1 Wednesday, 18 December 2013
2 [Rule 98 bis Hearing]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning to everyone in and around the
8 Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
10 IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
12 May we have the appearances, please, starting with the
14 MR. STRINGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. For
15 the Prosecution, Douglas Stringer; Sarah Clanton; Starroula Papadopoulos;
16 case manager, Thomas Laugel; and legal intern, Ana Humljak.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
18 Mr. Zivanovic, for the Defence.
19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Good morning, for the Defence of Goran Hadzic,
20 Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell. Thank you.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
22 Mr. Stringer, you have the floor.
23 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours. Good
24 morning again, also to counsel.
25 In our submissions today, I will be addressing legal issues first
1 that arise out of the Defence submissions made on Monday. I will then
2 address aspects of the joint criminal enterprise and how it relates to
3 the Defence submissions from Monday. I'll also be addressing two of the
4 four specific incidents that counsel identified as part of their
5 challenge, those being Ovcara and the Velepromet.
6 After I've completed my submissions, Mr. President, then my
7 colleague, Sarah Clanton, will take the floor. She will address the
8 other two incidents related to Opatovac and Lovas. She is also going to
9 address other incidents, other aspects of the case, in which in our view
10 the Court could find that there is sufficient evidence on all counts that
11 the Defence has challenged. And she will also just -- she will also
12 briefly address a couple of the other issues raised as part of the
13 Defence submissions.
14 Mr. President, Your Honours, at the hearing on Monday, the
15 Defence clearly limited its 98 bis challenge to Counts 2 through 9 to the
16 extent that they're based on four specific incidents or events and not
17 counts, specifically the incidents at Velepromet, Ovcara, Lovas,
18 Opatovac. The Defence also challenged Counts 5 through 9, but only to
19 the extent that they are based on crimes committed in the camps that were
20 located in Serbia. That's transcript 8988 and -89 from Monday's
22 Your Honours, the Chamber should reject the Defence invitation to
23 engage in the piecemeal and incident-based application of Rule 98 bis
24 that focuses only on parts of Counts 2 through 9 based on these four
25 incidents. The Chamber should also decline to enter a judgement of
1 acquittal regarding only those parts of Counts 5 through 9 that relate to
2 the detention facilities in Serbia.
3 The Defence's proposed application of Rule 98 bis is not only
4 contrary to the plain language and intended of the Rule itself, it is
5 also contrary to the consistent manner in which Trial Chambers have
6 interpreted and applied Rule 98 bis since it was amended in 2004.
7 As amended in 2004, the rule provides that the Chamber shall
8 enter a judgement of acquittal on any count if there is no evidence
9 capable of supporting a conviction. The specific use of the word "count"
10 is significant, it's not accidental. The word "count" was introduced in
11 2004 to replace the word "charge" which had appeared in the previous
12 formulation of the Rule.
13 On Monday, after citing Rule 98 bis as reformulated to focus on
14 counts, my learned friend proceeded by referring to charges nonetheless,
15 and it is indeed only a few specific charges that form the basis of the
16 Rule 98 bis application. What was clear from my learned friend's
17 presentation is that the Defence is not pleased with or does not suit
18 them to apply Rule 98 bis as it ought to be applied and how it exists in
19 its current version. Counsel indicated or claimed that counts and
20 charges ought to be equivalent or that they are equivalent for purposes
21 of 98 bis. That's page 8986.
22 In support of this view, counsel claimed that Judge Robinson, in
23 the Milosevic case, also considered charges and counts as equivalent;
24 that's 8984. However, this is misleading, because Judge Robinson's views
25 in the Milosevic case, of course, were expressed prior to the amendment
1 of Rule 98 bis. What my learned friend omitted to mention is that
2 Judge Robinson's views on Rule 98 bis after its amendment, for example,
3 in Lukic and Lukic. We have a slide up for Your Honours and for counsel.
4 This is page 3582 of the Lukic and Lukic case, where Judge Robinson
6 "The rule, as amended in December 2004, focuses on counts rather
7 than charges. If a count is comprised of several parts and there is no
8 evidence on one part of the count but there is evidence capable of
9 supporting a conviction on the other parts, the motion will fail."
10 This was a unanimous decision, no dissent or separate opinion.
11 This same approach and application is found in numerous other Rule 98 bis
12 decisions entered by Chambers after the 2004 Rule change.
13 Just for the Chamber's benefit, we're citing Mrksic decision from
14 28th June, 2006; Martic, 3 July 2006; Milutinovic, 18 May 2007; Prlic,
15 20 February 2008; Popovic, 3 March 2008; Lukic and Lukic,
16 13 November 2008; Gotovina, 3 April 2009; Seselj, 4th of May, 2011;
17 Karadzic, 11 June 2012. These are all cases which have applied Rule
18 98 bis in the way it ought to be applied, by a counts approach, rather
19 than entertaining specific incidents and purporting to strike or enter a
20 judgement of acquittal as to a specific incident forming a part of a
22 The Defence referred to Judge Antonetti's dissent in the Seselj
23 case. What they did not mention is Judge Antonetti's statement in the
24 Prlic case, which we've just cited here, which was unanimous. There
25 Judge Antonetti said:
1 "Since the 8th of December, 2004, when Rule 98 bis was last
2 amended, a Trial Chamber is only expected to determine whether the
3 Prosecution has adduced enough evidence for each count taken as a whole,
4 as opposed to all the various charges making up that particular count.
5 As a consequence, the Trial Chamber may only enter a judgement of
6 acquittal with respect to an entire count of the indictment."
7 Now, when they referred to the Lukic and Lukic indictment, as
8 well as the Haradinaj indictment on Monday, counsel essentially argued
9 that 98 bis should apply to counts only when the count is based upon a
10 single charge or a single incident, as was the case in those indictments.
11 This approach would, in our view, Mr. President and Your Honours,
12 effectively render 2004's amendment of 98 bis to be meaningless. The
13 distinction between charges and counts with regard to the rule was noted
14 by the Chamber in Karadzic, after it advised the parties that the
15 Rule 98 bis submissions should be concerned with counts and not specific
16 charges. And that's on the slide for Your Honours at this point. That's
17 the Karadzic decision on accused's motion for order to withdraw unproven
18 allegation, 23 May 2012, paragraph 3.
19 I should say that it's in this decision, Mr. President, the
20 Chamber did suggest that the Prosecution should go back and look at
21 specific incidents. Of course there are many, many incidents in the
22 Karadzic case, and invited the Prosecution to go back and to see whether
23 there are any specific incidents which, in fairness or for whatever
24 reason, ought to be dropped out of the case at that stage. And the
25 Prosecution agreed to undertake that. In this case, it's our submission
1 that there are no incidents in which there has been a failure of proof,
2 none. So that again the counts-based approach is what's required under
3 the law, and proceeding on that basis certainly isn't going to result in
4 any inefficiency because of the possibility that an individual incident
5 here or there might have actually been left unproved.
6 In advocating a return to the charge or incident-based approach
7 to Rule 98 bis, the Defence has also referred to the structure of the
8 Hadzic indictment. However, our indictment is entirely consistent with
9 the approach taken in other leadership cases. The indictments in Martic,
10 Karadzic, Seselj, all have counts also which are comprised of different,
11 separate incidents. During the Rule 98 bis proceedings in those cases,
12 the Chambers determined whether for each count there was sufficient
13 evidence capable of supporting a conviction for at least one of the
14 criminal incidents and the accused's responsibility for it.
15 We say that's the correct approach and the approach taken by the
16 Defence here asking the Court to focus on specific incidents as opposed
17 to the counts as a whole is not a correct application of the Rule.
18 My learned friend also indicated that it's more efficient,
19 perhaps more fair, to consider specific locations or incidents. In our
20 view, Mr. President, the amendment to Rule 98 bis was intended to make
21 the proceedings more efficient by eliminating the requirement that each
22 charge has to be considered individually. The fact that a count is made
23 up of several incidents was acknowledged by Judge Robinson himself. In
24 the Dragomir Milosevic Rule 98 bis decision, this is what he said, this
25 is from Dragomir Milosevic, 3 May 2007, transcript in that case, 5641
1 and -42:
2 "Thus, a count could have as many as 100 or more separate
3 allegations. It could cover 40 municipalities, be alleged completed by
4 15 different mean, details of which could be set out in 50 or more
5 items ..."
6 He goes on:
7 "As presently formulated and applied, a submission leading to the
8 acquittal of the accused or of an accused at the end of the Prosecution
9 case is only likely to succeed in the very rare case when the Prosecution
10 case, as a whole, has broken down, so that there is no evidence of either
11 the actus reus or the mens rea of the crime."
12 And, Mr. President, we say that there is no aspect of the case in
13 which there has been a failure of proof remotely close to that level of
15 It's our submission, Mr. President, Your Honours, that the
16 Chamber can deny the Defence Rule 98 bis application on this ground. The
17 Defence has not even attempted to demonstrate that there was a failure of
18 proof on any count in the indictment. They have only focused on four
19 specific incidents out of the many that are found in the case.
20 The Defence also argued that this is a circumstantial case and
21 that, therefore, inferential findings, inferences, can only be entered at
22 the Rule 98 bis stage when they are the only reasonable inference or
23 conclusion that can be drawn, that's at transcript 8975, 8991. That is
24 factually and legally incorrect. Factually, we do not accept that this
25 is a circumstantial case. This is a case with abundant direct evidence
1 of Goran Hadzic's criminal intent, direct evidence of his significant
2 contribution to the joint criminal enterprise, direct evidence of his
3 participation in the events, and indeed in some of the crimes themselves
4 that occurred. There's nothing circumstantial about that.
5 Legally it is also incorrect to say that this is a circumstantial
6 case or that, as a result, the Chamber has to draw all inferences or has
7 to rule out all inferences apart from guilt basically in order to
9 There is clear case law on this. At the Rule 98 bis stage,
10 inferences do not have to be the only inferences reasonably available on
11 the evidence. The Chamber in Popovic squarely addressed the issue and
12 stated that:
13 "At the ... 98 bis stage, the inference of an agreement to commit
14 genocide need not be the only reasonable inference that could be drawn
15 from the evidence."
16 This is Popovic, 3rd of March, 2008, their transcript
17 number 21464.
18 Indeed, for the Chamber to accept the Defence application to
19 apply this strict inferential standard at this stage would run contrary
20 to the practice and the rule that the Chamber accepts the Prosecution
21 evidence at its highest.
22 Applying Rule 98 bis to the evidence at hand, to counts, and
23 accepting the Prosecution evidence at its highest, we submit the Defence
24 has failed to meet its high burden of showing that there is any count for
25 which a judgement of acquittal should be entered.
1 With regard to the detention facilities located in Serbia, the
2 Defence raises a legal question whether international humanitarian law
3 applies in Serbia. This argument begins on page 9023 of Monday's
4 transcript. The Defence question whether there was an armed conflict or
5 a spillover of an armed conflict into Serbia, and therefore whether IHL
6 applies there, is the question that was raised by counsel on Monday.
7 Our first response to that is that, as is the case with the other
8 four substantive incidents which the Defence raised linking those to
9 OG South, this assertion that with respect only to the detention
10 facilities in Serbia this is yet again a piecemeal, incident-based
11 argument that's inappropriate for consideration under the applicable
12 Rule 98 bis standard. There is by no means a complete failure of proof
13 on the detention-related crimes charged in Counts 5 to 9 and there is
14 indeed no challenge raised to the detention crimes alleged to have
15 occurred in places, for example, such as Erdut and Dalj.
16 Again, it's a specific incident-based approach that's
17 inappropriate under Rule 98 bis.
18 Secondly, this is a novel legal question, raised for the first
19 time in this case on Monday in the form of an oral submission. Counsel
20 refers to no legal authority or precedent supporting his view that the
21 prisoners in Serbia did not merit the protection of international
22 humanitarian law simply because they had been transported into Serbia.
23 And yet the Defence asked the Chamber to remove parts of Counts 5 to 9
24 regarding the charged detention facilities in Serbia and the crimes such
25 as mistreatment and the sexual violence that occurred in those facilities
1 on the basis of a legal argument raised for the first time on Monday.
2 Although Chambers are not precluded from making determinations of
3 legal issues at the 98 bis stage, the Tribunal case law after the 2004
4 amendment indicates that generally they refrain from doing so. The
5 Trial Chamber should refrain from doing so here. Here are some examples
6 of issues that were not considered appropriate for determination at the
7 98 bis phase. We have the slide up. These come from the Popovic case,
8 3 March 2008, transcript 21462-63, 21465-66, 68; Milutinovic decision
9 14 June 2007, paragraph 18; Kvocka, decision on motions for acquittal,
10 15 December 2000, paragraph 41. Legal issues raised which the Chambers
11 declined to consider at the 98 bis stage, including such issues as
12 whether victims of deportation as a crime against humanity must be
13 civilians, whether the Prosecution had alleged two conspiracies based on
14 the same conduct, definition of forcible transfer, et cetera.
