1 Wednesday, 4 September 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning to everyone in and around the
7 Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
9 This is the case IT-04-75-T, The Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, the appearances, please.
11 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning,
12 Your Honours. Matthew Olmsted, Alex Demirdjian, for the Prosecution,
13 with Case Manager, Thomas Laugel, and our intern, Simona Onicel.
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
15 Mr. Zivanovic, for the Defence.
16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. For the Defence of
17 Goran Hadzic, Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell. Thank you.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
19 Mr. Olmsted, you wanted to make a submission before the witness
20 comes in.
21 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, Mr. President.
22 And it's with regard to 65 ter 5127, which was the last exhibit I
23 showed the witness prior to completing my direct examination.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Can we have it on the screen, please.
25 MR. OLMSTED: Yeah, it's -- it's 5127.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: There it is.
2 MR. OLMSTED: Yes. Your Honours, our submission is that this
3 is -- well, first of all, it's a letter from the
4 British Medical Association to General Kadijevic and it's dated
5 9 December 1991, and we can see from its contents its primary concern is
6 a significant number of persons, patients, and staff who were missing
7 from Vukovar Hospital after its fall. And it is our submission that,
8 first of all, this is a letter addressed to a named JCE member. And it's
9 significant because the head of the SSNO Security Administration and a
10 direct subordinate to General Kadijevic has testified that not only was
11 he not aware of this letter, he was not aware of the information
12 contained within it, and so we believe this is evidence of failure to act
13 upon information that was available to the JNA leadership.
14 And it's also significant that the witness has testified that,
15 had he been informed of this information, there were concrete measures
16 that he would have taken.
17 I should also note that the witness was also able to confirm some
18 information in this letter. For instance, the letter does speak about
19 Vesna Bosanac and other doctors, and the witness has confirmed that
20 Bosanac and other doctors were in detention at the collection centres
21 and, in fact, the day after this letter he was involved in an exchange of
22 Ms. Bosanac with the Croatian authorities.
23 In addition the Trial Chamber has received into evidence
24 subsequent correspondence from other international organisations or NGOs
25 with similar content. And I draw the Trial Chamber's attention to P2643,
1 which is a letter from Helsinki Watch US dated 21 January 1992. And if
2 we could just briefly go into private session.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Private session, please.
4 [Private session]
18 [Open session]
19 MR. OLMSTED: And for those reasons, Your Honours --
20 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
22 MR. OLMSTED: And for those reasons, Your Honours, we make the
23 submission that this document may be tendered into evidence at this time.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor, as regards this
2 exhibit, I can see the name of Veljko Kadijevic,
3 General Veljko Kadijevic, of course, and according to this letter, he
4 would be the head of the SSNO, but I also see something handwritten in
5 this letter which would indicate that General Kadijevic was the head of
6 the armed forces.
7 Is that the same position or not?
8 MR. OLMSTED: I think that's a good question, Your Honour, and I
9 think in layman terms, it is. The head of the SSNO was, in essence, the
10 commander of the armed forces. He was subordinate to the SFRY
11 Presidency, but certainly in times of conflict, and the Defence counsel
12 may correct me if I'm wrong, certainly in times of conflict, the head of
13 the SSNO was, in essence, the commander of the armed forces.
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.
15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Your Honours, I would object to the admission of
16 this document. First of all, there is no nexus between this document,
17 the content of this document, and testimony of the witness. He clearly
18 testified that he has no -- anything about this document, about the
19 content of this document, and it is reason because I object to
20 admission [microphone not activated] this witness.
21 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, Mr. Zivanovic, isn't that the point that
22 Mr. Olmsted just made? The fact that the witness says he doesn't know
23 anything about it, is the -- is the -- the link that, if I understand
24 Mr. Olmsted correctly, that he is drawing between the addressee,
25 General Kadijevic, and the -- and -- and -- and the author of the
1 document - pardon me - in other words, that it is -- that in it the
2 ordinary course of events, having regard to the witness's position it is
3 something that ought to have been brought to his attention and the fact
4 that he says it wasn't is the -- is foundational to Mr. Olmsted's
6 Did I misunderstand you, Mr. Olmsted?
7 MR. OLMSTED: You understood me perfectly, Your Honour.
8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It is my submission that it is not enough for
9 admission of this document, Your Honour, because something that was sent
10 to General Kadijevic as a superior to the witness should not be known to
11 the witness. It is not necessary to be known to the witness. And
12 because of that, I -- I -- in my submission, there is no nexus for --
13 between his testimony and this document.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: The majority, Judge Mindua dissenting, decides to
16 overrule the objection. The document is admitted. And please mark it,
17 Madam Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the document shall be assigned
19 Exhibit P2974. Thank you.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
21 The witness may be brought in.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning, General Vasiljevic. Sorry for the
24 delay. We had a procedural matter to address.
25 Mr. Zivanovic, please proceed.
1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
2 WITNESS: ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC [Resumed]
3 [Witness answered through interpreter]
4 Cross-examination by Mr. Zivanovic: [Continued]
5 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
6 A. Good morning.
7 Q. During your testimony, you spoke, on page 7890 of the transcript,
8 that -- about Velepromet as being the TO centre in Vukovar, if I
9 understood you well.
10 A. You mean a reception centre?
11 Q. Yes, I guess.
12 A. Because I used the term "reception centre" because there was some
13 captured persons there.
14 Q. Do you know who established that centre?
15 A. No. I was getting information -- or, rather, I got information
16 from that -- about that centre from Captain Borisavljevic, the security
17 organ, in 1995 or so when he told me about where some prisoners were, who
18 had to be transferred to the barracks pursuant to some threats, and he
19 was speaking about the TO being in charge of that centre. But I
20 personally never went to Velepromet.
21 Q. I believe that yourself, on a number of occasions, mentioned --
22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear the end of the
24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see P2285.2284.
25 Q. [Interpretation] This is a report which was sent to the
1 Security Administration on the 10th of November, 1991. I think it has
2 already been shown to you, but we'll go through it once more.
3 You see that it says, I'll start with the second paragraph. It
5 "A centre for the admission of civilians and preservation of
6 material goods, Vukovar, Jug south has been set up within the offices of
7 Velepromet, which is directly managed by Srecko Borisavljevic, captain
8 first class from the security organ of the Guards Brigade, our first
9 mechanism for finding extremists and possible disguised member [sic] of
10 the MUP and the ZNG."
11 Was that information known to you?
12 A. The Security Administration got it, but it doesn't mean that it
13 reached me. However, I cannot contest anything you've just said.
14 Q. It goes on to say:
15 "The head of the centre, Ljubinko Stojanovic, businessman from
16 Petrova Gora, who is otherwise a security organ source, who was given
17 detailed instructions for work on security matters when he came to
19 Do explain to us what "source" means here.
20 A. Every person with whom the security organ speaks is a source.
21 However, we must distinguish between sources and collaborators.
22 Q. Do you know what kind of instructions were given? What were
23 these instructions mentioned here?
24 A. I don't know.
25 Q. It goes on to say what is done in connection with identification
1 and the rest of it.
2 I'm going to show you some other documents that have to do with
3 Velepromet. Do you know, did you ever learn from anyone that only such
4 people could be released from Velepromet who were under the control of
5 the security organ, that that organ was the only body that did -- did
7 A. No. As I've already said, I know what Captain Borisavljevic told
8 me in 1995. He clearly pointed out that this is about material assets,
9 war booty, and it all stayed in that centre.
10 And, secondly, Borisavljevic, of all persons detained and
11 screened as possibly having committed war crimes, had to be transferred
12 to the barracks for their even safety. When they were leaving during the
13 final operations on the 19th or 20th, I don't know, Ljubinko stayed
14 behind. And all the time when I was talking to him I had the impression
15 that he was a member of the TO and that's why he stayed behind. Now,
16 who he went to see in Belgrade and why, I don't understand. They could
17 have prepared him right there. There was a security organ, Sljivancanin,
18 and so on, and Borisavljevic himself who had been in the service quite
19 some time.
20 Now, I cannot say any more about this. I only know what he told
21 me in 1995 and on the basis of that, I gave evidence. And it's important
22 to me that they were transferred. When there was a danger for them,
23 because Arkan was there, then he transferred the people to the barracks
24 in order to protect them, which means that he had a group of people for
25 whom he -- he was in charge of them, operatively. But he certainly
1 wasn't in charge of everybody.
2 Q. He told you that he transferred some people from Velepromet to
3 the barracks because, otherwise, they would have been in danger.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see D81, please.
7 Q. [Interpretation] This is a certificate which certifies that
8 Marko Crevar was authorised by the above command to take over two
9 prisoners from Velepromet in Vukovar, and I believe that you can see who
10 signed it?
11 A. The signature is illegible but since he is a major --
12 Q. Yeah, well, this could also be enlarged. At any rate, we can
13 tell that the person in question is a major. I think that the printed
14 name is legible too.
15 But why am I showing this? It follows from this, as far as I can
16 tell, that not every prisoner could be taken out of Velepromet without a
17 written approval of the security organ. Do you agree?
18 A. But this doesn't says "Velepromet." It says "unit command,
19 Negoslavci." And there is no security officer here. Well, if you can
20 tell me who signed this, I cannot --
21 Q. But the name is printed too. Perhaps we could enlarge it some
23 A. Yes, it could be Veselin Sljivancanin.
24 Q. And, as for a Velepromet, I believe that the last sentence
25 mentions Velepromet.
1 At any rate, we can move on to another document.
2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see, please, D82.
3 Q. [Interpretation] Here we can also see some dates when the
4 takeover took place, the 20th of October and the 21st of October, 1991,
5 respectively. They were used for some digging work.
6 Did you have any information to the effect that people could not
7 be handed over from Velepromet without the approval of the JNA organ in
9 A. I don't know what is doubtful here. If the army detained some
10 persons, then it was in charge of those persons. If somebody wanted to
11 take them over, they needed approval from the -- the officer. And if
12 that's how they proceeded, I don't see a problem with that.
13 Q. Exactly. There was a procedure concerning captured persons who
14 were handed over to someone that their names had to be noted down and a
15 note had to be made about who they were handed over to, so it had to be
17 A. At that time, the collection centre at Begejci was in existence,
18 and it was natural that those deprived of liberty or detained after the
19 screening, these persons had to be sent to a collection centre if their
20 processing required more time. That depended on the Chief of Staff, the
21 chief of the 1st Army, and the corps commanders, so this order was passed
22 down to corps command level. They had a reception centre here, but what
23 became of it, I don't know. I never went there. When I was in Vukovar,
24 I wasn't aware of it. If I had known, I certainly would have gone there
25 to see the place. But what could possibly be a problem with this?
1 Q. No, there isn't a problem with this at all. I only showed you
2 this document to confirm the existence of a procedure in place in the
3 army at the time. If there was a hand-over, be it to other military
4 authorities or civilian authorities, a document had to be made about that
5 hand-over which people were concerned and so on?
6 A. Yes, if it was a permanent hand-over, but if the people were used
7 for digging, that was a temporary hand-over and in that case it wasn't
8 necessary to note the names. It's a good thing that they made such notes
9 at all, in such cases.
10 Q. All right. Well, you know, I didn't know that it was unnecessary
11 to write down names and surnames. People can go missing, for instance,
12 and then the commanding officer of a unit could be held responsible.
13 After all, there should be a document that says that someone is then
14 responsible for their further destiny.
15 A. Well, that's what it says here, and if they go missing, then he
16 is going to start a procedure in terms of who are the four persons
17 missing, for instance. But it is a good thing this was noted down so
18 there was some kind of control over this, after all, so they were not
19 just locked up and squeezed into a detention space and nobody ever cared
20 what happened to them after that.
21 Q. That's precisely what I wanted us to see, Exhibit 532, according
22 to 65 ter. This is also a document that the Prosecutor showed you during
23 your examination on Monday. I think it is on page 2.
24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we zoom in a bit, please.
25 Q. You see, I'm actually interested in the second paragraph.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could we please have a
2 reference. We cannot find this passage.
3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry. No, no, it is the last paragraph of the
4 second page.
5 Q. [Interpretation] "In order to more realistically assess own
6 force, particularly in the field of combat morale, we acquainted the
7 chief of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, cabinet, with the
8 content of the operations report. He expected -- he expressed a certain
9 amount of surprise and at the same time he expressed a degree of reserve
10 at the objectivity of reporting by the Guards Brigade command."
11 Do you know anything about this?
12 A. Now that I am reading this, on this page, this has to do with the
13 existence of Serb volunteer groups even as entities and even requests
14 that these units be given a special task, the organ, security organ did
15 get certain directions, but all of this goes beyond our possibility, so I
16 really need to see what this is that Vuk Obradovic is reacting to.
17 Looking at the regulations, and we did discuss who this
18 information went to and I mention who was superior to who, so the
19 Guards Brigade was then subordinated to the command of the
20 1st Military District. Vuk Obradovic does not have any command
21 responsibility in terms of the brigade, while it is resubordinated to the
22 1st Military District. And they are informing him, too. And then he is
23 providing his own assessments but he is actually not out in the field so
24 he cannot decide on that, and he cannot really change anything.
25 From this, I just see another detail, that the security organ is
1 subordinated to its commander. I assume that that is
2 Lieutenant-Colonel Djukic, the chief of security, at the office, the
3 cabinet, and he does give this to his superior officer but he does not
4 have any possibility to change anything.
5 This expression here, "he was surprised." I really don't know
6 what that would mean, what he was surprised about.
