1 Tuesday, 8 March 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 10.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Madam Court Deputy.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
7 number IT-01-48-T, the Prosecutor versus Sefer Halilovic.
8 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.
9 We are very disappointed for the delay. Mr. Re, could you please
10 tell us the reason for that.
11 MR. RE: I apologise for the delay in relation to the witness.
12 There was some delay in relation to the e-court system before that.
13 The witness sought some additional protective measures. There is some
14 information I would like to provide to the Court, if we could go into
15 private session for a moment.
16 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we'll go to the private session.
17 [Private session]
11 Pages 2-6 redacted. Private session.
20 [Open session]
21 JUDGE LIU: Well, this Bench believes that all these matters is
22 triggered off by the protective measures. Here we believe it's necessary
23 to remind both parties of the Rules, as well as the jurisprudence of this
24 Tribunal for granting of the protective measures. Article 21 of the ICTY
25 Statute stipulates that the Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is
1 fair and expeditious with full respect for the rights of the accused and
2 a due regard for its protection of victims and witnesses.
3 There are five or six balancing tests which has been adopted
4 before this Tribunal ever since the first case, that is, the Tadic case,
5 to determine whether protective measures is to be granted to a witness;
6 namely, first, there must be real fear for the safety of the witness or
7 his family.
8 Two, the evidence to be furnished by the witness must be
9 sufficiently relevant and important to the Prosecution's case.
10 Thirdly, there must be a lack of prima facie evidence that
11 witness is untrustworthy.
12 Fourthly, there must be a lack of a witness protection programme
14 Fifth, any measure taken should be strictly necessary.
15 The sixth, protective measures are to be granted only in
16 exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis.
17 I believe that is a summary of the jurisprudence for granting of
18 the protective measures for the witnesses before this Tribunal, and this
19 criteria is applicable to the witnesses of both parties.
20 Well, having said that, could we have the witness, please.
21 [The witness entered court]
22 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, Witness.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
24 JUDGE LIU: Would you please make the solemn declaration in
25 accordance with the paper Madam Usher is showing to you.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
2 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
3 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. You may sit down, please.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 WITNESS: WITNESS F
6 [Witness answered through interpreter]
7 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Re, the witness is yours.
8 Examined by Mr. Re:
9 Q. Witness F, I want to show you a piece of paper which has your
10 name, date of birth, and place of birth on it. And when you get it, I
11 want you to look at the piece of paper and tell me if it correctly
12 records those details.
13 A. Yes.
14 MR. RE: Could we go into private session for one moment for some
15 personal details, please.
16 JUDGE LIU: Yes, let's go to the private session, please.
17 [Private session]
20 [Open session]
21 MR. RE:
22 Q. Witness F, can you please briefly tell the Trial Chamber, as
23 briefly as possible, what your duties were in your job in 1993.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. What exactly did that -- did -- what exactly did that entail?
10 What sort of things did you and your men do?
11 A. At the time, we had to formulate certain measures and rules
12 concerning the manner of the protection of those facilities. That meant
13 that in all facilities we had a reception desk or a reception service.
14 Then, as I've already mentioned, we had to ensure protection in the
15 residence, protection while in movement and protection in every other
17 Q. Protection of who? Who precisely were you protecting?
18 A. It was necessary to protect the commander of the army at the
19 time. That was General Delic.
20 Q. What about the deputies? Were -- was your department involved in
21 the protection of the deputies, including Mr. Halilovic?
22 A. According to the rules of service and other rules of the security
23 services, other generals, the chiefs of the administrations at the time
24 and deputies of the commander or the Chief of Staff, did have a right to
25 certain security protection measures.
1 Q. What I'm asking you, if you could please answer this as directly
2 as you possible can: What protective measures, if any, did you provide
3 for the deputies? That is, Mr. Halilovic and Mr. Siber and the other
5 A. We had security for them where they worked. We had a reception
6 service at the facilities where they worked.
7 Q. What did the reception service involve?
8 A. If anybody, whoever it was, wanted to reach those persons, those
9 senior officers and so on, they had to pass through that check. They had
10 to be announced. They had to go through the reception service.
11 Q. Was there a registration, like a logbook or something like that?
12 A. I think so, yes.
13 Q. And did it record the names of people who visited the commanders?
14 A. It was a rule. They had to be written down.
15 Q. You referred a moment ago to facility protection. What do you
16 mean by "facility"? Are you talking about buildings, material, or what?
17 A. These were the seats of commands, administrations or parts of the
18 Main Staff. Since they were placed in several buildings or facilities,
19 then -- these are the buildings or facilities that I'm talking about.
20 Q. Were these the facilities in Central Sarajevo, near the eternal
21 flame, in that area?
22 A. Yes, mostly they were in the centre of Sarajevo.
23 Q. Where was your office physically located?
24 A. My office was in the pre-war students residence hall, called
25 Mladen Stojanovic.
1 Q. Was Mr. Halilovic's office in that building or another one?
2 A. Mr. Halilovic's office was perhaps 50 to 70 metres away from my
3 building, but those two buildings were physically connected. However,
4 they had different entrances and they were in the same street.
5 Q. What about Mr. Siber's office? Where was that?
6 A. I think that he was about 100 metres further down. I think that
7 the name of that facility was Privredna Banka, or something like that.
8 Q. And the commander, Rasim Delic's office, where was his office
10 A. Commander Delic's office was located in a company building. The
11 company was called Vranica. It was across the street from Mr.
12 Halilovic's office.
13 Q. Did your role also involve gathering -- you -- I withdraw that.
14 A moment ago you mentioned information and data. Did your job
15 involve the gathering of information and data on persons and
17 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, I'd -- I object -- I make it quite clear, I
18 object to any leading on what this person's role was. Let him explain
19 what his role was and let it not be suggested to him, in my submission.
20 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Mr. Re, I believe that you have to build up
21 your case step by step. Maybe you could ask a general question first,
22 and then go into the details.
23 MR. RE:
24 Q. You mentioned "information and data." What did you mean by that?
25 A. This is the protection of the archive and archive documents, so
1 that they would physically not be taken out of the headquarters of the
2 commands. We also drafted rules and regulations and instructs on how to
3 keep and preserve these documents.
4 Q. Did the role of your department involve any gathering of
5 intelligence? And if so, from whom?
6 A. My department could also work on the gathering of intelligence
7 from various sources, from persons and other ways. I don't know.
8 Q. Directed at what? What sort of intelligence would your
9 department -- or did your department gather and why?
10 A. We were supposed to gather information -- all kinds of
11 information which would have a negative effect or were directed against
12 facilities or persons from the Main Staff.
13 Q. Which individuals or groups were you interested in who had
14 information which could have a negative effect or be directed against
15 facilities or persons on the Main Staff? In other words, what were your
17 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, I'd object to that. He hasn't said he had
18 any targets. My learned friend's question seems to me really to be what
19 were his sources, and he can ask that question. But the witness hasn't
20 said that he had targets. What he said is he gathered information to
21 protect the people in the facilities of the Main Staff. So I object to
22 the way that question was phrased.
23 MR. RE: I can rephrase it. It doesn't matter.
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Yes.
25 MR. RE:
1 Q. Sources, targets, sources. What were your sources of
3 A. It's like this: Every day we had meetings, morning meetings,
4 reporting, briefings, and so on and so forth. Sometime in early 1993 we
5 started to receive various kinds of information from subordinate units -
6 for example, from the security service of the 1st Corps - and the state
7 security. Besides that, some citizens also would come and report things
8 in different ways about the inadequate activities of some members of two
9 brigades which were part of the 1st Corps. These are the 9th Motorised
10 and the 10th Mountain Brigade.
11 Q. Why were you or your department interested in this particular
13 A. It wasn't my department that was particularly interested, but it
14 was my obligation to participate in these morning briefings, and I was
15 told there to carry out adequate protection measures in relation to some
16 intentions of those two brigades or, actually, some individuals from
17 those two brigades.
18 MR. RE: Your Honour, would you just excuse me for one moment.
19 Q. I'll come back to that a little later, Witness F. I want to ask
20 you at the moment about the physical protection of the commanders and
21 deputy commanders. Specifically, just very briefly, what protection did
22 you organise for the commander, Mr. Delic?
23 A. I think that those measures at that time, physical protection
24 measures, were something that the commander and the deputies claimed a
25 right to. They didn't allow us to do that, even though they had physical
1 protection units. They themselves in a way actually organised this
2 protection. If it's necessary, I can provide examples.
3 Q. Yes, please. But Mr. Halilovic, what -- what was his protection
4 unit? Who was protecting him, and how was that organised?
5 A. At the time, I must admit, was not so well informed about that
6 area, although there were some guys there who were called the Delta Unit,
7 I think. It consisted of some 30 guys who were there. We would see them
8 often. They didn't have any particular contact with us, actually.
9 Q. I just want you to clarify your last answer. You said there were
10 30 guys and the Delta Unit and Mr. Halilovic. Can you just be more
11 specific about what you saw and what you knew about his protection and
12 the Delta Unit and these 30 people.
13 A. I think that at the time Mr. Halilovic had one man who was with
14 him at all times. I don't know exactly what his name is. I've forgotten
15 his name. But I did know him personally at that time. There were also
16 one or two drivers with him too. The others were at the command. They
17 were just there, present; although I don't know in what capacity, what
18 they did, and so on. We were simply not absolutely informed about that
19 particular manner of protection.
20 Q. Where was this Delta Unit from?
21 A. It was there in Sarajevo. The information was quite restricted,
22 so I really couldn't tell you -- I know that it was in Sarajevo, and I
23 think that the name of its commander was Dino. That was his nickname or
24 something like that. I don't know where their headquarters were, and I
25 don't know how many of them there were, but I think that their role was
1 of a combat nature.
