1 Tuesday, 24 May 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
6 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Mr. Court Deputy.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is Case Number
8 IT-01-48-T, the Prosecutor versus Sefer Halilovic.
9 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
10 Good morning, Witness.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Morning.
12 JUDGE LIU: Did you have a good rest last night?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think so.
14 JUDGE LIU: Are you ready to continue?
15 Thank you.
16 Mr. Re, please continue with your direct examination, please.
17 MR. RE: Will do, thank you. Good morning, Your Honours.
18 WITNESS: BAKIR ALISPAHIC [Resumed]
19 [Witness answered through interpreter]
20 Examined by Mr. Re: [Continued]
21 Q. And good morning, Mr. Alispahic. I want to remind you of where we
22 were up to yesterday before we broke. And you were telling the Trial
23 Chamber about your meeting Mr. Emin Zebic, Jablanica police station, and
24 him telling you about a massacre of civilians committed by members, he had
25 been told, of the Sarajevo units in that area. Yesterday you said it was,
1 you were told, in a village. What was the name of that village?
2 A. No. I think I didn't say I was told in a village, I was just told
3 it was in some village, and this is what I was told at the police station.
4 Q. Were you told, do you remember now, the name of the place where
5 the massacre occurred?
6 A. I think it was in the village of Grabovica. That's what the
7 village was called.
8 Q. Had you heard of this village of Grabovica before your
9 conversation that day with Mr. Zebic?
10 A. That was the first time I was told about that village. I had
11 never been to that village before the incident or crime or after. I
12 located it on a map. It's a village down the river Neretva. That's as
13 much as I know. I know that the population of the village was
14 predominantly Croat.
15 Q. When did you locate it on the map? Was it that time or some later
17 A. When I got interested in finding out about its location. No
18 common citizen would find the village particularly important, I think.
19 It's just a village down by the side of the road, as simple as that. So I
20 saw it later on a map. The police in their - what should I call it? -
21 work use maps. So you can read the name of this village on a map and find
22 out about its location.
23 Q. When you saw Mr. Zebic, who else was there when he was speaking to
24 you about the massacre in this village?
25 A. I can't remember any names. I think the commander was there and
1 some of his associates. There were two or three people, perhaps. Emin
2 Zebic and two or three of his associates.
3 Q. Where was Mr. Halilovic when you were speaking to Mr. Zebic that
5 MR. MORRISSEY: Sorry, Your Honours, I'm not sure if the witness
6 said he was speaking that morning, but I might have missed something last
7 time, so...
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Maybe we have the time frame established first.
9 MR. RE:
10 Q. I thought you said "morning" yesterday, I just can't find it. It
11 was in my mind and I thought I read it there this morning. If there's any
12 doubt about this, when, what time of day did you have this meeting with
13 Mr. Zebic; morning, afternoon, night?
14 A. It was in the morning hours. Not too early, though. In the
15 morning hours when - what should I call them? - work activities are
16 resumed, or perhaps I should call them normal activities. It was in the
17 morning, at any rate.
18 Q. Where was Mr. Halilovic when you were having this meeting with
19 Mr. Zebic?
20 A. When I was at the police station, that is when we were talking,
21 something happened and I don't know where General Halilovic was. I really
22 didn't know where he was staying at all, or where he was at that moment,
23 for that matter. However, when I asked, Mr. Zebic offered a phone for me
24 to use to try and track down Mr. Halilovic in order to speak to him and in
25 order to arrange for a meeting over that issue. Zebic dialled a number
1 somewhere and found General Halilovic. So it was from the police station
2 that I had this phone conversation.
3 Q. Are you saying there that you asked Mr. Zebic to find
4 Mr. Halilovic for you?
5 A. Yes, I asked Mr. Zebic, and I think that was only logical because
6 Zebic knew who was where and what was where in Jablanica. It was much
7 easier for him to track people down than for me. He knew where people
8 were staying, and I was just passing through. I didn't have that kind of
9 information. Zebic knew where the command was, where certain phones were
10 that were still operational, who was manning the phones. I didn't have
11 that sort of information myself.
12 Q. Now, why did you want to speak to Mr. Halilovic?
13 A. I wanted to tell him what I had been told by the Jablanica police.
14 I wanted to look at what the options were. I wanted to do something as a
15 police officer. I wanted to say that these things must be dealt with,
16 either by the army or the police. I wanted light shed on the matter and
17 the case explained. That was the main reason why I wanted to see the
19 Q. Why did you want to speak to that particular general as opposed to
20 any other senior military officer who may have been in the area?
21 A. In terms of his position, General Halilovic was the Chief of
22 Staff, which means the number two man of the entire army of Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina. Secondly, I believed or I knew or I understood that General
24 Halilovic was the commander of the operation that was underway and that he
25 was the person who had all the information. In the context of everything
1 that was - how shall I put it? - going on on the ground, including
2 potential incidents and crimes, the logic I used was firstly the
3 hierarchy, the chain of command, and secondly, the fact that - to use
4 plain language - Mr. Halilovic was the boss of the operation. Ultimately,
5 I think in the brief communication that I had I realised that all the
6 other commanders who were with General Halilovic displayed the same sort
7 of attitude towards him; they accepted him as the person in charge.
8 Q. Which brief communication are you referring to there?
9 A. The brief conversation during my stay. That means later when I
10 had left the police station and arrived in the area of the forward command
11 post. We had a talk, and there were other officers there, and I realised
12 that that group of people had business of their own with General
13 Halilovic. The result was that my stay there was rather short, so this is
14 the time frame I had in mind.
15 Q. I'll move to that in a moment. If I could just take you back now.
16 You said you believed or understood that General Halilovic was the
17 commander of the operation that was underway and that he had -- he was the
18 person who had all the information. What was it that led you to
19 understand on that particular day that Mr. Halilovic was the commander of
20 that operation that was underway?
21 A. Everything that was going on after the meeting in Zenica and the
22 talks that were held in Zenica, the resubordination of the special unit to
23 the BH army, and for the most part General Halilovic's statement or speech
24 about the needs of the military, and those needs truly were justified.
25 Also, the conversations I had with a number of different commanders, such
1 as General Delic and other commanders. It was based on these that I
2 realised - and this is only logical if you look at the way my mind works -
3 that General Halilovic was in charge as far as that area and that
4 particular activity was concerned. And when I say "activity" I mean two
5 concepts. I mean that he as the number one man of this operation should
6 have been familiar with what was going on; and secondly, he was the number
7 two man in the army and in the area he was the most senior officer in
8 terms of position and thus be the one who would have been expected to
9 solve any problems. And this is to explain why I spoke to the general
10 directly and why we had this communication.
11 Q. You referred to a statement or speech General Halilovic had given
12 about the needs of the military. Which speech are you referring to? Was
13 that at Zenica or some other town?
14 A. Zenica, yes. The consideration, the definition of activity. In
15 relation to the Neretva action, I think we can now address it like that
16 because the action was called Neretva 93. It was in Zenica that the
17 reasons and needs were defined. Quite simply, all the elements to do with
18 the start of the action were defined there, at that meeting, I believe.
19 While I was there, the first day of the meeting, and I think later, since
20 the meeting lasted some time, in a purely operative sense these things
21 were defined with a greater degree of precision and probably prepared in
22 terms of documents being drafted, units being assigned; everything that an
23 army normally does in its work, in its work technology, if you like.
24 There was a great amount of activity to be done. It wasn't easy to move
25 those units about or bring them to the area. It wasn't easy to ensure
1 they had sufficient supplies. Even if this was -- even if this had been,
2 for example, a peacetime activity, it would have been complicated enough.
3 In this sort of situation, it was yet more complex and more difficult, and
4 it required a lot of activity and a lot of obligations.
5 So from that very meeting, I'm trying to, as they say, get things
6 in some sort of order, I realised that General Halilovic was the commander
7 of the operation that was about to begin, and that was the reason I
8 addressed him.
9 Q. You also said a few moments ago that your understanding that he
10 was in charge of -- the commander of that operation was also based upon
11 conversations you had with a number of different commanders, such as
12 General Delic and other commanders. I want you to tell the Trial Chamber
13 about your conversations with General Delic and other commanders which led
14 you to believe that General Halilovic was in charge of that operation.
15 A. So I've given you the first and principal reasons: The
16 presentation and the defining of the need for the operation to take place,
17 which was at the meeting. After this meeting, when I spoke to
18 specifically General Delic, he said that General Halilovic personally
19 would be in charge of the operation, that he had every authorisation to
20 mobilise all the supplies and equipment as well as units needed and that
21 he -- it would be made possible for him to successfully run these combat
22 activities. So that's as far as I remember. That's what I spoke to Delic
23 about. In this environment where the military structure was, the command
24 structure, for example, Vehbija Karic, I'm not sure about his rank and
25 position at the time, but he was a high-ranking officer; for example,
1 Zicro Suljevic, Bilajac, they were generals, I assume, but they would be
2 addressed as "boss" or "commander" in that context because this was a
3 situation where there was a quick succession of changes in the army.
4 General Halilovic was first commander and suddenly became chief. It was a
5 sort of inertia that was involved in these changes. So people would
6 address him as "boss" or "commander," and everything they wanted to make
7 sure about, they would go to General Halilovic. As to what people wanted
8 to make sure about, this is not something that I went into. I didn't
9 think it was fair to go into that sort of thing, so I didn't. I'm just
10 trying to explain to you what the environment was and what the relations
11 were, nothing more.
12 Q. Just going back to your conversation with General Rasim Delic, do
13 you remember how long after the Zenica meeting and before your units went
14 to Herzegovina you had this conversation with him?
15 A. We had frequent conversations in Sarajevo. It was very often
16 necessary to get in touch with General Delic. There were many reasons,
17 there were many problems, and these problems had to be tackled. So we
18 were in a situation where we had all the problems that I testified about
19 yesterday, a situation that I described, and now there was this task that
20 we had to deal with in some way. So I would meet General Delic nearly
21 several times a week. We would have a conversation. We would meet in the
22 overall context of tackling these problems and especially the relationship
23 between the army and the police. And everything that I -- official
24 positions implied in terms of solving problems, Delic told me that this
25 was underway, that some of the units had been transferred and some hadn't.
1 He was asking me whether I had prepared units for dispatch and whether I
2 had received an information on these current problems.
3 Q. When you say "problems," are you referring to Mostar?
4 A. I did not understand your question.
5 Q. In your last answer you referred to meeting General Delic several
6 times a week. "We would meet in the overall context of tackling these
7 problems..." the relationship between the army and the police. And he
8 asked you whether you had prepared units for dispatch "and whether I had
9 received any information -- an information on these current problems."
10 What I want to know is: What are you referring to when you say
12 A. I think you misunderstood. It was not in the context of the
13 problems that Delic asked about the unit. When we asked about those
14 matters, he wanted to know whether I had prepared what I took upon myself
15 as the duty to allocate a special unit for that operation. This is what I
16 was referring to. And as for the problems, we discussed them in general
17 terms, the problems that existed in Sarajevo and how to solve them. So
18 let us not link up these two matters. He wanted to know whether I indeed
19 carried out everything that I had taken upon myself in the context of this
20 operation. Quite another matter are the activities that were conducted in
21 Sarajevo regarding the problems in Sarajevo.
22 Q. And when you say "operation," are you still referring to the
23 operation in Herzegovina which you came to know as Operation Neretva?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Let's just move back to the telephone call that Mr. Zebic made to
1 General Halilovic on the morning from Jablanica police station. You said
2 you spoke to Mr. Halilovic. What did you say to him?
3 A. That was a very brief conversation, just long enough in order to
4 identify who was there in order to discuss what I wanted to discuss. So
5 basically, this was not a proper conversation; we simply spoke about where
6 and when we could meet. And the general said that it would be best if I
7 came to the hydroelectric plant in Jablanica, where the forward command
8 post was located. I think that "the forward command post" is a military
9 term which denotes a type of a command post.
10 Q. Did you tell him why you wanted to meet him?
11 A. I don't remember that I said anything on the phone about the
12 reasons for meeting him. I think that I simply said, "I wish to meet you.