7 Q. I'm interested in something else now. Since this report was sent
8 to the Security Administration, and that can be seen on the first page, I
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. I would be interested in the assessment provided by the
12 Security Administration, in terms of this report, and whether you know
13 about that, in terms of its authenticity.
14 Let me just tell you something else. It says here also that this
15 report of the security organ of the Guards Brigade is attached. However,
16 we don't have that attachment.
17 A. Well, it can be seen up here what the reaction was to this
18 report. It says here Lieutenant-Colonel Mojsilovic; that is to say,
19 these are tasks for Lieutenant-Colonel Mojsilovic. And now this is the
20 handwriting of the chief of the 1st Division at the
21 Security Administration --
22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not catch the name.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So one should not have any
24 interference from the Security Administration. This has to do with
25 archives. Assessments, I don't know, cabinet SSNO, probably chief of
1 security regarding the situation in the battalion of the military police.
2 That's probably correct.
3 Now that Vuk Obradovic is surprised, that has to do with the
4 situation in the battalion of the military police. As far as I can
5 remember now, yes, it is on the first page here, there are things that
6 are said about Zjajo Muris and the anti-terrorist company. And
7 Vuk Obradovic is surprised by Zjajo Muris's behaviour and the behaviour
8 of the people from the anti-terrorist company. Now what kind of problems
9 they had, I don't know.
10 Q. Sorry. How do you know that he is surprised by Zjajo Muris and
11 not surprised by this information?
12 A. Because he knows who Zjajo Muris is. I would also be surprised
13 to learn that Zjajo Muris did something bad. I do apologise. I would be
14 surprised if Zjajo Muris appeared now in some new light, if you will, and
15 this anti-terrorist company that was an elite unit, I'm convinced that
16 this note of Vuk Obradovic had to do with this, what I've been speaking
17 about just now.
18 Q. So you believe that he was not surprised at all by the fact that
19 from this report -- actually, I don't know how true that was, that
20 prisoners of war were being killed?
21 A. I don't even know that that's contained in there. Actually, I'd
22 have to sit down and read the entire passage. If you have enough time, I
23 can read it passage by passage and give my comments. I did not have this
24 document before. This is the first time I see this, and now I am
25 interpreting it on the basis of my own knowledge about the situation.
1 Q. I think that --
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted.
3 MR. OLMSTED: Perhaps the witness's memory needs to be refreshed.
4 If he can be given a paper copy - I have one here - maybe he can just
5 look at it briefly, as I know that this was shown to him during direct
6 examination, and I don't think he has put the two documents together.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: What -- what exactly did you give to the witness,
8 Mr. Olmsted.
9 MR. OLMSTED: I'm sorry. This is just the -- the original
10 version of the document that's on the screen. It's a two-page document
11 and Defence counsel was referring to something on the second page, and I
12 think just --
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Now I can enter this polemic.
15 What is the question?
16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. There's no need for a polemic. I had put a question, or rather,
18 you provided an explanation what -- as to what Vuk Obradovic had been
19 surprised at. You've already provided answers to that. So would you
20 perhaps like to add something to that answer?
21 A. I think that he was surprised by these observations too. In
22 relation to the Vukovar operation, Serb nationalist and Chetnik
23 propaganda is assuming serious proportions. So in terms of its breadth
24 it considerably exceeds the participation of volunteers and
25 paramilitaries. Nationalist symbols, nationalist songs, speeches by
1 Vojislav Seselj are being tolerated, and that is understand justified.
2 We are indicating this tendency that there is tacit recognition of the
3 legitimacy of Chetnik officers, the existence of Serb volunteer groups as
4 establishment entities and even requirements that such units be given
5 special directions and tasks. In preventing such phenomena, the security
6 of the brigade received some guidance but broader measures are required
7 as well and that exceeds our abilities. So he is indicating these other
8 problems as well, this other group of problems.
9 Now what was Vuk Obradovic surprised by? I think, primarily, by
10 the officers from the anti-terrorist company. Now whether he was
11 surprised about this too, I assume that he had received information about
12 that as well, these problems in the combat zone with volunteers, Seselj's
13 speeches in Vukovar. But I can only make assumptions.
14 Q. All right. Briefly we can finish with this document now. You
15 hadn't seen this report, this document, at the time?
16 A. No, no.
17 Q. You said that it did reach the Security Administration but what
18 was stated was that it should be archive, that no measures should be
20 A. Yes. Because it was Vuk Obradovic who was really in charge of
21 this. And also the organs for morale and political education. That's
22 what it was called at the time, and it really does have to do with the
23 morale of the unit at the time.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see, please, P2001.1981.
1 Q. [Interpretation] That is the report that we already looked at
2 several times. You know about it, the 10th of December, 1991.
3 Can we move to the end of this report, the last page; that is,
4 paragraph 8.
5 In paragraph 8 of the report, it is stated:
6 "The reception centre ... functioned successfully (Velepromet)
7 and about 9.000 to 10.000 men, women, and children passed through it."
8 So I conclude on this basis that the security organ was in charge
9 of this centre, since this report about the work of the centre is being
10 submitted by the security organ.
11 A. That's not true. Major Sljivancanin is writing a final report.
12 This is not a separate report about the reception centre in Velepromet.
13 Less there be any misunderstanding, in the reception centre that
14 Major Borisavljevic told me about, there is this information that we saw
15 here, about 200 to 300 persons, and then 25 were selected. So I would
16 like to remind you of that centre.
17 This is a reception centre. That is what it was called. What
18 happened on the 18th, 19th, and 20th, when the operations were over and
19 when the population was being taken out of cellars, destroyed houses,
20 et cetera, and then they passed through this reception centre. That is
21 the reception centre and the time when -- that Sljivancanin is silent
22 about, when they tried to kill Colonel Vujic, Bogdan. That's that
23 centre, not to have any confusion. That's the month of October, in
25 Q. Are you trying to tell us that there were two reception centres
1 there, at Velepromet?
2 A. I could just say that these two centres have nothing in common,
3 so it is Velepromet but the activities are different. In the reception
4 centre from the month of October that the Guards Brigade was in charge of
5 in relation to persons who were brought into custody for some reason,
6 there were about 300 persons there, as far as I can see from that
7 information that was looked at here.
8 And, secondly, there is this centre, the reception centre,
9 through which the population that was leaving Vukovar passed through.
10 Sljivancanin is giving a very rough estimate here from 5- to 10.000
11 persons, 9- to 10.000. Whereas, in Sremska Mitrovica according to the
12 information of the Red Cross, 5.000 persons had passed through there.
13 And then there was speculation that there were 5.000 or 10.000 persons at
14 the reception centre. Not true, 2.600 and I don't know how many.
15 So this is a rather one-sided, rough estimate. The most
16 interesting thing is that he did not describe key matters in this report
17 at all. And that is what happened to the persons who left Vukovar, who
18 were evacuated for -- from Vukovar and who interfered there? And how the
19 officers who wanted to introduce order in that centre faired. He says
20 nothing about any of that.
21 Q. If you read this report now, I would like to know how you can
22 conclude, based on this report, that there are two separate centres?
23 A. Now that you're showing me this document, telling that there were
24 9- to 10.000 people and trying to persuade me that this was a centre
25 headed by Borisavljevic. But Borisavljevic had to escape from that
1 centre because it was assaulted and he had to evacuate the people to the
2 barracks. He couldn't do that with 9.000 people.
3 This is the first time I'm drawing the conclusion that when he
4 says "collection centre," he means a place where people were taken
5 because, from there, they were transported to a place of their choice.
6 Once again, this is not the collection centre for prisoners of
7 war under the control of the brigade and in -- in October and of which
8 Captain Borisavljevic was in operative charge. And they had to transfer
9 the people from that place and evacuate them further. That was done,
10 evacuation, and not detention and processing.
11 Q. And this centre, through which 9- to 10.000 people passed as we
12 read here, was not under the authority of the security organs; is that
14 A. Absolutely.
15 Q. Yesterday you spoke about the establishment of civilian
16 authorities and said that a distinction has to be made between the
17 establishment of civilian authorities at Lovas in October 1991, on the
18 one hand, and the activities pursuant to the instructions of the SSNO
19 when bodies for civilian affairs were established and, as a consequence,
20 Town Commands. Do you remember?
21 A. Yes, I do. Go ahead.
22 Q. I would like to focus on the first part, and the second part will
23 be discussed later.
24 Let us talk about the establishment of civilian authorities
25 before that instruction from late November or early December 1991.
1 Please take a look at paragraph 9. It says:
2 "There was progress in organising and forming organs of the
3 people's authorities and police stations in the zone of active -- the
4 zone of combat activity."
5 From this, I conclude that OG South was forming civilian
6 authorities in its zone.
7 A. Probably we must distinguish between OG South and the
8 Guards Brigade. He doesn't mention the Guards Brigade forming and
9 information of, and so on and so forth. He says forming. I would say
10 providing assistance. I don't think that they appointed the president of
11 the municipality or whoever.
12 You said that you had information that he was the one who
13 appointed that man, Ljubinko, I forget his name, a TO commander who
14 replaced Dusan Jaksic. I wasn't aware of that. He probably understood
15 it to be his duty to do that. And as far as I remember, around the
16 18th or 19th of November, upon the cessation of combat activities -- and
17 I forget the date of that instruction that was sent out containing the
18 tasks of the Town Commands and the assistance to be provided in the
19 establishment of authorities.
20 Q. I seem to remember that it was subsequently, in late November,
21 and the tasks were assigned on the 6th of December. But we'll get there
22 yet and discuss it in more detail.
23 Please take a look at paragraph 10 of this same document. It
25 "The Gmtbr security organ bore the brunt of the work in forming
1 those authorities, organising security and safety measures, and receiving
2 and processing prisoners."
3 A. Yes. And I think that's all right.
4 Q. All right. That's what I wanted to clarify.
5 A. Organisation of security and safety measures in the combat zone
6 is in the charge of the command and its security organ.
7 This is a well-known thing. But if you're alluding to the
8 establishment of civilian authorities, I don't know if they were
9 establishing them or assisting in the establishment, and I don't think
10 that you know either. And I have already said that I was dissatisfied
11 with the language he used but never said what the security organs did,
12 what the results of their work were, and what came out of the questioning
13 of, say, those 25 who had been screened as suspects.
14 Q. I'm not saying that this was in the purview of the security organ
15 or your purview and that you were supposed to do anything about it. I
16 just want to know or make sure that this is a fact mentioned in this
17 report where he says that the security organs bore the brunt in the
18 forming of local authorities and providing safety for the reception and
19 processing of prisoners.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Thank you.
11 Page 8069 redacted.
1 Q. Thank you. In your statement, paragraph 47, if you want to take
2 a look, you spoke about the tasks of the JNA or the three stages the JNA
3 went through from the start of the armed conflict until the end, and you
4 said that, in the first phase, it was the JNA's task to separate the
5 parties to the conflict.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Can you tell me now which these parties were according to the
8 JNA? On the Croatian side, I suppose it was the national guards corps,
9 the ZNG or their MUP units?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And what were those forces on the Serb side?
12 A. The self-organised forces that armed themselves. And that's how
13 the conflict arose, because it was all happening in the territory of the
14 Republic of Croatia. They were claiming that they were the legitimate
15 authorities there and treated them as rebel groups, and that's how the
16 conflict began.
17 Q. The armed Serb groups, what did they want, really? Did they want
18 to remain in the same state - that is, the SFRY - or did they have other
19 ambitions? Do you remember that?
20 A. Oh, certainly I do. Above all, they wanted to protect their
21 rights that had been taken from them when the HDZ came to power.
22 The Serbs were a constituent element in Croatia and they were
23 turned into a minority without the rights that a constituent people had.
24 That's the essence why there was dissatisfaction among the Serbs. Until
25 the month of March and the Presidency session I have mentioned, the order
1 on the disarmament of all paramilitaries was in force. That did not
2 apply only to such units in Croatia but there were also similar units in
3 Kosovo, Sandzak, and elsewhere. From the month of March onwards - and
4 that session did not result in the proclamation of a state of emergency
5 in the country - the Serbs who until then were poorly armed, they had
6 procured arms through individual channels, had hunting rifles, and so on,
7 turned to President Milosevic for help because the Croats did not return
8 their weapons. They only returned 427 pieces of armaments and they had
9 imported 18.000 AK-47s. And then Serbia began assisting the
10 self-organisation of the Serbs in that area.
11 Q. Could you please slow down because I believe it was not said how
12 many weapons were returned.
13 A. I can elaborate. The Croatian side returned 427 weapons of which
14 only ten were automatic rifles, Kalashnikovs from the Hungarian
15 contingent. However, the Serbs, after the -- issuing of the order of the
16 president of the SFRY on disarmament, and it was first and foremost the
17 Serbs in Knin, returned the weapons that they had and removed three
18 roadblocks that they had set up, because that was the order of the
19 Presidency of SFRY. Since the Croats did not disarm, the Serbs
20 considered themselves tricked, and that's why they applied for help to
21 Serbia, among others, help in arming themselves.
22 Up until then, they had their own local armed units who had
23 hunting rifles or whatever they had, and they could be found mostly in
24 the villages where there was a majority Serb population.
25 This may not be directly related, but it will be related to
1 Borovo Selo. The Croatian authorities started setting up police stations
2 in places where there hadn't -- there had never been any, and those were
3 mostly places inhabited by Serbs.
