1 Tuesday, 1 February 2005
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can the registrar call the case,
7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Yes. Case Number IT-01-47-T, the
8 Prosecutor versus Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 Can we have the appearances for the Prosecution.
11 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning,
12 Your Honours, counsel, and everyone in and around the courtroom. For the
13 Prosecution, Stefan Waespi, Daryl Mundis, assisted by Mr. Andres Vatter,
14 our case manager.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. And for the Defence,
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President. Good
18 morning, Your Honours. On behalf of General Hadzihasanovic, Edina
19 Residovic, lead counsel; Stephane Bourgon, co-counsel; and Muriel Cauvin,
20 legal assistant.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can we have the appearances for
22 the other Defence team, please.
23 MR. DIXON: Good morning, Your Honours. On behalf of Mr. Kubura,
24 Rodney Dixon assisted by Mr. Nermin Mulalic. Thank you, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber bids good morning to
1 all those people present on the 1st of February and the 174th sitting that
2 we are holding. Before bringing in the witness the Chamber, which was
3 yesterday addressed by the question of hearsay testimony, wishes to say
4 the following. But we're going to give under arrest ruling in private
5 session, as the matter was raised in private session yesterday.
6 [Private session]
11 Pages 15234-15242 redacted. Private session.
3 [Open session]
4 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in open session,
5 Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are in open session. The
7 witness that started testifying yesterday will be brought into the
8 courtroom in order to answer questions put to him by the Prosecution in
9 the course of the cross-examination.
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good morning, Colonel. If you
12 hear me, can you say so.
13 You have been brought in with some delay, but we had some
14 procedural matters to deal with that's why you were brought into the
15 courtroom at 20 to 10.00. Without further delay, I'm going to give the
16 floor to the Prosecution to continue their cross-examination.
17 WITNESS: ROBERT STEWART [Resumed]
18 Cross-examined by Mr. Waespi: [Continued]
19 Q. Good morning, Colonel.
20 A. Good morning.
21 Q. I have about an hour and 25 minutes left according to
22 calculations, and I want to spend the first part on issues unrelated to
23 the Mujahedin. You talked yesterday about the Kacuni checkpoint incident
24 of 25th of January, I believe. Do you remember that?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. You did mention, though, that two Croats were killed. Is that
3 A. I didn't mention that two Croats were killed, no I did not.
4 Q. Now, let me just remind you of what you testified in Kordic, and
5 you also discussed it in your book on page 231. In Kordic, transcript
6 pages 12.371 you were asked by -- I believe it was the Defence,
7 Mr. Sawyers of Mr. Kordic at the time. And his question was, and I quote
8 him: "In connection with the fighting that occurred, sir, there is no
9 question that the spark that set off the fighting was the murder of two
10 Croats at the Kacuni checkpoint. And you subsequently had conversations
11 with General Hadzihasanovic and Colonel Merdan about that. Correct?"
12 Your answer: "Yes."
13 "Q. In fact, you told both General Hadzihasanovic and
14 Colonel Merdan one day later that they were at least responsible for the
15 outbreak of the fighting that occurred on the 25th of January, and they
16 both agreed, did they not?"
17 Your answer: "Yes, I think I certainly told them. Whether they
18 necessarily agreed, I can't remember."
19 Do you remember having testified according to these lines?
20 A. Yes, I do.
21 Q. Now, let me go on to the -- another aspect of those days, and it's
22 about Dusina. Again in Kordic you were asked, again on 17th January,
23 1999, this time by Mr. Nice.
24 MR. WAESPI: And, Your Honours, it's pages 12.374.
25 "Q. All right. Did you receive any information from your
1 soldiers or other sources of information that you had at your disposal
2 regarding massacres of Croat civilians at the villages of Dusina and
3 Lasva, sir?"
4 Your answer: "I think I did and I think I've referred to them
5 already, that sort of evidence."
6 Mr. Nice: "Yes."
7 Your answer: "Most certainly I tried very hard to investigate any
8 reports of Croats being massacred by Muslims."
9 Mr. Nice: "Just one question on that regard. Did you ever hear
10 about anyone being prosecuted or administratively punished, removed from
11 command or anything like that in connection with those massacres at Dusina
12 and Lasva on January the 25th and 26th, 1993, sir?"
13 And you answer: "I think that Merdan told me that the people
14 concerned were going to be court-martialed.
15 "Q. And do you know whether they ever were?
16 "A. No."
17 Do you remember testifying under oath like that?
18 A. You've reminded me. But, yes, I think that's what I said.
19 Q. Thank you very much. Let's go onto a point about the Geneva
20 Conventions. You told us, I believe, that the soldiers on the ground not
21 necessarily knew what the Geneva Conventions meant -- or at least what
22 that is, the Geneva Conventions.
23 A. Yes, that's correct.
24 Q. But you would agree with me that they certainly knew -- every
25 soldier knows that it's a crime, it's illegal under any system to massacre
1 civilians, unarmed civilians, to execute captured prisoners who lay down
2 their weapons --
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [In English] Stop.
4 [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon.
5 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. If my
6 learned friend wishes to quote the Geneva Conventions, I must say that the
7 word "massacre" is not part of the Geneva Conventions. If he wants to
8 mention a crime, he may quote any convention but he cannot use big words
9 to reinforce his quote.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Defence is saying that you
11 may quote the Geneva Conventions, but that according to the Defence the
12 word "massacre" is not a word that is part of the Geneva Conventions.
13 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, the witness said that the people on the
14 ground didn't know the Geneva Conventions. The articles -- I don't know
15 the Geneva Conventions in every article, so my point is: I want to know
16 what the witness knows, what the state of knowledge was on the ground in
17 regard to whether somebody is allowed to execute prisoners. I would like
18 to know whether the witness has any knowledge about that, because he said
19 the people on the ground didn't know the letter of the Geneva Conventions.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well then.
21 So you want, Witness, to be precise and say what the people on the
22 ground knew about the Geneva Conventions and how they interpreted the
23 Geneva Conventions.
24 You may proceed.
25 MR. WAESPI:
1 Q. Sir, my question is: Would every soldier in your knowledge, and
2 you had contact with all these people, you were in the scene almost half a
3 year, perhaps even more. Do these soldiers know that it's not allowed to
4 massacre civilians?
5 A. My belief is that every human being knows that massacring anyone
6 is a crime. My belief is also that everyone should know that shooting
7 prisoners is not acceptable. Now, when I say the "Geneva Conventions," I
8 specifically mean the treatment of prisoners and how you deal with people.
9 And I am not an expert on the Geneva Conventions, I just know the basic
10 outlines of how to deal with people. But I would always emphasise the
11 basic points that came from law, whether they were Geneva Conventions or
12 not. You do not kill people, civilians particularly, and you treat
13 prisoners properly, with respect. And those are the kind of things I
14 would say all the time. Some of the soldiers on the ground, specifically
15 in places right on the front line, I would necessarily -- I would
16 re-emphasise this point when I was visiting, that if they did take
17 prisoners, they were not to hurt them once they got them under power. I
18 didn't talk to them and say, Do you know about the Geneva Conventions? I
19 would say, You are not allowed to do this under law, because the Geneva
20 Conventions would mean so little to so many people. But the commanders -
21 let's be clear - the commanders on all sides were professional military
22 officers like I was, and they understood the Geneva Conventions. But it's
23 quite difficult when you suddenly have an army come from nothing, for them
24 to understand all the details of how you treat prisoners. After all, the
25 British army is not without sin itself.
1 Q. Thank you for this answer. And when you talk about commanders,
2 that would General Hadzihasanovic?
3 A. Absolutely, General Hadzihasanovic was a professional officer like
4 I was.
5 Q. Now, let me touch upon another issue which you mentioned almost
6 Beaussou yesterday. You told us about the death of your driver and that
7 you believed that a BH soldier was responsible for that.
8 A. That is my belief. I have no proof.
9 Q. And you then went on to say that, and I quote you -- you also had
10 incidents with the HVO. "I don't believe that they were under
11 instructions from their chain of command to engage the United Nations. In
12 fact, I'm pretty sure they weren't, and that includes the HVO. So I used
13 to put it down to lack of control, out of control soldiers, such as on the
14 13th of January."
15 Do you remember having said that yesterday?
16 A. Thankfully I do, yes.
17 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, with your leave I would like to show
18 the witness a document, and I informed counsel yesterday orally, I faxed
19 it to them. It's a two-page -- in fact, one-page order by General Blaskic
20 which is very telling and which appears to contradict at least what the
21 witness says. Perhaps it refreshes his memory because he was on the
22 ground. Now, stated -- it's an order classified "urgent, urgent, urgent,"
23 to all -- to various units by General Blaskic, Colonel at that time, dated
24 18th April, 1993, at 0800 hours in the morning. And if I just can read
25 out the --
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon, you have the floor.
2 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I would
3 kindly ask my learned friend to clarify -- I see what the witness has
4 said. He said that the two armies did not have any express orders to
5 attack the United Nations. I don't see the purpose of this document. The
6 witness says that neither the BiH army nor the HVO ever received an order
7 to attack the UN forces. And I don't see how this document can be helpful
8 with that respect.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Is this some sort of confusion
10 that we are facing here? The Defence says that the witness never said
11 that the party in conflict ever had an order to attack UN vehicles. Are
12 we talking at cross-purposes here?
13 Mr. Prosecutor, what are you trying to achieve with your questions
15 MR. WAESPI: The witness said he believed that several units were
16 out of control, and he gave an example that he -- his driver was attacked
17 by a BiH driver. He gave another example without foundation that the HVO
18 would also shoot at UN, but he said that wasn't commanded, it wasn't
19 controlled. And here we have a clear example of Colonel Blaskic ordering
20 that UN troops be shot at. And there will be another document saying that
21 ten days later in fact we know they were shot at. And that is a
22 contradiction of what the witness said, and perhaps he can help us whether
23 that changes his opinion that indeed in particular HVO troops shot at UN
24 and were indeed commanded and ordered to do so, not just out of control
25 elements as the witness had told us yesterday. And since he was on the
1 ground, I think it's probably interesting for him to see that.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well then, you may proceed.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
4 MR. WAESPI:
5 Q. Are you surprised to see this order?
6 A. Well, I am surprised a little, but looking at the date of the
7 order, if you note the date it's round about the time of the Lasva valley
8 activities, and my soldiers were indeed restricted in their movements at
9 this time as I recall. I said, if I can remember correctly what I said
10 just earlier, that out of control soldiers, not elements -- I mean,
11 individuals might have opened fire. I felt quite strongly that actually
12 there weren't orders given out by people like Colonel Blaskic to attack
13 me. Indeed on several occasions - at least one occasion I can remember,
14 so I'll be precise - at least one occasion I went to Blaskic after I'd
15 personally been engaged quite heavily by snipers and RPG-7s fired at me
16 personally. And my complaint to Blaskic was: Your soldiers opened fire
17 at me this morning, personally at me, and I should have killed them or I
18 could have killed them in response. In fact, I aimed off when I responded
19 by firing myself. And his answer to me was: You should have killed them
20 because I have given orders that they are not to attack you.
21 Now, I took "you" as being the United Nations, not me personally.
22 It may well have been me personally, but I took it as the United Nations
23 forces. And it's on that sort of principle that I say I didn't believe
24 that the HVO or the ABiH had direct orders to attack my soldiers; however,
25 this document here dated the 18th of April suggests that soldiers of the
1 HVO might actually in the pursuit of stopping us going into the so-called
2 operational area might open fire at us. So I've never seen this document
3 before. I accept that I might be wrong. I've said that it's my opinion,
4 not a fact. And I accept that at that time it was extremely difficult,
5 because my orders to my soldiers were quite simple: Get into the middle
6 of the battle, take our vehicles straight in the middle there, make sure
7 they are clearly visible with their white sides and the United Nations on
8 it, do not open fire unless someone opens fire at you, but if they open
9 fire at you, kill them.
10 I wanted to try and stop the fighting, and I also gave
11 instructions for anyone that was hurt, whether they be ABiH, HVO, or
12 civilians, regardless of their status, they were to be picked up and dealt
13 with properly in accordance with civilised behaviour and brought into
14 hospitals and, if necessary, our hospital direct. Those are the
15 instructions I gave. Now, I'm sorry if I'm slightly at variance with this
16 document, but I've never seen it before.
17 Q. And you agree with me --
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just for the record, I would
19 like to clarify as following. Colonel, when you were shot at, was it
20 before the 18th of April or after the 18th of April? It would be of some
21 importance to know that. Do you remember?
22 THE WITNESS: I would look through my diary, Your Honour, to find
23 it. The incident was I think at -- I definitely -- I would need time just
24 to look because it would be in my diary because there were two pigs that
25 were dead there as well. And that would -- I seem to remember writing
1 something about pigs and the smell, but I don't know -- right now I can't
2 give you an honest answer -- I can't give you the right answer, whether it
3 was before. I think it was probably -- most probably afterwards, and I
4 think I had also General Morillion around on that day.
5 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. And you would agree with me that this order shows actions on the
7 ground were probably were probably coordinated than they appeared to you
8 at first sight?
9 A. Forgive me, sir, I never said that the HVO didn't have coordinated
10 actions on the ground. This was a deliberate attack in -- a deliberate
11 and pre-planned attack that started on the morning of the 16th. If I
12 implied that or said that, I'm sorry, I've made a mistake.
13 Q. I've said that before, and there's evidence on the record.
14 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, it's Exhibit DH205, an ECMM document
15 dated 28th April, 1993, signed by Mr. Thebault that on page 2 of this
16 document -- and perhaps that could be distributed as well again. The
17 reference I'm interested in is on page 2 of this document.
18 Q. The next paragraph after the middle it says: "Between Kiseljak
19 and Zenica we are unable to see many burning places. We were able to see
20 many burning place in HVO-controlled area, in particular Gomionica, 3
21 kilometres northwest of Kiseljak, where access was yesterday denied by HVO
22 to ECMM combat joint patrol which after a new attempt today was fired at."
23 That appears to be a direct consequence perhaps of Mr. Blaskic's
24 order, and you remember in paragraph 5 of this order it said: "Any
25 arbitrary behaviour will be severely punished."
1 Do you remember that incident raised by Mr. Thebault where CanBat
2 was shot at?
3 A. No, I don't because it was outside the area -- the Canadian
4 Battalion was dealing with ECMM up towards Kiseljak. Although I often
5 patrolled up there, I do not remember this particular incident, except I
6 was shot at around that position on a couple of occasions.
7 Q. Very well. Next, Colonel, let's go on to -- briefly to the
8 milinfosums. Again, would you agree with me that informing your superiors
9 was one of your foremost duties?
