1 Monday, 3 May 2004
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Registrar, could you call
6 the case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honour. Case number
8 IT-01-47-T, Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Could we have the appearances for the Prosecution.
11 MR. WITHOPF: Good afternoon, Mr. President. Good afternoon, Your
12 Honours, good afternoon counsel. For the Prosecution, Daryl Mundis,
13 Ekkehard Withopf, and Ruth Karper. And for the duration of the
14 examination of the military expert our legal intern, Mr. Kyle Wood.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Withopf.
16 And could we have the appearances for the Defence.
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. President. Good
18 day, Your Honours. On behalf of General Hadzihasanovic, Edina Residovic,
19 counsel, Stefane Bourgon, co-counsel, and Muriel Cauvin, our legal
20 assistant. JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good day, Your Honours. On
22 behalf of Mr. Kubura, Rodney Dixon, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and Nermin
23 Mulalic, our legal assistant.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Residovic.
25 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could a correction be made. The
1 legal assistant for the Defence is Muriel Cauvin not Mirna Milanovic,
2 which is what it says in the transcript. Thank you.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. That's quite right. The
4 correction will be made.
5 After the long weekend, the Trial Chamber would like to greet
6 everyone present in the courtroom, members of the Prosecution, and in
7 particular, the Prosecution's assistant who is responsible for military
8 affairs. I would also like to greet Defence counsel, the accused, and all
9 those present in this courtroom, the two new interns, and the
10 interpreters, as well as the security officers.
11 We have an expert witness scheduled for today. He will be
12 testifying over a period of several days. Before we call this expert
13 witness into the courtroom, the Trial Chamber would like to inform the
14 Defence counsel that the Judges, who will have questions, think that this
15 will take at least one hearing. It will certainly be Friday, or perhaps
16 Thursday, if the cross-examination doesn't take as long as expected. So
17 I'd like to encourage the Defence to not use up more time than is
18 allocated to them. Otherwise, the Judges won't have time to ask their
20 If the schedule is adhered to, we'll be able to conclude at the
21 end of the week and the documents that still have to be dealt with,
22 Mr. Bourgon still has four or five documents to deal with, they can be
23 dealt with and Mr. Dixon also has to express his position with regard to
24 the categories of documents he has mentioned. If we can finish with this
25 stage this week it will enable the Trial Chamber to render its decision
1 concerning the documents.
2 Without wasting any more time, I will now ask the usher to call
3 the witness, unless Mr. Dixon has something he would like to say perhaps.
4 He won't be addressing the issue of categories after all.
5 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honour. There's just one matter I
6 wish to raise on behalf of both Defence counsel and that follows on from
7 what Your Honour has mentioned about the methodology of examining the
8 expert witness. It is our understanding, and I've spoken to my learned
9 friend from the Prosecution about this, that no documents will in fact be
10 tendered through this witness when he gives his evidence in chief. He
11 will have the documents available for him to refer to, but there will be
12 no application to tender any of those documents into evidence.
13 I am advised by my learned friends that the examination-in-chief
14 will be very brief, probably no longer than about an hour and a half to
15 two hours. Your Honours will recall I did raise some concern about this
16 matter a while ago, and Your Honours were absolutely correct. It's not
17 for Defence to indicate how the Prosecution should examine in chief.
18 However, there is one matter that we would seek Your Honours' guidance on
19 and that is that the re-examination of the witness after we've
20 cross-examined should not become an examination-in-chief. If the
21 Prosecution elects now to keep it very brief and the Defence then
22 cross-examines, the usual rules should apply, that they can only
23 re-examine on those matters that are raised by the Defence, and in
24 particular, only refer to documents that are either referred to by the
25 General in his examination-in-chief or that the Defence raises in
1 cross-examination. But not reintroduce a whole range of new documents
2 right at the end, when the Defence won't have an opportunity to
3 cross-examine thereafter.
4 I think that is acceptable to my learned friends, having spoken to
5 them earlier, but we were just somewhat concerned that if the
6 examination-in-chief was very brief, that the opportunities shouldn't then
7 be taken at the end to open up many new issues when the cross-examination
8 would have been completed already.
9 Your Honour, that's the only matter we wish to raise about the
10 method in which the examination will take place.
11 Thank you, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Just a minute, Mr. Mundis.
13 I will let you take the floor in a minute to respond. The Trial Chamber
14 usually summarises what has been said, for the following reason: As the
15 proceedings are relayed to the outside, those following the proceedings
16 might not be in a position to understand the meaning of something that is
17 being said, given that what is being said might refer to previous hearings
18 and the person following the proceedings on the outside might be perplexed
19 and uncertain of what is happening. So for pedagogical reasons, the Trial
20 Chamber has been attempting to summarise in general terms what is being
21 said, and it's true that the Defence, generally speaking, has already
22 raised this issue. They did so a few days ago. The issue is the
23 following one: The Prosecution told us that it reserved the right to have
24 one and a half hours or two hours to conduct its examination-in-chief.
25 And the Defence told us that they would need a number of days to
1 cross-examine the witness. This was accepted by the Trial Chamber. Given
2 that these days should take up about 50 per cent more than the time taken
3 by the Prosecution. If the Prosecution takes two hours, then the Defence
4 would only have the right to have three hours. But given the importance
5 of the testimony that we will be hearing, it would be appropriate for the
6 Defence to be in a position to ask all questions that are useful within
7 the framework of these adversarial proceedings. That is why we have
8 planned to question the witness for a few days. But the Defence was
9 concerned about the issue of the Prosecution re-examining the witness, and
10 the Defence has mentioned two problems in relation to this matter.
11 When re-examining the witness, will the Prosecution be tendering
12 documents into evidence, and within the framework of their re-examination,
13 will the Prosecution be dealing with issues that weren't raised in the
14 course of the examination-in-chief? In theory, additional questions, by
15 definition, are questions that have to do with the cross-examination,
16 because if the examination-in-chief has been properly conducted, there is
17 no need for additional questions. Because all this has been addressed or
18 should have been addressed in the course of the examination-in-chief. If
19 there are any other additional questions, it means that after the
20 cross-examination, there are new issues, new questions, which make it
21 necessary for the Prosecution to ask the witness more questions. It is
22 within this framework that additional questions are asked.
23 This was the position expressed by the Defence, a position we have
24 just summarised with regard to additional questions.
25 Can the Prosecution now inform us of its position as far as their
1 view of additional questions are concerned.
2 Mr. Mundis, you may take the floor.
3 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon to Your
4 Honours, counsel, and everyone in and around the courtroom.
5 Let me briefly respond to the comments of my learned colleague
6 Mr. Dixon. Mr. President, the Prosecution has at this time no intention
7 of conducting a lengthy re-examination of the witness. Again, as long as
8 we remain within the general confines of examination and
9 cross-examination, then certainly the re-examination would follow only
10 from those areas of cross-examination that the Prosecution might feel a
11 need to clear up for the benefit of the Trial Chamber.
12 Of course, with an expert witness, it's a slightly different
13 scenario in that the expert has filed and provided to Your Honours an
14 expert report or statement. The Prosecution, as I will explain in just a
15 moment, will not be necessarily leading or adducing evidence as to each
16 and every paragraph contained in that statement, but will primarily for
17 the benefit of the Trial Chamber and the public at large, adduce evidence
18 from this expert report in a bullet-type format, if you will, to explain
19 the salient portions of that report for the benefit of Your Honours and
20 the public. Of course, at the end of the examination-in-chief of the
21 witness, the Prosecution will tender into evidence the full expert report,
22 and of course the Defence will be entitled to cross-examine, not only on
23 the oral testimony of the expert but upon his methodology and in fact on
24 all of the conclusions he reaches in his report.
25 If I may, Your Honour, I would like to explain very briefly,
1 because I'm quite aware of the tick tock of the clock, how the Prosecution
2 is planning on proceeding this afternoon. I do not anticipate that the
3 direct examination will take longer than 90 minutes, and in fact I will be
4 endeavouring to complete the examination at or about the time of our first
6 For obvious reasons, the expert will have -- or we would propose
7 that he be allowed to have his expert statement in front of him as he
8 testifies. We also would ask the Trial Chamber to allow the expert to
9 have those documents which he has referred to in his footnotes in front of
10 him and accessible to him. The witness will testify as to the extremely
11 large amount of material that he was provided with in order to compile his
12 report. General Reinhardt has in fact collated that material and
13 currently has all of the documents to which he cites in his footnotes
14 assembled into two arch-lever binders which he has then tabbed by footnote
15 number. The Prosecution would submit, Your Honours, that it would be a
16 means of saving vast amounts of time for him to have before him, or
17 accessible to him, those two binders with the documents he has cited to,
18 so that he can quickly refer back to the documents in order to answer any
19 questions put to him by any of the parties or by Your Honours.
20 While it is true, as Mr. Dixon has said, the Prosecution will not
21 tender documents through the witness, it is equally true that the
22 Prosecution in its direct examination does not intend on asking or showing
23 the expert witness specific documents. However, we anticipate in
24 responding to questions, such as: How, sir, did you reach that
25 conclusion? That the expert will have recourse to the documents that he
1 cites to and should then be given the opportunity, if need be, to flip to
2 those documents in order to highlight a point or to read out a particular
3 passage that supports the conclusions he reached in his report.
4 So again, Mr. President, with the leave of the Chamber, we would
5 propose that the expert have available to him at the witness bench both
6 his statement, or expert report, and the binders that he has with him
7 containing the documents which he cites to in the footnotes of that
8 report. The Prosecution will then take the expert relatively briefly
9 through the various conclusions that he has reached along the lines of the
10 subject headings that are stated in his report. Thank you.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Mundis. You
12 focused on the methodology, but you haven't answered the question that
13 concerns Mr. Dixon, and that is the issue of additional questions. What
14 is your position with regard to additional questions? What you have just
15 said, does that mean that there won't be any additional questions unless
16 new elements arise in the course of the cross-examination?
17 MR. MUNDIS: As Your Honours might appreciate, it's a bit
18 difficult to answer that question in anything other than very general
19 terms. In the event that the Defence remains within the four corners, if
20 you will, of the expert's report, it's not anticipated that we would have
21 a lengthy redirect examination. However, if the Defence were to take a
22 different approach whereby they would use this expert to testify about a
23 large number of issues that are not contained in his report or perhaps to
24 show him a relatively large number of documents which the Prosecution is
25 not aware of or has not seen, then that would be a completely different
2 I will, Mr. President, assure Your Honours and the Defence that it
3 is not our intention in conducting a relatively short direct examination
4 to then use redirect as a means of then adducing several hours of
5 additional testimony for which the Defence would not be perhaps given an
6 opportunity to fully cross-examine the witness. We certainly have no
7 intention of doing that, Mr. President. But again, as Your Honours will
8 appreciate, it's difficult for me to say how long I will take on redirect
9 until the cross-examination is over and we see precisely what areas
10 outside of the expert report the expert has been asked to comment upon.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Mundis. You've
12 been very clear. So we can draw the following conclusions from what you
13 say. There are two issues you addressed. Firstly, the issue of the
14 methodology. As far as this witness is concerned, this witness should
15 have his statement with him and the two binders. Since both the Defence
16 and the Trial Chamber had these, there are footnotes in the statement and
17 as the statement is based on documents, it's necessary for the witness to
18 be able to refer to the documents. So this would make it possible to save
19 a lot of time, because the witness will immediately be able to locate the
20 document that is being discussed at a given point in time. And as a
21 result, it won't be necessary for the Prosecution or the Defence to find
22 the document and show it to the witness. This seems to be the best and
23 most appropriate methodology to follow. As far as Mr. Dixon's concerns
24 are concerned, it seems that you have answered this question.
25 Mr. Dixon, you said that the point of main interest is the
1 statement, just the statement. And additional questions would only be
2 raised if the Defence addresses new issues or refers to new documents. If
3 issues are addressed -- new issues are addressed, issues that aren't
4 contained in the report, then the Prosecution will ask additional
5 questions, and if necessary, they will ask these questions on the basis of
6 the cross-examination. This is what the Prosecution stated.
7 Mr. Dixon, is there anything else you would like to say about the
8 clarifications that Mr. Mundis has provided?
9 MR. DIXON: No, Your Honour. At this stage, not. The main point
10 was to, as Your Honours indicated, to confine the re-examination only to
11 questions that are raised by the Defence that could not have been dealt
12 with in the examination-in-chief on the basis of the statement and the
13 documents that are before General Reinhardt.
14 Thank you, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Dixon.
16 Madam Usher, could you call the witness into the courtroom.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Reinhardt, I would first
19 like to check that you are receiving the interpretation of what I am
20 saying. If you're receiving the English interpretation, because we don't
21 have any German interpretation, please tell me that that is the case.
22 THE WITNESS: This is the case, sir.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You have been called
24 to testify here as an expert witness for the Prosecution, and as a witness
25 for the Prosecution, you should take the solemn declaration. Before you
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 do so, you should tell me your first and last names and your date of birth
2 and place of birth.
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, my name is Klaus Reinhardt. I was born
4 on the 15th of January, 1941 in Berlin Germany.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What position do you hold at the
7 THE WITNESS: I'm just a husband of my wife. I have no additional
8 position right now, sir. I'm a retired general.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. In 1993, ten years
10 ago, what duties did you perform, from January to December 1993?
11 THE WITNESS: In 1993 I was still the commandant of the Commander
12 General Staff College in Hamburg Germany 1993, and then I transferred to
13 Koblenz to become the commanding general of the 3rd German Corps.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Have you already
15 testified before an International Court or is this the first time?
16 THE WITNESS: Sir, I never testified in international or national
17 court. This is my first experience.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could you please
19 read the declaration you have in your hands, the solemn declaration.
20 WITNESS: KLAUS REINHARDT
21 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
22 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. You may sit down.
24 As I have already said, you have been called here as an expert
25 witness for the Prosecution. Before the Prosecution takes the floor, I
1 would like to provide you with some information regarding the procedure
2 that will be followed here during this hearing and the following hearings.
3 I think that the parties have already provided you with such information.
4 Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber would like to inform you of how this
5 hearing will proceed. In particular, because of the media.
6 You have just taken the solemn declaration, which naturally means
7 that your testimony should be precise. You shouldn't give false
8 testimony, because when a witness gives false testimony, such a witness
9 could be prosecuted. But this is a purely academic issue, given your
11 There is another provision, but that doesn't apply to you. This
12 provision concerns a witness who refuses to answer a question because his
13 answer might incriminate him. In such a case, the witness doesn't have to
14 reply to the question, but the Trial Chamber can compel the witness to
15 answer the question, though the witness would be granted a form of
16 immunity. But as an expert witness, this is not something that would
17 usually be applicable to you.
