1 Wednesday, 24 November 2004
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, will you call the
6 case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Case number
8 IT-01-47-T, the Prosecutor against Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can we have the appearances for
10 the Prosecution, please?
11 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon,
12 Your Honours, counsel, and everyone in and around the courtroom. For the
13 Prosecution, Darryl Mundis. I am assisted again today by Lisa Hartog and
14 by our Ana Vrljic, case manager.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Mundis.
16 Can we have the appearances for the Defence.
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: Good afternoon, Mr. President and Your Honours.
18 On behalf of General Enver Hadzihasanovic, Edina Residovic, lead counsel,
19 Stefane Bourgon, co-counsel, and Alexis Demirdjian, legal assistant.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: Thank you. And the other Defence team.
21 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. On behalf of
22 Mr. Kubura, Rodney Dixon, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and Mulalic, Nermin, legal
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. The Chamber bids
25 afternoon to all those present, the representatives of the Prosecution,
1 the Defence counsel, even though there's an obstacle between me and them,
2 so I can't see them too well. Also, good afternoon to the accused and all
3 the personnel of the courtroom.
4 Before bringing in the witness, we have a minor point to address.
5 First of all, I wish to inform the parties that the attorneys of the
6 Defence and the Prosecution, regarding the timetable for next year and the
8 According to the UN Rules, we will have no hearings on Friday, the
9 21st of January, Friday, the 25th of March, Monday, the 28th of March,
10 Friday, the 29th of April, and Monday, the 16th of May, which will allow
11 you to make your schedule of witnesses.
12 I wish also to add that last year, in April, at the request of the
13 Defence, we had a small break of about one week. In view of the fact that
14 Friday, the 29th of April, is a holiday, I would suggest that both the
15 Defence and the Prosecution will be able to comment on this proposal, that
16 we have the break during the previous week, that is, from Monday, the 25th
17 until Friday, the 29th of April.
18 I will give the floor later on to the Defence for them to tell us
19 what they think about this, because by April, that will be about half of
20 the semester and you will be able to benefit from such a break before
21 engaging on the final stage of the proceedings. That is the first point.
22 The second, unless the Defence have any comments to make regarding
23 the timetable. If you do, I give you the floor.
24 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, regarding the
25 timetable you have just told us about, for the present we have no remarks
1 to make and we take note of it. However, as we are in the process of
2 producing evidence, we have ahead of us the Christmas and New Year
3 holidays, so would you be kind enough to tell us when we will have the
4 Christmas recess and when we will resume work in January.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In theory, but Mr. Registrar,
6 you can give us more precise information, in theory we will be having our
7 final hearing on the 18th of December, and then a three-week break, and we
8 resume on the Monday after those three weeks. So the last hearing in
9 December will be on the 18th of December, a Friday. So after that comes a
10 three-week break, and we will resume, I think, the 9th or 10th of January.
11 I don't have a calendar in front of me. A Monday anyway.
12 The second item on the agenda is the question of the admission
13 into evidence of documents produced and contained in this file. There are
14 several documents, and I give the floor to the Defence.
15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you,
16 Mr. President. Having heard the witness, General Cuskic, and after
17 producing documents, we would tender the following documents:
18 From the first section, that is, the 17th Krajina Brigade,
19 document 0432, marked as number 1. Then Defence number 0458, as number 3;
20 0493, marked as number 4; document 0725, marked as number 8; and document
21 1219, marked as number 9.
22 From the section on relations with the HVO, the Defence would like
23 to tender the following documents:
24 Document Defence number 0459, marked as number 3; document 0596,
25 marked as number 5; number 0609, as number 6; document 0645, marked as
1 number 7; document 0965, marked as number 8; document 0999, marked as
2 number 9; document 1087, marked as number 10; document 1096, marked as
3 number 11; and document 1160, marked as number 12.
4 The Defence would also like to tender into evidence, from the
5 section entitled "The HVO and the army of Republika Srpska", the
6 previously identified Defence exhibits. Number 1 is DH232 ID, number 2
7 DH233 ID. And as new exhibits, documents 1130, marked as number 3;
8 document 1129, marked as number 4; 1140, marked as number 5.
9 From the section entitled "Events in June 1993," we would like to
10 tender documents 1101, marked as number 1; and 1189, marked as number 2.
11 From the group of documents under the title "Measures," and shown
12 to the witness, we would tender as Defence exhibits number 0897, marked as
13 number 1; document 1132, marked as number 4; document 1156, marked as
14 number 7; document 1186, marked as number 9; document 1188, marked as
15 number 10; document 1224, marked as number 12; 1246, marked as number 13;
16 1278, marked as number 14; and 1516, marked as number 16.
17 From the group of documents shown to the witness under the heading
18 "The Travnik Church," we should like to tender the document that was
19 earlier marked for identification, that is, DH68, which is marked as
20 number 3.
21 And finally, the section under "Mujahedin," we would like to
22 tender document 1515.
23 Mr. President, all the documents I have listed were shown to the
24 witness. The witness was either a person who signed those documents, or
25 they were documents of his brigade or operations group that were
1 personally shown to him, or that he was personally aware of, or that he
2 knew the events referred to in those documents being a witness of the
3 events of the time.
4 Thank you.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis?
6 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. The Prosecution has no
7 objection to the said documents being admitted into evidence.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
9 Mr. Registrar, I give you the floor.
10 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. So we
11 have a series of 29 documents admitted into evidence. I will begin with
12 the documents previously marked for identification. DH232, marked for
13 identification, will become DH232 and DH232-E. Document 233 will become
14 Exhibit DH233; for the English version, DH233-E, marked for identification
15 on the 18th of March, 2004, and admitted now as DH68 for the English
16 version, DH68-E.
17 And I pass on now to the documents tendered today.
18 DH432 is admitted and the English version DH432-E. DH458-E.
19 DH493, English version, DH493-E; DH725, and the English version DH725-E;
20 DH1219, English version, DH1219-E; DH459, and the English version,
21 DH459-E; DH596, English version, DH596-E; DH609, English version DH609-E;
22 DH645, English version DH645-E; DH965, English version, DH965-E; DH999,
23 English version DH999-E; DH1087, English version DH1087-E; DH1096, English
24 version, DH1096-E; DH1160, English version, DH1160-E; DH1130, English
25 version, DH1130-E; DH1129, English version DH1129-E; DH1140, English
1 version, DH1140-E; DH1101, English version DH1101-E; DH1189, English
2 version, DH1189-E; DH897, English version DH897-E; DH1132, English version
3 DH1132-E; DH1156, English version DH1156-E; DH1186, English version
4 DH1186-E; DH1188, English version DH1188-E; DH1224, English version
5 DH1224-E; DH1246, English version DH1246-E; DH1278, English version
6 DH1278-E; DH1516, English version, DH1516-E; finally, DH1515, and the
7 English version DH1515-E.
8 And that completes the list, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. We have a third
10 point to address, and that has to do with the observations of the
11 Prosecution regarding the oral motion of the defence.
12 Mr. Mundis, you have the floor.
13 Submissions by Mr. Mundis:
14 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Before I turn to that
15 issue, if I might, there is one additional issue that I would like to draw
16 the Trial Chamber's attention to, and also seek the Trial Chamber's leave.
17 On the 8th of November, as the Chamber is aware, the Defence filed
18 a motion in which they sought to preclude the Prosecution from
19 cross-examining with respect to the presence of the Croatian army, and in
20 the same motion, they requested that the Prosecution not make reference or
21 use the terms "detain" or "detention."
22 On the 10th of November, the Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecution
23 to respond to that motion within 15 days. As I was finalising the
24 Prosecution response to that motion last evening, it occurred road to me
25 that the 15 days perhaps referred to the filing date of the Defence motion
1 rather than the time when the Trial Chamber informed us that we had 15
2 days. As a result of that, Mr. President, I, first thing this morning,
3 attempted to contact the Chamber's legal officer, the one who's normally
4 present with us but who I see is not here today. At the same time, I
5 directed my case manager to file our response today. And I raise this
6 issue, Mr. President, in the event that the 15 days commenced from the
7 Defence filing, clearly we missed the deadline, which would have been
8 yesterday. And so we are at this point seeking your leave to accept that
9 filing as if it had been filed in time, again, assuming that the 15-day
10 period commenced on the 8th when the Defence filed rather than the 10th,
11 when the Chamber informed us that we had 15 days.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, in our view, the 15 days
13 ran from the moment when we granted you 15 days, that is, starting from
14 the 10th. So the 15 days do not run from the moment when the motion was
15 filed but from the moment when we informed you about it.
16 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you for that clarification, in which case what
17 I said is just moot. We filed our response earlier this morning, and it
18 should be available from the Registry today at some point, I hope.
19 Let me turn, then, Mr. President and Your Honours, to the issue
20 that was raised on the 9th of November, and the Prosecution is grateful
21 for this opportunity to respond.
22 There are several issues involved, and the Prosecution will
23 briefly respond to these issues after making a few general comments about
24 what we would submit is the proper scope of cross-examination.
25 At the outset, Mr. President, Your Honours, the Prosecution
1 asserts that the scope of cross-examination is wide, as reflected in the
2 provisions of Rule 90(H), which requires the cross-examining party to put
3 their case to a witness when a witness is able to give evidence that is
4 relevant to the subject matter of the case.
5 Once a link has been established between the knowledge of such a
6 witness and certain documents, in our respectful submission, the
7 cross-examining party should be permitted to put the contents of documents
8 to a witness. In some cases, it might be helpful to the Trial Chamber to
9 have the document in question admitted into evidence, while in other
10 situations, this may not be necessary; all that may be needed is to
11 confront the witness with the document or documents in question.
12 Also, as a general rule, in our submission, where the document is
13 used to test the credibility of a witness, there is no legal requirement
14 for a foundation to be laid with respect to the document that is used to
15 test the witness' credibility. Rather, the cross-examining party must lay
16 a foundation in the form of questions put to the witness in order to put
17 the issue of credibility into play.
18 It's important, Mr. President and Your Honours, to keep in mind
19 that when the Prosecution was putting together its exhibit list, it was
20 not possible for us to anticipate the witnesses that the Defence might
21 call in its case. And consequently, and in light of the large number of
22 documents which the Prosecution possesses, our view is it should not be a
23 surprise that the Prosecution possesses documents which were not disclosed
24 because they didn't fall within the regular disclosure regime, or which
25 were not on the Prosecution exhibit list. Some of these documents may, in
1 our submission, however, now be shown to Defence witnesses who appear
2 before this Tribunal to testify.
3 At the same time, and along the same lines, because the identity
4 of the Defence witnesses was obviously not known to the Prosecution before
5 or during the Prosecution case, and because many of these witnesses
6 testified about all sorts of events and incidents in their evidence in
7 chief, the Prosecution would submit, as I'll be discussing in a few
8 minutes, our position is that we should be allowed broad latitude in terms
9 of cross-examining witnesses with documents and, if need be or if it's
10 helpful to the Chamber, tendering such documents into evidence.
11 We believe that the usual criteria which governs
12 cross-examination, including relevance, perhaps prior inconsistent
13 statements of the witness, or the credibility of the witness, in these
14 cases, we should be allowed to use documents which we had not previously
15 disclosed since they did not fall within Rule 68 or on our exhibit list.
16 The Prosecution submits that this is particularly true in the present
17 case, since the Defence have been permitted to introduce a defence based
18 on the widest possible use of contextual evidence.
19 Because the Trial Chamber that let the Defence lead evidence
20 concerning the military, political, historical, and socio-economic context
21 in which the armed conflict and the alleged crimes occurred, the
22 Prosecution should be permitted to challenge such evidence through
24 However, because our exhibit list and disclosure was premised on
25 the charges and counts in the indictment, and not in anticipation of
1 having to rebut actions taken by the HVO or, for example, crimes committed
2 by the HVO, it was not foreseeable that such material should have been
3 disclosed and placed on our exhibit list. The Prosecution position,
4 Mr. President and Your Honours, is that we could not have anticipated that
5 the Defence would have been permitted to lead evidence on the scope of the
6 entire conflict in the Lasva and Bila River Valleys in 1993, since our
7 indictment focussed on discrete incidents in that conflict.
8 The Defence have argued that the proper time for the Prosecution
9 to adduce such evidence is through a rebuttal case and not through the
10 Defence case, through Defence witnesses. While the Prosecution
11 appreciates this position, it raises problems, in our respectful view.
12 For example, the Prosecution could be faced in rebuttal with
13 several choices in order to get these documents before the Trial Chamber.
14 First, we would seek to tender them from the bar table in a case in
15 rebuttal, as was done during the Prosecution case in chief, over strenuous
16 objections of the Defence. Second, we could recall or seek leave to
17 recall the relevant witnesses, many of whom would be Defence witnesses, to
18 speak about the documents that would be in our possession.
19 In our respectful submission, Mr. President, neither of these ways
20 of proceeding are sound and could result in wasting precious resources and
21 time, especially if the witness' subsequent re-examination consists of
22 only a handful of questions relating to a document or documents. The
23 better course, in our view, would be for the Prosecution to be allowed to
24 show such documents to the Defence witnesses while they're here and to ask
25 them to comment on them.
1 Let me turn to a couple of the specific issues, other issues,
2 raised by the Defence, the first concerning disclosure.
3 As everyone in and around this courtroom is aware, Rule 65 ter
4 (E)(3)(iii) requires the Prosecution to list and disclose the exhibits it
5 tends to -- intends to use or would like to use in its case in chief.
6 Rule 66 governs disclosure of confirmation material, permits the Defence
7 to inspect material within the Prosecution's possession. Rule 68, of
8 course, governs exculpatory and other material.
9 There is no specific rule that governs the disclosure of material
10 for purposes of cross-examination.
11 As this Chamber is aware, the investigation mandate of this
12 Tribunal runs through the end of 2004, and the Prosecution is continuing
13 to investigate alleged crimes relating to other potential suspects.
14 During the course of such investigations, which are not linked to the
15 present case, the OTP occasionally seizes or otherwise takes custody of
16 material and documents which might be relevant in these proceedings,
17 which, in our respectful view, can be an explanation as to why material
18 comes into our possession or has come into our possession both after the
19 commencement of this case and during the course of this case.
20 As the Prosecution reviews this material, we, of course, disclose
21 any and all material that falls within the scope of Rule 68, which is, of
22 course, an ongoing obligation.
