1 Thursday, 29 August 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning to everyone in and around the
7 Mr. Registrar, could you call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
9 This is case number IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus
10 Goran Hadzic. Thank you.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
12 May we have the appearances, please, starting with the
14 MR. STRINGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.
15 For the Prosecution, Douglas Stringer, Matthew Gillett,
16 Thomas Laugel, and legal intern Pape Malick Djiba.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
18 Mr. Zivanovic, for the Defence.
19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. For the Defence of
20 Goran Hadzic, Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell. Thank you.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
22 The witness may be brought in.
23 [The witness entered court]
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning, Mr. Witness.
25 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Could you please us your name, first name, name,
2 date of birth, and -- yeah, and your nationality, please.
3 THE WITNESS: Frederick Noseworthy, born 13 June 1948.
4 Nationality Canadian.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. So I take it your testimony will be
6 in English.
7 THE WITNESS: Oui. Yes.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. Mr. Noseworthy, you're about to read
9 the solemn declaration by which witnesses commit themselves to tell the
10 truth. I have to point out you that by doing so, you expose yourself to
11 the penalties of perjury should you give false or untruthful information
12 to the Tribunal. Could you now please read the solemn declaration the
13 usher will give to you.
14 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
15 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.
16 WITNESS: FRED NOSEWORTHY
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much. You may be seated.
18 Mr. Gillett, your witness.
19 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honours.
20 Examination by Mr. Gillett:
21 Q. Now, sir, good morning. Can you hear me loud and clear?
22 A. Yes, I can.
23 Q. I see you have a document in front of you. Could you tell the
24 Court what that document is?
25 A. That's the -- this is my sworn statement. And the affidavit, the
1 witness statement just so that I can remind myself what I said if need
2 be, and I think the Court has this document.
3 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, if the usher would like to show the
4 document to the Defence, we're fine with that.
5 Thank you very much.
6 Q. Now, sir, could you please tell the Chamber when you first
7 arrived in the former Yugoslavia to carry out your duty with the
8 European Community Monitoring Mission?
9 A. I arrived on the morning of September the 7th, 1992.
10 Q. And what was your role with the mission, I'll call it the ECMM,
11 as I ask the questions.
12 A. I was the commander of the Canadian contingent to the ECMM and I
13 was the Chief Operations Officer for the mission.
14 Q. Now in relation to the statement in front of you, did you provide
15 a statement to the Prosecution of this Tribunal in 2012?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 MR. GILLETT: And I'd ask that 65 ter document --
18 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are kindly asked to pause between
19 question and answer for the interpretation. Thank you.
20 MR. GILLETT: Thank you.
21 Q. I'll observe a pause after your answers.
22 MR. GILLETT: Could I ask that 65 ter document 06379 be placed on
23 the monitor.
24 Q. Now, sir, if you look at the document on the monitor, do you
25 recognise that to be the statement that you gave and do you recognise
1 your signature at the bottom of it?
2 A. I don't see my signature on this. But I recognise the document.
3 Q. Perhaps if we zoom on the English version, and if we scroll to
4 the next page?
5 A. Yes, that's my signature.
6 Q. And when you arrived in The Hague this week to testify, were you
7 given a chance to review your statement and make any corrections?
8 A. Yes, I was.
9 Q. Do you affirm the accuracy and truthfulness of the statement?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. And if you were asked about the same matters today, would you
12 provide the same information?
13 A. I hope so. Yes, I would.
14 MR. GILLETT: Your Honour, at this time the Prosecution tenders
15 65 ter document 6379 together with the associated exhibits.
16 THE WITNESS: I just want to make a comment here that my -- my
17 responses to these questions are based on memory from 21, 22 years ago,
18 so detail is -- is difficult to draw upon, but having read -- read
19 the statement that I gave initially, I'm confident that my answers were
20 as accurate as they could be.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: It's -- it is reassuring, sir, that you're not
22 claiming to remember everything from 20 years ago.
23 Admitted and marked.
24 THE REGISTRAR: The witness statement shall be assigned
25 Exhibit Number P2891. And the associated documents shall be assigned
1 exhibit numbers to be circulated to the parties at a later stage. Thank
3 MR. GILLETT: Thank you very much.
4 Q. Now, sir, I'm going to ask you some questions about some
5 additional documents that relate to matters addressed in your statement.
6 MR. GILLETT: If I could first get 65 ter document 1269 on the
8 Q. Now, sir, this fax and the attached summary concern a meeting of
9 the joint commission of 20 September 1992. Could you tell the Chamber
10 what the joint commission was?
11 A. The joint commission was a -- was a conference structure set up
12 by the United Nations, which included the European Community Monitor
13 Mission of which I was a member, and the two opposing -- or
14 representatives from the two opposing factions to try and resolve the
15 issue of the pink -- what was known then as the pink zones, which was a
16 zone of -- zone of contention between the official cease-fire line and
17 the zones which were protected by the United Nations forces, the UN --
18 the United Nations Protected Areas, UNPAs.
19 Q. If we could go to the final page of this document, and on this
20 page, under ECMM, we see that your name is listed as the third person.
21 Does that mean that you attended this meeting?
22 A. I did. I also want to point out that the voice of the mission,
23 of the European Community Monitoring Mission was Ambassador
24 John MacDonald from the United Kingdom. I was there as Chief Operations
25 Officer to advise him on operational matters. My input into those
1 meetings, any meetings that I attended, were strictly related to ECMM
2 operations modus operandi and what was reported through our reporting
3 system, but I didn't -- I -- I didn't speak on behalf of the mission. I
4 was an advisor.
