particular time. I
6 don't know, and to be fair I don't want to nail it down one way or the
8 Q. Your monitors were reporting that they were leaving --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- for that reason?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Was that a frequent occurrence?
13 A. Frequent, I wouldn't refer to it as frequent, but I know it has
14 appeared on occasions. I wouldn't consider it a frequent situation, and
15 I think the circumstances of meetings and so forth wouldn't -- wouldn't
16 justify that as being the case. There were police available.
17 MR. GOSNELL: This document is tendered, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gillett.
19 MR. GILLETT: No objection.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D69, Your Honours.
22 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 65 ter 1254, please, Prosecution
23 tab 9.
24 Q. Sir, this is a document that I believe is referred to in your
25 report, although I don't have a paragraph reference, and --
1 MR. GILLETT: If I could assist. It's paragraph 113 of the
2 statement of the witness.
3 MR. GOSNELL:
4 Q. And there, at the -- that doesn't seem to be the right document.
5 MR. GOSNELL: 10 -- or, sorry. 01253.
6 Q. This is a status report on the Serbo-Croatian conflict and
7 UNPROFOR mission. It's dated 7th of September, 1992. No authorship is
8 indicated, but, sir, you -- you've probably looked at this document.
9 Based on the idiom, the way in which it's written, can you tell us who
10 you think wrote this document?
11 A. Could you enlarge it a little, please.
12 I would -- I would associate it with perhaps a civil affairs-type
14 Q. Is this a document -- would it probably have been authored by
15 Mr. Andreev?
16 A. Hmm, September 1992 ... I think -- yes, oh I can't say he
17 authored, but I think Viktor was in the mission when I arrived. He was
18 because we -- we met because -- we had met in Namibia, so I would have
19 recalled him in the sense when I met him as meeting with somebody from
20 the past.
21 Q. What was his position at the time?
22 A. He was head of civil affairs in Sector South.
23 Q. Paragraph 1 says:
24 "UNPROFOR's mission is still in a military phase."
25 And your statement echos that at one point. Can you tell us what
1 that means, that UNPROFOR's mission was in a military phase?
2 A. I think basically what he is say something that demilitarisation
3 has not taken place, and they find themselves in that environment.
4 Q. And how does that impact on UNPROFOR's duties or role?
5 A. Go back to the Vance Plan again. The basic concept of what your
6 functions were couldn't be fulfilled because the pitch was not clear.
7 Q. If we could turn to page 3, please.
8 At the top of the page it reads:
9 "Risks of military action to restore Croatian authority are
10 indeed realistic. Croatian side's patience and good will is reaching the
11 point of non-return. They seem to react out of pure nationalism.
12 "October is a deadline for them and therefore a turning point for
13 the whole operation.
14 "Provocation/retaliation process is intensifying. Pressure on
15 the front line from Croatians increases daily under form of incursions,
16 infiltrations of both armed groups and civilians. Clashes and incidents
17 between milicija and Croatian police are expanding daily. The
18 confrontation might result from this milicija's like trend with probable
19 intervention of CA followed by the opening up of heavy arms stores to
20 back it. Mobilisation is probably ongoing overnight."
21 Now, I just want to focus in particular on the part where he says
22 "pressure on the front line from Croatians increases daily under form of
23 incursions, infiltrations of both armed groups and civilians."
24 Now do you know what he is referring to when he refers to
25 infiltrations of -- infiltration of armed groups?
1 A. In -- I'm sure the military will account for certain aspects, but
2 CIVPOL also would have encountered incidents. Indeed, I would think if
3 you look over that period of time, you my find there were murders
4 committed in the UNPAs. I referred to earlier a number of incidents
5 which took place and I dealt -- or the Croatian authorities actually
6 complained of their people being killed, and I was asked to prepare a
7 report on it, and I examined the records available at that time and it
8 may go back to around that period. And I established that in fact the
9 Croatians had actually killed more Serbs and that was noticed -- that was
10 sent back to them.
11 In addition to that, in the same report we also sought an
12 explanation from them in respect of a situation where a Serb was detained
13 in a Croatian prison and that was recorded as death by suicide. When the
14 body was returned to the family, our monitors carried out an inquiry and
15 they also engaged a British medical doctor, if I can recall correctly, to
16 carry out a post-mortem examination on the body, and they established
17 that this man was beaten to death. And that was sent back to them. So
18 you can see the impact of it is that, you know, there was activity and
19 indeed at that particular moment of time, the figures showed that they
20 were the greater aggressors.
21 Q. Infiltration of armed --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
23 stay closer to the microphone. Thank you.
24 MR. GOSNELL:
25 Q. Infiltration of armed groups is one thing and another thing being
1 referred to is infiltration of civilians.
2 Do you understand what Mr. Andreev was referring to when he
3 referred to infiltration of civilians? Why does he draw that
4 distinction, if you know?
5 A. I think -- again, I think there is evidence of what I would
6 consider as just maverick groups who just went on a rampage. They were
8 Q. You mean to say that there were Croatian maverick groups, as you
9 describe them, crossing over the confrontation line from the Croatian
10 side into the UNPAs and committing crimes?
11 A. I think there is a report in existence from down south in --
12 in -- indicating that that is one of the scenarios for the killings, or
13 some of the killings that has been put forward, yes.
14 Q. And it says there that there were clashes between militia and
15 Croatian police. Now, when I see the word "militia," I often caution
16 myself that it may be a reference to "milicija," namely, the Serb police.
17 As far as you know, were there direct clashes between the Serb milicija
18 and the Croatian police? Were they fighting each other in any way?
19 A. The -- what do you call, the group of policemen from within the
20 700 group are you referring to or the special police as I would?
21 Q. Well, there's no reference to special police here. I'm not sure
22 precisely what Mr. Andreev may be referring to you, but what I'm asking
23 you is whether there was any direct confrontation between the regular
24 police on the Serb side, and any Croatian police?
25 A. I'm not aware of it. During my time there, no, I'm not. But I
1 think historically there were incidents of that type.
2 Q. And how did actual infiltration or the threat of infiltration
3 affect the ability of the police, and by police I mean here the 7.000?
4 How did it affect their ability to conduct law enforcement in the UNPAs?
5 A. Again, they were faced with a difficult situation. I suppose you
6 could say they were starting on a playing pitch that was never designed
7 for them either. If you take it, in reality they were coming into a
8 field that wasn't what was promised. If they were starting with the
9 Vance Plan, they were going into what should be a demilitarised area, so
10 you can see the difficulties they had. And we understand that.
11 Q. And they were not permitted under the Vance Plan to carry
12 anything other than side-arms, right?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Were the groups, the maverick groups that you described, based on
15 what you know, did they tend to be heavily armed?
16 A. I can't say what they had, but I would suspect that they would be
17 heavily armed. Yes. Certainly would. I would think so, yes.
18 MR. GOSNELL: We would tender this document, although it may
19 already be tendered. I'm not sure.
20 MR. GILLETT: It should come in as an associated exhibit with the
21 statement. This is 1253.
22 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you. Could we have 1290, please, which is
23 Defence tab 26.
24 Q. Now, Mr. McElligott, this is the further report of the
25 Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 743 and 762.
1 The date is 19 September 1992. If we could please turn to page 4,
2 paragraph 6.
3 "General Nambiar has repeatedly stressed to the authorities in
4 Belgrade and Knin that is UNPROFOR which exercises the protection
5 function notice UNPAs and that the presence of these paramilitary units
6 is contrary to the United Nations Plan and has caused the Croatian army
7 to retain some of its forces at the confrontation line."
8 Now just an aside there, from the context it appears that the
9 paramilitary forces being referred to -- paramilitary units are the
10 special police. And then he goes on:
11 "As a result, clashes continue to occur along the line, fueling
12 intercommunal tension in the UNPAs."
13 Now, first of all, sir, there's a connection being drawn here
14 between the clashes and the intercommunal tension. Does that correspond
15 with what you know was going on at the -- what was fueling intercommunal
16 tension, amongst other causes?
17 A. Yes. You can see where just one is sparking off the other. And
18 on it goes. That's where you are.
19 Q. And would you agree with me that here General Nambiar appears
20 to -- is reported as having asserted that it is indeed UNPROFOR which
21 exercises as, it's put here, the protection function in the UNPAs?
22 A. Yes. And what he is saying is simply that the special police
23 should not be there, and if they got a foothold in the situation, you may
24 get a different attitude from the other side, and you may get into
25 discussions, into negotiations, and advance somewhat. So that's what
1 he's saying to them. He's saying, "Look, you're breaking the Vance Plan.
2 The other people don't trust you because you're doing. Please let us
3 take responsibility for what we should be taking responsibility and
4 withdraw," and I think that's the message he is trying to convey and
5 trying to get a starting point on.
6 Q. Not only withdraw, disarm; correct?
7 A. Disarm. It's absolute -- absolutely. Yeah.
8 Q. And that was the consistent message of UNPROFOR, wasn't it, that
9 UNPROFOR will provide the protection, and therefore these units must be
10 disbanded and there must be full demilitarisation; correct?
11 A. They're basically saying give us a chance to do the job.
12 MR. GOSNELL: This document is tendered, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D70, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
16 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 01321, please. Prosecution tab 12.
17 Q. Do you remember that there was a joint commission set up to
18 address various issues between the Croat and Serb side under the auspices
19 of UNPROFOR?
20 A. Yes -- yes, I think it came as part of the pink zone resolution,
21 if I recall correctly.
22 Q. And do you know whether it was restricted to discussion of pink
23 zone issues or was it an across the board forum for discussion of any
25 A. My recollection is from reading some minutes is that it was used
1 actually as a forum to broaden out and engage in a rather broad field. I
2 think it became on occasions quite an open agenda.
3 Q. And the chair of the joint commission was Mr. Thornberry; is that
5 A. Mr. Thornberry, yes. The UN chaired the meeting. I think Cedric
6 was the -- generally in charge. I think Viktor may have -- Andreev may
7 have also chaired some meetings.
8 MR. GOSNELL: Let's go to page 2, please.
9 Q. "Chairman's report:
10 "The presence of these armed irregular forces was totally
11 unacceptable. He wished also to ask the Serb delegation for a
12 clarification of recent statements attributed to, inter alios,
13 Mr. Goran Hadzic and Mr. Milan Martic, in which they had been reported as
14 saying that their authorities did not accept the basic elements of
15 Resolution 762 and wished to renegotiate the Vance Plan."
16 Now, is this another example of UNPROFOR pressuring for complete
17 demilitarisation of any forces in the UNPAs on the Serb side?
18 A. I haven't been able to read the document, but ...
19 Could you start where -- enlarge it slightly, please.
20 MR. GILLETT: If it helps, it's in the binder in the first lot of
21 documents, if you prefer to look at the hard copy. 1321.
22 THE WITNESS: Is that the early stage of the folder?
23 Could you lead me to ...
24 MR. GOSNELL:
25 Q. Yes. It's page 2, sir. The first paragraph, under "Chairman's
2 A. Your question?
3 Q. Does this again reflect that UNPROFOR at the highest levels is
4 insisting on complete, full, and absolute demilitarisation of the Serb
5 side in the UNPAs?
6 A. Yes, they are asking for demilitarisation. That is the Vance
7 Plan coming into effect.
8 Q. And this is about a month and a half after Mr. Andreev's report.
9 You remember we looked at that, the second-last document, in which he
10 said there was a danger of a threat of Croatian attack; correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And notably there's no reference in this document to that threat,
13 is there?
14 A. Not in that paragraph. I haven't read the rest. But again, it
15 reflects the slowness of the situation, the mistrust. At least they're
16 still talking and, you know, that's the way you go.
17 Q. But my point is that here we have UNPROFOR asking for full and
18 complete demilitarisation at the very moment when they know, based on
19 their own intelligence, that Croatian forces are as was said in the
20 second-last document mobilising; isn't that right?
21 A. And I have no doubt they are talking to them as well and trying
22 to calm the situation down and bring them into discussions, negotiations,
23 and adjust the position they're holding. And that's what I said earlier,
24 you're taking one step back -- or forward or maybe taking two steps
25 backward. So all you can say is you still have them talking in some
1 fashion, and they haven't gone into total aggression because that is
2 where it could go, is total head-on, and I think if the UN wasn't there
3 to create that type of engagement, you know, where would you have gone?
4 Q. And the basis of this demand that full demilitarisation should
5 take place is General Nambiar's assurance, an assurance provided on other
6 occasions I'm sure, that UNPROFOR would protect those areas, right?
7 A. He's saying let's go back to the Vance Plan. You said you would
8 give your full commitment to getting engaged in it and so forth and get
9 it into a proper beginning. And he is then saying, "Well, we have a role
10 to play, we will do it." And again you can see that could be a very
11 difficult role, extremely difficult.
12 Q. And --
13 A. As I say, it was one that would probably take years. So we were
14 never going to solve it in a day, or a year.
15 Q. And the role is to militarily protect the protected areas?
16 A. To protect the protected areas. And I think again the military
17 protect is referred to in -- the role of the military is referred to as
18 the level of engagement is by, you know, more or less basically defending
19 themselves and limited force. And again, once you got to that point, you
20 are looking at negotiating, negotiating, and stabilising. Using -- using
21 your fire-arm should be the last option in your situation. And you know,
22 there's a lot of space for talk in between. The day you go to the gun,
23 you have lost the real purpose of going forward.
24 MR. GOSNELL: Let's go to 03170, please. Defence tab 37.
25 Q. Now, am I right, sir, about two months after this meeting, the
1 joint commission meeting that we've just looked at, on or around the 21st
2 January there was a major Croatian offensive --
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. -- against the area in which Benkovac was located; is that
6 A. Yes, Your Honours. Yeah.
7 Q. Can you describe, please, as best you know about that event what
9 A. I understand the attack took place from Maslenica bridge and they
10 came forward certainly to Benkovac because I was there that morning, and
11 the town was shelled from what I know. And the population fled from the
12 countryside ahead of it. And many of them ended up at the CIVPOL station
13 in Benkovac.
14 When I was departing that morning on the 22nd, the hotel
15 reception area was full of civilians. The car park area was crowded.
16 There are accounts there of people being injured. There's an account
17 there of a lady starting to give birth to a child. It -- there was --
18 they were in absolute panic, and our monitors took some -- the -- people
19 injured and casualties to hospital, they dealt with the lady who was
20 giving birth, and these people were in absolute terror. And that was
21 the -- the civilian impact on it.
22 Q. Many civilian casualties?
23 A. I don't have the figures myself, but there were. There were many
24 from what I know, yeah. I don't have the actual figures here. I'm
25 unfamiliar with them. But there were casualties, human casualties, yes
1 Q. Artillery --
2 A. Indeed. I think when -- our monitors who were held hostage went
3 to the hospital and with -- with some patients, and they saw several
4 people at the hospital injured and very seriously injured. So they saw
5 first-hand the fallout.
6 Q. Artillery shelling of urban areas, including Benkovac --
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. -- while you were there?
9 A. I didn't -- believe it or not, I slept through the whole thing
10 and I had to be called in the morning. But I -- I -- I was aware of it
11 when I got up. Let's put it that way. I slept soundly.