23 The Trial Chamber specifically asked the Prosecution to address
24 you on the issue of the general circumstances concerning "the
25 Prosecution's knowledge of the documents that they had or obtained after
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the presentation of its case."
2 Now, Mr. President and Your Honours will recall that Mr. Withopf
3 briefly explained, during the lengthy arguments concerning the
4 admissability of documents tendered by the Prosecution from the bar table
5 during the course of the Prosecution case in chief. Most, but not all,
6 most of the documents which have been tendered into evidence in this case
7 have originated in one of about 10 different document collections.
8 The disclosure of this material is contained in what we refer to
9 as our disclosure log. The disclosure log in this case runs to more than
10 200 pages of a spreadsheet, and it lists the date on which each individual
11 document, or collection of documents, was disclosed.
12 I thought it might be of some assistance to the Trial Chamber and
13 to the Defence to attempt to summarise what's contained in the disclosure
14 log. I have prepared a chart, a two-page, or page-and-a-half chart which
15 I would ask, with the assistance of the usher, to be distributed to the
16 Trial Chamber and to the Defence. Let me stress, however, that while this
17 is being done, that again, this is only a summary. This document, as I'll
18 explain in a few moments, has certain limitations, as any summary will
20 First, let me stress again that there are some documents which do
21 not come from the six or seven or eight collections that are listed here.
22 For the most part, however, with the exception of the documents coming
23 from UNPROFOR and BritBat, which I'll address in just a moment, this chart
24 reflects those collections from which a large majority of the documents
25 used in this case have come.
1 You'll note the second -- the first column indicates the
2 collection name, the name by which the Office of the Prosecutor refers to
3 these collections of documents. Mr. Withopf has used some of these terms
4 earlier in this trial.
5 The second column refers to the ERN range, the internal
6 OTP-assigned number that's unique to each document or each page of each
7 document. These ERN ranges refer to the B/C/S version of the documents
8 for the simple reason that when we go into an archive and either seize or
9 voluntarily take documents, or when a state or an agency provides us with
10 documents, we'll have an entire collection. Those documents will then be
11 sequentially numbered in their original language. When they are submitted
12 for translation, the translations receive a different ERN number
13 reflecting the different version of that document, which is why we've used
14 the original ERN ranges.
15 The third column indicates the date or dates that the documents
16 were obtained by the Prosecution.
17 The fourth column indicates disclosure. Let me emphasise for
18 everyone's benefit that, as a general rule, in this chart, the column
19 indicating disclosure refers to electronic disclosure only for the simple
20 reason that, as I've said, a 200-page spreadsheet containing individual
21 dates, it's simply impossible to capture in any other way other than to
22 say the material was made electronically available, either on CDs or more
23 recently via the electronic disclosure suite. I should also stress that
24 most of those document collections were disclosed in hard-copy format
25 prior to trial, and in some instances, many, many months before trial.
1 The final column addresses a question that Your Honour put to us
2 concerning the method, whether it was a consensual search, whether it was
3 a seizure, whether it was in response to a request from the Office of the
4 Prosecutor to provide documents. We've also indicated whether we have
5 taken copies of the documents or the originals.
6 With this chart, Mr. President, it should be - and Your Honours -
7 it should be possible to identify rough information about most of the
8 documents which have been tendered into evidence or documents which the
9 Prosecution may, in the future, seek to tender, if the Trial Chamber
10 grants us permission to do so. Again, it's a rough summary, and it's an
11 attempt to reduce more than 200 pages down to a page and a half, with the
12 inherent difficulties that that may cause.
13 I think, Mr. President, I have hopefully answered your questions.
14 We do have a couple of other issues that I would like to just address in
15 the context of this discussion.
16 With respect to disclosure of material that might become relevant
17 during the course of the direct examination, either because it's something
18 that was not clearly anticipated by the Prosecution or because it,
19 perhaps, goes to refreshing the witness' recollection or somehow goes to
20 the credibility of the witness, we would assert in those situations and
21 circumstances we should be permitted to show documents to the witness, we
22 should be able to put these documents to the witness, and we should be
23 able to cross-examine the witness on these issues.
24 I would also, before I sit down, I would like to draw the Trial
25 Chamber's attention and the attention of the Defence to a decision in the
1 Kupreskic case, which is case number IT-95-16-T, a decision of the 21st of
2 January, 1999. The decision is titled "Decision on Order of Presentation
3 of Evidence." And I would like to read from pages 3 and 4 of that
4 decision, which relates to the very issue that has arisen in this case.
5 The Trial Chamber in that case stated:
6 "In order to avoid a possible prejudice to an accused which might
7 result from the Prosecution introducing documents in the cross-examination
8 of a witness which the accused had not hitherto had the opportunity to
9 review and to cross-examine the witness upon, the Prosecution must bona
10 fide disclose to the accused at the earliest available opportunity and, at
11 the latest, prior to cross-examination, any new material it wishes to
12 submit to a Defence witness in cross-examination, in order to give the
13 accused due notice."
14 In our respectful submission, Mr. President, this decision stands
15 for two propositions.
16 First, due process and due notice requirements require the
17 Prosecution, at the earliest available opportunity, to disclose material
18 it seeks to tender in cross-examination of Defence witnesses. At the same
19 time, however, this decision, in our respectful view, in light of the
20 language "disclosure, at the latest, prior to cross-examination," simply
21 means that the Defence should not be ambushed with such documents. And as
22 long as the Prosecution discloses such documents prior to
23 cross-examination, our view is that the decision of the Kupreskic Trial
24 Chamber, if adopted by this Trial Chamber, would permit us to do that.
25 Finally, the final issue I would ask to be taken into
1 consideration would be that, in our respectful submission, the interim
2 oral order of the 10th of November, we would ask that that be modified to
3 take into consideration the needs for cross-examining based on documents
4 in terms of refreshing recollection, in terms of potential prior
5 statements, and in terms of the relevance of material which was not
6 foreseeable to the Prosecution prior to trial. We would ask that a
7 balancing test approach be taken similar to the one taken in Kupreskic.
8 The Prosecution would be in the best position to disclose such
9 information as early as possible if we were to get the earliest possible
10 notification from the Defence as to the witnesses coming in the next week.
11 We have indicated on several occasions that we receive our information on
12 our searches based only upon our informing the relevant unit who's coming
13 in the next week or two weeks.
14 I understand the difficulties that the Defence have had in this
15 respect, but it is our respectful view that the more time we have,
16 Mr. President, the more time we will have to review that material and to
17 disclose any potential material that, in our respectful view, we have a
18 duty to seek to put before Your Honours in terms of resolving the ultimate
19 issues involved in this case.
20 With that, Mr. President, again, I thank the Trial Chamber for
21 allowing us some 20 minutes in order to respond to the Defence
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Given the
24 Prosecution's submissions, is there anything the Defence would like to say
25 now, or would you prefer to respond at a subsequent date, after having
1 examined the transcript and after having established exactly what your
2 position is.
3 Mr. Bourgon.
4 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Good day,
5 Judges, good day, Mr. President.
6 Submissions by Mr. Bourgon:
7 Defence counsel will respond to the submissions made by the
8 Prosecution right now. I will try to be as brief as possible.
9 First of all, Mr. President, I'd like to draw the Trial Chamber's
10 attention to the many comments made by my colleagues that concern
11 disclosure evidence. The Trial Chamber can see, on the basis of the
12 document distributed to everyone in the courtroom, that there's an
13 incredible volume of documents that are included in the new system, what
14 we call the electronic disclosure system or electronic disclosure suite.
15 The volume of material that can be found in this document and in
16 this new system underlies the lack of resources that the Defence counsel
17 has. We don't even have limited access to all these documents included in
18 the electronic system.
19 Mr. President, these documents, this system, have only existed for
20 a very short while, and as the Trial Chamber is well aware, the first time
21 we had access to this system was when we received the documents from the
22 EU Monitoring Mission. However, this is not the subject that the Defence
23 wants to discuss today.
24 As far as the Prosecution's arguments concerning tendering new
25 documents into evidence are concerned, I can summarise them as follows:
1 It wasn't possible for the Prosecution to anticipate the documents
2 that would be used by Defence counsel, nor was it impossible for them to
3 anticipate the witnesses that Defence counsel would be calling.
4 Similarly, the Defence shouldn't be surprised if the Prosecution presents
5 new documents. I think that that's the essence of the Prosecution's
7 Mr. President, I won't repeat everything I said when I made my
8 submissions the first time, but it's necessary to emphasise the fact that
9 the Prosecution and Defence have diametrically opposed positions in these
10 proceedings. The Defence doesn't bear the burden of proof, but the
11 Prosecution has the burden of proof. They must prove beyond any
12 reasonable doubt all the charges leveled against the accused.
13 Nevertheless, the Prosecution doesn't have any arguments that they need to
14 protect themselves. The purpose of the Prosecution is to present all the
15 elements that they have, and then the accused may raise certain doubts
16 with regard to their guilt. Why? Because it's not permissible to
17 surprise an accused. Justice should not surprise anyone. Either we have
18 proof or we have no proof. Similarly, an accused should have sufficient
19 time to prepare and to assess the impact of new documents presented.
20 The Prosecution adds that there are no rules governing disclosure
21 in the course of its cross-examination. Naturally, Mr. President, it is
22 true that there are no specific rules for the Prosecution or for the
23 Defence as far as the use of any given document is concerned. What the
24 Prosecution failed to mention, however, is that there is a principle, and
25 this principle can be found in Article 21. And these principles are based
1 on the rights of the accused, too.
2 Mr. President, the Prosecution is not playing a game here. The
3 Prosecution is here to present the evidence it has against the accused.
4 The Prosecution has all the means it needs to carry out its
5 investigations. It's been carrying out its investigations since 1993.
6 They can present the evidence against the accused and, above all, a
7 principle has been established, according to which the Prosecution cannot
8 divide its evidence into two parts. They can't say that they'll present
9 sufficient evidence so that we can move to the Defence stage and then say,
10 We'll commence with another stage and introduce new documents, under the
11 pretext that they did not know what the Defence was going to do. This is
12 turning the situation upside down.
13 The Prosecution has its case. They have made certain charges,
14 they have carried out investigations, and they should disclose all their
16 Rule 65 ter (E)(iii) provides for these principles. The Defence
17 should be provided at the same time as the pre-trial brief a list of
18 documents and all the documents. This should enable Defence counsel to
19 prepare its case and to see the witnesses and examine the Prosecution's
20 case. The accused are on this side, not on the other side.
21 Mr. President, once the Prosecution has provided this list, it
22 should include all the evidence they have against an accused. The
23 Prosecution should not keep certain material that they have and say that
24 they don't need it immediately, because they want to wait to see what the
25 Defence is going to say before they examine the documents and decide
1 whether the evidence they have might really be needed, or to see whether
2 it would be sufficient to use only a certain number of documents.
3 Mr. President, when the Defence case commences, there's nothing
4 the Defence has to disclose in terms of information, in terms of
5 knowledge, to the Prosecution. In this system, this is based on the
6 principle that the Prosecution should know everything. The Prosecution
7 shouldn't be surprised by a document, because the Prosecution made the
8 charges, the Prosecution conducted the investigation. So if the
9 Prosecution had a document that they investigated and didn't find, that
10 wouldn't be prejudicial. It would only be prejudicial if they could not
11 present their case.
12 Here before the International Tribunal, we have rules governing
13 the disclosure of evidence, according to which the Defence, before the
14 beginning of its case, provides the Prosecution with all the documents it
15 intends to use. Not just a list of documents but copies of these
16 documents. So the Prosecution knows exactly which issues are going to be
17 raised by the Defence. In certain systems, that would go far beyond what
18 one usually expects from the Defence. But in international proceedings,
19 one believes that this is correct. In order to determine the truth, one
20 should provide the Prosecution with all the documents, and this is what is
22 Once the Prosecution has these documents, one should not say that
23 the Prosecution can then use these documents. They should not be allowed
24 to say, Well, now, examine the evidence against the accused that we didn't
25 disclose before, and then decide that this material can be, in fact, used
1 against the accused.
2 As we have already said, the Prosecution may continue to carry out
3 its investigations. This is quite normal, where a new fact is established
4 in a courtroom, and the Prosecution sends investigators into the field to
5 check up on this information. However, to establish new evidence, if they
6 have contrary evidence, according to proceedings before the International
7 Tribunal, this fact can be established, or the Defence's evidence can be
8 challenged in the course of the rebuttal phase. That is when the
9 Prosecution can present new evidence.
10 Finally, Mr. President, as far as cross-examination on the part of
11 the Prosecution is concerned, we believe that there are certain practical
12 issues that the Trial Chamber has to take into consideration, and I
13 welcome the arguments of my colleague who says that it wouldn't be
14 practical to call back a witness in the course of the rebuttal stage; this
15 would result in a waste of time.
16 The Defence, like the Prosecution, is trying to proceed
17 expeditiously. Nevertheless, Mr. President, we believe that any new
18 documents that might be filed by the Prosecution should at least meet the
19 following criteria:
20 Firstly, they should be disclosed to Defence counsel at least 48
21 hours in advance. Why 48 hours in advance? Because the system is such
22 that, in order to have time to meet the accused, discuss with the accused
23 in their language, and in order to adjust the Defence's strategy, well,
24 this requires a certain amount of time. This is a formal stage.
25 As far as the substance is concerned, Mr. President, the
1 Prosecution should ask the Chamber for leave. Before a witness is heard,
2 they should ask for permission to modify the list of documents, and they
3 should explain to the Judges how the document was obtained and why it
4 wasn't included in the list beforehand. They should also explain why the
5 document is so important that it has to be presented immediately in the
6 course of the cross-examination. They must also explain why they cannot
7 wait to present this document in the course of the rebuttal stage.
8 Thirdly, my colleague said when the witness is in a position to
9 assist the Chamber. But, Mr. President, since the very beginning of the
10 Defence's case, we have noticed that on a number of occasions, the
11 Prosecution has used the cross-examination not to challenge, not to
12 contradict witnesses, but to find out names, find out things about certain
13 events, and these are all matters that should have been dealt with before
14 the commencement of the Defence's case.