18 In the course of these proceedings, which are of an Anglo-Saxon
19 kind, you will have to answer the Prosecution's questions. They will
20 conduct their examination-in-chief. You have already met the members of
21 the Prosecution, and they will ask you questions on the basis of the
22 written report that you drafted at their request. The Prosecution has
23 told us that their examination-in-chief should take between an hour and a
24 half and two hours, at the most. Once the Prosecution has concluded its
25 examination-in-chief -- you will have your written statement before you,
1 and you will also have two binders containing the various documents that
2 you need in order to answer questions.
3 Once this stage has been concluded, Defence counsel, and they are
4 to your left, there are six of them, but only two of them will be asking
5 you questions within the framework of their cross-examination. The
6 purpose of the cross-examination is to verify the witness's credibility
7 and the Defence can also ask the witness any questions that they might
8 think are useful, questions that concern military issues, technical
9 issues, the relevant period, et cetera. So this is the cross-examination,
10 which will take a number of days, given the length and importance of your
11 report. And the Defence has requested a number of days for the conduct of
12 their cross-examination.
13 Once they have concluded their cross-examination, the Prosecution
14 may ask you additional questions which will arise from the answers you
15 have given to the questions put to you by Defence counsel. So that will
16 be the re-examination. And on the last day, perhaps on Friday, the three
17 Judges, who are sitting before you, will also ask you some questions. The
18 purpose of these questions will be to clarify the answers you have
19 provided to the parties. All these questions will be questions that the
20 Judges want to ask you in order to clarify important issues that are not
21 clear or that haven't been mentioned.
22 After the Judges have asked their questions, the Prosecution and
23 Defence may take the floor again so that you can complete the answers you
24 had given the Judges. As an expert witness, and this is something that
25 you have surely understood, there will be a debate that concerns your
1 expert report.
2 Generally speaking, this is how the proceedings will unfold. Try
3 to provide complete and precise answers to the questions put to you,
4 because the procedure followed here is an oral procedure. Everything is
5 done orally and it is on this basis that the Judges need to be informed.
6 That's why your answers are important. If a question doesn't seem clear
7 to you, ask the person asking you the question to rephrase it.
8 In addition, in the course of the cross-examination, you will have
9 to answer very precise questions put to you by the Defence. The Trial
10 Chamber will ensure that the questions are put to you simply and clearly
11 to ensure that the Trial Chamber understands your answers. Very often,
12 the answer we expect you to give will be yes or no, but the Trial Chamber
13 will ensure that your answers are intelligible and clear for the Judges,
14 because the Judges have to come to their conclusions on the basis of your
16 If you encounter any difficulties in the course of this hearing or
17 in the course of future hearings, inform the Trial Chamber of this. We
18 are here to deal with any difficulties. We are at your disposal and we
19 can help you in the course of this week. We have a little time before the
20 break. The hearing goes on for one and a half hours and then we have half
21 an hour break for technical reasons. It's not because the Trial Chamber
22 needs to rest. We need to have a break after an hour and a half so that
23 the technicians can change the tape. We could all go on for a number of
24 hours, but for technical reasons, we have to have this technical break
25 after an hour and a half.
1 Mr. Mundis, I think you will be conducting the
2 examination-in-chief. You may take the floor.
3 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
4 Examined by Mr. Mundis.
5 Q. Good afternoon, General Reinhardt.
6 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Mundis.
7 Q. For the benefit of the Trial Chamber, can you please describe for
8 them your military career, beginning from the time you joined the German
10 A. Yes, sir. I joined the German army in October 1960, as a recruit
11 in a military infantry unit, and I stayed there for the next two years to
12 become an officer's candidate. And after I finished my training as an
13 officer, I was a platoon commander for five years in the same battalion,
14 became the operations officer of that battalion before I went to the
15 University of Freiburg to study history and political science.
16 After I finished my studies, I became a company commander in the
17 neighbouring mountain infantry battalion, before I went to the Command and
18 General Staff College in Hamburg to get my general staff training which
19 was followed by the General Staff training of the US army Command and
20 General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
21 From there I had my first NATO assignment as a planner in
22 headquarter CENTAG in Heidelberg, from which I was called to act as the
23 military assistant of the vice chief of the German armed forces. I then
24 became a battalion commander of a mountain infantry battalion for two
1 From there I went to the headquarters of the 1st Mountain Division
2 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen as the operations officer, and half a year as a
3 Chief of Staff before I became the military assistant of the then minister
4 of defence, Manfred Worner. Afterwards, I went back to the mountain
5 troops as the commander of the one and only mountain infantry brigade in
6 Bad Reichenhall, from where I went back to Bonn as the chief planner of
7 the German armed forces. In this capacity, I had to unite the east and
8 west German military forces. I then became the commandant of the Command
9 and General Staff College in Hamburg, then went to Koblenz as the
10 commanding general of the 3rd Corps, which I had to disband and build up a
11 new organisation which we call the German army forces command, which was
12 built up for deployment out of area. So I commanded in this capacity our
13 troops, our national troops in Somalia, in UNPROFOR, in IFOR and SFOR.
14 Under the UN and then NATO command, I then became the commander of the
15 commanding general of the headquarter LANDCENT in Heidelberg, and in this
16 capacity I deployed with my staff as KFOR staff to Kosovo for six months.
17 And then in the last year of my career, I came back in the key mission as
18 the commander of this headquarters was to get the Polish and the Czech
19 land forces into NATO, and I retired from the military in April, end of
20 March 2001.
21 Q. General, I have a few follow-on questions from your CV, if you
22 will, that you've just explained to us. First, you mentioned that you
23 finished your studies in history and political science. What degree, what
24 was the highest degree you earned in terms of your formal academic
1 A. I wrote the thesis and on this -- for this thesis and the
2 examinations I got the Ph.D.
3 Q. General, you also mentioned - and I know this is common for career
4 military officers such as yourself - a few acronyms or abbreviations. For
5 the benefit of the Chamber, I just wanted to ask you about a couple of
6 those. You mentioned CENTAG. That's C-E-N-T-A-G. Can you tell the Trial
7 Chamber what CENTAG is?
8 A. Yes, sir. CENTAG is the central army group. This is the land
9 component of the NATO forces from the Nordkapp to the Alps, responsible
10 for all the forces stationed and organised in this area.
11 Q. General, you also mentioned LANDCENT. Can you tell us what
12 LANDCENT refers to.
13 A. Yes, sir. This is almost identical to what I just said. It is --
14 it was a new name giving for almost the same thing, with the exception
15 that we had very strong navy, naval and air components within this
16 headquarters. But basically again it embraced the entire area from the
17 Nordkapp to the Alps, as far as army forces were concerned.
18 Q. And, General, based on what you've told us, would it be fair to
19 conclude that during your 40-year military career, you held a number of
20 command positions from platoon commander all the way through and including
21 corps commander?
22 A. Yes, sir. I'm very proud that most of the time in my career I was
23 a commander.
24 Q. General Reinhardt, do you recall approximately when you were first
25 contacted by the Office of the Prosecutor with respect to this case?
1 A. It's almost two years ago.
2 Q. Do you recall what your tasking was, or what the Office of the
3 Prosecutor asked you to do?
4 A. Well, I was asked whether I would look through a variety of
5 documents in order to try to check on the status of the Mujahedin and the
6 chain of command in the Bosnian armed forces as far as the 7th Mountain
7 Infantry Brigade, and in particular, the Mujahedin, were concerned. And
8 at the beginning, I was just given that material. I had to scan it, and I
9 should answer to the questions I have been provided for by the Prosecution
10 whether I could get a special -- closer feeling on that.
11 Q. General, I should just caution you that because we are speaking
12 the same language, we need to pause between question and answer so that
13 the interpreters can keep up with us. So if I briefly pause, I would ask
14 you to periodically do the same.
15 General, that initial contact that you had with the Office of the
16 Prosecutor, did that subsequently expand? That is, were you subsequently
17 given a larger task to perform?
18 A. I was called back here and we had our first discussion, and it was
19 still open whether I would take the task to look through the material in
20 more detail and be the witness, and I thought it was a very interesting
21 case, so I said yes, and I got additional material, I got additional
22 questions I had to answer, and this was an interrelation which was
23 established from thereon.
24 Q. General, can you tell the Trial Chamber approximately how much
25 material and what type of material the Office of the Prosecutor provided
1 you with?
2 A. Well, I'll be very frankly [sic], when I got the material for the
3 first time I was rather shocked because I got two moving [sic] full of
4 material, and in the meantime, I got additional material, including my own
5 excerpts -- it's almost 23 binders, thick and smaller binders of material,
6 documents, witness statements, orders, excerpts of war diaries, this kind
7 of material.
8 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber the methodology that you used with
9 respect to the 23 binders of material that you received? What did you do
10 with it? How did you approach this material?
11 A. I have been given answers [sic] by the Prosecution which I was
12 asked to answer, based on those documents. So I scanned at the beginning
13 to get a basic overview of the whole material, and then I matched the
14 questions I've been given to the documents. I went through. I had a
15 matrix of those questions and basically had to find through these
16 documents the appropriate documents which could answer, in a positive or
17 negative way, the answers I was asked to work on. So this was a very
18 time-consuming and tedious way, and I had to go through this at least two
19 times, because additional questions were coming up and then I had to start
20 the whole thing again.
21 Q. General, I have a question of clarification. At page 19, line 3
22 in the transcript, which you might see before you on the screen, you
23 indicate -- you said: I have been given answers by the Prosecution which
24 I was asked to answer. Were you in fact given answers by the Prosecution?
25 A. No. Sorry. Sorry. Excuse me for my pigeon English. I was given
1 questions I had to answer. No, I was never given answers, and I was never
2 somehow told whether my answers were appropriate or not. I was just given
3 questions, and I tried to answer them the best way as possible, based on
4 the abundancy of material provided to me.
5 Q. General, do the subtopics, if you will -- your report sets forth a
6 number of subtopics. Do those generally relate to the questions that the
7 Prosecution asked you to focus on?
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. Now, you've told us that among the material that you received were
10 witness statements. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what, if anything, you
11 did with the witness statements that you were provided with?
12 A. Well, at the beginning, I was, when I went through this material,
13 I was not very clear how important these were, so I really read them page
14 by page. And these were binders, a lot of material. And I -- in my first
15 statement I also relied to them, but I was then told that this written --
16 witness statements were not as important as the military documents. So I
17 had them in the back of my mind, knowing what went on in Dusina, in
18 Maljine, in Miletici. But I did not go much deeper then when I went
19 through the whole material for the second and finally the third time.
20 Q. Sir, I take it from the last comment that you made, the second and
21 finally the third time, that your report has evolved over time.
22 A. Yes. It's an iterative process which had to be amended based on
23 additional questions asked to me and based also by the incorporation of
24 additional material provided to me, which basically caused me to go
25 through the whole process again and see how this additional material would
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 match what I have already worked out.
2 Q. In addition, would it be correct to say that as a result of, for
3 example, an order by the Trial Chamber, you made certain deletions from
4 your report?
5 A. Yes, sir. I made deletions because I incorporated something which
6 was given to me and in hindsight it seems that this was not the
7 appropriate way, so I had to delete this again and had to rewrite and
8 adapt this part of -- well, this was a larger part of my statement,
9 obviously, yes.
10 Q. Now, General, as recently as two weeks ago -- or I should start
12 On the 19th of April, sir, of this year, we had a meeting where we
13 discussed your report and your testimony here today; is that -- do you
14 recall that meeting?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. And at that meeting one of the things that we talked about was a
17 number of the footnotes of your report?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. Do you recall or can you briefly tell the Trial Chamber what we
20 discussed with respect to the footnotes or some of the footnotes of your
22 A. Well, my main problem was that from the first time I got these
23 documents until the time I edited or wrote my paper, I had four different
24 numbers -- types of numbers of individual documents. And by translating
25 them back and forth, I had made some mistakes, because I'm not the
1 greatest typist. I mixed up some things, and therefore I also ask you to
2 help me to straighten this out, because I also lost two or three documents
3 which I could not retrieve from my 23 binders. So this was the thing to
4 straighten things out where I was not quite sure which was the appropriate
5 number or where I just have written down a wrong number and couldn't find
6 the right one. And I was helped by you to get the appropriate documents
7 straightened out again in the proper sequence for the footnotes. I think
8 these were about 15 or 16 footnotes where I still had troubles, which some
9 of them I already indicated beforehand, which I found out, but about seven
10 to eight I couldn't straighten out again, and I'll just ask for help.
11 Q. And, General, during that meeting that we had, can you describe
12 for the Trial Chamber what process you went through to verify the
13 documents that you cited in your report?
14 A. Well, some, as I just said, I had some question marks on very few
15 footnotes, which I brought forward in an email to the Prosecution, asking
16 me to provide me with the material which I had lost, especially when I
17 destroyed the folder of the Blaskic case where some other documents were
18 attached to. I asked them to replace them for me, to send them back, and
19 I also asked to help me and find out the appropriate numbers of those
20 documents. And when I came here, we finally -- I told you where my --
21 what my document numbers were and then we basically checked this together
22 and realised that I was on the right track again.
23 Q. General, earlier this afternoon, I showed you a filing that we had
24 filed, a chart updating your report. Do you remember that?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. There was one instance in that report where the Prosecutor had
2 made a change which we didn't discuss on the 19th of April.
3 A. Yes. And this was right so, because I made a mistake there,
4 referring it to a case, 18th April, to a case which happened six years --
5 six days later. So it was appropriate just to delete this reference.
6 Q. So, sir, would it be correct to state that having looked at the
7 materials the Prosecution filed on the 22nd of April of this year that
8 your report is now complete and as up to date as possible?
9 A. Yes. And we discussed that. I asked you to make these amendments
10 in the footnotes because I was just not -- I just didn't have the
11 capability to rewrite the whole thing again.
12 Q. General, do you have any rough approximation as to the number of
13 hours or number of days that you have spent reviewing this material and
14 producing your expert report?
15 A. No. I really don't. I never figured out how many days it was all
16 together, but I tell you, it was much, much more time than I ever
17 anticipated when I told Mr. Withopf that I would become his expert. If I
18 had known this now from now, I would never have agreed upon that. Because
19 it took much more time. My wife was very angry with me, because I was
20 sitting days and nights just to scan all this material and to go through,
21 it takes a hell of a time if it's a total new case, total new documents,
22 and a topic you're not so familiar with.
23 Q. Sir, I'd like now to turn to your report. Do you have a copy of
24 your report in front of you?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. I see also that you have actually two binders in front of you.
2 Can you just tell the Trial Chamber what is contained in the two binders
3 that you have before you.
4 A. In this binder I have my report, I have the comment of the Trial
5 Chamber of changing some of the things, and I have all those different
6 lists of the documents, the different numbers -- excuse me, the different
7 numbers of the documents. And in this second binder, I have the documents
8 referring -- to which I referred to in my footnotes.
9 Q. General, I'm going to now ask you a few questions about each of
10 the sections of your report. I'm going to do so in a slightly different
11 order than you have presented the material. If you have any questions or
12 if you don't understand what I'm asking you, please say so and I'll
13 rephrase the question.