4 Secondly, at police stations, where mostly Serbs lived, they
5 would conduct raids mostly at night and take out weapons from the reserve
6 police force. I believe that there were 18 such stations.
7 This all irritated the Serbs. It wasn't so much connected with
8 their desire to stay in Yugoslavia, but the more -- they felt threatened
9 and that's why they started to organise themselves. And as of March, as
10 I mentioned, they were growing stronger because they were able to procure
11 weapons, behind which process there was Serbia.
12 Now the question arose, if all Serbs wanted Yugoslavia. Some did
13 want to stay in Yugoslavia, but there were others who didn't want to stay
14 behind in other republics; in this case, in Croatia. That's how the
15 motto became popular, all Serbs in one state, and then people started
16 speaking about Greater Serbia.
17 Some political parties were founded, and the Croats -- the Croats
18 who lived there but weren't a majority were supposed to move to Croatia,
19 if they wanted to live in Croatia.
20 And when did the establishment of the TO begin in Slavonia, to be
21 specific? I don't have any exact information about that. I know that
22 autonomous provinces began to be proclaimed. It started with Knin. And
23 others followed their motto, in Slavonia and Srem.
24 And then there was the incident at Pakrac, when Croatian police
25 officers were disarmed and a Serbian police station established there.
1 Later, there -- there was an attempt to do the same at Plitvice.
2 Q. You say that you don't know when the Territorial Defence was
3 established in the territory of Croatia. However, you said that these
4 village guards existed, if we're going to call them that, these people
5 who guarded their villages, protecting them from possible attacks. We
6 have quite a bit of information about that too.
7 It was based on a principle of self-organisation, wasn't it, of
8 people from those villages? Is that the way it was?
9 A. During the first stage, that's the way it was.
10 Q. So during this first stage, as you say, they did not have - how
11 do I put this? - a single command? Everybody guarded their own village?
12 A. Well, the question is what the first stage is, what period that
13 is. That is the period of the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991.
14 However, in Pakrac, political leaders emerged. They started working on
15 the organisation of the Serbs.
16 There was this national council or whatever they called
17 themselves, and they practically guided all this activity in that
18 organisation. They established contact with Belgrade and with people in
19 the government of Serbia and directly with Milosevic too. And there was
20 this attempt through retired generals who hailed from that area to
21 establish contact with the JNA. So this does show that there was some
23 The JNA, in the Krajina, tried to establish a system of
24 Territorial Defence. I've already said that plan, unity, from 1987
25 disbanded military units in the territory of the Knin Krajina, Lika,
1 Banja and Kordun, and then the SSNO ordered that activity be initiated on
2 bringing these units back. There was this order from the SSNO that had
3 to do with the establishment of these units. That is characteristic of
4 the Knin Krajina. The Territorial Defence started being organised and in
5 what form in Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem? I cannot say right now
6 what the exact date would be and what the exact period would be.
7 Q. I think that you said Western Slavonia and Srem, whereas, the
8 record says the opposite.
9 All right. Later, when this organisation of the
10 Territorial Defence started, as you said, this Territorial Defence
11 actually included these members of these village guards, these units that
12 were in the -- there in the beginning, that were practically
13 self-organised. Do you know about that?
14 A. I would assume that this would be the natural sequence of events.
15 They were self-organised and then the organisation came. Weapons,
16 arrived, institutional links with Serbia. So all of this assumed an
17 organisational nature.
18 Since we are talking about that, these clashes between the
19 National Guards Corps and the MUP forces, the ZNG wanted to establish
20 their own authority in their territory and then there was the
21 self-organised Serbs. And then later on, they were organised in some
22 form of Territorial Defence, so these clashes started. And then the JNA
23 was called in to intervene, to separate them, to prevent clashes, and
24 then was attacked by the National Guards Corps and the MUP, and, truth to
25 tell, sometimes by some Serb units which did not want these activities to
1 go on. They did not want the Ustashas, as they said, to be protected.
2 So they did things as suited them.
3 Q. Tell me, did you have any information during this first stage,
4 that is to say, practically before Croatia officially declared its
5 independence - that was on the 25th of June, 1991 - are you talking about
6 that period now or are you already in July, for instance, these early
7 stages of the conflict?
8 A. These conflicts in the area that we are discussing went on
9 without interruption. They went on in August too. There were clashes
10 that occurred in August as well.
11 From September onwards, all-out blockades started of army
12 barracks and that's when the JNA got involved in the de-blockade. That
13 is what General Kadijevic spoke of in his book. So this was not done in
14 a planned fashion, namely that up until one month this will go on, and so
15 on and so forth. The operations became more extensive and more
17 Q. Since you often -- since you said that often the -- the opposing
18 sides did not like this role of the JNA and that sometimes they would
19 fire at them, either one side or the other side.
20 Tell me, when the blockades of the barracks started, was it both
21 sides that blockaded the barracks or only one?
22 A. No. If we are talking about Slavonia, Baranja, Western Srem, no,
23 Serb forces did not block the barracks. However, we did have a case in
24 Bijeljina where Arkan's unit blocked the barracks so that they would not
25 intervene regarding what was happening in Bijeljina. I think that was in
1 April 1992.
2 Q. Let us just clarify this. This is in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
3 A. Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4 Q. 1992?
5 A. 1992.
6 Q. In these efforts to de-blockade the barracks, did the JNA manage
7 to carry that out in some of the barracks and how successful was it in
8 that effort?
9 A. Depended on the resistance put up and also the persistence of the
10 units involved. So the situations were different.
11 The barracks in Vukovar was blocked already in August 1991. Let
12 me not repeat everything that is already contained in this statement.
13 The 14th of September, when they sent a dramatic dispatch that they had
14 been under blockade for already 20 days, that they had no food or water,
15 that they have fatalities, they cannot bury their dead and they have
16 wounded persons who they cannot treat medically, and then
17 General Kadijevic established contact with the European monitors in
18 Zagreb, asking them to convey this to Tudjman and to make it possible to
19 de-blockade the barracks and to enable the transfer of the dead and
21 Q. You spoke about that extensively in your statement. I just
22 wanted to ask you why in this specific case the JNA allowed for one of
23 its barracks to be under blockade for 20 days and that their people
24 basically had no -- bare living conditions. Why did they wait for
25 20 days before they took concrete action?
1 A. This action led to war, which did follow. The SSNO did not allow
2 for them to be under blockade for 20 days. They probably had the
3 opportunity of submitting reports about the situation because before
4 that, considerably before that, commanders were issued the following
5 order: That small facilities should be abandoned and that units should
6 be kept in larger facilities that can defend themselves, and that there
7 should be sufficient, water, food, medical equipment, generators, power
8 generators, and so on, so that they could defend themselves.
9 The army was in favour of an alleviation of the situation and
10 resolving problems in the country peacefully, to have them resolved by
11 peaceful means, not by military force.
12 Now, there are different situations. The command of the
13 Varazdin Corps had surrendered after two days of blockade, whereas the
14 brigade in Bjelovar stayed on for another seven or eight days and
15 continued to fight. And the corps command had already surrendered and
16 withdrawn to Belgrade, and some brigades stayed on and fought. Some
17 remained under permanent blockade, without surrendering.
18 Q. Now that you said this about these brigades, these units that
19 stayed on and fought. Could you please tell us when this decision was
20 passed not to defend small facilities, to concentrate forces in larger
21 facilities and to have sufficient food and water supplies, medical
22 supplies, et cetera, if barracks were to be attacked?
23 A. I think it must have been March or April 1991.
24 Q. Another thing, at the time were there any plans for action if
25 these surrounded garrisons in some territory could be de-blockaded, if we
1 can put it that way?
2 A. Most of the commanders who were in that situation expected some
3 help to come from the outside and they did not draw on all the resources
4 that they had. Usually they asked for air force to be used.
5 The general position was as follows: If you are attacked, defend
6 yourselves by all means and respond even more than necessary. So they
7 were not prohibited from defending themselves. But this was a specific
8 situation. This was a situation when fire had to be opened at a town
9 where people lived, people that you lived with, communicated with, so
10 this is not a classical war. That's why there was a great deal of
11 caution, and commanders gave this a great deal of thought, whether they
12 would apply the force that they did have and how they would do that.
13 Resistance was put up to the extent possible, rather than firing with
14 artillery at neighbouring buildings. So small arms were used, and quite
15 a few people were killed.
16 Q. Does this look like some kind of hopeless resistance if --
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: I note the time. If it is a very short question,
18 it's okay. But if not --
19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, very short question.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed.
21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Doesn't this look like some kind of hopeless resistance? If
23 these surrounded garrisons are defending themselves, irrespective of the
24 resources they have, if they do not receive any external support it is as
25 if they were doomed to die?
1 A. No. No. They were supposed to hold their facilities as they
2 were and it was the political echelons that were supposed to resolve
3 matters. That is how the situation would have been resolved. When
4 politicians did not resolve the situation, then the rest started.
5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: General, it's 10.30; time for our first break.
7 Thirty minute, as always. Court Usher shall escort you out of the
8 courtroom. Thank you.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
11 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Just one second, Mr. Olmsted. I have something
14 to deliver as well, a very short oral decision. We are seized of the
15 Prosecution motion for replacement of page 30 of Exhibit P1418, with a
16 revised translation of that page filed on 30 August 2013. Would the
17 Defence wish to make any submission on that -- that motion?
18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: No, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
20 The Chamber hereby grants the motion, and the Registrar shall
21 take any necessary action to implement the decision.
22 Thank you.
23 Mr. Olmsted.
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. President. With regard to the two
1 documents that are included as associated exhibits for this witness's
2 92 ter package that Your Honour raised yesterday, this is 65 ter 2491 and
3 65 ter 2929, the problems with those documents have been resolved and
4 loaded into e-court.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
6 Mr. Zivanovic.
7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry, Your Honour. Sorry, I forgot to ask
8 pending of document 1D656 into evidence. It is the order of
9 10 October 1991 about the attack on Lovas.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted.
11 MR. OLMSTED: If I recall the only thing the witness said was
12 that this is what the document says. I don't think he provided any
13 substantive evidence regarding it.
14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I think it's enough he spoke about Lovas --
15 Lovas -- whole Lovas case and role of the army and the role of the TO
16 Valjevo and the role of Dusan Silni volunteer detachment. So I -- I
17 think that's enough.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, is your intervention meant to be an
20 MR. OLMSTED: On the grounds that this witness really wasn't able
21 to speak to the document, other than to say what was read to him is what
22 is said in the document.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: We'll come back to your request and -- and -- and
25 the -- the objection.
1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you.
2 Q. [Interpretation] General, in your statement, in paragraph 48, and
3 you may take a look, you said that you were present at a session of the
4 council for the protection of the constitutional order on the
5 30th of June, 1991, where Borislav Jovic addressed the session, and he
6 said then that no one should be forced to stay in Yugoslavia and that if
7 the Slovenes didn't wish to do so the JNA should withdraw from Slovenia
8 to new borders. Do you remember that? Of course, he did not mention
9 what those new borders, where the JNA should withdraw to, were.
10 In that same paragraph, paragraph 48, or a bit lower down, in
11 fact, that would be paragraph 51, you were shown two articles, newspaper
12 articles, two exhibits, and you said that in both those articles,
13 Goran Hadzic spoke about the expansion of the borders of the area of
14 Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and a mutual exchange of populations.
15 I would like to show you this article and to ask you something
16 about this issue of the expansion of borders.
17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see Rule 65 ter number 310, please.
18 [Interpretation] Perhaps we can zoom in on the B/C/S version.
19 [In English] Could you zoom in, please. The text -- text on upper left
20 side of the screen.
21 Q. [Interpretation] This is a text dated the 20th September 1991
22 that you mentioned. I don't know how well you can read the text, but I
23 know that you were shown this by the Prosecutor. And let me just say
24 briefly that nowhere in this text was I able to find any reference to the
25 expansion of borders of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, so I would
1 like you to take a look at it and tell me if I'm right.
2 A. Well, he did speak about Osijek where he mentions Osijek, where
3 he said that Osijek has not been liberated yet for the time being. And
4 that is in reference to the border of the SAO up until then.
5 I don't know what your question is really.
6 Q. Well, my question is: Where did you find that? Because what you
7 said in your statement, and you said that you stood by the statement,
8 where did you find in this article that he was talking about the
9 expansion of borders?
10 A. Well, where the reference is made about Osijek and that Osijek
11 has not been liberated yet but that it would be.
12 Q. Well, who says that?
13 A. Well, he does. You can read it.
14 Q. Well, let me read it then. So it reads as follows, I will read
15 the whole paragraph:
16 "'We are aware that those borders will depend on our forces,'
17 Hadzic said, 'although we are in favour of a democratic resolution of
18 that issue.'" The text is not very easily legible, my apologies:
19 "In response to an American reporter from the associated press to
20 the question whether Osijek was within the borders of Slavonia, Baranja,
21 and Western Srem, Hadzic briefly replied, 'So far Osijek has not been
23 And you understood that to mean an expansion of borders?
24 A. Well, yes. He said so far it hasn't been liberated but there
25 were constant efforts to engage Osijek and to include Osijek as part of
1 the area which did not materialise.
2 Q. When you said there were later efforts, whose efforts?
3 A. Well, the efforts by both the leadership and the
4 Territorial Defence of SAO Slavonia, and there were attempts to put -- to
5 exert an influence on General Biorcevic who had been issued strict orders
6 to ceasefire and not engage Osijek. But I don't know what your question
7 was regarding the first part of your quotation of Boro Jovic's words.
