1 Monday, 7 February 2005
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, call the case,
7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. This is case
8 number IT-01-47-T, the Prosecutor versus Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Appearances for the Prosecution, please.
12 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon, Your
13 Honours, counsel, and everyone in and around the courtroom. For the
14 Prosecution, Matthias Neuner and Daryl Mundis, assisted today by
15 Mr. Andres Vatter, our case manager.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Appearances for the Defence,
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. On
19 behalf of General Hadzihasanovic, Edina Residovic lead counsel, Stephane
20 Bourgon co-counsel, and Muriel Cauvin legal assistant. Thank you.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. The other Defence
22 team, please.
23 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.
24 On behalf of Mr. Kubura, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and Nermin Mulalic legal
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. On Monday, 7
2 February 2005, I would like to bid welcome to everybody present in the
3 courtroom; the representatives of the Prosecution, the Defence team of
4 General Hadzihasanovic, the Defence team of General Kubura, as well as the
5 two accused. I do not wish to forget everybody else in the courtroom and
6 outside the courtroom.
7 If there are no issues to raise on the part of the two parties,
8 I'm going to ask the usher to go and fetch the witness, who is probably
9 waiting outside.
10 I'm going to ask the Defence to tell us what is the length of this
11 witness's testimony that they envisage.
12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] The Defence is going to take an
13 hour and a half, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 [The witness entered court]
16 WITNESS: EDIN HUSIC
17 [Witness answered through interpreter]
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. First of
19 all, let me check whether you hear the interpretation of my words in your
20 language. If that is the case, tell me that you understand.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can hear you, and I can
22 understand you.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have been called as a
24 Defence witness. Before you take the solemn declaration, I would like to
25 hear your first name, last name, the date of birth, and the place of
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My name is Edin Husic. I was born
3 in Zenica on the 28th of April, 1967.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, what is your current
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm a professional soldier.
7 Currently I'm the military attache of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
8 in the United States of America.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Do you have a rank? Are you an
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm a colonel.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In 1992 and 1993, did you
13 perform military duties? Were you in a position? Were you attached to
14 any unit?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was a soldier at the time. I was
16 in the Municipal Staff of the Territorial Defence of Zenica, and after
17 that I was attached to the command of the 3rd Corps of the BiH army.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, have you ever testified
19 before, either at an international court or a national court with regard
20 to the events that took place in your country in the year 1992 and 1993 or
21 is this the first time you testify?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have already testified twice
23 before this Tribunal about the events that took place during that
24 particular period of time.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Since you have already
1 testified, could you please tell us in what cases, and did you appear as a
2 Defence witness or as a Prosecution witness?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was a Prosecution witness in the
4 Kordic case.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And you have testified twice in
6 the Kordic case or did you also testify in some other case? I can see in
7 the transcript that the interpreter actually tells me in French that you
8 have testified on two occasions. Did you testify on one occasion or on
9 two occasions?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On two occasions in the same case.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. So you
12 have testified twice in the same case.
13 I'm now going to ask you to read the text of the solemn
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
16 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Colonel. You may be
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before I give the floor to the
21 Defence lawyers, who are going to conduct their examination-in-chief, I
22 would like to provide you with some information about your testimony. You
23 have already testified before this Tribunal on two occasions, but at the
24 time you were a Prosecution witness. Today, however, you are a Defence
25 witness. The procedure is the same, so our explanations will only confirm
1 what you already know about the procedure.
2 At the beginning, you're going to be asked questions by the
3 Defence lawyers of General Hadzihasanovic, whom you have already met in
4 preparation for this trial. The Defence lawyers have told us that they
5 will need an hour and a half. The questions that you will have to answer
6 form part of the so-called examination-in-chief. Those are the questions
7 which are not leading. They're rather neutral, and it is up to the
8 witness to provide detailed answers to the rather uncomplicated questions.
9 After that, the Prosecution lawyers, seated on your right, will
10 also ask you questions for the duration of an hour and a half. You will
11 soon realise that the character of their questions will be somewhat
12 different than the character of the questions put to you by the Defence
13 lawyers. This procedure is similar to the procedure that exists within
14 the common law system, and the Prosecutor's questions may be somewhat
15 leading in order to get a simple answer from you. Sometimes it will be
16 only a yes or a no.
17 After that stage, the Defence lawyers may take the floor again to
18 ask you additional questions that arise directly from the questions put to
19 you during the stage of cross-examination. And at that moment, if any of
20 the Defence's questions are not directly linked with the Prosecution's
21 questions, they will have to ask permission from the Trial Chamber.
22 The Trial Chamber, the three Judges seated in front of you,
23 according to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, can also put questions
24 to you at any time. However, for the reasons of convenience, the Judges
25 prefer to wait until the stages of examination-in-chief and the
1 cross-examination are over. The Judges' questions are put to you with two
2 goals in mind: The first one is to clarify your answers; and secondly,
3 the Judges, in the interest of justice, will sometimes want to hear
4 answers from you about the questions that they have in mind.
5 After that, the Judges will allow the Prosecution and the Defence
6 to ask you some additional questions that arise from the Judges'
7 questions. These questions will be put to you either to clarify some
8 answers given by yourself to the Judges or to clarify some of your answers
9 and ask you to provide some more detail.
10 The Judges will never take the floor after that. Last week we
11 explained in written form what was the goal of our questions, and we
12 believe that the explanations that we have provided have addressed the
13 issued raised by the Defence.
14 I would like to inform you of two other important elements. One
15 of them is the fact that you took a solemn declaration, which means that
16 you are not supposed to lie, because this is punishable by law.
17 The second element that I mention before every witness is the fact
18 that a witness may object to making any statement which might incriminate
19 the witness. In that case, when the witness refuses to answer, which is
20 the right which is familiar in the countries where the common law exists,
21 but this is also something that exists at this Tribunal, however, at that
22 point the Chamber may compel the witness to answer the question, and when
23 the witness answers, the Chamber will grant the witness a certain form of
24 immunity. This rule exists in order to help the Trial Chamber to arrive
25 at the truth.
1 It will happen that the parties will present you documents during
2 your testimony. Those documents are most commonly from the military
3 source. They will ask you whether you are familiar with the document and
4 if you can provide any comments about the document. If a question seems
5 too complicated to you, you always have the right to ask the person who
6 has put the question to you to rephrase it.
7 As you know, the Trial Chamber doesn't have any written evidence
8 prior to your testimony, and this is where the weight of your testimony
9 arises from. Your words are very important. Before you there is a
10 screen. Your words are translated into English, and since I believe you
11 speak English, you can follow the translation of your words, your answers
12 given to the questions put to you.
13 For technical reasons, we are obliged to take two breaks during
14 the course of the afternoon, each of them lasting about 25 minutes. These
15 breaks will take place every hour and a half, and it has been foreseen
16 that this session will end at 7.00 in the afternoon. And if the Defence
17 and the Prosecution do indeed take the time that they have indicated to us
18 that they will, your testimony will end today.
19 I'm now going to give the floor to the Defence, who will start
20 their examination-in-chief.
21 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Examined by Ms. Residovic:
23 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Husic.
24 A. Good afternoon.
25 Q. In addition to what the President of the Trial Chamber has told
1 you, I would also like to ask you to make a pause after my question and
2 only then give your answer. This is required for the translation to be
3 able to proceed smoothly and for everybody in the courtroom to be able to
4 understand you. Did you understand that?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. You have told us that you are a professional soldier, Mr. Husic.
7 Where did you acquire your military education, and before the war where
8 did you serve?
9 A. I acquired my military education in the former Yugoslav People's
10 Army. From 1982 to 1986, I attended the military grammar school in
11 Belgrade, and then from 1986 until 1989, I was also in Belgrade attending
12 the Military Academy there, and after that I transferred to Pancevo where
13 I attended a specialised course which I completed in 1989. After that, I
14 was assigned to serve in Zagreb.
15 Q. Mr. Husic, did you have a rank, and did there come a time when you
16 left the Yugoslav People's Army?
17 A. Upon completing my education, I became a second lieutenant. A
18 year later, I became a lieutenant, and towards the end of 1991 -- 1991, I
19 left the Yugoslav People's Army.
20 Q. Mr. Husic, can you tell us why you left the JNA, and after you
21 left it, where did you go?
22 A. I left the Yugoslav People's Army because I did not feel I
23 belonged to that army. I started thinking about going home, and I
24 returned home to Zenica.
25 Q. You said that you were first hired by the District Staff of the
1 Territorial Defence of Zenica. What was your position in 1992 when you
2 were a member of that staff in Zenica?
3 A. I joined towards the end of April 1992, I joined the Territorial
4 Defence, and in the Territorial Defence Staff in Zenica from the end of
5 June I held the position of the chief for intelligence of that staff, up
6 to the moment when the corps was established, which was at the beginning
7 of December 1992.
8 Q. When the corps was established, did you assume another position,
9 and what duties and tasks did you perform during the course of 1993?
10 A. When the corps was established, I was appointed the officer for
11 intelligence, and later on I became the Assistant Chief of Staff for
12 intelligence in the 3rd Corps.
13 Q. You have told us that you were the Assistant Chief of Staff. Who
14 was your immediate superior in your capacity as the officer for
16 A. When I became the Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence, my
17 immediate superior was the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Corps, who at the
18 time was Mr. Muradif Mekic.
19 Q. Mr. Husic, when you joined the 3rd Corps, what was the make-up of
20 your personnel? What equipment did your service have at its disposal, the
21 service which you first joined as an officer and later on as its head?
22 A. When I arrived there, there were only two of us; my chief at the
23 time, the assistant, Mr. Cikotic Selmo, and myself. And we tried to
24 improve the number of personnel, and after a certain period of time there
25 were only a few of us within that body. Naturally at the very beginning,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 I can't say that we didn't have anything, but we didn't have the basics.
2 It was necessary to be able to form units that we could rely on. A
3 reconnaissance company that was part of the corps was subsequently formed,
4 and it was linked to us in professional terms. And a company for
5 electronic reconnaissance, and a counter-electronic combat was formed.
6 There was also a unit of the 3rd Corps attached to the 3rd Corps that was
7 professionally linked to us. And naturally, we tried to bring up to
8 strength subordinate units so that there could be men working on the
9 establishment of a system of intelligence in the zone of responsibility of
10 the 3rd Corps.
11 Q. Mr. Husic, what sort of connections did you have with the superior
12 and subordinate units in order to be able to perform your duties as well
13 as possible at the very beginning, and were efforts made to improve the
15 A. We, at the time, relied on the system of communications that had
16 been established, the system of communications that was used for the
17 superior and subordinate command. We didn't have a special system of
18 communications at the beginning, naturally. The communications with the
19 superior command functioned correctly, more or less correctly given the
20 conditions. So-called packet communications was used. And as far as
21 subordinate units are concerned, one of our tasks was to establish such
22 communications with them. I can't say how rapidly this was done.
23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since I would now
24 like to use some documents when examining the witness, I would be grateful
25 if these documents could now be distributed to the Chamber, my colleagues
1 from the Prosecution and, to the other Defence team. And, Mr. President,
2 since I might be using some new documents that the Prosecution has been
3 provided with, and as you are well aware, we have translation problems.
4 These documents, these new ones, haven't been translated. So if I may use
5 them, I will use them in accordance with your instructions. The witness
6 will recognise the document or will not recognise the document, read the
7 relevant part, and if the witness hasn't recognised the document in
8 question, we would just request that the documents be marked for
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. This is how we will
11 proceed as there are no translations. The witness will read the relevant
12 paragraph, the one that you think that is relevant, and the document may
13 subsequently be marked for identification, pending full translation. I
14 believe that you have provided the Prosecution with these documents in
15 good time, and I believe that the Prosecution will be in a position to
16 cross-examine the witness.
17 Mr. Mundis. There are no obstructions to proceeding in this
18 manner? Or Mr. Neuner?
19 MR. NEUNER: There are no obstructions so far. We have received a
20 list of P -- or DH numbers, and right now we received the hard copies.
21 Thank you.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Please proceed.
23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Q. Mr. Husic, you mentioned the situation when the body was formed,
25 and you said that you immediately attempted to make the body functional.
1 Please have a look at the document number 1. We only have this document
2 in the Bosnian language.
3 So, Mr. Husic, I would first like to ask you whether you recognise
4 the document before you in B/C/S.
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 Q. I will now --
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, the Prosecution.