15 And finally, I'd like to draw your attention to this matter,
16 Mr. President. When the Prosecution wants to produce a document, wants to
17 show a witness a document, if it's a new document, it is obliged to show
18 why it has a certain theory; they must explain their theory. They must
19 say, Mr. Witness, Witness, I put it to you that such and such an event
20 took place, and then, after having put their case to the witness, they can
21 present their document. They can't go on a fishing expedition and show a
22 document to a witness that might lead to a name and might lead to another
24 As far as the credibility of a witness is concerned,
25 Mr. President, this is something that we have already spoken about. This
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 is an exception. The Defence would never oppose the Prosecution if they
2 wanted to use a document to discredit a witness and show that a witness
3 gave false testimony. If someone gives false testimony, this is a very
4 serious offence. And if the Prosecution wants to use any documents, new
5 ones or old ones, they can show these documents to Defence counsel before
6 the examination of the witness and say that they intend to use the
7 document. We did this with a witness for the Prosecution, and we used a
8 number of documents to demonstrate the particular situation that that
9 witness was in. When we addressed the issue of the credibility of the
10 witness, there's the credibility as a substantial issue, and there's
11 credibility in the sense of the witness speaking the truth. In this
12 particular case, the Prosecution may in fact present a new document.
13 My colleague mentioned the Kupreskic case, and he mentioned a
14 decision taken in the case dated 1999. As my colleague said, the purpose
15 of this decision was to ensure that the accused weren't trapped, and it
16 was also to ensure that the rights of the accused were respected.
17 Nevertheless, Mr. President, this decision does not deal with new
18 evidence. It does not state anything about the use of new documents to
19 establish facts that should have been established in the course of the
20 Prosecution's case. And that's the crux of the matter. The Prosecution
21 shouldn't be granted leave to present new evidence in the course of the
22 Defence's case. They have two occasions to do this, and that is during
23 the presentation of its own case and during the rebuttal phase.
24 As I have said, the Prosecution has all the resources it needs,
25 and these resources have been used since 1993. If we compare their
1 resources to the Defence counsel, well, you may think that the Defence
2 counsel is very strong, but we don't have significant resources behind the
3 scenes. Nothing that would be comparable to the resources that the
4 Prosecution has.
5 One final thing I would like to say, Mr. President, as far as the
6 witnesses are concerned. The Prosecution says that our list of witnesses,
7 we provided them a little too late, and they would like to know who is
8 going to be called a week in advance. Naturally, we agree with the
9 Prosecution, and we're doing our best, and we will continue to do our best
10 in order to inform the Prosecution as soon as we have the relevant
11 information about the identity of the future witnesses.
12 Nevertheless, Mr. President, in the course of the Prosecution's
13 case, we were faced with the identical situation. From one week to the
14 next week, we didn't have the list of witnesses, and we didn't know the
15 identity of the witnesses. Nevertheless, there's a huge difference. If
16 the Defence doesn't know who the next witness is, this affects the rights
17 of the accused. But in the case of the Prosecution, who have been
18 involved in investigations for five years, if they only know about the
19 witness' identity a few days in advance, well, this shouldn't affect them
20 significantly. They have all the resources, they have all the
21 investigators, they have all the documents, so the situation is different.
22 Naturally, they might discover that the witness, or a witness has lied.
23 Why should they prepare for a Defence witness? The Defence can prepare
24 for a Prosecution witness, because the Prosecution witness will be
25 appearing to testify and the evidence provided might establish the guilt
1 of the accused. It's necessary to conduct a lot of investigations. But
2 the Prosecution have already completed their investigations. They should
3 be fully aware of the nature of their case. The problem in these
4 proceedings is that the Prosecution appears to be unaware of the nature of
5 their case, and we are wasting a lot of time as a result. And if I make
6 submissions for 20 minutes, as well as my colleague, naturally we'll be
7 wasting more time.
8 But, Mr. President, it's necessary to spend this time in order to
9 clarify the nature of the proceedings, because all the cases before the
10 International Tribunal must show full respect for the rights of the
11 accused. Thank you, Mr. President.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Was there anything
13 that the other Defence team would like to say?
14 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours. There are a few points that
15 we wish to add.
16 Submissions by Mr. Dixon:
17 Your Honours, if at the outset I could state that what my friend
18 Mr. Mundis has said in two respects is absolutely correct.
19 Firstly, that there is always a lot of new information that is
20 potentially relevant to any case; and secondly, that it is not always
21 possible for the Prosecution to foresee everything that the Defence is
22 going to raise during its case. However, I think to be fair,
23 Your Honours, there are important qualifications to be made to each of
24 these points.
25 Firstly, in respect of what the Prosecution can expect, it is
1 correct that the Defence is required, under Rule 65 ter (F), to file a
2 Defence statement at the commencement of the Prosecution case where the
3 Defence sets out what its main lines of defence are going to be. So, for
4 example, in the case of Mr. Kubura, I don't think that the Prosecution
5 can complain that, from the outset, for example, in respect of the charges
6 for Miletici and Malina, the Prosecution have known that the issue of the
7 presence and the deployment of the 7th Brigade is the key issue in
8 dispute; and that if they wish to prove their case in that respect, that
9 is where they need to focus their efforts.
10 In addition, throughout the whole Prosecution case, through the
11 cross-examination that the Defence presents, the Prosecution is on notice
12 as to what are the key challenges that are raised by the Defence.
13 Secondly, Your Honours, in respect of the amount of information
14 that does become available, in our submission, there must be some limit
15 placed on the evidence that the Prosecution can use. Otherwise, trials
16 would be elongated to unreasonable proportions. And also at the appeals
17 stage, we would still be, as is the case in many appeals, looking at new
18 evidence that does become available. And as Your Honours will know, the
19 test for the admission of new evidence at the appeals stage is a very,
20 very high one.
21 Your Honours, Mr. Mundis is also correct that there is no rule
22 which governs the disclosure of material to be used during
23 cross-examination, and it is for each Trial Chamber to determine the
24 matter according to its own procedures. We would urge Your Honours to be
25 guided by Rule 89(B), which states that when there is no rule dealing with
1 the issue in point, that Your Honours should devise a rule which best
2 favours the fair determination of the matter before Your Honours. The
3 touchstone is fairness.
4 Of course, Your Honours, we are all concerned about determining
5 the truth about what occurred in these proceedings, but that must be done
6 in the context of a fair determination of the issues before Your Honours.
7 We would, therefore, propose that a procedure be adopted which has
8 four aspects to it.
9 The first is that material can only be used in cross-examination
10 when, as Mr. Mundis has said, it is disclosed at the earliest opportunity
11 to the Defence. So disclosure is obviously the starting point. We can't
12 be taken by surprise. That applies to both sides.
13 Secondly, and this is the thrust of my submission, is that the
14 disclosure must have taken place before the end of the Prosecution case,
15 or at least before the start of the Defence case once the Defence begins
16 calling its witnesses. The Prosecution has ample opportunity, and has had
17 in this case, to extend the length of its case. If there are still
18 documents coming in, well, more time can be asked for, if they are deemed
19 to be relevant.
20 For example, Your Honours, on the list of the document collections
21 that is have been handed to you by Mr. Mundis, the third category, the
22 ABiH security documents, I think many of the discussions we're having
23 today are going to concern, in reality, these documents, which started
24 coming in in February 2004 and finished in September 2004, which is just a
25 little bit after the time when the Prosecution closed its case in July.
1 And in our submission, there's no reason why, when those documents were
2 coming in, an analysis couldn't have been made of them then, they could
3 have been introduced during the Prosecution case, or more time could have
4 been sought to extend the case so that those documents, which are
5 potentially crucial documents, could be made available.
6 For example, Witness ZP testified on the 14th of June and onwards,
7 a member of the highest command within the Bosnian army, and would have
8 been a witness through which many of these documents could have been
9 considered and put before Your Honours.
10 That's just one example, Your Honours, of how we say there must be
11 a limit put on the extent of the documents the Prosecution can introduce.
12 And we would say that that would be the end of the Prosecution case for
13 such investigations and documents to be disclosed to the Defence.
14 Your Honours, there are two exceptions, in our view. The one
15 would be, and this is the third point of the procedure, if the Defence
16 suddenly raises an entirely new defence not disclosed before and
17 unforeseen, if we had to suddenly say, Well, Mr. Kubura was in Canada for
18 1993, Mr. Mundis would be justified in cross-examining our witnesses to
19 introduce new documents to challenge that point, when there's no way he
20 could have been on notice of that beforehand. But that would require the
21 Prosecution to identify what is new, to make an application before
22 Your Honours for those documents to be put in cross-examination, if --
23 this is, of course, only in a situation where those documents were not
24 disclosed by the end of the Prosecution case.
25 And the second issue Mr. Bourgon has referred to is the issue of
1 credibility. We would, however, argue that credibility needs to be viewed
2 in a very limited light. It's quite possible to cost any
3 cross-examination of a witness as a challenge on credibility. And
4 documents which are disclosed after the commencement of the Defence case,
5 which support the Prosecution case, should not be put to a witness under
6 the guise of credibility. Credibility only concerns a discrete allegation
7 or statement made by a witness which can be challenged by a document which
8 the Prosecution has only disclosed to the Defence at a much later stage,
9 after the commencement of the Defence case. And it would be for the
10 Prosecution to show how that document challenges the particular allegation
11 made by the witness, how credibility is, therefore, an issue; and upon
12 that application, for Your Honours to decide whether that document could
13 be introduced. That would, of course, have to be done in the absence of
14 the witness.
15 So we would urge Your Honours to look at that in a narrow light.
16 It shouldn't be used as a back door to fill gaps in the Prosecution case.
17 And then lastly, Your Honours, the fourth aspect of the procedure
18 is that any material the Prosecution obtains after the start of the
19 Defence case that falls squarely under Rule 68 must be disclosed to the
20 Defence. But once again, we would emphasise the back-door point. And
21 this is not meant any disrespect to my friends. But material which is not
22 truly Rule 68 should not be disclosed to the Defence in an effort, then,
23 to say that the Defence have it so that it can then be used in
24 cross-examination to introduce new evidence that the Prosecution wish to
25 rely upon. If there's a critical point that has arisen in the Defence
1 case, as has been stated, there's always the rebuttal stage to do that.
2 Your Honours, that would be our proposed procedure to deal fairly
3 with the matter before Your Honours, that all four of these steps be
4 adopted. The key for us is that there must be some limit on what the
5 Prosecution can continue to introduce as evidence, and the procedure
6 adopted must be one which is fair to both the parties. The alternative
7 would be that, conceivably, at the end of the Defence case, new material
8 that hadn't been disclosed could still be introduced during the Defence
9 case at a time when the entire case had already been presented to
10 Your Honours.
11 Your Honours, those are our submissions on this matter, and we
12 would urge Your Honour to follow the spirit of Rule 89(D) in determining
13 this matter. I'm grateful.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Judges will deliberate and
15 we will render our decision as soon as possible.
16 We are now going to bring in the witness, who must be wondering
17 what's happening.
18 Mr. Bourgon?
19 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Before
20 the witness arrives, I'd just like to inform the Chamber that, following
21 the motion filed by the Defence regarding the production of its list of
22 documents, the Chamber orally informed us that we have up to the 3rd of
23 December. We wish to remind you that in our request, we asked for 15 days
24 after the disclosure of documents, and we can now confirm in the chamber
25 that we received last night, or this morning, all the materials in the
1 case against Prlic. There are 10.000 documents who are on the EDS system
2 since yesterday. We shall do our best to review all those documents
3 before the 3rd of December, and it is possible that we will be addressing
4 the Chamber again if we fail to do so by the 3rd of December.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. Please sit
8 down. We kept you waiting, but we had to deal with a few problems before
9 calling you in. The examination will continue. As we started at quarter
10 past 2, we will go on until quarter to 4, for another 20 minutes,
11 therefore, because then we will have to make a technical break. So we
12 will have a break at a quarter to.
13 Please proceed.
14 WITNESS: MESUD HADZIALIC [Resumed]
15 [Witness answered through interpreter]
16 Examined by Ms. Residovic [Continued]:
17 Q. [Interpretation] In answering my questions yesterday, you drew
18 attention to a large number of obstacles that you had to grapple with,
19 establishing the communications system for the 3rd Corps and the
20 operations group. Will you tell me, please, should there have been
21 breakdowns in the equipment, who would repair the military equipment
22 within the communications system in the area in which you were operating?
23 A. If these were minor repairs on the equipment, such as a break in
24 the cable, then the people who were trained to operate the system would do
25 the repairs. As for other repairs, they had to be done in the Maintenance
1 Institute in Travnik.
2 Q. At the beginning of your testimony, Professor, you said that the
3 devices that you had at your disposal came from different sources. Can
4 you tell us which those sources were, and to what extent certain problems
5 in repairing those devices were linked to their origins?
6 A. Territorial Defence units at the time, and later army units, that
7 is, brigades and units of the 3rd Corps, used similar sources for the
8 provision of such devices. The main source were devices used by the
9 former JNA to be found partly in the Maintenance Institute and partly in
10 the warehouses which the units would capture on the ground. But
11 percentage-wise, they had a very limited number of such devices.
12 Then the second source were radio amateur equipment, and because
13 they were used by radio hams, they were -- they could work under normal
14 temperatures and could not tolerate major climatic changes.
15 And a third source of devices were devices that had a special
16 purpose, as I have already described. All those devices were not
17 compatible; that is, at the beginning, they could not be used together.
18 And as a result, we had to configure the radio network accordingly to deal
19 with communication problems among the units.
20 Q. Tell me, please, Professor, how the system of communications
21 functioned in the chain of command. How did the lower and higher commands
23 A. According to the concept that we tried to implement, we had
24 several networks, and these were networks for control and command and
25 networks for combat operations. The networks for control and command were
1 used to issue -- for communications between subordinate and superior
2 units, whereas the other networks were mainly used within units, and
3 sometimes they could also be used for control and command, in certain
4 special cases, for communicating with the superior command as well.
5 Q. Professor, you said on a number of occasions that there would be
6 breakdowns in the communications system. Tell me, were you a witness or
7 are you aware of the way in which lower level commands endeavoured to
8 bridge such breakdowns and to establish contact with a superior command,
9 and what methods they used to do this?