14 I'd first like to turn to section 2 of your report, where you
15 discuss the responsibility of a commander. General, can you please tell
16 the Trial Chamber, briefly tell the Trial Chamber, what are the
17 responsibilities of a military commander?
18 A. The answer is rather simple, because the commander is responsible
19 for everything which happens in the area he is responsible for, for which
20 he takes command. So this is personnel, this is training, this is
21 operations, this is morale and welfare, this is materiel, everything which
22 affects his command, he is responsible for, and he's personally and
23 uniquely responsible for that.
24 Q. And, sir, what is the basis for command? What -- where does
25 command come from?
1 A. Well, command is invested on you by higher headquarters, and it
2 has different echelons. And you have to go through some particular
3 training before you get this command to be capable of doing that, and then
4 it's invested to you by your government, which has the trust that you
5 would execute your commandship the appropriate way.
6 Q. General, in your report, for example, on page 2, there are some
7 footnote sources or footnote references to German regulations. Can you
8 tell the Trial Chamber why your report begins with discussion of German
10 A. Well, I'm obviously more familiar with the German regulations than
11 with the regulations of any other countries, and I also made reference to
12 a book where all the different NATO regulations were brought forward and
13 compared. And I realised that what I had as legal -- no, as written
14 material was more consistent for me as far as the German regulations were
15 concerned than, for instance, the British, the French, or the Americans,
16 which I didn't have at my disposition by that time.
17 Q. In other paragraphs in section 2 of your report, you also make
18 reference to JNA, that is, Yugoslav People's Army, regulations. Did you
19 in fact compare those regulations with the German regulations you were
20 familiar with?
21 A. Yes, sir. I did this with the JNA regulations, which applied to a
22 large extent also to the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was
23 striking to me that they were very modern as far as the legal disposition
24 was concerned, very similar, and if I had not known that before, it was
25 obvious for me that the basic content of commandship of being a commander
1 and the responsibility being uniquely responsible for what happens in your
2 area of responsibility is very similar.
3 Q. Did you also, sir, look at any regulations pertaining specifically
4 to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
5 A. Yes. The ones which were in my papers I looked through. And
6 again, besides using JNA declaration -- laws and rules, there were clear
7 new rules, regulations, laws for the Bosnian army. And what I just said
8 applied also to them. If I see the rules of the international law of war
9 by the ABiH, this could have been written the same way, I think, in my
10 country. It's very modern, it's very up to the requirements of today, and
11 I don't see any big difference from what I used to work with in NATO
13 Q. General Reinhardt, can you tell the Trial Chamber a little bit
14 about the role of a commander with respect to good order and discipline
15 within the units that that commander has under his or her authority?
16 A. I think there are two aspects to this point as far as my answer is
17 concerned. One is the commander is responsible, legally responsible, for
18 discipline and order within his area of responsibility, and there's a law
19 which binds him to do that and take care that no wrong things happen.
20 On the other hand, it's also his personal interest that law and
21 order prevails, because that is a key factor for the combat value of his
22 forces. If his forces lose law and order, if they lose discipline,
23 normally they become not such a combat-ready and trustful unit as he wants
24 to have them, and then it's much more difficult for him to execute his
25 power over those soldiers. So it's in his inherent interest that
1 discipline is prevailed and ensured.
2 Q. General Reinhardt, what duty or duties does a commander have once
3 that commander issues an order?
4 A. Issuing an order is a - especially in military operations - a very
5 complex endeavour, but issuing an order is not enough. You have to ensure
6 afterwards that the order has been executed the way you want it executed.
7 I mean, the control factor in the decision cycle, decision, appreciation
8 of the situation, giving orders, and the last part of this decision cycle,
9 then, is to make sure that the things really have been executed the way
10 you want to, or if not, to make the appropriate amendments. So yes,
11 control is a key thing in giving orders, and only by controlling this, you
12 know that the things really have been executed that you want to have
14 Q. General, you've told us you have to ensure afterwards that the
15 order has been executed the way you want it executed. How does a
16 commander do that?
17 A. There are also different ways. One way is, which we know from the
18 old time, that the commander is sitting on the strategic point from which
19 he overviews the whole battlefield as I see it right now and gives his
20 direct order to influence what happens on the battle. So he can influence
21 the battle directly. This is today not the way we do any more with high
22 technical things. You send orders, you give -- you receive messages
23 constantly from the battlefield, giving you an appreciation what's going
24 on there. And based on that appreciation, you try to influence with your
25 own messages, with your own additional orders, the flow of action going on
1 on the battlefield. So this is a constant interrelation between the lower
2 headquarters and the higher headquarters that you realise what's going on
3 there. And the ideal thing is that you give an order and the execution
4 will follow your order the same way and you don't have to interfere. But
5 if necessary, you would interfere and today you would interfere by giving
6 written or oral orders by telephone, by radio, or what have you.
7 Q. What are the duties of a commander with respect to information
9 A. Information is always -- information flow a thing which goes from
10 higher headquarter to lower headquarter. The higher headquarter has to
11 establish the technical installations to lower headquarter so that the
12 lower headquarter can report to the higher headquarter. And I think this
13 prevails almost in all armies. So as a brigade commander, you have to
14 ensure that you have technical facilities that you can talk to the
15 battalions and the battalion can talk to you. The battalion commander has
16 the same vis-a-vis the companies. So the battalion -- the commander, no
17 matter what level he is, is responsible for establishing the
18 communications, and if they're inadequate, he has to improve them.
19 Q. So I take it from your description that this communication flow is
20 a two-way street?
21 A. It's a two-way street but the responsibility for the establishment
22 of the technical facilities is for the higher headquarters.
23 May I give an example to that? When I deployed to Kosovo, my
24 former headquarters redeployed with all their equipment, as far as command
25 and control, radios, and so on was concerned. So I had to rebuild the
1 whole architecture of new command and control structures, including all
2 the technical facilities from scratch, otherwise I wouldn't have been
3 capable to commanding my forces, and my forces would not have been capable
4 to exchange their information to forward this to me. So this was my
6 Q. General, I'd like to turn your attention now to those sections
7 within section 2 of your report, where you talked about disciplinary
8 structures within the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you recall the
9 conclusions that you reached about the disciplinary structures and the
10 court structures within the ABiH?
11 A. Well, the disciplinary structure again are in consonance with the
12 level of command. The higher the level of command, the broader the
13 disciplinary possibilities of reaction for the commanders are there, and
14 they are set down in a document which is called the rules of military
15 discipline. And in a manual on military discipline, the details are laid
16 out very similar, I would say, very similar to the ones familiar to me in
17 my German army.
18 In addition to that, there is a military -- there is a special
19 military courts. There were military courts for the individual corps, one
20 or two courts to which the commander could transfer those cases which
21 basically surpassed his own capability as a disciplinary power, which were
22 basically deeds which a court had to take care of, and again this has been
23 regulated in a very detailed way.
24 Q. What are the responsibilities of commanders within the Army of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina with respect discipline, based on the material that
1 you've reviewed?
2 A. He had to ensure discipline within his units. He had to ensure
3 that the rules of the international military law have been adhered to.
4 And it's obvious and very striking how often in different Official
5 Gazettes, papers, laws, this comes up to. And he had to transfer the case
6 to the court if he thought that the case in question would not be adequate
7 for his level of disciplinary power.
8 Q. General, I'd like you to turn now, please, to paragraph 2.20 in
9 your report. It's on page 6 in the English version. The final sentence
10 of that paragraph concludes with footnote 24. Do you recall writing this
11 part of your report?
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. The first sentence of footnote 24 says: "This is exactly what
14 Hadzihasanovic did." Do you recall what that was in reference to, what
15 you were describing in that footnote?
16 A. General Hadzihasanovic was not very happy about the slow reaction
17 of the court. There were cases, obviously, at the court, and he was
18 complaining that he didn't get the answers in time in order to proceed
19 those cases, and because of that, he basically asked to do more on this.
20 And he wrote that he was not very happy with those organs because they did
21 not do the job as he expected them to do.
22 Q. Now, General, do you recall, or if need be you can refer to the
23 document, but if you recall, what type of crimes or offences was the
24 accused Hadzihasanovic referring to in the document that you've cited to
25 in this footnote?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Well, I think he did not refer to any very particular things, not
2 any particular cases. I only refer that these were cases affecting the
3 discipline within his forces, and he was very much concerned because by
4 having a negative discipline, also the combat power of his forces would
5 deteriorate. So it was in his interest that these cases would be solved,
6 and as an example, to maybe prevent other soldiers doing similar things.
7 Q. General, I guess perhaps my question wasn't specific, but do you
8 recall -- you've said that these cases were affecting discipline within
9 his forces. What kind of cases were these?
10 A. The cases are not enumerated in detail, but as far as disciplinary
11 cases in this particular case, I think it was plundering. It was also
12 leaving the forces unauthorised, going home, things of this kind of
14 Q. Sir, I'd like to turn now to section 3 of your report, and
15 particularly paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3. You discuss the 3rd Corps of the
16 ABiH and the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade in those two paragraphs. Can you
17 briefly tell the Trial Chamber what conclusions you reached about the
18 establishment of those two units.
19 A. Well, the corps has established by the president of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it basically comprised the territorial forces in
21 that area, to have one responsible for that. And these forces then were
22 extended, additional forces were added to those, and the 7th Mountain
23 Brigade, the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, was one of those brigades
24 established in this area and attached to the 3rd Corps, a situation which
25 I think was very difficult because there was no corps headquarters at the
1 beginning. These were territorial forces at the beginning who had to be
2 worked into a fighting force. A very difficult organisational, very
3 difficult endeavour for the corps, as well as for the brigade.
4 Q. General, I'd like to turn to paragraph 3.5 of your report. In
5 that paragraph, you discuss the leadership within the 7th Muslim Mountain
6 Brigade. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what conclusions you reached
7 about the leadership of that brigade based on the documents you reviewed.
8 A. There was a brigade commander, Mr. Asim Koricic, who basically was
9 appointed as a brigade commander, and he had a Chief of Staff in his
10 brigade, Mr. Kubura. The brigade commander during that time when
11 Mr. Kubura was his Chief of Staff, was absent for quite a while. And in
12 that time, the deputy -- actually, the second highest ranking officer in
13 the brigade, which is the Chief of Staff, took over command for those
14 forces in the 7th Mountain Brigade, and at the end he then became the
15 brigade commander of this brigade, after he had served for a couple of
16 months as the Chief of Staff and for a certain period of time as the
17 de facto brigade commander, but not the de jure brigade commander, because
18 the de jure one was absent.
19 Q. Sir, to your knowledge, and based on your experience in the
20 military, what difference exists between, as you've called it, a de facto
21 commander and a de jure commander?
22 A. Well, the one who is in the position to take over the command for
23 a certain period of time, even so he is not the commander appointed, is,
24 as far as the responsibility, the same situation. He is responsible for
25 that period of time. He might not be appointed as a commander, but he is
1 the commander with all the command and control relationship and
2 responsibility as the commander who is not here by that period of time.
3 That's the reason why you have somebody replacing him, with the same
4 spectrum as the normal commander would have had.
5 Q. Sir, this would -- what you've described for us would necessarily
6 follow, based on a principle of unity of command; is that right?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. And can you tell the Trial Chamber what unity of command refers
10 A. The key thing is that you have one who is responsible for
11 everything, which happens in that -- in his area of command. So that you
12 don't split it. Therefore, in many armies, you have an authorised deputy,
13 who then takes over if the commander goes. If you don't have a deputy,
14 then the next high-ranking officer automatically takes over and takes the
15 duties the commander would normally have. And I think this was the case
16 here. But it was a rather long time for the Chief of Staff to take over
17 as a commander, an exceptionally long time.
18 Q. General, I'd like to turn now to paragraph -- or paragraphs 3.6
19 and the following paragraphs where you discuss the Operational Group
20 Bosanska Krajina [sic]. Can you tell the Trial Chamber, based on the
21 documents that you have read, what that was all about.
22 A. This operational group is a thing which other armies also create
23 once in a while, what we would call a task force, where you have different
24 forces subordinated under one intermediate commander, to coordinate in a
25 certain area for a certain specific mission and for a certain period of
1 time operations for the higher headquarters. So this is an intermediate
2 headquarters responsible with a very small staff to coordinate this,
3 because the higher headquarters cannot do this on the spot and cannot
4 command and control all the forces directly. So this is an ad hoc
5 situation which you would normally create a situation like this in the
6 former Yugoslav army and I would say also in the Warsaw Pact countries.
7 This, in NATO country, ad hoc situation, was established for a longer
8 duration, and it was some intermediate command and control installation
9 which seems to be playing to the variety of forces within this large corps
11 Q. So I take it, sir, based on what you've told us, that there was
12 nothing particularly unusual about the establishment of the OG Bosanska
14 A. No. And this was not the only one in the corps area. There were
15 different -- there were additional ones. And in the other corps you also
16 had operational groups.
17 Q. What effect, if any, did the establishment of the operational
18 groups have on the chain of command from the 3rd Corps to the units that
19 were assigned temporarily to the OG?
20 A. Well, you had incorporated an additional layer of responsibility.
21 So the responsibility for the corps -- from the corps commander did not go
22 directly to the brigade commander but through the commander of the OG, and
23 the same vice versa. But nevertheless, the brigade was always still under
24 the command and control of the 3rd Corps.
25 Q. General, I'd now like to turn to section 5 of your report,
1 beginning on page 14. You discuss in that section professionalism within
2 the 3rd Corps. Can you highlight some of your findings with respect to
3 the professionalism of the 3rd Corps, based on all of this material that
4 you've reviewed?
5 A. Well, first of all, I think one has to say that for the leaders in
6 the new Bosnian army, it was a very, very difficult job to build up an
7 army not under peace conditions but under very adverse conditions,
8 fighting with their former colleagues, fighting against the Serbs, and
9 then against the Bosnian Croats at the same time, not having an
10 established corps of officers, NCOs, as we have them in the West, trained,
11 specifically trained and prepared for this kind of command and control
12 relationship. So they had to do it out from scratch, with all the
13 problems affected to that, that many things were not as solid as much
14 based on professional knowledge and especially professional experience as
15 you would expect it in a headquarter or a staff like this.
16 In addition, I think the problem is that the materiel at the
17 beginning was scarce materiel, practically materiel which has been taken
18 over from the former Yugoslav army. But the key problem is that the
19 leading officers of this new army had to jump into positions for which
20 they were not prepared the same detailed way you normally would prepare
21 them, by getting up step by step until they reach this level. They had to
22 take up command responsibilities two to three levels higher than they were
23 trained for, and therefore it was very, very difficult to do that at that
24 particular time.
25 Q. Sir, how did these difficulties manifest themselves with respect
1 to issues surrounding command and control within the 3rd Corps?