8 MR. NEUNER: Just one small interruption. If I may ask my learned
9 friend to state the DH number or P number of the documents for the record.
10 Thank you very much.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. I see a number 01819218.
12 Perhaps that is number the number that should be mentioned.
13 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. For the sake of the
14 transcript, I will repeat the number you have just mentioned,
15 Mr. President. The number is 01819218.
16 Q. Mr. Husic, you can see the number at the top of the document; is
17 that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Mr. Husic, could you please read out the person who sent the
20 document, the subject of the document, who is it addressed to, and could
21 you read out item 1.
22 A. Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 3rd Corps Command, Zenica, the 5th
23 of December, 1992. The title of the document is "Seminar For Intelligence
24 Organs Order." It's addressed to all brigade commands, to the Zenica
25 regional staff, to all municipal staffs, to the intelligence organs, the
1 organs mentioned above.
2 It says: "On the basis of demonstrated need and in order to
3 organise and improve intelligence activities, I hereby order:
4 "1. Organise and hold a seminar with all intelligence organs of
5 the above-mentioned commands, staffs, and units on the 9th of December,
6 1992, on Tuesday, commencing at 0900 hours in the Tehnoprojekt building in
7 Zenica (the 3rd Corps Command) with regard to the subject of intelligence
8 activities in wartime."
9 Q. Given the date when this order was issued, tell me whether these
10 activities that started after the establishment of the corps were
11 activities that you were involved in in the course of 1993, too, or
12 rather, what sort of efforts did the 3rd Corps make to ensure that this
13 organ was functioning correctly?
14 A. In the subsequent period, given the way the situation unfolded, it
15 was easy to organise things in this way. It wasn't easy to ensure that
16 the men were outside of their units. Most of the intelligence activities
17 were carried out through orders by requesting intelligence, by submitting
18 reports. So this is the course that the intelligence activities within
19 subordinate units took.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The registrar has drawn my
21 attention to an issue or a question that I forgot to ask the witness.
22 I'll ask the witness this question immediately.
23 You said that you testified in the Kordic case. When you
24 testified, had you been granted protective measures or not? Did you
25 testify in open session or were protective measures in place?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I testified in open session.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. You may
4 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Husic, I would now like to ask you to have a look at the
6 documents under the following numbers: 2, 3 and 4. The document numbers
7 are DH578, and then 01820719, 01822418, and P268 under number 5. So
8 documents 2, 3, 4 and 5. And since the first two documents -- the first
9 document has been translated, but as far as document 3 is concerned, and
10 document number 4, could you identify these documents in the same way that
11 you identified the other document? Could you say who sent the document,
12 what the subject of the document is; and in document number 1, could you
13 read out the introduction and item number 1 so that we can see whether
14 you're able to comment on these documents.
15 A. Well, first let me say that document DH0578 is the document that I
16 recognise. This is a document that I drafted. It was sent from the 3rd
17 Corps Command on the 6th of January, 1993, to all brigade commands and the
18 Zenica Territorial Defence District Staff.
19 It's a request for intelligence, form number 1. At the time it
20 was urgent. I don't know if it's necessary to read the entire contents of
21 this document since there is a translation, but this concerns the
22 decisions of the government of the so-called Herceg-Bosna and the order of
23 the Main Staff of the Herceg-Bosna HVO regarding the disarming of the
24 members of the BH army. And we requested that our organs assessed the
25 strength of the HVO in their zones of responsibility and provide this
1 information in reports. We requested that they provide us with this
2 information in code, via couriers or via packet communications.
3 Q. Mr. Husic, thank you for that answer. Have a look at document
4 number 3, please. The number is 01820719. Who sent the document, what is
5 the subject of the document, and is this one of the documents that have to
6 do with your attempts to ensure that subordinate units were well prepared
7 to carry out the activities you have testified about already?
8 A. Well, let me repeat this. Document 01820719 is also a document
9 that I recognise. It's from the 3rd Corps command. It's -- it was sent
10 on the 9th of April, 1993. It's a request for intelligence information,
11 number 10; and you can see in this document -- since there is no
12 translation I will read it out.
13 "On the basis of reliable information that the HVO is preparing a
14 basis for a new conflict with members of the ABiH or, rather, they're
15 preparing an action to clean up our ranks, in order to prevent such
16 actions and prevent them carrying out their intentions and surprising us,
17 immediately do the following:
18 "1. Intensify intelligence activities with regard to individuals
19 and units from the HVO.
20 "2. Immediately gather information and revise the old
21 disposition of forces and equipment in the territory of the municipality
22 where your units deployed. Provide the intelligence organ of the corps
23 with the information gathered by the 30th of April, 1993, and by 1500
25 "3. Provide immediate information on anything of importance."
1 Q. Do you recognise document 401822418? And if so, could you please
2 read out item 1 in the document.
3 A. Yes, I recognise this document, too, which was sent soon after the
4 previous one, on the 18th of April, 1993, from the 3rd Corps Command.
5 Again it's a request for intelligence information, number 11. It was
6 addressed to all the commands of OGs, brigades, and municipal staffs and
7 to the intelligence organ. It says:
8 "On the basis of their demonstrated need and in order to
9 efficiently provide information, it is necessary to do the following:
10 "1. All information that concerns changes of any information on
11 the force of the HVO should be immediately provided in short and succinct
13 Q. Have a look at document 5 now, P268. Since you have said that
14 this is how you provided instructions and in a certain sense trained your
15 intelligence organs and subordinate units, could you now tell me whether
16 this document is one of the documents you used to provide precise
17 instructions on the manner in which one should operate.
18 A. In this case, this is an order for intelligence support. It was
19 sent to the commands of all OGs, to brigades, and municipal defence staffs
20 and to intelligence and intelligence security organs. This document was
21 drafted on the basis of an order from the superior command, which at the
22 time regulated the manner of reporting, the way in which reports were
23 submitted. We had previously established the way in which reports should
24 be compiled and submitted, but given the situation, the superior command
25 requested that the reports have a certain form. So they issued such an
1 order, and it's on the basis of this order that we drafted our own orders
2 for subordinate units.
3 Q. Mr. Husic, given the documents that clearly show how you requested
4 subordinate units to inform you about any relevant information, and you
5 tried to train them to do this, tell me, how important was it to gather
6 intelligence on the enemy in order to carry out the commander's mission?
7 A. It is my personal opinion and my professional opinion that
8 gathering intelligence is extremely important, because without such
9 relevant information on the basis of which one makes assessments, a
10 commander can't take any decisions or, rather, a commander can take
11 decisions, but if we have better intelligence, then the conditions for
12 taking decisions have been improved if a commander has to take such
14 Q. Mr. Husic, how did you obtain information and intelligence that
15 might have had an impact on the decision-making process in the command at
16 that period?
17 A. During that period, we relied on our reconnaissance units. We
18 also relied on our electronic reconnaissance unit, and within its
19 capabilities we carried out radio reconnaissance because we were not
20 equipped for any other forms of reconnaissance.
21 We also carried out interviews, and we also monitored the local
22 media. This was another way for us to obtain information.
23 Q. Mr. Husic, could you please look at document 36. This is another
24 new document. The number is 10/99/3, and the date is 12 January, 19 -- I
25 apologise. The number is 10/288-1. And the date is 23 January 1993.
1 Do you have that document before you?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. I'm going to ask you to read, just for the identification of this
4 document, who the -- who drafted the document and when was this document
5 sent, and then I will ask you to read item 4 of this document.
6 Before that, I would like to ask you whether you recognise this
8 A. Yes. I recognise this document. This is a document issued by the
9 command of the 3rd Corps, numbers 10/288-1. The date is 23 January 1993.
10 This is a report. The number is 21. The intelligence report sent
11 to the staff of the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina, to be more precise, for the Intelligence Administration.
13 Q. Can you please look at item 4 and read it, and can you tell me
14 whether these were your proposals aimed at preparing your body to be able
15 to carry out such an important mission that was required from it?
16 A. Item number 4 says: "With regard to this item pursuant -- on the
17 basis of the work so far, with a view to improving organisation and
18 functioning of the intelligence service, we hereby propose that at the
19 level of the command of the corps the intelligence department is
20 established as a special body of the command. The following would -- the
21 following staff would make up this body: Chief officer; two officers for
22 intelligence out of whom one officer, one assistant chief, one younger
23 officer, one typist, translator. The department should be brought to the
24 strength of at least 60 to 80 per cent, and it should have at least one
25 vehicle at its disposal. The intelligence organs in the brigade command
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 should be brought to 100 per cent strength and the same applies to the
2 reconnaissance units at least when it comes to the staff and weapons that
3 they have at their disposal."
4 Q. My question to you is: Are these proposals of the 3rd Corps sent
5 to the superior command, and how did you by means of such proposals try to
6 prepare your body to carry out its important missions within the 3rd
8 A. Yes. These were the proposals of the intelligence organ of the
9 3rd Corps, and the objective was to improve the organisation and
10 functioning of the intelligence service. In any case, we believed that we
11 were not well-equipped and that we did not have enough staff. That is why
12 our proposal showed what we meant the best situation would be when it came
13 to staff. We also said that we needed a vehicle.
14 As far as the subordinate units were concerned, we wanted these to
15 be brought up to the hundred per cent strength, because the customary
16 situation was that there was one person at the level of the brigade and
17 one at the level of each and every battalion, and their reconnaissance
18 units which also were not brought to the full strength, we asked for more
19 attention to be paid to that issue. The situation reflected the situation
20 at that moment.
21 Q. Mr. Husic, you have told us that the information that you received
22 from individuals and that -- that was one -- one of your sources of
23 information. Can you please look at documents number 31, 32, and 34.
24 First of all tell me whether you recognise these documents and
25 then I will ask you some questions about these documents. First of all,
1 document after number 31. Tell us, please, who sent it and when, on what
2 date. And the same applies to number 32 and 34.
3 A. This is document sent by the command of the 3rd Corps. Number is
4 10/1 --
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please. Yes, the
7 MR. NEUNER: Mr. President, we noted that there is no ERN number
8 here on this document. If my learned friend could at least state the date
9 of the document so that later in the transcript the document can somehow
10 be identified. At this moment, it is difficult. This is here transcript
11 lines -- 20, line 1, documents number 31, 32, and 34. If my learned
12 friend could just state the date of the document and where they came from
13 for the record, please. Thank you very much.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. It is either the Defence
15 or the witness who should provide us with the date of this document that
16 was issued in Zenica. Maybe you could give us the date and the witness
17 could confirm it after you. We have to have that in the transcript,
18 because number 31 does not have any ERN number, so it has to be said that
19 the document originates from the 3rd Corps, that it was issued on the 15th
20 of December, 1992. Maybe we can say that this document bears the internal
21 number of the 3rd Corps, 10/183-1.
22 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. I can do
23 that. I thought maybe the witness would do that.
24 Q. Can you please look at the documents number 10/183-1. The date is
25 15 December 1992. Then document 10/183-2, and finally the document number
1 10 dated 11 January 1993.
2 Do you recognise these documents, and what are they about?
3 A. Yes, I do recognise them. I would like to provide separate
4 comments about each of these individual documents. The first one was
5 issued on 15 December 1992. The number is 10/183-1. It is an official
7 At the beginning, it says that intelligence organs on the days of
8 the 13 and 14 December 1992 carried out interviews with Merim Galijatovic,
9 father's name Mahmut, born in 1964 in Trebinje, currently residing in
10 Sarajevo in Danila Djekica Street number 28. Currently he is a member of
11 the HVO, and he is an officer of the Siroki Brijeg Convicts Battalion.
12 Q. We don't want to talk about the contents of the document, so you
13 were talking about the way you obtained information. Can you tell us,
14 what does this document represent and how does it reflect the method of
15 your work and the method of collecting information in your service?
16 A. From time to time, we were not in the position to talk to the
17 individuals for whom we assumed that they might provide us with certain
18 intelligence information. In this particular case, we did have such an
19 opportunity, and we took that opportunity.
20 Q. Can you please look at document number 32. The document was
21 issued by the command of the 3rd Corps. The number is 10/183-2, and the
22 date is 20 December 1992. Is this a similar document to the previous one?
23 Do you recognise this document, and can you tell us whether this document
24 is similar to the one and does it reflect the same method of obtaining
25 intelligence information by your service?
1 A. Yes, I recognise this document of the command of the 3rd Corps.
2 The number is 10/183-2, and it was drafted in Zenica on the 20th of
3 December, 1992. Again it's an official record, and again this is an
4 interview that was carried out on that particular date.