15 So in our view, Mr. President, that's another reason why the
16 Chamber should not take up the issue of the Serbian detention facilities,
17 which, as raised on Monday, is a purely legal question whether
18 international law applies to the victims, the prisoners, who were held
20 If the Chamber were minded to consider the merits of the Defence
21 submission on the applicability of international humanitarian law, the
22 Prosecution offers these brief submissions, although we believe that such
23 a question is indeed best left until the end of the proceedings, if ever,
24 and only then on written submissions in which both parties have been
25 afforded sufficient time to research and develop their positions. In
1 fairness, we should get more time to address this purely legal issue.
2 Having said that, we offer these brief and possibly incomplete
3 submissions, based upon what we've been able to develop as a response in
4 the limited time that we've been given.
5 Before arriving at the Serbian detention facilities, many of
6 those prisoners who testified in this case first had to endure the siege
7 and the destruction of Vukovar. When the town fell on the
8 18th of November, they emerged from their destroyed homes, cellars,
9 shelters. They were rounded up by the JNA and they were transported to
10 Serbia. (redacted)
16 Therefore, the rounding up and the detention of these prisoners
17 undoubtedly occurred in the context of the armed conflict in Vukovar and
18 the surrounding area. The crimes inflicted on these prisoners in the
19 Serbian camps occurred in the context of the armed conflict and are
20 clearly connected to the conflict, even though the detention crimes
21 occurred in Serbia. How can it be that after being bombed out of their
22 homes, rounded up, and transported to detention camps by the JNA, these
23 victims lost the protection of international humanitarian law simply
24 because they had been removed to Serbia?
25 In the Seselj case, the Appeals Chamber held that for purposes of
1 Article 5, crimes against humanity:
2 "The Prosecution need only establish that an armed conflict is
3 sufficiently related to the crimes with which the accused is charged."
4 The Chamber has that on the screen, Seselj decision on the
5 interlocutory appeal concerning jurisdiction, 31 August 2004,
6 paragraphs 12 to 14.
7 To this end:
8 "It is sufficient to show a connection between the Article 5
9 crime itself and the armed conflict."
10 For Article 3 crimes, the Prosecution must show a nexus to the
11 armed conflict. In Stakic, the Appeals Chamber stated at paragraph 342:
12 "For Article 3 to apply, the crime charged must be committed in a
13 time of armed conflict and an accused's acts must be closely related to
14 the conflict. The latter requirement is known as the 'nexus'
15 requirement. The nexus need but not be a causal link, 'but the existence
16 of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part
17 in the perpetrator's ability to commit the crime, his decision to commit
18 it, the manner in which it was committed, or the purpose for which it was
19 committed.'" And here the Chamber cites the Kunarac appeal judgement at
20 paragraph 58. This is Stakic, 22 March 2006, paragraph 342.
21 Your Honours, we submit that the nexus between the crimes at the
22 Serbian crimes and the armed conflict is self-evident. The facts and
23 circumstances of their detention and mistreatment demonstrate a clear
24 link between the victims in the Serbian camps, the crimes committed
25 against them there, and the armed conflict from which they came before
1 finding themselves in the Serbian camps. In particular, even if the
2 detainees were only entitled to the protections available in
3 non-international armed conflicts, that is, Common Article 3, they would
4 be protected from the inhumane treatment which they suffered. It would
5 be nonsensical if these protections could be circumvented by simply
6 moving detainees a certain distance or even across a border.
7 The Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3, in particular, are
8 part of customary international law, applicable to both international and
9 non-international armed conflicts. Regardless of how one characterises
10 the conflict or the fact that the victims had been transported from
11 Vukovar to camps in Serbia, these people cannot be stripped of the
12 protections to which they're entitled under Common Article 3. And that
13 is because of the close, virtually seamless, nexus that exists between
14 these prisoners, the crimes visited upon them in the Serbian camps, and
15 the armed conflict from which they emerged in Vukovar.
16 We consider the Defence's challenge to crimes occurring in Serbia
17 at the detention facilities to be a wholly legal challenge, the one that
18 I've just addressed. There is no claim that the crimes did not occur,
19 nor is there a claim that Hadzic is not responsible for them under one of
20 the alleged modes of liability. The claim is that IHL does not apply.
21 Having addressed that point here, we do not intend to make further
22 factual submissions related to the Serbia detention facilities.
23 Finally some remarks on the legal side with regard to counsel's
24 characterisation of aspects of the law of joint criminal enterprise. On
25 Monday counsel repeatedly asserted that the accused must intend or know
1 the details of a specific incident falling within a common criminal
2 purpose in order to be held responsible. For example, in relation to the
3 killings at Lovas minefield, counsel argued that a "precondition" for
4 Hadzic's liability would be a pre-existing or contemporaneous knowledge
5 of the incident. That's page 9014 of the transcript. This argument is
6 based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the law of this Tribunal.
7 The Defence supported their argument by referring to Brdjanin,
8 the appeal judgement, paragraph 430. This paragraph concerns JCE
9 liability and indeed JCE is a mode of liability that the Prosecution
10 alleges in this case. However, Brdjanin does not stand for the
11 proposition that the Defence claims. In Brdjanin the Appeals Chamber
12 held that for JCE liability it must be shown that the JCE member shares
13 the intent for the crimes within the JCE. By "crimes," this means crimes
14 set out in the Statute of the Tribunal, such as murder as a war crime or
15 crime against humanity, forcible transfer, torture, et cetera. This does
16 not mean that the accused has to intend or be aware of all the details of
17 the specific criminal incidents occurring on the ground.
18 The Appeals Chamber has confirmed this in numerous cases; for
19 example, in Krajisnik the Appeals Chamber held at paragraph 200:
20 "The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber correctly
21 identified the required mens rea for the first form of JCE, explaining
22 that it must be shown that 'the JCE participants, including the accused,
23 had a common state of mind, namely the state of mind that the statutory
24 crimes forming part of the objective should be carried out ...'"
25 Here the Appeals Chamber referred to the statutory crimes. It
1 did not require the Chamber to look at the accused's specific state of
2 mind and conduct in relation to every underlying incident.
3 Mr. President, I believe that a redaction may be needed at
4 page 11, line 4, I've just been passed a note. I may have mentioned a
5 name that I shouldn't have.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: We'll check that, Mr. Stringer.
7 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 The Appeals Chamber jurisprudence establishes -- excuse me, I
9 need to back up. The Defence also erroneously claims that the accused
10 must specifically or directly contribute to each underlying incident,
11 again such as the murders at Lovas minefield. See, for example,
12 transcript 9014. Here counsel stated, "Now, even assuming..." These are
13 the words of counsel, my learned friend, on Monday:
14 "Even assuming that there is some potential association between
15 Mr. Hadzic and Mr. Bogic, there is no indication that Mr. Bogic shared
16 any information about the incident, much less that Bogic was the conduit
17 for conveying any instructions that would have contributed to this
19 We say that's not necessary or required as a contribution under
20 JCE. The Appeals Chamber jurisprudence establishes that the accused's
21 significant contribution should go to the common criminal purpose. As
22 the Appeals Chamber in Kvocka held, paragraph 263:
23 "Contrary to Kvocka's claim, to find an accused guilty of the
24 crime of murder it is not necessary to establish his participation in
25 each murder. For crimes committed as part of a joint criminal
1 enterprise, it is sufficient to prove not the participation of the
2 accused in the commission of the specific crime but the responsibility of
3 the accused in furthering the common criminal purpose. The
4 Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber did not err in finding
5 Kvocka guilty of the crime of murder without establishing his specific
6 responsibility for each murder committed."
7 By contributing to the common criminal purpose, the accused
8 contributes to the crimes falling within the JCE. This is why the
9 appeals jurisprudence does not require direct participation in each
10 specific crime charged.
11 Mr. President, that completes our legal submissions. With those
12 arguments, it's our submission that applying correctly the law and the
13 practice of Rule 98 bis, the Defence arguments concerning the state of
14 jurisprudence on personal responsibility at this Tribunal correctly.
15 This is a basis on which the Chamber can deny the motion or motions for
16 judgement of acquittal, to the extent that they are directed at pieces of
17 the case, specific incidents forming a relatively small number of the
18 total number of incidents on which the counts are based.
19 If the Chamber applies 98 bis correctly, there are no counts to
20 dismiss because the Defence has not identified any count for which there
21 has been a failure of proof. This alone is sufficient for the Chamber to
22 deny now, at this time, the Defence motion without any further input or
23 response from the Prosecution. The Chamber should not entertain the
24 incident-based challenges advanced by the Defence.
25 I'm not getting the signal that the Chamber's prepared to accept
1 our suggestion on that point, and so I will continue with my submissions.
2 The Prosecution is, Mr. President, prepared to proceed with
3 additional submissions in order to show that even the relatively small
4 number of incidents which the Defence now seeks to challenge falls
5 squarely within the scope of the joint criminal enterprise charged in the
6 indictment and are incidents for which Goran Hadzic bears individual
7 criminal responsibility. In what remains of my submissions, I will refer
8 the Chamber to evidence showing that Hadzic intended these crimes, these
9 statutory crimes, and that he contributed to the JCE in which they were
10 committed. I will address the Defence's challenge to the Ovcara and
11 Velepromet incidents. My colleague, Ms. Clanton, then, as indicated,
12 will refer the Chamber to more specific evidence related to the other two
13 incidents, Opatovac and Lovas, and to other incidents charged in Counts 2
14 through 9 which make it clear that there is ample evidence to support
15 each of those counts for purposes of this hearing.
16 Goran Hadzic bears individual criminal responsibility for what we
17 call the four incidents because he shared the intent that the crimes
18 charged in Counts 2 through 9 would be committed against non-Serbs as
19 part of the common purpose of the JCE. He knew and intended that
20 murders, beatings, unlawful imprisonment, and torture would be committed
21 in furtherance of the joint criminal enterprise, even if he was not
22 personally present when every incident occurred. The physical
23 perpetrators of crimes charged in the four incidents were members of this
24 joint criminal enterprise with Hadzic or else were tools used by JCE
25 members. Hadzic, as the most senior and powerful Serb political figure
1 in the SBWS, significantly contributed to this enterprise.
2 And so if we are to engage in an incident-based analysis of the
3 evidence for purposes of this hearing, the Chamber would, in our
4 respectful submission, benefit from a look-back at some of the evidence
5 it has heard and seen that tells us about Hadzic's criminal intent and
6 contribution to the JCE generally. Before this, however, I do have a
7 couple of preliminary remarks.
8 First, the Defence raises no challenge with respect to any counts
9 or crimes that were committed in the SAO Krajina region and no challenge
10 to crimes that occurred during 1992 and 1993. We will, therefore, not
11 address those crimes. We will, however, refer to some pieces of evidence
12 from that period that shed light on Hadzic's intent during 1991.
13 Secondly, as mentioned already, the fact that Hadzic was not
14 personally present when every crime was committed does not make this a
15 circumstantial case. On a few occasions Monday my learned friend
16 asserted just that, transcript 8975 and -76. As said, our case is a
17 direct case, direct evidence of Hadzic's intent, direct evidence of his
18 contribution to the common criminal purpose.
19 As president of the SBWS, Goran Hadzic -- sorry, as president of
20 the SBWS government, Goran Hadzic made clear his government's policy and
21 his own personal view that there was no place for non-Serbs in the
22 Serb-controlled territories in Croatia. Hadzic repeatedly and publicly
23 advocated ethnic separation of Serbs and non-Serbs. His tactic of
24 demonising Croats in his public statements made clear that they were a
25 fair target for crimes such as those charged in Counts 2 through 9,
1 whether in Erdut, Beli Manastir, Lovas, or Ilok.
2 His views manifested themselves on the ground in the crimes that
3 we have, in our view, proven in this case. For example, in a press
4 conference in September of 1991, after claiming that Vukovar would be the
5 capital of the SAO SBWS, Hadzic distinguished between "indigenous Croats"
6 as opposed to Croats who arrived after World War II. He claimed that
7 some of the Croat population carried a hatred of Serbs in their genes.
8 The non-indigenous Croats who in previous generations had settled in
9 these areas from western Herzegovina would be given return tickets.
