1 Tuesday, 19 April 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Mr. Court deputy.
7 REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-01-48-T, the Prosecutor versus Sefer Halilovic.
9 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, Witness.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
11 JUDGE LIU: Are you ready to start?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
13 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
14 Mr. Re?
15 WITNESS: VAHID KARAVELIC [Resumed]
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 Examined by Mr. Re: [Continued]
18 MR. RE: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. Good morning, Mr. Karavelic. I want to take you back to something
20 you were saying yesterday afternoon just before we finished. You finished
21 your evidence by talking about so-called arbitrary actions by Celo, Ramiz
22 Delalic, and I just want to go to the last part of your answer. You were
23 talking about -- you said that, for example, "if a mission was assigned to
24 him, to stay there for 24 hours around the clock we would not be able to
25 do that. He would have to leave the spot in question to attend to some
1 business of his and he would leave the men alone there and things of that
3 Now, when you said "attend to some business of his," what sort of
4 business were you referring to?
5 A. No particular business, the business that he can do, but I'm not
6 sure what specifically you have in mind.
7 Q. Are you saying that he was away from the soldiers and was going
8 elsewhere attending to other business?
9 A. Well, probably it was just that or something like it.
10 Q. Could the witness please be shown 65 -- the document under our 65
11 ter exhibit list number 11? Do you require the ERN?
12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Mr. Re.
13 MR. RE: Sorry, the B/C/S is 01850108.
14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 377.
15 MR. RE:
16 Q. A document is going to come up on the screen in front of you,
17 Mr. Karavelic. You see the document there?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. It's -- it's an order dated the 11th of March 1993, from Sefer
20 Halilovic to the command of the 1st Corps and the 9th Motorised Brigade
21 and the detachment for special purposes of the Main Staff. The order
22 refers to the transfer of 100 soldiers from the 9th Motorised Brigade to
23 the special purposes detachment under Mr. Zulfikar Alispago. Why -- what
24 was the purpose of that particular order?
25 A. It's difficult for me to comment on this document. There are
1 several reasons for that. First of all, I was the deputy commander of the
2 1st Corps at the time. This means that I may not be fully informed about
3 the nature of this document or the true intentions behind this document.
4 As for what the intentions are behind this document, well it was possibly
5 the case that Mr. -- General Halilovic, then Chief of Staff, that he
6 coordinated with the Corps Commander Solakovic to resubordinate this
7 amount of soldiers to Zulfikar Alispago's detachment, which reported
8 directly to the Supreme Command Staff of the BH armed forces, the
9 objective probably being to bring manpower levels up in that unit using
10 the certain amount of soldiers so that this unit could respond adequately
11 to the tasks set it, this unit being a unit that reported directly to the
12 main command.
13 Q. At that stage I think you said yesterday that the 4th Corps --
14 sorry the 1st Corps had 75.000 soldiers.
15 A. Throughout 1993, it was the biggest corps and the figure you've
16 just given is about right. It was always about 75.000.
17 Q. Have you ever seen an order from the person who was the most
18 senior in the army directed to a specific brigade to transfer a small
19 number of soldiers from that one to another one? Have you ever seen that
20 sort of order before?
21 A. There were such orders. However, if you're talking about what the
22 normal procedure was to resolve problems such as these, and to go about
23 tasks such as this one, then I have to say that normally, there would be
24 an order from the superior command to select a particular number of
25 soldiers to be transferred or resubordinate to another unit. Names would
1 not be specified but the units would be. This was the most practicable
2 thing to do. However, there was always the possibility for a superior
3 officer to resolve the issue in precisely this manner, especially -- he
4 has previously consulted, as is the case here, where there was
5 consultation between the commander of the 1st Corps, Mustafa Hajrulahovic,
6 and General Sefer Halilovic.
7 Q. Do you know of any reason why Sefer Halilovic would have wanted,
8 out of the 75.000 men or soldiers under your -- under the command of the
9 1st Corps, he would have wanted a group of 100 from the 9th Motorised
10 Brigade to be detached to the special purposes unit?
11 A. It's difficult for me to comment. I don't have the relevant
12 information. I was at the time the deputy commander of the 1st Corps. I
13 said this would not have been the normal thing to do, but it always
14 remained a possibility. It was not something that could have been ruled
15 out. As for the reasons, the reasons were probably to be found in
16 conversations and contact between General Sefer Halilovic and the
17 commander of the 1st Corps. They must have had their own specific
19 Q. The Trial Chamber has heard evidence of there being a front line
20 around Sarajevo and there being a series of trenches on the side of the
21 ABiH near the front lines. How were the front -- how were the trenches
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours before that I just wonder if that
24 document is going to be tendered or not.
25 MR. RE: Oh, yes, I move to tender it.
1 MR. MORRISSEY: It's not objected to.
2 JUDGE LIU: So it's admitted into the evidence and with a number
3 on it.
4 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit -- Prosecution Exhibit P377.
5 MR. RE:
6 Q. The question was, how were the trenches constructed? What was the
8 A. You mean generally speaking in reference to the defence lines
9 surrounding the city of Sarajevo?
10 Q. Correct.
11 A. First and foremost, the whole city of Sarajevo was surrounded and
12 I'm talking the inner perimeter of our defence. I'm talking about the
13 inner perimeter of the city's defences. So that's where the first line of
14 defence was. It was between 60 and 70 kilometres long. There were
15 connected -- interconnected trenches along this entire line. The depth
16 was an average over 2 metres in order to protect men. This first line of
17 trenches had a great number of exits and entries leading to it, very many
18 underground facilities, storages, both for men and ammunition as well as
19 food. In addition to this first line of trenches, depending on the lie of
20 the land and the general nature of the local terrain, there was also the
21 second line of defence. However, it was not a continuous line. It was
22 not connected throughout all around Sarajevo. I'm talking about the one
23 that was behind the first line. And then there were communication
24 trenches to the first line of defence. There were some very prominent
25 features that were important for the defence of the city, that were
1 important for defending the city from the aggressor's attack. Around
2 these, a third line of defence was constructed. It was not connected
3 throughout, not all around, but it was connected to both the second and
4 the first line by communication trenches. There were a number of
5 underground facilities dug deep, used by reserve units used to store
6 ammunition, reserve ammunition, food for the reserve units and in order to
7 give shelter from enemy shelling. These trenches and these communication
8 trenches were dug along the first line of defence to a large extent, 90
9 per cent or 100 per cent of the cases, by soldiers. Behind the first
10 line, the so-called work units would often be used to dig trenches.
11 Q. Were work units civilian units?
12 A. Those were work units. Under the law on defence these units could
13 be mobilised in the regular way and used for a certain amount of time for
14 defence purposes and those people were certainly civilians.
15 Q. What was the process under the law whereby civilians could be
16 utilised to assist in digging those trenches behind the front lines?
17 A. I can give you a brief clarification of how this was organised.
18 I'll give you one example. If, for example, a brigade belonging to my
19 corps wished for example to have a 30-strong work unit, in order to do
20 some work for that brigade, this brigade or rather its commander using his
21 own officer in charge of mobilisation had to forward a request to the
22 corps command specifying how many men he required for how long, and what
23 the nature of the work to be carried out was. Once the corps commander
24 received this request, or, rather, its organ for personnel and
25 mobilisation, which was a body within the corps command, they would
1 process this document, and on behalf of the corps commander, this document
2 would then be forwarded to the Secretariat for National Defence. The
3 local office for that specific area, now we are talking about the city of
4 Sarajevo, this was a branch office of the defence ministry of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, to put it simply.
6 Once this request was received, and having considered all the
7 specific counts and items of the request, they would then mobilise and
8 prepare this work unit and bring it up to wherever it was required.
9 Whether it was the brigade that had submitted the request in the first
10 place or the corps command itself, depending on what was specified in the
11 document itself. And much in the same manner, the unit would eventually
12 be returned back where it had come from.
13 Q. How were the civilians in the work unit protected from danger when
14 they were engaged in that work?
15 A. There was always a certain number of officers around that were in
16 charge of these work units and the work units were in their care, so to
17 speak. And the officer would be seconded from the unit that filed the
18 original request. These had to be responsible officers. At all times, in
19 touch with the unit commander. I mean the commander of the unit that the
20 work unit was performing work for. They needed to know the general
21 situation and how the situation was developing. And that's how the work
22 itself was paced. If there was a worsening of the military situation,
23 more often than not, the tasks being performed by the work unit would
24 immediately cease. This is something that was very much taken into
25 account and kept track of. However, if work was being carried out deep
1 behind the lines, within the area of the brigade's responsibility, well,
2 then they were afforded the same protection as all other civilians
3 residing within the city of Sarajevo.
4 Q. Just described the legal or official manner of engaging civilians
5 into a work unit. What unofficial means were there of taking civilians to
6 dig trenches employed by brigades in the 1st command, sorry the 1st Corps?
7 A. Unofficial means would be anything that is not included by my
8 definition, the one I have just given you.
9 Q. Did you become aware of the use of unofficial means of taking
10 civilians to dig trenches in 1993?
11 A. That depends on what exactly you mean when you say "did I become
12 aware." I could answer yes or no, depending. There were very few cases
13 where I was officially informed and presented with an appropriate
14 arguments and proof. This was very difficult to prove. There was
15 information coming in, the security service obtained information on a
16 great many such incidents; if that's what we are talking about, then yes,
17 I did become aware of that being done.
18 Q. That's exactly what I'm talking about, and I want you to
19 concentrate at the moment on Ramiz Delalic's brigade. I'll come to Caco's
21 A. As to the deputy commander of the 9th Motorised Brigade, this is
22 something that I must admit to myself, even. I never had occasion to
23 learn, especially in 1992 or even up to the summer of 1993, let alone as
24 late as the Trebevic Operation that he was engaging in anything like that.
25 However, I was given a document today to look at, a document such as I've
1 never seen before, nor was I ever informed about a document like this.
2 One of the assistants for security in one of the battalions of the 9th
3 Motorised Brigade submitted a report to his superior officer about
4 security-related affairs in their brigade, saying that the previous night,
5 about 20 people, and I can't be certain about the figure, had arrived
6 allegedly brought in by Ramiz Delalic to perform work that night, work
7 meaning specifically digging trenches for the purposes of the 9th
8 Motorised Brigades. It was later on that I looked at certain documents
9 and reports by the security service which I had not seen at the time, I
10 must say, that I found a number of sources discussing these very same
11 activities in a similar manner.
12 Q. What were they saying had happened?
13 A. You mean the first document that I've just spoken about?
14 Q. Yes.
15 A. If I remember correctly, it said that Ramiz Delalic had brought in
16 about 20 people that night - I'm not sure if they were civilians - brought
17 them in, as I said, to dig trenches. They left the next morning, and so
18 on and so forth. The assistant for security was saying something to the
19 effect that this wasn't right and so on and so forth.
20 MR. RE: Can the witness please be shown Exhibit P211?
21 Q. You referred to official and unofficial means of citizens being
22 engaged to dig trenches -- or, sorry, being engaged in work units. Is
23 this document an example of an unofficial or an official means of engaging
24 civilians or something else?
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours before the witness answers that
1 question, I've just got another matter to raise. The witness just gave
2 a -- an answer which the interpreter has recorded as saying that he was
3 "given a document today" to look at. It's gone off the screen now. But
4 you can go back up, and I just want to clarify whether that document we
5 are talking about is one of the ones that is on the list. I wonder if the
6 Prosecution could just clarify that for us. It's at line 22, page 8, line
7 22, that's referred to. It may be it may not mean anything it might I
8 just want if clarify before we move to the documents because it has to be
9 clear which documents the witness is being show shown and which one he's
10 referring to.
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re?
12 MR. RE:
13 Q. Mr. Karavelic you referred to seeing a document, the translation
14 said today. Have you received any documents today from anyone?
15 A. I think I said these last few days, didn't I? Not today.
16 Q. Which particular document were you referring to?
17 A. The one that I'm looking at on my screen.
18 MR. MORRISSEY: Thanks, well that answers the question. Thank
20 JUDGE LIU: And by the way, this document is not admitted into
22 MR. RE: It's not?
23 THE REGISTRAR: It was admitted on the 4th of March 2005,
24 Your Honour.
25 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
1 MR. RE:
2 Q. Just going back to the document, Mr. Karavelic, I think my
3 question was, is that an example of an unofficial or an official means of
4 engaging civilians for a work unit or is it something else?
5 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours just once again before that's done
6 the witness ought to be given the chance to say whether he -- whether this
7 is one of the documents he saw before. Of course, that might allow a lot
8 of other questions to be asked but when the document is being shown it my
9 submission it should be made clear whether the witness had a chance to see
10 it on a previous occasion or not. So I make that objection.
11 JUDGE LIU: Before, you mean in 1993?
12 MR. MORRISSEY: Well --
13 JUDGE LIU: Not recently, not before --
14 MR. MORRISSEY: Not at The Hague, effectively. Of course, there
15 is nothing wrong with -- with the witness being shown documents if the
16 Prosecutor wants to, and I'm not objecting to that as such. But it just
17 has to be clarified first whether it's a document he looked at then or
18 perhaps in his subsequent researches and, yes, so that needs to be
20 JUDGE LIU: It's a reasonable request.
21 MR. RE: Yes but I think he just said it was the document that he
22 first saw here. So I think that one is actually answered.
23 Q. So I'll go back to my question. You've told us that you saw this
24 one for the first time here a few days ago. Is it --
25 A. That's what I said.
1 Q. Well, is it as an example of a genre of civilians assisting the
2 military? What sort of document is it? Unofficial, official, something
4 A. Report by the assistant for security from this battalion, which
5 was sent to the security service in his brigade. So to his superior. It
6 is official. However, it doesn't say anything here. Based on this
7 document, I cannot tell whether this was an illegal way of using the work
8 unit or a legal way of using it. Based on this document, I cannot really
9 say anything specifically for one main reason. It's possible, very
10 easily, that the command of the 9th Brigade had a request which it sent to
11 the corps command and that perhaps this unit was sent to dig trenches
12 based on a request. We have a large number of people here. I said 20.
13 But it states here 40. So it's my mistake. I didn't remember it
14 properly. It's a pretty high number, 40 people is quite a large number.
15 However, this assistant for security in the battalion is at quite a low
16 level. So it's quite possible that he wasn't informed, that he wasn't in
17 on things. So in order to respect the proper procedures, he was sending
18 this report to the security service of the 9th Motorised Brigade Command.
19 However, what you say could also be possible but based on this document, I
20 cannot say whether it was one or the other.
21 I would have to dig deeper in the archives of the federation army
22 and look under these dates and try to find whether there was a request
23 from the 9th Motorised Brigade or from the 1st Corps for this work unit.
24 And one more thing, excuse me. It states here that all these
25 people are registered with the duty officer of the 9th Motorised Brigade,
1 which tells me that this is most probably a legal way of doing it.
2 However, I'm not stating that it's one or the other.
3 Q. What was your information about Celo, that is Ramiz Delalic's
4 financial activities when he was the deputy commander of the 9th Motorised
6 A. You know, in Sarajevo, particularly in 1993, this was -- well,
7 it's very hard for me to find the proper words in order to clarify this.
8 Simply said, it was confusing. Totally confusing. Not only this aspect
9 but all aspects. There was frequent information coming in different ways,
10 not only about Ramiz Delalic but many other brigade commanders, that they
11 were supplying themselves, trying to get food, ammunition, weapons, and
12 other supplies in various ways. For Ramiz Delalic, perhaps this was a
13 little more characteristic or Caco, I would actually put him first.
14 Compared to others. But many others tried to do these things in a similar
15 way or did them in a similar way. I can give you an example.
16 I think this happened during the spring or summer of 1993. I
17 don't know whether Ramiz Delalic made an agreement with the chief of the
18 municipality of the Centar Municipality or whether this was something that
19 he did on his own or whether the chief of the Centar Municipality, Huso
20 Kamber, did that in relation to him. This is something that only they
21 know. But that was when he gave him 20.000 German marks, simply because
22 Huso Kamber, as the head of the municipality, considered that brigade to
23 be conditionally speaking his brigade, and not a brigade of the 1st Corps
24 and so on and so forth, which would be equal to all the other brigades.
25 When I heard this information over the radio, I came down from the
1 front lines of defence. I went to the chief of the municipality's office.
2 I treated him quite badly. I did myself, personally. So because of this
3 quarrel that we had in his office, this information quite quickly reached
4 Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the Presidency of the Republic of
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina and a day after that he formed a commission headed
6 by General Stjepan Siber and over the next couple of days, he and his team
7 had to effect a reconciliation between us.
8 I got angry precisely because I was constantly trying to introduce
9 a system, and if the chief of the Centar Municipality wished to give
10 20.000 German marks to the 9th Motorised Brigade, then he should not have
11 done -- given that money to Ramiz Delalic. He could only give the money
12 to the commander of the brigade, and not to Ramiz Delalic. However, the
13 proper way to do it would be for anybody who wanted to give anything
14 outside of the 1st Corps to people in the 1st Corps, it had to be handed
15 to the logistics sector of the 1st Corps or to the finance sector of the
16 1st Corps and then the 1st Corps would then distribute these funds
17 according to a system. These funds would be distributed to the
18 subordinate units according to a system.
19 Q. Why did Kamber give Celo 20.000 Deutschmarks?
20 A. It's hard for me to give you a correct answer. I could speculate
21 or guess, but this would lead to problems of the wrong, irregular or
22 unreasonable conduct of the civilian authorities towards the army.
23 Q. Stop, stop?
24 A. That's one thing.
25 Q. All I want to know is what is your information about why he gave
1 the money. Please don't speculate. I just want to ask you a series of
2 questions so if you please confine your answers to the question.
3 A. At that time, in 1993, when many were thinking about how to escape
4 from Sarajevo, because the survival of Sarajevo was in question, many
5 wished to have some or one of the brigades linked to them in order to be
6 sure of their own protection, and authority. And this is possibly the
7 reason why Huso Kamber got in touch with Ramiz and he probably, perhaps I
8 mean, I'm assuming, wanted to buy him with those 20.000 German marks, so
9 that he would receive some kind of protection from him or something like
10 that. However, this is not in my opinion the best possible estimate, even
11 if it comes from me. Let it just be one of the assessments, an
13 Q. Did Celo keep the money?
14 A. The money stayed in the brigade. I know that I requested that
15 this money be recorded in the finance section of the command of that
17 Q. Do you know what Celo did with the money?
18 A. You would need to check the documents, if they acted in accordance
19 with my orders and this was supposed to have happened, then this was money
20 that was used by the command of the brigade. So it's very hard for me to
21 say what the money was used for. But there must be some kind of record in
22 the unit.
