1 Tuesday, 12 July 2005
2 [Prosecution Closing Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you call
7 the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Case
9 number IT-01-47-T, the Prosecutor versus Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could we have the appearances
12 for the Prosecution, please?
13 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning, Your
14 Honours, counsel and everyone in and around the courtroom. For the
15 Prosecution, Stefan Waespi, Matthius Neuner, Daryl Mundis, and our case
16 manager Andres Vatter. We will be joined during in the course of our
17 arguments by our colleague Ms. Tecla Henry-Benjamin.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 And could we have the appearances for the Defence, please?
20 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President good
21 morning, Your Honours. On behalf of General Hadzihasanovic, Edina
22 Residovic, lead counsel, and Stephane Bourgon, co-counsel. Thank you.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could we have the appearances
24 for the other Defence team, please.
25 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. On
1 behalf of Mr. Kubura, Rodney Dixon, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and our legal
2 assistant Nermin Mulalic.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We would like to greet everyone
4 present at this hearing in which we will be hearing the Prosecution's
5 closing arguments. I would like to greet representatives of the
6 Prosecution, who almost all are present. I should add that Ms. Benjamin
7 will be joining us in the course of the morning. I would also like to
8 greet the Defence lawyers who are present, as well as General
9 Hadzihasanovic and Brigadier Kubura. I wouldn't like to forget anyone
10 else in the courtroom, in particular the registrar who was of much
11 assistance during our site visit. I would also like to greet the usher
12 and the legal officer, the Chamber's legal officer. I would also like to
13 greet the interpreters who are outside and the security officers.
14 As I have already said, today we will be hearing the Prosecution's
15 closing arguments. But before we hear these closing arguments, there is a
16 minor issue I would like to raise which concerns the Defence's motion for
17 an extension of the number of pages granted to them.
18 The Defence stated that they had filed written submissions, a
19 brief, of 200 -- consisting of 200 pages, but the directive said that it
20 could only be 200 pages. So the Trial Chamber grants this motion, grants
21 this additional number of pages, but I'll take advantage of this
22 opportunity to inform both parties, the Prosecution and the Defence for
23 General Hadzihasanovic of the following problem. According to the
24 directive that concerns the length of briefs and motions dated the 5th of
25 March, 2001, briefs and motions must be presented in A4 format and the
1 margin on all sides must be two and a half centimetres.
2 According to paragraph B of the directive, the size must be 12
3 points and there must be a two and a half line space between the lines. A
4 page must consist of 300 words.
5 Paragraph C says that final briefs should not exceed 200 pages or
6 60.000 words. In addition, the footnotes and quotes also included when
7 calculating the number of pages and words. Similarly, paragraph C points
8 out that a party has to request leave to exceed the limits set in this
9 directive, and they must explain the exceptional circumstances that
10 justify filing a lengthier brief. The purpose of this directive is to
11 limit motions to a maximum of 200 pages and to no more than 60.000 words.
12 The Trial Chamber has examined your written submissions and we
13 drew the following conclusion. With regard to the Prosecution's final
14 trial brief, it consists of 200 pages and there is nothing to say about
15 that. However, we calculated that it consisted of 104.680 words, and
16 having made the appropriate calculations, this would amount to 349 pages
17 and not to 200 pages. As far as the Defence's pre-trial brief is
18 concerned, in the case of General Hadzihasanovic, it consists of 202 pages
19 but we granted additional pages. There were 114.230 words and this
20 amounts to 380 normal pages. The Prosecution has therefore filed 149
21 additional pages and General Hadzihasanovic's Defence team has filed 180
22 additional pages. I would also like to point out that the size of the
23 letters was 10.5 in the case of General Hadzihasanovic's Defence team and
24 wasn't 12, which means that we have 340 pages. As far as Brigadier
25 Kubura's Defence team is concerned, they only filed 75 pages and this
1 corresponds to 25.000 words.
2 There is nothing that I would like to add to that. The Chamber
3 wanted to point this out. The Chamber did not issue this directive. The
4 purpose of the directive is general and is applicable and must be
5 respected before all Trial Chambers. So in future, I will -- I would like
6 to ask both parties to bear in mind this directive. They should bear this
7 in mind when filing or drafting motions and briefs. This is something the
8 Trial Chamber wanted to draw your attention to.
9 We will now go into private session. Mr. Registrar.
10 [Private session]
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are back in open session,
12 Mr. President.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Now that we are in
14 open session, as I said a minute ago, the Prosecution will be presenting
15 its closing arguments today. Before we had our break, I said that the
16 Prosecution intended to spend six hours on its closing arguments. General
17 Hadzihasanovic's Defence team said they intended to spend six hours on
18 their closing arguments, and Brigadier Kubura's Defence team will need
19 four hours. We should naturally respect this schedule, and the Chamber's
20 legal officer will calculate the time used to ensure that the schedule is
21 respected because as you're well aware, we will be having a hearing on
22 Friday afternoon in case we fail to complete our work on Friday morning.
23 I'm now addressing both parties before we commence with the
24 closing arguments, are there any other issues to raise? Mr. Mundis, are
25 there any other issues you would like to raise?
1 MR. MUNDIS: No, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence counsel?
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And as far as Brigadier's
5 Kubura's Defence team is concerned?
6 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, we
7 have no issues to raise.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. In that case,
9 Mr. Mundis, it is now 9.15, and time is now running for the six hours that
10 you have coming. The hour-glass is running.
11 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 In order to save time, I will commence right with where our
13 respectful submissions in closing this case will go. We will be using
14 throughout the course of our closing arguments a number of PowerPoint
15 presentations based completely on the evidence that Your Honours have
16 heard during the course of these proceedings, which, as Your Honours are
17 well aware, has run more than 220 trial days. We also, Mr. President,
18 intend on using a demonstrative aid, that is a map which you will see
19 before you, later this morning. We've shown this map to the Defence. It
20 clearly is not a map that is in evidence, nor will we seek to have it in
21 evidence, but at the appropriate time in our submissions later this
22 morning, with your leave, Mr. President, I would ask Mr. Neuner to assist
23 me in pointing out a number of those locations on that map which are
24 based -- the markings on that map are based on material that is in fact
25 in evidence.
1 Let me begin by just giving a brief overview as to where our
2 submissions will be going. As the Trial Chamber is well aware, and I'm
3 sure my colleagues for the Defence as well, it's certainly impossible to
4 discuss all of the evidence in a limited period of time. What we will be
5 doing is highlighting a number of issues that we think are either
6 particularly important or are issues which we would like to elaborate upon
7 the material that was contained in our final trial brief.
8 If you see on the screen before you, a rough outline, I will begin
9 with an introduction, I will then address the Trial Chamber on the issue
10 of the Mujahedin and the evidence which the Prosecution submits supports
11 our contention that the Mujahedin were part of the 3rd Corps of the army
12 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. My colleague Mr. Waespi will then address the
13 Trial Chamber on count 1 of the indictment, including Dusina, Miletici and
14 Maline/Bikosi. My colleague Mr. Neuner will then address the Trial
15 Chamber on the counts relating to Motel Sretno. And Ms. Henry-Benjamin
16 will then address the Trial Chamber on Bugojno. We anticipate that those
17 issues most likely will take us through the course of the today.
18 Tomorrow morning in the time that will be remaining to us,
19 Mr. Neuner will address, Guca Gora, Orasac and Vares. I should say time
20 permitting we will address the Trial Chamber on the Zenica music school
21 and some brief comments on the Bijela valley, but the latter two only if
22 we in fact have time to do so.
23 I will then address the Chamber tomorrow morning on repressive
24 measures or failure to punish. We will then make some brief submissions
25 with respect to sentencing and then conclude with some overarching
1 concluding remarks.
2 Again, we rely entirely upon our final trial brief which is
3 certainly much more detailed than anything we will be addressing you
4 during the course of the next day and a half, and again these comments are
5 simply some either elaborations or highlights of particularly important
6 points that the Prosecution would like Your Honours to consider in
7 rendering the judgement in this case.
8 I will begin with discussing a number of issues that have been
9 raised in the Defence brief, and particularly the Defence brief of the
10 accused General Hadzihasanovic. We will begin with some comments
11 regarding the accomplishment of the mission and the mission itself. We
12 will discuss a little bit about the role of discipline but before doing
13 that, I would draw your attention to paragraph 68 of the Hadzihasanovic
14 final trial brief, as well as paragraph 604 of the report of General
15 Karavelic. In that paragraph, Your Honours will recall the Defence
16 military expert stressed, and this is a quote now from the paragraph 68 of
17 the final Hadzihasanovic trial brief: "The commander must avoid being
18 drawn into using his resources to take on activities which, although may
19 appear important and critical at any given moment, will distract him from
20 his mission, if not prevent him from accomplishing the same."
21 And there is a reference to paragraph 604 of the expert report of
22 General Karavelic.
23 The Prosecution would submit that to the extent that this
24 paragraph is a reference to the duty of the accused to prevent or punish
25 crimes committed by their subordinates, this is misplaced, for the reasons
1 which we will be addressing in just a moment.
2 Let's turn now to the relationship between discipline and mission
3 accomplishment. Your Honours have heard a number of witnesses who were
4 questioned about the importance of discipline and particularly how that
5 concept relates to the accomplishment of a mission. For example, Sir
6 Martin Garrod, General Garrod, was asked about the issue of discipline and
7 agreed with the statement as put to him by the Defence that the issue of
8 discipline is of paramount importance to any army and that it is what
9 makes an army successful or an army that will be defeated.
10 Similarly, General Reinhardt was asked about the role of
11 discipline, and in response to a question with respect to good order and
12 discipline within units of the army, indicated or testified that it's in
13 the personal interest of the accused that law and order prevails because
14 it is a key factor for the combat value of his forces. If his forces lose
15 law and order, if they lose discipline, normally they become not such a
16 combat-ready and trustful unit as he wants to have them. And it's much
17 more difficult for him to execute his power over these subordinates.
18 Why do we stress this, Mr. President, Your Honours? It's quite
19 simple, because discipline in an armed force requires law enforcement.
20 Again, Witness Garrod was asked a number of questions about the
21 importance of the relationship between discipline and law enforcement. A
22 commander must be sensible to the fact that army regulations will be
23 respected, national law or common law crimes must be addressed,
24 international law must be respected and action must be taken in the event
25 international law is violated; and of course, he also agreed when the
1 question was put to him by the Defence that the object of discipline is to
2 make one's force operational and effective.
3 This is not a concept that was alien to the accused, General
4 Hadzihasanovic. I turn now to Prosecution Exhibit P284, which was a
5 report of the 10th of August, 1993 concerning legality in the army of the
6 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the accused in that document wrote the
7 following: "All these and other questions that relate to combat morale,
8 combat readiness, order, discipline and legality, will be under continuous
9 consideration at the command of this corps."
10 Your Honours, we have heard on a number of occasions some of the
11 difficulties that were encountered within the 3rd Corps in terms of
12 meeting their mission. The Prosecution would submit to the extent that
13 there were crimes which went unpunished within the 3rd Corps area of
14 responsibility, that this failure to take the adequate steps contributed
15 to the difficulties encountered by the accused in meeting the mission that
16 was assigned to him.
17 We've also heard, Your Honours, a number of witnesses testify and
18 documents to the effect that orders were issued for units of the 3rd Corps
19 to follow the law or to comply with the law. The Prosecution asserts that
20 a commander must do more than simply issue orders that his subordinate
21 units follow the law.
22 A simple issue to follow the law is not enough.
23 General Reinhardt was asked about the importance of follow-up when
24 issues -- when issuing orders and testified as follows: "Issuing an order
25 is not enough. You have to ensure afterwards that the order has been
1 executed the way you want it executed."
2 He was then asked a follow-on question, how do you ensure that an
3 order has been executed the way you want it to be executed? And he
4 testified that there must be a constant interrelation between the lower
5 headquarters and the higher headquarters, and the ideal thing is that you
6 give an order and the execution will follow your order the same way, and
7 you don't have to interfere, but if necessary, you would interfere, and
8 today you would interfere by giving written or oral orders by telephone,
9 by radio, or what have you.
10 Let me turn now to another set of arguments that have been raised
11 on numerous occasions by the Defence, and we will categorise those, as the
12 Defence has done, in terms of context. Your Honours, context is not
13 always all that it appears. There have been several lines of arguments
14 advanced by the Defence relating to context. For example, the ABiH was in
15 a defensive posture in 1993. Well, General Reinhardt was asked about the
16 effect of an army being in a defensive posture in terms of the duties of a
17 commander to prevent or punish crimes, and his response was that a
18 defensive posture has "No effect whatsoever. Whether you are in an
19 offensive operation or defensive operation or retrograde operation, the
20 law has to be applied no matter what you are doing in a military
22 Your Honours have also heard evidence led about crimes committed
23 by either the HVO or the VRS, for example in Ahmici or Bandal [phoen] or
24 Stupni Do, as well as the ethnic cleansing that was conducted in the
25 Krajina, resulting in large numbers of refugees flooding into the
1 3rd Corps area. What is the effect of war crimes committed by the HVO or
2 the VRS? Again, General Reinhardt was asked this question and his
3 response is as follows: He told Your Honours: "If things happen on the
4 other side, the more you are obliged to prevent things on your side.
5 Otherwise, you come into a spiral of violence on either side where both
6 sides basically are breaking the rules of international law which will
7 affect your own soldiers in a very detrimental way."
8 We've also heard, Your Honours, evidence, for example, that led by
9 the constitutional expert, Trnka to the effect that the VRS and the HVO
10 were illegal armies. Again, General Reinhardt was asked about the effect
11 of that on the duty of commanders to prevent or punish crimes, and his
12 testimony was again, it doesn't have any effect because no matter what the
13 enemy is doing, the laws of your country are binding and obliging. So
14 this doesn't have any effect on you as a commander of those Bosnian forces
15 by that time.