13 There are certain problems or reasons for the meeting." I might have
14 given him some more detailed explanation, but I simply cannot recall that
16 Q. What did you do after the telephone call to Mr. Halilovic?
17 A. Immediately following the conversation, I went to the premises
18 which are located nearby. I arrived in those premises. Right at the
19 entrance, at the gate, I think, there was a soldier who was there to
20 secure the area. Then I came into a room where there were officers,
21 including General Halilovic. I think that Zicro Suljevic, Vehbija Karic
22 were there as well, as was possibly Officer Bilajac and perhaps several
23 more senior officers, not too many of them. This was the room which was
24 used as the room for the forward command post, and this was within the
25 hydroelectric power plant Jablanica. This room formerly used to be a
1 conference room and at that time was used for military purposes.
2 Q. What sort of things were in this room?
3 A. There was a long table with chairs around it, and then on one wall
4 there was a board or something like that. I'm not sure what was
5 underneath, but there were maps covering it with military markings. I
6 assume that they depicted the deployment or positions of forces in that
7 area of Herzegovina. I did not read those maps, as they say in the
8 military, so I couldn't really tell you what they depicted, what they
9 showed. I simply was close enough to realise that these were military
11 MR. RE: Could the witness just be shown for a moment Exhibit
12 D134, which is the large map which is behind me there. I actually said
13 D134; I meant D131.
14 Q. Mr. Alispahic, I just want you to have a look at that map. You
15 said you saw some maps on the wall, military-type maps. All I want you to
16 do, when this map is pinned up, is just tell the Trial Chamber whether --
17 A. I can't see the map.
18 Q. You will -- whether you recognise this particular map, this one
19 here, as the one that was on the wall - that's the first part - and
20 secondly, whether -- what you can say about this map in relation to the
21 types of maps you saw on the wall in the forward command post.
22 A. I couldn't claim with certainty that this was precisely this map
23 that I saw on the wall, this map that is in front of me now. Based on
24 what I saw in view of the situation that I was in, in view of the distance
25 between me and the maps, I couldn't claim with full certainty that this
1 was precisely this map. As for the nature and type of map, in view of my
2 experience during the war with the military and with the police, and in
3 view of my experience with working with the maps and so on, I can tell you
4 that this is a typical military map showing the position of the forces of
5 the HV, HVO, and the BH army. I think that other important things are
6 marked on the map as well, such as combat disposition, disposition of the
7 weaponry, equipment, the direction of activities. I think that military
8 commands typically have these sorts of maps, and I think that they're
9 changed, sometimes on a daily basis, and that any changes are entered into
10 the map. Whenever there are changes on the ground, changes are entered
11 into maps as well.
12 If we look at the name of the operation, which is normally placed
13 in the heading of the map --
14 Q. I'm not actually after an opinion as to this particular map. All
15 I want to know is whether maps of a similar type to this one were on the
16 wall in the IKM when you were there.
17 A. Yes, those were military maps with certain information that I just
18 described to you, information that every military map should have. Such
19 type of military maps must be present in all environments where combat
20 operations are conducted, even in lower-ranking command posts, let alone
21 high command posts.
22 Q. Now, you said earlier when you were telling the Trial Chamber
23 about why you understood Mr. Halilovic was in charge of the operation was
24 that when you were at the meeting at the IKM there was something about the
25 attitude the other commanders who were with General Halilovic displayed
1 towards him when you were there, that also led you to believe that he was
2 in charge. And I want you to tell the Trial Chamber what you observed
3 about the behaviour of the other people in the IKM that day towards
4 General Halilovic.
5 A. I don't know whether this will be a sufficient explanation, but in
6 institutions such as the army or the police one can see clearly who is the
7 boss and who isn't because of the type of communication that exists
8 between people. In the army, the command system is of major importance
9 because it reflects the position of the superior. The general was the
10 Chief of Staff, therefore I had no doubt about the fact that he was the
11 number one man in that environment, in that structure.
12 Q. How were the others there behaving towards him? What they -- how
13 were they addressing him? How was he addressing them?
14 A. Since I didn't spend -- I didn't stay long enough there to have a
15 full picture, what I could tell you was that the officers who were there -
16 and I don't know anything about their ranks - they reported to the
17 general, they briefed him on what was going on, and they listened to what
18 he was saying and ordering. If I addressed the general as the number one
19 man, then I did that because I wanted to speak with the right person about
20 whatever problem I had. I did not think that I should talk to Vehbija
21 Karic. I think that from my point of view that would have been
22 irrelevant. My reading was that General Halilovic was the head of that
23 operation, both in terms of the essence and the form. And I've already
24 explained to you what I am referring to when I say "the essence and the
1 Q. How did you and Mr. Halilovic address each other? You were the
2 minister of the interior and he was the Chief of Staff -- chief of the
3 Main Staff of the army.
4 A. I don't know. I think that their relations were proper, decent
5 human relations. I thought that I was in the position to tell everything
6 to the general, and vice versa, that he could also say everything to me.
7 We were not on too formal terms. I myself was not a member of the
8 military, therefore the military subordination did not apply to me.
9 Moreover, the -- my relationship with the general was such that it was not
10 too formal. We believed that in direct communication we would be able to
11 solve the problems quicker and that the more efficient communication would
12 be in favour of that, therefore our communication was a proper one.
13 Q. What did you say to him in this meeting?
14 A. When I arrived there, there were several senior officers and the
15 general present. I think they were discussing some military matters and
16 issues. I don't know what it was about. I arrived there and I started by
17 saying, General, such-and-such problem has occurred, I have been informed
18 by the police station about that, the problem could be a major one, we
19 don't know of its extent right now. I believe that this should not have
20 happened and I propose that we establish the facts and take appropriate
21 measures in order to take disciplinary action. I think that the general
22 was already partially or perhaps even fully informed about what had
23 happened. I realised that he saw this as a major problem, that he was not
24 indifferent to it.
25 After this conversation, if I can call it that, I wanted, in my
1 capacity as minister of police, to inform him about what had happened and
2 to hold the perpetrators accountable, perpetrators of that incident or
3 crime. I wanted to inform General Halilovic of this. The general most
4 likely considered this, and I think that on that occasion he told me that
5 the military would resolve it with its own resources, that there was no
6 need for police to interfere, and that it was possible for the
7 perpetrators of the crime to also create an incident with the policemen.
8 I understood that and I believed it to be a reasonable solution and I
9 offered any kind of assistance. By that, I mean professional assistance
10 within the means available to the police. I said that if anything was
11 needed, the police would provide it.
12 I think that then another officer intervened; it might have been
13 Vehbija Karic. My reaction was that these people ought to be sent back to
14 Sarajevo and disciplined, that they ought to be removed from the area in
15 order to avoid any further incidents or similar situations. That was the
16 gist, the summary, of my visit to the area, meeting with the general and
17 the others. We did not discuss the event itself any further. We did not
18 discuss any of these matters. And after staying there briefly, I left the
20 Q. You said that you arrived there and started by saying, "General,
21 such-and-such a problem has occurred. I have been informed by the police
22 station about the problem; it could be a major one." Then you said that
23 you think -- you thought that the general was already partially or perhaps
24 fully informed about what had happened. I just want to clarify that a
25 little bit. Did you tell General Halilovic what Mr. Zebic had told you
1 about what had happened in Grabovica?
2 A. I conveyed to the general what I knew, what I had learned from
3 Emin Zebic. I think that when we talked about that, about that problem,
4 the crime in Grabovica, neither I nor General Delic or Zebic had full
5 information, full insight into what had happened in Grabovica. We simply
6 heard about the crime, about the incident. We heard about that, were
7 informed of that, received information that it was impossible to access
8 the area. The operative information indicated that a large number of
9 people were killed; 20, 30 were the numbers mentioned, that the victims
10 included civilians, the elderly, women, and so on. However, the entire
11 information, all of the details, were not known at the time. That was
12 what the situation was like when we talked.
13 Q. How much information did it appear to you that General Halilovic
14 had about what had happened in Grabovica?
15 A. I could not establish that. I think I've just told you that I
16 think that even he did not know the proportion of the crime at the time
17 when we talked.
18 Q. What was your attitude then towards the continued participation of
19 your Laste Unit in that particular operation?
20 A. The incident which took place there was the straw that broke the
21 camel's back in terms of the incident caused by the army members, by
22 certain individuals. This was really the last drop, and I was revolted.
23 I was appalled. Therefore, I said that when it comes to that operation,
24 the Neretva operation, which was to liberate that entire territory all the
25 way up to Mostar, I said that I would not allow the Laste Unit to continue
1 its participation in the operation. That unit could participate in
2 military combat and so on. It was deployed in Mostar, but after the
3 incident took place, I told the general and his associates - and I
4 repeated that later on to Delic - that I was against it and that I would
5 not permit the special unit to participate in the operation any further.
6 I think that I was still under the heavy impression, I was still
7 quite emotional because of this incident and what had happened. I even
8 proposed that the operation be suspended until the facts were established.
9 I was concerned that these people could continue with this type of
10 behaviour and that they could continue with similar "military operations."
11 This was the reason for my reaction.
12 Q. What was Mr. Halilovic's reaction, response, to your saying you
13 wanted to withdraw your units from the operation?
14 A. I can say I assume it was not relevant to him at the time because
15 not a lot of members of the special unit were involved. 50 men is not a
16 lot. It is quite a number of men but it's not crucial and it wouldn't
17 bring any commander to change his decision. I think the general decided
18 to go on with the military operation and that he would discipline the
19 people, the members of the army. I don't think he thought it was a good
20 idea just to halt the operation, and again I must say this was something
21 that was a matter of military assessment and there was a decision to
22 continue these operations in order to liberate the areas under
24 Q. Did Mr. Halilovic respond when you said you wanted to withdraw
25 your units from the operation? You just said a moment ago you could
1 assume it wasn't relevant to him. What I'm after is: Do you remember
2 whether he responded to you?
3 A. I really can't remember whether he provided a specific answer to
4 what I said.
5 Q. All right.
6 MR. RE: Can the witness please be shown photograph 0299-2334,
7 which is Exhibit Number 147 on our 65 ter exhibit list.
8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 432.
9 MR. RE:
10 Q. What is that a photograph of?
11 A. I assume this is an aerial photograph, which means that it was
12 taken from a plane. The photograph of Jablanica, the -- a general view of
13 the urban structure.
14 Q. Can you see the building where the forward command post was
15 located in September 1993?
16 A. If you follow the road into the town of Jablanica itself, it's on
17 the left-hand side --
18 Q. I'll get you to mark it on the map. My question is: Can you see
19 it there?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. All right. Can you just --
22 A. The water plant of Jablanica.
23 Q. I just want you to put a circle around that building.
24 A. [Marks].
25 Q. And just underneath it can you please write "IKM" on the screen.
1 A. [Marks].
2 MR. RE: May that be received into evidence?
3 MR. MORRISSEY: There's no objection, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
5 It's admitted into the evidence.
6 THE REGISTRAR: The original photograph will be Prosecution
7 Exhibit P432, and the one that's marked now will be Prosecution Exhibit
9 MR. RE:
10 Q. Who did you attend that meeting with?
11 A. At the forward command post?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. I think General Halilovic was there, Vehbija Karic, Zicro
14 Suljevic, Bilajac, and some other officers whose names I can't remember
15 now. But there weren't too many officers there because --
16 Q. Sorry, what I actually mean -- because? I'm sorry. I cut you off
18 A. I don't think there were many officers at the forward command post
19 at the time, and that is the reason I can't remember too many names. I
20 have now told you about the people I'm sure were there, people I saw. I
21 think throughout the operation they were there, for the operation itself
22 and in order to deal with other military matters.
23 Q. What I was actually asking you -- what I meant was: Did you
24 attend the meeting by yourself or did you go with someone? Did someone
25 accompany you there?
1 A. No, I arrived on my own with my driver and my vehicle. I knew
2 where the forward command post was, or rather I was told to go there
3 because that was the place. I had never been to the area before. I
4 didn't even know it was there; I only knew where the police station was in
5 Jablanica. I came. I was there on my own.
6 Q. Where did you go after that meeting with Mr. Halilovic at the
7 forward command post?
8 A. I had some other minor duties to see to in Jablanica and later in
9 Konjic. I was meeting the former BH government minister, Rusmir
10 Mahmutcehajic [Realtime transcript read in error "Ahmutcehajic"], later on
11 in the afternoon.