23 Q. Apart from taking 20.000 Deutschmarks from the chief of the
24 municipality of Centar, what other means was Celo using to obtain finance
25 for his brigades, sorry, his brigade?
1 A. At that time, too, in accordance with certain information,
2 including a call that I had from President Izetbegovic himself, and I
3 don't know exactly which date it was, but I think it was in the spring of
4 1993, requesting that I, as the corps commander check what was going on,
5 whether Ramiz Delalic and his men, during the night, in certain sections
6 of the town, were forcing people to give a voluntary donation. This way,
7 and this concept of work in Sarajevo, and I believe in other places, is
8 called racketeering. Probably because somebody had this information and
9 managed to complain to the president. Ones I arrived in The Hague here I
10 was able to see some documents from the security service about alleged
11 possible activities of that kind by Ramiz Delalic and a number of his
12 soldiers. However, at the time, no such case could be proved by
13 arguments, nor was it proved at that time.
14 Q. I'm not quite sure what you mean by "proved by arguments." You
15 just told us you received a call from President Izetbegovic to speak to
16 you about that very issue. What did the president tell you that Celo was
17 supposed to be doing? Can you go into more details about the
18 racketeering, please?
19 A. Exactly what I said before. This is exactly what we discussed.
20 President Izetbegovic was also unable to say anything specific, such and
21 such an address, such and such a number, such and such a person. However,
22 I always asked my own security organs that if they had any facts or any
23 specifics relating to this matter, I told them that they should be
24 prosecuted. No such Prosecutions were initiated. So nothing was brought
25 to trial, and nothing was proved. I know that after the Trebevic
1 operation, after the arrest of Ramiz Delalic, during his trial, after the
2 Trebevic action, I don't know whether there is anything that came to light
3 during the trial or whether anything is mentioned in the judgement by the
4 Sarajevo cantonal Court regarding this racketeering. I did not have the
5 opportunity to follow the trial or read the judgement.
6 Q. I just want to clarify what you did in response to
7 President Izetbegovic's conversation with you. It's a little bit unclear
8 from your last answer. What was your response to President Izetbegovic
9 telling you that one of your subordinate commander was allegedly involved
10 in racketeering?
11 A. One of the deputy commanders. He was not a brigade commander. I
12 answered reasonably, of course, as a subordinate of the Supreme Command.
13 "Mr. President, I will take all steps to shed light on this matter and
14 you will be informed." I tried to shed light on this. The security
15 service made many steps regarding these matters. Most often things would
16 end up with assumptions, without any specific arguments or without any
17 statements by the people in question, because the people in question,
18 although this had happened to them, were not able to provide statements
19 after that, probably because of their own safety. The situation in
20 Sarajevo in 1993 cannot be described. It was confused, difficult,
21 complex, full of uncertainty, and this applied to the whole of Sarajevo,
22 never mind one person, whoever he is, or a group of people, whatever it
23 might be.
24 Q. To clarify something from your last answer, are you saying that
25 you asked the security service to investigate President Izetbegovic's
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Did you report back to President Izetbegovic -- sorry, first of
4 all, did the security service report back to you?
5 A. Amongst other things, you showed me a number of documents from the
6 security service, and you could see what's in those documents from my
7 security chief Sacir Arnautovic. You could see what was in the reports he
8 sent back to his superior command, along his line, to Jusuf Jasarevic, as
9 the number one man of the security service in the army of the Republic of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So I learned for the first time of many facts that
11 are stated there here, when I was reading those documents. Probably there
12 was an occasion when I did inform President Izetbegovic, but I don't
13 remember when, how, because we had such numerous requests of that kind. I
14 had problems to establish the movement of certain mortars around Sarajevo.
15 I could never establish anything for a year. I exhausted my people in
16 order to track these portable mortars.
17 Q. Mr. Karavelic, we are going to have to speed this up. I'm going
18 to have to ask you to please give very brief answers. My question was did
19 they report back to you? You see what I mean? So could you please assist
20 by giving shorter answers, if possible? You just referred to a document.
21 Could the witness please be shown Exhibit P210?
22 There is a document there in front of you now, Mr. Karavelic.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. All right. It's a document titled "official note," it's dated the
25 1st of July, 1993. Is this one of the documents you saw for the first
1 time when you came to The Hague?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And is the information in the paragraph that begins on the 29th of
4 June 1993 -- I think that's about the fourth paragraph. Is that
5 consistent with the information that President Izetbegovic gave you about
6 racketeering activities?
7 MR. MORRISSEY: Sorry, might I just intervene there? The witness
8 is free to give the answer as he sees fit, but I'm not sure whether he has
9 given any evidence that Izetbegovic provided him, that is Mr. Karavelic,
10 himself, with any information. As I understood it, what Mr. Izetbegovic
11 did was to ask him to make an inquiry. Perhaps there is more to it. I
12 don't know. And the witness can say. But at that stage I'm not sure that
13 Mr. Re's proposition has actually got into evidence at this stage.
14 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re.
15 MR. RE: The evidence was, at page 15, President Izetbegovic
16 called him and asked that he check out what was going on, whether Ramiz
17 Delalic and his men during the night in certain sections of the town were
18 forcing people to give a voluntary donation, and this concept of work in
19 Sarajevo, and I believe in other places, is called racketeering, probably
20 because somebody had this information and managed to complain to the
21 president. My question is, is that consistent with what the president
22 told him.
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes. I believe that is quite clear.
24 MR. MORRISSEY: The question phrased that way, I don't object to.
25 MR. RE:
1 Q. Did you understand the question a few moments ago?
2 A. I must admit that I'm not sure. Could you please repeat the
4 Q. You told us before that President Izetbegovic had asked you about
5 whether it was true that Ramiz Delalic was -- and his men, during the
6 night, were forcing people to give voluntary donations which was
7 racketeering. Looking at that document, in the paragraph referring to
8 Ramiz Delalic making a sweep around Breza [phoen] at a restaurant, was
9 that consistent with what President Izetbegovic said to you in the
11 A. This document by the security service mentions many facts, and a
12 lot of elements. However, President Izetbegovic spoke generally, and he
13 wasn't specific at any point in time, in terms of mentioning the names of
14 people, the street address and number. But it's possible that the
15 conversation President Izetbegovic had with me correspond to this
16 document. It's possible. I cannot give you the exact date of my
17 conversation with President Izetbegovic. Was it at this point in time,
18 before or after?
19 Q. Just go down the document and it refers to, towards the bottom --
20 A. Excuse me, may I say something?
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. Since this is a document dated the 1st of July, I was still deputy
23 commander of the 1st Corps at that time, which means that when
24 President Izetbegovic called at that time he wouldn't have called me. He
25 would have called the commander of the corps. He would have called me
1 very infrequently, my being deputy commander. So it's possible that this
2 call came after I was appointed commander of the corps, which means that
3 it must have taken place in mid-August or after, mid-August 1993.
4 Q. If he called you in your capacity as commander, as opposed to
5 deputy commander?
6 A. I think that's how it was, yes.
7 Q. All right. Just go down the document. The sentence that
8 reads, "According to the source, that" quote 'negative' unquote "part of
9 the brigade disrespects the 9th Motorised Brigade Commander Ensurovic
10 because they are in favour of Ramiz, a.k.a. Celo, who his subjects are
11 afraid of." I just want to you comment on that particular piece of
12 information. Is that consistent, inconsistent, or something else, with
13 information you knew at the time about the relationship between Celo and
14 Imsirevic and the men in the 9th Motorised Brigade?
15 A. Which part of the document are you talking about?
16 Q. The paragraph that begins, "The source claims that most of the
17 people around Ramiz Delalic are from Sandzak." It's halfway down the
19 A. Yes. I see it.
20 Q. The portion I want you to comment on -- just read that paragraph
21 and read the next line, "according to the source, that negative part of
22 the brigade ..." Just read that line. You've got it?
23 A. My security service is mentioning its source, and this is a
24 confidential source. It is not known what kind of a source it is and what
25 the source is. When they are talking about these elements, --
1 Q. Okay. I'm not asking you that. What I'm asking you about is the
2 next line, and a part of the brigade disrespecting the commander Imsirevic
3 because they are in favour of Celo. What I'm asking you about is
4 disregard the source, just that piece of information. Now, is that
5 information consistent, or inconsistent with the information you yourself
6 had at the time?
7 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours I object to that question.
8 Your Honours, it's not an academic exercise where the witness should be
9 asked to disregard the source in answer the question that my learned
10 friend's posed, he's asked whether this document is consistent with
11 something he told. He was told. And he's fully entitled, in my
12 submission, to comment upon the source that it comes from because that
13 will be the framework within which he answers the question so if he's got
14 comments to make about the source he should be allowed to make them, in my
15 respectful submission.
16 JUDGE LIU: Yes, of course, because we heard some descriptions
17 concerning of the date of that document. So there might be some doubts in
18 our mind about the source of this document.
19 MR. MORRISSEY: I think there is a misunderstanding. The source
20 means the informer, the person who has given the information to security.
21 That's not relevant for the purposes of the question. Mr. Karavelic
22 doesn't know what the source is. It's a security document. I'm asking
23 him to comment upon the information, whether it is accurate, as far as
24 he's concerned. He can't comment on who the source is.
25 JUDGE LIU: Yes, well, let's come to the essential questions
1 that -- just to verify the information of this document, I mean from his
2 own experience, whether he heard or saw something described in this
3 document. Yes.
4 MR. RE:
5 Q. The piece of information which I want you to comment upon is that
6 one about part of the -- a negative part of the brigade disrespecting the
7 commander Imsirevic because they are in favour of Ramiz, Celo. What I
8 want you to comment upon is the accuracy of that particular statement,
9 according to your own information at the time.
10 A. I can give you a simple answer. Based on all the information that
11 I have, and based on my own experience at the time, there is probably some
12 truth to this. How much truth exactly would be very difficult to say.
13 Most people in the brigade, most brigade members, respected and obeyed
14 their brigade commander. That much is certain. Nevertheless, I can't
15 rule out the possibility that to a certain extent some soldiers preferred
16 Ramiz Delalic, who was the deputy brigade commander, over their own
17 brigade commander.
18 Q. Let's go down to the next paragraph. In the evening, the people
19 who were led to dig are put into the basement of the day care centre but
20 there are no other types of repression against them and the prisoners eat
21 the same food as the army. People are held at digging far less time than
22 those with Caco. In the last group of quote "men diggers" unquote were a
23 couple of young men had regular military papers, so that their forced
24 digging may in a legal sense be considered as a quote "kidnap" unquote of
25 a soldier. Same question. What can you say, based on your own
1 information, about the accuracy of that particular representation?
2 A. This is what the document says. Unlike my previous answer to your
3 question, in connection with this, there is absolutely nothing that I can
4 tell you. Unlike the case of the 10th Mountain Brigade and its commander
6 Q. What was your information about -- this is the spring, summer
7 1993, about where the 9th Motorised Brigade were obtaining its food and
8 ammunition from?
9 A. The 9th Motorised Brigade, like all other brigades, got everything
10 that was necessary for the defence of the city of Sarajevo through regular
11 supply routes of the corps. Some of the food that was obtained from other
12 sources was more often than not registered or counted by the corps
13 command. The supplies were modest, and diminutive. So modest, in fact,
14 that it was very difficult to understand why this was so. For example,
15 whenever there was a request by the brigade to supply 10.000 or 15.000
16 bullets, what would usually arrive was 500 or 1.000 bullets at most. The
17 simple reason being that people had no bullets to send. As for uniforms,
18 there were no uniforms to go around. It was as simple as that. So all
19 over soldiers wore trainers, jeans, that sort of thing. They were all
20 civilians. This may have been the reason that people tried, in a variety
21 of other ways, to get their own supplies. If they did this in order to
22 obtain food, ammunition and clothes, this would have been justified. If
23 they were doing this for their own personal gain, it would by no means
24 have been justified. Whatever was done outside the system was usually not
25 recorded or reported, which would seem to make it illegal.
1 Q. Was Ramiz Delalic obtaining weaponry and ammunition outside of the
2 regular supply chain?
3 A. It's very difficult for me to answer that. I don't have a single
4 shred of evidence. If I had, I would certainly make sure he's prosecuted
5 for it. For example, back then, I had two officers, one of them was
6 alleged to have been involved in arms smuggling. This was the assistant
7 for logistics, Eso Radeljas, and the other was Enes Crna, who was
8 reselling certain amounts of coffee. Late in 1993 I had both these
9 officers imprisoned for a period of seven days I had proceedings
10 instituted against them. But I had proof, I had facts that I could
11 pursue, despite which, they were eventually acquitted. Seven days later,
12 they were released from prison and several months later, one of them was
13 acquitted and the other, I think, was imposed a sentence on probation.
14 But this is just one example that I'm giving you.
15 Q. All right. You just said that you didn't have a "single shred of
16 evidence" in relation to Celo but you had facts in relation to the other
17 two men. Did you -- were allegations plead to you about Celo as opposed
18 to you being provided with hard evidence?
19 A. More often than not, it was my assistant for security that
20 reported to me about these matters. He would inform me about whatever he
21 believed was relevant in relation to Celo as well as in relation to these
22 other two officers and the entire corps.
23 I've been telling you about how many times I talked to my
24 assistant for security Sacir Arnautovic. If we go back to these two
25 officers that I've mentioned, the two Majors, I said, "Are you sure about
1 the facts? Are you sure about the evidence? Are you sure these people
2 are guilty?" And he invariably said "Yes." But it proved to be very
3 flimsy once the proceedings were under way, in terms of proof, and
4 producing actual evidence. What I'm trying to say is that throughout the
5 war in Sarajevo and in 1993 particularly, there were so many stories going
6 around, so many unfounded stories going around, but I can't say that there
7 weren't stories at one point in time that had something more to them.
8 MR. MORRISSEY: Sorry, could I just intervene for one moment here,
9 this is not an objection it's a possible interpretation issue, two of them
10 of the. Firstly at page 25, line 20, the witness mentioned the name of
11 Sacir Arnautovic, the transcript doesn't seem to have quite caught it and
12 I think it's -- perhaps that could be clarified. It is at line 20. So
13 it's spelt the same way as the other witness who came here, but he's not
14 the same one. But anyway, that could be clarified perhaps.
15 The other one was that the Bosnian speakers at -- at -- at our
16 table thought that the interpreters might have missed something that
17 the -- that the witness said. He mentioned two people -- the witness
18 mentioned two people that he had -- that he had initiated proceedings
19 against, with respect to coffee, and with respect to coffee at least, and
20 I'm instructed that the witness may have mentioned the units that they
21 came from, and that doesn't appear on the transcript. Now, that's --
22 obviously this is on the run but we have to point it out now, otherwise it
23 will just vanish, so I'm sorry to jump into Mr. Re's cross -- sorry,
24 evidence-in-chief there but those things have been pointed out to me so I
25 thought I just better raise them now to be clarified.
1 JUDGE LIU: Yes, thank you, Mr. Re, could you have those two
2 points clarified?
3 MR. RE: The first one, Sacir Arnautovic, that will of course be
4 picked up as the transcript is revised because the stenographer has a list
5 of names. The second one, the two -- did you mention the names of the two
6 units from those -- in relation to the coffee smuggler and the weapons
7 smuggler, or the alleged smugglers?
8 A. Eso Radeljas was a major. He was an assistant for logistics
9 alleged to have involved in arms smuggling. This was in the 2nd Vitez
10 Motorised Brigade. I think I said that. And the other man was Major Enes
11 Crna, a commander of a battalion in the 102nd Motorised Brigade at Stup.
12 My security service started proceedings against him for the alleged crime
13 of coffee smuggling. I approved these proceedings. At the time, one kilo
14 of coffee in Sarajevo used to -- the going rate was about 50 German marks.
15 Q. Did you have any information linking Ramiz Delalic with criminal
16 activities, such as smuggling?
17 A. I think I answered that already. From time to time I would
18 receive such information. I was in possession of such information to a
19 greater or lesser extent, not only in relation to Ramiz Delalic but to
20 other people too. Sometimes more about Ramiz Delalic than about other
21 people. But Caco was the most prominent. I think he was the number one.
22 However, I did not start any proceedings against Ramiz Delalic. I didn't
23 and my security service didn't, regardless of me, and this speaks for
24 itself. All I'm trying to say is that for different reasons this was not
25 possible. There was a war on or perhaps on account of some other
1 circumstances that I wasn't aware of. The result was it was simply
2 impossible to institute proceedings against him, to prosecute him, or at
3 least it was impossible before the Trebevic operation.
4 Q. Why was it impossible before the Trebevic operation to take -- to
5 institute proceedings against Ramiz Delalic?
6 A. It's difficult to provide a specific answer. Probably because it
7 was impossible to prove the allegations. If you take that into account,
8 it may lead you to other conclusions and other speculations, but this is
9 not something that I wish to venture upon right now.
10 Q. Just going back to the information about smuggling, you said "from
11 time to time I would receive such information," and said "Caco was number
12 one." Where would you rank Celo on the list of alleged smugglers, two,
13 three, four, five, somewhere else?
14 A. Caco was certainly number one. I don't think I would allow myself
15 to put together a ranking now but it wasn't only Ramiz Delalic. There
16 were complaints about other people too. Those two officers that I
17 mentioned. There were complaints coming in about the 4th Motorised
18 Brigade, about Fikret Prevljak. There were complaints about -- well,
19 depending on the case in hand, but there were complaints about a great
20 deal of other commanders. The war went on for four years, as you know,
21 all sorts of things happened.
22 Q. What were the complaints about Celo's smuggling? What was he
23 supposed to have been smuggling?
24 A. Everything boils down to arms smuggling and ammunition. Food and
25 equipment for the army, and money. Everything revolves around these
1 things, and I mean everything.
2 Q. How was he supposed to -- or how was he alleged to have been
3 smuggling these things?
4 A. You see, it's very difficult for me to speak about these things
5 before a court. I may end up saying something that is unfounded. If we
6 are talking about a general feature of the BH army as a whole, equipment,
7 food, ammunition, and weapons were being obtained for the purposes of the
8 armed forces. By what means? By any means available.
9 We bought -- we seized and requisitioned these things from the
10 enemy. There were donations from outside the country that reached us
11 through individuals or bodies inside the country and so on and so forth.