8 You read that out, but I can't see that in the question.
9 Q. Well, I mentioned that in the context of the borders that you
10 were talking about. But we will get to that. We are still discussing
11 that issue.
12 A. Well, I have to say right at the outset that the context is not
13 the same. If I may --
14 Q. Well, go ahead.
15 A. Well, Boro Jovic spoke twice, addressed the parliament twice at
16 the sessions where I was present, the one that was mentioned -- that you
17 mentioned of 30th June. If I'm not mistaken, that was the 18th Session
18 of the Federal Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order.
19 And the first time he addressed this forum, he said that the army should
20 withdraw from Slovenia to the new borders and only four days earlier on
21 the 26th June at the same session of the Federal Council for the
22 Protection of the Constitutional Order when the decision was made on the
23 movement of the army into Slovenia, he was in favour and he called for
24 firm action and that the Yugoslav army should take up the borders and
25 defend them.
1 So this was just four days later where he said something quite
2 different. In other words as Ante Markovic would have said he was not
3 really consistent. But even after that, he was within the Presidency of
4 the SFRY, but no command was ever issued for the army to withdraw.
5 Q. We'll get to that and I will put some questions to you about
7 Now you understood this, in other words, to mean his demand for
8 the expansion of borders and you say that there was pressure exerted on
9 General Biorcevic?
10 A. Well, no, this is not what I said. This is what you are saying
11 now with respect of what is written in the article. There was no
12 pressure but there were efforts to engage Biorcevic in activities against
14 Q. So there was no pressure?
15 A. Well, he was called upon not to stop but move on towards Osijek
16 and then he would say, Well, Kadijevic is -- he provides the strategy and
17 I'm supposed to be a tactician and take care of the tactics, so --
18 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter kindly request that the witness
19 repeat the last sentence.
20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Would you please just repeat your last sentence. I believe you
22 said that all activities ceased.
23 A. Well, yes, if it wasn't recorded, I can repeat it.
24 Q. Please do.
25 A. So Biorcevic under the influence of the situation that prevailed
1 in the Territorial Defence units, that the -- the -- the engagement
2 should not cease, that they should move on against Osijek, in
3 contravention of General Kadijevic's order that all engagement, all of
4 Osijek should cease, I believe that at one point he even briefly engaged
5 in some operations. But when General Kadijevic was informed of this,
6 following that, all activities ceased. So there were calls for moving on
7 against Osijek.
8 Q. Well, that's exactly what I was going to ask you about, and we
9 can find this in paragraph 173 of your statement. In this paragraph, you
10 say that General Biorcevic stated, If we would not advance, if we were
11 not to advance, those behind us, the men of Goran Hadzic, would kill us
12 from the back.
13 A. Well, that might amount to the pressure that you were asking me
15 Q. Well, could you then now, please, tell us whether you really
16 considered that some of Goran Hadzic's men would go behind the units of
17 the Yugoslav People's Army and shoot them in their backs if they refused
18 to move forward? I mean, does this statement seem feasible to you?
19 A. Well, that's not what I said. I didn't say that part.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Gentlemen, may I remind you not to overlap and to
21 respect pauses between questions and answers in order to allow the
22 interpreters to finish their interpretation. Thank you.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I was not the person who made
24 that statement. It was Biorcevic, and it was recorded as his words. So
25 I cannot really interpret what it was that he was trying to say there and
1 what the situation was. I don't know whether he was just trying to be
2 offensive or whether he knew something and that the situation was,
3 indeed, such that if he were to stop they would open fire at him.
4 But, generally, there was a lot of criticism at the time by -- by
5 Goran Hadzic as well at the expense of the army, that it hadn't really
6 accomplished the task it was supposed to accomplish, and so on.
7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General, could we please leave the criticism aside. There
9 were -- there was criticism from all parts and we can discuss this, if
10 need be. But, here, what we see are threats because this would be an
11 open threat if an army is being forced to move forward and engage in
12 fighting or else there would be men going after them and shooting them in
13 the back. So let's not divert the conversation to criticisms and other
14 matters. What I would like you to tell us is this: As a security
15 officer and the top person in the security organ, you were responsible
16 for protecting the army against such matters as well. For instance,
17 people threatening to shoot them in the back if they weren't to do what
18 they wanted them to do. So I would like to ask you whether you launched
19 any investigation to check this, to see whether it was indeed true,
20 whether there were these threats of this nature, or did you just file
21 this away?
22 A. Well, I can perhaps now remind you of the ambit of our work,
23 whether this was something that the security organ was supposed to do.
24 You're trying to put this in a different framework. My first question
25 would be, was there any reaction from the government circles at a
1 statement of this nature, to ask him, What are you saying, man? And then
2 there should be a question to the federal secretary, We are not
3 threatening anyone and yet you are threatening to shoot us in the back.
4 Q. Did Biorcevic tell that to the government or to
5 General Kadijevic?
6 A. I don't know who he said it to.
7 Q. But then how could the government react?
8 A. But you see that things appear in the media and people talk, and
9 so on.
10 Q. But, at any rate, do you know if any measures were taken to
11 discover the persons who would allegedly shoot soldiers in the back
12 unless they did what they were expected to do? Specifically in this
13 context, these men of Goran Hadzic's making the army attack a town. Do
14 you know whether any investigations of this kind were launched?
15 A. No, they weren't.
16 Q. Thank you. Let us -- let us go back to the texts about exchanges
17 to some extent. You said that in this text there's mention of an
18 exchange of population. Let us look at that part before we move on to
19 the other text.
20 Here, among other things, an appeal to those who left Slavonia,
21 Baranja, and Western Srem is mentioned to return. And Goran Hadzic also
22 says who is being appealed to. In other words, only Serbs or others as
23 well. You can read it, if you want. But you said that this is about
24 some sort of exchange of population. And, as far as I can tell, he
25 answered in that context that this appeal also applied to Croats
1 returning; in other words, whoever had left with the exception of
2 extremists, as he termed them. Do you agree with that?
3 A. I cannot agree with everything that you said. Apart from this
4 article, what does he advocate?
5 Q. You know something? You gave a statement about this article, and
6 I'm interested to hear whether that can be found in the article. Let's
7 not go beyond the framework of this article, for now.
8 A. So in this article, he advocates an exchange of population.
9 Q. In this article?
10 A. In this article.
11 Q. Well, do show me that.
12 A. People from Rijeka and Pula and wherever should move to Osijek.
13 I'm not reading it now. I'm now speaking from memory. And those who
14 were colonised and taken there by Pavelic will be given return tickets.
15 If not in this article, then in another.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted.
17 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, it appears to me that there might be
18 some confusion by the fact that paragraph 51 of the statement refers to
19 two separate articles, and the Defence counsel is focussing on this
20 particular article with regard to both issues, and the witness,
21 obviously, his evidence is with regard to both articles. So perhaps if
22 Defence counsel shows him the second article, this could be clarified.
23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: The paragraph 58 -- 51 of -- of the witness
24 statement clearly stated that in both articles Goran Hadzic spoke about
25 the western borders of SBWS and of the exchange of the population. And I
1 asked the witness for this specific article, whether he spoke about
2 exchange of the population or not. And I'll -- I'll also confront the
3 witness with the -- another article.
4 MR. OLMSTED: Well, Your Honours, I think this is really getting
5 down to semantics but I think both articles have to be read together or
6 shown to the witness together for him to give a full explanation of how
7 he perceived events.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: It's not about the events, Mr. Olmsted. It's
9 about the content of the article, whether -- whether something is in this
10 article, or in the other, or not. So I think that's something
11 Mr. Zivanovic can explore with the witness. I think it would be best
12 you --
13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: If --
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: -- repeat your question, Mr. Zivanovic.
15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. My question is --
17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: And if we could scroll down a little bit, please,
18 the B/C/S text.
19 Q. [Interpretation] Whether this text speaks about an exchange of
21 A. We see a headline in both letters. The heading over the
22 photograph: Return of the men. And there it says that return tickets
23 will be given to those who were brought there by Pavelic.
24 Q. You mean in this frame with the headline: Return of the men?
25 A. Those who were colonised in our province by Pavelic during the
1 war from Herzegovina, Imotska, Krajina, and Zagorije will be given a
2 return ticket.
3 Q. Okay. But that is not an exchange of population.
4 A. All right. It's an expulsion. Yes, I made a mistake when I said
5 "exchange." It's an expulsion of population.
6 In this same text, which is about who was -- who had prisoners
7 and you were claiming that this was the army in the context of
8 Velepromet, whereas Goran Hadzic says here: Hadzic without a customary
9 introduction answered a number of journalists' questions, and the TASS
10 reporter said right at the outset, Although his government offered 20
11 Guards Corps members taken prisoner in exchange for the Soviet
12 journalists who went missing, there is -- he has no information about
14 Q. I have no problem about discussing prisoners and anything else,
15 but do limit your answers to the questions that I asked because our time
16 is also limited. I wanted to clarify paragraph 51, about the borders and
17 Goran Hadzic's wish to expand the borders of Slavonia, Baranja, and
18 Western Srem.
19 But let me ask you something else. In September 1991, which
20 borders did the JNA -- was the JNA facing?
21 A. The borders of Yugoslavia.
22 Q. At the time, the JNA was no longer present in Slovenia.
23 A. It was. I will slow down now. They had their warehouses, they
24 had armaments, and under the Brioni Agreement, there was a considerable
25 time-period for the stay of technical teams to maintain those assets.
1 And then a decision was to be taken when the JNA would finally leave
3 In September, we still had JNA members in Slovenia. It was not
4 all -- it was not all of the JNA but, as far as we were concerned,
5 Slovenia was still part of Yugoslavia.
6 Q. But what about Croatia? Was all of Croatia still considered to
7 be a part of Yugoslavia?
8 A. It was in Yugoslavia all the time, until it was internationally
10 Q. In other words, on the 20th of September, when Goran Hadzic
11 wanted to expand the borders of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, as
12 you said, that's a sin, although it's still part of Yugoslavia, according
13 to the conceptual frame work of the Yugoslav People's Army.
14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't understand the witness's
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic, we need the witness's answer, if
17 there was any.
18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. You said that the question was out of context -- or, actually,
20 please repeat your answer.
21 A. I said that the last thing you said was not part of the
22 context -- didn't -- didn't belong in the context of what we are
24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see document from Rule 65 ter list, 306.
25 Q. [Interpretation] Before we start dealing with this, you said that
1 the JNA - and I'm referring to paragraph 49 of your statement - that the
2 JNA -- if the JNA had wanted to take and retain Slovenia and Macedonia by
3 force, it could have done so. In other words, it -- it withdrew from
4 those republics voluntarily.
5 A. Your question isn't well phrased. That the JNA didn't defend
6 Yugoslavia because it didn't want to. It acted upon the tasks as
7 assigned by the Presidency of the SFRY.
8 Let me return to the March session. Had the Presidency ordered
9 the use of the army, then the outcome of the overall situation would have
10 been different. So don't speak about the -- the desires or the
11 willingness of the army as if Yugoslavia broke apart because the army
12 wouldn't act. There was no political will to use the army.
13 Q. Please take a look at this directive.
14 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, before we do this, could the Defence
15 counsel refer me to whether it's on the Prosecution's exhibit list or the
16 Defence exhibit list? Because it is very hard for me to manage my
17 documents without knowing where it is. And I cannot find this on either
18 my list or the Defence's list.
19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It is on our -- our exhibit list -- I'm not able
20 at this moment to find it.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: What is the document number, Mr. Zivanovic, the
22 65 ter number? Do you have that one?
23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I know the number of document from the
24 Rule 65 ter list.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yeah.
1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: But --
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: What is the number?
3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: 310. 306.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Pardon, sorry?
5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: 306.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: 306.
7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: The document is on the screen.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: No, but I'm looking -- I'm trying -- 306. There
9 is no 306 in your -- in your document list, the Defence exhibit list.
10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry. In that case, I'll withdraw this document
11 and not put any question to the --
12 MR. OLMSTED: And, Your Honours, if I may just ask as a service
13 to the Prosecution, if Defence counsel could refer us to the tab numbers,
14 that's something that I really made an effort during my
15 examination-in-chief. And it really helps us out because by the time the
16 document is called up and by the time I find it in one of my binders half
17 the questions have been asked, and I haven't had a chance to look at the
18 full documents.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: I agree that the tab numbers are very useful to
20 find the documents quickly. I agree with you, Mr. Olmsted.
21 Please proceed, Mr. Zivanovic.
22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I do my best to find it, but, unfortunately, I
23 did not organise it appropriately.
24 Q. [Interpretation] Among other things, you spoke about the arming
25 of the Serbs in Croatia, and you said that, in 1990 or so,
1 Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, was captured while he was smuggling arms to
3 Do you remember that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You said that the MUP of Serbia was behind that.
6 A. I said something else. We can check what I said.
7 Q. But you -- you -- do say what you said.
8 A. The MUP of Serbia took part in the creation of conditions for
9 Arkan and two others to be released from detention. The minister of the
10 interior of Serbia and his Croatian counterpart were in contact, and that
11 tells us that the MUP of Serbia was really behind Arkan's activities.
12 The same applies to their talks about the release of Goran Hadzic, who
13 had also been detained.