12 MR. RE: Can the witness please be shown Exhibit P118.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think this was written
14 properly, Rusmir Ahmutcehajic.
15 MR. RE:
16 Q. We will correct that in the transcript later, Mr. Alispahic.
17 Thank you for pointing it out. Do you have the document on the screen
18 there in front of you? It's a document dated the 9th of September, 1993,
19 headed "Order," directed to the 4th Corps Commander Mostar, saying:
20 "Please inform the minister of internal affairs, Bakir Alispahic, to head
21 to Jablanica tonight because he has a meeting tomorrow, 10th of September,
22 1993, at 1900 hours in Konjic with Mr. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic," and the name
23 Sefer Halilovic, chief of the Supreme Command staff.
24 A moment ago you said you were due to have a meeting with
25 Mr. Mahmutcehajic. Does that document refer to the meeting you were to
1 have with him?
2 A. This is a document informing me about the precise time. Before I
3 left Sarajevo for Herzegovina, I had had an appointment with Minister
4 Mahmutcehajic that we would meet in that area, without defining the exact
5 time, that he would resolve matters that were in his remit. And then the
6 4th Corps informed me about the exact place and time of our meeting.
7 Nothing had been agreed ahead of time and it was in that day, in the
8 afternoon, and here it says --
9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't get the time that the
10 witness mentioned.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- that we were supposed to meet. I
12 have never seen this document before because at the time I was informed
13 orally that I was to meet at such-and-such a time. It was an oral report.
14 MR. RE:
15 Q. The interpreters missed the time which you specified. Did you say
16 1900 hours, as it says in that document?
17 A. I just read it from here, from the document. It says, "1930."
18 Q. Does -- or do the dates on that document accord with your memory
19 of when it was that you met Mr. Mahmutcehajic and Mr. Halilovic?
20 A. The date simply must be right. This is a document, after all.
21 It's a generally known fact that Minister Mahmutcehajic was a very
22 accurate person and I am sure that was when the meeting took place;
23 there's no doubt about that. I mean, Mahmutcehajic never postponed or
24 delayed any of his meetings. I think the date and time must be right.
25 Q. Now, did you meet Mr. Mahmutcehajic on that day after meeting
1 Mr. Halilovic?
2 A. Yes, we had this working meeting. We had an appointment.
3 Mr. Mahmutcehajic was dealing with important things at the time. He was
4 the minister for energy resources. He was in charge of supplying the army
5 with sources of energy, and the police, too, in a way. And he wanted to
6 help to the extent that he could. Further, the minister also dealt with
7 special-purpose industry. In Konjic we had a production line for infantry
8 ammunition, so I visited the factory with Mahmutcehajic. He spoke to
9 engineers, he spoke to the manager and people at the factory about the
10 problems that he was dealing with. Mahmutcehajic was billeted in a
11 military installation near Konjic, and that's where we had the meeting,
12 that's where we dealt with the matters that he had delegated to us, in a
13 manner of speaking, that we were supposed to come to grips with. All
14 these matters were related to a variety of military activities; that's
15 what it was about.
16 Q. Were there -- are you referring to one or two meetings with him on
17 that day?
18 A. I'm sure there was only one meeting on that day. There can't have
19 been two meetings. All of us who were involved in defence had many
20 meetings with Mahmutcehajic. There were always problems to be solved. We
21 were always short of ammunition, of petrol, and he was the person who
22 could help obtain those.
23 Q. Just to be clear, are you saying that you visited the munition
24 factory with him and then had a meeting later with him at the
25 accommodation facility for the military?
1 A. It's possible that it was the next day that I was with him at the
2 factory, or rather I think it was on the same day and it was later in the
3 afternoon that we had this - what should I call it? - official meeting.
4 When I returned from Jablanica, I came to the Konjic police station. I
5 learned that there were things going on in Konjic, that Mahmutcehajic had
6 already arrived. And I think it was later on in the day, before the
7 meeting, that we went to this special-purpose factory. I can't be
8 positive about this, the timing, but what I'm positive about is that the
9 meetings took place in the setting that I've described; that much is
11 Q. The meeting you're referring to, who was at the meeting? Was
12 Mr. Halilovic there?
13 A. I think he had a lot of his own business to see to, but he came to
14 the meeting. And the focus of the meeting was on issues of relevance to
15 Minister Mahmutcehajic, what he was dealing with. I think a number of
16 Mahmutcehajic's associates were there, I was there, General Halilovic was
17 there, possibly also Vehbija Karic or some other generals and associates,
18 someone from the military logistics department. There was discussion, and
19 issues were being tackled related to the supply of logistics for
20 continuing combat operations.
21 Q. Were the events in Grabovica discussed?
22 A. The events were discussed, but one thing I wish to point out is
23 that they were not discussed in relation to other issues discussed at that
24 meeting. It was an informal discussion because one did not know exactly
25 what had happened. Information was incomplete. I think both General
1 Halilovic and I talked to Mahmutcehajic about what had happened. At least
2 I can speak for myself. I was surprised by the crime. I couldn't bring
3 myself to accept it. I talked to General Halilovic about this. I gave
4 the police station certain tasks related to this, and believed that any
5 steps should be taken to overcome this situation and tackle the problem.
6 I believed this was something that should never have happened to the BH
7 army. Mahmutcehajic was also surprised. He was also surprised and
8 reacted in a way to show his disapproval. He wanted to establish what
9 exactly had happened and for the perpetrators to be punished. Normally he
10 was not a man who interfered much or understood much about combat
11 operations, but his reaction was purely human. And once the conversation
12 was over and I was leaving for Sarajevo, he said that I should inform the
13 president and General Delic about this because this was not a matter that
14 should be passed over lightly, this was not a matter that should go
15 unsolved, and this was a matter that should be looked into. That's what
16 Rusmir said and that's what Rusmir felt about this matter.
17 Q. Was it your intention to see President Izetbegovic and General
18 Delic about this matter?
19 A. I had no doubt then, and I still have no doubt now, that I should
20 do it. I believe that I, as someone who had been to the area, should go
21 to these people to inform them, to the extent that I could, to share
22 whatever information I could with them, and to insist that the matter be
23 explained and resolved. That was my intention. That's what I had in mind
24 at the time. And I still believe this was the right thing to do.
25 Q. Did you communicate your intention to see President Izetbegovic
1 and General Delic to Mr. Halilovic?
2 A. No, I didn't. I don't remember ever telling him that I would go
3 and see these people about what had happened. I believed that General
4 Halilovic would use his own contacts within the army to pass the
5 information on. I did what I believed I was supposed to do in my capacity
6 at the time.
7 Q. Just to be a little bit more clear about this: Where was this
8 meeting held, the second meeting you had with Mr. Halilovic?
9 A. You mean Rusmir Mahmutcehajic and Halilovic and the logistics
11 Q. Yes, that one.
12 A. This was a military facility called Arka. This is near Konjic.
13 It's a rather large military installation, built to the best military
14 standards in terms of security and in terms of how it met its purpose.
15 There are certain outbuildings there with meeting rooms, conference rooms,
16 and the meeting took place in one of those buildings next to the river
17 Neretvica. It was a working meeting and that was that.
18 Q. When did you return to Sarajevo?
19 A. I probably returned that night. Why am I saying probably that
20 night? Because you could only go into Sarajevo by night. During the day
21 it would have been impossible on account of the ongoing combat operations
22 that made it impossible to enter or leave Sarajevo. So you couldn't
23 negotiate the road into Sarajevo over Mount Igman because it would have
24 been a life-threatening journey. Many people lost their lives along that
25 route. So it was at night that I entered Sarajevo, and the next day I was
1 back at work and went to see the people that I've told you about.
2 Q. I neglected to ask you something a moment ago, and that was: Do
3 you remember seeing Sefko Hodzic when you were in Jablanica or Konjic on
4 the day you met both Mr. Halilovic and Mr. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic?
5 A. Somewhere or other, in Konjic I think, I met the journalist Hodzic
6 in passing. I think we had an informal chat. He asked me where I was
7 headed to and what I was doing, and I think I told him I was going to a
8 meeting organised by Rusmir Mahmutcehajic; that was that. Sefko Hodzic,
9 during the military operations in the area, dispatched reports to the
10 media in Sarajevo, and these media then announced which positions the BH
11 army had taken and reported any military successes. So Sefko Hodzic was
12 the person behind this.
13 MR. RE: It's almost 10.30, Your Honours. Is that an appropriate
14 time to break?
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Let's take a break and we'll resume at 11.00.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.
18 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re, please continue.
19 MR. RE:
20 Q. All right. We are now at the position, Mr. Alispahic, when you
21 went to speak to Mr. Delic. I'm going to ask you about your meeting with
22 Mr. Delic and your meeting with Mr. Izetbegovic. Firstly, you said you
23 returned to Sarajevo, and the next day, after your meeting with
24 Mr. Halilovic, you went and saw Mr. Delic. Why did you go and see
25 Mr. Delic?
1 A. The main reason for me to go in the morning hours - I'm not sure
2 what time exactly it was but it was in the morning hours - to go to the
3 command where General Delic was, was to inform him about the information
4 that I had learned during my stay in Herzegovina and in Jablanica. I told
5 him that I had received the basic information from the chief of the police
6 station. Then I told him what I had heard while at the police station,
7 told him that I had informed General Halilovic about it, and that I had
8 talked to Rusmir about it in Konjic. And that, finally, I told him that I
9 had come to inform him about that as well because we had such a good
10 relationship that I thought that I could tell him about what I knew and
11 also warn him that that problem needed to be resolved.
12 For my own peace of mind, I wanted to inform the general
13 personally about this; that was my position. I stayed briefly with the
14 general, perhaps half an hour, and during that time we did not discuss
15 this problem alone. There were some other issues as well. General Delic
16 made it known to me that he knew some of that information; however, it was
17 not my impression that he knew a lot, and it seemed as though he was not
18 aware of the full scope of the problem, just as I wasn't.
19 Q. What was his response to your visit and your telling him about the
20 information you'd received about what happened in Grabovica?
21 A. I saw that he was upset - I don't know whether that was the right
22 term - that he regretted this. His reaction was such that I realised that
23 his position was that this should not have happened, that this was a
24 disgrace, and that this was something impermissible. This was the
25 impression that I received. He said that he would personally ask that
1 this be inquired into and that he would personally see to it.
2 Q. Did he ever communicate to you that he had in fact ordered that it
3 be inquired into?
4 A. After our meeting, in the following days we would see each other
5 occasionally for various reasons, in order to solve various issues, issues
6 that fell under our jurisdiction. Therefore, I can't claim this with
7 certainty, however, the general did say that he had issued an order that
8 this be looked into. He wanted to receive more information -- or rather,
9 I asked him whether he received more information, more reliable
10 information about it, and he said, "I took certain steps in that
11 direction. I sent a dispatch." That's what he told me. I didn't know
12 what the dispatch was about, but I understood that this was to do with the
13 incident and that this was most likely an order that he issued in order to
14 have this case investigated and the facts established.
15 MR. RE: Could the witness please be shown Exhibit D157.
16 Q. While that's coming, was there anyone else present at that meeting
17 you had with Mr. Delic or was it just the two of you?
18 A. I think it was just the two of us.
19 Q. If you turn to the document to the left, on your screen, it's an
20 order dated the 12th of September, 1993, with Rasim Delic's name on the
21 bottom of it. Now, you said a moment ago that you understood that he had
22 issued an order. Have you seen this document --
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, that's not accurately putting what
24 was put. Your Honours, he said that he was told that a dispatch was --
25 well, Your Honours know what was said. He said: "I asked him whether he
1 received more information, more reliable information about it, and he
2 said, 'I took certain steps in that direction. I sent a dispatch.'
3 That's what he told me. I didn't know what the dispatch was about, but I
4 understood that this was to do with the incident and that this was most
5 likely an order that he issued in order to have this case investigated and
6 the facts established."
7 That's what the witness said.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
9 MR. RE: That's how I paraphrased it, I said he understood that an
10 order was issued, which is a paraphrase of that line, "I understood this
11 was to do with the incident and most likely an order that he issued..."
12 JUDGE LIU: Hopefully your paraphrase is in line of whatever the
13 witness said. Hopefully you could do it again, taking into consideration
14 the objections put by the Defence.