2 A. It shows, for instance, that competent officers - and the most
3 competent officers seem to have been the former Yugoslav -- the former
4 officers of the Yugoslav army - were a scarce resource. Brigades were
5 complaining they did not have proficient officers enough. They were
6 complaining that the officers - especially on the platoon and company
7 level - did not know their job adequately enough. They were complaining
8 about the logistical differences. The command and control, as far as the
9 technical equipment was concerned, was a problem. It was not state of the
10 art, as you would expect it in a modern army. And all technical
11 facilities were [Realtime transcript omitted the word "were"] used just to
12 establish command and control.
13 So in this regard, I think there was a lot of improvisation, I
14 could imagine, in this army, a lot of improvisation to meet the criteria
15 of building up the corps and at the same time of fighting the enemy in the
16 whole area. This again was not an area where they had a clear-cut front
17 line in which you attacked or over which attacked with corps level forces.
18 These were all smaller battles conducted by the corps in the whole area,
19 so there was never a real time to relax and to do the normal military
20 training and business as you would do in any pauses. They were under
21 constant pressure.
22 Q. General Reinhardt --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon.
24 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I just
25 wanted to draw the Trial Chamber's attention to the fact that on page 35,
1 line 22, there is a word which doesn't appear in the transcript. When the
2 witness said, and I'll quote the witness: "And all technical facilities
3 used just to establish command and control." In my opinion,
4 Mr. President, the witness said: "And all technical facilities were used
5 just to establish command and control." Could we confirm, Mr. President,
6 that this word is missing from the transcript. Thank you.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Did the witness
8 say "were used," or something else?
9 General, in the transcript, as the Defence has pointed out, in
10 line 22, the term "used" appears. But you apparently said "were used."
11 Is that correct?
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
14 Mr. Mundis, you can continue.
15 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, sir.
16 Q. General, these difficulties that you've described with respect to
17 the conclusions you've reached, did they continue throughout 1993? What
18 was the time period of these difficulties you've described?
19 A. I think they continued throughout 1993. This was also the time
20 period I was asked to look for. They may have improved in this or that
21 case, but it seems that this was a major problem throughout the time of
22 operations in that particular year.
23 Q. Did these difficulties, sir, mean that the 3rd Corps was unable to
24 function as a cohesive military unit?
25 A. No, sir. It made it more difficult. The corps had clear
1 communication establishments. It has a communication officer in the corps
2 who basically coordinated everything as far as communication was
3 concerned. The problems I'm referring to are more on the tactical level
4 of companies and battalions basically in operations against an enemy who
5 did not have the modern equipment they would normally appreciate it to
6 have. They had outmoded equipment. And because of that, also security,
7 as far as command and control was concerned, was very often jeopardised.
8 The relations between the brigades and the corps, as far as I can
9 deduct from all the documents I have looked through, were on the regular
10 basis. There were regular messages from the brigades to the corps during
11 operations. Even every six hours they were asked for and they were sent
12 by the brigade commanders. So the basic operational knowledge of what
13 happened on the battlefield was available for the commanding general of
14 the corps.
15 Q. And, sir, my final question before we take the break: What was --
16 with respect to these difficulties you've described, what was the overall
17 effect of these difficulties on the functioning of the corps?
18 A. I think the corps as such could function appropriately, but the
19 operations on the tactical level, as I just mentioned, were hampered and
20 were maybe not so easy to conduct as they would have been conducted if
21 they had had normal modern communication equipment.
22 Q. Thank you, General. Mr. President, I note the time.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have the break now. It's
24 a quarter to 4.00. And we will resume at about a quarter past 4.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 3.46 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 4.22 p.m.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, we start the
3 session. You may continue.
4 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 Q. General Reinhardt, I'd now like to turn to sections 6 and 7 of
6 your report, dealing with legal principles and legal responsibilities for
7 ABiH commanders. Sir, in drafting these two sections of your report, what
8 materials did you rely upon?
9 A. There are the legal documents, like the decree of the armed forces
10 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the manual of service of the Army of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the rules of the international law of war by the ABiH,
12 the order of enforcement of international military law, the decision to
13 declare state of war, the manual on military discipline, the rules of
14 military discipline, the law on special military courts, the statutory
15 order of district military courts, plus the laws and manual applicable
16 from the JNA, like the rules of land forces corps, the regulations of the
17 authority of the ground forces corps commander, the Criminal Code of the
18 SFRY, and the regulations on the application of the rules of international
19 law of armed forces of the SFRY. These were the main documents. But I
20 must tell you that I didn't have the entire documents. I always had
21 paragraphs or articles of them, not the entire documents.
22 Q. Now, General, you certainly are not a professionally trained
23 lawyer; is that correct?
24 A. I think this is very important to mention. I'm a professional
25 soldier, but not a professional lawyer. This has not been the main topic
1 of my former job.
2 Q. Nevertheless, can you tell the Trial Chamber what type of training
3 or education you might have received concerning the law as it relates to
4 military issues and the conduct of hostilities during your military
6 A. First of all, as a young officer candidate, you learn everything
7 about disciplinary rights and the soldiers' law in which the boundaries,
8 the legal boundaries of your profession are established. So you learn how
9 to conduct a disciplinary [indiscernible], how to investigate, how to turn
10 to a court if necessary, through a divisional headquarters. This is the
11 one in the German army which basically has this right to turn to the
13 These things are being taught to you at the school, at the
14 officers candidate school. And then you go on to become a battalion
15 commander, you get additional information on that. The very key question
16 is the question on the Geneva Convention, the question on international
17 military law and human rights, which are being trained again and again.
18 And let me tell you: Before we are deployed to all our peacekeeping
19 operations, especially the later parts of my answer, became very obviously
20 a key feature which we discussed with our soldiers before we deployed.
21 Q. So, General, as a result of this periodic training you received in
22 your military career, you were certainly familiar with some of the
23 fundamental tenets of international law and the law of armed conflict.
24 Would that be fair to say?
25 A. I would say, so yes, sir.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. And would the same conclusion be true with respect to general
2 notions or basic principles of military criminal justice?
3 A. As far as the military criminal justice is concerned, I think I'm
4 not as familiar, because normally things of military criminal justice are
5 being transferred to courts. And I never had any direct connection with
6 the court, because it never happened in my career that I had to deal with
7 problems like this. Therefore, I know they are there. I know, I think,
8 the basic principles, how they would be applied, but I have no whatsoever
9 personal experience in that.
10 Q. With respect to the role or responsibilities of a military
11 commander in the military criminal justice system that you were familiar
12 with, can you tell the Trial Chamber what those basic principles were?
13 What were the primary responsibilities of a military commander with
14 respect to military justice?
15 A. Well, whenever there was a criminal injustice been committed to
16 which the commander thought his disciplinary right would be expended, that
17 these disciplinary possibilities would not be adequate, and if a capital
18 activity has happened, then he had to turn this case to the court, and it
19 was then being conducted in front of a court.
20 Q. Now, sir, can you tell us, based on your experience, training,
21 background, and the review of the materials that the Office of the
22 Prosecutor provided to you, can you compare what you were experienced with
23 or familiar with as a result of your training with the documents from
24 either the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the army of BiH, or even the
1 A. I want to reiterate that I'm not an expert on that. But as far as
2 I can deduct it from the documents I've seen and from my experience, I
3 think the big difference is not in the handling of a commander. Once he
4 knows the case, expands his capability, he then informs the court and
5 gives the case and transfers the case to the court, I think the difference
6 between the German system and the system you just mentioned in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also in the JNA, is that there is a military
8 court. We don't have a military court in Germany. It goes to the normal
9 civil court, and the civil court then presides the case because we have no
10 military justice in this case in our country, based on our history. But
11 the principle for the commander to take the case and to basically get all
12 the material ready to transfer the case then to the appropriate corps, I
13 think is basically the same. What happens then in the court is a
14 different thing.
15 Q. Now, General, you just mentioned the principle for the commander
16 to get all the material ready to transfer the case. What does that
17 entail? What is that all about?
18 A. Well, he has to see what the case was -- who were and who were
19 involved in the case, who were the possible perpetrators, what are the
20 sources which still can be found, who are possible testimonies. So these
21 are the things he has to ensure on the ground and get all this evidence
22 ready to transfer it then to the court.
23 Q. General Reinhardt, how would a commander do these things that
24 you've just told us about, to get the case ready to transfer to a court?
25 What are his obligations?
1 A. Well, there are a variety of organisations, installations helping
2 him to do that, because he normally wouldn't go where the crime has
3 happened. He would have his security forces and the Army of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. He would send his military police. He would also
5 have his legal experts on the staff, specially trained for this kind of
6 evidence-gathering and for initiating the case.
7 So in the German army, I would have turned this to my legal
8 advisor, and my legal advisor would have started investigation on my
9 behalf. He would inform me how the case would being succeeded or not.
10 But basically it would be his job on my behalf to do that. And there were
11 legal -- there was a legal division in the corps headquarters in the
12 Bosnian army as well where you had legal professionals to look for these
13 things and to do the job for the commander.
14 Q. General Reinhardt, I'd now ask you to turn to section 4 of your
15 report, which is on page 9 of the English version. You've entitled this
16 section, "Subordination of the Mujahedin within the 3rd ABiH Corps." Can
17 you tell the Trial Chamber what materials you relied upon in writing this
18 section of your report.
19 A. These are orders by the commanding general of the 3rd Corps to his
20 subordinate brigades. These are orders, internal reports of the 7th
21 Muslim Mountain Brigade about events that happened within the brigade
22 sector. These are reports and excerpts of war diaries of the 306th
23 Mountain Brigade, which to some extent cooperated together with the
24 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade and Mujahedin in operations. This is a text
25 of a Muslim video, or Mujahedin video, where the Mujahedin portrayed
1 themselves in their history of Mujahedin in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So these
2 are all, with the exception to the video, military documents of different
3 levels in the 3rd Corps sector, under which I -- on which I based my
4 assumptions here.
5 Q. Now, General, you mentioned videotape. Did you in fact watch this
7 A. No, sir. I just said: These were the texts, the transcripts. I
8 didn't see the videotape itself.
9 Q. Now --
10 A. But if I may expand. It shows how the Mujahedin saw themselves in
11 that area also vis-a-vis the military environment in which they operated.
12 Q. Another -- sir, I forgot to ask you this question, but another
13 overarching factor that I think is important: The documents, all of the
14 documents that you have been provided with, what language were those
15 documents in?
16 A. All these language are translations in the English language.
17 Q. So, General, just for the record, you do not read the B/C/S or
18 Serbo-Croat language; is that correct?
19 A. No, sir.
20 Q. Now, General, I would like you to turn in the English version of
21 your report to page 10 and look at paragraphs 4.5 and 4.6. Those two
22 paragraphs, sir, at first glance or at first reading, might not be
23 consistent. Can you explain to the Trial Chamber how those two paragraphs
24 can be reconciled, or how you reached those conclusions that you set forth
25 in those two paragraphs.
1 A. Well, the problem is the documents I had are not giving very clear
2 indication. You only can make deductions and assumptions based on the
3 military experience one has, how it could have been. Because there is no
4 clear order where it says the Mujahedin or a group of Mujahedin belonged
5 to the 7th Mountain Brigade. I haven't found anything like this. But I
6 found quite a few documents where a cooperation in operations or a
7 complaint after operations about the behaviour of the Mujahedin within the
8 area of the 7th Mountain Brigade or the 306th Mountain Brigade, are so
9 obvious that there must have been some cooperation beforehand, otherwise
10 they wouldn't have been in the area, otherwise the commander or his
11 responsible [sic] for the morale and welfare would not complain about the
12 misbehaviour of the Mujahedin within their area. So if they cooperated to
13 some way there must be some kind of cooperation, some kind of way of
14 preparing operations, of conducting operations. This was just not a very
15 loose things going totally independently. And therefore, it's very
16 difficult that you don't have a paper in which you can say: Here on the
17 paper it says they were part of this or that battalion. On the other
18 hand, they spearheaded and advanced in the operation with the battalions
19 in operations. And therefore, there must have been a cooperation, because
20 they just do [sic] it on their own.
21 Q. And, General, you tell us that there must have been cooperation.
22 What do you base that on? What is the basis for saying there must have
23 been cooperation?
24 A. Well, if I see the report of the brigade commander of his
25 battalions, and he reports that in his 1st Battalion there is this company
1 and that company, and he says in addition, "I have 60 to 70 Arabs," which
2 are Arabs/Turks, which is the expression for the Mujahedin, then it shows
3 that these Arab/Turks were somehow involved in the daily life of the
4 battalion. The same goes for the 2nd Battalion.
5 It also shows that an officer responsible for the security of the
6 brigade went into a battalion sector after an operation and complains very
7 much about the negative behaviour, the chaos [Realtime transcript read in
8 error "caste"] which has been established by the Mujahedin within that
9 area. So I think one can deduct that if they operated with them in the
10 area and created chaos afterwards, they must have been a part of that.
11 In addition, coming back to the video, it says very clearly in the
12 video that they offered training to the battalion, to one of the
13 battalions of the 7th Mountain Brigade, and I think training is a part of
14 cooperation, at least in the way I see that.
15 Q. General, just a couple of follow-on or clarification questions, if
16 I may. Again on the transcript before you, you'll see page 44, line 25,
17 and page 45, line 1, you said: "And therefore there must have been a
18 cooperation, because they just do it on their own."
19 A. They just don't do it on their own.
20 Q. Just don't do it on their own. And also, two places in the last
21 answer that I think the transcript misstated. Did you make reference to
22 chaos being established by the Mujahedin?
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. At least that's what the text says.
1 Q. Okay. Now, let me again draw your attention to paragraph 4.6.
2 You say there are some traceable indications that individual Mujahedin
3 were serving with and in the 7th MMB already in early 1993. What do you
4 base that conclusion on?
5 A. I base it on the conclusion that internal reports of the 7th
6 Brigade complain in the aftermath of operations about the behaviour of the
7 Mujahedin, who - and I assume this then - had to have been members of the
8 operation before. There is a document where it's clearly said that this
9 close cooperation is a moral factor for the battalion, the 1st Battalion
10 of the 7th Mountain Brigade, working so closely with the Mujahedin which
11 boosts up the morale of their own soldiers. So if they have not
12 cooperated, why having that boosting factor of those forces?
13 So I think one can deduct from the way that these forces, as I
14 also said before, were included in the enumeration of a battalion
15 commander that in addition to his companies, there are 60 to 70
16 Turks/Arabs or Arabs/Turks, that this is not just without any kind of
17 cooperation. I don't know exactly how deep this cooperation was. I don't
18 know how many Mujahedin who basically trained also the so-called guerrilla
19 were leading or part of the guerrilla, but at least there was a close
20 rapport, because if you train them, you have to cooperate with them. And
21 it says that they spearheaded some of the operations, that they were
22 advancing before the other operations happened. So if as a military, if I
23 imagine an operation being conducted, you normally don't have a spearhead
24 unit or an advancing unit with whom you don't cooperate in detail just in
25 order to prevent fratricide.