5 Q. Is this the same method as the one described in document number
6 34, the document issued by the 3rd Corps Command under number 10 on the
7 11th of January, 1993, in Zenica?
8 A. Yes, I recognise this document. Attached to this document should
9 be an official record. This is report number 10/992. The date is 11
10 January 1993, and it was sent to the Intelligence Administration of the
11 Supreme Command Staff, and it should contain the official record, which I
12 do not have before me.
13 Q. I might have provided you with the wrong document. This is
14 document number 33. However, the document number 34 - this is number 10 -
15 the date is 11 January 1993, and this is an official record. Do you
16 recognise this document, and does it belong to the series describing
17 methods of obtaining information from the physical persons?
18 A. Yes. It is the same type of document. The only number is 10. It
19 was drafted in Zenica on the 11 January 1993. Again it describes another
21 Q. In response to my previous questions, you have told us that you
22 used radio communication that intercepted radio communication, and that's
23 how you obtained information.
24 Can you please look at document number 43, which is a document
25 issued by the 3rd Corps Command, and the number is 10/280-1, and can you
1 tell me, what kind of document is this? Do you recognise it, and whether
2 this was one of the ways that you obtained your information.
3 A. Yes. This is a document issued by the 3rd Corps Command. The
4 number is 10/280-1. It was issued in Zenica on the 22nd of January, 1993.
5 The title is the Intelligence Report Number 19. It was sent to the
6 Supreme Command Staff of the armed forces of the Republic of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the Intelligence Administration thereof, and you
8 can see in this document how we obtained intelligence. I can read only
9 the first sentence, which says as follows: "Our units for electronic
10 surveillance and anti-electronic fight on the 19th of January, 1993, at
11 2000 to 2200 hours, during the course of electronic surveillance, the
12 frequency 41.75 megahertz intercepted the following conversation." Then
13 the participants in the conversation are mentioned, and the text is also
15 Q. You've also told us that you collected information from the media
16 and from some documents. Can you please look at document after tab 27.
17 The number is 1387. It does have an English translation. Can you please
18 tell me whether the attachment to this order is one of the sources that
19 you used to obtain information on the behaviour of your enemy?
20 A. I can see this document, and in this specific case I was not the
21 author of this document, but you can see that this is an order to prevent
22 surprises and that we analyse a document that the command of the operation
23 zone of Central Bosnia of the HVO sent to its subordinate units, and we
24 forwarded this order to our subordinate units.
25 Q. Under item 5, you can see that the information that you obtained
1 from this document led to the intensifying of your reconnaissance
2 activities. Tell me, the information that you collected in various ways
3 and by using various methods, did this information govern the work of your
4 intelligence service, or did you have a constant interest in only some
5 subjects of your work?
6 A. Given the way the situation developed, this determined where we
7 would focus our activities, and this document shows, and if you bear in
8 mind certain information and the fact that units were requested to
9 intensify the work, well, yes, you can see that this was the case, that
10 they were asked to intensify their work. The activities that they focused
11 on depended on the situation and on whether we had any reliable
13 Q. Mr. Husic, you have spoken about the structure of the organs and
14 the methods that you used. You mentioned some of the methods that you
15 used. Who did you gather information and intelligence on? Who were you
16 interested in?
17 A. At the time, in 1992, in the course of 1992, we were mainly
18 interested in aggressor forces or, rather, the Republika Srpska forces.
19 However, we were also interested in HVO forces, because occasionally this
20 is how the situation in the field would develop; information was obtained.
21 We didn't consider HVO forces as an enemy, we considered these forces as
22 an ally, but we were interested in them.
23 Q. Mr. Husic, could you now tell me, once you had gathered
24 information, your field of work included the situation of the enemy, the
25 Republika Srpska army, and later the HVO, but once you had gathered such
1 information, who would you forward such information and intelligence to?
2 What was the procedure followed when gathering information, assessing
3 information, and forwarding it? Who would you forward your information
5 A. All the information gathered would first be processed in the
6 intelligence organ. It's very important to make certain assessments when
7 processing the information. Naturally the more information you have or
8 you -- if you get the same information from a number of sources, then the
9 assessment will be better, more appropriate.
10 Once we had made assessments of the information, if we had enough
11 time, if we had enough information, we would then forward this information
12 to the Chief of Staff. If we believed that the information was
13 interesting but we didn't have enough time, we would provide them in the
14 form that we had received such information in, and we would express our
15 opinion that it would be good to have a look at that information.
16 Q. Would you sometimes provide information to subordinate units too?
17 A. Yes. We soon started to inform our subordinate units too. In
18 this case, we informed our colleagues, our colleagues in the intelligence
19 organs, and it was their duty to inform their superiors, and this was one
20 of the ways of informing them, of focusing our work. This enabled them to
21 know what was happening. This enabled them to make certain assessments
22 and to be well-informed. And this certainly improves the pre-conditions
23 that required for them to continue with their work.
24 Q. When I asked you about who your organ was interested in, you said
25 that in 1992, you were interested in the Republika Srpska army, which was
1 the aggressor, but you said that you also started gathering information
2 and assessing information on the HVO.
3 Tell me, why did you become interested in the HVO, and when did
4 you realise that it was necessary to view the HVO not only as an ally but
5 also someone who perhaps didn't share the same objectives as the ABiH?
6 A. Well, we were interested in the HVO above all because of the
7 situation that prevailed at the time in territory that was under the
8 control of the HVO or that was administered by the HVO. As an example, we
9 were interested in them because in the territory under HVO control, there
10 was limited control of movement, but certain other things took place. Our
11 members would be arrested, inhabitants would be arrested. So in order to
12 prevent certain things from happening, it was important to have
13 information. But this wasn't a matter of priority for us and it varied
14 from situation to situation.
15 However, there were also certain indicators showing that HVO
16 members were establishing contact with the enemy, with the Republika
17 Srpska army at the time, and naturally we thought it was necessary to pay
18 attention to this. So there were incidents, of course.
19 The first time we thought that a serious conflict was breaking out
20 with HVO units was in mid-January in Gornji Vakuf. After those events, we
21 focused our attention on the territory where HVO units were deployed or,
22 rather, on territory under HVO control.
23 Q. Mr. Husic, you said, "We considered the HVO to be an ally." Did
24 you obtain any information on how the HVO viewed the ABiH?
25 A. Well, from time to time we would hear in conversations, in
1 interviews, or in certain cases we would come across certain documents,
2 and this was particularly the case when the organs of the Croatian
3 Community of Herceg-Bosna were being established. They were, in fact,
4 establishing control over that territory. So bearing all this in mind, we
5 believed that a state was being created within a state, and we had certain
6 information to this effect.
7 Q. Mr. Husic, please have a look at document number 7, number 0556,
8 and please have a look at item number 1. The HVO says that the enemy
9 forces of the ABiH should be broken up and certain places are mentioned.
10 Tell me, does this first item, once you have read it, reflect the
11 information that you had in January 1993 on how the HVO began to view the
13 A. This document, 0556, was drafted by the Operative Zone of
14 North-Western Herzegovina. The number is 01/35-1, Tomislavgrad, the 12th
15 of January, 1993. The title of the document is Action of the Operative
16 Zone of North-Western Herzegovina Forces in Gornji Vakuf and Bugojno.
17 It's an order addressed to all brigades in this Operative Zone.
18 Q. Please read it out to yourself and then answer my question,
19 because we do have the English version of this document. The Chamber and
20 my colleagues in the courtroom have the English translation of this
21 document so you don't have to read it out loud, but please have a look at
22 it and tell me if it reflects the information you had on how the HVO was
23 behaving in January 1993 in Central Bosnia.
24 A. The document shows, and in particular item number 1 shows the
25 following: It says that the attack forces of the operation zone and other
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 forces, which were probably in the zone, it says that they are to rout the
2 enemy forces, and in the brackets it says the BH army in Bugojno and
3 Gornji Vakuf. One can see what the objective is. If I continue, I can
4 see that it mentions certain tasks.
5 Q. It's not necessary, Mr. Husic. All I'm interested in is whether
6 this document reflects the information you had on the way in which the HVO
7 was behaving in January 1993 in the Central Bosnia area.
8 A. Yes, but we didn't have this document. We didn't have such
9 precise information -- or, rather, we couldn't have expected that they
10 would really carry out an attack against us.
11 Q. Please have a look at document number 8 now. 0571 is the number
12 on the top of the document. And tell me -- or, rather, have a look at
13 this document and then have a look at document number 9, 0575. Document
14 number 12, 0587. And once you have had a look at these documents, could
15 you tell me whether these documents also confirm the information that you
16 had at the time, the information that you had on the HVO was no longer an
17 ally and had started behaving in a completely different way. Have a look
18 at these HVO documents and then could you please answer my question.
19 A. Document 0571 is similar to the previous document, and here it
20 says that Colonel Siljeg should be informed that the Muslims deliberately
21 negotiating all the time while they're simultaneously being active on the
22 front line. This is their tactic. It says, "Order our forces to open
23 fire." So, yes, they are treating us as an enemy here.
24 And then you mentioned number 10; is that right? Twelve?
25 Q. Yes, I said number 10.
1 A. Number 10, 0580, from the 3rd Corps Command.
2 Q. Number 9. I apologise. 0575. And number 12.
3 A. 0575 is also an order from the Bobovac HVO Brigade, dated the 16th
4 of January, 1993. And in the introduction, it mentioned certain things
5 that are not true; that we carried out an attack, et cetera, and that they
6 are placing their units in a state of readiness.
7 Q. Let's have a look at document number 12 now. Could you tell me
8 whether this document also reflects the situation you were familiar with
9 on the basis of the information you had in January 1993.
10 The information you had on the way the HVO was behaving, was this
11 the reason for which you focused your attention on HVO units?
12 A. In document 0587 from the Bobovac Brigade, the 2nd Manoeuvre
13 Battalion Haljinici, dated the 17th of January, 1993. This is an order
14 again. It also has to do with combat readiness of units and ensuring that
15 they have maximum ability. Certain tasks are being set. It reflects the
16 situation at the time, and this is one of the reasons for which we decided
17 to monitor HVO activities and to monitor them more intensively than
19 Q. Mr. Husic, you had a look at a number of HVO documents that
20 mention how the ABiH should be treated. Have a look at document number 10
21 and document number 11 now, and could you tell me whether you recognise
22 these documents and do they reflect the information you had at the time on
23 the way in which the HVO was behaving?
24 A. The document number 10 is 0580. This document was issued by the
25 3rd Corps Command, and it was sent to the intelligence administration of
1 the Supreme Command Staff. It's an intelligence report based on which one
2 could see that we did have certain intelligence regarding the HVO and its
4 For example, on page 1 you can see, under section 474, it says
5 here on the basis of the new information of the HVO in Cajdras,
6 Grahovcici --
7 THE INTERPRETER: If the witness could slow down reading this
9 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Can you please read -- look at the second page and the whole
11 section thereof. And you don't have to read it. We have a translation.
12 And can you tell me whether this was the information that you had at your
13 disposal at the time, and was that part of your intelligence that you
14 reported on in your reports?
15 A. Yes. This is an intelligence report, and again we're talking
16 about the intelligence that had to do with Zenica and Vitez, Novi Travnik
17 as well. This report talks about units which had arrived, and they didn't
18 belong to that area of responsible. This is something that reflects the
19 situation at the time.
20 Q. Thank you very much. Mr. Husic, when did the relationship with
21 the HVO deteriorate further? When did you intensify your work in order to
22 enable the 3rd Corps Command to perform its mission and take appropriate
24 A. The intensity of our work depended on the development of the
25 situation. However, from that period of time onwards, we continued
1 monitoring the HVO. As far as I can remember, the next serious conflict
2 took place in the sector of Vitez after the attack on the village of
4 Q. I'm now going to ask you to look at document number 14. The
5 number is 18 -- 1782. Tell me whether this was a period of particularly
6 intensive intelligence gathering regarding the behaviour of the HVO. Was
7 that something that you paid particular attention to? But not only you
8 but also the other organs of the 3rd Corps?