10 Hadzic further stated that "we" do not have problems with colonised Serbs
11 who are extremists. That's P39 and P2955.2913.
12 The Chamber will recall the evidence of Witness Veljko Dzakula, a
13 prominent Serbian politician in Croatia. He reviewed this report that
14 I've just described and confirmed that such statements provoked hatred,
15 distrust and fear among Serbs and Croats alike, having come from a member
16 of the Croatian Serb leadership. He confirmed that Hadzic advocated
17 population movements: Serbs in, Croats out, prevention of Croat returns,
18 transcript 394-395.
19 By March of 1992, Hadzic, with the assistance of Serb forces such
20 as Arkan's volunteer guard and the JNA units deployed throughout SBWS,
21 had substantially achieved the goal of cleansing non-Serbs from the
22 territory. As implementation of the Vance Plan approached, Hadzic
23 advocated for population movements in the opposite direction. At the
24 SFRY Presidency meeting in Belgrade on the 2nd of March, 1992, Hadzic and
25 Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had an exchange on the issue of
1 population movements and exchanges. Karadzic observed that the idea of
2 organised population exchange was nebulous and would be seen as abhorrent
3 by the rest of the world. Hadzic disagreed saying:
4 "There is nothing nebulous in it. The Serbs from Zagreb should
5 resettle, as well as those from Belgrade, and it is out of the question
7 That's P37, page 68; transcript 384-385.
8 Hadzic and Arkan intimidated and threatened even Serbs who did
9 not support their vision of an ethnically pure SBWS. The Chamber will
10 recall the testimony again of Mr. Dzakula, who in late March or April of
11 1992 met with Hadzic in Hadzic's office in Erdut. Arkan was also
12 present. Hadzic asked Veljko Dzakula:
13 "Is it true that you advocate co-existence with the Croats?"
14 Dzakula denied that he advocated co-existence because he was
15 afraid of the consequences of admitting it in the presence of Arkan. As
16 Dzakula said, Arkan was "quite ruthless to people who did not express
17 Serbdom as he thought was fit." That's transcript 379-380, 413, 570-572.
18 And indeed, the Chamber will recall subsequently that in the
19 spring of 1993 Mr. Dzakula was stripped of his membership in the
20 RSK Assembly and jailed for having signed the Daruvar Agreement, which
21 was an agreement he made with Croatian authorities that was intended to
22 create preconditions for the return of refugees to Western Slavonia.
23 Goran Hadzic signed a decree disbanding the Western Slavonia regional
24 council through which Hadzic had entered into the Daruvar Agreement, P44,
25 P45, P46, transcript 403-405, 413-417.
1 In a July 1992 meeting with UNPROFOR Commander Nambiar, Hadzic
2 claimed he was willing to accept the return of non-Serbs, that it must be
3 realised that "even if all non-Serbs were to return, the Serbs would
4 still remain in the majority." That's P41, paragraph 10. Hadzic was
5 clearly in favour of taking advantage of ethnic cleansing committed under
6 his regime to maintain the Serb majority where there had not even been
7 one prior to the conflict. On the 4th of September, 1992, when
8 confronted by UN Under-Secretary-General Marek Goulding with the ethnic
9 cleansing of non-Serbs that was continuing in Sector East in the SBWS
10 region, Hadzic defended the practice saying that they should act "eye for
11 eye and tooth for tooth" because of the expulsion of Serbs from areas of
12 Western Slavonia, P2432.2398.
13 In our submissions on the JCE, I will refer the Chamber to
14 evidence of Hadzic's broad powers as SBWS prime minister and his
15 relations with several of the various Serb forces that were on the ground
16 in the SBWS contributing to the common criminal purpose. The Chamber
17 should consider all of this evidence to come in light of the personal
18 views expressed by Goran Hadzic throughout the period covered by this
19 case, his views on ethnic separation, ethnic engineering, demographic
20 engineering, if you will, and consider that evidence now in light of how
21 he's acting with other JCE members, Serb forces, during 1991.
22 We know from Theunens that the mission of the JNA changed. After
23 first, of course, having been the army of all of Yugoslavia and then
24 initially acting as a buffer between conflicting parties in Croatia, the
25 JNA eventually became a Serb armed force for the Serb people in Croatia.
1 This is clearly visible from early operations in July and August 1991
2 during the take-over of Dalj and Erdut. That's Theunens,
3 transcript 4150-4153; P1753, pages 141-142; P2930.
4 We also know that the JNA accepted for operational purposes
5 Serbian volunteers linked to political parties and/or otherwise known for
6 undisciplined and violent behaviour, such as the Leva Supoderica, party
7 linked to the Serbian Radical Party of Mr. Seselj; the Dusan Silni, which
8 was active in Lovas; and of course the Serbian Volunteer Guard, Arkan and
9 his men. Exhibit 2937, transcript 4128, 4649; Exhibit 1753,
10 pages 124-125; D17; and P1865.
11 The JNA's having accepted volunteers for operational purposes is
12 important because it shows the interrelation between the various Serb
13 forces in the SBWS: The JNA, Arkan, volunteers, and the local TO, the
14 SBWS Territorial Defence. The Defence attempt on Monday to try to
15 describe OG South as some separate organisational structure bearing no
16 link to Hadzic or other members of the JCE, does not reflect the
17 evidence. I'm referring to counsel's remarks on Monday at page 8991.
18 This issue of OG South/OG North is a red herring. Whether or not there
19 is some sort of organisational structure connecting Hadzic to crimes in
20 OG South is irrelevant. What matters is whether the crimes committed
21 there are linked to Hadzic or one of his fellow JCE members.
22 In his submissions on Monday, Defence sought to create this
23 distinction between OG North and OG South, even suggesting that there
24 might be two JCEs in this case: One in the north, one in the south.
25 Transcript 9012. The 98 bis challenge that they raise relates to the
1 four incidents which they say took place in OG South.
2 Your Honours, there are not two JCEs in this case. There is a
3 single JCE, a single joint criminal enterprise, for purposes of this
4 hearing which encompass the entire territory of the SBWS, that is, the
5 entire territory for which Goran Hadzic acted as prime minister during
6 1991. The JCE members operating on the territory of the SBWS included:
7 Hadzic, as the prime minister; Arkan and his Serbian Volunteer Guard; the
8 SBWS TO; Serb volunteers such as Leva Supoderica; Stevo Bogic and the
9 Serbian National Security unit, which was based just metres away from
10 Mr. Hadzic's office in Erdut; and of course the JNA.
11 JNA forces in the SBWS were all under the command of the JNA
12 1st Military District and its commander, Zivota Panic, P2931, P2933,
13 P2940, P1986.1981.
14 Your Honours see a slide. This is from the expert report of
15 Mr. Theunens, Exhibit P1753. This is at page 197. And in describing the
16 respective areas of responsibility within the territory of the SBWS, he
17 refers here to the north.
18 "OG North is based on the 12th Novi Sad Corps, commanded by
19 Major-General Andrija Biorcevic ..."
20 Biorcevic's predecessor, I should add, was General Bratic.
21 The Trial Chamber will recall the video footage of the dinner
22 celebration in which Biorcevic described how his units, his JNA units, of
23 OG North worked in close co-ordination with Hadzic. The video is
24 P211.140. He celebrated Arkan and worked jointly with him in his
25 operations in OG North. We say that Biorcevic, the JNA, and Arkan were
1 all acting jointly in the north to further the common criminal purpose.
2 The next slide relates to the Vukovar area. In the middle of the
3 SBWS, corresponding to the eastern Slavonia/Vukovar area, Colonel Mrksic
4 was in command. His area of responsibility was Vukovar, extending south
5 to Ovcara and Grabovo. Here again we're relying on the Theunens report,
6 1753, pages 197 and 198. We say that the JNA's complete and utter
7 destruction of Vukovar was intended to advance the common criminal
8 purpose by installing Vukovar as the capital of the SBWS with Hadzic as
9 its president, and in the process to drive out the non-Serb civilian
10 population there. Vukovar was better defended and it took longer to
11 conquer than the other places in the SBWS. However, the purpose of the
12 attack on Vukovar, the intent to achieve Serb domination over the town,
13 is qualitatively no different from the JNA attacks to the north or to the
14 south in Western Srem. This also was a part of the common criminal plan.
15 After the town fell, the JNA removed the inhabitants of Vukovar, in many
16 cases transporting them to the JNA camps in Serbia where now it's claimed
17 they no longer had any protection under international humanitarian law.
18 In the south, again from the Theunens report page 198 of
19 Exhibit P1753, the area of Western Srem, including Lovas, Tovarnik,
20 Bapska, Sarengrad, Ilok, these comprised the area of responsibility of
21 Major-General Arandjelovic. I'll speak in a few minutes about how the
22 JNA in Western Srem conducted its activities in a way that was consistent
23 with the JNA forces to the north.
24 But first, in Monday's submissions the Defence claimed that
25 Hadzic was not responsible for the Lovas and Opatovac incidents because
1 they fall inside the JNA's Operative Group South. That's not correct.
2 The Chamber has visited these places on the site visit. You will recall
3 that all of these places are in Western Srem. And as we see here on the
4 slide, Lovas is specifically in the area of responsibility of
5 Arandjelovic, not the Operative Group South, which is under Mrksic's
6 command farther to the north and which is restricted primarily to the
7 Vukovar town. Opatovac is down here as well. The Chamber may recall
8 Lovas, Tovarnik, Bapska. It's on the road between those various towns in
9 Western Srem, all outside of the OG South, in the area of responsibility
10 of Arandjelovic.
11 Whatever might be the Defence theory as to why Hadzic is not
12 responsible for crimes committed in OG South, that theory does not apply
13 to Lovas and Opatovac.
14 Regarding Western Srem, as Arkan and Biorcevic were working
15 together in the northern third of the SBWS where Hadzic was based, doing
16 their part to further the criminal common purpose by attacking and
17 expelling non-Serbs there, Arandjelovic and his JNA forces were busily
18 ridding the SBWS territory of the non-Serbs who lived in Western Srem,
19 places whose name we see, Lovas, Tovarnik, Bapska, Sarengrad, Ilok, for
21 Arandjelovic, his JNA forces in the south contributing to the
22 same common purpose as the pounding, the destruction of Vukovar, which is
23 intended to achieve the same result also being sought by Biorcevic,
24 Arkan, and Hadzic's own backyard in the north, it's all the same, top to
25 bottom, north to south. The OG South/OG North distinction bears no
1 relevance to the Chamber's consideration of the evidence in this case or
2 the joint criminal enterprise.
3 On the 27th of September 1991, a Bora Tomic delivered an
4 ultimatum to the inhabitants of Bapska. It was signed by JNA
5 Major Slobodan Barjaktarevic, who was under the command of
6 Major-General Arandjelovic. The Chamber has the ultimatum. I'm not
7 going to bring it up or read it, but it made clear that if the people of
8 Bapska did not surrender the village would be erased from the map. The
9 ultimatum was read out on Croatian TV, P324, paragraphs 13 to 16; P316,
10 page 1.
11 Arandjelovic was involved in the expulsion of the non-Serbs
12 inhabitants of Ilok. During the negotiations leading up to the
13 expulsion - this is October 1991 - Arandjelovic threatened the Croat
14 representatives from Ilok if they did not surrender their weapons:
15 "I am going to use tanks and howitzers and aircraft and I'm going
16 to level Ilok to the ground."
17 That's the statement attributed to Arandjelovic by
18 Witness Brletic, P1418, transcript 1338.
2 Mr. President, Your Honours, we submit that the purported
3 distinction, as I've said, between North and South is not only incorrect,
4 it is artificial. The JNA forces deployed throughout the entire SBWS
5 territory were there to make their contribution to the joint criminal
6 enterprise, each with their respective areas of responsibility, making
7 their own contribution.
8 Hadzic, as president of the government of the SBWS, was fully
9 informed about and enthusiastically supported the JNA's ethnic cleansing
10 activities throughout his territory.
11 I'd like to show one video, Mr. President, with your permission,
13 [Video-clip played]
14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Presenter: Let's move on to the
15 area of Slavonia and Western Srem.
16 "Reporter: After the press conference that was held in Erdut
17 earlier today, we asked Mr. Hadzic, the prime minister of Slavonia,
18 Baranja, and Western Srem, to respond to several questions for the
19 benefit of the viewers of TV Belgrade. Mr. Hadzic, to what extent are
20 fierce battles being fought at the moment on the battle-field ? What are
21 the prospects in this war?