12 Q. I'd like, if I may, to ... turn to page 2 of this document.
13 And this is, again, General Nambiar. And he's writing to
14 Mr. Goulding. At paragraph 5, down at the bottom --
15 A. Which page number, please?
16 Q. Sir, I don't think that that document is the right one. In fact,
17 you don't have this one in your binder, I'm sorry.
18 A. Okay. Okay.
19 Q. But we could perhaps dispense with the B/C/S on the screen and
20 just zoom in on the English.
21 "The credibility of the various parties to the conflict in this
22 region has always been debatable, but what we have been subjected to over
23 the last few days has made it impossible to place any value on any
24 assurances that are given, no matter what the level. A senior colleague
25 has used the term surreal too describe conduct which none of us, in our
1 diverse years and fields of experience has previously encountered at high
2 levels of government. This factor will have a serious effect on future
3 discussions and negotiations."
4 Now I suggest that in paragraphs 4 and 5 he is talking about the
5 Croatian side, and then here we have at paragraph 6 his analysis of the
6 Serb side:
7 "On the Serb side, as I mentioned in one of my earlier cables, we
8 are seen as traitors and betrayers. This is mainly because we had relied
9 on Croatian assurances of willingness to sit and talk and had persuaded
10 many of our Serb interlocutors of that faith. While the vehemence of
11 their denunciation is beginning to abate as some see what the real
12 situation was, I cannot see them placing their weaponry back into storage
13 areas in the near future."
14 Did you understand at this time that in fact it turned out that
15 UNPROFOR felt completely betrayed by the Croatian assurances that they
16 would not attack the UNPAs and the pink zones?
17 A. I think --
18 MR. GILLETT: Sorry --
19 THE WITNESS: Sorry.
20 MR. GILLET: Sorry to interrupt. Just in relation to which side
21 is being referred to in which paragraph. I see in paragraph 4 they are
22 referring to the political parties in Croatia, but then at paragraph 5
23 the opening line says: "The credibility of the various parties to the
24 conflict in this region..." And my learned friend has suggested that
25 both these paragraphs refer to the Croatian side but that didn't seem to
1 reflect what had been read onto the record in that paragraph.
2 MR. GOSNELL: That's my interpretation. My learned friend is
3 more than welcome to ask further questions on re-direct.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think it clearly sets out
5 General Nambiar's position at that time, the difficulties he had. It --
6 there's no doubt. You can see the difficulties of the mission. They are
7 truly reflected there, and the level of negotiation and
8 confidence-building that would have to take place before you could
9 advance anywhere. You know, it's -- I think it focuses precisely how the
10 stalemate was there and he almost -- there's a level of frustration on
11 his part as well.
12 MR. GOSNELL:
13 Q. Now you were present there at the time. And presumably you were
14 in communication with your colleagues in UNPROFOR. Did you hear whether
15 UNPROFOR took any steps to prevent this attack?
16 A. UNPROFOR is -- their role at that point was negotiate, negotiate.
17 And you go back to the Vance Plan for your beginning, and you have got to
18 say to yourself: "No, this is where we are beginning with defence, and
19 the pitch is not where we should have it." Do they become the aggressors
20 at that point? And I don't think -- I certainly wouldn't envisage it as
21 being the way to go about it. And all you can do is negotiate and get
22 people talking and try and withdraw in -- in a -- in a sensible way, to
23 put it mildly, and you're looking at those with the authority and the
24 responsibility at the highest level of government there to be talked and
25 the difficulties UN is encountering with them. And that is the type of
1 change that they were pursuing, and you can see the difficulty of it.
2 Q. But UNPROFOR --
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell.
4 MR. GOSNELL: I see the time, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: We've reached that time.
6 And also, Mr. Gosnell, I am still looking at what you said about
7 paragraph -- paragraphs 4 and 5 of this document. If it is -- I don't
8 have it on the screen. But if as Mr. Gillett said paragraph 5 says, "The
9 credibility of the various parties to the conflict in this region," what
10 you call your interpretation would rather be a misinterpretation.
11 MR. GOSNELL: Perhaps I should respond to your question in the
12 absence of the witness, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Witness, it's the time for our first break.
14 We will be back in 30 minutes. The court usher will escort you out of
15 the courtroom. Thank you.
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Could we have paragraph 5 on the screen, please.
19 Oh, we have it. The -- we have it here, yes.
20 Yes, Mr. Gosnell.
21 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, I -- I believe it's beyond dispute
22 that paragraph 5 is referring to the Croatian side, notwithstanding that
23 preamble in the first sentence where he says "the credibility of all
25 And the reason I say that is because you see the discussion in
1 paragraph 4 which is all about the position on the Croatian side,
2 including a speech by -- or an interview given by president Tudjman to
3 "Der Spiegel." And then if you look at the second and third sentences of
4 that paragraph, and in fact even the first sentence itself, there's only
5 one side whose assurances could be being referred to. It's definitely
6 not the Serb side. There are no Serb assurances under discussion. It's
7 the Croatian assurances that are in discussion. And in that context, I
8 say that it's quite clear that this is referring to the Croatian side.
9 There's nothing in -- in the context that would suggest that this is in
10 any way referring to assurances that have been given by the Serbs or that
11 anything that they had done would have been described as surreal. That
12 can only be the Croatian side. And the discussion of what the Serbs are
13 doing is in paragraph 6 and beyond because that goes on.
14 MR. GILLETT: I -- I may have jumped up precipitously, and I do
15 see that possible interpretation. I also think there is a possible
16 interpretation that paragraph 4 refers to the Croatian side, paragraph 5
17 is more of a general paragraph, and paragraph 6 is referring to the Serb
18 side. But I may have jumped up too early on this point. It just was the
19 first sentence that put me off at paragraph 5.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
21 Court adjourned.
22 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
23 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Mr. Gosnell.
4 MR. GOSNELL:
5 Q. Now just before the break, Mr. McElligott, you said that
6 UNPROFOR's role at that point was negotiate, negotiate. But, in fact,
7 UNPROFOR's role was broader under the Vance Plan, wasn't it? Its role
8 was to protect the protected areas from fear of armed attack.
9 A. That was its mission.
10 Q. And the Maslenica or Benkovac attack, as I think you refer to it,
11 that was a major failure for the UNPROFOR mission, wasn't it?
12 A. I don't accept it in that term. I think that the UNPROFOR
13 mission was never one of going to war with another nation. We had go
14 back to the Vance Plan for the starting point of all the points. And
15 what you have is breaches of the Vance Plan that the UN have to cope it.
16 And that's where I see it. I don't see it as UNPROFOR literally having
17 to go to war with the parties, and this is why I talk about negotiate,
18 negotiate, because the commitments given by the various parties in
19 signing into the Vance Plan were not honoured. And that is where
20 UNPROFOR was trying to bring them to. And you had breaches and extremely
21 serious breaches with consequences. And this is ... where I see it.
22 Q. The very least that can be said is that UNPROFOR was not able and
23 did not perform what General Nambiar referred to as the protection
24 function. At least in that regard, Mr. McElligott, would you agree that
25 this was a failure on UNPROFOR's part?
1 A. I think the protection function has to be always based on the
2 Vance Plan and that is your foundation stone, and how you assess your
3 function mostly based on that rock, that foundation. And I think the
4 opposing parties have a big contribution to make in changing what did
5 happen. So our role was defined and set on what could be determined a
6 good basis for a beginning was to get those who were warring to stop and
7 to withdraw. They had been down that road. This was a new -- potential
8 for a new beginning.
9 Q. What was your observation or what did you learn of the Serb
10 reaction to this event, and in, particular, in respect of how they viewed
12 A. I have no doubt there was a reaction. There's always a reaction
13 to situations of this gravity. And from a CIVPOL point of view, our
14 monitors lost all their stations in the -- in the pink zones and had to
15 withdraw. We were out of action in that area for a long period of time.
16 You can see what happened at the hospital in Benkovac where they were
17 taken hostage. So you -- there was a natural reaction. Of course there
18 would be a reaction, and a blame will pursue -- to it as well. And the
19 tensions escalate on all sides. That totally predictable.
20 Q. Amongst your interlocutors on the Serb side, would you say that
21 they were then less trusting of assurances given by UNPROFOR?
22 A. You were starting from a position of nobody trusts anybody. And,
23 you know, we have seen that in very simple ways as CIVPOL monitors. And
24 if I could only give an example, Your Honours. They're just practical
25 things. Our monitors engage -- in the height of the conflict we engaged
1 in various humanitarian things, and I'll just cite a couple, and one is
2 there was to be a body exchange. And our monitors -- one of our monitors
3 went to the scene with the parties who were going to exchange of bodies,
4 and these were buried in graves and nobody would start to dig or start
5 the process. And our monitor picked up the shovel and started to dig the
6 grave himself, and it's only when he was well down the grave that others
7 stepped to help and do their part and they got on with the job and the
8 exchange took place.
9 And what was seen as a big achievement on another occasion, they
10 agreed that today we will exchange the bodies of Croatian people and
11 tomorrow we will do it with Serb people, and the trust was sufficient
12 that they would agree to do it on two separate days. And that was seen
13 as a major change, that you could build an amount of trust that could
14 last for two day, and two days later it was gone again.
15 So you can see, you go right up the scale and add to the gravity
16 of the situation, the trust will diminish. And this is where the UN was
17 given this huge task, not to be solved in a day or week. They were in a
18 difficult position. All you could do was hope to keep the parties apart
19 and that somewhere along the way you could gain the confidence and that
20 you would advance.
21 Q. Now let's go to the paragraph 7 and this pertains to some events
22 that you testified about during your direct. Paragraph 7 reads -- and
23 again, this is the same document we've been talking about. I think it's
24 on the screen in front of you, still.
25 A. Oh yeah, okay.
1 Q. And paragraph 7 says:
2 "After initial confusion and setbacks, the Serbs are gradually
3 reorganising but may have logistical problems in our opinion. They have
4 mobilised, deployed on the front line, and have even begun lying
5 minefields in many places. What is more disturbing, however, is the
6 increasing presence of external elements like Arkan's troops and possibly
7 other such forces who, from what one can gather are ruthless but highly
8 organised and professional."
9 We need to turn the page, please.
10 A. Could you enlarge the print slightly, please.
11 Q. "The impact of their presence is that the present Serb leadership
12 in Knin who were difficult to deal with before, because of their
13 diversity and rather weak top leadership, may already be beginning to
14 lose control of their own side. A new leadership, marching to a
15 different drum, is already emerging."
16 Now I first want to ask you, do you agree with the
17 characterisation that there was a diversity, as it's described here, and
18 a weak top leadership in the RSK?
19 A. As I said previously, Your Honour, I'm not a politician and I'm
20 not going to go down that road. I don't know. I can't go into the
22 Q. Well, in respect of police matters did you observe that?
23 A. On policing side?
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. From the police side, there -- we have set out already that, you
1 know, there were difficulties, they didn't make -- we'd -- they didn't
2 follow through in investigations, they didn't report matters to it. They
3 didn't -- refused to carry out investigations. There were serious
4 deficiencies and indeed they had confided in us on occasions that when
5 the special police came into being the culprits in the situation, let's
6 put it that way, it was beyond their power, so to speak, to handle the
7 issue. These people were out of their control. And that presented them
8 with a clear difficult.
9 Now, looking at it from a police officer's point of view and
10 looking at the -- you know, you look at and say, "Well, if this is where
11 we are," you would be looking upwards to your authorities to say, "Well,
12 how do we solve this problem?" And Mr. Martic would have been there,
13 highest authority, at the highest level, and he was also the highest
14 authority for the special police. So I think honestly, if I was a police
15 officer there, I would be feeling that I was abandoned perhaps, in
16 certain circumstances. And, you know, there was another agenda, when it
17 arose, I didn't have control of it.
18 So, you know, there was a lack of -- I would think from a
19 policing point of view, they had a difficulty, and they declared: When
20 certain people are involved, we have a problem.
21 Q. Did you observe in Benkovac and Knin for that matter on -- and I
22 believe you testified it was on two occasions in the aftermath of the
23 attack that you were there, did you observe that there was an increasing
24 presence of what is described here as external elements?
25 A. When I returned the second time, that is the day we released our
1 monitors, the place was basically a military base. And while I was --
2 unaware of it on the day, I am aware that Arkan and his people were there
3 in the -- in the hotel. And perhaps to a degree were the controllers
4 within that group there. And, again, if we look at the policing side of
5 it, in that scenario, you had a police officer there who was held in the
6 highest esteem, I think, on all fronts, indeed in the community. He was
7 a man who showed professionalism, human sensitivity, and on the day he
8 became the hostage taker. And, you know, he had confided in our people
9 in advance that he was in this -- faced with this problem --
10 Q. Mr. McElligott, I will come back to that particular aspect of
12 A. Okay.
13 Q. Can we just go back now to page 1. And paragraph one says:
14 "We have kept headquarters fully informed of developments in the
15 area since 22 January 1993 when the Croatian government resorted to
16 unilateral use of force. Since then, despite various calls for a
17 cessation of operations, and assurances received, operations have
18 continued until late afternoon 28 January 1993, when the Peruca dam was
19 retaken by the Croatian army."
20 Were you aware - and you were following certainly events in
21 Benkovac --
22 A. Mm-hm.
23 Q. -- were you aware that the operation was continuing --
24 A. Oh yes.
25 Q. -- until -- through the 28th of January, at least?
1 A. Yes, I was conscious of the fact that it was an ongoing
3 MR. GOSNELL: This document is tendered, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D71, Your Honours.
6 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 01466, please, which is Defence
7 tab 32.
8 Q. This is from Jeannie Peterson and we had some discussion about
9 her during the direct examination to Mr. Thornberry. The date is 1st of
10 February, 1993. And I just want to look at a few parts of this fax.
11 Paragraph 1 says:
12 "At a meeting in Knin not so many days ago, shortly after the
13 surprise Croatian attack on Sector South, President Hadzic addressing
14 UNPROFOR's representatives said, You are our diplomacy. The Krajina
15 Serb, under UNPROFOR protection, are now appealing to UNPROFOR to ensure
16 that their side of the story is communicated and as Nambiar and
17 Thornberry have both told them, that is our responsibility."
18 Now, I want to ask you: In the area of policing, did you find
19 that the Serbs had difficulty, the Serb side, I'll say broadly, did they
20 have difficulty conveying their side of the events to the outside world?
21 And I ask you that question, sir, because you were observing them. You
22 were observing the events on the ground. You were able to appreciate the
23 nuances. Did you find that the Serb side was being fairly characterised
24 in the media, in general?
25 A. I think that they accepted themselves that they had an extremely
1 bad image. And in fact I remember going up to one of the negotiations
2 in -- in -- in Geneva -- in Vienna, actually, on the plane with one of
3 them, and we actually entered that area of discussion. And he -- his
4 attitude was almost one of -- almost why should we engage in PR because
5 our image is absolutely tainted. And we're -- we're -- you know, we're
6 seen as the villains and -- you know, like, he was that frank about it.