9 A. Did you say number 14?
10 Q. Yes, number 14. And the number that it bears is 1782.
11 A. This number 1782 is actually a document issued by the HVO in
12 Vitez, and the date is 16 April 1993. It is engagement in further combat
13 operations. We can assume that this is an order, because this is the
14 style and the tone of this document. And especially in its item 1 in
15 which it says: "Capture the villages of Donja Veceriska, Ahmici, Sivrino
16 Selo and Vrhovine completely."
17 Q. At the time did you have ample intelligence on the activities of
18 the HVO or its offensive in the area where the units of the 3rd Corps were
20 A. At the time we did have certain information. However, I can
21 confirm that we did not have information that there would be this attack
22 on behalf of the HVO.
23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, maybe this is a
24 good time for our first break. If the Trial Chamber will allow me to do
25 so, I will ask the witness to look at the remaining documents. I am going
1 to group these documents according to the subjects that I'm going to
2 tackle. It will enable me to proceed with my examination-in-chief without
3 asking the witness to read in front of the Trial Chamber.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. We shall now take a break.
5 We shall resume around ten past four. The witness is allowed to peruse
6 the binder and thus will save the time.
7 --- Recess taken at 3.46 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 4.14 p.m.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence, you have the floor.
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Q. Mr. Husic, before the break we were talking about the HVO
12 activities in April. During that period of time, did you face with the
13 propaganda which aimed at distorting the facts of the events that were
14 taking place in the area to what extent your information had -- had a
15 bearing on the mission of the 3rd Corps Commander?
16 A. Yes, we were faced with this propaganda. Whatever was going on
17 was accompanied by propaganda activity. However, from the intelligence
18 point of view, we could only observe that. But this was not our method of
19 work. We monitored the media in order to obtain data, to obtain
20 information that might point to what would follow. There was a lot of
21 propaganda, obviously, but there is nothing else I could say about it.
22 Q. I was not going to discuss propaganda with you in any case.
23 However, you did say that the information that you received after the
24 events in the Lasva Valley and in Ahmici and its impact. I would kindly
25 ask you to look at document 16. The number is 0866. Can you please look
1 at the first sentence and tell me, was this the best way in which the
2 general public was informed of the events at -- the customary way the
3 events were portrayed totally different than they actually looked?
4 A. What we can see here is that they accused us of the attack. We
5 know what happened there. We were always called Muslim forces, and this
6 was part of that propaganda. We were not Muslim forces, as is well known.
7 Q. This was a document issued by the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna.
8 The number is 01-4-264/93, the date is 16 April 1993.
9 Let's move on to another subject. The subject is whether in the
10 situation in which the mission of the 3rd Corps was carried out and the
11 mission was the state defence. Were you faced with the information on the
12 cooperation between the two enemy forces that the BiH army was in conflict
13 at the time? If you have that information, when was the earliest
14 information that you received on this cooperation?
15 A. As I've already told you, the HVO became a subject of our interest
16 before these conflicts in Gornji Vakuf, which were a real turning point.
17 Even before that, we had information that there was a contact between
18 members of the HVO and Republika Srpska army that we considered our enemy.
19 Q. Can you please look at document number 30. The number -- the
20 document was issued by the Supreme Command Staff of the armed forces. The
21 number is 02347 -- 173. And can you please tell me whether you have any
22 personal information about the contents of this information, especially
23 its first paragraph. The number of the document is 1468. It's a Defence
25 A. One can see from this document that it arrived from the Supreme
1 Command, from the superior command. However, it says in the first
2 sentence that according to the report of the intelligence organ of the
3 regional staff of Zenica, and so on and so forth. The negotiations in
4 Teslic are mentioned. Some names are mentioned.
5 If I were to see my own report, I could confirm all this.
6 However, this document is something that I'm familiar with, and I know the
7 person who authored it because he was my superior along the professional
8 lines of command in my superior command.
9 Q. Mr. Husic, on the 24th of September, 1992, who was the head of the
10 intelligence organ of the regional staff of defence of Zenica?
11 A. I was the head of the intelligence organ at the time.
12 Q. Thank you very much. Tell me, please, what was the importance of
13 the information on cooperation between the two enemy forces when it came
14 to the mission of the corps commander? How did it impact the situation in
15 your area? Was the situation even more compounded by that cooperation?
16 A. The information was anything but welcome. Our situation was
17 anything but enviable at the time, and this cooperation was anything but
18 welcome. On the other hand, we found this behaviour rather strange. We
19 tried to confirm whether this was really the case. We had some previous
20 experience from -- with the HVO, and we didn't know why this happened.
21 However, later on it turned out that there indeed was cooperation between
22 the HVO and the Republika Srpska army. This compounded the situation even
23 further, and the situation after that deteriorated rapidly.
24 Q. Based on your intelligence and the real situation on the ground,
25 you realised that the HVO and the army of Republika Srpska engaged in a
1 joint fight against the BiH army. Isn't that correct?
2 A. The most obvious example was Zepce, and this fully confirmed our
3 information. We had an opportunity to see units of the Republika Srpska
4 army and HVO units acting in concert and fighting together. This was the
5 most obvious example of direct cooperation between the two forces.
6 Although we had some previous intelligence, this is the classical example
7 of the intelligence being confirmed in practice.
8 Q. I'm now going to ask you to look at the documents after the title
9 number 3, Cooperation Between The HVO and The Republika Srpska Army. Look
10 at documents after number 48 to number 59 and tell me, please, whether
11 these documents -- actually, look at documents up to number 60. When you
12 look at these documents, would you say that they confirmed your
13 intelligence on permanent cooperation and the development of that
14 cooperation between the two enemies against the BiH army? If you think
15 that any of the documents among these should be highlighted and commented
16 upon, please do so. I am going to ask you to look at all of them, and I'm
17 going to quote their numbers.
18 After 48, the number of the document is 0651. After tab 49, the
19 number of the document is 1192. On tab 50 we have 1260. On tab 51 we
20 have 1280. On tab 52 we have 1291. On tab 53 we have 1309. On tab 54,
21 we have 1340. On tab 55, we have 1335. On tab 56, we have 1339. On tab
22 57, we have 1380. On tab 59, we have 1542. On tab -- tab 59, we have
24 I hope you had an occasion to skim through these documents during
25 the break. Now I would kindly ask you to answer the following question:
1 Do these documents issued by the HVO confirm your information in 1993?
2 A. Certainly. I would like to start --
3 Q. Could you please hold on just a second. The Prosecution has a
5 MR. NEUNER: Mr. President, just a correction for the record. It
6 is on page 36, line 1. Two, there's twice 1542 mentioned, but I think my
7 learned colleague wanted to say 1543. Can this please be corrected for
8 the transcript please.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I continue?
11 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Go ahead.
13 A. The first document, number 0651, as far as I can tell this
14 followed the events in Gornji Vakuf. It was drafted by the Main Staff of
15 the HVO, and in item 1 it says that the defence line facing the Chetniks
16 should be weakened to the minimum. They obviously lost any interest in
17 engaging the Chetniks.
18 The next document, 1192, the date is 16th of June. It was issued
19 by the Zepa Brigade, 111.XP Brigade. I found here that in one place a
20 reference is made -- let me just try and find it. On line 15, it says
21 that Serbs with the commander of the Doboj OG, Colonel Arsic, offered full
22 cooperation in joint fight against the balija in these areas. They also
23 request from us an urgent response about that cooperation. "We are in two
24 minds. We need your opinion very urgently. We don't want to further the
25 same as Travnik."
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. I apologise. Who are balijas?
2 A. This is another term, a derogatory term that was used in the
3 propaganda vocabulary and what they meant are the armed forces of the
4 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5 The next document is 1260, and it was issued by the same brigade
6 on the 26th of June, 1993. It says here that, "Due to the aggression of
7 the Muslim forces, we were forced to abandon the defence line and the
8 positions facing the Serbian army." The facilities are mentioned here,
9 and it says that the Serbian army respects the cease-fire, and they have
10 not engaged or opened fire against the HVO.
11 Q. You said the positions were surrendered to the Serbian army. Is
12 that what it says?
13 A. Yes, that is what it says. "We were forced to hand over, to
14 surrender our positions," which means that they ceded their positions.
15 Q. And then the following document, number 1280. Again at the end of
16 item 1, it says: "Enemy." It says, "In the course of the day the Serbian
17 forces infiltrated tanks through our territory, and they're preparing to
18 take Zavidovici, and Maglaj and Tesanj have been completely encircled and
19 will not be able to withstand the blockade for very long."
20 It's obvious this refers to cooperation between the HVO and the
21 Republika Srpska army.
22 The next document, 1291, it's from the security service from
23 Vitez, and as far as I have understood, they are analysing a situation.
24 At the beginning it says about establishing contact with representatives
25 of the Serbian army, with responsible representatives of the Serbian army,
1 and then it also says, "From all information available you can see that
2 there's been numerous contact between HVO individuals and individuals from
3 the Serbian army." And then certain other details are mentioned.
4 Q. You can have a look at the next document.
5 A. If I may, I think that this document suggests developing similar
6 contacts in that area, so to speak.
7 The following document, 1309, it's the North-Western Herzegovina
8 area. The staff is issuing an order to provide documents to those
9 brigades and to provide coordinates and a list of MOS objectives that have
10 to be targeted. "XY side," it says. And at the end of the sentence it
11 mentions the line that MOS is holding in direction of the Serbs. The
12 Serbian army, the Republika Srpska army is the XY side here.
13 Q. Since this is an HVO document, could you please say who the HVO
14 call the MOS.
15 A. The MOS is an abbreviation for the Muslim armed forces, and
16 naturally in this case they consider the ABiH to be the Muslim armed
18 The next document is from the same command. It's to the commander
19 personally. It says that a report should be provided on Chetnik
20 activities in the morning and on the targets that they fired at. And then
21 there's a handwritten part.
22 Q. Have a look at document 56 now. 56, 57, and 59. I think that
23 would be enough in order to clarify the problem that you were confronted
24 with when performing your duties as well as the 3rd Corps Command when
25 performing its mission.
1 A. This document relates to what I've already been testifying about.
2 It -- it mentions the army, the red, and there's other information on
3 agreements, and then it says -- at the end there's a post script and it
4 says, "Tell the Serbs that their people are together with our people and
5 that the Serbs are fighting the Muslims alongside our forces and that's
6 how the Serbs have been killed."
7 The next document is document 1380. This is dated August 1993,
8 and it is about the efforts made by the XP Brigade to establish contact
9 with the 110th HVO Brigade with which we were not in a conflict. It
10 behaved in a correct manner, so to speak, complied with its duties, and it
11 mentions the meeting at Teslic, and we know that that was in territory
12 under the control of the Republika Srpska army. And this document is
13 about the efforts made in order to get this unit involved. And what was
14 the other document you mentioned?
15 Q. 59.
16 A. 59. The date is the 18th of November 1993. I think the document
17 number, the next document is 1542 and it says, on the basis of an
18 agreement between the Republika Srpska government and the Herceg-Bosna
19 government, two tanks were leased.
20 Q. You've had a look at a lot of HVO documents and you've read
21 through them. Tell me now, Mr. Husic, you've commented on all these
22 documents, and do these documents confirm the information that you had in
23 1993 on the cooperation of two enemy forces? And tell me, in 1993, what
24 sort of a situation was the 3rd Corps Command in as far as performing its
25 mission was concerned?
1 A. Having had a look at these documents, naturally this confirms the
2 information that we had. These documents contain a lot of information
3 that we were not aware of at the time. But in any event, this information
4 does support the idea that there was cooperation and that this cooperation
5 had started even earlier, in the territory of Bugojno.
6 So what could the situation have been like if we had been totally
7 encircled? Well, I wouldn't comment on that, but it couldn't have been
8 worse, most likely.
9 Q. Mr. Husic, could you please just have a look at documents number
10 60, 1124; 61, the number of this document is DH1130. Document 62, the
11 number of this document is DH1140; and number 63. Can you tell me whether
12 these documents from the Republika Srpska army confirmed the information
13 that you had, and do they confirm the sort of situation that the 3rd Corps
14 had to go through, live in in 1993?
15 A. The first document, 1124, under item 1 mentions the firing support
16 of HVO forces. Item 2 mentions taking care of wounded. So, yes, this is
17 a textbook example of cooperation, and the document does confirm this.
18 The next document, number 1130, which was drafted on the following
19 day, we can see that they're regulating the status of HVO prisoners in the
20 Travnik sector. The first part says that they requested that lines be
21 taken and that they should be taken care of until a final solution had
22 been found.
23 Q. That document is already in evidence, but my question is when you
24 have a look at the following document, at the time the documents drafted
25 by the Republika Srpska army, did these documents confirm what you knew in
1 -- within your body? Did it confirm -- do these documents confirm the
2 information that you had in your organ?