2 Q. What was your knowledge of their relationship to Mr. Halilovic?
3 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I would object to this. I think
4 we're talking about the Delta Unit here. And if my friend has a good
5 reason for asking the questions, he should say what it is, because
6 otherwise this looks entirely irrelevant.
7 MR. RE: I withdraw that question. I'll ask another one.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
9 MR. RE:
10 Q. Mr. Witness F, the Delta Unit, which corps was it from? Do you
12 A. No, I don't know.
13 If I can just give a clarification. I think that later, in a
14 certain period of the transformation of the army, it was transferred to
15 the 1st Corps, but I really cannot remember the exact time period.
16 Q. A little earlier you mentioned the 9th and the 10th Brigades in
17 Sarajevo. Which corps were they a part of?
18 A. The 1st Corps of the Army of the B and H then.
19 Q. Were you aware in 1993 of who Ramiz Delalic was?
20 A. Yes. I knew who he was, although I didn't communicate with him
21 except for one occasion, during a one-day seminar which we organised at
22 the headquarters of his brigade command.
23 Q. Who was he, to your knowledge, in 1993?
24 A. He had a reputation, you could say, of being a person with a
25 shady past and somebody who was known to police and official security
2 Q. How did you gain your information that he was a person known to
3 have a shady past?
4 A. We received the information from the State Security Service and
5 also from citizens, friends, and so on, and actually this was something
6 that was general knowledge around Sarajevo.
7 Q. What do you mean by "a shady past"? What was he alleged to have
8 done in the past?
9 A. I can tell you that when I was taking a statement from him and
10 during my conversation with him, he told me that he had spent several --
11 served several terms in prison, both in the country and also abroad.
12 Q. What was that for?
13 A. Probably because of criminal activities.
14 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Yes, Mr. Morrissey.
15 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you. Is this an attack being made by the
16 Prosecutor on the credibility of one of their own witnesses? Because if
17 it is, it's wholly impermissible and improper. If it's relevant for some
18 other reason, then it had better be spelled out, because Ramiz Delalic,
19 as we understand it, is going to be called in this case by the
20 Prosecutors, presumably as a witness of truth. So we -- that needs to be
21 clarified right now, in my submission.
22 JUDGE LIU: Yes. But I believe that there will be a lot of
23 questions concerning with this person later on.
24 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, I can assure the Court that you're
25 right, but the question is whether Mr. Re is to be permitted to lead
1 evidence that's adverse about Ramiz Delalic in this way when he's going
2 to call or at least somebody from the Prosecutor is going to call Mr.
3 Delalic in person to give evidence either on videolink or here later on.
4 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Yes, Mr. Re.
5 MR. RE: Well, the answer to that is quite easy: It's in the
6 indictment, the pre-trial brief. We opened on it, that one of the planks
7 of the Prosecution case is the accused's use of criminal elements within
8 the 9th and 10th Brigades, and one of the persons -- or two people
9 involved were Caco and Celo. And as Your Honour, and especially the
10 Presiding Judge, Judge Liu, is aware in this Tribunal often witnesses are
11 called who the Prosecution will submit should be believed on some things
12 but not on others, and that may well be our ultimate submission with Mr.
13 Delalic. I'm not attacking his credibility. I'm leading evidence as to
14 the reputation of those particular brigades and that goes to the inquiry
15 notice of the accused.
16 JUDGE LIU: Yes, you may proceed.
17 MR. RE: May it please the Court.
18 Q. Your last answer was probably -- "Probably because of criminal
19 activities." Are you able to say now from memory what those criminal
20 activities were that he told you about, if he did in fact tell you about
21 them in the interview?
22 A. That was not the topic of our conversation, so I didn't ask him
23 anything in particular about that, and he probably wouldn't tell me
24 either. If we're talking about before the war.
25 Q. Yes. Look, just to clarify this last part. When did you
1 interview him? And I'll move on to something else.
2 A. I spoke to him on the 27th or the 28th of October, 1993.
3 Q. And was that -- I'll come back to this later. And was that part
4 of Operation Trebevic?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. What about a person called Musan Topalovic, Caco? Did you know
7 of him in 1993?
8 A. Yes, I did.
9 Q. What did you know of him in 1993? I'll make this clear. This is
10 before -- before Operation Neretva.
11 A. Yes. I heard of Musan Topalovic, Caco, probably in early 1993,
12 probably from the point in time when he was appointed commander of that
13 brigade, but I never actually saw him. He was a man who was acting from
14 the background, if I can put it that way. He didn't like to be in the
15 public eye. Most of the population in Sarajevo never saw him. He did
16 not appear on television or the media and so on and so forth. I know
17 that at that time they said that he was a very brave fighter and that his
18 -- he enjoyed quite a reputation among his -- the people in his unit. He
19 was quite respected. But after a while, we began to find out some things
20 about his illegal activities.
21 Q. I'll come to that in a moment. I just want you to ask -- tell me
22 briefly to which brigade was Ramiz Delalic attached and to which brigade
23 was Musan Topalovic attached.
24 A. Ramiz Delalic was a commander of the 9th Motorised Brigade for a
25 while and then later the deputy commander, while Musan Topalovic was the
1 commander of the 10th Mountain Brigade. I think it was the -- a mountain
3 Q. Did the military security service have an officer in the 1st
4 Corps or in the 9th Motorised Brigade?
5 A. In the security services' structure, as part of the 1st Corps, I
6 think that there was a security service department and then the brigades
7 had a security service sector, and of course there were people working in
8 these services.
9 Q. What was the relationship between military security service in
10 the 9th Motorised Brigade and Mr. Delalic? This question is directed
11 toward the quality of the relationship.
12 A. I don't know enough about that, because the 9th Motorised Brigade
13 was subordinated to the corps and all information which came from the
14 security service of the 9th Brigade were sent to the 1st Corps and then
15 the 1st Corps would then forward it to us. So I cannot really give you a
16 specific answer. Although I do think that the relationship between Ramiz
17 Delalic and his security service wasn't bad, and I can clarify that.
18 In early 1993, I myself and the security administration service
19 deputy -- commander and his deputy went to the brigade for a seminar.
20 Our objective was in some way to introduce and instruct those people
21 about the methodology of the work of those services, although the person
22 who was in the security service of the 9th Motorised Brigade was a
23 professional. I think that he had retired from the State Security
24 Service. His name was Tomo Juric. He was a Croat by ethnicity. I think
25 that he was a serious, mature man and that he was very well versed in the
1 methodologies and principles of operation of those services.
2 Q. What was your awareness of Mr. Delalic's attitude towards the
3 military security service, if you had any knowledge of his attitude and
4 if he had an attitude towards the military security service?
5 A. At the seminar which we attended, we had been there for some time
6 and then at some point Ramiz Delalic appeared. He was quite professional
7 in his behaviour towards us. He didn't create any problems, although he
8 did have an attitude toward some people from his own service, from the
9 brigade. I could say that he had some problems because he had acquired
10 some information -- actually, written information about him and his
11 activities, and that is why we had actually gone there in the first
12 place, in a way to ease the situation in that respect and avoid further
14 Q. I just want you to be precise. Well, what was the information?
15 What was he supposed to have done that cause you to go there? As briefly
16 as possible.
17 A. I can't remember exactly what it was all about, but I know that
18 there were some information from the security service that had leaked, or
19 as we say, this information was leaked, and in a way he ordered his
20 people that they could not communicate with the security services unless
21 it was through him.
22 Q. What did you hear he'd said about the security services and
23 talking directly to them?
24 A. He simply said that no one could go and communicate with members
25 of the services without his knowledge. Something to that effect.
1 Although I have to be honest and say that at that time his conduct
2 towards us was very proper and professional and he did express a kind of
3 wish for cooperation and so on.
4 Q. How did your service get to know about his behaviour? That's
5 Ramiz Delalic's.
6 A. Our service learned about his behaviour -- or at least, I can
7 tell you about myself personally. I learned about that through morning
8 meetings and briefings, through staff meetings. I learned the -- about
9 the information received from the State Security Service and the security
10 service of the 1st Corps.
11 Q. I've asked you about Ramiz Delalic. I want to ask you about the
12 9th Motorised Brigade. What was your information as to its reputation
13 and behaviour in Sarajevo before Operation Neretva?
14 A. The 9th Motorised Brigade, at least based on what we know and the
15 information that was available to me, was primarily within the
16 composition of the 1st Corps. In addition to that, it was one of
17 stronger brigades in terms of its composition, manning, and equipment.
18 It held a very important position line in Sarajevo and had within its
19 composition five battalions which were combat battalions defending that
20 line. Naturally, they rotated, but they were positioned there. Within
21 its composition, it also had one company which was a so-called assault
23 Q. Tell the Trial Chamber what you heard, if anything, about the
24 behaviour of the assault company before Operation Neretva.
25 A. I, as a member of the security service, through daily briefings
1 and staff meetings learned firsthand about the activities of all brigades
2 within the BH army and especially those units, the 9th and the 10th
3 Brigades, because they had engaged in unlawful activity.
4 Q. What were those? What did you hear? What were they doing?
5 A. As for the 9th Brigade, we received information that they in a
6 way terrorised certain citizens by extorting money from them, seizing
7 motor vehicles, property, and so on. I received that information mostly
8 via the morning staff meetings and so on.
9 Q. Mostly via the morning staff meetings. What other sources of
10 information did you have apart from the morning staff briefings? Who
11 else told you this?