10 A. I do.
11 Q. And these milinfosums were part of that duty?
12 A. I do, yes.
13 Q. Now, I believe you submitted a milinfosum one every day over time
14 you were in the area?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, did you ever hear back from BH command in Kiseljak,
17 Mr. Morillion, or perhaps MOD in London, if they received, any complaints
18 about not properly assessed materials in these milinfosums?
19 A. I don't think I did, otherwise I would have paid more attention to
21 Q. And who exactly drafted the daily milinfosums?
22 A. A mixture of people, the operations officer, perhaps my second in
23 command, perhaps the intelligence cell perhaps the duty watchkeeper,
24 normally a young officer.
25 Q. Can one tell from looking at the face of a milinfosum on a given
1 day who the drafter might have been?
2 A. I think that would be difficult.
3 Q. Is it recorded in a war diary who the drafter or perhaps the duty
4 officer on a specific day was?
5 A. Maybe not -- you see, probably not the duty officer -- the answer
6 is probably not. We didn't have time -- forgive me. We did not have time
7 to do everything written down.
8 Q. Now, I'll come to milinfosum in a second. I also want to clarify
9 something you mentioned in relation to Mr. Hadzihasanovic yesterday. I
10 asked you whether you knew there might be incidents in these milinfosums
11 that would reflect that Mr. Hadzihasanovic wasn't speaking the truth or
12 was less accurate. And your answer was: "It's quite possible," but you
13 weren't able to give a concrete example of such a behaviour?
14 A. It is possible. And I was not able to give a concrete example.
15 Q. Now, let me ask you something about milinfosum, but first: Who
16 would usually meet with Hadzihasanovic, General Hadzihasanovic, the corps
18 A. Probably me. Probably me, and possibly my second in command, and
19 possibly the company commander, that sort of level. After all,
20 General Hadzihasanovic was the top officer of the BiH.
21 Q. And did you have an interpreter with you when you talked to him?
22 A. Yes, and I can't see how I could have communicated with
23 General Hadzihasanovic without an interpreter. I can't absolutely say
24 that when I was on my own perhaps at an ECMM meeting, and I just happened
25 to meet him, that I had an interpreter right by my side. But for any kind
1 of formal meeting, I couldn't go to see General Hadzihasanovic without an
3 Q. Did you always use the same interpreter?
4 A. No. I had two, three military interpreters, two captains and one
5 sergeant, and I hired 16 local interpreters trying to balance in a kind of
6 way between ethnic Serb, Croat, Muslim in that number, but it wasn't easy.
7 But the very best interpreter I had was a lady called Dobrila Kolaba who
8 was a Bosnian Serb who was very sadly shot just after the end of my tour.
9 But it might have been the kind of person, the kind of interpreter I might
10 have taken to see General Hadzihasanovic would be either a military
11 interpreter or someone like Dobrila Kolaba, who I trusted.
12 Q. Did you ever use (redacted) as a interpreter?
13 A. Yes, of course.
14 Q. Many times?
15 A. Many times.
16 Q. When did you start using him, if you recall?
17 A. Nick Stansfield was the first interpreter, military interpreter I
18 had. And (redacted) arrived a little bit later. I can't
19 remember exactly when.
20 Q. Was it in 1993 or already in 1992?
21 A. I don't know. I can't recall.
22 Q. Would that be reflected in your notes?
23 A. No, not necessarily. The interpreter didn't -- forgive me, didn't
24 really matter. I just wanted to be -- my words to be as properly
25 presented as possible. However, I would take normally a military
1 interpreter into a difficult -- a very difficult situation to safeguard
2 the civilian interpreter from, perhaps, reprisals.
3 Q. Who is the CO 1? That's a reference in a milinfosum who went to
4 see General Hadzihasanovic. Who would that be?
5 A. CO 1?
6 Q. Yes.
7 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps if the witness could be shown an already
8 existing exhibit. Mr. President, it's at tab 2 in the binder P370.
9 Q. If you could look at the first paragraph A it talks about a CO 1
10 PWO met with Enver Hadzihasanovic who initially spoke about renewed
11 fighting in Mostar of the cease-fire between Halilovic and Petkovic. He
12 mentioned involvement by regular HVO brigades against -- in the fighting,
13 specifically mentioning 113 and 114 Brigades from Split and elements of
14 114 Brigade. During conversation, Hadzihasanovic threatened action
15 against Vitez and Busovaca. When questioned about the deployment of 314
16 Brigade in the area of Preocica, he flatly denied that it was stating they
17 were on the front line against the Chetniks. Comment. This directly
18 contradicts a non-fact. Comment ends.
19 A. I could answer this without -- this is very easy for me.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Bourgon.
21 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. My
22 learned friend put a question to the witness, and that is: What does CO 1
23 mean? And to specify he showed him a document to illustrate what this
24 abbreviation means. I am surprised that my colleague is not familiar with
25 this abbreviation at this stage of the proceedings, but the problem is
1 that the witness has not been given a chance to answer, to say, what it
2 means. And also, no reason, no grounds, have been established for showing
3 him this document which was drafted after he left Bosnia.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. When you put this
5 question, I noted that the date of the document is the 15th of May, 1993,
6 and if he left before then we may have a problem. Perhaps it would be
7 best for him to tell us what CO 1 stands for.
8 MR. WAESPI: Let me just quickly respond to --
9 THE INTERPRETER: PWO.
10 MR. WAESPI: [Previous translation continues] ... we are not
11 testifying, unlike, perhaps, what sometimes I see from the Defence bench,
12 so it's not up to me to say what the CO 1 is in the abbreviation. So it's
13 up to the witness to do that, and I wanted to give him a chance. In
14 looking at the exact wording of the CO 1 -- and if he left two days
15 earlier, this may be a follow-up of what was discussed in an earlier
16 conversation. And his successor, if CO 1 indeed means his successor, then
17 he may have raised something he was briefed about. So this witness
18 certainly is able to give a comment about the meeting with Hadzihasanovic,
19 and he was in fact willing to proceed.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could we hear your comment,
21 Colonel, please.
22 THE WITNESS: Your Honours and sir, the CO 1 confused me. CO 1
23 PWO does not. Commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, the Prince of
24 Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire, which I totally understand is extremely
25 confusing if you haven't been brought up with British army abbreviations.
1 And it is true, this is dated after I had left Bosnia.
2 MR. WAESPI:
3 Q. Can you tell us about -- something about this deployment of -- or
4 this threat by Hadzihasanovic. When it says "again," was that something
5 you had experienced before?
6 A. To be honest, I was never in the slightest bit threatened by
7 General Hadzihasanovic. The only indication not of threat was that he was
8 fighting to preserve his area; it wasn't a threat -- I never had a threat
9 made against the United Nations by General Hadzihasanovic.
10 Q. Yes. Here in fact he doesn't talk about United Nations or
11 yourself; he talks about Vitez.
12 A. That's true. He's probably in that case talking generically about
13 the HVO who were in control of Vitez. I wasn't in control of Vitez. My
14 camp was on the outskirts and I wasn't meant to be in control of anything.
15 I was meant to be escorting humanitarian aid, which I accept caused me
16 huge problems.
17 Q. And I take it you can't comment on the comment here: "A direct
18 contradiction of a known fact"? You don't know what these facts which are
20 A. No, I don't.
21 Q. Very well. If we could move on to a new subject, and that's the
22 killing of two British soldiers or mercenaries. I believe you told us
23 that there were Danes and Germans in the area. And in your book you
24 mention the killing of two British soldiers. And I would like to briefly
25 paraphrase and I don't know --
1 A. Could I stop you there. They weren't British soldiers; they were
3 Q. Yes, I just wanted to ask you about them. Their names were Ted
4 Skinner and Derek Arlo McBride?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. I don't know if you want to have the book open, I just want to
7 read a couple of passages on these gentleman. You said that you first met
8 them outside the hospital in Travnik when you went to see the doctor
9 there, and that's on page 93 of your book. Do you remember that?
10 A. I do.
11 Q. And they apparently worked with the Muslim army; that's what you
12 were told?
13 A. That's what they said.
14 Q. And specifically you talk about Ted, Ted Skinner, who explained to
15 you that he was: "A captain in the Muslim army and that his job was
16 training and medical evacuation."
17 A. Yes, can I explain that before that, perhaps not in the book, his
18 approach to me that he came to me and saluted me and told me - maybe it
19 wasn't the book, I can't remember - he told me that he knew I disliked
20 mercenaries and I didn't want to have anything to do with mercenaries and
21 I had told mercenaries collectively to get out of my area. Even so he
22 approached me and apologised and then told me this, which softened me a
24 Q. But in fact later you became interested in the fate and indeed
25 usefulness of mercenaries as a source of information. Is that correct?
1 A. Well, if people come to me and give me information, that's great,
2 but it didn't change my basic view of mercenaries, that they had no right
3 to be in Bosnia.
4 Q. Yes, but it's correct that previously you had decided not to get
5 connected to them. But later you started to use them as a considerable
6 source of information?
7 A. No, that's not correct. If they brought information to us, we
8 would listen. We did not seek out, to the best of my knowledge none of my
9 intelligence officers went out and deliberately cultivated mercenaries as
10 sources of information.
11 Q. I don't want to put words in your mouth. Let me just read out
12 what the book says and perhaps I mis-paraphrased it. Quote from page
13 92: "Although in principle I had previously decided not to have anything
14 to do with mercenaries, as I wanted very much to disassociate our
15 activities from theirs, it was not easy in practice. Actually they could
16 be a considerable source of information. And so I began to talk to some
17 of them."
18 A. Yes, but I didn't seek them out. They -- if I came across them I
19 would repeat my message, which was: Get out. And indeed with McBride and
20 Skinner, I repeated that when I saw them because I thought they were very
22 Q. But you called them a considerable source of information.
23 A. Yes, because they told us what was going on on the front lines,
24 boasting maybe, but they told us.
25 Q. Let me go on about what these two gentlemen told you. They told
1 you: "They lived in the Muslim barracks at Travnik and received hardly
2 any pay, calling themselves helpers rather than mercenaries, they claimed
3 that they were in Bosnia because it was such a tragic situation. 'The
4 Muslims needed all the help they could get,' they said."
5 A. I think that's right.
6 Q. Now unfortunately they were killed and the Trial Chamber has heard
7 evidence about that before. And I quote again from your book, it's now on
8 page 247: "As Ted and Derrick" - the two mercenaries - "had worked for
9 the Bosnian Muslims, their bodies were taken to the city morgue in Zenica.
10 I spoke to General Merdan about the matter. He knew both men well and was
11 very unhappy about what had happened. He also assured me that they had
12 not been killed because they were British or because people thought they
13 were connected to us."
14 Do you remember that?
15 A. Yes. I remember writing it.
16 Q. Let me perhaps conclude before the break -- yes, my colleague just
17 mentions a request for clarification. What do you mean by "Muslim
18 barracks in Travnik"? Can you be more specific.
19 A. Well, there was a building where people -- soldiers would stay.
20 It wasn't a -- I mean, I think it -- I couldn't quite work out what it
21 was, but there was a place where the ABiH would customarily have a
22 headquarters and some sleeping accommodation.
23 Q. Thank you. I want to briefly quote and I'm coming to a command
24 and control aspect, what you said in the Blaskic trial, and it's on page
25 23.847, 18th June, 1999. Just one sentence: "I put it simply. A
1 commander is responsible for the action of his soldiers. There is a
2 difference between responsibility and the actual crime itself, but overall
3 responsibility rests with that commander."
4 A. That's my belief.
5 Q. Now, let me ask you, if you were told that your troops had
6 committed crimes in an area, you would do all you could to try to
7 investigate that crime?
8 A. Well, actually I'd do more than that; I'd call in the special
9 investigation branch because I would not want people to think that I had
10 in any way tried to hush it up. But that is in an army that's got an
11 established organisation. But you're right, if my troops commit a crime
12 and it was my constant demand to all sides if the commanders knew about a
13 crime or were told about a crime in their operational area of
14 responsibility, they had a duty to investigate and identify what had
15 happened and to punish if necessary.
16 Q. And one of the first persons or person to talk to would be the
17 commander, the local commander, of that unit in that area, company
18 commander, battalion commander?
19 A. You -- in the circumstances of Central Bosnia at the time, yes, it
20 would be likely that I would go directly to the top man and someone else
21 would go to the local area, or I would do both.
22 Q. I'm talking about your unit. When one of your subordinate
23 commanders in his area of responsibility, his unit perhaps had done
24 something, then you would certainly almost as a first reaction to talk to
25 him and ask him, not necessarily as a suspect, ask him: Explain me what's
2 A. Yes. Tell me what's happened, and why hadn't I known about it
4 MR. WAESPI: Let me move on now, Mr. President, to the issue of
5 Mujahedin. And I believe we have a few minutes left, although we can
6 also stop for the break and I can start this last subject after the
7 break. I am in your hands.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Perhaps it's better to have the
9 break now. It is 10.25. We'll have our regular break, and we'll resume
10 work at around 10 to 11.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are resuming after the break.
14 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. If we could go into
15 private session just for the beginning of the --
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.
17 Mr. Registrar, can we please go into private session?
18 [Private session]
11 Page 15264 redacted. Private session.
14 [Open session]
15 MR. WAESPI:
16 Q. Now, let me continue with the information you told us, you know,
17 about this source. We also had a person testifying in this Tribunal who
18 met with a Mujahedin, and I would like to -- and this was a British
19 journalist. Perhaps you might even though him. His name is Andrew Hogg
20 and he worked at that time for the --
21 A. Sunday Times.
22 Q. -- Sunday times. Yes. And I believe he even came to the area
23 again a second time, in April 1993, he went to Milici. Do you remember
24 having seen him?
25 A. I remember his name, I remember his face; I don't know when I saw
1 him frequently at the start and perhaps in April 1993 -- in fact, I do see
2 to remember that I saw him in April 1993.
3 Q. Very early August 1992 he met with Mujahedin and he provided the
4 Trial Chamber with a tape, and a transcript was made. And that appears to
5 contradict what, you know, the information you provided us.
6 MR. WAESPI: So, Mr. President, I would like to show the witness
7 tab 7, and this is Prosecution Exhibit 112, tab 2, of 112.
8 Q. Did you see a transcript of conversation between Andrew Hogg,
9 journalist, and Abdul Aziz?
10 A. I do.
11 Q. Now, I just want to refer you to one transcript that's on page 2,
12 and I want to quote what Aziz who apparently spoke English very well.
13 "There is no specific area we are fighting, but different area.
14 One thing I want to tell you about my Mujahedin is that we are under
15 guidance or you can say control of Muslim forces. My Mujahedin and my
16 rules or whatever your condition is, that we are not leader here. We
17 don't like to have our own first line or our own base. We working under
18 their guidance and their control."