12 Now, in all of this, I'm talking specifically about Ramiz Delalic, whether
13 some people jumped on the band wagon and in what way exactly? Did they
14 derive personal profit? I never managed to prove this and I don't think
15 it's likely ever to be proven.
16 Q. I just want to go back to Celo about -- you said you had
17 information or were told that Celo was alleged to have been smuggling.
18 What were you told that he was doing and how he was doing it?
19 A. You see, there is one thing that I read in a document these days.
20 Was it just Caco or also Celo? But it was just on the eve of the Trebevic
21 operation in August or September 1993. They managed to obtain a huge
22 amount of anti-tank missiles and the type was Red Arrow TF 8. Is this
23 allegation true? Did they actually manage to obtain this or not? I don't
24 know. I didn't know about it at the time. It was only several days ago
25 that I read about this. But this was never proved because had they been
1 in possession of a considerable amount of these Red Arrow missiles they
2 would have had to surface somewhere once the Trebevic operation was over
3 and done with. But the same sort of stories were going around about all
4 other kinds of equipment, ammunition, that sort of thing.
5 Q. What was the tunnel under Sarajevo airport being used for?
6 A. For everything.
7 Q. Including? And meaning?
8 A. Everything.
9 Q. We have just been talking about smuggling. Is smuggling included
10 in everything?
11 A. Well, if there was smuggling, then I would definitely include it
12 in everything. The DB tunnel, the Dobrinja Butmir tunnel, was the one
13 that caused me the greatest amount of problems in 1993 and 1994. There
14 were so many problems, in fact, that in mid-1994 I got together with
15 President Izetbegovic and he ordered me to hand the tunnel over to be
16 under his control, that is under the control of the executive board of
17 Sarajevo city. I complied.
18 Q. Okay. Let's just go back to spring, summer, 1993. Did you have
19 any information that soldiers within the 1st Corps were using the tunnel
20 for smuggling purposes?
21 A. The tunnel was not being used at this time. It was only being
22 used from the 1st of August 1993, because that's when it was dug.
23 Q. Sorry, I meant from summer, the 1st of August. Disregard spring.
24 A. It's difficult for me to state something like that categorically,
25 especially as regards the early days. When the tunnel was first dug,
1 right off we imposed severe restrictions on its use, and on security.
2 That's one thing. On the other hand, I set up a battalion as a security
3 unit for the tunnel and they were supposed to see to it that the tunnel
4 was being used in the proper way. There was so much work involved in this
5 that the first commander, and if I'm not mistaken his name Almir Sutrovic,
6 I'm not sure about his first name, though, so he was the tunnel
7 commander. And after a very short time, he simply ran away. He upped
8 sticks and left. He disappeared. But my sources say he lives in Israel
9 now. Now, I'm just asking the question: Why did he leave? Why did he run
10 away? If this commander ran away, then anything would have been possible,
11 literally anything.
12 Q. All right. Historically that's interesting but what I'm trying to
13 get to is did you have any information that soldiers in your corps were
14 involved in smuggling there?
15 A. There was nothing to confirm the stories but there were stories
16 going around, yes. No hard evidence.
17 Q. What were they -- what were you told the soldiers were doing in
18 that tunnel and who were they?
19 A. Here is an example for you. I can talk about this until the cows
20 come home because the examples are countless. One morning I was called
21 again by President Izetbegovic. He criticised me severely. He lashed out
22 at me. He had been told that during the night, several hundreds of litres
23 of alcohol had been smuggled out through the tunnel or rather smuggled
24 into the city of Sarajevo. He said, well, Karavelic, shall we now have
25 alcohol passing through this tunnel instead of food, weapons, ammunition
1 and all the things that we really need? My answer was -- but I'm telling
2 it to you like it was. I don't want you to get the wrong idea. I was a
3 very responsible corps commander. I'll take all the measures I can. I
4 got the civilian police forces involved to work along side my own security
5 people. A month later roughly speaking I received word, something to the
6 effect that the civilian police had taken over. There was something to do
7 with this. Alija Izetbegovic knows about this. There is no need to press
8 this any further. What am I -- just one example. There you have it.
9 Q. Okay. But specifically, were you ever given any information that
10 Celo or Caco were involved in smuggling things through the tunnel?
11 A. There was nothing major they could have done in a legal sense
12 while using the tunnel. Even if they had done something like that, it
13 could only have been something minor. There was no way to do anything
14 major using that tunnel without this being observed. If we are talking
15 about something that a man could carry on his back or perhaps two or three
16 individuals as a group, it would have been very difficult to control and
17 monitor at the time if not actually impossible.
18 MR. RE: Is that a suitable time?
19 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We will make a break and resume at 11:00.
20 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 11.00.
22 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re. Please continue.
23 MR. RE:
24 Q. All right, Mr. Karavelic. We are going to try and speed this up a
25 little bit if we can to try to get you back to Sarajevo as quickly as
1 possible. All right. So I'll try and ask you very short questions and if
2 you could please help, we might be able to get you home a little bit
3 earlier. I want to get you back to the question I was asking you before
4 the break which was about information about Caco, Celo and that tunnel. I
5 just want to know if you had any information about them using the tunnel,
6 either of them, for smuggling, and if so, what was it?
7 A. There was such information, but I cannot really state any specific
8 one here because I don't have access to them. They are not available.
9 Q. What is your memory of the information you were given at the time?
10 A. For example, Caco passed through the tunnel last night, he created
11 some minor problems, would not submit to control at the entrance to the
12 tunnel, he passed with his five soldiers through the tunnel and then there
13 would be an assessment, it is believed that he brought in this and he
14 brought in that and so on and so forth.
15 Q. And what about Celo?
16 A. More or less the same, but to a lesser degree, and less
18 Q. Would Celo or Caco have any legitimate reason to be using that
19 tunnel to enter or leave Sarajevo at that time?
20 A. Most often, it would be going in or out for some other justified
21 reasons but there were also entries and exits without my knowledge, and
22 even without my approval.
23 Q. Did they require your approval to leave Sarajevo or the approval
24 of someone in the corps command?
25 A. The brigade commanders had to have my permission. However, Caco
1 did not adhere to this quite often.
2 Q. What was your response to being told that Celo or Caco had been
3 using the tunnel at night? What did you do?
4 A. I would order the security service to check whether there were any
5 illegal activities involved and I would simply go on. My objective was
6 the combat, the defence of Sarajevo, and not so much to deal with
7 individuals, no matter who these individuals might be.
8 Q. What was the relationship between Celo and the commanders of the
9 other units in the 1st Corps? What I mean is, what was the quality of
10 their relationship?
11 A. In the course of 1992 and 1993, and now I'm speaking about the 1st
12 Corps even though I wasn't the commander then, we had some kind of
13 animosity between the brigades in the centre of the Novi Grad and Novo
14 Sarajevo or Ilidza municipalities, in relation to brigades that were
15 located in the municipalities of Centar and Stari Grad. We undertook
16 various activities like socialising and commanders visiting each other so
17 that they would get to know each other better, and create a more
18 harmonious and better internal system of defence as a whole in the 1st
20 This functioned up until -- well, it's hard for me to give the
21 exact date, but let's say up until the spring of 1993. After that, there
22 was some -- there was even greater animosity that started to appear. For
23 example, I had considerable problems when we are speaking about Ramiz
24 Delalic and his relations with the sabotage, reconnaissance unit. This
25 was a brigade which was also linked to the 1st Corps command headed by
1 Boris Krstanovic, Cile. So there were several occasions when I personally
2 had to deal with resolving their personal conflicts which then grew into
3 conflicts between a large number of soldiers on each side, and even a
4 conflict between the brigades themselves, and there was a conflict like
5 that when I and the Commander Mustafa Hajrulahovic, with our bodies, tried
6 to prevent blood shed between the two sides. I tried to prevent
7 casualties from amongst our soldiers.
8 Q. When was that, that particular incident?
9 A. I can't tell you the exact date but I think it's spring 1993.
10 Q. Was Celo involved in it?
11 A. This specific case that I'm talking about had Ramiz Delalic, Celo,
12 on one side and on the other side was the commander of this brigade, Boris
13 Krstanovic, a.k.a. Cile.
14 Q. And where did this confrontation occur?
15 A. In front of the corps command. This was the Danijela Ozme No. 7.
16 That's the street and number.
17 Q. Were other soldiers apart from Celo and Boris Krstanovic involved
18 in this confrontation?
19 A. Yes. The military police of the corps, military police battalion,
20 and they were together with me and the corps commander, and they were
21 there to try to prevent the conflict from breaking out.
22 Q. Tell the Trial Chamber what happened? What did Celo do and what
23 did Krstanovic do and what did you have to do?
24 A. The corps command was in the middle, between these two brigades,
25 the sabotage reconnaissance unit and the 9th Motorised Brigade, but it was
1 closer to the command of the Sabotage Reconnaissance Brigade, and at one
2 point, on one side of the street, Ramiz Delalic appeared and on the other
3 side of the street Boris Krstanovic appeared.
4 Q. Were they armed?
5 A. Absolutely. It was wartime. Everybody was armed.
6 Q. What were they doing with their weapons?
7 A. Threats were made between them, that they would kill one another.
8 Why? Well, question mark. At that point when we saw what was happening
9 from the command, me and the corps commander ran out of the HQ and we
10 placed ourselves in the middle between them and we said, "You can only
11 start fighting over our dead bodies." After an hour or two of this whole
12 mess, we managed to prevent any casualties.
13 Q. What were the two sides doing with their weapons when you and
14 Talijan came down?
15 A. They had taken up each window, each rooftop, every corner of the
16 street, every place, they had their weapons pointed at each other. It was
17 a real battlefield.
18 Q. How did you manage to bring peace to that battle field?
19 A. I simply rushed out into the street. I raised my hand up and I
20 said -- hands up, and I said, "I am not armed." Well, there were police
21 officers with me but there was a small number in relation to the two
22 sides. The corps commander did the same thing, and we said "We're not on
23 anyone's side, not on the side of one person or the other. The one who
24 begins first will be blamed, and they will have to go through us." And
25 then by talking to the soldiers and with them, we managed to calm the
1 situation, more or less in the same way as in the case when Caco's
2 security deputy wanted to fire at me from a cannon. There was a different
3 occasion. In that case and in this case we did manage to calm the
5 Q. We will come to the Caco one a little later. How many --
6 approximately how many soldiers were there on either side, armed and
7 pointing weapons at each other?
8 A. It's difficult to give the number. In any event, more than a
9 platoon. Perhaps less than a company. But it's hard to give you the
10 exact number.
11 Q. Approximately, in --
12 A. It's hard to talk about the number of pages in a document or the
13 number of soldiers. Then you're expected to stand by that number. But as
14 I said, more than a platoon, less than a company. A platoon numbers about
15 30 people and a company, depending on the kind, can range from 100 to 150
17 Q. All right. Was Colonel Imsirevic there?
18 A. I'm not sure but I don't think so. I'm not sure.
19 Q. Was this particular standoff between the two sides considered to
20 be a breach of some disciplinary code of the Bosnian army?
21 A. Well, it would be difficult to describe it as anything other than
22 that, other than some kind of disciplinary breach.
23 Q. Who started that particular conflict? Celo or Krstanovic?
24 A. Ramiz Delalic said it was Boris Krstanovic and Boris Krstanovic
25 said it was Ramiz Delalic, and that's where things stop.
1 Q. Was any action taken as a result of this incident against either
2 side or either man?
3 A. How do you mean, any action?
4 Q. Disciplinary, criminal, investigatory? I mean, you've described a
5 situation where you've got two groups of soldiers within your corps
6 threatening to kill each other outside your corps headquarters, which you
7 described as a disciplinary breach. Was any action ever taken?
8 A. After that, I remember well the corps commander called Boris
9 Krstanovic, Cile, to the office. I was present. The conversation lasted
10 a couple of hours and he criticised him so much. And finally the
11 conversation with Boris Krstanovic ended so that he said that he would not
12 do anything in relation to Celo unless he was attacked, and that he would
13 calm down and would not do anything outside of the permission of the corps
14 commander, unless he was suddenly attacked.
15 I think that the commander had a similar conversation with Ramiz
16 Delalic. However, I don't remember attending that conversation. I think
17 that Sulejman Imsirevic was there, the brigade commander, too, and that
18 confirmation of this -- actually, that there was an affirmation made by
19 the other side, in terms of this, and I don't remember whether there were
20 any disciplinary measures imposed or whether things just ended with the
22 Q. Were there other instances involving Ramiz Delalic and his unit on
23 the streets of Sarajevo in breach of normal disciplinary requirements? I
24 mean similar incidents but not involving the first brigade.
25 A. There were other instances like that. I can't give you the exact
1 dates but this also took place in the course of the summer of 1993, when
2 soldiers of the 9th Motorised Brigade and I think Ramiz Delalic was also
3 present there when a civilian police station was surrounded, there was
4 some kind of settling of accounts with the civilian police, or certain
5 officers within the civilian police. Then during July, when under the
6 orders of General Delic, Sefer Halilovic, and Mustafa Hajrulahovic, I had
7 left Sarajevo and went to Igman. As far as I can remember, the command of
8 the Main Staff of the B and H army was surrounded, and so on and so forth.
9 Q. I'm interested in the "so on and so forth." You mentioned the
10 settling of scores with civilian police. What scores did Celo have to
11 settle with civilian police? What was the root of his animosity towards
12 civilian police?
13 A. Well, it's hard for me to say because I didn't deal with this. I
14 didn't have time to deal with it. I couldn't deal with the relationships
15 of one man to other people. When I had my hands full with a corps
16 numbering 75.000 men. I can conclude, perhaps, that if it was one officer
17 from a police station, why would I bother to surround the whole police
18 station unless I was being irritated by something from the civilian
19 police? There must have been some reason for it, but I don't want to
20 speculate, because then I could just give an unobjective opinion.
21 Q. Was your information that he had surrounded a police station, that
22 is, his men had surrounded a police station?
23 A. Well, I have it somewhere in my mind, but it's quite remote, and I
24 think I read something about it in the papers those days. When you're
25 talking about an event such as the surrounding of a police station, it's
1 quite a minor event. It's not really very important. At that time, in
2 Sarajevo, there were much more important things. There was a different
3 Celo, also on the other side, who was maybe making even bigger problems.
4 Then we had a person the likes of Topalovic, the commander of the Military
5 Police Battalion of the General Staff. There were many others, in Stup,
6 for example, in Sarajevo, for example.
7 Q. Describe the surrounding of a police station by soldiers as a
8 minor incident in Sarajevo. You also described the surrounding of the
9 Main Staff. What other things, what other incidents, similar incidents,
10 did you know that Celo was involved in, in that period, of that nature?
11 A. Well, I really couldn't tell you more without documents.
12 Q. Were there more?
13 A. Unless you remind me of something, then I could perhaps.
14 Q. Are you saying that there were more but you just can't remember
15 them at the moment?
16 A. Well, you can say that, yes.
17 Q. Did you ever speak to Celo about these breaches of discipline,
18 that is surrounding police stations, blockading the Main Staff,
19 threatening to killing the commander of a reconnaissance brigade outside
20 your headquarters?
21 A. I did about this event in front of the corps command. These other
22 two events, with the police and the surrounding of the Main Staff, no, I
23 did not, because I really didn't have the opportunity later, in view of
24 the accelerating events in the course of August 1993.
25 Q. What did you say to Celo about the incident in front of the 1st
1 Corps headquarters?
2 A. The main thing I said at the time, and the corps commander used to
3 send me frequently to all sorts of negotiations on all kinds of questions
4 relating to the corps units, because the corps commander was a naval man
5 from the JNA, from the Yugoslav People's Army. He was a diver. So he
6 really wasn't that well-versed in the structure of the land forces. So he
7 would always send me for all talks and to deal with problems. I mean, he
8 knew the reasons why he was sending me out. During my conversation with
9 Celo, the only thing I demanded was that you could not -- and it was out
10 of the question to use one unit against another unit within the 1st Corps,
11 no matter who it was, even if it was Ramiz Delalic, Celo, you had no right
12 to do that and next time you will be punished in one of the prescribed
13 ways. The conversation was also nice, in the sense of he was asked
14 politely not to do it, but it also had its stricter side where threats
15 were made and that kind of thing. Most often, at that time, Ramiz Delalic
16 did listen and he made promises that he would not do things like that
18 Q. Well, did he do things like that again?
19 A. After that event in front of the corps command, there were these
20 other two events which I recalled, the one involving the police and the
21 other involving the Main Staff. What his participation in that, it's hard
22 to say. I mean I have information indicating that he was present and that
23 he did have a role in those incidents, but I didn't have the opportunity
24 to speak with him about that later, or at least I don't remember speaking
25 to him.
1 Q. You said that you told him that if he did it again he would be
2 punished in one of the prescribed ways. Why wasn't he -- sorry, was he
3 punished in one of the prescribed ways when he repeated that kind of
4 behaviour, at least twice, as you've described?
5 A. Yes. He was punished in October 1993. This was two or three
6 months later, in the Trebevic operation.
7 Q. Why the delay? Why did you wait two or three months before action
8 was taken?
9 A. I talked to President Izetbegovic earlier and asked him to do
10 that. Why this particular date was set, well, only the Supreme Command
11 can tell. President Izetbegovic, and the Main Staff of the BH army,
12 specifically Rasim Delic.
13 Q. Let's move to the 10th Brigade and its commander, Musan Topalovic,
14 Caco. Yesterday you told us about Caco's area of responsibility, and at
15 various times today you've referred to Caco being the number one smuggler
16 and being worse than Celo in his activities. What was the relationship
17 like between Caco and the corps command in 1993?
18 A. My apologies but when I'm being told that I said he was the number
19 one smuggler, a thief, a robber, I can't confirm this in relation to Caco
20 or in relation to anyone else for that matter. I am basing all of my
21 allegations on certain reports, certain information. What exactly was
22 said at trial, at the district court in Sarajevo following the Trebevic
23 operation, well, maybe this Court should request a final report concerning
24 the final sentences that were pronounced against Ramiz Delalic, Celo, and
25 a great deal of other people. And to request a copy of the sentence in
1 the case against Musan Topalovic, Caco, concerning actions that he
2 committed in Kazani and in his own brigade's area of responsibility.
3 There is plenty more information there, I suppose. So that's why I'm
4 telling you. There is the impression that I'm actually saying that these
5 people are thieves and criminals but this is not something that I can
7 Q. I just want you to tell the Trial Chamber what you know, saw,
8 observed, or heard yourself. I'll approach it in a slightly different
9 way. What was your knowledge about Caco's background before he became a
10 brigade commander?