14 Q. You said that General Biorcevic issued a false certificate that
15 Arkan was under the JNA.
16 A. No. We must be precise here when you quote my words. I didn't
17 say that he issued him a false certificate that he was under the JNA. He
18 issued him a false certificate about belonging to a recon group of the
19 Novi Sad Corps that was deployed to the Badovinci area for special tasks.
20 That's what I stated.
21 Q. Do you remember when that was?
22 A. If I'm not mistaken, in March, before the events at Bijeljina, in
23 1991. I apologise. 1992.
24 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 2473 from the 65 ter list. It is our
25 exhibit. I see that it's on our list, but I don't have the serial number
1 of the document, unfortunately.
2 Therefore, I'll ask you to look at it. It's on page 75.
3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Page 95, please.
4 Q. [Interpretation] This is a text that was published a while ago in
5 that newspaper, and --
6 MR. OLMSTED: Do we have an English translation of this --
7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, sorry, I didn't say. Yeah, the text has
8 been translated, as far as I know. And we have -- I'm not so interested
9 in the text but in one document published in this text. It is in the mid
10 of this page. If we could scroll down a little bit. This is document --
11 may we scroll down, please, a little bit more. That's it.
12 MR. OLMSTED: Well, Your Honours, I'd like --
13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: And I have translation of this particular
14 document. It is 1D769.
15 Q. [Interpretation] Could we zoom in a bit, the B/C/S text, so that
16 you can see it better. So it's a document, actually.
17 A. Could it please be enlarged a bit?
18 Q. Yes, yes, right now. It says here that pursuant to the rules on
19 military service and the rules on work of -- and I don't know what this
20 abbreviation is:
21 "I hereby approve the appointment of Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan,"
22 and then his details, "as commander of the newly established Special
23 Purposes unit under the direct supervision of this organ.
24 "Pursuant to the same rules, I hereby appoint Dusan Bandic ... as
25 his Chief of Staff."
1 And then there's signatures and stamps. I'm interested in the
2 following: Did you know about this document?
3 A. This is a forgery. I categorically assert that. This is not
4 General Marko Negovanovic's signature. This is not the form in which a
5 chief of administration addresses someone, so -- what is this written
6 down here in the stamp? What kind of "uprava," administration is this?
7 Q. Political or something like that.
8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in on the
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What's the date?
11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. There's no date, at least I haven't seen one.
13 A. If this is the arrest of Arkan, what we've been discussing,
14 Marko Negovanovic was not chief of the political administration then. He
15 was chief of the Security Administration, and I was his deputy at the
16 time, and at that time I was in Zagreb. This is a forgery that was
17 published by some newspaper. You didn't even say which newspaper and
18 we're going to know straight away whether it is a tabloid and whether
19 it's part of a campaign that was waged against the JNA. It's pure
20 forgery. I stand by that.
21 Q. My understanding is that this is a Croatian newspaper. We can
22 take a look and see which newspaper it is. This material was probably
23 secured through Mesic, as far as I can see, from what is on the
24 Prosecutor's list.
25 A. There's no need for us to deal with this forgery.
1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I would ask to tender this document,
2 Your Honours.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted.
4 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, well, I think the witness's testimony
5 speaks for itself. But we don't have a date on this document. We don't
6 know about the authenticity of this document. We don't have a
7 translation of the article in which it appears. Really, there's
8 absolutely no basis for tendering this document into evidence.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.
10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: As for translation of the newspaper article, it
11 could be marked for identification. But I think that the date -- the --
12 the -- the lack of date on the document is not the reason for not
13 tendering this document here.
14 And I don't know that it is accurate to say that -- that it is
15 false document.
16 MR. OLMSTED: Well, for instance, Your Honours, I see the date in
17 the document. It looks like it -- it's talking about events in 1990,
18 which is well in advance of our indictment period. And, again, the date
19 does matter as to what this document is and whether it's authentic.
20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: The indictment includes the arming of Serbs in
21 Croatia, and in this context, the Prosecution included many allegations
22 and many evidence about the arming of --
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic, another -- another detail. Isn't
24 the relevant thing -- the relevant element not whether it is accurate to
25 say that it is falsed -- forged, sorry, but the fact that this witness
1 states, it is this witness's testimony that it is a forgery.
2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, that's it. But I think that the other
3 document might -- might change his mind.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: We will deny your request to admit this document,
6 Mr. Zivanovic.
7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you. May we see document from Rule 65 ter
8 list, 6050.
9 Q. [Interpretation] This is an order from the command of the
10 12th Corps, or, rather, a document from the command of the 12th Corps.
11 What is referred to here are the units that participated there.
12 If you look at paragraph 8 - could we please zoom in on paragraph 8? - he
13 says in the 12th Corps we have the Baranja TO detachment, 388 military
14 conscripts, and then volunteer TO detachment consisting of conscripts
15 from Novi Sad, Backa Topola, Smederevska Palanka, total 310, and a
16 volunteer detachment of Arkan's, 70 military conscripts. This was a
17 document that was sent to the command of the 1st Military District. Does
18 this indicate that this detachment, Arkan as it is called here, was
19 within the 12th Corps of the JNA?
20 A. No. This could just be some kind of evidence of this detachment
21 taking part in the operations of the Novi Sad Corps, as mentioned here.
22 But it could have been part of it only during combat operations. If I
23 may explain this further because I cannot just state it so briefly. From
24 the 1st Military District, why would the Commander of the
25 1st Military District issue an order in January 1992 to Colonel Petkovic
1 to draw Badza's attention to the fact that Arkan's people are still out
2 in the field? Why did he not give a -- an order to his direct
3 subordinate, the corps commander? It is well known that later on he kept
4 advocating that volunteer units should be formed in the military because
5 they keep deserting from the army. That is a well known extremist point
6 of view of his.
7 Q. I beg your pardon. This is a document, as far as I can see from
8 the very beginning, it has to do with manning level of that unit. And I
9 see here that what is mentioned, inter alia, is that we have - that's
10 what it says - we have the following volunteer units from the 12th Corps.
11 A. And the date?
12 Q. We'll have a look at the date. I think it's December 1991.
13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Scroll up B/C/S document, please.
14 Q. [Interpretation] The 12th of December, 1991. As far as I know,
15 there were no war operations at the time, no combat operations at the
17 A. It is that request that goes back to the 24th of November, asking
18 to regulate the status of volunteers. They will either stay in the JNA
19 or will be expelled. That is that order of the Presidency from a date
20 that we know.
21 Q. I'm sorry, just one thing. I agree with what you said. On the
22 12th of December, he is actually saying what his situation was at the
23 time. Do you agree with me?
24 A. He is trying to show Arkan as if he is an element that should be
25 kept, that he is in contact with, that this is a legal unit, and the way
1 he lifted his arm, look at the wounded hero, and so on. The question was
2 how the 1st Military District reacted to this kind of information. Even
3 little children know that Arkan was not part of the 12th Corps. Now what
4 he wrote, whether he had to account for it later, that is something I
5 don't know. But I claim that he was not within the 12th Corps, outside
6 combat operations. And to what extent he took part in that, too, is a
7 separate story all together as well.
8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I would tender this document, Your Honour.
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: I'm told that it is already an exhibit.
11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yeah, sorry.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
13 MR. OLMSTED: And it is also included in this witness's 92 ter
14 package in the statement at paragraph 94.
15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Exactly. May we see, please, Rule 65 ter 6019.
16 Q. [Interpretation] This is an order dated the
17 30th of October, 1991, again from the command of the 12th Corps. This is
18 an order for some combat action. And, again, in paragraph 2, there's a
19 reference to tactical group Vihor and the units are listed there that are
20 included in that group, including the territorial detachment of
21 Borovo Selo; volunteer detachment, Arkan; then Luzac; then two
22 detachments from Serbia; then companies from Trpinja and Brsadin
23 Territorial Defence, this is Slavonia and Western Srem; then Kole
24 volunteer detachment; and Mandic. And they are given a certain task
25 there. Do you agree that these units were under the command of the
1 12th Corps at this point in time, the 30th of October, 1991?
2 A. I agree that that is the way it is written here, but to what
3 extent they were actually under his command and control, that is
4 something I cannot assess.
5 However, some volunteer detachments, I -- I mean, the names
6 themselves are telling: Kole, Mandic. That tellingly demonstrates the
7 situation that existed in the 12th Corps.
8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I would check whether this document was tendered.
9 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, it is. It's P1685.
10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yeah, thank you.
11 May we see P2715.
12 Q. [Interpretation] This is General Panic's statement, as given to
13 the OTP. [No interpretation]
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes, Mr. Olmsted [Microphone not activated]
15 MR. OLMSTED: Two issues with regard to this. First, as the
16 procedure is that if it is in fact a ICTY interview, Defence counsel
17 should have refrained from identifying the person who was being
18 interviewed. And, secondly, I am not certain what this is. Even though
19 I'm certain that we disclosed it to the Defence, it is unclear with
20 regard to who took this interview, who this is an interview of,
21 et cetera.
22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: This document was admitted into evidence and
23 there is no confidential mark on it.
24 MR. OLMSTED: According to our list --
25 [Prosecution counsel confer]
1 MR. OLMSTED: Objection withdrawn.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Mr. Zivanovic.
3 MR. ZIVANOVIC:
4 Q. [Interpretation] I would like to see page 25 of the English text.
5 In Serbian, I believe it's page 24.
6 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, while we're calling this up, I was
7 speaking to my colleague here, and it's my understanding that this is not
8 an ICTY interview. It's a BBC interview.
9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry. Sorry, maybe I misunderstood that it was
10 interview given to the Prosecution. Sorry. But that's better if it is
11 to the press.
12 MR. OLMSTED: Let's just be fair and say at this stage it's
13 certainly not an ICTY interview, given it's -- the way it appears. We
14 don't -- we believe it might be a BBC interview. We don't have the video
15 to confirm that. But that is what is marked on our data. But the source
16 is still a little bit unclear.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: It's a Prosecution exhibit now.
18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It's admitted in -- into evidence.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes.
20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yeah. As Prosecution exhibit.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Microphone not activated] Yeah.
22 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, Your Honours, and I'm not raising that issue.
23 It's just as far as identifying where it comes from, it's a little
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yeah, Mr. Zivanovic's qualification of this
1 document as an ICTY interview was --
2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Maybe it is not accurate. I cannot say it right
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Thank you.
5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I don't know if the part I'm
6 interested in has been found in the Serbian version. At any rate, I
7 believe we have it in English.
8 Q. [Interpretation] I'll read out the text in English because I
9 cannot see it in the Serbian version. And it will be interpreted to you:
10 [In English] "I think the operative units did their job
11 correctly, but the mobilised units were not prepared adequately for
12 action. And when you don't prepare them adequately, you have -- you
13 encounter the problems that you just mentioned. And that's how
14 volunteers started appearing and we trained them for action, for combat
15 action in Belgrade, and they were fighting together with our units. They
16 included Arkan's Tigers and Seselj's Chetniks. They were not big groups,
17 say, in Arkan's case between 80 and 120 persons, and in Seselj's case
18 between 90 and 120. All these formations were under my command. But the
19 people who wanted to act independently were being removed from that area
20 and disarmed and returned home."
21 [Interpretation] Based on this, my impression is that
22 General Panic, as commander of the 1st Army District knew that Arkan's
23 and Seselj's unit were under his command.
24 A. If that's what he says, then he would probably know. And it is
25 not an issue whether or not they took part in combat activities. But
1 later on, he wanted to get rid of them and couldn't.
2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see, please, 1D617. Would you zoom in,
4 Q. [Interpretation] This is an order. And I see that in the upper
5 right-hand corner it says Colonel Z. Raznjatovic personally. There is a
6 reference to the Law on the Armed Forces, and it says "Order":
7 "Make a breakthrough on the Bijeljina-Loznica-Visegrad axis while
8 moving out the Muslim population, regardless of casualties," and so on.
9 It is not dated either, but most probably this is probably 1992.
10 And we see that it is signed by the chief of General Staff. Does this
11 mean that Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, was under the command of the JNA?
12 A. No. This, again, shows that this is a very clumsy forgery. Let
13 me substantiate. We see how this was drafted. Not even a
14 non-commissioned officer would have drafted such a document, let alone
15 that the General Staff of the JNA would do that. And the stamp is
16 blurred again.
17 Q. We can blow it up.
18 A. It again says "political administration." Where did you get
20 Q. The OTP found it, not me.
21 A. If you want to show this as being a forgery, great. It says
22 chief of General Staff but the stamp reads "political administration."
23 And it's the same stamp as in that article that was -- where
24 General Negovanovic allegedly signed the -- the document.
25 Q. I really don't know.
1 A. No matter who came up with this document. This is a forgery. If
2 the OTP has military experts, well, the least you could expect for them
3 to have is a pair of glasses like me to take a better look at the stamp.
4 Q. So you're saying that this is a forgery?
5 A. Absolutely.
6 Q. General, even if the two documents are forgeries, which I don't
7 know, but you say that they are, there are some statements here and other
8 documents that show that Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, was under the command
9 of JNA units; that is, the 1st Military District, and the 12th Corps
10 respectively. A great number of reports were shown to you, submitted by
11 security organs about various criminal acts, alleged crimes committed by
12 Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, and that group of his that was out there. And
13 I also noticed that basically no proceedings were launched against him or
14 his men.
15 Since these reports were written by the security organs of the
16 12th Corps, for example, was this engagement of his in -- in the
17 framework of the 12th Corps a reason why no proceedings were launched
18 against him? Instead, reports were being written.