12 A. We could also use other sources of information, meaning
13 individuals, the media, and so on.
14 Q. All right. You said you mostly got it from staff meetings. What
15 I want you to tell the Trial Chamber is who else or how else did you hear
16 specifically about the activities of -- these illegal activities of the
18 A. We received that information from our sister service, the
19 security service -- State Security Service and the security service of
20 the 1st Corps.
21 Q. You said earlier, "As for the 9th Brigade, we received
22 information." To which part of the 9th Brigade were you referring? All
23 of it or part of it?
24 A. I've just told you that that brigade had five battalions which
25 held the defence line. Within their composition, they had the so-called
1 assault company. I don't know about the number of personnel in that
2 unit. So that was the unit that in a way could have engaged in criminal
4 The other troops from other battalions I believe had nothing to
5 do with those acts.
6 [Prosecution counsel confer]
7 MR. RE:
8 Q. Who was the -- which unit was Ramiz Delalic in?
9 A. Ramiz Delalic was initially commander and later deputy commander
10 of the 9th Motorised Brigade.
11 Q. Who was in charge, do you know, of the assault unit?
12 A. I don't know. That information was in a way off limits to us.
13 We didn't know about that. And I, in my position, did not know who was
14 the commander of that unit.
15 Q. What about the illegal activities of the 10th? What were those
16 and what did you hear?
17 A. At the time, I believe already early in 1993, we started
18 receiving information, again from the security service of the 1st Corps
19 and the State Security Service and also through the morning meetings and
20 briefings and so on. That was the source of my information.
21 In addition to that, citizens would come in, sometimes even our
22 friends, and report about that activity. In actual fact, that was well
23 known in Sarajevo that occasionally it would happen that people would be
24 picked from the street and taken to the command of that brigade and later
25 on taken to dig trenches in Sarajevo within the area of responsibility of
1 the 10th Brigade.
2 Q. Just tell us a little bit more about the trench-digging you heard
3 about. Who were the people taken there and what was the process of them
4 being taken to the front line?
5 A. What I can remember now is that occasionally they would appear in
6 a van in town and go to places where people assembled, mostly coffee
7 bars, and they would then force young people, mostly men, to enter the
8 van, take them to the command headquarters of the brigade, and there,
9 based on what I knew at the time, they would be always met by Caco, Musan
10 Topalovic, who would prescribe the number of days or the length of time
11 during which they had to dig trenches.
12 Q. What was the average period or time of service trench-digging?
13 A. Sometimes it would be 10, 15 days, or longer. I don't know. I
14 don't remember now.
15 Q. And were these military people or civilians?
16 A. I don't know for a fact. Sometimes they would be soldiers.
17 However, I think that these people were mostly civilians. They would
18 select people right there in the street. They would ask the person to
19 produce a military booklet, and if the person didn't have it, he would
20 definitely be selected; if the person had by chance a military booklet on
21 him showing that he belonged to a certain unit, then sometimes they would
22 spare him.
23 Q. And where were these trenches that people were being taken to
25 A. That was in the area of responsibility of the 10th Mountain
1 Brigade on the left bank of Miljacka and on the slopes of the Trebevic
3 Q. Where was that in relation to the front line, to the Serb
5 A. I think it was across from the Serb positions. Those were the
6 first front lines.
7 Q. What can you say about the safety or danger to the civilians
8 digging trenches in those front-line positions?
9 A. I wasn't there. I didn't see the situation. But if they were in
10 front-line positions, that meant that there was always a possibility of
11 them getting killed. That means that they were very exposed to danger.
12 Q. And from where in Sarajevo were the soldiers from the 10th taking
13 civilians? Where were they finding them? Was there a particular area?
14 A. I think that was in the old part of the town, the so-called Stari
15 Grad municipality. This is where they were mostly active. They defined
16 that by themselves as their area of responsibility, which I believe was
18 Q. You've -- you've just described hearing about people being taken
19 from the streets to Caco's command and then taken to the front line to
20 dig trenches. Did you yourself have any -- what was your attitude --
21 your own attitude, living in Sarajevo in 1993, to going into that area
22 which was controlled by Caco's men?
23 A. I lived right there. Let's say between the Stari Grad and Centar
24 municipalities. I didn't volunteer to go to that area of responsibility
25 there myself because it wasn't popular to go to that area.
1 Q. What do you mean "it wasn't popular to go to that area"? Just
2 elaborate on that, please.
3 A. Because we from the security service believed that we could be
4 possible targets and could be selected to go dig trenches, just like many
5 others were.
6 Q. I want you to tell the Trial Chamber about something that
7 happened in July 1993 involving the 9th and 10th -- sorry, involving
8 soldiers in Sarajevo.
9 A. I think that that happened sometime in early July. It was the
10 2nd or the 3rd of July. In the morning, at that time I, as usual, was in
11 the headquarters of the military security service, and what happened was
12 that part of the town which in a way belonged to those brigades, the 9th
13 and the 10th, was suddenly blocked, blocked by the members of these two
15 For example, I at the military security service in the morning
16 was informed during our briefing - although there was quite a commotion
17 and people were concerned - but we received information that the -- the
18 operations centre facility was blocked, or the command and control centre
19 of the BH army, which was housed in this so-called SDK building near the
20 eternal flame. The building was blocked by the members of the 9th
21 Motorised Brigade.
22 The other part that was blocked was the part around -- where
23 Commander Delalic [as interpreted] was. I think the street is called
24 Kulovica [Realtime transcript read in error: "Kuce"] Street. And there's
25 a bridge leading to that area. I can't remember what it was called now.
1 What they did was they placed the metal hedgehogs, the so-called
2 hedgehogs with barbed wire so that people couldn't pass. This was done
3 by members of the 10th Brigade.
4 In addition to that, we received information that the MUP was
5 blocked, namely, the Stari Grad police station, as well as part of the
6 Main Staff which was housed in the Faculty of Political Sciences. That
7 building was blocked by the members of the 10th Brigade.
8 Q. I'll just stop you there for a second. The transcript said you
9 said Commander Delalic. Did you say "Delalic" or Delic"? The street --
10 Kuce Street?
11 A. I said "Delic." What I wanted to say is that they blocked the
12 street leading to the seat or the office of the army commander, Rasim
13 Delic. I think that that was done by the members of the 10th Brigade.
14 Q. All right. Now, earlier in your testimony you told the Trial
15 Chamber that your department was responsible for facility protection, and
16 you've named the various Supreme Command facilities that your department
17 was protecting. Did you have people in position of -- at those buildings
18 on the day when the 9th and 10th blockaded that part of town?
19 A. Yes, we did have our people there but not in position. I don't
20 think we could use that term. These people were performing their regular
21 duties at the reception desk and guarding whomever they were supposed to
22 guard. When you say "position," for us that means something else. It --
23 it pertains to combat.
24 Q. Maybe that was inelegantly phrased. I meant going about their
25 normal daily business.
1 What happened to them during the blockading of these buildings?
2 A. They were disarmed on that occasion and taken away from those
3 buildings. Later on we learned that their weapons had been taken away
4 from them, in most cases their uniforms as well. They were humiliated,
5 and returned to us after several days -- or perhaps on the same day. All
6 of these events unfolded very quickly, so I can't remember exactly.
7 Q. Where were they taken to?
8 A. They were taken most likely to the headquarters of those
9 brigades, the 9th and the 10th Brigade.
10 Q. How long did this blockade go on for?
11 A. I think it lasted one day, as far as I can remember now. Later
12 on an agreement was reached - at least, that's what I heard - and the
13 blockade was lifted.
14 Q. Well, how did it come -- how did the blockade come to be lifted?
15 Who was the agreement reached between? Who was involved in reaching the
17 A. What I learnt, since I was in the headquarters of the military
18 security service administration, was that somebody from the command
19 intervened with Mr. Halilovic and asked him to contact Ramiz Delalic and
20 do something about it, and afterwards the blockade was lifted. This is
21 what I remember now.
22 Q. Just -- just so we can get the sequence. When did you learn that
23 someone had asked Mr. Halilovic to contact Ramiz Delalic? Was it during
24 the blockade or at a different time?
25 A. During the blockade.
1 Q. And how long after you learned that Mr. Halilovic had been asked
2 to contact Mr. Delalic was the blockade ended or lifted?
3 A. I can't remember exactly, but I think that it was lifted on the
4 same day or very shortly thereafter.
5 Q. Why was -- what were you told was the reason for asking Mr.
6 Halilovic to speak to Mr. Delalic?
7 A. Well, I don't know. Most likely they knew that -- they had some
8 personal contacts, and so on.
9 Q. What was your information working in military security service in
10 19 -- in July 1993 about the personal contact between Mr. Halilovic and
11 Mr. Delalic?
12 A. At the time, we -- or rather, I personally learned at the
13 meetings, briefings, and so on that Mr. Halilovic was in permanent
14 contact with Ramiz Delalic and Musan Topalovic. We learned that through
15 the information that reached us. I received it firsthand. What I mean
16 by that is that the information was not shown to me, but I learned about
17 it during briefings.
18 Q. What action, if any, was taken against those members of the 9th
19 and 10th Brigades who blockaded the Supreme Command headquarters on about
20 the 2nd or 3rd of July, 1993?
21 A. At the time, I think that nothing was done, no particular
22 measures, because practically it was impossible. The reason for is that
23 is that the Main Staff did not have any combat units at its disposal. It
24 had no resources and no means to do anything about that. Those forces
25 were outside of the command control and -- command and control of the 1st
1 Corps and the army at the time.
2 Q. When you say "those forces" -- my question was the 9th and the
3 10th. Is that who you were referring to?