22 "Goran Hadzic: There is fierce fighting going on. This first
23 operation, the first part of the liberation of Western Srem is in its
24 final stages, the battles for Vukovar, as I say, are being fought. It
25 could be said that our units control almost 50 per cent of the town. We
1 have secured positions and advances are made slowly house by house. Over
2 the past two days the operation to cleanse the Ustasha villages has been
3 completed. After the mopping up of the Sid-Vinkovci route, a couple of
4 Ustasha villages were also cleansed on this route in this central section
5 of the area, this was three days ago, and that's to say Bogdanovci and
6 the villages down there. Some of the villages surrendered.
7 Specifically, in Ilok we have an offer of surrender from a group, while
8 another extremist group will not allow it. Incidentally, I will be
9 attending talks today to take care of this issue so that they surrender
10 their weapons and that the culprits be brought to justice and those who
11 did not do anything wrong can stay and live together with us.
12 "Reporter: Will the Territorial Defence men" --
13 MR. STRINGER: Thank you.
14 Mr. President, I brought up this video, it's obviously -- well,
15 in our view it's relevant for quite a number of different things. First
16 of all, (redacted)
22 (redacted) We know that the timing of this video, it's prior to the fall of
23 Vukovar. He says they control almost 50 per cent of the town. So this
24 is quite likely in November or October of 1991.
25 He's demonstrating knowledge and support of the entire operations
1 of the JNA that are taking place at the time. At this stage of the case
2 it's our submission that the Chamber has heard plenty of evidence about
3 the crimes that are being committed against non-Serbs in all of these
4 areas. Of course we hear his repeated references to Ustasha villages as
5 a justification for the cleansing of entire villages which, in our view,
6 the Chamber knows, has heard evidence, was indeed taking place.
7 If we can just continue with the video.
8 Sorry, just before we start, Mr. President, could I ask to redact
9 from page 26, lines 10 to 16.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes, Mr. Stringer.
11 [Video-clip played]
12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Reporter: Will the
13 Territorial Defence men, village defenders, and the Yugoslav People's
14 Army mount a fierce offensive of some sort because as of late, as you
15 know, a number of objections have been raised in respect of the ferocity
16 of the operations especially those conducted by the
17 Yugoslav People's Army?
18 "Goran Hadzic: Well, yes, there have been objections. They are,
19 I would say, relatively warranted, given its stance and the possibilities
20 open to it. Our primary objective is not to kill Croatian people in
21 large numbers, but to punish the criminals among them. This means that
22 we have tried everything, including these democratic approaches and other
23 non-military approaches, to prevent it. However, even after we signed
24 truces and agreements and after negotiations, the Ustasha continued to
25 act in disregard of the signatures. This means that everyone with all
1 this - I do not trust them at all - it is clear to me that there is no
2 more negotiating with them and that the situation must be tackled
3 militarily. After this press release of the Supreme Command -- and this
4 press release of the Supreme Command speaks in the same vein, but we must
5 be aware that the army cannot do that without its people. In other
6 words, there must be a co-ordinated action of some sort, a true
7 co-ordinated action of the people together with the army."
8 MR. STRINGER: Thank you.
9 Now, just a couple of remarks here, Mr. President, starting with
10 possibly the most important which is the final point Hadzic makes here,
11 which is the importance of co-ordination between the people and the army.
12 Hadzic is the people, the JNA is the army, and they are indeed
13 co-ordinating and working in their own respective spheres toward
14 achieving the common criminal purpose.
15 Hadzic makes a few references in here to bringing culprits to
16 justice. People, the culprits, will be dealt with -- they will be
17 brought to justice and those who did not do anything wrong can stay and
18 live with us. This is an important point because, in our view, it
19 relates to this issue of the Croatian fighters from the Vukovar hospital
20 who, in theory, were also to be brought to justice. This is a common
21 thread throughout Hadzic's statements. It's false, in our view. It's a
22 lie. He has no intention of bringing any of these people to justice in
23 the true sense of the word. It's our submission that, as will be the
24 case on the Ovcara submissions, it's his intention that they be brought
25 to justice through retribution and violence. This is just for public
1 consumption; that's our assertion.
2 That brings me to Ovcara. He moves for a judgement of acquittal
3 as to the Ovcara massacre on the 20th of November, 1991. We know,
4 Your Honours, that on that day the 260 prisoners executed there on the
5 night of the 20th began their day as prisoners of the JNA. They were
6 rounded up at the Vukovar hospital and taken to the JNA barracks, where
7 they spent some period of time. This is -- I'm referring now to
8 transcript 8658-8660, Witness GH-063, Mr. Karlovic.
9 We also know that a group of prisoners, Croatian fighters from
10 the Mitnica unit, had already been removed by the JNA previously and
11 taken to the JNA prison at Sremska Mitrovica, transcript 8686.
12 The reason why the second group of prisoners was never taken down
13 to Sremska Mitrovica is because Goran Hadzic played a decisive role in
14 pressuring the JNA to turn the prisoners over to him and his local
15 authorities, including ultimately the TO commander Vujovic, who was in
16 charge of the killing operation. I'm referring of course to the pivotal
17 meeting between Hadzic, other members of his government, and
18 representatives of the JNA, which was held at the Velepromet complex
19 earlier in the day on the 20th.
20 On 20 November 1991, a session of the government of the SAO SBWS
21 took place at Velepromet. Hadzic presided and the chief topic of the
22 agenda was war prisoners. GH-028, transcript 6303, 6304, 6307, 6311.
23 Hadzic had arrived at the Velepromet facility with Arkan; that's
24 agreed fact 60. The Trial Chamber will recall Arkan's statement that he
25 doesn't take prisoners, P102. The meeting with the JNA was tense. At
1 one point Arkan took his pistol off his chest and put it on the desk,
2 GH-028, transcript 6314.
3 The Chamber will recall my description earlier of the incident in
4 which Hadzic had Mr. Arkan present in order to intimidate and bully
5 Veljka Dzakula on the issue of whether he supported or agreed to
6 co-existence with Croats. Here again we see Hadzic with Arkan in this
7 pivotal meeting, again not hesitating to bring his attack dog, who
8 doesn't hesitate to threaten and intimidate even other Serbs who don't
9 share the prevailing view of Serbdom that exists in the Hadzic
10 government. The Chamber's going to hear about another incident of Arkan
11 being used to intimidate and threaten a person who expressed disagreement
12 with the Hadzic policy in Ms. Clanton's submissions later.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Goran Hadzic: This is the first
3 meeting of the government held in the future capital of our Serb district
4 of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. Now to the conclusions, apart
5 from the ones intended to bring life and the situation in general back to
6 normal, there is one main conclusion that the Ustasha prisoners who have
7 blood on their hands must not leave the territory of the Serb district of
8 Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, and they cannot be taken to Serbia
9 because Serbia is not a country at war. Also, the army that assisted in
10 the capture, well those who were taken prisoner were not soldiers, they
11 were paramilitaries. They can only be put on trial by the people here,
12 that is to say the people of our Serb district which has been recognised,
13 which has its court. We even have a second-instance court. The third
14 instance could possibly be on the federal level, the Yugoslav level, but
15 we have our district court and our municipal court. Consequently we have
16 agreed with the authorities that the Ustasha remain in some of our camps
17 around Vukovar. Since one group was already taken to Sremska Mitrovica,
18 I will make sure that these people, if they can be called people at all,
19 are brought back and put on trial here, those who are culpable and those
20 who are not will naturally be released so they can join us in rebuilding
21 our town.
22 "Journalist: In your estimate, how many" --
23 MR. STRINGER: Thank you.
24 Mr. President, apart from yet another demonisation of the Croat
25 prisoners, if we can call them people at all, as he says, Hadzic makes
1 clear that he has now reached an agreement with the military authorities
2 that the prisoners would stay in the SBWS. He tells the world this. He
3 refers to the earlier group that had already been taken down to
4 Sremska Mitrovica, and he's now going to try to bring those back, those
5 people back, and we know that he did. Again, the evidence of his having
6 gone to Sremska Mitrovica with judges and other people, I refer, for
7 example, to the testimony of Mr. Pribudic.
8 In essence, in this video Hadzic tells the world that he has
9 taken responsibility for the lives of these prisoners and he cannot wash
10 his hands of his responsibility, given his direct involvement, the
11 pressure he's brought to bear, in procuring their transfer from the JNA
12 forces to his local authorities. By the time Hadzic was giving this
13 interview, the buses of prisoners, some 260 of them which had been
14 waiting at the barracks, had in all likelihood arrived at Ovcara. Many
15 prisoners were beaten in the hangar, a few were executed. The Chamber
19 prisoners, Vujovic answered:
20 "That's no longer your concern, it is our business."
21 Transcript 4927. The prisoners were in Vujovic's hands because
22 Hadzic made it happen.
23 That night, as the Chamber knows, the prisoners were summarily
24 executed in groups of 20 to 30. The beatings and executions were carried
25 out by members of the JNA, volunteers of the Leva Supoderica unit, and
1 the local TO. Adjudicated facts 125-126; GH-129, transcript 4925,
3 Your Honour, it's the Prosecution position that Goran Hadzic was
4 lying when he said that he wanted the prisoners to stay so that they
5 could stand trial. Based upon not only the evidence that I've described
6 today but all the evidence in the case, his own views, his repeated
7 expressions demonising Croats, association with Arkan, and Arkan's role
8 in keeping these prisoners in the territory - Arkan is someone who
9 doesn't take prisoners - it's our submission that he did this in order to
10 keep the prisoners in the SBWS so that they could be killed. He played a
11 direct role in bringing about the deaths of these prisoners. The
12 perpetrators were all linked to Hadzic's co-JCE members or to Hadzic
13 himself through his SBWS TO. The crime itself is not disputed. The
14 Prosecution submits that on these facts, a reasonable Chamber could, for
15 purposes of this 98 bis hearing, find that Hadzic is responsible for this
16 crime under any of the modes of liability that are charged in the
18 Your Honour, perhaps this would be the time to -- I could, with
19 Your Honour's permission, start on the Velepromet piece. I might not be
20 able to finish it, but maybe I'll just continue. I was going to say we
21 could break and I could come back for the Velepromet part.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: I think that's a good idea, Mr. Stringer. Let's
23 take the break now and come back at 11.00. Court adjourned.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic, we heard that you want to address
2 the Court.
3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, I'd just like to inform the Chamber that we
4 noted some discrepancies between Exhibit P322, the transcript of this
5 exhibit and the content of the transcript here on the -- it is page 27
6 through 33. There are more than one or two discrepancies, and I wouldn't
7 inform about it in details. But just to let you know, and we shall see
8 with the translation service how it appears.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
10 Mr. Stringer.
11 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Just to follow-up, the transcript of the video was printed from
13 e-court and was given to the interpreters in the booths to assist them.
14 The extent I think to which they read versus listen and interpret is
15 obviously for them. So if there's a discrepancy, that may be part of
16 what's happening.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The quality of the
18 translation received is rather poor so the interpretation differed
19 because of that.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Is this the quality of the interpretation or the
21 quality of the copy you got?
22 THE INTERPRETER: The quality of the written translation of the
23 videos that were played. The translation into English was problematic in
24 our view.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: So it's about content. Okay. Thank you.
1 MR. STRINGER: I'm being told that what's in e-court actually
2 bears a Defence document ID, so I think it's obviously for the Chamber to
3 consider as it sees fit.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stringer.
5 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Your Honour. Also just to -- I failed
6 to mention the -- give a citation on the Kvocka, this -- on the legal
7 submissions on contribution referred to the Kvocka appeals judgement
8 decision or the appeals judgement, I should say, and just for the record
9 that's the 25th of February, 2005, paragraph 263. I didn't give that
10 citation on page 15, lines 14 to 15, today which would have been the
11 place to do it.
12 Shall I -- could I also indicate for the record, Mr. President,
13 that we're now joined in the courtroom by our intern, Mr. Kat Tai Tam,
14 who's joining us for the remainder of today's proceedings.
15 One last loose end -- one last loose end, Mr. President. On the
16 issue of the Vukovar, we would like to direct the Chamber to the
17 testimony of Mr. Theunens at 4296-4297, also P1694. And this relates to
18 a ceremony or recognition of the 1st Military District of the JNA which
19 was given to the efforts of the volunteers for their contribution to the
20 Vukovar operation and this was held at the SSNO, that's the secretariat
21 for the people's defence in Belgrade, at a reception on the
22 21st of November, 1991. And to congratulate JNA officers involved in --
23 who were in charge of the operation at Vukovar, Mile Mrksic,
24 Andrija Biorcevic, Zivota Panic, who was the commander of the
25 1st military district. Noting also that Vukovar TO member
1 Miroljub Vujovic was also present with Kadijevic who was the secretary
2 for All People's Defence at the reception in his office. And so we see
3 that as a broader, more JNA-membership-based piece of evidence that
4 relates to the Vukovar operation as well as Ovcara.