7 And that's how he saw it. And, in fact, I mentioned yesterday when I
8 went round to -- to finalise the negotiations on the release our --
9 policemen, the same issue arose about, you know, like, that the PR image
10 that was being put to them, that instead of going on to a PR response and
11 saying, "Look, this is what's happening to us," they turned the whole
12 thing against themselves and grabbed 20 policemen and turned the whole
13 international world against them. So -- and talking to the politician on
14 the plane, he had thrown in the towel in respect of PR and generating
15 their side of the story. They felt they were just the villains and they
16 had literally given up on it. That was the sad impression I got from
18 Q. There's a description in paragraph 3 of what's going on in this
19 area, or in Benkovac, Knin:
20 "However, the immense buildup of the last few days which now
21 appears to be completed, the recent inflow of volunteers from the FRY,
22 the presence of Dragan, Arkan, and his men, and the redeployment of
23 troops and artillery, appear to indicate that everything is ready for a
24 major confrontation. (According to one unconfirmed report they were
25 running out of buses in Belgrade to transport the volunteers for the
1 Krajina battle)."
2 Now, sir, did you hear that there were a large number of
3 volunteers, as they're characterised here, who were seeking to join this
5 A. Yes. There's no doubt there was an influx and it was building up
6 to what could be termed a full-scale -- an outbreak of war, let's put it
7 that way. And, again, that's -- that's what was facing us. How do you
8 stop it?
9 Q. Do you know where these volunteers were coming from?
10 A. Not specifically. But I would expect they would have been coming
11 from the east side from the Krajina, Bosnia, perhaps, from Serbia, I'm
12 not sure. But they were certainly coming from the outside.
13 Q. Paragraph 4. Again, this is Jeannie Peterson's report:
14 "The Knin authorities are extremely concerned and are under
15 tremendous pressure, and they urge the international community to move
16 fast, fast, to implement Resolution 802 in order to avoid a tragedy of
17 possibly momentous proportions."
18 Let me just stop there. Do you remember the Security Council in
19 response to this incursion by Croat forces ordered that they retreat?
20 A. We're back to the Vance Plan principal again, I'm sure here, of
21 halting conflict that's coming.
22 Q. No, Mr. McElligott. Let me just cut you off there and simplify.
23 A. Okay.
24 Q. Do you remember that the Security Council called upon Croat
25 forces to retreat after this offensive?
1 A. I don't specifically remember that, but I have no doubt that that
2 is the road they would be taking. Is looking for fallback.
3 Q. And then it -- this goes on, and we can turn the page now:
4 "They warn that the battle," and "they" is referring to the Knin
5 authorities, whoever that might be.
6 "They warn that the battle that may start in the very near future
7 could escalate to all of the UNPAs and then engulf all of the former
8 Yugoslavia, the Balkans, Europe, and/or even the world. On 31
9 January they asked Thornberry, as they had earlier asked the force
10 commander, if UNPROFOR is able to ensure the implementation of resolution
11 802. He replied that UNPROFOR could not accomplish this by force but the
12 political and diplomatic efforts are under way. In somber terms, they,"
13 and again this appears to be a reference back to the Knin authorities,
14 "They say that despite their disillusionment with the protection
15 capabilities of the UN, they still hope that the Security Council will
16 see to it that 802 is implemented."
17 Do you remember from the Serb side that that was a demand that
18 they were making in your -- in any of your discussions with the Serb
19 officials with whom you had contact at the time?
20 A. Could you just clarify for me 802 again, just to be -- is that
21 referring to the pink zones?
22 Q. Well, my understanding is that Resolution 802 - I don't think
23 there will be any controversy about this - was a resolution that called
24 for the withdrawal of Croat forces following this offensive.
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. So that's --
2 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... yeah, yeah, yeah.
3 Q. That's what 802 is.
4 A. Yeah. If it's a resolution that was agreed, and obviously it was
5 if it's a resolution of the UN, again, that's a foundation stone that
6 would have been laid and people would be looking to -- try and establish
7 it, yes.
8 Q. But what I'm asking you, and you, for example, had a conversation
9 with Mr. Spanovic and perhaps others, do you recall them mentioning that
10 as a matter of high priority as far as they were concerned and that
11 UNPROFOR should act accordingly?
12 A. I don't remember talking to them about it, but I certainly
13 remember it coming through in correspondence so for that -- you know, the
14 element of where are we going and what's going on, so I would be aware
15 that, you know, this type of talk and negotiation was taking place. So,
16 yes, it -- if it's an anchor that's there, I have no doubt it would be
17 drawn, to be utilised, and to be respected.
18 Q. Did you observe in your conversations, and I'm asking you a
19 general question now, and I ask you this because it appears implied in
20 some of what you said during your direct testimony, did you see that
21 there was a spectrum amongst the officials who you were dealing with in
22 Knin between moderates and more extreme elements?
23 A. There were. There was a difference, yeah.
24 Q. And --
25 A. The only two people I can refer to specifically are the two men I
1 mentioned yesterday, was Mr. Martinovic. I had met him, I think on -- I
2 met him on the night prior to this -- my first meeting with him on the
3 hostage talking, and I think he was seen as moderate, he was
4 approachable, and he was -- yeah, I would describe him as that. And
5 likewise in relation to the release of our monitors, Mr. Spanovic. I met
6 him on a prior occasion as well, and I always remembered the sense that
7 when I left him on the day - I met him with Jeannie Peterson - when I
8 left him on the day, you know, he -- you felt you could go back and talk
9 to this man again, and fortunately I had the opportunity to do so, and it
10 was clear, you know, we got on quite politely and well and he delivered
11 to us, something that, you know, I thought might be a very difficult
12 thing. So there was that moderation there and there was the capacity
13 within those people to do things, you know. That's one thing about them.
14 Q. Would you agree with me that these events, namely, the Croat
15 offensive and subsequently to that, their failure to the withdrawal, and
16 the failure of UNPROFOR to secure their withdrawal, did that undermine
17 the position of the moderates?
18 A. I have no doubt they stand back and look at the situation and it
19 has to generate some reaction from them. Yes, of course, I -- I expect
20 it would affect them.
21 Q. Paragraph 5 --
22 A. And despite that, I think they still held the moderation that was
23 within them, was it the part of their psyche, there were still people who
24 were amenable and disposable to us.
25 Q. Paragraph 5 says -- again, Jeannie Peterson in her report dated
1 1st of February, 1993:
2 "Their great sense of urgency may suggest that they," and again,
3 "they" is referring to these unidentified Knin authorities, "are worried
4 about something over which they do not have complete control. For
5 example when Zadar was shelled ... the second time, Spanovic said it had
6 not been ordered and was not authorised. Also, during a critical period
7 of time, re explosions that occurred add Peruca, Spanovic said he did not
8 have clear information about what was happening there. At Benkovac,
9 Arkan's Men said they would not take orders from Spanovic, Martic, or
10 Martinovic but only from Arkan."
11 Now that last comment, because you said something about this
12 during your testimony, is it true that Arkan said he wouldn't take orders
13 from these individuals. Did you hear that said?
14 A. I didn't hear it said but I was conscious of the fact that Arkan
15 was a forceful unit to be dealt with. That he carried a lot of power and
16 in my view in doing so he was doing it with the blessing of somebody.
17 The only point I can make on it, in relation to accountability,
18 Mr. Spanovic agreed to release our monitors. He told me that he would
19 have released -- he would have them with us at 8.00 the following
20 morning, and he contacted Benkovac and secured our release.
21 Now Arkan was the man in charge there at the time. Arkan called
22 down police monitor Mitchell, one of our monitors, and he gave him what I
23 would consider as a rather flippant reason for his release -- to release
24 the remaining ten monitors, so in that sense I would say he responded to
25 the requirements of Mr. Spanovic. Okay, it may have been a very simple
1 matter, but up to that point, we were not getting our monitors back.
2 So you know, I -- like -- what we're looking at, a simple issue
3 here. We're looking at political, military matters there. I'm not sure
4 how powerfully he exerted his power. But that being said, he was deemed
5 to be a formidable force.
6 Q. Ms. Peterson in this report appears to be saying that the Knin
7 authorities are very concerned about losing control. In your
8 conversations with Mr. Spanovic or anyone else, did you have the sense
9 that they were concerned about that?
10 A. We didn't get into that area of conversation, but I think that I
11 would also be conscious of the fact that there were greater powers to the
12 east who were probably still likely to influence the situation and engage
13 in it maybe so that the greater Serbia issue was somewhere in the
14 background as well. So that was a conscious thing. And you can see in
15 the earlier paragraphs where the escalation of the conflict could go up
16 to such a level and draw in those people, so it's being alluded to in
17 that report already.
18 Q. Was it also because there was a large influx of forces at this
19 time from the outside who were not and could not be brought under the
20 control of those authorities?
21 A. Well, I don't think it was a situation where everybody at a given
22 moment decided we're all going to go to Benkovac. I'm sure they went
23 there by direction. Whether it was at the behest of the Knin authorities
24 or not, I don't know. But that report on the basis of Jeannie Peterson's
25 assessment would indicate that it was presenting a difficulty. That
1 there may have a difficulty, that it was bigger than themselves, and it's
2 is alluded to there.
3 MR. GOSNELL: This document is tendered Mr. President.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D72, Your Honours.
6 MR. GOSNELL:
7 Q. Now, sir, I'd like to move away these questions about context,
8 and I'd now like to come specifically to what you have said about
10 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 05404, Prosecution tab 57.
11 Q. And, Mr. McElligott, this is your summary report on crimes
12 committed against Croats in Sector South. May I ask you, did you prepare
13 reports for other sectors or was this the only report of its kind that
14 you prepared?
15 A. That was the only one done at that point, yes.
16 Q. You say --
17 A. There may be others done subsequently. I don't know. I think --
18 I know that there was another one done in Sector South in respect of the
19 Serbian population who had become victims of crime and various other
20 serious assault.
21 Q. And this report covers a ten-month period; is that correct?
22 A. Yes, roughly. Yeah.
23 Q. And there on the cover page it says there were 497 crimes
24 committed during this -- or crime incidents committed during this
25 ten-month period. So that would be approximately 50 crime incidents per
1 month, correct?
2 A. Yeah.
3 Q. Do you know or have any idea as to the Croat population of
4 Sector South during this time? The total population.
5 A. I was aware of it at some point, yes. But now I have no idea.
6 Q. Do you have any idea or any statistics as to the total number of
7 crime incidents that occurred in Sector South during this same ten-month
9 A. No, I don't, Your Honour.
10 Q. Do you have any idea how many crime incidents were committed
11 against just the UN, UNPROFOR, during the ten-month period mentioned
13 A. They are all logged at some point, yeah. Every one of them, as
14 far as I can see it, are logged, yeah.
15 Q. For Sector South, was that in the hundreds?
16 A. I don't know. But I wouldn't go up to 100. Yeah, I don't think
18 Q. And my question should have been more precise. During this
19 ten-month period, namely, between May -- excuse me. August 1992 to the
20 31st of May, that ten-month period, I don't know whether there was report
21 that precisely mirrored this time-period for crime statistics against the
22 UN, but were there monthly reports of crime statistics against the UN?
23 A. Yeah. These would be recorded at headquarters, so they were
24 there in -- yeah, every incident coming in or situation report was coming
25 into headquarters and being recorded so that they were available, and
1 they would be consolidated in some fashion throughout the mission.
2 Q. And of the 497 crime incidents, 120 were committed by individuals
3 in uniforms. So that's just over 20 per cent, right?
4 A. In fact, I went back to that document again since and I have 490
5 is the figure I've come up with. One page was duplicated. And I think
6 there were one or two then where it started on the bottom line with
7 one -- and was -- and was missed or so forth.
8 There were suspects seen at -- not seen as -- 490 suspects were
9 seen at in the case of militia in uniform, 39 people in other uniforms,
10 97 -- and I think it's 135 where suspects would be deemed to be civilian,
11 let's put it that way. And the other remaining groups, there is no
12 evidence to indicate who the suspect was.
13 Q. Mr. McElligott, those numbers didn't appear to have come through
14 quite correctly. Could you please just lean forward and -- and, sorry,
15 just repeat those numbers again?
16 A. The figures I -- the figure I'm putting forward from this report
17 is that there were a total of 490 crime incidents recorded. Within that,
18 39 of the incident reports are apply to people what described as militia
19 or in uniform, or policing uniform. And another 97 are people in
20 military uniform or other uniform. And I think it's 135 in what I would
21 refer to as civilian attire. And in the balance, there is no indication
22 of who the suspect was.
23 Q. Well, those numbers don't add up quite perfectly to 120, but
24 let's not detain ourselves with that. Is it correct that somewhat more
25 than two-thirds of those who were identified as having been perpetrators
1 wearing uniforms were in what would be described as regular military
3 A. I put the forward 97. You can work out the percentages by
4 yourselves, but I've -- 97 is the figure I have and 39 in the other case,
5 and I think it's 135.
6 Q. And during your testimony at 5977, you said 48 per cent of the
7 perpetrators were seen at the -- seen at the scene of the crime. Is that
8 figure correct?
9 A. We should take those figures, the ones I have again you. They're
10 the figures -- I -- I'm going on my memory here, but I do have it.
11 Q. So more than half of these crimes of the 497 were not seen at the
12 scene of the crime, correct?
13 A. I think so, yes.
14 Q. Now, does that mean that since many -- well, let me just ask
15 first: Are most of these reports based on information provided by the
17 A. Well, in the case of murder you don't have a victim but there
18 would be other witnesses, and the victims where there is a robbery, a
19 burglary, whatever, you know, where the party is present, you have a
20 description from them.
21 Q. Well, leaving aside murder, are the reports in this report based
22 primarily or if not exclusively on information provided in whole or in
23 part by the victims?
24 A. In general I would say as being provided by the victims or
25 perhaps an independent witness in the locality.
1 Q. So that means that if I follow the train of thought, in about
2 half of these cases, the victims were not present when the crime was
4 A. Somewhere in that region, yeah.
5 Q. And I presume those would primarily be property crimes such as
6 theft or what's characterised as looting, possibly arson; is that
8 A. They are specifically referred to, yes, and in general, I would
9 think, yes.
10 Q. And am I correct in understanding that in this report where the
11 perpetrator is not identified in one way or another, that means that the
12 complainant or the victim or whatever other witness may have been present
13 was not able to positively identify the person?
14 A. Yes.
15 MR. GOSNELL: Could we go to page 29 of e-court, please, of this
17 Q. Now the reason I asked you that last question, Mr. McElligott,
18 is -- and this page is, I think, fairly representative of many pages in
19 the report, where we see a reference to -- as in the first, second,
20 fifth, sixth, and seventh entries on this page, it says armed/uniformed
21 men forced or armed/uniformed men committed, whatever crime. But in none
22 much these cases is there -- or does there appear to be a specific
23 identification of a perpetrator.
24 Am I right in understanding that all these cases there's been an
25 identification of the attire of the person but no identification of the
1 identity, the specific identity of the perpetrator?
2 A. In general that would be the case. I think there are a few
3 instances where a person is named. But, in general, it would be
4 referring to them as wearing a uniform.
