050201ED

Page 15244

1 Q. You did mention, though, that two Croats were killed. Is that

2 correct?

3 A. I didn't mention that two Croats were killed, no I did not.

4 Q. Now, let me just remind you of what you testified in Kordic, and

5 you also discussed it in your book on page 231. In Kordic, transcript

6 pages 12.371 you were asked by -- I believe it was the Defence,

7 Mr. Sawyers of Mr. Kordic at the time. And his question was, and I quote

8 him: "In connection with the fighting that occurred, sir, there is no

9 question that the spark that set off the fighting was the murder of two

10 Croats at the Kacuni checkpoint. And you subsequently had conversations

11 with General Hadzihasanovic and Colonel Merdan about that. Correct?"

12 Your answer: "Yes."

13 "Q. In fact, you told both General Hadzihasanovic and

14 Colonel Merdan one day later that they were at least responsible for the

15 outbreak of the fighting that occurred on the 25th of January, and they

16 both agreed, did they not?"

17 Your answer: "Yes, I think I certainly told them. Whether they

18 necessarily agreed, I can't remember."

19 Do you remember having testified according to these lines?

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Now, let me go on to the -- another aspect of those days, and it's

22 about Dusina. Again in Kordic you were asked, again on 17th January,

23 1999, this time by Mr. Nice.

24 MR. WAESPI: And, Your Honours, it's pages 12.374.

25 "Q. All right. Did you receive any information from your

Page 15245

1 soldiers or other sources of information that you had at your disposal

2 regarding massacres of Croat civilians at the villages of Dusina and

3 Lasva, sir?"

4 Your answer: "I think I did and I think I've referred to them

5 already, that sort of evidence."

6 Mr. Nice: "Yes."

7 Your answer: "Most certainly I tried very hard to investigate any

8 reports of Croats being massacred by Muslims."

9 Mr. Nice: "Just one question on that regard. Did you ever hear

10 about anyone being prosecuted or administratively punished, removed from

11 command or anything like that in connection with those massacres at Dusina

12 and Lasva on January the 25th and 26th, 1993, sir?"

13 And you answer: "I think that Merdan told me that the people

14 concerned were going to be court-martialed.

15 "Q. And do you know whether they ever were?

16 "A. No."

17 Do you remember testifying under oath like that?

18 A. You've reminded me. But, yes, I think that's what I said.

19 Q. Thank you very much. Let's go onto a point about the Geneva

20 Conventions. You told us, I believe, that the soldiers on the ground not

21 necessarily knew what the Geneva Conventions meant -- or at least what

22 that is, the Geneva Conventions.

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. But you would agree with me that they certainly knew -- every

25 soldier knows that it's a crime, it's illegal under any system to massacre

Page 15246

1 civilians, unarmed civilians, to execute captured prisoners who lay down

2 their weapons --

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [In English] Stop.

4 [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon.

5 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. If my

6 learned friend wishes to quote the Geneva Conventions, I must say that the

7 word "massacre" is not part of the Geneva Conventions. If he wants to

8 mention a crime, he may quote any convention but he cannot use big words

9 to reinforce his quote.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Defence is saying that you

11 may quote the Geneva Conventions, but that according to the Defence the

12 word "massacre" is not a word that is part of the Geneva Conventions.

13 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, the witness said that the people on the

14 ground didn't know the Geneva Conventions. The articles -- I don't know

15 the Geneva Conventions in every article, so my point is: I want to know

16 what the witness knows, what the state of knowledge was on the ground in

17 regard to whether somebody is allowed to execute prisoners. I would like

18 to know whether the witness has any knowledge about that, because he said

19 the people on the ground didn't know the letter of the Geneva Conventions.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well then.

21 So you want, Witness, to be precise and say what the people on the

22 ground knew about the Geneva Conventions and how they interpreted the

23 Geneva Conventions.

24 You may proceed.

25 MR. WAESPI:

Page 15247

1 Q. Sir, my question is: Would every soldier in your knowledge, and

2 you had contact with all these people, you were in the scene almost half a

3 year, perhaps even more. Do these soldiers know that it's not allowed to

4 massacre civilians?

5 A. My belief is that every human being knows that massacring anyone

6 is a crime. My belief is also that everyone should know that shooting

7 prisoners is not acceptable. Now, when I say the "Geneva Conventions," I

8 specifically mean the treatment of prisoners and how you deal with people.

9 And I am not an expert on the Geneva Conventions, I just know the basic

10 outlines of how to deal with people. But I would always emphasise the

11 basic points that came from law, whether they were Geneva Conventions or

12 not. You do not kill people, civilians particularly, and you treat

13 prisoners properly, with respect. And those are the kind of things I

14 would say all the time. Some of the soldiers on the ground, specifically

15 in places right on the front line, I would necessarily -- I would

16 re-emphasise this point when I was visiting, that if they did take

17 prisoners, they were not to hurt them once they got them under power. I

18 didn't talk to them and say, Do you know about the Geneva Conventions? I

19 would say, You are not allowed to do this under law, because the Geneva

20 Conventions would mean so little to so many people. But the commanders -

21 let's be clear - the commanders on all sides were professional military

22 officers like I was, and they understood the Geneva Conventions. But it's

23 quite difficult when you suddenly have an army come from nothing, for them

24 to understand all the details of how you treat prisoners. After all, the

25 British army is not without sin itself.

Page 15248

1 Q. Thank you for this answer. And when you talk about commanders,

2 that would General Hadzihasanovic?

3 A. Absolutely, General Hadzihasanovic was a professional officer like

4 I was.

5 Q. Now, let me touch upon another issue which you mentioned almost

6 Beaussou yesterday. You told us about the death of your driver and that

7 you believed that a BH soldier was responsible for that.

8 A. That is my belief. I have no proof.

9 Q. And you then went on to say that, and I quote you -- you also had

10 incidents with the HVO. "I don't believe that they were under

11 instructions from their chain of command to engage the United Nations. In

12 fact, I'm pretty sure they weren't, and that includes the HVO. So I used

13 to put it down to lack of control, out of control soldiers, such as on the

14 13th of January."

15 Do you remember having said that yesterday?

16 A. Thankfully I do, yes.

17 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, with your leave I would like to show

18 the witness a document, and I informed counsel yesterday orally, I faxed

19 it to them. It's a two-page -- in fact, one-page order by General Blaskic

20 which is very telling and which appears to contradict at least what the

21 witness says. Perhaps it refreshes his memory because he was on the

22 ground. Now, stated -- it's an order classified "urgent, urgent, urgent,"

23 to all -- to various units by General Blaskic, Colonel at that time, dated

24 18th April, 1993, at 0800 hours in the morning. And if I just can read

25 out the --

Page 15249

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon, you have the floor.

2 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I would

3 kindly ask my learned friend to clarify -- I see what the witness has

4 said. He said that the two armies did not have any express orders to

5 attack the United Nations. I don't see the purpose of this document. The

6 witness says that neither the BiH army nor the HVO ever received an order

7 to attack the UN forces. And I don't see how this document can be helpful

8 with that respect.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Is this some sort of confusion

10 that we are facing here? The Defence says that the witness never said

11 that the party in conflict ever had an order to attack UN vehicles. Are

12 we talking at cross-purposes here?

13 Mr. Prosecutor, what are you trying to achieve with your questions

14 here?

15 MR. WAESPI: The witness said he believed that several units were

16 out of control, and he gave an example that he -- his driver was attacked

17 by a BiH driver. He gave another example without foundation that the HVO

18 would also shoot at UN, but he said that wasn't commanded, it wasn't

19 controlled. And here we have a clear example of Colonel Blaskic ordering

20 that UN troops be shot at. And there will be another document saying that

21 ten days later in fact we know they were shot at. And that is a

22 contradiction of what the witness said, and perhaps he can help us whether

23 that changes his opinion that indeed in particular HVO troops shot at UN

24 and were indeed commanded and ordered to do so, not just out of control

25 elements as the witness had told us yesterday. And since he was on the

Page 15250

1 ground, I think it's probably interesting for him to see that.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well then, you may proceed.

3 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

4 MR. WAESPI:

5 Q. Are you surprised to see this order?

6 A. Well, I am surprised a little, but looking at the date of the

7 order, if you note the date it's round about the time of the Lasva valley

8 activities, and my soldiers were indeed restricted in their movements at

9 this time as I recall. I said, if I can remember correctly what I said

10 just earlier, that out of control soldiers, not elements -- I mean,

11 individuals might have opened fire. I felt quite strongly that actually

12 there weren't orders given out by people like Colonel Blaskic to attack

13 me. Indeed on several occasions - at least one occasion I can remember,

14 so I'll be precise - at least one occasion I went to Blaskic after I'd

15 personally been engaged quite heavily by snipers and RPG-7s fired at me

16 personally. And my complaint to Blaskic was: Your soldiers opened fire

17 at me this morning, personally at me, and I should have killed them or I

18 could have killed them in response. In fact, I aimed off when I responded

19 by firing myself. And his answer to me was: You should have killed them

20 because I have given orders that they are not to attack you.

21 Now, I took "you" as being the United Nations, not me personally.

22 It may well have been me personally, but I took it as the United Nations

23 forces. And it's on that sort of principle that I say I didn't believe

24 that the HVO or the ABiH had direct orders to attack my soldiers; however,

25 this document here dated the 18th of April suggests that soldiers of the

Page 15251

1 HVO might actually in the pursuit of stopping us going into the so-called

2 operational area might open fire at us. So I've never seen this document

3 before. I accept that I might be wrong. I've said that it's my opinion,

4 not a fact. And I accept that at that time it was extremely difficult,

5 because my orders to my soldiers were quite simple: Get into the middle

6 of the battle, take our vehicles straight in the middle there, make sure

7 they are clearly visible with their white sides and the United Nations on

8 it, do not open fire unless someone opens fire at you, but if they open

9 fire at you, kill them.

10 I wanted to try and stop the fighting, and I also gave

11 instructions for anyone that was hurt, whether they be ABiH, HVO, or

12 civilians, regardless of their status, they were to be picked up and dealt

13 with properly in accordance with civilised behaviour and brought into

14 hospitals and, if necessary, our hospital direct. Those are the

15 instructions I gave. Now, I'm sorry if I'm slightly at variance with this

16 document, but I've never seen it before.

17 Q. And you agree with me --

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just for the record, I would

19 like to clarify as following. Colonel, when you were shot at, was it

20 before the 18th of April or after the 18th of April? It would be of some

21 importance to know that. Do you remember?

22 THE WITNESS: I would look through my diary, Your Honour, to find

23 it. The incident was I think at -- I definitely -- I would need time just

24 to look because it would be in my diary because there were two pigs that

25 were dead there as well. And that would -- I seem to remember writing

Page 15252

1 something about pigs and the smell, but I don't know -- right now I can't

2 give you an honest answer -- I can't give you the right answer, whether it

3 was before. I think it was probably -- most probably afterwards, and I

4 think I had also General Morillion around on that day.

5 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Q. And you would agree with me that this order shows actions on the

7 ground were probably were probably coordinated than they appeared to you

8 at first sight?

9 A. Forgive me, sir, I never said that the HVO didn't have coordinated

10 actions on the ground. This was a deliberate attack in -- a deliberate

11 and pre-planned attack that started on the morning of the 16th. If I

12 implied that or said that, I'm sorry, I've made a mistake.

13 Q. I've said that before, and there's evidence on the record.

14 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, it's Exhibit DH205, an ECMM document

15 dated 28th April, 1993, signed by Mr. Thebault that on page 2 of this

16 document -- and perhaps that could be distributed as well again. The

17 reference I'm interested in is on page 2 of this document.

18 Q. The next paragraph after the middle it says: "Between Kiseljak

19 and Zenica we are unable to see many burning places. We were able to see

20 many burning place in HVO-controlled area, in particular Gomionica, 3

21 kilometres northwest of Kiseljak, where access was yesterday denied by HVO

22 to ECMM combat joint patrol which after a new attempt today was fired at."

23 That appears to be a direct consequence perhaps of Mr. Blaskic's

24 order, and you remember in paragraph 5 of this order it said: "Any

25 arbitrary behaviour will be severely punished."

Page 15253

1 Do you remember that incident raised by Mr. Thebault where CanBat

2 was shot at?

3 A. No, I don't because it was outside the area -- the Canadian

4 Battalion was dealing with ECMM up towards Kiseljak. Although I often

5 patrolled up there, I do not remember this particular incident, except I

6 was shot at around that position on a couple of occasions.