5 With regard to Velepromet, Your Honours, the Prosecution position
6 is that Hadzic bears responsibility for the crimes committed at
7 Velepromet as charged in Counts 2 through 9 because the perpetrators of
8 the crimes were linked to members of the JCE of which Hadzic was a
9 member. This applies whether the perpetrators were JNA, local TO, or
11 The evidence shows that the perpetrators of the crimes committed
12 at Velepromet were both members of the JNA, Vukovar TO, and volunteers.
13 As counsel indicated in his submissions on Monday, the JNA acquiesced in
14 the crimes committed against prisoners by others such as volunteers who
15 were permitted to enter the Velepromet compound; that's transcript 9016.
16 Even if TO members or Chetniks committing crimes were subordinated to the
17 JNA at the time or had been subordinated to the JNA for operational
18 purposes as counsel asserts at page 9016 of the transcript, this still
19 does not sever or break the link between the crimes, the perpetrators and
20 Hadzic in the JCE. Of course, as set out in our earlier submissions, the
21 TO SBWS members were subordinates of Goran Hadzic. And I'm going to
22 direct the Chamber to additional evidence on that issue shortly.
23 This does not change even if they had been temporarily
24 subordinated to the JNA. Those perpetrators at Velepromet were clearly
25 carrying out crimes that form a part of the JCE, crimes that Hadzic
1 intended and accepted.
2 Furthermore, both the JNA and TO units were closely co-operating
3 with members of the SBWS government and the other Serb forces, such as
4 Chetnik volunteers used by the JCE members during the implementation of
5 the JCE. For example, counsel claims that Velepromet was a JNA
6 headquarters under the control of the JNA; that's Monday's transcript at
7 9016. However, as we know, the Velepromet facility was indeed used by
8 Hadzic and his government as the site of the important government meeting
9 held there on the 20th during which the fate of the Ovcara prisoners was
10 decided. This is yet another example of the collaboration between the
11 various JCE actors, Serb forces, and Hadzic's government.
12 We note some ambiguity in the Defence position in respect of
13 Velepromet, and I do wish also to highlight briefly errors in counsel's
14 characterisation of what must be proved in relation to Hadzic's knowledge
15 and intent regarding crimes at Velepromet.
16 In his submissions counsel initially referred to challenging the
17 Velepromet crimes that occurred on 19 November 1991; that's page 8988 of
18 Monday's transcript. However, in the course of the submissions on
19 Velepromet, the Defence referred to the evidence of GH-063. 63 was not
20 present at Velepromet until the 21st of November, after he had been
21 returned from Ovcara on the night of the 20th, spent the night at a place
22 called Modateka and then brought to Velepromet on the 21st where he spent
23 time with others in the room of death and the carpentry workshop, the
24 Stolarija; that's transcript of GH-063, 8670 and -71. So there is
25 somewhat of a disconnect in terms of the time-frame, 19, 20, 21,
1 involving the crimes at Velepromet and precisely what the Defence is
3 Counsel's also mis-characterised the law, in our view, again in
4 terms of what is required to prove Hadzic's knowledge and involvement and
5 responsibility for crimes at Velepromet. At page 9016 and 9017 of
6 Monday's hearing, my learned friend says, I'm quoting:
7 "There has to be evidence that he knows, starting with knowledge,
8 there has to be knowledge that these crimes are taking place or will take
9 place. He," referring to Hadzic, "has to have at least an awareness that
10 that's going to occur; and if he doesn't, then there cannot be liability
11 for those crimes."
12 We would just simply refer the Chamber to our earlier submissions
13 on the knowledge requirement in respect of Hadzic's liability for these
14 crimes as a member of the joint criminal enterprise, particularly the
15 Krajisnik Appeals Chamber judgement at paragraph 200 in which the
16 Appeals Chamber stated the Trial Chamber had correctly identified the
17 required mens rea for the first form of JCE, explaining that it must be
18 shown that the JCE participants, including the accused, had a common
19 state of mind; namely, the state of mind that the statutory crimes
20 forming part of the JCE objective should be carried out.
21 So we do not have to prove Hadzic's knowledge of the specific
22 incidents, as was asserted by my learned friend on Monday, for every
23 beating, every murder, every incident that occurred at Velepromet during
24 the 19th, the 20th, or the 21st.
25 In our submissions we will address the composition of the Serb
1 forces that were at the Velepromet facility during the three-day period
2 of 19 to 21 November, which is the period that corresponds to
3 paragraph 31 of the indictment, as set out in annex 1.
4 There is no dispute that Hadzic was present at Velepromet on the
5 20th. However, Mr. President, Your Honours, it's the Prosecution
6 position that because the crimes committed at Velepromet were all linked
7 to co-JCE members of Hadzic, his presence or not at Velepromet at the
8 moment that any given crime was committed is not decisive in respect of
9 his criminal liability.
10 Your Honours have heard evidence that non-Serbs were detained at
11 Velepromet from early November 1991 under the control of the JNA,
12 Exhibit P2285.2284, which is a report drafted by the Guards Motorised
13 Brigade security organ.
14 Your Honours have also heard from victims and survivors that
15 non-Serbs were detained at Velepromet following the fall of Vukovar on
16 the 18th of November, 1991. They testified before the Chamber that the
17 guards at Velepromet were members of the Vukovar TO. Referring here to
18 P2506, transcript 4008-4013, 4035-36. That on the 19th of November there
19 were paramilitaries wearing all sorts of clothing. Also Covic, P067.1,
20 transcript 3441.3443, referring to a member of the Territorial Defence
21 and members of the Territorial Defence at Velepromet being in charge.
22 GH-054 stated that he was taken to Velepromet on the
23 21st of November and was searched by a soldier and reservist. He noted
24 that three prisoners were taken away by paramilitaries and never
25 returned. That's P02032, paragraphs 44-45.
1 In the submissions on Monday, counsel referred to the evidence of
2 GH-063, Mr. Karlovic. He was quoted -- Karlovic was quoted by the
3 Defence at page 9016 of Monday's hearing, stating that "the JNA military
4 police was in charge of guarding us," that statement being attributed to
5 Karlovic. That's referring to page 8674 of Karlovic's trial testimony.
6 However, the Defence failed to provide Your Honours with the remainder of
7 Karlovic's evidence on that point. He said, and it's on the same
8 page, 8674:
9 "There is no procedure. The JNA military police was in charge of
10 guarding us. However, the Chetniks had no problem entering the two rooms
11 we were in and taking people out. Quite simply, the JNA military police,
12 in co-operation with the Chetniks, had organised for those people to be
13 taken out and killed."
14 So it's our position, Mr. President, the evidence supports that
15 both components, volunteers as well as JNA, were working together or
16 certainly facilitating the activities of each other at Velepromet.
17 Members of the Guards Brigade Motorised Brigade security organ,
18 the Guards Motorised Brigade military police, and members of the
19 Territorial Defence were present at Velepromet on the 19th of November;
20 that is, P02284, paragraphs 51, 56; also transcript 6390.
21 In front of the hangars where the detainees were held, there were
22 two sets of guards, JNA military police, and Chetniks. This is P02284,
23 paragraph 58-59.
24 During a visit by the international diplomat and negotiator
25 Herbert Okun, who was part of the delegation of Cyrus Vance, a visit to
1 Vukovar on the 19th of November, 1991, more specifically at the reception
2 centre there, it was noted that the centre was full of JNA and other
3 rough customers, armed irregulars, and others. According to Okun there
4 was an air of brooding and imminent menace conveyed by Chetnik-types.
5 The JNA and irregular forces were intermingled and smoking cigarettes
7 P1332.1325, page 33; P1325, transcript 16917 and 16919, that's
8 Okun's 92 quater statement I'm referring to.
9 GH-054 testified that a JNA captain came on the 21st of November,
10 took him to the room of death. The captain said that they were all in
11 danger of getting killed that night. This is 2032, paragraph 46.
12 The room of death that the Chamber's heard a lot of evidence
13 about P02056.1, transcript 5923-5924.
14 Witness 54 gave evidence, I'm going to refer to at transcript
15 5498 and also P2038, regarding the identities of various victims who were
16 in the room of death, among whom was Tihomir Perkovic, who was killed;
17 that's at GH-063's evidence at trial transcript 8675.
18 8676, GH-063, Karlovic, tells his own story about when the
19 Chetniks came into the room and took the 14-year-old boy, had him remove
20 his clothes before taking him out and killing him.
21 The JNA leadership in Vukovar, including Mrksic and Sljivancanin,
22 were aware of the beatings and killings occurring at Velepromet on the
23 night of the 19th of November, 1991. That's agreed fact or possibly
24 adjudicated fact, I should say, adjudicated fact 157. Also P2284,
25 paragraph 81-83.
1 That night, Sljivancanin told members of the security
3 "Don't be surprised if Chetniks are slaughtering Ustashas there."
4 That's 2284, paragraph 49-50; trial transcript 6353.
5 So on the basis of all this, Mr. President, it's our position
6 then that the JNA, being in charge of the Velepromet, the evidence
7 indicating that JNA personnel were guarding prisoners and yet at the same
8 time making the prisoners available to Chetniks for purposes of beatings
9 and murders, these are linked through to JCE membership, the JCE
10 membership on the one hand and the Chetnik volunteers through to Seselj's
11 Serbian Radical Party on the other, committing crimes which are within
12 the intended scope of the JCE of which Hadzic is a member.
13 I'd like to just spend my last few minutes directing the
14 Chamber's attention to some pieces of evidence which relate to Hadzic's
15 authorities and his role, contribution, in respect of some of the other
16 JCE actors whose crimes were taking place throughout the SBWS region.
17 As we said in our legal submissions, it's not necessary to prove
18 that Hadzic contributed in some direct way to each criminal incident.
19 What is required is his proof of a significant contribution to the common
20 criminal purpose. Hadzic used his powers and authorities as
21 prime minister of the SBWS government and the support he received from
22 the Serbian leadership in Belgrade to contribute to the common criminal
23 purpose, which encompassed the crimes in this case including the specific
24 incidents alleged challenged by counsel in their 98 bis submissions.
25 As prime minister, according to GH-016, Hadzic possessed the
1 powers typical exercised by prime ministers from around the world, but
2 the powers were augmented due to the state of immediate threat of war in
3 SBWS. That's transcript 1106-1108, and 1236.
4 Witnesses universally testified that Hadzic was in command of the
5 Serbian National Security unit, SNB, that was led by Stevo Bogic. For
6 example, P1040, paragraphs 37-39 and 41; transcript 2825-2826; P140,
7 paragraphs 94-95; P111, paragraphs 79 and 80; P246, which is a 92 ter
8 statement, the transcript reference there 15201; and P201.140.
9 Hadzic selected members of his SBWS government, that's GH-016,
10 P140, paragraph 20. He proposed presidents of the municipal councils who
11 were approved by his government, P197.140, including the -- Mr. -- the
12 appointment of Mr. Borislav Zivanovic to be president of the
13 Beli Manastir Executive Council. The Chamber may recall that it was
14 Zivanovic and the Beli Manastir authorities which had passed a number of
15 highly discriminatory pieces of legislation against non-Serbs residing in
16 the Beli Manastir region during the latter part of 1991, referring here
17 to P2157, 2158, 2160.
18 The effects of the discriminatory legislation were described at
19 transcript 5827-37.
20 We know that Hadzic used his position and support to obtain
21 needed equipment, manpower, and materials for the Serb forces that were
22 conducting the crimes on the ground in the SBWS. Witness Djordjevic gave
23 evidence of the trip that Hadzic and Arkan made to Belgrade in
24 November of 1991, in which they met at the Serbian Ministry of Defence
25 with Djordjevic who was acting on the co-ordination group of the
1 Ministry of Defence. Hadzic requested 30- or 40.000 grenades. He was
2 provided a smaller quantity of grenades for a different weapon. That's
3 P2300, paragraph 71.
4 Hadzic ordered that the Erdut training centre expenses be covered
5 out of the funds of the DP Dalj agricultural enterprise, the place where
6 Arkan was based. Pursuant to Hadzic's order, Arkan's training centre was
7 financed by DP Dalj. P215.140 and P214.140.
8 Hadzic had command over the SAO SBWS police and he exercised his
9 authority to appoint and dismiss members of the police, P111,
10 paragraphs 29-34; transcript 881, 884, 972 and 975.
