1 Friday, 18 February 2005
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can the registrar please call
6 the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Case
8 Number IT-01-47-T, the Prosecutor versus Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar. Can I
11 have the appearances for the Prosecution, please.
12 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning, Your
13 Honours, counsel, and everyone in and around the courtroom. For the
14 Prosecution, Matthias Neuner and Daryl Mundis, assisted today by our
15 intern, Lisa Hartog.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The appearances for the Defence,
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President. Good
19 morning, Your Honours. On behalf of General Enver Hadzihasanovic, Edina
20 Residovic, counsel; Stephane Bourgon, co-counsel; and Muriel Cauvin, legal
21 assistant. Thank you.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 And for the other Defence team, please.
24 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. On
25 behalf of Mr. Kubura, Rodney Dixon and Fahrudin Ibrisimovic.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 The Chamber on this Friday, the 18th of February, bids good
3 morning to all those present, representatives of the Prosecution, the
4 Defence counsel, Generals Hadzihasanovic and Kubura, and all the personnel
5 present in this courtroom. Today we have a witness who is going to
6 testify, but before we have the witness brought in there is a point to be
7 addressed, the question of documents, and there's also an oral decision to
8 be rendered.
9 Regarding the point raised yesterday, it will be an additional
10 oral decision, and it is as following: Regarding the response of the
11 Prosecution of the 15th of February, 2005, submitting that sections 1, 2,
12 and 3 of the report of Professor Trnka are not relevant and that this
13 person does not have the qualities of an expert but rather that of a fact
14 witness. In view of the oral arguments submitted yesterday, Thursday, by
15 the Defence, the Chamber rendered today's following ruling: That it
16 rejects the arguments of the Prosecution on the grounds on the one hand
17 that the relevance can be assumed prima facie, and that, regarding the
18 second point, the information contained in the report, in the view of the
19 Chamber, are sufficient to hear this witness as an expert. He will be
20 examined in-chief and cross-examined by the Prosecution, which will be
21 authorised to spend at least four hours, upon which the Defence can have
22 additional questions, as will the Judges. That is the substance of our
24 I now give the floor to the Defence who will intervene with
25 respect to the documents that they intend to tender. You have the floor.
1 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Before
2 I read out the documents which we would like to tender into evidence, I
3 just wish to inform the Trial Chamber that yesterday we received
4 translations of four documents. We have provided the Prosecution with
5 those translations, and as far as I understand they will not object to
6 those four documents being tendered into evidence as well.
7 The Defence would like to tender from chapter 1, On-site Reports,
8 document number 2, Zenica District Military Court number 146/93 dated the
9 19th of April, 1993; document number 5, also Zenica District Military
10 Court number Kri-202/93, dated the 1st of September, 1993; document number
11 6, Zenica District Military Court number KRI 219/93, dated the 17th of
12 October, 1993.
13 In Chapter 2, Request for an Investigation, the Defence would like
14 to tender document number 1, 1366, the translation of which we provided
15 this morning; document number 2, Zenica District Military Court number
16 Ki-218/93, dated the 25th of August, 1993; document number 4, Zenica
17 District Military Court number KI243/93, dated the 29th of October, 1993;
18 document 7, Zenica Senior Public Prosecutor's Office number KT 11/94,
19 dated the 5th of March, 1994.
20 In this chapter the Defence would propose to be marked for
21 identification documents number 3, Zenica Senior Public Prosecutor's
22 Office KT387/93, dated the 31st of August, 1993; document number 5, 1.560;
23 and number 6, number 1.973, only to be marked for identification.
24 From chapter number 3, Indictments, the document [as interpreted]
25 would like to tender the following documents: Number 1, 1311; number 3,
1 document 1450, the translation was provided this morning; document number
2 5, 1576, the translation which was also provided this morning. Whereas,
3 document number 4, that is 1975, and document 7, 1977, which only have the
4 Bosnian version, we suggest should be marked for identification.
5 Under chapter 4, Judgements, the Defence would like to tender
6 documents number 3, Zenica District Military Court number IK212/93, dated
7 the 4th of August, 1993; document number 4, 1367, the translation of which
8 was provided this morning; document number 11, Zenica District Military
9 Court number IK334/94. Whereas, the following should be marked for
10 identification: Document number 1, Zenica High Court number K12/93, dated
11 the 14th of May, 1993; number 7, Zenica District Military Court IK285/93,
12 dated the 27th of September, 1993; number 8, Zenica High Court number
13 K67/93, dated the 27th of January, 1994; number 12, Zenica District
14 Military Court number IK552/94, dated the 9th of December, 1994; number
15 15, Zenica High Court number K194/96, dated the 20th of March, 1997; and
16 number 16, Zenica Cantonal Court number K67/00, dated the 12th of March,
17 2002, as these documents do not have an English translation.
18 From chapter 5, miscellaneous, we should like to tender as
19 exhibits document number 1, 1967, and document number 6, 1705. And the
20 following should be marked for identification, as they do not have an
21 English translation: Document number 2, 1974; and document number 7,
23 Also, the Defence would propose to be marked for identification
24 the documents which were shown to Judge Ahmetovic yesterday and which he
25 identified, and they are: The decree with the force of law on the
1 application of the criminal code of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the
2 criminal code of the SFRY which was taken over during a state of war and
3 immediate threat of war published in the Official Gazette number 6, dated
4 the 15th of June, 1992, and the decree with a force of law on amendments
5 to the decree with a force of law on the application of the criminal code
6 of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the criminal code of the
7 SFRY taken over as the republican law during the immediate threat of war
8 or state of war published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina number 21, dated the 23rd of November, 1992. Thank
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] From the list of documents in
12 the table in the binder, you're asking certain documents to be marked for
13 identification. That is, in addition to those in the binder, two decrees,
14 one dated the 15th of June, 1992, and the other one dated the 23rd of
15 November, 1992. In view of the fact that these documents are in B/C/S.
16 Is that right?
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. The documents are only in
18 B/C/S, that is why we are asking that they be marked for identification.
19 We have provided the Prosecution and the Registry with copies, and I think
20 that the Prosecution had no objection. Thank you.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But the Judges don't have
22 copies. But the registrar will give us copies.
23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise. We only have one
24 copy, but in the morning we will photocopy the required number of
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yesterday we saw that you had a
2 collector [as interpreted] of all the Official Gazettes that seemed to us
3 extremely interesting, but we don't know what this collection contains.
4 There may be other decrees with a force of law, and maybe this collection
5 will appear later on.
6 I turn now to the Prosecution to hear their observations regarding
7 the requests made.
8 MR. MUNDIS: The Prosecution has no objection, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In that case, I will ask the
10 registrar to read out in English, slowly, the names of the documents and
11 their exhibit numbers.
12 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I will
13 begin with the list of documents tendered by the Defence entitled Zenica
14 District Military Court [In English] dated 19th of April 1993, is admitted
15 into evidence under reference DH2027, with an English translation
16 DH2027/E. The second document, entitled --
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There's a problem from the very
18 outset. They say 2032, but it should be 2027. It's okay now.
19 THE REGISTRAR: [Previous translation continues]... 1st of
20 September, 1993, is admitted into evidence under DH2028, with an English
21 translation DH2028/E.
22 The document entitled: "Zenica District Military Court dated 17th
23 of October 1993 is admitted into evidence under reference DH2029, with an
24 English translation DH2029/E.
25 The document 1366 is admitted into evidence under the reference
1 DH1366, with an English translation DH1366/E.
2 The document entitled: "Zenica District Military Court, dated the
3 25th of August 1993 is admitted into evidence under the reference DH2030,
4 with an English translation DH2030/E.
5 The document Zenica Senior Public Prosecutor's Office reference --
6 internal reference number KT387/93 dated 31st of August, 1993, is tendered
7 into evidence, marked for identification under the reference DH2031 ID.
8 The document entitled Zenica District Military Court dated 29th of
9 October, 1993, is tendered into evidence, marked for identification under
10 the reference DH2032 ID.
11 The document 1560 is tendered into evidence marked for
12 identification under the reference DH1560 ID.
13 The document 1972 [sic] is tendered into evidence marked for
14 identification under the reference DH1972 ID. The document entitled:
15 "Zenica Senior Public Prosecutor's Office internal reference number
16 KT11/94 is tendered into evidence under the reference DH2033. The English
17 translation is DH2033/E.
18 The document 1311 is admitted into evidence under the reference
19 DH1311, with an English translation DH1311/E.
20 The document 1450 is admitted into evidence under the reference
21 DH1450; in English translation DH1450/E.
22 The document 1975 is tendered into evidence under the reference
23 DH1975. It's marked for identification, ID.
24 The document 1576 is tendered into evidence under the reference
25 DH1576, with an English translation DH1576/E.
1 The document 1977 is marked for identification under the reference
2 DH1977 ID.
3 The document entitled: "Zenica High Court" dated 14th of May,
4 1993, is marked for identification under the reference DH2034 ID.
5 The document entitled: "Zenica District Military Court" dated 4th
6 of August, 1993, is admitted into evidence under the DH2035, with an
7 English translation DH2035/E.
8 The document 1367 is admitted into evidence under the reference
9 DH1367, with an English translation DH1367/E.
10 The document entitled: "Zenica District Military Court" dated
11 27th of September, 1993, is marked for identification under the reference
12 DH2036 ID.
13 The document entitled: "Zenica High Court" dated 27th of January,
14 1994, is marked for identification under the reference DH2037 ID.
15 The document entitled: "Zenica District Military Court" dated 8th
16 of September, 1995, is admitted into evidence under the reference DH2038,
17 with an English translation DH2038/E.
18 The document entitled: "Zenica District Military Court" dated the
19 9th of December, 1994, is marked for identification under the reference
20 DH2039 ID.
21 The document entitled: "Zenica High Court" internal number
22 K194/96 dated 12 -- sorry, 20th of March, 1997, is marked for
23 identification under the reference DH2040 ID.
24 The document entitled: "Zenica Cantonal Court" internal reference
25 number K67/00, dated 12th of March, 2002, is marked for identification
1 under the reference DH2041 ID.
2 The document 1976 is admitted into evidence under the reference
3 DH1976, with an English translation DH1976/E.
4 The document 1974 is marked for identification under the reference
5 DH1974 ID.
6 The document 1705 is admitted into evidence under the reference
7 DH1705, with an English translation DH1705/E.
8 The document 1552 is marked for identification under the reference
9 DH1552 ID.
10 Now come two other documents, the first one coming from the
11 Official Gazette, dated the 15th of June, 1992, is marked for
12 identification under the reference DH2042 ID.
13 The second document coming from the Official Gazette, dated 23rd
14 of November, 1992, receives the reference DH2043 ID.
15 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, apparently
17 there's an error which concerns document in section 2, document number 6,
18 which is 1973, whereas on page 7, line 4, it says 1972.
19 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. In
20 fact, this is a document marked for identification and the number is 1973.
21 Thank you.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar. We
23 have taken note of all the exhibit numbers and all the numbers given to
24 documents marked for identification.
25 Before we continue, before we move on to another subject, I'll
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 turn to Defence now. With regard to the two decree laws, the two
2 documents that have been marked for identification, the 15th of June,
3 1992, and the 23rd of November, 1992, these are the dates of the
4 documents. As far as I have understood, these decree laws were amended by
5 the competent assembly, by the legislative assembly. As a result, were
6 these two texts not amended subsequently in the course of 1992 or in 1993
7 or in 1994? Could the Defence clarify this because thanks to you we found
8 out that the decree laws -- some of the decree laws were subsequently
9 amended, and hence the question concerning these two documents.
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, at a time of
11 imminent threat of war and at a time of war, as witnesses have testified,
12 and because of the encirclement of Sarajevo, it was impossible for
13 parliament to hold session. The Presidency had the role of the
14 parliament. And in 1992 and in 1993, they issued decree laws. In
15 accordance with the constitution, when the parliament is in session, the
16 Presidency had the obligation of confirming these decrees as law; this
17 happened later in 1994 and in 1995 when these decrees were probably
18 confirmed by the parliament. But in 1992 and 1993 and 1994, they were in
19 fact laws which were obeyed by all the organs as well as by the courts.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. With regard to this
21 legal issue, are there any comments that the Prosecution would like to
22 make? Defence counsel has told us given the state of war in 1992, the
23 parliament could not hold sessions and these -- the texts were issued as
24 decree laws and perhaps at a subsequent date, but Defence can't provide us
25 with more information, subsequently texts were completely ratified or may
1 have been completely ratified. What is Defence's [as interpreted]
2 position, legal position?