19 And let me also tell you that for Mr. Hogg to interview this
20 person, he had to go through the ABiH. And in fact, this gentleman,
21 Mr. Abdul Aziz told him, and I quote --
22 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Maybe my
23 learned friend could give us the date of this interview and then we could
24 see where the witness was at that time; and which is even more important,
25 he seems to be saying that the BiH army was involved. He has to give us
1 his source. That would help us understand how could BiH army be involved
2 in such an incident if it didn't exist at the time.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you please be more
4 specific with regard to the date when this interview was conducted between
5 the journalist and Mr. Abdul Aziz? We have to bear in mind that they --
6 the Defence finds it important that at the time the BiH army did not
7 exist, so can you give us the date of this interview?
8 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I believe it's already on the record. I said he
9 met with him in August of 1992. It just disappeared from the screen right
10 now. So that's the time this person talked to him, and again this is
11 cross-examination. I have a statement of a source who -- which appears to
12 contradict what the witness told us earlier, and I can certainly ask
13 him -- and he even knows the journalist, you know, whether that changes
14 his view about whether the Mujahedin were indeed part of the 3rd Corps or
15 not. Perhaps he considers then his information to be unreliable.
16 I would just like to ask him and in fact continue my question that
17 the --
18 Q. This Mujahedin who was the interviewee, the partner, to Mr. Hogg
19 told Mr. Hogg, and I quote: "If you want an interview, come back here
20 with permission from the Bosnian army. I will grant an interview if they
21 allow it."
22 So if you hear this -- you know, the circumstances how this
23 interview was conducted and indeed the contents of it, does that surprise
24 you that you hear an obvious connection between the BH army and the
25 Mujahedin in August 1992?
1 A. It surprises me, and I don't know what to believe about it.
2 Q. Let me move on to another exhibit, and this is tab 9.
3 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, in my bundle and this is Exhibit 461.
4 I believe Mr. Dixon has something. Perhaps if the witness could not --
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Dixon.
6 MR. WAESPI: [Previous interpretation continues] ... exhibit for a
8 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours. Only a brief point. In
9 accordance with Your Honour's decision yesterday that documents can be
10 shown to the witness even if they are documents which he might not have
11 seen at the time or been party to. We have another document here which is
12 an internal document of the 7th Brigade. And I wish to request that in
13 line with the decision Your Honours gave yesterday, that the witness
14 should be asked, if he is going to be shown this document, at the outset
15 of whether or not he recognises this document. In our submission, it does
16 not assist Your Honours at all just to read out the title of the document
17 or who it's signed by; anyone in the courtroom can do that. The important
18 question is whether he recognises anything in this document. In our
19 submission, this is important in respect to the weight that is to be given
20 to these documents. As Your Honours will know, many of these documents
21 were contested documents and then admitted into evidence, but Your Honours
22 made it clear that the weight to be assigned to them would be assigned at
23 a later point once all the evidence had been heard depending on which
24 witnesses could comment on the document and interpret it. And in our
25 submission, if the witness does not recognise this document at all, then
1 it cannot assist Your Honours in determining what weight to give to this
2 document at the end of the day. Our request would be that if he is to be
3 shown it, he should be asked whether he recognises the first and then any
4 further questions, if necessary, can be put thereafter. Thank you,
5 Your Honours.
6 MR. WAESPI: If I may be heard on this point, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution, you have the
9 MR. WAESPI: This is cross-examination. I need to have a
10 good-faith basis for any leading question I can put to this witness, and
11 it certainly is a good-faith basis if there is an exhibit. It could be
12 even not an exhibit, in our case, whether internal or outside, that
13 doesn't really matter. And again the witness testified that he thought
14 from his assessment the Mujahedin were not connected to the ABiH. This
15 document contradicted it, and I would like to have his comment on this
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, go ahead.
18 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Q. Now we can have a look at it, if you may. It's Exhibit P461, and
20 I'm just asking whether perhaps you heard about these incidents. This
21 document is -- originates from the 3rd Corps, 7th Muslim -- Mountain
22 Muslim Brigade. It dates 12 April 1993, and it's titled "Report on
23 Members of Our Brigade Taken Prisoner by HVO Members." And it's signed by
24 the assistant commander for morale, religious and legal affairs, Ahmed
25 Hadilovic [phoen].
1 Let me just read out the -- for the record the first sentence,
2 first paragraph: "Recently there have been an increasing number of cases
3 of HVO members at certain checkpoints unlawfully taking prisoner foreign
4 citizens who are members of the BH army, i.e., volunteers who are in our
5 unit. The command of our brigade asserts that the fact that these
6 prisoners have never participated in fighting against HVO units. More
7 specifically, we have expressly stated to them conscious of the situation
8 that they are only fighting against the Chetniks."
9 And then you can see on the same page some members also of these
10 foreign fighters, where they are from. Now, you would agree with me that
11 this document indeed shows that the -- at least the 7th Muslim Brigade,
12 part of the 3rd Corps, in fact claims that these people are part of the BH
13 army and they want them back?
14 A. This is the first time I've seen this document, but it appears to
15 be a copy of the document underneath, and it appears to be that there are
16 Middle East people, Pakistan, Algeria, who were part of the BiH as
17 volunteers; it appears to show that.
18 Q. Now, do you have reason now to start to doubt the veracity of the
19 information you have provided as previously?
20 A. No.
21 Q. And why not?
22 A. Because this doesn't say this were Mujahedin. I'm looking for a
23 Mujahedin unit here.
24 Q. Okay.
25 MR. WAESPI: Let me go on to the next document, Your Honours, and
1 this is tab number 10 and it's Prosecution Exhibit P541.
2 Q. And this is in fact -- and I'm for the first part interested in
3 the second letter, so it's the third page. That's a letter by
4 Mr. Hadzihasanovic dated 2nd April 1993. And it has the heading "Violent
5 Treatment of Foreign Nationals, Volunteers in the BH Army by Members of
6 the HVO." So again Mr. Hadzihasanovic talks about the similar issue, and
7 we don't need to go over it. And he also mentions that some goods of
8 these --
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]
10 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. My
11 learned friend says that General Hadzihasanovic is involved again. Why
12 again? In the previous document, there is no hint that the document might
13 have originated from the 3rd Corps or General Hadzihasanovic.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As we all know, again means
15 again. And the Defence has a point saying that General Hadzihasanovic was
16 not mentioned in the previous document, so you can't use the word "again"
17 unless you're saying that the same problem is mentioned here again, in
18 which case we have a different situation.
19 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President. And the source of misinformation
20 is my command of the English. I tried in fact to say that again we have
21 an issue, and I confused it with that. So I apologise. I didn't want to
22 say that Mr. Hadzihasanovic was also connected to the earlier document,
23 although I might add that he was the commander of that corps under
24 which -- whose authority the first document originated.
25 Q. Okay. Let's briefly talk about this one. Have you had the chance
1 to glance over the document?
2 A. I've only skimmed it, yes.
3 Q. And again here -- I'm sorry, and here the commander of the 3rd
4 Corps shows an interest in these foreign nationals. Do you agree with me?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Now we have fortunately - and that's not always occurring in this
7 Tribunal - a response. And this response is from General Blaskic, and you
8 can see it on the first two pages. And it's dated the 3rd April, and he
9 makes reference to Mr. Hadzihasanovic's letter of the 2nd April. And then
10 here I believe we come to an issue raised beforehand about the fourth
11 paragraph. It says: "Four foreign nationals, Mujahedin, were arrested at
12 the Puticevo checkpoint. They had resisted inspection by threatening with
13 their weapons and did not allow the inspection to be carried out."
14 And then it goes on: "All four individuals were arrested and
15 driven to the military prison Busovaca."
16 So he appears to give his assessment to the allegations, and he
17 did request of General Hadzihasanovic. Would you agree with that?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now we see here what's meant -- we can't read the minds of these
20 gentlemen who drafted, but it appears to be one of the subjects is the
21 Mujahedin. Do you agree with me?
22 A. He says "four foreign nationals (Mujahedin)." You know, one of
23 the problems for all forces in this country was that both the HVO and the
24 BiH were reinforced by people from outside the countries. It is his
25 choice, the word "Mujahedin." It is not mine or yours.
1 Q. Thank you, Colonel. And perhaps just following up from this.
2 What you personally mean when you say "Mujahedin"?
3 A. Excuse me. I mean a group of people who work as a unit together
4 who come from outside and who are not actually integrated normally into
5 the structure of the army, and may or may not be connected to the army
6 they are supporting. And generally they are more aggressive and fanatical
7 than others. That's what I mean.
8 Q. Yes, and I believe we will come to that when we look at the
9 document. Now, without showing you documents, did you know that a senior
10 member of again the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade requested the 3rd Corps to
11 provide helicopters to transport to the front lines at Igman foreign
12 Mujahedin. Were you aware of that?
13 A. No, I was not.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon.
15 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. There is
16 a document describing that. Maybe my learned friend has economised on
17 time and that's why he didn't shown it. However, this document contains
18 an error that has been corrected, but it has not been corrected on the
19 document that was shown to the document [as interpreted]. Can this first
20 be corrected so that the translation is correct, and then the document can
21 be quoted and shown to the witness.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, there has been a debate on
23 translation issues arising from that document. The Defence would like to
24 have the witness to be shown a correct translation of the document before
25 he is asked any questions, because the original document did not contain
1 those corrections.
2 Mr. Registrar, can you please find the document, and I believe
3 that from the CLSS we have asked that the right word be communicated to
5 To gain time, Mr. Bourgon, can you tell us what the matter was
6 with the translation, what was wrong with the translation? Maybe
7 Mr. Dixon can enlighten us.
8 MR. DIXON: Thank you, I have the document in front of me, it's
9 P616, and the first line of that document was translated incorrectly, and
10 Your Honours confirmed that in the transcript on page 12.173 an onwards.
11 The first line in the incorrect translation said "we have 11 people, Arabs
12 and Turks," but the correct translation which has now been accepted is
13 that "we know," not "have," "we know 11 Arabs and Turks." So if my
14 learned friend is going to put this document to the witness, once again we
15 would request that he's asked whether he recognises the document, but then
16 also the correct version should be put to the witness to see what his
17 comment is, if any. Thank you, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. The debate was whether the
19 document contains the words "we know" or "we have." It's not the same
20 thing obviously. The issue was the difference between "we have" and "we
22 MR. WAESPI: [Previous translation continues] ... the question
23 perhaps in a way that could solve the problem.
24 Q. Colonel, were you aware that there was a request for a helicopter
25 flight under -- requested by the 7th Muslim Brigade in order to transport
1 Arabs and Turks to the Igman front line? Are you aware of that?
2 A. My answer is no, but I may have forgotten.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [In English] Stop, stop please.
4 [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon, you have the floor.
5 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Maybe my
6 learned friend could give us the date of the document. This would be of
7 assistance to the witness.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Prosecution, can you give us the
9 date on the document because this will tell us whether the witness was
10 there at the time. If the document dates from the time when the witness
11 was no longer there, then we have a problem.
12 MR. WAESPI: Yes, certainly, Mr. President, it was my mistake; I
13 should have done that. The document dates of 28th August 1993, but my
14 question had been general, whether he had heard of any type of
16 Q. And I take it your answer remains the same?
17 A. Well, it becomes more -- no, I wouldn't have heard of it either.
18 I had no knowledge in fact.
19 Q. Now, were you also aware or not that ABiH identity cards were
20 issued to foreign fighters? Have you heard of that?
21 A. I didn't know that.
22 MR. WAESPI: And, Your Honours, the exhibit I was relying was
23 P626. It's a document from the HVO dating 9th March, 1993, and it's in
24 tab 11 of my bundle.
25 Q. Does all of this information, does it change your assessment of
1 whether these Mujahedin were connected to the ABiH?
2 A. No, it does not but it's obvious that maybe some foreign nationals
3 were working with the BiH. But it doesn't change my assessment with
4 regard to my definition of the Mujahedin working not under control of the
6 Q. Let me show you another document. And before that I would like to
7 ask you whether you have heard in the course of your duties as commander
8 of the 1st Cheshire Battalion, that a normally reliable source has
9 provided information about the Mujahedin and the 7th Muslim Brigade. And
10 I can just quote one piece of that information that perhaps you remember
11 that --
12 MR. DIXON: Sorry, Your Honour, my learned friend knows very well
13 he's about to quote from a new document. New documents cannot be shown to
14 witnesses unless there's a proper basis established according to your
15 ruling, either that it goes to credibility or it goes to refreshing
16 memory. So this document needs to be considered as a new document. It's
17 one that was only disclosed to us recently, and it mentions a source,
18 although it doesn't say what this source is. And I think this matter does
19 need to be fully debated before it's just slipped in and shown to the
21 MR. WAESPI: If I can briefly respond, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, go ahead.
23 MR. WAESPI: I preceded my question exactly with the foundation,
24 because this is a milinfosum originating from his battalion, and I asked
25 him whether he remembers that a reliable local source provided the
1 information. Apparently it was good enough to be included in this
2 milinfosum, and I think the commander of that battalion ought to know
3 about that. Perhaps he doesn't, because he was busy. I don't doubt that.
4 But I can certainly show it to him; perhaps it refreshes his memory,
5 because he's shown a certain interest in the Mujahedin as developed over
6 time. And I think I'm following the procedure right now, Mr. President.
7 MR. DIXON: Your Honour, if I could --
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Wait a moment, Mr. Dixon. I'll
9 give you the floor. The Defence has a document, a milinfosum in which
10 apparently this question is referred to. According to my understanding
11 this is a new document and the Prosecution pursuant to our decision
12 regarding credibility or the refreshment of memory wishes to show this
13 document to the witness. That is the situation as it now stands.
14 Mr. Dixon.
15 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours. It is indeed a new document
16 which refers to the 7th Brigade, and our objection would be that this
17 document cannot be shown to the witness to refresh his memory because he's
18 already said in -- perhaps the witness can be asked to leave. I don't
19 want to waste time, but my learned friend is suggesting it, and I agree
20 with him.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Usher, will you please ask
22 the witness to leave the courtroom for a few minutes.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Dixon, before giving you the
25 floor, we referring to a document which the Chamber is not aware of
1 because it is a new document which was disclosed to you earlier. You have
2 the floor.