3 A. Yes. This document, which is from the corps command, provides
4 instructions to the Vlasic OG. And in the previous documents I have
5 spoken about, in the previous document, cooperation was already mentioned.
6 It referred to regulating the status. And the following document you have
7 mentioned says, according to the information we have -- well, the document
8 is DH1140. I think the office of the president of Republika Srpska
9 forwarded this to the Main Staff, and it says that he is ordering soldiers
10 in Serb territories on Vlasic. It says they have to be transported to
11 Vares with all of their weapons.
12 Q. Thank you. Awhile ago you said that sometimes your sources of
13 information were not very reliable and the media were not very reliable.
14 Have a look at the last document. In spite of what you said, in the ABiH
15 were you aware of the fact that this cooperation and everything else that
16 took place in 1993 was in fact part of something that had been agreed upon
17 far earlier, or were you not aware of that at the time? Did you have no
18 such information at the time? This is document 63. It's a press release
19 dated the 7th of May, 1992.
20 A. At the time, we didn't have this document. The date is May 1992.
21 But when I have a look at this document, it's clear that agreements were
22 reached at a high political level, and it was said that Bosnia would be
23 separated into three -- or divided into three independent states. So this
24 does confirm that. But we hoped that in spite of all information that we
25 had, this would not happen, because to this very day I don't understand
1 why, given everything that people had been through in Croatia, I didn't
2 understand why the HVO was fighting us. I didn't understand why they
3 wanted this, why we weren't allies, which is what we should have been at
4 the beginning, because so many of our men fought in the Republic of
5 Croatia too. And on the other hand, there were quite a lot of men,
6 especially in Herzegovina, there were quite a lot of men in the HVO units.
7 So we had information, but we hoped that none of this would happen.
8 Q. Mr. Husic, just a few more questions that have to do with the
9 second field in which you were active in 1993. In mid-1993, were you
10 assigned to any other duties in the 3rd Corps Command; and if so, can you
11 tell us what sort of duties you were assigned?
12 A. From time to time, I was also engaged as liaison officer. Above
13 all, I had to liaise with BritBat. There were so many international
14 organisations present there. There was a lot of pressure to establish
15 contacts. Those were duties that I was assigned, although later one of
16 the intelligence organs of the 3rd Corps continued with that work. But
17 during that period of time, these duties had to do with meetings at high
18 levels, at levels that -- where I wasn't usually present.
19 Q. Mr. Husic, with regard to that role, what policies did the 3rd
20 Corps pursue as far as assisting international organisations is concerned,
21 and primarily UNPROFOR, so that they could perform their mission
22 unhindered, the mission for which they were in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
23 A. We tried to help them as much as possible to ensure that they
24 could perform their mission. That was the -- those were the policies
25 pursued by the 3rd Corps. We tried to grant all their requests. And when
1 I had contact with these bodies, it was my task to act in this way.
2 Q. And finally, tell me, to what extent did Commander Hadzihasanovic,
3 when he had contact with UNPROFOR representatives and representatives of
4 international organisations, to what extent did he contribute to pursuing
5 these 3rd Corps policies and implementing them?
6 A. Well, since I received instructions from the Chief of Staff, on
7 the whole, as far as I know, General Hadzihasanovic, at least when I had
8 contact with him, was positive and responded in a positive manner to
9 requests for meetings. And deputy -- his deputy, General Merdan, was in
10 fact responsible for such contact because there were so many agreements,
11 so many negotiations at that time, and representatives of the
12 international organisations were always involved in these negotiations and
13 agreements. So he was the main person for such contact.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Husic.
15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. This
16 concludes my examination-in-chief, and I apologise for having taken up ten
17 additional minutes. Thank you.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll now turn to the other
19 Defence team. Do they have any questions for this witness?
20 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. At
21 this point in time, Mr. Kubura's Defence has no questions for this
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. The Prosecution may
24 commence with their cross-examination.
25 MR. NEUNER: Before I commence with the cross-examination, I would
1 just point out that there is one new document which has been disclosed to
2 the Defence, to both Defence counsels yesterday at noon. So within the
3 24-hour -- or more than 24 hours in advance. And this document is
4 authored by today's witness, and for this reason I'm anticipating that I'm
5 showing this today.
6 Cross-examined by Mr. Neuner:
7 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Husic. My name is Matthias Neuner, and I am
8 appearing on behalf of the Prosecution here, and I want to ask you some
9 questions. If you don't understand my questions, please ask me to repeat
10 or rephrase them and I will try to do so.
11 You just testified in extenso about the cooperation between the
12 VRS and the HVO in Central Bosnia in 1993. Do you agree with me that even
13 if such cooperation between the HVO and the VRS was occurring, this in no
14 way could affect the principle duty of the corps commander,
15 Mr. Hadzihasanovic, or of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, Mr. Kubura, to
16 prevent crimes of their own subordinates in 1993? Do you agree with this?
17 A. They certainly had an impact on all the decisions made by the
18 commander. I'm talking about the crimes that were committed, but I cannot
19 say that this did not have an impact. In any case, this compounded the
20 situation. I wouldn't be able to agree with you on the position that you
21 have just put forth.
22 Q. I understand. You said you cannot say that this did not have an
23 impact. Can you try to explain why and how should it have an impact on
24 the commander's duty to prevent crimes if adversaries might cooperate?
25 Isn't the duty to prevent an overall duty, the duty to prevent crimes?
1 A. Certainly. There is a duty to prevent crimes. It's a key duty.
2 However, when the situation is complicated, I'm sure that your decisions
3 are affected by that. If we're talking about how these decisions were
4 affected, it's very simple. If the situation had not been such as it was,
5 these units would have been engaged in a certain other area.
6 Q. But do you agree with me that the units who were fighting the
7 enemy are distinct from the units who have to prevent crimes? I'm talking
8 about ABiH units now.
9 A. Your question is rather general and broad. Can you be more
10 precise? In my view, units are units. They have a certain purpose.
11 Could you be more specific in your question and narrow it down a little?
12 Q. You referred to the complexity of the situation at the time in
13 1993 and that the complexity of the situation could have an impact, in
14 your opinion, on the duty to prevent. What I try to get at is to ask you
15 which unit -- which units within the 3rd Corps had to prevent crimes, and
16 didn't this -- these units have this specific task as opposed to combat
17 units who were -- whose task it was to fight the aggressor?
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Defence.
19 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am trying to
20 understand the questions by my learned friend, but these questions are not
21 for me but for the witness, and I fully appreciate that. However, within
22 the scope of my examination-in-chief, I was not talking about units that
23 were involved in crime prevention. We're talking about the intelligence
24 organ, about the intelligence and information that that organ had. And if
25 these questions do not serve to refresh the witness's memory or to
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 discredit the witness, they certainly do not arise from any of the
2 questions that were put to the witness during the examination-in-chief.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The other Defence team, please.
4 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I
5 believe that on page 24, line 18 and 19, the witness told us exactly what
6 he did, and he was involved in the -- in collection of the intelligence on
7 the HVO and the aggressor forces, and there was no mention of the crime
8 prevention units.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Defence has mentioned a
10 number of problems. The first one mentioned by Mr. Kubura's Defence -- I
11 will give you the floor. I will summarise the position of both Defence
13 The lawyers of General Kubura have just told us that the witness
14 has not spoken about any units that might have committed crimes, that his
15 main activity, the chief activity was to collect information on the
16 relationship between the HVO and the Serbs and the consequences that this
17 relationship might have had on the BiH army. The other Defence team,
18 representing General Hadzihasanovic, have mentioned that they have not
19 addressed this type of problem in their examination-in-chief.
20 I would like to hear from the Prosecution why they are asking this
21 type of question. At my level, I have not been able to understand the
22 meaning of your questions and why you're putting those questions to the
23 witness. Either you are putting the questions that nobody understands, or
24 you have an explanation for those questions. Why?
25 MR. NEUNER: The Prosecution is moving on, Your Honours, to
1 another line of questioning.
2 Q. Witness, to the best of your recollection, did any contacts
3 between the ABiH and the Serbian side, the VRS, occur in 1993?
4 A. The intelligence organ did not have such information. I
5 personally can say that one could hear and that there were rumours on such
6 contacts, that there was trade going on and so on and so forth. However,
7 I wouldn't be able to provide you with any comment whatsoever, because I
8 personally do not know, nor was I in the position to see any such
9 information, to have such information at my disposal.
10 Q. You just mentioned rumours, and my learned colleague has shown you
11 a document. This is in your binder, number 52, or tab 52, and it's
12 DH1291. If you could please have a look at this document. It's an HVO
13 document dated 7 July 1993. And if you please look at the third or the
14 second paragraph, starting with "Postoje..." In English it's indeed the
15 third paragraph, starting with "There's also information indicating..."
16 In the B/C/S version it's the passage with "Postoje..." Do you find this
17 passage? If you could maybe read out this one sentence, please.
18 A. You will confirm whether this is the exact sentence: "There is
19 also information indicating that the Serbian side maintains similar
20 contacts with representatives of the BiH army only the BiH army had
21 definitely been better prepared. Given the overall relations --"
22 Q. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I understand -- or I
23 understood from your answers that this is an HVO document, but you
24 commented upon it while it was shown to you. Do you have any idea what
25 this can refer to here?
1 A. Comment was required from me, and I provided it. From what I can
2 see here, the next sentence speaks about the evaluation by this body, and
3 it says here: "Given the overall relations existing in the area, we
4 estimate that the contacts between the Serbian army and the HVO are pretty
5 realistic, especially since some of our agreements have been implemented
6 in practice (the area of Zepce, the crossing of Mt. Vlasic...)" and so on
7 and so forth.
8 Q. I'm not asking you to comment upon the next sentence, I'm
9 actually asking you to comment upon the one sentence which you read out.
10 I understood also from your earlier response that the document relates in
11 part to cooperation between VRS and HVO. I'm just asking you now to tell
12 the Trial Chamber whether you know anything about cooperation between ABiH
13 and VRS as stated in this sentence, for example.
14 A. In my previous testimony, I looked at a number of documents which
15 spoke about the information that we had. And as I analysed all that
16 information and as I looked at some other documents, I can confirm that
17 there was such cooperation and that it reached the level of cooperation or
18 concert activity, joint fighting. I'm talking about the HVO and our --
19 the army of Republika Srpska fighting together against the army of Bosnia
20 and Herzegovina.
21 This is it, if that's what you're asking me about. However, if
22 you're asking me about the first sentence, I said I don't know anything
23 about that. I --
24 Q. I move on to another topic. Please just state for the record the
25 date on which you were appointed assistant commander for intelligence
1 within the 3rd Corps. You mentioned you were appointed, but when were you
3 A. I really don't remember the exact date, but this should have been
4 at the beginning of December 1992. This is when I was assigned to work in
5 the command of the 3rd Corps.
6 Q. From -- in December 1992, did you also -- did you already become
7 assistant commander for intelligence or did you acquire that post at a
8 later point in time?
9 A. No, not at first. I was appointed later because there was already
10 an assistant, the officer who had been appointed to that post, and I have
11 already said that. The assistant -- the Assistant Chief of Staff for
12 intelligence at that time was Mr. Selmo Cikotic. I was just an officer in
13 that service, in that organ.
14 Q. When did you substitute Mr. Cikotic in the post of assistant
15 commander for intelligence in the 3rd Corps?
16 A. I believe that this was -- I would actually stand in for him every
17 time he was absent. When he was appointed the commander of the OG, and
18 before that he was a member of the negotiation team for the negotiations
19 that took place in Gornji Vakuf, it was after that that I was appointed.
20 Before that, I stood in for him every time he was absent. I was the
21 acting assistant.
22 Q. So I understand that after negotiations in Gornji Vakuf, you were
23 appointed. Can you just state at least a month? When were these
24 negotiations in Gornji Vakuf? When were they taking place, and
25 approximately what point in time were you appointed?
1 A. It was in January, as far as I can remember. I was appointed in
2 March, I believe. I really can't give you the exact date. If you were to
3 provide me with the order, this would still not reflect the real situation
4 because I was appointed a bit later than I actually started performing
5 these duties as the acting assistant for intelligence.
6 Q. I understand. You were referring to March in the sense of March
8 A. Yes. However, I was there all the time. I was a member of this
9 intelligence organ, and I was engaged in these duties all this time.