3 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, we would respectfully reserve our
4 position on this issue. I would prefer to perhaps raise this issue in the
5 very near future after I'm able to consult with some colleagues who have
6 more expertise on this matter than I do. It may be that we have nothing
7 further to add, but I would respectfully ask in the future I could --
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Mundis. In any
9 event, these two documents have been marked for identification, so we will
10 have sufficient time to establish what our position is.
11 Mr. Registrar, could we move into private session now.
12 [Private session]
17 [Open session]
18 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We're back in open session,
19 Mr. President.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now that we're in open session,
21 if no other issues need to be raised, we will now call the witness into
22 the courtroom because we have already taken up 35 minutes.
23 Could Defence counsel tell me how much time they believe they will
24 need for their examination-in-chief.
25 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we were planning to
1 take one hour, but I would like to ask the Trial Chamber for leave to
2 examine the witness for an hour and 15 minutes.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You need an hour and
4 15 minutes; that is not a problem. But it's important for us to conclude
5 by 1.45, because as you know, there's an afternoon session and we can't
6 work beyond that time. It's absolutely necessary to finish by that time.
7 I'd also like to point out to the Defence that sometimes there are
8 questions that are interesting but that might not be asked, questions
9 about his education, et cetera. These are not indispensable questions,
10 perhaps. So please try to focus on essential issues so everyone can
11 understand the witness's testimony and ensure that his testimony is
13 [The witness entered court]
14 WITNESS: ASIM DELALIC
15 [Witness answered through interpreter]
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good day, sir, I would first
17 like to make sure that you can hear what I'm saying in your own language.
18 If so, please say yes.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can hear you.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, you have been called here
21 as a witness for General Hadzihasanovic's Defence. Before you take the
22 solemn declaration, I would be grateful if you could tell me your first
23 and last names and date of birth.
24 It appears that there is a delay with the interpretation. Have
25 you heard my question?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've understood the question. My
2 name is Asim Delalic. I was born on the 10th of December, 1955.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Which town or village were you
4 born in?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was born in the village of Suhi
6 Dol in the municipality of Travnik.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Are you currently employed; and
8 if so, what is your job?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm currently employed. I work as a
10 graphic artist. I work in the printing company called Borastani [phoen].
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In 1992 and 1993 did you hold a
12 military position; if so, what sort of military position and which unit
13 were you assigned to?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1992 and 1993 I was first in a
15 detachment in the Mehurici detachment, and when the 306th Mountain Brigade
16 was formed, I was a member of that brigade. I was in the Mehurici
17 detachment as a commander in the detachment of military police, and then I
18 was an assistant commander for security. And in the 306th Mountain
19 Brigade I was the assistant commander for security from the time that the
20 brigade was formed.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. So have you already
22 testified before a national or an international court with regard to the
23 events that took place in your country or is this the first time?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the first time.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you please read out the
1 solemn declaration.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
3 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. You may sit down.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, I would like to provide you
7 with some information concerning the procedure that we'll be following
8 here. You'll first have to answer questions that will be put to you by
9 General Hadzihasanovic's Defence, whom you have already met when you were
10 being proofed. Defence counsel have told us that they will need about one
11 hour and 15 minutes for your examination-in-chief. Once they have
12 completed their examination-in-chief, the Prosecution, to your right, will
13 conduct their cross-examination, which will also take one hour and 15
14 minutes. Then the Defence may put additional questions to you. And then
15 the three Judges sitting before you, if they believe it is necessary, may
16 also ask you questions.
17 I would also like to point out two other things to you. You have
18 just taken the solemn declaration, which means that you should not give
19 false testimony. And secondly, and this is a procedural matter, if a
20 witness believes that his answer could be used against him at a subsequent
21 date, if he believes his answer could be used to prosecute him, the
22 witness may refuse to answer the question. This is a situation we have
23 never encountered so far, but if such a situation should arise, the
24 Chamber can compel the witness to answer the question but the Chamber
25 guarantees the witness a form if immunity in that case. Try to answer the
1 questions to the best of your ability and if you find that a question is
2 complicated, ask the person putting it to you to rephrase it. Please
3 inform us of any difficulties you may run into.
4 We will be having two 25-minute breaks. The first break will be
5 at about 10.30 and the second break will be about 12.30. Usually if
6 everything proceeds smoothly, we should be able to complete your
7 examination today and you should then be able to return to your country.
8 Without wasting any more time, I will give the floor to Defence
9 counsel now.
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Examined by Ms. Residovic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Delalic. You said that you
13 were a graphic artist, a graphic designer by profession. Tell me, did you
14 have any military education before the war?
15 A. Before the war I had no professional military education, apart
16 from the fact that I was in the JNA and I was in charge of the military
17 police detachment.
18 Q. In response to a question from the Trial Chamber you said that
19 when the 306th Mountain Brigade was formed you became assistant commander
20 for security. Tell me, in the course of 1993 what sort of duties did you
22 A. In the course of 1993 I worked as the assistant commander for
23 security. I had no other duties --
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The witness said that
25 he was a lance corporal in the JNA.
1 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Since the Trial Chamber has already heard a lot about the
3 formation of the 306th Mountain Brigade, my question for you is as
4 follows: When the 306th was formed, did any problems arise?
5 A. At the very beginning when the 306th Mountain Brigade was formed,
6 there was problems in the Bila Valley, where is where I am from, because
7 at the very beginning one company from Bukovica didn't want to become part
8 of the 306th Mountain Brigade. It became part of the 314th Motorised
9 Brigade; it split off. And later two or three other villages also became
10 part of the 314th Motorised Brigade; they also separated. Some soldiers
11 or some inhabitants become part of the 7th Muslim Brigade and some become
12 part of the 312th Motorised Brigade.
13 Q. Mr. Delalic, when inhabitants of the Bila Valley joined the
14 various brigades, did this at the time and subsequently create problems
15 for you as the assistant commander for security?
16 A. There were quite a few members who joined other brigades. And
17 since they spent their free time in our territory, this caused certain
18 problems and we had no authority over these individuals.
19 Q. Mr. Delalic, could you now tell me the sort of duties that the
20 security organ of the 306th Mountain Brigade had to perform.
21 A. On the whole, these duties included military police duties,
22 counter-intelligence, et cetera.
23 Q. What sort of staff did you in that body have at your disposal?
24 How many of you were there and were these individuals individuals who had
25 previously been engaged in this field of activity?
1 A. Well, in the security organ itself, in the brigade, there was the
2 assistant commander for security and there were two officials; none of
3 them had previously been engaged in that field of activity, apart from the
4 fact that I, when I was appointed to that post, requested a professional,
5 I requested a lawyer. And the official in my service was Haris Jusic, a
6 lawyer, and I think he was of great assistance to me. Whereas, in the
7 battalions there was one assistant commander for security in each
8 battalion, and similarly they didn't have much professional training, but
9 in the 1st Battalion I think the person who had that role had been a
10 professional policeman.
11 Q. Mr. Delalic, tell me whether in your territory there were
12 individuals -- there were staff who had professional experience but you
13 did not want to engage them, or was the situation such that you had to
14 staff your organ in a certain way?
15 A. As far as I know, there were no such individuals in our territory.
16 Had there been such individuals, we would have gladly engaged them as
17 staff in the security organ.
18 Q. Did the 306th Mountain Brigade have a military police force? And
19 if so, could you tell me about the strength of that military police force.
20 A. The 306th Mountain Brigade did have a military police detachment.
21 I think there were 28 policemen and one platoon commander, but I'm not
22 sure. But because of the nature, the particular nature of the Mountain
23 Brigade, which was composed of refugees, there was a military police
24 detachment within that unit.
25 Q. How was your military police platoon organised?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Well, it was organised so that there were three detachments; two
2 were engaged and one was on leave. As the brigade didn't have sufficient
3 weapons, we had to give some of our weapons to the soldiers at the front
4 lines. So they worked for 14 days and they rested for seven.
5 Q. Given the tasks you have mentioned, the tasks that the security
6 organ had to perform, tell me what sort of problems you encountered in the
7 first half of 1993 in your territory. What were the main problems that
8 you had and what were you main tasks?
9 A. Well, the main problems and tasks in the first half of 1993 were
10 as follows: The soldiers had not been sufficiently trained and there was
11 a lack of discipline among them.
12 Q. How do you explain those problems? Why were such problems present
13 in your area?
14 A. Well, because the local inhabitants lived by raising livestock, by
15 farming the land; so they didn't have any resources, the army couldn't
16 offer them anything. And we couldn't issue them military orders in an
17 effective manner. Everyone wanted to defend his or her own house. So
18 they would refuse to comply with the order to form a brigade on next
19 territorial principle. People searched for food. Soldiers would, as a
20 result, leave the defence lines, they would not respond to the call to man
21 the defence lines. And when a certain number of Arabs arrived in our
22 territory, this compounded the situation. They, these Arabs, went after
23 certain individuals whom they would train. And this resulted in a
24 blockade as well of the territory by the HVO. And our Bila Valley during
25 that period of time was split up into four or five entities. And the
1 command of the brigade itself had been dispersed and consisted of about
2 three entities.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I would now like to show the
5 witness a series of documents. Since we have a sufficient number of
6 copies for the Trial Chamber and for my colleagues in the courtroom, could
7 they be distributed. After the witness has had a look at the documents, I
8 will ask the witness a number of questions.
9 Q. Tell me, Mr. Delalic, how did you react to such lack of discipline
10 and what steps did you take against members of the 306th Brigade who were
11 causing you difficulties of this kind?
12 A. At first we would try to talk to them and to persuade the members
13 of the army that they should be disciplined. When those efforts failed,
14 we resorted to military disciplinary measures, reprimands up to detention,
15 and occasionally even criminal reports would be filed against individuals.
16 Q. Mr. Delalic, would you be kind enough to look at the documents
17 under numbers 18 and 19. 18 is 0547, and 19 is DH711.
18 [No interpretation]
19 There are cases of fighters refusing to go to the front lines --
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There's no interpretation.
21 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] It's working now. Thank you.
22 Q. So I was saying in the one-but-last paragraph, about the middle of
23 that paragraph, we have the sentence: "In truth there are many cases of
24 soldiers refusing to go to positions. This problem is currently being
25 resolved by the military police bringing soldiers in and sending them to
1 positions and there have been many cases of military custody being imposed
2 as a disciplinary measure."
3 Does this document reflect the situation you referred to which
4 existed as of the beginning of January 1993?
5 A. Yes, it does.
6 Q. I would like to ask you whether you recognised this document.
7 A. Yes, I do.
8 Q. Who compiled and signed the document?
9 A. I compiled and signed this document.
10 Q. Now look at document number 19, DH0711. My question is: What was
11 your attitude towards lack of discipline and criminal offences? Were
12 orders issued as to how the soldiers should behave?
13 A. Yes. Orders were issued to cover those issues.
14 Q. The document that you're looking at right now is one -- is it one
15 of those documents whereby the commander was endeavouring to give orders
16 to all soldiers as to how they should behave with respect to civilians and
17 with respect to property?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you. A moment ago you said that one of the problems that
20 arose in your area, in addition to the numerous units and their members in
21 the area, there was the advent of Arabs. Tell me, when did you notice the
22 presence of those Arabs in your area?
23 A. I first noted their presence at the end of September, when I
24 joined the Mehurici detachment. We were put up in the elementary school
25 of Mehurici and they were put up in the same school only on a different
2 Q. Tell me, did they stay there for long; and if not, do you know
3 where they went later on?
4 A. With the formation of the 306th Mountain Brigade, the 1st
5 Battalion was given a command post in the Mehurici elementary school;
6 earlier, it was in the elementary school of Visnjevo. So it was moved to
7 the Mehurici elementary school and it stayed there. And with them came a
8 large number of refugees who had no homes and who then became members of
9 our brigade, the 306th. Soon after that, the Arabs moved out to the
10 village of Poljanice or, to be more precise, the Savic houses.
11 Q. Mr. Delalic, as assistant commander for security of the 306th
12 Brigade, where were you based? Did you remain in Mehurici?
13 A. I did not stay in Mehurici; my headquarters were at Rudnik, which
14 is about 6 kilometres from Mehurici.
15 Q. Tell me please, what were those Arabs doing when you arrived in
16 Mehurici? And you said it was at the end of September, what were those
17 Arabs doing until the 306th Brigade was formed? Do you have any knowledge
18 about that?
19 A. What I was able to see could be reduced to humanitarian activities
20 among the local population as well as religious teaching of the local
21 population. In that period of time, that was their primary activity.
22 Q. As assistant commander for security of the 306th Brigade, did you
23 at any point in time identify any problems that affected the combat
24 readiness of the 306th Brigade and which could be traced to the presence
25 of those foreigners in your area?