7 Q. Very well. Next, Colonel, let's go on to -- briefly to the

8 milinfosums. Again, would you agree with me that informing your superiors

9 was one of your foremost duties?

10 A. I do.

11 Q. And these milinfosums were part of that duty?

12 A. I do, yes.

13 Q. Now, I believe you submitted a milinfosum one every day over time

14 you were in the area?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, did you ever hear back from BH command in Kiseljak,

17 Mr. Morillion, or perhaps MOD in London, if they received, any complaints

18 about not properly assessed materials in these milinfosums?

19 A. I don't think I did, otherwise I would have paid more attention to

20 them.

21 Q. And who exactly drafted the daily milinfosums?

22 A. A mixture of people, the operations officer, perhaps my second in

23 command, perhaps the intelligence cell perhaps the duty watchkeeper,

24 normally a young officer.

25 Q. Can one tell from looking at the face of a milinfosum on a given

Page 15254

1 day who the drafter might have been?

2 A. I think that would be difficult.

3 Q. Is it recorded in a war diary who the drafter or perhaps the duty

4 officer on a specific day was?

5 A. Maybe not -- you see, probably not the duty officer -- the answer

6 is probably not. We didn't have time -- forgive me. We did not have time

7 to do everything written down.

8 Q. Now, I'll come to milinfosum in a second. I also want to clarify

9 something you mentioned in relation to Mr. Hadzihasanovic yesterday. I

10 asked you whether you knew there might be incidents in these milinfosums

11 that would reflect that Mr. Hadzihasanovic wasn't speaking the truth or

12 was less accurate. And your answer was: "It's quite possible," but you

13 weren't able to give a concrete example of such a behaviour?

14 A. It is possible. And I was not able to give a concrete example.

15 Q. Now, let me ask you something about milinfosum, but first: Who

16 would usually meet with Hadzihasanovic, General Hadzihasanovic, the corps

17 commander?

18 A. Probably me. Probably me, and possibly my second in command, and

19 possibly the company commander, that sort of level. After all,

20 General Hadzihasanovic was the top officer of the BiH.

21 Q. And did you have an interpreter with you when you talked to him?

22 A. Yes, and I can't see how I could have communicated with

23 General Hadzihasanovic without an interpreter. I can't absolutely say

24 that when I was on my own perhaps at an ECMM meeting, and I just happened

25 to meet him, that I had an interpreter right by my side. But for any kind

Page 15255

1 of formal meeting, I couldn't go to see General Hadzihasanovic without an

2 interpreter.

3 Q. Did you always use the same interpreter?

4 A. No. I had two, three military interpreters, two captains and one

5 sergeant, and I hired 16 local interpreters trying to balance in a kind of

6 way between ethnic Serb, Croat, Muslim in that number, but it wasn't easy.

7 But the very best interpreter I had was a lady called Dobrila Kolaba who

8 was a Bosnian Serb who was very sadly shot just after the end of my tour.

9 But it might have been the kind of person, the kind of interpreter I might

10 have taken to see General Hadzihasanovic would be either a military

11 interpreter or someone like Dobrila Kolaba, who I trusted.

12 Q. Did you ever use (redacted) as a interpreter?

13 A. Yes, of course.

14 Q. Many times?

15 A. Many times.

16 Q. When did you start using him, if you recall?

17 A. Nick Stansfield was the first interpreter, military interpreter I

18 had. And (redacted) arrived a little bit later. I can't

19 remember exactly when.

20 Q. Was it in 1993 or already in 1992?

21 A. I don't know. I can't recall.

22 Q. Would that be reflected in your notes?

23 A. No, not necessarily. The interpreter didn't -- forgive me, didn't

24 really matter. I just wanted to be -- my words to be as properly

25 presented as possible. However, I would take normally a military

Page 15256

1 interpreter into a difficult -- a very difficult situation to safeguard

2 the civilian interpreter from, perhaps, reprisals.

3 Q. Who is the CO 1? That's a reference in a milinfosum who went to

4 see General Hadzihasanovic. Who would that be?

5 A. CO 1?

6 Q. Yes.

7 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps if the witness could be shown an already

8 existing exhibit. Mr. President, it's at tab 2 in the binder P370.

9 Q. If you could look at the first paragraph A it talks about a CO 1

10 PWO met with Enver Hadzihasanovic who initially spoke about renewed

11 fighting in Mostar of the cease-fire between Halilovic and Petkovic. He

12 mentioned involvement by regular HVO brigades against -- in the fighting,

13 specifically mentioning 113 and 114 Brigades from Split and elements of

14 114 Brigade. During conversation, Hadzihasanovic threatened action

15 against Vitez and Busovaca. When questioned about the deployment of 314

16 Brigade in the area of Preocica, he flatly denied that it was stating they

17 were on the front line against the Chetniks. Comment. This directly

18 contradicts a non-fact. Comment ends.

19 A. I could answer this without -- this is very easy for me.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Bourgon.

21 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. My

22 learned friend put a question to the witness, and that is: What does CO 1

23 mean? And to specify he showed him a document to illustrate what this

24 abbreviation means. I am surprised that my colleague is not familiar with

25 this abbreviation at this stage of the proceedings, but the problem is

Page 15257

1 that the witness has not been given a chance to answer, to say, what it

2 means. And also, no reason, no grounds, have been established for showing

3 him this document which was drafted after he left Bosnia.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. When you put this

5 question, I noted that the date of the document is the 15th of May, 1993,

6 and if he left before then we may have a problem. Perhaps it would be

7 best for him to tell us what CO 1 stands for.

8 MR. WAESPI: Let me just quickly respond to --

9 THE INTERPRETER: PWO.

10 MR. WAESPI: [Previous translation continues] ... we are not

11 testifying, unlike, perhaps, what sometimes I see from the Defence bench,

12 so it's not up to me to say what the CO 1 is in the abbreviation. So it's

13 up to the witness to do that, and I wanted to give him a chance. In

14 looking at the exact wording of the CO 1 -- and if he left two days

15 earlier, this may be a follow-up of what was discussed in an earlier

16 conversation. And his successor, if CO 1 indeed means his successor, then

17 he may have raised something he was briefed about. So this witness

18 certainly is able to give a comment about the meeting with Hadzihasanovic,

19 and he was in fact willing to proceed.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could we hear your comment,

21 Colonel, please.

22 THE WITNESS: Your Honours and sir, the CO 1 confused me. CO 1

23 PWO does not. Commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, the Prince of

24 Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire, which I totally understand is extremely

25 confusing if you haven't been brought up with British army abbreviations.

Page 15258

1 And it is true, this is dated after I had left Bosnia.

2 MR. WAESPI:

3 Q. Can you tell us about -- something about this deployment of -- or

4 this threat by Hadzihasanovic. When it says "again," was that something

5 you had experienced before?

6 A. To be honest, I was never in the slightest bit threatened by

7 General Hadzihasanovic. The only indication not of threat was that he was

8 fighting to preserve his area; it wasn't a threat -- I never had a threat

9 made against the United Nations by General Hadzihasanovic.

10 Q. Yes. Here in fact he doesn't talk about United Nations or

11 yourself; he talks about Vitez.

12 A. That's true. He's probably in that case talking generically about

13 the HVO who were in control of Vitez. I wasn't in control of Vitez. My

14 camp was on the outskirts and I wasn't meant to be in control of anything.

15 I was meant to be escorting humanitarian aid, which I accept caused me

16 huge problems.

17 Q. And I take it you can't comment on the comment here: "A direct

18 contradiction of a known fact"? You don't know what these facts which are

19 contradicted?

20 A. No, I don't.

21 Q. Very well. If we could move on to a new subject, and that's the

22 killing of two British soldiers or mercenaries. I believe you told us

23 that there were Danes and Germans in the area. And in your book you

24 mention the killing of two British soldiers. And I would like to briefly

25 paraphrase and I don't know --

Page 15259

1 A. Could I stop you there. They weren't British soldiers; they were

2 mercenaries.

3 Q. Yes, I just wanted to ask you about them. Their names were Ted

4 Skinner and Derek Arlo McBride?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. I don't know if you want to have the book open, I just want to

7 read a couple of passages on these gentleman. You said that you first met

8 them outside the hospital in Travnik when you went to see the doctor

9 there, and that's on page 93 of your book. Do you remember that?

10 A. I do.

11 Q. And they apparently worked with the Muslim army; that's what you

12 were told?

13 A. That's what they said.

14 Q. And specifically you talk about Ted, Ted Skinner, who explained to

15 you that he was: "A captain in the Muslim army and that his job was

16 training and medical evacuation."

17 A. Yes, can I explain that before that, perhaps not in the book, his

18 approach to me that he came to me and saluted me and told me - maybe it

19 wasn't the book, I can't remember - he told me that he knew I disliked

20 mercenaries and I didn't want to have anything to do with mercenaries and

21 I had told mercenaries collectively to get out of my area. Even so he

22 approached me and apologised and then told me this, which softened me a

23 little.

24 Q. But in fact later you became interested in the fate and indeed

25 usefulness of mercenaries as a source of information. Is that correct?

Page 15260

1 A. Well, if people come to me and give me information, that's great,

2 but it didn't change my basic view of mercenaries, that they had no right

3 to be in Bosnia.

4 Q. Yes, but it's correct that previously you had decided not to get

5 connected to them. But later you started to use them as a considerable

6 source of information?

7 A. No, that's not correct. If they brought information to us, we

8 would listen. We did not seek out, to the best of my knowledge none of my

9 intelligence officers went out and deliberately cultivated mercenaries as

10 sources of information.

11 Q. I don't want to put words in your mouth. Let me just read out

12 what the book says and perhaps I mis-paraphrased it. Quote from page

13 92: "Although in principle I had previously decided not to have anything

14 to do with mercenaries, as I wanted very much to disassociate our

15 activities from theirs, it was not easy in practice. Actually they could

16 be a considerable source of information. And so I began to talk to some

17 of them."

18 A. Yes, but I didn't seek them out. They -- if I came across them I

19 would repeat my message, which was: Get out. And indeed with McBride and

20 Skinner, I repeated that when I saw them because I thought they were very

21 vulnerable.

22 Q. But you called them a considerable source of information.

23 A. Yes, because they told us what was going on on the front lines,

24 boasting maybe, but they told us.

25 Q. Let me go on about what these two gentlemen told you. They told

Page 15261

1 you: "They lived in the Muslim barracks at Travnik and received hardly

2 any pay, calling themselves helpers rather than mercenaries, they claimed

3 that they were in Bosnia because it was such a tragic situation. 'The

4 Muslims needed all the help they could get,' they said."

5 A. I think that's right.

6 Q. Now unfortunately they were killed and the Trial Chamber has heard

7 evidence about that before. And I quote again from your book, it's now on

8 page 247: "As Ted and Derrick" - the two mercenaries - "had worked for

9 the Bosnian Muslims, their bodies were taken to the city morgue in Zenica.

10 I spoke to General Merdan about the matter. He knew both men well and was

11 very unhappy about what had happened. He also assured me that they had

12 not been killed because they were British or because people thought they

13 were connected to us."

14 Do you remember that?

15 A. Yes. I remember writing it.

16 Q. Let me perhaps conclude before the break -- yes, my colleague just

17 mentions a request for clarification. What do you mean by "Muslim

18 barracks in Travnik"? Can you be more specific.

19 A. Well, there was a building where people -- soldiers would stay.

20 It wasn't a -- I mean, I think it -- I couldn't quite work out what it

21 was, but there was a place where the ABiH would customarily have a

22 headquarters and some sleeping accommodation.

23 Q. Thank you. I want to briefly quote and I'm coming to a command

24 and control aspect, what you said in the Blaskic trial, and it's on page

25 23.847, 18th June, 1999. Just one sentence: "I put it simply. A

Page 15262

1 commander is responsible for the action of his soldiers. There is a

2 difference between responsibility and the actual crime itself, but overall

3 responsibility rests with that commander."

4 A. That's my belief.

5 Q. Now, let me ask you, if you were told that your troops had

6 committed crimes in an area, you would do all you could to try to

7 investigate that crime?

8 A. Well, actually I'd do more than that; I'd call in the special

9 investigation branch because I would not want people to think that I had

10 in any way tried to hush it up. But that is in an army that's got an

11 established organisation. But you're right, if my troops commit a crime

12 and it was my constant demand to all sides if the commanders knew about a

13 crime or were told about a crime in their operational area of

14 responsibility, they had a duty to investigate and identify what had

15 happened and to punish if necessary.