16 Let me turn now, Mr. President, Your Honours, to the issue of the
17 Mujahedin. There has been a large amount of evidence presented on the
18 Mujahedin by all the parties in the courtroom, but what I would like to do
19 in terms of starting our discussion about the Mujahedin is return to the
20 summer of 1992 when the Mujahedin first appeared in Central Bosnia and the
21 testimony of Mr. Andrew Hogg, a reporter from The Times of London who, as
22 you will recall, interviewed Ebu Abdel Aziz in August of 1992.
23 Andrew Hogg testified that before Mr. Abdel Aziz permitted him to
24 be interviewed, Mr. Hogg was required to get the permission from the
25 Bosnian army. I will grant an interview if they allow it, Hogg testified,
1 about what Abdel Aziz had told him. Andrew Hogg then went with an
2 interpreter and obtained such permission, and where did he go? He
3 testified that he went to "the army command post by the waterfall" in
4 Travnik. Once Mr. Hogg had obtained that interview, or that permission,
5 Abdel Aziz sat down and allowed Andrew Hogg to interview him.
6 We are now going to play for you some excerpts from that
7 interview. This is, of course, P112 and the transcript of that is P112
8 tab 2, I believe. This is the audio tape of Andrew Hogg interviewing Ebu
9 Abdel Aziz. And the first questions and answers that we would like to
10 play for you concern why the Mujahedin came to Bosnia.
11 [Audiotape played]
12 About killing the Muslims by the Serbians just because they are
15 So we according to that I came along checked the area. I found
16 that it was the truth, that these Muslims are being killed just because
17 they are Muslims not because they are Bosna or something else.
19 So I decided that our duty to defend these people.
20 Yeah. Right. Do you expect the numbers here to equal the number
21 of Muslims who went to Afghanistan to fight Jihad there?
22 No no. There is no equal in it other than to my knowledge that
23 very few Yugoslavian Muslims came out for fighting in Afghanistan. But
24 this not a mathematical equalisation that you should help me so that I can
25 help you.
2 No our duty is wherever Muslims been forced to leave the country
3 or being killed or being punished because they are just Muslims because
4 our duty I mean I or any other Mujahedin duty to help these people to
5 defend themselves against any [inaudible] what do you call aggression
6 they ...
8 ... they are getting from ...
10 ... from any people.
11 Yeah. What has been the reception that you received from
12 Izetbegovic and the Bosnian government? Did they welcome you with open
13 arms or did it take a lot of negotiation to be able to ...
14 No by, especially by Muslims yes, they opened their hands and
15 their, we are welcomed and even they help us and any kind of they have of
16 food or anything because they recognise that we are here to defend them.
18 To help them.
20 And we from the beginning from the first day we already announced
21 that why we are here ...
23 ... that we are to help them and we go back to our country as soon
24 as they feel, get peace.
25 MR. MUNDIS: The next questions, Mr. President, that we would --
1 or question and answer that we would play for you is again from the
2 Hogg/Aziz interview, where did the Mujahedin come from? And Mr. Aziz also
3 testified -- told Andrew Hogg where the Mujahedin had come from.
4 [Audiotape played]
5 Can you tell me with regard to the soldiers to the Mujahedin you
6 have brought well that have come here.
8 They are, with regard to the Mujahedin that are now here. These
9 are people with battle experience I, I. These are people with battle
12 Can you give me an any idea where else they have fought?
13 You mean from where they got their experience?
15 Most of them from Afghanistan but there are others from different
16 countries. Even some of them this is the first time they are involving in
18 Can I ask about the claim that's made to us about Mujahedin which
19 is that the Mujahedin do not fear death that you would regard it as a
20 honour to die in battle defending Islam. Is that the view of the
21 Mujahedin soldiers here?
22 Mujahedin methods, Jihad methods, is either victory or death for
23 Islam. It means Shada we call it Shada. Either victory or Shada. Shada
24 means we being killed in battle for Islam.
25 How do you spell Shada?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 Right. That means being killed in battle for Islam? Have you
3 lost any soldiers?
5 How many?
6 From. One of the things I want to tell you that my people is they
7 are not only from Arab countries. They are from Islamic countries. So
8 they are, they are from different area even we have from England, from
9 German, from Albania and other Arabic countries. So we lost about eight
11 When you say that your people are from England and Germany now are
12 we talking about Muslims living in England ...
14 ... Muslims living in Germany.
15 They are English Muslim people or German Muslim people or Albanian
16 Muslim people.
18 Then nationals of these countries ...
20 ... plus with eastern countries like Arabian or the Middle East or
21 Pakistan or ...
23 ... Africa yes, especially, especially for North Africa.
24 Yeah. Right. But you've lost eight so far. You've been fighting
25 for a month and already eight men have died. You've mentioned Pakistan,
1 you've mentioned North Africa is it fair to say that there is a pretty
2 large collection of people here from Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia?
3 There are many, there are, I cannot count how many there, there
4 are from each country.
5 MR. MUNDIS: The next excerpt from this interview that we would
6 like to play for Your Honours is a very brief one and concerns the support
7 that the Mujahedin received from the Bosnians in the summer of 1992.
8 [Audiotape played]
9 Are you able to bring equipment with you? What the Bosnians from
10 our point of view need desperately is weapons have you been able to help
11 them in this?
12 No this is the problem that we have here that because it is very
13 difficult to bring any equipment and any weapons.
15 And the Bosnians themselves are providing us with the weapons we
16 need which is not that big number and not heavy equipment.
17 MR. MUNDIS: Finally, with respect to this interview, as Abdel
18 Aziz informed Andrew Hogg, by August of 1992, he had suffered eight
19 casualties. Hogg then asked him where the Mujahedin were active in terms
20 of combat, and we will play for you now this excerpt from that interview.
21 [Audiotape played]
22 Yeah. Is this area basically from Visoko around to Paroba? This
23 is the front on which you are fighting or have you people elsewhere as
25 Yes this is the area it is starting from the border of the
1 Sarajevo ...
3 ... until north to the ... there is no specific area we are
4 fighting but different area.
6 One thing I want to tell you about my Mujahedin is we are under
7 guidance or you can say control of Muslim forces.
9 Or something like that, call it. My Mujahedin and my rules or
10 whatever you conditions is that we are not leader here. We don't like to
11 have our own first line or our own base we working under their guidance
12 and their control.
13 MR. MUNDIS: Your Honours, when Andrew Hogg testified, he in fact
14 made a couple of corrections to the transcript of the tape that you just
15 heard, and he was specifically asked about a second change that he made,
16 and he testified there is no such place as Paroba. When I asked the
17 question, is this area basically from Visoko around to Paroba, he said:
18 "It was something beginning with a K, but I couldn't make out precisely
19 what, I'm afraid, on the tape." We would assert that that location is not
20 Paroba but Karaula, which is in the area around the front lines, as we'll
21 be describing to you in a few moments.
22 At this point in time, Mr. President, we will move on to elaborate
23 upon some of the instances which we have described in our final trial
24 brief as involving joint combat with the Mujahedin, and we are now going
25 to be talking about that section of our brief, and I anticipate I will
1 remain on this subject through our first break.
2 And at this point, Mr. President, with your leave I would ask if
3 Mr. Neuner could sit, in effect, in the witness box and point out a number
4 of locations that we have marked on the large demonstrative aid map that
5 is before Your Honours. We also do have A3 sized copies of these maps.
6 I've provided those to the Defence, but we do have copies for the Trial
8 We will move, Mr. President and Your Honours, in a chronological
9 fashion beginning, just as Abdel Aziz did, with the summer of 1992 and the
10 testimony of the witness Ibrakovic concerning an individual that he knew
11 as Ebu Sahar who was killed in the beginning. The witness Ibrakovic
12 testified he was killed in Visoko in 1992, in the summer of 1992, sometime
13 in July or August. And you see the citation to that testimony. Again,
14 this would be another example the Prosecution asserts of situations where
15 Mujahedin who were involved in combat operations with either the TO
16 initially but subsequently the ABiH in the 3rd Corps area and its
17 immediate environs in terms of the mission that that corps had been given.
18 In the autumn, moving towards the autumn of 1992, there was
19 testimony about foreign fighters being involved in the area around
20 Karaula. Two witnesses testified about this, both the witness Cuskic and
21 the witness Merdan, Cuskic saying with respect to the Mujahedin, "The
22 first time I heard about them was in 1992, perhaps when they participated
23 in the Defence of Karaula. Perhaps a group of about 20 of them
24 participated in the Defence."
25 Merdan testified that in November of 1992, he heard rumours that
1 in the Defence of Karaula, several foreigners had been observed defending
2 Karaula from the Serb aggressor.
3 In December 1992, as Your Honours are aware, there were a -- there
4 was an operation in the area of Visoko concerning lifting of the siege of
5 the city of Sarajevo. This was known as Operation Koverat. We will take
6 a look first at a document which is P246. This is a document from General
7 Halilovic, the chief of the Supreme Command staff. It was marked urgent,
8 to be delivered immediately, and it was addressed to the 3rd Corps
9 commander personally, this document dated 21 December 1992. And in this
10 document, General Halilovic informs the accused Hadzihasanovic that the
11 Koverta plan has been seriously jeopardised because of the shortage of men
12 on the Buca-Paljevo axis. General Hadzihasanovic was ordered to find a
13 way at all cost to send at least one battalion with 500 men from the
14 3rd Corps territory to that axis.
15 I would now like to play for Your Honours an excerpt from
16 Prosecution Exhibit P482 which runs about one minute.
17 [Videotape played]
18 On the 29th of December, 1992, the second Visoko operation was
19 carried out under the command of the Egyptian [unintelligible]. The
20 Mujahedin moved from the front line Bijela Buca near Travnik to the
21 mountains. These are the mountains that overlook the city of Ilijas,
22 which is five kilometres away from Sarajevo. The mountains were liberated
23 and the Mujahedin continued advancing until they reached some difficult
24 territory. There was then an aerial attack carried out by the Serbs with
25 the use of helicopters. The fighting continued from the morning until the
1 time of the [intelligible] prayer. The enemy were defeated. Vast areas
2 were liberated, and the city of Ilijas nearly fell into the hands of the
3 Mujahedin. The Bosnian forces were not able to maintain the position
4 gained, and the Arab brothers found themselves deserted in vast areas so
5 they were forced to withdraw. A large number of the brothers were injured
6 and seven of the foreign Mujahedin were killed.
7 MR. MUNDIS: We would also refer Your Honours with respect to this
8 clip and Operation Koverat to Prosecution Exhibit P514 and P513. Of
9 course, P514 is the document that is signed by the commander of the
10 1st Company, Ramo Durmis, and we of course have discussed this document
11 during the course of the trial, and Your Honours are familiar with P514
12 and 513.
13 The next main instance where the Prosecution has alleged that the
14 foreign fighters were fighting in conjunction with units of the 3rd Corps
15 occurred of course in the village of Miletici on or about 24 April 1993.
16 Mr. Waespi will be addressing Miletici later this morning.
17 Shortly after Miletici, in fact at roughly the same time in -- the
18 next day, there was combat operations on Mount Zmajevac, which is
19 immediately to the west of Zenica, and Your Honours will note it is the
20 high point directly above the Cajdras junction or the Cajdras checkpoint
21 which numerous witnesses have testified about.
22 The witness Alajbegovic was asked about operations on Mount
23 Zmajevac, and although he said he personally didn't participate in this
24 operation, Mr. Catic, along with soldiers of the 3rd Battalion were
25 involved in that operation.
1 If Your Honours then look at Prosecution Exhibit P462, this is a
2 document which concerns a report on war booty after the successfully
3 completed operation on Mount Zmajevac. Approximately two and a half weeks
4 later, P558 contains the minutes of a 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade command
5 meeting held with the Brigade Sura on 13 May 1993 at 1500 hours. And
6 again the issue of war booty or distribution of war booty is on the
8 Nihad Catic, whom the witness Alajbegovic had testified was
9 involved in the operation on Mount Zmajevac, on or about 25 April 1993, at
10 the meeting held on 13 May Nihad Catic apparently discussed the issue of
11 war booty, and the minutes reflect the following: "The lack of
12 organisation in collecting booty stemmed from our lack of experience. The
13 Arabs did not permit access to one ammunition and explosives depot."
14 Now, the Prosecution would assert that that indicates quite
15 clearly that this 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade operation involved Arabs on
16 Mount Zmajevac on or about 25 April 1993.
17 This document goes on with respect to conclusions, under point 3,
18 Adilovic is charged with holding talks with the Arabs about the war booty
19 which they took. RP being the Bosnian abbreviation for war booty.
20 In early June 1993, the Prosecution asserts that, again, foreign
21 fighters were involved with units of the ABiH 3rd Corps in the operations
22 around Maline, and again my colleague Mr. Waespi will be discussing in
23 greater detail Maline/Bikosi later this morning.
24 Let's turn now to Bijelo Bucje. There has obviously been a large
25 amount of evidence that's been adduced at trial concerning Bijelo Bucje.
1 Witness HF, for example, testified there were some in the Bijelo Bucje
2 area, referring again to Mujahedin, because it was a very difficult part
3 of the front line. They would go there on their own initiative and carry
4 out some operations, he told us. But the Prosecution asks, Mr. President
5 and Your Honours, did they really go there on their own initiative to
6 carry out some operations?
7 Let's take a look at Prosecution Exhibit P775. This is a report
8 of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade to the 3rd Corps dated 20 June 1993,
9 signed by the accused Kubura for the commander of the 7th Muslim Mountain
10 Brigade. This is during the period prior to his formal appointment as the
11 de jure commander of the 7th but during the period in which the
12 Prosecution asserts he was in fact the de facto commander of the 7th. And
13 we have addressed that at some length in our final trial brief.