1 A. Yes, because certain members of our brigade would willfully
2 abandon their units and go to be trained by those Arabs. So we couldn't
3 have the necessary personnel we needed for our battalions because fighters
4 were abandoning their ranks, and as a result the commanders were unable to
5 hold the defence lines as required by military principles.
6 Q. Listing the problems that you were confronted with as the security
7 organ, you said that Arabs tried to win over people. What did they use to
8 do that, to recruit people, which, as you said, could not be mobilised to
9 the 306th Brigade?
10 A. Well, I don't know. They had their own methods, but quite a
11 number of people left us for economic reasons. They really didn't have
12 any food at home, and these people provided that food. Another segment
13 was the religious aspect, because some people felt that that was the way
14 they should practice their religion and that is how they won them over.
15 Q. At some point in time, in addition to this problem of recruitment
16 of the local population, did you discover that those Arabs did something
17 that could be described as a crime?
18 A. I was first informed about this while I was at Rudnik, that they
19 had entered the village of Miletici, that is the Arabs had, and that they
20 had committed the act of killing five civilians. And I learned this from
21 Officer Suljic, Dervis. I immediately got in touch with the assistant
22 commander for security of the 1st Battalion, and I ordered him to check
23 out the accuracy of this report and to report back to me.
24 Q. When did Dervis Suljic inform you about the event, and did you
25 receive any information from your assistant in the 1st Battalion?
1 A. To the best of my recollection - it was a long time ago - I think
2 Suljic informed us in the morning at the briefing of the brigade command.
3 And at the same time or a little later I was informed by my assistant that
4 a joint commission consisting of members of the 3rd Corps, the HVO, and
5 the international community who were in the area, and that they had
6 established that without any doubt that this had been committed by the
8 Q. In addition to the killing of those persons in Miletici, did you
9 receive any information as to what happened to the rest of the inhabitants
10 of that village?
11 A. As far as I can remember, the entire civilian population of Croat
12 ethnicity, and some Bosniaks, too, were taken by them to their camp in the
13 village of Poljanice. My assistant commander for security informed me
14 that with the assistance of the command of the 1st Battalion and also some
15 people of prestige up there, they had been returned to the village of
16 Zagradje and that they were being taken care of by the 306th Motorised
17 Brigade which had a platoon up there that was active against the Chetniks.
18 Q. Mr. Delalic, did you inform anyone about that event?
19 A. I informed, up my chain of command, the organ of military security
20 of the 3rd Corps.
21 Q. After receiving this information from your assistant for security
22 in the 1st Battalion, first did you have the authority to conduct any
23 additional investigation, or rather, did you have any real ability to
24 undertake anything against those Mujahedin?
25 A. I had no authority, especially with respect to the Mujahedin,
1 because they did not belong to the army, and as a result, the situation
2 was extremely complicated on the ground. And with the arrival of the
3 commission, the joint commission consisting of representatives of the HVO
4 and the international community as well, they had no suspicions with
5 respect to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time.
6 Q. When you informed the security organ of the 3rd Corps, did you
7 receive any order to act?
8 A. I did receive an order, according to which I should report in
9 greater deal about foreigners as well as about persons who were out of
10 control from our own units and who were sometimes acting together with the
12 Q. What did you do after that?
13 A. The commander of the 1st Battalion was based in Mehurici, but I
14 also had an assistant commander for security in the 4th Battalion, a part
15 of whose unit was in Mehurici village, and he would come often. And I
16 gave him an assignment to monitor and check the Bosnians who were in that
17 area and who had -- who were out of control.
18 Q. And did you do anything with respect to the Arabs, Mr. Delalic?
19 A. It was difficult to do anything at all with respect to the Arabs.
20 They never gave their real names; they were mobile; new persons would
21 appear frequently, so that we were unable to do anything in that respect.
22 Q. Mr. Delalic, regarding the assignment that you received from the
23 security service, did you inform your commander about it and did you try
24 to learn more about those Arabs?
25 A. I did inform my commander, and we tried to find out more about it.
1 My commander was a professional soldier, and he wanted to learn more about
2 it because this situation affected the combat morale of our units.
3 Q. And what did you do?
4 A. The commander offered to join me for us to go and talk to them to
5 see what they actually wanted, and we headed towards the village of
6 Poljanice to talk to these persons. When we reached the entrance to the
7 Mujahid camp there was an obstacle and a guard, I think he was of Arab
8 origin. We stopped and asked to enter. I don't know whether he
9 understood us. In any event, he blew his whistle. And from the first
10 house, as far as I can now remember, two persons came out with arms; one
11 was an Arab and the other appeared to be a local. When they approached
12 us, this local man asked us what we wanted. The commander introduced
13 himself and said that he would like to talk to them about their activities
14 in our area because certain problems were occurring. This person
15 translated this, I assume it was his superior, to his superior, and that
16 one said that they had nothing to discuss with us, that they had seen
17 Mr. Sefer Halilovic and that they were forming the 8th Muslim Brigade.
18 Q. What happened then? Were you able to continue this conversation?
19 A. We could not continue the conversation because they said that they
20 would continue with their efforts to form the 8th Muslim Brigade, which
21 would rely on the supreme command staff. They simply turned around and
22 left us. They were hostile towards us.
23 Q. What did you do after that? Did you inform anyone at all about
25 A. I informed the superior command of the security service of the 3rd
2 Q. Mr. Delalic, will you now look at the document under tab 10.
3 Could you tell me whether you're familiar with this document.
4 A. Yes, I am.
5 Q. Who drafted the document?
6 A. I drafted the document.
7 Q. In this document are you providing information on the event that
8 you have just described for the Trial Chamber?
9 A. Yes. I did provide such information.
10 Q. Mr. Delalic, in that conversation with the Arabs, were these other
11 individuals mentioned in the document also discussed or is this
12 information that you obtained from some other source?
13 A. We didn't speak to them about any other individuals; we didn't
14 have time. And in fact, they didn't make this possible, they wouldn't
15 allow us to do this. And as for other information, I had the Bosnians, I
16 obtained that information through my assistant commander for security of
17 the 1st Battalion.
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] For the sake of the transcript,
19 the document we are discussing is DH1007. Thank you.
20 Q. Since you had already received an order to monitor the Arabs in
21 the area and provide information on them, tell me whether up to this event
22 you had this obligation and did you report on what they were doing in that
24 A. Yes, we did have that obligation and we did report on all the
25 information that we obtained through the military security organ.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Mr. Delalic, when performing your duties as the assistant
2 commander for security, did you find out about any other activities that
3 the Mujahedin were involved in? If that was the case, could you please
4 tell us when and how you came to such information.
5 A. Well, from the end of May 1993 I was at Rudnik at the basic
6 command post there. And I've already mentioned that our command had been
7 dispersed and was in three places. I was there at the command post as the
8 most senior officer in the village near Krpeljici. There was a commander
9 with a chief of staff and two or three assistants of his. And in
10 Mehurici, some of the officers were there. At that time we couldn't
11 establish sufficient command and control over the units. The conditions
12 were not normal for command and control. But from the position at which I
13 was located, I was able to monitor certain events. So towards the end of
14 May, as far as I can remember, the HVO, the Croatian Defence Council,
15 established control over the Bosniak village of Ricice. Inhabitants of
16 that village were ordered to surrender their weapons and to move out. The
17 inhabitants noticed or came to the conclusion that they couldn't defend
18 themselves. They examined the situation and at the time the brigade
19 couldn't help them, and they all moved out, en masse. Then an ultimatum
20 was issued somewhere around the beginning of June. I don't know the exact
21 date, I think it was the 4th of June, an ultimatum was issued to the
22 village of Velika Bukovica in which they were asked to surrender their
23 weapons and to move out; they refused to do so. They did not surrender
24 their weapons and they didn't move out. And on the 6th of June I believe
25 that the HVO attacked the village, and from that area we received alarming
1 information about the vast number of dead and wounded. The most recent
2 information I had during that period was about 18 dead and six wounded.
3 The commander was aware of the situation, and as a reasonable
4 commander, he took certain steps to protect the Bosniak population. He
5 requested assistance from a corps, from UNPROFOR. And from the command
6 post in Mehurici, our units were ordered to lift the blockade of Velika
7 Bukovica. This was difficult. And I think that on the 7th our units
8 didn't believe that it was appropriate to attempt lifting the blockade in
9 Bukovica, but from some telegrams that were sent from the command post to
10 the commander, I could see that the lifting of the blockade of Velika
11 Bukovica was to take place on the 8th of June. That is what in fact took
12 place, and in the morning our unit carried out an attack from the
13 [Realtime transcript read in error "Haric"] Mehurici/Suhi Dol access in
14 the direction of Maline. And by the afternoon they had stabilised the
15 lines behind the village of Maline in the direction of Guca Gora.
16 Q. Mr. Delalic, tell me, on that day or during the subsequent days,
17 did you find out that in the course of the fighting some events had
18 occurred of interest to security that you were responsible for or with
19 regard to which you took certain measures?
20 A. At the time I was in Rudnik at the command post, at the main
21 command post, and I didn't leave that post. But two or three days later
22 when I went to Mehurici, I found out that a large number of Croatian
23 individuals, Croatian civilians, had been brought in from the village of
24 Maline for their own personal protection because the units couldn't
25 provide them with adequate protection in the village itself. I found out
1 that among these civilians there was some Croatian soldiers, but
2 unfortunately, I also found out that when the column was passing through,
3 20 civilians were separated, they were singled out, and taken away in an
4 unknown direction.
5 Q. What did you do? Did you issue any orders in relation to this
6 event, in relation to the fact that some civilians and soldiers were taken
7 away in an unknown direction; or rather, did you issue any instructions
8 that concerned the HVO soldiers who had been brought in?
9 A. Well, as far as the assistant commander for security for the 1st
10 Battalion is concerned and given that the security organ from the 1st
11 Battalion had been leading a certain group of people from which these
12 individuals had been singled out -- well, I requested this assistant to
13 carry out certain investigations and to determine how this event had
14 occurred. And I issued a task to my officer, Haris Jusic, and asked him
15 to take statements from HVO members. But what we were most interested in
16 at the time were minefields because we had already sustained losses
17 because of their existence.
18 Q. Mr. Delalic, tell me, did you inform the commander about the
19 information that you had and did you also provide anyone else with the
20 information that you had?
21 A. As far as I can remember, the commander scheduled a meeting for
22 the 12th of June, a meeting of the corps command. At this meeting I
23 provided the information I had obtained, and I said that there were also
24 certain indications according to which people had been killed. I provided
25 the commander with this information and I also provided this information
1 to my superiors in the security corps.
2 Q. Have a look at document under number 2, DH1903.
3 Have you had a look at the document?
4 A. I didn't understand the number.
5 Q. Under tab 2, the document number is DH1903.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. In the penultimate sentence, it says that "there are indications
8 of the execution of 20 captured civilians and HVO members. Investigation
9 is pending, and upon the completion of the investigation you will be
10 informed on time."
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Is this the document in which you provided the 3rd Corps with
13 information of the event?
14 A. Yes, it is.
15 Q. What was the position of the 3rd Corps command in relation to
16 detecting, investigating, and prosecuting all those who had perpetrated
18 A. Well, it was clear that it was necessary to investigate such
19 occurrences, and if the perpetrators were identified it was necessary to
20 punish them, if the perpetrators were army members.
21 Q. Mr. Delalic, could you please tell me, since you had ordered an
22 investigation to be carried out and you also informed the 3rd Corps of the
23 fact that there was an ongoing investigation, did you find out anything
24 about the results of the investigation and did your assistant for security
25 in the 1st Battalion encounter any difficulties, any problems?
1 A. Well, after about 15 days, as far as I can remember, the assistant
2 commander for security provided me with a report, and all the statements
3 from military police members who had been leading this column were
4 provided to me as well as certain other information. And on the basis of
5 this material, you could see that no one from the 306th participated in
6 those actions, nor had anyone from any other units participated in them.
7 It was quite clear that the Mujahedin unit was responsible for what had
8 been done.
9 Q. Did you inform anyone? Did you report to anyone about the
10 information you had obtained in the course of the investigation?
11 A. I informed my commander and I also informed the superior military
12 security organ.
13 Q. After you found out that it was the Mujahedin who had separated
14 these individuals and taken them away, but probably, as you said, executed
15 certain individuals, did you as the security organ or did your police
16 force carry out an investigation? Were you in a position to carry out an
17 investigation? Or rather, first of all, did you have such authority to
18 investigate the Mujahedin who were not army members and were you in a
19 position to enter the camp and try and investigate the event?
20 A. We didn't have the forces required to enter the camp. When you
21 bear in mind how we were received, myself and the commander, it's quite
22 obvious that we could not enter their camp. Had we gone there with the
23 intention of carrying out some sort of an investigation, there would have
24 been an armed conflict, fighting would have broken out, and I didn't have
25 the force for the possibility to do this.