15 MR. RE: I will re-quote back exactly, rather than paraphrase. It
16 will take longer, but I'll certainly do it, Your Honour.
17 Q. Now, Mr. Alispahic, a moment ago you said: "He told me --" "...
18 he said, 'I took certain steps in that direction. I sent a dispatch.'
19 That's what he told me. I don't know what the dispatch was about but I
20 understood that this was to do with the incident and this was most likely
21 an order he issued in order to have the case investigated and the facts
23 Now, moving from what you said a few moments ago back to the
24 document --
25 A. I would like to explain this in a simple way.
1 Q. You can in a moment. I just want to ask you whether you had in
2 fact seen this document before coming to The Hague.
3 A. No, I've never seen it before.
4 Q. Does the information contained in that document accord with your
5 understanding of what Rasim Delic said that he had done?
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, that question is not
7 permissible, in my submission. The witness has given evidence about what
8 Mr. Delic said. The Tribunal has the order. If the witness has got some
9 knowledge about this, he may have -- he may have something else to say
10 about this document that's relevant, but to ask him whether what he thinks
11 about it is consistent -- or perhaps to use my friend's terms: "Is the
12 information" -- "Does the information accord with your understanding of
13 what Rasim Delic said that he'd done?"
14 Well, that's no more than to say, "Does that document accord with
15 the words of Rasim Delic?" That's not a matter for this witness to
16 answer; it's a matter for the Court to assess in light of all the other
17 matters that you know about. So, in my submission, it's not a permissible
19 JUDGE LIU: Yes, and also taking into consideration that the
20 witness testified that he never saw this document before.
21 MR. RE: I press the question on this basis -- or I press
22 questioning as to whether that is consistent with what Mr. Delic told him
23 on this basis: There has been a Defence attack on this particular
24 document, many unkind things have been said about its provenance along the
25 way, and I must be entitled, in the Prosecution's submission, to ask the
1 witness, given that he's given evidence that Mr. Delic told him that he
2 had issued an order in similar terms to this - I'm paraphrasing - to this
3 document, whether the document -- the terms of the document accord with
4 what Mr. Delic said to him. That's a step the Prosecution must be
5 entitled to make, in our submission, towards establishing the legitimacy
6 of this document without the author of it there. It's another piece of
7 evidence which goes towards establishing the reliability -- or
8 establishing the fact that this is a legitimate document.
9 JUDGE LIU: Maybe you could go step by step. First establish
10 whether that dispatch includes any orders; secondly, the witness -- you
11 could ask this witness what exactly Mr. Delic said at that moment;
12 thirdly, you show him this document to see whether that is responded to,
13 whatever Mr. Delic said.
14 MR. RE: I will.
15 Q. Mr. Alispahic, firstly, when you said "dispatches" earlier, did
16 you mean that to include orders?
17 A. In my terminology, the terminology that I understand and the one
18 that is applied in the Ministry of the Interior and in the communication
19 means, "dispatch" is a means of communication. One can send different
20 types of document, from orders, instructions, any kind of document can be
21 sent via a dispatch. In this particular case, it was via a dispatch that
22 the general issued an order concerning certain things, and I ask that this
23 be understood properly, the way I said it. I don't know how you interpret
24 this, but I can repeat: A dispatch is just a mechanism for transmitting
25 certain documents, for sending them to somebody. It can be information,
1 it can be an order, it can be an instruction. In this particular case, an
2 order was sent by way of a dispatch.
3 Q. Now, secondly, try to remember what Mr. Delic told you was in that
5 MR. MORRISSEY: Just a moment, Your Honours. This is completely
6 -- it's leading, it misstates what the witness has previously said, and
7 this whole procedure is unfair for -- as a third basis, because the
8 witness is being asked these questions with an order sitting in front of
9 him on the screen, when he gave quite plain evidence before about what he
10 said about it and what he knew about it. He'd said -- he'd given the
11 words -- now, Your Honour gave leave to my friend to ask three questions
12 in a row, and the second one was: What were the exact words he used? And
13 that really -- my friend is, in my submission, seeking to jump over that.
14 That should be the next question, "What were the exact words used by Mr.
16 MR. RE: Well --
17 JUDGE LIU: I believe that the first part of the question will
18 stand. That is: Try to remember what Mr. Delic told you, first of all.
19 MR. RE:
20 Q. Mr. Alispahic, please try and remember what Mr. Delic told you
21 that he had done, in whatever way he'd done it.
22 A. He said that he had sent an order aimed at investigating what had
23 happened in Grabovica and establishing the facts. He sent an order about
24 Grabovica. I can comment on the document, however General Delic said that
25 he had sent an order to investigate the incident.
1 Q. Now, the third thing His Honour Judge Liu asked me to do is show
2 you the document and ask you whether what is in the document corresponds
3 to what Mr. Delic said.
4 A. I think that what Delic said is consistent with the contents of
5 this order or a dispatch because it contains all the elements pertaining
6 to the investigation. It even gives certain instructions on what to do.
7 I don't know if we need to go into these details right now, but this
8 document contains certain demands sent to the command as to what needs to
9 be done. I think that all of the elements are contained in the order.
10 Q. A while back I interrupted you when you said you wanted to explain
11 something. Is there something you still wish to explain about something
13 A. Perhaps at the end, once we finish with everything, I would
14 perhaps like to state certain things which are not related to this
15 specific issue. So perhaps we should leave them for the end.
16 Q. If you could perhaps -- what do those issues relate to? Just the
17 subject matter, not the details.
18 A. Well, I can tell you that now. I have these things written down,
19 I have certain things written down related to the activities which took
20 place in accordance with the plans, especially the Trebevic plan. I
21 wanted to point out, I wanted to emphasise, that the plan was verified or
22 approved by the BH Presidency with all of the members present. The
23 operative plan was approved there as well. And General Delic and I simply
24 implemented the Presidency's order concerning the Trebevic plan.
25 Q. Right. We'll -- I will come to that a little later.
1 Now, did -- let's just go back to the meeting with Delic.
2 Yesterday you told the Tribunal that you -- or the Trial Chamber that you
3 and Mr. Delic discussed on a regular basis the problems of the units in
4 Sarajevo. Did you discuss at that particular meeting, when you informed
5 him about Grabovica, the problems of those units in Sarajevo?
6 A. Not at the time because there was not much time. There was no
7 need for that and I was on my way to see the president, so the meeting was
8 very brief and we discussed what I've just described to you.
9 Q. What was your view at the time when you were talking to Mr. Delic
10 on that day, based upon your experience as the police chief in Sarajevo
11 and as the minister of the interior, of the difficulty or otherwise that
12 may be encountered in investigating or attempting to arrest people who
13 were from those units in Sarajevo in Grabovica?
14 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, I object to that question.
15 First of all, it's got two questions in it; and secondly, it's got a
16 presumption in it which is not in evidence here.
17 MR. RE: Sorry, I withdraw it. It's gone.
18 Q. In that meeting, you -- did you discuss with Mr. Delic the
19 possibility of arresting -- of having arrested members of the brigades who
20 allegedly committed the massacre in Grabovica?
21 MR. MORRISSEY: I'm sorry, just again, this has got a presumption
22 in it as well, and the presumption is that there were members of the
23 brigades who allegedly committed the massacre in Grabovica, and in fact
24 the evidence is that there were no identified perpetrators at all at that
1 JUDGE LIU: Well, I regard it also as a compound question. Maybe
2 you could go step by step. I mean, the first part of the question will
3 stand. First you have to establish whether there's any discussions
4 between them. And later on, what's the contents of that discussion?
5 MR. RE:
6 Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Delic the identity of those who allegedly
7 committed the crimes in Grabovica?
8 A. First of all, it was clear that the perpetrators of the crime were
9 the members of the army. It was clear to all of us. Initially, we, at
10 least the police, had bare assumptions as to who could have perpetrated
11 that, and it was logical to assume that it could have been done only by
12 the soldiers who were deployed there, who were there to conduct combat
13 operations. So using that logic, we deduced who the perpetrators could
14 have been, or rather members of which units. Our basic aim was to
15 establish the actual perpetrators. We wanted a thorough investigation to
16 be carried out to establish the perpetrators in order to make the job of
17 the military police and other judicial system organs easier. However,
18 there was also a concern that if the perpetrators were not established and
19 not isolated, that the same people could cause another incident, do
20 something similar. In view of the situation and in view of who these
21 people were, they represented a risk for the army and for other army
22 members. This is why I insisted that the problem be taken seriously.
23 This is why I reacted the way I did. From my point of view, the problem
24 had to be resolved.
25 Q. What I'm getting at is the identity of the people who committed
1 the massacre, and my learned friend's objection was clearly incorrect a
2 moment ago because the evidence -- this is where I was getting to
3 yesterday at page 72, was that Mr. Zebic told him "there had been
4 operative information to the effect that the army members from Sarajevo -
5 that's what he said - or perhaps members from Celo's and Caco's unit, had
6 ... committed a massacre in a village, and this was the information I
7 received initially."
8 The witness then said that he had conveyed this information to
9 Mr. Halilovic and he had conveyed the information he had received from
10 Mr. Zebic to Mr. Delic, and I was acting on the assumption that he had
11 given that same information, that is, it was Caco and Celo's unit, because
12 that was the evidence here. That was the basis for my putting the
14 Q. That's what I'm getting at, Mr. Alispahic. Did you discuss the
15 fact that -- you said earlier that you gave the information to Mr. Delic
16 that Mr. Zebic had given you. Yesterday you said that Mr. Zebic and you
17 had discussed if it was units or members of Celo and Caco's unit --
18 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, I object. This has now become a
19 ten-line question. I have done that myself, I have to concede, however,
20 the best thing to do is simply to ask a question, especially when evidence
21 in-chief is being led. A simple question can do. I wouldn't object to
22 asking this, just so that the matter can move on: Was Celo or Caco
23 mentioned in this discussion?
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, but here this issue has been discussed for
25 several times and it doesn't matter if the Prosecution want to make sure
1 of that. There's no problem on that, because we all know the background
2 for this question.
3 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours are right. But just so that it's
4 clear and so that I'm not seeming to pick a fight, and just so the witness
5 understands, too, what the situation is, when I refer to "perpetrators," I
6 mean killers, I don't mean units from which killers might come. And
7 "perpetrator" means the actual murderer. Now, let it be clear, there has
8 never been any suggestion from Zebic or anyone else that at this stage
9 there were individual perpetrators identified. That was the objection
10 before, and my friend says that's incorrect, well, it's correct. Of
11 course it's right to say that those units had been mentioned. The witness
12 gave that evidence yesterday and that's the case.
13 JUDGE LIU: Well, let us hear the answer from this witness.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as the identity of the
15 perpetrators is concerned, I said today in no uncertain terms that we did
16 not have their names at first. This was only logical for the reasons what
17 I've mentioned. The truth is Emin Zebic told me that members of Celo's
18 unit - I think he also said Caco's unit but I'm sure about Celo's unit -
19 were the ones who committed the crime, members of that unit.
20 MR. RE:
21 Q. Now, did you discuss that with Mr. Delic, the fact that you had
22 been told that it was Celo's unit and possibly Caco's unit -- or members
23 of those units who had committed the crimes?
24 A. That was precisely what I told him, that I'd been there, that I'd
25 heard this, and that people were saying that it was precisely the members
1 of those units that had committed the crime.
2 Q. Well, after seeing Mr. Delic, did you go and see Mr. Izetbegovic,
3 the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
4 A. After seeing Mr. Delic, and that was a brief meeting, as I've
5 explained, I went straight to the Presidency to see President Izetbegovic,
6 as I had planned.
7 Q. Did you go alone?
8 A. Yes, alone.
9 Q. Was it just the two of you there, you and Mr. Izetbegovic?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. What did you tell Mr. Izetbegovic?
12 A. I found Mr. Izetbegovic in his office. I said I was there to
13 inform him about some things that had happened in the field, given the
14 fact that I had arrived from -- back from Herzegovina the night before.
15 In the briefest possible terms, I informed him of what I had learned about
16 and what the chief of the police station had told me. I informed him
17 about that. I told him that I'd spoken to people from the army, General
18 Delic and General Halilovic, and that I was finally now there to inform
19 him, the president. He wanted to know about what had happened. And to
20 the extent that I could, I told him what I'd heard, as I have told you
21 now. He was visibly unsettled. He was visibly upset about this news.