14 But let's take a look at what the accused Kubura reported to the
15 3rd Corps in P775. The commander of the 1st Battalion of the 7th Muslim
16 Mountain Brigade immediately sent a unit of 70 soldiers to the
17 Bijelo Bucje sector, where this unit, along with others, contacted the
18 command of the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Krajina Brigade. "A
19 counter-attack was carried out from three directions, and the coordinated
20 Ustasha Chetnik attack was repulsed and front line positions recaptured.
21 During the action, four soldiers, foreign citizens, Arabs, were killed."
22 He then goes on and says: "As well as three soldiers from the
23 312th Motorised Brigade and one soldier from the 3rd Battalion of the
24 17th." This language, Your Honours, suggests that the four soldiers
25 mentioned, the four foreign citizens, the four Arabs, were part of the
1 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade. Why? Because the language goes on to
2 state: "Not only were these four soldiers killed but as well as soldiers
3 from other units."
4 But that's not all with respect to these operations in
5 Bijelo Bucje area in mid- to late June 1993. We have the highly contested
6 DH1360 which as Your Honours know has been or was revised, I believe at
7 least twice. As revised by court Exhibit 5, DH1360 now reads: "Given
8 that a relatively small unit, 30 soldiers, of Arabs, who remained behind
9 when -- after the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade left this area, is operating
10 autonomously in the Bijelo Bucje sector."
11 Now, we know from the previous document, P775, that the 7th Muslim
12 Mountain Brigade was, in fact, engaged in combat operations in the
13 Bijelo Bucje sector in mid- to late June 1993. We also know that when the
14 7th left that area, a relatively small unit of 30 Arab soldiers remained
16 The Prosecution would submit that they were, in fact, left behind
17 by the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, perhaps to secure that area. DH1360
18 goes on to state, and this again is a report to the accused Hadzihasanovic
19 on an inspection carried out on the 312th Motorised Brigade, it was
20 recommended to the accused Hadzihasanovic that these -- this unit of 30
21 Arab soldiers who remained behind should be resubordinated to the 312th
22 Motorised Brigade or pulled out of the 312th Motorised Brigade's zone of
23 operations. And again we would submit the use of the
24 term "resubordination" and not "subordination" is of great importance.
25 Turning to the next area, we are talking now about the line
1 between Mravinjac and Kamenjas as reflected again on the map which you
2 have before you. Court Exhibit 13, which is the war diary of the
3 operation group Bosanska Krajina contains an entry dated 24 June 1993 at
4 2100 hours, and it states, as set forth on the screen: "The Mravinjac,
5 elevation 129, Suplja Stijena, Plane, Kamenjas, partially, line was
6 seized." It then goes on to list what was reported as being seized in
7 terms of war booty. One T55, which as the Trial Chamber is aware is a
8 tank, an anti-aircraft machine-gun mounted on a TAM 150 truck. A number
9 of anti-aircraft machine-guns, bulldozer, mortars and other light weapons.
10 Turning to Prosecution Exhibit P790 an interim report dated
11 24 June from the commander of the OG Zapad, Selmo Cikotic, again to the
12 3rd Corps commander personally, Commander Cikotic reports on 24 June
13 1993: "Our forces took control of the territory, Mravinjac, Plane and
14 Kamenjas. We have one killed foreigner from the 7th Muslim Mountain
15 Brigade. We seized a tank, one anti-aircraft gun, and one anti-aircraft
16 gun mounted on a truck."
17 This corresponds with information contained in P598, which again
18 Your Honours are well familiar with. I think it will come as no surprise
19 to anyone that the Prosecution would be mentioning Ramo Abu Dzihad this
20 morning and P598 relates to that individual. Ramo Abu Dzihad mentioned
21 that the Arabs on Mravinjac captured a tank. The men of Novi Travnik
22 captured a tank, seven anti-aircraft machine-guns and three anti-aircraft
23 guns on Mravinjac but gave us nothing, he says.
24 So we have information that the Arabs, we have evidence that the
25 Arabs captured this equipment. We also have evidence reported by the
1 commander of OG Zapad, Selmo Cikotic, that it was his forces who captured
2 this material.
3 The Prosecution asserts that this leads to the conclusion, again,
4 that the Mravinjac-Kamenjas plane, along that axis, there was in fact
5 joint combat between units of the 3rd Corps and more specifically of the
6 OG Zapad and the foreign fighters in the last week of June 1993.
7 Turning to the month of July 1993, in the area around Kacuni, we
8 again have evidence of the presence of foreigners in and around active
9 combat locations. P924, tab 4, which is an entry of the 3rd Corps war
10 diary of 11 July at 1806 hours, and I point out this was formerly
11 Prosecution Exhibit P604, at 1806 hours reports the following: "The 3rd
12 Corps command received a report from the 333rd Mountain Brigade." This
13 report concerned combat operations in Kacuni. It goes on to state that
14 the HVO is swiftly digging in positions and their activities jeopardise an
15 advance to Kacuni. "It will be difficult to regain control of the lost
16 positions with the available forces. The Arab has been asked to solve
17 this problem."
18 Moreover, this report from the 333rd Brigade indicates that in
19 addition to the involvement of the Arab, they are running out of
20 ammunition. "They are trying to obtain some by purchase but they have no
21 more foreign currency. They are asking for a certain amount of foreign
22 currency for the purchase of weapons and ammunition."
23 The next document related to this event in Kacuni or these events
24 in Kacuni is P603. P603 is a document of the 3rd Corps commander
25 addressed to the 333rd Mountain Brigade. The subject, approval for
1 engagement of a unit. And there is a reference on this document, a
2 reference to the same report that was reflected in P924, tab 4. That is,
3 if you compare the entry at 1806 hours in the logbook, reference is made
4 to the report received from the 333rd Mountain Brigade bearing reference
5 number 0440942993. And you see the response or the letter, the document
6 of the 3rd Corps commander going back, referring to that report which had
7 been received from the 333rd Mountain Brigade.
8 Again, P603 states: "With reference to your above document, our
9 response is the following. We approve the use of this unit on the
10 mentioned axis as previously agreed."
11 But that's not where the document trail ends, Your Honours,
12 because on 12 July 1993, as reflected in Prosecution Exhibit P434, the
13 3rd Corps commander submits a query to the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade
14 command with an information copy to the 333rd Mountain Brigade. And in
15 this document, the 3rd Corps commander reminds the 7th Muslim Mountain
16 Brigade command that engaged in your brigade there is a unit of 77
17 soldiers from the territory of Busovaca. It is the 3rd Company of the
18 3rd Battalion of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade. Since the engagement of
19 Arabs, who are ready to carry out combat activities in the 333rd Brigade
20 zone of responsibility is conditional on joint combat together with your
21 unit. The 3rd Corps commander wants to know if the 7th Muslim Mountain
22 Brigade has reserve forces that could be engaged in the 333rd Brigade's
23 area of responsibility at their demand. This, we would assert, ties back
24 to P924, tab 20 -- or tab 4, where the 333rd Brigade had reported that it
25 will be difficult to regain control of the lost positions with the
1 available forces.
2 Let's move now into August of 1993 in the area around Petrovici
3 and Misici. P477, a document dated the 9th of August 1993, addressed to
4 the Supreme Command staff of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
5 and in this document, the 3rd Corps command, under the section 1.2, "Our
6 forces, reports the following: The Muslim forces or Mujahedins brought
7 from Travnik, as well as the part of Muslim forces from Zavidovici, which
8 is also in the 3rd Corps area of responsibility, did not want to carry out
9 an order. Why? Why didn't they want to carry out the order? Well,
10 although thorough reconnaissance has been carried out with the
11 aforementioned, and they did not show a single sign that they would refuse
12 to carry out the assigned tasks, at 1900 hours, they had reported that
13 they could not carry out combat activities by night. They could not carry
14 out combat activities by night. We would respectfully submit that this is
15 not necessarily a situation where the Mujahedin, for whatever reason,
16 refused to carry out an order. They refused because, for whatever reason,
17 they could not carry out combat activities by night.
18 The 3rd Corps commander goes on and reports, "Due to recent
19 behaviour of this group of Mujahedins from Travnik, they will be returned
20 to where they have come from. The rest of the Muslim forces from the
21 Zavidovici Municipal Staff I will probably disband and assign to the
22 battalions of the 318th Mountain Brigade."
23 Let's move on to Kruscica, September 1993, and again what the
24 Prosecution asserts is that we have a pattern here, Your Honours, of
25 consistent and regular use of foreign soldiers in combat roles by the
1 3rd Corps and its subordinate units. September 1993, Kruscica. Cuskic
2 testified: "... at the beginning of September 1993, we did have a joint
3 operation towards Vitez, the area of Kruscica, with a part of that
4 El Mujahid detachment.
5 Merdan: "... to the best of my recollection, it was in the
6 beginning of September 1993. And to be even more precise, it was maybe
7 the 5th or 6th of September 1993 when they were resubordinated to the OG
8 Bosanska Krajina. And they were included, involved, in a combat activity
9 in the area of Kruscica."
10 Now, we've heard evidence, Your Honours, or the Defence have put
11 forward evidence, that even after the formation of the El Mujahid unit
12 they still weren't part of the army, and they still weren't carrying out
13 orders, and they weren't under the effective command and control of the
14 accused or the 3rd Corps. We submit, Your Honours, that that is simply
15 not the case, and we will -- this example in September 1993 also reflects
16 that. Again, C11 and C13, the operation group Bosanska Krajina logbook
17 and war diary contains entries concerning the El Mujahid detachment on the
18 5th and 6th of September. The 306th Mountain Brigade war diary, C18, at
19 5 September 1993 at 1800 hours indicates that the 306th Mountain Brigade
20 carried out an attack in coordination with the forces of the El Mujahid,
21 27th and 325th Brigades.
22 Let's turn to the area around Grbavica, to the north-west of
23 Vitez. Again, September 1993. The OG Bosanska Krajina logbook, C11, on
24 an entry dated 6 September 1993 at 0230 hours indicates that a report had
25 been received from the 325th Brigade and in this interim report, a large
1 amassing of Ustashas was noticed. "They are probably preparing a
2 counter-attack." Combat fatalities are listed including two killed and
3 ten wounded from the El Mujahid unit. And with respect to that last
4 phrase, "they are probably preparing a counter-attack," it's interesting
5 to know some of the following entries in the logbooks and war diary of the
6 OG Bosanska Krajina. Again, this entry is 6 September 1993 at 0230 hours.
7 On 7 September 1993 at 1820 hours, the 325th Mountain Brigade
8 commander sent a request to the OG Bosanska Krajina, "I ask that you
9 urgently send me a company of Mujahedin for reinforcement until we repel
10 the attack." Clearly the forces which they had seen massing the previous
11 day had, in fact, come to pass.
12 Two hours after, less than two hours after this urgent request for
13 a company of Mujahedin for reinforcement, the following is contained in
14 the Bosanska Krajina OG logbook. Sipic and Beba went to activate military
15 police unit and Mujahedins as a help in the 325th Mountain Brigade area.
16 So we clearly have an indication where the 325th was anticipating
17 an attack, where they urgently requested a company of Mujahedin for
18 reinforcement to repel the attack, and we see Sipic and Beba going to
19 activate the Mujahedin in order to help the 325th Mountain Brigade.
20 Again in September in the area, the greater area around Vitez
21 Cuskic testified on the 18th of September 1993 there was a joint operation
22 with the Mujahedin unit in the area around Vitez. In October 1993, we
23 have evidence in the form of P618 that foreigners were involved in the
24 area around Gornji Vakuf. And the OG Zapad, on the 9th of October,
25 reports to the 3rd Corps commander in an extraordinary report and request.
1 He asks for representatives or indicates in there "representatives of
2 detachment El Mujahid visited me today and stated their readiness to
3 engage a part of their unit in the activities in the area of Gornji Vakuf.
4 It is conditioned with your orders. It's a fact that it should be done
5 because any help in this area is welcome, even if it is more of a
6 psychological character." Well, certainly we've had other evidence
7 indicating the psychological character of an importance of the Mujahedin
8 in this respect, and we would submit that that evidence is consistent with
9 this request of the OG Zapad commander.
10 Let's turn now to the area around Novi Travnik. Again, OG
11 Bosanska Krajina logbook, 27 October 1993, at 1900 hours, under the
12 heading, "308," indicating the 308th Brigade, the following is reported
13 with respect to an attack carried out by the HVO on the
14 Novi Travnik-Gornji Vakuf road. "The commander of the El Mujahid
15 detachment was wounded and then a number of soldiers retreated." The
16 308th commander reported that he had four killed and 17 wounded and that
17 the El Mujahid unit apparently suffered three killed and eight wounded.
18 Moving into December 1993, again P495, a report to the Supreme
19 Command staff from the 3rd Corps under paragraph 2.2, in the area
20 around -- or indicating our forces, paragraph 2.2, in the areas around
21 Dubravica and Tomica Gaj, the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the 17th Krajina
22 Brigade, and the south TG, the 1st Battalion of the 7th, and the El
23 Mujahid detachment put off the continuation of combat operations until
24 tomorrow due to continuing reconnaissance activity.
25 We would submit, Your Honours, that from the beginning of the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 arrival of the Mujahedin in the summer of 1992, through at least the end
2 of December 1993, there is clear evidence that the foreigners were
3 involved in joint combat operations with units of the 3rd Corps of the
4 ABiH, and we would like to offer you some concluding remarks with respect
5 to this component of our case, and this testimony or this evidence comes
6 from the so-called international witnesses, the witnesses from BritBat or
7 UNPROFOR or the ECMM. And we would again, as we indicated earlier,
8 Mr. President, we believe that these witnesses and their testimony is
9 particularly important because they were neutral observers. They are --
10 they carry with them no bias. They were sent to monitor and observe.
11 They are all trained professional military men and women. Their
12 testimony, we believe, is of -- is of much weight and should be given such
13 weight by the Trial Chamber.