11 My colleague, Ms. Clanton, will address further issues regarding
12 the SBWS police and Mr. Hadzic's relationship with it. As prime
13 minister, Hadzic was Commander-in-Chief of the SBWS TO, T 1218, T 8283,
14 8292-93, 8378-8380; P1327, transcript of which is 17119-120; and P2913.1,
15 paragraphs 98-99. That's the authority supporting that Hadzic was the
16 Commander-in-Chief of the SBWS TO. Hadzic appointed Radovan Stojicic,
17 Badza, as commander of the SBWS TO, P140, paragraph 48; transcript
18 page 2645-2649.
19 Witness Djordjevic of the Serbian Ministry of Defence gave
20 evidence that as Croatia withdrew from the SFRY, presidents of the SAOs
21 in Croatia filled the void that would have been otherwise filled by the
22 president of the republic in respect of the TOs. He says at P2300,
23 paragraph 8:
24 "Presidents of the SAOs with their assemblies and structures
25 became responsible under the law for organising and equipping the TOs in
1 their territories."
2 This means that for the SAO SBWS, it was Hadzic who was
3 responsible for organising and equipping the SBWS Territorial Defence.
4 We know that Badza, Stojicic, whom Hadzic appointed, was a
5 high-level government of the MUP, Ministry of the Interior, of Serbia;
6 and that once he arrived in the SBWS Stojicic attended meetings of
7 Hadzic's SBWS government. P2913, paragraph 100; see also L38, page 3;
8 and P197.140.
9 One witness said that Hadzic and Stojicic regularly attended
10 meetings together approximately every few days, P246, transcript 15186.
11 GH-027 testified that Hadzic resisted taking on active-duty JNA
12 officers as commanders of the SBWS TO. And as a result, no senior
13 active-duty JNA officers were appointed as commanders of TO staffs in the
14 SBWS. Instead, the SBWS TO officers were local taxi-drivers and
15 labourers, and this was one of the ways in which Hadzic maintained
16 control over what he referred to as "their" TO. That's P2913.1,
17 paragraphs 98-99; transcript 8161-62; P2959.2913.
18 That evidence is consistent with the evidence of GH-068 -- excuse
19 me, GH-168, a witness who counsel spent quite a bit of time attempting to
20 discredit in his submissions on Monday. On this point, GH-168's
21 testimony is completely consistent with the testimony not only that I've
22 just cited, but also to the testimony of Djordjevic of the Serbian
23 Ministry of Defence.
24 168 testified that the SBWS leadership headed by Hadzic set up TO
25 staffs to assist with the implementation of the plan to create
1 Greater Serbia. He said that Hadzic's government selected staff members
2 and subordinate units on that basis of the membership and loyalty to the
3 SDS and their willingness to carry out any task. That's transcript
4 8282-8284; 8292-93; 8375, 8378-80.
5 Djordjevic, who's co-ordination group was tasked to provide
6 support to the TOs in Croatia, gave evidence that as opposed to the
7 SAO Krajina, in 1991 the SBWS TO had limited dealings with the Serbian
8 Ministry of Defence, again consistent with what's being said by 168 and
9 also GH-027.
10 Djordjevic said that he believed the SBWS TO dealt more closely
11 with the JNA and possibly the Serbian MUP because Stojicic, Badza, was
12 also himself a member of the Serbian MUP. P2300, paragraph 21.
13 Brief few words on the volunteer unit Leva Supoderica and Arkan.
14 P194.140, Hadzic, as SBWS prime minister, exercised his authority in
15 appointing Arkan as commander of the Erdut training centre. P140,
16 paragraphs 98, 100-101; also transcript 1218, 2650-2651.
17 More generally, Witness GH-010 testified that volunteer units
18 arriving in the SBWS placed themselves under the SBWS TO; that's
19 transcript 4813-14; P1739; P1740.
20 Exhibit 1727 indicates -- identifies Leva Supoderica as being one
21 of these units comprised of volunteers from the Serbian Radical Party.
22 They were dispatched from Belgrade. Its commander was Milan Lancuzanin,
23 also known as Kameni. This document, 1727 bears the stamp of the
24 Vukovar TO staff. 2576, dated the 9th of November, 1991, to Kameni was
25 commanding Leva Supoderica personnel as part of the Vukovar operation,
1 receives this letter indicating additional volunteers are being
2 dispatched to be placed "under the protection of the Vukovar TO."
3 P151, on the 21st of January, 1992, Hadzic issued a decision
4 disbanding the Leva Supoderica at the proposal of an assistant commander
5 of the Novi Sad Corps. Hadzic issued the call welcoming volunteers from
6 Serbia to come into the SBWS and to join the Serb forces already engaged
7 there. He enthusiastically thanked them for their support and
8 contribution, P58, transcript 610-612.
9 My last remarks are about the Serbian National Security unit, the
10 SNB, an elite unit that was formed for purposes of providing security to
11 Hadzic. They were based in the Erdut training centre in the government
12 offices. They were led by Stevo Bogic. P1040, paragraphs 54-61, 79;
13 transcript 2895-2896.
14 Bogic reported directly to Hadzic, 1040, paragraph 37, 38.
15 There is a close connection between Bogic and the SNB, their
16 personnel, and members of Arkan's Tigers, some of Arkan's Tigers received
17 the SNB identification cards which enabled them to move throughout the
18 area more freely even beyond the curfew time. P1040, paragraph 58.
19 Members of the SNB acting jointly with some of Arkan's Tigers committed
20 some of the most brutal and cold-blooded murders charged in this case.
21 They also participated in brutal interrogations and torture, taking place
22 with Arkan and Milorad Stricevic in the training centre. Members of
23 Hadzic's SNB arrested and murdered Juliana Pap, Franjo Pap and
24 Natalia Rakin, whose deaths are charged in paragraph 28 and whose bodies
25 were dumped into the well outside Borovo Selo, that the Chamber visited a
1 few months ago.
2 Could I briefly go into closed session or private session,
3 Mr. President.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Private session, please.
5 [Private session]
13 [Open session]
14 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
16 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, unless the Chamber has any
17 questions, that completes my submissions at this point. I propose to
18 give the floor to my colleague, Ms. Clanton, who will continue with our
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Stringer.
21 Ms. Clanton.
22 MS. CLANTON: Good morning, Your Honours, Mr. President.
23 As Mr. Stringer has explained, at the Rule 98 bis stage the
24 question for Your Honours is whether the Prosecution has adduced enough
25 evidence for each count taken as a whole, as opposed to an examination of
1 all of the various charges making up the particular count. The
2 Prosecution submits that it has presented evidence establishing each of
3 the incidents charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.
4 However, since it is unnecessary to establish the sufficiency of the
5 evidence for every incident at this stage, our next submissions will
6 focus on particular crimes and events that illustrate that the
7 Prosecution's evidence is indeed capable of sustaining a conviction for
8 every count of the indictment.
9 I would like to begin with the detention and murders that took
10 place in the Dalj police buildings. These crimes fall under Counts 1
11 through 9 of the indictment.
12 The Chamber has heard evidence about the murders of at least 39
13 people in Dalj over the course of a two-week period in September and
14 October of 1991. These crimes shocked the community and further
15 intimidated the remaining non-Serb population of Dalj and the surrounding
16 villages. As shocking as they were, these killings were not random or
17 isolated incidents. The evidence shows that these crimes were part of
18 the pattern of crimes committed against non-Serbs to force them from the
19 territory and ensure that they would not return.
20 Beginning with paragraph 24, the murder of 11 persons on
21 September 21st, 1991. By the time of this crime, Dalj had already fallen
22 into the hands of Serb forces and was serving as the seat of Hadzic's
23 government. The forceful take-over of Dalj on the 1st of August, 1991,
24 was part of what Hadzic described on the radio as the "decisive attack"
25 on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, which had been planned in
1 July of 1991. T 8291-8292; P2987; transcript page 1284-1285.
2 In September 1991, non-Serb civilians who had been arrested in
3 Baranja were transferred by the SBWS and Serbian police through Serbia to
4 Borovo Selo. They joined other non-Serb civilians who had been arrested
5 from Dalj, Erdut, Aljmas, and the respective hill areas or "planina" of
6 each of those villages. All of the arrests were arbitrary, no criminal
7 reports, detention orders, or other paperwork were provided for the
8 detainees. As the Chamber heard, this transfer of non-Serb detainees
9 from Banja and other parts of the SBWS to Dalj was done pursuant to
10 Hadzic's orders. This included his own assertion when confronted about
11 the status of these people that he was the prime minister and could order
12 that anything be done. That's P111, paragraphs 49-54; transcript
14 Some prisoners from Baranja were then taken to Dalj, where they
15 were first detained at the cultural centre and then to the local
16 co-operative or Zadruga building that was serving as the Dalj police
17 area. While in these Dalj police buildings, the detainees were
18 frequently interrogated and savagely beaten almost every night. In
19 particular, they were beaten and interrogated by Milorad Stricevic and
20 his so-called space police, who were notorious for taking people away,
21 interrogating them, physically mistreating them and liquidating them,
22 P278, paragraphs 9-10; P111, paragraphs 47 and 65. A few days into their
23 imprisonment, Arkan arrived at the facility and swore at the detainees,
24 calling them Ustashas. He was together with Marko Loncarevic, a former
25 policeman who co-ordinated the work of the TO staffs of the SBWS, as well
1 as several men in camouflage uniform, Arkan's men. After introducing
2 himself to the detainees, Arkan, that is, his men beat them severely with
3 iron chairs until the chairs fell apart, P2132, page 7; P2110, page 5.
4 During the night of the 21st to the 22nd of September, Hadzic and
5 Arkan arrived at the police building along with approximately 20 of
6 Arkan's men. After introducing himself to the detainees, Hadzic ordered
7 that two of the men be released to him and left the remaining
8 11 prisoners to Arkan and his men, P250.245; P2132, pages 8-9.
9 The Trial Chamber will recall that Hadzic had earlier attended a
10 meeting with Arkan and journalist Aernout van Lynden in Belgrade, during
11 which Arkan openly stated that he took no prisoners and told van Lynden
12 that he would not be able to film if he killed prisoners. This is a
13 statement that Arkan publicly repeated throughout the international
14 media, transcript page 7029; P102. It therefore could not have come as a
15 surprise to Hadzic or to anyone else that the 11 detainees were executed
16 by Arkan and his men after they were removed from the Dalj police
17 station. Hadzic's responsibility for this incident did not cease at the
18 time that the non-Serbs whom he brought to Dalj were killed. He is
19 further responsible for covering up this crime and preventing an
21 Mr. President, if we could go into private session, please.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Private session, please.
23 [Private session]
11 Page 9082 redacted. Private session.
4 [Open session]
5 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
7 MS. CLANTON: Approximately two weeks after the murder of 11
8 persons, at least 28 prisoners detained in the Dalj police station were
9 killed by Milorad Stricevic, Arkan, and their men. This incident appears
10 at paragraph 25 of the indictment. As with the previous 11 victims, many
11 of the 28 victims had been brought from Baranja, P111, paragraph 62.
12 There is evidence before this Chamber that during the first week
13 of October 1991, Hadzic knew that the non-Serb prisoners were being held
14 in the Dalj police buildings. Indeed, Hadzic and Arkan were seen talking
15 in front of the detention facility in the days immediately before the
16 killing of the prisoners, P278, paragraph 11.
17 On the evening of the 4th of October, 1991, Arkan, Stricevic, and
18 20 of Arkan's men arrived at the station. For several hours in the early
19 morning, the prisoners were beaten and then most were killed. A few
20 prisoners were kept alive in order to load the bodies onto a truck which
21 drove them to the river's edge. There the remaining prisoners were
22 executed and all of the bodies were dumped in the river. Upon learning
23 of this crime the next day, the Dalj police leadership conducted a
24 preliminary inquiry and reported the incident of the SBWS police chain of
25 command. This is P112.111; P111, paragraphs 65-72; P1140.1, page 4;
1 P1141.1, transcript page 4166.
2 These killings were known throughout Dalj within a day or so
3 after they took place. Civilian medical staff were asked to retrieve
4 four or five bodies that were stuck in the rocks as the water-level had
5 dropped. Blood was visible on these rocks. Bodies were seen floating in
6 the river, P104; P253, paragraph 82.
7 The townspeople of Dalj kept reporting this information to the
8 police. Around the 10th of October, 1991, Arkan made a speech in the
9 Dalj market square in front of hundreds of persons, including
10 representatives of the JNA, the SBWS government, and SBWS TO and police
11 officials, acknowledging that he had killed the prisoners and stating
12 that no one could do anything to him. He announced that his philosophy
13 was "a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye." This was widely known
14 in the community. T 1543, 1546-1549; P111, paragraphs 68, 75-76.