22 And I believe I was the first who broke the news to him. At least, I
23 believed so based on his reaction.
24 The president condemned this in my presence. He was antagonised
25 [as interpreted] by this upon hearing the news, which, by the way, was
1 unverified still but it seemed likely. So he asked his secretary to
2 arrange for a meeting with General Delic. First they spoke on the phone
3 and he told the general that I was there to see him and that he had been
4 informed in very rough terms about the problem. He demanded that the
5 general take a serious approach to resolving this problem. I'm not sure
6 why this was his reaction, but I think he wanted to give an additional
7 warning to the general about the need to shed light on this matter.
8 Roughly speaking, that was the substance of my conversation with
9 the president on that day.
10 Q. And if I could just take you back for one moment to the meeting
11 with Rasim Delic, and I'm not sure whether you answered this in passing at
12 some other point. You said that you told Mr. Halilovic the day before
13 that you did not want your units to participate any further in the
14 operation because of what had happened. Did you say something similar to
15 Mr. Delic?
16 A. Yes. I told Delic as well that I believed it to be impermissible
17 from my perspective, as well as unnecessary, for special units to be
18 involved in the operation any longer, that I said that they could stay in
19 Mostar for a while, holding the same positions that they were holding at
20 the time.
21 Q. What was Mr. Delic's response to your saying that?
22 A. I think he accepted that. He didn't make any comments, he just
23 said, "Fine."
24 Q. You've -- you've told us about speaking to Mr. Delic, General
25 Delic, the commander-in-chief of the army -- sorry, the commander of the
1 army, and President Izetbegovic. Now, what about the chief of the
2 military security service, Mr. Jasarevic? Did you communicate with him in
3 relation to the events in Grabovica?
4 A. The chief of the military security -- I wouldn't say that I talked
5 to him. It was more that I asked to inform him about certain matters, to
6 tell him that I'd been to see General Delic and President Izetbegovic. It
7 was a matter of professional courtesy and good relations. That was why I
8 wanted the chief of the military security service, Jasarevic, to know
9 about what I'd done, in order to avoid this move on my part being
11 Q. Can you just clarify --
12 A. In order to make sure that he didn't misunderstood what I had
14 Q. I just want you to clarify what you meant by: "I wouldn't say
15 that I talked to him."
16 Did you actually speak to him, as in a telephone call or a meeting
17 or a letter, in relation to Grabovica?
18 A. I spoke to Jasarevic over the phone at the time, but I didn't
19 speak to him very often. He had an ongoing cooperation with the chief of
20 the state security service, Nedzad Ugljen. They had a professional
21 relationship which entailed a great deal of communication. What I did was
22 merely as an act of courtesy between our two institutions, but we didn't
23 speak about anything specific, really. I believed he would just keep on
24 doing his job. His superiors had been informed, all the relevant people
25 had been informed, therefore, I did not find it necessary to go to the
1 chief of the military security service and explain anything. Information
2 had been exchanged between the state security service and the military
3 security service in relation to what had happened, but in the context of
4 exchanging intelligence and operative information; it was more like that.
5 Later on, I hardly had any communication with Jasarevic, but I did
6 have communication with my own chief of the secret service, who would
7 inform me about certain matters. But communication with Jasarevic was
8 really infrequent, at least as it concerned his activities.
9 Q. I just want you to clarify from your last answer. I'm not sure
10 whether you're saying that you actually spoke to him about Grabovica or
11 you didn't. You said: "What I did say was only an act of courtesy
12 between our two institutions."
13 Are you saying you spoke to him about Grabovica or you didn't
14 speak to him about Grabovica?
15 A. I certainly did tell him that I'd been to see the superior
16 officers about the incident in Grabovica. So the reason I called was to
17 tell him that I'd been to see those people to discuss the problem of
18 Grabovica. When I talked to him, I told him also what had happened in
19 Grabovica. I didn't seek or expect any reaction from him because it would
20 not have been logical to expect that. I understood that General
21 Jasarevic, too, was familiar with the case, but it was just a matter of
22 courtesy. That was why I phoned him, too, although it wasn't strictly
23 necessary, in my opinion.
24 Q. What powers or authorities did the civilian police or MUP
25 employees have to investigate crimes allegedly committed by members of the
2 A. The police had no powers over any members of the army, and here I
3 mean first and foremost members of the army who were actually members of
4 military units, and you can take it from there on, combat operations,
5 manoeuvres carried out by certain units. They were under their own
6 superiors, their own commanders, and they answered to their own superiors
7 and commanders. Our only powers concerned cases where they were at a
8 given point in time civilians and, as civilians, committed any violations.
9 That's when we would have powers over them. But we had no special powers,
10 and there were documents and orders to this effect. There were also oral
11 instructions that the police should not interfere in areas of combat
12 activity. I think the same applies in all the armies in the world, that
13 the police have no powers in an area where there is combat going on. So
14 the same applied to the BH MUP. This is not only in reference to our
15 present case; I'm talking about a general principle here that applied.
16 Q. Did the police have power to initiate their own investigation into
17 the murders in Grabovica?
18 A. By virtue of its function and under the law and based on any
19 documents governing the work of the police, the police would have had
20 power as well as the duty to carry out any investigations on the operative
21 level; collecting intelligence and security-related information. And here
22 first and foremost I have in mind the state security service. As for the
23 public security service, I think they had no power or authority and they
24 couldn't have had any unless the army had asked them to give them a hand
25 in some way.
1 The intelligence service - and this was another part of the
2 ministry - had the authority to collect information. And it was based on
3 that that they collected information on this incident as well as other
4 incidents that occurred during the war.
5 Q. Which body or organ had the authority or power to investigate the
6 murders in Grabovica?
7 A. I really can't answer specifically, but it must have been military
8 bodies and military judicial bodies that were operational in Bosnia at the
9 time. If not military, then probably it was the civilian judicial bodies.
10 So it would have been the military judicial bodies or the civilian
11 judicial bodies that should have reacted.
12 Q. Which body or organ would have been responsible for conducting an
13 investigation into the murders of Grabovica?
14 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, in light of the witness's last
15 answer, I submit that he shouldn't be pressed for another try at that same
16 question. He's indicated that he can't answer specifically but it must
17 have been a military body. Now, this is simply another way of asking the
18 same question, and I object to it.
19 JUDGE LIU: Yes, I believe that the witness has already answered
20 that question.
21 MR. RE: Just give me one moment, please.
22 Q. Did the civilian police ever participate in investigations into
23 crimes committed by the military?
24 A. Yes, in some, pursuant to requests by the army.
25 Q. I want you to tell the Trial Chamber how that worked, what the
1 role of the military was and what the role of the civilian police were in
2 those circumstances.
3 A. I can only talk about the time of my tenure as minister of the
4 interior. All police activity that had activity within the context of
5 military problems, be it incidents or investigations of certain crimes,
6 would be initiated pursuant to a request by the army. In principle, the
7 military intelligence service or the military police would file a written
8 request or make a direct request, and then this would be recorded, for
9 assistance in whichever way they needed. And they would request specific
10 police resources. This would always be specified. For example, there
11 would need to be an investigation or an expert opinion provided.
12 Resources that the Ministry of the Interior had at its disposal at the
13 time to a greater degree than perhaps the army, as the army was still in
14 the process of setting up these departments and lacked the resources,
15 especially in terms of equipment. In the early days of the war, the
16 ministry often helped the army and solved problems together with the army,
17 but it was the military security bodies who were in charge of the
19 Q. By the last part of your answer, do you mean the military security
20 bodies maintained control of the investigation that civilian police were
21 participating in?
22 A. Yes, that's what I'm trying to say.
23 Q. And what were the respective roles of the military police or the
24 military security bodies and the civilian police in any investigation that
25 the civilian police participated in? I mean, what did the military do and
1 what did the civilian police do?
2 A. This depended on the case in hand. No two cases were the same.
3 If the perpetrators were military men, then they would be dealt with by
4 the military; the military police would arrest them and detain them and
5 everything else. They would have been under the jurisdiction of the army.
6 Any other act that was investigated, if the Ministry of the Interior had
7 better resources, then this would be done in the presence of the police.
8 Documents would then be drafted that were later used in prosecuting these
9 cases. Sometimes an investigating magistrate would be part of the
10 investigation. And you would always need to have a proper team - the
11 composition of this team was defined by regulations - and then documents
12 would be drawn up in relation to the case.
13 Q. I just want you to be a little bit more specific, if you can.
14 What was the division of responsibilities? I mean, what did the military
15 police do and what did the civilian police do in these investigations?
16 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I object to that. Your Honours, my
17 learned friend already elicited from this witness that he wasn't sure
18 which military body it was that had the -- had the competence to deal with
19 the particular investigation we are dealing with. And in my submission,
20 this is just a third way of doing -- of asking the same question. But if
21 my learned friend has a specific case which this witness knows about and
22 can give an illustration of what happened in that case, then that might
23 give a focus to the question. I wouldn't object to that being done; it
24 might help the Chamber.
25 JUDGE LIU: Well, that may be a good suggestion.
1 MR. RE: The witness has said that the military would -- military
2 police would arrest them and detain them and everything else. He's
3 already given an answer as to what the military police do. I'm asking him
4 what the civilian police do. I don't understand the objection. I've
5 asked him about the respective roles. He said the military police arrest
6 and detain. Well, I'm asking him what the civilian police do in these
7 investigations which are under the control of the military but in which
8 the civilian police participate. Now, he's the minister of interior, in
9 charge of all the police in Bosnia at the time --
10 MR. MORRISSEY: If my friend will stop there, I'll indicate this:
11 If that's the question, if that's the question, I've got no objection to
12 it at all. What do the civilian police do in such a case? I don't object
13 to that. Of course the witness knows that.
14 JUDGE LIU: Yes, you may proceed.
15 MR. RE:
16 Q. That's the question.
17 A. First there is the assumption that the military seek assistance
18 from the police in one of these tasks. There is the tasks that they are
19 setting out to do, there must be an on-site investigation, and an
20 on-the-spot assessment must be made. So the army makes a request for the
21 police to give assistance. The request would usually specify the kind of
22 assistance being sought from the police; what the police is supposed to
23 do, in other words. Everything else, with the exception of the army,
24 would have been under the jurisdiction of the police. Everything to do
25 with citizens, with the protection of property, would have been within the
1 remit of the police.
2 As far as military persons are concerned, then it would be down to
3 other bodies to carry out investigations.
4 Q. Securing the crime scene, whose responsibility was that; the
5 military police or the civilian police?
6 A. The military police. If there is an incident in the area of
7 combat operations, if there is an incident wherever the army is staying,
8 if there is an incident with soldiers as the perpetrators, the crime scene
9 is secured by the army and everything else is done by the army. And the
10 police, I think the best expression would be, assists, perhaps, in as far
11 as any assistance is requested, it offers whatever assistance it can. But
12 it is the army that sees the task through from the very beginning to the
13 very end.
14 Q. What about the collecting of forensic evidence, such as taking
15 photographs, fingerprints, footprints, blood testing, or any of those
16 sorts of things? Civilian police or military police?
17 A. I would like to add the following, in order to explain it in
18 simple terms: If the civilian police would have to apprehend a soldier,
19 civilian police cannot come in and take in a soldier for interrogation.
20 Civilian police cannot apprehend and take into custody a soldier. Under
21 no circumstances can this be done by civilian police, because there is a
22 separate structure in charge of the soldiers. Since the Ministry of the
23 Interior, even before the war, had decent equipment and very good
24 personnel trained to carry out on-site investigations and was competent
25 for all of the technical issues relating to investigation, then in the
1 territory of the BH they would go to the sites jointly in order to carry
2 an examination and possibly identify the perpetrators. It could involve
3 an ordinary robbery, a brawl involving -- or resulting in death. So there
4 are a lot of elements here that need to be taken into account. Various
5 experts need to be consulted. This just shows you how complex this issue
7 And the police did a lot and assisted a lot, provided a lot of
8 assistance to the army in order for the army to create its own service.
9 And nowadays the BH army has all of these facilities within its own
10 framework, but at the time they had neither the staff required nor the
11 equipment in order to carry out the job. And in that sense, the Ministry
12 of the Interior assisted them, when it comes to matters that represent the
13 core of its work.