14 And let's focus on a few things that some of these witnesses said
15 to us about the Mujahedin. And let's start with General Peter Williams
16 from BritBat. He said: "I would say it was very difficult, I would say,
17 impossible, for us to consider that there could be a well-armed, indeed
18 well-motivated unit such as the 7th Muslim Brigade or indeed the Mujahedin
19 operating within the 3rd Corps area with military capabilities that was
20 not directly subordinate to the commander of the 3rd Corps. It would seem
21 a very curious situation to have a heavily armed group of people wandering
22 around inside your operational area without you having them, to some
23 extent, to the greatest extent possible, under your command and control."
24 He went on: "What I'm saying is that as and if and when they were
25 in the 3rd Corps area, I cannot envision -- envisage them operating in
1 that area other than under the direct control, albeit perhaps through the
2 chain of command, but from the headquarters of the 3rd Corps."
3 Mark Bower, another British officer, when asked about the
4 Mujahedin, testified that: "What I mean is that where the Mujahedin
5 7 Muslim Brigade were, it is certainly where the fighting would be the
6 most intense, and we could expect that that would be the prolonged main
7 effort for the attack, that it is something which was, as I say, this
8 combat indicator. It was of great importance that that's where this unit
9 would be. It was -- it happened on a number of occasions, and it was too
10 many occasions for it to be circumstance or coincidence, that wherever the
11 main effort was, as part of the overall campaign within the six months we
12 were there and witnessed the overall campaign, for it to be coincidence.
13 It was too coordinated for this unit to just be in the right place at the
14 right time on a battlefield, more than once or twice."
15 We would submit that it wasn't coincidence, and the reason it
16 wasn't coincidence was because the Mujahedin, as we've explained in a
17 number of subsections in our final trial brief and highlighted for you
18 this morning, these foreign fighters were integrated in and engaged in
19 combat operations with the units of the 3rd Corps, and the only reasonable
20 inference that can be drawn from this evidence that you have before you is
21 that these foreign fighters were under the effective command and control
22 of the accused Enver Hadzihasanovic, and with respect to the foreigners in
23 the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, under the effective command and control
24 of the accused Amir Kubura.
25 I think, Your Honours, this would be an appropriate time for the
1 first break.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's almost half past 10. We'll
3 have our break now and we will resume at about 11.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will now resume, and I give
7 the floor to the Prosecution to continue with the closing argument.
8 MR. WAESPI: Good morning, Mr. President, good morning, Your
9 Honours. In the next hour or so I would like to address you on count 1
10 that relates to the crime base in Dusina, Miletici and Maline/Bikosi.
11 But before doing that, I would like to spend the first part of my
12 submission into the resources the accused had at their disposition. The
13 resources to investigate, to punish the perpetrators, and I do that by
14 showing what was done when normal crimes were committed, theft, murder,
15 and we had seen mostly Defence witnesses, Judge Veseljek, Menkovic and
16 Mujezinovic, who testified about the huge resources used for these crimes,
17 and I'd like you to contrast it with what was done - and we submit almost
18 zero - when it was about the killing of Croat civilians and soldiers who
19 were captured.
20 Let me start with Judge Veseljek who testified for the Defence and
21 who told you what the effect of the inactivity to punish, to perpetrate
22 crimes is. He was asked about that question and he said: "I fully agree
23 with you that any event that is qualified as a crime should be
24 investigated. Its perpetrator should be identified and punished."
25 And he goes on the well-known concept to us criminal lawyers of
1 general prevention. And he goes on and says that this concept also
2 applies in times of war, and I quote: "General prevention in wartime
3 doesn't only have an effect on potential perpetrators of crimes. It has a
4 significance that is quite different. It also sends a message to
5 potential victims. The message that if certain situations arise, they
6 will be protected, and these potential victims can then take decisions as
7 how they want to organise their lives."
8 I believe that's a very, very important quote. It shows the
9 impact of inactivity to investigate and punish criminals have on society
10 as a whole.
11 Now, the Prosecution submits that the accused Hadzihasanovic and
12 Kubura could have made a difference. They could have sent a signal by
13 investigating also and specifically into those three crimes we are talking
14 about here, in my submission, Dusina, Miletici, Maline. Both accused were
15 very well respected by their subordinates, by their superiors, by the
16 internationals. There have been many quotes praising the accused. They
17 had all the support they needed if they wanted to take action against the
18 alleged perpetrators as they should have done and bring them to justice.
19 Let me talk about the general picture that surrounds these
20 investigations. Now, the Defence in their final brief, and I'm talking
21 specifically about Defence of General Hadzihasanovic, made a big issue out
22 of the circumstances and Senior Trial Attorney Mundis as alluded to that.
23 If you look at paragraph 85 in the brief of Hadzihasanovic's counsel, they
24 list all the problems which in their submission should have an impact on
25 the abilities of General Hadzihasanovic to investigate.
1 Pages 15 to 18 of the Defence brief talks about, I think, about 30
2 different problems, from the shortage of material, huge front line, the
3 HVO checkpoints, which hindered the 3rd Corps troop movement. That's all
4 fine. I don't think we dispute that. But in our submission, with all due
5 respect, this had absolutely no impact on the ability of the accused to
6 investigate into these crimes and punish the perpetrators.
7 We had two international witnesses, General Reinhardt, our
8 military expert, and I believe it was General Duncan, who talked about the
9 battle, the situation of battle, which allowed both accused to devote time
10 to the investigation.
11 The first one is General Reinhardt, and he says here that, again
12 there was no constant war, there was no constant campaign. The last
13 sentence: "It was not a constant military battle one has to perceive
14 here." And the consequence of that is seen on next answer he gives, and I
15 quote him: "Besides that, the commanders who were very busy during the
16 operation in executing and controlling the pursuit of the operations were
17 capable of turning their attention to those things which they could not
18 fulfil during the operations. And one of those things are their legal
19 obligations, investigations and so on." So, yes, they had the chance to
20 do that in those pauses I just mentioned.
21 And similarly, General - I believe he was a general - Duncan, of
22 BritBat, also talked about the fact that, and I quote him: "I would
23 estimate there would be sufficient time for that on the basis that the
24 action time is quite small compared with, if you like, recuperation time."
25 And almost an anecdotal piece of evidence is his next comment,
1 that there was apparently one of the features was that General
2 Hadzihasanovic was warned, was advised, to yet introduce a 24-hour working
3 staff organisation like the other corps had. I'm not saying they had a
4 relaxed time but it appears they have sufficient time to complete, to
5 fulfil, their legal obligations.
6 Your Honours, a very important feature in investigating crimes in
7 war times is the cooperation between MUP, the civilian police, and the
8 military, and I would like to run you through a few pieces of evidence
9 which show that they closely worked with each other, that especially the
10 military -- the MUP acted upon requests, even orders, from the accused
12 The first quote, Merdan, deputy commander of the 3rd Corps, alter
13 ego to the accused Hadzihasanovic, and he says here, I believe it was in
14 relation to Dusina: "Because they established full cooperation with the
15 civilian bodies and with all the professional bodies that could establish
16 what had happened to those people who were killed there," and he talked
17 about his corps command.
18 And he added that: "He received information that the civilian
19 police would help with that. In other words, professional from the
20 civilian police.
21 Witness HF adds similar credence to this argument. Yes, there was
22 good cooperation. Sometimes it was better, sometimes not so good,
23 depending on the situation. We had joint actions with the MUP, that is,
24 the military police and the security organ with the civilian police. We
25 would always go together.
1 And there was even evidence, and I believe it was from Witness
2 Delalic, a Defence witness, who said on page 16372, when he was asked
3 about the help a civilian police station could give to the 3rd Corps, and
4 he said, and I quote here, I don't have it written: "They also protected
5 civilians to the best of their ability. For a period of time, they were
6 resubordinated to us because we didn't have enough strength in view of the
7 breadth of the front line, so we were engaged on the front as well. They
8 cooperated with us as far as they could, and as far as the combat
9 operations allowed, and so on."
10 So we have even a subordination of a civilian police station under
11 the 3rd Corps unit, and I believe Delalic was the assistant commander for
12 security for the 306th Brigade.
13 Another quote comes from Menkovic, commander of a military police
14 platoon, first the -- the first Bosanska Krajina Brigade and later he
15 moved on to the 17th Krajina Brigade: "If somebody filed a direct report
16 to the civilian police, and if they felt a need for our help or if they
17 thought that the perpetrators were members of the military, then we
18 cooperated and carried out certain parts of the investigation together."
19 Another witness, Kapetanovic, just the last of the quote displayed
20 for Your Honours: "And if the military police asked for such assistance,
21 I know that they provided that assistance." And he talked about the
22 civilian police helping out the military.
23 Again, Witness HF, associated to the 3rd Corps, he talked about
24 Maline. In the middle of the quote displayed in bold, I quote: "It was
25 the responsibility and the duty of all the relevant organs to continue
1 with the investigation until the perpetrators were caught. That activity
2 never stops."
3 And he goes on to talk about who assisted in this effort. His
4 answer was: "The organs of the public security service and the MUP had
5 the duty to continue. They worked on a parallel track with us. The
6 military security, the military police, it was the duty of all of them."
7 And at the end, he agreed that they all, the military, the civilian law
8 enforcement, security, intelligence agencies, were all working together to
9 identify the perpetrators.
10 And we have legal bases for that, and that was Prosecution
11 Exhibit 329, paragraph 50, where he talks about, again, the cooperation
12 between the military and the civilian police. When the perpetrator or
13 accomplice of a criminal offence, "Is a citizen of the republic who is not
14 a member of the armed forces or a foreign citizen without diplomatic
16 And we have a specific example of what could be the application of
17 that law. Again Witness HF, on the specific -- on the specific example of
18 that cooperation: "In another situation when a member of the humanitarian
19 organisation Oda Nomad, I believe it was a British organisation, was
20 killed by the Mujahedin, in that case we made an arrest together with the
21 public security and detained the perpetrator in the KP Dom, pressed
22 charges, et cetera." And Your Honours will note that was about a
23 Mujahedin, the alleged perpetrator.
24 The accused himself - and I'm talking about General
25 Hadzihasanovic - made use of the MUP for investigation purposes - this is
1 DH161/6 - when he directed an order to the command of OG Lasva. It was
2 about ABiH members who illegally moved into abandoned houses from
3 civilians. "OG, together with the bodies of the MUP, shall identify
4 guilty persons who moved out Croats." That was his duty and that's what
5 he implemented with his own resources and with the assistance of the MUP.
6 The corps had all its abilities, also informal ones, to press for
7 investigations when it mattered to them. This is Prosecution Exhibit 774,
8 and it's a letter from the 3rd Corps command to the district military
9 prosecutor, from the commander, from the command of the combat unit, to
10 the military judicial authority, and it concerns a serious event; the
11 death of 19 BiH soldiers and the wounding of others. And I quote the
12 letter: "As the competent authority, after reviewing all of the material,
13 you are to take measures to identify the individual who perpetrated this
14 crime, as well as possibly other crimes. And to investigate criminal
15 proceedings against him before the district military court in Zenica,
16 which has jurisdiction in the matter."
17 Let me turn, Your Honours, to investigation. What needs to be
18 done if you are told, because it's your obligation, to investigate, to
19 find out what happened? Mujezinovic, commander of the military police
20 Battalion of the 3rd Corps, he said something obvious. What needs to be
21 done if a crime happened? I quote him: "Well, if there is a crime, it is
22 necessary to go and carry out an on-site investigation, to establish the
23 factual situation and to detect the perpetrator of the crime."
24 And what are the methods? We are all familiar with it, but it's
25 important to see what it is. Mujezinovic, "The main method," and I quote
1 him, "applied was to interview eye-witnesses, potential eye-witnesses or
2 co-perpetrators, and this meant that it took sometime to collect all the
4 Veseljek, he was more specific about what needs to be done, and
5 I'll just guide you through a few of the attempts he made when he was sent
6 out to the field to investigate crimes. And you remember he gave, I
7 believe, testimony over two days and brought with him, triggered by the
8 Defence, a large number of police reports and other military judicial
9 documents which show what was done and indeed what they were capable of
11 He talked about DH278, and I believe I'll come to that in a
12 moment. And he said: "In this particular case, whatever I was able to
13 locate I collected. It was easy to collect evidence because the area was
14 peaceful, it was secure, and I had ample time to collect all these
15 things." And Judge Veseljek was talking about, and we'll come to that in
16 a second, collecting forensics, something obvious, normal, mandatory, for
17 every military policeman going to a scene.
18 The first example I want to use to show what the police, military
19 police, was capable of doing if they wanted, if they were directed, is
20 P Exhibit 276 -- I'd like to correct the record. It's not P276, but
22 It's a document dated 26 December 1992, called on-site
23 investigation report. It's authored, signed by Judge Veseljek, the
24 witness. And he talks about an event that happened the same day. That
25 means they were capable, as they should, to show up at the crime scene the
1 same date. On 26 of December 1992, they encountered a young man who was
2 running around from a shop or something. Somebody wanted to stop him. So
3 policemen chased him and they injured him while he was running away with
5 What happened was another example of cooperation. Immediately
6 afterwards, the judge started carrying out the inspection, and shortly,
7 the organs of the CSB and the military police arrived who secured the
8 scene during the inspection. The judge, I have to add here, happened to
9 be on the scene. That's why he called these other people. Now, what was
10 done, and you see the title description of the scene, it was sketched and
11 photographed in detail, and the sketch and the photographic documentation
12 shall be a component part of the record.
13 He went on, and you don't see it on this screen, that he collected
14 cartridges, a gun cartridge was found there, and describes the calibre.
15 Then later the judge left the taking of statements from the perpetrator
16 and the witnesses to the military police organs and he adds when the
17 on-site inspection was carried out. Also, eye-witnesses were listed in
18 this very, very short report, two pages.