3 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours. Yes, we did receive this
4 document. It's a military information summary. Your Honour, our
5 objection is that the witness has already testified that he knew nothing
6 about the 7th Brigade. And in addition to that, Your Honours, he has
7 stated that he never read or saw any military information summaries. That
8 was not something that he regarded as part of his duties. We, therefore,
9 would object to him being shown the document to seek to refresh his memory
10 when he said quite clearly from his best recollection that he knows
11 nothing about the 7th Brigade. There was no issue in relation to the 7th
12 Brigade and he had taken no view on it. In addition to that he has said
13 that the document that we have in front of us is one that he wouldn't have
14 seen. So in our submission there's no way that his memory can be
15 refreshed from a document which he wouldn't have seen at the time and in
16 relation to matters he said he knew nothing about at the time. He's been
17 asked a question about what he knew about the 7th Brigade and he's
18 answered it. And really what the Prosecution is now seeking to do, in our
19 submission, is introduce a new document in order to strengthen its case.
20 And Your Honour's ruling is quite clear on that. They cannot use new
21 documents to strengthen their case.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I give the floor to the
24 If I understand, the Defence's analysis is that the witness has
25 said that he hardly ever heard mention of the 7th Brigade and therefore
1 any questions about the 7th Brigade would be null and void, as he is not
2 in a position to contribute anything regarding the 7th Brigade. However,
3 I don't know the date of this document, but if it is a milinfosum coming
4 from his battalion or his regiment, it would be rather paradoxical that as
5 head of the regiment he was not familiar with that document. So could you
6 tell us the date of that document, please?
7 MR. DIXON: Certainly, Your Honour. The date is 27 January 1993.
8 That predates the time when it is alleged that Mr. Kubura was the
9 commander of the 7th Brigade as well. But, Your Honour, the witness has
10 said that he never looked at any of these military information summaries,
11 and in our submission, to look at it now can't therefore refresh his
13 MR. WAESPI: If I may respond, Mr. President. It's not refreshing
14 the memory of whether he has seen the document, it's about refreshing the
15 memory of what was said about the issue of command and control over the
16 Mujahedin. And as he rightly observed, he was the battalion commander and
17 every night this went out to his superiors. And this time -- and it's on
18 tab 6 of your bundle, it's only two pages. And almost 25 per cent is
19 occupied by what this normally reliable source says. And he testified he
20 had these 5.00 meetings, so perhaps that was discussed at this 5.00
21 meeting and is now reflected in the -- this milinfosum. And you will also
22 note, Your Honours, that this normally reliable source has provided
23 additional information. So it appears to have been a topic beforehand. I
24 really believe that the commander of the battalion must have been
25 appraised of that, and it would surprise me if he hasn't heard of the
1 discussion on the issue of Mujahedin, which was a topic of interest as he
2 told us today.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution tells us that
4 this document is dated the 27th of January, 1993. It comes from the
5 witness's regiment, over which the witness had supreme responsibility.
6 This witness and other witnesses have said that every day a milinfosum was
7 drafted, intended for a higher authority. The witness told us that
8 yesterday, in fact. And the Prosecution wishes to ask the witness whether
9 what appears on page 2 of that document, is it not in contradiction with
10 what he might have said up to now. So that is the purpose of the question
11 to be put to the witness.
12 Mr. Dixon.
13 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours. I have no objection to the
14 witness being asked about what might have been discussed about the
15 Mujahedin in his daily briefings. He said he was there at a number of
16 those briefings. The issue did arise. My learned friend could ask him
17 about what was discussed, he could put assertions to him about information
18 that might have come up. But in our submission, there is no basis to put
19 this particular document to him and ultimately seek it to be admitted into
20 evidence as a new document. That is the crux of the argument we're
21 making. This is an entirely new document the Prosecution could have
22 introduced during its case; it didn't do so. And in our view, it could
23 only do so in limited circumstances. If the witness has said these are
24 documents he never dealt with, then in our view it shouldn't come into
25 evidence at this point. Thank you, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But we are still not at the
2 stage when the Prosecution is asking to tender the document. So,
3 Mr. Dixon, you are anticipating things. We have still not reached the
4 stage when the Prosecution is asking to tender the document. They have
5 just told us that they are going to refer to a paragraph and ask the
6 witness what he says in response.
7 So, Mr. Usher, will you call the witness back into the courtroom
8 and then we can continue.
9 [The witness entered court]
10 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps if that second page could be put on the ELMO
11 as well, Mr. Usher. It's tab 6. A milinfosum, number 88 of the 27th of
12 January, 1993.
13 Q. Do you have it in your hands?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Just to start with, on page 1, is that one of your daily milinfo
17 A. I understand it is.
18 Q. Which went up the chain of command?
19 A. Yes, the UN chain of command.
20 Q. And as you told us you take full responsibility for it despite the
21 fact that you may never have seen it?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, if you could turn to page number 2 and the second paragraph.
24 And there is -- let me see whether we have it on the screen. Yes.
25 Here we have a -- what's called a normally reliable source and he
1 provides additional information about the 7th Muslimanske Brigade, and the
2 source confirmed that this brigade is commanded from Zenica with
3 battalions deployed within the 3rd Corps area. "A battalion from the 7th
4 Brigade is deployed on the front line in the Travnik area. Members of the
5 battalion consider themselves Mujahedin in every sense. The majority of
6 members are staunch, practicing Muslims recruited from the local area.
7 Although this particular battalion was instructed by two Iranians, the
8 source confirmed that external Mujahedin from Islamic countries within the
9 brigade numbered at the most 100 to 150. A number of 7th Brigade soldiers
10 on checkpoints north of Vitez were noted wearing a cap badge consisting of
11 a green Muslim crescent insert with a gold star. They stated that this
12 was an insignia for the Muslimanske Brigade."
13 Now, do you remember looking back to that day? Perhaps it's
14 reflected in your diary on your book that a normally reliable source
15 provided this type of information?
16 A. Is it in my diary do you say? I don't think so. I don't remember
17 this, but I accept it's from a milinfosum from my battalion.
18 Q. I'm also curious because it says in the first line "additional
19 information." Apparently this source may have, you know -- or the issue
20 was discussed beforehand. Do you have any knowledge?
21 A. No, I don't.
22 Q. And would you agree with me that the two Iranians - and we talk
23 about January now -- already discussed here by this reliable source, you
24 know, they appear to reappear in documents later, and I think we have seen
25 that yesterday. So indeed, that seems to be a reliable source?
1 A. Excuse me. I suppose it might have been from the person that
2 wrote this -- this report. I don't want to dispute the authenticity of
3 the military information summary; I just want to say that perhaps because
4 of slackness on my part I didn't see it. I wish someone had shown me
5 this, but I'm sure I didn't see it before it went out. I would have been
6 very interested in this report.
7 Q. And again, my question, you know, how do you assess now your
8 source of information about the comment you made between Mujahedin and the
9 3rd Corps?
10 A. I'm so sorry, I've got a --
11 Q. Perhaps you can drink some water.
12 A. I hope it will work.
13 No, I don't change my position with regard to the business of
14 Mujahedin group, and I accept that there are individuals from other
15 countries that come and actually work in the HVO and BiH. I saw quite a
16 number of people from external countries working with the HVO. And it's
17 difficult to define what is a mercenary here and what is a volunteer. And
18 I had a slight difficulty with that.
19 Q. But that contradicts what this milinfosum, this reliable source
20 says. It says, and I quote again: "A battalion from the 7th Brigade is
21 deployed on the front line in the Travnik area. Members of the battalion
22 consider themselves Mujahedin in every sense."
23 It goes on to make a difference between local and foreign people,
24 and they are all part of this Muslimanske Brigade. Doesn't it say that?
25 A. Yes, it does say that. Members of the battalion, presumably,
1 would include locals. Now, they're starting to call themselves Mujahedin.
2 This might be a bit of bravado. I don't know. I accept. I wish I had
3 seen this on the day, the 27th of January I suspect I was still involved
4 with Gornji Vakuf or something, but I accept that this is a report. And I
5 accept that it was sent by my battalion, and I accept that it was probably
6 from a patrol report. That's how we normally get information.
7 Q. And just following up what you said, it not only talks about local
8 people considering themselves as Mujahedin, it talks specifically about
9 external Mujahedin from Islamic countries within the brigade and it even
10 gives a number, almost 100 to 150.
11 A. Well, when you started talking about numbers, I didn't think it
12 was anything like that, 100 to 150 --
13 Q. Very well --
14 A. -- in the Mujahedin group or groups.
15 Q. So in your assessment, how many were there then?
16 A. It was difficult to say, but I saw with my own eyes 15 to 20, no
17 more. And other people reported that it was about 30.
18 Q. And who were these other people?
19 A. My source.
20 Q. Just one?
21 A. Yes, just one.
22 Q. So your basis of information is that one source plus the personal
23 encounter you had at that checkpoint?
24 A. Yes, and also my offices. I used to talk to them about --
25 particularly the company commanders about it.
1 Q. So you did discuss the issue with your company commanders?
2 A. Yes, of course I discussed it in the 5.00 conference. I can't
3 remember exact details, but we were desperately trying to find out what
4 was happening the whole time.
5 Q. And so it was -- would be this type of information you would
6 discuss with your superiors --
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. -- with your subordinates --
9 A. Yes. And this is a mistake on my part not to have seen this. To
10 be honest, it's the first time this week I've seen it.
11 Q. So there were other type of information like that, if you would go
12 through other milinfosums?
13 A. Well, it's normally me saying I want to know what's going on. Has
14 anyone seen or has anyone had any contact? That sort of thing.
15 Q. Let me conclude with a similar document. It might be indeed one
16 of the milinfosums or one of the issues you discussed with your
17 subordinates in one of these meetings.
18 MR. WAESPI: And, Mr. President, this is tab 8 in my bundle. It's
19 a milinfosum dated 11th March 1993.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. There's a small error in
21 the transcript. The milinfosum that we referred to was 4 -- it said 428
22 [as interpreted], but it should have been 408 [as interpreted]. I don't
24 Wait a moment. There's still an error. It is 98 and not 88. 98.
25 It should be 98.
1 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
2 Q. So this witness is another milinfosum. This type it's number 132.
3 Do you recognise it also as a genuine, authentic document?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now, let's go to the second page, the bottom of it when it talks
6 about Zepce. And I read it out to you again.
7 "121 Cheshire LO visited both BiH and HVO headquarters in Zepce.
8 Tension has been raised in the town by the arrival of external Muslim
9 forces in the town. Muslim troops reportedly from the 7th Muslim Brigade
10 have moved into house in Zepce. The local commander reported that these
11 troops were not under his direct command and he could not always control
12 their actions. There has been a number of minor incidents in the town
13 involving drunken Muslim soldiers, but the situation is not assessed as
14 serious. Comment. The reason behind a deployment of Muslim externals
15 into the area is not known. The standard 3rd Corps policy is to deploy a
16 brigade," or perhaps that battalion, BN, "or elements of a -- of 7th
17 Brigade to a particular sector of need on the front line or an area of
18 potential Croat/Muslim conflict. However, the deployment of the three
19 troops into potential ethnic conflict areas tends to inflame the situation
20 rather than calm it down. Comment ends."
21 Colonel, do you recall having discussed this influx of external
22 Muslim forces into the town of Zepce at one point in time?
23 A. I remember that we talked about it at some stage.
24 Q. Here -- I believe yesterday you said in response to a question --
25 I think a document was shown to you about originating BH Kiseljak where
1 you said it's like putting petrol into a fire already. Do you agree with
2 me that the comment down here appears to say the same?
3 A. I do.
4 Q. So the Muslim forces, the 3rd Corps used, according to this
5 comment, these forces, external forces, to ignite, inflame the situation?
6 A. Well, I could read it another way. The way I could read it is
7 these people arrived and weren't under the control of the ABiH commander
8 in the area, as is said here. As I feel that these guys -- these
9 Mujahedin -- this Mujahedin group or groups was moving around out of
10 control. Now, here you see a report and it says this time that the local
11 commander commented that troops were not under his command. And to be
12 quite honest, in fairness to the Mujahedin, the drunken Muslim contingent
13 would probably not be them.
14 Q. And that was the local commander?
15 A. Local commander, it says local commander.
16 Q. But if you look at the second part of the comment it appears to
17 say, at least according to the assessment of this commentator, that this
18 was a deliberate 3rd Corps policy to use these people in a particular
19 sector -- in an area of potential Croat/Muslim conflict for specific
20 purpose. That's what it appears to say?
21 A. Well, the standard tactic of any commander when a front is weak is
22 to reinforce it, if necessary, at his decision, perhaps with reservists.
23 And that may be a requirement. I'm not quite sure there's a
24 necessarily -- that actually it says here that the standard policy -- it's
25 the standard policy of any commander to be honest. If you've got a weak
1 part of your line, you may need to reinforce it.
2 Q. But reinforce with a specific unit, the Mujahedin would add a
3 certain flame --
4 A. But in fairness this is a comment -- I'm trying to be fair as well
5 in response to your questioning because I accept your arguments sometimes.
6 The standard 3rd Corps policy is to deploy a battalion or elements of 7th
7 Brigade to a particular sector of lead on the front line. And that would
8 be the standard policy of anyone. It might not be -- that's in comment
9 that -- they didn't know that. That's a comment on the situation. It
10 doesn't come under the factual side of the report.
11 Q. And that was the fair assessment of one of your subordinates on
12 the basis of the facts which were available to him?
13 A. I assume so, and I think I knew about this one.
14 Q. Do you know who drafted -- made this comment?
15 A. I have to refer back to the same sort of general answers I gave
16 before. It may well have been coordinated by my second in command.
17 Q. Did ever Mr. Morillon get back to you and say, Stop these stupid
18 comments, you know, they don't help Have you ever about that??
19 A. No, he didn't. And actually even though they may seem stupid in
20 retrospect, at the time we were doing our best.
21 Q. And why are you saying they may look stupid in retrospect?
22 A. Because I don't necessarily agree with them now, you know. But my
23 point is: I was at fault for not seeing every document that went out. I
24 accept that fault. Failure of command, if you like, because I take
25 responsibility for these documents.
1 Q. But I'm interested in why you disagree today. What's the basis --
2 what more information do you have today than the people -- your people had
3 on the ground at the time?
4 A. The last report, I have a problem with, not this particular one.
5 Q. And again my question is: What additional information do you have
6 in relation to the last report to tell today under oath that at that time
7 you thought the report in your opinion was not accurate or whatever your
8 opinion is?
9 A. Well, one, I didn't see the first report; this report I accept.
10 The first report I didn't see at the time. But my opinion, which hasn't
11 changed, at the time, was that the Mujahedin group was not under
12 operational control of anyone.
13 Q. And the basis for it, just to repeat, is your personal contacts
14 with the Mujahedin at that checkpoint between Zenica and, I think,
15 Zavidovici, and secondly, your source?
16 A. Yes. And also talking to the soldiers on the ground. Saying,
17 Look, who -- anyone near these people?
18 Q. These are the same soldiers that would be part of information
19 collecting, gathering, providing, so that these comments and assertions
20 could be made?