15 This all occurred while Hadzic maintained his government offices
16 less than a kilometre from the crime scene and a couple hundred metres
17 from the Dalj market square, transcript page 769-787. Despite the uproar
18 in Dalj and the actions taken by the police in this instance, no actions
19 were taken to punish the perpetrators.
20 The same Serb forces who murdered the detainees in late September
21 and early October participated in forcing the remaining non-Serbs of Dalj
22 from their homes and they plundered their property. This pertains to
23 Counts 10 through 14 of the indictment. I have just one example. In
24 October 1991, the same month as the killing of the 28 prisoners,
25 remaining Croats in Dalj were gathered in busses and expelled. GH-169
1 explained that the expulsions of the Croats from Dalj were organised and
2 were similar to the expulsions that took place in other towns such as
3 Vukovar, transcript 8793-8797. He also testified that this happened
4 again and again.
5 Buildings of religious significance to the Croat community, such
6 as the Catholic church in Dalj, were mined and destroyed by Arkan's men,
7 transcript 8735-8736.
8 The mistreatment I've described, that is, the mistreatment of the
9 non-Serb civilian inhabitants of Dalj and surrounding areas, is
10 consistent with the widespread expulsions, deportation, imprisonments,
11 torture, wanton destruction, plunder, and persecution inflicted on the
12 non-Serb residents of many towns in the SBWS and throughout what would
13 later become the RSK in 1991 and 1993. This mistreatment featured
14 prominently as well in the nearby town of Erdut where Arkan established
15 his training centre.
16 Mr. Stringer has already spoken today about the contributions of
17 the accused to the JCE, including his role in assigning the Erdut
18 training centre to Arkan, who became its commander. Now I will briefly
19 speak about the violent crimes and the environment of fear that
20 characterised Arkan and his training centre and the concordance between
21 the functions of the training centre and the counts in the indictment --
22 THE INTERPRETER: The counsel is kindly asked to slow down for
23 the purposes of interpretation. Thank you.
24 MS. CLANTON: I apologise. The Concordance between the functions
25 of the training centre and the counts in the indictment, including but
1 not limited to Counts 3-9.
2 The Erdut training centre was the epicentre of the activities of
3 Arkan and his men. They lived there, they ate there, and they trained
4 there. The facility was also next to that used by Hadzic, for the
5 government and for Hadzic's personal security service, the SNB. When not
6 travelling to Serbia, Hadzic would spend the night at the training
7 centre, transcript page 2705-2706.
8 The installation by Hadzic of Arkan and his men at the training
9 centre served several purposes. First and foremost, this facility was
10 used to further the campaign of removing non-Serbs from Slavonia and
11 surrounding areas. The men who were trained at the centre, like Arkan
12 himself, were known criminal and they lived up to their reputation. I
13 refer the Chamber to P2916. At the training centre, they imprisoned,
14 mistreated, tortured, and murdered non-Serbs. The non-Serbs were
15 detained in poor conditions, including what had been the public
16 restrooms. Their space by 4 by 4 metres, and was damp, dark, and cold.
17 They were provided no bedding and were unable to sleep. They were
18 repeatedly taken to Milorad Stricevic for interrogation and many came
19 back badly beaten. They were removed in the middle of the night from
20 their cell, lined up against a wall, and then subjected to a mock
21 execution. During the nights, members of Arkan's men took prisoners from
22 the room. Shortly thereafter, the prisoners remaining heard gun-shots
23 and the people who were taken were never seen again. This continued
24 until a room holding 28 men contained only two. Transcript page 2686,
25 2701-2703; 2207-2214, 2227.
1 Arkan's men targeted the remaining Croat male population of Erdut
2 and surrounding villages. Many of these men had been forced to labour,
3 that is, as forced labourers in the months before they were taken from
4 their homes and ultimately brought to the training centre and killed.
5 But they did not target only men. The Chamber has heard evidence that
6 non-Serb women were also detained and mistreated at the centre. The
7 prisoners included a woman of 65 years who was kept in a robe and
8 slippers, P2039; transcript 2702.
9 Arkan's men, working with Milorad Stricevic and Erdut local
10 police, including Bozo Bolic, decimated the ethnic Hungarian population
11 of the Planina region of Dalj, Erdut, and Aljmas. All the men of several
12 families were taken and killed. The wives of the victims were told by
13 Bolic that their husbands and their fathers were in Arkan's hands and
14 that they should not try to go see them. Ominously, they were told that
15 their husbands and fathers would not be requiring medication or warm
16 coats anymore. The training centre employees testified that the
17 Hungarians were kept in detention at the training centre where they were
18 forced to sing the Serb national anthem. The Hungarians were taken away.
19 Transcript 2174-2176, 2193, 2701.
20 By November 1991, it was public knowledge in the eastern Slavonia
21 region that prisoners taken to the Erdut training centre never returned,
22 transcript page 2208.
23 The Erdut training centre served to support the widespread
24 commission of crimes against civilians with the purpose of creating a
25 state without non-Serbs. It is important to emphasise that the training
1 centre itself and the forces located there facilitated the removal of the
2 non-Serb population in another way: Through sheer intimidation. Even
3 those who were not detained at the centre feared for their lives and knew
4 that anyone could be taken at any time. The behaviour and reputation of
5 Arkan's men was such that their daily activities spread fear. The
6 Chamber has seen video of his men singing songs with lyrics such as: We
7 will crush the Ustasha, we will kill them all. The Chamber has heard
8 evidence that Arkan was relied on by other JCE members to operate in the
9 field, engaging in retribution and intimidation, which was designed to
10 rid the area of non-Serbs, P129; P331, paragraphs 11-12; transcript page
11 8282-8283, and 8295-8297.
12 Your Honours, the crimes I've just described that were committed
13 in Dalj and Erdut, part of eastern Slavonia, they did not take place in
14 isolation. The crimes in Slavonia in 1991 were part of the plan that was
15 executed in the entire territory of the SBWS. The Prosecution has shown
16 that the crimes that were committed and charged in the indictment all
17 took place in the context of the execution of the common criminal plan to
18 expel non-Serbs. As we have stated several times, consideration of
19 individual incidents is inappropriate for Rule 98 bis. However, the sake
20 of assisting Your Honours, I will now discuss the mistakes in counsel's
21 submissions about -- submissions on Monday concerning the testimony of
22 GH-012; then I will discuss the evidence showing the single JCE and the
23 links between bodies in Western Srem and the government; finally, I'll
24 turn to the remaining crime bases identified by Defence counsel, Opatovac
25 and Lovas.
1 On Monday, counsel suggested, page 8971, that the accused is not
2 responsible for certain crimes committed in the area of what was
3 described as OG South. In particular, counsel suggested that the
4 testimony of GH-012, Dusan Jaksic, proves that there were no links
5 between the SBWS government and the TO units and TO staffs located in
6 Vukovar and in Western Srem. Jaksic's testimony does not support this
7 claim. Further, the recitation of his evidence of counsel was selective
8 and ignores the totality of the evidence of the relationship between the
9 accused and events that occurred south of the Vuka river.
10 Counsel's interpretation of Jaksic's evidence is highly strained.
11 Counsel conflated the concepts of TO units and TO staffs. While TO units
12 could and were resubordinated to OG South and Colonel Mrksic during
13 combat, the TO staffs themselves were not. Transcript page 7063-7064,
14 7109-7110. This is part of Jaksic's testimony and I refer the Chamber to
15 that in particular related to his description of the political functions
16 and the position of commanders of the TO staff. In this context,
17 Your Honours, Jaksic's testimony that the TO staffs were civilian
18 political institutions that reported to the Ministry of Defence is
19 entirely consistent with his evidence that the Petrova Gora TO unit was
20 resubordinated to OG South. In fact, Jaksic testified that he was
21 appointed TO Staff Commander for the OG South area, not by the JNA, but
22 rather at a meeting of village TO staff commanders held in Oriolik.
23 Transcript page 7063-7064, 7109.
24 Other witness evidence presented in this trial also supports that
25 the various local TO staffs within the SAO SBWS remained under civilian
1 control, even when their TO units were temporarily resubordinated to the
2 JNA for combat operations. Transcript page 8283-8293; P140,
3 paragraphs 40-41.
4 The Chamber has also received into evidence documents that
5 establish that the TO staffs in Vukovar and Western Srem were operating
6 under the SBWS government, in co-operation with the JNA. The following
7 are exhibits that show these links: P1727, is dated
8 18th of October, 1991, a document of the SBWS TO, issued by Dusan
9 Filipovic in Sid that legalised the Leva Supoderica detachment as part of
10 the Vukovar TO.
11 D6, D6 is the minutes of a 30th of October, 1991, meeting in
12 Lovas that was attended by TO staff and village representatives of, among
13 other villages, Lovas, Opatovac, Sotin, and Tovarnik. The minutes show
14 that the meeting was also attended by several members of the SBWS
15 government, including Mladen Hadzic, Ilija Petrovic, Stevo Bogic,
16 Borislav Bogunovic, and Vojin Susa. Radovan Stojicic, Badza, is listed
17 as attending as the SBWS TO commander. Mladen Hadzic chaired this
18 meeting and during the meeting he explained how the SBWS government "is
19 constantly working in this field" and that they had launched many
20 "drives, actions, and tasks." Stevo Bogic insisted that it was the duty
21 of the village representatives to inform the government of events.
22 Ljuban Devetak of Lovas asked the SBWS government to recommend "the
23 organisation of power in local communes ... the government must issue
24 decrees about how we should get organised." The minutes of this meeting
25 show the ability of the government to operate in the Western Srem area
1 prior to the fall of Vukovar.
2 P2979, this exhibit is the minutes of a 3rd of November, 1991,
3 meeting also held in Lovas attended by TO staff and village
4 representatives of the towns or villages of Opatovac, Mahovo, Lovas,
5 Tovarnik, Sotin, and Vukovar. On this occasion, the meeting was led by
6 Slobodan Grahovac, who was listed in the minutes as the deputy minister
7 of the Serbian district of the SBWS. It was attended as well by Dusan
8 Filipovic, a member of the SBWS TO staff. This evidence about the
9 positions that were held by Grahovac and Filipovic is consistent with the
10 testimony of witnesses before this Chamber, including Goran Stoparic, who
11 stated that Grahovac was linked to the government and was described as a
12 minister and the testimony of Borivoje Savic who said that Filipovic was
13 the commander of the TO staff. I would refer the Chamber to P50,
14 paragraph 205, and transcript page 4714, 4773-4774. The agenda of the
15 meeting was the current problems of the Territorial Defence staffs in the
16 liberated places. At the end of the meeting, the participants
17 unanimously arrived at the following conclusions, and there are three
18 that I want to share:
19 First, to establish units and TO staffs in the liberated places
20 "in accordance with the instructions and tables which the competent
21 organs of the government worked out and sent out."
22 Second, based on the organisation worked out per the previous
23 item, to step up co-operation and co-ordination with the JNA.
24 And third, that "existing and obvious problems have to be
25 continuously resolved in co-operation with the government of this
1 district and the relevant military command, such as the mop-up of the
2 village and surrounding areas, freedom of movement, et cetera."
3 General Vasiljevic testified about these minutes. He stated that
4 the use of the term "co-operation" between the TO staffs and the JNA
5 shows that:
6 " These are activities of two sides that have an approximately
7 equal status. So this is not a relationship between a subordinate and a
8 superior. So that is co-operation in something that is in their common
9 interest, two structures that co-ordinate their activities."
10 Transcript page 8179-8184.
11 For all of the reasons noted above, Your Honours, there is ample
12 evidence in the record showing the links between Hadzic, his government,
13 and the TO forces in the areas referred to on Monday as OG South. And
14 I'm mindful of the time, perhaps we should ...
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Ms. Clanton.
16 Court adjourned. We will be back at 12.45.
17 --- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 12.46 p.m.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Ms. Clanton.
20 MS. CLANTON: Thank you, Mr. President.
21 Your Honours, I am now going to discuss why the Defence arguments
22 concerning Opatovac and Lovas also must fail. These towns are in
23 Western Srem and Your Honours have heard evidence that they were taken by
24 Serb forces in October 1991. For the village of Opatovac, the Defence
25 has challenged the charges of imprisonment, torture, inhumane acts, and
1 cruel treatment in Counts 5 through 9. For Lovas, the Defence has also
2 challenged the charges of murder and extermination, Counts 1 through 4.
3 For the village of Opatovac, the Defence pointed to the testimony
4 of two witnesses at transcript page 9021 and 9022 of Monday's transcript.