5 Q. Now, uniforms were very widespread in this area, I believe you'd
6 agreed with me, amongst everyone, the adult male population at the least.
7 That's true certainly for regular military uniforms. Can you tell us
8 whether there were also blue uniforms that were available at large for
9 anyone to purchase?
10 A. I'm not aware of them being aware in that fashion, but I think
11 there are one or two reports both in the military and in our own reports
12 suggesting our -- saying that blue uniforms were being given out --
13 readily given out to people whom I would consider had no training
14 whatsoever in a policing background, but they were being provided. I'm
15 not -- I'm not aware of a situation where they were being sold on or
16 whatever, but they were being given out. We have a couple of reports
17 where that is shown.
18 MR. GOSNELL: Could we go to page 49, please, in e-court.
19 Q. If we could look at the third entry down, focus on the third
20 entry down.
21 A. Could you enlarge, please.
22 Q. It's P2-114/92. The crime is theft of livestock. And the
23 summary says:
24 "Four milicija men stole the victim's sheep."
25 Now can you tell from looking at that whether that's an inference
1 based on the fact that they were wearing milicija uniforms or can you say
2 whether they were positively identified as milicija members?
3 A. I can only read it on the basis of what it says there and they're
4 describing then as milicija men. You again have the victim making the
5 report who has lived in the community, who would have a good knowledge of
6 who the people in a general sense are. He may not know everybody but he
7 has referred to them as being in this uniform, so that's the starting
8 point you have for your information.
9 Q. You can't say one way or the other whether these individuals
10 were --
11 A. The investigation --
12 Q. Just let me finish. Whether these individuals were merely seen
13 wearing the uniforms or whether they were identified as members of the
15 A. This is where the investigation should produce some results and
16 that was a matter for the local police.
17 Q. Is the answer to my question yes?
18 A. As I say, it's open-ended at that point. The facts have not been
19 fully established. All we have is the initial report.
20 Q. Well, I'm not talking about police processes here. I'm just
21 talking about trying to understand the content of your report. And --
22 and -- and what we can understand it to mean. And, sir, I suggest to you
23 that unless you have some further information --
24 A. I'm --
25 Q. It appears to me that it's not clear looking at this entry
1 whether the individuals are identified or whether they merely were seen
2 wearing these uniforms.
3 A. I would say that based on what's stated there, they were not
4 identified in name. If they were, I expect they would be named, and
5 there may be reports where they are actually named.
6 Q. Can you say anything at all looking at that third entry about the
7 motive of the perpetrator or perpetrators?
8 A. There are two elements to it. One is the victim. It's a source
9 of food and so forth and continuity of keeping his stock. On the other
10 side, you ask why do they take that away from them, people in uniform,
11 one would expect better things they, and let's take it in the context
12 that they are police.
13 And the other end of the scale is you have people, living
14 conditions were quite horrific there was -- there was lack of food, so
15 people had little to eat as well. So you have a number of social issues
16 surrounding the crimes committed, and on one side you have the victim who
17 has little, and the other side who knows on the basis of what we see.
18 Q. Well, precisely. Who knows on the basis of what we see.
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. Would you agree with me that there's not enough information there
21 to draw an inference about the motive or motives of those four
23 A. It's a crime report, it's setting out the preliminary element of
24 the report which CIVPOL established. That in turn would be conveyed to
25 the police for investigation or indeed they may have given it to us.
1 There were occasions where they did provide. So that could quite easily
2 be the case too. So this is where you look for follow-up on
3 investigations to see what were the full facts of what's going on. But
4 there is a victim there.
5 Q. I fully understand that, sir, and I'm not suggesting otherwise.
6 All I'm asking is: Based on the information in your report, based on
7 this description, based on the fact that it's a -- a theft, you can't
8 draw an inference that the motive behind this crime was ethnic abuse or
9 discrimination, can you?
10 A. I think if you look at it as just one single crime incident and
11 say you want me to make a decision on that, I would say you can't. But
12 when looking at the full picture, and you see a community who have had
13 numerous incidents of people in uniform, of one fashion or the other,
14 stealing their goods, killing them, burning down houses, I think you
15 would look at it in another light again. And as a police force, you
16 would have to ask yourself how do we respond to this problem? There is
17 what is clearly a problem bigger than just crime or individual crimes,
18 and I think you have to look at a carpet approach to how you approach
19 that. So it's not --
20 Q. Well, Mr. McElligott, I'm not asking you about the proper
21 policing response. I'm asking you what we can infer based on the
22 information in the report.
23 A. On the single report what you have is a preliminary report from a
24 victim, and basically they're saying this is what I have, this is what I
25 saw. An investigation process which would broaden out into the
1 community, find other witnesses who could identify the individual
2 concerned, and you may say, yes, he was a member of the milicija, or he
3 was not a member of the milicija. So this is where investigation -- and
4 by conducting proper investigations, you can go back to your community
5 and show the facts to them and build their confidence and say, we are
6 with you, and, you know, this report, the individual concerned, is not a
7 member of our police force or a member of the authority of this state.
8 And, you know, that's all part of the confidence building that will take
9 place from a police point of view. You know, nothing about it, you know,
10 it's just abandoning.
11 Q. You wouldn't say, would you, that merely because the victim is
12 identified as Croat that a crime of theft, for example, would be
13 motivated by ethnic animosity?
14 A. Indeed it could.
15 Q. That wasn't my question. It wasn't whether it could. It was
16 whether you would necessarily draw that inference?
17 A. On a single incident, no. But when you take the overall profile
18 of crime occurring in your area, you have to look at it and say what is
19 going on here? Do we have a specific problem, and how do we address it?
20 And I think you have to -- you have to stand back and approach the
21 situation on that basis. But if you have a single crime you may keep an
22 eye on it, but you don't call out the biggest response to it at that
23 particular point.
24 Q. There's no doubt there is a broader context. I'm not suggesting
25 that should be ignored from a policing perspective. What I'm simply
1 suggesting to you is isn't it very possible that there were individuals
2 who were opportunists, took advantage of the situation in order to steal
3 sheep because not only were crimes taking place against Croats but
4 because there was general situation of insecurity. Isn't that extremely
6 A. I think it's quite frank to say that no matter what is going on,
7 you would have an element of criminal activity. And taking the
8 circumstances, as you mentioned, I have no doubt you would have another
9 percentage who would exploit that situation. I think that would be quite
10 realistic to say. But then have you another situation that is left
11 behind that has to be addressed as well.
12 Q. Would you agree that a large percentage of the criminality that
13 occurred was simply beyond the milicija's ability, and I'm speaking here
14 about the 7.000, the regular police, was simply beyond their capacity to
15 control or punish?
16 A. I think from a prevention point of view, and if you go back to
17 that police force, and they have to face the issue on the basis of the
18 Vance Plan that they only carry side-arms, and when they find themselves
19 in a situation that there's a crime scale of a proportion that is
20 presenting us with a difficulty, they would have to look upwards towards
21 their authorities to say, you know, here we are, there's a crime problem
22 in our area, there's a specific element -- problem attached to it, and we
23 need additional support. And when I say that, I am not talking about
24 fire-arm arms. I'm talking about -- what we would a term a government
25 response. And if I can refer back to my own particular country in kind
1 of putting into some sense of context, my country, my police force, is an
2 unarmed police force and was from the formation of the state and still
3 is. Our police officers do not carry fire-arms. And indeed, when it was
4 formed, the commissioner of the day, and if I might quote it for, just
5 put it in there, is that he stated that our force would not succeed by
6 force of arms or people but under moral authority of -- of the officers
7 who will act as servants of the community, and he made them an unarmed
9 Over the years we had confronted political issues, we met with
10 serious crime, our government responded, and they introduced such a thing
11 as a the special criminal court. Normally we would have a trial by jury.
12 They brought in a three-judge court and dealt with the problem. It
13 assisted with witnesses, there were no juries, and it was an effective
14 way of handle that crisis.
15 Subsequently we met with organised crime and a serious drug
16 issue. They again responded with mechanisms such as criminal assets
17 bureau, went down to seize the assets of criminals. So, you know, the
18 policemen on the ground, you -- how -- you can't put too much blame on
19 them to a degree when you look at the scale of what's going on. Upwards
20 is where management and indeed government has to respond to protect its
21 police force and protect the community. So they may have felt abandoned
22 at that point, to a degree. That's on -- on -- on the -- the -- the
23 strategic end. But on a day-to-day basis there were also problems.
24 Q. Let me -- let me -- let me ask a different and perhaps a slightly
25 less subjective question. Would you agree that it would be unfair to say
1 that most of the regular police were themselves engaged in criminal
3 A. Of the regular police? Oh, no.
4 Q. Correct, the regular police.
5 A. The regular police in general we had regarded them as
6 professional police officers, and in fairness we met some very fine
7 people. There is no doubt about that. We have already alluded to that
8 man in Benkovac. He was one of the finest officers you could meet.
9 Q. And according to what you just told us, taking your Sector South
10 report as a point of reference, there were only 39 incidents where people
11 were even identified as wearing a milicija uniform, correct?
12 A. Yeah. I'm not -- I think in fairness to them these are what we
13 would refer to as the special police, not what I would call the 7.000
14 group. And I -- you know, we have to be fair. There might be one or two
15 incidents there where they did engage in incidents, but they are small.
16 I can considered them to be quite okay.
17 Now they had difficulties within themselves in -- okay they --
18 they may not -- I touched on them earlier where they didn't let us know
19 of crimes, they failed to investigate at times, and, indeed, you know,
20 they down right refused to investigate. And there are instances of
21 murder there where they just did nothing. And, you know --
22 Q. Sir, Mr. McElligott, just for the transcript if you could speak a
23 little bit more slowly.
24 A. Okay.
25 Q. That would be helpful. But thank you very much for that answer.
1 Perhaps we could look at -- usefully at some documents.
2 Could we have 1335, please. Prosecution tab 14.
3 This is a briefing about UNCIVPOL Sector South. It's a monthly
4 report I presume for October because the date is the 2nd of November,
5 1992. And if we could just turn over to page 3. General zone B down
6 there towards the bottom:
7 "The a/m incidents show that the violations of human rights
8 continues. The local milicija seems to be unable to protect people. As
9 far as we know, not many night patrols are carried out. However,
10 milicija have promised to increase patrolling in some villages."
11 Now first, what is a/m?
12 A. Where is the --
13 Q. There's an a/m?
14 A. You're at zone B? Sorry, apologies. It's gone. Could you
15 enlarge it, please. Okay. I have it. Yeah.
16 Zone -- you mean zone B?
17 Q. Yes, yes.
18 A. The a/m incidents. These must be -- I'd say the morning
19 incidents. Is it -- you know, these are probably reports.
20 Q. Now was there any particular difficulty for the police in
21 engaging in night patrols?
22 A. Night patrols are standard procedures in policing. And indeed
23 our own monitors did engage in night patrols. Again, you have to ask
24 yourselves the question with them, what was their standing in -- in a
25 community, what would the response of the people be to them, and they
1 would have to be considered. You could end up in a situation where they
2 may not feel safe to go out themselves. So that can be a factor as well.
3 But, you know, you've got to go back to the roots and say, How can we
4 change that? And this, again, is back to your management and your higher
5 authority in creating an environment will bring about real policing.
6 Q. Although even that higher authority might not be in a position to
7 put in place all of the conditions for what you would describe as
8 successful policing; isn't that right?
9 A. I think if you look at some of the reports of, say, people in
10 milicija uniform causing the problem, you know, if -- as an organisation
11 can head off that end of it, and head off of uniformed element of the
12 crime, you know, you will solve a lot of the problem. You will also be
13 sending a very positive message to the community that, you know, we are
14 supporting you as a community and are with you rather than being seen
15 within the community as part of the problem, and I think that if --
16 Q. Can I go back -- sorry to cut you off. Can I go back to a
17 question that I asked you earlier about the numbers, the relatively small
18 number of individuals in uniforms who were identified by either the
19 victims or other witnesses. Now, what does it tell you as a policeman
20 that even though you have -- as you testified, a high percentage of
21 individuals who were spotted at the crime scene but relatively few who
22 managed to be identified by the victims or other witnesses? What does
23 that tell but those perpetrators?
24 A. If you are -- well, what you have is an established community,
25 and you have people functioning within it that they do not know,
1 certainly. And what you have and what we started with in this mission
2 was a group of 16.000 who were put into uniforms and literally let free
3 within the territory. So they were not known. But their uniform was
4 known to the community and, indeed I would say, perhaps terrorised by it.
5 And I think I've been quite frank when I said that.
6 Q. Does it suggest to you that the soldiers or the individuals
7 wearing the uniform came from outside those communities where the crimes
8 were committed?
9 A. The special police we talk about were put in there by the
10 authorities of the day and are shown as being under Milan Martic. So,
11 you know, that is a group that there were in there. And they were a
12 problem and indeed the policemen themselves responsible for law and order
13 indicated to our monitors that they were a problem. And when they were
14 brought to book, so to speak, they still presented a problem in the sense
15 that they could not deal with them. So that reflected back into the
16 community. And you can see how it impacted on them.
17 MR. GOSNELL: Could we go to 1502, please. Prosecution tab 27.
18 Q. This is a sitrep. It's coming up on the screen in front of you.
19 It could even be in your binder as 1502.
20 A. If you enlarge it. It's quite okay. Yeah.
21 Q. And at page 1, item 1, under operations --
22 A. Could -- could you enlarge, please.
23 Q. And the date of this is the 22nd of February, 1993. So this is
24 about a month after the Croatian offensive on Benkovac.
25 "CIVPOL monitors from Kistanje, accompanied by local milicija,
1 visited the village Madrino Selo and found 16 Croats living in a hut
2 which is TDF/milicija post. It was also learned that about 42 other
3 Croats are making their way to this place."
4 Would you agree that this seems to be an occasion where the local
5 population is apparently take refuge at a Territorial Defence or a
6 milicija post, as it's described here?
7 A. It seems that they have left their homes anyway. They're
8 [indiscernible] could I refer back to it? Are they -- they're referred
9 to as Croatian, are they?
10 Q. 16 Croats and then 42 other Croats?
11 A. Croats, yeah. So they with taking refuge there, yes. That
12 would -- read on until we see the full context of it.
13 Q. So at least in this case this is a circumstance where the local
14 Croat population trusts the milicija or the Territorial Defence enough to
15 seek their protection, right?
16 A. It doesn't say if there are others there. They say the CIVPOL
17 monitors accompanied by the milicija went there and found them at what I
18 would say as a vacant post other than the fact that they themselves are
19 occupying it. Is that the -- I think that's the way it's coming, is it.
20 The conditions are horrible. They're cold, hungry. So it seems that
21 they just found this place to take refuge.
22 Q. You would infer from this, this is an abandoned TDF/milicija post
23 and that that is where these Croats have sought refuge?
24 A. I don't see any reference to other people being present on the
25 basis of what I read. So I don't know. It's not saying that there is
1 anybody else there.
2 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 01478, please. It's Prosecution
3 tab 25.