1 Q. You just mentioned an armed conflict. As the assistant commander
2 for security, did you or was the commander of the 306th Mountain Brigade
3 in -- were you in a position to decide to enter into an armed conflict
4 with individuals who were not army members, in spite of the fact that they
5 were present in your territory? Were you able to make such an assessment
6 and to take a decision on such action?
7 A. No, I couldn't take such a decision. And from my point of view
8 they were more a political problem. It was for someone at the top to deal
9 with this problem. I can now say that, as far as I could see at the time,
10 they were not army members, and by virtue of that fact, I couldn't carry
11 out an investigation into the event.
12 Q. Mr. Delalic, what sort of duties did the military police of the
13 306th Mountain Brigade perform after those events in the month of June?
14 What sort of tasks did it have and what sort of problems did you
16 A. Well, immediately after those events the military police spent
17 about 20 days at the main command post, which is where it mounted a
18 defence of the main command post. They were quite exhausted. They had
19 been quite traumatised because they had been shelled night and day at the
20 main command post. But in spite of that fact, they immediately started
21 performing their military police tasks. The main objective was to secure
22 the church or the monastery in Guca Gora, the command post, and to an
23 extent their request to participate at the defence lines because the HVO
24 wanted to take back positions that they had lost. So the police were
25 engaged 100 per cent during that period of time.
1 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It is time for our
3 break. It is half past 10.00 and we will resume at 5 to 11.00. According
4 to my calculations, the Defence has another 25 minutes. We will resume at
5 5 to 11.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. I shall
9 give the floor to the Defence, and looking at the clock, please take note.
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. Mr. Delalic, you said that after those combat operations you had a
12 lot to do in view of the situation in the area of the 306th Brigade. Tell
13 me, in connection with the civilian population brought to Mehurici, do you
14 know who took care of that population, who guarded them, and what happened
15 to them?
16 A. As far as I know, the civilian population was taken care of by the
17 civilian community. They were assisted by members of the 1st Battalion.
18 Because they, too, were partly housed in the school, they gave them
19 whatever they could to facilitate their stay there. They also had medical
20 care, they had covers and mattresses, whatever we could give them. And
21 the security was ensured by the civilian police.
22 Q. You also said that there were some members of the HVO and that
23 your assistant, Haris Jusic, took statements from them. Tell me, how were
24 those captured soldiers treated and where were they put up?
25 A. They were accommodated in an abandoned smith's, ironsmith's shop.
1 Haris took statements without the presence of the military police. As he
2 was a person -- a civilian, he used to be a lawyer in Nova Bila, and
3 people knew him and we didn't want to frighten people; that's why we chose
4 him. They had three meals a day, they had medical care. The
5 accommodation wasn't too good, but we just didn't have anything better
6 than that to offer them.
7 Q. Did anyone complain or did anyone inform you that a member of the
8 army or of the police who was securing them had treated them inhumanely or
9 used cursive measures against them?
10 A. As far as I know, no one complained to me. After statements
11 taken, Haris provided those statements to me, and talking to him, as far
12 as I can remember, he also told me that no one had mistreated them in any
14 Q. What happened to those detainees -- or let me ask you first, did
15 any representatives of the International Red Cross come to talk to these
17 A. As far as I know, the International Red Cross did go to Mehurici.
18 They spoke to those people, but I was not present when they came, as I had
19 other engagements. But my officer, Haris Jusic, was there on a daily
21 Q. Tell me, Mr. Delalic, what finally happened to those detained
22 members of the HVO?
23 A. We received an order from General Alagic, as far as I can
24 recollect, for them to be escorted to the KP Dom in Zenica. And he
25 mentioned me by name as being held responsible for them. And I thought
1 about the way to transport them to Zenica safely so as to avoid anything
2 that could adversely affect the security situation. So I requested a bus
3 and we transported them by bus to Zenica without any problem.
4 Q. Look at document number 1, please, it is P104, and tell me, is
5 that the order that you received and which you carried out in the way you
6 have just told us?
7 A. I think that it is that order.
8 Q. Thank you. Before the break you spoke about the numerous problems
9 along the lines with the HVO, the duties the military police had with
10 respect to securing the Guca Gora monastery. In that period of time did
11 any other persons or policemen come to assist you?
12 A. At the time we lacked the strength to carry out all the planned
13 assignments and -- with our own military policemen. So a squad of the
14 military police battalion from Zenica came to assist us and they secured
15 the monastery at Guca Gora together with us.
16 Q. In view of the fact that you said a moment ago that combat
17 operations continued towards the HVO lines, the closeness of front lines,
18 did it affect the ability to preserve the property in the area? Due to
19 combat was any damage inflicted or did you not have any such problems in
20 the area of your brigade?
21 A. During combat itself, few buildings were damaged. Some were burnt
22 but in small numbers. Probably both sides used incendiary ammunition, but
23 these villages have highly inflammable outhouses, that is haystacks and
24 hay sheds, so once it catches fire, the fire would spread quickly and
25 during the war it was difficult to extinguish such fires. And the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 closeness of the front line led to frequent shelling, particularly around
2 Guca Gora and towards Han Bila, houses were destroyed and set on fire in
3 that way, too.
4 Q. In view of the area in which you were situated, were there any
5 civilian police stations there and what was their task with respect to the
6 security and safety of people and property in the area?
7 A. They also protected civilians to the best of their ability. For a
8 period of time they were resubordinated to us because we didn't have
9 enough strength in view of the breadth of the front line, so we were
10 engaged on the front as well. So I can't remember but they stayed for
11 quite some time in the area. So they cooperated with us as far as they
12 could and as far as the combat operations allowed because the front line
13 was constantly active there, right up until the spring of 1994, that is
14 until the signing of the Washington agreement.
15 Q. Tell me, Mr. Delalic, in view of the opening of a new front and
16 the lifting of the blockade of the road, did you as the security organ and
17 your military police come across some problems that could not be foreseen
18 or expected?
19 A. All this happened so quickly that we simply could not have
20 foreseen certain things. The opening of the Zenica-Travnik road, which
21 had been blocked, thousands of civilians were moving along that route and
22 various groups of soldiers who could no longer be controlled. I had 29
23 policemen. If I had had 2.900, I would not have been able to protect each
24 and every individual.
25 Q. You say you could not have protected every building and every
1 house. Who was living in those houses? What was in danger from those
2 various troops passing there?
3 A. Some civilians remained in their houses, but 98, 99 of those
4 houses were abandoned and it was very difficult to control. After combat
5 operations when we were on the defence line, women and children in their
6 hundreds were moving around, looking for food in those houses, and they
7 caused the greatest problems. Then they started taking away furniture
8 and, as winter approached, doors and roof tiles and things like that.
9 Q. Did you take any steps to prevent what you have described as
10 looking for food and objects, but in legal terms these would be qualified
11 as theft?
12 A. We had very clear-cut positions of the command. Our own positions
13 were clear, too, and we did issue certain orders and instructions. We set
14 up checkpoints, but it's one thing to write something down and another the
15 actual state of affairs on the ground, because there were so many people
16 on the move. And there are -- even if we put a checkpoint at a certain
17 village, there are hundreds of ways getting round it. The military police
18 had markings on them so people knew where they were so people would get
19 round them somehow, and that is how they stole things. But we did what we
20 could in that respect.
21 Q. Mr. Delalic, you said a moment ago that the superior command had
22 very clear-cut positions. Which command are you referring to with respect
23 to preventing looting and prosecuting perpetrators?
24 A. I'm talking about the superior commands of the 3rd Corps, the
25 operations group, and my own commander of the 306th Brigade. I was saying
1 that positions were quite clear in that respect.
2 Q. Regardless of these pronounced difficulties, that it was difficult
3 to control abandoned areas and that villages could be entered from various
4 sides, did you nevertheless manage to identify certain perpetrators and
5 find stolen property? And if so, what did you do?
6 A. We took a series of measures. We would find the perpetrators, we
7 would seize property. If we find someone stealing, we would seize that --
8 those objects. And then the military police would store those things in
9 certain storehouses near the monastery and the cooperative building in
10 Guca Gora. But those objects were, with time, destroyed, so we couldn't
11 return it to those people except for a man who stayed behind, so we
12 returned to him his passenger car and his tractor. But -- and also in a
13 number of cases we filed criminal reports. But in those days it was very
14 difficult and dangerous to travel to Travnik because the line was
15 constantly exposed to sniper fire, so that in view of that situation, we
16 resorted more to military disciplinary measures, which we proposed to the
17 commander. And I think that we are one of the brigades that issued the
18 largest numbers of decisions regarding detention from 30 to 60 days for
19 such perpetrators.
20 Q. A moment ago you mentioned the burning of houses during combat
21 operations and in the fighting with the HVO until the spring of 1994.
22 Tell me, did you notice any other fires and did you do anything about it?
23 A. At one point in time the civil defence informed us that certain
24 Arabs had torched two buildings in Guca Gora. I think we took some
25 statements, but torchings would usually occur at night, when you really
1 were not able to control it. There were also revenge actions. If
2 somebody had someone killed on the front line, he had no other way but to
3 go and set fire to a building at night so that he wouldn't be caught.
4 Q. Now, look at document number 5, please. It is number P158. Can
5 you see it? Securing the Guca Gora sector, dated the 16th of June, 1993.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. This is an order from the 3rd Corps. Is this the order you
8 referred to a moment ago when a part of the military police battalion came
9 to assist you? Were these the assignments you worked on together? Will
10 you now look at the next document, number 6. It is P204.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. In this document we can see that Commander Sipic is ordering units
13 of the MUP and the military police to undertake certain measures to
14 prevent looting and torching. You said a moment ago that you set up
15 checkpoints and so on and that all the commands, including your own
16 commander, issued orders. Is this one of those orders which you would
17 issue, or rather, implement as far as possibilities allowed?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you. Tell me please now, did you continue to have problems
20 with the presence of these Arabs or Mujahedin and did you, as you were
21 duty-bound, inform the command of the 3rd Corps about those problems, or
22 rather, the security organ of the 3rd Corps?
23 A. We did continue to have problems. We had a family housed in Guca
24 Gora and they had been threatened. And as we couldn't physically protect
25 them, we brought them there and they lived with us in the monastery. So
1 we protected them in the Guca Gora monastery. We also had a problem that
2 our typist couldn't come to work because she didn't wear a veil and she
3 was not allowed to go to work. And I have a personal example. My
4 daughter had two bullets fired at her because she was not veiled and she
5 was only 15 at the time.
6 Q. Now, will you look at document 1950 and 1951. Is this the
7 document that you compiled?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. There is reference in the document to threats by the Mujahedin
10 against certain Croats, Volic, Zoran; Volic, Davor; and Volic, Vinko. And
11 attached are statements from those persons. Is this something that you
12 informed the military security organ about, that is, the event you
13 mentioned that afterwards you took care of those people in the monastery
15 A. Yes. That is a document referring to that incident about which I
16 informed the superior command.
17 Q. Could you please have a look at document at tab 15. The number of
18 the document is 1400. Is this a document in which you describe and inform
19 the security organ about what happened to your typist?
20 A. Yes, that's the document. Yes.
21 Q. Tell me, although you provided all these reports, during this
22 period of time when you provided such reports, were you able to take any
23 measures against those Arabs, the Mujahedin, or was the situation that
24 you've already described to us such that they were out of the control of
25 the 306th and the ABiH and did that situation continue?
1 A. Well, there was nothing we could do against them. I think that
2 the issue was a political one and someone at the top should have dealt
3 with it, because they informed us that they were negotiating or speaking
4 to someone. They weren't under our control and, as a result, we had no
5 authority over them.
6 Q. Since you were a security officer and, after all, you did speak to
7 the people and you could have certain information about the influence they
8 had on certain people, could you tell me, did you try to assess what an
9 armed conflict with the Mujahedin might result in? How would the local
10 population have reacted?
11 A. Well, they had a significant influence on the local population and
12 I think that the local population would have had a negative relation to
13 the army if we had tried to engage in armed conflict with them at the
14 time, but we really didn't have the forces for such conflict because two
15 fronts had been opened at the time.
16 Q. At the time did you try to determine whether an armed conflict
17 with the Mujahedin might also lead to an armed conflict with the
18 population, or rather, even -- or rather, would it have caused certain
19 problems in certain divisions in the units themselves?
20 A. Yes. That was one of our assessments because while they were
21 present up there they established relations with a lot of families, you
22 know, and it was no longer possible to know whether someone would have
23 obeyed an order to act against them at the time. That is why at that time
24 there was really no possibility to engage in an armed conflict with them
25 and place them under our control.