16 Q. And one of the first persons or person to talk to would be the

17 commander, the local commander, of that unit in that area, company

18 commander, battalion commander?

19 A. You -- in the circumstances of Central Bosnia at the time, yes, it

20 would be likely that I would go directly to the top man and someone else

21 would go to the local area, or I would do both.

22 Q. I'm talking about your unit. When one of your subordinate

23 commanders in his area of responsibility, his unit perhaps had done

24 something, then you would certainly almost as a first reaction to talk to

25 him and ask him, not necessarily as a suspect, ask him: Explain me what's

Page 15266

1 him frequently at the start and perhaps in April 1993 -- in fact, I do see

2 to remember that I saw him in April 1993.

3 Q. Very early August 1992 he met with Mujahedin and he provided the

4 Trial Chamber with a tape, and a transcript was made. And that appears to

5 contradict what, you know, the information you provided us.

6 MR. WAESPI: So, Mr. President, I would like to show the witness

7 tab 7, and this is Prosecution Exhibit 112, tab 2, of 112.

8 Q. Did you see a transcript of conversation between Andrew Hogg,

9 journalist, and Abdul Aziz?

10 A. I do.

11 Q. Now, I just want to refer you to one transcript that's on page 2,

12 and I want to quote what Aziz who apparently spoke English very well.

13 "There is no specific area we are fighting, but different area.

14 One thing I want to tell you about my Mujahedin is that we are under

15 guidance or you can say control of Muslim forces. My Mujahedin and my

16 rules or whatever your condition is, that we are not leader here. We

17 don't like to have our own first line or our own base. We working under

18 their guidance and their control."

19 And let me also tell you that for Mr. Hogg to interview this

20 person, he had to go through the ABiH. And in fact, this gentleman,

21 Mr. Abdul Aziz told him, and I quote --

22 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Maybe my

23 learned friend could give us the date of this interview and then we could

24 see where the witness was at that time; and which is even more important,

25 he seems to be saying that the BiH army was involved. He has to give us

Page 15267

1 his source. That would help us understand how could BiH army be involved

2 in such an incident if it didn't exist at the time.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you please be more

4 specific with regard to the date when this interview was conducted between

5 the journalist and Mr. Abdul Aziz? We have to bear in mind that they --

6 the Defence finds it important that at the time the BiH army did not

7 exist, so can you give us the date of this interview?

8 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I believe it's already on the record. I said he

9 met with him in August of 1992. It just disappeared from the screen right

10 now. So that's the time this person talked to him, and again this is

11 cross-examination. I have a statement of a source who -- which appears to

12 contradict what the witness told us earlier, and I can certainly ask

13 him -- and he even knows the journalist, you know, whether that changes

14 his view about whether the Mujahedin were indeed part of the 3rd Corps or

15 not. Perhaps he considers then his information to be unreliable.

16 I would just like to ask him and in fact continue my question that

17 the --

18 Q. This Mujahedin who was the interviewee, the partner, to Mr. Hogg

19 told Mr. Hogg, and I quote: "If you want an interview, come back here

20 with permission from the Bosnian army. I will grant an interview if they

21 allow it."

22 So if you hear this -- you know, the circumstances how this

23 interview was conducted and indeed the contents of it, does that surprise

24 you that you hear an obvious connection between the BH army and the

25 Mujahedin in August 1992?

Page 15268

1 A. It surprises me, and I don't know what to believe about it.

2 Q. Let me move on to another exhibit, and this is tab 9.

3 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, in my bundle and this is Exhibit 461.

4 I believe Mr. Dixon has something. Perhaps if the witness could not --

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Dixon.

6 MR. WAESPI: [Previous interpretation continues] ... exhibit for a

7 moment.

8 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours. Only a brief point. In

9 accordance with Your Honour's decision yesterday that documents can be

10 shown to the witness even if they are documents which he might not have

11 seen at the time or been party to. We have another document here which is

12 an internal document of the 7th Brigade. And I wish to request that in

13 line with the decision Your Honours gave yesterday, that the witness

14 should be asked, if he is going to be shown this document, at the outset

15 of whether or not he recognises this document. In our submission, it does

16 not assist Your Honours at all just to read out the title of the document

17 or who it's signed by; anyone in the courtroom can do that. The important

18 question is whether he recognises anything in this document. In our

19 submission, this is important in respect to the weight that is to be given

20 to these documents. As Your Honours will know, many of these documents

21 were contested documents and then admitted into evidence, but Your Honours

22 made it clear that the weight to be assigned to them would be assigned at

23 a later point once all the evidence had been heard depending on which

24 witnesses could comment on the document and interpret it. And in our

25 submission, if the witness does not recognise this document at all, then

Page 15269

1 it cannot assist Your Honours in determining what weight to give to this

2 document at the end of the day. Our request would be that if he is to be

3 shown it, he should be asked whether he recognises the first and then any

4 further questions, if necessary, can be put thereafter. Thank you,

5 Your Honours.

6 MR. WAESPI: If I may be heard on this point, Mr. President.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution, you have the

8 floor.

9 MR. WAESPI: This is cross-examination. I need to have a

10 good-faith basis for any leading question I can put to this witness, and

11 it certainly is a good-faith basis if there is an exhibit. It could be

12 even not an exhibit, in our case, whether internal or outside, that

13 doesn't really matter. And again the witness testified that he thought

14 from his assessment the Mujahedin were not connected to the ABiH. This

15 document contradicted it, and I would like to have his comment on this

16 point.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, go ahead.

18 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

19 Q. Now we can have a look at it, if you may. It's Exhibit P461, and

20 I'm just asking whether perhaps you heard about these incidents. This

21 document is -- originates from the 3rd Corps, 7th Muslim -- Mountain

22 Muslim Brigade. It dates 12 April 1993, and it's titled "Report on

23 Members of Our Brigade Taken Prisoner by HVO Members." And it's signed by

24 the assistant commander for morale, religious and legal affairs, Ahmed

25 Hadilovic [phoen].

Page 15270

1 Let me just read out the -- for the record the first sentence,

2 first paragraph: "Recently there have been an increasing number of cases

3 of HVO members at certain checkpoints unlawfully taking prisoner foreign

4 citizens who are members of the BH army, i.e., volunteers who are in our

5 unit. The command of our brigade asserts that the fact that these

6 prisoners have never participated in fighting against HVO units. More

7 specifically, we have expressly stated to them conscious of the situation

8 that they are only fighting against the Chetniks."

9 And then you can see on the same page some members also of these

10 foreign fighters, where they are from. Now, you would agree with me that

11 this document indeed shows that the -- at least the 7th Muslim Brigade,

12 part of the 3rd Corps, in fact claims that these people are part of the BH

13 army and they want them back?

14 A. This is the first time I've seen this document, but it appears to

15 be a copy of the document underneath, and it appears to be that there are

16 Middle East people, Pakistan, Algeria, who were part of the BiH as

17 volunteers; it appears to show that.

18 Q. Now, do you have reason now to start to doubt the veracity of the

19 information you have provided as previously?

20 A. No.

21 Q. And why not?

22 A. Because this doesn't say this were Mujahedin. I'm looking for a

23 Mujahedin unit here.

24 Q. Okay.

25 MR. WAESPI: Let me go on to the next document, Your Honours, and

Page 15271

1 this is tab number 10 and it's Prosecution Exhibit P541.

2 Q. And this is in fact -- and I'm for the first part interested in

3 the second letter, so it's the third page. That's a letter by

4 Mr. Hadzihasanovic dated 2nd April 1993. And it has the heading "Violent

5 Treatment of Foreign Nationals, Volunteers in the BH Army by Members of

6 the HVO." So again Mr. Hadzihasanovic talks about the similar issue, and

7 we don't need to go over it. And he also mentions that some goods of

8 these --

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]

10 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. My

11 learned friend says that General Hadzihasanovic is involved again. Why

12 again? In the previous document, there is no hint that the document might

13 have originated from the 3rd Corps or General Hadzihasanovic.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As we all know, again means

15 again. And the Defence has a point saying that General Hadzihasanovic was

16 not mentioned in the previous document, so you can't use the word "again"

17 unless you're saying that the same problem is mentioned here again, in

18 which case we have a different situation.

19 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President. And the source of misinformation

20 is my command of the English. I tried in fact to say that again we have

21 an issue, and I confused it with that. So I apologise. I didn't want to

22 say that Mr. Hadzihasanovic was also connected to the earlier document,

23 although I might add that he was the commander of that corps under

24 which -- whose authority the first document originated.

25 Q. Okay. Let's briefly talk about this one. Have you had the chance

Page 15272

1 to glance over the document?

2 A. I've only skimmed it, yes.

3 Q. And again here -- I'm sorry, and here the commander of the 3rd

4 Corps shows an interest in these foreign nationals. Do you agree with me?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now we have fortunately - and that's not always occurring in this

7 Tribunal - a response. And this response is from General Blaskic, and you

8 can see it on the first two pages. And it's dated the 3rd April, and he

9 makes reference to Mr. Hadzihasanovic's letter of the 2nd April. And then

10 here I believe we come to an issue raised beforehand about the fourth

11 paragraph. It says: "Four foreign nationals, Mujahedin, were arrested at

12 the Puticevo checkpoint. They had resisted inspection by threatening with

13 their weapons and did not allow the inspection to be carried out."

14 And then it goes on: "All four individuals were arrested and

15 driven to the military prison Busovaca."

16 So he appears to give his assessment to the allegations, and he

17 did request of General Hadzihasanovic. Would you agree with that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now we see here what's meant -- we can't read the minds of these

20 gentlemen who drafted, but it appears to be one of the subjects is the

21 Mujahedin. Do you agree with me?

22 A. He says "four foreign nationals (Mujahedin)." You know, one of

23 the problems for all forces in this country was that both the HVO and the

24 BiH were reinforced by people from outside the countries. It is his

25 choice, the word "Mujahedin." It is not mine or yours.

Page 15273

1 Q. Thank you, Colonel. And perhaps just following up from this.

2 What you personally mean when you say "Mujahedin"?

3 A. Excuse me. I mean a group of people who work as a unit together

4 who come from outside and who are not actually integrated normally into

5 the structure of the army, and may or may not be connected to the army

6 they are supporting. And generally they are more aggressive and fanatical

7 than others. That's what I mean.

8 Q. Yes, and I believe we will come to that when we look at the

9 document. Now, without showing you documents, did you know that a senior

10 member of again the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade requested the 3rd Corps to

11 provide helicopters to transport to the front lines at Igman foreign

12 Mujahedin. Were you aware of that?

13 A. No, I was not.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon.

15 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. There is

16 a document describing that. Maybe my learned friend has economised on

17 time and that's why he didn't shown it. However, this document contains

18 an error that has been corrected, but it has not been corrected on the

19 document that was shown to the document [as interpreted]. Can this first

20 be corrected so that the translation is correct, and then the document can

21 be quoted and shown to the witness.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, there has been a debate on

23 translation issues arising from that document. The Defence would like to

24 have the witness to be shown a correct translation of the document before

25 he is asked any questions, because the original document did not contain

Page 15274

1 those corrections.

2 Mr. Registrar, can you please find the document, and I believe

3 that from the CLSS we have asked that the right word be communicated to

4 us.

5 To gain time, Mr. Bourgon, can you tell us what the matter was

6 with the translation, what was wrong with the translation? Maybe

7 Mr. Dixon can enlighten us.

8 MR. DIXON: Thank you, I have the document in front of me, it's

9 P616, and the first line of that document was translated incorrectly, and

10 Your Honours confirmed that in the transcript on page 12.173 an onwards.

11 The first line in the incorrect translation said "we have 11 people, Arabs

12 and Turks," but the correct translation which has now been accepted is

13 that "we know," not "have," "we know 11 Arabs and Turks." So if my

14 learned friend is going to put this document to the witness, once again we

15 would request that he's asked whether he recognises the document, but then

16 also the correct version should be put to the witness to see what his

17 comment is, if any. Thank you, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. The debate was whether the

19 document contains the words "we know" or "we have." It's not the same

20 thing obviously. The issue was the difference between "we have" and "we

21 know."

22 MR. WAESPI: [Previous translation continues] ... the question

23 perhaps in a way that could solve the problem.