4 Q. This is dated the 8th of February, 1993. It's from UNCIVPOL HQ,
5 Sector South. Daily situation report.
6 MR. GOSNELL: If we could go to page 3.
7 Q. Second paragraph:
8 "A common problem at present is that local Croats are still being
9 forced out of their houses and apartments by both newly arriving refugees
10 and local opportunists. Local authorities appear powerless to stop
12 Let me just stop there. Do you know that there were newly
13 arriving refugees to the area who posed a particular threat to law and
15 A. There was a sequence of people coming into the sector from
16 outside areas and they did displace Croatian people, yes. I think we
17 have it in Sector East and there was some in Sector South, and I think
18 that was part of a fallout following the Benkovac situation. I think
19 there was almost a double hit of people being moved. That one crowd was
20 displaced and their houses were occupied by one group and when they moved
21 forward they displaced group of other people. So that was -- yeah, that
23 Q. And would you agree, based on what you observed, that in many
24 cases local authorities were powerless to stop the hostile intentions and
25 acts of those individuals?
1 A. Again, you're back to how you respond to the greater problem.
2 What is your policy on housing? How do you look after the people who are
3 already in the house? Somebody has to say how do we deal with this
4 problem. And, you know, if -- if somebody takes over my house tomorrow
5 morning and they call the police, I don't expect that they would say to
6 me, you can't go back in there but we will send you somewhere else. So
7 that type of situation is there and the displacing was taking place and
8 it did present a problem. No doubt about that.
9 Q. And did the milicija continue to provide UNCIVPOL with
10 information about the crimes that were taking place in the areas under
11 their jurisdiction?
12 A. They did provide information and there were occasions when they
13 didn't provide it. We found it out for ourselves and went to them with
14 it. And there were occasions where the victims perhaps would have never
15 gone to them because of the policing style at the time. So you had all
16 those situations there.
17 Q. Would you say that the vast majority of reports -- of crimes, for
18 example, that appear in your report, did those -- did that information
19 originate from the regular police, the 7.000?
20 A. I think the reports tend to indicate whether it was given to them
21 by the milicija or the police or that they had brought it to them. I
22 think the overall situation reports would reflect some of that in them.
23 Now the specifics. You had a two-way traffic in that.
24 MR. GOSNELL: I see the clock, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Indeed, Mr. Gosnell.
1 Mr. McElligott, this is our second break. We'll come back at
2 12.45. The court usher will escort you out of the courtroom.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
5 [The witness stands down]
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
7 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.
9 [The accused not present]
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Stringer, about your request to sit on the
11 5th, Friday, the 5th of July, unfortunately, there is no courtroom
12 available on that day. Is there a particular problem with your -- with
13 your planning for that week?
14 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 If we could briefly go into private session. That may I with
16 perhaps mention some names without --
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Private session, please.
18 [Private session]
11 Pages 6105-6106 redacted. Private session.
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. McElligott, sorry for the delay. We had some
15 procedural matters to take care of.
16 Mr. Gosnell, please proceed.
17 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 01383, please, which is Defence
18 tab 31.
19 Q. Mr. McElligott, coming up on the screen in front of you will be a
20 memo from -- or a letter from Nambiar to Goulding dated the 30th of
21 November, 1992. Subject: "Discussion with Knin Authorities."
22 MR. GOSNELL: If we could go to page 3, please.
23 Q. "The visit ended today with a two-hour tour and CIVPOL briefing
24 in the fraught Benkovac area, wherein there have recently been a number
25 of especially nasty murders and ambushes, most of which quite probably
1 have been committed by Croat infiltrators and others. A quite
2 understandable though not defensible process of destabilisation by the
3 Croats seems to focus on Benkovac as well as one or two other areas in
4 the pink zones."
5 Now, Mr. McElligott, I believe you've already given some
6 testimony about infiltrators, so I'm not going to go back and ask to you
7 repeat that. What I would like to know, however, first, is: Were you a
8 participant in this CIVPOL briefing that's referred to here?
9 A. I'm familiar with what is mentioned here, very much so.
10 Q. And can you help us understand how far behind the confrontation
11 line these murders took place? How far -- how far on the Croat -- on the
12 Serb side of the confrontation line did these events take place?
13 A. They came in -- in -- in distance, I am not sure, but they
14 were -- would be regarded as very serious incursions, yes.
15 Q. And how did this affect the activities of the Serbian milicija,
16 and by that, I mean the regular police, in this area, if at all?
17 A. There was a heightening of tensions there and the Serbian
18 police -- I think Benkovac were particularly impacted on because in --
19 our own monitors set up patrols in the area, and I think again they had
20 the assistance of -- I think the Kenyan Battalion were there in that area
21 at the time. There was a liaison I know with the local chief of the
22 milicija as well. And things were brought under control to some degree,
23 but there were -- there were repercussions and on the other side that
24 there were other people attacked as well. So you had a reaction to the
25 activities. So it was a tit-for-tat kind of scenario.
1 Q. Did -- did the extent of their patrolling, to take a specific
2 example, decrease?
3 A. In that specific area, I'm not sure in that specific moment of
4 time, but their patrolling was up and down. It would vary.
5 MR. GOSNELL: This document is tendered Mr. President.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D73, Your Honours.
8 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 01277, please. And I've sent the
9 Prosecution an e-mail about this document, even though it doesn't appear
10 on our list.
11 Q. And this is -- if we can go to page 3, this is an out-going
12 crypto-cable from Nambiar to Vance dated 26th September, 1992. And in
13 item 2 down there at the bottom, it says:
14 "We are still in a military phase, step 3 in the pink zone. Pink
15 zones are presently controlled by militia which is organised in military
16 units, heavily armed. The behaviour of the militia in the pink zone
17 responds to orders received from Knin to prevent Knin -- to prevent any
18 return process without RSK clearance. The impression is that the trend
19 is increasingly towards a situation of anarchy. Some local commanders
20 seem ready to take initiatives to react towards any sign of Croatian
21 presence in the pink zone."
22 Did you sense that, in some area, let's say the pink areas, there
23 was a situation of anarchy?
24 A. I wouldn't describe it as anarchy in that sense, but there was
25 that group of -- what I refer to in general terms as the special police
1 who were functioning, I would say, with a free hand. And I think, you
2 know, that is reflecting that to some degree there, and it is suggesting
3 that they are not under control, but I don't accept that to be exactly
4 the case. They certainly ran with a free hand.
5 Q. Well, there might be a distinction between a free hand and acting
6 on their own initiative.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Did you observe that there were some elements of the special
9 police who took it upon themselves to act on their own initiative in
10 various ways?
11 A. I don't have experience of it but I would expect that with that
12 looseness of scope that the boundaries would be extended by individuals.
13 Q. Let's go back, if we could, to the last document, 1383.
14 If we go to page 2, paragraph 6. Again, this is from Nambiar to
15 Goulding, dated 30th of November, 1992.
16 "We kept clear of displaced persons' issues on this occasion and
17 said little about disarmament. But Spanovic volunteered that they were
18 making a very big effort to clean up their act by arresting their bandits
19 and making life hot for their gangsters, especially in Sector East."
20 Now, first of all, would you agree that the authorities viewed
21 those who were committing crimes as bandits and gangsters. In short,
22 they viewed them as criminals, didn't they?
23 A. We certainly referred to -- we're talking about specifically --
24 if we're talking about Arkan, yes. He would be a person with a criminal
25 background and behaved in that way. And he was operating in the area, I
1 would say, with a degree of -- of approval. And it -- this would suggest
2 that they are now approaching this problem with a view to taking some
3 sanctions in the matter.
4 Q. Well, you don't know that they were acting with their approval
5 when they were commits crimes, do you?
6 A. I think their activities were well known. Like, it was -- let's
7 put it this way: When they were in the area, they established a control.
8 Their presence alone had an impact, and if they are -- the governing
9 authorities of that area didn't realise that, I think they would be blind
10 to reality.
11 Q. Well, it goes on:
12 "Clearly very sensitive to this matter, now, he agreed precisely
13 with our analysis, and felt the 'decline into anarchy' line we have been
14 publicly taking could destroy any residual credibility they may have.
15 Colleagues confirm that they are indeed attempting to crack down on at
16 least some of their thugs and that the serious crime rate has dropped
18 Is that true? Is that what happened?
19 A. Again, I would need to look at the crime figures for that time.
20 But it's indicated there that that is the case, and if it's going from
21 one senior UN official to the other, I expect the background research
22 would have been done to substantiate what they are say.
23 Q. Well, you were monitoring the crime figures --
24 A. Well, I am --
25 Q. -- was that --
1 A. You're asking me for a specific period of time 20 years later. I
2 don't have the facts in front of me now. But what I would say is that
3 those writing the report would have had access to relevant information at
4 the time of writing.
5 Q. Considering that the RSK authorities under the Vance Plan were
6 not supposed to be in possession of any armed forces with long barrels,
7 how do you suggest that they would have put under arrest an armed group
8 of 100 people who did have such long barrels and who were well armed?
9 Were they capable of doing that?
10 A. This again goes back to the core issue of starting the Vance
11 Plan, and we are now getting to a signal that that may happen. In
12 reality, I think you will get 90 per cent or perhaps in that region who
13 will go -- go with the plan and you will demilitarise. You're then going
14 to be left with a hard-core group. And, in reality, they will -- can
15 cause you continuing difficulties. And, at that point again, you're back
16 down to disarming and dealing with that issue. And you may have to mete,
17 at that point, a response that is effective.
18 And, again, going back to what I said this morning, it is
19 bringing all the pillars of the criminal justice system into play, to
20 bring a final measure and a control measure to the most extreme ends of
21 it. And I suppose, in reality, you will always be left with an extreme
22 percentage, no matter how good your system is.
23 Q. Thank you. Could we have 01344, please. Defence tab 29.
24 The cover sheet is from Nambiar to Goulding dated the 9th of
25 November, 1992. The attachment is a letter -- we've seen a different
1 letter of this type, but this is a -- not the same one. From Zecevic to
2 Nambiar; Zecevic writing as the president of the State Committee for
3 Co-operation with UNPROFOR.
4 And if we turn to page 3 in e-court of the document. Again,
5 there is a -- Zecevic telling Nambiar that there are responsibilities
6 that, in his view, are not going carried out by UNPROFOR. And then at --
7 but what I'm interested in is the end, where he says:
8 "At the same time, armed groups which might eventually be seen on
9 the terrain are outside of the composition of our militia units and are
10 presenting to us at this moment a bigger problem than they are to you."
11 Now the question that I simply have for you is: Did you see
12 indications that there were elements of the milicija that were out of the
13 control of the government?
14 A. That is -- there was a group, as I mentioned, who ran with a free
15 hand, and I suppose when you allow a situation like that to happen, they
16 become an unaccountable group that you are now left having to face the
17 monster yourself; the one that you created on the first day. And that's
18 where they perhaps have found themselves at that point.
19 So -- but it does indicate that they are coming around, starting
20 to address the issues and, you know, I think that you could sense a door
21 opening to getting back to the beginning of the Vance Plan again, so
22 that, you know, the -- the serious issues are there, and they realise
23 they have big problems.
24 And it doesn't mean it's impossible to address it. It will be
25 difficult. But there will be means. And the UN is there to enhance
1 witness support them in addressing that issue in an appropriate way.
2 Q. Now, yesterday at page 6007, you were discussing the chain of
3 command in the police, and I want to ask you some questions about what
4 you understood the chain of command in the police to be.
5 And you said: "You have the police functioning as a police
6 force, and, at station or opstina level, they are a role, and their line
7 of command, as I would see it, to the ultimate height is Milan Martic."
8 Now before we get to Milan Martic, can I ask: Was that statement
9 exclusively in respect of the 7.000, the regular police force, so to
11 A. The regular police force, as I've seen on the chart, goes to him.
12 But I understand as well that, say, within a sector, as the UNPAs
13 are set out, there was what I would see as a regional headquarters as
14 well. So that perhaps a number of opstinas came within its remit. And
15 then you went to what would be the government level of control.
16 Q. Now, in the Vance Plan, and we don't need to turn to it, but at
17 paragraph 19, it says: "The local police forces would be responsible to
18 the existing opstina councils in the UNPAs."
19 Now I'm not saying that that's exclusively the managerial
20 hierarchy, but I want to ask you: What did you observe on the ground?
21 Can you help us understand what was the relative respective
22 responsibility of the opstina versus the RSK in respect of the regular
24 A. My recollection is that the mayor of the opstina played a role in
25 the management element of the policing and, indeed, on occasions, would
1 sit in on meetings so that he had in an authoritative role somewhere in
2 the system. It was designed to function on an opstina basis.
3 But overriding that, then you have the regional area. So you're
4 carrying basically the same philosophy of policing across a greater area
5 and, ultimately, the entire territory.
6 Q. And that would be Milan Martic with ultimate responsibility at
7 the regional level; correct?
8 A. Yes. He is recorded as being the person there at the
10 Q. And that's both for the regular police and the special police;
12 A. Correct [indiscernible].
13 Q. And am I right in saying that the only two interlocutors of
14 UNPROFOR on the Serb side at the regional level were Mr. Martic or
15 Mr. Prijic? Ilija Prijic.
16 A. Mr. Prijic featured quite frequently in Sector South, and I think
17 I have alluded to him in the sense that Hakun Jufors, the Swedish sector
18 commander following K. G. Andersson, established pretty good
19 relationships with him, and they did improve things at, say -- you could
20 take Sector East, there would have been contacts at the regional level as
21 well, with the police heads there.
22 And, indeed, I remember reading one report where there was a
23 particular difficulty in a particular area. I think it was referred to a
24 mafia operating in that particular area. The regional police did join
25 with the local police in taking on the issue. And our monitors were part
1 of developing that initiative.
2 Q. And that's Martic at the top of that regional
3 structure [Overlapping speakers] ...
4 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... of the -- what I would call the
5 national level of it; let's put that way.
6 Q. And that's Martic?
7 A. That's Martic.
8 Q. Have you seen any documents addressed to Mr. Hadzic about police
10 A. There was a number of documents sent to Mr. Martic. I think we
11 have alluded to them along the way, but -- [Overlapping speakers] ...
12 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ... sorry, I --
13 A. [Overlapping speakers] ...I -- I --
14 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ...I think the question was --
15 A. Okay --
16 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ...the question was misunder -- yeah, may
17 not have been heard correctly.
18 A. Okay.
19 Q. What I am saying to you is, you haven't seen any documents
20 addressed to Mr. Hadzic about what I would call bread-and-butter law
21 enforcement issues; correct?
22 A. A number of letters were sent to him, and some were presented
23 here. But if you're asking me specifically on policing, I would need to
24 go through the letters again to just clear my mind on it.
25 Q. From what you can recall, Martic was the --
1 A. But he was the -- he was the person that one would look at for
3 Q. And you don't know what the managerial control or political
4 control was of Martic in the structure of the RSK, do you?
5 A. All I can say is that he what I would have considered part of
6 that parliament at that point.
7 Q. I want to ask you a few questions about the hostage taking.
8 Was the hotel, by all outward appearances where the monitors were
9 held, by all outward appearances, was that a civilian structure?