19 Your Honours, that's one of the examples of what was done, just a
20 normal day-to-day event, somebody running away allegedly from a crime
22 Let me take to the -- to a second example. This is DH276. And,
23 again, we have the photography of the crime scene, then a description
24 called "probable course of events," and you remember that was the example
25 when one of the cows of an inhabitant was stolen. He called the military
1 police and they came for the mere fact that a cow was stolen.
2 Unfortunately, they couldn't arrest the perpetrators because they were
3 shooting back. Cows were valuable at that time. So we have injured
4 people on the scene. Now, the people from the military police who tried
5 to arrest the perpetrators, the thieves of the cow, were named here. Data
6 about the perpetrators. And then they concluded, after taking down all
7 this information, that, and I quote: "It was found the military policeman
8 acted according to service regulations in all matters and no measures were
9 taken against them."
10 That's a proper way to deal with a situation like that. State it
11 down, see what happens, make an assessment, and put it on the record, not
12 to hush it up as it was done in the cases we are talking about today.
13 Your Honours, Judge Veseljek testified about a number of other
14 documents and I listed them down here. Just a brief other document, and
15 it's DH161, also listed on this slide, and in fact it's a letter from the
16 accused Commander Enver Hadzihasanovic, who requested information in June
17 1993 about the theft of 1.5 litres of oil, a vehicle type Golf, and
18 certain quantities of food, and he wants to have these allegations
19 verified. This is the commander of the 3rd Corps.
20 Another example, an interesting example, is DH1471, again a
21 document that came with Judge Veseljek, and it's an official note by the
22 military police battalion of the 3rd Corps, who looks into an aggressive
23 behaviour by an alleged perpetrator. I'd like to read out what was said
24 about the perpetrator. "He usually poses as a member of the MOS, Muslim
25 armed forces." We heard about that. "And when robbing Croatian houses
1 with owners who do not know him, he presents himself as a Mujahedin. He
2 wears a long beard. This man is sought in order to be taken into custody
3 and submitted for further proceedings. Victims and witness statements are
4 being taken." Predrag Tomic.
5 So they acted upon all these issues. Of interest here, even the
6 military police talks about the MOS. And we heard evidence or witnesses
7 from the Defence talked about that these forces did not exist. It's
8 1st October 1993.
9 There are other instances, I can't go into all of them. DH155
10 talks about joint cooperation in checking vehicles. Joint cooperation,
11 again MUP and the military police.
12 DH1467, misappropriation of a video recorder and several medals
13 and cups was also investigated, prosecuted by the 3rd Corps military
15 After you have investigated, what do you do with the perpetrators?
16 Mujezinovic, battalion commander, 3rd Corps, gave an example of how
17 robust, aggressive, the authorities could be if they wanted, and they had
18 to; that was their job. He gives an example when a formation of the green
19 legion was suspected to be involved in criminal activities. And you know,
20 Your Honours, how violent these instances can be in this environment. "It
21 took us sometime for us to collect the documents and the material
22 evidence, and of course with the security sector we submitted all this to
23 the Prosecutor's office and when they accepted it as relevant on the basis
24 of a plan, we did actually arrest and escort people to the Court." That
25 was done when they wanted, according to their experiences, abilities,
1 identify the perpetrators, collect evidence where they are, and make an
2 action. I believe this refers to what they called action Golub, or
4 Another Judge, Your Honours, Judge Adamovic, also testified as to
5 the risks an investigative judge took. He said, and I quote him on
6 page 9492: "Even judges would go out very close to the front line. I
7 remember a location that we went to where the opposing unit was literally
8 50 metres away from the trench where we were conducting an investigation."
9 That was what was done when normal crimes were at stake.
10 And the accused, Enver Hadzihasanovic, had a similar approach, as
11 he should, in a communication to his superior command and to his fellow
12 1st Corps commander, when he said, and I quote: "We request that you deal
13 with this matter more robustly as such actions jeopardise our units' lines
14 of defence, since the aforementioned unit may not actually be in our area
15 of responsibility but is next to it." P526, and it's about the
16 abandonment of a position by one soldier. A serious issue, I agree; but
17 look what was done, the commander of the corps sits down, writes a letter
18 to his superior command, and to somebody he thinks could have more
19 abilities to deal with it, his fellow corps commander. Coordination,
21 Witness HF states again the obvious. He asked one of his
22 subordinates to "gather information about the event itself, about the
23 perpetrators, about the circumstances, under which it all happened, all
24 the relevant information normally sought in such situation." Witness HF
25 at 17268.
1 Brief on the involvement of the corps commander. Karavelic, the
2 military expert from the Defence in his expert report, he says that: "All
3 these investigations need to be done, possibly at the initiative of the
4 corps commander, at least he's expected to ensure that it takes place."
5 Your Honours, you heard a lot of testimony by internationals about
6 the role of a commander, and we have all these quotes in our brief, and
7 looking at the time, I don't want to spend too much on it but I urge you
8 to follow these quotes - for instance, from Colonel Stewart - very, very
9 closely, and give them due regard when you deliberate.
10 But I'd like to quote a quote by Cordy-Simpson on command
11 responsibility, when he was asked to comment about what another expert
12 testified that command is a personal thing. And he said he would agree
13 with it, and at the end he says: "Of course, things will go wrong. It's
14 a subsequent action that a commander takes when things have gone wrong
15 that is a test of whether he's a good commander or not." Not on paper but
16 in reality, Your Honours.
17 And the last two issues before going in detail to the crime scenes
18 is a point the military expert Karavelic made on the reporting of
19 collateral damage. He was asked about that and he said, and I quote the
20 bold part: "If collateral damage, serious collateral damage, has been
21 observed, the commanders of the units in the field have to report ... on
22 the fact." It's not hushed up. It's being looked at. It's being
23 reported. Battle casualty is no carte blanche, just raise it, nobody
24 talks about it, nobody's asked question, it has at the minimum be
25 reported, and Prosecution submits investigated, as they did, remember the
1 example with the two military policemen who were doing some arguably legal
2 action, it was looked into it, a report was made, and it wasn't followed.
3 And lastly, Karavelic again on the powers of a corps
4 commander: "Being a corps commander is a huge thing. Enver
5 Hadzihasanovic was in charge of several thousand people with all the
6 authority and responsibility that comes with it." Mr. Karavelic gave you
7 an example of what he did when he thought two of his subordinate brigade
8 commanders didn't live up to their duties. He fired them briefly. I
9 quote: "I, as the corps commander, decided to remove them from their
10 respective positions." And later: "And I instituted criminal proceedings
11 against both of them with the military district court in Sarajevo."
12 That's what the corps commander can do. He can use his military
13 police. He has to use them. He can use the MUP. He can do action
14 himself. He can even fire people as he should.
15 Mr. President, Your Honours, I'd like to move on to the three
16 specific crime scenes.
17 And I don't want to spent too much time -- in fact no time at all,
18 on the crime scene itself. We have heard Witness Ivica Kegelj, who
19 testified that he personally witnessed the killing, the murder of the
20 people who were captured alongside him. You have also heard another
21 witness, Cvijanovic who testified live for the Prosecution about the death
22 of Zvonko Rajic who was killed by Serif Patkovic, the commander of the
23 2nd Battalion.
24 Now, there can be absolutely no doubt, although the Defence raised
25 it several times, that there was no notice to the accused Hadzihasanovic,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 that he knew about it. First of all, he was intimately involved, and you
2 can see that in paragraph 120 of our brief. He was intimately involved in
3 the Dusina operation. He signed reports, he ordered units, almost to the
4 platoon level, and the military expert Karavelic acknowledged that.
5 Now, as a result of this intimate knowledge, he knew about the casualties,
6 about the killings.
7 Just to mention Exhibit P132, the press release of the 3rd Corps.
8 There is no way, in our submission, that the corps commander isn't aware
9 of a public press release that went out on that day talking about the
10 killing, the execution of Zvonko Rajic. But he did more than passively
11 listening to information. He sent out two reports following the Dusina
12 events. The first one is a report, and you see that on your screen, P237,
13 where he talks about what happened in Dusina, and you see he takes note of
14 the arrest of five to six HVO people. Second document, the famous meeting
15 that happened the same day in Kiseljak. Several witnesses called by the
16 Defence testified about that. And you remember that the HVO commander of
17 the other side, the counterpart of General Hadzihasanovic talked about the
18 exchange of -- that people who were exchanged were killed in Dusina. This
19 provides clear notice.
20 Witness Merdan, his deputy, came and testified in front of you,
21 Your Honours, and said: "In fact, I talked to my commander about that
22 meeting. " And he then, and you see that here, he informed the superior
23 command of the events in Kiseljak, meaning what was talked about that
25 Also, Totic, Your Honours, one of the HVO commanders in Zenica,
1 and this is in footnote 548 in our brief. He said that he called Enver
2 Hadzihasanovic the same night and talked to him about what happened.
3 Now, especially Merdan committed himself and his commander and his
4 unit on several instances to a full investigation into what happened in
5 Dusina. And he did it in front of you, Your Honours. He said, and I
6 quote him: "As I sat here today, I can say with full responsibility that
7 the corps command did their utmost and went even beyond that, because they
8 established full cooperation with the civilian bodies and with all the
9 professional bodies that could establish what had happened to those people
10 who were killed there."
11 Very important, Your Honours, in our submission, is the fact that
12 this was the first time that an army unit had committed a war crime. That
13 is what Merdan testified. It wasn't the HVO crying wolf 500 times. Your
14 Honours, it was the first time. So Hadzihasanovic had all reasons to take
15 it serious.
16 Stewart, Colonel Stewart, Bob Stewart, called by the Defence, told
17 you that Merdan told him the people concerned in Dusina were going to be
18 court-martialed. Merdan, he said, yes, he remembered that conversation as
20 Now, the Defence tries to say that Merdan looked into the events
21 overnight between the 26th and the later day, and came back to Stewart, to
22 the internationals, and said, "We looked into it, we investigated it,
23 battle casualties." So when the Defence asked Colonel Stewart, well, were
24 you satisfied? Let's see what he says. "I couldn't understand why seven
25 people would be killed. I thought it was probably the work of the
1 Mujahedin. There would be no reason whatsoever for these sort of -- I
2 just did -- didn't have time to investigate it but probably thought the
3 BiH -- seven people killed? You know that's -- that's almost a deliberate
4 attack. You know one or two people killed in a fire-fight, yes. Seven
5 people, that looks to start like a massacre."
6 Defence Witness Hadzic, called again to testify on Dusina, was
7 talking about the hypothetical. And he said, again, if captured
8 individuals would be killed, he would look into, as he should.
9 Now, what did the accused and his military authority do? They
10 could go, they had to go, to the crime scene, investigate, according to
11 the standard set by their own witnesses. They didn't go. Nobody went to
12 the crime scene in Dusina. The access was clear. HVO had gone on the
13 control of the ABiH. Even the sanitary people from the civil protection
14 went there. But no military police. They weren't interested in.
15 Hadzic confirmed that. He said there were no subjective pieces
16 of evidence in the case file. There were no witness statements or no
17 information about possible witnesses either, and he even testified that
18 one of the people killed was 70 years old. He didn't care. He said they
19 wouldn't go there and make a proper investigation. And Your Honours, you
20 have seen Ivica Kegelj who testified. He was detained at the KP Dom after
21 the Dusina events for 13 days. Nobody questioned him about what he saw.
22 He was an eye-witness, as was Franjo Krsto [phoen]. He was also there,
23 although a shorter time.
24 Of interest, Mr. President, Your Honours, is also the fact that
25 Hadzic testified on pages 15116 to 17, that the investigative judge, this
1 famous, infamous judge Strika played no role whatsoever. And he
2 concludes, Mr. President, Your Honours, Mr. Hadzic, who was a prosecutor,
3 who looked into the files, he said, an official investigation was never
4 launched. These interviews which took place, allegedly, in the KP Dom,
5 and we elaborate on that in footnote 571, were routine interviews, done
6 with every captured HVO soldiers. They weren't directed focusing on the
7 Dusina events because there was no investigation, as we heard.
8 Witness Stewart was asked whether he was happy with the
9 information provided about the investigation, so-called, into Dusina, and
10 he said: "Yes, I would have liked that for every single crime committed I
11 wanted to know what was going on. So the answer to the question is -- did
12 I receive good information that somebody has been disciplined? The answer
13 is no."
14 And Your Honours, you may recall that in Dusina, not only Croats
15 were killed, executed. There was also at least one of the ABiH soldiers,
16 officers, and look what happened. Here they conduct a full investigation.
17 They collect statements of eye-witnesses. They talk about detention and
18 arrest of the alleged murderer, Cvijanovic. And this is Prosecution
19 Exhibit P135. A clear indication again what they were capable of doing,
20 if they only had wanted.
21 Your Honours, there was no investigation; it was the opposite.
22 The people, the alleged perpetrators were promoted. Serif Patkovic,
23 commander of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, 14th April,
24 1993, short time after these Dusina events, spread out through the valley
25 to the internationals. He was given an award. Look at the first line of
1 why he's given award. "Given the enthusiasm and results achieved in the
2 struggle on Allah's path, the unselfish dedication in completing combat
3 tasks," and so on.
4 He gets another award and becomes even promoted later. This is
5 P612, a proposal dated 17th August 1993. Proposal for the Golden Lily
6 award, and you can read yourself, Your Honours, what the motivation for
7 that was. And the same is true for the second named individual,
8 perpetrator Vehid Subotic, also known as Geler. I think that means
9 shrapnel also.
10 P713 talks about the list of soldiers who were nominated for
11 military medals. That was in May. And here it's signed by somebody we
12 know, Serif Patkovic.
13 Let me turn, Mr. President, to the next part. That's Miletici.
14 Again, I don't want to spend time on the crime base of Miletici. You have
15 heard evidence of people who were not eye-witnesses but who came to see
16 the body after it had happened and testified that they saw the bodies, the
17 way they looked like. One, I believe, had his hands tied behind his back,
18 was sitting there dead.