5 Q. Thank you. If we could turn to page 2 of this document and if we
6 look at the first paragraph, it states that the joint commission was
7 established to oversee the step by step restoration of Croatian authority
8 in pink zones.
9 You've described what the pink zones are. Now putting aside what
10 was supposed to happen under Resolution 762, who actually controlled the
11 pink zones on the ground at this time?
12 A. It was in contention the -- the Croatian forces, Croatian
13 government, sought to re-establish complete sovereignty over the pink
14 zones, while the ethnic Serb faction, population, at the time, and it's
15 my understanding of the intention at the time, wished to retain control
16 over it for themselves. That was the -- that was the essence of the
17 conflict and the -- the joint -- the objective of the joint commission
18 was to get the two opposing factions to talk to each other so that we
19 could resolve that and do away with the pink zones.
20 Q. If we move to page 3 in the second paragraph, the document states
21 that Cedric Thornberry met with Martic, Spanovic, and Zivkovic, and they
22 agreed to the disarmament of the special police by 15 October 1992. Did
23 that disarmament occur as agreed?
24 A. Not my knowledge, no.
25 Q. And what effect did the presence of these heavily armed special
1 police have on the non-Serb population in the UNPAs and the pink zones?
2 A. I'm a little confused by the term "special police." They were
3 paramilitaries, and the effect of having heavily armed paramilitaries in
4 the zone was an intimidation. It was intimidation to the population, in
5 my view.
6 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, we would tender this document at this
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Shall be assigned Exhibit Number P2892. Thank
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
12 JUDGE HALL: If I might intervene before you go further,
13 Mr. Gillett.
14 Mr. Noseworthy, going back to your answer that appears at line
15 13, "the objective the joint commission was to get the two opposing
16 factions to talk to each other so that we could resolve that and do away
17 with the pink zones."
18 That answer, in part, answers something that I was curious about,
19 namely as to -- if you have the -- these demarcation lines and the UNPAs,
20 how come the pink zones came about?
21 But the question I want to pose now is whether these were --
22 these pink zones had, as it were, fixed boundaries or were they sort
23 of -- having regard to the conflicts of which you speak, whether they
24 were floating areas.
25 THE WITNESS: They were reasonably well defined because there was
1 a fixed cease-fire line and that's where they -- the official conflict
2 ended. But there were -- there were areas that the United Nations had
3 inserted -- what's called the United Nations Protection Force, they were
4 at UNPAs, those areas didn't coincide exactly with the -- the cease-fire
5 line. So you had this zone in between the two in which -- which was --
6 which was contested.
7 I'm sorry if that doesn't make sense.
8 JUDGE HALL: I think I understand. Thank you.
9 Thank you, Mr. Gillett.
10 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Your Honour. If we could now get 65 ter
11 document 1361. And this again -- 1351, apologies. And this again
12 concerns the work of the joint commission.
13 Q. Now this fax and the attached summary concern a meeting of the
14 joint commission on 9 November 1992. If we turn to the final page,
15 page 7, we see an individual listed under the ECMM called Patrick Curley?
16 Who was Patrick Curley?
17 A. Patrick Curley was an Irish officer, a lieutenant-colonel in the
18 Irish army. He was the commander of the Irish contingent to the European
19 Community Monitor Mission and he worked for me as one of my staff
20 officers. I was not able to attend the joint commission on that day. I
21 was away on a mission myself and I assigned Patrick Curley to attend in
22 my stead.
23 Q. Thank you. And did Patrick Curley inform you of the contents of
24 this meeting?
25 A. He sure did. Yes, he did.
1 Q. If we look at page 1 of this document, we see that the meetings
2 of the joint commission were adjourned without a fixed date for a
3 subsequent meeting and the writer of the fax, Cedric Thornberry, states
4 in the last line of this front page that the Serb side is substantially
5 responsible for the UNPAs.
6 How did the Serb side stand to benefit by impeding the
8 A. You know, it wasn't just the Serb side. There were both sides --
9 were -- were stalling the -- the progress here. But by -- by stalling,
10 they were trading time for influence, I suppose. The -- I know that
11 Cedric Thornberry was extremely frustrated by this time, and -- and
12 the -- the two sides weren't prepared to talk to each other at all, which
13 was the purpose of the commission.
14 Q. When you say "they were trading time for influence," could you
15 explain what you mean by that?
16 A. Well, yeah, the -- I mean, yes. By agreeing to meet with --
17 in -- in the form of the joint commission, it would appear to the world
18 that they were co-operating in the -- in the effort to resolve the issue
19 of the -- of the pink zones. But, at the same time, there were
20 paramilitaries roaming the country-side, and they weren't just roaming
21 this was, in my view, organised, and they were intimidating populations.
22 And it was -- in retrospect it would like now as though by stalling for
23 time, in -- in -- they could probably establish themselves as the
24 dominant force in -- in that zone and the Croatian government was getting
25 very, very frustrated. Because, in their view it was clearly -- in fact,
1 the pink zones in -- in the context of what they were -- were recognised
2 as Croatian.
3 Q. When you refer to these organised paramilitaries, what terms were
4 used to describe them?
5 A. In English they were called special police. In practical terms,
6 they were a militia, a paramilitary militia. They were irregulars. They
7 were organised. They operated as -- as an organised militia - again,
8 that's my term - but an organised paramilitary unit. But they were
9 called special police.
10 Q. What type of equipment did these units have?
11 A. Ah. I personally only saw side-arms and assault weapons.
12 Q. Did you read reports of them having any other equipment?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. What type of equipment?