21 A. There were 900 of them, yes.
22 Q. So the same soldiers, the information they gave, their information
23 is assessed differently by you today, ten years after the events, and by
24 the persons at that time?
25 A. No, by me at the time was assessed differently. It remains the
1 same today, as the assessment then. And clearly there were differences in
2 the information we were gathering and consequently the intelligence we
3 were trying to make from it.
4 Q. But the only thing reflecting the information level and the
5 assessment your Battalion, the 1st Cheshire Battalion, you and BritBat
6 made at that time is reflected in these milinfosums. Your opinion at that
7 time isn't recorded anywhere.
8 A. Probably correct. Probably correct. I -- we had another chain of
9 command to the British, but we generally did it verbally. It was
10 difficult enough doing a military infosum every day.
11 Q. And these other chains of information you had with the British,
12 they would end up in London at the end of the day?
13 A. Yes. Well, we would frequently have disagreements. You know,
14 people -- various commanders had differing views. Everyone's human. My
15 successor would have a different view. Someone else in my position might
16 have a different view. My view was what I stated.
17 Q. And do you agree at the end of the day at one time somewhere on a
18 desk in London the two different information streams could come together,
19 the written milinfosums from your subordinates and your oral comments?
20 A. Not necessarily. They -- this one was sent to the -- the United
21 Nations, up the United Nations chain of command. We -- we -- I had a full
22 intelligence section working -- operating in Vitez.
23 Q. But again, nobody ever told you, you know, it's very curious.
24 What you tell us is totally different from the milinfosums we are getting
25 from you on a daily basis. Nobody -- either Mr. Morillon or --
1 A. I think that's unfair. It's totally different. We've had and I
2 have pointed out there are differences. But the broad thrust of military
3 information summaries is correct. One or two areas - and I've accepted my
4 fault, my responsibility - I didn't see that milinfosum. I remember this
5 incident, and I accept that we weren't perfect. I also accept that it was
6 my viewpoint based on what I was doing at the time. At the time in this
7 period in Bosnia, I wasn't even sure they spent the night in my base most
8 times. I was permanently out, and so a lot of these things were done in
9 my absence. I was on the road either between Gornji Vakuf or in Gornji
10 Vakuf, or up in Turbe. These are vast distances to be covered in an
11 armoured vehicle.
12 Q. But the central point where the information was received was in
13 your operational room in your headquarters?
14 A. Yes. And I accept there was clearly from my perspective things
15 that went wrong.
16 Q. For instance?
17 A. Well, for instance a report that I would disagree with. I mean,
18 I -- we did our best.
19 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I very much appreciate your answers.
20 MR. WAESPI: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 We come to the re-examination stage. And I look at the Defence
23 attorneys to give them the floor for any re-examination.
24 Mr. Bourgon, you have the floor.
25 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I should
1 just like to know how much time I have before the break to prepare my
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The break would normally take
4 place at half past 12.00, so you have 35 minutes.
5 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Re-examined by Mr. Bourgon:
7 Q. Good morning, Colonel.
8 A. Good morning. Sorry for my voice, Your Honours.
9 Q. Let me begin by asking you a quick question concerning an issue
10 that was raised by my colleague concerning the distrust amongst people in
11 the former Yugoslavia, amongst the parties. Did you experience the fact
12 that people did not trust each other in the former Yugoslavia?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And in your experience is there one person that you know of that
15 would be trusted by all sides?
16 A. General Merdan.
17 Q. And why is that, Colonel?
18 A. Because he was well-known by everyone and because he had honour
19 and decency.
20 Q. Can you provide the Trial Chamber with an example where you saw
21 that General Merdan was trusted more than another person?
22 A. When I first went, Your Honours, to Bosnia, one of the real
23 problems was that we had an outbreak of fighting in Vitez and Donji --
24 Novi Travnik. And I went in -- I only had Land Rovers. I had no
25 soldiers. But it seemed to me that we had to stop the fighting otherwise
1 the United Nations couldn't deploy. So I drove into Novi Travnik and I
2 first went to the headquarters of a man called -- I think he was called
3 Lendo. And he had taken six HVO soldiers as prisoners or hostages. So I
4 demanded that I have them and take them back before I went to see the HVO.
5 He refused point-blank. So I said, Okay, I'll just take one as proof that
6 you're going to look after them. And he said, Yes. My point was when I
7 got -- when I went across town, there was still fight -- it wasn't a good
8 situation. There was still a lot of fire fight around. I met Kordic in a
9 bar -- I think it was called something like the Grand Bazaar or something.
10 He was upstairs. And I said, This fighting has got to stop now otherwise
11 the UN can't deploy, I can't carry out my operational role. Please,
12 actually, let's have a cease-fire. And I said, Who would you like to
13 speak to on the other side for the ABiH. And Kordic said, Only Dzemal
14 Merdan, and I had never met Merdan at this point. We got on a satellite
15 phone. We drafted a cease-fire agreement. And then I went to go and get
16 Merdan from Zenica and we started our meeting at 2.00 in the morning and
17 finished it at 4.00 with a kind of agreement.
18 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Did you know what was the position of General
19 Merdan at that time?
20 A. Well, I wasn't sure at the time, but it was soon apparent that he
21 was something to do with the 3rd Corps and probably the deputy.
22 Q. And do you know, Colonel, when the 3rd Corps was actually
24 A. I have no idea.
25 Q. And do you know where was General Hadzihasanovic in September of
2 A. I don't think I met him then.
3 Q. How much information did you have at that time on the 3rd Corps
4 itself and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its units?
5 A. None.
6 Q. Now, I'd like to bring you to a document which was used by my
7 colleague yesterday which is part of your diary when you recalled a
8 briefing that was given to you in Zagreb. Do you recall this briefing
9 discussed yesterday?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And yesterday you said that you were told by an individual that
12 most people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are really good at twisting the
13 truth and that all parties are quite prepared to attack their own people
14 and to blame it on someone else.
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Having spent nine months in Central Bosnia, do you agree with this
18 A. Yes and no. Yes insofar as I'm sure there were people capable of
19 doing such a disgusting thing; and no, the vast majority of people would
20 not, HVO, ABiH, and the Bosnian Serb army, and the Mafia of course.
21 Q. And would a comment like this apply to General Merdan?
22 A. No, it would not.
23 Q. And would a comment like that apply in your experience to
24 General Hadzihasanovic?
25 A. No, it certainly did not.
1 Q. And did Lieutenant Colonel Doyle, I believe, provide any basis for
2 his remark when you were in Zagreb?
3 A. Well, he -- he -- I think he was Lord Owen's or Lord Carrington's
4 special advisor. So we almost took it down verbatim what he was saying
5 because we knew nothing. So I wrote it down and reported it in my diary
6 and indeed I reported in my situation report to my battle group when I got
8 Q. And do you think it was proper for the head of the European
9 Community Monitoring Mission in Bosnia to make such derogatory comments
10 about the population in Bosnia as you were about to deploy to save their
12 A. Well, he didn't make them. Doyle was a staff officer, and the
13 answer is: That was an opinion and this is a private diary, and I think
14 it's perfectly proper for him to prefer his opinion if that's the way he
15 felt. Later I was to discover that that wasn't necessarily the case. But
16 at the time, I accepted it.
17 Q. And is it possible, Colonel, that what Lieutenant Colonel Doyle
18 wanted to do at that time was really to say, Guys, be careful and don't
19 take anything for granted?
20 A. Yes, that's the lesson I got from it. Because from then on one of
21 the maxims I worked by was that I never believed anything, Your Honours,
22 that anyone said to me until I saw evidence of what they said happening on
23 the ground. And it was almost a principal maxim that I applied to the way
24 I operated. When I see actions on the ground, I believe what -- you know,
25 mentally I would say, then I'll believe you're doing it.
1 Q. And can you say whether you saw such action -- whenever there was
2 a commitment by General Hadzihasanovic, did you see such action on the
4 A. Well, to be quite honest, if I didn't with both Hadzihasanovic and
5 with Merdan -- with Blaskic I would be hammering on the door rather
6 quickly, which I did on occasion. But it takes a while to get
7 instructions down from the top, particularly in the situation of lack of
8 communication. No telephones, for example, it's difficult.
9 Q. And the fact that one night you showed up at
10 General Hadzihasanovic's headquarters and you requested a cease-fire for
11 6.00, and we saw yesterday the order imposing a cease-fire on his troops,
12 is that an example of what you're saying?
13 A. Well, yes, I -- I didn't see that written order. I don't think I
14 saw it at the time. So it was done blind to me. But yes, there's an
15 example. And then actually if it's not this occasion, another occasion
16 when it hadn't happened, I would go back and demand that I need some
17 assistance to make sure it did happen.
18 Q. And when you requested that checkpoint in Kacuni to be turned
19 down, to be taken out, and we saw yesterday the order issued by
20 General Hadzihasanovic, is that the type of incident you are referring
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Did the 3rd Corps follow through with your request, albeit with
25 A. Yes. I felt for these commanders, Your Honours. I mean, it's not
1 like, you know, you could just pick up a phone and speak to them.
2 Sometimes they had to wait for the commander to come back to a telephone
3 for contact to be made. It was very difficult indeed, but the answer is
5 Q. Now, I'd like to -- since we are on the issue of Kacuni, I have a
6 few questions with respect to what happened. First I'd like to refer to
7 you -- you mentioned that two persons were killed. Is that correct?
8 A. Yes. I was reminded that two persons were killed, but, you know,
9 there was a lot happening.
10 Q. And I'd like you -- to refer you to your diary, and that is on the
11 26th of January. And this is on page 0890, I believe at the end. And
12 it's the first paragraph on 26th of January dealing with the Kacuni
14 A. Yes. Well, here we are. It's in my diary. You're right.
15 Q. Can you tell us from reading this paragraph or, if you recall, in
16 what circumstances those two persons were killed?
17 A. I cannot recall exactly how they were killed.
18 Q. Was that information that was relayed to you or were you witness
19 to those killings?
20 A. No, I certainly was not witness to the killings, and it would be
21 information that was relayed to me.
22 Q. And those killings that you were informed of, would they have
23 happened after the 21st of January according to the information that you
25 A. I cannot recall.
1 Q. If they are mentioned in this incident on the 26th?
2 A. Well, it's likely that they were just before the incident of the
3 26th, but I don't know exactly when they were killed. I suspect it was
4 the 25th.
5 Q. I showed you a document yesterday, and that was document number 9
6 in the binder that you had yesterday.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And this document you acknowledged with me what had happened on
9 the 21st, which is that between 8.00 and 9.00 on the 20th of January the
10 HVO put a checkpoint at the entry and at the exit of the town. And then
11 they pounded the town between 9.00 and 2.00 in the morning and then
12 removed the checkpoints. I refer here to document DH612.
13 Now, with this in mind, when you look back to your diary to the
14 comment that you made to General Merdan where you told him, and I
15 quote: "I told him that this time the Muslims were at least in some way
16 to blame. They had killed two HVO personnel and they were holding me up."
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. In context can you explain what was the problem at that time and
19 what you meant by "at least in some way this time."
20 A. Well, I tried, Your Honours, to always stay neutral. It was very
21 difficult, because to act is to destroy neutrality on the ground. And
22 people -- as soon as you do one thing, people -- the other side thinks
23 you're supporting. So I was trying to be neutral, and I never necessarily
24 blamed people, but in this case I said it seems you were responsible, so
25 that is what I meant: It seems that by your actions of soldiers you have
1 killed two people, and this is actually causing an absolute problem.
2 Q. And the difficulty to you was that they were holding you up?
3 A. Well, they -- my main objective in that area was to keep the main
4 supply route into Kiseljak and thence into Sarajevo, the ground route,
5 open. That's what I considered to be an objective of mine because it was
6 the only route into Sarajevo for foodstuffs, medicines, et cetera. So to
7 hold me up, what I meant was to stop me actually sending aid convoys into
8 Sarajevo through Kiseljak. And this was the only route and this was the
9 only way I could get in.
10 Q. So the roadblock, was that what the ABiH was doing wrong at that
11 time in your view?
12 A. Yes, because they were blocking -- they were stopping a UN mission
13 and in fact they were also stopping us patrolling that area, but not just
14 that. There was an agreement -- we all agreed to try and keep the routes
15 open. So that was a problem.
16 Q. And you recalled -- you said yesterday that this incident was
17 solved by you placing two warriors to replace this lorry with the logs.
18 Is that correct?
19 A. Yes -- well, that was my suggested solution, and I left those
20 vehicles in position for at least several days.
21 Q. And why did you decide to leave two warriors? What was the aim
22 and who could pass from then on, at that checkpoint?
23 A. Well, I left the warriors to reassure the people who had put the
24 barricade up, because I think also it was relatively close to the HVO
25 front line positions. So the people who lived there, who seemed to be
1 Bosnian Muslims in the main, were reassured by actually having our
2 presence. And this was a tactic I used time and time again, to put my
3 soldiers into a position where people felt frightened.
4 Q. Did you understand what the use of the checkpoint was to the Army
5 of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
6 A. The military aim of that checkpoint was to deny communication
7 between Kiseljak and Vitez for the HVO and also to provide a reassurance
8 for the people who lived in that area. And by default, it stopped us
9 moving up and down the road, too, particularly when you put the -- the
10 lorry was huge. It had great trunks on the back, and it stretched right
11 across the road.
12 Q. And once you, meaning the international community, could have
13 freedom of movement again in this particular area, for you the issue was
15 A. Yes, except, you know, I wanted people not to be fighting there.
16 So solved insofar as we opened the road, so that's correct. But I still
17 would have prefer people not to be at each other's throats. In fact I
18 got -- at Kacuni I got attacked as well. My interpreter lost the toe --
19 his toe cap.
20 Q. You beat me to the question. I just wanted to know who was your
21 interpreter. I believe that I see from the diary that (redacted) was
22 with you. Is that possible?
23 A. Yes. He was known as (redacted) because we tried to disguise
24 his identity. He was a British Serb officer and we also had a British
25 Serb sergeant. So we changed their names, not very subtly, to (redacted) and
1 (redacted), but it was (redacted).
2 Q. And is he the person you are talking about when you say that the
3 only casualty it was the top of (redacted) boot, which was struck by
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Thank you. Let me move on, Colonel, to the issue of the -- the
7 role of the adjutant which was raised yesterday by my colleague. Can you
8 explain what is normally the rank of the adjutant in a battalion.
9 Who normally gets this position, and what are the duties of the
11 A. The adjutant is a captain in rank. He's normally perhaps one of
12 the best if not the best captain in the battalion, and his duty is to run
13 the battalion apart from the training and the operations. In all other
14 aspects his staff job is to run a battalion under the commanding officer.