19 You also may recall that the people who were survived that attack
20 on Miletici, the civilians, were led in a column down to Mehurici,
21 Mehurici, a well-known place and you'll hear more today and tomorrow about
22 this, where they were detained for a brief period and then released.
23 There were Croat civilians but also three members of the ABiH. A
24 negotiation took place between the local BiH commanders, I think from the
25 306th Brigade and the Mujahedin who were there, and the negotiations were
1 successful. In our brief, paragraph 190, footnote 618, we will talk about
2 these negotiations, especially also the people who played a big role,
3 Ramadan, for instance. You see the references in our footnotes, the way
4 he was, as we say, affiliated, with the ABiH army.
5 Miletici, there was joint operation, joint combat, and my
6 colleague Daryl Mundis talked about that this morning. This is again one
7 of the examples of joint combat. You will see it in every single
8 document, combat report. I listed here just three instances in combat
9 reports and war diaries that clearly say that it was a joint operation
10 happening not only on the 24th of April, 1993, but also on this place. I
11 don't want to go over it. The Mujahedin are all over. They are
12 acknowledged, they are taken into account, they are a factor. And that's
13 reflected in these instances.
14 Another information which shows to you, Your Honours, the presence
15 and the involvement of these people, and also of the ABiH unit, is P664,
16 by the command of the 306th Brigade, and there was an issue about the way
17 these people were killed, and you can see the explanation given, a very
18 detailed explanation, of what happened given very, very shortly after the
19 incidents, by the commander of the 306th Brigade. He knows what's
20 happening because he's involved. He has his eyes and ears there, where
21 the Mujahedin are, his troops support them. It's joint combat.
22 "With great effort and maximum involvement of people from the
23 brigade we prevented even graver consequences of this incident." So they
24 acknowledged they were there. They had influence to the very least over
25 these Mujahedin and could change their behaviour.
1 Just a few quotes from fact witnesses, Mr. President. You asked
2 one of the witnesses, Pavlovic, about joint cooperation I might add over
3 the objection of one of the Defence counsels, and I'm sure you recall the
4 words what she said. She observed these people, the Mujahedin, and the
5 ABiH together, approaching, and her opinion was: "I think that they did
6 belong to the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were with the
7 Muslims." And I don't need to go further into the second quote.
8 Another fact witness didn't testify live, P392, again talks about
9 the joint action by both forces.
10 Also of interest is a Defence witness. He was admitted as a Rule
11 92 bis. He was the assistants commander for security of the 1st Battalion
12 of the 306th Brigade. He says, and I quote: "On 24th April, 1993, when
13 most of the members of our battalion were in combat positions, we received
14 a call from the duty officer who informed us that the Mujahedin had been
15 in the village of Miletici and arrested one Croat and a number of Bosniaks
16 from the village."
17 Again, they had the capabilities, as they should, to look into
18 what's happening in Miletici. They were interested what they doing, the
19 Mujahedin, because they were part of their joint actions.
20 My colleague, Mundis, already talked about the role of -- the
21 observations by the internationals, here a quote by Witness Bower, which I
22 don't want to elaborate upon.
23 Very important, Mr. President, in those joint actions, are the
24 locals. We already heard about the arrest of one of the locals who posed
25 himself as a member of the MOS. Now, this piece, Mr. President, is P576,
1 an HVO communication, so to speak, from the other side. And he talks
2 about "the massacre in the village of Miletici was perpetrated by
3 Mujahedins and local Muslims."
4 It goes on: "Osman Tahirovic brought the Mujahedin into the
5 village in a tractor. After that, the massacre happened."
6 Your Honours, one of the significances of this document is that
7 only three days after the event, the HVO, who had no access to the crime
8 scene, apart from the representative of that UNPROFOR commission that went
9 there to gather information. So the other side was able to get the names
10 of the perpetrators within three days.
11 Another letter dated almost a year later, specifically again names
12 all these people, including Tahirovic. Very, very detailed. That's from
13 the Busovaca police station, quite some distance from where it happened.
14 Witnesses, Your Honours, were asked about these locals, and they
15 knew them. Witness Ribo, for instance, was able to talk about Pasanovic,
16 another local, and Jasarevic, one of the people named in the exhibit I
17 just mentioned a moment ago. Tahirovic, one of the key anchors between
18 the locals and the Mujahedin. Again, the witness Ribo was asked about
19 him, and Ribo said "that he saw him cooperating with them," meaning the
21 One of the witnesses, Mr. President, talked about the mobilisation
22 of soldiers. He was asked, but those who were older than 18, they were
23 obliged to become members of the army, they had to be mobilised. His
24 answer was: "Yes, yes, they fell under the obligation to be mobilised.
25 That was pursuant to the decision of the Presidency proclaiming the state
1 of, and it was the duty of every citizen of the state to defend their
3 These people, Mr. President, these so-called locals, they were
4 under clearly jurisdiction of the 3rd Corps, the military authorities,
5 MUP, whatever. They could be Mujahedin as well, but certainly these local
6 people could be questioned, interrogated, prosecuted for whatever they
7 did. Nothing was done. They were left untouched, despite the fact that
8 everybody knew who they were.
9 And lastly, on this point, a quote from the UN report, Mazowiecki
10 report on the former Yugoslavia, Payam Akhavan, who was a witness in the
11 Blaskic case, he testified about a visit, I believe it was on 4th of May,
12 to Miletici, and he later co-drafted a report, and let's see what he
13 says. "The Miletici massacre was committed by," and I'll quote from the
14 report, "members of government forces from neighbouring villages and
15 Mujahedin." That's DH2097. That's a view from the internationals.
16 And another interesting quote, an important point from Judge
17 Veseljek, and I don't want to go into that, is that there was an
18 obligation on everybody to inform about crimes. There are no cracks
19 through which crimes go unpunished. The net is tight, Mr. President, Your
21 And Witness HF, he talked about what kind of action he thought the
22 306th Mountain Brigade could instigate, and he talks about the possible
23 perpetrators of Miletici, the Mujahedin, and he said they couldn't act on
24 their own, but they could do so by approval of Witness HF, and you know
25 what his position was. "I believe they would need to get approval from me
1 because they were not members of the army." And he talks about Mujahedin.
2 But they could do something if they only wanted.
3 Briefly, Mr. President, on notice, again, there is no doubt that
4 the accused received ample notice. This is P908, an HVO daily report
5 sent, inter alia, to the 3rd Corps, the day after the incident. Five
6 civilians were massacred in the village of Miletici.
7 And a similar notice, little bit later, 7th May 1993, again talks
8 about what happened in Miletici. And Your Honours, Witness Merdan told
9 you that he went to the crime scene, the day, I believe, after the
10 killings occurred in April.
11 We have talked already, Mr. President, about the cooperation in
12 general. Here again specifically on Miletici, Witness HF talked about
13 that, and I quote: "In fact, I contacted with the head of the centre of
14 the Public Security Service, Mr. Fazlic, who was responsible for the
15 police in that area of responsibility. I also asked other services to
16 provide me with any information they had about the event."
17 Again, Mr. President, it's full cooperation from everybody
19 And Witness HF again about steps and duties to investigate, and he
20 talks about Miletici, quote in the middle: "It was the responsibility and
21 the duty of all the relevant organs to continue with the investigation
22 until the perpetrators are caught. That activity never stops."
23 And he goes on a little bit more detailed, and the quote, I'm not
24 sure whether it's in our final brief, is at page 17268: "The organs of
25 the Public Security Service and the MUP had the duty to continue. They
1 worked on a parallel track with us. The military security, the military
2 police, it was the duty of all of them."
3 And two final pieces of evidence on Miletici. First of all,
4 again, Witness Akhavan from the Mazowiecki report. People, he said
5 that -- and he was in Miletici; you remember, Mr. President. And I quote
6 him: "None of the parties had engaged in any form of investigation, let
7 alone prosecution of those responsible."
8 And to counter one of the Defence arguments that, well, the
9 national people looked into that. No, it was the job of the local
10 commanders. And that's exactly what the meaning, the opinion was, of the
11 special rapporteur. He expected all the parties to "bring to justice the
12 perpetrators of such atrocities as are outlined in this report." In our
13 brief we elaborated a little bit on that.
14 The UNPROFOR commission certainly had no authoritative powers to
15 summons people, to question them, to arrest them, to detain, to conduct
16 forensic investigations. That was the job and the obligation of the
17 resources the accused had at his position.
18 Sipic, the commander of 306th Brigade, who was part, or I believe
19 it was Zulic, who was part of the negotiations when the captured Muslims
20 were released after being detained in Mehurici. He testified he was never
21 interrogated. He was never asked to give an account, and he was a direct
22 eye-witness to what occurred on the 24th of April, 1994.
23 And lastly, Karavelic, on the impact Miletici had. "The event in
24 Miletici, regardless of who had committed it, had the potential to
25 exacerbate ethnic tensions in the area and possibly to lead to the failure
1 of the cease-fire agreement." Again, Mr. President, the accused could
2 have made a difference if he had properly investigated into this event, a
3 big difference for the Lasva Valley.
4 If I can take a moment, Mr. President --
5 [Prosecution counsel confer]
6 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] I do apologise, Mr. President.
7 Apparently we have a problem on the screen. The transcript can't be seen.
8 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps if we could take a recess at this point.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Right. And the best thing to do
10 would be to take a break now so that the technicians can come and repair
11 whatever has broken down.
12 So it is a quarter past 12.00 and we shall start again at quarter
13 to 1.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 12.46 p.m.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We will now resume.
17 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to finish my
18 part of the --
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute.
20 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Judge, President, for the sake of
21 the transcript, as far as the Defence team is concerned, our legal
22 assistant, Alex Demirdjias, is now present. Thank you.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. The Trial Chamber
24 would like to greet your assistant.
25 I will give the floor to the Prosecution again.
1 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to conclude
2 my part of the oral submissions of the Prosecutor by briefly talking about
3 Maline. And you know where the locations are. I believe that's one of
4 the locations you visited the victims of that massacre. You're well aware
5 of them.
6 Again, the Maline/Bikosi massacre was initiated by a joint combat
7 operation, as we have seen before many, many times, and we have of the
8 witnesses, P92, who talks about that, and I quote her: "The BH army
9 soldiers in Maline wore camouflage uniforms with their unit's insignia
10 from which one could see that there were members of the 306th Mountain
11 Brigade." That's what she saw.
12 Most importantly, Witness HF, and again that may not be in our
13 trial brief; it's in our closing brief. It's on page 17236 where he talks
14 about when the Mujahedin would join in, and I quote him: "The Mujahedin
15 would come, I don't know how, by information about combat, about combat
16 activities, and they would come and join in those combat activities."
17 And later: "But once the fighting started, they would join in the
18 way they thought fit, and that is why they committed the crimes that we
19 have referred to."
20 And I believe in redirect the Defence counsel asked him at what
21 time in a combat action they would join? Was it at the beginning, in the
22 middle, at the end? And Witness HF said right at the beginning.
23 Another telling example is P174, and that's a letter we'll come to
24 in a moment again. That's a letter which was provoked by a letter by
25 Mr. Mazowiecki. And here, from the 3rd Corps command, they talk about,
1 and I quote: "Took part of" -- let me read out the whole quote. "Soldiers
2 of the [illegible] and armed citizens, who were not members of the BH army
3 units and who obtained weapons through some private channels, took part in
4 the combat actions in the region of the village Maline."
5 And Your Honours, if you look at the B/C/S version of this
6 document, you can clearly see the number 306, where it says here
7 "illegible." So I believe this is what the document says. Again,
8 note, "Took part in the combat actions," a joint action.
9 Then an important element again provided by Witness HF was about
10 notice, that he had received notice, and he was -- you remember what his
11 position was. He had received information about the killing of 20 people,
12 and that they were executed by firing squad, and this -- that this crime
13 had been committed by the Mujahedin, and that's an important point at this
14 juncture. I'll come to that in a second.
15 Another witness, Mr. President, Your Honours, who testified was
16 Menzil. He was a doctor associated, I believe, with the 306th Brigade,
17 the 1st Battalion. Now, he examined one of the survivors of this
18 massacre, and he told you that he looked at it and it really didn't look
19 to him like a battle casualty. And we can assume, and Prosecution
20 suggests, you know, this was really part of an execution, and he was able
21 to determine that by examining this victim. Of note, Mr. President, he
22 was never asked to give an account of what he has seen, witnessed,
23 himself, by anybody.
24 Merdan again provides the notice anchor to the accused. He said
25 that: "I suggested that we should go there in order to investigate what
1 kind of murders or killings had taken place." Again, a clear commitment
2 by the alter ego of the accused Hadzihasanovic to investigate.
3 Now, Sipic, the I believe commander of the 306th. He now looked
4 into that. He was present and he asked his assistant commander for
5 security to investigate, and you can see that in the middle of this quote.
6 And then it says they basically stopped the investigation, once they
7 realised that it wasn't them. It wasn't the members of the 306th Brigade,
8 although that was only the opinion of his assistant. Because later, and
9 that's in the footnote 646 of our brief, it says: "It was only the
10 assumption of the assistant for security that it was not done by members
11 of the 306th Brigade."
12 And then he goes on and says, and I quote: "I only asked them to
13 inform the superior command that this has happened and that this was the
14 Mujahedin who had done that." So that's it. There they stopped.
15 Mujahedin, no more investigation. But remember this Mujahedin allegation
16 so early, because it will change in the battle casualty in a moment.
17 Witness F, again telling you about their abilities and indeed
18 their commitment to look into information of the local Mujahedin, although
19 nothing came out of it. "We made efforts to collect information about
20 these local Mujahedin and we had some success." But then he goes on and
21 basically says, you know, we couldn't really do anything. That's at
22 page 17254.
23 And I already told you, Your Honours, about the fact that Menzil
24 was never interrogated by anybody about his firsthand account.