11 A. As far as I know, I never looked into that. I never tried to
12 learn more about his life and his career. I think before the war, he was
13 into music and he was a member of a band. So that's one thing that I
15 Q. Did he have --
16 A. I'm not sure what his educational background is. He may have
17 completed secondary school or he may not have completed secondary school.
18 But he became brigade commander, not because he would have been expected
19 to become brigade commander in terms of the mobilisation plan but rather
20 because he was among the first who managed to set up a brigade on his own,
21 in April, May, and June, 1992, when the aggression against Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina first started. The defence system was paralysed at the time.
23 And that's how he became brigade commander. And no one's permission or
24 approval was asked.
25 Q. Did he have a military education?
1 A. Not that I know of.
2 Q. What was his attitude towards former JNA officers?
3 A. It was ugly and negative.
4 Q. How did he show that?
5 A. He made public announcements to the effect that he was proud of
6 the fact that his brigade did not comprise a single former JNA officer.
7 He said he didn't trust those people, that sort of thing. And he didn't
8 need them, that's what he said.
9 Q. How did he describe them?
10 A. In a wide variety of ways.
11 Q. Please.
12 A. I'm not sure what I should say first. I know he said things like,
13 if he could get to the commander of the 1st Corps Mustafa Hajrulahovic at
14 the time and then it was me afterwards, if he could get his hands on me he
15 said he would grill me on a spit.
16 Q. Sefer Halilovic was a former JNA officer. What was Caco's
17 attitude towards Mr. Halilovic?
18 A. He said the same sort of thing about all former JNA officers.
19 Q. All right.
20 A. It's very difficult to say whether his attitude to Sefer Halilovic
21 was any different or not.
22 Q. You said that he said if he could get his hands on you, he would,
23 and Mustafa Hajrulahovic, he would grill you on a spit. Did you and the
24 1st Corps commander have any fears from this particular character?
25 A. That's a very good question. In part, yes, in part no. That is
1 the truth. That is a fact.
2 Q. Did he respect the chain of command within the 1st Corps?
3 A. Up to a certain point in time, yes. After that, no.
4 Q. What's that certain point in time, approximately?
5 A. There is a document that I read here, which appears to indicate
6 that, as early as May and June, for a rather long period of time all
7 communication between that brigade and the corps command ceased. However,
8 generally speaking, I can say that when I became the commander of the 1st
9 Corps, I demanded certain radical steps to be taken by my superiors, in
10 terms of establishing a functional chain of command within the corps
11 itself, an operational one. Serious problems arose in relation to Caco,
12 needless to say. The more radical I was on the one hand, the more radical
13 he became in terms of putting up resistance on the other.
14 Q. What things was he doing which showed you he was not respecting
15 the chain of command?
16 A. If you say not respecting the chain of command, that seems to
17 imply all the answers that I can think of, doesn't it? There is one thing
18 I must admit, though. When talking about the fundamental mission of the
19 10th Mountain Brigade or the 9th Mountain Brigade or any other brigade
20 within the corps, and when I say the fundamental mission, I mean being
21 successful in defending the area of responsibility assigned or the line of
22 defence around Sarajevo in their own respective areas of responsibility.
23 There were never any problems whatsoever about that. Not with the 10th
24 Brigade, not with Caco, not with the 9th Brigade, not with its commander,
25 not with the deputy commander, with Celo or with any other units, for that
1 matter. Brigades in their entirety and all the soldiers did their best to
2 put up a fight and to defend Sarajevo. And in that sense, they never
3 failed in completing a single task. Such problems as there were, were
4 entirely outside that, were a different matter, and took on all sorts of
5 shape and form.
6 Q. That's what I'm specifically interested in at the moment, those
7 problems that were outside of that. You referred to serious problems
8 arising earlier. What were those serious problems? What sort of things
9 was Caco doing not involved strictly in the defence of Sarajevo which were
10 causing problems?
11 A. One of the actions, for example, whenever an officer from the
12 corps command was sent to the 10th Mountain Brigade, officers or people
13 from the 10th Mountain Brigade, based on the commander's order, on Caco's
14 order, would be returned, in the majority of cases they would be returned
15 because they were not allowed inside the brigade command or even inside
16 the brigade's area of responsibility. They weren't allowed access. No
17 matter what their original remit was or the reason why they were sent out
18 to begin with, by the corps command. Secondly, he failed to submit
19 reports, the reports that he was duty-bound to submit as brigade
20 commander, and forward them through his own brigade bodies on to the corps
22 Or, if the reports were sent, they were far too general, vague,
23 and tawdry, containing no elements of facts that would be desirable in a
24 regular military report, such as a report being sent from a brigade to a
25 superior command.
1 More often than not, based on all the information that was
2 available, he randomly mobilised people, civilians, around town, within
3 his area of responsibility. He would mobilise persons and then take them
4 away to perform some physical labour, for the purposes of his own brigade.
5 Q. I just want to ask you about that. You've already described the
6 official means of involving civilians in work units, requests through the
7 corps to the Ministry of Defence, requisition and so on. Did Caco employ
8 those official means when he needed assistance with trench digging?
9 A. I believe there were plenty of requests made by the brigade,
10 especially in 1992, and the beginning of 1993, when these procedures were
11 in fact used, and when he went about these tasks in a legal manner.
12 However, there is a lot of information that appears to indicate that he
13 did things randomly, in ways that were illegal and unlawful.
14 Q. What were those? What was he doing? How was he getting those
15 civilians to the trenches?
16 A. This is an assumption on my part. I assume he would send his
17 soldiers, and military police officers or some other officers, to find
18 people, civilians, in his brigade's area of responsibility, or further
19 afield, in town, he would bring them to the command to talk to them, and
20 then he would send them to perform labour. How else could he have done
21 that? They probably didn't go there of their own accord, would they?
22 Q. We have had some evidence even from someone who got there in that
23 manner. But were people, to your knowledge, taken to the first line of
24 trenches or one of the second or third line of trenches by Caco's men?
25 A. There is information to suggest all of these, but anything would
1 be very difficult for me to confirm. It's quite possible that all of it
2 is actually true.
3 Q. What about Rasim Delic's son? Was there an incident involving
4 Rasim Delic, Supreme Commander of the ABiH's son and Caco and his men?
5 A. I think I remember that incident. Among other things, as Caco was
6 going about his business, as we just described, his son, who was a
7 soldier, was also one of the people who were picked up, and he was taken
8 away to dig trenches, or at least that's what people said. It took us a
9 long time, I'm not sure how long exactly, I think several days. Several
10 days, trying to talk, to discuss things, and we pulled many strings to get
11 him released, which eventually happened.
12 Q. The transcript says among other things, as Caco was going about
13 his business. Did you say Caco or Rasim Delic's son?
14 A. Caco, Caco. As he was going about the business that he was going
15 about, I mean in terms of taking people away.
16 Q. He picked up Rasim Delic's son?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You said many strings were pulled to get him released. What was
19 the process? Was there negotiations with him? How did he come to be
21 A. It's difficult for me to think back and remember all the tiny
22 details. I can say that I -- I had several officers in the command of the
23 10th Mountain Brigade. One of them -- I'm not sure if it's okay for me to
24 say this publicly, to state the person's name, but he reported to the
25 corps command regularly, and for the most part the information he provided
1 was truthful. He informed on what was going on in the brigade, especially
2 on the eve of the attack against the 10th Mountain Brigade and the 9th
3 Motorised Brigade. He was one of the contacts used to try and get Caco to
4 release some people. President Izetbegovic, his own contacts, and so on
5 and so forth.
6 Q. Was Caco aware who he had taken to the trenches? Who this person
8 A. Well, you're asking me this question, and this brings to mind
9 another incident. I can't remember the exact date. I think it was in
10 August, or September possibly. At one point in time I received a call
11 from President Izetbegovic. He was asking me, "Who is firing at the
12 Presidency building?" Shortly afterwards, having talked to my operations
13 centre, I found out we had no indication that the enemy from outside the
14 city was shooting, and our information appeared to confirm that it was
15 Caco targeting the BH Presidency building and then President Izetbegovic
16 said, "Is that possible?" And my answer was, "Mr. President, just about
17 anything is possible round here, if you take into account the general
18 military and political situation in Sarajevo." That's some sort of an
19 answer for you. You're asking me if he was aware that he had taken Rasim
20 Delic's son to the trenches. It would have meant nothing to him.
21 Q. Was Caco in fact firing upon the Presidency building at that time?
22 Did your inquiries reveal that?
23 A. If I say yes, then I appear to be committing myself. That was the
24 information that I had at the time. It's quite probable, though, but I
25 can't be 100 per cent certain and positive.
1 Q. You said earlier that Caco wasn't letting people into your --
2 sorry, people into his area of responsibility. Specifically what area was
3 he preventing people from coming into?
4 A. The area between Bistrik and the Jewish cemetery.
5 Q. What's the name of that area?
6 A. There are a lot of neighbourhoods in that area. For the most part
7 the slopes of Mount Trebevic, the northern sector of Sarajevo. More
8 specifically, the greatest part of Centar municipality and Stari Grad, the
9 old town. The Jewish cemetery, Skenderija, and the entire area. I don't
10 know all the names myself. Including Bistrik.
11 Q. What about Kazani?
12 A. Kazani is a small neighbourhood near the first line of defence, or
13 straddling the first line, even. It's a group of rocks. Kazani. I'm not
14 sure if you could find this on a map or whether it's just a name used
15 colloquially. It was, however, inside his area of responsibility.
16 Q. Why was he preventing access to his area of responsibility?
17 A. This requires speculation.
18 Q. What information, if any, did you receive at the time, as to why
19 he wouldn't let anyone in, including people from the 1st Corps command?
20 A. Some people thought the reason was he needed no one to help him
21 defend the city. He had everything he wanted, and he could manage on his
22 own. That was one line of reasoning. And there was another theory. The
23 theory was the corps command was entirely superfluous to him because
24 whatever he received from the corps command was not only insufficient, it
25 was next to nothing, I'm saying, in terms of what he got from the corps
1 command, in terms of equipment, ammunition, that sort of thing. Very
2 often he used this as an excuse to explain why he had to go out and get
3 things himself, for the purposes of his own brigade, from, as he used to
4 say, alternative sources. Then if I go on speculating, another reason for
5 him doing what he did, was also to keep it concealed, for as long as
7 Q. Keep what concealed?
8 A. All of his actions, the actions that I've been speaking about,
9 requisitioning weapons, ammunition, food, taking people away, civilians,
10 to dig trenches, unlawful actions, and so on and so forth. When taking
11 people -- as far as the taking away of people was concerned, the cantonal
12 court in Sarajevo dealt with the case after the war. How many people were
13 killed by his men at Kazani, which people, and so on and so forth. I
14 would be hard put to specify any of that here. I've never had an
15 opportunity to read through the sentences passed by the cantonal court in
16 Sarajevo in these cases.
17 Q. You just mentioned his requisitioning weapons, ammunition. You've
18 already described the official means of supplying ammunition and weapons
19 to the brigades in relation to the 9th Motorised Brigade. How was Caco
20 obtaining weapons and ammunition outside the regular supply chain?
21 A. Well, this is how. I'll describe one of the things that happened,
22 one of many things that happened. It's very difficult for me to be
23 specific about the date without any documents to rely on. I think it was
24 in the spring or summer, 1993. An officer came over to see me, an
25 UNPROFOR officer, saying they will start firing, they will tell the UN,
1 they will tell the headquarters in Europe about it, they will do this and
2 they will do that. And why? Because the 10th Mountain Brigade or rather
3 Caco had taken away several of their APCs.
4 In actual fact, what probably happened was that Caco had sent a
5 number of his soldiers who took these APCs from the UNPROFOR people by
6 force. They didn't kill anyone or hurt anyone on that occasion, truth to
7 tell, but this man Caco wanted these APCs so he could send them
8 immediately to the first line of defence, to help defend the city. His
9 understanding of the situation was as follows. Why should those APCs be
10 rotting away downtown in Skenderija being no use, like that? It would be
11 much better to put them to some good use, take them to the first line, and
12 target the enemy. The UNPROFOR commander came to Sarajevo,
13 President Izetbegovic got involved, and I can't remember the exact date
14 but there had to be involvement on his part. Sefer Halilovic was still at
15 the head of the army, as far as I can remember. Rasim Delic and Sefer
16 Halilovic had to be involved. It took several days for us to bring those
17 APCs back to take them away from the soldiers without the use of force,
18 and we handed the APCs and the ammunition back to UNPROFOR. That was one
19 thing. There was another incident. He sent some soldiers over. He
20 claimed he didn't have enough food. It was over night. And salt was
21 carried out. He went to Skenderija where he went to people's cellars
22 taking away considerable amount of potatoes, sacks of potatoes and
23 commodity reserves to be used by his brigade. I had to step in to do
24 something about it. And so on and so forth.
25 Whether it was really his intention to use this to defend
1 Sarajevo, to get supplies for his men, or whether perhaps this was his way
2 of bribing soldiers to follow him in a blind and unquestioning manner,
3 that's a very tough call for me to make. I think the best answer would be
4 there was a bit of both in it.
5 Q. Apart from stealing APCs from UNPROFOR, what other means was he
6 using to obtain weapons and ammunition outside the regular supply chain?
7 A. I don't know what you mean. Perhaps if you remind me I will tell
8 you. I think the question is a little bit broad and unclear.
9 Q. All right. I'm asking you about what he did to obtain weapons
10 outside of the official supply chain. You've described his raid on
11 UNPROFOR and hijacking some APCs and taking them to the front. What other
12 information were you given about similar activities by Caco, how he was
13 obtaining weapons and ammunition?
14 A. There was information which I couldn't confirm that there were
15 people outside Sarajevo, somewhere in Herzegovina, that this was being
16 purchased in -- I don't know what ways, that it was reaching Sarajevo.
17 Then also purchases from the aggressor and so on and so forth. I mean,
18 you could go into endless speculations and possibilities. It's possible
19 that there is some truth in that, but at the same time, that doesn't have
20 to be so.
21 Q. Where would he have been obtaining the finances from to purchase
22 weapons from the aggressor? I assume you mean the Serb forces.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I object to that question. I think
24 the question itself carries the reason why. The question is where would
25 he have been obtaining the finances from. Now, if the witness -- the
1 witness can be asked where was he obtaining them from, and if he knows the
2 answer he can give that answer, I've got no objection to that. But it
3 looks as if the question accepts that he doesn't really know, but we are
4 after an opinion. So I don't object to it being asked where the finances
5 were coming from as a direct question.
6 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
7 MR. RE:
8 Q. Mr. Karavelic, where were the finances -- where was Caco getting
9 his finances to obtain weapons from the Serb aggressor from?
10 A. This is the most difficult question so far perhaps. I don't know
11 if there is a person in Bosnia and Herzegovina who could provide an
12 adequate answer to that.
13 Q. What was your information about the source of his financing to
14 obtain weapons and ammunition in 1993?
15 A. I know one thing: The financing from the corps command was quite
16 modest, too modest, in fact. At the corps, in the course of 1993, I never
17 had more than 100.000 German marks to cover the entire corps numbering
18 75.000 people. This is very symbolic, so symbolic that it would
19 practically mean nothing. If I give 5.000 marks to the brigade, this is a
20 lot of money for me, for the corps command, but essentially it's nothing.
21 How did they get those funds? How did money enter Bosnia and Herzegovina?
22 Who distributed it? Which channels existed? For me, this is too broad.
23 It's too big a question for me. And I would not go into making any -- any
24 comments on that question.
25 Q. You've described one encounter with UNPROFOR in which they stole
1 some APCs. Were there any other encounters between Caco's -- Caco and the
2 10th Brigade and UNPROFOR in Sarajevo?
3 A. There were such encounters, not only with the 10th Brigade but
4 other units, to stop an UNPROFOR soldier, for example, and confiscate his
5 bullet-proof vest, or to take communication devices which were of good
6 quality for the use of the unit, from UNPROFOR soldiers or antennas were
7 taken and then information would go out about that. It had to be
8 returned. A lot of it was returned. Some things that UNPROFOR could do
9 without were probably not returned. This was the reality in Sarajevo in
11 Because in 1993, in Sarajevo, every person, including myself as a
12 Corps commander, from one day to another, thought if the defence lines
13 were broken through and the aggressor entered Sarajevo, I would never be
14 without a bullet or a bomb or something so that I could end my own life.
15 This was the way of thinking, as far as the majority of citizens and
16 soldiers in Sarajevo were concerned.
17 Q. Did they ever take food from UNPROFOR? That's the 10th I'm
18 talking about.
19 A. Well, I told you about a case, a little bit earlier when they
20 broke into a warehouse and took sacks of potatoes and other staples.
21 Q. What about goods from private citizens in Sarajevo? Were you
22 given any reports or did you receive any information about the 10th taking
23 things from private civilians?
24 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, I object to that on a number of
25 grounds now. Firstly, my friend has now drifted into leading and putting
1 propositions. Secondly the witness has made it very clear as to what his
2 sources of information are. And in my respectful submission it's getting
3 to a point now where he's being asked to speculate, and in a leading way
4 on matters concerning the 10th Brigade. I really do need to raise as an
5 issue, Your Honour has now given the evidence that's already arisen, why
6 we are going into this massive detail about the 10th brigade because
7 you'll recall now what the evidence is and as I understand it it's
8 effectively now finished, the crime screen evidence. That there is not
9 one squeak of evidence that the 10th Brigade had anything to do with the
10 killings at Grabovica, none. And although my friend -- I haven't objected
11 up until now, but frankly I now do object to 10th brigade questions
12 generally, and this one in particular because it's leading.
13 JUDGE LIU: I believe it is too early for us to say that there is
14 absolutely no involvement in the killings in Grabovica, because we have to
15 read all the documents at a later stage. So we would not jump into any
16 conclusions on this aspect, and the Prosecution's case is not finished
17 yet. Anyway, generally speaking, we'll allow any questions concerning
18 with the 10th Brigade in this aspect. However, concerning with those
19 specific questions, I believe that the Prosecution should ask about the
20 warehouse and the actions of taking sacks of potatoes and other staples,
21 whether those things belong to military or civilian. Depends on the
22 question; the Prosecution could elaborate on that point, rather than
23 directly coming to civilian properties.