5 Based on the submissions of counsel, the Prosecution understood
6 that the accused is not challenging the crimes themselves, but rather his
7 responsibility for them. I should add that for now I am intentionally
8 setting aside the quotation used from expert Reynaud Theunens that was
9 provided to Your Honours on the submissions of Lovas and Opatovac. I
10 will return to that issue when we speak about Lovas.
11 With regard to Opatovac at page 9021, counsel listed certain of
12 the evidence about who the perpetrators were and what they did. Then he
13 suggested that there is no evidence that the accused intended these
14 crimes or that the crimes were encompassed through a joint criminal
15 enterprise of which he was a member. This is at page 9022.
16 My colleague, Mr. Stringer, has already discussed the existence
17 of the JCE in which the accused was a member. He has also clarified for
18 Your Honours the correct legal framework, including that the accused need
19 not be aware of all the details of the specific criminal incidents as a
20 JCE member in order to be found responsible.
21 Now, turning to the facts that were presented by counsel, the
22 witness evidence concerning some of the perpetrators in Opatovac is
23 indeed Prosecution evidence of the commission of crimes by members of the
24 JCE and the forces that utilised them. The evidence you heard on Monday
25 shows that units of the JNA and the local Territorial Defence, aided by
1 local Serbs, participated in the crimes in Opatovac. In addition, the
2 Chamber heard evidence during this trial that soldiers from Kragujevac
3 were present in Opatovac, as were paramilitary or Chetnik groups who
4 threatened the population. Transcript page 8626 and 8642.
5 The evidence before Your Honours of the crimes committed in
6 Opatovac mirrors the broader pattern of crimes in Western Srem. I would
7 like to briefly remind you of the evidence that you have heard about the
8 pattern of crimes committed by JCE members or persons utilised by them in
9 Western Srem. For this I will mention the evidence of four witnesses as
10 an illustration.
11 First, the former commander of the police force in Ilok testified
12 that the pattern was as follows: First, the JNA issued tough ultimatums;
13 then it indiscriminately shelled; then its forces entered the towns,
14 followed by reservists and local Serbs. This method caused the
15 inhabitants of the town to flee. When the reservists and local Serbs
16 entered towns, they would abuse villagers physically and psychologically
17 and they would kill some of them. That's at page 3487-3488, P1418 at
18 transcript page 1313.
19 Next, the Chamber also heard evidence that the crimes did not
20 stop at killings and physical and psychological abuse.
21 Witness Tomislav Rukavina, a resident of Bapska, verified that the
22 non-Serbs remaining in Western Srem in early 1992 were then forced to
23 leave. When they left, they confirmed what had happened in their
24 village. After the Serb army subdued the village, the village was left
25 to paramilitaries. These paramilitaries would break into their homes,
1 threaten their lives, force them to sign documents which stated that they
2 were willingly moving to Croatia, strip them of their personal
3 possessions and valuables, and then force them to leave. Transcript
4 page 2130; P327 and P328.
5 Third, Your Honours heard the evidence of James Lubin, a civilian
6 affairs co-ordinator for UNPROFOR in Sector East. He testified that
7 prior to his arrival non-Serbs were mistreated in the manner I've just
8 described consistent with P328. He added to that that the description is
9 incomplete because in some cases the expulsions were happening on a daily
10 and even hourly basis. Mr. Lubin testified that some people were
11 physically beaten and were in a very bad state when they were expelled.
12 He said that they were crying and shaking with fear, obviously terrified
13 for their lives. Transcript page 3196.
14 Finally, Your Honours heard evidence that some non-Serbs from
15 Opatovac and other villages were unable to reach safety when they were
16 expelled from their villages. They were sent to the Sid military prison,
17 to Begejci camp, to Stajicevo farm and the Zrenjanin barracks, P2993,
18 page 6; P2992, page 9. Dr. Mladen Loncar testified that the older women,
19 those who were not of child-bearing age, in the Begejci detention camp
20 were from the towns of Western Srem, including Tovarnik, Ilok, Lovas,
21 Berak, Sarengrad, and Bapska. This is at transcript page 8231.
22 Your Honours, these witnesses, Mr. Rukavina, Mr. Brletic, and
23 Mr. Lubin, all confirmed that persons from Opatovac, non-Serb persons
24 from Opatovac were victimised in this way. This is at transcript
25 page 2130, 3488, and 3196 respectively.
1 The underlying criminal incidents in Opatovac fall squarely
2 within the JCE.
3 Next, Your Honours, I would like to move on to Lovas and address
4 the shortcomings of the Rule 98 bis challenge to the crimes that were
5 committed in Lovas. The argument made by counsel about the Lovas
6 minefield crime which is paragraph 26 of the indictment contains errors
7 that are similar to those in his submissions on Opatovac. In addition,
8 the Defence has challenged the relationship between named members of the
9 Serb authorities in Lovas, such as Ljuban Devetak and the government.
10 The Defence has also challenged whether the accused could be liable for
11 crimes that took place when he was not physically present at the scene of
12 the crime. This is transcript page 9010-9013 of Monday's hearing.
13 As Mr. Stringer has already discussed the errors in legal
14 submissions and has emphasised for Your Honours that there is no
15 requirement for the accused to have knowledge of every incident, that is,
16 every murder that takes place, I will focus my submissions on some of the
17 key evidence which shows the responsibility of the accused for crimes
18 committed in Lovas, also including evidence before Your Honours about the
19 relationship between the authorities in Lovas and JCE members. This
20 forms part of Counts 2 through 9.
21 Inhabitants of Lovas were not the only persons who were present
22 during the attack that began on the 10th of October. Some of the people
23 in Lovas on that day had come to Lovas after fleeing neighbouring towns
24 that had already been attacked, such as Tovarnik, Ilaca, and Berak,
25 transcript page 1653 to 1654. The pattern of crimes that I have just
1 discussed and the submissions on Opatovac feature prominently in the
2 attack on Lovas. Your Honours have heard evidence of negotiations that
3 did not succeed, an ultimatum, then shelling, including of religious
4 buildings, followed by an attack, including killings, before the ultimate
5 take-over of the town. The take-over occasioned forced labour, unlawful
6 detention, and additional crimes such as the murder and torture of
7 non-Serbs. Witness Zeljko Cirba testified that after the village was
8 taken over, all villagers of Croatian nationality and non-Serbs had to
9 report for interrogations and they were sometimes detained for days at a
10 time. Croats and non-Serbs were obliged to wear a white ribbon on their
11 sleeve marking their ethnic origin and constantly taken for interrogation
12 and mistreatment. They were also subject to the work detail. This is at
13 P288, paragraph 27.
14 The killing in the minefield was perpetrated by members of the
15 Valjevo TO detachment from Serbia and the Dusan Silni. The Dusan Silni,
16 a unit led by Devetak, was active in the Western Srem area and consisted
17 of men from the Stara Pazova area who supported Mirko Jovic's
18 Serbian National Renewal Party. They operated in Lovas alongside the TO
19 and the JNA and with the civilian authorities led by Devetak. This is
20 P2913.1, paragraph 80; transcript page 7951; transcript page 1822-1824;
22 The evidence shows that Serb civilian authorities took over Lovas
23 very soon after the attack. Various witnesses have given evidence about
24 these authorities in Lovas. Witness Ivan Mujic described these people,
25 these authorities, in plain language. He said Devetak was the number one
1 person in the village and that Milan Radojcic was his right-hand man.
2 Transcript page 1703-1704. Radojcic was the commander of the Lovas TO,
3 P2979, P300, paragraph 46. General Vasiljevic confirmed that the JNA had
4 no part in the appointment of Ljuban Devetak, transcript page 8180.
5 P2979, which I've already referred to, again this exhibit is the
6 minutes of the meeting on the 3rd of November in Lovas. The attendees
7 were the local civilian leaders, TO commanders, Dusan Filipovic of the
8 SBWS TO staff, and representatives of the government, police, and JNA.
9 During this meeting - this is on page 6 of the English and 6 of the B/C/S
10 of P2979 - Devetak listed the problems in Lovas and stated that:
11 "Our government should urgently get in touch with the JNA and
12 solve all these problems."
13 Now, the positions held by Ljuban Devetak and Milan Radojcic are
14 further explained in a JNA report to the 1st Military District which is
15 dated the 28th of February, 1992. This is Exhibit D51. In this
16 document, on page 4 of the English and of the B/C/S, the JNA reports that
17 Serb refugees from Western Slavonia are moving into the municipalities of
18 Mirkovci and Vukovar. Colonel Novica Gusic, the assistant commander for
19 civilian affairs, stated the following and this is a quote:
20 "Because of distrust and what is happening to the Serbs who
21 remained in Western Slavonia and their property, and with the tacit
22 consent of the government of the SAO Slavonia and the assistance of the
23 prominent members of the government, the so-called co-ordinators and
24 ministers, they are placing a certain pressure on the local inhabitants
25 to make them move out voluntarily. In doing so, they resorted to
1 unlawful means, threats, and even killed some individuals.
2 Characteristic examples of such conduct can be found in the villages of
3 Bapska, Lovas, Sarengrad, and Mahovo, organised by Radojcic from Lovas
4 village, the commander of the Lovas Territorial Defence Staff and
5 co-ordinator for the TO 5th Zone who has behind him a certain
6 Ljuban Devetak, who is very influential in the government of the
7 SAO Slavonia."
8 Your Honours, these excerpts of documents are meant to provide
9 examples of the links between the government, other members of the JCE,
10 and the crimes that were committed in Lovas. This is not an exhaustive
11 list. Witness and documentary evidence show that the crimes in Lovas,
12 including the murders in the minefield, were part of the plan to remove
13 non-Serbs. After the minefield incident, those who survived who were
14 able to leave, had to sign a document turning over their property to the
15 government, that's at transcript page 1822-1826 and 1828. Some of those
16 persons who were put through the minefield were expelled in
17 December of 1991, P1083, paragraphs 58 and 59. Witness Ivan Mujic
18 testified that at least one person who was wounded in the minefield was
19 tortured in a cellar in Lovas in December of 1991 before being forcibly
20 expelled, this is P296, transcript page 1706-1707, and P292.287.
21 Your Honours, turning now to the argument put forth by counsel
22 for Opatovac and Lovas concerning the role of town commands and the
23 testimony of expert Reynaud Theunens. This is at transcript page 9011
24 and 9022 from Monday's hearing.
25 Mr. Theunens' evidence on town commands, as well as that of town
1 commander Colonel Milorad Vojnovic and General Aleksandar Vasiljevic,
2 makes clear that the JNA was not in charge of civilian affairs in the
3 areas mentioned by counsel. Instead, the civil affairs organs of the JNA
4 were co-operating with the civilian authorities in the area, that is, the
5 government and its representatives. I would refer Your Honours to P2943;
6 transcript pages T 5106-5109; P1981, paragraphs 24 and 25; transcript
7 pages 7956 to 7961 and 8169-8170.
8 During this hearing, the Prosecution will not address every
9 single factual misrepresentation or inaccuracy from the presentation we
10 heard on Monday. One in particular, however, relates to the
11 mis-characterisation of Mr. Theunens' evidence. Counsel parsed a
12 20-plus-page exchange that took place during Mr. Theunens' testimony and
13 claimed that Mr. Theunens testified that the civilian authorities did not
14 have authority over civilian affairs. This discussion starts on
15 transcript page 4572. In fact, Mr. Theunens testified that there were
16 consultations and co-ordination between the town command and the SAO SBWS
17 authorities. This is at transcript page 4575.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please continue, Ms. Clanton.
19 MS. CLANTON: Thank you.
20 Further, Your Honours, using the specific examples that were put
21 forward by counsel during his cross-examination of Mr. Theunens,
22 Mr. Theunens stated --
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: I hope that this one will be the last one,
24 Ms. Clanton. Please continue.
25 MS. CLANTON: Thank you.
1 I think I should go back a sentence. What I was saying,
2 Your Honours, is that during his cross-examination Mr. Theunens, using
3 the specific examples that Defence counsel put to Mr. Theunens, Theunens
4 stated that the documents indicate that the civilian authorities, that
5 is, the government, had responsibility for most civilian matters. And
6 this is at transcript page 4583-4585.
7 And, Your Honours, this concludes our response to the submissions
8 made by counsel on Monday. For all of the reasons put forward by the
9 Prosecution today, the Chamber should deny the Rule 98 bis motion seeking
10 a judgement of acquittal. Thank you.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Ms. Clanton.
12 This is the end of the Rule 98 bis hearings. Court is adjourned
13 until further notice.
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.09 p.m.