4 A. At the time, we were unable to reach these people. In addition
5 to that, we had a problem and we were hindered by the fact that we did
6 not have sufficient information about their illegal activities. That
7 means that we continued our intelligence work on verifying and proving
8 their activities.
9 Furthermore, we had information that they were in permanent
10 contact with the Chief of Staff, Mr. Halilovic, and that in a way made
11 any action of ours more difficult.
12 Q. What was your understanding of the reason why they were in
13 permanent contact with Mr. Halilovic?
14 A. I don't know what to say. They were always under some kind of a
15 pressure as though something was being prepared against them and there
16 was something looming over them. As far as I know, that wasn't the case.
17 Attempts were made to return these people under the command and control
19 Q. Why did their contact or their permanent contact with Mr.
20 Halilovic make any action on your part more difficult?
21 A. Well, after all, Mr. Halilovic was the second highest ranking
22 person in the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I don't think that
23 anything could be done without his consent -- or rather, nothing could be
24 done against those brigades. I think that at the time there were
25 attempts to contact Mr. Halilovic. I remember, for example, when
1 somebody intervened to have a member of security service released, a
2 member who was imprisoned by Musan Topalovic. Those attempts were made
3 by the chief of the administration, and I don't know whether that was
4 successful, whether the man was released. That means that they were on
5 good terms.
6 Q. A moment ago you said it was your view that those forces, meaning
7 the 9th and the 10th, were outside the command and control of the 1st
8 Corps and the army at the time, meaning July 1993. Under whose command
9 and control were the 9th and the 10th at the time?
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, he hasn't said they were under
11 anyone's command and control.
12 MR. RE: I'll rephrase it.
13 Q. If they were under any -- sorry. Were they, to your knowledge,
14 under the command and control of any person or unit at the time? And if
15 so, who?
16 A. I can make a logical conclusion. If these two brigades blocked
17 the Supreme Command -- or rather, not the Supreme Command but the Main
18 Staff of the army and block their entire work, and if they're allowed to
19 take away a member of the security service of their superior command, and
20 at that time they also arrested the son of the army commander, they
21 mistreated him, humiliated him, just like the member of the security
22 service, then based on that it is logical to conclude that they were
23 outside of the system.
24 In addition to that, after some time a meeting was held at the
25 level of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina during which a position
1 was taken along those lines.
2 MR. RE: Is that an appropriate time? I think that's an hour and
3 a half.
4 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Well, if you prefer, we'll have a longer break
5 you know. We'll resume at ten minutes after 12.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 11.31 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 12.15 p.m.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re. Please continue.
9 Q. Just before the break, Witness F, you told the Trial Chamber that
10 -- I'll just take you to your last answer, and it was about the knowledge
11 of whether they were within the command and control of the army or the
12 1st Corps, and you said, "It was logical to conclude that they were
13 outside of the system," and, in addition to that, "a meeting was held at
14 the level of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina during which a
15 position was taken along those lines."
16 I just want to take you back to the first part of your answer,
17 where you said "it was logical to conclude that they were outside of the
18 system," that is, the system of the ABiH. To your knowledge, who were
19 the 9th and 10th Brigades accountable to or who, if anyone, were they
20 taking orders from?
21 A. I can't say whether that was true or not, and I don't know who
22 they received their orders from, but the things that the military
23 security administration had at its disposal and then I myself, through
24 meetings, documents, and so on, was that they were frequently directly in
25 contact with the Chief of Staff.
1 Q. Well, what -- what was the significance in military terms of the
2 9th and -- the leaders of the 9th and 10th Brigades being in contact with
3 Mr. Halilovic, the Chief of Staff? What was the significance from an
4 intelligence perspective?
5 A. I don't understand the question.
6 Q. You said you -- you'd heard through meetings and documents that
7 they were frequently directly in contact with the Chief of Staff, and you
8 said that you had been led to conclude that they were outside of -- the
9 army system. What's the significance in the context of that answer of
10 them being outside the control of the army but in contact with the Chief
11 of Staff?
12 A. Well, you can conclude that that wasn't logical.
13 Q. Well, why not? I mean, what do you mean by "not logical"?
14 A. The Chief of Staff, as the person number two of the B and H army,
15 directly contacted the commanders of the brigades which were linked in
16 the organisational sense to the 1st Corps. So I think that it wasn't
17 logical to have such direct communication in that case.
18 Q. Why wasn't that logical, in your understanding of the way the
19 ABiH worked?
20 A. According to the command and control system, the brigades were
21 linked to the corps and not to the Chief of Staff or the commander of the
23 Q. And are you referring to the period before or after the blockade
24 in July 1993 or both?
25 A. I'm talking about the period approximately when we began to find
1 out about this inadequate conduct of the people from those two brigades
2 and, of course, after that key date between the 2nd and 3rd of July. I
3 think that after that, it would have been logical not to have contacts
4 directly with those people. This applies to the commander according to
5 the rules and principles of command and control, because they were
6 actually linked to the 1st Corps.
7 Q. All right. I want you to tell the Trial Chamber briefly about
8 the meeting at the Presidency level in connection with the -- the 9th and
9 the 10th Brigades. What was that about?
10 A. I can't give you a precise answer, but at the time the
11 information that reached me during those briefings and at meetings, we
12 were told, or it was said that at the level of the Presidency - I don't
13 know who was presiding over it; I think it was probably Professor Dr.
14 Pejanovic, who was the president of that commission for the protection of
15 constitutional order, or something like that - at that meeting, Commander
16 Rasim Delic expressed his views, and then after that probably the
17 position was taken. That's what was said to us. But I wasn't present at
18 that meeting, so I wasn't really directly interested in it.
19 Q. Were any directions given to your department as a result of that
20 meeting? Were you told to do anything arising from that meeting?
21 A. After that period, immediately after the 3rd of July, we took a
22 more offensive position or stance. Like it's called in the service, to
23 gather more intelligence and to look at more incriminating actions, and
24 we already had some indications that these activities of theirs would no
25 longer be tolerated and that at some point measures would be taken to
1 stop this.
2 Q. I just want to tie your answer to the question. I was asking you
3 about the meeting at the Presidency level. Were -- by your answer, do
4 you mean that as a result of that meeting your section was directed to
5 gather -- or the service was directed to gather more intelligence and
6 look at the activities of those units?
7 A. I cannot remember whether it was because of that, whether we
8 received some written document or not, but we had meetings constantly.
9 Every morning we had a briefing where we would submit reports on our
10 work. And after that, we would receive the directives and tasks for the
11 forthcoming period, for the following days. This was not a particular
12 task issued to my department. It was an overall -- a general task at the
13 security service level that we all had to focus more on this problem.
14 Q. And was action taken against the 9th and the 10th at any point?
15 I just want a very brief answer. And if so, when? And I'll come to what
16 happened later.
17 A. I think on the 26th of October, 1993, that's when it was,
18 following a political and military - when I say "military," I am thinking
19 of the commander - so it was decided at that level that these activities
20 of those two brigades should be stopped. There should be an end to that.
21 Q. To clarify what you're saying, are you saying that it was after
22 the 3rd of July incident that a decision was made at a higher level that
23 their activities had to be stopped, directions were given to the
24 intelligence services and so on to --
25 MR. RE: All right.
1 Q. I'm just after the time frame. What happened in very brief -- in
2 very brief terms between July and October? If you could just very
3 briefly in general say what action was taken against the 9th and the 10th
4 between July and October.
5 A. Between July and October, I think that nothing was done, except
6 for the fact that the security service was active on the gathering of
7 data and in a way was trying to prove that this activity was going on in
8 order that the political structures and the military leadership would see
9 what was really going on and that they would then make a decision to put
10 an end to this.
11 Q. You mentioned earlier before the break the -- something that
12 happened to Commander Delic's son. I want you to tell the Trial Chamber
13 what you know of what happened and what your involvement in it was.
14 A. I cannot give you the specific time, but this was the period when
15 things became critical, in July. This was when they began to arrest
16 people from the army, specifically from the Main Staff and from the
17 corps. For example, I know that a member of ...
18 Q. I'm sorry. Just complete that sentence, "I know that a member
19 of ..."
20 A. That on that occasion a security -- a member of the security of
21 the army commander was arrested. His son -- actually, his escort or the
22 person who was a member of his personal security, that's -- that's who
23 that person was.
24 Q. I just want to go back to something. You said, "This was when
25 they began to arrest people from the army ..." Now, in giving your
1 evidence, would you -- if you're going to say "they," could you please
2 help us by saying who "they" is every time you say "they." In the
3 specific context of this answer, who is "they"? Who is "they" who began
4 arresting people?
5 A. I think that this was done by members of the 10th Brigade.
6 On this occasion, I would like the clarify one thing. I don't
7 know that members of the 9th Brigade arrested anyone and in that way took
8 people away and harassed them and abused them by making them dig
9 trenches. This is something that was done by the 10th Brigade.
10 Q. All right. You specifically mentioned someone from the -- the
11 son -- of a person who was a member of the personal security of the
12 commander. Who was that?
13 A. It was Admir or Almir Delic, something like that. He was a young
14 man in his 20s.
15 Q. What happened to him?
16 A. He was taken to the command of Musan Topalovic, Caco, to the 10th
17 Brigade. He was up there for a few days. The information that we had
18 indicated that he was beaten up there, humiliated, abused, and so on and
19 so forth, to such an extent -- he was humiliated to such an extent that
20 he had to escape, risking his life, and he jumped from a wall from this
21 command of the 10th Brigade to the headquarters of the UNPROFOR at that
22 time. I think it was the Egyptian Battalion at the time, because the
23 10th Brigade was located right next to the Egyptian UNPROFOR battalion,
24 and that's how he saved himself. He escaped, and they pulled him out and
25 then sent him back.