10 A. In such cases, when there are breakdowns in communication or in
11 the lines between superior and subordinate units within a brigade or
12 defence staffs, or between two brigades, it was customary to include in
13 our communications plans such exceptional cases, that is, to use networks
14 of higher commands. We had to convey the information to the higher
15 command and then that command would use its network, which were radio
16 links, to pass on that same information to a particular unit that it was
17 intended for. So these are special links that were very complicated and
18 difficult to use, because transmission of information was done through
19 speech signals and this took a lot of time and required a lot of
20 resources, and that was only the last resort, when we had no other way of
21 conveying a telegramme or a message.
22 Q. If I were to ask you, through a specific example, whether I fully
23 understand your answer. If the 306th Brigade could not get in touch with
24 its operations group, for instance, west of Krajina, how would it
25 establish contact with that superior command?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. The corps command had its own network. It was a primary network
2 in the system of control and command, and that network would have to be
3 used. The telegraph would be sent through the communications centre of
4 the 3rd Corps so that the communications unit of the 3rd Corps could
5 forward that telegramme to the command of the operations group west, for
6 instance. One could ask why this didn't function directly, because they
7 were mostly radio communications. As cables -- cable wire links were
8 broken at the very beginning, and also because of the configuration of the
9 land, it is not always possible to find good quality radio channels, so
10 that an intermediary has to be sought to deal with the problem.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. I think there is a
12 misunderstanding somewhere. On page -- line 5, page 33, the witness is
13 being asked if there's a breakdown in communication between a superior
14 command and a subordinate unit, what happens, and the witness answers that
15 in that event the superior command is informed which needs to contact the
16 unit. However, in line 17, you're giving us an example, and you say, if
17 the 306th Brigade could not get in touch with its operations group, what
18 happens? But this is reversing the first question.
19 Witness, let me ask you to be more specific, because it's
20 important. The Defence is asking you, when there's a break in
21 communications between the command and the subordinate unit, what happens?
22 Can you answer that question? That was your question, wasn't it?
23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm not following the transcript.
24 My question was intended to give an example. So my question at first was,
25 what happens if there's a breakdown between a subordinate unit and a
1 superior command. And in answer to that question, the witness provided an
2 answer. To make things clearer to me and everyone else, I gave a real
3 example, an example that we heard from the witness, asking him to explain
4 what happened, using the example of a particular brigade.
5 Perhaps, Your Honour, it would be a good idea for the witness to
6 clarify this, because if there was a problem in the translation of my
7 question, this could cause confusion.
8 A. The gist of the problem, in my view, is the following: The 306th
9 is a subordinate brigade to the operations group west, and if there is a
10 breakdown in between the 306th and the operations group west, then the
11 information is passed on to the command of the 3rd Corps, which is
12 superior to the 306th Brigade and the operations group, and then, using
13 primitive speech methods, the telegramme is forwarded to operations group
15 Q. Thank you. Professor, could you tell me now something about the
16 security of communications, and to what extent your system, in the 3rd
17 Corps, or rather, in the operations group where you worked in the second
18 half of 1993, to what extent that system was protected from disturbances
19 by enemy forces, and jamming.
20 A. I said at the beginning that we used conventional devices which
21 are highly susceptible to interception, and the former JNA would develop
22 special devices which used to be a part of the set to provide
23 cryptographic protection.
24 In the area covered by the units and command of the 3rd Corps, we
25 did not, in that period of time, have a single system or any additional
1 encrypting device to provide protection from interception of our
2 communications. So there was no way we could deal with this, so that the
3 technology of the devices that we used was highly susceptible to
4 interference and interception.
5 Q. Professor, in view of the fact that in 1993 there were major
6 combat operations between the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian
7 Defence Council, do you know, and if you do, how, which devices and
8 resources the HVO had at their disposal to intercept the communications
9 system of the 3rd Corps?
10 A. Yes, I do know. In May and June '92, I was the initiator and, to
11 a certain extent, the designer of a system. We used a military vehicle, a
12 TAM 150, using measuring devices. In the Travnik Maintenance Institute,
13 we developed quite a sophisticated system for reconnaissance. And it was
14 based, the equipment itself was suitable for computerisation. And this
15 system was located, by agreement, to the area controlled by the HVO. So
16 after the first conflicts and disagreements started, this system was left
17 to the HVO, and our operators did not have access to that centre.
18 I wish to underline that the location was technically not the most
19 suitable, but it was accepted, simply to meet the requests of the HVO.
20 Q. When a highly sophisticated device, as you describe it, was given
21 to the HVO, what was the plan for the use of that device, since we're
22 talking about 1992, when you were operating as allies?
23 A. The system was designed to be mobile, on a vehicle, and by
24 selecting the proper locations and using well-trained operators, the
25 system could monitor all radio networks; our own networks, as well as the
1 networks of the Serb units in the territory or the zone of responsibility
2 of the 3rd Corps and the area of responsibility of the HVO. We're
3 talking about the area around Vlasic, Zenica, the Lasva Valley, and so on.
4 Q. On a number of occasions, in answer to my questions, you spoke
5 about a system of communications that was to satisfy the operative
6 tactical needs, as well as those required at the combat level. Could you
7 please clarify, what is the tactical level and what is the combat level?
8 A. Every army, every concept that includes preparation of combat
9 operations, has to provide secure communications, so that the combat level
10 covers a smaller area, an area in which battles are fought, where there
11 are combat activities between units, up to the level of company or
12 battalion. And for this purpose, special frequency ranges are used and a
13 special device. Those devices, depending on the location and the
14 configuration of the land, could even be used for the tactical level.
15 However, the tactical level is provided with different devices and
16 different frequency ranges, and are used mainly to monitor combat
17 operations, to report about those operations, and to pass on information
18 during the preparation stage for combat.
19 Q. Professor, you were an officer of the Yugoslav People's Army, and
20 you worked on communications. As a university professor, you are familiar
21 with the NATO communications system as well. Tell us what quantity of
22 resources you used for the communications system of the 3rd Corps. Were
23 they up to the standards of the Yugoslav army or NATO standards? If not,
24 tell us how well-equipped the 3rd Corps was in the course of 1993.
25 A. After the war, as a member, or as an employee of the Defence
1 Ministry, I was a coordinator and collaborated with experts of the US army
2 regarding communications for control and command, so that I was aware of
3 the NATO norms and standards. And I knew the JNA standards. And many
4 were surprised how we managed, with limited resources that we had, to
5 ensure the necessary level of communications. And taking into account
6 both concepts, I think a maximum of 15 per cent existed in relation to the
7 normal requirements for communications.
8 Q. Just one more question before the break.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We better stop. We are going to
10 stop, because it's more than a quarter to 4.00, and we will resume at
11 about 10 past 4.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 3.48 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 4.15 p.m.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll give the floor to the
15 Defence so that they can continue with their examination now.
16 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Q. Professor, just before the break, you were saying that, up until
18 the end of 1993, the 3rd Corps had 15 per cent of communications equipment
19 at the most, equipment that would fit the norms and the standards of the
20 former JNA. The system that you developed in 1993, in the 3rd Corps, to
21 what extent did it meet the norms for providing communications, if you
22 compared the situation with the JNA or with NATO?
23 A. To a certain extent, I've already answered that question. As far
24 as protecting those communications is concerned, as far as cryptographic
25 methods is concerned, as far as intercepting and jamming the
1 communications system, the percentage was a lot lower. You could say that
2 the communications system was never adequately protected or secured from
3 that point of view.
4 Q. Professor, in order to clarify what you have just said, to a
5 certain extent, I would like to ask you what the usual norms would have
6 been, if we're talking about the JNA or some NATO army, what would have
7 been the lowest level if someone might have been using a radio set? Would
8 this concern a platoon, a company, an individual?
9 A. Well, if you have a look at the structure or the organisation of
10 the former JNA, well, it would be a detachment. All detachment commanders
11 should have had a certain communications device. This depended on the
12 tasks that they had to carry out. Naturally, certain soldiers should also
13 have the possibility of establishing communications, because they carry
14 out additional tasks outside the scope of platoons, for example. So this
15 would be the minimum that would have to be provided to develop
16 communications systems for commanding and controlling units.
17 Q. Professor, if we assume that there are at least 100 platoons in
18 one brigade, one brigade consists of at least 100 platoons, what would you
19 say, were there 100 radio devices at any point in time in any of the
21 A. Well, one would have to rephrase your question, because one device
22 doesn't mean anything on its own. We can talk about the activities that
23 involve a number of devices. We call this system radio directions. The
24 only way to make up for the lack of equipment, for the lack of devices,
25 and it wasn't possible to obtain a sufficient number of devices, the only
1 way to make up for the lack of equipment was as follows:
2 First of all, you needed a high level of training for the
3 operators, for the men, for the commanders, who provided communications.
4 And secondly, there was redistribution. We spent a lot of time and a lot
5 of resources on using equipment that was used in one centre, in another
6 centre, so we would relocate equipment from one centre to another centre.
7 So these criteria were never fulfilled. Far from it. And I've told you
8 how it was possible to make up for the lack of equipment.
9 In the case of areas where there was no combat, we would take
10 equipment from those areas. But units would sometimes be left without the
11 basic means of communications. This was because we thought it was
12 necessary to use the equipment they had in areas where it was more
13 important to have that equipment.
14 Q. You have just said that you paid a lot of attention to training
15 men. Could you tell us who trained these communications officers, these
16 men who operated the equipment?
17 A. Well, training was organised in the following manner: For radio
18 amateurs -- for radio amateur equipment and radio amateur technology, we
19 had men who were familiar with this technology, who were involved in the
20 training. These devices, this equipment, was in army units, and there
21 were men who could assist with the training. And then the commanders
22 would train subordinate units. So there was a lot of attention that was
23 paid to training and instructing units and individuals who were in the
25 Q. Were you ever helped by foreigners or Mujahedin in providing
1 training for communications devices?
2 A. Well, first of all, I knew enough and I could use my knowledge to
3 instruct others. Given my experience and the job I had, the people could
4 be trained who had to use devices for tactical reasons. It was never
5 necessary to have that kind of assistance. We never used assistance
6 provided by the Mujahedin or any individuals who were outside the 3rd
7 Corps system.
8 Q. Do you know whether these Mujahedin ever used the army
9 communications system for their own purposes, to carry out activities of
10 their own, or for any other needs?
11 A. I personally never had any contact with them. I don't know how
12 they dealt with those problems. But I can assume that they probably tried
13 to resolve those difficulties. But as to the equipment they had, I don't
14 know, they didn't have any army equipment. As to whether they bought
15 equipment or obtained equipment in some way, I don't know. But they
16 couldn't have used such equipment if they didn't have adequate and
17 appropriate instructors.
18 Q. Professor, on the basis of documents we have seen, we realise that
19 documents were often forwarded by packet communications. Please, could
20 you tell us whether packet communications were used within the
21 communications system of the 3rd Corps, and what did this mean, exactly?
22 How did this function?
23 A. Let me first tell you what packet communications involves. Packet
24 communications is a system that uses an intermediary to transfer
25 information. In order to use such a system, you need to have a computer
1 on both sides with appropriate modems; you need a station that emits; then
2 you need an intermediary that functions as a sort of transit point for the
3 information. This was a system developed for radio amateurs. So, radio
4 amateurs developed this technology. We realised what the potential for
5 such technology was in the conditions that prevailed at the time. And we
6 only introduced this technology in cases where it was appropriate to use
7 this technology. It meant that you needed premises where the temperature
8 was 20 degrees and where the humidity was 50 per cent. That enabled you
9 to use the system. So this technology was used to provide communications
10 in the field.
11 Naturally, this technology is used as part of the modern equipment
12 of all armies now. But at the time, it was a technology that was only
13 used by radio amateurs. We introduced, to a certain extent, at the
14 beginning of 1993, in March, April, and May, we introduced this equipment
15 and trained our operators to use this technology. We trained people at
16 the level of the 3rd Corps in order to be able to establish communications
17 between the brigades and the 3rd Corps command.
18 Q. You said that that communications system required an intermediary;
19 is that correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. What do you mean when you say an intermediary?
22 A. Well, you need a point, a reference point in space that has a
23 connection with both -- that can see both users in order to be able to
24 provide an efficient way of communicating information via that link.
25 Q. You said that up until May you were busy introducing that system.
1 To what level within the army was this system of packet communications
2 introduced, up until the end of 1993?
3 A. Well, it was introduced between commands and brigades to the
4 extent it was used in operations groups, and also for communications
5 between brigades and the 3rd Corps.
6 Q. As far as relaying information is concerned, what could you tell
7 us about the technology that was required to verbally relay information?
8 A. Well, this is an interesting question. Usually, telegrammes
9 provide the contents of information, and that's how they should be
10 treated. Special systems should be used to relay such information, for
11 example, packet communications. But given the lack of such equipment in
12 the units and in the commands, we would encode a telegramme or document
13 and this coded message would then be transmitted verbally over radio
14 channels. And we used the frequencies that were available to relay this
16 Q. Tell me, how long did one communications centre work for a certain
17 level of command? For example, the communications centre of the 3rd
18 Corps, for a brigade, for how long was it in operation?
19 A. Well, these communications centres worked around the clock. All
20 posts had to be occupied around the clock.
21 Q. One communications centre, for example, at the level of brigade,
22 within a brigade, what sort of possibilities did it have? Was it possible
23 for such a communications centre to establish a number of connections at
24 the level of the 3rd Corps, for example? You've just mentioned this.
25 A. Well, one could provide you with an example. Imagine two towns,
1 and you have a crossroads and vehicles arrive from five or six directions.
2 And you have another town with a similar junction, and you have a similar
3 volume of traffic at that junction in the second town. So if the extent
4 of traffic between those two centres involves 10-lane motorways, then it's
5 not a problem, circulation between those two centres for the vehicles is
6 not a problem. And that is the case for communications, too. It all
7 depended on the number of channels you had available in order to provide
8 such a communications system. Given the lack of devices, given the
9 limited number of devices that we had, and given the limited number of
10 centres, on the whole, only one channel was used. So you had a link with
11 the superior command, and you used the same equipment you used for links
12 with subordinate commands. So you first had to finish relaying
13 communication to the superior command, and then you would use the
14 equipment to relay information to subordinate units. This is a very
15 complicated and difficult job because you need operators who are very
16 experienced and very good.