15 Q. If we compare the position of the adjutant to that of a G1 in a
16 brigade, would there be a difference or would they resemble each other?
17 A. They would resemble one another.
18 Q. And Can you tell the Trial Chamber what the G1 does in a
20 A. He runs things like discipline, education, that sort of thing, and
21 the re-positions of units out of combat.
22 Q. I'd like to move now, Colonel, to the issue of Dusina. Now, my
23 colleague -- first let me ask you the first question. If after an
24 investigation no crime is committed, did you expect anyone to provide you
25 information that someone can be court martialed?
1 A. Yes, I would have liked that, yes.
2 Q. Given --
3 A. Let's be clear. A lot of people were dying at this time,
4 Your Honours, including my own escort driver had been shot and I was
5 demanding that we have the person responsible -- I hadn't even got an
6 investigation for what had happened to my own driver. But I was -- didn't
7 stop me demanding -- for every single crime committed, I wanted to know
8 what was going on. So the answer to the question is: Did I receive good
9 information that somebody had been disciplined? The answer is
11 Q. You mentioned that following the meeting in Dusina, that following
12 the series of meetings that took place - I'm not going to go back into
13 those meetings - but correct me if I'm wrong, you said that you were
14 satisfied that this incident was closed?
15 A. Yes, I said that. Closed insofar as I couldn't do anything about
16 it. I couldn't be responsible for everyone dying in the area, although I
17 felt it quite personally that it was part of my mission to try and stop
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down for the
21 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation]
22 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... one of your answers in the
23 Kordic case, you mentioned that Merdan told you that the people concerned
24 were going to be court-martialed, then it would not be the persons in
1 A. I don't know.
2 Q. The issue of Merdan mentioning this to you, did that -- did this
3 happen once or many times?
4 A. Several times. Several times when I complained, General Merdan
5 said something would be done.
6 Q. Let me move on to the issue of the Geneva Conventions. Would you
7 agree with me - and just to confirm with what my colleague said to you -
8 that it is a duty of a commanding officer to instruct his troops on the
9 Geneva Conventions?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And on the basis of the document I showed you yesterday as to
12 whether saying that there was an order out and the corps commander to
13 instruct the units on the applicable law, is that a way for the corps
14 commander to ensure that the person -- that his soldiers as best as
15 possible will be trained in the Geneva Conventions?
16 A. It's a very good way of doing that.
17 Q. Did you expect or would you expect, Colonel, to see
18 General Hadzihasanovic holding classes on the Geneva
20 A. No, I wouldn't. But I would expect General Hadzihasanovic to have
21 done what he did, tell people -- refer them to the fact that the ABiH must
22 act in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. And if people don't
23 understand what those are, perhaps to explain them further. But I expect
24 the officers to whom General Hadzihasanovic was addressing looked to the
25 Geneva Conventions, totally understood what the Geneva Conventions were.
1 Q. Now, Colonel, the -- we looked at the issue of the -- an order
2 which was issued by Colonel Blaskic. My friend showed you this order, and
3 I guess you may still have the order with you.
4 A. I don't.
5 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] May we -- may the usher please bring
6 the exhibit which was shown to the witness dated 18th of April, 1993.
7 Q. Now, I ask you, Colonel, just to tell you what exactly is meant by
8 paragraph 1 of this order from Kordic.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Prosecution.
10 MR. WAESPI: First of all, we are no longer in
11 examination-in-chief, and we are also not in cross-examination. It's
12 re-examination. And I didn't object yesterday when my learned friend, you
13 know, had him comment on what Mr. Hadzihasanovic intended, what did he do,
14 what did he mean by that. But here now in re-examination, it's really of
15 no use to ask him what did he mean, Mr. Blaskic, when he issued this
16 order. It speaks for itself and he can only speculate, and that's of no
17 use for the Trial Chamber.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I understand you well, this
19 document was issued on the 18th of April, 1993. It was at 8.00 in the
20 morning, and it is marked by "urgent, urgent, urgent." Is that the case?
21 This document was shown to the witness as a new exhibit, and the question
22 was also put to the witness within the context of cross-examination. And
23 the question that was put to the witness now wants to be clarified by the
25 You may proceed, Mr. Bourgon, but in the sense that I have
2 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Yes, of course, Mr. President.
3 Because the question that I'm going to put the witness -- I'm just the
4 Defence counsel, but I really did not understand any of the questions put
5 to the witness by the Prosecution and I would like to clarify some issues
6 that remained unclear.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Go ahead.
8 MR. BOURGON:
9 Q. In paragraph 1 of this order, what is your interpretation as to
10 what is being asked by this order?
11 A. Stop UN vehicles moving into an operational area. Pursuant,
12 Your Honours, worries me. I wonder if that's an exact translation,
13 because it could mean pursuant after reference to the orders of a superior
14 commander. Could be that.
15 Q. Is there anything in this document, Colonel, that is giving an
16 order to fire at the UN?
17 A. Well, it gives clearance to fire in some way or another if there's
18 a requirement.
19 Q. But to deliberately fire. Is that what this order is giving?
20 A. It doesn't say -- the final paragraph contradicts everything,
21 arbitrary behaviour -- well, slightly contradicts. What does he mean by
22 arbitrary behaviour, number 5?
23 Q. Would that confirm, Colonel, what you were saying that in your
24 view no one had been given orders to shoot at the UN?
25 A. It could do, but this is a very confusing order to me. If I
1 received it in the English like this, I would demand clarification as to
2 what exactly is meant. So I suspect in the original Croatian it would be
4 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Now, the issue that was raised along with the
5 questions related to this document was the issue of control. Now, can you
6 state in terms of controlling the troops what you mean by "troops out of
7 control within the army."
8 A. I particularly mean, Your Honours, a man who is in a probably
9 location up the front line who is frightened, who is bored, who actually
10 has no one near him, who decides to open fire without orders and without
11 reason. A sniper position maybe. And that is, I think, the position of
12 the person that killed my escort driver on the 30th of January, and there
13 were various other instance. And that was by the -- in my view, in my
14 opinion, came from an area controlled by the ABiH; therefore, it was an
15 ABiH soldier out of control. And in my view, there were other soldiers
16 out of control in -- on all sides. I'd give an example on the other side.
17 A HVO soldier attacking my petrol dump in a drive-past shoot.
18 Q. Now, Colonel, the -- on the 18th of April, where were you yourself
19 and what is the context of this order?
20 A. I was in Zenica. I went into Vitez. I lost a vehicle -- it
21 overturned behind me on the return back. I took -- I see -- I chaired a
22 cease-fire meeting. I made a plan to try and patrol Vitez and arrange for
23 armoured vehicles to be positioned in the town. And I arranged for a
24 joint commission to investigate what was happening. I went to the
25 International Committee of the Red Cross to make ensure that they were
1 happy about prisoner exchange. And for the first time the International
2 Committee of the Red Cross travelled in one of our armoured vehicles with
3 permission from Geneva. And I noticed there were 16 bodies on my route
4 from Vitez. That was all I wrote on that day
5 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I'd like, just before the break, to ask
6 you -- and you've spoke about that in your examination-in-chief and you
7 also provided some more information to my colleague in his
8 cross-examination. But can you tell us -- you've just read us one day.
9 Can you tell us what you were doing most of the time during your mission
10 in Central Bosnia.
11 A. Most of my time, Your Honours, I was away from my base. I had
12 two, three vehicles. I had an armoured vehicle, a kind of light tank
13 called a Warrior. The foreign office -- the British foreign office gave
14 me a Land Rover Discovery, a Land Rover, white. I had another Land Rover
15 as well, another Land Rover fitted for radios and I would spend most of my
16 time actually on the ground often at frontline positions like Turbe,
17 Maglaj, and if I wanted to visit Tuzla, that took me a minimum of seven
18 hours to get there, and I had a company base up there. And if I wanted to
19 visit Gornji Vakuf, that took me a minimum of two hours to get there. So
20 most of my time I was away from my headquarters. For that reason I
21 appointed two operations officers so that 24 by 7 I would have someone of
22 my own -- actually, I don't mean to say anyone else was alien, but
23 someone -- an operations officer knew exactly what I was doing and what
24 I wanted to do. They were put in the operations room. They were
1 Q. And how would you decide on a certain day what the focus of your
2 attention would be?
3 A. At the night-before's conference I would receive reports as to
4 what was happening and I would decide where the point of everyone's --
5 well, certainly my concentrated efforts should be the next day.
6 Q. And in the time that you spent in Central Bosnia, how many
7 other people have travelled as much as you did and have made as many
8 observations as you did about the main incidents that were going
10 A. I don't know. A lot of the liaison officers, I had appointed six
11 liaison officers to get to know the area extremely well and gave them
12 sectors to govern. I should think that the liaison officers were out as
13 much as I was, if not more. They used to spend time actually sleeping
14 with the units on the ground.
15 Q. And do you feel, Colonel, that your way you operated allowed you
16 to understand and to know what was going on despite the vastness of your
18 A. Well, Your Honours, no one -- no one gave me instructions. I've
19 been to staff college and things. No one gave me instructions on how to
20 operate in this extraordinary place. So I did my best, and that
21 fundamentally meant working out how to operate as we went. Obviously I
22 got things wrong, like the Prosecution has identified. I did not -- I was
23 not systematic enough with the military information summaries; I accept
24 that. But my style of command was that I would be with the soldiers on
25 the ground as much as possible and talking to the relevant commanders as
1 often as I could and fundamentally being at the position -- in a position
2 to make a decision in time to stop people dying.
3 Q. And one last question before the break, Colonel. My friend has
4 shown you a number of milinfosum -- actually, maybe two, maybe three at
5 the most, which he discussed with you in relation to alleged control over
6 Mujahedin. And we'll go after the break into these documents very quickly
7 just to ask you a few questions, but how many more milinfosums to your
8 knowledge in the complete period when you were there for your BritBat 1
9 and operation Grapple 1 contained information related to Mujahedin?
10 A. Well, Your Honours, it's easy as I've never read them. But I
11 would suspect that the people who -- preparing for this trial have been
12 through them with a tooth comb, I suspect there aren't many other -- other
13 military information summaries ones that contain references to the
15 Q. And would you say that the information that you had at the
16 time, if I asked you, was it plenty, was it middle, or was it almost
17 nonexistent? Where does it come closer on the Mujahedin issue?
18 A. Well, you know what, I would have liked to have actually met them
19 properly. So I would think that I had to -- I would be in the middle or
20 towards the lower end of middle of lack of knowledge.
21 Q. Colonel, after the break we'll go into some of the questions that
22 my colleague asked you, the Mujahedin, and then I'll be finished with my
24 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I believe this is a
25 good time from the break. I have another 20 minutes after the break.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe that in line 8, page
2 76, there is a mistake in the transcript. In English it says my friend
3 has shown you a number. You're referring to the Prosecution, aren't you?
4 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Yes, Prosecution, they are my
5 friends. Of course. I hope so.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are going to make a break.
7 It is 25 to 1.00 and we are going to resume around 1.00.
8 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 12.59 p.m.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. The
11 Prosecution wishes to take the floor.
12 MR. WAESPI: Yes, just one brief point, if Mr. Bourgon could
13 indicate how long his re-direct lasts because you don't need to be
14 reminded but this re-direct comes in on cross. So whatever this witness
15 says, I have no chance to follow-up. So he should really limit himself,
16 as we are in chief and in cross-examination to the most important issues.
17 And I don't know how long he's intending to go on, but I just wanted to
18 make this observation, Mr. President.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Bourgon.
20 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. As I
21 said just before the break, I need roughly another 20 minutes. All my
22 questions are directly linked to the examination of my learned friend.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Proceed.
24 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, because the Prosecution
1 cannot take the floor again unless you open up some new questions.
2 MR. BOURGON:
3 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... before the break, and in
4 your last answer, I believe, was that the information you had on
5 Mujahedin during your tour from the mid to the on lower end. Is that
7 A. Yes, I didn't have much information about the Mujahedin,
8 Your Honours.
9 Q. My colleague has shown you a document which was at tab 7 in the
10 documents that were given to you, and that was the interview between a
11 journalist that I believe you know, Andrew Hogg, and an individual
12 pretending to be a Mujahedin. I'd like to refer you to this document.
13 Now, my colleague has shown you some lines, and I would also like to do
14 the same thing to see if this document which was shown to you by my
15 colleague --
16 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]
18 MR. WAESPI: I don't want to be picky, but I don't think there's
19 evidence that this person was pretending to be a Mujahedin. All the
20 evidence we have is that he is, that's what he says, a Mujahedin. So I
21 object to the word "pretending." It's also suggestive to this witness,
22 Mr. President.
23 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] The remark has been well-noted,
24 Mr. President.
25 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... but first let me ask you,
1 where were you in June 1992?
2 A. I was in Germany, Fahlenbostel [phoen].
3 Q. Were you ever informed of the existence of an individual named
4 Abdul Aziz?
5 A. I was not.
6 Q. Given the -- the text that was given to you I would like to refer
7 you to some of the lines and do the exact same exercise as my colleague
8 did and say -- find out whether this reinforces your belief or not
9 concerning the existence of Mujahedin in Central Bosnia. Now, I refer you
10 to page 2 at the top where this is an answer provided by this gentleman
11 Aziz. And he said about: "About myself or my group, it is not allowed to
12 come through any official [inaudible] organisation or any government
13 involvement. My people, they are coming by themselves, by their own
14 efforts. Nobody is forcing them or nobody is requesting them. They
15 just heard like me that there are Muslims being killed and they should
17 Does that reinforce your belief that there is no link between the
18 3rd Corps and the Mujahedin?
19 A. I don't really have a comment. I believe that from what I knew
20 this looks to be support and -- but I don't change my view.
21 MR. WAESPI: Just to be sure about re-direct. It's not asking
22 leading questions. He can ask him what his comment about that, but we
23 have to be careful at this point in time. But I'm curious what the
24 gentleman says about this sentence, but procedurally I believe we have to
25 be careful the way it's phrased.
1 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. The same
2 procedure has been used as that of my colleague. During my re-direct, I
3 show him the same document. He has the document in front of him and I am
4 asking him to comment on it. This is not a new procedure, but I can
5 understand that my colleague wants to object. It's quite legitimate on
6 his part.
7 MR. WAESPI: My objection was to the phrasing of the question.
8 It's the same document, but I was cross-examining and you're examining or
9 examining in-chief. You're not supposed to ask leading questions, and you
10 asked one.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Make sure that the questions are
12 not leading, but you're reading a paragraph and asking him what he thinks
13 about it. So the question is not leading.