10 Q. The subordinated intelligence departments in the operation groups
11 and within the brigades, would these intelligence organs exclusively
12 report to the 3rd Corps intelligence department, or could they
13 alternatively send information further up the chain of command to the
14 Supreme Command of the ABiH and thereby bypassing the 3rd Corps? Can you
15 please explain.
16 A. The chain of command and control at that time was very precise.
17 Generally speaking, when we're talking about any army, a subordinate unit
18 sends its report to the superior command. In the specific case, all the
19 intelligence organs, be it in the OG or the brigade, report within its own
20 unit to the Chief of Staff and the commander, and they also have their own
21 line according to which they send reports to their superior command, from
22 the brigade to the corps command. As far as I know it was never requested
23 from the subordinate command to report directly to them. The information
24 reached us first. I'm talking about the intelligence line. And then when
25 we received information, we would forward that information to the
1 administrative -- to the Intelligence Administration that was above us in
2 the chain of command. It was part of our superior command.
3 Q. Did the intelligence organs from the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade
4 submit intelligence reports to your unit?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You mentioned during your testimony - it was page 9 of today, I
7 think - that reconnaissance companies of the 3rd Corps were formed. Can
8 you describe what the reconnaissance company -- what the tasks of such a
9 reconnaissance company is and when it was formed, please.
10 A. These units were established immediately after the 3rd Corps was
11 established. I cannot tell you exactly when these units were formed.
12 However, when the order was issued to establish the corps, this was
13 followed by the order to establish its units amongst which the
14 reconnaissance company, which was a unit attached to the corps staff. The
15 of this unit, the primary task of this unit, was to reconnoiter, to
16 collect information on the enemy, and very often, generally speaking,
17 these reconnaissance units were also used as combat units. In other
18 words, not only for the specific tasks of a reconnaissance unit, which
19 reflected the situation very well. I would have been much happier if that
20 unit could only do its proper job.
21 Q. What was the commander of this reconnaissance company of the 3rd
22 Corps, and where was the unit stationed?
23 A. I can't remember the name of this unit's commander. For a period
24 of time, this unit was stationed in a building close to the Raspotocje
25 mine near Zenica.
1 Q. And the commander of that unit, did this commander report to the
2 assistant commander of intelligence? To whom did this commander report
4 A. He reported to us if he -- if the unit performed tasks on our
5 orders. If this unit was resubordinated to some other unit, then he
6 didn't report directly to us but he reported through the chain of command
7 to his first superior.
8 Q. If I can -- if you can please look at tab 5 of the list of Defence
9 documents which was given to you. This is a document P268. You have
10 already commented upon that document. If you look at the very last page,
11 please, of this document. On the left-hand side you find initials,
12 "HE/HE" there. Do you find this? Tab 5 of the Defence documents.
13 A. I apologise. Document 5.
14 Q. I have provided already the details. It's P268. If you can just
15 look at the last page where on the left-hand side two initials, HE and HE,
16 can be found, HE/HE. The last page of the document behind tab 5.
17 A. Number 5. Yes. 01853885 is the number.
18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... can you please just answer my
19 question. On the last page you find initials HE/HE there. Does this
20 refer to you, to your person?
21 A. Since this is an order for intelligence support, yes, it probably
22 refers to me too.
23 Q. So HE standing for Edin Husic?
24 A. That stands for Edin Husic, yes.
25 Q. If you look now, there are two forms attached -- contained in this
1 document. If you look at the first form, and this is actually page 2 of
2 the B/C/S and of the English version, and if you look at number 4(A).
3 There is the possibility to resubordinate organs. Do you see that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. If you can please inform the Trial Chamber, which organs can the
6 brigades or the OGs request, according to this form, to be resubordinated?
7 Which organs are envisaged here?
8 A. Above all, reference is made to what we had at our disposal in the
9 unit or, rather, in the staff above the unit requesting such
10 resubordination. So they could have requested that a platoon be sent to
11 them in territory -- in that territory, a platoon from the reconnaissance
12 company, for example, or to have our company for electronic reconnaissance
13 and electronic jamming engaged, because they're contacting us in this
14 particular case as the superior command.
15 Q. And the reconnaissance company of the 3rd Corps or the electronic
16 reconnaissance unit would be then sent to the requested unit in 1993? Did
17 this occur on a continuous basis?
18 A. Well, if someone had made such request, then the commander in the
19 corps would have to see whether we were in a position to grant such a
20 request. Naturally this is the form of the request, but this was not
21 used. Usually a unit would really be resubordinated as a combat unit.
22 That's what happened in the greatest number of cases. But in such cases
23 the request would not be forwarded by the intelligence organ, and
24 sometimes there were no requests at all but the commander would just
25 decide that one of the units should be resubordinated or sent as
1 reinforcements to the area in question.
2 Q. If you -- we just dealt with the question from the first report.
3 If you now stay within this document and look to the weekly intelligence
4 report. This is question number 2(H). This is on page 3 of the B/C/S
5 document and page 4 of the English version. I'm referring to question
6 2(H). Do you find this paragraph 2(H)? And mention is made there of
7 "psychological propaganda against our forces."
8 A. If I can ask you, the psychological propaganda mentioned, did this
9 questionnaire here envisage allegations made by the HVO, for example along
10 the lines that the HVO would use Mujahedin during their combat operations
11 or would use Mujahedin in their territory or would have Mujahedin on their
12 territory? What was this psychological propaganda? What is -- what is
13 meant by this? Please explain.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence.
15 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. This
16 is a form, as the witness has said, a form that was provided to all units.
17 This document doesn't mention any of the subjects referred to by my
18 learned colleague from the Prosecution, and this is not something that the
19 witness has testified about.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but the party putting
21 questions can ask the person who drafted the document what he meant by
22 "psychological propaganda." He could perhaps provide certain
23 explanations about what was meant in the field. Is this just an empty
24 term that doesn't mean anything or did it have a certain sense?
25 Colonel, you have heard the question. Could you answer the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 question put to you. When you wrote down "psychological propaganda," what
2 did this mean? This is the question that the Prosecution is putting to
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, by this term I meant anything
5 that might have an effect on our units and on the population. Usually the
6 purpose of propaganda is to disseminate information that will give rise to
7 doubts, that will make the population of the units suspicious or doubt
8 what they're doing, have doubts about what they're doing, or might make
9 them change the way they thought.
10 So under (H) when it -- well, the organs, if they had such
11 information, would also have to provide information about this subject. I
12 think that this is quite clear, in my opinion. But if you would like me
13 to provide you with further explanations, I'll try to provide you with
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution may proceed.
16 MR. NEUNER:
17 Q. Did you ever receive such a weekly report back mentioning in this
18 area of the report the Mujahedin?
19 A. I don't believe so, or I can't remember. If you could show me a
20 document, I'd be happy to comment on it.
21 Q. You testified earlier about the sources of intelligence to my
22 learned colleague. You mentioned the reports you received from
23 subordinated organs. You mentioned that electronic means were available
24 to tap phones, the intercepting of mails, and you also mentioned - that is
25 on page 17, line 23 - that interviews were carried out to collect
1 intelligence information. Can you please tell us who in your unit was
2 involved in such interviews and where they took place. Who was
3 interviewed? Can you please inform us a little bit.
4 A. Well, first of all, on page 17, line 23, does this relate to some
5 of the documents or to what I have already been speaking about?
6 Q. I don't have the page now in front of me, but I assume you -- this
7 is the transcript. This is the transcript which is in the proceeding. It
8 is now page 56, so it means probably half an hour, maybe an hour ago.
9 You just mentioned interviews were carried out, and I wanted to
10 ask you what you had in mind here. Who did the interviews? Who was
11 interviewed? If you can enlighten us, please.
12 A. Well, we had proof that such interviews had been conducted. There
13 were official records, et cetera. These documents show that I conducted
14 these interviews. Perhaps there were others as well. In other cases, if
15 we had documents, I could comment on it.
16 There wasn't just one person. We did what was possible at the
17 time, and if we had information or if it was possible for us to interview
18 someone. Our task as an intelligence organ wasn't to conduct interviews
19 of all kinds, it was only to conduct interviews if this was of interest
20 for intelligence reasons and if we had information that might be useful to
21 have an interview with someone.
22 If I can comment on something else. As far as tapping phones is
23 concerned, we really didn't have such equipment, although in one case we
24 did tap a phone, and this is something I have testified about. I
25 testified about this earlier. But as far as monitoring radio
1 conversations is concerned, well, yes, we monitored conversations that
2 were held over the radio.
3 Q. Coming back to the interviews. You said that you conducted some
4 interviews. Did you conduct these interviews in your own office or did
5 you go somewhere in the field, to somewhere in the field in order to
6 conduct the interviews?
7 A. I think I conducted all the interviews in my office.
8 Q. And the persons who were interviewed, were these civilians? Were
9 these prisoners of war? Can you please tell us where these people were
10 coming from. Were they coming from a detention facility? Just asking.
11 A. Well, the people who were interviewed came on a voluntary basis.
12 The intelligence organ wasn't responsible for prisons of any kind, and
13 this isn't how we did our work.
14 It is true that later on in certain cases interviews were
15 conducted with POWs too, and usually people from the corps did not
16 participate in these interviews. But I can't now confirm -- I can't say
17 that we didn't have POWs and that we didn't interview them. This was the
18 responsibility of the military security service. So in fact what I'm
19 saying is we were not in a position to interview these people.
20 Q. You said in certain cases POWs were interviewed. In what time
21 frame was this and were you participating in such an interview, please?
22 A. That happened later on. I did not -- I wasn't personally involved
23 in these interviews, but if we had a look at reports from 1994, we'd
24 probably be able to find some information. If you have anything from that
25 period, I'll be quite happy to comment on that information, but as far as
1 I can remember, I did not have any such information, and I personally did
2 not participate in interviews with POWs at the time.
3 Q. Other witnesses have testified in front of this Chamber and stated
4 that within the 3rd Corps and in the intelligence department of the 3rd
5 Corps there was a so-called intelligence map. Can you explain what that
6 intelligence map means as opposed to the ordinary map being in the
7 operations centre of the 3rd Corps.
8 A. Usually we would note down information that we had obtained on the
9 map. The main difference is that we didn't make a note of information on
10 our units apart from the zone of responsibility that had been assigned in
11 certain orders, and naturally when noting such information, we tried to
12 perform certain analysis. That was a sort of working map, so to speak.
13 We would analyse certain information to try to make assessments to see
14 whether assessments of an organ at a lower level fitted the larger picture
15 that we had about the situation. That would be my explanation.
16 Q. And on this intelligence map the positions of the VRS and the ABiH
17 would be marked, wouldn't they?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. How often would the 3rd Corps Commander consult this map; on a
20 daily basis, on a weekly basis?
21 A. Usually the commander would not consult the map at all. That was
22 an internal map, and it was for the intelligence organ. The map in the
23 operative centre had information that we provided when making the map, and
24 naturally that was the map used. So there was no more information on that
25 map than on the map in the operations centre. It was not necessary for
1 the commander to come and use it.
2 Q. Who would --
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will have a break now since
4 we have been working for an hour and a half. It's now twenty to six. We
5 will resume at about 6.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 5.38 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 6.04 p.m.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We shall now resume, and we have
9 approximately an hour left.
10 MR. NEUNER:
11 Q. Witness, I wanted to ask you about your intelligence on the
12 presence of the HV in Central Bosnia. Can you tell us a little bit what
13 you know about the presence of the HV in 1993 in Central Bosnia, please.
14 A. Let me tell you, the intelligence that we had, although I can't be
15 very precise with that regard given the time that has lapsed --
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can you please hold on just a
18 Mr. Bourgon, you have the floor.
19 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Just to
20 point out, ask for a clarification. Why is my learned friend asking
21 questions about the presence of the army of the Republic of Croatia in
22 Bosnia? The Chamber has already rendered a decision to that fact, and
23 they said that the Prosecution can do that in order to establish a context
24 but not in any other -- with any other objective. If -- if my learned
25 friend is asking the question to establish a context it's okay, but not in
1 any other case.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have already rendered a
3 decision on the nature of the conflict, whether it was an international
4 conflict, and we said that you can do that in order to establish a
6 You may proceed.
7 MR. NEUNER:
8 Q. Can you please answer the question.
9 A. We had certain intelligence. Truth be told, it was only on a few
10 occasions when we had information about the presence of the HVO [as
11 interpreted] citizens of the Republic of Croatia. I believe that in one
12 report a reference is made to the members of the Ministry of the Interior
13 of the Republic of Croatia. I wouldn't be able to give you any more
14 specific detail unless you provide me with the specific report. I can't
15 provide you with any more specific context. I believe that the initial
16 information to that effect appeared in the Gornji Vakuf sector.