17 Q. Professor, tell me, in such situations, how sure can one be that a
18 message sent from one command level will be received by the person to whom
19 the message is sent, especially since we know about all the problems that
21 A. Well, look, if we're talking about the relay of information via
22 speech, and I've already described how this worked, then this system is
23 not very reliable, and its reliability diminishes if you use a circular
24 method of work. At the station that is the central source of information,
25 that distributes information to a number of users who are using the same
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 channel, well, in such cases it's difficult for them to confirm whether a
2 message has been received. So the technology for relaying information in
3 a reliable manner, well, it's difficult to provide such technology, to
4 provide information in a reliable manner in the conditions that prevailed
6 Q. Professor, if we look at the way in which this communications
7 system was developed, and if we look at the possibilities of communicating
8 between superior and subordinate commands, could you tell me, to what
9 extent did this system function in this way in 1993, up to which level did
10 it function in this way? How well-established were the links up to the
11 level of battalions -- at the level of battalions, companies, and
13 A. Well, the situation changed, depending on the deployment of the
14 commands or units that were carrying out combat operations, defence or
15 attack operations. If you examine the overall situation, I think that a
16 brigade always had, perhaps, up to about one-third of the equipment
17 necessary. They had such equipment by using the resources and applying
18 the principles that I mentioned, the principles that involved
19 redistributing equipment and redistributing devices.
20 Sometimes individual units were islands, so to speak, isolated
21 islands, because they or the superior command wasn't able to provide
22 communications. In Vlasic, this is something that frequently happened.
23 Q. Thank you. Although these questions concerning equipment and
24 communications are certainly extremely complicated -- and I am not in a
25 position to ask you all the questions I would like to ask you about these
1 matters, and I'd like to thank you for your answers -- I'd like to move
2 onto something else.
3 In 1993, did you assume any other duties, or rather, were you
4 assigned any other tasks, apart from the task in the 3rd Corps?
5 A. In 1993, towards the end of April or at the beginning of May, I
6 was transferred to the joint command for Central Bosnia. This command was
7 transferred to the joint command for Central Bosnia. This command was
8 composed of army members and of HVO members.
9 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] With the help of the usher, I
10 would now like to show the Professor a number of documents. My next
11 questions will have to do -- my following questions will have to do with
12 these documents.
13 Q. Professor, will you please look at document number 5 and tell me
14 whether that document is actually information about that particular
15 function of the new joint command, of which you are a member.
16 A. This is just information to corps in the operation zone for
17 Central Bosnia, just an announcement to tell them that the command has
18 started operating and its composition.
19 Q. Where was the command based?
20 A. In the post office of Travnik, in the basement of that building in
22 Q. What was the main task of that command?
23 A. The main task of the command was to plan operations against the
24 common enemy in the areas of responsibility of both commands, planning
25 operations by the joint forces of the HVO and the army.
1 Q. For the transcript, the document I showed you is Defence Exhibit
3 Will you now look at 0995, Defence Exhibit 0995. Professor, does
4 this document speak of the assignment that you personally assumed in the
6 A. Yes, I was responsible for ensuring the system of communications
7 for this temporary command structure, and as the command of the 3rd Corps
8 and of the HVO in Vitez could communicate through the public system of
9 communications, we insisted that that be the first step in establishing
11 Q. Now will you please look at documents number 3 and number 4. They
12 are DH Exhibits 996 and 081 -- 996 and 981.
13 A. During my activities in the joint command, or rather, my
14 cooperation, who was to be my partner in the HVO, we were supposed to work
15 together in establishing these communications, and I feel that the person
16 attached to our command did not have the necessary knowledge or skills for
17 these assignments. So there were quite a number of problems due to this,
18 and as a result, I agreed that the public enterprise PPT Travnik should
19 introduce mobile telephony in this area. This was a concession so as to
20 get a response from an institution that was the only one capable. But
21 this could not be done because it was not possible to develop mobile
22 telephony during the war. It was only after the war that it was
23 introduced in Bosnia-Herzegovina this was established. So the concept was
24 doomed to fail. It was never achieved. But this was simply a concession,
25 telling those who could provide a qualified answer what it was all about.
1 Q. You asked me to look at this other document.
2 A. Yes. This document is simply a request, as we wanted to deal with
3 packet -- package networks through the system we have just described. We
4 asked for personnel from army units and the HVO to operate these
6 Q. As a representative of the BH army in this joint command, how did
7 you undertake preparations for joint operations, and what was the approach
8 taken by our colleagues from the HVO?
9 A. People who have an understanding of these things and who are
10 monitoring developments in the world of communications, especially
11 military communications, know that, using mobile telephony from public
12 institutions doesn't have much use. And the aims set could never be
13 realised, because no serious problem was addressed using methods applied
14 in all armies. So this communications problem, too, was not addressed as
15 seriously as it should have been.
16 The work of the command was mainly based on complaints, mostly by
17 one side, and then teams were formed to go into the field to analyse the
18 situation there. I joined the command with a clear task to plan combat
19 operations against a joint enemy rather than to deal with problems that
20 occur in the field.
21 Q. After your work in the joint command, or rather, let me ask you:
22 Did that command function successfully, or was it brought to the end
23 precisely because of the obstruction you have referred to?
24 A. If we examine the aim of the joint command, I think that its
25 results were equal to zero. Nothing was done that the joint command was
1 supposed to do.
2 As for the other aspect, I was not a member of those commissions
3 that went into the field so -- as I had other things to do. But I think
4 as far as its prime goal was concerned, the joint command did not achieve
6 Q. Tell us, Professor, after your work in the joint command, which,
7 as you said, never even started to work properly, where did you go?
8 A. After this assignment, I took over the duty ahead of
9 communications of the operations group Bosanska Krajina.
10 Q. In that position, did you manage at some point in time to decipher
11 any HVO messages? If you did, tell us which, and were they important for
12 the command and for the protection of defence lines?
13 A. Because of the events in Travnik, that is, the conflict and the
14 attack operations of the HVO in the broader area of Travnik, we tried and
15 managed to monitor their radio communications using standard military
16 equipment and some additions and support from computers. We had
17 well-trained people, people who were skilled in these disciplines, that
18 is, in computerisation, so that certain encryption systems used by the HVO
19 were broken into and we managed to decode the contents of those messages.
20 Q. Can you give us a specific example of which you informed your
21 commander, that is, the links that existed between two enemies at that
22 point in time, two enemies of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
23 A. Yes. We had a couple of telegrammes, the contents of which
24 revealed contacts between the Serbian side and the HVO at the level of
25 brigade commands; also, about certain movement of units and activities in
1 the area of responsibility of the 3rd Corps.
2 It is very interesting that both parties should use the same
3 system of encryption. Even though it was primitive, what it meant was
4 that they could develop a joint encryption system that they used in their
5 mutual communication.
6 Q. Professor, where was your communications centre of the operations
7 group Bosanska Krajina?
8 A. Because of the events that took place in the area of Travnik, and
9 because the operations group did not have its own communications
10 resources, we used the equipment of the 17th Vitez Brigade, and parallel
11 with the communications centre in the basement of the Travnik barracks, we
12 developed a centre for monitoring and analysing traffic between both
13 sides, in that same building; that is, we monitored traffic as far as we
14 were able, with the technology we had. All the personnel was housed in
15 the basements of barracks for the simple reason that it was not possible
16 to go outside because of sniping and mortar shelling from the surrounding
18 Q. Professor, how much time did you spend in the communications
19 centre in the Travnik barracks?
20 A. Before the beginning of the conflict and during and after, since
21 there was an HVO unit on a hill above Travnik which was able to target the
22 barracks, I spent my entire time in the basement, because it wasn't
23 possible to go out.
24 Q. Did you see on those premises other parts of the basement that
25 were used as prisons?
1 A. As the corridors were close to one another, I could hear the
2 guards. And as I knew the premises from before, as that is where I did my
3 military service, I knew that there were some kind of prison premises
4 there, and we knew that they existed.
5 Q. Professor, as you spent time in that basement, did you ever hear
6 or see anyone mistreating the persons who were being held there, in one
7 way or another?
8 A. I wouldn't talk about the detention area itself specifically, but
9 I never heard, nor did I have any inkling that anything like that was
10 going on.
11 Q. Thank you, Professor.
12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have no further
13 questions of this witness.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I give the floor to the other
15 Defence team.
16 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise to my colleague.
17 Because of the translation, there's an error. Maybe there's imprecision
18 in the interpretation, because the professor says that he didn't know what
19 was happening. It says here "detention area itself specifically." I'm
20 not sure that that reflects what the professor said. Maybe I should
21 repeat my question so as to get a more precise answer.
22 Q. Did you enter the cells?
23 A. No, I did not. I would pass along the corridors. On one side
24 were the cells, and on the other side were the premises that we used. I
25 would come there at any time of day and night, when information could be
1 exchanged. So all I can say is I did not see or hear anything strange
2 happening. And if I didn't know, I wouldn't be able to tell that those
3 areas were being used for that purpose.
4 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Just
6 a couple of questions for this witness.
7 Cross-examined by Mr. Ibrisimovic:
8 Q. [Interpretation] During your testimony, I think page 34, and the
9 Presiding Judge raised the issue, when there's a breakdown of
10 communications between command and subordinate units, let me ask you, when
11 we're talking about the brigade and the battalion, when there's a
12 breakdown in communications between the brigade command and the battalions
13 of that brigade -- you probably know that there were three battalions of
14 the Muslim Brigade, and that the command was in Zenica. I think the same
15 applied to the 314th Brigade.
16 Bearing everything in mind that you said regarding problems with
17 communications that occurred, what was the situation like in Travnik in
18 May and June of 1993? Could you describe this situation, that is, the
19 relationship between the brigade and the battalions.
20 A. In view of the configuration of the land, Travnik is very
21 unsuitable for establishing any kind of communications on frequencies, and
22 you have to use the high frequency range, which is a range which is
23 extremely unsuitable, where disturbances are such during the day and night
24 that you have to plan communications very carefully. And unlike others,
25 we didn't have special services for planning such channels. NATO has a
1 special service for the frequency management of this kind, so they, too,
2 had to use our resources, that is, to relay telegrammes to special
3 communication channels to the brigade command. They had to use the same
4 technology, in other words.
5 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] There's an error in the
6 transcript. In Travnik there was only one battalion of the 7th Muslim
7 Brigade, whereas the command was in Zenica.
8 Q. When describing this situation, you used the term "isolated
9 island," a situation when the command cannot establish communication with
10 its subordinate battalion. Would you say that the 1st Battalion, in
11 relation to the brigade command in Zenica, was in such a situation?
12 A. It was in such a situation very frequently.
13 Q. Could you also confirm that between the brigade and the battalion,
14 there was no packet communications?
15 A. In that period of time, the brigade and the battalion did not have
16 a packet link. That's for certain.
17 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
18 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Cross-examined by Mr. Mundis:
20 Q. Good afternoon, sir. My name is Darryl Mundis, and together with
21 my colleagues, we represent the Prosecution here today. I'm going to ask
22 you a few questions. I just wanted to make sure at the beginning, sir,
23 that you understand that my purpose is not in any way to confuse you, and
24 if there's any question that I ask you that you don't understand, simply
25 tell me that and I will rephrase the question so that you do understand
1 that. Is that clear?
2 You were just telling us, in response to some questions from my
3 learned colleague, that communications between the 7th Muslim Mountain
4 Brigade and its 1st Battalion, you characterised as an isolated island, or
5 you said it was in such a situation very frequently. What time period
6 were you referring to?
7 A. Well, I can refer to the entire period, up until the point in time
8 when equipment was available to solve the problems, that is to say, up
9 until the time when the operations group managed to establish a fully
10 efficient system of command and control. So that was the situation that
11 prevailed in the first half of 1993.
12 Q. Okay. So I take it, then, that in the second half of 1993, this
13 problem was largely solved?
14 A. I wouldn't say it was solved. It was in the process of being
15 solved, because as far as communications is concerned, as far as the
16 technology we had available is concerned, well, we could never say that
17 the problems had been solved. According to the terminology we use, we can
18 talk about the reliability of the communications system. At that period
19 of time, the situation was better. When the operations group established
20 a system of command and command and control, the situation was better. I
21 think that would be in August, or at the beginning of September, and
23 Why was the situation improved? Well, because we redistricted
24 certain equipment in order to improve the system, in order to improve the
25 functioning within those units.
1 Q. Let me talk, then, sir, about the first part of 1993, that is, up
2 until, as you put it, the end of August or beginning of September, so
3 let's talk about the period from January until the end of August 1993.
4 And again, because we were talking about the 7th Battalion -- the 7th
5 Muslim Mountain Brigade and its 1st Battalion, let's focus on that
6 relationship, if you will.
7 During that period, from January through the end of August 1993,
8 how reliable, in your professional estimate, was communication between
9 that battalion and the brigade?
10 A. Well, I put it in the following way: If you made 10 attempts to
11 establish communications, or there was a request to transfer telegrammes,
12 perhaps you would be successful in one or two cases. So if you had 24
13 hours to use your communications systems, and you had 10 telegrammes,
14 during that period of time, you could perhaps forward two telegrammes.
15 Q. Can you tell us a little bit -- now I'm talking in general terms,
16 in 1993, throughout that year, within the 3rd Corps as a whole, based on
17 your experience there and your professional expertise, the communications
18 systems, and I use the word plural, "systems," meaning all the range of
19 communications means available, would you call that system or those
20 systems, in 1993, functional or dysfunctional?
21 A. Well, I would say, if I examined the system and the men involved,
22 and I believe that a lot of attention was paid to training men and a lot
23 of attention was paid to manoeuvring equipment, or rather, we tried to
24 move equipment from one area to another area, from one unit to another
25 unit, so that functioned -- from that point of view, it was functioning.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 But if we held onto our resources, our equipment, without relocating the
2 equipment, in that case, I wouldn't say that the system functioned. It
3 was possible for the system to function because the equipment was
4 relocated very frequently, and a lot of attention was paid to training the
5 men who are involved in providing the communications system.
6 Let me explain to you what I mean by "manoeuvre." For example, a
7 combat operation at place X is planned, then I would get hold of all the
8 equipment at that location, for example, mobile devices, other devices
9 that aren't used at the time, and then I would provide these units with
10 this equipment, together with the relevant orders. They would carry out
11 their task and use that equipment. And when it was decided that the
12 equipment was no longer needed, the equipment had to be returned and sent
13 back to the locations where they were taken from. This was a very
14 complicated procedure, but it was the only manner in which we could
15 operate during that period of time.