1 Q. At the time did you manage to infiltrate associates of yours among
2 their ranks and were you able to determine the strength of that unit, the
3 number of men they had, the quantity of weapons they had, and the forces
4 that they had?
5 A. Well, in order to infiltrate associates -- you can have three
6 kinds of associates, you know: You can have an economic associate, a
7 patriotic one, and an associate involved in compromising material. But I
8 didn't have any compromising material, I didn't have economic grounds
9 because they never used their real names; they adopted false names. So it
10 really wasn't possible for us to infiltrate any of our associates. But
11 the men who were with them, well, they really didn't want to discuss those
12 matters. It was impossible for us to obtain certain information. We made
13 assessments on the basis of what we could observe. We believed that there
14 was about one battalion present in the area.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'd like to point out to the
16 Defence that your time is up. If you have a final question to put to the
17 witness, go ahead, but please be brief.
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Q. My question is: Did you also provide information to the security
20 organ of the 3rd Corps about your assessments?
21 A. I provided all the information I obtained to my superior command.
22 Q. And the last question is: Have a look at document number 17 and
23 could you tell me whether this is the -- a document in which you found out
24 from the civilian protection that two houses in Guca Gora had been set on
25 fire by the Mujahedin? The number of this document is 1411.
1 A. Yes, that's the document.
2 Q. Thank you very much.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, thank you for your
4 understanding. This concludes my examination-in-chief of the witness.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Does the other Defence team have any questions for this witness?
7 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We
8 only have one question for this witness in order to clarify the transcript
9 on page 26, line 22, 23, 24. In the transcript, it says that: "Units on
10 the 8th of June in the early morning hours set out from the direction of
11 Haric and Suhi Dol, whereas I think that the witness said Mehurici and
12 Suhi Dol in the direction of Maline."
13 Cross-examined by Mr. Ibrisimovic:
14 Q. Is that correct, Mr. Delalic?
15 A. As far as I know, the units set off from the direction of Mehurici
16 and Suhi Dol.
17 Q. And you said that at 5.00 in the afternoon the lines were
18 stabilised behind the village of Maline in the direction of Guca Gora.
19 A. Yes, that's what I said.
20 Q. Those were the units of the 306th Mountain Brigade?
21 A. Yes, 306th Mountain Brigade.
22 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, we have no
23 further questions, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 I'll now give the floor to the Prosecution. You have one hour and
1 15 minutes. Please go ahead.
2 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Cross-examined by Mr. Mundis:
4 Q. Good morning, Mr. Delalic. My name is Daryl Mundis --
5 A. Good morning.
6 Q. My name is Daryl Mundis, and along with my colleagues here, we
7 represent the Prosecution in this case, and I have a few questions to ask
8 you about the matters we've been discussing this morning. Before I do
9 that, though, sir, I would just like to inform you that it is not my
10 intention in any way to confuse you, and I would ask you, sir, that if you
11 don't understand my question, just say so and I'll reformulate or rephrase
12 the question so that you do understand it.
13 Sir, can you tell us to the best of your recollection the date
14 that you assumed responsibilities as the 306th Mountain Brigade assistant
15 commander for security?
16 A. Well, as I said, from the very beginning of the brigade. It was
17 established on the 22nd of December, 1992, and as of that time I was the
18 assistant commander for security.
19 Q. And, sir, you've told us that you were actually based in Rudnik.
20 Can you confirm for us that at no point in time in 1993 were you actually
21 based in the Mehurici primary school?
22 A. Yes, I can confirm that. From the time when the brigade was
23 formed, I immediately went to Rudnik and that's where I was based.
24 Q. And, sir, how long did you remain as the assistant commander for
25 security of the 306th Mountain Brigade?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. I remained there until the 14th of February, 1996, and that's when
2 I requested to be demobilised from the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3 Q. Can you tell us, sir, during the period from 22 December 1992
4 through the end of 1993 how frequently in the course of your duties you
5 went to the primary school in Mehurici.
6 A. I occasionally went there. I had three battalions, and if time
7 allowed this, I wanted to see assistant commanders for security but I was
8 frequently absent and at forward command posts. So I spent quite a lot of
9 time there; sometimes seven days.
10 Q. Can you be -- you were asked this morning by my learned colleague
11 about the Arabs that were in the school. Do you recall, sir, an
12 approximate month or time period when you became aware that they left the
14 A. I can't say exactly, but when the brigade was formed and when the
15 1st Battalion was deployed in the primary school in Mehurici, soon
16 afterwards they left that place. Perhaps it was a few days later because
17 a certain number of men arrived with the battalion and they had no other
18 accommodation. They had to stay and live in the school.
19 Q. Well, I'm -- I was hoping, sir, that you could be a little more
20 specific. When you say "a few days later," when did the 1st Battalion
21 deploy to the school?
22 A. Well, as soon as the brigade was formed they were given a
23 headquarters in the primary school in Mehurici. So it wasn't possible
24 immediately on the 22nd to move in there, it took perhaps four or five
25 days to move in. I can't remember exactly now, a lot of time has passed
1 and I didn't pay that much attention to the time when they were to move
2 out. During that period of time, we didn't have significant problems that
3 would have led me to monitor them or to pay attention to that issue.
4 Q. When -- since you say "we didn't have significant problems," when
5 did the presence of these foreigners first become a significant problem,
6 in your opinion?
7 A. Well, it became a significant problem when the events in Miletici
9 Q. You told us, sir, that you had three battalions -- or within the
10 306th Mountain Brigade there were three battalions. I believe also,
11 though, you've made reference, at least in the English transcript, to the
12 4th Battalion. Were there three battalions or four battalions in the
13 306th Mountain Brigade?
14 A. In fact there were four battalions; it was a slip of the tongue.
15 Because the brigade was transformed into a light brigade later on and then
16 it was transformed into a mountain brigade again. And later -- and there
17 were three battalions in that unit. At the beginning, initially, there
18 were four battalions.
19 Q. Did each of those battalions have an assistant commander for
20 security? And if so, can you tell us the names of the battalion assistant
21 commanders for security?
22 A. Yes. Each battalion had such commander. In the 4th Battalion,
23 the commander was Hrustan Zelkanovic; in the 2nd Battalion the commander
24 was Nedzad Begic -- where in fact in the 3rd Battalion the commander was
25 Nedzad Begic; in the 2nd Battalion the commander was Zrakan Husic [phoen].
1 And Zukanovic Hasan was in the 1st Battalion. They were the assistant
2 commanders for security.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, sir, earlier today you've told us about the time
4 in May 1993 where you went with your commander to the Poljanice camp. Can
5 you describe for us this camp or this -- you've also said it was the Savic
6 houses. Can you describe for us what this compound looked like.
7 A. Well, I know that place. The houses are on -- are in a field
8 above Mehurici, perhaps about 500 metres away.
9 Q. How many houses?
10 A. At the entrance where they lived there were two houses, as far as
11 I can remember, and they had constructed a sort of temporary hut for
12 themselves. Above those houses, about 100 metres away, there was another
13 house. And across the road toward the east there was another house, but I
14 don't know who lived there. I never went there.
15 Q. So in this compound, or camp, there were two houses and a hut. Is
16 that right?
17 A. Yes, as far as I can remember, that's correct.
18 Q. And approximately -- if you're able to tell us, sir, approximately
19 how many square metres was this area?
20 A. I don't understand the question but -- well, perhaps about 20
22 Q. Can you tell us what a dulum is?
23 A. A dulum is 1.000 square metres.
24 Q. Now, sir, on this occasion in May 1993 when you were at the -- at
25 this location with your commander, you told us you saw a guard who blew a
1 whistle, and then two individuals came out and spoke with you. Other than
2 these three people, did you recall seeing anyone else inside this
4 A. I don't recall having seen anyone else there at the time, but
5 there were probably others there. There were probably people there. But
6 at that point in time two individuals came out when he whistled, and as I
7 have said, one was an Arab and the other was probably a local person,
8 judging by his appearance, and he spoke the Bosnian language very well.
9 Q. Now, sir, this morning you said - and this is reflected at page
10 24, line 11, of the transcript: "There were persons from our units who
11 were acting together with the Arabs."
12 How many such people, to your knowledge, how many local people,
13 Bosniaks, were acting together with the Arabs?
14 A. I'm not sure. I can't remember exactly whether I said that they
15 cooperated with the Arabs, but they were drawn to them and went to attend
16 training by the Arabs, a part of the local population. In my estimate,
17 from the area of Mehurici there may have been 40 to 50 Bosniaks who were
18 present among them.
19 Q. Can you tell us, sir, if you at any point as part of your duties
20 came to know the identity of any of the Bosniaks among these 40 to 50
22 A. Off hand I can't remember, but there were quite a number of
23 criminal reports that we filed against those people. And it was our view
24 that the court would respond. However, as far as I know, the court did
25 not do much with those cases. I don't know what happened later. Some
1 returned to join our units and stayed with the units until the end.
2 Q. Sir, when you say "criminal reports were filed," do you know in
3 which court such criminal reports would have eventually landed or ended up
5 A. Attached to the military prosecutor's office in the court in
7 Q. What type of crimes were covered in these criminal reports that
8 you submitted?
9 A. The criminal reports were filed for the act of desertion; willful
10 abandoning of units.
11 Q. Sir, you were shown a document, and it's tab 10, which you might
12 want to turn to in the tab -- or in the binder that's before you. At tab
13 10, this document is DH1007. Do you remember this document, sir?
14 A. Yes, yes.
15 Q. If you look approximately halfway down the document on the
16 left-hand side in the Bosnian version, you'll see two names; Ramo Durmis
17 and Sljivo Malik. Do you see that part of the document, sir?
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. And the sentence in which their names appear says: "There are a
20 lot of Bosnians with the Mujahedins, who are commanded by Ramo Durmis, and
21 Sljivo Malik is also with him, who used to study in Saudi Arabia."
22 Where did you get this information from, sir?
23 A. I got this information from the assistant commander of the 4th
24 Battalion, Hrustan Zelkanovic.
25 Q. And, sir, do you know either of these two Bosniaks who are
1 mentioned in your report?
2 A. No, I didn't meet them.
3 Q. Let me ask you, sir, while you've got the binder in front of you
4 and open, if you could turn to tab 15, which is Defence number 1400. And
5 again, my learned colleague from the Defence asked you about this
6 document. And in this daily report that you submitted, it describes the
7 incident involving Zuhra Aganovic, who was a typist. And the English
8 version of this document says: "On 20 August 1993, in the vicinity of the
9 Command of the 306th Mountain Brigade, a group of Mujahedins stopped one
10 of he female employees, Zuhra Aganovic, a typist, on her way to the
11 kitchen for lunch."
12 Can you recall this incident, sir?
13 A. I do remember this incident, but I did not draft this document. I
14 wasn't there at the time but I am familiar with the incident.
15 Q. Can you tell us a little bit more about the incident? And I'm
16 particularly interested to know where this incident took place.
17 A. I can't really read this document well, but this happened
18 somewhere close to the command.
19 Q. Was it in a building? Was it on the street?
20 A. It was outside.
21 Q. Can you tell us what this kitchen that's referred to in the
22 document, where is this kitchen?
23 A. I can't say exactly now because we moved from one command post to
24 another within a brief interval and the kitchens or canteens were in the
25 command premises. But occasionally typists would go to the logistics
1 department, which was outside the command post, and probably as she was
2 went out and was coming back, this happened, because the roads linked
3 Mehurici-Travnik or Han Bila-Travnik, those were the roads there.
4 Q. Sir, at any point in time in fulfilling your duties as the
5 assistant commander for security in the 306th Mountain Brigade, did you
6 become aware of the names of any of the Arabs that were in the area of
7 responsibility of your brigade?
8 A. It was very hard to find out their real names. We couldn't get
9 hold of their passports, you see; that's number one. Number two, they
10 would call themselves by names they used, like pseudonyms. They were
11 constantly on the move, new faces kept cropping up, so we simply were
12 unable to discover their proper names.
13 Q. Did you become aware of any of their pseudonyms or nicknames?
14 A. I remember Abu Minaj, for instance. Abu Minaj, that was a
15 nickname, and nothing more than that.
16 Q. And where was this Abu Minaj person?
17 A. He was in the initial period in Mehurici in the Savic houses. As
18 far as I was able to find out, that is where he lived, but we didn't know
19 anything more about him.
20 Q. And, sir, how did you find out this person's name and the fact
21 that he was one of the inhabitants in the Savici settlement?
22 A. Passing through Mehurici I would frequently meet with my security
23 officer Zelkanovic, who I said had the duty to sort of monitor things as
24 much as he could. And they would call out to one another using those
25 nicknames, and that is how I memorised this one. And he told me about
1 him, but we didn't know anything more than that about him. They would
2 mostly move from the Savic houses towards Zenica.