19 A. This is an additional proof that, in reality, he did not belong
20 to the 12th Corps. And the security organs knew full well what this man
21 was like, who he was. I'll will not mince my words. The drunkard,
22 General Biorcevic, said -- and he is a good man but he has one little
23 short coming: He drinks a lot. And he as a drunken fool comprises both
24 himself who is a general of the JNA by raising Arkan's hand to show that
25 he was wounded in the finger.
1 Did I act upon that? On the 28th of October, 1991, I contacted
2 the minister of the interior and the chief of state security to tell them
3 what Arkan was doing on the ground.
4 Q. It seems that you misunderstood my question.
5 A. Whose business it was to take measures.
6 Q. No. I asked whether it was a fact that the security organs of
7 the 12th Corps merely submitted reports instead of filing criminal
8 reports. Do you think that the reason for that was the fact that he was
9 engaged in combat activities, or whatever activities of the 12th Corps,
10 and the 1st Military District?
11 A. No, it was the other way around. If he had been part of the
12 12th Corps, they may have been in a position to file criminal complaints
13 or -- or inform the corps command of that man's activities.
14 How can he be part of the corps if he had his base at Erdut? How
15 can he belong to the 12th Corps if he wants to enter the command of the
16 12th Corps forcefully and slaps a policeman on the face who didn't allow
17 him to enter? And then a lieutenant of the military police raids Erdut
18 to see what Arkan is doing to one of his soldiers, and since the captain
19 drew his weapon faster then the guy said, Okay, okay. How can he be a
20 member of the 12th Corps subordinated to the corps' command if he has his
21 own base, has his own training, and kills people at will.
22 I cannot agree with that. You can show whatever documents you
23 want. He was being used in these actions because it was convenient.
24 Whoever is willing to fight, let them fight. But -- but in -- in
25 documents, it seems that he is some sort of unit of the 12th Corps
1 because those documents were written by trained officers.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Perhaps we should come back after the break to
3 that very last answer. It is a little bit confusing to me.
4 General, second break. We'll come back at 12.45. The
5 Court Usher will escort you. Thank you.
6 [The witness stands down]
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
8 --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 12.46 p.m.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Just one moment, Mr. Olmsted.
11 About -- about 1D656, the Defence tendered, and Mr. Olmsted
12 objected to. The objection is sustained. The witness, indeed, didn't
13 say anything else but the document said. So the objection is sustained
14 and the document is not admitted.
15 MR. OLMSTED: And, Your Honours, just to clarify with regard to
16 Exhibit P2715. I apologise for my ignorance. It is not shared by the
17 other members of the team. I've now learned.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: The ignorance, you mean? Okay.
19 MR. OLMSTED: The ignorance is not shared by other members of the
20 team. And I've now been able to clarify that that is indeed an interview
21 by General Panic. It's the raw footage of an interview that what was
22 conducted by BBC back in 1994.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Now, the little query I had about the last --
1 about the witness's last response just before the break. Let me see
2 whether I can find that. Yeah, there it is. Is my -- my confusion or my
3 doubt shared by anybody? I mean, what -- what -- what the witness seems
4 to have said -- what you seem to have said, General, is:
5 In documents it seems that he," and we are talking about Arkan,
6 or Arkan's people, "that he is some sort of unit of the 12th Corps
7 because these documents were written by trained officers."
8 Is that what you meant to say?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. And I can perhaps explain
10 that, clarify it.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please do.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document, this is a military
13 document properly put together. There are tasks assigned, and it is
14 noted there that the Arkan's unit is part of the 12th Corps.
15 Then I tried to explain that, in factually, or actually it was
16 not part of the 12th Corps so then I explained that it -- that this unit
17 had its centre in Erdut and not within -- or on the premises of the
18 12th Corps, then that a policeman would not let him enter the premises of
19 the corps, and then that there was the slapping of the policeman.
20 Now there are other arguments that I could put forth to support
21 what I'm saying.
22 On the 20th of November, 1991, at Velepromet, there was a session
23 of the regional government attended, among others, by Arkan. Mr. Hadzic
24 introduced him as a guards commander, or something like that - it's just
25 a paraphrase - at the Territorial Defence that had just been established
1 within the region.
2 Now, this was on the 20th of December. As for the information
3 that Arkan was a member of the 12th Corps, it dates 12th of the December.
4 So this is not really logical. As a member of the 12th Corps it wouldn't
5 be logical for him to attend a government session and be promoted by the
6 prime minister as a person who was part of his Territorial Defence.
7 That's number one.
8 Now also in all the footage, video footage that you see, you
9 could always see that he never wore a JNA uniform. They had some special
10 uniforms and they did not bear the same insignia that the JNA soldiers
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. I perfectly understand your arguments to
13 say that he was not a member of the 12th Corps. But what I do not quite
14 understand is that you -- that you say that from documents, it looks like
15 if he is member of the 12th Corps, and the reason why it looks like that
16 is - that's what you say - is because these documents are written by
17 trained officers.
18 How would trained officers make documents that look like if he is
19 member of the 12th Corps after everything we heard -- hear from you to
20 underline that he wasn't?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it is not contentious that he
22 took part in combat in the area of the responsibility of the 12th Corps
23 and that at time he had, as it said there, 70 men in his unit.
24 General Biorcevic wanted to create conditions for him to really
25 be -- to really become a part of the new Army of Yugoslavia, to draw him
1 in. I saw a couple of documents, I was shown a couple of documents by
2 the Prosecution, where he set forth his reasons why all volunteers should
3 be treated as members of that future Serbian army. And if I may use that
4 term, he kept trying to legitimatise him, to present him as someone who
5 was subordinated to the command, including Zivota Panic, and under Zivota
6 Panic -- and when I said that this document was properly put together,
7 what I meant was that they didn't really discuss whether he was actually
8 a member of that army. Biorcevic was the person who assigned him to be
9 in his own corps but he was actually never a member of the JNA, and he
10 never had the rank of Colonel, as we saw in that falsified document. He
11 just proclaimed himself to be a colonel and he also appointed a deputy or
12 something of his.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, General. That's very helpful.
14 Mr. Zivanovic, please proceed.
15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Well, the last thing I asked you about had to do with
17 Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, and the information that was forwarded by
18 members of the security organs relating to various -- alleged crimes
19 committed by him and his men without actually any proceedings ever being
20 taken against him. Now, you mentioned an attack or assault of his, that
21 he assaulted a military policeman or a guard or something like that, and
22 I believe that you spoke about that in your statement. But could you
23 tell us now, talking about this assault on this military person, was
24 there -- was there -- were any proceedings instigated against him?
25 A. Yes. There was a criminal report for assault on an military
1 person in the course of his duties. Now what the outcome was, I don't
2 know, but the criminal report was submitted.
3 Q. There's another thing that I would like to clarify. In a number
4 of reports submitted by the security organs that you were shown by the
5 Prosecution, next to his name I did not notice that there was ever
6 mention of any other member of his unit who allegedly committed these
7 crimes, so -- and there were also no crimes mentioned specifically.
8 Now, can you tell me what was the reason for sending such
10 A. Well, we have specific information about his crimes in Dalj, and
11 there's also an Official Note of the duty police officer at the time
12 regarding this event. He was, for all practical purposes, under the
13 protection of the MUP throughout this time, and the only real commander
14 who could issue orders to him was Radovan Stojicic, also known as Badza.
15 Q. Thank you. I would now like to move to your description of the
16 Vukovar operation. You talked about this in your statement. You also
17 said what you knew about it, and you also testified about it in these
19 First, I'd like to ask you this: If I understood you correctly,
20 you were in Vukovar on the 19th of November, 1991; is that correct?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. What part of the day was it, approximately? Was it in the early
23 hours or later hours, if you can recall?
24 A. Of course. On the 19th of November, I attended a meeting in
25 Milici in Bosnia and Herzegovina which lasted the whole day. It was a
1 meeting with the republic MUP members and the federal secretary for
2 national defence, General Gracanin. In the evening on my way back from
3 this meeting, I was informed by my deputy that the Vukovar operation was
4 over and he proposed that we should meet on the road as I leave Bosnia.
5 From there, we left together and arrived at around 1900 or 2000
6 hours. I can't tell you exactly what the time was but it was already
7 dark. I did not go to the brigade command headquarters and I didn't know
8 that a group of the security organ was already there. It had been sent
9 by someone, and I can only guess who might have sent them, probably the
10 chief of security of the 1st Military District, to Vukovar.
11 Now they reported to the brigade commander in order to offer
12 their assistance in the triage and evacuation of the civilians who were
13 being pulled out of the town, the buildings that were pulled down, and
14 these three or four retired officers who were recruited at the time by
15 the 1st Military District security organ, they communicated directly with
16 the brigade commander.
17 Now my presence there was limited to my knowledge on the
18 operation having been completed, some losses, if there were any in the
19 course of the day. We talked about the fact that a group of prisoners, I
20 think from Mitnica - I'm not sure if it was the 204th Brigade - had been
21 send to the collection centre in Sremska Mitrovica, which had been
22 established there.
23 I didn't stay there for a long time. I saw Marin Vidic then and
24 asked Sljivancanin what he was doing there. I mean, I can go into these
25 things, but I don't know if I need to. I ordered them to immediately
1 send them to Mitrovica and I think there were two other persons going
2 with him. So I returned from Negoslavci from Belgrade, and on my way I
3 stopped in Sremska Mitrovica to see what was going on there and I saw
4 that these people were housed in various rooms, so I didn't really spend
5 much time. There I left for Belgrade. So that's about my stay there.
6 But you know, as well as other people, that there were various things
7 inputted to me, that I was allegedly the one who had sent these officers,
8 and so on, although I had nothing to with it and I didn't know anything
9 about what happened or what was happening that night and the following
11 Q. During the time while you were in Vukovar on the 19th November,
12 could you tell us, if you recall, which officers of the
13 1st Guards Brigade you met there, any officers that were there?
14 A. I've already said that I didn't meet any other officers other
15 than Major Sljivancanin, the security organ, also other officers from the
16 security organ, Vukasinovic, Karan, and other security organs who
17 gathered when they heard that I had returned. They were joyous. They
18 wanted to share a drink with me and so on.
19 I stayed there briefly, and I was really looking at and
20 interested in them collecting the necessary documents and reports, and
21 I -- because they were in those parts, I wanted to make sure that they
22 didn't run into land-mines or something like that. So I did not contact
23 any other officers that evening, other than these people that I
25 Q. Did they tell you about their plans for a the following day?
1 What it was that they were going to do, what their tasks or assignments
2 were, whether they had received any assignments from their commander or
3 any other task that they would have to do as part of their duty?
4 A. No. As I've already told you, it was an informal meeting. They
5 just said that they were happy that the operation was over, that they had
6 survived it. And there wasn't much talk at all about any future
7 activities. All that happened was that I learned that there were people
8 taken prisoner. When I asked them what happened after the operation was
9 over, they said that this Mitnica Brigade had surrendered and that their
10 men were sent -- had been sent to Sremska Mitrovica. And then on my way
11 back to Belgrade I just stopped there briefly to see whether they were
12 accommodated properly.
13 Q. Did they tell you that officers from the 1st Military District
14 had arrived there, these retired officers from the security organ?
15 A. Well, I've already said that they did not know it themselves
16 because I think that there was some 200 metres away from the
17 headquarters, the brigade headquarters. These men were about 200 metres
18 further, in another building, and they never mentioned them. And I'm
19 sure that at that time while I was there and throughout that time they
20 did not know that these men, these officers, had arrived. And had I
21 learned it from them then I would have asked to meet with them as well.
22 However, they were exclusively on the premises of the brigade
23 headquarters, and I'm sure that these men, including Sljivancanin, didn't
24 know that they had arrived because, had they known, they would have told
1 Q. I see that you mentioned them in your statement, that, on that
2 day, they were in Vukovar, and I thought that that was when you learned
3 that they were there. Can you then tell us now when it was that you
4 learned that they were there on the 19th of November?
5 A. Well, I didn't know that they were there on the 19th until the
6 instigation of criminal proceedings before a military court in Belgrade
7 when they appeared as witnesses. And then we talked in the hallway, we
8 discussed this. Now, as for what was happening on the 19th and all the
9 events there, as I've told you, I learned it about it then during these
11 Now as for when I learned that they had been reactivated it was
12 when I went to that meeting at the collection centre, I think on the
13 13th of November, where I met with a military prosecutor, which is when I
14 saw that there were some retired officers who were members of this team
15 of the security organ.
16 Now because at the time I -- there were --
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter kindly asks that the witness
18 repeat the last part of his answer.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: General, the interpreters did not get the last
20 part of your answer.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I learned that these officers were
22 reactivated, recruited by the security organ of the 1st Military District
23 when, on the 13th of December, in 1991, I went to the collection centre
24 in Mitrovica where I attended this meeting with the military prosecutors.
25 At the time, there were active security officers who were not
1 deployed anywhere because they had been withdrawn from Slovenia and
2 Croatia. I felt that it was not necessary to reactivate retired officers
3 and then they were withdrawn from the active service, and they returned
4 to the collection centre.
5 Q. And do you know, then, how it was that these retired officers
6 then happened to be in Vukovar on this date, on the
7 19th of November, 1991?
8 A. They received orders to come to Sid. They were in Begejci at the
9 collection centre there. The chief of the 1st Military District,
10 General Babic, was waiting for them there. They were in
11 Colonel Petkovic's office, and from then they were given the task to go
12 to Vukovar and help deal with the situation, evacuation, and so on. So,
13 from Sid, they went to Vukovar and went to the brigade command. They
14 went to see the brigade commander.