15 A. You know something? I can't -- I just cannot remember the
16 detail. I'd have to read the reports again.
17 Q. Are you able to give a general answer or not?
18 A. Yeah. They had -- in -- as I recall, they had what would be
19 considered as -- as infantry weapons.
20 Q. And if you could --
21 A. A broad spectrum of infantry weapons. Crew-served weapons.
22 Q. Could you explain what crew-served weapons are?
23 A. Well, a crew-served weapon is any weapon that requires more than
24 one person to operate it.
25 Q. Could you give an example?
1 A. Yeah. A machine-gun is a crew-served weapon if it is belt fed.
2 Q. Okay.
3 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, we would tender 65 ter document 1351.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Shall be assigned Exhibit Number P2893. Thank
7 MR. GILLETT: Thank you.
8 Q. And my final question. In your statement at paragraph 63, you
9 state that Goran Hadzic was the president of the RSK and that you ran
10 into him in Knin at one point in time.
11 Could you describe what occurred during that encounter?
12 A. It was a very brief -- I'm sorry, I should wait.
13 It was a very, very brief encounter. I was with a member of the
14 Knin co-ordinating centre for the European Community Monitor Mission. He
15 was my guide. I used to visit the -- the various teams and coordinating
16 centres and regional centres around the deployment area. It was part of
17 my duties. I was their immediate superior, and I was being given a tour
18 of the area. We were in a government building, and Mr. Hadzic and I just
19 essentially crossed paths, and it was a very brief encounter.
20 Q. How did you know he was president of the RSK?
21 A. My guide told me.
22 Q. Did he tell you anything else about Hadzic?
23 A. It's one of those things you don't forget. And he -- he stated
24 to me that not much goes on in this area that he doesn't know about, I
25 think, was his -- as best as I can summarise the statement.
1 I tried to -- and I should say to the Court that I tried to
2 reconfirm that issue. The officer who was -- who was escorting me at the
3 time is suffering post-traumatic stress disorder. I was not able to
4 speak to him so that is the -- that is the exchange in the best of my
6 Q. Thank you very much, sir.
7 MR. GILLETT: That completes my direct examination.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Gillett.
9 Is the Defence ready for cross?
10 [Defence counsel confer]
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Take your time, Mr. Zivanovic, if you ...
12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you. May I consult my client for a moment,
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Of course.
15 [Defence counsel and Accused confer]
16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you.
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Zivanovic:
18 Q. Good morning, Mr. Noseworthy. My name is Zoran Zivanovic and I
19 am counsel for Mr. Goran Hadzic in this case.
20 I would like to discuss two topics in your testimony, the first
21 being demilitarisation.
22 As you testified, you began your work with ECMM on
23 7th of September, 1992?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. And before that you had two weeks of preparatory work, briefings?
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. And through those briefings, did you learn the historical
3 background and recent developments in the former Yugoslavia?
4 A. You know I have to be honest, not in the detail that I would have
5 preferred, but we had a -- we had a lot of briefings, and we were exposed
6 to individuals who had lived in the former Yugoslavia who gave us
7 historical briefings and gave us some history of the area.
8 We were also -- went through a short training period when we
9 arrive in the mission. That was perhaps much more relevant to the
10 mission itself.
11 Q. And you were aware of the details of Vance Plan?
12 A. Oh, yes.
13 Q. The first phase of -- of this plan was demilitarisation and
14 withdrawal of the JNA. Is it correct?
15 A. As I understand it, yes.
16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we have Rule 65 ter exhibit 1402.
17 Q. It is a book from Colonel Riley as far as I know.
18 A. Yes. I know him well.
19 Q. Yes.
20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see the page 7 in e-court, please.
21 It is in penultimate paragraph on the left side of the screen.
22 Q. The last sentence reads:
23 "ECMM teams also monitored the withdrawal of the JNA out of
24 Krajina which began in May 1992, having been permitted to enter Krajina
25 in April."
1 Do you agree with that statement?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. The next page of this document, it is the first -- I think it is
4 the first paragraph and first sentence read:
5 "The cease-fire in Croatian was broken in May by Croatian army
6 attacks north of Split."
7 Do you recall that?
8 A. The actual event, I don't recall it. But it's part of the
9 history of the -- of the conflict. So, yes, I'm aware of it. I was not
10 in theatre in May.
11 Q. And you are aware that in the first week of June 1992, the
12 Croatian army invaded Bosnia and Herzegovina and cut off the corridor
13 connecting RSK with former Yugoslavia.
14 A. That's -- that's a matter of history, yes.
15 Q. Could you confirm that the corridor was vital for survival of the
16 RSK? This connection between Yugoslavia on one side, and the RSK on the
18 A. Yeah. It's -- that is -- the answer is yes, if -- if RSK was to
19 be accepted as a -- as a viable entity. But I'm not sure -- I must say
20 I'm not sure that in international law that that was -- that's
21 universally accepted. But from the perspective of the population of
22 the -- the ethnic Serb population within the RSK, that would have to be
23 the way that they would have viewed the situation.
24 Q. Thank you. And you're aware that the corridor was re-established
25 only after the armed intervention of the RSK forces in first part of
1 June 1992?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Could you confirm that on 21st of June, 1992, the Croatian army
4 made an incursion into the Miljevacki Plateau, in contravention of the
5 Vance Plan?
6 A. It is a matter of history. I was not in theatre at the time. So
7 the answer is: I did not observe any of this, but it is -- it -- it's a
8 historical fact.
9 Q. And could you confirm that the RSK forces halted the Croatian's
10 army incursion into Miljevacki Plateau?