24 Q. Colonel, were you aware that there was a request for a helicopter

25 flight under -- requested by the 7th Muslim Brigade in order to transport

Page 15275

1 Arabs and Turks to the Igman front line? Are you aware of that?

2 A. My answer is no, but I may have forgotten.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [In English] Stop, stop please.

4 [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon, you have the floor.

5 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Maybe my

6 learned friend could give us the date of the document. This would be of

7 assistance to the witness.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Prosecution, can you give us the

9 date on the document because this will tell us whether the witness was

10 there at the time. If the document dates from the time when the witness

11 was no longer there, then we have a problem.

12 MR. WAESPI: Yes, certainly, Mr. President, it was my mistake; I

13 should have done that. The document dates of 28th August 1993, but my

14 question had been general, whether he had heard of any type of

15 information.

16 Q. And I take it your answer remains the same?

17 A. Well, it becomes more -- no, I wouldn't have heard of it either.

18 I had no knowledge in fact.

19 Q. Now, were you also aware or not that ABiH identity cards were

20 issued to foreign fighters? Have you heard of that?

21 A. I didn't know that.

22 MR. WAESPI: And, Your Honours, the exhibit I was relying was

23 P626. It's a document from the HVO dating 9th March, 1993, and it's in

24 tab 11 of my bundle.

25 Q. Does all of this information, does it change your assessment of

Page 15276

1 whether these Mujahedin were connected to the ABiH?

2 A. No, it does not but it's obvious that maybe some foreign nationals

3 were working with the BiH. But it doesn't change my assessment with

4 regard to my definition of the Mujahedin working not under control of the

5 BiH.

6 Q. Let me show you another document. And before that I would like to

7 ask you whether you have heard in the course of your duties as commander

8 of the 1st Cheshire Battalion, that a normally reliable source has

9 provided information about the Mujahedin and the 7th Muslim Brigade. And

10 I can just quote one piece of that information that perhaps you remember

11 that --

12 MR. DIXON: Sorry, Your Honour, my learned friend knows very well

13 he's about to quote from a new document. New documents cannot be shown to

14 witnesses unless there's a proper basis established according to your

15 ruling, either that it goes to credibility or it goes to refreshing

16 memory. So this document needs to be considered as a new document. It's

17 one that was only disclosed to us recently, and it mentions a source,

18 although it doesn't say what this source is. And I think this matter does

19 need to be fully debated before it's just slipped in and shown to the

20 witness.

21 MR. WAESPI: If I can briefly respond, Mr. President.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, go ahead.

23 MR. WAESPI: I preceded my question exactly with the foundation,

24 because this is a milinfosum originating from his battalion, and I asked

25 him whether he remembers that a reliable local source provided the

Page 15277

1 information. Apparently it was good enough to be included in this

2 milinfosum, and I think the commander of that battalion ought to know

3 about that. Perhaps he doesn't, because he was busy. I don't doubt that.

4 But I can certainly show it to him; perhaps it refreshes his memory,

5 because he's shown a certain interest in the Mujahedin as developed over

6 time. And I think I'm following the procedure right now, Mr. President.

7 MR. DIXON: Your Honour, if I could --

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Wait a moment, Mr. Dixon. I'll

9 give you the floor. The Defence has a document, a milinfosum in which

10 apparently this question is referred to. According to my understanding

11 this is a new document and the Prosecution pursuant to our decision

12 regarding credibility or the refreshment of memory wishes to show this

13 document to the witness. That is the situation as it now stands.

14 Mr. Dixon.

15 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours. It is indeed a new document

16 which refers to the 7th Brigade, and our objection would be that this

17 document cannot be shown to the witness to refresh his memory because he's

18 already said in -- perhaps the witness can be asked to leave. I don't

19 want to waste time, but my learned friend is suggesting it, and I agree

20 with him.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Usher, will you please ask

22 the witness to leave the courtroom for a few minutes.

23 [The witness stands down]

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Dixon, before giving you the

25 floor, we referring to a document which the Chamber is not aware of

Page 15281

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But we are still not at the

2 stage when the Prosecution is asking to tender the document. So,

3 Mr. Dixon, you are anticipating things. We have still not reached the

4 stage when the Prosecution is asking to tender the document. They have

5 just told us that they are going to refer to a paragraph and ask the

6 witness what he says in response.

7 So, Mr. Usher, will you call the witness back into the courtroom

8 and then we can continue.

9 [The witness entered court]

10 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps if that second page could be put on the ELMO

11 as well, Mr. Usher. It's tab 6. A milinfosum, number 88 of the 27th of

12 January, 1993.

13 Q. Do you have it in your hands?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Just to start with, on page 1, is that one of your daily milinfo

16 summaries?

17 A. I understand it is.

18 Q. Which went up the chain of command?

19 A. Yes, the UN chain of command.

20 Q. And as you told us you take full responsibility for it despite the

21 fact that you may never have seen it?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, if you could turn to page number 2 and the second paragraph.

24 And there is -- let me see whether we have it on the screen. Yes.

25 Here we have a -- what's called a normally reliable source and he

Page 15282

1 provides additional information about the 7th Muslimanske Brigade, and the

2 source confirmed that this brigade is commanded from Zenica with

3 battalions deployed within the 3rd Corps area. "A battalion from the 7th

4 Brigade is deployed on the front line in the Travnik area. Members of the

5 battalion consider themselves Mujahedin in every sense. The majority of

6 members are staunch, practicing Muslims recruited from the local area.

7 Although this particular battalion was instructed by two Iranians, the

8 source confirmed that external Mujahedin from Islamic countries within the

9 brigade numbered at the most 100 to 150. A number of 7th Brigade soldiers

10 on checkpoints north of Vitez were noted wearing a cap badge consisting of

11 a green Muslim crescent insert with a gold star. They stated that this

12 was an insignia for the Muslimanske Brigade."

13 Now, do you remember looking back to that day? Perhaps it's

14 reflected in your diary on your book that a normally reliable source

15 provided this type of information?

16 A. Is it in my diary do you say? I don't think so. I don't remember

17 this, but I accept it's from a milinfosum from my battalion.

18 Q. I'm also curious because it says in the first line "additional

19 information." Apparently this source may have, you know -- or the issue

20 was discussed beforehand. Do you have any knowledge?

21 A. No, I don't.

22 Q. And would you agree with me that the two Iranians - and we talk

23 about January now -- already discussed here by this reliable source, you

24 know, they appear to reappear in documents later, and I think we have seen

25 that yesterday. So indeed, that seems to be a reliable source?

Page 15283

1 A. Excuse me. I suppose it might have been from the person that

2 wrote this -- this report. I don't want to dispute the authenticity of

3 the military information summary; I just want to say that perhaps because

4 of slackness on my part I didn't see it. I wish someone had shown me

5 this, but I'm sure I didn't see it before it went out. I would have been

6 very interested in this report.

7 Q. And again, my question, you know, how do you assess now your

8 source of information about the comment you made between Mujahedin and the

9 3rd Corps?

10 A. I'm so sorry, I've got a --

11 Q. Perhaps you can drink some water.

12 A. I hope it will work.

13 No, I don't change my position with regard to the business of

14 Mujahedin group, and I accept that there are individuals from other

15 countries that come and actually work in the HVO and BiH. I saw quite a

16 number of people from external countries working with the HVO. And it's

17 difficult to define what is a mercenary here and what is a volunteer. And

18 I had a slight difficulty with that.

19 Q. But that contradicts what this milinfosum, this reliable source

20 says. It says, and I quote again: "A battalion from the 7th Brigade is

21 deployed on the front line in the Travnik area. Members of the battalion

22 consider themselves Mujahedin in every sense."

23 It goes on to make a difference between local and foreign people,

24 and they are all part of this Muslimanske Brigade. Doesn't it say that?

25 A. Yes, it does say that. Members of the battalion, presumably,

Page 15284

1 would include locals. Now, they're starting to call themselves Mujahedin.

2 This might be a bit of bravado. I don't know. I accept. I wish I had

3 seen this on the day, the 27th of January I suspect I was still involved

4 with Gornji Vakuf or something, but I accept that this is a report. And I

5 accept that it was sent by my battalion, and I accept that it was probably

6 from a patrol report. That's how we normally get information.

7 Q. And just following up what you said, it not only talks about local

8 people considering themselves as Mujahedin, it talks specifically about

9 external Mujahedin from Islamic countries within the brigade and it even

10 gives a number, almost 100 to 150.

11 A. Well, when you started talking about numbers, I didn't think it

12 was anything like that, 100 to 150 --

13 Q. Very well --

14 A. -- in the Mujahedin group or groups.

15 Q. So in your assessment, how many were there then?

16 A. It was difficult to say, but I saw with my own eyes 15 to 20, no

17 more. And other people reported that it was about 30.

18 Q. And who were these other people?

19 A. My source.

20 Q. Just one?

21 A. Yes, just one.

22 Q. So your basis of information is that one source plus the personal

23 encounter you had at that checkpoint?

24 A. Yes, and also my offices. I used to talk to them about --

25 particularly the company commanders about it.

Page 15285

1 Q. So you did discuss the issue with your company commanders?

2 A. Yes, of course I discussed it in the 5.00 conference. I can't

3 remember exact details, but we were desperately trying to find out what

4 was happening the whole time.

5 Q. And so it was -- would be this type of information you would

6 discuss with your superiors --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- with your subordinates --

9 A. Yes. And this is a mistake on my part not to have seen this. To

10 be honest, it's the first time this week I've seen it.

11 Q. So there were other type of information like that, if you would go

12 through other milinfosums?

13 A. Well, it's normally me saying I want to know what's going on. Has

14 anyone seen or has anyone had any contact? That sort of thing.

15 Q. Let me conclude with a similar document. It might be indeed one

16 of the milinfosums or one of the issues you discussed with your

17 subordinates in one of these meetings.

18 MR. WAESPI: And, Mr. President, this is tab 8 in my bundle. It's

19 a milinfosum dated 11th March 1993.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. There's a small error in

21 the transcript. The milinfosum that we referred to was 4 -- it said 428

22 [as interpreted], but it should have been 408 [as interpreted]. I don't

23 know.

24 Wait a moment. There's still an error. It is 98 and not 88. 98.

25 It should be 98.

Page 15286

1 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

2 Q. So this witness is another milinfosum. This type it's number 132.

3 Do you recognise it also as a genuine, authentic document?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, let's go to the second page, the bottom of it when it talks

6 about Zepce. And I read it out to you again.

7 "121 Cheshire LO visited both BiH and HVO headquarters in Zepce.

8 Tension has been raised in the town by the arrival of external Muslim

9 forces in the town. Muslim troops reportedly from the 7th Muslim Brigade

10 have moved into house in Zepce. The local commander reported that these

11 troops were not under his direct command and he could not always control

12 their actions. There has been a number of minor incidents in the town

13 involving drunken Muslim soldiers, but the situation is not assessed as

14 serious. Comment. The reason behind a deployment of Muslim externals

15 into the area is not known. The standard 3rd Corps policy is to deploy a

16 brigade," or perhaps that battalion, BN, "or elements of a -- of 7th

17 Brigade to a particular sector of need on the front line or an area of

18 potential Croat/Muslim conflict. However, the deployment of the three

19 troops into potential ethnic conflict areas tends to inflame the situation

20 rather than calm it down. Comment ends."

21 Colonel, do you recall having discussed this influx of external

22 Muslim forces into the town of Zepce at one point in time?

23 A. I remember that we talked about it at some stage.

24 Q. Here -- I believe yesterday you said in response to a question --

25 I think a document was shown to you about originating BH Kiseljak where

Page 15287

1 you said it's like putting petrol into a fire already. Do you agree with

2 me that the comment down here appears to say the same?

3 A. I do.

4 Q. So the Muslim forces, the 3rd Corps used, according to this

5 comment, these forces, external forces, to ignite, inflame the situation?

6 A. Well, I could read it another way. The way I could read it is

7 these people arrived and weren't under the control of the ABiH commander

8 in the area, as is said here. As I feel that these guys -- these

9 Mujahedin -- this Mujahedin group or groups was moving around out of

10 control. Now, here you see a report and it says this time that the local

11 commander commented that troops were not under his command. And to be

12 quite honest, in fairness to the Mujahedin, the drunken Muslim contingent

13 would probably not be them.