3 Q. And how did they move?
4 A. They were motorised. They had Toyotas, they had quite a number of
5 motorcars, and various types of vehicles.
6 Q. Other than this Abu Minaj, do you remember the names of any of the
7 other Arabs that were in the 306th Mountain Brigade's area of
9 A. I cannot remember. It really was a long time ago, but I somehow
10 managed to remember this one. Because of the word Abu Minaj, and in our
11 language "mina" means "mine," so it has stuck in my memory.
12 Q. Sir, one of the other documents you were shown this morning, which
13 is behind tab 13 and which is 1951, mentions the name Hamza. Do you see
14 that, sir?
15 A. I don't.
16 Q. It's the second paragraph, right under the line that says: "Today
17 at 1400 hours..."
18 A. I see 2240 hours.
19 Q. It's the second paragraph. 2240 is the first paragraph.
20 A. I found it.
21 Q. Sir, do you know anything about this person, Hamza?
22 A. I don't. I know that after the war there was some problems and
23 that the international police was searching for him.
24 Q. Let me turn next, sir, to the events in Miletici. You told us,
25 sir, that after they were released from the Poljanice or Savici
1 settlement, the villagers from Miletici were taken to Zagradje. Did you
2 direct any of the personnel in the 306th Mountain Brigade security service
3 to go and interview or speak to the villagers from Miletici in Zagradje?
4 A. I said that I gave an assignment to the security officer of the
5 1st Battalion to go there and to brief me about the situation there.
6 Q. My question, sir, is a little bit different and it had to go to do
7 not with just going there but my question was: Did you order that
8 security officer of the 1st Battalion to interview any of those Miletici
9 villagers who were accommodated in Zagradje?
10 A. Well, the very fact that I sent him there means I ordered him to
11 go there. I didn't order him to interview people, but he knew that they
12 were there and he knew that there was a commission on which there was a
13 representative of the 3rd Corps, of the HVO, and the international
14 community. And they gave their opinion, and on the basis of that opinion
15 he passed on the necessary information to me.
16 Q. Sir, do you recall the names of the people who were part of that
18 A. I only know that on behalf of the 3rd Corps I think it was
19 Mr. Merdan.
20 Q. Did you ever speak to any members of that commission about the
21 events in Miletici?
22 A. I did not.
23 Q. Now, sir, following Miletici, you've told us that you considered
24 the Mujahedin to be a significant problem. Is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. And at that point in time, the end of April 1993, you were
2 certainly aware that they were in the camp in Poljanice. Isn't that
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And clearly you knew that they were dangerous, based on the events
6 in Miletici.
7 A. I did know.
8 Q. And, sir, you also testified earlier that they presented a threat
9 to the 306th Mountain Brigade in the sense that they were luring local
10 young men to come and join them, and that would have a detrimental effect
11 on the combat readiness of your brigade. Would you agree with that?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Sir, the personnel within your security service of the 306th
14 Mountain Brigade would have been aware of these facts as well, would they
16 A. They did know.
17 Q. Did you issue any orders to the members of your security service
18 to avoid the Poljanice camp?
19 A. We didn't issue written orders, but orally we did. We spoke about
20 this and said that they shouldn't go there, they couldn't socialise with
21 them, and that they should tell people not to join their units, because
22 they were needed by the army.
23 Q. Can you tell me, sir, why a column of civilians and surrendered
24 HVO soldiers under escort by military police officers of the 306th
25 Mountain Brigade would be marched adjacent to this camp, in light of the
1 information which you've just told us about?
2 A. Well, the army couldn't provide adequate protection for the
3 population in Maline, they couldn't remain in Maline. They took them to a
4 safe place in Mehurici. However, this unforeseen, unexpected, incident
5 occurred. No one had expected such a thing. And, you know, at the time I
6 really wasn't in the area; I was in Rudnik.
7 Q. Well, sir, you've told us that you were aware that -- or you've
8 told us that the Mujahedin murdered five villagers in Miletici. You've
9 told us that they were dangerous. You've told us that you ordered your
10 military policemen to stay away from that camp, yet they marched a column
11 of civilians and surrendered HVO soldiers, whom it was their duty to
12 protect, right next to that camp.
13 A. They did lead the column, but it wasn't by the camp. You know
14 they passed eastwards of the camp, you know, somewhere in the area of
15 Maline above Sedici and towards Mehurici. And at the time the military
16 police, as far as I can remember, there were about five military
17 policemen, and they really couldn't do anything. The other force was more
18 significant. They were surprised and they took these people from them.
19 Q. Sir, you just said, "They did lead the column, but it wasn't by
20 the camp."
21 How close did that column get to the Savici settlement?
22 A. Well, I can't say for sure the camp, as far as I remember, as far
23 as I know - at the time I wasn't there, as I said. The camp is west of
24 Mehurici and the column passed by to the east of the camp.
25 Q. How close were they to the camp when the Mujahedin approached the
1 column, based on the information you received from your military police
3 A. As far as I know, they waited for them in the forest. They came
4 out of the forest and took them by surprise. It wasn't in the camp, it
5 wasn't by the camp, as far as I know.
6 Q. Sir, did you debrief -- did you personally debrief or speak to the
7 military police officers who had been escorting that column?
8 A. No, I didn't speak to them. I let the security officer do that.
9 He was their immediate superior and he reported to me and informed me of
10 all the events, of the conversations he had, of the statements made by
11 those policemen and of any other information he had.
12 Q. Sir, you also told us this morning that in the period around the
13 8th to the 10th, 12th of June, 1993, there was a number of activities
14 undertaken with respect to clearing minefields. Do you remember that,
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. What unit or units were involved in this mine-clearing operation?
18 A. There were engineer units from the 306th Mountain Brigade.
19 Q. Were there soldiers of any unit other than the 306th Mountain
20 Brigade involved in mine clearing in the area around Mehurici and its
22 A. As far as I know, at the time there were no other units involved.
23 According to the information we had on the minefields -- well, this
24 information was provided to battalion commanders and to the chief of the
25 engineer units. And they were involved in clearing those minefields.
1 Q. Let me turn now, sir, to the issue of persons who were detained in
2 Mehurici. You told us, sir, that although you didn't personally see it
3 you were made aware that the International Committee of the Red Cross
4 visited Mehurici. And my question, sir, is: Who told you that?
5 A. When I went to see my official at the time, at that time he told
6 me that the Red Cross had been there and that they had visited these
8 Q. And when you say, sir, "my official at the time," are you
9 referring to Haris Jusic?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Can you tell us, sir, during what period Haris Jusic was involved
12 in interviewing or dealing with the HVO soldiers detained in the
13 blacksmith's shop in Mehurici?
14 A. When I arrived in Mehurici, which was about the 11th, I found
15 Haris in Pode, and that's where he was during the blockade of the area.
16 And I assigned him the task of taking statements if there were any
17 interesting questions, and minefields were interesting questions. He
18 immediately started carrying out this task. He took statements in the
19 school, in the office, not in the place you mentioned. We didn't use a
20 single policeman. We didn't want to frighten the people. Haris was a
21 respected lawyer in his company. Many people knew him, and that's why I
22 wanted him to do this, to make sure that no one was frightened.
23 Q. And, sir, Mr. Jusic, was he tasked by you with questioning the HVO
24 soldiers or the Croat civilians or both?
25 A. Only the HVO soldiers.
1 Q. And you told us, sir, that those HVO soldiers were being kept in
2 the blacksmith's shop; but, based on this answer, they would then be taken
3 to a room in the school where he would question them?
4 A. Yes. They were interviewed in the office in the primary school,
5 but they were being held in the blacksmith's shop.
6 Q. Now, sir, did Mr. Jusic report back to you concerning how this
7 questioning process was going?
8 A. Yes, he did report back to me, and I went there myself to see
9 whether this order was being carrying out. And perhaps I would spend four
10 or five minutes there -- perhaps I spent four or five minutes there while
11 a man was being interviewed. The man was smoking a cigarette and speaking
12 quite normally to Haris because he was close to Haris's house, you know,
13 he lived close to Haris's house.
14 Q. And, sir, can you tell us during what time period Mr. Jusic was
15 conducting these interviews?
16 A. I can't provide you with a precise date, but as I said I arrived
17 there around the 11th and that's when it started. As to when he completed
18 the task, I really couldn't say now. I haven't seen those documents and a
19 lot of time has passed since then, you know, and one forgets things.
20 Q. Now, sir, how many HVO soldiers were kept in the blacksmith's shop
21 in Mehurici?
22 A. I can't remember exactly. I don't have the list at the moment,
23 but as far as I can remember, I think there were about 20 or 30 people
25 Q. Can you tell us, sir -- I know you said you can't provide a
1 precise date, but a rough approximation how long it took Mr. Jusic to
2 interview these 20 or 30 people? Was it a week? Was it an afternoon?
3 Was it a month?
4 A. Well, it went on for perhaps about seven to ten days.
5 Q. Other than Mr. Jusic, were there any other members of the 3rd
6 Corps or any of its subordinate units involved in questioning these 20 to
7 30 HVO soldiers?
8 A. As far as I can remember, no. Only authorised individuals could
9 enter the premises. As far as I know, Haris said that no one went there.
10 He was the only person present in the course of these interviews.
11 Q. Now, sir, with respect to property that was damaged during the
12 course of the war, you told us that a lot of the fires were caused either
13 by shelling or incendiary rounds and consequently were just a result of
14 combat operations. My question to you, sir, is: Did you receive any
15 reports or have any information about fires being intentionally set by
16 members of the 306th Mountain Brigade?
17 A. I don't have any such information. As I have said, a small number
18 of buildings caught fire in the course of combat. Incendiary ammunition
19 was probably used by both sides. Afterwards, certain buildings were set
20 on fire. I assume that this was also a matter of retaliation. You know
21 that at the lines of defence people were killed, and if someone wants to
22 take revenge, the only way to do so is to set fire to that person's house,
23 you know. And this would usually take place in the evening. Buildings on
24 the other side were frequently destroyed and set on fire when shelling was
25 ongoing. And this was particularly the case in Guca Gora.
1 Q. I take it, then, sir, from your answer that you do not recall any
2 criminal reports being submitted concerning arson or intentional burning
3 of buildings within the 306th Mountain Brigade's area of responsibility?
4 No reports about soldiers being involved in that type of activity?
5 A. I didn't say -- well, I said there was certain assumptions. I had
6 a report from the field, from the civilian protection, according to which
7 they had seen certain individuals, certain Arabs, who had set fire to
8 buildings. Someone who wants to set fire to something takes care to hide
9 their traces. I didn't have sufficient forces to prevent such acts. The
10 Bila Valley is a fairly vast area and instead of having -- I would have
11 had to have 2.900 policemen, and not 29, had I wanted to secure each and
12 every building.
13 Q. I understand that, sir, but I'm going to ask the question one more
14 time. My question concerns whether or not you ever saw or were aware of
15 any criminal reports filed with the courts concerning the offence of arson
16 or unlawful burning committed by soldiers of the 306th Mountain Brigade
17 within that brigade's area of responsibility?
18 A. There weren't such criminal reports filed. We did file some
19 criminal reports for theft, but I said that the road to Travnik wasn't
20 very passable. And the courts weren't very up-to-date at the time, so we
21 took disciplinary measures. Usually we would hand down a prison sentence
22 of 30 to 60 days and this sentence would be signed by the commander.
23 Q. Sir, where were these prison sentences carried out?
24 A. The prison sentences that we put into force were put into force
25 within the command. We had a detention unit there and individuals against
1 whom military disciplinary measures were to be taken, individuals who were
2 to serve a 30- to 60-day sentence would serve their sentence there.
3 Q. Where was this detention unit?
4 A. Well, the detention unit was on the grounds of the monastery.
5 There's a separate building. On the floor there was the military police
6 and on the ground floor there was the detention unit I have referred to.
7 And when we moved from the Guca Gora monastery to the Guca Gora primary
8 school, it was then in a house near the command, that's where the
9 detention unit was.
10 Q. Let me ask you this, sir, if you can help us out: In the Bila
11 Valley, what type of construction material was used in building houses?
12 A. Usually bricks were used or blocks, construction blocks. There
13 were quite a few houses built of wood and a sort of earth compound.
14 Q. Now, sir, I believe earlier today you mentioned at some point in
15 time, due to the combat requirements and the need for the military police
16 of your brigade to be involved in certain operations, that the civilian
17 police were resubordinated to your brigade, to the military police of your
18 brigade. Did I understand you correctly?
19 A. I said that it was resubordinated for a while and it was at a
20 position for about a month or a month and a half in the area of Busjevo
22 Q. Do you recall approximately when that was?
23 A. This was after the combat operations, maybe a month after that. I
24 can't remember the exact date.