24 MR. RE: I think the evidence was from the witness, I'll be
25 corrected if I'm wrong, but that was UNPROFOR. I think he said that in
1 the last answer.
2 JUDGE LIU: Let me make it clear.
3 MR. RE: Those were UNPROFOR potatoes.
4 JUDGE LIU: Yes. You may clarify that.
5 MR. RE: Yes, thank you.
6 Q. Were those UNPROFOR potatoes?
7 A. The potatoes and many other articles that he took on that
8 occasion, it was a few tonnes, it was quite a lot of stuff that he took.
9 This was the Skenderija sports complex in the centre of town from where he
10 took articles belonging to UNPROFOR.
11 Q. I want to move on to away from UNPROFOR to private civilians. Did
12 you receive reports that he had taken or his men had taken things from
13 private civilians? And if so, what were those reports?
14 A. Very little information, and I cannot confirm that there was such
15 cases directed at individual civilians, civilians as individual citizens,
16 incidents in which their property was taken. The second thing is the
17 people who were taken away, well, I don't know if they were forced to give
18 some kind of monetary amount, but out of the numerous units from the
19 corps, there was kind of arbitrary behaviour, in terms of taking property
20 from companies, from firms, from certain state institutions, and so on,
21 but this most often came down to taking motor vehicles, petrol, and so on.
22 Q. When you say arbitrary, do you mean within the law or outside of
23 the law?
24 A. Both. If we had a case, for example, of somebody from the brigade
25 command, let's take the 10th Brigade as an example, would go to a company,
1 having found out that they had, for example, 5 tonnes of petrol. In
2 Sarajevo at the time, a drop of petrol was worth gold. And they got this
3 petrol. After that, when you sent the security service to these people,
4 and when you asked them, was this taken by force? They would say, "No,
5 no, no, we gave that voluntarily." And then it's up to you to conclude
6 whether this was legal or illegal.
7 Q. What was Caco's relationship with -- sorry, relationship like with
8 the 1st Mountain Brigade?
9 A. At one point in time, it was quite ugly and hostile. At one
10 point, there was a clash between the 10th mountain and the 1st Mountain
11 Brigade where the brigade commands were close by. They were about 150 to
12 200 metres apart. And on that occasion --
13 Q. I'll Just stop you. When was that?
14 A. I think this was before I was appointed corps commander. I'm not
15 100 per cent sure.
16 JUDGE LIU: Before we go into details, could we have a break?
17 MR. RE: Of course.
18 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We will take a 30 minutes' break and we'll
19 resume at quarter to 1.
20 --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 12.48 p.m.
22 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re.
23 MR. RE: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Mr. Karavelic, before the break, we were -- you were telling us
25 about an incident or a clash involving 10th Mountain and 1st Mountain
1 Brigades in 1993, you think possibly before you became the commander. I
2 want to take you through it and I want to ask you some questions about it.
3 Were there -- where were their headquarters locations -- located in
4 relation to each other?
5 A. Both of the commands were at Bistrik. I already said that they
6 were about 150 to 200 metres apart. The command of the 1st Mountain
7 Brigade was located in a former command building of the 2nd Military
8 District of General Kukanjac and the command of the 10th Mountain Brigade
9 was in a building right next to a building of the Ministry of Defence.
10 Q. What happened in this particular clash?
11 A. I remember that incident. It was reported at the corps command
12 that an armed conflict was practically breaking out between the 10th and
13 the 1st Mountain Brigades. So it was an attack by the 10th Mountain
14 Brigade on the command building of the 1st Brigade. I ran from the
15 command post close to that location, and when I -- on my way there, near
16 hotel Evropa on the right bank of the Miljacka River, I was wait -- I was
17 greeted by Mujo Zulic, the commander of the 1st Mountain Brigade, and in
18 my conversation with the officers there, I had to take the street going
19 along the Miljacka River next to the Ministry of Defence building, and the
20 command of the 10th Mountain Brigade. I had to cover about 200 metres or
21 so. Actually, very close to the command of the 10th Mountain Brigade,
22 there was a B-1 cannon that was set up. Soldiers had taken up positions.
23 There were the soldiers there, people were milling around. The deputy
24 security officer of the 10th Mountain Brigade Command was there. His name
25 was Hasic, Senad.
1 Q. I just ask you to pause there for a moment. You mentioned a B-1
2 cannon. What are the dimensions of a B-1 cannon? Can you describe it to
3 us, please?
4 A. It's a 76 millimetre, smaller artillery weapon.
5 Q. What sort of damage can it do?
6 A. It can cause considerable damage. It's used for large surface
7 targets, dotted targets, and when a projectile strikes that target, as --
8 it can cause major damage, as any cannon can. It can also cause human
9 casualties, as well as considerable material damage in the sense of
11 Q. You said that soldiers had taken up positions. Describe how they
12 had done that.
13 A. The cannon crew had taken up combat positions. The crew numbers
14 four or five soldiers, and there were other soldiers nearby. Combat
15 position, the very term tells it all.
16 Q. What were they aiming this cannon at?
17 A. The cannon was aimed at the command of the 1st Mountain Brigade,
18 but it's necessary to change the angle only slightly to turn it to the
19 direction from which I was coming from.
20 Q. You said that soldiers were milling around and the deputy
21 security officer of the 10th was there, his name was Hasic, Senad. Go
22 on, what happened.
23 A. I tried to stop the conflict, just like in the earlier occasion,
24 when I spoke in front of the corps command. However, when I came out into
25 the clearing, in that street, which leads directly to the cannon, once I
1 got to the bridge across the Miljacka I was loudly told to stop, otherwise
2 I would be fired at. I stopped for a minute. Again, started to talk with
3 the soldiers, with Hasic, in order to persuade them not to shoot, that
4 they would not achieve anything by killing me, and in particular, they
5 would not achieve anything if they start firing at their neighbouring
7 Q. Were they --
8 A. And step by step, with a large number of breaks, I did manage to
9 reach the cannon without them firing at me. That's when I stroked the
10 soldiers on their heads, on their shoulders, I tapped them on their
11 shoulders, because they had listened and didn't fire, and I requested or I
12 ordered Hasic, Senad, to return the soldiers to their regular duties, and
13 this is both in the 1st and the 10th Mountain Brigades. And this is how I
14 managed to prevent the conflict.
15 Q. Was the cannon aimed at you, when they yelled at you and told you
16 to stop?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. How long did it take you to get to the cannon and placate the
20 A. It seemed like an eternity to me, but I can't really be sure how
21 long it took. Perhaps 10 or 15 minutes it took me to cover those 150
22 metres, even longer. Perhaps 20 minutes. It's very difficult for me to
23 make an estimate.
24 Q. How many soldiers from the 10th were there, approximately?
25 A. It's hard to say. The streets are narrow, buildings are close
1 together. I don't know how many of them were around the other buildings.
2 I didn't go later to check. But the cannon crew and the soldiers around
3 the cannon numbered about 20 to 30 altogether.
4 Q. Was Caco there?
5 A. Caco was not there.
6 Q. Do you know what the cause of the conflict was?
7 A. The cause of the conflict was possibly that the 1st Corps, in the
8 area of the Centar and Stari Grad municipalities had four or five
9 brigades, and all the brigade commanders were people with no military
10 experience, non-professional officers, and out of all of those brigades,
11 only Suljo Imsirevic became the commander of the 9th Brigade later when
12 the 3rd and 7th brigades were fused into the 9th. As opposed -- this is
13 the western part of Sarajevo. As opposed to the eastern part of Sarajevo
14 where there were also five or six brigades, but all the brigade commanders
15 were professional officers, except one brigade commander in Dobrinja,
16 Ismet Hadzic, who was not a professional soldier.
17 Q. What I'm interested in is the cause of that particular conflict on
18 that particular day. Do you know what caused them to train a cannon on
19 the headquarters of the 1st Mountain Brigade?
20 A. I'm talking about that. I mean, I can give you a very brief
21 answer to that but you won't understand it. Because of disagreement
22 between the 1st and the 10th Brigade but what does that mean to you?
23 Absolutely nothing. Because the answer is too short. This is why I tried
24 to provide a clarification.
25 Q. Were you alone when you went down to attempt to resolve the
2 A. Outside the Evropa hotel there was a large group of officers. I
3 don't want to say they didn't want to come with me but when push came to
4 shove, I had to go on my own, and I did.
5 Q. Were those training the cannon on you aware of who you were, when
6 they told you to stop?
7 A. Until I turned the corner, I didn't know myself, but they could
8 see me all the time. The visibility was ideal.
9 Q. Were they aware that you were from the corps command, either the
10 commander or the deputy commander of the 1st Corps?
11 A. Hasic Senad knew very well. He was aware. As for soldiers, some
12 of them may have known and some may not have known.
13 Q. What was Caco's relationship like with Hasic Senad?
14 A. At the time, Caco had already changed his position. He didn't
15 hang about in one place for too long. He was afraid that he might be
16 attacked. He perhaps sensed that he might be attacked. Hasim Radelic
17 [phoen] was his assistant for security. That would seem to imply, as was
18 the case after the Trebevic operation, that Senad Hasic too was arrested.
19 He spent a long time in prison sow the assumption is that he was the other
20 man's right hand.
21 Q. In military terms, how would one regard the training of a cannon
22 by one brigade on that of another brigade's headquarters and then the
23 training of that same cannon on the corps commander or deputy commander,
24 with a threat?
25 A. Under more ordinary, normal circumstances, when the whole
1 defensive apparatus of the state was operational, when all the elements of
2 the system were operational, when the state itself was operational, at all
3 of its levels, there should have been a court martial. That very minute.
4 Those people should have been given short shrift and punished for what
5 they did. However, for a great many reasons, objective for the most part,
6 perhaps even subjective in part, that was not taken for what it was.
7 People decided that since there were no casualties, since no one was
8 killed, it could end right there, and this incident was treated as just
9 another ordinary breach of discipline.
10 Q. By that --
11 A. Could I have taken any further steps, whether the previous corps
12 commander or I, it would have led to nothing. It would just make the
13 situation worse.
14 Q. Why do you say that?
15 A. Why do I say that? I need to provide ample clarification,
16 especially since you interrupted my answer.
17 I started explaining something a moment ago. A certain number of
18 brigades in the western part of town, and a certain number of brigades in
19 the eastern part of town, with non-professional military men as brigade
20 commanders, and on the other hand, you had professional military men as
21 commanders. It was in those four brigades, in the western part of town,
22 and we are talking about the 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades, the 10th
23 Mountain Brigade and the 9th Motorised Brigade.
24 In the summer of 1993, and later in the course of the year,
25 strategically speaking the idea was to prevent that all our brigades
1 should become like that, to stop the 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades from
2 becoming like that. The idea was for the 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades to
3 be prevented from breaking away from our system of command. Had that been
4 the case, a certain area would have been surrounded where there were
5 indications that these brigades might try to secede from the 1st Corps.
6 The reasons go very deep, indeed. It would be hypothetical to speak about
7 these reasons. The focus was to keep the commanders of the 1st and 2nd
8 Brigades under our control. They were important for territorial reasons
9 because their area lay approximately but not fully between these two other
10 brigades, the 9th Mountain Brigade and -- the 10th Mountain Brigade and
11 the 9th Motorised Brigade. To a large extent we succeeded in achieving
13 Q. Just taking you back to your answer to the question before, in
14 relation to taking any action against the 1st mountain, sorry, against the
15 10th for training the cannon on you and on the 1st Mountain Brigade
16 headquarters, are you saying -- you said you regarded it as a disciplinary
17 matter. Why didn't the army take any action against the 10th Mountain
18 Brigade for that act which you just said a moment ago should normally have
19 resulted in instant court martial?
20 A. What I believed is one thing. What should be done under the law
21 is quite another. In addition, you have the third thing. What was I able
22 to do under the circumstances that I faced at the time? These are very
23 different things, and these propositions are very much at odds among
24 themselves. Had I demanded that Caco be court-martialled and sentenced to
25 death, how could I possibly have pulled it off? That's your answer. Why
1 did I believe that this was in fact the case? My aim as corps commander
2 was to keep, to preserve, the corps's unity and to prevent the rift from
3 becoming deeper and deeper. The main thing was to keep the corps's
4 mission in mind, to defend the city and the state. That was my principal
5 mission. Everything else was less important. Another important objective
6 was to prevent casualties. Well, our casualties at least.
7 Q. What do you mean by "prevent casualties"? How could casualties
8 have occurred?
9 A. To prevent casualties among our own ranks. Had I faced the
10 soldiers of the 10th Mountain Brigade at the time and told them to shoot
11 at the first Mountain Brigade, they would have done so, probably, but
12 being a corps commander that would certainly not what I wanted to do.
13 Rather, my objective was to prevent in-fighting and to bring about a
14 greater degree of harmony so that the entire corps could operate
15 successfully in our struggle against the aggressor, and in our struggle to
16 defend the city of Sarajevo. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate for a
17 corps commander to sometimes maybe turn a blind eye to a transgression, to
18 a violation, if that can lead to a general improvement in the future.
19 Q. Did your turning a blind eye to that particular incident in which
20 a cannon was trained on you lead to a general improvement?
21 MR. MORRISSEY: One second, please.
22 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: I'm not sure that the witness lass agreed that in
24 this instance he himself did turn a blind eye to that incident. He's
25 explained, in fact -- well, I won't make a speech. Your Honours have all
1 heard what was said in the last passage. Your Honours, what he said about
2 all this is "that sometimes it's entirely appropriate for a corps
3 commander to sometimes maybe turn a blind eye to a transgression." But it
4 has to be established that he agrees that he did turn a blind eye, and
5 this is the - I'm working with the English translation now, of course - to
6 this one, Before it's put to him in the way that it was. So I object to
8 JUDGE LIU: I believe that the facts of this incident is very
9 clear. The problem is we have to establish the linkage between this
10 incident with your client, Mr. Halilovic. The witness already said that
11 it's another matter of breach of discipline. So in the mind of the
12 witness, he regarded as a matter of breach of discipline, rather than
13 commission of a crime. So I wonder whether there is any point to go into
14 the further details in this aspect.
15 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, well, as Your Honour pleases.
16 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re.
17 MR. RE:
18 Q. Mr. Karavelic, was that particular incident reported to the
19 Supreme Command?
20 A. Yes. Everyone was informed.
21 Q. Who is everyone?
22 A. Everyone in the chain of command, from top to bottom, and the
23 other way around.
24 Q. Where was Mr. Halilovic in the chain of command at that time?
25 A. I can't say right now, because it's very difficult for me to
1 remember the exact date when the incident took place. If it took place
2 before my appointment, I do believe this occurred during the summer of
3 1993. I assume that Rasim Delic had already been appointed to a leading
4 position in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina by this time which means that
5 at the time f we count the two commanders behind the deputy chief of the
6 Main Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stjepan
7 Siber and Jovo Divjak, that would have made Sefer Halilovic the number 4
8 man or possibly the number 2 man but in terms of the army structure and in
9 my reckoning the number 4 man of the army.
10 Q. Are you aware whether Mr. Halilovic was made aware of this
11 particular incident? Either by virtue of his position or by some other
13 A. I can't confirm that. I believe it was the corps command that
14 sent a report to the Main Staff, but this needs checking.
15 Q. What about the Presidency? Was the Presidency informed?
16 A. I think so.
17 Q. What about the treatment of civilians by Caco? That is, of
18 civilians in his area of responsibility. What was your information about
19 his treatment of civilians?
20 A. I think I said that in my -- one of my previous answers. Based on
21 security service information, and based on hearsay, this sort of thing
22 that people were talking about round town, he was taking civilians away,
23 bringing them to the brigade, and forcing them to perform labour for the
24 brigade. Later on, throughout the summer and until as late as the
25 Trebevic operation, there was no information to suggest that he was having
1 people killed.
2 Q. Did you obtain that information later?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Did you or your predecessor as corps commander ever issue orders
5 in relation to the treatment of civilians?
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Just a moment, Your Honours. Before that's done,
7 it ought to be clarified from this witness when it was that he found out
8 about the -- the news about people, civilians, being killed. It's no use
9 to ask did you obtain that information later, in the trial of Sefer
10 Halilovic the question is when. That's the only way it can possibly be a
11 relevant question. That must be clarified now with this witness,
12 Your Honour.
13 MR. RE: I disagree, because he said "later" meaning after
14 Trebevic and the indictment period finishes at Trebevic. I can certainly
15 clarify, I know what the answer is, but I just didn't consider it relevant
16 to the --
17 JUDGE LIU: Let's have a clear record at this stage.
18 MR. RE:
19 Q. When did you find out -- well, tell us about the killing of
20 civilians by Caco. Let's open up that area.
21 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, Let's not open up that area. First
22 of all, we just need the question resolved. After that, my friend can ask
23 any relevant question he chooses. But that issue as now has to be
25 JUDGE LIU: Yes, let's establish the time frame first.
1 MR. RE:
2 Q. When did you find out that Caco had been killing civilians?
3 A. The first time I received any information, if you can translate
4 hearsay from Bosnian into English, meaning of-the-record information,
5 started making the rounds of Sarajevo -- well, I can't give you the exact
6 date. It was at some point in the summer of 1993. Whether it was June or
7 July, I'll be hard put to say.
8 However, no one was at any point in time able to confirm the
9 authenticity of any such information or hear say and if anything at all
10 was authentic, what? There were proceedings before the cantonal court in
11 Sarajevo. There was a trial. This trial never resulted in anything that
12 would show the extent of Caco's killing of civilians, and if indeed he
13 killed any civilians, how. No such thing that I know of, at least. And
14 still there is this persistent rumour saying that the Court found Caco to
15 have killed civilians. There was an investigation afterwards, civilian
16 police bodies were sent to Kazani. They carried out exhumations there at
17 Kazani and so on and so forth. So you can go to Sarajevo and ask anyone,
18 but no one will be able to provide you with accurate information.
19 The first information arrived in 1994 and 1995, after the war, to
20 the effect that Caco had killed 10.000 Serbs in Sarajevo. That's what the
21 papers said. That's what the media bandied about, this figure, and then
22 suddenly the figure won't down to 5.000 and then from there, as years went
23 by to a mere thousand. And then suddenly this figure shrank to 1 or 2
24 civilians in some cases, or about 15 in some other cases. It's very
25 difficult to discuss this here before the Trial Chamber, to say anything
1 on the record. The fact of the matter is, even as we speak I do not know
2 the whole truth.