14 Q. And that was the local commander?

15 A. Local commander, it says local commander.

16 Q. But if you look at the second part of the comment it appears to

17 say, at least according to the assessment of this commentator, that this

18 was a deliberate 3rd Corps policy to use these people in a particular

19 sector -- in an area of potential Croat/Muslim conflict for specific

20 purpose. That's what it appears to say?

21 A. Well, the standard tactic of any commander when a front is weak is

22 to reinforce it, if necessary, at his decision, perhaps with reservists.

23 And that may be a requirement. I'm not quite sure there's a

24 necessarily -- that actually it says here that the standard policy -- it's

25 the standard policy of any commander to be honest. If you've got a weak

Page 15288

1 part of your line, you may need to reinforce it.

2 Q. But reinforce with a specific unit, the Mujahedin would add a

3 certain flame --

4 A. But in fairness this is a comment -- I'm trying to be fair as well

5 in response to your questioning because I accept your arguments sometimes.

6 The standard 3rd Corps policy is to deploy a battalion or elements of 7th

7 Brigade to a particular sector of lead on the front line. And that would

8 be the standard policy of anyone. It might not be -- that's in comment

9 that -- they didn't know that. That's a comment on the situation. It

10 doesn't come under the factual side of the report.

11 Q. And that was the fair assessment of one of your subordinates on

12 the basis of the facts which were available to him?

13 A. I assume so, and I think I knew about this one.

14 Q. Do you know who drafted -- made this comment?

15 A. I have to refer back to the same sort of general answers I gave

16 before. It may well have been coordinated by my second in command.

17 Q. Did ever Mr. Morillon get back to you and say, Stop these stupid

18 comments, you know, they don't help Have you ever about that??

19 A. No, he didn't. And actually even though they may seem stupid in

20 retrospect, at the time we were doing our best.

21 Q. And why are you saying they may look stupid in retrospect?

22 A. Because I don't necessarily agree with them now, you know. But my

23 point is: I was at fault for not seeing every document that went out. I

24 accept that fault. Failure of command, if you like, because I take

25 responsibility for these documents.

Page 15289

1 Q. But I'm interested in why you disagree today. What's the basis --

2 what more information do you have today than the people -- your people had

3 on the ground at the time?

4 A. The last report, I have a problem with, not this particular one.

5 Q. And again my question is: What additional information do you have

6 in relation to the last report to tell today under oath that at that time

7 you thought the report in your opinion was not accurate or whatever your

8 opinion is?

9 A. Well, one, I didn't see the first report; this report I accept.

10 The first report I didn't see at the time. But my opinion, which hasn't

11 changed, at the time, was that the Mujahedin group was not under

12 operational control of anyone.

13 Q. And the basis for it, just to repeat, is your personal contacts

14 with the Mujahedin at that checkpoint between Zenica and, I think,

15 Zavidovici, and secondly, your source?

16 A. Yes. And also talking to the soldiers on the ground. Saying,

17 Look, who -- anyone near these people?

18 Q. These are the same soldiers that would be part of information

19 collecting, gathering, providing, so that these comments and assertions

20 could be made?

21 A. There were 900 of them, yes.

22 Q. So the same soldiers, the information they gave, their information

23 is assessed differently by you today, ten years after the events, and by

24 the persons at that time?

25 A. No, by me at the time was assessed differently. It remains the

Page 15290

1 same today, as the assessment then. And clearly there were differences in

2 the information we were gathering and consequently the intelligence we

3 were trying to make from it.

4 Q. But the only thing reflecting the information level and the

5 assessment your Battalion, the 1st Cheshire Battalion, you and BritBat

6 made at that time is reflected in these milinfosums. Your opinion at that

7 time isn't recorded anywhere.

8 A. Probably correct. Probably correct. I -- we had another chain of

9 command to the British, but we generally did it verbally. It was

10 difficult enough doing a military infosum every day.

11 Q. And these other chains of information you had with the British,

12 they would end up in London at the end of the day?

13 A. Yes. Well, we would frequently have disagreements. You know,

14 people -- various commanders had differing views. Everyone's human. My

15 successor would have a different view. Someone else in my position might

16 have a different view. My view was what I stated.

17 Q. And do you agree at the end of the day at one time somewhere on a

18 desk in London the two different information streams could come together,

19 the written milinfosums from your subordinates and your oral comments?

20 A. Not necessarily. They -- this one was sent to the -- the United

21 Nations, up the United Nations chain of command. We -- we -- I had a full

22 intelligence section working -- operating in Vitez.

23 Q. But again, nobody ever told you, you know, it's very curious.

24 What you tell us is totally different from the milinfosums we are getting

25 from you on a daily basis. Nobody -- either Mr. Morillon or --

Page 15291

1 A. I think that's unfair. It's totally different. We've had and I

2 have pointed out there are differences. But the broad thrust of military

3 information summaries is correct. One or two areas - and I've accepted my

4 fault, my responsibility - I didn't see that milinfosum. I remember this

5 incident, and I accept that we weren't perfect. I also accept that it was

6 my viewpoint based on what I was doing at the time. At the time in this

7 period in Bosnia, I wasn't even sure they spent the night in my base most

8 times. I was permanently out, and so a lot of these things were done in

9 my absence. I was on the road either between Gornji Vakuf or in Gornji

10 Vakuf, or up in Turbe. These are vast distances to be covered in an

11 armoured vehicle.

12 Q. But the central point where the information was received was in

13 your operational room in your headquarters?

14 A. Yes. And I accept there was clearly from my perspective things

15 that went wrong.

16 Q. For instance?

17 A. Well, for instance a report that I would disagree with. I mean,

18 I -- we did our best.

19 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I very much appreciate your answers.

20 MR. WAESPI: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22 We come to the re-examination stage. And I look at the Defence

23 attorneys to give them the floor for any re-examination.

24 Mr. Bourgon, you have the floor.

25 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I should

Page 15292

1 just like to know how much time I have before the break to prepare my

2 questions.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The break would normally take

4 place at half past 12.00, so you have 35 minutes.

5 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Re-examined by Mr. Bourgon:

7 Q. Good morning, Colonel.

8 A. Good morning. Sorry for my voice, Your Honours.

9 Q. Let me begin by asking you a quick question concerning an issue

10 that was raised by my colleague concerning the distrust amongst people in

11 the former Yugoslavia, amongst the parties. Did you experience the fact

12 that people did not trust each other in the former Yugoslavia?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And in your experience is there one person that you know of that

15 would be trusted by all sides?

16 A. General Merdan.

17 Q. And why is that, Colonel?

18 A. Because he was well-known by everyone and because he had honour

19 and decency.

20 Q. Can you provide the Trial Chamber with an example where you saw

21 that General Merdan was trusted more than another person?

22 A. When I first went, Your Honours, to Bosnia, one of the real

23 problems was that we had an outbreak of fighting in Vitez and Donji --

24 Novi Travnik. And I went in -- I only had Land Rovers. I had no

25 soldiers. But it seemed to me that we had to stop the fighting otherwise

Page 15293

1 the United Nations couldn't deploy. So I drove into Novi Travnik and I

2 first went to the headquarters of a man called -- I think he was called

3 Lendo. And he had taken six HVO soldiers as prisoners or hostages. So I

4 demanded that I have them and take them back before I went to see the HVO.

5 He refused point-blank. So I said, Okay, I'll just take one as proof that

6 you're going to look after them. And he said, Yes. My point was when I

7 got -- when I went across town, there was still fight -- it wasn't a good

8 situation. There was still a lot of fire fight around. I met Kordic in a

9 bar -- I think it was called something like the Grand Bazaar or something.

10 He was upstairs. And I said, This fighting has got to stop now otherwise

11 the UN can't deploy, I can't carry out my operational role. Please,

12 actually, let's have a cease-fire. And I said, Who would you like to

13 speak to on the other side for the ABiH. And Kordic said, Only Dzemal

14 Merdan, and I had never met Merdan at this point. We got on a satellite

15 phone. We drafted a cease-fire agreement. And then I went to go and get

16 Merdan from Zenica and we started our meeting at 2.00 in the morning and

17 finished it at 4.00 with a kind of agreement.

18 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Did you know what was the position of General

19 Merdan at that time?

20 A. Well, I wasn't sure at the time, but it was soon apparent that he

21 was something to do with the 3rd Corps and probably the deputy.

22 Q. And do you know, Colonel, when the 3rd Corps was actually

23 created?

24 A. I have no idea.

25 Q. And do you know where was General Hadzihasanovic in September of

Page 15294

1 1992?

2 A. I don't think I met him then.

3 Q. How much information did you have at that time on the 3rd Corps

4 itself and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its units?

5 A. None.

6 Q. Now, I'd like to bring you to a document which was used by my

7 colleague yesterday which is part of your diary when you recalled a

8 briefing that was given to you in Zagreb. Do you recall this briefing

9 discussed yesterday?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And yesterday you said that you were told by an individual that

12 most people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are really good at twisting the

13 truth and that all parties are quite prepared to attack their own people

14 and to blame it on someone else.

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Having spent nine months in Central Bosnia, do you agree with this

17 statement?

18 A. Yes and no. Yes insofar as I'm sure there were people capable of

19 doing such a disgusting thing; and no, the vast majority of people would

20 not, HVO, ABiH, and the Bosnian Serb army, and the Mafia of course.

21 Q. And would a comment like this apply to General Merdan?

22 A. No, it would not.

23 Q. And would a comment like that apply in your experience to

24 General Hadzihasanovic?

25 A. No, it certainly did not.

Page 15295

1 Q. And did Lieutenant Colonel Doyle, I believe, provide any basis for

2 his remark when you were in Zagreb?

3 A. Well, he -- he -- I think he was Lord Owen's or Lord Carrington's

4 special advisor. So we almost took it down verbatim what he was saying

5 because we knew nothing. So I wrote it down and reported it in my diary

6 and indeed I reported in my situation report to my battle group when I got

7 back.

8 Q. And do you think it was proper for the head of the European

9 Community Monitoring Mission in Bosnia to make such derogatory comments

10 about the population in Bosnia as you were about to deploy to save their

11 lives?

12 A. Well, he didn't make them. Doyle was a staff officer, and the

13 answer is: That was an opinion and this is a private diary, and I think

14 it's perfectly proper for him to prefer his opinion if that's the way he

15 felt. Later I was to discover that that wasn't necessarily the case. But

16 at the time, I accepted it.

17 Q. And is it possible, Colonel, that what Lieutenant Colonel Doyle

18 wanted to do at that time was really to say, Guys, be careful and don't

19 take anything for granted?

20 A. Yes, that's the lesson I got from it. Because from then on one of

21 the maxims I worked by was that I never believed anything, Your Honours,

22 that anyone said to me until I saw evidence of what they said happening on

23 the ground. And it was almost a principal maxim that I applied to the way

24 I operated. When I see actions on the ground, I believe what -- you know,

25 mentally I would say, then I'll believe you're doing it.

Page 15296

1 Q. And can you say whether you saw such action -- whenever there was

2 a commitment by General Hadzihasanovic, did you see such action on the

3 ground?

4 A. Well, to be quite honest, if I didn't with both Hadzihasanovic and

5 with Merdan -- with Blaskic I would be hammering on the door rather

6 quickly, which I did on occasion. But it takes a while to get

7 instructions down from the top, particularly in the situation of lack of

8 communication. No telephones, for example, it's difficult.

9 Q. And the fact that one night you showed up at

10 General Hadzihasanovic's headquarters and you requested a cease-fire for

11 6.00, and we saw yesterday the order imposing a cease-fire on his troops,

12 is that an example of what you're saying?

13 A. Well, yes, I -- I didn't see that written order. I don't think I

14 saw it at the time. So it was done blind to me. But yes, there's an

15 example. And then actually if it's not this occasion, another occasion

16 when it hadn't happened, I would go back and demand that I need some

17 assistance to make sure it did happen.

18 Q. And when you requested that checkpoint in Kacuni to be turned

19 down, to be taken out, and we saw yesterday the order issued by

20 General Hadzihasanovic, is that the type of incident you are referring

21 to?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did the 3rd Corps follow through with your request, albeit with

24 difficulty?

25 A. Yes. I felt for these commanders, Your Honours. I mean, it's not

Page 15297

1 like, you know, you could just pick up a phone and speak to them.

2 Sometimes they had to wait for the commander to come back to a telephone

3 for contact to be made. It was very difficult indeed, but the answer is

4 yes.

5 Q. Now, I'd like to -- since we are on the issue of Kacuni, I have a

6 few questions with respect to what happened. First I'd like to refer to

7 you -- you mentioned that two persons were killed. Is that correct?