11 A. It's a matter of history. It's a historical fact.
12 Q. Thank you. Are you familiar with the UN Security Council's
13 Resolution 762 condemning these acts of Croatian army?
14 A. I'm aware of it.
15 Q. Let me now please -- would you agree that if the RSK had
16 continued disarming its forces, it would not have been able to resist to
17 these and the future acts of Croatia -- Croats?
18 A. You're asking me for an opinion that -- that I'm not comfortable
19 in giving because the situation that you're describing is a -- is a
20 situation that wasn't universally accepted as being legitimate. But from
21 the view of the RSK, I have to -- I have to concede, yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that on 22nd of January, 1993, the
23 Croatian army attacked the Maslenica region?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And if the RSK had not its armed forces, they could not resist to
1 this attack. Do you agree?
2 A. Yeah. Yes, I do.
3 Q. And do you recall that UN Security Council passed the
4 Resolution 802, condemning these attacks and calling on Croatia to
5 withdraw its forces to previous confrontation line?
6 A. Yes, I do. Can I comment on that? Because there was much --
7 there was much activity going on back and forth, and there were
8 United Nations Council's resolutions, there was demarches, diplomatic
9 notes were being exchanged all the time because there were -- it was a
10 very fluid situation.
11 I just wanted to put that in the context. That's all.
12 Q. And would you agree that Croatia refused to comply with the
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And, indeed, Croatia continued its action by shelling Serb
16 positions in the Kordun region?
17 A. That did happen.
18 Q. Do you recall that in September 1993, the Croatian army launched
19 an attack on Medak pocket where they committed crimes against Serb
20 civilian population?
21 A. Again, now you're asking me questions that post-date my -- my
22 service in the -- in the theatre. But, of course, I'm well aware of it.
23 There was a Canadian battalion that was involved in that activity, and
24 yes, I do.
25 Q. And you might be aware that the military leaders responsible for
1 this attack were indicted before this Tribunal?
2 A. I'm aware of that.
3 Q. Do you agree that if the RSK did not have its armed formations,
4 they could not resist this attack?
5 A. No, because in the Medak pocket, if you recall, there was a
6 major -- well, in terms of the activities that were going on at the time,
7 but there was a major confrontation between the Canadian battalion, which
8 was a member of the United Nations Protection Force, and the Croatian
9 forces. I'm speaking now from -- from a historical perspective. I
10 wasn't there.
11 Q. Thank you. Could you confirm that the Serb population in RSK did
12 not see any effective measures undertaken by UNPROFOR to deter Croatia
13 from armed attacks --
14 A. Well, if we go back --
15 Q. -- of UNPAs.
16 A. I'm sorry. If we go back to that one particular example that
17 you're using of the Medak pocket, the United Nations Protection Force did
18 offer stiff resistance against the Croatian forces to protect the Serb
19 population. Just an opinion.
20 Q. Thank you. And I repeat my last question.
21 Could you confirm that the Serb population in RSK did not see any
22 effective measure undertaken by UNPROFOR to deter Croatia from armed
23 attacks on UN protection areas?
24 A. You know, I can't -- I can't answer that question because I
25 wasn't a part of the Serb population and I'm looking it from the outside
1 as a -- as a third party.
2 Q. We have in -- just in this book. I read the statement, but I'm
3 not able to find it right now, but ... on that -- maybe you can recall.
4 That the Serb population distrust in UNPROFOR -- have distrust in -- had
5 distrust in UNPROFOR?
6 A. In the RSK?
7 Q. In RSK.
8 A. Yes. I mean that's -- that's a fact. The Serb population felt
9 threatened, and they did express displeasure with UNPROFOR and that's a
10 matter of history. That's a historical fact.
11 Q. And would you agree in light of these attacks, that the Serb
12 population might perceive the insistence that the Serb -- Serbs disarm
13 resemble the policy that would facilitate Croatian military occupation of
14 the UN protection areas?
15 MR. GILLETT: Your Honour, again, the witness is being asked to
16 speculate on the subjective viewpoints of other persons. He said he was
17 looking from a different person, so I just note that in relation to this
19 THE WITNESS: I think as a monitor, as -- as a European Community
20 Monitor Mission operator, I would have to say that from our perspective,
21 we -- we were there to monitor the conflict and to -- and to observe that
22 the laws of armed conflict were being respected and I cannot comment on
23 what one faction or the other felt. I can only comment on whether or not
24 the -- their activities, their armed activities were being carried out in
25 accordance with the laws of armed conflict. As I understood them.
1 And so if one faction or another conducted operations that were
2 not in accordance with the laws of armed conflict, then it was our duty
3 to report that and the result of those reports is bearing out in -- in
4 this courtroom right now.
5 MR. ZIVANOVIC:
6 Q. In your communication with the people, did you see any distrust
7 in UNPROFOR intentions?
8 A. And the answer to that is an unqualified yes.
9 Q. Thank you. I'd like to move on to another topic, and that is the
10 resettlement of displaced persons and refugees.
11 You were aware of the large number of Croats displaced from
12 UN Protected Areas East, South, and North. Is it correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Are you aware of the large number of Serbs displaced from
15 Western Slavonia, UN Protected Area of west --
16 A. Yes. I mean, the whole area was -- was affected by the
17 displacement of -- of citizens from one location to another, based on
18 their ethnicity.
19 Q. And most of population from Western Slavonia -- most of Serb
20 population from Western Slavonia were temporarily settled in
21 Eastern Slavonia, in UNP East. Is that correct?
22 A. As I understand it.
23 Q. As you know, the Vance Plan provided for the return of displaced
24 persons and refugees to their homes. Correct?