15 When they completed this effort, they returned to Sid and met up
16 with General Babic again. After that, they went to the collection
17 centre. As far as I managed to find out later, they did not compile any
18 documents as to what it was that happened on the 19th, 20th in
19 Velepromet, in Vukovar.
20 Q. Can you tell us, or, rather, do you know how come they actually
21 happened to be in Sid? They were in Begejci. You concluded that there
22 was no need for them to be involved any longer because there were regular
23 officers who were not busy at the time so perhaps this is a strong word,
24 but you let them go. You dismissed them?
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the
1 witness's answer.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: General, could you please repeat your answer.
3 The interpreters did not get your answer.
4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Yes, please start from the very beginning.
6 A. From Begejci, from the collection centre, at the request of
7 General Babic, they came to Sid, where the operations group was of
8 Colonel Petkovic, and he was waiting for them there. And from there, he
9 sent them to the Guards Brigade and to help with the evacuation of the
10 population that was underway.
11 On their way back from Vukovar, again, they went through Sid. As
12 far as I learned from them afterward, General Babic was waiting for them
13 there, again, and from there, they went to the collection centre in
15 Q. So they did return to Begejci from there?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. When you were returning from Vukovar, did you have contact in Sid
18 with any of the security organs there, either General Babic or Petkovic?
19 A. No, I did not stop in Sid at all because I was busy all day and I
20 was in a hurry to get back to Belgrade and I needed to have enough time
21 to be able to go to Sremska Mitrovica, too. So I didn't stop in Sid at
22 all and I did not talk to anyone either from Petkovic's group or anyone
23 from Sid at all.
24 Q. When you say that you wanted to stop in Mitrovica, you said that
25 these prisoners were in dormitories. Did you go to that prison in
1 Sremska Mitrovica, or did you go to some other place?
2 A. I went to the KP Dom and I was escorted by their policemen to the
3 area where these people had been put up.
4 Q. You went to Vukovar again, I think you said on the
5 21st of November, and that was your last visit to Vukovar during the
7 So when you went then, were you in contact with any of the
8 security organs from the 1st Army? Babic or Petkovic, that is.
9 A. No. I was not in Vukovar on the 21st of November. My statement
10 maybe says that it was after the 21st of November. It could have been
11 around the 25th of November. Why? Because the Guards Brigade returned
12 on the 24th of November. And I did not contact anyone there, and there
13 wasn't anyone there that I would get in contact with. I was sent from
14 the General Staff with General Vuletic, chief of the intelligence
15 administration, and I had my deputy with me, General Tumanov.
16 So we went in connection with a particular problem that had
17 probably reached the operations centre of the General Staff of the JNA,
18 and that is that a group of volunteers there was making trouble. They
19 didn't want to return their weapons, and they didn't want to leave the
20 area. I came to this group. They were pretty drunk. They reacted to
21 the fact that they were not given any certificates about participation in
22 combat in order to be able to get financial compensation. After a
23 relatively short conversation they calmed down and I explained to them
24 how they could receive that. And the problem was resolved.
25 It was raining very hard and I returned to Belgrade straight away
1 because that is what I went there to do. That was the task that I had.
2 Q. In other words, you didn't have any contacts with General Babic
3 or with Petkovic, starting from the 19th of November. We're not
4 interested in previous contacts. From the 19th of November onwards, you
5 did not have any contacts; is that correct?
6 A. I did not.
7 Q. In addition to these retired security officers, do you remember
8 how many of them there were there?
9 A. Perhaps eight to ten. That would be my estimate.
10 Q. Do you remember their names?
11 A. Well, that would be quite hard.
12 Q. Did they include active-duty officers in that group that came to
13 Vukovar on the 19th of November?
14 A. I think NCO Korica was there. And I'm not sure whether
15 Captain Dragan Muncan was there too. I was reactivated in 1999, as you
16 know. Before that, I hardly ever had any contact with officers from the
17 service. And then, after those seven years, I had an opportunity to ask
18 what it was that had been going on, and I know from then that Korica and
19 that Muncan were there.
20 Q. When did you receive information -- actually, first of all, did
21 you receive any information at all, why it was that they were sent to
22 Vukovar on that 19th of November?
23 A. I've already said that up until that testimony because soon after
24 that, after what we have been discussing just now, I was pensioned off
25 and I did not have any contact with people from the service then. I was
1 in contact with them when criminal proceedings were instituted before the
2 military court, and I talked to them then and that is when I heard that
3 they were there. And later on, through different trials and testimonies,
4 because the trial was re-started before our courts and over here, that's
5 when I found out what it was that happened then and who was where. But
6 none of them told me what it was that happened concerning the execution
7 at Ovcara. In my statement, I said that when I had my first information
8 that something had happened in Ovcara that was in 1993. And now let me
9 not mention who it was. I talked to Captain Borisavljevic after that.
10 Q. Did you find out from this contact with them or in any other way
11 what the reason was they were sent on the 19th of November? Why were
12 they sent there? Why was this officers of security organs sent there?
13 A. To help the orderly transport of these persons and initial
14 selections that were supposed to be carried out, who would go to the
15 collection centre, and who could be released to go wherever they wanted
16 to go. So they were supposed to help in this situation, in this
17 commotion, help from their own point of view, because these were
18 experienced officers, colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and that's why they
19 reported to the brigade command, not to the security department at
21 Q. Does that mean that they were supposed to carry out some kind of
22 selection among these people who were there in Vukovar and they were
23 supposed decide who was to be sent where, I mean, whether they could
24 freely go to Serbia or Croatia or whether they were supposed to be kept
25 there as POWs or something like that?
1 A. My conclusion was that this kind of selection - objectively -
2 could not be carried out because of the situation in which the population
3 was gathered there and taken further. Then Sid. Then Mitrovica. The
4 Red Cross of Serbia was involved in taking in these people in Mitrovica.
5 And the security organs had to deal with that, and they were supposed to
6 assess who was supposed to go there, but there were persons who had been
7 taken prisoner who were wearing uniforms and who had weapons. It's the
8 entire Mitnica Brigade that was there and they were disarmed in a
9 classical, military, soldierly way. No selection was required there.
10 These first contingents that arrived were rather well-known people.
11 We -- there was knowledge as to who these people were. They were
12 wounded. They went to the collection centre, so it was only logical that
13 they had taken part in combat activities. Later on, various organs from
14 the ground were non-selective, the military police, the police, the
15 military. Some persons were being brought into custody - sorry about
16 this - and sent to the collection centre.
17 In documentation, I found out that some had been beaten up before
18 having been brought to the collection centre. They had been beaten up by
19 the police, milicija, and then the leaders of the operation teams reacted
20 and told the MUP people not to do that kind of thing.
21 Q. As far as I can see, on the 19th of November, this group that
22 surrendered at Mitnica was transferred without the participation of the
23 security organs at all. I mean, the security organs who were sent from
24 Sid. Perhaps it the security organs of the brigade itself that took part
25 in this.
1 A. Yes. Because when I arrived and that team of the
2 1st Military District was at the brigade command, so when I arrived, I
3 already knew that this Mitnica group had been transferred to the
4 collection centre that had been established in Sremska Mitrovica. So
5 that is to say that they had left, so these four or five officers could
6 not have taken part in that.
7 Q. According to our information, according to my information, at
8 least, on that 19th of November -- actually, for the 20th of November,
9 what remained was the evacuation of people who were at the Vukovar
10 Hospital. I don't know whether there was any other place involved
11 because basically all the other Croat units had been disarmed and the one
12 from Mitnica, too. Does that mean that they were supposed to carry out
13 this selection at the Vukovar Hospital to separate the people who would
14 go to Mitrovica, that is to say, perhaps to this collection centre, from
15 the people who were supposed to be allowed to go wherever they wanted to?
16 A. I did not give any assignments with regard to this selection when
17 I was there. Later on, I learned from trials and from other things that
18 happened, they were given an assignment by General Mrksic, these four or
19 five officers who came. That evening, I didn't even know whether the
20 hospital had been evacuated or not, so I did not go in, and I had no idea
21 who was left there. I heard of this Mitnica Brigade ...
22 Q. This is what I'd like to ask you, perhaps a bit more
23 specifically. Later on, when you discussed the matter, did anyone tell
24 you what specific task they were given in which selection they were
25 supposed to take part, and whether they were supposed to take part in the
1 transportation provided for these people?
2 A. Later on I saw that there was an order issued by General Panic to
3 evacuate the hospital. Because I see that there were some people there
4 from that organisation, doctors, who were providing help, et cetera.
5 I suppose that they were all supposed to be sent to
6 civilian-health institutions or elsewhere in the territory of Croatia. I
7 can only make assumptions now. But I see that Major Sljivancanin was
8 around the military hospital and that the military police were securing
9 the military hospital, that Colonel Bogdan Vujic and others from that
10 group from the 1st Army came there. So they certainly were not there
11 just to watch. They took part in this selection.
12 In 1997 I asked the then-head of the Security Administration to
13 conduct an official interview, not a personal conversation, with
14 Colonel Sljivancanin, he was a colonel by then, to find out what happened
15 in Vukovar and about all of these things that were being said, like in
16 the media, that I had stolen money from Vukovar. And I had that official
17 interview on the official premises in 1997. I'm not going to list all
18 the officers who were present there.
19 He told me then that he had problems, too, when he was getting
20 personnel out of the hospital, not during some kind of selection but for
21 them to go to the next place that they were supposed to go to, a
22 temporary collection centre at Ovcara where the 80th Brigade was. As
23 they were getting them out of the hospital, already then --
24 Q. Please do slow down a bit.
25 A. I do apologise.
1 When they were being taken out of hospital, he had problems. He
2 had a rifle pointed at his back. It was a TO man who did that.
3 According to list -- who -- a list that he got from Vesna Bosanac, a list
4 of hospital personnel, and he released them, and he was in a situation to
5 almost be shot in the back. In that commotion, he first transferred them
6 to the barracks. That's the first thing he could do because he
7 considered them safe there. But then that group went to the barracks,
8 and problems started there. And let me not go into the details now.
9 Q. When he said that he transferred the people from the hospital to
10 the barracks, did he say why he didn't take them to Mitrovica
12 A. I didn't go into such subtleties. According to their procedures
13 in place from before, he was to take them to Ovcara. And there the first
14 screening was made, who would be released and who would be taken to a
15 collection centre.
16 Since there were problems in front of their hospital, the TO men
17 wanted to snatch them already. Then he fled to the barracks with them.
18 Actually, he sheltered them there. If there hadn't been the barracks,
19 then he would have taken to Mitrovica, where the 80th Brigade was.
20 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the latter part
21 of his answer.
22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Please repeat the latter part of your answer. I will read out
24 this last sentence that was interpreted:
25 [In English] "If there hadn't been the barracks, then he would
1 have taken to Mitrovica, where the 80th Brigade was."
2 A. I spoke too fast. I apologise. If it hadn't been for that
3 situation, as the situation in front of the hospital when the people were
4 being taken out of there, they wouldn't have gone to the barracks but,
5 instead, directly to Ovcara, which was some sort of a makeshift reception
6 centre, and from there they would have been either sent to Mitrovica or
8 Q. Did anybody -- anyone of these people tell you that, or is that
9 your free conclusion?
10 A. This is an interpretation of my -- of the interview I had with
11 Sljivancanin on the official premises of the security service.
12 Q. When you were in Vukovar on the 19th of November - actually, it
13 was Negoslavci - did anyone of the security organs tell you that on that
14 day there had been an international mission that wanted to visit the
15 hospital and that they had some problems with them, a discussion, a
17 A. No.
18 Q. We have information that on that night the security organs really
19 went to Negoslavci and that there was a total of ten of them. Five were
20 from the 1st Military District; and the other five were sent there by the
21 Security Administration. I want to acquaint you with that so that you
22 may tell us to what extent that is correct.
23 A. No one was sent from the Security Administration. I wasn't at
24 the Security Administration then. I was in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's
25 number one.
1 Furthermore, nobody ever mentioned that to me later. Nobody
2 mentioned that anyone was sent there from the Security Administration.
3 They were only sent by the Military District through Sid, where
4 General Panic waited for them. If you have the names of these officers
5 who went there on the 19th, I might provide further comment.
6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [No interpretation] [In English] I refer to
7 transcript page 6391 to 92 and page 6430.
8 Q. [Interpretation] General, I have these names, but I'm prohibited
9 to tell the names to you. Those are our rules. I can only tell you what
10 information I have but not the source of information.
11 A. You may want to be careful using that information, and it would
12 have been a good thing if you had been more careful when you received
13 that documents that were forged.
14 Q. You said that you had some problems with reporting that had to do
15 with General Babic. You said that you noticed that some reports about
16 crimes that you received from Milici Jovanovic, who was your second
17 subordinate, as it were, which reports he sent to his first superior
18 along professional lines and these reports never made it to you. Was
19 that before the Vukovar operation or after?
20 A. After. I was speaking about the 4th of December. And around the
21 12th or 13th of December, I saw General Babic.
22 Q. Did you ask him to send you the -- the detailed reports that he
23 had received from Milici Jovanovic, or maybe make a summary report and
24 forward it to you, about all this information about committed crimes that
25 were never reported to the Security Administration?
1 A. If you know what the purview is of the security organs, then --
2 well, you're insisting that we are the only ones responsible for
3 reporting about crimes committed in the territory. The information
4 collected by the security organs about things outside their purview were
5 communicated by them to the officers in charge.