8 A. Yes. I was reminded that two persons were killed, but, you know,

9 there was a lot happening.

10 Q. And I'd like you -- to refer you to your diary, and that is on the

11 26th of January. And this is on page 0890, I believe at the end. And

12 it's the first paragraph on 26th of January dealing with the Kacuni

13 roadblock.

14 A. Yes. Well, here we are. It's in my diary. You're right.

15 Q. Can you tell us from reading this paragraph or, if you recall, in

16 what circumstances those two persons were killed?

17 A. I cannot recall exactly how they were killed.

18 Q. Was that information that was relayed to you or were you witness

19 to those killings?

20 A. No, I certainly was not witness to the killings, and it would be

21 information that was relayed to me.

22 Q. And those killings that you were informed of, would they have

23 happened after the 21st of January according to the information that you

24 received?

25 A. I cannot recall.

Page 15298

1 Q. If they are mentioned in this incident on the 26th?

2 A. Well, it's likely that they were just before the incident of the

3 26th, but I don't know exactly when they were killed. I suspect it was

4 the 25th.

5 Q. I showed you a document yesterday, and that was document number 9

6 in the binder that you had yesterday.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And this document you acknowledged with me what had happened on

9 the 21st, which is that between 8.00 and 9.00 on the 20th of January the

10 HVO put a checkpoint at the entry and at the exit of the town. And then

11 they pounded the town between 9.00 and 2.00 in the morning and then

12 removed the checkpoints. I refer here to document DH612.

13 Now, with this in mind, when you look back to your diary to the

14 comment that you made to General Merdan where you told him, and I

15 quote: "I told him that this time the Muslims were at least in some way

16 to blame. They had killed two HVO personnel and they were holding me up."

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In context can you explain what was the problem at that time and

19 what you meant by "at least in some way this time."

20 A. Well, I tried, Your Honours, to always stay neutral. It was very

21 difficult, because to act is to destroy neutrality on the ground. And

22 people -- as soon as you do one thing, people -- the other side thinks

23 you're supporting. So I was trying to be neutral, and I never necessarily

24 blamed people, but in this case I said it seems you were responsible, so

25 that is what I meant: It seems that by your actions of soldiers you have

Page 15299

1 killed two people, and this is actually causing an absolute problem.

2 Q. And the difficulty to you was that they were holding you up?

3 A. Well, they -- my main objective in that area was to keep the main

4 supply route into Kiseljak and thence into Sarajevo, the ground route,

5 open. That's what I considered to be an objective of mine because it was

6 the only route into Sarajevo for foodstuffs, medicines, et cetera. So to

7 hold me up, what I meant was to stop me actually sending aid convoys into

8 Sarajevo through Kiseljak. And this was the only route and this was the

9 only way I could get in.

10 Q. So the roadblock, was that what the ABiH was doing wrong at that

12 A. Yes, because they were blocking -- they were stopping a UN mission

13 and in fact they were also stopping us patrolling that area, but not just

14 that. There was an agreement -- we all agreed to try and keep the routes

15 open. So that was a problem.

16 Q. And you recalled -- you said yesterday that this incident was

17 solved by you placing two warriors to replace this lorry with the logs.

18 Is that correct?

19 A. Yes -- well, that was my suggested solution, and I left those

20 vehicles in position for at least several days.

21 Q. And why did you decide to leave two warriors? What was the aim

22 and who could pass from then on, at that checkpoint?

23 A. Well, I left the warriors to reassure the people who had put the

24 barricade up, because I think also it was relatively close to the HVO

25 front line positions. So the people who lived there, who seemed to be

Page 15300

1 Bosnian Muslims in the main, were reassured by actually having our

2 presence. And this was a tactic I used time and time again, to put my

3 soldiers into a position where people felt frightened.

4 Q. Did you understand what the use of the checkpoint was to the Army

5 of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

6 A. The military aim of that checkpoint was to deny communication

7 between Kiseljak and Vitez for the HVO and also to provide a reassurance

8 for the people who lived in that area. And by default, it stopped us

9 moving up and down the road, too, particularly when you put the -- the

10 lorry was huge. It had great trunks on the back, and it stretched right

11 across the road.

12 Q. And once you, meaning the international community, could have

13 freedom of movement again in this particular area, for you the issue was

14 solved?

15 A. Yes, except, you know, I wanted people not to be fighting there.

16 So solved insofar as we opened the road, so that's correct. But I still

17 would have prefer people not to be at each other's throats. In fact I

18 got -- at Kacuni I got attacked as well. My interpreter lost the toe --

19 his toe cap.

20 Q. You beat me to the question. I just wanted to know who was your

21 interpreter. I believe that I see from the diary that (redacted) was

22 with you. Is that possible?

23 A. Yes. He was known as (redacted) because we tried to disguise

24 his identity. He was a British Serb officer and we also had a British

25 Serb sergeant. So we changed their names, not very subtly, to (redacted) and

Page 15301

1 (redacted), but it was (redacted).

2 Q. And is he the person you are talking about when you say that the

3 only casualty it was the top of (redacted) boot, which was struck by

4 something?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Thank you. Let me move on, Colonel, to the issue of the -- the

7 role of the adjutant which was raised yesterday by my colleague. Can you

8 explain what is normally the rank of the adjutant in a battalion.

9 Who normally gets this position, and what are the duties of the

10 adjutant?

11 A. The adjutant is a captain in rank. He's normally perhaps one of

12 the best if not the best captain in the battalion, and his duty is to run

13 the battalion apart from the training and the operations. In all other

14 aspects his staff job is to run a battalion under the commanding officer.

15 Q. If we compare the position of the adjutant to that of a G1 in a

16 brigade, would there be a difference or would they resemble each other?

17 A. They would resemble one another.

18 Q. And Can you tell the Trial Chamber what the G1 does in a

19 brigade?

20 A. He runs things like discipline, education, that sort of thing, and

21 the re-positions of units out of combat.

22 Q. I'd like to move now, Colonel, to the issue of Dusina. Now, my

23 colleague -- first let me ask you the first question. If after an

24 investigation no crime is committed, did you expect anyone to provide you

25 information that someone can be court martialed?

Page 15302

1 A. Yes, I would have liked that, yes.

2 Q. Given --

3 A. Let's be clear. A lot of people were dying at this time,

4 Your Honours, including my own escort driver had been shot and I was

5 demanding that we have the person responsible -- I hadn't even got an

6 investigation for what had happened to my own driver. But I was -- didn't

7 stop me demanding -- for every single crime committed, I wanted to know

8 what was going on. So the answer to the question is: Did I receive good

9 information that somebody had been disciplined? The answer is

10 no.

11 Q. You mentioned that following the meeting in Dusina, that following

12 the series of meetings that took place - I'm not going to go back into

13 those meetings - but correct me if I'm wrong, you said that you were

14 satisfied that this incident was closed?

15 A. Yes, I said that. Closed insofar as I couldn't do anything about

16 it. I couldn't be responsible for everyone dying in the area, although I

17 felt it quite personally that it was part of my mission to try and stop

18 it.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down for the

20 interpreters.

21 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation]

22 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... one of your answers in the

23 Kordic case, you mentioned that Merdan told you that the people concerned

24 were going to be court-martialed, then it would not be the persons in

25 Dusina?

Page 15303

1 A. I don't know.

2 Q. The issue of Merdan mentioning this to you, did that -- did this

3 happen once or many times?

4 A. Several times. Several times when I complained, General Merdan

5 said something would be done.

6 Q. Let me move on to the issue of the Geneva Conventions. Would you

7 agree with me - and just to confirm with what my colleague said to you -

8 that it is a duty of a commanding officer to instruct his troops on the

9 Geneva Conventions?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And on the basis of the document I showed you yesterday as to

12 whether saying that there was an order out and the corps commander to

13 instruct the units on the applicable law, is that a way for the corps

14 commander to ensure that the person -- that his soldiers as best as

15 possible will be trained in the Geneva Conventions?

16 A. It's a very good way of doing that.

17 Q. Did you expect or would you expect, Colonel, to see

18 General Hadzihasanovic holding classes on the Geneva

19 Conventions?

20 A. No, I wouldn't. But I would expect General Hadzihasanovic to have

21 done what he did, tell people -- refer them to the fact that the ABiH must

22 act in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. And if people don't

23 understand what those are, perhaps to explain them further. But I expect

24 the officers to whom General Hadzihasanovic was addressing looked to the

25 Geneva Conventions, totally understood what the Geneva Conventions were.

Page 15304

1 Q. Now, Colonel, the -- we looked at the issue of the -- an order

2 which was issued by Colonel Blaskic. My friend showed you this order, and

3 I guess you may still have the order with you.

4 A. I don't.

5 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] May we -- may the usher please bring

6 the exhibit which was shown to the witness dated 18th of April, 1993.

7 Q. Now, I ask you, Colonel, just to tell you what exactly is meant by

8 paragraph 1 of this order from Kordic.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Prosecution.

10 MR. WAESPI: First of all, we are no longer in

11 examination-in-chief, and we are also not in cross-examination. It's

12 re-examination. And I didn't object yesterday when my learned friend, you

13 know, had him comment on what Mr. Hadzihasanovic intended, what did he do,

14 what did he mean by that. But here now in re-examination, it's really of

15 no use to ask him what did he mean, Mr. Blaskic, when he issued this

16 order. It speaks for itself and he can only speculate, and that's of no

17 use for the Trial Chamber.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I understand you well, this

19 document was issued on the 18th of April, 1993. It was at 8.00 in the

20 morning, and it is marked by "urgent, urgent, urgent." Is that the case?

21 This document was shown to the witness as a new exhibit, and the question

22 was also put to the witness within the context of cross-examination. And

23 the question that was put to the witness now wants to be clarified by the

24 Defence.

25 You may proceed, Mr. Bourgon, but in the sense that I have

Page 15305

1 indicated.

2 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Yes, of course, Mr. President.

3 Because the question that I'm going to put the witness -- I'm just the

4 Defence counsel, but I really did not understand any of the questions put

5 to the witness by the Prosecution and I would like to clarify some issues

6 that remained unclear.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Go ahead.

8 MR. BOURGON:

9 Q. In paragraph 1 of this order, what is your interpretation as to

10 what is being asked by this order?

11 A. Stop UN vehicles moving into an operational area. Pursuant,

12 Your Honours, worries me. I wonder if that's an exact translation,

13 because it could mean pursuant after reference to the orders of a superior

14 commander. Could be that.

15 Q. Is there anything in this document, Colonel, that is giving an

16 order to fire at the UN?

17 A. Well, it gives clearance to fire in some way or another if there's

18 a requirement.

19 Q. But to deliberately fire. Is that what this order is giving?

20 A. It doesn't say -- the final paragraph contradicts everything,

21 arbitrary behaviour -- well, slightly contradicts. What does he mean by

22 arbitrary behaviour, number 5?

23 Q. Would that confirm, Colonel, what you were saying that in your

24 view no one had been given orders to shoot at the UN?

25 A. It could do, but this is a very confusing order to me. If I

Page 15306

1 received it in the English like this, I would demand clarification as to

2 what exactly is meant. So I suspect in the original Croatian it would be

3 clearer.

4 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Now, the issue that was raised along with the

5 questions related to this document was the issue of control. Now, can you

6 state in terms of controlling the troops what you mean by "troops out of

7 control within the army."

8 A. I particularly mean, Your Honours, a man who is in a probably

9 location up the front line who is frightened, who is bored, who actually

10 has no one near him, who decides to open fire without orders and without

11 reason. A sniper position maybe. And that is, I think, the position of

12 the person that killed my escort driver on the 30th of January, and there

13 were various other instance. And that was by the -- in my view, in my

14 opinion, came from an area controlled by the ABiH; therefore, it was an

15 ABiH soldier out of control. And in my view, there were other soldiers

16 out of control in -- on all sides. I'd give an example on the other side.

17 A HVO soldier attacking my petrol dump in a drive-past shoot.

18 Q. Now, Colonel, the -- on the 18th of April, where were you yourself

19 and what is the context of this order?