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. You saw documents today which indicated ECMM widely discussed the
2 return of Croat refugees to Sector East.
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. And they would return to houses temporarily occupied by the
5 refugees from Western Slavonia.
6 A. That did happen, yes, sir.
7 Q. As far as you can see from these document, the return of refugees
8 from Western Slavonia to their homes elsewhere was not discussed at all.
9 Is that correct?
10 A. I'm not sure that -- that they were not discussed at all. The
11 issue of displaced persons was a major concern at the time, and it was
12 always being discussed, within the missions.
13 Q. My conclusion follows from the documents showed to you, and
14 tendered into exhibits here.
15 A. And I can -- I can understand where you would -- you would choose
16 to take that point of view. And I can't -- I can't disagree with it.
17 Q. And do you agree that Croatian side was not prepared to receive
18 the refugees from Western Slavonia back?
19 A. That was an issue.
20 Q. Yes or not?
21 A. As I say, that was an issue, and I don't know what the Croatian
22 side was or was not prepared to do. I know that that was an issue. I
23 can't speak for the Croatian side. I can't speak for the -- for the RSK
24 side. I can only speak from the position of -- of an independent
25 monitor. But that was an issue; yes, it was.
1 Q. Was it topic of your discussion with Croatia side?
2 A. Always. We discussed that on numerous occasions. There was a
3 reluctance on both sides of -- of the conflict to receive displaced
4 persons from the other. I mean, it's -- the -- the situation as we -- as
5 I understood it at the time was that people were being displaced on no
6 notice, based on their ethnicity. Both sides.
7 Q. Now, I am interested -- interested for the refugees --
8 A. Mm-hm.
9 Q. -- from Western Slavonia. We have many -- many documents
10 indicating that the issue of refugees from Eastern Slavonia was
12 A. Yes. And that's a -- that's a matter of fact. That's history.
13 Yes, I agree. I can't -- I can't elaborate on it.
14 Q. And let me know, did the ECMM or UNPROFOR have any plan for the
15 people in Eastern Slavonia who temporarily occupied those houses after
16 being expelled from Western Slavonia?
17 A. Yeah. That -- in terms of a plan, that -- that is -- that's an
18 UN issue, that's an UN lead on that one. That's not an ECMM lead on
19 that. Ours was a monitor mission.
20 Q. And are you aware of -- are you aware of such plan?
21 A. I'd have to go back through the documents to look at them again
22 to refresh my memory. I can't speak to you in any detail on it right
23 now. I really can't. I'd like to, but I can't.
24 Q. Let me know, was it inconsistent to insist that Croatian refugees
25 be returned to Eastern Slavonia while no similar accommodation were made
1 for refugees from Western Slavonia?
2 A. You know, if you go back to 1992/1993 and you try and understand
3 what was happening at the time, and there was much confusion, there was a
4 great detail of reluctance on all factions, not just -- not just on -- on
5 any one particular side but there was a great -- there was a great
6 reluctance to get this thing moving and ... and I -- both sides were
7 stalling for time, as I understand it.
8 It was a source of frustration. And we were just as frustrated
9 with the Croatian side as we were with the -- with the RSK side or any
10 other faction in theatre at the time.
11 Q. And whether the Croatian side or UNPROFOR expect -- expect the
12 RSK authorities to re-expel Western Slavonia refugees to Serbia or to
13 live there in open fields?
14 A. Yeah, I'm not aware of -- of -- of any particular plan to that
15 effect. I'm really not. And I would have to go back and refresh my
16 memory by looking at the historical documentation of the day.
17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we look -- we have Rule 65 ter exhibit 5324.
18 It is paragraph 52.
19 I will read it for the transcript.
20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Maybe we should go to private session. I don't
22 know whether this specific paragraph is confidential or not or ...
23 MR. GILLETT: Yeah, if I could just help on that front. The
24 provider has asked us to use this document confidentially. So if we
25 could go into private session.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Private session, please.
2 [Private session]
16 [Open session]
17 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session. Thank you.
18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we have P286 -- 2847, please. It is
19 Resolution 762. It is paragraph 17. I read it for the record.
20 Q. "UNPROFOR believes that there is a direct link between this
21 situation and the presence of large numbers of refugees in these areas.
22 The influx into the UNPAs of Serb refugees from other parts of Croatia,
23 and more recently from Bosnia and Herzegovina, continues unabated. The
24 refugees from Croatia, some of whom appear to foresee no possibility of
25 return to their homes, especially in Western and Central Slavonia, have
1 reportedly occupied houses left vacant by the departure of their non-Serb
2 occupants. While they claim that they are entitled to these houses as
3 long as their own homes are denied to them by the Croatian authorities,
4 the Force Commander is concerned that such actions are part of a
5 concerted effort to change the ethnic composition of these areas."
6 I stop here.
7 Would you tell us, please, how did the ECMM understand this
9 A. That was the crux of the problem, that was the crux of the issue
10 that was central to much of what we were attempting to verify, observe,
11 and monitor.
12 So from the perspective of the European Community Monitoring
13 Mission, we would place monitoring teams inside all factions, inside all
14 regions, on both sides of -- of the conflict. And you must have had the
15 opportunity by now to read many of our reports. We tried to provide as
16 objective a view as to what was actually occurring as we could -- as we
17 could honestly -- honestly get, and that -- that's a matter of record and
18 it speaks for itself.
19 That is -- that is the crux of the problem with respect to what
20 is now being termed ethnic cleansing and displaced persons and refugees.