1 Q. Was a statement taken from him as to what happened to him?
2 A. I personally took his statement. I cannot recall all the
3 particulars. It was a long time ago. All I know is that I personally
4 took his statement and that statement has to be somewhere in the
6 Q. Well, what stands out from that statement about what they did to
8 MR. MORRISSEY: Look, Your Honours, I haven't -- I haven't
9 objected up to now, but this is becoming extremely remote. The witness
10 took a statement from another person, who, as I understand, is not a
11 witness in this case, about terrible things that happened to him at the
12 10th Brigade. I cast no aspersions on the witness's evidence. He's just
13 responding, as he's entitled to do, to questions. But I submit this has
14 gone too far in terms of speculative questioning. And asking for details
15 of a statement from someone who is not being called, who was mistreated
16 in a private place, captured by the 10th Brigade, is in my submission,
17 just too remote from the trial of the man whose in prison, Sefer
18 Halilovic. So I object to the question.
19 JUDGE LIU: Well, I think you have to remember that the hearsay
20 evidence is admissible. Of course this piece of the evidence is a little
21 bit remote, as you put it, but this witness took the statement of that
22 person, and that issue is somehow relevant to our case and later on maybe
23 we could see more relevance. So I will allow --
24 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE LIU: -- Mr. Re to proceed.
1 MR. RE:
2 Q. Witness F, do you remember -- the question was: What stands out
3 from the statement that you took from Mr. Delic's son as to what the
4 members of the 10th Brigade did to him when he was in captivity?
5 A. I cannot remember right now, but I know that he was humiliated
6 and abused. There's probably some information about that, but I know
7 that it was said that this was so, but I can't remember.
8 Q. You said he managed to escape by leaping off a wall into an
9 UNPROFOR base. Were you aware of any other efforts, apart from his own,
10 being made to secure his release?
11 A. I think that there were some direct interventions addressed to
12 Musan Topalovic by some officers, but they were not successful. I think
13 that one of our senior officers intervened directly by contacting Musan
15 Q. All right. You said earlier that your understanding was that Mr.
16 Halilovic was in constant contact with Musan Topalovic and Ramiz Delalic.
17 Were you aware whether Mr. Halilovic ever intervened or was asked to in
18 relation to Mr. Delic's son's release?
19 A. I don't know whether Mr. Halilovic was asked to intervene on
20 behalf of Mr. Delic's son, but I know that this intervention was sought
21 in relation to Amir Deljkic, who was a security service officer in the
22 1st Corps. I don't know what the outcome of that intervention was. I --
23 I don't know actually what happened later.
24 Q. Well, what happened to Mr. Deljkic and when was that?
25 A. Again, in this time of crisis, members of the 10th Brigade
1 arrested Amir Deljkic. He was one of the chiefs of a part of the
2 security service in the 1st Corps. He lived in the area of
3 responsibility of the 10th Brigade and probably as he was passing there
4 on his way to work or perhaps they knew where he lived - I don't know -
5 on one occasion they intercepted him, arrested him, and took him to the
6 command of the 10th Brigade.
7 I also know that he was humiliated, abused, and really exposed to
8 the basest forms of human behaviour. As far as I know, the chief of the
9 security service administration intervened on his behalf by contacting
10 Mr. Halilovic because we had information that his life was in danger.
11 That's what we were told at the security administration, and I don't know
12 what happened. I don't know if this intervention was successful or not.
13 I must admit that I really didn't follow that situation.
14 Q. And you're referring to Mr. Jasarevic there, when you said chief
15 of the military security administration?
16 A. Yes. Yes. Yes.
17 Q. I want to move to another area now; namely, Operation Neretva.
18 When did you become aware of the name of an operation called Neretva?
19 A. I can't remember exactly, but I was told -- or actually, I knew
20 by early September, again through those morning briefings where task were
21 assigned and so on, that something was being prepared in the area of
22 Herzegovina. I don't know exactly when I found out that the name of it
23 was "Neretva." I don't know whether it was before the operation was
24 carried out or after that, but I know that in some way we were told that
25 some activities were being prepared on a larger scale in the territory of
1 Herzegovina in early September.
2 Q. Which part of Herzegovina?
3 A. In the Neretva River Valley.
4 Q. What were you told, if anything, was the aim of this particular
6 A. I have to clarify one thing here, because I was not involved in
7 combat activities and I was not entrusted with -- or had anything to do
8 with the people or security services of the corps, so I really wasn't all
9 that interested in details, so I didn't know what the objective was. But
10 you could conclude that for yourself. Mostar was blockaded at the time,
11 that whole area there, so it was quite normal.
12 Q. Were you told who, if anyone, was to be in charge of this
13 particular operation?
14 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, I object to that.
15 Your Honours, what he said - and this is at line 43 -- page 43,
16 line -- lines 4 onwards - but what he said -- what the witness said was
17 he "knew by early September, again through the morning briefings where
18 the tasks were assigned and so on, that something was being prepared in
19 the area of Herzegovina ... I don't know whether it was before the
20 operation was carried out or after that, but I know it was in some way we
21 were told that some activities were being prepared on a larger scale."
22 MR. RE: I can rephrase it.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Just a minute. I want it to be clear what I'm
24 objecting to fist. I'm objecting to him putting in the witness's mouth
25 the term "operation" when the witness has simply said he knew about
1 activities and some -- well, I won't repeat it, but what I've -- what
2 I've read out there. So that's the objection.
3 MR. RE: As I said, I'll rephrase it.
4 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
5 MR. RE:
6 Q. Mr. Witness F, in relation to those activities that you heard
7 were about to be carried out in Herzegovina, were you told who, if
8 anyone, was to be in charge of them?
9 A. We heard at that time and we were told that the leader of those
10 activities will be the Chief of Staff, Sefer Halilovic. This is what --
11 the information that I had at that time. This was unconfirmed
12 information. I didn't see any paper to that effect or any particulars.
13 I wasn't really informed about the details.
14 Q. And was that information consistent or inconsistent with your
15 understanding of Mr. Halilovic's role as the Chief of Staff?
16 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, that question should be clarified. Does he
17 mean the role of Mr. Halilovic's -- does he mean Mr. Halilovic's role as
18 Chief of Staff generally speaking, or --
19 MR. RE: Yes.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, if that's the case, that should be made
22 MR. RE:
23 Q. Generally. Mr. Halilovic's duties generally as Chief of Staff.
24 That is, what he did every day.
25 A. I don't know what he did every day. He was my superior officer
1 in a way. In any case, the place and the role of the Chief of Staff of
2 the army is something that would mean that in a way he was in charge or
3 in command and control of a combat in the field, in charge of combat
4 operations, directly or indirectly. It's something that I cannot say
6 Q. All right. My question was: Was the information that Mr.
7 Halilovic was to be in charge of those activities consistent or
8 inconsistent with your understanding of his general role?
9 A. Well, it could be logical, but I didn't see a document or
10 anything where this would be stated explicitly.
11 [Prosecution counsel confer]
12 MR. RE:
13 Q. Did you know someone called Namik Dzankovic in September 1993?
14 A. Yes, I did.
15 Q. Did he have any connection with these activities in Herzegovina?
16 And if so, what?
17 A. Namik Dzankovic was a member of the security service
18 administration at the time and also prior to that. I couldn't tell you
19 the exact time period, but he left for family reasons and went to
20 Herzegovina, to the area near Mostar. I know that during one of those
21 morning briefings it was decided that in view of the fact that he was in
22 that area, he should join that team. I think that the team was known as
23 some kind of an inspection team under the leadership of the Chief of
24 Staff and he was to join that team immediately. I think that he did join
25 the team and performed duties from his scope of competence. Now, the
1 question is as to what extent he was able to do that.
2 Q. Are you able to comment on that?
3 A. Concerning the extent? To which extent? Is that what you mean?
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. Namik Dzankovic worked in the military security administration
6 perhaps one year before that, as far as I know. I think that he's an
7 educated man, an economist or an engineer by profession. I'm not sure.
8 As far as I know, he had no prior work experience in the military
9 services -- security services, and I think that in terms of professional
10 competency he wasn't quite up to it. And even if he was, it would have
11 been difficult to undertake all measures that his position would entail
12 in that area.
13 Simply speaking, within his operative competencies he had units
14 or parts of units that were not familiar to him. I don't know whether he
15 had security officers within those units. I don't know whether he
16 received any instructions concerning that. And therefore, I think it was
17 very difficult for him to put in place security protection measures.
18 Q. Witness F, did you yourself ever hear about civilians being
19 killed at Grabovica?
20 A. Yes, I did hear.
21 Q. When and how did you hear about that?
22 A. I can't say precisely the date, but I know for a fact that upon
23 the return of these units from Herzegovina there was a lot of talk, even
24 public talk, about something terrible having happened in the valley of
25 the Neretva River or, rather, in Grabovica.
1 Q. Which units are you referring to returning from Herzegovina?
2 A. I think that that involved part of the 10th Mountain Brigade,
3 part of the 9th Motorised Brigade, and the so-called 2nd Independent
4 Battalion. I'm not sure about its strength, but some parts of that
5 battalion had been in that area as well.
6 Q. What do you know about how the 10th and the 9th and the 2nd
7 Independent Battalion came to be in Herzegovina or why they were there?
8 What did you hear about that?
9 A. I am not familiar the information concerning who engaged those
10 brigades, but again, based on the information we received in our daily
11 morning briefings, they in a way either directly or indirectly had been
12 selected by the Chief of Staff, Sefer Halilovic.