10 A. Oh, yes, absolutely.
11 Q. Did it appear that way throughout the period of the so-called
12 hostage taking?
13 A. On closer view, once it was filled with troops, there would be
14 visibility [indiscernible]. As I say, when I arrived on the day, you
15 could sense there is another presence here by what you saw in the car
16 park. So that would be the biggest visible feature. There was also the
17 installation of communication aerials on the roof. That would be part of
19 Q. Did you see those aerials yourself?
20 A. I didn't see them, but I was made aware of them being there.
21 Q. And how big and how visible were they?
22 A. As I say, I didn't see them but I was made aware of them being
23 there. So if you're -- aerials can vary in size, depending on the scale
24 of your range of communication.
25 Q. And a civilian hotel might have an aerial; correct?
1 A. It could.
2 Q. So, from a distance, there was no indication that the hotel had
3 become a military installation; correct?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Well, that being the case, why do you say that the Serbs were
6 holding them there as shields for a military location, if there was no
7 outward indication that, indeed, it was a military location?
8 A. One has also got to factor in the sense that those engaged in
9 these activities will also have intelligence to give them the fuller
10 picture of what is on the ground. And that is, I have no doubt, a
11 reality of anybody carrying out a policing function or, I'm sure, a
12 military function, is that intelligence-gathering is vital. So I would
13 be rather naive if I thought that the opposition didn't know a certain
14 amount about me.
15 Q. Did some --
16 A. I saw that as an extreme -- as a very serious risk, risk to our
17 people, and I raised the matter with Cedric Thornberry to take it up with
18 the Croatian government.
19 Q. Did someone on the Serb side tell you that it was there -- the
20 purpose of them being held there was to serve as human shields?
21 A. The police monitor who was given the job of taking them hostage,
22 and I said to him -- I said before he was a very honourable man. He told
23 them that they were going to be taken hostage and -- so that was the
25 Q. Well, being taken hostage -- and I don't think I'm splitting
1 hairs here. But being taken hostage or detained or being restricted from
2 free movement is one thing. Being used as a human shield is quite
3 another. Wouldn't you agree?
4 A. That is what they were being used for. They were put onto the
5 top floor, or the third floor, and that was what they were for. And we
6 had other intelligence to say that would happen in respect of other
7 installations, if they came under attack. It didn't stand alone on this
8 particular instance.
9 Q. Let's come back to my question. Did someone on the Serb side
10 tell you that they were being used as human shields?
11 A. We had it from other sources that our monitors and other civilian
12 staff in UNPROFOR would be taken hostage to act as human shields. And
13 that's the simple call on it. If you were put into an installation and
14 put in there strategically so that the installation would not be
15 attacked. That's the simple version. I wouldn't call it anything else.
16 Q. So this -- how far in advance of this event taking place were you
17 informed of that?
18 A. The date is stated on the report made by Mitchell. I think it's
19 two days in advance but -- I think it's 17th, 16th. It's actually
20 specifically referred to, when he was told.
21 Q. And was he told that they would be not permitted to leave
22 Benkovac as a means of deterring an incursion by Croatian forces? Or was
23 he told - and maybe you don't know this - was he told that they were
24 going to be used specifically as human shields at a military location?
25 A. There was no doubt in any of our minds that if the situation
1 arose, we were to be used as human shields. No doubt. And we were very
2 conscious of that risk for our people in the field. I wouldn't call it
3 in any other way.
4 Q. When you use the term "human shield," do you understand it to
5 have meant and now do you understand it to mean that you would be held at
6 a military location, a military -- a place that could be militarily
7 targeted to provide protection for that location and facility?
8 A. I think the information we had went beyond that. They were going
9 to even use it for facilities such as electrical stations or whatever.
10 So, again, what you're doing is you're putting something in front of the
11 opposition to say do you want to go down that road take on the
12 international community. You had 21 monitors there from, I would say,
13 perhaps ten nations. You can see the implications of that. So it was a
14 very strategic move and it's placing lives at serious risk. And we
15 mentioned earlier that there were always people, mavericks, who will do
16 their own thing, so no matter what control you have of your sources -- of
17 your resources, there can be an individual who will just blow the place
18 away. So it was a real, real risk to our people.
19 And I'll tell you something, it left its mark on many of them.
20 Q. When you say there are mavericks who might do anything, are you
21 suggesting that the individuals who directed the detention of these
22 UNCIVPOL monitors, were they acting on their own?
23 A. No. This was planned.
24 Q. By whom?
25 A. By those who were planning the strategies to resist the attack
1 and, indeed, any attack from Croatian sources. As I mentioned, the
2 information was available and it also included installations. So it
3 wasn't just it happened on the day for this situation. It was a planned
5 Q. Well, who was involved exactly; do you know?
6 A. At the end of the day, I would think you could go back up to the
7 Kenyan authorities. It was a strategic plan. You have to go back to a
8 serious level of the management.
9 Q. Was Spanovic in on it?
10 A. I don't know who was in -- you look at a strategic op -- a strike
11 like that, it has to be at a serious level because they are literally
12 challenging the international community. They're saying to you: We're
13 taking your people and we are going to use you. They're drawing other
14 nations into the situation.
15 Q. Is it true that at one point during the hostage taking some of
16 the UN observers were escorted outside of the hotel?
17 A. At gunpoint.
18 Q. Were they at gunpoint when they drove to the hospital in Knin?
19 A. I believe they were. And indeed I remember, if I recall
20 correctly, they asked to go down to the local police station, that's the
21 UNPROFOR office, and were refused permission.
22 Q. How far is the hotel in Benkovac from the hospital in Knin?
23 A. It could be 50 miles.
24 Q. The UN observers were held at gunpoint while being driven
25 50 miles?
1 A. They were held at gunpoint, yeah.
2 Q. And while, as you suggest, they were being held at gunpoint
3 during this 50-mile journey, did you hear that at one point,
4 notwithstanding that they were under milicija escort, you say at
5 gunpoint, notwithstanding that they were under milicija escort, that they
6 were run off the road by an angry Serb soldier. Do you know about that
8 A. There was an incident, yes, and they were shot at. And I would
9 say indeed their own assessment was despite the fact -- they felt they
10 would have been killed only for the presence of the other people, and
11 basically the point I'm making on it, and they made, was even despite the
12 peer pressure of their own people, these guys reacted and fired.
13 Q. And wasn't there another incident, a separate incident right in
14 front of the hotel when another angry soldier saw the UN Land Cruiser and
15 used an automatic rifle and fired almost 40 bullets into the car? Didn't
16 that occur too?
17 A. Yes, it did. And again it highlights, if our monitors were free,
18 would they stay there? Certainly not.
19 Q. Well, we'll come to conclusions in a moment. Isn't it the case
20 that there were two French soldiers who were killed --
21 A. Yes, Your Honours.
22 Q. -- by a mortar shell and essentially they were killed on impact,
24 A. Correct, Your Honours.
25 Q. And the military operation was ongoing for at least seven days,
1 possibly more?
2 A. It was on for a period of time, yes.
3 Q. And their release happened to coincide with the end of the
4 military offensive, didn't it?
5 A. The release -- no, the release commenced with my going down
6 there. My going down there wasn't designed on what was happening in the
7 greater picture. I just came to a point where nothing was happening to
8 get them out and I took the initiative to go on that particular day.
9 That wasn't written by other agendas, let's put it that way, other
11 Q. That -- that wasn't my question. The question was: Their
12 release coincided with the end of the military operation, did it not?
13 A. I don't think so. I think we mentioned earlier that it went down
14 to Benkovac -- or into -- approached the dam up to the 28th.
15 Q. Would you agree that to an outside observer, there was a very
16 credible basis to think that unarmed, and you were unarmed, that unarmed
17 UN officials might be under threat or danger either from the fighting or
18 from elements amongst the Serb forces who were out of control, angry, in
19 particular at the UN at this point?
20 A. We always felt that being unarmed was perhaps the best weapon we
21 had, for the use of a word, in the sense that we were not going to cause
22 danger to anybody. And we always believed that was the best approach to
23 take and to ensure our safety. And that's the way it was. And you can
24 see that in this situation, we were used.
25 Q. Let me be clear about what I'm asking you. I'm not suggesting
1 necessarily that everyone who was involved in this incident was animated
2 by a genuine desire to protect the observers. What I'm suggesting to you
3 is, from an outside perspective, wouldn't a reasonable observer be able
4 to say, Well, maybe there was legitimate reason to not permit the UN
5 observers to drive around under these circumstances, for their own
7 A. You go back and you ask the observers who were involved what the
8 facts are and they are quite clear that they were hostages, and there is
9 no other call on that. And they are quite clear on that. And I think
10 there's nowhere else to go with it, in my view. It's quite honest,
11 saying that to you.
12 Q. You don't know what Mr. Hadzic may have been told before he gave
13 the press conference that you were shown by the Prosecution during your
14 testimony, do you?
15 A. No, I'm not privy to his briefing.
16 Q. Now I want to ask you some questions about returns of internally
17 displaced persons.
18 MR. GOSNELL: And if we could have, please, 01212. That's
19 Defence tab 23. This is the Secretary-General's report of the 27th of
20 July, 1992. If we could go to page 6, which is paragraph 18:
21 "The Force Commander estimates that the conditions do not yet
22 exist for a large-scale voluntary return programme into the UNPAs."
23 Q. Was that view widely shared amongst UNPROFOR officials?
24 A. Yes, Your Honours.
25 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 1-0 -- excuse me, 01253. Prosecution
1 tab 9.
2 Q. This is a status report and we've looked at this before. I'm not
3 going to discuss it again. But the date is the 7th of September, 1992.
4 If we could turn to page 3, please.
5 "Return of displaced Croats." And then we're looking for a
6 sentence that begins:
7 "But the latest escalation of events in Sector South, Croatian
8 rights violations included, indicated that it might be unrealistic to
9 carry out any return in the forthcoming future. It is necessary to
10 carefully consider the dangers of jeopardizing the entire process of
11 return in phase 3. But when started, even in limited manner, Croatians
12 will expand it elsewhere, and uncontrolled mass-scale return with
13 possible escalation into war."
14 Can you help us understand why -- if you can, can you help us
15 understand why the author is making that comment?
16 A. You have a couple of comments there. First of all, it is about
17 coming in in small numbers and scaling it in. I think in reality there
18 was no scope to go down that road. And I think what's being indicated
19 then is even if you do, you will be taken advantage of. And the other
20 side will push on to go beyond the boundaries of what your plan may have
21 been in bringing in a minimal group and just trying to take one step
22 forward and that it would be exploited.
23 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 01273, please. Again this is a
24 document that we've looked at. It's Defence tab 25.
25 Q. This is General Nambiar reporting to Goulding on the 22nd of
1 September, 1992. And that date is significant, September 1992, because
2 wasn't there much discussion about a planned mass return of refugees at
3 the end of the month?
4 A. Yes, Your Honour.
5 Q. And then -- and in this first paragraph, we've looked at it
6 before, General Nambiar says:
7 "Perhaps you might also bring home to him," him being Tudjman,
8 "the disastrous consequences which could ensure if the proposed mass
9 march of refugees into Sector East were to take place on 30 September."
10 Was that the view of UNPROFOR that that march was not a good
12 A. I think so, yes.
13 Q. And UNPROFOR opposed it.
14 A. They -- they opposed it.
15 Q. Do you know whether UNPROFOR took any steps to prevent it from
16 taking place?
17 A. Again, the steps UNPROFOR would be taking would be ones of
18 negotiation to downscale the likelihood of it happening.
19 Now what they actually did, I do not know. But I would see that
20 as being the road they would go. And, again, with respect to negotiating
21 yourself out of a serious conflict.
22 MR. GOSNELL: Could we have 01290, please, which is Defence
23 tab 26.
24 Q. Again, further report of the Secretary-General dated the
25 29th of September, 1992. Am I right in recalling that this is the day
1 before the scheduled mass march that we've been referring to?
2 A. I'm not sure of the actually date of it now, on -- off the top of
3 my head but it's somewhere at the end of September.
4 MR. GOSNELL: If we can turn, please, to page 9 in e-court.
5 Paragraph 21.
6 Q. "However, constant agitation by the media and certain political
7 authorities for immediate return is building up dangerous pressures, with
8 unilaterally proclaimed timetables for return and advertised mass marches
9 to the sectors. UNPROFOR has told the authorities that such exploitation
10 of the deep and very understandable desire of people to return to their
11 homes is irresponsible. Ill-timed and uncoordinated returns could lead
12 to a further disaster."
13 A. That's real, yeah.
14 Q. Was Croatia playing -- let me put it a bit more neutrally. Was
15 Croatia using the issue of the return of internally displaced persons as
16 a wedge to accomplish goals in the war?
17 A. It's in my view that this issue was being driven to further other
18 agendas, yes. These civilian people were just being used. And I think
19 if we look at some of the reports from the other side, the Serbian side,
20 you will see that there was an increasing of a military response on that
21 side of the house. I think there are mention of reports where we had
22 people armed with AK-47s and going to Batina bridge, and if you have a
23 mass march of innocent civilians walking into that situation, what is the
24 outcome? It's pushing the board out a long way.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. McElligott.
1 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, no further questions.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
3 Mr. Gillett, re-direct.
4 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honours, I'll try
5 and go through this -- a couple of points quickly.
6 Re-examination by Mr. Gillett:
7 Q. So, Mr. McElligott, again I'll ask you to speak slowly and
8 clearly. Thank you?
9 If we go back, at transcript page 47 you were asked about the
10 regular police and ability to control the special police. You said:
11 "From the police side there were difficulties. They had confided
12 in us on occasion that the special police were out of their control."
13 Can I just clarify who you mean by "they" when you say "they had
15 A. We're talking about the -- the normal police had confided on us,
16 to us.
17 Q. And do you know any individuals who were confiding that
18 information or is it a more general response?
19 A. I met one or two myself who did tell me, that they had a problem.
20 It has emerged in some of the reports as well or it was declared. There
21 were men there who wanted to police and there is no doubt their hands
22 were tied. They couldn't do their job and they did it as best they could
23 at local level, and that's where their goodwill and their commitment came
24 into -- at just local level they were able to do the thing in their own
25 corner as best they could. And there were times when they had to back
2 Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr. McElligott, I think the identity of the
3 "they" is clear enough.
4 Another clarification, at transcript page 66 you were asked about
5 essentially the possibility of opportunist crime being an explanation for
6 some of these crimes referred to in report 5404. And you said that:
7 "There is always an element in any context of this type of
9 And then you said that:
10 "Then you have another situation, what is left behind, that has
11 to be addressed as well."
12 What did you mean by that second sentence?
13 A. I meant the people who were committing crime and who were dressed
14 in uniform. I think, you know, if you are a police force and you receive
15 a complaint from a victim that the person engaging it has a police
16 uniform or a police identity, you would take a very, very serious view of
17 it, first of all, to establish your own credibility as a police force
18 and, secondly, to reassure the community of the facts of the situation.