3 Q. Which sort of explains why I didn't actually go into this area.
4 Mr. Karavelic, did you ever -- you or your predecessor ever issue orders
5 to the -- your subordinate units in relation to the treatment of
7 A. I think among other things, the previous commander of the 1st
8 Corps, Mustafa Hajrulahovic, issued an order like that in May or in June,
9 and so did I later on. I think Sefer Halilovic once issued an order like
10 that, while he was still the number one man in the army.
11 Q. Did you or your predecessor ever issue orders in relation to
12 criminal activities, such as racketeering?
13 A. I can't say yes, and I can't say no. I would need to go back to
14 the files, to the documents, and have a look. I know I always talked to
15 the security service about that. I did say that about one or two hours
16 ago. If you can obtain official reports, worthwhile reports, based on
17 which you can press charges against someone, please do so. That's what I
18 always told my assistant for security. If you have information on me as
19 the corps commander, press charges. Don't think twice. Even if it's my
20 head on the block.
21 Q. Did Caco suffer an injury in 1993?
22 A. Yes. As far as I remember, I don't think it was in combat. I
23 think it was something that he was doing with some weapon that was not
24 standard issue. It was something home-made. Some sort of a grenade
25 launcher, something like that. He was testing this piece of equipment,
1 and one of his fists was blown to bits. Some people said this had a
2 devastating effect on his psyche. Most people said that after that
3 incident, he became even more difficult to deal with and even less pliable
4 for any sort of cooperation.
5 Q. And when was that?
6 A. It was certainly 1993, but can't be more specific. The summer of
7 1993, but I'd be at a loss to give you an exact date.
8 Q. What did you say about his mental state in 1993, from your
9 dealings with him and activities?
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, I think that the evidence has been
11 that he didn't have any dealings with him because he wasn't allowed to
12 because he was going to be put on a spit. Your Honours, I don't mind the
13 witness giving evidence about what he saw, if he had meetings with him, I
14 don't mind him saying what that was, it could be relevant to something.
15 The question as it's currently framed calls for expertise and seems to fly
16 in the face of previous answers. But, however, if he had meetings with
17 him of course he might be -- be able to say something about the mental
18 state he observed on those occasions, so with a bit more precision I don't
19 object to the question.
20 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we have to establish the dealings of this witness
21 and this other person.
22 MR. RE:
23 Q. How often or how many times did you personally meet Caco in 1993?
24 A. For as long as I was deputy commander of the 1st Corps in 1992 and
25 halfway through 1993, I met him personally a great number of times. I
1 would go to his headquarters. I would hold meetings with him in his
3 Q. From those meetings, what can you say in your observations about
4 his mental state?
5 A. I'm no psychologist, that much is certain. I'm a military man, a
6 military professional. The main thing is those meetings, for most of 1992
7 and the first half of 1993, were simple working meetings. They were
8 perfectly normal meetings. Maybe in 1993, there were a number of meetings
9 after complaints had already started to come in, complaints about his lack
10 of cooperation or his lack of respect for certain parts of the brigade's
11 command chain. I talked to him and I said to him on various occasions,
12 "Caco, don't do anything without consulting others because you and your
13 brigade alone mean nothing. You only make sense as part of the 1st Corps.
14 It is only if we are united that we can stand up to the aggressor and
15 succeed in defending this city of ours, Sarajevo." That was the crux of
16 most of our conversations. He would often complain about how little he
17 was receiving from the corps, that he wanted to step up the struggle and
18 defend the city of Sarajevo. I would often tell him, "We want the same
19 thing, but you need to know that certain things just can't be done right
20 now, for various reasons." That's what I would tell him. Until all
21 contact ceased.
22 He would complain about everything and anything. He would
23 complain about President Izetbegovic and then all the way down.
24 MR. RE: Can the witness please be shown document --
25 JUDGE LIU: Before we are going to that document, I believe that
1 previous document is still on the screen, and I have a question to ask of
2 this witness, if you don't mind.
3 MR. RE: Certainly not.
4 JUDGE LIU: Witness, please look at the document on the screen. I
5 believe it is still there. Somewhere in the middle it says, the source
6 claimed that most of the people around Ramiz Delalic, Celo, are from
7 Sandzak, they are mostly members of the Military Police Brigade and all of
8 them were wearing Sefer Halilovic's badge. Could you tell us what is
9 Sefer Halilovic's badge? I just need some clarifications.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I have to say that
11 here in The Hague, when I was shown this document, was the first time that
12 I saw and heard anything like this, that there is any kind of written
13 record of that. I do have a vague impression in my mind that somebody at
14 some point during the war said something about badges, but I myself never
15 saw these badges, and cannot believe that the military police in the 9th
16 Motorised Brigade wore these badges without me knowing about it. But
17 there is nothing else I can say about that.
18 And also, as to whether all the men were from Sandzak, I don't
19 know. I don't believe that they were all from Sandzak. I don't think so.
20 But I couldn't talk to you about the percentages of where people were
21 from. I would have to go back to the archives to find lists of the men so
22 that this could be precisely determined. The conclusion is that I cannot
23 confirm this. I think here it is more a question of deliberate blowing up
24 or making up of certain things.
25 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That would be to somebody else's
2 advantage but I don't know to whose.
3 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. I apologise for this
4 interruption. You may proceed.
5 MR. RE: Not at all.
6 Q. Mr. Karavelic, can -- can -- I'll move to another document. Can
7 we please be shown D219?
8 Do you have the document now?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. That's a -- the document, just so the record is clear, is the 3rd
11 of June 1993, it's signed by Sefer Halilovic, and is in relation to the
12 forming of a committee. At that time, you were the deputy commander of
13 the corps. Do you recall seeing that document at the time?
14 A. No. I could not affirm that. But I don't think that I did. It's
15 possible but I don't think so.
16 Q. Is the --
17 A. I spoke earlier, this is precisely the document that I was
18 thinking of, because I've seen it here, from you, over the past few days,
19 it's a document issued by Sefer Halilovic for the purpose of taking
20 measures with regard to activities of the 10th Mountain Brigade.
21 Q. Underneath order, at paragraph 1, it orders a mixed committee of
22 representatives of the Supreme Command Staff, the Ministry of the Interior
23 and the 1st Corps Command to be formed. What do you know about the
24 formation of that committee in June of 1993?
25 A. I can say that I might have some kind of vague recollection of
1 this, but I guarantee that this was not the only such case. Such cases
2 were more frequent. So I cannot really say anything specific about this
3 commission, especially because another member, Mazlak, Enver [phoen] is a
4 member of the commission. He's from the 1st Corps command. He was in
5 charge of personnel and mobilisation at the 1st Corps command which means
6 most probably that the commission was formed, and that they probably tried
7 to get into the 10th Mountain Brigade, but because nothing spectacular
8 happened in terms of the problem being resolved, it means that the
9 commission didn't really achieve any significant results. This would be
10 my assessment, and it couldn't have achieved much. This is not unusual,
11 in my mind.
12 Q. Why couldn't it have achieved much?
13 A. Probably simply because it wasn't given access to the brigade, and
14 to carry out what it was supposed to do, according to orders of
15 General Sefer Halilovic.
16 Q. Can we move now to document 65 ter number 16, which is 01858799.
17 The document we are about to show you is a document in the name of Sefer
18 Halilovic, and the relevant part -- it's to the Presidency of the Republic
19 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the relevant part I want to take you to is
20 the first page under the heading, "One, combat activities on mount
21 Trebevic, A, combat activities of the 10th Mountain Brigade." Do you see
22 that there now?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. All right. Can you just read the -- the paragraphs under A to the
25 bottom of the page?
1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 378.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I don't mind this witness being
3 shown any document the Prosecutor chooses but it should always be
4 established whether or not he's seen it before.
5 JUDGE LIU: Yes, I agree with you.
6 MR. RE:
7 Q. Mr. Karavelic, have you seen this document before you came to The
9 A. I don't think so.
10 Q. Just continue reading it, please.
11 A. I've read it.
12 Q. I want you to comment upon the accuracy of the information
13 Mr. Halilovic provided to the Presidency.
14 A. In accordance to what I know and the information that is available
15 to me concerning this incident, I think that this is an objective,
16 realistic, and truthful report.
17 Q. How would Mr. Halilovic have received this information, in the
18 normal course of the military chain of communication?
19 A. The most usual way would be for the command of the 1st Corps to
20 receive this information. However, the superior has a right to acquire
21 information in other ways also.
22 Q. Information I've just asked to you comment on is, quote, "On the
23 28th of May, 1993, the 10th Brigade engaged in a combat mission of their
24 own without the corps command approval." Quote stop. "Not a single
25 report reached the corps command from this brigade area after the 25th of
1 May 1993. On several occasions the corps command tried to influence the
2 management and command of this brigade in writing through personal
3 contacts and communication means, all too no avail, which the SVKOSBH and
4 the Presidency have been informed," unquote. What was the effect, the
5 military effect, the 10th Brigade engaging in this combat mission on their
6 own without the corps command approval?
7 A. The effect was negative, precisely this report of
8 General Sefer Halilovic states that the arbitrary behaviour of the
9 commander of the 10th Mountain Brigade, who on his own initiated combat,
10 resulted in a situation where we had to activate the 1st Mountain Brigade
11 in order to take the pressure off the 10th Brigade and the 1st and the 1st
12 Mountain Brigade had to embark on more speedy preparations and go into
13 attack earlier, and when it finally did go into attack, it achieved
14 considerable effect. It took the Vidikovac positions, but after that,
15 something unforeseen happened. There was a fog in the early morning. The
16 wind destroyed this fog. The visibility became better, and the soldiers
17 were visible on their positions, which resulted in a lot of casualties, as
18 a result of that.
19 Q. Is this document objected to by the Defence?
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, there hasn't been an offer made to tender it
22 MR. RE: If an offer were made.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: I don't really want to get into an auction about
24 it. If my friend's offering it for tender, my friend should say -- is
25 he's offering it for tender or not and then we'll say -- we'll what our
1 position is.
2 MR. RE: I do. I just ask him because of the break. If it's not
3 objected to, I'll press for its tender now.
4 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, could I ask to ask -- I just ask we
5 defer that argument until the end. The Prosecutor should offer it as he
6 has for marking. I would like to take some instructions on a couple of
7 aspects of it. I -- I -- I must say I already have instructions already
8 about some parts. I'm guessing that I won't object, but I'd just like to
9 leave that to the end if that's okay.
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes, of course we will defer a decision on that
12 It's time for the lunch break and we'll resume at 2.30.
13 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.47 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 2.30 p.m.
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re.
16 MR. RE: Thank you. Could we have that document back, please,
17 which was MFI --
18 THE REGISTRAR: 378.
19 MR. RE: 378.
20 Q. Mr. Karavelic, I just want you to comment on the format of that
21 document. Does it appear to you to be a document issued from the Supreme
22 Command in 1993? Does it follow the normal format of such documents?
23 A. I didn't see the signature at the end of the document, but the
24 heading of the document seems to be the usual one.
25 Q. Could we go to the second page and then the third page, please?
1 Has the second and third page come up before you?
2 A. I only have the second page. Actually, the last page, with the
3 signature, a total of two pages.
4 Q. All right. There should be one in the middle. Do you want to see
5 the one in the middle?
6 A. Yes. I see it now. It has "paragraph B" on it.
7 Q. Let's just go to the third page, please.
8 There is some handwriting on the left-hand side of the page. The
9 English translation says, "second tragic event on Dobrinja." Do you
10 recognise that handwriting?
11 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I wasn't aware of this occurring but
12 is it going to be sought to elicit evidence about -- about Mr. Halilovic's
13 handwriting or somebody else's handwriting here? Because I don't know
14 anything about this coming up, frankly. I'm caught by surprise. But if
15 it's expert type of evidence that's sought we should know about it.
16 JUDGE LIU: I don't know either. We have to wait for the
17 questions, I'm afraid. Would you please wait for a minute until the
18 question is out?
19 MR. MORRISSEY: I thought the question was out but if you want to
20 wait for the answer, I'll wait.
21 JUDGE LIU: Well, let's proceed.
22 MR. RE:
23 Q. The question is, do you recognise the handwriting, not as an
24 expert but as someone who may have come across it before or may not have?
25 A. I don't recognise the handwriting. It doesn't ring a bell.
1 Q. Having seen now the second and third pages of that document, can
2 you comment on whether it is -- appears to be a normal communication from
3 the Supreme Command as of June 1993?
4 A. I think that it does. It has the usual format, and I had the
5 opportunity to see various documents from the Supreme Command Staff
6 headquarters, or from the General Staff to the Supreme Command, where
7 events are described or assessments are given.
8 Q. Let's move to another one. 65 ter 20, 01858798.
9 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 379.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Sorry, Your Honour, I don't seem to have it as
11 yet. I don't know if I'm the only person who hasn't, but --
12 MR. RE: It appears to have arrived.
13 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I know what the problem is.
14 Would -- could I just ask for the indulgence of the Prosecutor for a
15 minute, please, while we -- I know what's happened on the screen. It will
16 just take us a second to fix it. And I apologise for that. We have it.
17 Thank you.
18 MR. RE:
19 Q. The first question, Mr. Karavelic, as always, have you seen this
20 document before? That is, before coming to The Hague.
21 A. I don't remember seeing it before, no.
22 Q. Just have a look at the format of it. The heading is "Republic of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina staff of the Supreme Command of the armed forces,
24 office of the commander." The date is the 9th of July 1993, and just as I
25 ask to you comment upon the format of the document we looked at a moment
1 ago which was MFI 378, can you comment upon the format of that particular
3 A. This is also the usual kind of document. I don't know who signed
4 this document. It should be the commander of the Supreme Command Staff.
5 Q. Who is -- who was the commander of the Supreme Command Staff, as
6 of the 7th, sorry, the 9th of July 1993?
7 A. General Rasim Delic.
8 Q. The document says "A list of illegally detained persons, according
9 to information available to the Supreme Command Staff, the following
10 persons have been arrested and are still detained in the 10th Mountain
11 Brigade." There is a list of 15 people. The first one is one Amir Delkic
12 [phoen]. Did you know Mr. Amir Delkic as of the 9th of July 1993?
13 A. I'm not 100 per cent sure. I assume that Amir Delkic, under
14 number 1 on this list, is my security officer from the 1 Corps command,
15 one of my people, if I'm not mistaken. Even though the first time I saw
16 this document was a couple of days ago, I remember that at one point, he
17 was also forcefully taken by members of the 10th Mountain Brigade.
18 Q. Forcefully taken and what?
19 A. I can't say exactly what all the steps were that we took, but he
20 was released after a certain period, and he returned to the service.
21 Q. At the bottom of the document -- I withdraw that. When you say
22 forcefully taken, are you referring to taken to do trench-digging work by
23 the 10th?
24 A. That's probably it. I can't really explain exactly. I don't know
25 all the details, but I do have a vague recollection that he did have some
1 problems for a while and that he was detained by members of the 10th
2 Mountain Brigade.
3 Q. There are another 14 people listed on that list. Do you know or
4 recognise -- do you know any of those people or recognise any of those
6 A. No.
7 Q. How could the information about those people have been obtained by
8 the Supreme Command Staff in the normal course of military communication?
9 A. The way the Supreme Command communicated with anyone from the 1st
10 Corps usually was to communicate through the 1st Corps Command. However,
11 the superior command, the Supreme Command, has a right to acquire
12 information in different ways, through its services, or diagonally by
13 skipping over the 1st Corps Command, that is their right. But this is
14 something that was applied very rarely in practice.
15 How could they have acquired this information? Well, there were
16 numerous ways. There were several ways to do that. Specifically, perhaps
17 from Amir Delkic if he was released quickly perhaps he provided this
18 information, the first person on this list.
19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... the document, the first line
20 says, have been arrested and are still detained.
21 A. This is just a general statement. Many things were not known at
22 the time. Never mind whether those people had just been detained, whether
23 they were still being detained, or whether Amir Delkic was released five
24 minutes after it was drafted, this is something that you could not specify
25 or perhaps a couple of days afterwards. This is just general information.
1 Q. Just go to the last paragraph, it refers to a few dozen other
2 citizens, quote, "and members of the BH army and HVO units have been
3 illegally arrested and detained in the area of responsibility of the 10th
4 Brigade, where they are carrying out fortification work," unquote.
5 Were you aware that members -- of whether or not members of the BH
6 army and the HVO were being detained and forced to do fortification work
7 in the same way that civilians were?
8 A. As far as I know, the 10th Mountain Brigade did not make any
9 distinctions as to whether they were civilians or members of the army, if,
10 in a given moment they were not doing anything in particular, and were
11 perhaps seen in downtown sitting in a cafe and having a cup of coffee and
12 there was fighting within -- with -- by the 10th Mountain Brigade they
13 would just pick up these people because this was their conception of the
14 proper way of doing things, to feed such people into battle or to engage
15 them in various fortification works, for the needs of the 10th Mountain
16 Brigade. Similarly, they made no distinction in terms of nationality. On
17 this list of 15 people I think 14 are Bosniaks, Muslims, and only the one
18 under number 13 is either a Serb or a Croat. I can't be sure. Also, they
19 made no distinction in terms of who was whose son or family member or who
20 was what, ethnicity wise. I also think that I remember that some
21 ministers in fact were also taken to dig trenches. I cannot say
22 specifically what ministers, at what particular time, et cetera. So it
23 emanates, I mean the answer to all conceivable questions that you might
24 ask me in this context actually emanates from what I've just said.
25 Q. May that be received into evidence?
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, it's not agreed to. Perhaps we
2 could defer that particular document to the end as well, but this looks
3 like just more of the operative information type of material, and there
4 witness hasn't seen it so perhaps somewhat unlike the other one, I think
5 I'll probably object to. I'd just like to defer these discussions to the
6 ends if it's okay.
7 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
8 MR. MORRISSEY: I can deal with it now.
9 JUDGE LIU: Yes, let's defer it to the end of this proceedings.
10 MR. RE: Just in relation to that, is there some specific area of
11 objection which I might be able to cover with the witness if some further
12 information from the witness is needed rather than leaving it to the end
13 if he's not here?
14 JUDGE LIU: Yes, of course.
15 MR. MORRISSEY: There is two answers. The answer is that first of
16 all, it's up to my friend to do that, but secondly I think it's a fair
17 request given that we will deal with it at the end. So I expect to object
18 to it and the basis that this witness has never seen it before and it's
19 operative information, it's, well, just the objections I've really raised
20 I think would be the main ones, there is nothing else other than that
21 there is no reason it should be admitted on the face of it.