16 Q. Let me ask you, sir, about the time period where you were with --
17 you told us yesterday there came a time when you were part of the
18 communications battalion of the 3rd Corps. Did I understand that
20 A. Yes, I was a member of that battalion.
21 Q. Can you tell us the time period, or the approximate time period,
22 that you were part of that battalion?
23 A. Well, the corps was formed sometime in November, and I assumed my
24 new duties in the joint command in Central Bosnia somewhere around the
25 beginning of May.
1 Q. So I take it, then, sir, that for approximately six months, from
2 November 1992 through May 1993, you were with the 3rd Corps communications
3 battalion; is that approximately correct?
4 A. Yes, yes.
5 Q. During that period, approximately how many men were in the
6 communications battalion of the 3rd Corps?
7 A. In fact, in terms of the establishment, it was the battalion
8 that -- as far as the strength of the battalion is concerned, well, I
9 wasn't a member of the personnel staff, so I don't know the exact numbers,
10 but it wasn't up to full strength. One couldn't speak about a real
11 communications battalion. I think it was, in terms of its strength, more
12 like a company, but it was described as a battalion because that's what it
13 was supposed to be, according to its establishment. But perhaps there
14 were as many men as one would have in a company, up to about a hundred
16 Q. And, sir, where were these men, these men of the communications
17 battalion, where were these men deployed during the six-month period you
18 were part of that battalion?
19 A. They were deployed at various locations and in the communications
20 centre of the 3rd Corps. My task wasn't that of an operations officer, or
21 rather, I didn't have the task of an operator. I had to design the
22 network, assist with training, introduce new devices, new equipment, et
23 cetera, et cetera. I had a team that worked with me in the Travnik
24 Maintenance Institute and they were members of that battalion. They
25 carried out tasks in the wide area of the zone of responsibility of the
1 3rd Corps, and they had a unit in the corps command, and parts of the unit
2 would accompany subordinate units and go there with the relevant
3 equipment. In the case of units that didn't have their own equipment,
4 resources were provided and the technical means were provided to have
5 communications with those units.
6 Q. Sir, perhaps my question wasn't clear, but I was more interested
7 about the geographic areas within the 3rd Corps zone where members of the
8 communications battalion were stationed or deployed. Let's take yourself
9 as a starting point. You remained in Travnik during the six-month period?
10 A. No. I was in Zenica and in Travnik and in the surrounding hills
11 and mountains. I was in the command of the 306th, the command of the
12 312th, the command of the 314th, et cetera. I was present in units where
13 it was necessary to help, where it was necessary to provide equipment and
14 train the men to carry out their tasks. I wasn't the battalion commander.
15 So as to where the units were deployed, et cetera -- well, as a rule, I
16 know the areas that they were in, but I wouldn't really go into that, I
17 wouldn't really go into where they were deployed. But I know the
18 principles that were followed and I know how that unit was used and I know
19 how the resources of that unit were used.
20 Perhaps I should clarify something with regard to the training of
21 units, or rather, with regard to the training of men that had to provide
22 the communications system for command and control.
23 They had to be trained to use devices, they had to be trained to
24 use cryptographic machines, they had to be trained in procedures that had
25 to be followed when sending and receiving telegrammes, et cetera. So their
1 tasks were quite varied. And they also had to maintain the equipment,
2 because the communications battalion also had units that first came into
3 contact with faulty equipment, and they had to deal with this problem at
4 their own level, and to the extent that it was possible for them to deal
5 with these problems.
6 Q. Sir, during the period of time when you were with the 3rd Corps
7 communications battalion, who was the commander of that battalion?
8 A. The battalion commander was, he is a brigadier now, his name was
9 Senad Salimovic.
10 Q. During the period when you were with the communications battalion
11 of the 3rd Corps, did you, on any occasion, have the opportunity to
12 discuss communications issues with the 3rd Corps commander, Enver
14 A. I personally did not have any significant form of contact with the
15 general, but I was a member of the delegation from the Maintenance
16 Institute that went to see the general when we had to resolve certain
17 difficulties that concerned the security and protection of the institute
18 itself. And the problems also concerned the functioning of the
19 Maintenance Institute in Travnik and the maintenance of the equipment.
20 Q. My question, though, sir, was did -- on these occasions, you said
21 you did not have any significant form of contact. Did the 3rd Corps
22 commander ever raise with you problems concerning the communications
23 systems in place within the 3rd Corps during the time period you were part
24 of the 3rd Corps communications battalion?
25 A. Look, my task didn't involve the command and control of that
1 battalion, and I believe that the general was a trained officer and he
2 knew what the role of the communications system was. As far as dealing
3 with the problems of command and control are concerned, I assume that he
4 had contact with the commander and issued tasks to the commander. I
5 didn't receive any tasks from the commander himself. But on the other
6 hand, if we examine the way in which we worked, and if we examine the
7 possibilities we had, well, we had carte blanche to do whatever we could
8 do in those conditions to ensure that the system of command and control
9 functioned properly. So a commander can't show more confidence in his
10 subordinates, or this is the best way for a commander to show that he has
11 confidence in his subordinates.
12 Q. Sir, you said "we had carte blanche to do whatever we could do in
13 those conditions to ensure that the system of command and control
14 functioned properly." And I ask you, in this context, did you do
15 everything possible to ensure that this system worked?
16 A. Well, I can tell you what I myself think about this. When all
17 this came to an end, I've often thought about this matter and about that
18 time period. I wouldn't want such a thing to ever happen again. I
19 wouldn't want to go back to that time, because it was a very difficult
20 situation. Well, if you are someone who has a certain proficiency,
21 certain knowledge, and you don't have the means of doing what you know how
22 to do, this is a difficult situation. I admire people who did what they
23 did in those conditions, in the rear, the combat line, et cetera. And so
24 I think in that respect, we did our utmost, we did our best, and I myself
25 did all I could in that field.
1 Q. Let me return to a theme that we spoke about a few moments ago.
2 The battalion -- the 3rd Corps communications battalion commander,
3 Mr. Salimovic, do you recall ever discussing with him any complaints that
4 he received from the commander of the 3rd Corps about specific
5 communication problems?
6 A. Yes. I had frequent and direct contact with the commander, who
7 was a colleague of mine, because after my duties as chief of
8 communications, I became the chief of communications in a corps. All the
9 time we understood each other and cooperated well. Mr. Salimovic was
10 responsible for tactical matters, for the use of units. I was responsible
11 for preparing the men and the technology. He would receive tasks, but I
12 was only interested in the tasks to the extent that they concerned me and
13 my team, or rather, the team who carried out the tasks assigned to us,
14 along with myself.
15 Q. Sir, can you tell us, if you recall, where you were or what unit
16 you were assigned to on the 8th of June, 1993?
17 A. Well, on the basis of the documents, on paper at least, I think I
18 was still listed as a member of this joint command. You know, I don't
19 remember receiving an order relieving me of those duties. I only received
20 an order appointing me to my new duties in the operations group. So I had
21 a certain authority in the joint command -- because of what I had done in
22 the joint command, I also had certain authority in the units that were
23 communication units. So I was still listed officially as a member of that
24 joint command. I never received a document in which I was relieved of
25 those duties during that period of time.
1 Q. And, sir, if you can recall, where were you physically present on
2 8 June 1993?
3 A. In view of all the circumstances, I can't really give you a
4 precise answer regarding that date. But in that period of time, I was in
5 Travnik. That was when these activities was going on and the conflict
6 with the HVO.
7 Q. I take it, sir, from the last sentence of your answer that you
8 were, therefore, aware that there was a relatively high degree of military
9 operations going on in the Bila valley on the 8th of June, 1993?
10 A. Yes, your conclusion is correct, because, as a member of the joint
11 command and listening to complaints and following those developments,
12 because we had meetings with the commands and commanders of units and
13 operations groups, I was aware of what was going on. But as the joint
14 command was housed in that building in Travnik, I felt personally the
15 consequences of those conflicts. I couldn't leave the building. We used
16 all kinds of methods to move from the barracks when we had to; in the
17 dark, at night, and so on. So as someone who lived and worked with people
18 in the joint command, as someone who lived in Travnik, I knew what was
19 going on.
20 On the other hand, from contacts and the presentation of those
21 events that I heard about at meetings from Commander Alagic, Cuskic, and
22 the representatives of the HVO, I knew what it was about.
23 Q. I suggest to you, sir, and I would like your comments on what I'm
24 about to suggest, that the operations undertaken by units of the 3rd Corps
25 of the ABiH on 8 June 1993 in the Bila valley reflected a relatively high
1 degree of tactical command and control, and a relatively high degree of
2 communications were necessary for those military operations to be
4 A. You said yourself that the operations were in the Bila valley, and
5 I spoke about the techniques and the principles and the efforts we made to
6 have well-trained personnel, that we regrouped equipment. But I think
7 that I couldn't describe the functioning of that segment as being
8 particularly effective, nor did the system of communications have a very
9 significant contribution. We also applied the same techniques and
10 methods, and our contribution was always up to a maximum level, as far as
11 the use of the technology allowed. But I wouldn't really describe our
12 contribution in that way.
13 Q. Let me turn back now, sir, to the earlier period, and I'm
14 referring to the summer of 1992. You told us yesterday, at that point in
15 time, that among the jobs or the tasks that you had when you were with the
16 Territorial Defence was supplying communications systems to the
17 Territorial Defence and HVO units. Did I understand ...
18 A. No, you didn't. That was my assignment as director of the
19 Maintenance Institute in Travnik. And when officers of the former JNA
20 left the institute, and after the Presidency gave the decision that I
21 should be provisional manager, I carried out those tasks as instructed by
22 the War Presidency.
23 Q. And, sir, what time period was this that you're now referring to?
24 A. That was the period from May until, shall we say, July, end of
1 Q. My question, sir, is: How did you -- how was the physical process
2 of supplying the Territorial Defence units and the HVO units undertaken?
3 Did people from those units come to the institute and retrieve the
4 equipment, or did you deliver it to various locations? How did that
5 actually work?
6 A. How it worked was that, as the provisional manager of the
7 institute, I would receive instructions from the Presidency. I wouldn't
8 call it an order, but instructions for certain means, indicating the name
9 and the quantity should be given to the units, and then representatives of
10 those units would come. And as I said yesterday, I was not informed at
11 all about how the HVO units were equipped. But we simply carried out the
12 instructions given by the Presidency.
13 Q. So I take it, then, from your answer, sir, that the
14 representatives of the units came to the institute and collected the
15 equipment and took it back to the units.
16 A. Mostly so, yes.
17 Q. When you say "mostly so," do you recall any specific incidents or
18 time periods where you, or persons from the institute, went to the unit
19 with radio equipment and delivered it or delivered it and installed it?
20 Do you recall any incidents or instances where that was the case?
21 A. I would avoid giving instructions to subordinates, that is,
22 personnel from the institute, to go to the units, and I don't remember of
23 any such cases. But I do remember other cases when units, especially HVO
24 units, would, from positions of power, insist and pressure me to speed up
25 the procedure and to resolve the problem of distribution of equipment.
1 And I have to tell you that in that period of time, when all this was
2 taking place, this transitional period for the institute, the HVO units
3 wanted to gain full control of the institute. And I remember a positive
4 example, Major Mihajlo Petrovic, who unfortunately was killed as a member
5 of the BH army in 1993, thanks to whose courage and behaviour, the problem
6 was resolved and HVO units were prevented from entering the premises where
7 the equipment was held, and to keep both outside the working premises and
8 the warehouses of the institute.
9 In that transitional period, we would use a squad of the HVO and
10 the army to provide physical protection of the buildings of the institute,
11 which are quite large, because of the possibility of reserve units, who
12 were located next door to the former barracks of the JNA.
13 Q. Sir, just so that we're clear, other than units of the Territorial
14 Defence, units of the HVO, and later, units of the 3rd Corps, would it be
15 correct that the institute did not provide any type of communications
16 equipment to any other person, entity, agency, governmental office, et
18 A. Let me tell you, in answering your question, I would like to say
19 precisely that we did not give equipment to anyone else while I was
20 receiving instructions from the War Presidency. Of course, there were
21 certain contacts with state institutions, and the institute later received
22 instructions from the Defence Ministry, and on the basis of those
23 instructions, it did distribute equipment.
24 As for those instructions, as I still dealt with the institute, I
25 am not aware that they distributed that equipment in that way, nor could
1 they do that. The institute continued to function and provided services
2 for other systems, for the electricity boards, et cetera, because we had a
3 large generator, for instance, so it was working on a sort of commercial
4 basis in the sense of exchange of goods. But apart from that, I can't
5 give you a more precise answer.
6 And if there were any requests of that kind, they must have been
7 outside the institutions. From the moment the operations group was
8 formed, and when I took up my new duties, and while I was in the joint
9 command, I didn't do anything outside the system, nor did I send or
10 coordinate any other units or individuals or institutions in terms of
11 supplying them with equipment.
12 Q. So let me turn to the last subject I want to ask you about. I
13 have just a couple of questions about this. You were asked earlier today
14 about your knowledge concerning persons who were being kept in the
15 basement of the barracks where you were assigned or stationed. Can you
16 please describe for us where those persons were kept, perhaps starting
17 with going down the stairs into the basement of that building, and where
18 you were going. You told us that you passed by that corridor on your way
19 somewhere else. Can you just tell us, to the best of your recollection,
20 as you go down the stairs and into the basement, where those persons were
21 being kept and where you were going.
22 A. I would turn right, and these areas were to the left. So as soon
23 as I turned right, there would be a soldier who acted as a sort of guard,
24 and the corridor was open. There wasn't a door. There was a corridor
25 that was used generally. And I think that answers your question.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 As for the details, who was there and what they were doing, my
2 role and function was such that I had no interest in that, so I cannot
3 give you any details. But it may be interesting to note, there was an
4 intervention by one of my staff. He used to be my driver in the
5 institute, and his wife was the treasurer. And during the conflict, a
6 young man, Adzaip, was held in detention, and I guarantee that he was
7 someone who hadn't done any serious offence, so I intervened personally
8 with persons who were in charge. Now, whether it was Beba Salko, I'm not
9 quite sure, or General Alagic in person. They believed me. And that is
10 the only case I can comment on when talking about those premises.