25 Now, of interest, Mr. President and Your Honours, is the fact that
1 in those days, in Maline, military police was available. Merdan visited,
2 I believe, on the 12th of June, a few days later, Guca Gora nearby, and he
3 had a military police escort; in fact, General Hadzihasanovic provided it
4 to him. Why didn't they use that, the military police, to go to the crime
5 scene in Maline where more than 20 people, civilians, captured HVO
6 soldiers, were killed? That would have been the proper course of action.
7 It wasn't done.
8 To finish with the international reaction to Maline/Bikosi,
9 because in October, it was picked up again, again by Mr. Mazowiecki and
10 his expert group. He writes, and this is P120, a letter dated 15 October
11 1993. He writes, and I quote: "That on June 8, 1993, at least 25 Bosnian
12 Croat civilians are reported to have been killed in the Maline village."
13 And then later it says: "Eye-witnesses to the atrocities at
14 Maline have claimed that so-called Mujahedin troops were involved,
15 reportedly incorporated into the 7th Brigade of the ABiH."
16 You remember, Your Honours, that this was exactly the explanation
17 given by the commander of the 306th when he stopped his investigation. It
18 was the Mujahedin troops.
19 Now, two days later, 17th October, the Supreme Command now writes
20 to the 3rd Corps and says: "Please give us information. We need to
21 respond to Mr. Mazowiecki." And this is P171. Information whether
22 massacre really occurred.
23 Again, two days later, and you see, Mr. President, Your Honours,
24 how quickly they could react when they wanted, at least formally,
25 19th October 1993, and this is DH 1498, the command of the 306th, who had
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 previously said it was the Mujahedin, now is forced to give an
2 explanation. This time it's different. And I quote: "During a battle
3 with units of the HVO in the villages of Maline, et cetera, the HVO
4 suffered losses in manpower as a result of combat operations."
5 And then at the end it says: "We repeat that all these
6 individuals died in combat."
7 Looks like a cover-up. A few months earlier they determined it
8 was the Mujahedin or they had the opinion. Now it's since they have now
9 to provide some details, they say, okay, battle casualty, for us no need
10 to look into that. No explanation given whatsoever.
11 Two days later, now the 3rd Corps command reports what they got
12 from the 306th Brigade to the BH command and says, and you can see it at
13 the bottom quote, and I quote from P174: "Since it was not a massacre,
14 but the bodies of killed people by rifle bullets or shells, the
15 perpetrators were not defined for objective reasons, as can be seen
16 above." They even invent bullets or shells.
17 The Mujahedin, Mr. President, Your Honours, have completely
18 disappeared from this communication.
19 So again, two days later, the 3rd Corps writes to the BH, and
20 says, in reference to the request of Mr. Mazowiecki on the alleged
21 massacres "we report as follows," and then the quote goes: "So nor was
22 this a massacre of civilians as alleged in Mazowiecki's letter but an
23 armed conflict in which, apart from RBH army members, the cited number of
24 the HVO soldiers and armed civilians whom the soldiers had included in the
25 fighting lost their lives."
1 No proper investigation, nobody was interviewed, neither Sipic,
2 all these people, the doctor. Just a bold statement, a complete cover-up,
3 towards the international community.
4 Let me end with the deputy of the accused Hadzihasanovic on the
5 obligation of the ABiH vis-a-vis the citizens. "We, as the army, had to
6 guarantee the safety of all the citizens, including the Croatian
8 Nobody, not the accused and not Mr. Merdan, lived up to this
9 commitment and to the legal obligations they had to investigate and punish
10 the crimes that happened, occurred, in their area of responsibility.
11 Thank you, Mr. President.
12 MR. NEUNER: Good afternoon, Mr. President, good afternoon, Your
13 Honours. I will take you in a moment to Motel Sretno.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber would like to
15 welcome Mrs. Benjamin. You may proceed now.
16 MR. NEUNER: Given the advanced time I will continue, and I have
17 prepared some slides which should help Your Honours to follow the
19 I want to start my presentation on Sretno with a cease-fire agreed
20 in Medjugorje. High-level negotiations had taken place, including
21 Izetbegovic, Tudjman, Owen and Stoltenberg, and they led to a conclusion
22 of agreement on the 18th of May, 1993 and an annex to that agreement said
23 complete cease-fire and withdrawal of troops to the army barracks should
24 be done by 1200 hours on the 19th of May, 1993. This provides a little
25 bit the background of what has happened in Motel Sretno.
1 Basically, what has happened, the Defence in their closing briefs,
2 have accepted that the brigade military police of the 7th Muslim Mountain
3 Brigade carried out arrests occurring and that members, and the
4 Prosecution submits that these were not only members of the Brigade
5 military police that day but also members of the guerrilla from the
6 2nd Battalion of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade who participated in the
7 arrests. Why is that so? Because Witness Petrovic has testified that he
8 was arrested on 18th of May, around 1200, 1230 hours, and I quote: "These
9 two men had a wide green band around their heads, around the left arm.
10 They also had a green band but it was narrower, and they were wearing
11 camouflage uniforms."
12 Another witness, Mr. Marusic, described his arresters. "These
13 units were based in the motel. We called those units the Muslim armed
14 forces or MOS would be the abbreviated form. They were in uniform. They
15 had green headbands on them, and they had green bands on their arms, and
16 on some of them these bands bore the inscription, 'the police.'"
17 As this witness has observed, it was not on all of his arresters,
18 bands or uniforms they were, that he could see the police inscription.
19 Also, only three to four members of the military police from the
20 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade had returned that day to Motel Sretno, and
21 altogether 16 persons had been abducted, which is quite a lot, given that
22 we had only three or four military policemen. So there were far more
23 people involve in the arrests ensuing. And who were the victims? They
24 were almost exclusively civilian. "Of those 16 of us who were detained,
25 all of us were civilians except for one man who was wearing a uniform. He
1 was a refugee in Kakanj, and I think that he was the only one who was a
2 member of the Croatian Defence Council." That is what witness Petrovic
3 testified to, Your Honours.
4 And even the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade had information about the
5 fact that the arrested persons were civilians. A document, P563, states:
6 In the night of the 18th of May, 1993, the following, in Kakanj, our unit
7 captured 16 Ustashas, civilians."
8 Serious mistreatments followed that night, and I've put together
9 only one quote as an example for the very many things which happened.
10 It's from Mr. Bogeljic. And he says: "They put me on a chair there, and
11 one of the men said that I would be hit 20 times with some sort of a
12 wooden plank."
13 I jump a little bit. "He said if I groaned, I would be hit 50
14 times. Then the first time I was hit, I fell back and hit my head on the
15 stairs, and I think I lost consciousness for a moment.
16 "Question: Do you recall what happened when you got back your
18 The answer is: "There was something warm on my face. I think one
19 of them urinated on me. I still hadn't come to, not completely, you
20 understand. It's difficult for me to think to all those events."
21 Your Honours, the question is: Were the two accused present in
22 the events surrounding the Motel Sretno incident? I will first deal with
23 the presence of Mr. Hadzihasanovic. It is not alleged that he was present
24 in the motel but during the arrest operation, one witness testified,
25 Mr. Borovcanin, again the bandanas, he testifies: "They wore bandanas and
1 some wore insignias on their arms and some had green bandanas around their
3 "Question: Could you continue. Tell us what transpired please?
4 This group which was to my right stopped in a little meadow, in a little
5 opening. I looked and I saw Mr. Hadzihasanovic who was talking to them."
6 Mr. Borovcanin lived only three to four houses away from
7 Mr. Hadzihasanovic at that point in time. He had seen Mr. Hadzihasanovic
8 in a meadow, and the day afterwards, the following day, he saw on the
9 property of Mr. Hadzihasanovic a table where he found a -- or where he saw
10 a bag and a brief-case from an HVO commander. This also indicates -- who
11 had been arrested. This also indicates that there was some relationship
12 between the activities of the arresters, the people they arrested, and
13 then the items which were found on them.
14 I want to go back to the meadow where Mr. Hadzihasanovic was seen.
15 What was the distance at the time? In examination-in-chief,
16 Mr. Borovcanin said: "20 to 30 metres away from my house." When asked on
17 cross-examination, 200 metres was suggested to him, and his answer was:
18 "There is no 200 metres there. I'm sorry, it may be perhaps -- well,
19 let's say not even 60 or 70 metres away. It's right nearby. 200 metres
20 may be the distance up to the last house over there."
21 I want to turn to Witness Izmirlic, who has referred to a book and
22 said one can see the head of a man from a distance of 400 metres. This
23 was taken from a book on military topography from Gvozden Colovic, DH1642,
24 and I'm referring to page 6 here. If you look at the -- at the appendix
25 there, it is confirmed a man's head can be seen at 400 metres and details
1 on clothing on 100 metres. As stated, Mr. Hadzihasanovic was seen from a
2 distance of 70 metres or less by a neighbour who had met him several
4 Another indication about the presence or not presence of
5 Mr. Hadzihasanovic is the Prosecution looked at the documents personally
6 signed by Mr. Hadzihasanovic in the relevant time period, 18th and 19th
7 May, and earlier. All documents in the period 18th until 20th of May are
8 either type-signed by -- for Hadzihasanovic or signed by a substitute. So
9 there is no personal signature.
10 In the time period 16th until 21 May 1993, in evidence, there is
11 only one document personally signed by Mr. Hadzihasanovic, and this is
12 P276 dating 16th of May. It is displayed here. You can see the
13 signature, and it was sent, it says here on the stamp, on the 16th of May.
14 So there is no further indication that Mr. Hadzihasanovic had been in his
15 headquarters, apart from this exhibit.
16 What about the presence of Kubura? His unsworn statement,
17 Mr. Kubura has said: "At that period of time, I was involved in combat
18 operations 20 kilometres away from Kakanj." What is the substantiation of
19 that claim? The unsworn statement of Mr. Kubura doesn't mention a
20 specific location where he had been, does not mention a specific time
21 frame, in what time frame he had been in that combat 20 kilometres away.
22 Is there substantiation of that alibi in the closing brief for Mr.
23 Kubura? It's paragraph 162. It just makes reference the two Defence
24 witnesses have stated that Mr. Kubura was not in Kakanj at the time. It
25 doesn't say positively where Mr. Kubura had been at the time or how long
1 he had been there, at this other location.
2 Also here, the Prosecution looked at the orders signed personally
3 around the time period, and there is indeed one order on the 17th of May,
4 1993, P562. And as Your Honours can see, the date is 17th of May on the
5 stamp here, and you see also the signature of Mr. Kubura, signing for
6 Mr. Koricic at the time. It says relocate a part of the 17th Muslim
7 Mountain Brigade command from the Bilmiste barracks to the broader village
8 of Dusina.
9 The question is who is meant with this order on the 17th with part
10 of the 17th -- of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade command? There is an
11 annex to that order which is displayed here, and the translation is here,
12 and it says: "Plan of engagement of commanders of the 7th Muslim Mountain
13 Brigade at the camp villages of Dusina from 18 to 21 May, 1993."
14 If you look, Your Honours, which positions or which personnel was
15 supposed to be in Dusina, you will find several persons -- or several
16 positions listed here, but you will not find the Chief of Staff of the
17 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, and you will not find the commander of the
18 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade mentioned here.
19 The question is: Where was the Chief of Staff? I'm referring --
20 on that day, on the 18th of May, 1993. I'm referring to P563, which
21 states in the relevant part: "The unit is at full readiness and DNS Chief
22 of Staff are in the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade.
23 Written at 2300 hours on the 18th of May."
24 Your Honours have heard where the 3rd Battalion was located at
25 that point in time. It was the barracks was the Motel Sretno, and the
1 question is who is meant by Chief of Staff? Were there Chief of Staff
2 positions on battalion levels? In the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Muslim
3 Mountain Brigade, there was no Chief of Staff. The source for that is
4 Witness Alajbegovic, transcript 18711, and Witness Kulovic, transcript
5 18815. They all denied that there would be a Chief of Staff in
6 3rd Battalion.
7 Also in the other battalions, in 1993, there were no positions for
8 Chief of Staffs foreseen. This is an inference drawn from P498 which
9 lists on the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade command level a position of a
10 Chief of Staff but not on the battalion level.
11 So the interim combat report just shown places the accused Kubura
12 at least from 2330 hours onwards on 18th May 1993 in Motel Sretno.
13 The question is: How long did the beatings last? When did the
14 beatings stop? And when were the persons released? And the Prosecution
15 has listed the witnesses talking about this. Mr. Alajbegovic said it
16 was on the following day, in the morning. More specific. Mr. Petrovic
17 said between midnight and 1.00 a.m. on 19th of May 1993. Mr. Petrovic
18 says after 3.00 a.m., about 3.30 or 4.00. Mr. Marusic states at 4.00 a.m.
19 on 19th of May.
20 On that day, on the 19th of May, Witness Bogeljic showed also his
21 injuries at a meeting with the AB -- HVO chaired by a French UNPROFOR
22 officer. And he states, transcript page 2127 to 2128, that his commander,
23 Pavo Sljivic, has said during the meeting, he mentioned a name. When he
24 was speaking he said Kubura, what are your men -- excuse me, I have to
25 repeat that. He said, and I quote: "Kubura, look what your men are
1 doing. And we are negotiating a truce and covering up our trenches."
2 The arrest operation occurring in Motel Sretno had also earlier,
3 Your Honours, heard evidence about this, arrests of military policemen
4 from the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade. The HVO had arrested them. If both
5 arrest operations are compared with each other, one can see the
6 disproportionate behaviour of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade. The HVO
7 had arrested nine military targets and one Iranian civilian, and evidence
8 has been led that one ABiH detainee was beaten and released on the 18th of
9 May 1993 while the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade had arrested 15 civilians
10 and eventually one military target, and all of these 15 or 16 men were
11 severely mistreated.