21 Q. And could you tell me, please, how would the ethnic composition
22 of the areas change if Serbs from one part of Croatia move into other
23 part of Croatia?
24 A. You know, I can't answer that because I don't know. But from
25 a -- from the perspective of an international monitoring mission, it
1 would have been our desire to see each faction represent -- or respect
2 the rights of minority groups, whatever their ethnic composition might
3 happen to be. It was a very difficult situation.
4 Q. And let me know, would the relocation of Serbs from
5 Western Slavonia to former Yugoslavia, Serbia, would change the ethnic
6 composition of Croatia?
7 A. I suppose from a Croatian perspective at the time it would.
8 Q. And they would like it?
9 A. From a Croatian perspective at the time, probably not.
10 Q. And --
11 A. But that's just a comment. I mean, I don't know. I can't -- I
12 can't honestly give you an opinion. And it wasn't my role, it wasn't the
13 role of the mission to -- to give opinions on that. It was the role of
14 the mission to facilitate, observe, and report on the -- the developments
15 within the region in -- in trying to find a permanent resolution to the
17 Q. And let me know if I understand -- if I understand you, Croatia
18 authorities did not like Serbs from Western Slavonia back in
19 Western Slavonia?
20 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, I have to interject here. The
21 witness has said to the same question effectively, "I don't know, I can't
22 honestly give you an opinion."
23 So the question has been asked an answered, and the witness has
24 recognised that he would speculating on the subjective views of a
25 different party.
1 So we object to that question.
2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I didn't finish my question. Sorry.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Well, let's see if what you add to the question
4 could improve it.
5 MR. ZIVANOVIC:
6 Q. As far as I understand from all the -- all your answers, there
7 was no -- there was no clear plan to return the Serbs from Western
8 Slavonia -- Serbs from Eastern Slavonia to Western Slavonia. Is it
10 A. Okay. Here's what I'm going to say on it.
11 There was a plan but it wasn't universally accepted as being a
12 workable solution and that led to the intransigence that was occurring at
13 the time. But I cannot -- I really cannot see inside the minds of
14 tacticians and strategists from any of the opposing factions, but I can
15 see where you might draw that conclusion.
16 I'm sorry if that doesn't -- that doesn't answer your question.
17 Q. Your last answer reads that it wasn't -- the plan wasn't
18 universally accepted. But whom -- by whom?
19 A. By any of the factions. By any of the factions.
20 Q. It includes Croats?
21 A. It includes Croats.
22 Q. Thank you. It means that the Croats didn't like to see Serbs
23 from Western Slavonia back. Am I right?
24 A. Yes, you are right in assuming that. But, you know, again, from
25 a -- from the perspective of an international operative, we were
1 interested in seeing the laws of armed conflict respected, the rights of
2 ethnic minorities, on both sides, or all sides, because there were more
3 than just the two sides, respected. And however, you know, these events
4 transpired at the time, doesn't excuse the commission of crimes by one
5 side or another. That's just my personal view.
6 Q. Now I'm just interested in the position of the Croat side.
7 A. Okay.
8 Q. And if they didn't want the Serbs from Eastern Slavonia back in
9 Western Slavonia, and wanted to resettle Croats into their homes in
10 Eastern Slavonia where were the Serbs from Western Slavonia, the only
11 option is to resettle these people in Yugoslavia or to leave them on
12 the -- in the open fields. Is that correct?
13 A. Again, pure speculation. But -- but the -- the response that the
14 international community was looking for at the time was to have all sides
15 sit down and resolve the issue through negotiation. And that wasn't
17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we have a look at P2677, please. It is
18 paragraph 19. I don't know, is it confidential or not.
19 MR. GILLETT: No. This is the UN Secretary-General report.
20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yeah, okay.
21 MR. GILLETT: It's not confidential.
22 MR. ZIVANOVIC:
23 Q. It is the second sentence in -- I'm interested in first two
24 sentences from paragraph 19.
25 It reads:
1 "Extremist elements on both sides are nevertheless still present
2 in Sector West. The Croatian police have often played an intimidatory
3 role which has vigorously protested by UNPROFOR."
4 Could you explain what that means, intimidatory role?
5 A. I don't know. That's an UN document and I'm not here to comment
6 on UN documents, sir. I would have read it. And intimidatory involves
7 intimidation, tactics, methods, and could in today's terms could be
8 interpreted as terrorist, terrorist activities. Intimidation.
9 Q. Were you informed about such cases?
10 A. Of course, yes, we were.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 A. But I should say they were happening on both sides.
13 Q. Yeah, yeah.
14 A. Okay.
15 Q. There are a lot of documents in records about it.
16 Could you look at paragraph 20 of this report, please.
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. Just a moment to find this specific sentence.
19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we go to next page, please. Hmm. Next page.
20 Oh. Sorry. May we go to -- to previous page. It is last sentence,
21 actually, that's spilled to another page.
22 Paragraph 20, please.
23 I read it for the record:
24 "Certain political leaders have sought to develop movements for
25 return to -- to the UNPAs within stated deadlines, and then to organise
1 mass returns. UNPROFOR has emphasised at all levels that the basic
2 conditions of security do not exist for such mass returns and that the
3 highly publicised attempts made so far not only exacerbate tensions but,
4 if persisted in, could lead to renewed tragedies. On one occasion, in
5 the Osijek area on" - may we go to the next page, please - "on
6 30 September, the situation was made worse by public statements by a
7 senior officer that the Croatian army would support such returns and move
8 up behind the marching people. These events caused great tension in
9 Sector East, which is the displaced persons' stated destination and,
10 indeed, fear among the Serb population in the sector ..."