13 Q. In general terms, what was the reaction of the military security
14 service and the authorities in relation to Grabovica, what had happened
15 there, upon the return from Herzegovina of those three units you referred
17 A. Upon the return of these units from Herzegovina, it was already
18 decided that such activity would not be tolerated in the future and that
19 serious measures have to be taken to prevent that. I know that an urgent
20 plan was adopted at the highest level with involvement of certain police
21 establishment to put an end to such activity and also to investigate the
22 events in Grabovica. I know that the then-chief of military security
23 administration had full-scale correspondence and this was reported to us
24 at the daily briefings, that written instructions, directions, and so on
25 had been sent to Herzegovina to Namik Dzankovic personally and also to
1 the 6th Corps, I believe.
2 In addition to that, I know that General Delic or the army
3 commander established a commission. I'm not sure if it was called a
4 commission, but at any rate it was a team set up to investigate the
5 events, to identify the perpetrators, to conduct interviews, prepare
6 evidence, and punish the perpetrators properly.
7 Q. Did what happened in Grabovica have any effect on the existing
8 investigations into the activities of the 9th and 10th Brigades?
9 A. I did not understand your question entirely.
10 Q. You said earlier in your evidence that as from July 1993 a
11 decision had been made to put an end to the activities of the 9th and the
12 10th. I'm taking you to Grabovica and when they returned. Did what
13 happened in Grabovica have any effect on what was already occurring in
14 relation to their activities?
15 A. I think that that crime which had been perpetrated was the last
16 straw and that it in fact just stepped up this intention to put an end to
17 those activities.
18 Q. And briefly, I want you to describe what happened in relation to
19 the 9th and the 10th between their return from Herzegovina and Operation
20 Trebevic, which I think you said was October the 26th, 1993.
21 A. On the 26th of October, 1993, according to the plan which had
22 already been approved and signed both by political, military, and MUP
23 officials, those activities were to be stopped. I know that it was
24 planned to carry out an operation in the morning hours. Certain MUP
25 intervention forces were engaged, an intervention unit, a battalion of
1 military police with the Main Staff, and some other units which I cannot
2 remember now, but at any rate they were from the 1st Corps.
3 Q. Can I just stop you there --
4 A. It was --
5 Q. I'd ask you to pause there. I'll come to that in a moment. I'll
6 ask you in a moment what happened between their return from Herzegovina
7 and Operation Trebevic on the 26th of October. How was it planned? What
8 happened? And what was your involvement? As briefly as you possibly can
9 tell us.
10 A. The work, the operative work, was intensified as well as
11 gathering documents and information in order to be as prepared as
12 possible when embarking on this operation.
13 Q. All right. And what was your specific role in Operation
15 A. My specific role in Operation Trebevic was in the first place to
16 conduct the initial triage or selection among the people from that
17 brigade who had already been arrested. As regards those concerning whom
18 we had no knowledge of their prior criminal activity, they were to be
19 released and they were to go back to their regular daily tasks. As for
20 those about whose criminal and other activities we had information, those
21 people were taken into custody and sent to the central prison in order to
22 be further processed, questioned, and so on. There were four to five
23 hundred arrested persons who had gone through that initial triage or
24 selection, which was not conducted by myself only. There was colleagues
25 of mine working on that too.
1 The final number of those taken into custody was about 50, and
2 their activities were further investigated and so on.
3 Q. Maybe I jumped the gun a little bit. What I should have asked
4 you before was - when I stopped you - you said that MUP, an intervention
5 unit, a battalion of military police, and some other units from -- you
6 think from the 1st Corps were engaged. Were they the units that arrested
7 those four to five hundred people?
8 A. I think there was a mistake. Not from the 1st Corps. No. This
9 military police battalion was from the Main Staff. However, that doesn't
10 mean that people from the 1st Corps did not participate as well, because
11 there were several units, and I don't know all the details concerning
13 Q. From which units were the people arrested?
14 A. The people arrested were from the 9th and 10th Brigade.
15 Q. The final number, you said, taken into custody was about 50 and
16 they were investigated. Did you interview any of those taken into
18 A. Correction: I said it was roughly 50. I don't know the exact
19 number. That means that there could have been 40 and there also could
20 have been 60 of them. I did not conduct interviews with them.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness -- could the witness repeat
22 the last question -- the last sentence. It was unclear to us.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I took a statement and conducted an
24 interview with Ramiz Delalic.
25 MR. RE:
1 Q. What about those who were arrested but not taken into custody?
2 What happened to them, the several hundred who weren't -- who weren't
4 A. The people who were not taken into custody were immediately
5 released. They went back to their units and their regular tasks. Our
6 defence lines at that time and also always were exposed to great danger,
7 were under attack from the enemy. And people had to go back to their
8 daily tasks. There was no reason for us to hold them back.
9 Q. How was a decision made that these people should be sent back and
10 others kept in custody?
11 A. In our daily meetings, briefings, and so on, it was said -- or
12 rather, the position was taken at the level of the security service
13 administration chief when he assembled all of us senior staff that we had
14 to conduct ourselves professionally and properly at all times, and in
15 case of persons concerning whom no information existed about their prior
16 criminal activity, we had to release them to enable them to go back to
17 their regular tasks.
18 As for the other category of people concerning whom we had
19 knowledge of their prior criminal or any other activity, we were to
20 detain them, to investigate them further, and these people in fact were
21 punished and served sentences for their prior activities.
22 Q. You said you took a statement and conducted an interview with Mr.
23 Delalic. Over how many days did you interview Mr. Delalic?
24 A. I think it lasted seven to eight days. Perhaps even longer.
25 About ten days. That's how long we interviewed him. On a daily basis,
1 from the day he was arrested onwards.
2 Q. And just -- I just want the place where it occurred. Where did
3 you interview him?
4 A. We interviewed him in my then-office at the headquarters of the
5 military service administration on the second floor of the hotel where we
6 were housed.
7 Q. Can you very briefly list the topics that you interviewed him
9 MR. MORRISSEY: I object to this. This is just an attempt to get
10 the statements of Mr. Delalic before the Court. He's coming. There's
11 all sorts of reasons why it shouldn't be allowed. The primary one is
12 that it's just statements from the witness. There can be no evidentiary
13 value to this at all. And it's particularly to be objected to on a
14 second basis, that he's coming.
15 It may be that questions are asked of him arising from
16 statements, but it may well be that there are no such questions. And the
17 principle of oral evidence is a very important one at this Tribunal and
18 shouldn't be undermined by this.
19 So I object to this attempt to lead the substance on the topics
20 of the statements by my learned friend.
21 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe that the Prosecutor just asked a
22 preliminary question, that is, the topic of the interview with Delalic.
23 Of course Mr. Delalic will come here to give his testimony at a later
24 stage, and that piece of the evidence may be served as part of the
25 evidence for the purpose of the credibility of this witness or with Mr.
1 Delalic. We are not going into the specific issues of his statement at
2 this stage, but here it is just a topic.
3 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, it's really the specific issues that
4 I'm concerned with. I agree that I've risen at an early stage. It's in
5 order that I don't jump up in the middle and interrupt the witness when
6 he's given a bona fide answer. I agree with what Your Honour says.
7 JUDGE LIU: Yes. You may proceed, Mr. Re.
8 MR. RE:
9 Q. Just the topics, please. No details. If you could just list
10 them like they're under each other.
11 A. I will as far as I can remember, because I never saw that
12 statement again. After I took the statement, I forwarded it to the
13 department, which put it all together and forwarded it to the
14 prosecutor's office. However, I can remember the topics.
15 One of the topics was the crime in Grabovica.
16 Q. Okay. The next one? The next one?
17 A. The next one involved other incriminating acts concerning the 9th
18 Motorised Brigade and the events in town.
19 Q. The next one?
20 A. The opinion of Delalic himself concerning all of that.
21 The next topic was his attitude -- or rather, his relationship with the
22 Chief of Staff, Sefer Halilovic. I cannot remember all the details, but
23 the statements are there. There should be six or seven statements. I'm
24 not sure about the exact number. All of them were signed by Ramiz
25 Delalic, and perhaps you could acquire them.
1 Q. What did he tell you about what had happened in Grabovica?
2 MR. RE: I anticipate the objection, and can I respond to the
3 objection my learned friend has already made before? I know what the
4 objection is, and if I can respond to it, it might be quicker to do it
5 that way.
6 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re, you may respond to the previous
8 MR. RE: Yes, thank you. The Prosecution wishes to lead evidence
9 on this witness on two particular points: Firstly, Ramiz Delalic, what
10 he told the investigating person - namely, Witness F - contemporaneously
11 - that's on October the 26th or thereabouts, 1993 - about, firstly,
12 Grabovica, what happened there; and, secondly, his relationship with the
13 accused, Sefer Halilovic.
14 It's probative and relevant for these particular reasons: First
15 -- I mean, of course it's hearsay. But firstly, it's contemporaneous.
16 And secondly, it's corroborative of anything that Ramiz Delalic himself
17 might say in this -- before this Trial Chamber. So it's corroborative
18 and, hence, probative, and, hence, relevant to the matters for
19 determination by the Trial Chamber.
20 And thirdly, if, for example, Ramiz Delalic did not come, even
21 though he's on the list, for whatever reason, the evidence would be here.
22 The Court can give it whatever weight it wishes, it being hearsay
23 evidence, of what Ramiz Delalic said at the time had happened in
24 Grabovica and his relationship with Sefer -- Sefer Halilovic, because the
25 best evidence is, of course, the most contemporaneous evidence, as
1 opposed to evidence given many years later.