1 Q. Now, sir, what would be the result, if you will, of this
2 cooperation with respect to command and control issues? What is the
3 relationship between what you've described as cooperation and command and
5 A. If I conducted an operation, I'm responsible for everything which
6 happens within that cooperation, within that operation. So I'm
7 responsible for what happens there, for the positive as for the negative
8 points of the operation, because this is my command responsibility. In
9 forces who work with me in this regard, in an operation, in an area of
10 responsibility for which I'm responsible, fall then automatically also in
11 my responsibility as a commander.
12 Q. General Reinhardt, did you see any legal documents, regulations,
13 laws, et cetera, provided to you by the Office of the Prosecution that
14 would support the notion that you've just described for us?
15 A. No, I did not. And maybe there is none, because the first
16 official paper in this regard is the paper by the commanding general of
17 the 3rd Corps asking for the possibility to build up an organic unit of
18 the Mujahedin. So this organic unit, this build-up, the organisational
19 order for the build-up of the organic unit shows that he was not very
20 happy with the situation until that time.
21 I haven't, at least I -- in the documents provided to me, I
22 haven't found any official document in this regard where I could deduct
23 they were part of -- an original part like a unit of the ABiH.
24 Q. I think, sir, my previous question perhaps wasn't clear. I'd like
25 to return to that. You told us about a commander being responsible for
1 everything that happens within an operation. Did you see any documents,
2 regulations or legal documents, codes, et cetera, that would support the
3 notion that an ABiH commander is responsible for everything that happens
4 within an operation?
5 A. Yes, sir. I think in Article 21 of the regulations on the
6 applications of the rule of international war of the armed forces of the
7 SFRY, which was also applicable for the Bosnian forces, it says that the
8 commander is responsible for what happens in his area. Even so, they are
9 not elements of his own forces, but working with him, cooperating with him
10 in this area, he takes automatically responsibility for these things being
11 happening -- that happen in his area of responsibility.
12 Q. And, General Reinhardt, do you recall discussing this provision
13 anywhere in your report?
14 A. I think I did.
15 Q. Do you recall which paragraph or paragraphs you might have
16 discussed this provision?
17 A. Well, I just have to look right now. Excuse me. I have now to
18 look a little bit. It's paragraph 4.22. But as we discussed it earlier
19 last -- when I was here 14 days ago, the reference was wrong. It's not --
20 it's not the reference as I pointed out in footnote 78, but the one I just
21 mentioned before. And I think I also mentioned it in paragraph 9, or in
22 chapter 9, but I don't know right now which under 9 it is.
23 Q. That's fine, sir. But you do discuss it in paragraph 4.22 of your
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. Now, let me then return to the subject that we touched on, and
2 I've just got a few more questions for you, sir. Did there come a time
3 when the Mujahedin were consolidated within the 3rd Corps?
4 A. Yes. There was obviously a time, because the commanding general
5 asked the headquarters of his forces to bring them into an organic unit,
6 to form an organic unit of the Mujahedin, and to put them under his
7 command. And on 13 August, they were established as an organic
8 El Mujahedin unit.
9 Q. And which year was that, sir?
10 A. 1993.
11 Q. General, based on your review of the documents and your
12 interpretation of those documents based on your experience, why was this
13 unit established?
14 A. I think there are two reasons. One reason is - at least, this is
15 what the corps commander reported to higher headquarters - that he didn't
16 want to be further accountable for what happens in his area of
17 responsibility by Mujahedins under which he did not have constant and
18 direct control, and therefore, he said, "Let's put them into a unit and
19 then it's easier for me."
20 And the other thing is, if I deduct it from the transcript of the
21 video, that the Mujahedin themselves were not very happy with their
22 situation, and somehow they refused to continue to cooperate fighting with
23 the Bosnian army as long as they would not be put into a direct -- in a
24 state of a direct unit of the 3rd Corps. So they themselves also asked
25 for becoming a unit within the Bosnian army.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. General, can you elaborate upon what you just told us when you
2 said the corps commander did not have constant and direct control over the
3 Mujahedin. What does that mean?
4 A. That's what we just discussed before, that the Mujahedin were
5 operating in his area of responsibility, but not as you would have a
6 normal unit, with direct control and effective control over them, but only
7 part time they were working with his units. And some might have been
8 included in his units. Some kind might have just cooperated. And
9 therefore, it was more difficult for him to take disciplinary command and
10 control and charge them for the misbehaviour than if they were an organic
11 unit. So the situation was more loose for him, more difficult to execute
12 his disciplinary power and his command and control over these forces.
13 Q. General Reinhardt, could you please turn now to section 8 of your
14 report on page 21 in the English version. Based on your review of the
15 documents that were provided to you, can you tell the Trial Chamber what
16 conclusions you reached about the notice that might have reached the
17 accused with respect to events described and alleged in the indictment.
18 A. Well, the first documents I found were documents of early
19 February, which seemed to me to be a consequence of what happened in
20 Dusina, because the French General Morillon asked the commanding general
21 of the 3rd Corps to come and have a discussion with him. And right after
22 this, the commanding general issued an order to his brigade commanders,
23 telling them to, I would say, very simple, to behave properly, according
24 to the law. And two days later, he issued another order to all brigade
25 commanders, telling them, "We don't want to be as the other side is. We
1 want to show that we are better, that we are better prepared and that we
2 are fighting according to the human law." And he made the brigade
3 commanders responsible that if their soldiers don't adhere to the Geneva
4 Convention, that he would make them responsible and that the brigade
5 commanders had to make their soldiers responsible. So there was a clear
6 reaction in the way as the law provides it for in the ABiH that he
7 basically monitored his commanders to do that.
8 He does it again in April. He does it again in June. So there are
9 many written orders to the brigade commanders in which he complains about
10 the misbehaviour of individual soldiers and admonishes his commanders to
11 do something about it.
12 Q. General Reinhardt, what is the temporal relationship between these
13 written orders that you've just referred to and the crimes alleged in the
15 A. You cannot relate all the things which I just discussed to
16 criminal activities as related in the indictment. But Dusina for me is
17 pretty clear, that Dusina, which happened on the 26th of January, and the
18 reactions which I just mentioned on the 1st and 3rd February, seem to be
19 related. And I think again to what I have seen from Miletici, which was
20 the 306th Brigade, together with elements of the 7th Mountain Brigade, and
21 the reactions on that, again is a clear idea that something has happened
23 And again with the Guca Gora complex, the commander basically
24 admonishes his troops that they have to stop things which they have done
1 And Maljine again, when Maljine happened, very shortly afterwards
2 you see those kinds of orders. So there's for me a clear action and
3 reaction of the commanding general telling his forces that what they have
4 done was not the right way to do it, and monitoring them that they should
5 not do this and making their commander responsible for what had happened.
6 Q. Finally, General, if you could turn please to section 9 of your
7 report, dealing with the actions taken by the accused. Again, based on
8 your experience and background and the documents that you've reviewed, can
9 you tell us what steps the accused Hadzihasanovic took with respect to
10 notice of these crimes that you've been talking about.
11 A. I'm sorry if I might reiterate myself now a little bit, but he has
12 published and issued written orders in which he made clear that he knows
13 about criminal activities, that he doesn't accept them, that he admonishes
14 his commanders that they prevent their soldiers from looting, plundering,
15 killing, mistreating civil citizens, priests, destroying churches, and
16 making the brigade commanders responsible that their soldiers act
17 accordingly. And that goes like a red thread from February to June. And
18 in this regard, the commanding general of the corps shows a clear reaction
19 to what have happened on the battlefield.
20 In one case, in Kakanj, where the 3rd Battalion of the 7th
21 Mountain Brigade was looting and destroying property of the civilian
22 population, he even ordered the brigade commander of the 7th Mountain
23 Brigade to relieve the battalion commander and company commanders, so this
24 is a very clear, outspoken order to his subordinate, but I don't know
25 whether the execution really has taken place of the relief of those
1 officers, of those commanders.
2 Q. General, the event you've just described in Kakanj, you make
3 reference to that in your report?
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. Would you characterise that incident as being one in which the
6 commander took the appropriate steps?
7 A. I think the commanding general is very clear and very strong here,
8 telling his brigade commander, "I'm not happy with what had happened here.
9 Your commanders were responsible for that, and I expect you to relieve
10 them. No, I don't expect you. I order them. I order you to relieve
12 I think this is the reaction which I would have expected in my
13 army, that if a commander -- or if the troops of a commander misbehaved
14 the way they did, that you relieve the commander right away and start then
15 afterwards an investigation.
16 Q. General Reinhardt, based on your review of the materials provided
17 to you, on how many other occasions did the corps commander take similar
19 A. I don't know, sir. I really don't know. This is the only
20 document which I found in the stack of documents provided to me. There
21 might have been different cases, but this is the only one which I have
23 Q. Did you find any similar instances of situations where the
24 commander of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, the accused Kubura, took
25 similar steps with respect to subordinate units under his command?
1 A. No, sir, I did not. Again, also the brigade commander of the 7th
2 Mountain Brigade gave orders to his subordinate battalions to discontinue
3 looting and plundering and things like that. But I haven't seen any case
4 in which he took additional measures than those. And there's a particular
5 case in Vares where his neighbouring brigade commander accused him that
6 the soldiers of the 7th Mountain Brigade misbehaved dramatically in the
7 operations, but he just -- he just said, "These were not my soldiers."
8 And he just denied it. So he did not went any further on those
9 accusations of his fellow brigade commander.
10 Q. Thank you, General Reinhardt.
11 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, this concludes examination-in-chief of
12 this witness.
13 I'm wondering if this would be the appropriate time to tender
14 General Reinhardt's report into evidence or if Your Honours would prefer
15 that that wait. We would certainly wish that to be admitted into
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll now turn to the Defence.
19 The Prosecution is requesting that the expert witness's report be admitted
20 into evidence. What is the Defence's position?
21 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Our
22 belief is that we should wait for the conclusion of the cross-examination
23 in order to assess the probative value of this report and to take a
24 decision with regard to the matter.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We will withdraw for
1 a few minutes and we'll be back in a few minutes' time. We will now
3 [Trial Chamber deliberates]
4 --- Break taken at 5.03 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 5.04 p.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as tendering the expert
7 witness's report into evidence, the Trial Chamber has taken note of the
8 fact that the Prosecution has requested that this document be admitted
9 into evidence. Defence counsel would rather wait for the
10 cross-examination to be concluded. It is the Trial Chamber's opinion
11 that, given that this is an expert witness's report and we are discussing
12 questions of the admissibility at the moment, we can admit this report,
13 and its probative value will be assessed at a subsequent date.
14 Could Madam Registrar give us a number for this report now.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit P108.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The exhibit number is P108.
17 It's five past 5.00 now. It's now possible to start with the
18 cross-examination. We will work until a quarter to 6.00, since we have to
19 work until 7:00 p.m. We'll then have a 25-minute break and continue until
20 7.00 p.m., after the break.
21 Mr. Bourgon, you may start with your cross-examination. I assume
22 that you have divided the task and that Mr. Dixon will cross-examine on
23 behalf of the other accused. I don't know how you have organised
24 yourselves on the basis of subjects or on the basis of days. Could you
25 tell us how the defence intends to cross-examine the witness.
1 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We have
2 two different cross-examinations, one for the accused General
3 Hadzihasanovic and another for the accused Mr. Kubura.
4 As far as General Hadzihasanovic is concerned, whom I represent,
5 the Defence intends to cross-examine the witness for about two hours,
6 which we have already informed the Trial Chamber of. As we are discussing
7 time, the Trial Chamber said that they would like to ask the witness
8 questions on the last day, for about four hours. Since we have 20 hours
9 of hearings during the week, I've spoken to my colleague, who represents
10 Mr. Kubura, and we believe that if General Hadzihasanovic spends 12 hours
11 and the Defence for Kubura spends about 12 hours [as interpreted] on
12 cross-examining the witness, we should then have enough time for the Trial
13 Chamber to ask the witness the questions it wants to ask.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Bourgon. You may
15 take the floor for 12 hours now.
16 Yes, Mr. Ibrisimovic, on behalf of Mr. Kubura.
17 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I
18 think there is a mistake in the transcript. Mr. Kubura's Defence will
19 need two hours, not 12 hours for the cross-examination of the witness.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So Defence for
21 General Hadzihasanovic will require 12 [sic] hours, six times two, and
22 Mr. Kubura's Defence will require two hours, two times one, roughly
23 speaking. The breaks have been included.
24 Mr. Bourgon.
25 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I would
1 like to start this cross-examination by showing a Defence exhibit. In
2 order to explain this to the Trial Chamber, there is a map behind the
4 You have a map there, Mr. President. It was placed in the
5 courtroom last week. You must have noticed it. And I would just like to
6 refer to a document that mentions how this map was prepared. This map is
7 a collage of documents we have already tendered. It is the series of maps
8 on the scale of 1:25.000. We took the following exhibits: DH98, DH99,
9 DH100, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 105. That makes up a total of eight maps,
10 to which we have added eight -- I apologise, six other maps. We only have
11 one copy of these maps. I will tender this document in order to
12 illustrate what I am saying. Could the usher please distribute this.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis.
14 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, if I could, while this document is
15 being passed around. I notice from where I'm sitting it appears that
16 there are some markings in the upper left or central panel of this map,
17 and I don't -- perhaps we could have an explanation as to what that is,
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon will explain that.
20 Since the Judges don't have binoculars, and we would need military
21 binoculars in order to read the indications from where we are sitting.
22 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, my colleague is quite
23 right. I can see the indications. I won't be using this map today, but I
24 think I will take advantage of the cross-examination in order to explain
25 to everyone where the map comes from.
1 As you can see, Mr. President, together with the document that you
2 have in front of you, you have in white, together with the numbers,
3 indications for the maps that are on the table. And the maps which are
4 shaded are new maps. We only have one copy. This provides us with a
5 representation, the one we have there. The only map that is missing is
6 the map in the upper left-hand corner. The Jajce 24 map, we weren't in a
7 position to obtain it, and that's why we have a missing piece on the map
8 in front of you, Mr. President. We intend to use the map when
9 cross-examining the witness.
10 I would also like to inform you, Mr. President, that on the back
11 of this panel, we have maps 1 to 100.000, on a scale of 1:100.000 and
12 1:200.000. We made a collage in order to represent an entire sector, and
13 we'll be referring to this map too. I have a similar document that I want
14 to tender. I will do so when I turn this panel around tomorrow, and this
15 relates to the maps on a scale of 1:100.000 and 1:200.000.
16 And Mr. President, I will now commence with my cross-examination.
17 Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Cross-examined by Mr. Bourgon.
19 Q. Good afternoon. My name is Stefane Bourgon, and this afternoon
20 I'm accompanied by my colleague Ms. Edina Residovic from Sarajevo and Ms.
21 Muriel Cauvin from France. Together we represent General Hadzihasanovic
22 in the course of this historical trial. I say historical, Mr. Reinhardt,
23 because I think it is important that I start my questions by mentioning
24 the fact that this is the first time since 1946 that a commanding general
25 is accused solely on the basis of the manner in which he exercises command
1 and the command he was entrusted with.