19 And if you found it to be some policemen involved, that you would take
20 very effective measures to make sure your professional standards are
22 Q. Thank you. And in relation to crimes by police members, you were
23 asked whether Hadzic was ever contacted in relation to these issues.
24 MR. GILLETT: Could we get document 65 ter 5312 on the monitor,
25 please. And as this is coming up, you'll see it's a similar protest,
1 it's a pair of protest letters similar to ones that have been admitted
2 through this witness. I'm interested in the second page.
3 Q. Now, on the second page, this is a letter from Nambiar, Force
4 Commander. It says:
5 "I write this letter to express my deep concern at the deliberate
6 shooting of one of our Military Observers on 21 December 1992 in the
7 Bapska area in Sector East."
8 Now would you consider that a criminal matter?
9 A. Yes, indeed.
10 Q. And why would that be sent to Mr. Hadzic?
11 A. It is also --
12 MR. GOSNELL: Objection. It calls for speculation.
13 MR. GILLETT: Well, the witness has commented on a number of
14 protest letters sent to Mr. Hadzic concerning shelling and other topics,
15 and he was asked about this in cross-examination, whether letters would
16 be sent to Mr. Hadzic, so I'm verifying whether he does have an opinion
17 based on his experience with UNCIVPOL as to why this letter would have
18 been sent.
19 THE WITNESS: It would also be --
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Overruled.
21 MR. GILLETT: Thank you.
22 Q. If you could answer. Thank you.
23 A. It would also be a very serious breach of the Vance Plan
24 agreement. Our monitors were entitled to free movement and this would
25 certainly inhibit your movements.
1 Q. And in the second paragraph it also refers to restrictions of
2 movement in place. I know this is covered in your statement in quite a
3 lot of detail, so I won't ask you about that.
4 MR. GILLETT: I would ask to admit this document, 5312, at this
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2184, Your Honours.
8 MR. GILLETT: Thank you very much.
9 Q. In relation to Benkovac, you were asked about the reason for
10 which the UNCIVPOL monitors who were taken hostage were accompanied by
11 armed militia.
12 Now, your forces, as you've said, were unarmed, correct, and they
13 were always unarmed while they were in the region, and did they face
14 dangers at other times other than at the Benkovac incident?
15 A. Yes, indeed they did. They were confronted on various ways along
16 the period of their service. They were held at gunpoint on prior
17 occasions. There's -- I recall a specific incident where they were held
18 at gunpoint and indeed the interpreter stepped in between them and
19 literally -- I did declare that they would have to take her out if they
20 wanted to take the monitors out and she eventually settled the situation
21 down and got them back out of the situation safe. And they had been
22 robbed at gunpoint. There was a series of serious crimes committed
23 against our monitors at gunpoint.
24 Q. Thank you. And again, that's referred to in the statement. And
25 in instances other than Benkovac, were your monitors provided armed
1 guards as has been suggested by my learned friend for the Defence?
2 A. I know -- we have never been provided with armed guards but we
3 have gone on joint patrols with the military, I think KenBat is
4 specifically mentioned to -- in the Sector South, and again, that the
5 basic idea behind that was to spread our resources and our capacity to
6 engage in a lot of patrols by having, perhaps, one policeman in a car and
7 accompanied by a soldier or two soldiers. Now I do not know if they
8 carried weapons, but in general principle, as police officers we would
9 generally not allow a situation where you're going to have somebody with
10 arms engaging with or be with -- or be accompanying somebody who doesn't
11 be armed. We go for the neutral situation because if the gun is there,
12 the opposition are likely to engage with us, or readily, so we don't want
13 to expose the unarmed person. And the philosophy is to go back to
14 unarmed for safety of all.
15 Q. Final question. In relation to the issue of the attempted mass
16 return in late 1992, you've been asked about this.
17 MR. GILLETT: And if I could call document 65 ter 1277, this is
18 from the Defence list, on the monitor. And if we could go to page 3 of
19 this document.
20 Q. And you were asked several questions about this document during
22 MR. GILLETT: That's 1277. Thank you.
23 And if we could zoom in near the bottom, there is ... thank you.
24 Q. There is a bullet point that reads:
25 "The recent violations of human rights in the pink zone, mainly
1 destruction of houses already burned, of churches, are messages to warn
2 against any return of DPs," which I take it to mean displaced persons.
3 Did that have an impact on the conditions for the return of
4 people to these areas in which you operated?
5 A. Yes, it did. Of course, yes. Again it was creating the unstable
6 environment. Taking down the churches and the houses was, as I've said
7 earlier, literally breaking down the sense of community. Church was a
8 place where people went where there was very often social engagement by
9 old folk who may not meet from one end of the week to the other, so there
10 was -- just apart from a religious element, there was a community side to
11 it as well. So it was destabilising the whole community approach.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. GILLETT: We'd tender 1277 into evidence.
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2185, Your Honours.
16 MR. GILLETT: Thank you. No further questions, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. McElligott, this brings your testimony to an
20 end. We thank you very much for coming to The Hague to assist the
21 Tribunal. You're now released as a witness, and we wish you a safe
22 journey back home.
23 The court usher will escort you out of the court.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
25 [The witness withdrew]
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: In the meanwhile, it has been confirmed that we
2 can sit this afternoon for an extra session starting at 3.00, 3.00 to
3 4.30, and I thank everyone who is facilitating this to enable us to
4 finish this week's witness.
5 If there's nothing else, Mr. Gosnell.
6 MR. GOSNELL: Just one comment that may assist with scheduling.
7 I may well have no more than five minutes of cross-examination.
8 I don't know whether that might accelerate our plans or not. I just
9 thought I would say that now.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: I don't think we could -- we could take the
11 witness immediately and -- and -- and finish the witness within this
12 session. I don't think that's a realistic ...
13 MR. STRINGER: No, Mr. President we've confirmed that the
14 Defence -- sorry the Prosecution direct examination is still to be
15 previewed to be at 30 minutes or so --
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay.
17 MR. STRINGER: -- so we can't finish by 2.00.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. So let's stick to the plan, and we'll see
19 each other at 3.00, and probably we will be out before 4.30.
20 Thank you very much. Court adjourned.
21 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.47 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 3.00 p.m.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell.
24 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, may I, for the record, indicate that
25 the Hadzic Defence is joined at this time by legal intern
1 Jolana Makraiova. Thank you.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
3 MR. STRINGER: And I should say now for the Prosecution, we have
4 with us in the courtroom, Ms. Sarah Clanton and legal intern,
5 Marija Bukovac.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Stringer.
7 [The witness entered court]
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good afternoon, Madam Witness.
9 Can you hear me in a language you understand?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. Thank you for coming to The Hague to
12 assist the Tribunal. I will ask you in a few minutes to make the solemn
13 declaration by which witnesses comment themselves to tell the truth, and
14 I have to point out to you that by doing so you expose yourself to the
15 penalties of perjury should you give untruthful information to the
17 Could I ask you to stand for a moment and make the solemn
18 declaration the usher will give you.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
20 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 WITNESS: SARLOTA FORO
22 [Witness answered through interpreter]
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much. You may be seated.
24 Ms. Clanton, your witness.
25 MS. CLANTON: Thank you, Your Honour. Good afternoon.
1 Your Honour, I note that I don't believe we introduced the witness.
2 Would you like for me to --
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: You're right. I forgot to ask her name and date
4 of birth.
5 Could you give us -- tell us, Ms. Witness, Madam Witness, what
6 your name and date of birth is.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My name is Sarlota Foro. I was
8 born on the 4th of January, 1963, in Vukovar.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
10 Examination by Ms. Clanton:
11 Q. Ms. Foro, do you recall that you testified here in The Hague in
12 November 2005 in the case of Mrksic, Sljivancanin, and Radic?
13 A. I do.
14 Q. And since you arrived here in The Hague this week, have you had
15 an opportunity to listen to the audio recording of your testimony?
16 A. I got an audio recording and I re-listened to it.
17 Q. And is there anything in your testimony that you listened to this
18 week that you no longer believe to be correct?
19 A. There's only one detail regarding the identification of a person
20 from a picture that was shown to me during that trial. The picture
21 doesn't show the whole person, just the hands, or arms, so obviously by
22 mistake, I misidentified the person.
23 Q. And to make the record clear, Ms. Foro, who was the person that
24 you misidentified based on the hands?
25 A. That's Major Veselin Sljivancanin.
1 Q. Now, with the exception of the change to your evidence that you
2 just discussed with us, if you were asked the same questions today that
3 you were asked when you testified before, would you provide the same
5 A. As for the rest of the statement, I stand by it fully, except for
6 that one detail.
7 Q. And now that you've taken the solemn declaration, do you affirm
8 the accuracy and truthfulness of your testimony?
9 A. To the best of my recollection, I stated everything correctly.
10 And my testimony was truthful.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MS. CLANTON: Your Honours, at this time we would seek to tender
13 Prosecution 65 ter Exhibits 04638.1 and 04638.2, which are at tab 14. We
14 would also seek to tender the associated exhibits with the exception of
15 associated exhibits 02601 and 02990, these are at tabs 2 and number 12.
16 And the reason that we would not seek to tender these is that these are
17 the exhibits that relate to the correction that the witness has just
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2186 and P2187, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
22 MS. CLANTON:
23 Q. Now for the first question I want to ask you has to do with your
24 testimony about the events in Vukovar in the Autumn 1991. You said that
25 the people in Vukovar were living in shelters or cellars because of the
1 bombing that was happening, and this is at transcript page 2399 for the
2 record. You further testified that the destruction in Vukovar had
3 reached a point that because the roofs and the walls were missing,
4 projectiles were falling down the level of the shelters and there were
5 civilian casualties that resulted. And this is transcript page 2409.
6 Can you describe for the Chamber a particular instance in which
7 this happened.
8 A. If you give me the right to describe the events that were
9 happening already in November 1991.
10 Q. If there was a particular instance that occurred at that time,
11 yes, please, do continue with your answer.
12 A. In 1991, at that time, at the time that you referred to, and that
13 was already the month of November when the devastation of the city had
14 reached such a degree that even in shelters people were not safe anymore,
15 an incident happened involving our family friend, who got killed with his
16 entire family in a shelter in the centre of the town. He got killed, his
17 wife, his mother, and his very small child.
18 Another young man was killed on occasion. What happened was that
19 a projectile flew in through the window of the shelter and exploded.
20 Those are the civilian casualties that I spoke about last time, and such
21 things were happening already in November 1991. People were getting
22 killed in large numbers even in shelters.
23 Q. Now, Ms. Foro, you've just told us that there was a very small
24 child that was killed as a result of this projectile exploding in a
25 shelter. Can you tell us, what did you hear later on about this small
2 A. Specifically it was the family Aleksandar, the name of the child
3 was Matija Aleksandar. The parent's names were Vlasta and Emil. The
4 Aleksandars were our family friends because the husband worked with my --
5 with my husband. The next thing I heard of it, I next thing I saw, was
6 when I came to Sremska Mitrovica where I was for questioning and on the
7 desk of the colonel who was conducting the questioning, I saw a Belgrade
8 newspaper with the photo of the little child that was killed on the front
10 Q. And what were you asked about the photo of this child on the
11 front page of the Belgrade newspaper?
12 A. They didn't ask me anything. They just maintained that the child
13 was a Serb child who had its throat killed by the Croats; one among 40
14 Serb children who were killed by Croats. That was a very notorious
15 scandal at the time and it was in all the media, all over the media.
16 The colonel who was conducting the interrogation put that to me,
17 and I said that I have completely different information about the case,
18 and I can share it with him, if he wishes.
19 Q. And when you offered to share this information to him, what did
20 he say?
21 A. He asked me to explain. And I explained it in the same way as I
22 did to the Court today. I said the name of the child, who the parents
23 were, under what circumstances the child was killed, and I also made a
24 written statement about it in longhand, and I signed it.
25 Q. And what did you find out thereafter about this story about the
1 40 children being -- being killed.
2 A. Later on, I found out that some sort of a scandal, a outcry had
3 broken out in Serbia in that connection because all the allegations
4 printed in the press right after the fall of Vukovar were later refuted
5 by the same journalist who made the initial report, or perhaps his
6 editorial team. I'm not sure.
7 Q. Thank you. You previously testified that due to the destruction
8 and the shortage of ammunition and food that it became clear to the --
9 the people, including yourself, in Vukovar, that could you no longer
10 remain in the city. This is at transcript page 2409. You said that when
11 the people of Vukovar realised that Vukovar would be occupied that they
12 decided to begin surrender negotiation with the JNA and, for the record,
13 is this at page 2410 and 2411. The question I want to ask you now is:
14 What concerns did the Croats in Mitnica have about an occupation by the
16 A. Considering that I mentioned several times in my statement that
17 the war in Vukovar was waged by the local residents. People who had
18 their families there, who lived there, and some of them were members of
19 the ZNG, the Home Guards Corps. Some were members of the defence effort,
20 they just guarded their own homes, but most of them were members of the
21 ZNG who later surrendered at Mitnica and their families lived precisely
22 in that part of the city in that neighbourhood.
23 What worried them and all the other people the most at that time
24 was what was going to happen with the civilians, women and children, who
25 had lived in basements those three months.
1 At the command of the ZNG, they debated how to approach it and on
2 what conditions to talk to the JNA about the surrender of that part of
3 the town.
4 The conditions that I mean is that all civilians be able to go to
5 the unoccupied part of Croatia, the part of Croatia that was not a war
6 zone; and the second was that the members of the ZNG would surrender and
7 lay down their arms on the condition that they be treated as prisoners of
8 war, and that they be registered or filmed.
9 Q. Ms. Foro, a moment -- excuse me, if I can stop you there, I'm
10 going to go back to something you just said.
11 You said that the members of the ZNG or the Home Guard Corps and
12 some were member of the defence effort who guarded their own homes, that
13 these were people -- were you able to hear me?
14 A. Now I do.
15 Q. I'm going to ask my question again.
16 A moment ago, you said that the people who were members of the
17 ZNG, or the Home Guard Corps, were involved in civilian protection,
18 defence of their homes, you said that they were the people from your area
19 and that they were worried about what was going to happen to the
20 civilians. And I want to ask you to tell us why they were worried about
21 what would happen to the civilians?
22 A. Well, the circumstances were as follows: The citizens of Vukovar
23 had been shelled for the previous three months from all the heavy
24 weaponry of the JNA as the only armed force that had that kind of
25 weaponry in the former Yugoslavia. The city was devastated and the
1 civilians were in basements. A large number of civilians had been killed
2 by that time. What concerned us all, civilians and members of the ZNG
3 alike, was why would the Yugoslav People's Army which had tried to kill
4 all of us civilians and destroy the entire city, why would they suddenly
5 change their behaviour once they occupy the city?
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Clanton.
7 MS. CLANTON: Yes.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: I wonder whether you could clarify with the
9 witness what the witness meant when saying that "the war in Vukovar" --
10 "in Vukovar was waged by the local residents."