22 JUDGE LIU: Well, I've already made the ruling that we will defer
23 this matter at the end of the proceedings while the witness is still
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes.
1 MR. RE: Thank you.
2 Q. Just finally in relation to that document, you've given me an
3 answer about the attitude of the 10th towards civilians of any ethnicity
4 and their activities in relation to taking people to dig trenches.
5 Looking at the document as a whole, can you comment upon the accuracy,
6 based upon your knowledge, of what the 10th was doing? Does it appear to
7 be accurate or inaccurate, or what?
8 MR. MORRISSEY: That is a speculation. That's being sought. And
9 I object to it.
10 MR. RE: I press it. The witness has given evidence about what
11 the 10th was doing and I'm attempting to elicit whether the information
12 appears to be accurate based on what he knows or otherwise.
13 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours --
14 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe that this witness has already answered
15 that question from the previous questions and answers. I think the
16 picture is quite clear.
17 MR. RE: Fair enough.
18 Q. Can we please move to the next document, which is -- it did have a
19 marking of MFI 205. I think it -- I think we attempted to tender it
20 through -- I don't know, might have been Mr. -- Sorry, excuse me.
21 I think we attempted to tender it through Mr. Jasarevic?
22 THE REGISTRAR: It was not admitted into evidence.
23 MR. RE: I'll try with this witness. Can this witness please be
24 shown that document? Do you need the ERN?
25 THE REGISTRAR: No, Mr. Re, I have it.
1 MR. RE:
2 Q. All right. Can you see the document there, Mr. Karavelic?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. It's dated the 6th of July 1993. It's a Ministry of the Interior
5 document, Ministry of the Interior document headed "information,"
6 referring first of all to an attack on the police station on the 2nd of
7 July 1993 by the 9th and 10th brigades. One moment. Earlier, you gave
8 some information about the surrounding of a police station and the
9 blockading of the Main Staff in July 1993.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours before my learned friend commences to
11 question on it, the initial question should be asked again, has he seen it
13 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
14 MR. RE: I will, I promise I will ask that.
15 JUDGE LIU: But that should be the first question whenever we come
16 across a new document.
17 MR. RE: I'll train myself.
18 Q. Have you -- had you seen this document before coming to The Hague?
19 A. I don't think so.
20 Q. Have a look at the information in the first and second paragraphs.
21 A. I have.
22 Q. Earlier you gave some information about the surrounding of a
23 police station and the blockading of the Main Staff in July 1993. How do
24 you assess based upon your earlier evidence and your knowledge of what
25 happened in those two incidents, how do you assess the accuracy of the
1 information in the first two paragraphs?
2 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, I object to that. With respect, the witness
3 can't be asked to assess the accuracy of information like this because
4 it's totally irrelevant to what the Tribunal has to decide. He can be
5 asked whether he saw such things and what he's got to say about it. If he
6 saw the document at the time or has some contemporaneous knowledge of it,
7 or even something that arose as a relatively close time he could perhaps
8 comment upon it in that regard. But to ask him effectively to
9 authenticate what's here by saying, does it appear to him to be accurate,
10 is attempting to lend legitimacy to a document which at the moment looks
11 like it's not going to be tendered like all the others. And therefore I
12 object to that being done. But I wouldn't object to questions of the
13 normal sort that have already been permitted about what's to be found
14 there. In other words, not to authenticate the document itself but to
15 discuss the relevant things that have happened.
16 JUDGE LIU: Yes, but I believe that that is just a form of the
17 question. Let us go to the so-called normal sort of the questions.
18 MR. RE: The very question I just asked was objected to while I
19 was directed to ask have that he question before about the accuracy. I'm
20 not quite sure how to proceed.
21 JUDGE LIU: I quite understand that. To me there is no
22 difference. The accuracy or inaccuracy, as well as what he saw at this --
23 at that time, whether what he saw is corresponding to what is said in this
24 document. I think this is the aim for that. To me there is no
25 difference. But since there is objections from Defence, let's approach
1 the normal sort of the question.
2 MR. RE:
3 Q. Does what is written there accord with your own information as to
4 what happened?
5 A. I actually have various kind information in relation to this
6 particular event. Why? It is quite possible that at that time, if not
7 before, I had already left the city of Sarajevo on the orders of my
8 superiors and had gone to the mountain of Igman. So that I only heard
9 about this entire incident in the -- it is hard for me to say anything
10 specific in connection with this event apart from what I have already
12 Q. Move to the third paragraph, and that refers to -- it says
13 "According to the information currently at disposal the armed attack
14 against the SJB premises and employees by the 10th Mountain Brigade is
15 carried out among others by the following, Musan Topalovic, a.k.a. Caco,
16 Senad Hasic," and there is a list of other names. It goes down, and the
17 following members of the 9th Motorised Brigade, Ramiz Delalic a.k.a. Celo,
18 Mustafa Hata a.k.a. Musa [phoen], some other names, including Molcer,
19 Ravcanin [phoen], and finally a member called Atan [phoen]. What -- the
20 question is the same as the previous question. Does that accord with the
21 information you had as to who was involved in the attack on the police
23 A. I can only confirm in relation to a number of these people whom I
24 know, headed by Caco and a number of his people, and also people from the
25 9th - you said 10th - Motorised Brigade, which is who are Ramiz Delalic,
1 Celo, and another, several other people from that brigade, but at that
2 time, I did not have the names of those people, so that basically, my
3 answer is practically identical to the previous one I gave you, in
4 connection with this particular information.
5 Q. All right. Move, please, to document P206?
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Can my friend indicated he was going to offer that
7 one for tender. I'm not sure if he is or not.
8 JUDGE LIU: Well, we have already decided we'll deal with it
9 altogether with other documents.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Oh, yes, pardon me, I wasn't seeking to traverse
11 that. I just wondered if the practice is going to be for my learned
12 friend to offer them all at the end or to mention now that he's going to
13 offer them. Frankly, it's for my records, I'm just ticking them off as we
14 go, Your Honour. That's the only reason, so if we are going to deal with
15 the whole lot at the end I won't make the inquiry.
16 JUDGE LIU: To me there is no difference but the best way is to
17 let Mr. Re to tell us which way he prefers.
18 MR. RE: Well, I wasn't actually going to persist with attempting
19 to tender that one in the light of the answers just given.
20 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.
21 MR. MORRISSEY: Grateful for the indication, Your Honour.
22 MR. RE: P206, please.
23 Q. Do you have the next one, which is dated the 10th of July 1993,
24 headed "security administration," and it's an official note. Firstly, is
25 this a document you have seen before you came to The Hague?
1 A. No. In fact, maybe I misspoke. I -- I have not seen this
2 document prior to my arrival at The Hague.
3 Q. Just look at the information in it in relation to the attack, or
4 the -- sorry, the planned attack. Were you aware of that at the time or
5 became aware of it, the information contained there, or did you become
6 aware of it at some later point?
7 MR. MORRISSEY: May I object to that one? That appears to be one
8 of the questions such as, "Have you stopped beating your wife yet?" It
9 really implies the -- an answer there, so I object to the leading quality
10 of it.
11 MR. RE: I'm not -- I don't quite understand it to be leading. I
12 said, "Are you aware of the information there or did you become aware of
13 it later."
14 JUDGE LIU: Maybe the first part of the question is okay.
15 MR. MORRISSEY: It is.
16 JUDGE LIU: And by the way, could the Court deputy inform us about
17 the status of this document? It's admitted or not?
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour this document was admitted on the 4th
19 of March this year.
20 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.
21 MR. RE:
22 Q. I appreciate you're aware of it now but were you aware of that
23 information contemporaneously?
24 A. No, no, I wasn't. Not then, and not all this time after the war
25 until the point when I read it in this document that was shown me.
1 Q. Can the witness please be shown the next document, 65 ter 155,
2 which is ERN 02183086?
3 THE REGISTRAR: It will be MFI 380.
4 MR. RE:
5 Q. Do you have the document there now?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. It's a document dated the 28th of August 1993. Under the hand of
8 Sacir Arnautovic, your chief of security, to the Supreme Command Staff
9 security administration. My first question is: Had you seen this
10 document in 1993?
11 A. I'm not sure. I don't think so.
12 Q. All right. I want you to read the document, please.
13 A. I've read it.
14 Q. Is it this a document which appears on its face to have been
15 issued from the 1st Corps command when you were the corps commander?
16 A. Well, looking at its date and the structure of the document, if it
17 is a valid document, it was issued by the security service of the 1 Corps
19 Q. Do you have the signature page in front of you, which is the
20 second page?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Whose signature is on the second page?
23 A. I cannot say. Probably it is Sacir Arnautovic's signature but I
24 can't be sure. If you have any doubts as to whether it is his signature,
25 I cannot help you. I don't know.
1 Q. What can you say about the accuracy of the information contained
2 in the document?
3 A. I can say one thing. That is, that most of the content of this
4 report is something that I see for the first time now that I have read
5 this document, and generally, this is the first time that I hear of it.
6 Q. What -- there is an information which says quote "The source said
7 that the Sandzak lobby conducts many illegal dealings through Celo and
8 Caco from smuggling deficient goods to the typical gang robberies and
9 taking away of goods and foreign currency from civilians," unquote. What
10 can you say about the accuracy of that particular passage?
11 A. The Sandzak lobby, first of all, this concept, when one refers to
12 the Sandzak lobby, this is something that also had existed before the war
13 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and people used it in their normal every day
14 speech in Sarajevo. It was an argot concept before the war and after the
15 war. And in fact also today. So that if I can say so, this is a concept
16 that has worn out thin. It has been overexploited, as it were. Which
17 absolutely doesn't have to mean a thing, but having said that, I cannot
18 claim with certainty that there is not something there, but I cannot
19 assert either that there is something there, nor can I say anything to
20 corroborate the content of this document and the allegations in it.
21 Q. What I'm asking you is about the accuracy based upon the
22 information you had at the time of the allegation that Celo and Caco were
23 involved in smuggling deficient goods to -- deficient goods and typical
24 gang robberies and taking away goods and foreign currency from civilians.
25 A. Yes, Ramiz Delalic, Celo, is -- or hails from Sandzak. Musan
1 Topalovic, Caco, however, does not. He's not from Sandzak extraction, as
2 far as I know. But of course, that doesn't have to have anything to do
3 with some sort of a Sandzak lobby.
4 Now, as to the things you say they were doing, there are numerous
5 sources that do say that they did do that to a lesser or greater extent.
6 However, it is also a fact that these sources do not speak only about them
7 or rather that there are sources that refer to other men and officers of
8 the command in this vein as well. I cannot say before this Tribunal, yes,
9 they did do that, because I have nothing in the way of compelling evidence
10 to be able to say that, something with which I can confirm that and
11 something by which I can stand.
12 If you were to ask me when did Caco buy his rifle, a rifle, or
13 sell a rifle or buy anything, I, as a corps commander, what could I tell
14 you? I don't know the date or whether he did it or not, and how many
15 times, if so, he did do it, and so on and so forth. But of course, most
16 of the stories about the security service, the security service gathering
17 and obtaining information from their sources. Now, what sources are
18 these? This is something that only the security service knows, and I, as
19 the commander, do not wish to venture into any guess work of that kind.
20 Although, I often -- I often had things to say about that. I
21 often objected to such practices. Let me tell you something about the
22 security service and its functioning. A propos. In 1994, namely,
23 President Izetbegovic received a letter which was about me. According to
24 certain information, they said that I was the greatest criminal there, as
25 the corps commander. So when this -- when I got hold of this document,
1 myself, without so much as anyone's leave or permission, I went to see
2 President Izetbegovic, and I could see that it bore
3 President Izetbegovic's signature, and I asked the president,
4 "Mr. President, why didn't you investigate this matter to the full? If I
5 am the kind of person this document says that I am, this paper, why have
6 not you replaced me? Or rather, why haven't you hanged me near the
7 eternal fire in the city of Sarajevo for that? And I demand that of you
8 now. Either treat me in this way, treat me in that way, or treat the
9 person who gave you this report in that way." However, President
10 Izetbegovic remained silent and would not say anything to me. So I'm just
11 saying this to illustrate the kind of situation that obtained in Sarajevo
12 at the time, if you capture my meaning.
13 Q. All right. You've talked about Celo coming from Sandzak but Caco
14 not. Where was Sefer Halilovic from?
15 A. Believe me when I tell you that I don't know where he was born.
16 He lived in Sarajevo. I assume that Sefer Halilovic hailed from Sandzak,
17 just like Ramiz Delalic, Celo, did. I don't know where Musan Topalovic is
18 from. I assume he's from Sarajevo. I don't think he comes from Sandzak.
19 Q. Now, could we move to the next paragraph or the paragraph, the
20 second paragraph under that, which says, "According to the source's
21 information a number of wealthy citizens are being blackmailed, they have
22 to pay significant amounts in foreign currency in order to," quote 'have
23 the benefits,' unquote "of Caco's and Celo's protection and do their job
24 without disturbance." Unquote. Now, I just want you to confine yourself
25 to what's written there and tell the Trial Chamber whether that accords
1 with the information you had at the time about their -- about their
3 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, I object to this. He's
4 already been asked and given complete evidence about what he knew about
5 racketeering and so on. He was asked those specific questions perfectly
6 properly and he answered them. Now, asking him to comment on a document
7 that he's never seen and made quite a point of saying he wasn't vouching
8 for its validity is not the proper way to proceed and I object to it.
9 JUDGE LIU: And what's more, here, in this document, it says "the
10 source claims," which means that it's not the firsthand information. It's
11 just hearsay evidence. So this witness also testified that he's never
12 seen this document before. That will be the hearsay of hearsay. So I
13 wonder whether we could get somewhere through this document here
14 concerning of this witness.
15 MR. RE: I take your point and I've moved on.
16 JUDGE LIU: Yes, please.
17 MR. RE: Could the witness please be shown 65 ter number 22, which
18 is 01805241?
19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 381.
20 MR. RE:
21 Q. It's an order under the hand of Sefer Halilovic addressed to the
22 1st Corps command of the 30th of July 1993 in relation to the dispatching
23 of units from the 101st and the 9th -- sorry the 5th and 9th Motorised
24 Brigades, in part, and the detachment of part of the 9th Motorised Brigade
25 to part of the special purposes unit, the Zuka Brigade. Do you remember
1 receiving that document in 1993?
2 A. I don't remember receiving it because I was at Igman at the time,
3 and a few days before this date, and a few days after, I was with
4 General Delic and Sefer Halilovic. I was in communication with them only
5 via radio through Motorolas and I think this is a document which they
6 drafted at my request when, during those few days, a couple of days before
7 or after, requested from them as my superiors to send urgent assistance to
8 me at Igman because I didn't have enough soldiers, the aggressor would
9 make a second ring around Sarajevo, and the aggressor advancing from the
10 direction of Trnovo will link up with the aggressor advancing from the
11 direction of Hadzici. I also did not see this document before, until it
12 was shown to me.
13 Q. The first part refers to dispatching, or paragraph 1 says, "During
14 the night dispatch one unit from H 101st Motorised Brigade, 5th Motorised
15 Brigade and 9th Motorised Brigade in order to stop the aggressor
16 incursion." The second one says, "Units from the 101st and 5th shall
17 report to the 1st Corps commander," that's you, your name is there, "and
18 the units from the 9th Brigade shall become part of the special purposes
19 unit, Zuka." Why was one unit from the 9th being detached to become part
20 of Zuka's unit?
21 A. I can't say anything about that either. The simple answer is, I
22 don't know. It's a little bit illogical that it's written like this but
23 the superior is always right. That's one thing. This company never
24 became a part of the Zulfikar detachment and if I'm not mistaken the order
25 was written on the 30th of July. The units were not able to leave
1 Sarajevo via the airport because the tunnel was dug through only in the
2 morning of August 1st, and on August 1st, in the morning, the Zulfikar
3 detachment, of their own will, left Igman without my permission and they
4 never returned to Igman.
5 Q. Well, what military reason could you think of as an experienced
6 commander for the Chief of the Main Staff, Mr. Halilovic, to order the
7 detachment of a unit from the 9th to a special purposes unit of Zuka?
8 A. It's a question of assessment. I would rather not make such an
9 assessment. The superior has the right to do that, and that's what he did
10 with this order. However, I'm seeing this order for the first time, and
11 item 2 was never actually put into practice, and at the time, when I was
12 at Igman, I didn't know that this was something that was supposed to be
13 implemented, neither did I hear anything about it from anyone until I saw
14 this document. Only on the 2nd and 3rd of August, the 1st company came
15 out from this 5th Motorised Brigade, came through the tunnel to help me
16 out at Igman. Later, I don't know how many days later, a unit came -- a
17 company came from the 9th Motorised and also from the 101st and they were
18 under my command up there. They took up the lines of defence immediately.
19 And took up combat and prevented the aggressor from linking up from two
20 directions. And with fierce fighting and defence, they prevented the
21 aggressor from placing a second ring of siege around Sarajevo.
22 Q. Was it normal military practice for someone in Mr. Halilovic's
23 position as number 2 or number 4 in the army at that point, to order the
24 detachment of a specific unit from a specific brigade to another one?
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours I'd seek that that be
1 clarified. Does my learned friend mean was it normal military practice in
2 the context of the Igman war or Igman battle that was going on, or was it
3 normal military practice in the Bosnian army more generally, or military
4 practice in a broader context? Because those things can be quite
5 different and in this case would be.
6 JUDGE LIU: Yes, I think that's a legitimate request.
7 MR. RE: The witness lass given evidence that the second one had
8 nothing to do with the Igman one. The first one was to do with Igman but
9 the second one wasn't. My question was directed towards normal military
10 practice of detaching subordinating units in any circumstances.
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
12 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, perhaps I just have to expand the
13 objection. Unfortunately, the witness hasn't given evidence that the
14 second part had nothing to do with Igman at all. The witness says that it
15 didn't happen, and that the Zulfikar unit vanished. He hasn't said that
16 it has nothing to do with Igman and, well, anyway, that's the refinement.
17 The objection is the same and yes --
18 JUDGE LIU: I mean.
19 MR. MORRISSEY: -- got nothing to add to the objection.
20 JUDGE LIU: The units from those two mountain brigades did not
21 actually report to the witness himself. I believe that's what the witness
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, that's correct, that's a different -- well we
24 think it's a different theme but that's the reason I add the objection.