2 Now, my question to you, sir, is that I take it that the
3 Prosecution did inform you when preparing the expert report and that you
4 agree that General Hadzihasanovic did not commit any crimes himself in
5 Bosnia in 1993. Would you agree with me?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. And I take it, Mr. Reinhardt, that you would also agree with me
8 that General Hadzihasanovic did not order the commission of any crimes in
9 Central Bosnia in 1993. Would you agree?
10 A. I agree. Not that I know of.
11 Q. And would you also agree, Mr. Reinhardt, that General
12 Hadzihasanovic did not plan the commission of any crimes in Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina in 1993?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. And would you also agree, Mr. Reinhardt, that General
16 Hadzihasanovic did not instigate the commission of any crimes in Bosnia
17 and Herzegovina in 1993?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And finally, Mr. Reinhardt, I take it, and I would understand that
20 you would agree with me that General Hadzihasanovic did not aid or abet in
21 any way in the commission, the ordering, the planning, or the instigating
22 of any crime in Central Bosnia in 1993?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. Would you agree, Mr. Reinhardt, that in all the material which has
25 been given to you, and you have made reference to quite substantial
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 material, up to 23 binders of orders, of war diaries, and other similar
2 documentation, plus one video that you say is not a military document,
3 would you agree with me, Mr. Reinhardt, that in all this material that was
4 given to you, you did not come across any evidence showing that General
5 Hadzihasanovic had either committed, ordered, planned, instigated or aided
6 and abetted in the commission of a crime in any way in Central Bosnia in
8 A. I haven't seen anything like that.
9 Q. In fact, Mr. Reinhardt, you are probably quite aware that the
10 charges in the indictment against General Hadzihasanovic focus on the
11 allegations that he did not take reasonable and necessary measures to
12 prevent the commission of crimes by his subordinates or to punish the
13 perpetrators thereof. Are you aware of this fact?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. And are you aware that this is the first time since 1946 that
16 charges are laid against a commanding general solely on the basis that he
17 did not take reasonable and necessary measures to prevent his troops from
18 committing crimes or to punish them for doing so?
19 A. I'm not aware of that.
20 Q. Are you aware, Mr. Reinhardt, with a case, a war crimes trial
21 which took place following World War II called Yamashita case?
22 A. No, sir.
23 Q. I would like to show you a quote from the judgement that was
24 rendered in the Yamashita case. I would like -- [Interpretation]
25 Mr. President, I would like to tender this document into evidence. I have
1 copies for everybody, and I would like them to be distributed in the
2 courtroom. There's just one quote from this judgement. [In English] If
3 you can please read this citation from the Yamashita judgement.
4 Now, Mr. Reinhardt, I was under the impression, and of course I
5 may be wrong, that this was a very famous quote that was used in the
6 training of a lot of commanders in many armies in the world. But maybe
7 you have never been made aware of this quote in Germany?
8 A. I was not.
9 Q. Now, reading from this quote, Mr. Reinhardt, and of course I would
10 like to ask you to look at this quote not from a legal perspective but
11 from a command perspective. And I think it is necessary to read out loud
12 this quote.
13 THE INTERPRETER: May it be noted that the interpreters do not
14 have this quote.
15 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]...
16 "a murderer or rapist because one of his soldiers commits a murder or a
17 rape. Nonetheless, where murder and rape and vicious revengeful actions
18 are widespread offences," and I stress here the words "vicious, revengeful
19 actions, which are widespread offences," "and there is no effective
20 attempt...", again, I stress the word "no effective attempt," "by a
21 commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a commander may
22 be held responsible, even may be criminally liable, for the lawless acts
23 of his troops."
24 Would you agree with this quote, Mr. Reinhardt?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. I therefore take it that you agree that from a command perspective
2 that even if a commanding general did not order the commission of a crime
3 but if his subordinates do actually commit vicious, widespread offences
4 and that if he does nothing, then he may be responsible and even
5 criminally liable for the acts of his subordinates. Would you agree with
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Now, in this case, Mr. Reinhardt, and I quote here from
9 paragraph 9.2 of your report, which is on page 24. Here I have the words
10 that you used at paragraph 9.2, in the middle of the paragraph, where you
11 say: "They felt responsible for incidents in their areas of
12 responsibility and they tried to stop these from happening by issuing
13 pertinent written orders."
14 These are your words that you wrote yourself?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. And I further quote you at paragraph 10.1, on page 28. That's
17 paragraph 10.1, and that is towards the end of the paragraph, where you
18 say that: "In the wording of their many orders to their commanders, the
19 accused were always very strong and outspoken."
20 Those again are your words?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. And today, in response to a question from my colleague from the
23 Prosecution, and I refer the Trial Chamber to page 50, lines 19 to 24,
24 again you mention that the accused General Hadzihasanovic issued many
25 orders and that he monitored the actions of his subordinate commanders?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. So my question, based on what we have discovered, would I be right
3 in saying that in your professional opinion, after reviewing all the
4 material that you have been given, the issue in this case is not whether
5 the accused took actions to prevent, because you just said that they did
6 take actions to prevent, but the issue is whether they went the extra step
7 to take actions to punish violations of international law. Is that a fair
8 summary of your --
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. -- opinion today? Now, we have heard and we have read also your
11 numerous qualifications, and I would like to express on behalf of the
12 Defence my appreciation to you for having accepted to take on this
13 challenge and to be here today to share your knowledge with the parties
14 and with the Trial Chamber.
15 For me, Mr. Reinhardt, and I come to my question, you are not a
16 Prosecution witness, but you are an expert witness whose duty it is to
17 offer an objective opinion based on facts that were presented to you,
18 without any bias to any of the parties. Would you agree with me that this
19 is your duty as an expert witness?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. I also take it, Mr. Reinhardt, that you would agree with me that
22 if during your testimony - and we will, of course, spend some time
23 together this week. You've heard that we will have this conversation for
24 some 12 hours or so - that if the evidence that comes out this week, if a
25 different light is shed on the facts that you have been shown, or if you
1 should be shown with new and additional information that you may not have
2 been aware before coming here today, that, as an expert, you may be called
3 upon to change your professional and objective opinion on your conclusions
4 found in your report?
5 A. Yeah.
6 Q. Now, what I would like to do at this time, Mr. Reinhardt, is to
7 explain to you how we will proceed for the next 11 or 12 hours or so, so
8 that it is quite clear what -- and so that the Trial Chamber is well aware
9 as to what I would like to get from you, and so then there is no confusion
10 with respect to my colleagues from the Prosecution.
11 The first thing I would like to do is to review with you some
12 aspects of your qualifications, and my objective in doing so is to help
13 the Trial Chamber to determine the extent to which your expertise will be
14 helpful in deciding the issue in this case. Would you agree with me?
15 A. Sure.
16 Q. Secondly, in the second part of my cross-examination, I would like
17 to ask you some questions on the role of a corps commander. As I'm sure
18 you know, when a Trial Chamber authorise a party to call an expert
19 witness, it is because the Trial Chamber believes that the witness has
20 some specific knowledge which the parties don't have and which can help
21 the Trial Chamber to analyse the evidence and decide on the issue. Are
22 you aware of this fact?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. Now, in this case, the Prosecution did not really inform us as to
25 what your specific domain of expertise was, but of course we know from
1 your background that you have detailed military knowledge. There can be
2 no doubt about that. And as you've stated yourself, you've been a
3 commander for most of your career and there can be no doubt about that.
4 And it is our submission that the questions we will put to you have the
5 objective of fulfilling the aim of an expert witness, and that is, to help
6 the Trial Chamber to understand the issues, to understand the military
7 situation, and to benefit from your expertise so that everyone in the
8 courtroom can understand what really was going on and the situation in
9 which General Hadzihasanovic exercised the command he was entrusted with.
10 Is that your understanding of your role this week?
11 A. Yes, sir, but I must tell you that I don't know everything which
12 was going on, at least not in the military field. Because I am not an
13 expert of the war on Bosnia-Herzegovina. I just looked into those cases,
14 but I'm not a military expert in what was going on in the field, on the
16 Q. Thank you very much. These types of comments are helpful, because
17 in all likelihood this is aimed at allowing the Judges to grasp what you
18 can help them with and what may be something that you are less able to
19 help. And all this is important in assessing the charges laid against
20 General Hadzihasanovic.
21 Now, as for the other issues, in terms of -- I was talking about
22 your qualifications. We were not clear as to whether you possess the
23 necessary qualifications to assist the Trial Chamber, and I quote
24 specifically on legal issues and on issues related to Mujahedin. On the
25 reading of your CV, we had some doubts. But this has been resolved,
1 because the Trial Chamber has issued a ruling saying that you were
2 qualified to speak about those issues. So my only question at this time
3 is whether you feel that you are qualified and comfortable to provide an
4 opinion on all the issues covered in your report.
5 A. As far as the legal basis -- the legal documents I've been given,
6 and as far as the questions asked to me I've been given, I feel qualified
7 to give answers on that. But as I said before, I'm not a legal expert.
8 Q. Thank you very much. Now, in the third and final part of my
9 cross-examination, I will endeavour to cover some facts with you, some of
10 which that you may be aware from reading the documents, some which, of
11 course, may be new to you, because I will try to show you some documents
12 that maybe were not found in the 23 binders that were given to you, and to
13 ask you some specific questions. So quite easy. Part 1, your
14 qualifications; part 2, we'll move into really benefiting, taking the most
15 from your military experience; and part 3 we'll try apply this to the
16 facts of the case.
17 Now, before I begin with part 1, with the questions related to
18 your qualifications, I need, before we start into this, to go into the
19 preparation of your report and to the methodology that you used in
20 preparing this report, so that we are -- we start from the same document.
21 My first questions with respect to this -- to your report deals
22 with the relationship that you have developed with the Prosecution while
23 preparing your report and preparing to testify today. You mentioned, and
24 I would like you to comment upon, a little earlier, in response to a
25 question from my colleague, that this had developed into -- I'm not sure
1 what the word [sic], but interrelation between yourself and the
2 Prosecution in the development phase of your report. Could you elaborate
3 on this for us, please.
4 A. Yes. The first step was that I was asked by Mr. Withopf to come
5 to The Hague and discuss the basic issue of that case, to lay down the
6 basic issue, and to look into documents in order to see whether I can
7 understand the basic case. And then I was called back, discussing this
8 case and some of the documents and was asked whether I would be willing to
9 elaborate on what I had done as a first step. And I said, yes, I would.
10 And then I was given a lot of material, went through the material,
11 and made a first draft of a paper, based on questions which I have been
12 given by that time. And then I came here again and I was given additional
13 material, plus additional questions. And in this regard, I mean, there
14 was some interrelation that I did my analysis, wrote it down, and came
15 back here, and most of the time I've been then issued new material which I
16 had to incorporate in order to rewrite my statement. And the last part
17 was, as you know, that I had to take quite a few things out again of the
18 report which I had already been given in here, and I was asked to come in
19 here to get all this material and to crank it into the paper. So this was
20 basically a continuation by editing or not -- editing is wrong, I'm sorry.
21 By giving me, issuing me additional material which I had to then
22 incorporate in the statement which I have already prepared until that
24 Q. And, Mr. Reinhardt, thank you very much for this quite thorough
25 response. Could you inform the Trial Chamber whether in this process, how
1 many different versions of your report were either given or looked at by
2 the representatives of the Prosecution?
3 A. I think it was five, but two were just because we had to
4 renumerate the documents, because we had a different way of issuing the
5 documents, and to rewrite it the appropriate way. So I think the papers
6 which I brought in here from the first until the last one, which you have
7 right now, actually are four different versions.
8 Q. And, Mr. Reinhardt, I take it that the Prosecution were very clear
9 in the questions that they put to you in terms of what they wanted from
10 you, what questions they wanted answers to?
11 A. Yes, they were very clear in the questions, but they were never
12 very clear -- actually, they led me very far in the blind about their
13 being satisfied with my work. Let me put it this way.
14 Q. I'm not sure I understand. Could you elaborate a bit?
15 A. Okay. If you turn in a paper, normally you expect that the one
16 who gets the paper somehow comments on the paper and says, okay. It's all
17 right or not. I never got a comment on that. Because they said, "We are
18 not entitled to tell you anything about the paper. We give you additional
19 information. Please work it in." But we didn't talk about the substance,
20 the quality of the paper which I have prepared. And that was at least for
21 me not very easy.
22 Q. And thank you very much for the response. Now, you mentioned that
23 your first contact, the first phone call that you received, was some two
24 years ago.
25 A. Well, I think it was one and a half year ago, somewhere.
1 Q. One and a half years.
2 A. Because they also had to go to the minister of defence in Germany,
3 from which I get the permission to come here, and I was asked to come here
4 to do this kind of job, and that took quite a while, until we then really
5 went into the actual business.
6 Q. Because if I recall correctly, you retired in April of 2001.
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. And so you were still a serving member when they contacted you?
9 A. No, I was not. I was a retired general by that time.
10 Q. And when you -- you mentioned that there was a process where there
11 was an initial question concerning the Mujahedin and 7 Brigade.
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. That was the first question that was put to you with some
15 A. Yeah.
16 Q. Can you recall for the benefit of the Trial Chamber the other
17 questions that were put to you? Now, you've answered already that they
18 relate to the subtitles in the report, but the order in which these
19 questions came to you?
20 A. I don't think I can really recall in detail about the order,
21 because this was an evolving process. I remember that I was asked to
22 elaborate what is a commander all about and what is the specific role in
23 reference to a NATO commander and a commander of the Bosnian corps, are
24 there any differences. We were discussing the question of disciplinary
25 and legal issues as far as disciplinary is concerned, in comparison to
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 what I'm familiar with and what I found out in those papers, the legal
2 responsibilities. But I cannot tell you the priority in which I got the
3 questions. But the nine questions, and these are the ten is my summary,
4 the nine questions were basically evolving over time.
5 Q. And the questions, sir, concerning the actions taken by General
6 Hadzihasanovic, was that the last question or was that in the process?
7 When did this become a command responsibility case in terms of your
9 A. This was I think a very early question, because the case was
10 against Hadzihasanovic and against Mr. Kubura and a third one by that
11 time, and the question was: What did they know and how did they react.
12 Q. And you knew at that time when you began on this endeavour, or
13 this project, that the indictment already existed and that both accused
14 had already appeared before the ICTY? Are you aware of this fact?
15 A. I knew about the indictment and the amended indictment.
16 Q. And were these documents given to you so that you could know what
17 these people were accused of?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. So in focusing and in preparing your report, in addition to the
20 questions by the Prosecution, you were also focusing on what the
21 indictment was all about?