14 Q. What about autopsies and exhumations? Was the military equipped
15 to do that in 1993 when you were the minister of the interior, or did they
16 have to rely on Ministry of the Interior support for that?
17 A. I think that in general terms, in order to conduct autopsies and
18 exhumations, there was a division that was established in the context of
19 investigating war crimes. This division functioned within the BH
20 government and conducted exhumations. As for other medical expertise,
21 they used the services of the experts within the hospital centre of
22 Sarajevo in order to conduct autopsies and so on, because at the time
23 neither the army nor the Ministry of the Interior had appropriate services
24 within their own framework.
25 Q. What about the taking of witness statements in a military
1 investigation in which civilian police were participating? Were the
2 civilian police authorised to take witness statements?
3 A. The civilian police was authorised only if the army asked it to
4 get involved. It could not get involved on its own. It could not conduct
5 investigation against any members of the army. The police needed a prior
6 consent of the military, or a request in order to get involved.
7 Q. But what I'm -- what about the taking statements from civilians in
8 such an investigation?
9 A. The ministry could take statements from civilians and then forward
10 them to the military organs, if they were related to the investigation
11 conducted by them.
12 Q. Telephone tapping, was that something within the province of your
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. What was the legal process by which telephone tapping was
16 undertaken? How was it authorised?
17 A. In order for tapping to be put in place, that fell under the
18 jurisdiction of the SDB, the state security service. The service had to
19 submit a justification, a statement of reasons why this measure had to be
20 applied. So the reasons had to be stated in a document, and the document
21 needed to be signed by three persons: The operative officer, the
22 lowest-ranking one who proposed this measure; then the chief of the
23 security service who approved it; and finally, the minister who also gave
24 his consent. All of these measures of the secret service, including the
25 wire-tapping, had to be verified by political circles, meaning the head of
1 state. Secret wire-tapping at the operative level could be approved by
2 the minister and the chief of the secret service. Those were the
3 regulations in force at the time, the ones that were applied at the time.
4 Q. Did the military or military security service have the capacity to
5 undertake telephone surveillance - that's telephone tapping - in 1993?
6 A. I think that in 1993 the army did not have such capabilities, and
7 even within the SDB this was quite limited because we had suffered severe
8 physical damage of the PTT system. So our capabilities were limited.
9 This was not always possible for technical reasons. I think that the
10 army, towards the end of the war, or perhaps in 1996 and 1997, procured
11 some of that equipment for themselves as well. And until that time, they
12 used our resources, the resources of the state security service, which is
13 actually a service that we provided to them, the SDB provided that service
14 to the army. Because this was a security problem, and at the time any
15 security problem was treated as a problem of these two services when it
16 comes to the application of this measure.
17 Q. What about the Mr. Halilovic's phone; was it tapped in 1993?
18 A. Yes, his telephone was tapped. It was listened-in to during one
19 period of time.
20 Q. But who requested and who authorised the interception of
21 Mr. Halilovic's telephone conversations?
22 A. Prior to that, I would have to give you another explanation, if
24 Q. Yeah.
25 A. As you -- as you asked about this measure, in 1993 -- I was given
1 advice to speak in this manner.
2 To go back to the issue, this was 1993 and it involved sensitive
3 measures of the secret service. I took the office of the minister in June
4 of 1993. Upon acquainting myself with the secret security service where
5 the focus was directed at ensuring that it operated legally, it was
6 established that certain measures of that service were put in place
7 against Sefer Halilovic before my appointment by Munir Alibabic, who at
8 the time was the chief of the secret service sector in Sarajevo.
9 Q. All right. What I want to know is: When you were the minister,
10 was Mr. -- You said Mr. Halilovic's phone was tapped. Who had requested
11 the tapping of his phone and who had authorised it?
12 A. Just one more sentence, with your permission, because I believe
13 this to be important.
14 Q. Okay, and then the answer, please.
15 A. All right. All of the measures of the secret service, all
16 wire-tapping, after this review, were terminated, meaning they were not
17 applied any more. This was one of the first moves of the then-chief of
18 the secret service who had to clean-up, so to speak, the service. The
19 situation was very grave in 1993. So wire-tapping, not only of General
20 Halilovic but of others, was discontinued as well. And this is something
21 that can be verified in the documentation in Sarajevo. The measure was
22 re-applied in relation to General Halilovic at the request of the military
23 intelligence service and upon consent by President Izetbegovic.
24 I think that there must be a document confirming this in the
25 archives of the state security service and the military security service,
1 because the office -- or the post held by General Halilovic, and General
2 Halilovic himself, were so important, it was believed that the measure had
3 to be applied properly. So the chief of the secret service himself was in
4 charge of that.
5 Q. The request, you said, was from the military intelligence. Was
6 that from Mr. Jasarevic himself?
7 A. I think that it did come from Jasarevic, that he was the chief of
8 service at the time, although the people in that post rotated. But I
9 think that this was during the time when the service was led by Jasarevic.
11 JUDGE LIU: Now it's time for us to take a break and we'll resume
12 at quarter to 1.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 12.46 p.m.
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re, please continue.
16 MR. RE:
17 Q. We're talking about the telephone tapping of Mr. Halilovic's phone
18 before the break. What was the reason for the request to tap his
20 A. At that time when the telephone was wire-tapped -- I think I need
21 to explain this in more detail. The request had arrived from the military
22 security service, and the explanation was that problems had to be
23 resolved, problems relating to the units in town which had already caused
24 a number of problems.
25 Q. Which unit?
1 A. The ones that I spoke about in the beginning. The brigades under
2 the command of Caco, Celo, and some smaller formations. So it involved
3 them, and then the incident in Grabovica was something that topped it all.
4 The military structures and the Presidency decided that the problem had to
5 be tackled. And I think that it was in the context of that operation, of
6 that campaign that the military service requested that General Halilovic's
7 phone be tapped because, as they said, he had contacts with some officers
8 such as Celo, Delalic, and some others whose names I can't remember now.
9 But all of these names are stated in the documents. These contacts were
10 seen as a potential security problem, something that was important in
11 order to resolve the situation. And the authorities simply wanted to have
12 a clearer picture of the role and position of General Halilovic in
13 relation to these commanders and units.
14 Q. Were any other senior military officers' telephones tapped at that
15 same time, or was it only Mr. Halilovic?
16 A. Several phones were tapped. I can't claim with certainty -- I
17 can't give you the specific names of people whose phones were tapped, but
18 these were definitely the members of the army who were of interest to the
19 security service, who caused problems or had contacts with problematic
20 persons. And as a result of that, the security service deemed it
21 appropriate to apply the measure, or rather to request that the SDB apply
22 the measure. At the time, the situation was very difficult. The war was
23 going on and the situation in Sarajevo was very difficult.
24 Q. What I'm interested in is people of Mr. Halilovic's seniority or
25 below his, like members of the command -- Supreme Command staff or corps
1 commands or people of that level of seniority. Are you able to say now
2 whether the telephones of any of those people were tapped?
3 A. As far as I remember, General Halilovic was the most senior
4 military officer whose phone was tapped.
5 Q. Well, there was only one above him in the army, that's Mr. Delic.
6 What about the people on the level below him, like corps commanders?
7 A. I don't think that the measure is applied on the basis of the post
8 or function, no. I think the measure is applied if there are reasons to
9 believe that the person could be of interest to security services. The
10 position is irrelevant, be it the position of the chief of the General
11 Staff or the corps commander or the brigade commander. I don't think that
12 the measure is applied on that basis, on the basis of the post held by an
14 Q. Apart from telephone interception, was there any other
15 surveillance of Mr. Halilovic by your service or, to your knowledge, the
16 military intelligence or the military security service?
17 A. As far as I am aware - and I'm certain that the SDB did not apply
18 any other measure against General Halilovic - that's as far as I know.
19 This is what I can tell you from my domain. Now, as to any other measure
20 applied by the military secret service, I couldn't tell you anything about
21 that. The SDB applied only the wire-tapping measure, and that was done at
22 the request of the military security service.
23 Q. What about the -- does that include interception of radio
24 communications or are you confining it to telephone interception?
25 A. The measure pertained exclusively to telephone conversations.
1 Interception of radio communications, as far as I know, was a matter that
2 was of general relevance. Everybody could listen to that. The technology
3 was so poor in town that from the transmitter one could pick up various
4 signals, various communications. However, that is not something that was
5 done by the SDB with respect to General Halilovic. The state security
6 service definitely did not apply that measure, no.
7 Q. Who was in charge of the interception on Mr. Halilovic's telephone
8 and who was responsible for supervising the interceptions?
9 A. That was a purely technical matter. The man who was a
10 professional, who professionally listened to tapped lines, was one of the
11 officers of the SDB. One of the officers was assigned to this task. And
12 pursuant to the SDB regulations, the officer would write up reports
13 detailing how the measure was applied. He was duty-bound to report on
14 that. And the reports were sent only to the chief of the security
15 services, military security services, who would then indicate to whom else
16 the report should be sent, so this is purely a technical matter.
17 Q. And very briefly, what was Mr. Enver Mujezinovic's role in the
18 telephone interception?
19 A. He had a purely technical role, and he was not in a position to
20 make any decisions. He could only execute any measures that had been
22 Q. Now, what was your role as minister of the interior in Operation
23 Trebevic in late October 1993?
24 A. Within the plan of the Trebevic plan, once it was approved by the
25 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I had a position which was a
1 leadership position, and I also had a coordinating role. In accordance
2 with the plan, I was to command the police units which acted together with
3 the military. And as for my coordinating role, I was to coordinate
4 various matters and problems that might arise in the course of the
5 Trebevic operation. The person in charge of the entire operation was
6 General Delic, and in accordance with the document, I was his deputy and I
7 was in charge of the matters that I've just described to you.
8 MR. RE: Can the witness please be shown Exhibit D261.
9 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I just wish to raise a matter here.
10 This cross-examination has now expanded way beyond what was in the
11 statement or the proofing notes, and it seems that many matters are now
12 being raised. Frankly, we've all been in the case a long time so I
13 haven't objected to it. In some respects, we can see what's coming. But
14 if the number there was as I heard it, D261 -- I just can't see it on the
15 list. So I'm caught by surprise by this.
16 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
17 MR. RE: I apologise, it should be. It's D261, that's the
18 Operation Trebevic document. I'm just asking the witness if that's the
19 correct document, that's all.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Sorry, just to confirm. Is it -- I don't have a
21 note as to what it is. Is my friend referring to the team -- the document
22 establishing the team?
23 MR. RE: Yes, the document of the 25th of October, 1993, signed by
24 Rasim Delic.
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, I don't have an objection to
1 that being shown.
2 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. But actually the direct
3 examination took a longer time than expected.
4 MR. RE: Yes, longer than I expected, too.
5 JUDGE LIU: But anyway, the witness provided us with very useful
6 information on certain aspects. I believe that it will be also useful in
7 the Defence case.
8 MR. RE: It may even cut down cross-examination quite
9 significantly, you never know.
10 JUDGE LIU: You may proceed with your direct examination.
11 MR. RE:
12 Q. Is the document in front of you now, Mr. Alispahic, to the left?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I just want you to confirm, looking at that document, is that the
15 document by which you were appointed the deputy of the group which was to
16 direct the Trebevic and Trebevic 2?
17 A. Yes, that's the one.
18 Q. What was your role on the day, that is the 26th of October, 1993?
19 What did you do?
20 A. On that day I was at work. At this time, my task was to see to it
21 that the plan that had been verified by the Presidency was carried out in
22 cooperation with General Delic, as you can see from this order. It was by
23 coincidence that the office of the Ministry of the Interior was chosen for
24 this. I was there with some members of the staff. We were there and we
25 exercised control over the activities that were to happen in the early
1 morning hours. Therefore, what I was doing on that day, I was there to
2 make sure that the Trebevic plan was carried out.