25 Q. Sir, in the context of securing the Guca Gora monastery, you told
1 us that it was secured by the military police of the 306th Mountain
2 Brigade as well as some assistance received by members of the 3rd Corps
3 Military Police Battalion. Is that correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Sir, at any point in time in 1993, did you ever complain to the
6 3rd Corps about the behaviour of members of the 3rd Corps Military Police
8 A. I think I did, but I didn't complain about security of the
9 building but because of stealing, I think it was cigarettes, from some
10 civilians, as far as I can remember.
11 Q. Was it -- was this the only instance where you raised a complaint
12 about the behaviour of the 3rd Corps Military Police Battalion, or were
13 there any other instances?
14 A. As far as I can remember, that was the only occasion when I
15 complained about the behaviour of the police. I was complaining about
16 that squad attached to us, and I asked them to send us another one.
17 Q. Do you recall approximately when that was?
18 A. I can't remember.
19 Q. Can you tell us approximately when the military police from the
20 3rd Corps MP Battalion arrived to assist with securing the Guca Gora
22 A. As far as I can remember, immediately after the battles. You see,
23 there was some problems. The military police of the 306th Brigade was
24 stretched too much. We physically were unable to secure everything we
25 should have secured. So they came immediately, as far as I can remember,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 and they started to secure with us the actual monastery at Guca Gora.
2 Q. And, sir, when did the military police of the 306th Mountain
3 Brigade begin securing the Guca Gora monastery? On what day?
4 A. I can't remember exactly, but I know that while I was still at
5 Rudnik I was asked to send a part of the military police over there to
6 protect the monastery. But the command of the 3rd Corps had already taken
7 some steps in that direction and there were police from the 3rd Corps. I
8 said that the system of control and command wasn't functioning well at the
9 time. We wouldn't see or hear one another for a month, me and the
10 commander, we could just talk over the radio and through communications,
11 but it wasn't sufficient for us to deal with everything properly.
12 Q. Sir, who asked you to send part of the military police to protect
13 the monastery?
14 A. As far as I remember it was my Commander Sipic who was on the
15 ground there.
16 Q. And finally, sir, with respect to a civilian family in the Guca
17 Gora area, you said that in order to protect them, that this family - and
18 the English transcript says - "lived with us in the monastery." This is
19 page 39, line 25.
20 My question, sir, is: Did you personally stay in the monastery
21 for a period of time; and if so, when?
22 A. Yes, I did stay in the monastery. That is where I slept and our
23 command was there, too. Now, I can't recollect exactly when those people
24 arrived, but I think there is an official note saying when they were at
25 risk and then we offered them this. I knew them from before the war, this
1 person, and we are still good friends even after the war.
2 Q. Sir, my question is: When were you and your command housed in the
3 monastery? During what period of time were you personally and the command
4 of the 306th Mountain Brigade present in the Guca Gora monastery?
5 A. To the best of my recollection, maybe about a month, up to two
6 months. We stayed at Krpeljici, that is where the command was, and then
7 to protect the Guca Gora monastery as well as possible, we moved into the
8 monastery itself.
9 Q. Again, I understand, sir, that a dozen years have passed. Can you
10 give us a rough approximation of the time periods when you were at the
11 Guca Gora monastery?
12 A. Well, let's say to the best of my recollection from -- well, from
13 about August 1993 up until the end of 1994.
14 Q. Thank you, sir.
15 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the Prosecution has no more questions
16 for the witness at this time.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Mundis.
18 It is half past 12.00. We will have the break and after that I
19 will give the floor to the Defence for re-examination. We will resume
20 work at about 5 to 1.00 and we will have three-quarters of an hour
21 available to us.
22 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 12.56 p.m.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will now resume. It's 12.56
25 and I give the floor to the Defence for re-examination.
1 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we put the ELMO down. Could
2 we move the ELMO a bit because I can't see the witness.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.
4 Mr. Usher, could you move the ELMO a little.
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Re-examined by Ms. Residovic:
7 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Delalic, on page 54, lines 5 to 9, you spoke
8 about how at one point in time you realised that the Arabs, or rather, the
9 Mujahedin posed a certain problem because they were trying to lure people.
10 Do you remember saying that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And you started to perceive them as a threat after the events in
13 Miletici. That's your testimony so far. Have I understood you correctly?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Please tell me, Mr. Delalic, at that time were there any direct
16 attacks carried out by those Arabs against ABiH units, or are these
17 assessments that you made on the basis of the facts that you have already
18 mentioned in the course of your testimony?
19 A. Well, prior to the events in Miletici, as far as I can remember
20 there were no attacks. But the fact that they were luring our people,
21 trying to entice them to join them for training, shows that they were
22 preparing something that we should have been afraid of. And it is in that
23 sense that I meant that a certain threat was posed by them.
24 Q. My learned colleague asked you whether you informed your soldiers
25 of this fact, and you said that they were needed by the army and that they
1 should avoid them.
2 A. Yes. I said that they were needed by the army.
3 Q. Tell me, when your members of the military police department were
4 taking these people from Maline to Mehurici, tell me, do you think that
5 they could have in any way foreseen such an event? Could they have
6 expected that they might be attacked as they were armed members of the
7 ABiH? Did they act carelessly or were they convinced that they would be
8 able to take these people to Mehurici in safety?
9 A. Well, I don't think that they were aware of the fact that
10 something like that could happen. They would have probably taken other
11 action at that time in order to reach Mehurici in safety. As I said, they
12 were taken by surprise. They couldn't resist a certain group, and what
13 happened happened.
14 Q. In response to a question from my colleague concerning the
15 billeting of some soldiers in the blacksmith's shop, or rather, concerning
16 the fact that some people were held in the blacksmith's shop, tell me, who
17 secured the blacksmith's shop, which is where these HVO members were being
18 kept at that time?
19 A. Well, the civilian authorities secured the premises. The civilian
20 MUP, the civilian police station provided security for the blacksmith's
21 shop through the entire period of time.
22 Q. Did your officer, Jusic, tell you who was bringing those people
23 from the blacksmith's shop to him, and did those people complain about the
24 way they were treated by those who took them from the blacksmith's shop to
25 the school, which is where statements were taken from them?
1 A. Well, they were escorted by the civilian police, but the police
2 only accompanied them to ensure that they were secured. But as far as I
3 know, as far as I was informed, no one complained about receiving threats
4 or about being treated in an inhumane manner.
5 Q. You also said that they were given three meals a day. Tell me, at
6 the time how many meals a day were given to army members? And as far as
7 the quality and quantity of the food is concerned, I'm referring to the
8 food given to the prisoners, was the quality and quantity of the food they
9 received different from the quality and quantity of the food given to the
11 A. Well, they received the same food that the troops had. The food
12 was of the same quality as the food given to the troops.
13 Q. You have said that you obtained buses and by order from Commander
14 Alagic you transported these individuals to the KP Dom. While you were
15 taking the HVO members there, did anyone complain to you about being
16 mistreated in any way while in Mehurici?
17 A. I assessed the situation and I believe that I was ordered to march
18 the prisoners to the KP Dom in Zenica, but I believed it would be safer to
19 transport them by bus. I asked for a bus and I got one. When I arrived
20 in Mehurici with the bus, as far as I can remember the driver was Enver
21 Gopo [phoen], he was the bus driver. When I arrived there I asked the
22 commander for security, Zukanovic, he came to see me, we put the people on
23 the bus. I asked whether there were any problems and no one complained to
24 me. And I transported them then to Zenica in safety.
25 Q. You have answered my next question. Since you recognised the
1 order that was issued to you, the order which stated that these people
2 should be marched to Zenica, and you have just said that for security
3 reasons you decided to act independently and to act in a way that was in
4 the interest of those prisoners. Have I understood you correctly?
5 A. Well, I had to take a route that is visible from --
6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Just a minute, please.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution.
8 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, we've
9 endeavoured to give a little bit of leeway here, but I believe we've gone
10 past the scope of questions concerning or that arise out of the
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence.
13 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it's for you to
14 assess the questions that concerned the prisoners in Mehurici and the way
15 in which they were treated. And I believe that any questions that concern
16 this matter followed in the scope of cross-examination. If you believe
17 that it does not fall within the scope of cross-examination, I will move
18 on to another subject.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Could you rephrase
20 the question that you would like to put to the witness.
21 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Delalic, you've just testified that you decided to act
23 contrary to the order, and was this a result of the fact that you wanted
24 to transport these prisoners to the KP Dom under favourable conditions?
25 A. Yes, that was one reason. There are people who were 40 or 50
1 years old and Zenica is quite far from Mehurici and the road itself wasn't
2 safe because it was constantly exposed to fire from the HVO lines.
3 Q. In response to a question from my learned colleague when you were
4 asked to describe the Savica Kuce, the Savica houses place, you said that
5 you were familiar with that place. Please tell me, how long had you been
6 familiar with the area around the Savica houses?
7 A. Well, I was born perhaps 2 or 3 kilometres from the Savica houses,
8 to the west, to the Vlasic Mountain. I hadn't visited that property but
9 when going from my village to Mehurici it can be seen, you can see Savica
10 Kuce on the other side.
11 Q. In the course of 1993 when the Mujahedin made their -- set up camp
12 there, did you ever enter the premises of the camp, apart from the time
13 when you arrived before the camp with the commander?
14 A. The only time I went there was when I went there with the
16 [Defence counsel confer]
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. Perhaps my question
18 was not interpreted quite correctly. I asked whether the witness had ever
19 in the course of 1993, that is to say while the Mujahedin were present
20 there, entered the camp. And my colleague has said that the question is
21 not precise, but I think the witness understood my question correctly.
22 Q. My learned colleague asked you a number of questions that
23 concerned houses being set on fire, and you said that that usually took
24 place at night, that you had information from the civilian protection
25 according to which the Mujahedin had set fire to two houses. In the
1 course of your investigations, patrols, or when other police organs went
2 on patrol, did they ever detect members of the 306th Brigade engaged in
3 setting fire to houses?
4 A. We never found any members who set fire to the houses, but we did
5 find members who were engaged in looting. And as I have said, we would
6 confiscate those houses. We filed a certain number of criminal reports
7 with regard to these thefts but mostly we would take disciplinary measures
8 against those perpetrators and they would be given a 30- to 60-day prison
10 Q. In response to a question from my learned colleague you repeated
11 what you already said and when I asked you. You said that even if you
12 2.900 policemen and not just 29 policemen it would have been difficult to
13 secure each and every abandoned house. Tell me, did certain organs
14 nevertheless, once they realised the scale of the problem, take certain
15 measures in order to protect their property?
16 A. Well, as far as I know, the civilian organs, the civilian
17 authorities, civilian protection started taking certain steps. They moved
18 refugees into these houses and, as far as I understood, this was the best
19 possible protection for such property. Certain parcels of land were
20 distributed so the people could work the land and survive. And wherever
21 people moved in, whenever refugees were expelled, people moved into the
22 houses, the houses were protected and there were no problems.
23 Q. Page 64 lines 5 to 6, when responding to a question put to you by
24 my learned colleague, you said that at one point in time, and you tried to
25 be more precise later on, you said that it was in August 1993 the command
1 of the 306th Brigade moved into the Guca Gora monastery. Tell me, what
2 was the main reason for which the command decided to move into the
4 A. Well, I don't know what guided the commander when he decided to
5 move there, when he decided to go there. But later we realised that that
6 was the best course to take in order to provide the best possible
7 protection for the monastery and in order to be able to provide protection
8 for the books in the monastery and everything around the monastery. In
9 order to be able to do this, we moved into the monastery.
10 Q. Mr. Delalic, tell me, that since the monastery also had a church
11 and a number of buildings, this is what we have heard from other
12 witnesses, at least, tell me whether the command was in the church or in
13 one of the buildings on the grounds.
14 A. I'd never been in the church before that time. I don't know
15 whether the church is the part where religious rites are performed. You
16 know, where we were in the premises where the nuns and the fathers slept;
17 that's where we were and that's where we had our offices. In another
18 building, separated from the one we were in, there were the military
19 police, and down below we had the detention unit for members of the
21 Q. Mr. Delalic, please tell me, since you said that you were there in
22 order to protect the building, what was the attitude of the army and the
23 command to everything on the compound? You mentioned books. Were they
24 protected? What was your attitude towards the collection of books in the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Well, when we arrived there I must say that in the course of the
2 fighting and everything else, someone probably requested certain books.
3 As far as I can remember, the books weren't in order. The library was a
4 nice one, and I as a graphic designer, someone involved in the printing of
5 books, I made an effort and I think the entire command did so, too, we
6 made an effort to protect what had remained there, to take care of this
7 collection, and we didn't let anyone from that point in time touch those
9 Q. First tell me, who did you hand the monastery over to?
10 A. Well, I think that we handed the monastery over to the religious
11 authorities when an order was issued according to which we were to move
12 into it. We then moved into the primary school in Guca Gora.