22 A. Yes, sir. If I have just focused also on those cases only, and I
23 come back to what I said before on the military operations, I didn't focus
24 very much on the military operations because they were not the key
25 questions I was asked for. This was just a background taken that this has
2 Q. Now, did you receive any assistance from people? I mean, did you
3 get help within Germany, private help? I'm not talking any link
4 whatsoever with the Prosecution, but did you seek assistance? Sometimes
5 consultants and experts seek assistance from other people to help them,
6 because there was quite a volume of documents. Did you seek any
7 assistance or did you get --
8 A. Yes, sir, I did.
9 Q. What kind of assistance did you --
10 A. In the translation.
11 Q. Translation?
12 A. I have my translator from my former headquarters asking me --
13 asked him to help me in the translation, because my English, as you have
14 realised this afternoon, is not good enough, not fluent enough, to prepare
15 a paper which is rather consistent in your language.
16 Q. Well, to be quite honest, sir, if I spoke German as well as you
17 spoke English, I would be very happy.
18 A. Thank you very much.
19 Q. But it's -- so did you receive any other assistance in terms of
20 other --
21 A. No. No, sir.
22 Q. -- translation from English to German?
23 A. No, sir, none.
24 Q. Now, you did mention that you worked very long hours on this
1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. Did you?
3 A. Yeah.
4 Q. And much more than what you envisaged at the beginning.
5 A. Right.
6 Q. And you mentioned that you did not recall how many hours total,
7 but I asked this information to the Prosecution earlier, which was not
8 given to me, but how many hours were you actually paid to do this report?
9 How many hours did they pay you? Do you recall?
10 A. This is somewhere -- they are still -- some quite a few hours are
11 still open. I don't know whether I'm paid for that or not. I'm sure I
12 will. But, sir, I must tell you, I don't know. It was never a subject
13 for me. For me it was a subject to eat myself [sic] through the documents
14 and to get the proper information out in relation to my matrix, which
15 concerned those questions. I only realised that it took much, much more
16 time than I envisaged and it prevented me from doing many other things I
17 wanted to do and I couldn't do because I was hooked up in this material,
18 in these documents.
19 Q. My aim was simply to try and put an objective figure.
20 A. I really don't know. I never thought about this before. I don't
21 know, sir.
22 Q. Now, when you were actually going through the documents and also
23 drafting the initial product that you were doing, did you seek at any time
24 guidance from the OTP, from the Prosecution, because there's an issue that
25 you did not understand or that there were additional documents that you
1 were -- that you thought you required?
2 A. No. No, I never asked back on this one. Besides coming here and
3 getting additional material, asking them to work this in, I got no
4 additional guidance and I didn't call back for additional guidance.
5 Q. And now, we have, of course, your final report, which is the third
6 one that we actually received. We received one in November; is that
7 correct? And then there was a second one because you were asked to do
8 some modifications. And that, I believe, came in January.
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. And then this latest one, where you made some changes -- actually,
11 you approved some changes that were made by the Prosecution.
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. Is that correct?
14 A. No. I made -- I made all the changes, with the exception of one.
15 All the other changes were basically already indicated by me to
16 Mr. Withopf in an email, and then when I came here, I had additional -- a
17 handful of additional changes, because I was rather uncertain about the
18 numbering of the documents, and I misplaced some documents in this regard.
19 Q. Okay. We'll go into some detail into the preparation and the
20 documents, but for now I'd like to focus on the material which was given
21 to you by the Prosecution.
22 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are going to make a break
24 now. It is a quarter to 6.00. We will resume at 10 past 6.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 6.12 p.m.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm going to give the floor to
3 Mr. Bourgon. Before that, I would like to invite you to, when responding,
4 when you respond and when you hear the question, you turn towards the
5 Chamber rather than towards the Defence counsel. And the second issue is:
6 We are going to adjourn -- we are going to stop putting questions to you
7 at 10 to 7.00 because we have some housekeeping matters to deal with.
8 Without further ado, I'm giving the floor to Mr. Bourgon.
9 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Q. [In English] Welcome back, Mr. Reinhardt.
11 A. Thank you.
12 Q. We will now continue with my last question. Before I do raise
13 this question, however, I've been informed just prior to the break that,
14 again, as my colleague mentioned to you, because we speak the same
15 language, we have to try to take it a bit slower, and especially to take
16 some pauses between questions and answers. So I thought I was speaking
17 slow, but we will try again to -- both to do our best to accommodate both
18 the interpreters, but also the person taking down the transcript.
19 So my next question concerns the material which was provided to
20 you by the Prosecution. Now, the Defence has been provided with a list of
21 all the documents which were given to you. And I guess you would agree
22 with me, and you have already referred to the fact that it was quite
23 substantial material.
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. And I don't think you counted the number of pages, but if I say to
1 you that -- if I suggest to you that there were a few thousands of pages,
2 I think you would agree.
3 A. You might be right.
4 Q. And as you mentioned, you reviewed this material in order to
5 produce your report, and in some cases, you actually read the material
6 maybe two and sometimes three times. Am I correct?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. However, in drafting your report, you did not use all the
9 documents which were given to you. Am I correct?
10 A. You're correct, sir.
11 Q. And in fact, according to what I have counted in your report, you
12 used 104 documents out of more than 400. Is that a fair estimate?
13 A. Probably more than 400, but it might be right, yes, sir.
14 Q. Now, am I right in saying that your opinion, even though you used
15 only 104 documents, that your opinion is based on all the material which
16 has been given to you?
17 A. Yes, sir, because many documents are iterative in the content,
18 saying similar things, and therefore, I thought I should not elaborate so
19 much on the footnote. But you are right; this is a condensed version,
20 more or less.
21 Q. Now, I'm sure that when you were looking at these documents, you
22 had to assess the relevance of the documents, with a view to selecting the
23 documents which would best illustrate your opinion. Am I correct?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. Now, relevance is one thing, but I was wondering whether you
1 verified the quality and the reliability of the documents you were
2 provided with or whether you considered all material received to be facts
3 you can use in drafting your report.
4 A. No. I tried to qualify them according to the questions and the
5 case. And many documents, first of all, were not really related to what I
6 was asked for -- to answer. And many documents were just pertaining to
7 the individual criminal incidents on the spot, in which I did not
8 interfere any much more, especially the witness statements, which had a
9 huge amount of documents to be read.
10 Q. And, Mr. Reinhardt, my question -- I'll try to be a bit more
11 precise, in terms of: Did you assess the reliability of the document?
12 For example, if a document did not bear a signature, is that something
13 that you took into account?
14 A. Well, all the signatures, sir, which I saw were typed signatures.
15 I never know whether these were official signatures or not. I tried to --
16 not I tried. I only used documents from which I thought that they were
17 really giving some important information to that particular question.
18 Q. And did you receive any instructions or guidelines from the
19 Prosecution as to whether some documents you should be careful in using
20 them or some documents which were more reliable? Did you ever receive any
21 instructions of that kind?
22 A. Negative, sir.
23 Q. And were you informed by the Prosecution, because you answered my
24 last question in the negative, but were you informed by the Prosecution
25 that the material you were provided with was not yet evidence in the
2 A. I was only informed by the Prosecution that I should not base my
3 statements on written witness statements, because written witness
4 statements would not be as reliable as military documents. This was the
5 only thing I ever heard in this direction.
6 Q. And you took this into consideration in drafting your report?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Now, we confirmed a little earlier that General Hadzihasanovic had
9 already been indicted when you were approached by the Prosecution. Did
10 they at any time inform you of what their views were towards the
11 responsibility of the accused?
12 A. No, they did not.
13 Q. And did they ever show you any documents with respect to their
14 views in terms of: Did you ever see a document called a pre-trial brief?
15 A. No, sir.
16 Q. And moving on to witness statements, which my colleague referred
17 to a little earlier on. Based on the lists of documents I was given, you
18 were provided with 103 witness statements. Would that be more or less a
19 fair assessment?
20 A. I think so, yes, sir.
21 Q. Now, you were not informed in terms of whether these witnesses had
22 testified or would testify in the trial?
23 A. No, sir.
24 Q. And if I give you two examples, and I use witness Blazevic Katica,
25 a local witness, or witness Albert Hittmeyer, an international witness,
1 statements of whom were provided to you, would I be right in saying that
2 you were never informed that these people would not testify in the case?
3 A. No, sir. I was not informed.
4 Q. And in terms of the witness statements you were provided with, you
5 don't know whether you had been provided with the witnesses who have or
6 will testify?
7 A. No, sir. I did not know about that.
8 Q. Now, if I give you two examples of witnesses the statements of
9 whom you were not given, for example, Mr. Jeric, who was the military
10 prosecutor in Travnik, and Mr. Kapetanovic, who was the senior public
11 prosecutor in Zenica within the high prosecutor's office, would you be
12 able to confirm that you were not given these statements?
13 A. I don't remember having seen these documents.
14 Q. And if they are not on the list that I have, I guess that you were
15 not given those statements.
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. I would also like to refer to another example. There was a
18 document which was given to you, and this document had the number 1474. I
19 don't know if you have a list of your documents with you or if you could
20 refer to this document referred to as PT174. It would be the testimony of
21 a witness in the prior case, and the witness was called Major Dannatt.
22 A. No. I haven't used it.
23 Q. Now, this witness statement was in fact given to you. Could you
24 confirm this?
25 A. I cannot confirm this right now. Going through all those lists,
1 because as long as I don't have the other numbers, they are in a different
2 order. The order you just gave me, I really have to go page by page to
3 re-find this. It would take a lot of time, sir.
4 Q. So in order to save time, Mr. Reinhardt, I'd just like to show you
5 the consolidated list of documents that we have been -- that we have
7 MR. BOURGON: And I would like the usher, please, to show the
8 witness simply that document, this document from Major Dannatt was
9 actually given to you.
10 [Interpretation] Mr. President, I don't have copies for everybody.
11 I just wanted the witness to confirm that he has indeed been provided with
12 this document.
13 Q. [In English] I have all the lists here, if you prefer to have all
14 the lists, and we can of course show it to the Prosecution.
15 A. Okay. I see it right now. Unfortunately, I don't have the PT
16 number listed down in the same order as you have it. Therefore it's very
17 difficult for me to look back and forth. But it has been probably given
18 to me, but I did not use it.
19 Q. Now, this document, Mr. Reinhardt, I would just like to, for the
20 benefit of the Trial Chamber, refer to a decision which dated on 23
21 January 2004. Sorry.
22 [Interpretation] I'm going to continue in French, Mr. President.
23 In this decision, the date is 23 January 2004, this document bears the
24 number 115. That is the Prosecutor's list. And this is the document that
25 is an excerpt from the testimony of the witness Major Dannatt in a
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 previous case, in a prior case before this Tribunal. On the 23rd of
2 January, 2004, the Trial Chamber decided that this document would not be
3 admitted into evidence as a Prosecution exhibit. This is what I wanted to
4 state for the record. This document was returned to the witness and,
5 according to the decision of that Trial Chamber, it was not admitted among
6 the exhibits that the witness had at his disposal.
7 [In English] Mr. Reinhardt, on --
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution has to reply.
9 This document, 115, according to the Defence, has been returned to the
10 witness. We need to know the date. The decision was rendered on the 23rd
11 of January, 2004. Has the Prosecutor informed the witness that there's no
12 date on this document? We have to verify. Maybe you'll be able to tell
13 us more about it tomorrow, because at this moment I believe you cannot
14 reply, I'm sure.
15 Mr. Bourgon, can you please proceed.
16 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Q. [In English] I'm going to continue by going to the last draft of
18 your report, or the second draft of your report, whereby the Trial Chamber
19 issued a decision concerning some documents that were not to be used for
20 the -- in terms of writing your report. One of these -- there were two
21 documents. One related to each of the accused, which in fact was their
22 prior testimony in a previous trial. Now, following this, you were asked
23 by the Prosecution, in accordance with the instructions of the Trial
24 Chamber, to submit a new report.
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. Now, when I looked at the new report that you filed following
2 these changes, I could not see any difference in your opinion with respect
3 to the issue where you had used this document in your earlier draft. Can
4 you confirm this?
5 A. Yes, sir. I have not changed the basic attitude of my statement
6 because it was already confirmed based on the documents given to me before
7 I have been issued this additional material by the Prosecutor, which I
8 then incorporated. But while I incorporated it, it didn't change the
9 basic statement which I had before. It only increased some of my
10 findings, but it didn't change them. So I took all this out, but the
11 basic outcome was not affected by that.
12 Q. Now, in the same decision, the Trial Chamber requested that any
13 opinion on the ultimate issue be removed, and I take it that you were
14 informed by the Prosecution that this would be -- that that word was
15 removed, and in fact you did remove it from your report.
16 Now, my question to you is as follows: You did make a
17 determination that you remove from the first report to the second report
18 concerning the ultimate issue in this case?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And in doing so, had you already decided in your mind on the
21 criminal responsibility of the people against whom you are testifying
23 A. Well, I didn't decide on the criminal responsibility. I just laid
24 down the case. And I was asked not to come up with any personal attitudes
25 toward the accused and about their criminal responsibility or not.
1 Therefore, I didn't go -- therefore, I didn't mention this.
2 Q. I'd like to move on now, Mr. Reinhardt, to the third report that
3 we were provided with. I guess it was two weeks ago. And I refer here
4 to -- I guess it was given to us on the 22nd of April, 2004. And it
5 includes a new report, the contents of which you are familiar; is that
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. And as you explained earlier on, and I would like you to maybe
9 elaborate a little more in terms of whether these changes were originated
10 by you or whether they were originated by the Prosecution.
11 A. Okay, sir. First of all, it's not a new report, because the text
12 is with one little change absolutely the same. The question which -- or
13 the things which are different are some of the footnotes, where I have
14 different references to the footnote because I realised that in being
15 mixed up with those four different ways of documenting the documents, or
16 enumerating documents, I had made some mistakes. I did not been affected
17 by anybody on that [sic]; just the contrary. First of all, I wrote an
18 email to Mr. Withopf saying, "I made some mistakes here. Please -- I
19 inform you that this has to be corrected." This was when I was halfway
20 through. And when I went through with the rest of the things, checking
21 every document again and again, against those four different ways of
22 enumerating them, I found additional mistakes which I have made, and I
23 told them there are additional mistakes. They have to be corrected.
24 So this was my own realisation that I just did it not correctly in
25 this regard, as far as the numbering of the footnote was concerned.
1 Q. Now, what I would like to do is to go over a couple of these
2 footnotes. Now, you would agree with me that footnotes in a report of
3 this kind can be very important?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. And that because this document is indeed a document, like many
6 others, which will be used to determine the liability of two people. So
7 footnotes can be important.
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. I'd like to review a couple of these footnotes, starting with at
10 footnote 5 of your report. Now, footnote 5 of your report was modified
11 from the second to the third document, and footnote 5 is on page 3.
12 Now, what was changed in footnote 5 is basically that you were
13 referring to the regulations on the authority of a ground force corps
14 commander in peacetime, and the number that was given was that of a
15 telephone intercept which was a telephone intercept between Mr. Halilovic
16 and someone called Dzedo on 16 June 1993. Now, this was modified to read
17 and the text was changed to say these regulations prescribe the
18 responsibilities of the land army corps command. Now, can you explain how
19 a mistake like this could happen whereby you quote a document which
20 happens to be the wrong document, and there's also a document in the
21 numbering of the document?