2 So, Your Honour, that's the basis upon which I wish to lead that
3 evidence from the witness.
4 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Morrissey.
5 MR. MORRISSEY: The best evidence is the evidence given in this
6 court by the witness. My friend has just -- and I mean, no prosecutor
7 could fail to know that, that that submission there is just mist and
9 The best evidence is the evidence to be given by Mr. Delalic.
10 Your Honours, let me put something as -- what the Defence opinion
11 is to assist the Court. They're not going to call Ramiz Delalic. A
12 letter was sent to them yesterday asking them for their position on this.
13 My learned friend has indicated now that one of his reasons for this
14 question is that in case Mr. Ramiz Delalic doesn't come. Now, it's the
15 Defence prediction that he won't come. And we are very concerned
16 therefore about this and we think that -- that this is just an attempt to
17 get these statements into evidence because it's -- assists the
18 Prosecution case.
19 But it can't be allowed. Firstly, it's not the best evidence.
20 At this moment, Delalic is on the list. He's -- they say he's being
21 called. So we must act on that basis. And if he is being called, then
22 his is the best evidence. Therefore, these statements shouldn't be
23 allowed in on that basis.
24 Secondly, my learned friend says that this evidence would be
25 corroborative of Mr. Delalic. And the answer to that is that really
1 depends upon whether or not Mr. Delalic says now the same things that he
2 said then. And then another question would arise as to whether indeed it
3 is corroborative in any event.
4 But you can't say it will be corroborative until that witness
5 makes an appearance, and therefore it's too early for that -- that claim
6 to be made.
7 And -- just looking at -- could Your Honours just excuse me a
8 moment. I want to respond to something else.
9 Well, really the first point -- my friend made three points. He
10 said it was contemporaneous. Well, it's not really contemporaneous.
11 It's weeks later on the events of Grabovica. But that's an argument for
12 another time.
13 The second point is that one about -- about it being
14 corroborative. Well, I've made my point about that.
15 And the third one is that, as you'll see, my learned friend says,
16 "If for example Ramiz Delalic did not come." Perhaps my friend can
17 enlighten the Chamber as to why he thinks he might not come, and whether
18 that's a decision that has already been made, or whether there is
19 something about that in the atmosphere that we should all know about,
20 bearing in mind that he's a witness that the Defence would have to and is
21 currently investing a lot of time in preparing for.
22 But all of those reasons pale into insignificance beside the main
23 one, that at the moment he's a witness, he's coming, let him give his
24 evidence. And in fact I submit that there should be no question of this
25 -- of this proceeding.
1 And in fact I think at the start of my objection to the last one
2 my learned friend said as much. He said he just wanted the topics. And
3 Your Honour allowed him to proceed at that time. And we've had a massive
4 180-change of direction at that stage. So in short, I object.
5 MR. RE: Just in relation to the last point my learned friend
6 raised about whether or not Ramiz Delalic is coming, he's on our list.
7 As far as we are concerned, he is coming. I just said it for abundant
8 caution. Often witnesses are on a list and for some reason they may not
9 appear. That's all. Our intention at the moment is to call Ramiz
11 JUDGE LIU: Well, that gives me great relief to hear that,
12 because I believe that the witness list has been approved by the Trial
13 Chamber and we are prepared to hear that witness in the future. I don't
14 know when, but we are prepared for that.
15 As for the evidence on that point, I agree with the Defence team;
16 that is, that live witness testimony in this courtroom is the best
17 evidence. Here this witness is trying to help us. But anyway, that is
18 the secondhand hearsay evidence. So long we have the best evidence
19 available in the future on the substantial issues in our view, we'll rely
20 on that testimony in the future.
21 So, Mr. Re, your question to this witness is not allowed at this
23 MR. RE: May it please Your Honours.
24 Q. Witness F, I wish to show you a document.
25 MR. RE: Can Exhibit P216 please be put on the screen. Before
1 it's done, perhaps we could go into private session because it -- for
2 this particular document.
3 JUDGE LIU: Well, yes, we'll go to the private session.
4 [Private session]
21 [Open session]
22 MR. RE: That's my examination-in-chief.
23 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
24 Well, Mr. Morrissey, are you ready for the cross-examination or
25 you need more time?
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, in the circumstances, I can
2 commence, and the witness won't finish today, unfortunately. I'm in the
3 Court's hands. And there are some questions. I can proceed with the
4 witness now and not waste the Court's time. So I do have some matters
5 I'm going to need to pursue.
6 On the one hand, I won't waste time now; on the other hand, if we
7 leave it all until tomorrow, it might take shorter. So I'm in the
8 Court's hands. I'm ready to commence.
9 JUDGE LIU: Well, since we still have 25 minutes to go, you may
11 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honour. I will.
12 Cross-examined by Mr. Morrissey:
14 MR. MORRISSEY: I'm sorry, Your Honours, would you please redact
15 that. I note I've committed the sin already once.
22 Q. And it was in that capacity that you extended -- you attended the
23 daily briefing sessions which you've given evidence about; is that
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. In this Tribunal, we've heard of a -- a concept called "operative
2 information" and that was explained to us by a witness named Mr.
3 Jasarevic. Now, was the information that was used at those daily
4 meetings operative information? Is that an accurate term to use in
5 dealing with it?
6 A. Sometimes we would use these -- this information acquired by
7 operative means, but also we would use the information received from the
8 SDB of the MUP, as well as the information of the security service of the
9 1st Corps. It was more -- probably more reliable information in the
10 second instance. Operatively acquired information was less reliable.
11 You would need to put in additional work to double-check it, and so on.
12 Q. Well, that's the topic I wanted to ask you about. Where you
13 received information from the State Security Services, you -- I take it
14 you acted on the basis that they had already checked that information and
15 assessed its reliability; is that true or not?
16 A. The level of the State Security Service in the MUP structure
17 speaks for itself, and it's not logical for them to give their operative
18 documents to us because they are an institution at a certain level of
19 competence. For us, at those meetings, in a way - I won't say that it
20 was a position - but to a large extent it meant that the information was
21 checked, reliable, and so on.
22 Q. Okay. And as it was presented to you at these daily meetings,
23 did you personally look at MUP documents or SDB documents, or were you
24 simply told by other people at the meeting what their contents actually
1 A. I said that before. These documents, this information, was
2 something that I could see in the hands of my superior, but I didn't have
3 it in my possession. And we were not informed about this directly. We
4 would receive that based on reports indirectly and then find out about it
5 through instructions, directives, and so on.
6 Q. Yes, I understand. The other source that you -- I'm sorry, I
7 just have to go into some level of detail about a couple of these matters
8 before I go to the main questions. The other source that you mentioned
9 was material that came from the 1st Corps. And do you say the same thing
10 about that material; namely, that you personally weren't shown those
11 documents but you saw those documents in the hands of your superiors at
12 those meetings?
13 A. If we're talking about information, it would happen that I
14 wouldn't see this information. I could see it in somebody else's hands,
15 but I wouldn't read it personally. When there was a report or a dispatch
16 or something of a different nature that was less important or possibly if
17 it affected my area of operational responsibility, then I would get
18 documents of the type that we saw a little bit before, the document that
19 I was shown a little earlier.
20 Q. Okay. Now, I just want to ask you a couple of questions about the
21 9th Brigade and then the 10th Brigade and their structures. You
22 personally -- were you personally acquainted with Mr. Tomo Juric, the SVB
23 representative at the 9th Brigade?
24 A. I was acquainted with him that time when we had that one-day
25 seminar. We sat together for two or three hours at the seminar, where we
1 tried to provide them with instructions on work. He introduced himself
2 to me. I even heard about him from before the war, but I had never met
3 him personally until that point.
4 Q. And -- and he was a person who, so far as you knew about his
5 reputation, had a very good reputation as a professional policeman; is
6 that the case?
7 A. Yes. Yes.
8 Q. You also -- you also mentioned the attendance of Ramiz Delalic,
9 Celo, at a seminar. And I wanted to ask you this question -- well,
10 perhaps I'll ask you a more general question first and then I'll come to
11 Ramiz and the seminar in a minute. First of all, is it the fact that the
12 rule on military security was introduced first in -- on the 9th of --
13 sorry, on the 11th of September, back in 1992, to the best of your
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Okay. And to your recollection, did persons of experience such
17 as yourself, try to educate the volunteer and very new army that was
18 defending Bosnia in those rules after the time when those rules were
20 A. These were not volunteers when the security service is concerned.
21 There were certain procedures to admit people into the security and
22 safety services. And I am sure that on the 11th of September, 1992 we
23 adopted rules or instructions on the work of the security services which
24 came down from the president and then it went into force, and it
25 specified certain rules of conduct, measures, norms, our competencies,
1 authorities, and so on. And as far as I know, all members of the
2 services were informed about these rules, and it could not be applied
3 outside of the security services because there were -- and this was
4 something that was supposed to be confidential to the service because
5 there was certain methods of work that should not be disclosed to the
7 Q. I understand that, and I'm grateful for the explanation. What I
8 wanted to ask you about, though, was this: In general terms, in that
9 first year of the war were there a number of persons commanding units,
10 even quite large units, who didn't have any formal military training?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And in such circumstances, how was it that the army explained to
13 these commanders what the role of the SVB was, what its functions were,
14 how they should deal with it, and questions of that nature? How were
15 they educated about the role of the SVB in short?
16 A. I don't know. I didn't participate in meetings like that, and I
17 was never provided any explanations to that effect. I can provide my own
18 opinion, but that would be irrelevant.