11 It's at -- it's at page 109, line 12.
12 MS. CLANTON:
13 Q. Ms. Foro, are you able to respond to the Presiding Judge's
15 A. I don't know which passage is meant, which part of my evidence?
16 If you can clarify.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Shall I read it to the witness, Ms. --
18 MS. CLANTON: If you could. I'm sorry, mine is frozen.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Foro, you -- you -- you answered to
20 Ms. Clanton the following in the English record, that is. I quote:
21 "Considering that I mentioned several times in my statement that
22 the war in Vukovar was waged by the local residents."
23 Is that what you said?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: What was it -- what was it that you said? Do you
2 There's probably a problem with the translation. So do you
3 remember what you -- what you said?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just explained that members of
5 the Home Guards Corps, the ZNG, the Croatian army that we are discussing,
6 where indeed the Croatian army and they were indeed armed, but in all
7 parts of Vukovar they had been recruited from the local population, the
8 population of that area.
9 So in the course of the evacuation of the city and the
10 surrendering of the troops at Mitnica, all these people were people who
11 normally lived at Mitnica with their families and were part of the
12 Croatian army. I don't know if I have answered your question.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
14 Please continue, Ms. Clanton.
15 MS. CLANTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Q. Ms. Foro, a moment ago we were talking about the situation in
17 Vukovar concerning the JNA. I want to ask you now, what, if anything,
18 did you know about the activities of the JNA in the towns and villages
19 outside Vukovar?
20 A. We knew that already in October some places were occupied and
21 evacuated, some places between Vukovar and Serbia - that is to say, Ilok,
22 Sarengrad and Sotin - and it was known that these places had been
23 occupied and the population evacuated or displaced. Of course we
24 listened to the radio as well, up to a certain point we were able to
25 watch television, and we learned some things from both the Croat and the
1 Serbian television.
2 Q. And how did this information about what had happened to the
3 populations in Ilok, Sarengrad and Sotin, how did this information affect
5 A. Of course, the people who were hearing what was going on around
6 them, not far away from them, were afraid. And they were thinking what
7 our own fate might be.
8 MS. CLANTON: I would like to ask for the assistance of the Case
9 Manager, please, to bring up 65 ter 04780.9.
10 Q. And while that's coming up I want to ask you, Ms. Foro, what were
11 the names of the Croat negotiators?
12 A. There were three of them: Zdravko Komsic, Matija Mandic and
13 Filip Karaula. They were practically the command of the Home Guard Corps
14 for that part of the city.
15 MS. CLANTON: For the record, this is a video-clip from the video
16 ERN V000-686, and the clip is time code 8 minutes and 45 seconds to
17 9 minutes and 2 seconds.
18 And, thank you, I'm reminded there is no need for a transcript
19 here. We are only going to look at the images, and I would like to ask
20 for the video to be played but paused at 8 minutes and 47 seconds,
22 [Video-clip played]
23 MS. CLANTON:
24 Q. Now, Ms. Foro, who are the persons who are walking in the line
25 behind the soldier?
1 A. Behind the armed soldier is Filip Karaula, followed by
2 Matija Mandic and Zdravko Kondic [as interpreted]. They were together.
3 Q. For the sake of the transcript, can you repeat the last name of
4 the third person, Zdravko, and I don't think we got the last name.
5 A. Zdravko Komsic.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MS. CLANTON: Now I would like to ask for this video to be played
8 to the 9-minute mark, please.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 MS. CLANTON:
11 Q. Now, Ms. Foro, who is on the far left side of the shot?
12 A. Filip Karaula, one of the negotiators on the Croatian side.
13 Q. Now, the person next to him, the one who is wearing sun-glasses,
14 do you know what this person was doing at the negotiations.
15 A. I don't know the man.
16 Q. Now, since you arrived in The Hague were you able to watch a
17 longer version of this video?
18 A. I've seen the entire video-clip, which is perhaps an hour long,
19 maybe a little bit longer.
20 Q. And from viewing this video-clip, are you able to indicate what
21 the role or the position was of the person wearing the sun-glasses?
22 A. He's obviously the interpreter for the representative of the ICRC
23 who was also there. At the negotiations.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MS. CLANTON: Your Honours, at this time we would want to tender
1 this clip, 65 ter 04780.9, please.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2188.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
5 MS. CLANTON:
6 Q. Now, Ms. Foro, you testified in the Mrksic case that after these
7 negotiations took place, that the negotiators went back to Mitnica and
8 they said that you would be going to a collection point which is near a
9 veterinary clinic in approximately one hour in order to prepare for
10 departure and this is at transcript page 2417.
11 MS. CLANTON: I would like to ask for the Case Manager's
12 assistance, please, to pull up video with 65 ter number 4780.11. And
13 this is a clip of the same video from the same -- with the same ERN and
14 the time code is from 43 minutes, 42 seconds to 47 minutes and 52
15 seconds. And I would like for the Case Manager to play it and please
16 pause at 43 minutes and 50 seconds.
17 [Video-clip played]
18 MS. CLANTON:
19 Q. Ms. Foro, from the view on the screen in front of you, can you
20 tell the Court where the collection point was located?
21 A. It was not a collection centre. It was a place that everybody
22 knew, everybody knew where it was. That is the veterinary clinic at
23 Mitnica. The road widen there a bit and that's the place where they told
24 us it would be best for us to come and form a column, a convoy, to exit
25 Vukovar. This place is just before this road sign on the road.
1 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, in what direction are the people
2 that we see between the tanks, in what direction are they walking?
3 A. In the direction of the new cemetery at Mitnica. Towards the
4 exit from Vukovar. You can see the sign, Vukovar, in blue, and from
5 there, in that direction, you walk towards the new cemetery, towards
6 Sotin and Vucilevo.
7 MS. CLANTON: Now if I can ask the Case Manager to please skip
8 forward to 46 minutes and 52 seconds. And if we could play here until
9 46 minutes and 58 seconds, please.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 MS. CLANTON:
12 Q. Ms. Foro, do you recognise this woman?
13 A. That is a neighbour who lives in the same street where my husband
14 used to live with his parents.
15 Q. And where were you at the time that this footage was being taken?
16 A. I was already -- also walking in that column.
17 MS. CLANTON: Your Honours, at this time we would seek to tender
18 65 ter 04780.11.
19 MR. GOSNELL: Can I just ask how -- how long the clip is
20 that's --
21 MS. CLANTON: The clip is 4 minutes.
22 MR. GOSNELL: Well, I'm not sure what is on the other 4 minutes
23 of the video or whether the witness has commented on any of it. I would
24 prefer to only have the portions that the witness has been shown and
25 commented upon admitted.
1 MS. CLANTON: I am skipping to this point for the sake of time.
2 If I could ask for Your Honours to give us an additional ten minutes on
3 the direct then I would be happy to play the 4-minute clip.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ten minutes to play the 4-minute clip,
5 Ms. Clanton?
6 MS. CLANTON: In addition to the time that I would -- 30 minutes
7 I would request to have a bit more time so that we could build in the
8 time to play the 4-minute clip, please. If this is a concern to
9 Your Honours.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Well, you'll have five minutes extra.
11 MS. CLANTON: Okay.
12 Mr. Laugel, could we go back to, I believe we stopped at 43:42,
14 [Video-clip played]
15 "Get on the tank. Get on the tank. Go on, get on the tank.
16 "We need to get down to the Red Cross. Just get down to the
17 Red Cross. Let's go down to the Red Cross, eh?
18 "Sorry -- down. Down.
19 "Where is the next ..."
20 MS. CLANTON:
21 Q. Now, Ms. Foro, I want to ask you is everything we've seen in this
22 video-clip just now, is this consistent with what you saw on that day?
23 A. Everything on the video is consistent with what happened.
24 There's nothing that happened in a different place. Everything that we
25 see in the video did happen there. I just want to say that it's just a
1 small fraction of what happened during that day. This video does not
2 show us anything like a full picture of what transpired that day. I have
3 seen the whole video. I mean, the whole video doesn't show what happened
4 that day.
5 Q. Ms. Foro, would you agree that this video-clip that you've just
6 seen now is an accurate depiction of part of what happened on that day?
7 MS. CLANTON: Your Honours, I seek to tender.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [Overlapping speakers] ...
10 MS. CLANTON:
11 Q. Excuse me.
12 MS. CLANTON: We would like to tender this video-clip at this
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2189, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
17 MS. CLANTON: May I ask the Registrar how much time I have left,
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: How much do you need, Ms. Clanton?
20 MS. CLANTON: About five minutes, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: That's okay. Sorry. That's okay.
22 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
23 MS. CLANTON: Thank you for your assistance.
24 Q. Ms. Foro, the last topic that I want to talk to you about today,
25 to ask you about, is your experience at Sremska Mitrovica.
1 Now, you've given evidence about how you arrived at
2 Sremska Mitrovica. And I want to ask you where were you and the other
3 women taken?
4 A. We were taken to the prison at Sremska Mitrovica, and we were
5 locked up in a large room inside the prison.
6 Q. And in this large room, were there any persons in the room who
7 did not come with you on the bus that you were on from Ovcara?
8 A. Mostly those were women who had come from Ovcara and Dr. Bosanac
9 was brought two days later, I think, along with two other young women,
10 who, as far as I know, were not from Mitnica. They, too, were brought a
11 couple of days later.
12 Q. And what happened to these two women who were not from Mitnica
13 who came a couple of days later?
14 A. If I remember well, one of them was injured by shrapnel; a
15 smaller injury. They were with us very briefly, and then they were taken
16 away from our room.
17 Q. What did you find out what happened after they were taken away?
18 A. I found out they had been taken to a different part of the prison
19 where isolation cells were, and there they were interrogated and abused.
20 Q. Since you arrived in The Hague, have you had an opportunity to
21 see a list of names containing -- lists of names with people from
22 Sremska Mitrovica on it?
23 A. Yes, I did see a list of names. And that list names of names is
24 very familiar because it originates from the office where I worked after
25 I came to Zagreb following the events we have discussed.
1 MS. CLANTON: If we could please have 65 ter 02406.2 brought up.
2 This at tab 27. And this is a document that was circulated by e-mail
3 yesterday. The Defence indicated that they don't have any objection for
4 this document to be added to the 65 ter list, so we would request that it
5 be added and made available to the witness at this time.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Request granted.
7 MS. CLANTON:
8 Q. Ms. Foro, do you recognise the signature on this page?
9 A. I do. I reviewed that list, and I signed the first and the last
10 page of the list.
11 Q. Now, if we could please turn to page 4 of the list. This is ERN
12 ending in 8716. Now, Ms. Foro, we see that the number 136 is circled and
13 there's a letter A next to the name Bosanac, Vesna. What does this
14 marking mean?
15 A. That means that Dr. Bosanac, Vesna Bosanac, was with me in the
17 Q. And --
18 A. At the Sremska Mitrovica prison.
19 Q. And now above this row in line number 135, we see that -- that
20 number is also circled and that there's a letter B next to the name
21 Bosanac, Lavoslav. Can you tell us why there's a B next to this name?
22 A. Because, to the best of my knowledge, Lavoslav Bosanac was also
23 locked up in the Sremska Mitrovica prison. He is the husband of
24 Dr. Bosanac.
25 Q. Do you know who Lavoslav Bosanac was before you saw his name on
1 this list?
2 A. Yes, yes.
3 Q. Ms. Foro, can you confirm that the marking of the letter A
4 throughout is the same for the other markings as it is for Dr. Bosanac,
5 that is, that you've indicated with a letter A if it was somebody who was
6 in your room?
7 A. All the persons that I recognised from this list as having been
8 in the prison at Sremska Mitrovica with me, I marked with an A.
9 Q. And is it correct that throughout you marked with a B, as you did
10 for line 135, the persons that you knew?
11 A. That's correct. All the people that I knew personally, I knew
12 who they were, I marked with a B.
13 MS. CLANTON: Your Honour, we would seek to tender 02406.2 into
14 evidence at this time.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2190, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
18 MS. CLANTON:
19 Q. Ms. Foro, the last thing I want to ask you about is you testified
20 in the Mrksic case that your husband was also held at Sremska Mitrovica.
21 And this is at transcript page 2435.
22 What information did your husband share with you about the
23 conditions for the men who were detained there?
24 A. According to what he told me, I understood their circumstances
25 had been much worse than ours, and they were regularly mistreated and
1 abused. After being beaten up in Sremska Mitrovica, he came home,
2 missing a tooth, and generally they mistreated them. The men had worse
3 conditions than the women, and their treatment was much worse.
4 Q. During the time that your husband was at Sremska Mitrovica, did
5 he ever tell you about why he was being held there?
6 A. Nobody talked to them about such things. Nobody gave them any
7 reasons why they were there, just as they did not tell us anything, and
8 we had no opportunity to ask.
9 MS. CLANTON: Your Honours, I have no further questions.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Ms. Clanton.
11 Mr. Gosnell.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Gosnell:
13 Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Foro. My name is Christopher Gosnell. I
14 represent Mr. Hadzic in these proceedings, and I just have a few
15 questions for you. If I'm not clear at all, please feel free to ask me
16 to rephrase, and I'll do my best. Do you understand?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Did you watch Croatian television in 1992?
19 A. 1992? Yes. Yes, I was in Zagreb and I watched Croatian
21 Q. Are you familiar with a programme named "Latinica"?
22 A. Yes, I am. I just have to say that I didn't watch television too
23 much because I worked in an office that was busy 24 hours a day. We
24 prepared material and other things for exchanges of prisoners and we had
25 little time for TV.
1 Q. Was it a nightly newscast, or a weekly news programme? What
2 exactly was this programme, "Latinica"?
3 A. "Latinica"? I think it was on in the evening. I didn't follow
4 it. I know there was such a programme, but I did not follow it really,
5 with any attention.
6 Q. If I understand correctly, you took shelter during the siege of
7 Vukovar in the cellars of a utility company called Komunalno; is that
9 A. Yes, I worked at the utility company. Since it was a strategic
10 company for the city under those circumstances, our manager told us,
11 employees, to set up a group if we wished that would be on stand by in
12 that shelter, on stand by, meaning our work.
13 Q. And how many of you were there who took shelter in the basement?
14 A. There were perhaps ten of us from the utility company, 10 to 15
16 Q. And then at some point were you joined there by members of the
18 A. At one point, when the attacks at Vukovar became more intensive,
19 the command of the ZNG joined us because it was a large cellar, formerly
20 a wine cellar, dug deep into the ground, divided into several rooms, so
21 the command of the Home Guard Corps joined us in that basement, but, of
22 course, they were in a different part of the cellar.
23 Q. And did they have some radio equipment with them?
24 A. Yes. They had a radio, radio communications. We had a TV set
25 and we had radios where we were able to hear the programmes of Croatian
1 Radio Vukovar, and, of course, we were interested in the news.
2 Q. Thank you very much, Madam Foro.
3 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
5 Anything in re-direct, Ms. Clanton?
6 MS. CLANTON: No.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Madam Foro, this brings your testimony to an end.
8 We thank you for coming to The Hague. You're now released as a witness,
9 and we wish you a safe journey back home.
10 The Court Usher will escort you out of the courtroom. Thank you
11 very much.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 [The witness withdrew]
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.56 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Monday, the 24th day of June,
17 2013, at 9.00 a.m.