14 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Q. Colonel, the paragraph I just read to you, and maybe we can read
16 it again, saying that this individual -- saying that, and I quote the
17 paragraph: "My people, they are coming by themselves, by their own
18 efforts. Nobody is forcing them, nobody is requesting them, and they just
19 heard like me that there are Muslims being killed and they should help."
20 Can you comment on this paragraph with respect to the question
21 that was posed to you and the control of Mujahedin?
22 A. Well, that's the assumption I made that so many people arrived in
23 Bosnia. It -- in one way it certainly does confirm that -- from my point
24 of view that they weren't asked for because my impression, and it was an
25 impression, that these people just arrived -- these Mujahedin just arrived
1 as a group. But as individuals, it's much more understandable. A lot of
2 people used to arrive at places like Split seeking adventure or whatever
3 purpose and joined there the relevant armed forces from there as
5 Q. Colonel, I now refer you to page 5 of the same document towards
6 the bottom of the page. This is a reply by the gentleman named Aziz, and
7 he is saying: "They are coming through different area. There is no
8 specific area they are coming." And again the same thing, "I will never
9 ask them how you arrived there. And the journalist you know, Hogg, is
10 replying: "So what you are saying there is no organisation in the Islamic
11 world sending people here?"
12 And the response by Mr. Aziz is "neither."
13 The question is the same: "How does that relate, if it does, to
14 your opinion, that the Mujahedin were not under control?"
15 A. They weren't asked for them and they came as they wished. I am
16 sure that's what I feel.
17 Q. I now refer you to page 7 of the same document. And this is a
18 question that was asked to Mr. Aziz by Mr. Hogg, and that's the second
19 paragraph. And the question goes as follows: "Yeah. What has been the
20 reception that you receive from Izetbegovic and the Bosnian government?
21 Did they welcome you with open arms or did it take a lot of negotiating to
22 be able to?"
23 Mr. Aziz butting in and answering: "No. Especially by Muslims,
24 yes. They opened their hands and we are welcome and they even help us
25 with any kind of -- they have food or anything because they recognise that
1 we are here to defend them."
2 This question and answer, does that indicate to you or how does
3 that relate to your opinion that those Mujahedin were not under control of
4 the Bosnian army?
5 A. I don't think it indicates either way that answer actually, but my
6 reflection is that the Bosnian Muslims were under such pressure at that
7 time, I often used to think maybe they would -- this is privately at the
8 time and since, but certainly at the time I used to think, Poor devils.
9 They -- there's no one really supporting them. So they might accept help
10 from any direction, and any direction, I meant by this people coming to
11 help them.
12 Q. And I finally refer you to page 12 of the same document. And
13 again this is a question by Mr. Hogg saying: "From countries,
14 governments, or from the individuals."
15 And the response is: "No. Individuals, no. No single country
16 giving us from other. It is from government, but we are getting help from
17 all these personal effort."
18 How does that relate to your opinion of Mujahedin and
20 A. Well, I think the same as before, people were coming of their own
21 will. I also would like to comment maybe the Mujahedin unit came as a
22 complete entity, I don't know. But my point was, I don't think they were
23 under control of the ABiH. I don't know how they got there. They might
24 have dribbled in like this or they might have come as a unit. But my
25 point is, as far as I could see, they weren't under control.
1 Q. Now, Colonel, when I look at this interview that was conducted in
2 1992, does it really help you in making up your mind, one way or the
3 other, with Mujahedin?
4 A. It doesn't change my view, but it's interesting from my point of
5 view -- I didn't realise there was so many Middle East people in the area
6 from as early as that.
7 Q. Now, Colonel, I'd like to show you a document and I'd like the
8 usher to take out Exhibit DH181. Now, this is a piece written by the same
9 journalist and I'd like you to take a look at this same document. This is
10 written by Andrew Hogg that you know. And because he was looking for the
11 same information, I think it's good that you look at this exhibit.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could it be placed on the ELMO.
13 Can the document be placed on the ELMO?
14 MR. BOURGON: Put it on the ELMO, and it's DH181.
15 Q. Can you -- maybe I will help you to read some of the sentences.
16 And if I begin initially at the beginning: "Senior Bosnian army
17 commanders are calling on their president Alija Izetbegovic to expel
18 foreign Mujahedin fighters because they are terrorising civilians and
19 committing atrocities. More than 200 Mujahedin who have been fighting in
20 Bosnia for the past year now operate as lawless gangs which the Bosnian
21 army command is powerless to control. In recent clashes between Croats
22 and Muslims, the Islamic soldiers who say they are waging jihad, holy war,
23 have desecrated churches and murdered civilians. When they are not
24 fighting the Mujahedin have terrified the population they claim to defend
25 by attempting to enforce an Islamic code on a population traditionally lax
1 about religious observance. Colonel Stipan Siber, deputy commander of the
2 Bosnia Hercegovina army and its operations chief in Central Bosnia
3 said last week the freelance fighters were causing widespread alarm. It
4 was a mistake to let them in. No one asked them to come. They commit
5 most of the atrocities. They worked against the interest of the Muslim
7 I'll let you take a quick look at the rest of this document,
8 Colonel, and tell me if this can relate to your opinion that the
9 Bosnian -- that the Mujahedin were not under the control of the Bosnian
11 A. Well, I think it confirms what my thoughts were. And he's a good
12 journalist, this man. So I presume he'd done good research. I notice
13 Miletici is mentioned and that's an interesting second back-up to the fact
14 that it might have been Mujahedin who did it.
15 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I'd like to move now to a document which was
16 shown to you which was at tab number 9 in the list of documents by my
17 colleague, and that is one of the milinfosums. Is that 9 or -- yes,
18 sorry. It's not a milinfosum. This is a document that is labelled P461.
19 Now, my first question to you, Colonel, is that: Have you ever
20 seen this document?
21 A. No, I have never seen the document before today.
22 Q. And can you confirm that with respect to the 7th Brigade you had
23 very little information?
24 A. That's correct. I had little information about the 7th Brigade.
25 I mean, my intelligence cell may have had more, but I didn't carry
1 information in my head about the 7th Brigade.
2 Q. Now, were you aware of what is mentioned into this document, which
3 is that there are some foreign citizens who are being detained?
4 A. As far as I can remember, I wasn't aware but I know there were a
5 lot of foreign citizens, so-called, actually in Central Bosnia.
6 Q. Now, in this document you have before you do you see anywhere the
7 term "3rd Corps"?
8 A. Yes, at the top.
9 Q. In terms of the reporting of the document, does that tell you
10 anything that those people were members of the 3rd Corps, or if they were
11 members of anything it was the BH army?
12 A. There is no mention of the 3rd Corps, but we're talking about the
13 area in which the 3rd Corps operated.
14 Q. Now, these two individuals that were referred to by my
15 colleague Skinner and McBride, would they qualify as foreign citizens
16 who are members of the BH army, i.e., volunteers who are in our unit?
17 A. Yes, definitely.
18 Q. Now, the incident of the -- what happened to Skinner and McBride,
19 how does that contribute -- did that contribute in any way to you forming
20 an opinion about the control of Mujahedin?
21 A. Yes, it did actually. It was -- perhaps I should have mentioned
22 it before but you remind me. The death of -- Your Honours, the death of
23 McBride and Skinner upset me a great deal because I had had personal
24 contact with these men. I had tried to get them out of the place as I
25 told them to go, as I told all mercenaries, and I considered them to be
1 mercenaries, to get out. And because I knew them personally, I was upset.
2 I spent some time thinking and talking, why would the BiH do it to their
3 own? And the answer and the conclusion I made and others made was that
4 they were actually killed by a Mujahedin group for reasons presumably that
5 they were Westerners, Christians whatever you want do. I know when I went
6 to their burials, I assume they were Christians because I took their
7 torbay [phoen], the headstones off and put crosses instead.
8 Q. Do you remember the way in which they were killed?
9 A. I remember that they were killed somewhere near Turbe. They were
10 taken out of their houses in the middle of the night. They were taken,
11 and their bodies were found in a stream and they were shot in the back.
12 Q. And do you remember exactly shot where or how, or did that
13 contribute to your -- to giving you any information with respect to
15 A. It was -- I think it was near Travnik and we felt that it was a
16 Mujahedin unit that had done it. And I think it might have been done
17 during the night.
18 Q. Do you remember the number of bullets used to kill these two
20 A. I -- in my mind it's 17, but in other words over ten. A burst of
21 fire in the back of the jacket.
22 Q. I'll now move to tab number 11 which was raised to you. This is
23 document P626. And I -- my question to you, Colonel, first is: Did you
24 ever see this document?
25 A. Not before this week.
1 Q. And can you tell us who this document is addressed to and who is
2 the person sending this document?
3 A. I -- I think this is the HVO command in Mostar and sending to the
4 9th of March -- that's about it. I don't know quite more than that.
5 Q. Is this a document that you would have access -- that you would
6 have had access to during your stay in Bosnia?
7 A. No, of course not. It's an internal army document.
8 Q. And was such information about existence of 250 Mujahedin, is that
9 information that was ever conveyed to you by anyone during your stay in
11 A. Not to my knowledge.
12 Q. I'll now move to tab number 6, another document which was shown to
13 you by my friend, and this is the milinfosum dated 27 January. It was a
14 new document. Now, with respect to this milinfosum which was on the 27th
15 of January, we discussed yesterday a meeting that took place on the 26th
16 with a cease-fire, a meeting that took place on the 27th with a
17 cease-fire, a very serious -- and these two meetings that you attended
18 personally are not reported in this document. Should it have been or what
19 is your view with respect to making these documents reliable for the day
20 whether important events such as this should have been mentioned?
21 A. Maybe it should have been mentioned, but are what these
22 reportings -- you know, it's selective. I mean, I -- as -- as is obvious
23 from the record I was chairing meetings during this time.
24 Q. And would your battalion have known that you were doing so?
25 A. Yes, of course they would.
1 Q. Now, if I look at this document and I want to use that for the --
2 in terms of -- discuss what was raised with you with my colleague about
3 the milinfosum. Now, if I look at the first page where it says: "Gornji
4 Vakuf was reported to be generally quiet."
5 Now, what does that mean, it "was reported to be" in terms of
6 milinfosum language?
7 A. Reported generally means we're relying on other sources.
8 "Generally quiet" means there wasn't too much gunfire or shells
10 Q. And reported, what kind of observation would that refer to?
11 A. It could well be that it was reported not by my patrols but by
12 someone else. But I would think it's quite -- this is reported in this
13 sense as I had B company there, it came from B Company's situation report.
14 So as they're right beside the town, they can hear explosions and shooting
15 from where they were.
16 Q. Now, if I look at page 2 of this document, the top part where it
17 says that the "BiH and HVO in Travnik have signed an agreement."
18 Is there a difference between this type of language and the first
19 type where it says "it was reported that"?
20 A. Yes. I would suspect that Travnik -- this was a report submitted
21 by the liaison officer for Travnik, Captain Matthew Dundas Whatley whose
22 task was to liaise with the BiH and HVO.
23 Q. If you compare the two types of reporting where it says "was
24 reported to be" and the other paragraph, is the second one not a fact and
25 the first one an observation of which we don't know the source?
1 A. In the writing, yes.
2 Q. And this paragraph that was shown to you where it talks about a
3 normally reliable source, do you yourself know this source?
4 A. No.
5 Q. And how many sources were used to draft a milinfosum?
6 A. As many as we got information from.
7 Q. And what would be a normally reliable source?
8 A. In this kind of definition is someone in the ranks of either the
9 HVO or the BiH who was friendly and who talked to some of our patrols --
10 or the liaison officer.
11 Q. Now, in this case, in this specific scenario, could the source be
12 a civilian or an interpreter?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And could it be someone that could confuse a soldier wearing a
15 beard with a foreigner?
16 A. Maybe. Maybe.
17 Q. And the fact that a battalion would be trained by two people from
18 the outside, is that a sign that an external country is controlling this
20 A. No, no. What it means -- what someone being trained, it's --
21 it -- two people can't train a battalion anyway, Your Honours. But it
22 does actually mean that instruction is being -- is apparently being given
23 by instructors from outside.
24 Q. And has the British army ever called upon experts from other
25 countries to come and assist with the training of their troops?
1 A. Yes, I'm sure it has. I'm absolutely sure it has.
2 Q. I'd like to move on to tab number 8, which is the other milinfosum
3 that was shown to you. And this -- the paragraph about Zepce. And this
4 is again a new document which is not yet into evidence. Now, this
5 paragraph with Zepce, first of all as you noted correctly, and maybe you
6 can confirm that and ensure that I'm not getting it wrong, but you would
7 be surprised that the Muslim externals would be those found drunk in the
8 street. I guess you made a comment around that.
9 A. I did make that comment because there were a lot of very bad
10 Muslims in the BiH.
11 Q. What do you mean by that?
12 A. Well, they drank a lot. They all drank too much.
13 Q. Now, when I look at the first sentence where it says that the
14 local commander, in the middle, he says that "these troops were not under
15 his direct command."
16 Now, what could that mean? Is it a possibility that it's simply
17 another group of BiH soldiers and they are under his operational control
18 and not his operational command?
19 A. No. This is a reference to the fact that this group were not
20 taking orders from him.
21 Q. Are there many possibilities as to what this group could or could
22 not be?
23 A. Well, it is possible that the ABiH had special forces, and in fact
24 I know they had some special forces but -- and they might not take
25 control -- command -- operational control from a local commander. So
1 there is a possibility of that.
2 Q. Now, there is the word -- the reference here to the
3 word "external," where it says: "A deployment of Muslim externals."
4 And I'd like to refer you to document we saw yesterday, and this
5 document was the milinfosum of 26 January and it was at tab 14 of the
6 documents I showed you. Now, I'd like to, if you have this document with
7 you, tab 14, it's milinfosum 87. It was a new document dated 26th of
8 January. Now, I'd like to read the last paragraph where it says that B
9 Company stated that the main problem area is the village of Bizlica
10 [phoen] where UN vehicles were still being engaged by HVO snipers as were
11 the local populace, predominantly Muslim. It was also reported that there
12 had been no evidence as of yet of external forces withdrawing out of the
13 local area. This includes the 305th Jajce Brigade. Information leads us
14 to believe that the 305th Brigade moved to the area north of Gornji Vakuf
15 centred on the village of Hranca shortly after the fall of Jajce.
16 Comment. It is now believed that the brigade may be moved to Zenica as it
17 falls in the category of external forces."
18 Looking at this paragraph, what was the word "external forces"
19 used for in milinfosum language?
20 A. Well, I think you -- we've got word play here and it's soldiers
21 writing this report, Your Honour. I think in this context external
22 forces, as I recall -- because I brokered the cease-fire there, that
23 forces not directly from the area of Gornji Vakuf were to be withdrawn
24 from the area. So external in this case probably means a brigade that was
25 not from the Gornji Vakuf area. And I think -- seem to recall that that
1 was the kind of language we used to withdraw -- to calm down the situation
2 by removing the forces on all sides. So this was not referring to
3 external, out of the country.