11 Could you please clarify this statement? Do you recall this?
12 A. Yes -- yes, I do, in fact. And it's a matter of history. It's
13 an accurate statement.
14 Q. Thank you. Just one more question. Today you testified about
15 pink zones.
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. And as far as I know, these zones were almost completely
18 deserted. There was no population in the pink zones, but Croats and
19 Serbs. Is it correct?
20 A. They were being depopulated, yes, they were.
21 Q. Thank you. And the last issue is your -- your very short meeting
22 with Mr. Hadzic and the words about his position told you by your escort.
23 A. I want to clarify. It wasn't a meeting. We bumped into each
24 other as -- as I was -- either he was leaving or I was leaving, but we
25 just passed. And I happened to ask the question, who was this person. I
1 didn't have a meeting with him. I hadn't arranged a meeting with him.
2 It's just that I am aware of who he was through the records, and on that
3 one particular day, we just passed in the hallway. That's -- that's --
4 Q. And would you be able to tell us who was this man who give you
6 A. You know, I'm not exactly sure of who it was. I thought it was
7 Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Wolosichuk [phoen], who was with me at the time.
8 And I'm not -- I'm not 100 per cent sure of that. It's a long time ago,
10 Q. Sorry, would you repeat the name?
11 A. Wolosichuk.
12 Q. Wolosichuk. He was --
13 A. He was a monitor who was assigned to the coordination centre in
15 Q. From what country is he --
16 A. He was from Canada.
17 Q. He is also from Canada?
18 A. He is also from Canada. But I'm not sure that it was him because
19 I was visiting there and -- yeah.
20 Q. Thank you for your time. Thank you very much. I finish.
21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Your Honours, I finish my cross-examination.
22 Thank you.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Zivanovic.
24 Mr. Gillett, anything in re-direct?
25 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Mr. President. Probably five to ten
2 Re-examination by Mr. Gillett:
3 Q. Sir, you were asked about incursions by the Croatian side during
5 MR. GILLETT: Could I get 65 ter document 3151 on the monitor,
7 Q. And while this is coming up, this is an UNPROFOR military info
8 summary. Would you have access to these kinds of reports during your
9 time with ECMM?
10 A. Yeah, we shared reports back and forth.
11 MR. GILLETT: Could we go to page 13 of this document.
12 Q. Now, under the heading 18 September 1992, in the middle of the
13 page, we see a series of incidents listed. Inside the UNPA, we see
14 militia cars tried to force their way through Ken position at Civljane to
15 Peruca. Then under inside pink zones, we see an incident with fire from
16 the CA, which I understand to be Croatian army. In number 2, we see fire
17 from the TDF, which I understand to be Territorial Defence Force side to
18 the Croatian army. And then we see another three incidents of this
20 From your experience, were there incidents and provocations by
21 both sides during this conflict?
22 A. Yes, there were.
23 Q. And could I ask, are you aware what HMG - this is point 2 -
24 means, the acronym?
25 A. HMG is heavy machine-gun.
1 Q. Would that be an example of a crew-fired weapon that you referred
3 A. That is a crew-served weapon.
4 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, we would tender this document, 3151,
5 for admission.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Shall be assigned Exhibit Number P2912. Thank
9 MR. GILLETT: Thank you very much.
10 Q. You were also asked about the process of demilitarisation during
12 MR. GILLETT: Could we get 65 ter document 3624 on the monitor,
14 And this is a United Nations Secretary-General report. If we
15 could go to paragraph 7 of this report. Thank you.
16 Q. We see here that it reports:
17 "The justification given by the Knin authorities for these forces
18 that they are needed to defend Serb-controlled areas from attacks and
19 infiltration by the Croatian army. General Nambiar has repeatedly
20 stressed to the authorities in Belgrade and Knin that it is UNPROFOR that
21 exercises the protection function in the UNPAs, and that the presence of
22 these paramilitary units is contrary to the United Nations plan and has
23 caused the Croatian army to retain some of its forces at the
24 confrontation line. As a result, clashes continue to occur along the
25 line, fueling intercommunal tension in the UNPAs."
1 Would the presence of these Serb militia forces in the UNPAs and
2 pink zones constitute a provocation to the Croatian army?
3 A. It was irritant. I'm not sure that "provocation" is a word that
4 I would use because you have to understand that the Serb population was
5 under siege at the time and they saw themselves as being under siege. So
6 that was, again, the issue in trying to get the -- the implementation of
7 the Vance Plan to move forward.
8 So the answer is yes, but I'm trying to understand it from the --
9 from the Serb side as well.
10 Q. Thank you. And from the reports that you read, how did these
11 armed forces, the Serb militia, treat the non-Serb population within the
12 UNPAs and the pink zones?
13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It was not a part of my cross-examination, and it
14 was part of witness statement, and it could be matter of
16 MR. GILLETT: The reason I'm asking about this is it relates to
17 the issue of Croatian forces being provoked.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Objection sustained.
19 MR. GILLETT: Thank you.
20 If we could now go to paragraph 34 of this report. Thank you.
21 And just for the record, this is one of the paragraphs that was
22 inadvertently cut off in D70, which is a draft version of this report
23 that was admitted. This is the full, final version of the report.
24 Q. We see here it states that:
25 "The root cause of the deterioration in the UNPAs since late
1 July has been the Knin authorities' decision to create new paramilitary
2 forces. This action is inconsistent with the demilitarisation of the
3 UNPAs and thus is a blatant violation of the United Nations plan."
4 It then continues in the same vein. Would the creation of new
5 paramilitary forces constitute a provocation to the Croatian side?