6 Why didn't he forward information received from Colonel Jovanovic
7 to me? He said that this information was forwarded on a need-to-know
8 basis, and that's why he didn't consider it necessary to send that
9 information to the Security Administration, because we're not responsible
10 for such things. Furthermore, Colonel Jovanovic, at the briefing, gave
11 me -- communicated his observations to me, and I didn't need second-hand
12 information about what I already knew. I don't think I need to explain
13 any further, but I can. Babic, for a number of years, was my first
14 superior in the security organ. When I became chief of administration,
15 he was my subordinate. I was careful in the way I communicated with him,
16 because he was older than I was and he had been my superior.
17 Q. But the information you got from Milici Jovanovic, who, in fact,
18 was subordinated to General Babic because he had a number of security
19 organs in the 1st Military District who were subordinated to him. Do you
21 A. Yes, in the corps.
22 Q. Didn't that indicate that information that from other units came
23 to the 1st Army District, also from security organs, weren't communicated
24 to you either?
25 A. No. But much information was received by counter-intelligence,
1 mostly by the 1st Military District because it was a big Military
2 District. But the problems were happening in the area where there was
3 combat, it was the Novi Sad Corps. The Kragujevac Corps had remained in
4 their area. And that's where the problems were, with what you're talking
5 about - there weren't any problems with the corps at Uzice or Kragujevac
6 or wherever - it was the Novi Sad Corps.
7 Q. I agree that this is not -- it's not exclusively jurisdiction of
8 the security organs to prosecute perpetrators of crime and it's stated in
9 the -- rules of service. But in paragraph 42 of your statement, if you
10 want to take a look at it, let me quote:
11 "If a member of the army committed a crime and the JNA security
12 organ or other commanding organs knew about it, it would be those organs'
13 duty to report the crime up the chain of command."
14 A. Chain of command. What's meant here is up until the command.
15 Because I already explained, it wasn't the exclusive jurisdiction of the
16 security organs. I mentioned Lovas. And the organ for political work,
17 Eremija, got information from Petkovic. Petkovic reported up his
18 professional hierarchy to the assistant for morale and political work who
19 was a general, and nobody asked questions to him and his superior what
20 they did about it. And they had the prosecutor's office in their
21 jurisdiction. And now I'm answering these questions as if our service
22 were the only one that there was in the army. We reported about things
23 that we knew to the command.
24 Q. When you received information about events in Vukovar later, can
25 you tell us from whom you got that information or, to be more precise,
1 information concerning the evacuation of people from the
2 Vukovar Hospital? Who informed you what was happening there and how it
3 all went.
4 A. Nobody informed me of their own accord. I retired in 1993, and
5 then I learnt about some things from Ovcara for the first time. There
6 were some officers that I trusted because I was no longer a member of the
7 army, and I had been in remand prison, and I was accused and then tried.
8 But I went to -- through these people whom I trusted to inquire about
9 things. And in 1993, I started collecting information and talking to
10 people. The first such conversation with a man whose name you know, I
11 needn't mention him; the second one was Srecko Borisavljevic; the third
12 one, I discovered, was the commander of a military police company, a
13 reserve officer who was then in the 80th Brigade at Ovcara. I informed
14 the chief of the Security Administration of everything I had found out.
15 Nobody ever asked why the chief of the Security Administration who
16 succeeded me in my position was questioned and called to testify.
17 As for the information from 1993 which was requested by
18 Zivota Panic, you will see that the crimes committed at Ovcara are not
19 mentioned there, and I don't believe that they didn't know about those
20 crimes then, more so since some people from those circles were rather
21 close with the leading people in our administration. When I left,
22 General Nedeljko Boskovic, for example, got an early promotion.
23 In January 1998, I was prevented from obtaining some information.
24 I was told literally, Comrade General, stop meddling. I don't know what
25 the purpose of this is, but I'm glad I can speak about this and you know
1 what I was accused of and what I -- and what was said about me, that I
2 had been in agreement with the Croats for 200 people to be killed. The
3 one who threatened me had people from the Vukovar Trojka, with whom he
4 could clear up these things.
5 I was -- and then there was this affair with Mane. I was in
6 remand prison when that was going on, the proceedings. But nobody talked
7 to me about that because they found out that orders were being obeyed.
8 And during that interview with Sljivancanin in 1998, he went to his
9 strong box and took out receipts about money being deposited with the SDK
10 of Serbia. And in my case, amounts of 3 to 5 million were being
11 mentioned, the currency being either dollars or Deutschemarks. But I
12 don't know what this has to do with these proceedings.
13 Q. I think that you have digressed too much. I never asked you
14 about General Boskovic or these other proceedings. I limited myself to
15 your information about the events in Vukovar and at Ovcara.
16 A. This is all indirect information I obtained, and you know what
17 weight that has.
18 Q. Another thing: You must have heard about this -- actually you
19 spoke about it, too, this government session in Vukovar, or rather, in
20 Velepromet. In your statement, I think there are two dates, both the
21 19th and 20th of November. According to your information, were these two
22 sessions or one? And was it simply a -- not possible for you to say
23 exactly which date it was?
24 A. As far as I know --
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Just one moment, General.
1 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, if Defence counsel could refer us to
2 the paragraph in the statement which refers to a meeting on the
3 19th of November.
4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I try. I rephrase my question, but I'm sure I'll
5 find it later.
6 Q. [Interpretation] You talked about a government meeting in
7 Velepromet. Can you tell us -- or rather, do you know when it was that
8 this government meeting was held? Do you know the date?
9 A. As far as I saw, after so many years, in different statements
10 different dates were referred to as to what happened when. I am of the
11 opinion that this session was held on the 20th, not the 19th. Why?
12 Because the team that was sent from the 1st Military District arrived in
13 Vukovar on the evening of the 19th. And Colonel Vujic was at the
14 government session. So the session took place on the 20th.
15 Q. Another thing, let me be more specific, I think that you talked
16 about Arkan's stay in Vukovar, in that period of time, after the
17 liberation. Can you tell me whether during those days immediately after
18 the liberation of Vukovar, to the best of your knowledge, was he there
19 once or did he come twice?
20 A. I don't know. I just know what I saw on television. When it was
21 broadcast on the news that a government meeting had been held and then
22 there are statements of Mr. Hadzic's when he said that now the
23 Territorial Defence had been formed as their armed force and that Arkan
24 was appointed as some kind of commander of some special unit of theirs.
25 I saw that on television.
1 Q. I have to tell you, not that we don't have that footage, but
2 according to what I know from my client, too, he never made such a
3 statement. At least not about that, the establishment of the
4 Territorial Defence and Arkan as the - how did you put this? - the
5 commander of some special unit?
6 A. Well, media reports from that period need to be looked into, and
7 you can find it there.
8 Q. You saw that on television, you say?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Was this on that actual day, when this session was held, this
11 government session, or was it a day later, or some other day before that?
12 A. I think it was on the news that day. Finally, there are those
13 statements made by the officers who were in Velepromet, from
14 Borisavljevic, Bogdan Vujic, Warrant Officer Korica. They said that
15 Mr. Hadzic came to the government session with Arkan and that threat was
16 issued then. Yes, captain, that's what you're going to do, when he
17 transferred the prisoners from Velepromet to the barracks.
18 Q. So one thing is this session in Velepromet, or rather, the fact
19 that then on that day Goran Hadzic was there and Arkan was there. That
20 is one thing. I asked you about the organisation of the
21 Territorial Defence, and that Arkan was appointed commander of some
22 special unit, and that such a statement was made on TV?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You heard about that or did you -- did you see that yourself, did
25 you hear that yourself, or did you hear about it from the people you
1 mentioned a moment ago?
2 A. No. I said that I remember seeing that on television.
3 Q. It seems that your memory doesn't serve you very well, General.
4 Please, according to your assessment, do you think -- you know who
5 Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, is and possibly what his position was in this
6 war. Would he accept to be - how did you put this? - commander of
7 special units of the Territorial Defence of Slavonia?
8 MR. OLMSTED: I think we're venturing in the realm of
9 speculation, Your Honours.
10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I ask just for assessment of General, if he could
11 give it.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Could you, General?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I could. But I don't know of
14 what value this is for the proceedings that are underway. Arkan gave
15 himself the rank of colonel and the people around him the rank of colonel
16 and different ranks. He enjoyed any kind of promotion. However, that he
17 would be obedient in respect of Mr. Hadzic or anybody else, that's the
18 part I do not believe.
19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I see the clock, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.
21 Could I ask you, Mr. Zivanovic, what your planning is? Do you
22 have any indication about how long you need tomorrow?
23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I don't know how much time I have on this.
24 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: A little bit more than an hour, Mr. Zivanovic?
1 Would you need that?
2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, I hope.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. 1 hour, 20 to be exactly, but that's only
4 to be exactly, to give the exact time.
5 And then, Mr. Olmsted, any idea about redirect?
6 MR. OLMSTED: I'm hoping it will only be 20 minutes. But I do
7 believe that, regardless, we're not going to complete the next witness by
8 2.00 tomorrow.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Certainly not. That's -- that's far --
10 MR. OLMSTED: Would it be possible to make arrangements so the
11 next witness doesn't have to stay over the weekend, for either extended
12 sitting on Thursday or Friday?
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. We'll -- I'll first allow the general to
14 leave the court.
15 General, we are finished today. As you could hear, we -- your
16 testimony is not finished yet, so we expect you back tomorrow at 9.00,
17 and, as I told you yesterday, this means that you can't discuss your
18 testimony with anybody, and you can't talk to any of the parties.
19 Thank you very much. The Court Usher will escort you.
20 [The witness stands down]
21 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, if I understood you well, your --
23 you asked for arrangements so that the next witness does not have to stay
24 over the weekend. Is he already here?
25 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, he is here. Actually, he was ready to start
1 today, but ...
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: So your arrangement would mean that we have --
3 we -- we would have to make arrangements this week.
4 Now, tomorrow we would have, more or less, more or less than
5 more, one hour left after the general, right? One hour, 20, let's say,
6 1 hour and a half for Mr. Zivanovic, 20 minutes for you. That leaves a
7 little bit more than an hour. No? Am I -- am I bad in math? I know
8 that for a long time now.
9 So tell me.
10 MR. OLMSTED: I'm equally bad at math.
11 It's possible - maybe Mr. Zivanovic can confirm - we may be able
12 to finish during the first session or maybe towards the beginning of the
13 second session.
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. So we have two hours left.
15 MR. OLMSTED: Yeah.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Next witness is a viva voce witness. Estimate
17 three-hours in chief?
18 MR. OLMSTED: Yes. And I have confirmed with the trial attorney
19 who is going to be leading that witness and she expecting two and a half
20 to three hours.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Two and a half to three.
22 MR. OLMSTED: Yes.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: That gives ... two and a half to three hours.
24 Three hours to the Defence.
25 Do you have any indication yet, Mr. Gosnell?
1 MR. GOSNELL: Good afternoon, Mr. President.
2 Very little cross-examination expected. But, of course, with a
3 viva voce witness, hard to be precise on these matters.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. One moment.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: The suggestion is to have one extra sitting on
7 Thursday afternoon and ask the parties to do whatever is possible to
8 finish at the end of that sitting. Would that be possible?
9 MR. GOSNELL: I -- I -- I -- I'm speaking perhaps somewhat out of
10 turn, but I do have a suggestion or a way that this might be expedited.
11 We would waive any objections to having the statement 92 ter'd,
12 if that would be accelerate matters.
13 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I'll have to check on that
14 suggestion. We appreciate Defence counsel making that suggestion and I
15 could either -- we could probably provide information to your Chambers
16 later this afternoon whether that's a possibility. Of course, that would
17 save a substantial amount of time.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yeah. It is -- it is, of course, a helpful
19 suggestion without any position on -- on -- on all the other questions.
20 The only problem for me now is: Do we already ask for an extra session
21 tomorrow, or do we wait for that ... when we know whether it will be a
22 92 ter or -- is -- do you know, Mr. Olmsted, whether this -- whether this
23 is a viva voce witness because the Trial Chamber refused a motion to
24 92 ter the witness?
25 MR. OLMSTED: I'll have to check on that but my understanding is
1 this was a 98 bis witness and the Trial Chamber rejected that motion but
2 did not, in turn, say 92 bis under, I think, provision (C) or (D), which
3 allows for cross-examination but admission of the statement. And I
4 believe we didn't file subsequent motion seeking 92 ter.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: And when could you take a position on
6 Mr. Gosnell's offer.
7 MR. OLMSTED: I think sometime this afternoon. There's -- I will
8 have to speak to Mr. Stringer and, of course, the attorney who is going
9 to lead the evidence.
10 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: So you would take into consideration that we need
12 to ask for an extra session tomorrow, if -- if we need one, by COB today.
13 We would like to have your information, let's say, at least at the latest
14 an hour before, okay?
15 MR. OLMSTED: That shouldn't be a problem.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: And then perhaps you could think about the
17 question, whether if it -- if the witness is 92 ter'd, whether tomorrow
18 morning would be sufficient, right, or would we anyhow need an extra
19 session tomorrow afternoon?
20 MR. OLMSTED: I -- my -- my expectation is if we do admit the
21 statement 92 ter, that would substantially reduce the amount of direct
22 examination. And presuming that Mr. Gosnell is correct that he does not
23 have an extensive cross-examination, I don't think that will be any
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Thank you. We'll wait for your further
1 notice. Thank you. Court adjourned.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.10 p.m.,
3 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 5th day of
4 September, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.