4 Q. Now, if I go back to the document which was seen by my -- which
5 was shown to you by my colleague which talks about the external Muslims,
6 it's quite possible that we are not talking about Mujahedin at all.
7 That's the document -- the new document at milinfosum 132 of 11 March.
8 A. It's quite possible. There were some external fanatics,
9 individual fanatics, on all sides. And I can remember particularly one
10 very fanatical HVO soldier from Canada.
11 Q. Now, Colonel, if I look at this incident which you said in answer
12 to a question by my colleague that you were aware of the incident, do you
13 recall that this incident involved Mujahedin at all?
14 A. Which incident?
15 Q. The incident in Zepce where the liaise officer visited the
16 headquarters and we saw those people drunk in the street.
17 A. Yeah, I was aware of the incident. I wasn't aware that it was
18 necessarily Mujahedin at the time -- retrospectively now I suspect there
19 might be, but I wasn't actually going that detailed at the time.
20 Q. Now, with respect to your source, Colonel, you mentioned that --
21 and my colleague asked you many questions with respect to your source.
22 And the questions I'd like to ask you are quite simple --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Prosecution.
24 MR. WAESPI: If we could briefly go into private session.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, can we move into
1 the private session, please.
2 [Private session]
11 Page 15327 redacted. Private session.
11 Page 15328 redacted. Private session.
23 [Open session]
24 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in public session.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Is there anybody in the public
1 gallery [as interpreted] or not? Is there anybody after us in the
3 Go on, Mr. Bourgon, quickly.
4 MR. BOURGON:
5 Q. Now, in answer to a question posed to you by my colleague, you
6 mentioned that a commander is responsible to take action for his soldiers.
7 My question to you is very simple: If they are not his soldiers, such as
8 the Mujahedin, and they've done the things that you are aware of, what do
9 you expect the commander to do?
10 MR. WAESPI: Objection, Mr. President. That's a
11 mischaracterisation of the facts. That's a mere assumption by my
12 learned friend that they are not his soldiers. He can ask something --
13 although, again that should have been part of his examination-in-chief.
14 He can ask him, like I did, without any reference to any facts, Mujahedin
15 soldiers. And he's certainly entitled to do that. But now to mix it in
16 again to soldiers, Mujahedin, I think isn't of assistance to
17 Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The question as it has been
19 put -- if I had the time, I would rephrase it and put it to the witness.
20 The witness himself has touched upon this issue, and this issue would
21 merit more time. Go ahead and put your question.
22 MR. BOURGON:
23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... and bearing in mind your
24 opinion that the Mujahedin were not under his control and yet the
25 Mujahedin did things you are aware of, what did you expect
1 General Hadzihasanovic to do?
2 A. Well, he wasn't responsible for them if he was not in command and
3 control of them, I would expect him to establish, if he doesn't already
4 know, what exactly their right to be there is by reference to a higher
5 formation. I would -- if I was him, I would have an urgent consultation
6 with the chief of police, because if they're not under his operational
7 control, under whose control are they? And if they're under no one's
8 control, perhaps it's a police matter, which actually was one of the
9 things that Merdan used to say to me by chance.
10 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I'd like to end this re-examination by
11 showing you one document, that is DH73. I would ask the usher to show you
12 this document and whether this type of action by General Hadzihasanovic
13 would fit into the category of what you would have expected him to do in
14 the circumstances.
15 MR. WAESPI: If --
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]
17 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I would just like to see the document first
18 before the witness gives his answer.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] 73.
20 Mr. Bourgon.
21 MR. BOURGON:
22 Q. Colonel, could you read this document -- maybe I will read it for
23 the record. Letter addressed from the commander of the 3rd Corps,
24 General Hadzihasanovic, to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina army
25 staff commander, Mr. Delic, and army staff chief, Mr. Halilovic. And the
1 letter goes as follows: "In the general area of Zenica municipality since
2 the beginning of the war there have been volunteers from foreign
3 countries, Arabs and Turks, as well as a group of Bosnians trained by
4 them, the so-called guerrillas who do not enter -- who have not entered
5 the ranks of the BH army in spite of being invited to. They are still
6 contemplating the proposals made to them by the Republic of Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina army's chief of staff. They do not want to make public the
8 decision regarding their actions and eventual entry into the RBH army's
9 ranks and wish to communicate exclusively with top officials of the RBH
10 army staff and not with the 3rd Corps commander, whose only duty in their
11 opinion is to arrange for them a meeting with the said people. They were
12 in this territory even before the formation of the 3rd Corps. In fighting
13 to date, they have been acting outside the usual context and lawful
14 matters of combat, which is directly detrimental to the BH state and
15 especially to the RBH army. It is a known fact that some state organs and
16 high-ranking Muslim clergymen are behind them. Since negotiations have
17 started and finding a solution with the same at the highest level of the
18 RBH army in order to urgently continue and resolve them," then something
19 is missing, "in this connection I am requesting your stances and opinions
20 regarding the solution to this problem since these units are situated in
21 the zone of responsibility of the 3rd Corps and I do not want to be held
22 accountable for the consequences of their actions."
23 Colonel, is that a kind of actions that you would have expected
24 the commander of the 3rd Corps to take with this problem of these-called
1 A. Absolutely, that is an exoneration. That is a clear indication
2 that these Mujahedin were not under command or control. It's a request
3 for support from the high command of the ABiH, and it's a request for them
4 to direct how he is to deal with this matter. And quite honestly, this is
5 a matter of strategy at a higher level than corps level. So this is an
6 exoneration of Enver Hadzihasanovic in my view.
7 Q. Colonel, just one last question. In the last paragraph you see
8 that there are -- part of the sentence is in capital letters. Is this a
9 normal way in terms of staff duties in the military to send letters
10 to your superior officers and to highlight some parts in capital
12 A. No, it is not because that's really emphasising that you are to
13 direct me -- you must direct me, it's a plea for help, in service -- staff
14 duty terms. It's an actually: Don't ignore this and maybe he's actually,
15 by implication, by this asked for advice before this letter and hasn't
16 received it.
17 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I have no more questions.
18 MR. BOURGON: This closes my re-examination.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Bourgon.
20 Mr. Dixon.
21 MR. DIXON: Your Honour, I have about ten minutes of questions
22 arising from the cross-examination. I note the time --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The problem is that if you take
24 ten minutes it will be 2.00 and there is a session after us. If we can't
25 do anything else, go ahead. The Judges won't have any questions, so we'll
1 finish at 2.00, I suppose, unless the Prosecution believes that they have
2 more questions. In that case, we will delay everything until tomorrow
4 Mr. Waespi.
5 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President, in light of the last document,
6 which again should have been a document showed in examination-in-chief, I
7 have a few documents to ask him to put it into perspective.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] How much time will you need?
9 MR. WAESPI: I'm sorry, no more than five minutes.
10 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] We don't want to waste time, but
11 there's no reason why should the Prosecution be allowed to put any
12 questions following my questions unless their questions have to do with
13 the responsibility of the commander. I have not departed in the least
14 from the cross-examination, and I don't know why the Prosecution should be
15 allowed to put any additional questions.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution, what do you
17 have to say? They say they have not departed from the cross-examination
18 when it comes to the responsibilities of the commander. What do you think
19 about that?
20 MR. WAESPI: I said at the outset, Mr. President, and I believe
21 Mr. Bourgon said he would take 20 minutes and he's almost an hour now. As
22 said that he's going into areas which I might feel we have to
23 cross-examine again, and now he shows a document which hasn't been touched
24 neither by him nor by the Prosecution in cross-examination, and asks him
25 almost an ultimate question as to the ultimate issue of the trial, which
1 is really up to Your Honours to decide. I just want to ask him whether he
2 was aware of a few of the facts which occurred after the document was
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Since the Defence has shown a
5 new document to the witness, the Prosecution is expected to reply. If
6 Mr. Dixon takes his ten minutes and if after that the Prosecution goes on
7 to examine for five minutes, that will take us to ten minutes past 2.00.
8 Okay. Let's go and do it.
9 Mr. Dixon, very quickly, you have the floor.
10 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours.
11 Further cross-examination by Mr. Dixon:
12 Q. Sir, you were shown a number of documents by the Prosecution at
13 the brigade level of the 3rd Corps. Just so we can be absolutely clear on
14 this point, can you confirm that you had never seen any of those brigade
15 documents before?
16 A. I confirm that.
17 Q. So it would be correct then, would it not, that you cannot comment
18 on whether the contents of those documents are true or not?
19 A. That's correct. I'm sure that someone has interpreted them as
20 accurately as possible.
21 Q. But you cannot interpret those documents yourself, can you?
22 A. I wish I could have spoken Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, but I
24 Q. So, staying at the brigade level, is it correct that you had very
25 limited information about the composition and the internal structure of
1 the brigades and the 3rd Corps?
2 A. That's correct. Me personally, my intelligence cell probably had
3 more. But from an operational perspective of working and in the field, it
4 was not a great -- of great significance to me because I considered the
5 operational structure of the ABiH in particular to be quite fluid.
6 Q. And it would be correct as well that you didn't have information
7 of a definitive nature on the manner in which brigades in the 3rd Corps
8 were instructed or trained. Is that right?
9 A. That's absolutely correct.
10 Q. A lot has been made of sources today. It's partly a legal issue
11 concerning hearsay evidence that needn't concern you. But I did want to
12 ask you one question about the milinfosum, the new document that was shown
13 to you, the document dated 27 January 1993, where a source is also
14 mentioned. Can you confirm that the name of that source is not known to
16 A. I confirm that.
17 Q. It would be correct then, would it not, that the allegations
18 contained in that paragraph that emanate from that source are ones which
19 cannot be traced back to a particular person or organisation by you. Is
20 that right?
21 A. By me, correct.
22 Q. You mentioned at the commencement of your testimony that you
23 arrived in Bosnia with very limited intelligence. Would that apply to the
24 Mujahedin as well?
25 A. On the subject of Mujahedin?
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. Even less than limited, none. I had no intelligence on what was
3 happening; I had minus on Mujahedin.
4 Q. We have covered much of this territory already in this Prosecution
5 case when a number of BritBat and other international witnesses testified.
6 Some of these people you might know like your successor, General Williams,
7 Major Chambers, Colonel Duncan. They were all asked questions about the
8 level of intelligence. For example, your successor, General Williams,
9 stated that there was a lack of intelligence on the subordination of the
10 Mujahedin. That was at page 5998 of the transcript. You of course
11 wouldn't know that. But is there any reason in your mind to doubt what
12 General Williams said before this Trial Chamber?
13 A. Peter Williams was not my successor. Duncan, Alastair Duncan was
14 my successor and Williams followed Duncan.
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. And the answer is no.
17 Q. Major Guy Chambers was in the command in Kiseljak. He was, as he
18 stated in his evidence, receiving milinformation summaries and summarising
19 them and sending them higher up. He said in his testimony at page 6134
20 that there's no hard evidence that we had that the Mujahedins were
21 incorporated into the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade. Do you have any reason
22 to doubt his evidence?
23 A. No, I don't.
24 Q. From all of your experience in the field and from all the sources
25 that you were able to gain information, would it be correct that you had
1 no hard evidence that the Mujahedin element were effectively controlled by
2 the 3rd Corps or any brigade within the 3rd Corps, including the 7th
3 Brigade. Is that right?
4 A. I had no evidence, that is absolutely correct. And thinking it
5 through, I could never believe that there would be any logic in some of
6 the Mujahedin actions if the BiH were in control. If Enver Hadzihasanovic
7 had been in control, operational control or control of the Mujahedin that
8 were operating in Central Bosnia, they wouldn't have behaved in the way
9 they did.
10 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I have no further questions.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution regarding the
12 new document.
13 MR. WAESPI: Yeah.
14 Further cross-examination by Mr. Waespi:
15 Q. You saw this document and you made some comments about Mr.
16 Acamovic. Were you aware that the -- these forces which are mentioned
17 here, appear to have been mentioned, these foreign volunteers, they were
18 conducting joint operations with the 3rd Corps, not only while, you know,
19 at this time in June but also later in September. Were you aware of that
21 A. No, I wasn't aware of that fact, but you tell me they were. I
22 can't doubt you, if that's what you say.
23 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But the witness has answered.
25 What did you want to say, Mr. Bourgon?
1 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Is that an allegation? Is this a
2 fact? Are they trying to prove something that hasn't been proven? If
3 they want to do that, we don't -- they shouldn't represent it as a fact.
4 This is something that they wish to prove.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well then. Bearing lack of
6 the time, we're not going to put any questions to the witness. Do you
7 want to ask something else?
8 MR. WAESPI: [Previous translation continues] ... about the
9 sources. He, for instance, Colonel Walters talked about joint operations.
10 The witness knows him very well. We also have the information from an
11 ABiH officer, and his name, if you bear with me for a moment, you have
12 heard him recently was Ahmed Kulenovic, and I can give you the transcript
13 pages of that, joint operations in September of 1993.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon.
15 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. The --
16 this witness never said that this was done jointly with the BiH army. The
17 fact that a witness may have said it before the Trial Chamber does not
18 mean that this is a fact. The Trial Chamber will decide at the end of
19 this trial what really happened, what are the facts, and what are not the
20 facts. I am -- I just said that these persons claim that the Mujahedin
21 were not under the control of the BiH army, and I asked the witness what
22 he thought with regard to the fact that these persons stated that. I --
23 not for a moment did I say that those are the facts; I just said that
24 these were the things mentioned by the witnesses. Unlike me, the
25 Prosecution proposes that the witnesses' statements are facts. It is up
1 to the Trial Chamber to decide what the facts are.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well then. Obviously we
3 are talking about the witness statements and testimonies and testimonies
4 are not facts. If there are no more questions, Colonel, this brings your
5 testimony to an end. For two days you have answered all the questions put
6 to you by both of the parties. I would like to thank you. And on behalf
7 of the Trial Chamber I wish you all the best and a happy journey back home
8 and a lot of success in your career. I'm going to ask the usher to bring
9 the witness out of the courtroom.
10 As far as the exhibits are concerned, we shall deal with that
11 tomorrow because we really don't have anymore time.
12 [The witness withdrew]
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have a binder that has been
14 provided to us as well as some new documents that were shown by the
16 What about the witness Witness HD for tomorrow?
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we go into private session,
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can we go into private session,
20 Mr. Registrar?
21 [Private session]
9 [Open session]
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In open session we shall now
11 adjourn, and we shall resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.04 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 2nd day of
14 February, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.