13 Q. Tell me, if you were present when the monastery was handed over to
14 them, did these members of the clergy state what their position was with
15 regard to the fact that the monastery had been protected and preserved in
16 those very difficult times?
17 A. Well, I wasn't present at the time. As I have said, I was
18 frequently absent; I was at the front lines, facing the Serbian and
19 Montenegrin aggressor. I would often be absent for seven days and
20 sometimes even longer, but I did have the opportunity of getting to know a
21 guardian who was there. I spoke to him, I can't remember his name now,
22 but he was content with what we had done. At least, that's what he said;
23 we protected everything that could have been protected after that
25 Q. Thank you. On page 61, lines 15 and 16, in response to a question
1 from my learned colleague about resubordinating part of the civilian
2 police to the 306th Brigade, you responded to this question, but can you
3 tell me, who took the decision that a unit of the civilian police should
4 be resubordinated to the 306th Brigade?
5 A. Well, the situation in the field was such that our soldiers were
6 exhausted. And given the checkpoints and the security we had, the men
7 were very tired. And given their exhaustion, a time arrived when they
8 could no longer continue to perform their duties. As far as I know, the
9 commander requested the MUP to be resubordinated at that time and to be at
10 the defence lines.
11 Q. Can you just tell me which police station was resubordinated to
13 A. It was the Mehurici police station.
14 Q. And tell me whether there were any other police stations, civilian
15 police stations, present in the same area and did they perform their basic
16 police tasks?
17 A. Well, there was the Han Bila station. I don't exactly know how
18 they were organised now. These were certain branches. You know, some of
19 the men from all the stations were resubordinated to us; whereas, others
20 continued to carry out their daily tasks and duties that they had as the
21 civilian police.
22 Q. Tell me, given the defence tasks that you had and you and the
23 military police -- and the tasks that you and the military police had,
24 tell me, do you know whether at any point in time in 1993 was the
25 situation in which the army took over police tasks or was the police
1 involved in carrying out its tasks throughout that period of time in
2 accordance with the law?
3 A. Well, if you're referring to the civilian police, the civilian
4 police continued to carry out its work throughout that period of time.
5 The military police didn't meddle -- the military police didn't meddle if
6 the protection of civilians was concerned. There was cooperation, but
7 they never ceased to perform their daily duties.
8 Q. In answer to my learned friend, you -- on page 63, line 22, you
9 said that you had a brigade detention unit. Tell me, please, you as the
10 306th Brigade, did you have a barracks where all the soldiers would be
11 quartered and where there could be a detention unit for a brigade such as
12 yours, or were the fighters living in their own homes?
13 A. The combatants were mostly living at home. We didn't have the
14 necessary preconditions for housing them in barracks. Occasionally we
15 held about a platoon or a smaller unit to faze the Serbian-Montenegrin
16 aggressor when the conditions allowed.
17 Q. In answer to one of the first questions put to you by my learned
18 friend of whether you had three or four battalions, you said that you made
19 a mistake, that at first there were four and later on when you
20 re-organised there were three. Tell me, when did one of the battalions of
21 the 306th Brigade cease to belong to the 306th Brigade and to what unit
22 was it attached and continued to operate, within which other unit?
23 A. I did say that. At first we had four battalions and that one of
24 them was called the Sipreski Battalion, consisting of refugees, and it
25 also had a military police squad. I think sometime in August they formed
1 a brigade, the 27th Brigade, and they joined the brigade; whereas, some
2 from the Bila Valley that belonged to the 314th Brigade joined their
4 Q. Where was this newly formed brigade based?
5 A. The headquarters of the 27th Brigade was in Mehurici, but not in
6 the school anymore because the school was given to be used for another
7 purpose, but in a house. I think it was Ferid Jasarevic's private house.
8 Q. In connection with these questions, do you know how many 3rd Corps
9 Brigades could be housed in barracks and have appropriate detention units
10 such as the JNA used to have in its day?
11 A. I'm not aware of a single brigade except perhaps the 17th, because
12 it was a brigade of refugees and I think they lived in barracks. But as
13 for others, while the members were on the front lines, they would be
14 there, and when they were released from the front, they would go to their
15 own homes. We didn't have barracks for accommodation.
16 Q. And my last question, Mr. Delalic, is the following: Answering
17 questions put to you by me and my learned friend you described a number of
18 events from 1993. Could you please tell me how important for your brigade
19 for that whole period was the assignment to hold on to the lines towards
20 the Serbian army while at the same time having to fight the HVO? To what
21 extent was that a priority task above all others?
22 A. It was the absolute priority. Our brigade had one of the largest
23 areas of responsibility on the defence lines, so that we held almost the
24 entire eastern slopes of Mount Vlasic towards the Serbian-Montenegrin
25 aggressor. And then in June 1993 we were given another such zone. Had we
1 failed at one spot, the Bila Valley would have fallen and you know what
2 happens in that case to the population.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I have
4 no further questions.
5 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] No questions from us,
6 Mr. President. Thank you.
7 Questioned by the Court:
8 JUDGE SWART: Good morning, Witness. I have one question to put
9 to you, only one. That is about the column of persons that were brought
10 from Maline to Mehurici on the 8th of June. You told us about that this
11 morning. You said some 20 to 30 persons were selected from the column and
12 your later investigations revealed that they were taken by the Mujahedin
13 and probably killed by the Mujahedin. Is that a correct summary of what
14 you said this morning?
15 A. I said that the military police, consisting of five or six
16 policemen who were escorting that column, was caught by surprise by people
17 with weapons who were very serious and very dangerous, and I said that
18 about 20 people were taken away. According to all information obtained
19 after an investigation, it was established that about 25 people had been
21 JUDGE SWART: That's right. That's what I wanted to summarise as
22 briefly as adequate, but I totally agree with you that you said so. I
23 have one question on this event. We have heard many other witnesses who
24 said the same thing as you said to us this morning. My question is
25 related to a document that you wrote some months later, in the fall of
1 1993, and this is also in your binder that you have before you. It is tab
2 4, and I would like to -- would invite you to take a look at your document
3 that you signed on the 19th of October.
4 Have you found it?
5 A. Yes, I have.
6 JUDGE SWART: [Previous translation continues]... the document.
7 This is your signature, isn't it?
8 A. Your Honour, this is not my signature.
9 JUDGE SWART: [Previous translation continues]...
10 A. No.
11 JUDGE SWART: Whose signature is it, then? Do you remember that?
12 A. I cannot recognise the signature.
13 JUDGE SWART: And do you remember the report itself and the
14 content of this report? Please have a look and read it first because
15 otherwise ...
16 A. All I can say is that I see this document for the first time. I
17 did not compile it and I don't know who may have done it.
18 JUDGE SWART: So you cannot really comment on the content of the
20 A. I think that I first informed the superior security organ that
21 there were certain indications, and some 15 days later I confirmed this in
22 a second report, and I said that that was the end of it for me because the
23 Mujahid unit was not within the jurisdiction of the 306th Mountain
24 Brigade. Someone else at the top should have addressed that problem,
25 people that they had negotiated with, so I cannot accept this document. I
1 really don't know who signed it.
2 JUDGE SWART: Do you remember that in the autumn of 1993 the
3 Operation Group Bosanska Krajina made a request to the 306th Brigade to
4 report on the events of June? Are you familiar with that then?
5 A. I'm not familiar with that.
6 JUDGE SWART: Well, then I really suppose you cannot comment on
7 the content. Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as I am concerned, go
9 back to document number 4. You just said that you don't know who signed
10 the document. Can you please look at the document. To the left there is
11 -- there are initials FO/AZ. We know because other witnesses have told
12 us that the author of the document places his initials and the typist his
13 or her initials. So can you tell us what FO could be in your unit?
14 Because somebody who signs must have the authority to sign.
15 A. In my unit -- in my unit, the initials could be of the clerk Osman
16 Fusko, but I can't recognise his signature. I did not order this, I did
17 not draft it, and I'm really not aware of this document.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We're talking about
19 documents. Could you please now look at document number 2 that you have
20 in your binder from the 306th Brigade of the 3rd Corps. Have you found
21 that document?
22 A. Yes.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you tell me, at the bottom
24 to the left in your language, it says "babela 802." What does that mean,
25 "babela 802"?
1 A. I don't know, but this must have been a code name, a secret name
2 for a certain person. And this was the code used in radio communications,
3 or it could have been for a unit.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But we know which unit it is.
5 It is the 306th Brigade which is sending this report to the 3rd Corps. So
6 you're telling us that who drafted this document, you used the code name
7 babela 802. Is that your interpretation?
8 A. I'm unable to confirm that. I don't know.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. A final question:
10 You spoke a moment ago about the reasons for a fire in houses and you said
11 that both sides had incendiary bullets. To the best of your knowledge,
12 the soldiers of the 3rd Corps in combat operations did have -- did they
13 have incendiary bullets?
14 A. As far as I can recollect, the command during combat operations
15 and distribution of ammunition, they did not distribute such ammunition.
16 But there were fighters who managed to get hold of such ammunition on the
17 black market. And that is how incendiary bullets were used.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And was an incendiary bullet
19 more expensive than a normal bullet on the black market?
20 A. I didn't make any such purchases, so I don't know what the prices
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.
23 Have the Prosecution any questions?
24 MR. MUNDIS: No, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And the Defence? We have seven
1 minutes left.
2 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] No questions. Thank you,
3 Mr. President.
4 Further examination by Ms. Residovic:
5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Delalic, His Honour showed you the document
6 number 4 and you said that you could not recognise the signature. As this
7 is the document of the 19th of October, 1993, do you know who was your
8 brigade commander at the time?
9 A. As far as I can recollect, the brigade commander was Vezir
11 Q. Tell me, when did Mr. Vezir take over as brigade commander?
12 A. I can't remember the exact date but I think it was sometime in
14 Q. Can you tell us for how long Mr. Vezir remained commander of the
16 A. For about three or four months, as far as I can recollect.
17 Q. Around this date, the 10th, were you mostly in the brigade command
18 or did you have other duties within the area of responsibility of your
20 A. I said before that I had to go to forward command posts so that I
21 was frequently absent, and I really don't know where exactly I was at that
23 Q. Could the brigade commander ask for information about events that
24 occurred before he came from other members of your body, that is, from
25 other members of the command if he was asked to provide such information?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes. The commander could ask for such information, but if I was
2 present, he should have asked me.
3 Q. And if he didn't ask you for such information, does that unless
4 confirm your previous testimony that you were frequently absent from the
6 A. As far as I can remember, he didn't ask me ever for this
8 Q. Thank you.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir. Your testimony
10 has just been completed. Thank you for coming to testify in The Hague at
11 the request of the Defence. You have answered all our questions. On
12 behalf of the Chamber, I wish you all the best and a safe journey home,
13 and will Mr. Usher accompany you out.
14 We shall now go into private session.
15 [The witness withdrew]
16 [Private session]
12 [Open session]
13 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in open session,
14 Mr. President.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] The Defence would like to tender
17 into evidence as Defence exhibits documents under number 13, number 1951;
18 number 14, 1952; number 15, 1400; number 16, 1406; and number 17, 1411.
19 Thank you.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 The Prosecution?
22 MR. MUNDIS: No objection.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, will you please
24 do your duty.
25 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We have
1 five documents admitted into evidence as Defence exhibits under the
2 following numbers: DH1952 -- [In English] DH1951, with it's English
3 version DH1951/E.
4 The number 1952 under the reference DH1952, and then the English
5 version DH1952/E.
6 The number DH1400 under the reference DH1400/E -- sorry, DH1400,
7 and the English version DH1400/E.
8 The number 1406 admitted into evidence under DH1406, with an
9 English version DH1406/E.
10 Finally the number 1411 is admitted into evidence under the
11 reference DH1411, with an English version DH1411/E.
12 [Interpretation] I take advantage to make a correction in the
13 transcript regarding the documents admitted this morning.
14 [In English] DH2032 is admitted into evidence and not marked for
15 identification as wrongly indicated on the transcript, with an English
16 version DH2032/E.
17 [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar. The
19 Chamber takes note of these numbers. In the few seconds remaining to us,
20 I invite all the participants, the Prosecution, the Defence attorneys, the
21 accused, and all the personnel of this courtroom to meet again for the
22 hearing which will begin on the 28th of February, Monday, at 2.15 when we
23 will be resuming our public hearings. Thank you all.
24 The hearing is adjourned.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Monday, the 28th day of
2 February, 2005, at 2.15 p.m.