6 A. Yes, in my view.
7 Q. Final topic. You were asked about the return of refugees and you
8 were referred to document P2677.
9 MR. GILLETT: Could we get P2677 on the monitor. Paragraph 20,
10 which is page 7.
11 And if we go over to the next page, please.
12 Q. You were asked about the incident concerning the return of
13 refugees to Osijek, which is in Sector East. And we read that these
14 events --
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.
16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It was not return to refugees from Osijek. It
17 was the statement of officer in Osijek.
18 MR. GILLETT: Thank you for that clarification. That's correct.
19 Q. If we read the sentence:
20 "These events caused great tension in Sector East, which was the
21 displaced persons' stated destination, indeed, fear among the Serb
22 population in the sector (for fear, on both sides, is still a factor in
23 the UNPAs). This, in turn, provided both reason and pretext for further
24 mobilisation of the Serb special militias and renewed victimisation of
25 the non-Serb people."
1 Would the potential return of refugees to their homes justify
2 further victimisation of the remaining non-Serbs in the UNPAs?
3 A. Could you repeat that question again. I just ...
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.
5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry, it is incomplete quotation or incomplete
6 statement. Because it was said, clearly said, that Croatian army would
7 support such returns and move up behind the marching people. It was not
8 just the refugees but Croatian army.
9 MR. GILLETT: Indeed. And that was read in cross-examination. I
10 was reading the passage that wasn't highlighted in cross-examination to
11 give a complete basis for the witness to answer the question.
12 Q. Now, based on that, my question is: Would this paternal --
13 potential, sorry, return of refugees supported by the Croatian army
14 justify the further victimisation of the non-Serbs who remained in the
16 A. Not in my opinion.
17 Q. Okay.
18 MR. GILLETT: No further questions, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 Questioned by the Court:
22 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness. I was waiting for
23 the end of the French interpretation before I put my question to you.
24 I would like to go back to the exhibit that you were shown. That
25 was 65 ter 3624 and that was a report by the Secretary-General of the
1 United Nations.
2 I would like to know: Who was supposed to provide protection of
3 the police in UNPA zones in your sector?
4 A. I'm not sure I understand -- do you mean the United Nations
5 police or the local police of the -- of the area?
6 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] First of all, the very principle
7 of policing, police protection for people and for goods. Would it be the
8 local police or the UN police?
9 A. The UN police, at the time, were in a mentoring role. They
10 weren't providing protection. As I understand it, they weren't providing
11 protection to anyone.
12 The protection of the civilian population was the responsibility
13 of the local police in the various sectors, according to wherever --
14 wherever they lived. There were several different police forces, and the
15 UN -- UNCIVPOL were a -- were a mentoring force. As I understand it.
16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Indeed. And that's how I
17 understand things as well. But in the report of the UN
18 Secretary-General, we just read that paramilitary forces were created by
19 the Knin authorities which caused difficulties.
20 Now, these forces that were considered as paramilitaries in this
21 report, how did the Knin authorities consider them? Did they consider
22 them as the police or the military? Knowing that it was incumbent upon
23 the Knin authorities to protect the population.
24 A. I understand your question.
25 I can't comment on what the Knin authorities thought. I can only
1 comment on how we, as an international monitoring force, interpreted
2 the -- their actions.
3 There are two -- a policeman is an officer of the law who
4 operates within the law, who operates as an individual who protects a
5 people, citizens, in accordance with the law.
6 The paramilitary forces that we're talking about that were
7 referred to as "special police," in our view, or in my view, were
8 military-type militias, and that was in contravention of the spirit of
9 the Vance Plan. As I understand it. They were a fairly large force.
10 They were more heavily armed than policemen and they operated in an
11 organised military fashion as opposed to the operations of a civilian
12 police officer in accordance with whatever law he happens to be operating
14 Does that make any sense?
15 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you very much. I
16 understood you perfectly well.
17 This force, this special police, that was considered by the
18 report as a paramilitary force, were they alone on the ground for the
19 protection of people and property, or were there, in addition, also local
20 police forces?
21 A. There were local police forces. And those local police forces
22 we, as a -- as a monitoring mission, would consider them to be exactly
23 what they were: Police forces. Policemen.
24 The paramilitaries we considered to be a -- or the special
25 police, we considered them to be a paramilitary force.
1 Perhaps I can -- I can illustrate by stating that a policeman
2 operates under the principle of minimum force, minimum use of force. A
3 paramilitary force operates under the military objective of maximum use
4 of force. One is more intimidating than the other.
5 I hope that clarifies.
6 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] All right. Thank you very much.
7 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, if I may, just one question arising
8 from Your Honours' questions in relation to police forces.
9 Further Re-examination by Mr. Gillett:
10 Q. Sir, you've commented on the regular police in response to the --
11 the final question from Judge Mindua.
12 How were the local or regular police armed in the UNPAs and pink
14 A. Civilian police or regular police would be armed with side-arms.
15 And it was not uncommon to see them with short-range long guns, AK-47
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. GILLETT: Thank you.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Noseworthy, this is the end of your
20 testimony. You are now released as a witness. We thank you very much
21 for coming to The Hague to assist the Tribunal, and we wish you a safe
22 journey back home. The court usher will escort you out of the court.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
25 [The witness withdrew]
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Is there anything else for the moment?
2 MR. STRINGER: No, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 10.31 a.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Monday, the 2nd of September,
6 2013, at 9.00 a.m.