20 A. I was in Zenica. I went into Vitez. I lost a vehicle -- it

21 overturned behind me on the return back. I took -- I see -- I chaired a

22 cease-fire meeting. I made a plan to try and patrol Vitez and arrange for

23 armoured vehicles to be positioned in the town. And I arranged for a

24 joint commission to investigate what was happening. I went to the

25 International Committee of the Red Cross to make ensure that they were

Page 15307

1 happy about prisoner exchange. And for the first time the International

2 Committee of the Red Cross travelled in one of our armoured vehicles with

3 permission from Geneva. And I noticed there were 16 bodies on my route

4 from Vitez. That was all I wrote on that day

5 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I'd like, just before the break, to ask

6 you -- and you've spoke about that in your examination-in-chief and you

7 also provided some more information to my colleague in his

8 cross-examination. But can you tell us -- you've just read us one day.

9 Can you tell us what you were doing most of the time during your mission

10 in Central Bosnia.

11 A. Most of my time, Your Honours, I was away from my base. I had

12 two, three vehicles. I had an armoured vehicle, a kind of light tank

13 called a Warrior. The foreign office -- the British foreign office gave

14 me a Land Rover Discovery, a Land Rover, white. I had another Land Rover

15 as well, another Land Rover fitted for radios and I would spend most of my

16 time actually on the ground often at frontline positions like Turbe,

17 Maglaj, and if I wanted to visit Tuzla, that took me a minimum of seven

18 hours to get there, and I had a company base up there. And if I wanted to

19 visit Gornji Vakuf, that took me a minimum of two hours to get there. So

20 most of my time I was away from my headquarters. For that reason I

21 appointed two operations officers so that 24 by 7 I would have someone of

22 my own -- actually, I don't mean to say anyone else was alien, but

23 someone -- an operations officer knew exactly what I was doing and what

24 I wanted to do. They were put in the operations room. They were

25 captains.

Page 15308

1 Q. And how would you decide on a certain day what the focus of your

2 attention would be?

3 A. At the night-before's conference I would receive reports as to

4 what was happening and I would decide where the point of everyone's --

5 well, certainly my concentrated efforts should be the next day.

6 Q. And in the time that you spent in Central Bosnia, how many

7 other people have travelled as much as you did and have made as many

8 observations as you did about the main incidents that were going

9 on?

10 A. I don't know. A lot of the liaison officers, I had appointed six

11 liaison officers to get to know the area extremely well and gave them

12 sectors to govern. I should think that the liaison officers were out as

13 much as I was, if not more. They used to spend time actually sleeping

14 with the units on the ground.

15 Q. And do you feel, Colonel, that your way you operated allowed you

16 to understand and to know what was going on despite the vastness of your

17 area?

18 A. Well, Your Honours, no one -- no one gave me instructions. I've

19 been to staff college and things. No one gave me instructions on how to

20 operate in this extraordinary place. So I did my best, and that

21 fundamentally meant working out how to operate as we went. Obviously I

22 got things wrong, like the Prosecution has identified. I did not -- I was

23 not systematic enough with the military information summaries; I accept

24 that. But my style of command was that I would be with the soldiers on

25 the ground as much as possible and talking to the relevant commanders as

Page 15309

1 often as I could and fundamentally being at the position -- in a position

2 to make a decision in time to stop people dying.

3 Q. And one last question before the break, Colonel. My friend has

4 shown you a number of milinfosum -- actually, maybe two, maybe three at

5 the most, which he discussed with you in relation to alleged control over

6 Mujahedin. And we'll go after the break into these documents very quickly

7 just to ask you a few questions, but how many more milinfosums to your

8 knowledge in the complete period when you were there for your BritBat 1

9 and operation Grapple 1 contained information related to Mujahedin?

10 A. Well, Your Honours, it's easy as I've never read them. But I

11 would suspect that the people who -- preparing for this trial have been

12 through them with a tooth comb, I suspect there aren't many other -- other

13 military information summaries ones that contain references to the

14 Mujahedin.

15 Q. And would you say that the information that you had at the

16 time, if I asked you, was it plenty, was it middle, or was it almost

17 nonexistent? Where does it come closer on the Mujahedin issue?

18 A. Well, you know what, I would have liked to have actually met them

19 properly. So I would think that I had to -- I would be in the middle or

20 towards the lower end of middle of lack of knowledge.

21 Q. Colonel, after the break we'll go into some of the questions that

22 my colleague asked you, the Mujahedin, and then I'll be finished with my

23 re-examination.

24 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I believe this is a

25 good time from the break. I have another 20 minutes after the break.

Page 15310

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe that in line 8, page

2 76, there is a mistake in the transcript. In English it says my friend

3 has shown you a number. You're referring to the Prosecution, aren't you?

4 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Yes, Prosecution, they are my

5 friends. Of course. I hope so.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are going to make a break.

7 It is 25 to 1.00 and we are going to resume around 1.00.

8 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

9 --- On resuming at 12.59 p.m.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. The

11 Prosecution wishes to take the floor.

12 MR. WAESPI: Yes, just one brief point, if Mr. Bourgon could

13 indicate how long his re-direct lasts because you don't need to be

14 reminded but this re-direct comes in on cross. So whatever this witness

15 says, I have no chance to follow-up. So he should really limit himself,

16 as we are in chief and in cross-examination to the most important issues.

17 And I don't know how long he's intending to go on, but I just wanted to

18 make this observation, Mr. President.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Bourgon.

20 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. As I

21 said just before the break, I need roughly another 20 minutes. All my

22 questions are directly linked to the examination of my learned friend.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Proceed.

24 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, because the Prosecution

Page 15311

1 cannot take the floor again unless you open up some new questions.

2 MR. BOURGON:

3 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... before the break, and in

4 your last answer, I believe, was that the information you had on

5 Mujahedin during your tour from the mid to the on lower end. Is that

6 correct?

7 A. Yes, I didn't have much information about the Mujahedin,

8 Your Honours.

9 Q. My colleague has shown you a document which was at tab 7 in the

10 documents that were given to you, and that was the interview between a

11 journalist that I believe you know, Andrew Hogg, and an individual

12 pretending to be a Mujahedin. I'd like to refer you to this document.

13 Now, my colleague has shown you some lines, and I would also like to do

14 the same thing to see if this document which was shown to you by my

15 colleague --

16 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]

18 MR. WAESPI: I don't want to be picky, but I don't think there's

19 evidence that this person was pretending to be a Mujahedin. All the

20 evidence we have is that he is, that's what he says, a Mujahedin. So I

21 object to the word "pretending." It's also suggestive to this witness,

22 Mr. President.

23 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] The remark has been well-noted,

24 Mr. President.

25 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... but first let me ask you,

Page 15312

1 where were you in June 1992?

2 A. I was in Germany, Fahlenbostel [phoen].

3 Q. Were you ever informed of the existence of an individual named

4 Abdul Aziz?

5 A. I was not.

6 Q. Given the -- the text that was given to you I would like to refer

7 you to some of the lines and do the exact same exercise as my colleague

8 did and say -- find out whether this reinforces your belief or not

9 concerning the existence of Mujahedin in Central Bosnia. Now, I refer you

10 to page 2 at the top where this is an answer provided by this gentleman

11 Aziz. And he said about: "About myself or my group, it is not allowed to

12 come through any official [inaudible] organisation or any government

13 involvement. My people, they are coming by themselves, by their own

14 efforts. Nobody is forcing them or nobody is requesting them. They

15 just heard like me that there are Muslims being killed and they should

16 help."

17 Does that reinforce your belief that there is no link between the

18 3rd Corps and the Mujahedin?

19 A. I don't really have a comment. I believe that from what I knew

20 this looks to be support and -- but I don't change my view.

21 MR. WAESPI: Just to be sure about re-direct. It's not asking

22 leading questions. He can ask him what his comment about that, but we

23 have to be careful at this point in time. But I'm curious what the

24 gentleman says about this sentence, but procedurally I believe we have to

25 be careful the way it's phrased.

Page 15313

1 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. The same

2 procedure has been used as that of my colleague. During my re-direct, I

3 show him the same document. He has the document in front of him and I am

4 asking him to comment on it. This is not a new procedure, but I can

5 understand that my colleague wants to object. It's quite legitimate on

6 his part.

7 MR. WAESPI: My objection was to the phrasing of the question.

8 It's the same document, but I was cross-examining and you're examining or

9 examining in-chief. You're not supposed to ask leading questions, and you

10 asked one.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Make sure that the questions are

12 not leading, but you're reading a paragraph and asking him what he thinks

13 about it. So the question is not leading.

14 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

15 Q. Colonel, the paragraph I just read to you, and maybe we can read

16 it again, saying that this individual -- saying that, and I quote the

17 paragraph: "My people, they are coming by themselves, by their own

18 efforts. Nobody is forcing them, nobody is requesting them, and they just

19 heard like me that there are Muslims being killed and they should help."

20 Can you comment on this paragraph with respect to the question

21 that was posed to you and the control of Mujahedin?

22 A. Well, that's the assumption I made that so many people arrived in

23 Bosnia. It -- in one way it certainly does confirm that -- from my point

24 of view that they weren't asked for because my impression, and it was an

25 impression, that these people just arrived -- these Mujahedin just arrived

Page 15314

1 as a group. But as individuals, it's much more understandable. A lot of

2 people used to arrive at places like Split seeking adventure or whatever

3 purpose and joined there the relevant armed forces from there as

4 individuals.

5 Q. Colonel, I now refer you to page 5 of the same document towards

6 the bottom of the page. This is a reply by the gentleman named Aziz, and

7 he is saying: "They are coming through different area. There is no

8 specific area they are coming." And again the same thing, "I will never

9 ask them how you arrived there. And the journalist you know, Hogg, is

10 replying: "So what you are saying there is no organisation in the Islamic

11 world sending people here?"

12 And the response by Mr. Aziz is "neither."

13 The question is the same: "How does that relate, if it does, to

14 your opinion, that the Mujahedin were not under control?"

15 A. They weren't asked for them and they came as they wished. I am

16 sure that's what I feel.

17 Q. I now refer you to page 7 of the same document. And this is a

18 question that was asked to Mr. Aziz by Mr. Hogg, and that's the second

19 paragraph. And the question goes as follows: "Yeah. What has been the

20 reception that you receive from Izetbegovic and the Bosnian government?

21 Did they welcome you with open arms or did it take a lot of negotiating to

22 be able to?"

23 Mr. Aziz butting in and answering: "No. Especially by Muslims,

24 yes. They opened their hands and we are welcome and they even help us

25 with any kind of -- they have food or anything because they recognise that

Page 15315

1 we are here to defend them."

2 This question and answer, does that indicate to you or how does

3 that relate to your opinion that those Mujahedin were not under control of

4 the Bosnian army?

5 A. I don't think it indicates either way that answer actually, but my

6 reflection is that the Bosnian Muslims were under such pressure at that

7 time, I often used to think maybe they would -- this is privately at the

8 time and since, but certainly at the time I used to think, Poor devils.

9 They -- there's no one really supporting them. So they might accept help

10 from any direction, and any direction, I meant by this people coming to

11 help them.

12 Q. And I finally refer you to page 12 of the same document. And

13 again this is a question by Mr. Hogg saying: "From countries,

14 governments, or from the individuals."

15 And the response is: "No. Individuals, no. No single country

16 giving us from other. It is from government, but we are getting help from

17 all these personal effort."

18 How does that relate to your opinion of Mujahedin and

19 control?

20 A. Well, I think the same as before, people were coming of their own

21 will. I also would like to comment maybe the Mujahedin unit came as a

22 complete entity, I don't know. But my point was, I don't think they were

23 under control of the ABiH. I don't know how they got there. They might

24 have dribbled in like this or they might have come as a unit. But my

25 point is, as far as I could see, they weren't under control.

Page 15316

1 Q. Now, Colonel, when I look at this interview that was conducted in

2 1992, does it really help you in making up your mind, one way or the

3 other, with Mujahedin?

4 A. It doesn't change my view, but it's interesting from my point of

5 view -- I didn't realise there was so many Middle East people in the area

6 from as early as that.

7 Q. Now, Colonel, I'd like to show you a document and I'd like the

8 usher to take out Exhibit DH181. Now, this is a piece written by the same

9 journalist and I'd like you to take a look at this same document. This is

10 written by Andrew Hogg that you know. And because he was looking for the

11 same information, I think it's good that you look at this exhibit.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could it be placed on the ELMO.