11 Q. I take it, sir, then, from the answer that you just gave us, that
12 based upon your representations to Salko Beba or General Alagic, this
13 individual was released?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Let me just ask you a couple of follow-on questions from my
16 previous question about the corridor. When you get to the bottom of the
17 stairs in the barracks building, you would turn right to go to the
18 communications centre; is that correct?
19 A. Yes. Shall we say right? Probably right, because those corridors
20 in the basement, I haven't been there for a long time. Must be 10 or 11
21 years ago.
22 Q. And the persons who were being kept there were to the left, at the
23 bottom of the stairs.
24 A. I didn't pass by. My route didn't take me next to those areas,
25 those premises. So the corridor was an area that led both to the basement
2 Q. That was actually my point, sir. When you were going down to the
3 basement, to the communications room, you didn't actually walk in front of
4 the rooms where these persons were being kept.
5 A. No.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 A. I was just saying that the corridors were such, and I would
8 certainly have noticed or been able to identify had there been anything
9 unusual. I said that I did not enter those cells. It didn't interest me.
10 I was someone who had to spend a lot of time there because of my duties,
11 so had anything happened there, be it during the day or the night, I would
12 have heard it, because you can hear it. It's not so far away that one
13 wouldn't notice any unusual sounds.
14 Q. Thank you, sir.
15 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the Prosecution has no further
16 questions at this time.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is 5.35. We'll have a
18 technical break. We will resume around 6.00. I will give the floor to
19 the Defence for their re-examination, and after that, the Judges'
21 --- Recess taken at 5.35 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 6.04 p.m.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I will now give the floor to
24 Defence for re-examination.
25 Re-examined by Ms. Residovic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, in response to a question put to you
2 by my learned colleague, you said how you distributed equipment in the
3 Maintenance Institute, where you were the director in July 1992. Could
4 you please tell me whether, in that year, all the equipment that the
5 institute had was distributed to the BH army and the HVO?
6 A. Well, given the purpose, the function, of the institute, which was
7 to maintain equipment, at the time we shared out all the equipment that
8 was in good working order, all the equipment that could be used.
9 Naturally, a certain amount of equipment remained in the warehouses. This
10 was faulty equipment which had to be repaired so that the device could
11 work properly.
12 Q. You just said, Professor, that the main purpose of the institute
13 was to repair and maintain those systems. Would I be correct if I said
14 that the Maintenance Institute didn't produce communications equipment?
15 A. The institute never produced communications equipment.
16 Q. Thank you. It's not necessary to go into further detail. Thank
17 you. You've answered my question.
18 My learned colleague also asked you whether the communication
19 system that was established in the 3rd Corps could be considered to be
20 functional. You mentioned the staff, the importance of the staff and the
21 importance of having mobile equipment in order to ensure that the system
22 was functional, to a certain extent.
23 My question, Professor, is: Since you spoke about training men to
24 deal with certain elements within the communications system, could you
25 tell me whether the -- the way in which the system functioned also
1 depended on the level of training provided to the men?
2 A. Well, given the equipment at hand, given what was available to us,
3 it was essential to train men. We had organised activities to train these
4 men. This is what we focused on in order to raise the level of
6 Q. Professor, could you tell us, given the level of training that the
7 men had, given their ability to use the system at the end of 1993, to what
8 extent was the communications system better at the end of 1993 in relation
9 to the beginning of 1993?
10 A. You can say that it was better because some equipment had been
11 captured. In spite of these developments, the number of resources that
12 could be used, or the amount of resources used didn't significantly
13 change, so the efficiency was the same as in 1993. What guaranteed the
14 efficient functioning of the system was the men, or rather, the mobility
15 of the equipment.
16 Q. Towards -- or rather, the men, towards the end of 1993, did they
17 have more knowledge, were their possibilities greater, were they able to
18 put the equipment they had to better use, towards the end of 1993?
19 A. Yes. I think that towards the end of 1993, they had attained the
20 level of skill that was necessary for them to efficiently use the
21 communications equipment that they had available.
22 Q. My colleague has drawn my attention to something in line 23, page
23 70, a translation. It doesn't have to do with mobile equipment here, it
24 has to do with equipment that one could distribute via manoeuvres.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. So you could relocate equipment when needed. Thank you. I think
2 it's clear in the transcript now.
3 In response to a question put to you by my learned colleague, you
4 mentioned the problems the commanders had as far as the communications
5 system was concerned. Could you just tell me now, the communications
6 battalion that you were a part of, was this attached to the unit or was it
7 a unit that was attached to the commander?
8 A. Well, according to the rules that we followed, this unit should
9 have been under the command of the commander. It had the nature of a unit
10 attached to it that, in practice, as far as planning was concerned for the
11 use of the unit, the chief of staff could also have command over that
13 Q. Thank you very much. You mentioned numerous problems that you
14 were confronted with.
15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher now show the
16 witness Exhibit P192.
17 Q. As you can see, it's a report from the 3rd Corps commander. Have
18 a look at the middle of the document. It's entitled "The Problems of
19 Command and Control." The number is 01851600. That's the number for the
20 B/C/S version. Have you found it?
21 A. Yes, I have.
22 Q. Could you please read the last paragraph that commences with the
23 words "The second problem," or "The other problem," and go to the next
24 page to the section where it says "Certain limits," and then tell me
25 whether this reflects the state of the communications system.
1 A. "The second problem has to do with the communications system for
2 command and control. This problem is also present at the level of
3 companies and platoons. So companies may carry out attacks, but the
4 companies may not have a radio or a link with the platoon commander. They
5 will only have a career link. One must admit that the career link isn't
6 efficient if the enemy has better communications systems. One must admit
7 that a career link is not sufficiently efficient if the enemy, the
8 aggressor, has better communications equipment, and if his units can be
9 manoeuvred more easily." I'll now go to the other page.
10 "This problem is particularly present when carrying out attacks.
11 If a platoon is engaged in an attack on a given axis, which is fairly
12 broad, and if the platoon commander has no links with the left and right
13 flank --" well, I won't even mention the problem of cooperation,
14 regardless of the way it any it's established.
15 Q. This description of the problems at that level of command, were
16 these the kind of problems that you were aware of as someone who was
17 involved in that field? Was this the problem throughout the area covered
18 by the 3rd Corps?
19 A. Yes. This reflects the actual situation in the zone of
20 responsibility of the 3rd Corps.
21 Q. Professor, my colleague also asked you about certain
22 communications in the course of combat in June 1993. Tell me, at the
23 time, were you faced with the problem of a total lack of communications
24 with certain units in the area of combat, and if so, could you tell us
25 which units are concerned, and if this did occur, how could you obtain
1 essential information on the events unfolding?
2 A. Well, usually there were breaks in communication with the 306th
3 Brigade, because the brigade itself was located in terrain, the
4 configuration of which was not suitable for radio links. And the post
5 office infrastructure wasn't very good, and when there was such an
6 infrastructure, it would fall into disrepair. So usually we would deal
7 with these breaks in communication by establishing communication with the
8 superior command in the communications centre of the superior command.
9 But it's also important to note that those units had communication
10 problems in the zone that they covered, or rather, in the zone where they
11 engaged in combat action. In units of the 7th Brigade, there was a
12 similar problem because of the configuration of the terrain and because of
13 the circumstances in which events unfolded. But there were breaks in
14 communication in other units, but not to the same extent as in the case of
15 the brigade that I have mentioned.
16 Q. Thank you. And my last question now: In response to a question
17 from the Prosecution, you said that you knew that Mr. Adzaip was held in
18 detention in the JNA barracks, and you intervened to obtain his release,
19 in a certain sense.
20 Please tell me, was Mr. Adzaip taken into detention in June 1993
21 in the course of combat action, and is that the period of time during
22 which you requested his release?
23 A. Yes. At the time, there was ongoing combat action. I don't know
24 why he was detained, but that's the period concerned. And as I knew his
25 family, and as I -- well, it was my duty to try and solve that problem.
1 But that is the problem, and that was the situation.
2 Q. Thank you very much, Professor.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.
4 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] No further questions,
5 Mr. President, thank you.
6 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] No further questions,
7 Mr. President, thank you.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I have some
9 questions to put to you, but before I ask you to have a look at the
10 document you have before you again, I will first ask the registrar to
11 produce document P272.
12 Questioned by the Court:
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll provide the B/C/S version.
14 Have a look at the first page. This document, do you know that the 3rd
15 Corps Main Staff that approved of this document, that confirmed this
17 A. Well, I'd have to see who confirmed the document, who approved of
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's on the first page, to the
20 left. At the top of the first page, to the left.
21 A. I know this gentlemen, the chief of staff, but I didn't have any
22 direct contact with him. I didn't have any direct contact with him.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. There are some
24 tables in this document, a number of tables. Have a look at table number
25 5, communications equipment. There's a list and there are codes, 0, 501,
1 and then KT, et cetera. Can you tell us what these codes mean.
2 A. These are codes that were probably taken from the register of the
3 former JNA. Since most of this equipment was part of the equipment of the
4 former JNA and the codes the codes used by the former JNA, I assume that
5 these are the codes that they used. But I can comment on the right-hand
6 side. The names of the equipment, KT, KT means short-wave range. These
7 are frequencies used at a tactical level, and at -- the operations and
8 tactical level. N/KT-1, this is a subtype of such devices. UKT, that
9 means ultra short-wave. These are frequencies and devices that use such
10 markings. They're used at the combat level, when you're engaged in combat
11 operations in zones of responsibility, if speech is used, or you can use a
12 station to relay information by packet communities. MKT is another
13 system, another subunit. UKT, or the C in UKT, it's probably a variant of
14 the UKT system, in terms of the tactical possibilities of that set. KZZK,
15 I assume that's some kind of a device for cryptographic protection. Then
16 we have KLK; I assume that's a wire device. ITC-40, that's a telephone, a
17 field telephone central. It's a military central and 40 users can use it.
18 ITC-10, that's the same type of exchange, but only 10 users can use this
19 device. ITA, that's an inductor telephone device. That's a device that's
20 used with these systems. KDV, I'm not sure what this is. I'll skip that.
21 APST, that means a radio receiver station. KST is some sort of a radio
22 relay station. And then RRMST, that's probably a radio relay
23 inter-station. RPR/U is a radio-receiving device. This device can only
24 be used as a receiver. It can't be used to transmit any information.
25 PC-286, that's a personal computer, an XT or AT version; 286 type, that's
1 the Intel type. PAKET is something that designates the modem used for
2 tactical communications, or, rather, for the UKT range. PAKTOR is the
3 modem used to transfer information via radio amateur devices that use the
4 KT range. Tel modem is a telephone modem that could be used to transfer
5 information, and you could use a wire network, but usually the public
6 infrastructure, or the post office would be used. That would be a
7 telephone modem. AB, I don't know what that is. And AD, I could just
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. And this equipment
10 was intended for units normally. Then there's a list of units. Can you
11 look at the list of units, please. It begins with 5023, 5024 independent
12 unit, et cetera. Can you see this list.
13 A. I'm sorry, what page is that on? Is it the last page?
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No. Page 6. Page 7 in English,
15 but page 6 in B/C/S.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the English be placed on the ELMO, please.
17 A. Name of groups of units and the list of subunits.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You see, there's the 303rd, the
19 304th, 305th. You told us a moment ago that you would go to meet the
20 units sometimes. Look at the one after the 307th Motorised Brigade. 85
21 anti-terrorist group, what is that? What does that mean to you? It is
22 before the sabotage and reconnaissance brigade. There's 86, 87. What
23 does it -- Cobra, this group Cobra, what does it mean to you.
24 A. I remember the name, but it doesn't mean anything if particular,
25 anti-terrorist group. I couldn't tell you anything about the composition
1 or the nature of the unit.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So we'll go back to the document
3 that the Defence showed you, P72 -- P192, I'm sorry. You have read the
4 document, and thank you for reading it, because you mentioned the
5 problems. But when we follow the paragraphs, according to this document,
6 it would appear that communications between the 3rd Corps and the superior
7 command are defined by short-wave communications, VHF communications.
8 What is Digipiter.
9 A. I understand. If you recollect, when you showed me the list of
10 equipment, I commented on this UKT, ultra short-wave frequencies. It is a
11 frequency from 300 megahertz to 3 gigahertz, and Digipiter is a special
12 device which is intended to receive the information of user on one channel
13 to recognise to whom it is intended, and redirected towards another user.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A moment ago in the list, you
15 indicated that there were radio relay stations. I see under 3 that there
16 was a radio relay between Sarajevo and Zenica, with 24 channels. Does
17 this establish the fact that the 3rd Corps was linked to Sarajevo through
18 a system that had 24 channels.
19 A. This is a very interesting question, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, I'm asking because I
21 consider it to be interesting.
22 A. And could you give me a little more time to explain this problem,
23 because it could lead to the wrong conclusion.
24 The moment when there was a break in communications, that is, the
25 Serb army intercepted the cable links, there were no radio links, public
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 links before the war. In the institute, we managed to repair a certain
2 number of military radio relay devices, which are devices which can ensure
3 several channels in one direction, in between 12 to 24 telephone channels.
4 And the idea was a very good one, by those links, to try and restore the
5 public system for the needs of civilians, the military, and other
6 services, such as the centre for observation, certain ministries, and so
8 The idea was put into effect, but only in the area that the HVO
9 had under control. All the links that were done were done through
10 territory and intermediaries. There has to be a radio relay centre with
11 two devices that will receive information and retransmit it. Those
12 points, locations, were under HVO control. In Travnik, it was the HVO
13 that controlled communications towards Split and towards Jajce. Had those
14 communications become functional with Croatia, this was equipment
15 belonging to the institute in Travnik, and the people participating in
16 those communications were people who were in the army and the HVO, and I
17 was one of them. However, the control and the use of those communications
18 ended up almost 100 per cent, all the channels -- this was towards
19 Sarajevo, there were 24 channels. This was never realised. But they
20 ended up on the side of the HVO.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much for this
22 information. The document continues and addresses types of communications
23 with units, subordinated units, and then with the brigades. And according
24 to what I see in the document, it would appear that there are four methods
25 of communication with the brigades, one, two, three, four.