12 Finally, I will deal with further notice to the accused
13 Hadzihasanovic about the events on the 20th of May. Mr. Blaskic requested
14 the joint Travnik ABiH command to visit and alleviate the situation in
15 Kakanj, P682. It has been alleged in the Defence closing brief that the
16 joint command was not operating or not convening meetings at that time.
17 However, a close look at the documents in evidence show that even if no
18 meetings supposedly -- even if no meetings would have occurred, both sides
19 used the joint command as a kind of post-box to send messages to each
20 other. And I'm referring here in the time period 17th until 23rd of May,
21 to the HVO documents, DH1031, DH1040, DH1081. And the ABiH in turn also
22 used this post-box, I will call it, for this purpose, this post-box, the
23 joint command at that point -- that period of time. Your Honours, it's
24 DH1032 and DH1045 until DH1048. These are messages which have been passed
25 on by both sides.
1 On 21 of May, 1993, there was a further protest letter sent to the
2 3rd Corps command. It's P684. And that particular letter, as Your
3 Honours can see here, below on the screen the receiver is command of the
4 BH army 3rd Corps in Zenica, and the relevant part makes reference to:
5 "In the afternoon of the 18th May, BH army units led by the 7th Muslim
6 Brigade from Zenica brought in 15 Croatian and Serbian civilians." And
7 then goes on.
8 It provides other examples of physical torture as well as
9 psychological torture, so there is a clear indication that a crime has
11 And finally, this protest contains a paragraph which reads, and I
12 quote: "We request that the Muslim side conduct an investigation into the
13 incidents in Kakanj and raise the question of personal responsibility."
14 What were the measures? Mr. Kulovic, one of the persons who was in Motel
15 Sretno around that time period, Mr. Waespi asked him: "Now, were you
16 questioned by anybody, by your chief of security, by any authorities about
17 this incident, about what you know or don't know about this incident?"
18 Mr. Kulovic answers: "Nobody ever asked anything of me."
19 This is the presentation.
20 MS. HENRY-BENJAMIN: Good afternoon, Mr. President, good
21 afternoon, Your Honours.
22 Mr. President, as my colleague has indicated earlier, my task
23 today is to address you on counts 3 and 4 of the Third Amended Indictment
24 in so far as it relates to the town of Bugojno, in the municipality of
1 Mr. President and Your Honours, the Prosecution submits that in
2 mid-1993, the conflict between the ABiH and the HVO spread to the town of
3 Bugojno, and in particular on the 24th of July, 1993 the 3rd Corps of the
4 ABiH took control of the Bugojno town centre. Your lordships -- or Your
5 Honours, in addition to all that my colleagues have submitted earlier, the
6 ABiH soldiers of the 3rd Corps also established and operated a number of
7 detention facilities in the small town of Bugojno in which many Bosnian
8 POWs and civilians alike were confined and imprisoned.
9 During the presentation of the Prosecution's case re Bugojno, the
10 evidence reveals that the units primarily responsible for the conduct and
11 running of these facilities were the military police units of the ABiH
12 3rd Corps OG Zapad and soldiers of the 307th Motorised Brigade of the
13 operation group.
14 In the indictment, the Prosecution has enumerated six locations
15 where these facilities were established. And these are the gimnazija
16 school building, the convent building, the Slavonija furniture store, the
17 FC Iskra Stadium, the elementary school and the Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina
19 Of note here, Your Honours, is that during the incarceration of
20 the detainees, the relevant ABiH units above-mentioned transferred the
21 detainees between the various detention facilities, moving them
22 continuously from one detention facility to another.
23 Your Honours, the Prosecution fielded several witnesses who
24 testified on the appearance and physical conditions of these various
25 detention facilities as it appeared during the conflict in mid-July 1993
1 and thereafter, together with the treatment endured at these facilities
2 during the said period that they were confined.
3 I wish now, Your Honours, to deal very briefly with each facility
4 because I've been warned that I am on limited time. I in support -- I
5 would use Sanction and some PowerPoint demonstrations.
6 So we move to the gimnazija school. This facility -- and on our
7 screen, we can see Prosecution Exhibit P58, which is the gimnazija
8 building, and P64, which is a picture of the basement located in the
9 building which was used for the facility. This facility as was state was
10 located in the basement of the building. And all, each and every witness,
11 who testified with respect to this facility described the conditions as
13 Witness Mijo Marijanovic in particular, on day 33 at T 2744 to
14 2745, testified that the rooms located in the cellar of the building were
15 about three-by-five metres long, holding 35 to 45 detainees, with the
16 rooms being humid and hot, without light or ventilation. One witness
17 testified the detainees were beaten until their bodies were black and
18 blue. And still another witness, Vinko Zrno, had this to say, and I
19 quote: "I remember very well the guy whose name was Mario Subasic. He
20 was pushed down the stairs and fell on the floor, and at that moment I
21 could see his eye falling out of the socket and he was bleeding all over
22 his face."
23 The major importance here, Your Honours, is that all witnesses,
24 each and every one, said one main thing in common, and that was that all
25 the detainees were subject to this -- to severe beatings at the hands of
1 the soldiers of the ABiH 3rd Corps, the relevant units.
2 Secondly, I would move on to the convent building. And the first
3 exhibit, Prosecution Exhibit P56, shows us the building of the convent
4 building; and the next one, Prosecution Exhibit P57, shows us a photograph
5 of the basement of the building, which is where the facility was located.
6 The units of the ABiH 3rd Corps guarding this detention centre was
7 the 307th Motorised Brigade. The Trial Chamber heard witnesses testify
8 that this facility operated somewhere between 24th of July 1993 to the
9 beginning of August 1993 or thereabouts, and that the intake consisted of
10 more than 70 Bosnian Croats, including POWs and civilians at any one given
11 time. As was the case in the previously mentioned camps, the one
12 previously mentioned by me and the other camps mentioned by my colleagues,
13 Bugojno was no exception.
14 Witness Ivo Mrso testified in depth about the mistreatment that
15 occurred in the convent basement. And Vinko Zrno, on day 167, in his
16 testimony, had this to say: He itemised the implements that were used in
17 the beatings and this is what he said. "The rifle butt, boots, stones,
18 police battalions [sic], everything, everything, they treated him like an
19 animal, they were animals. The way they treated him was totally
21 One detainee who did not survive the beatings and who succumbed
22 thereafter was Mario Zrno. Vinko Zrno, the deceased cousin, testified
23 before the Trial Chamber on the said day 117 and had this to say, and I
24 quote: "The two of us had been beaten at the same time. When I fainted,
25 he would be beaten, and the other way around. After all the beatings, we
1 were thrown together in a lorry. I was really in a bad shape. Mario was
2 even in a worse shape. Perica Sistov took him in his lap. He tried to
3 help him. Four or five minutes later, on the way back to the reception
4 camp, Mario succumbed to his wounds. He died."
5 The entire evidence, Your Honours, reveal that prisoners and
6 detainees at the convent building suffered a similar fate as their
7 counterparts in the gymnasium building, all done in contravention of the
8 Geneva Conventions on the treatment of POWs and detainees.
9 Mr. President, Your Honours, evidence was led through maps that
10 showed that the detention facilities in Bugojno town were very close to
11 each other. The Exhibit P65 shows the photo of the Slavonija furniture
12 store; and P66 shows the basement of the building where this facility was
13 operated. This facility, and in the interests of time, like the
14 previously mentioned facilities, was guarded by units of the ABiH
15 3rd Corps, in particular the 307 Brigade. Evidence was lead by numerous
16 witnesses on behalf of the Prosecution who testified that rooms in which
17 detainees were held was always in constant darkness. The basement had no
18 windows and the floors were covered in water, about ten to 15 centimetres
19 high, constantly damp and cold.
20 The Trial Chamber heard in evidence - and I think the Trial
21 Chamber may have had the opportunity to see the furniture salon
22 themselves - through Prosecution witnesses, the detainees were forced to
23 sleep on pallets or on the concrete floors. And Witness ZE, a protected
24 witness, described in detail and gave a comprehensive account of this
25 facility and the conditions that they had to endure at this facility.
1 Witness Alvir on day 31 testified, and I quote: "On that night," with
2 respect to conditions, "on that night, we already thought that no one was
3 going to be called out. It was one of the calmest nights until 3.00 or
4 4.00 a.m. in the morning. Then they called me out first. I went up. I
5 was immediately hit as soon as I appeared on the ground floor. I think I
6 was hit with some sort of a wooden stick. I fell on the floor because of
7 the blow, and then they continued beating me with some sort of iron tubes.
8 They were nickel, metal iron tubes, and this would make your skin break as
9 soon as they hit you with these things. This went on for about half an
10 hour or 45 minutes at least."
11 At this facility, the witnesses testified that they were taken out
12 nightly for beatings with various instruments, and Mijo Marijanovic in his
13 testimony in day 33 describes same, and I quote: "Up in the shop, there
14 was a sort of warehouse downstairs. They would take people up to the shop
15 and they had various implements up there. They have those paper bags,
16 various things. They would use whatever they could get on their hands.
17 There were wooden implements, rods, iron rods, truncheons, police
18 truncheons, various sorts of things."
19 And when he was asked: "Did you get to know about these
20 implements which were used for these beatings?" He said: "There was a
21 toilet upstairs and when we passed by it we could see the weapons, the
22 truncheons and the bags that they used."
23 These physical assaults, your lordships, as recounted by witness
24 after witness resulted in detainees suffering broken limbs and even loss
25 of consciousness on many occasions and at least resulted in the death of
1 one of the detainees, Mladen Havranek.
2 Mr. President, the Exhibit on the screen, P62, shows the FC Iskra
3 Stadium, the largest and perhaps the most notorious of the facilities. As
4 with all the detention centres, the conditions here were deplorable and
5 accommodation was inadequate. One striking feature of this facility is
6 the detainees who were taken away from this facility for interrogation
7 were never returned.
8 Witness Mrso, in his testimony on day 1, testified before this
9 Trial Chamber that he was advised to see the commander of the ABiH 307
10 Brigade to lodge his complaints about the deplorable conditions at the
11 FC Iskra Stadium. The detainees at this facility all testified to the
12 cruel, inhumane treatment that they endured at the hands of the ABiH
13 3rd Corps soldiers who were subordinated to the accused General
15 Then we move on to the elementary school, and the Exhibit P60 on
16 the screen shows us the school and P61 shows us the exact location where
17 facility was. The sports hall in this school was in operation from
18 July 31st to the end of September 1993. And again, this facility was
19 guarded by the soldiers and military police of the ABiH 3rd Corps,
20 OG Zapad.
21 In addition to the deplorable conditions that we have heard the
22 witnesses over and over testify to that were again customary to the
23 detention centres in Bugojno for which I have already discussed, the
24 facility which housed some 300 persons, including POWs and civilians, was
25 always in constant darkness and the windows were permanently blocked and
1 the ventilation inadequate.
2 Ivan Mrso, on day 31, at page 2508, aptly described the scenario,
3 and I quote, "as being lined up like sardines in a can." Even though the
4 conditions here were deplorable, physical conditions appeared, according
5 to the witnesses, to be a little better than the other facilities; but on
6 the other hand, the pattern of physical abuse and torture that the
7 detainees here endured was no different to any other of the detention
9 Witness ZD, a protected witness, on day 35, transcript 2992, said
10 that the detainees were singled out on a daily basis and beaten until late
11 hours of the night. And on at least one occasion, there was evidence that
12 demonstrated that one detainee was returned unconscious after the severe
14 The Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A customary -- as customary,
15 the witnesses brought to this facility were subordinated -- were subjected
16 to the abuse and beatings as the other facilities previously mentioned.
17 This facility too was operated during the period September 1993 to October
18 1993 or thereabouts, and most of the detainees who were surround HVO POWs
19 who later became registered as missing after initially brought to the
20 facility for questioning. Witness ZD went into detail explaining to us
21 that each time a witness was taken out, or each time a detainee was taken
22 out for questioning, no one knew where that detainee disappeared to after.
23 Mr. President, Your Honours, I think I tried to condense the
24 facilities and the conditions in the facilities in as limited time as I
25 could have. I only have to go on notice, and if your lordships will allow
1 me, I would like to finish. If not, I can continue tomorrow.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. It's
3 almost time to adjourn now. I believe that the Prosecution has another
4 two and a half hours, but the Chamber's legal officer will make the
5 necessary calculations and tomorrow I will inform you of the time
6 remaining, because about three and a half hours have been used of the six
7 hours allocated to you.
8 Before we continue, there is another issue I would like to raise.
9 Defence counsel informed the Chamber's legal officer that an artist would
10 like to make some sketches of the courtroom and the Trial Chamber have a
11 few questions about the matter.
12 Mr. Bourgon, I'll give the floor to you because I understand that
13 it is you who made this request.
14 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. In fact,
15 yes, I've been informed of the fact that there is an artist who makes such
16 sketches, and I asked this artist to make a sketch of the Defence as a
17 souvenir. That's the only thing I would add.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I have understood you
19 correctly, the artist is outside the courtroom.
20 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] I've been told that this has been
21 done on a number of occasions in other cases. All I would like to have is
22 a sketch as a souvenir.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The accused agree.
24 They have nothing against the idea. Apparently not.
25 As far as the Prosecution is concerned, any objections?
1 MR. MUNDIS: We have no objection, Mr. President. I do note I was
2 in the lobby at the last recess, and the artist has indeed been sketching
3 all of us based on what he observes on the large-screen monitor, and he's
4 actually -- based on the resemblance he captured of me, he's quite good.
5 There is not a lot to work with here but he is a very good artist, from
6 what I saw. We have no objection.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
8 In that case, the artist will continue to work as he deems fit.
9 It's now quarter to 2.00. We will now adjourn and we will resume
10 tomorrow morning at 9.00. But first I would like to ask the registrar
11 whether the hearing will be in this courtroom. Yes. In that case, we
12 will continue in Courtroom II tomorrow. Thank you.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to
14 be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day of July,
15 2005, at 9.00 a.m.