17 Q. Please have a look in the Defence binder at tab number 11. This
18 is DH579, tab number 11.
19 MR. NEUNER: And for the record, I just want to state that there's
20 an error in the transcript. On page 60, line 23, the witness testified
21 "HV citizens," and here it says "HVO citizens."
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Maybe he can clarify. According
23 to the English transcript, what did you say? Did you make a reference to
24 the citizens of Croatia that arrived in that area? What did you say?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said -- and I believe that this is
1 a translation error. I made a reference to the citizens of the Republic
2 of Croatia, and I also said that in one of the reports reference was made
3 to members of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia. In
4 both cases, these soldiers or policemen were citizens of the Republic of
5 Croatia. So we had information about both the army members and the
6 members of the Ministry of the Interior.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for this
9 MR. NEUNER:
10 Q. Do you have the document DH579 in front of you? If you please
11 look at the very last page, and can you confirm that this is your
13 A. Yes, I can.
14 Q. This is a report dated 16 of January, 1993. And can you look
15 again on the last page of the B/C/S original. In the first main paragraph
16 there you find the second column beginning with, and I'm citing the
17 original words, "Takodje se." Do you find this? The second column,
18 starting, then, with "Takodje se." The English original it's the bottom
19 of page 2, the last column. You find it? Can you please read out this
21 A. Yes, I've found it. It says: "Also we can confirm information
22 about the stay of some 500 members of the Croatian army in the territory
23 of Central Bosnia, 250 of whom are in Novi Travnik. They came from Split,
24 Omis, and parts of Herzegovina. They are armed, most of them with
25 infantry weapons."
1 Q. Having read this after some years now, does this refresh your
2 recollection? Do you have anything to say to this?
3 A. Besides the fact that the reference is made to the parts of
4 Herzegovina which is part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if we're talking
5 about the information which is very specific, this information was
6 available at the time.
7 Q. And seeing your report after all these years, it states here,
8 "Information was confirmed." From an intelligence perspective, what does
9 this mean, it was confirmed?
10 A. This means that if certain information arrived for the second time
11 of -- or from a different source, this information is confirmed.
12 Information can be confirmed several times, but this is a minimum required
13 for one piece of information to be confirmed.
14 Q. Can you please now look at tab 47 of the Defence binder, document
15 DH1299. This is a document upon which you commented upon earlier.
16 Can you look at the second paragraph. It talks about the Croatian
17 army units there.
18 A. Am I supposed to read this or do you just want me to comment upon
20 Q. I'm just asking whether you maybe recall the incident or whether
21 this is new information. Then I would go on. The Croatian army is
22 mentioned here.
23 A. Let me put it this way: I am not disproving things that were
24 written. If you ask me whether I remember this particular information, I
25 can only say that I've already said in general terms that there was
1 information. I can't remember every particular document. Whether this
2 information was subsequently confirmed, I don't know. It's hard to say.
3 However, if this is something that I had at my disposal, this means that I
4 had received it. In any case, whatever is written here it stays as it is.
5 And I'm saying this primarily because there were indeed Croatian army
6 units present in the -- these areas. Whether this particular information
7 is correct, whether there were Croatian army units in these particular
8 areas, it is very hard to say, you know. In the intelligence work, it is
9 very rare when you can be absolutely certain that you have received a
10 correct piece of intelligence. If this particular piece of intelligence
11 is not confirmed from various sources after a certain period of time, and
12 so on and so forth. It also depends on a particular source of
13 information, because every source of information has its history.
14 Q. You collected intelligence on the HVO and -- in Central Bosnia.
15 Does this information or intelligence-gathering include also activities
16 undertaken by the HVO in relation to permitting Mujahedin to pass --
17 coming from Croatia to pass through HVO-held parts into Central Bosnia?
18 Did you come across such information?
19 A. No, never.
20 Q. When did you first learn about the presence of Mujahedin in
21 Central Bosnia?
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence, you have the floor.
23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] There is no foundation for this
24 question. It goes beyond the scope of the examination-in-chief. The
25 witness has clearly said what his task was, what he was doing. In other
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 words, I believe that there is no foundation for this question.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The examination-in-chief never
3 addressed the issue of the Mujahedin. The cross-examination, therefore,
4 cannot address any issue that was not addressed in the
6 MR. NEUNER: Mr. President, I respectfully request to continue
7 this line of questioning because in the possession of the Prosecution are
8 a few documents which show that indeed the witness had some knowledge
9 about the Mujahedin, and according to Rule 90, the Prosecution is called
10 upon to bring its case to the witnesses, and I'm prepared to show a
11 particular document and ask from this document, stemming from this
12 document, questions on the Mujahedin, if this helps. I was thinking to
13 start with a very generic question to open up this topic.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber will retire to
15 deliberate on this issue and come back with a ruling.
16 --- Break taken at 6.20 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 6.22 p.m.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber has deliberated in
19 order to render a decision whether the Prosecution can ask questions about
20 the Mujahedin based on the document that has been disclosed to the
21 Defence. To the extent that this document makes a reference to the
22 witness, be it that he was its author or had something to do with it, the
23 Prosecution is allowed to show the witness this document. And the Chamber
24 has also decided that the witness was in charge of intelligence and he may
25 be asked questions with regard to his professional activity in -- that had
1 to do with the intelligence in the 3rd Corps. He may have been aware of
2 the presence of foreigners in 1993, whether they were fighters or not
4 Mr. Neuner, you have the floor.
5 The Defence.
6 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. With
7 all due respect to my colleagues, if we are looking at the same document,
8 this document does not make a reference to either Mujahedin or foreign
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're taking about the document
11 that the Chamber does not have. That's why I said to the extent to which
12 this document originates from the witness or the witness is mentioned
13 herein. Maybe the Prosecution can explain the nature of this document
14 that we don't know, that we are not aware of.
15 If the Defence is right and if it's true that the Mujahedin is not
16 mentioned in this document, why do you propose to show this document to
17 the witness in the first place?
18 MR. NEUNER: There is obviously a misunderstanding. In my
19 previous intervention, I wasn't talking about having the new document
20 being shown to the witness but in documents which are already in evidence
21 or those which have been shown by the Defence in this binder to the
22 witness and which carry the witness's signature and which relate to
23 Mujahedin. I'm referring here to document DH580, which is in tab 10 of
24 the Defence binder, and I'm also referring to Chamber Exhibit number 3 as
25 a document which is in evidence which relates to the Mujahedin and which
1 has a link.
2 With Your Honours' permission, I would go on and show document
3 DH580 briefly to the witness. Tab number 10.
4 Q. Witness, if you please look in the B/C/S version, on the very last
5 page, the first column -- first of all, on the very last page you see your
6 signature. Do you recognise your signature, please?
7 A. Yes, I do.
8 Q. And on the first column, there is mentioning made of 500 Mujahedin
9 in Kakanj. For the English version, this is page 2, under Section, and it
10 says here "1:100.000 number 525." It's the first column. "Some of the
11 men from Kakanj ..." it starts there. It's about eight lines down from
12 "Section 1:100.000," mentioned on page 2.
13 Do you, having read this passage some years after you have drawn
14 up this report, do you recall anything about these Mujahedin or the
15 allegations that Mujahedin would be in Kakanj?
16 A. As I'm reading this document now, I can see that both pieces of
17 intelligence were obtained through an interview with a Serb. I can't say
18 who that person was. I don't believe that I was involved in that
19 interview. However, the source of information says what he heard during
20 his stay on two occasions in Serbia every time he returned via Kiseljak,
21 and he had an opportunity to meet some people from Kakanj, people whom he
22 knew, and it was these people that provided him with that information.
23 If you want me to provide you with my opinion with this regard, I
24 can say that I do not believe even to this very day after all that
25 happened that this -- this is true. This is just a product of the
1 propaganda that was present at the time, that reigned at the time.
2 We listened to all the information regardless of its nature. This
3 was not a matter of anyone's personal choice. It was not that you only
4 listened to something that you liked as opposed to the things that you
5 didn't like. People who are not objective, who are biased, cannot do this
6 job. Whatever we received, we presented it in the form of information
7 irrespective of the contents of this information. It is only if you put
8 together all the available information that you can come up with a full
9 picture, with a whole mosaic of things.
10 Q. I understand that. If, with the assistance of the usher, a new
11 document, document C3 could now please be shown to the witness. We have
12 copies for everybody.
13 This is tab 5 of the binder which you received. And there should
14 be the handwritten notes at the end. On the middle it relates to a
15 meeting on the 23rd of June. Do you find the handwritten notes, first of
17 A. Just a minute. I apologise.
18 Q. I think you have find it.
19 A. [In English] This one?
20 Q. Yes. And it says Biljesevo in the upper right-hand corner. 23rd
21 of June 1993, there was a meeting, and if you look at the participants of
22 the meeting, you will find also your name.
23 In the English version, it's on the bottom of page 1 where the
24 participants of this meeting are mentioned.
25 Do you find your name there or do you recall having been at the
2 A. [Interpretation] I found my name in the part that mentions those
3 in attendance, but I really can't remember. As we go through the
4 document, I'll tell you what I know.
5 Q. You also make a contribution to this meeting. First of all, the
6 participants -- the meeting place. Do you recall the meeting place,
7 having met at Biljesevo on the 23rd of June, 1993? You don't recall.
8 A. No.
9 Q. You make, according to the minutes, also a contribution. I think
10 it is 01814208. Excuse me: 4209. There's your name mentioned there, the
12 In the English version, it's page number 7.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. So do you now remember the meeting?
15 A. [In English] I really not, but I could comment at all information.
16 Q. Actually, the Prosecution is interested in a contribution given by
17 Mr. Amir Kubura on this meeting. Do you remember that Mr. Kubura made a
18 contribution on -- first of all, do you remember that Mr. Kubura was at
19 that meeting?
20 A. [Interpretation] I really can't remember. I can't remember the
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. Mr. Kubura's
23 Defence counsel is on his feet. You may take the floor.
24 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mr. President, we
25 won't object since the witness has said he didn't remember, that he didn't
1 remember what had been said, but the witness has just answered the
2 question, so we withdraw our objection.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Do proceed.
4 MR. NEUNER:
5 Q. I have one more question relating to this meeting, or just an
6 abstract question. Have you ever been at a meeting where the engagement
7 of foreign nationals was discussed?
8 A. No.
9 Q. So I assume if I show you the minutes which talk about this this
10 will not help you? I'm just asking. I would be prepared to move on if
11 you say you don't recall anything.
12 A. You could do so. I could comment, but if I can't remember,
13 there's nothing else I can say.
14 Q. Okay. In the English version it's --
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute.
16 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I'd just
17 like to check something. Is my colleague saying that he has a document
18 which shows that the witness participated or attended such a meeting? I
19 don't know what the basis of his question is for asking the witness
20 whether he attended a meeting or not. Is he fishing for something, or if
21 the witness says, "I don't remember," is there a -- is there a document
22 that mentions this?
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. This is a relevant
24 objection. Could you be more clear, because some doubts have been raised.
25 You mentioned conclusions of a meeting. Is this referred to in a
1 document? Is it hypothesis? Could you be more clear?
2 MR. NEUNER: It isn't a hypothesis. I was having in mind this
3 particular meeting, but I didn't want to lead the witness to say that on
4 this and this meeting the issue of Mujahedin was discussed, because my
5 impression was he didn't recall. That's why I formulated the question
7 Q. It is indeed this meeting minutes. And if you please look at
8 01814203 where mention is made of Mr. Kubura and the 7th Muslim Mountain
9 Brigade. He makes an intervention. In the English text it is page 4. If
10 you please briefly read through this passage and look particularly at the
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Defence counsel.
13 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I
14 don't want to interrupt my learned colleague for no reason, but this
15 question has already been asked and it has already been answered.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It seems that the
17 witness says that he can't remember this at all. Perhaps you could
18 refresh his memory by showing him the conclusion, but that's not the
19 witness's conclusion. Ask the witness if the conclusion on page 4 in the
20 English translation corresponds to what he may have heard on that day or
21 is there no more than he can say about the matter.