3 Q. How many Ministry of the Interior units were involved in Trebevic?
4 A. I think there were a number of different units. It's very
5 difficult for me to remember specifically. The special units, the Bosna
6 Detachment of the Ministry of the Interior, the Laste Special Unit, and a
7 number of police officers who were assigned. On this particular
8 assignment, an assessment had been made indicating that the situation
9 might turn complex. And it was decided to have more police officers
10 committed to this operation. This is a general statement, but we made
11 further additional statements in our stride on that day as the situation
13 Q. Paragraph 5 of the document, D261, of the 25th of October, 1993,
14 says: "Use all means at your disposal, including weapons, to bring in
15 Musan Topalovic, Ramiz Delalic, and the others if there is any resistance
16 or opposition." That's Caco and Celo. Did you participate in bringing in
17 either Caco or Celo?
18 A. Can I please ask you to clarify the question.
19 Q. All right. Paragraph 5 says -- one of the objectives of the
20 operation, according to this document, was, using all means at your
21 disposal, to bring in - I assume that means arrest - Caco and Celo.
22 What was your participation, if any, in arresting or bringing in
23 either Caco or Celo?
24 A. My participation was defined by this document, the plan that was
25 made. This is just one paragraph that defined the position that should be
1 taken towards these two senior officers. The order stated that -- or
2 rather, authorisation was given if they resisted that any measures could
3 be used. The Trebevic operation, in essence, was a military action.
4 Q. All I want to know is --
5 A. The situation was so serious that --
6 Q. I only want to know about the arrest of Caco and Celo, what your
7 role was. With Celo, did you have anything to do with his arrest?
8 A. The arrest of Celo and Caco was a complex operation, and it was
9 aggravated by the fact that they in fact resisted. The whole operation
10 had been planned and initiated in total secrecy and there were no leaks
11 until the time the commenced. Once the operation was underway, the
12 commanders under consideration realised immediately what was going on. It
13 is possible that they assumed they would be arrested and brought in, that
14 measures would be taken against them. So what they did was to block their
15 own facilities. They got them well fortified and they put up good
16 resistance. There was a fire fight as a result, in the course of which
17 members of both the police and the army were killed. Sarajevo, as you
18 know, was under siege and there was certain combat operations going on
19 that had been imposed by the enemy. And now the situation inside the town
20 was that there was a clash of -- between the regular forces and the
21 renegades. The arrest of Caco was a highly complex operation. What was
22 eventually done was one of the things that were possible. The former
23 minister, Jusuf Pusina, went and convinced Caco to come to the 1st Corps
24 command. Ramiz Delalic, also known as Celo, also put up a great deal of
25 resistance, and it took a lot to place him under control. So this lasted
1 the whole day, and this entailed a certain amount of combat. Delalic
2 asked to speak to someone from the government or from the Presidency. I
3 think the president or the Prime Minister, Silajdzic, decided that I
4 should go to Celo's command as well as Prime Minister Silajdzic.
5 The atmosphere there was awful. There was a lot of panic and
6 fear. There had been a fire fight, after all. Celo requested to have
7 guarantees that he would not be killed, that he would not be persecuted,
8 as well as other guarantees. He even requested to speak to the president,
9 to be received by the president.
10 At this point we wanted to get the hostage situation resolved.
11 There had already been casualties, especially at Caco's command, the
12 command that Caco had held under siege. Six police officers were killed
13 there. Therefore, we agreed. We provided the guarantees that Delalic had
14 requested. We brought two vehicles and drove to the Presidency building,
15 where Prime Minister Silajdzic probably held additional talks, gave Celo
16 further advice and offered further guarantees, while I went back to the
17 Ministry of the Interior.
18 Both Celo and Caco and many other members of those units were
19 brought in on that occasion. The first two were held at the corps
20 command, where they were interviewed. I believe that as many as around
21 100 soldiers were brought in on that day, which doesn't necessarily mean
22 that they remained in detention. They were simply brought in in order to
23 ascertain their individual responsibility. I believe 10 or 15 of them
24 were eventually detained and the rest were allowed to go home. The
25 members of those units were held back where it was proved that these
1 members or these units were guilty of criminal offences.
2 Q. You mentioned some police being killed -- six police officers
3 being killed at Caco's command. How did they die?
4 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, I object to that. At all events,
5 Mr. Halilovic was in his flat with -- well, I don't think that's in
6 evidence yet. We know that Mr. Halilovic on the 26th, at all events, is
7 not able to play any role that's relevant to this case here. So what
8 happened at the battle of Caco's, in my submission, is meaningless detail
9 and doesn't assist this Tribunal.
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes, are there any evidence relevant to our case?
11 MR. RE: I'll ask another question.
12 Q. Mr. Alispahic, did Mr. Halilovic have any role in the apprehension
13 of Caco or Celo on the 26th of October, 1993?
14 A. I, for one, am not familiar with any role or position that he held
15 or any task that he had as part of this operation, or activity.
16 Q. Do you know whether he was requested to be involved in it in any
18 A. I think General Jasarevic or some other military commander -- I'm
19 talking about the day when the operation took place and the situation was
20 complex and grave. So I think one of them asked General Halilovic to use
21 his authority with these people. It was believed, because General
22 Halilovic was a commander and now Chief of Staff, that from the beginning
23 of the war he was part of those structures in Sarajevo, and that
24 regardless of how those people acted, they held General Halilovic in high
25 esteem. But I think on that occasion General Halilovic refused. I think
1 Jasarevic said the general had told him that he did not wish to interfere
2 with our job and that we should just press on and keep doing our job.
3 That was what General Jasarevic told me.
4 Q. What was the reason -- as briefly as you can tell us, the
5 necessity to conduct this military operation between the 9th and the 10th
6 Brigades in October 1993?
7 A. In terms of police classification, this was self-defence. It was
8 highly critical that this problem be solved. It's for truth's sake that I
9 must say this. On that day, even if General Halilovic had interceded with
10 these people, it is highly questionable whether he could have achieved
11 anything because the action was underway by this time and it would have
12 been very difficult to control. They had already opened fire. There was
13 an open clash, a fire fight, and it would have been very difficult to
14 achieve anything at all.
15 Q. There's been some evidence that -- General Karavelic gave evidence
16 that there were 5.000 military employed against the 9th and the 10th in
17 Operation Trebevic. What was your understanding of the necessity to use
18 so many soldiers against units of the Bosnian army at Sarajevo?
19 A. I'll answer this question in two ways. I'm not certain, but
20 Karavelic, after all, was the corps commander. I'm not certain -- I was
21 saying that 5.000 men were involved. Maybe there was an estimate that
22 5.000 should be involved. Maybe this was one of the operations. When I
23 say "one of the options," I mean, for example, if the members of these two
24 brigades leave their combat positions and these positions should
25 immediately be taken by other soldiers. In this eventuality, the estimate
1 was probably justified, but I can't be certain because I'm talking from my
2 own perspective. But I was convinced at the time, and I still am, that
3 there was a real need for this operation to be carried out, implemented,
4 if you like.
5 Q. Was Sefer Halilovic arrested as part of Operation Trebevic?
6 A. As regards the Ministry of the Interior, Sefer Halilovic was never
7 arrested, not according to our norms and criteria, not in terms of what
8 the word "arrested" implies to us.
9 Q. There's been some evidence that he was interviewed at MUP
10 headquarters from the end of October through mid-November 1993. Why was
11 he interviewed there?
12 A. The general was interviewed following a request of the military
13 service, and this request was approved by the state president. It was
14 done at the state security service centre, and the interview was done by
15 Enver Mujezinovic. The idea was that this service had people who were
16 better qualified to interview a person, a commanding officer, of General
17 Halilovic's rank and standing. Although, as far as I know, the interview
18 lasted many days and members of the military police, or rather members of
19 the army's intelligence service were also involved.
20 Q. Was he in custody at the time when he was being interviewed?
21 MR. MORRISSEY: I object to that. Your Honours, that cannot be
22 relevant to the charges before the Tribunal now to go into this area.
23 There was a time previously when the Prosecution wanted to lead certain
24 evidence. They led evidence that they wanted to lead then, there was a
25 ruling about it, we've all acted on that ruling since that time. Now, I
1 submit that, at all events, the game was over on the 26th of October, and
2 this is now irrelevant.
3 MR. RE: The relevance is this, Your Honours, and that is that we
4 anticipate the Defence case will be, from their pre-trial brief and
5 questions asked of Prosecution witnesses, we anticipate that part of the
6 case is that there was a political campaign or vendetta being conducted
7 against Mr. Halilovic --
8 MR. MORRISSEY: Just a moment. I object to this in the presence
9 of the witness if that's going to be explained like this.
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
11 MR. RE: I have no objection to the witness leaving for the
12 purposes of --
13 JUDGE LIU: Well, I would like to say that this Tribunal is to
14 address the personal criminal responsibilities rather than some political
15 issues involved in this matter. It is very important for us to establish
16 that after the 26th of October Mr. Halilovic was arrested and interviewed.
17 And another matter is that: What's the situation after Mr. Halilovic was
18 released, which is not quite clear, or whether Mr. Halilovic resumed his
19 function as the Chief of Staff.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I'm just checking that it's in
21 evidence yet. My learned friend can stop me if I'm wrong, but I think it
22 is already in evidence - if it's not we'll put it there - that he was
23 removed from his position as Chief of Staff by presidential order, I think
24 on the 1st of November. And -- if you'll just excuse me a moment, Your
25 Honour, we'll tell you the date. It's Exhibit 263, I'm instructed, Your
1 Honour, that by virtue of that order he was removed as Chief of Staff on
2 the 1st of November. Thereafter he's, I think, placed in the position of
3 being at the disposal of the army, and they didn't find -- well, there's
4 no -- I don't think it's going to be suggested they found a job for him.
5 So the 1st of November is the time when he ceases formally to be Chief of
6 Staff. That's one date we can be sure of.
7 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.
8 It seems to me that it's not necessary for us to go into the very
9 details concerning of the interviews and the conditions in which
10 Mr. Halilovic is interrogated during that period.
11 MR. RE: I wasn't intending to go anywhere near the interviews.
12 The only thing I wanted to clarify was whether he was in custody at the
13 time of the interviews, and that's up until the time he was dismissed as
14 the chief of the Main Staff, and that's the 1st of November.
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
16 MR. MORRISSEY: I don't object to him asking that question.
17 JUDGE LIU: You may proceed.
18 MR. RE:
19 Q. Was Mr. Halilovic in custody when he was interviewed by your
20 service and the military security service?
21 A. As far as the Ministry of the Interior was concerned, the general
22 was not in custody. Every day, or whenever agreed, he would arrive in his
23 own vehicle with his driver at the state security premises, where the
24 interview was conducted. This is how the state security treated General
25 Halilovic. As regards the Ministry of the Interior, as far as the
1 Ministry of the Interior was concerned, General Halilovic was never
3 Q. What do you know about Sefer Halilovic badges? Were there such
5 A. I think for a brief while some members sported these badges, some
6 sort of a round badge. I believe that with some of us it caused a certain
7 amount of derision. It was derisory that some people should be wearing
8 the general's badges, which were a sign of revolt by some members around
9 town caused by the removal of General Halilovic and the appointment of
10 General Delic in that post. But I, myself, didn't consider that a real
11 security problem. It was probably just the case that certain members of
12 the army used this as an expression of support for General Halilovic, and
13 I still believe this was the case.
14 Q. What did the badges look like? What was on them?
15 A. I think it just had the general's face or effigy, I'm not sure
16 which is the correct expression, the sort you can buy in a shop. You can
17 pin it onto your uniform or onto your lapel. But this wasn't frequent.
18 It wasn't used very much. I remember that Nedzad Ugljen, the former state
19 security chief, once showed me one of these.
20 Q. Do you know who was making them?
21 A. I don't know.
22 Q. Which units were -- you said members of the army were wearing
23 them. Which units were they from?
24 A. I think most of them were from Delalic's unit. I believe that at
25 the time General Halilovic and the commander of that unit had a good
1 relationship, and I believe that that was where the gesture originated.
2 Q. Did you ever see anyone yourself wearing these badges in Sarajevo?
3 A. Apart from once laying eyes on this badge, I didn't really see
4 anyone else. You needed to move about town in order to see it, but I did
5 see this one. I didn't really have too much time to walk around the
6 streets, so I can't say I noticed any badges, but then again you didn't
7 see too many soldiers moving about either.