25 JUDGE LIU: But, Mr. Re, just ask a general question based on this
2 MR. RE:
3 Q. Do you remember the question?
4 A. Could you please repeat it?
5 Q. The question is directed to whether or not the information or the
6 direction in paragraph 2 is normal military practice. Was it normal
7 military practice for someone in Mr. Halilovic's position, as either the
8 number 2 or 4 in the army, to order the detachment of a unit from one
9 brigade within one corps to another?
10 A. Could you please give me a little more time so I can clarify? I
11 do not wish to be wrongly interpreted if I give you a short answer because
12 a short answer can often lead to a different direction. The situation in
13 late July and early August was the most difficult situation. Those two
14 months were the most difficult ones of the whole war. And this is 100 per
15 cent correct. You don't have to check this. The situation was so grave
16 that it was a question of to be or not to be. The whole town could fall
17 over night and the army could disappear, the citizens of Sarajevo as well
18 as the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, too.
19 That's when I requested, because I was in a panic, I was without
20 soldiers under the onslaught of the enemy, the aggressor. Give me units
21 from Sarajevo urgently, otherwise Sarajevo will be surrounded by a second
22 ring of siege. And this is something that I discussed with Mustafa
23 Hajrulahovic. I had spoken with Sefer Halilovic via Motorola as well. I
24 don't remember whether Rasim Delic was there as well but any way they told
25 me that everybody was there gathered together when I spoke with them, and
1 of course they were doing all they could to get units out to me. This is
2 my assumptions. I don't know whether Zulfikar Alispago, but allow me to
3 be clear, more clear. I don't know whether he's from Sandzak or from
4 Kosovo, I'm not sure. I assume he's from Sandzak. He was often in the
5 city of Sarajevo. And what if Ramiz or somebody from the 9th Motorised
6 said that that they wanted to fight together with that unit? At that
7 time, it was quite normal to accommodate commanders or soldiers who wanted
8 to fight with someone in particular. It was important to have high combat
9 morale and to use the unit in combat to stop the aggressor. But today,
10 ten or 15 years later, is a time when you must explain why things were
11 done that way. If I have to be really objective, I have to speak in this
12 way. Out of concern that I would not say something wrong or provide an
13 erroneous assessment. I wouldn't want to do that.
14 Secondly, it could also be a condition by someone. By whom?
15 That's something I can't talk about because I don't know who it was.
16 Third is General Delic, Halilovic, and Hajrulahovic would be the
17 ones who would know exactly why there was drafted in the way it was. At
18 the time I wasn't in Sarajevo so I wouldn't know. I don't know. I can
19 just guess if there is something else in the background of this, but I
20 don't need to speculate and assume that automatically it was something
21 that was bad that was in the background of this whole thing.
22 JUDGE LIU: Well, Witness, I'm afraid you did not answer the
23 question put to you by the Prosecutor. Maybe you did not quite understand
24 the question. Mr. Re, would you please raise it again?
25 MR. RE:
1 Q. The question I asked was whether it was normal military practice
2 for someone in Mr. Halilovic's position of seniority to issue an order
3 detaching one unit from a specific brigade in one corps to another unit
4 outside that corps altogether. Now, I just -- I just want to confine you
5 to normal military practice, as briefly as you can possibly answer it,
6 because we do -- we do have some understanding of the context here. There
7 has been a lot of evidence in this case.
8 A. When you say "normal," it means whether something was done
9 frequently and in continuity. This particular thing that you are thinking
10 of, I cannot say that it was done frequently and in continuity. However,
11 I cannot say either that it was not done quite frequently. It was. So
12 the briefest answer would be, perhaps this is not the most usual way, but
13 the superior has a right to do it.
14 Perhaps this is more a question for a military expert and not for
15 a witness.
16 Q. Well, you did give several weeks of expert evidence in the
17 Hadzihasanovic case?
18 A. Certainly.
19 Q. You've had many, many years of military expertise, didn't you?
20 A. I'm here as an ordinary witness. In order to respond to this
21 question, I would have to know 100 per cent the laws on defence, the rules
22 of service in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, about the competences
23 and the authority of superiors. I would have to study documents in order
24 to provide an adequate answer. I apologise, but that is my opinion.
25 Q. What was your understanding of the orders that Mr. Halilovic could
1 issue as the Chief of Staff on the 30th of July 1993?
2 A. If I were to interpret that, it would be the Chief of Staff who
3 had the right to issue orders, because he was backed by the commander of
4 the Main Staff of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, very
6 Q. All right. Does the document appear to you to have been signed
7 and issued by Mr. Halilovic?
8 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, it should be made clear in asking that
9 question whether the Prosecution is asking this witness to comment on the
10 signature and the authenticity of the document or whether he's just
11 saying, does it look as if it's come from those people.
12 MR. RE: Well, obviously the latter. I mean, the witness isn't
13 brought here as a handwriting expert.
14 Q. Does it appear to be a document -- you've just given evidence that
15 you spoke to Mr. Halilovic about the things in number 1. Does it appear
16 to be a document that he issued and signed?
17 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours the same objection arises. If he's
18 not being asked to give an opinion as to the signature, then it's a
19 completely meaningless question to ask.
20 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe it's about the signature. But not
21 from the expert point of view, but from his usual practice in the past. I
22 believe there are a lot of documents going back and forth between the 1st
23 Corps and the Main Staff.
24 MR. MORRISSEY: Of course.
25 JUDGE LIU: And there are a lot of documents bearing the signature
1 of Mr. Halilovic.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, that --
3 JUDGE LIU: We just want to know whether this witness is familiar
4 with the signature of Mr. Halilovic.
5 MR. MORRISSEY: There is no objection to that question.
6 JUDGE LIU: Which does not require the expert opinion there.
7 MR. MORRISSEY: If he knows it, of course it doesn't. I agree
8 with you entirely, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE LIU: Let me try that first.
10 MR. RE:
11 Q. Are you familiar with Mr. Halilovic's signature, Mr. Karavelic?
12 A. I can't say that I'm not familiar with it but I've forgotten a lot
13 also, but it seems as if it is his signature. But I cannot state that
14 with 100 per cent certainty.
15 Q. Is there any objection to the tender of this document? If I move
16 for its admission, so I know whether I have to go any further with the
18 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, I think that my friend should assume that
19 there may be an objection to it. I can't say that, but I'm -- he better
20 go further with it if needs be, if he needs to demonstrate ...
21 JUDGE LIU: It seems that we reversed our practice but --
22 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes.
23 JUDGE LIU: I'm entirely at the party's hands on that issue,
24 whichever they believe is convenient, we will do that. I'm very flexible
25 on that issue. And since the Prosecution tendered that document, it's
1 your opinion.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: I can respond now. Your Honours, I object to the
3 tendering of the document. The witness hasn't seen it before. He's made
4 comments -- the Prosecution has really got what it needs from it in the
5 sense that the witness can recall something about the incidents of that
6 time. That evidence is admissible and relevant. I didn't object to it,
7 but the document itself, he didn't see it, he can't authenticate it, he
8 hasn't dealt with it. I object to it.
9 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe that the witness testified that, upon
10 his request, this document was drafted. That means that this document is
11 to meet his request. Secondly, the witness testified that the contents of
12 this document, especially the part 2, he testified that whatever said in
13 part 2 is not materialised, at least at that time. We also believe that
14 this document has some relevance to our case and it is admitted into the
16 MR. MORRISSEY: As the Court pleases.
17 JUDGE LIU: It is so decided.
18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Prosecution Exhibit P381.
19 MR. RE:
20 Q. All right. I quantity to take you, Mr. Karavelic, to another
21 area, and that is Operation Neretva. When did you first hear about an
22 operation called Operation Neretva?
23 A. I cannot be specific about the date and time.
24 Q. Did you attend a meeting in Zenica of the corps commanders on
25 20th, 21st of August 1993?
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, the date is the 21st and 22nd. I
2 don't mind my friend leading as long as it's the right dates. It was the
3 21st and 22nd.
4 MR. RE: I stand direct corrected. The 21st and 22nd of August,
6 A. Yes. I was at that meeting or consultation. I think the question
7 was whether the Neretva operation was discussed at the meeting.
8 Q. Not yet. The question firstly is your attendance there. Did you
9 attend -- how long did you attend the meeting for, one day, two days, all
10 of it, parts of it?
11 A. As far as I remember, the consultations began in the morning,
12 around 9 or 10 in the morning, and it lasted practically all day. I think
13 that I left Zenica late that evening.
14 Q. Just stop you there. Do you mean -- I just stop you. You mean
15 the first day or the second day?
16 A. The first day, the 21st of August.
17 Q. Did you attend on the second day?
18 A. I don't think that I did. I don't know if the consultations were
19 held for the second day. I think two days were planned, but it was
20 actually finished in one day. But I cannot be 100 per cent certain.
21 Q. Do you remember an operation called Neretva being discussed at
22 that particular meeting when you attended?
23 A. I do remember it [as interpreted]. I don't think that the
24 operation Neretva was mentioned during the consultation, at least I don't
25 recall it being mentioned when I was there.
1 Q. The transcript says "I do remember it." I just want to clarify
2 that. Did you in fact say I don't remember it? I thought I heard -- I
3 thought I heard you say I don't remember it.
4 A. Precisely, yes.
5 Q. You said a few moments ago that you don't remember the exact date
6 when you first heard about it. When did you -- was it before or after the
7 soldiers went to Herzegovina that you heard of an operation called
9 A. In fact, I think that I had not heard about Operation Neretva
10 until the time when I was supposed to send in my units down there to
11 participate in the Neretva operation, according to orders by
12 General Sefer Halilovic.
13 Q. All right. Did you attend a supreme -- did you go to a Supreme
14 Command IKM in Kakanj? I'm sorry for my pronunciation. Kakanj.
15 A. Yes. I did, many times.
16 Q. Were you there when Operation Neretva was mentioned or discussed
17 at any time?
18 A. I do not recall that during at any of my stays at the forward
19 command post in Kakanj I attended any such discussions or conversations.
20 Q. Did you have any role in the planning of Operation Neretva?
21 A. No, I did not.
22 Q. What was your understanding of what Operation Neretva was?
23 A. Well, I never actually tried to understand it in that way until
24 this time when General Sefer Halilovic was indicted. I'm not quite sure
25 in what context you mean. I can give you my own view, my own assessment,
1 although perhaps this is a question for an expert.
2 Q. You said you first heard about it when you were supposed to send
3 your units down there, according to orders by General Halilovic. Tell the
4 Trial Chamber about your contact with Sefer Halilovic in relation to
5 sending troops to Herzegovina.
6 A. At the end of August, in very early September, the very beginning
7 of September, 1993, I remember this, I think telephone conversation or
8 perhaps it was by Motorola, I'm not quite sure at this point. This was a
9 talk with the Chief of Staff, General Sefer Halilovic. I was requested
10 then to send my units for the Neretva operation. Whether it was
11 specifically said that it was for the Neretva operation is something that
12 I cannot say, but what was said was for the execution of combat operations
13 in the Neretva River valley.
14 Given the overall very difficult, and I underline exceptionally
15 difficult situation in Sarajevo, and of course, I appreciated that to mean
16 our very difficult situation throughout the zone of responsibility of the
17 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, responsible for which were precisely General
18 Sefer Halilovic and Rasim Delalic [as interpreted], and I simply tried to
19 impress it upon the general, as far as I could, that I was afraid to
20 actually pluck out units from within the 1st Corps formation and deploy
21 them outside the zone of responsibility of the 1st Corps to carry out
22 combat missions somewhere in the zones of responsibility of other corps,
23 concretely speaking, in the valley of the Neretva River. Precisely
24 because I was afraid that a new attack might be mounted on the city of
25 Sarajevo. Because in July and August, there was an incessant, continuous
1 minute after minute attack on the city of Sarajevo, not hour after hour or
2 day after day, but minute after minute.
3 Q. I gist want to correct something. The transcript says "the Army
4 of Bosnia-Herzegovina responsible for which were precisely General Sefer
5 Halilovic and Rasim Delalic." It says Delalic. I think you said Delic.
6 Is that correct?
7 A. Delic, Delic is what I said. Including of course, and let me not
8 forget the two deputies, let me not be subjective in that respect. I'm
9 talking about the top brass of the Main Staff, the generals who were
10 responsible for the overall situation in the Army of Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina. I was of course responsible only for the 1st Corps.
12 Q. Now, where was Mr. Halilovic when he -- when you had this contact
13 by -- you think by Motorola?
14 A. I think that he was not in Sarajevo. He was somewhere outside
15 Sarajevo. I suppose he was in the Neretva River valley area.
16 Q. What did he say he wanted from you?
17 A. I think that the first conversation in principle was this.
18 Request by the general for units. However, for a time I tried, if I can
19 say so, I tried simply to -- and perhaps it is not nice to put it that way
20 now, in the -- before the general here, perhaps subconsciously I was
21 trying to evade having to send my units to combat in the Neretva River
22 valley. But today, I have to admit to my own self that I did not see the
23 entire picture, the entire playing field, in terms of the overall
24 situation that obtained throughout the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
25 irrespective of the fact that Sarajevo is -- was the capital of the
1 republic and was the most important of all our facilities.
2 Q. Which units did he want?
3 A. Very soon thereafter, a written document came, indicating quite
4 clearly the units that I was supposed to send, for the execution of combat
5 operations in the Neretva River valley area.
6 Q. Can the witness please be shown P161?
7 While the document is coming do you remember whether Mr. Halilovic
8 in that conversation specified the units or whether the specification came
9 in the order itself? Did he tell you he wanted certain units and then
10 sent you an order or wasn't that detail discussed at first?
11 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honour, I object to that question.
12 There could be more options than the two that have been offered to the
13 witness there.
14 MR. RE: I'm sure he can tell us if there are.
15 MR. MORRISSEY: I'll just finish my objection. The objection is
16 that the witness has been offered two cards to choose from. It might be
17 that there are more available in reality, so the witness could say what he
18 remembers about the designation of the troops and which troops were
19 discussed if any. And that's an open question that he can answer in a
20 non-leading fashion.
21 JUDGE LIU: Yes, and maybe Mr. Re you could ask one question after
23 MR. RE: All right.
24 Q. Did Mr. Halilovic specify, in your conversation with him, which
25 units he wanted? And please just -- I mean, if you can say yes, say yes,
1 if you can say no, say no, and I'll move on to the next question.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: No, no, no.
3 MR. RE: He can answer it. No, I object. He can answer it yes or
4 no but I'll move on to --
5 MR. MORRISSEY: [Unintelligible]
6 MR. RE: -- answer another question. That's another question.
7 JUDGE LIU: Well, as a rule of the proceedings, the witness should
8 first answer yes or no, if he could. If he wants to explain the reasons
9 for this answer, he may give his reasons.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: As the Court pleases.
11 JUDGE LIU: But if the Prosecution want more information, I'm sure
12 the Prosecution will ask further questions along this line.
13 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I think it's the other way around.
14 I think in -- in this case, it's the Defence who want further information
15 and the Prosecutor who is attempting to keep it under --
16 JUDGE LIU: Well, this is the Prosecution's case in chief. If you
17 want more information, you have the full opportunity to cross-examine this
18 witness at a later stage.
19 MR. MORRISSEY: I will, Your Honour. It's just that what I really
20 object to is that the witness be told to -- effectively to be
21 cross-examined, have his answers limited. But Your Honour's analysis of
22 the situation is right and I won't say any more about it.
23 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
24 MR. RE:
25 Q. All right. You understand?
1 A. Yes. I do understand. I do not remember whether in that
2 particular conversation he specified what particular units he wanted.
3 Q. Can we move to P161 which I think is on your screen there? You
4 said you received an order from Mr. Halilovic. Is that the order which
5 you received from Mr. Halilovic?
6 A. I think that it is, yes, that is it.
7 Q. In paragraph -- sorry, paragraph 2 says, quote, "if you consider
8 that such redeployment endangers the defence of Sarajevo I'm prepared to
9 bear full responsibility." Is it something Mr. Halilovic actually said to
10 you in conversation or does it appear in the order for the first time, to
11 your ...
12 A. It is hard for me to confirm whether it was said explicitly like
13 that in our telephone conversation, but I suppose that the second point in
14 the order stemmed from our conversation and my statements given to
15 General Halilovic when I said that it was very difficult for me to extract
16 my units, to send them outside my own zone of responsibility.
17 Q. And order one specifically refers to Delta Brigade, parts of the
18 9th and 10th and Solakovic's unit, that is the 2nd Independent Battalion,
19 involving over 300 soldiers. Now, that's -- Mr. Halilovic has asked for
20 some fairly specific units. Why did he ask for those particular units?
21 A. As for the Delta Brigade, and the 2nd Independent Battalion, it
22 was quite logical that he asked for those. Militarily observed, had I
23 been in a similar situation I would have probably acted in the same way,
24 because the Delta Brigade and the 2nd Independent Battalion were units in
25 reserve. In other words mobile units of the 1st Corps of the Army of
2 Which is to say they did not hold the defence line. They did not
3 have a zone of responsibility.
4 Q. What about the other two? Parts of the 9th and parts of the 10th.
5 A. The 9th and 10th Brigades, from the beginning to the end of the
6 war, had their zones of responsibility and were manning, were holding, the
7 defence line in Sarajevo. And already, as of the end of August, I'm not
8 quite sure whether they were included in my first order of the 18th of
9 August 1993. I think that they were. So those brigades, in addition to
10 this zone of responsibility which they had in Sarajevo, they were also
11 holding a part of the defence line at Mount Igman, outside the city of
12 Sarajevo, but still in the zone of responsibility of the 1st Corps.
13 Q. All right. You said that it was logical to ask for the Delta
14 Brigade and parts of Solakovic's brigade. Was there any military logic in
15 asking for parts of the 9th and the 10th Brigade at that particular time?
16 A. What I said so far, this was just for -- this was purely from a
17 military standpoint. Of course, the superior is entitled to do it this
18 way as well, of course.
19 Q. Was there any military logic, according to your understanding of
20 the circumstances, prevailing in Sarajevo, to ask for those, for parts of
21 the 9th and 10th brigade?
22 A. Well, I cannot give you an explicit and clear response to that.
23 It is hard for me. The response depends on who is the owner of this
24 military logic. Partly so, yes, but observed from a different angle,
25 perhaps it is not all that logical.
1 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe it's time for us to have a break.
2 We'll resume at 9.00 tomorrow morning in the same courtroom.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.01 p.m., to
4 be reconvened on Wednesday, the 20th day of April
5 2005 at 9.00 a.m.