22 MR. NEUNER:
23 Q. Witness, you have heard the remark made by the Presiding Judge.
24 Since you have refreshed your memory by reading through the intervention
25 of the -- Mr. Kubura, and since you have read now the proposal, do you
1 consider -- do you recall that this proposal was being discussed and that
2 this is adequately reflected here in the minutes?
3 A. I really could not confirm anything. All I can say is that I
4 don't remember this. I can provide you with comments on intelligence
5 assessment that was made, I can confirm whether what was written down
6 corresponded to the situation, but what you are referring to and with
7 regard to the proposal, it says -- or that refers to engaging foreign
8 nationals, well, I really don't remember that, and I could not say whether
9 this is correct. If I can't remember something, I can't confirm it
11 Q. Let -- let me please turn your attention to tab 2 of this binder,
12 of this same binder. It's document P294. And can you please briefly
13 indicate whether you recall that document, because your name is type
14 signed on the end of this document. Can you please confirm that you
15 recognise that document dated 10 December 1993.
16 A. I can't confirm that I remember this as the document was obviously
17 issued by the intelligence organ and, as such, I can't confirm that it is
18 a document from the intelligence organ.
19 Q. Your name is mentioned there as acting chief of intelligence
20 security organ. Do you remember having received in December 1993 a
21 reference from the Supreme Command Intelligence Administration, as it
22 states here in the first paragraph, a request to provide intelligence
23 information? Do you recall this?
24 A. I believe that I did receive that.
25 Q. In number 1, mentioning is made about the -- about foreign
1 mercenaries in the BH theatre. Can you state what is meant by "foreign
2 mercenaries in the BH theatre," please.
3 A. That means anyone who was not a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4 They were foreign combatants. And in this particular case, mercenaries
5 were probably men who went to the area and probably benefited in material
6 terms from the fact because they were paid to fight.
7 Q. You say they were paid to fight. Who paid them?
8 A. I don't know.
9 Q. What foreign mercenaries did you think that the Supreme Command
10 have in mind in December 1993 when it was requesting that information via
12 A. I believe that they had in mind all those who were not citizens.
13 Q. All those who were not citizens. Do I take it this can include
14 internationals fighting on behalf of the HVO, HOS, or also internationals
15 fighting on the side of the -- to put it abstract, Muslim forces? To put
16 it very abstract. What is meant by "foreign mercenaries"? Can you please
18 A. I would agree with everything that you have just said.
19 Q. What is -- what was the purpose to gather that information? It
20 says in number 1, name, origin, number, type of unit, location of the
21 unit's operation, commanding staff. What was the purpose of collecting
22 that information?
23 A. I really don't know what the purpose was in that particular case.
24 It was not the intelligence organ's task to focus on units that were part
25 of the ABiH, but anything else might be a subject of interest, primarily
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 enemy forces. In this case, I don't know what the reason was. I don't
2 know what the purpose was. And if we had a report, perhaps I could
3 provide you with further comments. This is really something unusual,
4 because this was not something that was within our field of activity.
5 Q. You collected reconnaissance of VRS and HVO positions in 1993.
6 Witnesses have testified in front of this Trial Chamber that also the
7 Mujahedin were collecting such information. For example, witnesses
8 testified that they were driving around in pick-up trucks and
9 reconnoitering positions. Were you aware that in 1993, in the 3rd Corps
10 area, such reconnaissance was collected?
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence.
12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] With all due respect, for my
13 learned colleague to put such questions to the witness and to refer to
14 certain witnesses who have testified before this Tribunal that the
15 Mujahedin gathered information, this is an inappropriate way to
16 cross-examine the witness, and so far the witness has not testified about
17 the Mujahedin. We don't understand the reasons for which the Prosecution
18 has now moved on to another subject. Up until now, the Prosecution has
19 been referring to foreign mercenaries.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. We were speaking about
21 foreign mercenaries. Why are you establishing a link between foreign
22 mercenaries and the Mujahedin given that the witness is not familiar with
23 the situation? He didn't provide any precise information, and it would
24 perhaps have been better to ask him if he had seen white vehicles, white
25 Japanese vehicles circulating, and I won't mention the name of these
2 MR. NEUNER:
3 Q. Did you see any white vehicles, meant by certain persons of
4 foreign origin, who were driving around in the 3rd Corps area of
5 responsibility and were looking at certain positions of the adversaries?
6 Did you see in 1993 such vehicles?
7 A. Well, perhaps I did see a white vehicle or white vehicles used by
8 foreigners, but I was never able to see -- or I never saw such vehicles
9 carrying out reconnaissance. But to try and facilitate this matter, I can
10 claim with full responsibility that none of the foreigners used for
11 intelligence in the 3rd Corps organ, which is where I was and this is what
12 I could have had information about, well, I don't know whether this might
13 assist you or not, but I never attended any meetings with any foreign
14 mercenaries or any foreigners involved in intelligence within the 3rd
15 Corps or involved in operations or in any other matters. The only people
16 that I had contact with, and they also had white vehicles - perhaps they
17 weren't Japanese ones - the only people that I had contact with were from
18 international organisations. You can continue to ask me questions, but I
19 want to answer your question. I don't want you to think that I'm trying
20 to avoid giving you a certain answer.
21 Q. Just asking you as a --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
23 MR. NEUNER:
24 Q. I'm just asking you as an intelligence officer at the time, the
25 very fact that individuals were gathering intelligence or information
1 within your area of responsibility --
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, my learned friend
4 has already pre-judged certain matters. Awhile ago he was referring to
5 certain witnesses, and now he has mentioned something that has been
6 established as a fact. But I believe that you will have the final
7 decision as to the weight to give to the evidence before the Tribunal.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. The witness never said
9 these individuals were circulating to gather information. This is the
10 first time that we have heard this from the Prosecution. I never heard --
11 I have never heard about individuals circulating in vehicles to collect
13 If this is what you claim, you probably have a basis for this
14 claim, but we're not aware of the basis. But you could rephrase your
15 question as the witness said that he did see vehicles circulating, but
16 whether these individuals were just driving around, were they trying out
17 the vehicle, did they want to just buy Coca-Cola, I don't know. But to
18 say that vehicles were circulating to gather information, well this is
19 quite an affirmation. But ask the witness to answer the question since he
20 said he was ready to answer your questions.
21 MR. NEUNER:
22 Q. You've heard the intervention of His Honour the Presiding Judge.
23 These vehicles, the white vehicles, the pick-ups, did you have any
24 knowledge in 1993 what the activities performed from these or in these
25 vehicles, what these activities were about, whether people were standing
1 on the flatbed of these vehicles just for their own pleasure or whether
2 they were engaging in some kind of activity, observe certain things? Do
3 you know -- did you have any understanding on what these vehicles -- what
4 the purpose of driving around these vehicles was?
5 A. No. I never saw anyone driving around for reconnaissance
6 purposes. I never saw someone in a white vehicle in vicinity of -- I
7 don't know, the lines or some location from which reconnaissance would be
8 carried out. If I saw them, that would probably be somewhere in town. So
9 I really wouldn't know. I really don't know why these individuals were
10 using those vehicles. They were probably just driving around. But what
11 you have referred to, what you have mentioned, is something that I
12 personally did not observe.
13 MR. NEUNER: Mr. President, I note the time. I would have only
14 the new document to show to this witness, and I noted -- I see my friend
15 -- learned friend on their feet.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You have a document
17 to refresh the witness's memory or to test the witness's credibility?
18 What category would this document fall into?
19 MR. NEUNER: It would be a memory-refreshing document, and it is
20 signed by this witness.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Defence.
22 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] If my learned colleague could say
23 why he wants to refresh the witness's memory, I would be grateful. Does
24 this document have to do with white vehicles or something else? I
25 apologise, but if the document is to be shown, it is necessary to provide
1 a basis. It's necessary to state why the witness's memory should be
2 refreshed or why it's necessary to discredit the witness. The fact that
3 the witness has signed the document doesn't mean anything in itself from a
4 legal point of view. This is not a reason to show such a document to the
6 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I
7 object to this document at the beginning of this last section. This
8 document doesn't refer to the Mujahedin or to foreign mercenaries, and it
9 doesn't refer to anything that was -- any issues raised in the course of
10 the examination-in-chief or in the course of the cross-examination
11 conducted by my learned colleague.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You have heard the
13 two objections, so could you now clarify the matter? This is a document
14 that was drafted by the witness or contradicts something the witness says?
15 Could you clarify the matter and provide us with more information on this
16 new document? And I would also like to point out that it's 7.00 p.m. now.
17 We could continue to midnight, if you like.
18 MR. NEUNER: Your Honour, this document relates to an issue which
19 is important for the Prosecution's case in the sense that it shows the
20 presence of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade -- of members of the 7th
21 Muslim Mountain Brigade in the -- can I maybe ask the witness to leave the
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Go ahead.
1 MR. NEUNER: This document relates to the presence of the 7th
2 Muslim -- of members of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade in the Bila Valley
3 in May 1993, and before I would respectfully request to show this document
4 to the witness, the Prosecution would be prepared to ask -- to lay a
5 foundation and to ask some introductory questions. However, it's -- it's
6 a detail which is mentioned here in a document signed by this witness, and
7 it's such a particular detail that it will probably be necessary to
8 refresh the witness's recollection about this event.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I understand you well,
10 there's a document signed by the witness that speaks about the 7th
11 Brigade, but how are you going -- proposing to make a link between the 7th
12 Brigade and the Mujahedin? I believe this is the essence of the objection
13 that was put forth.
14 MR. NEUNER: It is not intended to make any link between the two.
15 The prior line of questioning has ceased. It was just a last attempt of
16 the Prosecution try to finish the cross-examination today. So it is not
17 intended to make any link between the previous questioning and this
18 questioning now.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you would simply like to ask
20 the witness whether he has signed the document, whether it is a mistake
21 that the 7th Brigade is mentioned as the troops attacking a village? Is
22 that what you want to ask the witness?
23 The Defence, you have the floor.
24 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I
25 believe that at the end of the working day, at 7.00 in the evening, my
1 learned friend opens an issue that was not the subject of the
2 examination-in-chief or the cross-examination. I object to this issue
3 being opened because it goes beyond the scope of today's examination.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. The Defence says that the
5 examination-in-chief did not open the issue of the 7th Brigade, which is
6 true, and that the subject that you wish to address has nothing to do with
7 the questions that were -- have been put to the witness so far. Why do
8 you want to show the witness this document?
9 MR. NEUNER: The Prosecution would like to show this document to
10 the witness because it was authored by this witness, and the Prosecution
11 hopes that the witness is in a position to elaborate on a document which
12 he has produced 12 or -- ten or 12 years ago and can elucidate that fact
13 or what he knows about the presence of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade in
14 the Bila Valley in 1993. And it was always the Prosecution's position
15 that members of this unit were there at the time, an issue which is
16 contested. And since this witness has authored the document, the
17 Prosecution is of the position that it has, according to Rule 90, the
18 possibility to ask such a question.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] How much more time would you be
21 MR. NEUNER: I would simply ask two questions at the beginning in
22 abstract about this event. If the witness does remember right away, I
23 will ask him to elaborate and we will not even show him the document. If
24 he doesn't remember, I will just show him the document and ask him.
25 That's it.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence, as far as the
2 re-examination is concerned, do you know how much time you will need?
3 Mr. Bourgon nods. So you do have re-examination. Maybe it would be best
4 if we continued tomorrow. Mr. Bourgon nods his head. Maybe it would be
5 best to continue tomorrow, otherwise we may stay here until 8.00 or 9.00
6 this evening.
7 Can you please bring the witness into the courtroom and we will
8 explain to him why he needs to return tomorrow afternoon.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, I will have to ask you
11 to come back tomorrow. It is ten by -- past seven. We are already ten
12 minutes after the scheduled time. The Prosecution still needs another ten
13 minutes, but the Defence are going to have some additional questions. We
14 cannot, therefore, finish today. That's why we will have to ask you to
15 come back tomorrow afternoon. Unfortunately, this is the only way. So
16 you have to stay one day longer. Please come back tomorrow at quarter
17 past two for the conclusion of your testimony.
18 And let me just tell you that since you have taken the solemn
19 declaration, you are not supposed to talk to either the Defence or the
20 Prosecution. We wish you a good rest this evening. We shall see you back
21 at quarter past two. We are going to render this decision about the
22 contested issue, and we will resume at quarter past two.
23 I invite everybody to come back at quarter past two.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.09 p.m.,
25 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 8th day of
1 February, 2005, at 2.15 p.m.