8 MR. RE: Could the witness please be shown Prosecution 65 ter
9 Exhibit 154, which is 0218-3114.
10 Q. I want to show you a two-page document dated the 11th of October,
11 1993. It's a MUP SDB document entitled "Information" and signed by the
12 SDB sector chief, Enver Mujezinovic. What sort of document is that,
13 Mr. Alispahic?
14 A. This is an information dealing with a certain security situation
15 or phenomenon, and it is used for further steps by the military leadership
16 or perhaps chief of the security service or the Minister of the Interior.
17 These are the end users of this information that should be a document of
18 high quality.
19 Q. Is this a document -- I'm sorry. It's -- the name on the bottom
20 is Mr. Mujezinovic. What does that indicate to you, the fact that his
21 signature and name is on it?
22 A. That means that the then-chief of the Sarajevo sector, Enver
23 Mujezinovic, signed the document. This is one of the organisational units
24 which in the course of its work collects certain information of security
25 nature and is further sent to other people. In this specific case, it was
1 sent to the chief of the CSB security services centre, chief of the
2 military -- chief of the secret service, and the minister of the interior.
3 Based on what we can see here, several issues were dealt with in this
4 information. According to the service, all of this information here was
5 relevant from a security point of view.
6 Q. Is this a document that you saw or would have seen as the minister
7 of the interior in October 1993?
8 MR. MORRISSEY: They should ask the first question first, and that
9 is: Did he see it? And then afterwards we can decide whether he would
10 have seen it.
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
12 MR. RE:
13 Q. Do you remember seeing this particular document when you were the
14 minister of the interior, in October 1993?
15 A. Yes. This document definitely reached me. I think that after I
16 saw this document, the chief of the service saw it as well and it could
17 have been also sent to the military security service.
18 Q. I want you to --
19 A. Or rather, the military intelligence service.
20 Q. I want you to comment upon the reliability of the information
21 contained there as much as you can.
22 MR. MORRISSEY: Just excuse me a minute. Your Honours, once
23 again, that really is your job, to decide on the reliability. What the
24 witness can be asked is: Who provided that information? How far removed
25 from him is the source?
1 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
2 You may ask some questions about the source of this document.
3 MR. RE:
4 Q. What were the sources used to compile the information in this
6 A. Based on the document, one can see that Mufid Memija was one of
7 the sources for the document, because the security organ stated here that
8 he was one of the problems, as General Halilovic described him, because he
9 was creating a media ban or a media gag and was not allowing the
10 information to reach the media. And I think that Salko Gusic or somebody
11 else from the military structure explained the contact of General
12 Halilovic in this context. In the subheading you can see what this
13 document is about, namely it is stated here "Indicative attempts by Sefer
14 Halilovic to promote his military successes in the media."
15 So the service believed that this is something that others had to
16 be informed about. The text itself states that the information comes from
17 a reliable source. If one wanted, we could use the number stated in this
18 document in order to identify the source. If one went through the
19 records, we should be able to find that.
20 Q. What does the denotion of the source as a "reliable source"
21 indicate to you in your experience as the minister of the interior?
22 A. A reliable source can be a document which leaves no doubt about a
23 fact. It could also be a person who is an associate of the service and is
24 considered to be a reliable associate by the service. It could also be a
25 radio communication, or any other means of communication, or a secret
1 tapping which was not aimed at that person. What I'm trying to say is
2 that through secret wire-tapping of persons who are interesting for the
3 security service, one can obtain information about persons whose
4 communication is not wire-tapped.
5 Q. What about the source in relation to Zulfikar Alispago, that he
6 had, on Sefer's orders, "bribed certain journalists to report positively
7 on successes of the army under Halilovic's command."
8 Do you know what the source for that was?
9 A. I don't think I could tell you anything about that. It is very
10 difficult to say what the source was for this segment. It could be
11 Zulfikar Alispago himself; he could be the source. He could have said to
12 some members of the secret service that he had done that. It is stated in
13 the information that this needs to be looked into, but it would be
14 difficult to claim this with any certainty right now. It would be best to
15 check this with Zulfikar Alispago. If it were up to me, I would verify
17 Q. Are you able to comment on the accuracy or reliability or
18 otherwise of the information in that document?
19 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, once again the witness should not be
20 put in the position of having to do that; that's really up to you, the
21 Tribunal, to do that.
22 MR. RE: Based upon what he knows, of course.
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, I think we have come across this issue already.
24 MR. RE: Well, I move to tender it into evidence.
25 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Any objections?
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, since he's seen the document, there
2 can be no objection to it.
3 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much for your cooperation.
4 This document is admitted into the evidence.
5 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Prosecution Exhibit P434.
6 MR. RE: I only want to show the witness two more documents and
7 ask him to comment on the type of document and I will be finished. The
8 first one is P212 and the second one is P415.
9 Q. While the document's -- is the document there yet?
10 While the document's coming, I just want to ask you something to
11 clarify something from earlier when you said that the military security --
12 or military police could assist -- request assistance from the civilian
13 police to investigate. Could a military commander do the same; that is,
14 request assistance from the civilian police to investigate crime?
15 A. Yes, any senior officer of the BH army could go to the police and
16 get a response to any request, or rather get an assistance. I think that
17 in fact we had quite a good cooperation going on. All of the requests
18 coming from the army were always given a priority, in fact.
19 Q. Thank you. Now please turn to the document which is on the
20 screen, which is P212, a Ministry of the Interior document of the 2nd of
21 November, 1993, headed "Report on negative conduct and activities of Sefer
22 Halilovic, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the BH armed forces."
23 I just want your brief comment on the type of document this is,
24 that is, its status within the Ministry of the Interior.
25 A. This document was compiled on the basis of cooperation of the
1 Ministry of the Interior and the Supreme Command staff and the security
2 administration. I think that this information was produced in two copies,
3 or three copies. I don't think that more copies were made. This document
4 was marked as "state secret," and it -- upon being used by whoever it was
5 addressed to, it had to be sent back. The police and the army obtained
6 this information, which they described as negative aspects in the conduct
7 of General Halilovic. I read this on behalf of the Ministry of the
8 Interior; General Delic, Jusuf Jasarevic read this on behalf of the army;
9 and I think that Alija Izetbegovic also was sent this information, and
10 perhaps some other politicians as well.
11 Q. And finally, Exhibit P415, that is a document dated the 16th of
12 October, 1993. It's a Ministry of the Interior security services centre
13 Sarajevo document, subject: "Overview of security-related information
14 regarding illegal activities and abuse of authority by Ramiz Delalic,"
15 with the heading "Official secret, highly classified."
16 Again I want you to tell the Trial Chamber what sort of document
17 this is. What is its status within the security apparatus?
18 A. This document, in a way, provides an overview of security-related
19 information. There were various types of security-related information,
20 and it was based on the work of the state security service, which is
21 duty-bound to collect such information and to inform superiors about it.
22 I think that this document had to reach the chief of the state security
23 service and the chief of the military intelligence service. In my view,
24 this is a document with a high degree of accuracy.
25 Q. Did you see the document at the time?
1 A. I don't think I had this document at the time. I only had
2 collective information and I described to you a little bit ago. However,
3 the contents of this document were sent to me through other documents.
4 MR. RE: I've just been informed that it is actually still only
5 MFI 415. It wasn't actually admitted into evidence. I would move to
6 tender the document into evidence through this witness.
7 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
8 Any objections?
9 MR. MORRISSEY: Would you just excuse me for one moment, Your
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes, please.
12 [Defence counsel confer]
13 MR. MORRISSEY: No, Your Honour, I do object to that one. This, I
14 think, is one of the documents outstanding from the previous witness as
15 well, which has to be discussed. And perhaps we can deal with it at that
16 time, Your Honour. But I object to it; the witness didn't see it.
17 JUDGE LIU: Well, maybe we could delay the debate for the
18 admission of this document into the evidence at a later stage, but of
19 course this document as well as document 150 are pending at this moment.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes.
21 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
22 Mr. Re.
23 MR. RE: Yes. That would be the evidence in-chief. The only
24 thing I could do is develop further from this witness the contents of the
25 document and so on, but I note the time.
1 JUDGE LIU: Well, I think at the end of the testimony of this
2 witness we'll spend some time on those documents. At that time, you may
3 ask some further questions concerning of this document.
4 Well, Witness, I'm afraid that we have to stop here because the
5 time allocated to us for today is over. And we might not sit tomorrow.
6 Madam Usher will show you out of this courtroom, and I hope you still
7 remember what I reminded you of yesterday.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No problem.
9 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Morrissey, is it all right for us not to sit
13 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, Your Honour. We are hoping, as I indicated,
14 to get a report from our man in Sarajevo, who can indicate what the
15 position is about those documents. I mean, we reserve our position -- I
16 must say I have an open mind about what the situation is with those, but I
17 don't -- Your Honour, can I just indicate I don't intend to start a fire
18 just to put it out again. So it may be that it's -- one option we're
19 considering is quite a short cross-examination here. So we'll see how it
21 But, Your Honours, would it be convenient if we advise the Chamber
22 at around 5.30 today as to what the progress is?
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
24 MR. MORRISSEY: And we'll effectively keep the Prosecution
25 advised, of course, as well.
1 JUDGE LIU: Yes, thank you.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you.
3 JUDGE LIU: Well, at this stage this Bench has a ruling to make,
4 which is concerning of the decision on the Defence motion concerning use
5 and the tendering of a new military expert report filed on the 23rd May,
7 On the 31st of March, 2003, the Prosecution filed the expert
8 opinion of Major General Matthew Ridgway. During the Status Conference of
9 the 28th April, 2005, the Prosecution indicated that it would seek to
10 tender Mr. Ridgway's report into evidence and call him to testify before
11 this Trial Chamber. By letter of 12th May, the Prosecution provided the
12 Defence with a version of Mr. Ridgway's report that was revised by the
13 Prosecution. The revised version of the expert report was received by the
14 Trial Chamber on the 13th of May, 2005. On the 13th May, 2005, the
15 Defence filed its motion concerning use and the tendering of the military
16 expert report, in which the Defence objected to the expert report in its
17 original or revised form to be used at trial and to be admitted into
18 evidence; it also objected to the calling of Mr. Ridgway as an expert
19 witness. The matter was also discussed in the Court on the 12th and 13th
20 of May.
21 On the 18th May, 2005, the Prosecution filed its response to the
22 Defence motion concerning use and the tendering of the military expert
23 report, in which the Prosecution, having reviewed the expert report in the
24 light of the Defence objection, informed the Trial Chamber that it no
25 longer intends to rely upon the report in its entirety or in a revised
1 form. The Prosecution stated that it accepts that it now would be
2 impractical at this stage of the trial to expect an expert witness to
3 properly digest summaries of the evidence and many additional documents
4 and to formulate a response which could appropriately assist the Trial
5 Chamber. The Trial Chamber, therefore, considers the Defence request in a
6 motion of 13th May, 2005, with regard to admission of the expert report as
8 In the response, the Prosecution also outlined the proposed scope
9 of expert testimony and indicated that it would provide Defence with a
10 short opinion of Mr. Ridgway by 20th May, 2005. On the 20th May, 2005,
11 the Prosecution filed a new expert opinion of Lieutenant General Matthew
12 Ridgway. On the 23rd May, 2005, the Defence filed its motion concerning
13 the use and the tendering of a new military expert report, in which it
14 objects both to be used and the admission of the new expert report and to
15 -- and to the calling of Mr. Ridgway as an expert witness. The
16 Prosecution responded to the Defence motion concerning the new expert
17 report during the trial hearing on the 23rd May, 2005.
18 The Trial Chamber has considered the arguments submitted by both
19 parties. The Trial Chamber finds that the disclosure of the new report at
20 this late stage of proceedings does not accord with the Rules of Procedure
21 and Evidence. Its admission would cause prejudice to the accused and it
22 would be contrary to the fundamental requirement of a fair trial.
23 Moreover, the relevance of the new report to the present case is doubtful,
24 and the Trial Chamber finds that the report and proposed testimony of
25 Mr. Ridgway would not be of assistance to the Trial Chamber. The Trial
1 Chamber therefore decides pursuant to Article 21(4)(b) and Rule 94 bis of
2 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence not to admit the expert report and not
3 to hear the testimony of Mr. Ridgway as an expert witness in the present
4 case. It is so decided.
5 The hearing for today is adjourned, and we'll see you the day
6 after tomorrow.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.56 p.m.,
8 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 26th day of
9 May, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.