19 Q. Well, it wouldn't be irrelevant because you were there when the
20 bombs were falling, so we'd be very grateful if you could just explain,
21 just briefly, but explain how was it that the -- that the military
22 security organ, the SVB, was brought to -- I suppose to put it bluntly,
23 was brought into reality within these units which had untrained
25 A. Did I understand you properly? The SVB, the military security
1 service, or the SDB, State Security Service?
2 Q. The military security service.
3 A. Let me first say that at the time there was a lot of fluctuation
4 in the security services' staff, which was not good, in my opinion. But
5 the nature of the work was such that we had to work fast and we had to
6 find any possible way to resist or put up resistance against the
8 That's why we put together short seminars which we -- which were
9 given by people of experience; although, of course, we were short of such
10 staff. We had one seminar at the Bosna Hotel in early 1993. All members
11 of the military security administration took part in this seminar, as
12 well as members of the security service of the 1st Corps. And this, I
13 think, was coordinated with people from the SDB at the time.
14 The intention was to link these two services in a way so that
15 people could get to know one another and also that they could coordinate
16 and cooperate with a greater degree of confidence for one purpose. The
17 purpose was the protection of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
18 Q. Yes, thank you. And bearing in mind that explanation, now, when
19 Ramiz Delalic came to a seminar, was part of the purpose of that seminar
20 to enable him and others in his position to work with the SVB in a proper
22 A. No. It was like this: This was a completely different seminar
23 where we went to the command of the 9th Motorised Brigade. As far as I
24 can recall, this was in the first half of 1993, following an incident,
25 quote unquote, a small problem that occurred when Ramiz Delalic found out
1 that somebody was writing something about him behind his back. And after
2 that -- after that, the chief of the military security administration
3 tried to smooth these relations and in a way to improve the relationship
4 between Ramiz Delalic and the security service.
5 The two of us, I think, went to see Tomo Juric, the security
6 chief of the brigade, who assembled all of the security service staff
7 from that brigade. We went to the headquarters of the brigade.
8 Ramiz Delalic wasn't there. He arrived at some point after a
9 certain amount of time. He didn't interfere in our work. His conduct
10 was very proper. He welcomed us. He thanked us for coming, for the
11 instructions we were giving, and we didn't have any problems. I can't
12 remember, but I think we even had coffee with him. And he said at the
13 time that he had some information, something like that, that he wasn't
14 really a persona who was welcome. He felt that he wanted to be in touch
15 with us. He wanted to have good relations with us and contacts with us.
16 And this is what he told us.
17 Q. I understand. And I think you've indicated that took place
18 before the incidents of the 2nd and 3rd of July; is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. Before. But I cannot tell you specifically when.
22 Q. That's okay. All right. Well, now -- I was asking you some
23 questions about the 9th Brigade. And generally speaking, is -- is it
24 fair to say the 9th Brigade fought on an important part of the front line
25 and, to your knowledge, fought very well on that part of the front line?
1 A. I think that it did fight at a very important place. It had an
2 important task, and it was the largest section of the front line held by
3 a single brigade in Sarajevo. It was thought of as a very strong
4 brigade, even -- very well organised even, consisting of five battalions,
5 which were all carrying out their tasks and performing in a satisfactory
6 way. Although my opinion on this matter is not that relevant because I
7 wasn't involved in combat activities.
8 Q. That's okay. And it was located, I think you indicated, fairly
9 close to the old town, Stari Grad; is that right?
10 A. The brigade, I think, also held a part of Stari Grad, if we're
11 talking about the defence lines. I think that its right flank also held
12 a part of Stari Grad, and for the most part it covered the municipality
13 of Centar. Part of the brigade's command were in the old town, Stari
14 Grad. There were also some commands in the centre.
15 Q. Yes. And concerning the 10th Brigade, did their area of defence
16 also include part of the old town?
17 A. The 10th Brigade, too, covered a part of the centre, Centar, and
18 a part of the old town, Stari Grad, although I'm really not very well
19 informed about that because I wasn't involved in that. I didn't live in
20 those parts of town, so I'm not familiar well that. I know that it was a
21 smaller brigade and that it consisted of mostly local inhabitants, people
22 who lived there.
23 Q. Now, I just want to turn to the incidents of the 2nd of July. Is
24 it the case that personnel from the SVB, military security, arrested a
25 man named Senad Pezar who was an officer from the 10th Brigade on or
1 about the 2nd of July?
2 A. I know that this happened, that this incident happened, but I
3 cannot tell you specifically whether this happened before or after. I do
4 think that it was before then, though. I wasn't really involved in that,
5 so I'm not familiar with it.
6 Q. Very well. Well, I was going to put a line of questions to you
7 about that, but I'll just ask you a couple. To your knowledge, was Senad
8 Pezar arrested just before that trouble took place on the 2nd and 3rd of
9 July and was he held for about a day, approximately a day, and then let
11 A. It's possible. But as I said, I didn't take part in that, so I'm
12 really not familiar with the details.
13 Q. No, that's okay. I just -- I really want to get the narrative
14 right at the moment about that.
15 Now, to your recollection, is it the case that following the
16 incidents of the 2nd of July and the 3rd of July that the leaders of the
17 9th Brigade and the 10th Brigade made some requests of the Presidency;
18 namely, that Fikret Muslimovic be removed from the leadership of the SVB
19 and that the commander of the 1st Corps, a man with the nickname of
20 Talijan, be replaced? Do you recall whether those requests or
21 requirements were made by Ramiz Delalic and Musan Topalovic?
22 A. I can give you a reply like this: I think in the statement, when
23 Ramiz Delalic was providing his statement, I think that that's what he
24 told me. I cannot recall all the details, but I know that after those
25 events Fikret Muslimovic was replaced. Also it's possible that the late
1 Talijan was also replaced, although I'm not quite sure about the specific
2 time. I know that they were replaced from those duties. I didn't know
3 that this was because of that, but ...
4 Q. That's okay. And could I just ask you to be very -- and I'm not
5 criticising you in any way. Could I just ask you to be careful to refer
6 to your own knowledge. I'm certainly not asking you anything arising
7 from the statements that other people have made but just from what you
8 know. And I think you've indicated, is it accurate to say, that from
9 your own knowledge you can't say what demands were made? Is that
10 accurate or not?
11 A. I didn't know personally, but I found this out when I was taking
12 the statement from Ramiz Delalic, so I found out about it indirectly.
13 Q. Well, I won't ask for your -- I won't ask for indirect evidence
14 about that, and thank you for indicating it.
15 Very well. Well, I'll move from that episode onwards. It's the
16 fact that from the time of that -- during that confrontation on the 2nd
17 and the 3rd, whatever the reasons for it may be, it's the fact that some
18 civilian police were disarmed and some military security officers were
19 also disarmed by units of the 9th and 10th Brigades; is that the fact?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And can I ask you whether the name "Trebevic" or "Operation
22 Trebevic" was conceived at that time or whether that came about at a
23 later time.
24 A. The Trebevic action was devised later, conceived later, and at
25 that time nothing was said about it. There was no mention of it, as far
1 as I know.
2 Q. Could I refer you to a meeting of the constitution -- the Council
3 for the Protection of Constitutional Order towards the end of July of
4 1993, about which this Tribunal has heard some evidence from another
5 witness. Do you recall whether the operation designed to bring the 9th
6 and 10th Brigades back into the line of control and command was commenced
7 after that particular constitutional council meeting?
8 A. I didn't understand the question.
9 Q. I'm sorry, I must say it's been a long day.
10 Well, do you know the -- the council meeting that I'm referring
11 to, the meeting of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional
13 A. I did hear of that meeting and we talked about it earlier.
14 Q. Yes.
15 A. I said what I knew.
16 Q. Yes. Okay. But to your knowledge, it's after that meeting that
17 a plan developed for dealing with the 9th and 10th Brigades and their
18 leadership; is that true?
19 A. I'm not aware of that.
20 Q. Are you aware though that information-gathering and the
21 collection of operative information was stepped up and intensified after
22 that meeting?
23 A. After that meeting - I can't tell you the exact date - we
24 received the view or the position of our superior to intensify our
25 activities in relation to those brigades, to gather more information with
1 a view to putting an end to those activities. But it wasn't specified
2 when this would happen. No plan existed. And no names were given.
3 Q. Just two final questions before I finish.
4 MR. MORRISSEY: I'll be finished with that topic, if the Court
5 will just bear with me.
6 Q. First of all, at that time, there was -- well, you've -- sorry,
7 perhaps I'll turn it into one question. You indicated in answers to my
8 learned friend Mr. Re that there was information that Sefer Halilovic was
9 in touch with these two brigades. And I want to ask you this question:
10 Bearing that in mind, I take it that the information that was gathered
11 about those brigades was not shared, certainly not shared by you, but not
12 shared by the SVB generally with Mr. Halilovic. Is that correct?
13 A. Within my competency -- competencies, within my scope of
14 authorities, I did not have a right to do so, and also in accordance with
15 the Rules of Service, it was not allowed to disclose such information.
16 Perhaps only chief of the service or the commander superior to Mr.
17 Halilovic could have done that, but I don't know whether that was the
19 MR. MORRISSEY: I thank you, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE LIU: Well, Witness, I'm afraid that you have to stay here
21 for the -- for the further testimony tomorrow. So during your stay in
22 The Hague, do not talk to anybody and do not let anybody talk to you
23 about your testimony. Do you understand that?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do.
25 JUDGE LIU: And I'll see you tomorrow morning.
1 The hearing is adjourned.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,
3 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 9th day of
4 March, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.