1 One are short-waves, and we see VHF indicated as well. Is VHF
2 another frequency?
3 A. It says VKT. It means very short waves, and that is a range from
4 30 megahertz to 300 megahertz. So it is between the KT and the UKT. And
5 let me see that military equipment or armies everywhere in the world use
6 this range in the band from 30 megahertz to 80 megahertz. All military
7 devices use those frequencies. The rest of the range is available to
8 radio amateurs and special services. And this VKT relates to that range
9 exclusively. It is used by all those that I have mentioned in this range.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But after VKT, it says "and
11 VHF." What is that.
12 A. I'm not able to find the exact place. It is document 01851602, am
13 I right? Is that the right number, ERN number?
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No. In English, the translation
15 is VKT and VHF.
16 A. There's a mixture of terminology here. There's the terminology.
17 In the local languages, Serbian, Croatian or Bosnian, it is UKT or
18 sometimes UKV. That is the abbreviation in our language, whereas in the
19 English it is ultra high frequency, or UHF or VHF. And HF means high
20 frequency band, in English.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And the second system, when
22 there's reference to the operations group Bosnia Krajina, there's a radio
23 relay. Where was this radio relay located.
24 A. After the problems that we had in the provision of spare parts, we
25 managed to repair a couple of radio relay devices. And because of the
1 interruption in cables, we had to achieve links with Zenica and Bugojno by
2 some other way, and we used radio relays that we set up between Vilenica
3 and Lice near Zenica, and so we ensured both military and civilian
4 communication so that various levels of authorities and the military could
5 use them. But the maintenance and supervision of those communications was
6 in the hands of the army.
7 I mentioned that this was after the conflict and after the repairs
8 made. These were devices that the institute had and that needed to be
9 repaired with the help of spare parts. And antennae systems needed to be
10 found to replace the original systems, as these are very specific
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In point 4, I see that there is
13 mention of courier communication. So when radio communication was faulty,
14 wasn't the solution to resort to classical couriers, which, as the text
15 says, was a basic form of communication? When there were problems with
16 the radios, telephones, et cetera, did the army not use couriers.
17 A. We did, but in very rare occasions. To have a courier, you have
18 to give him a car or a motorcycle in order to be able to carry information
19 quickly, because if you go on foot or use a horse, you need a couple of
20 hours, and that is, in most cases, too late. So we did think about it,
21 but courier communications we used only for personal mail, preparatory
22 documents, and not when realtime events had to be dealt with.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Listening to the replies you
24 gave to the questions of the Defence, my impression was, and I'd like you
25 to confirm it, that in the building that you were situated in in Travnik,
1 I thought, I gathered that you had a system of tapping the HVO, listening
2 in to HVO communications. Were you able to listen in to HVO
4 A. Yes. In view of the complexity of the situations, we developed
5 the system out of the devices we had, and I said that a proper system was
6 developed much earlier on but it was kept by the HVO. But later on we
7 managed to develop this system of tapping the enemy.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You were listening in to the
9 HVO, but I suppose also to the Serbs. So this system of interception,
10 surely you as the professor would not take the notes from what you heard.
11 A. The transcript, sir, the intercepts were done by people who had
12 some knowledge in mathematics and information technology. They could
13 carry out certain searches and find solutions for decoding these messages.
14 But I said at the very beginning --
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There seems to be a technical
16 problem. It was becoming interesting, and the transcript stopped.
17 Mr. Registrar?
18 [Technical difficulty]
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have the impression it's
20 working now. I was about to ask the witness to help in restoring the
21 system to working order.
22 We were talking about interception of the HVO and the Serbs, and
23 you said that indeed you did listen in. I asked you whether there were
24 transcripts, I asked you who made those transcripts. What I wanted to
25 know was who used those transcripts. Was there a service, a body, which
1 would use the contents of those transcripts.
2 A. There was no separate service for that purpose in the critical
3 days during operations and combat activities in Travnik. When talking
4 about cryptography, then there are various possibilities. You never know
5 whether the information was accurately decoded or whether it is reliable.
6 So we assumed, and our assumptions were right, that communication between
7 the Serbian side and the HVO, because of inadequate preparations, used
8 incomplete cryptographic methods. Therefore, the tools we had needed to
9 be very sophisticated. We had to test various solutions on the basis of
10 probability, the appearance of certain word parts, syllables. So in view
11 of the fact that fighting was going on where these devices were being
12 used, they are spoken information, very often there's not sufficient time
13 to adequately prepare for sending such information. And knowing this, by
14 interception, we were able to get that information, and my task was to
15 pass on that information to the command; sometimes directly to
16 Commander Alagic or to someone who was charged by the command to respond
17 to the information we collected.
18 Of course, I am not somebody who was a professional in that area.
19 I never thought about the way in which that would be used later on. But
20 my efforts focused on conveying that information as accurately as
22 I must say straight away, because of the reasons I gave, they were
23 not the best cryptographic methods that both parties were using.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] At your level, did you have the
25 impression that the HVO or the Serbs were listening in to your units as
1 well and your messages.
2 A. Yes.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And technically, how did you
4 notice this.
5 A. Well, you see how. If somebody doesn't recognise or doesn't have
6 the tools and possibilities to detect information that is being
7 intercepted, then the channel is physically attacked by letting a stronger
8 signal into the channel so you block the channel for exchanges of
9 information. And when -- we always knew what the reason was. And as I
10 was saying that the equipment was technologically and that very
11 conventional methods were being used, it was quite easy to do this if you
12 wished to obstruct communications.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And on the ground there were
14 also foreign armies. Did you have the feeling that you might be
15 intercepted by foreign forces.
16 A. Could you tell me what you mean by "foreign forces"? In the area
17 of Travnik, we could see traffic being used by UNPROFOR units, as it was
18 called at the time, and also traffic among units of the HVO and the Serb
19 side. I don't know what exactly you mean by "foreign forces," except for
20 UNPROFOR, which was present there.
21 I also need to say that the police, the civilian police, had their
22 own system of communications. It was the VHF system, most frequently,
23 that we spoke about. We knew which frequencies and channels they were
24 using so that they were not an object of interest for us. So we didn't
25 interfere with the channels belonging to UNPROFOR and units within those
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We've had a number of witnesses
3 who have testified here, and some of them, as far as I can remember, said
4 that when they came to arrest them, the men were looking for radio amateur
5 devices. In that area, were there a lot of radio amateur operators among
6 the civilian population? Were there radio amateur clubs? Because a
7 number of witnesses have spoken about this.
8 A. Yes, that's correct. There were radio amateur devices for the
9 simple reason that, in Travnik, in that area, there were a lot of
10 refugees. It was very difficult to establish communications with the rest
11 of the world. And the only link with the rest of the world, for most
12 ordinary people, was via radio amateurs, via this intermediary. We didn't
13 use the devices for combat operations.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And my last question now. You
15 are a professional. You have told us about your educational background,
16 and all of this demonstrates that you are very familiar with this system.
17 You joined the 3rd Corps in various capacities, and as a judge, what I
18 would like to know is the following:
19 Was it conceivable for a military unit, however reduced it was, to
20 go into combat without communications equipment? Is this something that
21 would have been possible? Or when drawing up plans, was it necessary for
22 the platoon, the company, to have minimum communications equipment? What
23 is your opinion as a specialist?
24 A. Well, I would approach this from a different point of view. But
25 my interpretation of the tactics of the units, and as of the use of
1 communications system, also provides a partial answer.
2 The report you showed and asked me to comment on shows that, at a
3 given point in time, if you examine the situation of all the units, well,
4 the situation is terrible. You can't deal with the problem if you keep
5 all the equipment in the units at the same time. The only solution was to
6 provide good training and to manoeuvre the equipment on the basis of the
7 priorities that the commanders would set.
8 For example, if the 17th Vitez was engaged in combat, the units
9 that were part of the 17th, for example, didn't have enough equipment, I
10 would issue an order and coordinate with the withdrawal of equipment from
11 the 312th and the 306th in areas where I believed that it wouldn't be
12 necessary, because these were the assessments that were made. Naturally,
13 people were trained in the same way. I said a lot of attention was paid
14 to training. So if this equipment arrived, it was possible to provide the
15 minimum necessary for the system of command and control to function.
16 Naturally, after each operation, the equipment would be returned,
17 examined. This was a very complicated and difficult procedure, a
18 different way of using the equipment. But what is certain is that at the
19 time, this was the only way to attain our objective efficiently.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, any further
21 questions before we adjourn?
22 MR. MUNDIS: Just a couple of questions, Mr. President.
23 Further cross-examined by Mr. Mundis:
24 Q. Sir, you were shown Prosecution Exhibit P192 several times today.
25 Do you still have that document in front of you?
1 Sir, let me ask you this question: When was the first time you
2 ever saw this document?
3 A. This document?
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. Well, this is the first time I've seen all the details. Maybe
6 I've seen it before. But since I've already had such documents before me,
7 I can't say that I've never seen it before. I'm familiar with the
8 situation. I don't need the document to remind me of this. Perhaps
9 someone asked me to assist them, to assist them drafting the document.
10 But this is part of the professional field I belong to, so I'm familiar
11 with the contents, with the situation described here.
12 Q. Let me ask you this about the portion of the document talking
13 about radio relay communication between Sarajevo and Zenica. The
14 Presiding Judge asked you some questions about that, and the document
15 seems to indicate that there were 24 channels, and that this radio relay
16 communication system between Sarajevo and Zenica had been established. My
17 question, sir, is: Based on your answer, it was unclear to me whether
18 your testimony was that that system was established, or that system was
19 only established through the territory held by the HVO.
20 A. In order to establish this system, it was necessary to coordinate
21 it in the territory under the control of the HVO. And as far as I know,
22 this system, such as it was planned here, was never actually established.
23 Q. During 1993, can you tell us, based on your experience within the
24 3rd Corps and its subordinate units, what form of communication, if any,
25 was available between Zenica and Sarajevo?
1 A. On the whole, the communications in that area was via the KT or KF
2 system. I said that that was the basis for tactical -- operations and
3 tactical communications. They were devices that had sufficient -- that
4 were sufficiently powerful and could be secured so that telegrammes could
5 be exchanged or information could be exchanged between Sarajevo and
7 On the other hand, at some point in time, parts of the command,
8 parts of the superior commands, were relocated from Sarajevo and they were
9 based closer to us. So the communications and the terms of control and
10 command relocated at one point in time to areas where it was easier to
11 provide better communications. For example, this occurred in Kakanj.
12 Some of this equipment was relocated, and it was then possible to
13 communicate in this way. Kakanj and Zenica were very close.
14 But the HF range was the one that was used most frequently for
15 communications between the 3rd Corps and the supreme command staff.
16 Q. Thank you, sir.
17 MR. MUNDIS: The Prosecution has no further questions.
18 Further re-examined by Ms. Residovic:
19 Q. Professor, in response to a question put to you by the Chamber on
20 page 80, line 17, in relation to communications system used for
21 communication with subordinate units, you said that this took place after
22 the conflict and after you managed to carry out certain repairs, et
23 cetera. Could you tell me: After which conflicts this occurred, and
24 which period were you referring to?
25 A. The radio relay communications towards Zenica were established
1 after the elevation behind Travnik, the elevation where you could set up a
2 system for communication with Zenica. After this elevation came under the
3 army control, or rather, it was provided with a source of energy and
4 temporary facilities --
5 Q. I apologise for interrupting you, but we haven't got much time
6 left. Was this after June 1993?
7 A. Yes, that was after June. And things were moving in the direction
8 I mentioned.
9 Q. You've already seen the report that you've been shown by the
10 Chamber, by the Prosecution, by the Defence. When a commander drafts a
11 report, certain professional parts are drafted by his assistants, or are
12 you not familiar with such practices?
13 A. Well, the assistants, those responsible for part of the system of
14 control and command, would draft certain suggestions, and then the
15 commander would either accept these suggestions or not. If necessary, he
16 would send these suggestions to be back to be amended in accordance with
17 the objectives set by the commander, in accordance with the tasks that the
18 document had to deal with.
19 Q. Thank you. The Presiding Judge asked you about drafting plans for
20 certain units -- drawing up plans for certain units, and their
21 communications when engaged in various combat operations.
22 My question is: The planned communications systems for
23 operations, do these systems involve certain units and their component
24 parts -- do they involve units parts and component parts of units that are
25 part of the BH army?
1 A. Well, anyone involved in planning within this system must be given
2 specific and clear instructions from those planning the operation; above
3 all, the chief of staff and the commander, he must be told which units are
4 concerned. And it is upon that basis that a document is compiled, and
5 this document states how a network will be formed, how a special-purposes
6 network will be established, and what it will look like. So it's the
7 staff organ within the corps that determines this.
8 Q. But, Professor, if there's some independent unit in the field
9 which is not part of the army, does your plan also refer to such groups or
11 A. The plan can only relate units for which authorisation has been
12 provided. As a person involved in planning the communications system, I
13 can't include anyone else in the plan. The plan must be the basis on
14 which the operations are carried out. So any such unit wouldn't be
15 treated as a unit. That is the responsibility of the high command, of the
16 3rd Corps operations group.
17 Q. And my last question, Professor: At my request, you read out part
18 of this report, and the Presiding Judge also referred to that part of the
19 report. It was a very interesting exchange, an exchange that was
20 important to determine what the situation was in 1993. And then there was
21 a technical interpretation.
22 In 1993, tell me whether the 3rd Corps was continually faced with
23 the kind of problems that we had 15 minutes ago.
24 A. Well, when you have those problems in your area -- well, just
25 imagine what it was like in the field. For example, if you assume that
1 cables are functional and work properly, well, something can happen, rain
2 might fall, and then for three or four days you can't hear anyone via
3 those cables. So, interruptions, jamming, it's a serious problems, these
4 are serious problems.
5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hadzialic.
6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I have
7 no further questions.
8 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] We have no further questions for
9 this witness, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Professor. You have
11 answered all the technical questions put to you by all of the parties.
12 Thank you for your contribution. And we wish you a good trip home, and
13 all the best in your university career.
14 I'll now ask the usher to escort you out of the courtroom.
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Tomorrow we will be resuming.
18 We will have a hearing at 2.15. We have a witness who will be heard
19 tomorrow at 2.15.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.05 p.m.,
21 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 25th day of
22 November, 2004, at 2.15 p.m.