13 Can the document be placed on the ELMO?

14 MR. BOURGON: Put it on the ELMO, and it's DH181.

15 Q. Can you -- maybe I will help you to read some of the sentences.

16 And if I begin initially at the beginning: "Senior Bosnian army

17 commanders are calling on their president Alija Izetbegovic to expel

18 foreign Mujahedin fighters because they are terrorising civilians and

19 committing atrocities. More than 200 Mujahedin who have been fighting in

20 Bosnia for the past year now operate as lawless gangs which the Bosnian

21 army command is powerless to control. In recent clashes between Croats

22 and Muslims, the Islamic soldiers who say they are waging jihad, holy war,

23 have desecrated churches and murdered civilians. When they are not

24 fighting the Mujahedin have terrified the population they claim to defend

25 by attempting to enforce an Islamic code on a population traditionally lax

Page 15317

1 about religious observance. Colonel Stipan Siber, deputy commander of the

2 Bosnia Hercegovina army and its operations chief in Central Bosnia

3 said last week the freelance fighters were causing widespread alarm. It

4 was a mistake to let them in. No one asked them to come. They commit

5 most of the atrocities. They worked against the interest of the Muslim

6 people."

7 I'll let you take a quick look at the rest of this document,

8 Colonel, and tell me if this can relate to your opinion that the

9 Bosnian -- that the Mujahedin were not under the control of the Bosnian

10 army.

11 A. Well, I think it confirms what my thoughts were. And he's a good

12 journalist, this man. So I presume he'd done good research. I notice

13 Miletici is mentioned and that's an interesting second back-up to the fact

14 that it might have been Mujahedin who did it.

15 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I'd like to move now to a document which was

16 shown to you which was at tab number 9 in the list of documents by my

17 colleague, and that is one of the milinfosums. Is that 9 or -- yes,

18 sorry. It's not a milinfosum. This is a document that is labelled P461.

19 Now, my first question to you, Colonel, is that: Have you ever

20 seen this document?

21 A. No, I have never seen the document before today.

22 Q. And can you confirm that with respect to the 7th Brigade you had

23 very little information?

24 A. That's correct. I had little information about the 7th Brigade.

25 I mean, my intelligence cell may have had more, but I didn't carry

Page 15318

1 information in my head about the 7th Brigade.

2 Q. Now, were you aware of what is mentioned into this document, which

3 is that there are some foreign citizens who are being detained?

4 A. As far as I can remember, I wasn't aware but I know there were a

5 lot of foreign citizens, so-called, actually in Central Bosnia.

6 Q. Now, in this document you have before you do you see anywhere the

7 term "3rd Corps"?

8 A. Yes, at the top.

9 Q. In terms of the reporting of the document, does that tell you

10 anything that those people were members of the 3rd Corps, or if they were

11 members of anything it was the BH army?

12 A. There is no mention of the 3rd Corps, but we're talking about the

13 area in which the 3rd Corps operated.

14 Q. Now, these two individuals that were referred to by my

15 colleague Skinner and McBride, would they qualify as foreign citizens

16 who are members of the BH army, i.e., volunteers who are in our unit?

17 A. Yes, definitely.

18 Q. Now, the incident of the -- what happened to Skinner and McBride,

19 how does that contribute -- did that contribute in any way to you forming

20 an opinion about the control of Mujahedin?

21 A. Yes, it did actually. It was -- perhaps I should have mentioned

22 it before but you remind me. The death of -- Your Honours, the death of

23 McBride and Skinner upset me a great deal because I had had personal

24 contact with these men. I had tried to get them out of the place as I

25 told them to go, as I told all mercenaries, and I considered them to be

Page 15319

1 mercenaries, to get out. And because I knew them personally, I was upset.

2 I spent some time thinking and talking, why would the BiH do it to their

3 own? And the answer and the conclusion I made and others made was that

4 they were actually killed by a Mujahedin group for reasons presumably that

5 they were Westerners, Christians whatever you want do. I know when I went

6 to their burials, I assume they were Christians because I took their

7 torbay [phoen], the headstones off and put crosses instead.

8 Q. Do you remember the way in which they were killed?

9 A. I remember that they were killed somewhere near Turbe. They were

10 taken out of their houses in the middle of the night. They were taken,

11 and their bodies were found in a stream and they were shot in the back.

12 Q. And do you remember exactly shot where or how, or did that

13 contribute to your -- to giving you any information with respect to

14 Mujahedin?

15 A. It was -- I think it was near Travnik and we felt that it was a

16 Mujahedin unit that had done it. And I think it might have been done

17 during the night.

18 Q. Do you remember the number of bullets used to kill these two

19 individuals?

20 A. I -- in my mind it's 17, but in other words over ten. A burst of

21 fire in the back of the jacket.

22 Q. I'll now move to tab number 11 which was raised to you. This is

23 document P626. And I -- my question to you, Colonel, first is: Did you

24 ever see this document?

25 A. Not before this week.

Page 15320

1 Q. And can you tell us who this document is addressed to and who is

2 the person sending this document?

3 A. I -- I think this is the HVO command in Mostar and sending to the

4 9th of March -- that's about it. I don't know quite more than that.

5 Q. Is this a document that you would have access -- that you would

6 have had access to during your stay in Bosnia?

7 A. No, of course not. It's an internal army document.

8 Q. And was such information about existence of 250 Mujahedin, is that

9 information that was ever conveyed to you by anyone during your stay in

10 Bosnia?

11 A. Not to my knowledge.

12 Q. I'll now move to tab number 6, another document which was shown to

13 you by my friend, and this is the milinfosum dated 27 January. It was a

14 new document. Now, with respect to this milinfosum which was on the 27th

15 of January, we discussed yesterday a meeting that took place on the 26th

16 with a cease-fire, a meeting that took place on the 27th with a

17 cease-fire, a very serious -- and these two meetings that you attended

18 personally are not reported in this document. Should it have been or what

19 is your view with respect to making these documents reliable for the day

20 whether important events such as this should have been mentioned?

21 A. Maybe it should have been mentioned, but are what these

22 reportings -- you know, it's selective. I mean, I -- as -- as is obvious

23 from the record I was chairing meetings during this time.

24 Q. And would your battalion have known that you were doing so?

25 A. Yes, of course they would.

Page 15321

1 Q. Now, if I look at this document and I want to use that for the --

2 in terms of -- discuss what was raised with you with my colleague about

3 the milinfosum. Now, if I look at the first page where it says: "Gornji

4 Vakuf was reported to be generally quiet."

5 Now, what does that mean, it "was reported to be" in terms of

6 milinfosum language?

7 A. Reported generally means we're relying on other sources.

8 "Generally quiet" means there wasn't too much gunfire or shells

9 landing.

10 Q. And reported, what kind of observation would that refer to?

11 A. It could well be that it was reported not by my patrols but by

12 someone else. But I would think it's quite -- this is reported in this

13 sense as I had B company there, it came from B Company's situation report.

14 So as they're right beside the town, they can hear explosions and shooting

15 from where they were.

16 Q. Now, if I look at page 2 of this document, the top part where it

17 says that the "BiH and HVO in Travnik have signed an agreement."

18 Is there a difference between this type of language and the first

19 type where it says "it was reported that"?

20 A. Yes. I would suspect that Travnik -- this was a report submitted

21 by the liaison officer for Travnik, Captain Matthew Dundas Whatley whose

22 task was to liaise with the BiH and HVO.

23 Q. If you compare the two types of reporting where it says "was

24 reported to be" and the other paragraph, is the second one not a fact and

25 the first one an observation of which we don't know the source?

Page 15322

1 A. In the writing, yes.

2 Q. And this paragraph that was shown to you where it talks about a

3 normally reliable source, do you yourself know this source?

4 A. No.

5 Q. And how many sources were used to draft a milinfosum?

6 A. As many as we got information from.

7 Q. And what would be a normally reliable source?

8 A. In this kind of definition is someone in the ranks of either the

9 HVO or the BiH who was friendly and who talked to some of our patrols --

10 or the liaison officer.

11 Q. Now, in this case, in this specific scenario, could the source be

12 a civilian or an interpreter?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And could it be someone that could confuse a soldier wearing a

15 beard with a foreigner?

16 A. Maybe. Maybe.

17 Q. And the fact that a battalion would be trained by two people from

18 the outside, is that a sign that an external country is controlling this

19 unit?

20 A. No, no. What it means -- what someone being trained, it's --

21 it -- two people can't train a battalion anyway, Your Honours. But it

22 does actually mean that instruction is being -- is apparently being given

23 by instructors from outside.

24 Q. And has the British army ever called upon experts from other

25 countries to come and assist with the training of their troops?

Page 15323

1 A. Yes, I'm sure it has. I'm absolutely sure it has.

2 Q. I'd like to move on to tab number 8, which is the other milinfosum

3 that was shown to you. And this -- the paragraph about Zepce. And this

4 is again a new document which is not yet into evidence. Now, this

5 paragraph with Zepce, first of all as you noted correctly, and maybe you

6 can confirm that and ensure that I'm not getting it wrong, but you would

7 be surprised that the Muslim externals would be those found drunk in the

8 street. I guess you made a comment around that.

9 A. I did make that comment because there were a lot of very bad

10 Muslims in the BiH.

11 Q. What do you mean by that?

12 A. Well, they drank a lot. They all drank too much.

13 Q. Now, when I look at the first sentence where it says that the

14 local commander, in the middle, he says that "these troops were not under

15 his direct command."

16 Now, what could that mean? Is it a possibility that it's simply

17 another group of BiH soldiers and they are under his operational control

18 and not his operational command?

19 A. No. This is a reference to the fact that this group were not

20 taking orders from him.

21 Q. Are there many possibilities as to what this group could or could

22 not be?

23 A. Well, it is possible that the ABiH had special forces, and in fact

24 I know they had some special forces but -- and they might not take

25 control -- command -- operational control from a local commander. So

Page 15324

1 there is a possibility of that.

2 Q. Now, there is the word -- the reference here to the

3 word "external," where it says: "A deployment of Muslim externals."

4 And I'd like to refer you to document we saw yesterday, and this

5 document was the milinfosum of 26 January and it was at tab 14 of the

6 documents I showed you. Now, I'd like to, if you have this document with

7 you, tab 14, it's milinfosum 87. It was a new document dated 26th of

8 January. Now, I'd like to read the last paragraph where it says that B

9 Company stated that the main problem area is the village of Bizlica

10 [phoen] where UN vehicles were still being engaged by HVO snipers as were

11 the local populace, predominantly Muslim. It was also reported that there

12 had been no evidence as of yet of external forces withdrawing out of the

13 local area. This includes the 305th Jajce Brigade. Information leads us

14 to believe that the 305th Brigade moved to the area north of Gornji Vakuf

15 centred on the village of Hranca shortly after the fall of Jajce.

16 Comment. It is now believed that the brigade may be moved to Zenica as it

17 falls in the category of external forces."

18 Looking at this paragraph, what was the word "external forces"

19 used for in milinfosum language?

20 A. Well, I think you -- we've got word play here and it's soldiers

21 writing this report, Your Honour. I think in this context external

22 forces, as I recall -- because I brokered the cease-fire there, that

23 forces not directly from the area of Gornji Vakuf were to be withdrawn

24 from the area. So external in this case probably means a brigade that was

25 not from the Gornji Vakuf area. And I think -- seem to recall that that

Page 15325

1 was the kind of language we used to withdraw -- to calm down the situation

2 by removing the forces on all sides. So this was not referring to

3 external, out of the country.

4 Q. Now, if I go back to the document which was seen by my -- which

5 was shown to you by my colleague which talks about the external Muslims,

6 it's quite possible that we are not talking about Mujahedin at all.

7 That's the document -- the new document at milinfosum 132 of 11 March.

8 A. It's quite possible. There were some external fanatics,

9 individual fanatics, on all sides. And I can remember particularly one

10 very fanatical HVO soldier from Canada.

11 Q. Now, Colonel, if I look at this incident which you said in answer

12 to a question by my colleague that you were aware of the incident, do you

13 recall that this incident involved Mujahedin at all?

14 A. Which incident?

15 Q. The incident in Zepce where the liaise officer visited the

16 headquarters and we saw those people drunk in the street.

17 A. Yeah, I was aware of the incident. I wasn't aware that it was

18 necessarily Mujahedin at the time -- retrospectively now I suspect there

19 might be, but I wasn't actually going that detailed at the time.

20 Q. Now, with respect to your source, Colonel, you mentioned that --

21 and my colleague asked you many questions with respect to your source.

22 And the questions I'd like to ask you are quite simple --

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Prosecution.

24 MR. WAESPI: If we could briefly go into private session.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, can we move into