22 A. I did not rewrite this footnote. I only changed the PT number
23 from 1367, which I mistyped, in 1362.
24 Q. So this would just a numbering mistake?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. Okay.
2 A. Nothing else.
3 Q. Now, if I move to footnote 9, which also appears to be a numbering
4 mistake, where we have -- where you have written footnote -- or PT1221,
5 and this was changed to PT474. Now, the first footnote you refer to the
6 decree on -- the decree law on the army of BiH, whereas PT474 is the
7 official army journal of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8 Now, what I'm curious about is that if you look in the report
9 today, and if you look in paragraph 2.9, and I read on the fourth line.
10 It says: "The rules of command authority are also laid down in the decree
11 of the armed forces of BiH."
12 Then we go to footnote 9, the new footnote approved by both
13 yourself and the Prosecution is 474. Now, my problem is that 474 does not
14 include -- is the wrong footnote.
15 A. Sir, in my final report, which I issued, it's still 1221, and this
16 is the decree with the powers of law of the armed forces of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm sorry. This is my report.
18 Q. We were given a document here in which footnote 12 -- footnote 9
19 was changed from PT1221 to PT474.
20 A. Sir, I'm sorry, but I haven't changed this. There must be a
22 Q. Okay. I mean -- by all means, if you think it's a mistake, I take
23 your word, and I'm not here to -- I hope you understand that this
24 procedure is to solidify, to make sure that we have a firm base from which
25 to work on in the morning.
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. Now, if we look at the PT1221, which is quoted into your report.
3 A. The decree.
4 Q. And PT1221 is the decree of the armed forces of BiH. And if I
5 look at 1221, it's called decree law on the armed forces of the Republic
6 of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. So if this was changed, this was then changed -- or it was a
9 mistake changed by the Prosecution?
10 A. Well, the 1221, sir, is the decree with the powers of law of the
11 armed forces, which is the one which I quoted.
12 Q. And if I move on to footnote 50 -- sorry. Footnote 22. Sorry, I
13 skipped a page. Footnote 22. And this is in your report.
14 [Defence counsel confer]
15 MR. BOURGON:
16 Q. Sorry, Mr. Reinhardt. I just had a quick question from my
17 colleague, and indeed you did have the right footnote before this change
18 was made in terms of the fact that this footnote, the footnote 9, was 1221
19 and should have remained 1221. So I don't know what could have happened.
20 So in footnote 22, it was indicated PT471, and it was changed to
21 PT1144. Would that be a wrong number or would that be something else?
22 A. The number 471 basically is an overall presidential order which
23 has the decree law on military courts. It's the basic order which
24 established this. And 1144 is then the decree law on special military
25 courts. So what I want you to note here, and therefore I want to have
1 this amended it is 471 plus 1144. Because the real contents of the law is
2 in 1144.
3 Q. So it's plus. So --
4 A. It's a plus.
5 Q. With a plus?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. Okay. And I move on to footnote 29. I don't have too many
8 footnotes. Just the footnotes that were referred to us by the
9 Prosecution --
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. -- the changes. And I have four or five, I guess, so it shouldn't
12 take too long.
13 In footnote 29, there was a reference to a PT -- sorry. It's
14 footnote 29, yes. There was a PT478.
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. Now, my problem with this particular document is that you were
17 only provided, at least according to our documents, with a very short
18 summary --
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. -- which does not talk about the fact that the commander was
21 entrusted with the building of the corps. So I'm just curious, because if
22 I look at your footnote 29, in the text, and it reads here: "As the first
23 commander of the 3rd Corps, Enver Hadzihasanovic was made responsible for
24 its organisation and build-up." And footnote 29 says PT478.
25 Now, I can give you PT478, and at least in my reading of the
1 document, it doesn't refer to the fact that Enver Hadzihasanovic was made
2 responsible for the build-up of the corps.
3 A. If I read the summary, the first sentence, it says: "According to
4 the security administration information, Enver Hadzihasanovic plus Morad
5 Mikivic [phoen] are engaged in organisation of the 3rd Corps in Zenica."
6 And this is clear to me, that he is responsible for building up
7 the corps.
8 Q. The fact that he's engaged in the organisation of the corps. I
9 mean, I take your assessment of these words, but that is your reading of
10 those words --
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. -- is that he was made responsible for the build-up of the corps?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. I move on to the footnote 78. But before that, this refers to, of
15 course, paragraph 4.22 in your report. Now, in paragraph 4.22 of your
16 report, there was a modification that was made, where the first thing is,
17 and I read towards the end of the paragraph, the fourth line to the end,
18 where it says: "According to the legal obligations of Article 239 of the
19 RBiH criminal law," and that was crossed out and replaced with:
20 "regulations of international laws of war in the armed forces of the
22 Is that a change that you triggered, or whose decision is it to
23 say that Article 239 does not apply than it should be the regulations of
24 the international laws of war?
25 A. This was a mistake which I found out, which I haven't corrected,
1 and therefore, I asked last time that we correct this. This was my
2 finding out to the mistake here. I misquoted from the wrong document.
3 239, Article 239 has a total different meaning of that particular criminal
5 Q. Thank you. Now, this PT1222, you asked for this to be replaced,
6 and I take it that the Prosecution did not discuss with you and they
7 replaced it as you had requested?
8 A. They have -- they rewrote it -- I rewrote it and gave it to them
9 and asked them to replace it this way.
10 Q. Now, of course, my colleague referred to the fact that you are not
11 a lawyer. But I think you know that for a law to apply to somebody, the
12 law has to be in force. Would you agree with me?
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. Now, from the documents that you've read, I take it that you know
15 that when the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina became an independent
16 state, they actually enacted a number of laws from their former country
17 which became law in Bosnia.
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And you actually quote an example of this in -- which is included
20 in PT3, basically where it is a known fact that the Criminal Code of the
21 SFRY became law in Bosnia.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. Now, what would you say if I suggest to you that in terms of these
24 regulations on the international laws of war in the armed forces of the
25 SFRY, this law was not enacted as law in Bosnia? What would your reaction
2 A. Then my assumption was wrong. My assumption was that this was
3 also a part of these regulations and laws applicable now to the new Army
4 of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5 Q. Now, with respect to this specific paragraph, because this is one
6 of the foundations of your report, whereas you say that the commander was
7 responsible for everything that happened in his specific area of
8 responsibility. So you basically say there's an area and everything that
9 happens in the area, the commander was responsible.
10 Now, I would agree with you that this regulation of the SFRY
11 somehow referred to that, but if it is not in force, did you find any laws
12 or any regulations in force in Bosnia that said that the commander was
13 responsible for everything that happened in his area?
14 A. This was the main quotation. I didn't find any other. This is
15 the key document for that. And therefore, I was -- sir, therefore, I was
16 keen to have it changed, because I realised I made a mistake here. And
17 this was one of the key questions I wanted to come back here and say:
18 There is a question. I have to have it changed because I quoted on the
19 wrong -- on the wrong foot here.
20 Q. I move on to footnote 115. And I cut short because we were
21 advised to stop at 10 to 7.00. So I'll just maybe do this 115 and
22 tomorrow I'll have just two or three and then we can move on to really the
23 substance of the report.
24 But in footnote 115, there was a new PT which was added. Now, I
25 quote from paragraph 8.2, and it says, the third line from the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 bottom: "They reacted by repeatedly addressing such actions and behaviour
2 and by giving written orders to stop them immediately. The first
3 documents to this effect occurred in February of 1993 and continued to
4 appear throughout the year."
5 Now, this is footnote 115 and footnote 116. And a new PT39 was
6 added. Was this at your request? And if so, why? Because you had
7 already given examples. Or was it because you were invited to do so?
8 A. Sir, 215, the third one in 155. In my translation to my files
9 with A, B, C, and in these A, B, C, different numbers, I just called the
10 wrong thing, and therefore, I had to replace it. 215 was the wrong
11 document, and I replaced it with the right document, which is 39.
12 Q. But according to my information, 215 was not replaced; just 39 was
13 added. That's what I have from the information --
14 A. Okay, sir.
15 Q. -- that was provided to me by the Prosecution.
16 A. 215 has nothing to do with what I'm expressing here. It has to be
17 deleted. It has to be replaced by 39. I basically had the mistake in the
18 translation of the documents and I pulled the wrong document. And when I
19 realised this, I put in the document I was looking for.
20 Q. I thank you very much for your answers, Mr. Reinhardt. I guess we
21 have to stop for today. Tomorrow I have two or three documents like that
22 I would like to get further explanation and then we move on to the
23 substance. Because we are very interested in getting -- as I've mentioned
24 before, to benefiting from your military knowledge. And I hope you
25 understand that this is meant to establish, affirm documents from which we
1 can work. Thank you very much.
2 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, that concludes the
3 cross-examination for today. Thank you.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Bourgon. Before
5 we started hearing the witness, we discussed the matter of the duration of
6 the cross-examination. You said that it would take you 12 hours,
7 Mr. Bourgon, to cross-examine the witness, and Mr. Kubura's Defence
8 counsel informed us that they would need 2 hours, and you said that the
9 Judges could use the remaining time. According to your calculations, we
10 should have hearings that last about 20 hours.
11 We have made our own calculations and we -- the result we obtained
12 wasn't the same as yours. If starting from Today, Tuesday, Wednesday,
13 Thursday, and Friday, we have 3 hours and 45 minutes if we subtract the
14 breaks. We start at 9.00 and adjourn at 1345, so in fact we have 3 hours
15 and 45 minutes each day. When we multiply 3.45 by 4, we obtain a total of
16 15 hours. So tomorrow we'll have another 15 hours at our disposal.
17 You will need 10 hours out of these 15, because you have already
18 cross-examined the witness for two hours. Mr. Dixon or Ibrisimovic will
19 need two hours. So the Judges will only have about three hours, if we --
20 and we also have to include the Prosecution's additional questions.
21 Mr. Bourgon, weren't you a little too optimistic when you made
22 your calculations? When you said you would need 12 hours, is there a
23 possibility of reducing the time you need? Unless you think that you
24 could also cross-examine next week, but that would make it necessary for
25 the witness to be available next week too, on Monday and on Tuesday. I
1 will first ask the witness before I let you take the floor.
2 General Reinhardt, you've been scheduled to testify during this
3 week. Would it be possible for you to continue giving testimony next
5 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's not possible?
7 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. In that case, we
9 must conclude with hearing this witness on Friday. Mr. Bourgon, according
10 to our calculations, we can't follow the timetable, because the
11 Prosecution and the Judges won't even have three hours to cross-examine
12 the witness, because you will have taken up almost all the time.
13 My other question is: You have 12 hours and Mr. Kubura's Defence
14 will be taking 2 hours. You will need six times more time, whereas in
15 fact the questions might be quite the same. Well, what can you tell us
16 about this? I must point out that given the witness's obligations, we
17 have to conclude on Friday at 1.45.
18 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We have
19 discussed this matter with the Prosecution, and we would like to conclude
20 on Friday, as planned. So we will do all we can to make this possible.
21 When I calculated the hours, I was basing myself on four hours a day. But
22 my intention, Mr. President, was to conclude halfway through Thursday. So
23 I'll cross-examine for four hours tomorrow, four hours the day after
24 tomorrow, and two hours on Thursday morning, and then Mr. Kubura's Defence
25 can conclude.
1 Without counting the exact number of hours needed, I think,
2 Mr. President, that it would be possible for the Defence to conclude its
3 cross-examination at the end of Thursday, and that would mean that the
4 Trial Chamber and the Prosecution would have Friday to ask their
5 questions. We'll do what we can to reduce the time we need, but there are
6 a number of documents that we would like to discuss with the witness. At
7 the moment, we're trying to find a way of proceeding more effectively, a
8 way of avoiding any loss of time when referring to documents. We'll try
9 to conclude at the end of Thursday. And if we use up more time, perhaps
10 we could continue to work a little longer on Friday, if any problems do
11 arise. But, Mr. President, if the Trial Chamber accepts the suggestion, I
12 think that we could conclude at the end of Thursday.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as the documents are
14 concerned, the ones you have mentioned, how many of them are there? And
15 in your opinion, the documents you will be presenting, are they documents
16 that might result in the Prosecution asking additional questions? And
17 will any new issues be raised when dealing with these document?
18 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. As far as
19 admissibility is concerned, if there are any new documents - and in fact,
20 there are some new documents - if our colleagues from the Prosecution
21 agree - naturally, we haven't discussed this matter yet - we intend to
22 have them all marked for identification. As a result, we won't have to
23 discuss the question of admissibility and we can take full use of the
24 presence of the expert witness.
25 As far as the question as to whether the documents will give rise
1 to any new issues, we do not believe that any new issues will be raised.
2 We believe that the Prosecution will be aware of the purpose for which we
3 are cross-examining the witness with regard to these documents. But
4 certain issues might be raised on the basis of the these documents. This
5 is not a possibility I can exclude. Thank you, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Mundis, in the
7 light of what has been said, what would your comment be?
8 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I'll limit my comments, due to the
9 time. Certainly, in the absence of any indication as to which documents
10 Mr. Bourgon is referring to, where they came from, we're really not in a
11 position to fully explain whether or not it might give rise to new issues.
12 We don't have any of the documents he's referring to. We don't know if
13 they're documents that we disclosed to the Defence, if they're documents
14 that the Defence investigators turned up on their own. We simply don't
15 know how many documents, what the documents refer to, et cetera. So it's
16 certainly not possible for us to give a final determination as to whether
17 those documents would result in the need for re-examination or not.
18 We're certainly open to the idea of marking the documents in
19 advance to expedite the proceedings, and of course any advance notice that
20 we have or any advance disclosure of the documents to the Prosecution
21 would allow us to be in a better position to make a determination as to
22 whether re-examination is required in light of those documents.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. In view of what both
24 parties have said, the Trial Chamber notes that the Defence will attempt
25 to conclude its cross-examination by 1.45 on Thursday. We will then have
1 Friday morning for the Judges' questions and, similarly, for the
2 Prosecution to re-examine the witness. We'll see the matter more clearly
3 on the basis of the documents that you have to present.
4 As far as the excerpt of the decision is concerned, what did you
5 want to do with it? Did you want to request that it be admitted into
7 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since I read this
8 decision out loud and it's been included in the transcript, I don't think
9 it's necessary to tender it into evidence.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. It's
11 7.00 p.m. exactly now.
12 General, we will now adjourn and we will resume tomorrow at 9.00.
13 Given that you have made the solemn declaration, you're in the hands of
14 justice now. Naturally, you shouldn't have any form of contact with
15 either of the parties. So please appear tomorrow for the hearing that
16 will start at 9.00.
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.,
18 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 4th day of May,
19 2004, at 9.00 a.m.