1 Thursday, 26 May 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.
6 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
7 Would you please call the case, Mr. Court Deputy.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is Case Number
9 IT-01-48-T, the Prosecutor versus Sefer Halilovic.
10 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
11 Good morning, Witness. Did you have a good rest yesterday?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think so.
13 JUDGE LIU: Did you watch the soccer game last night?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Only in part. I didn't have time to
15 watch the whole thing unfortunately.
16 JUDGE LIU: I see. But however, we have to come back to your
18 Well, Mr. Morrissey, are you ready for your cross-examination?
19 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I am, but my learned friend has
20 asked if he might put another document which by way of an oversight he
21 didn't put and we agree with that being done, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Yes, of course.
24 MR. RE: Yes, I know I'd said I finished on Tuesday, but there was
25 a document I neglected to put to him and with Your Honours' leave, thank
2 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
3 MR. RE: Could the witness please be shown Exhibit D238.
4 WITNESS: BAKIR ALISPAHIC [Resumed]
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 Examined by Mr. Re: [Continued]
7 Q. Do you have the document there?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Right. It's a document of the 2nd of October, 1993, a security
10 administration report to the Main Staff of the armed forces of the ABiH,
11 signed by Jozo Jozic, the secretary for the SDB. I want to ask you about
12 this document. It's a letter which -- report which has gone to the
13 military security service. What can you say about that?
14 A. Can I just take a minute to look at the document. You would need
15 to go through the entire document to comment.
16 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours -- I'm sorry. I won't interrupt.
17 Your Honours, perhaps it could assist the witness if it's made clear what
18 he's being asked to comment upon. Obviously he can't be asked to comment
19 on the truth or otherwise of the document because it's not suggested that
20 he was there. But the Prosecutor is entitled to ask him to comment on the
21 form of it and how it came to go from one agency to another, that would be
22 legitimate, but it should be made clear to the witness what he's being
23 asked, in our submission.
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, maybe you could put your question more
1 MR. RE: Yes.
2 Q. Mr. Alispahic, I'm not asking you to comment on the truth or
3 otherwise of the document; that wasn't in my question. What I'm asking
4 you about is as with the other documents, the form of the document and the
5 manner how it was compiled and the type of document that it is.
6 A. I would like to say this about the document: It was a document
7 produced by the state security service and in most cases here we've had
8 documents drafted or produced or forwarded by the various public security
9 services, the Ministry of the Interior, the police stations, and other
10 such bodies. This is a state security document and it was signed on
11 behalf of the deputy secretary Jozic, Jozo. It was signed by Nedzad
12 Ugljanin. The document was produced by this service and as far as the
13 signature is concerned, it is perfectly regular.
14 The document reports about what happened in Grabovica. It hints
15 briefly that there was a killing in that area and states that it was not
16 possible for them to carry out an on-site investigation because the police
17 station was not allowed to access the area. There is nothing more in this
18 document about the problem, but as I've been explaining during this
19 testimony the state security quite -- regardless of the work of the public
20 security gathered information and informed the minister as well as both
21 the military and the civilian authorities. This is a perfectly regular
22 document, and it was produced by this body.
23 Q. What is the status of a document of this type, that is a letter
24 from the secretary -- under-secretary of the SDB to the Main Staff?
25 A. The document implies that this body had reliable information if
1 they decided to go to one of the other institutions with this information.
2 This document does indicate certain elements. For example, the field
3 report from the state security service, and there's a reference here to a
4 state security service report from Jablanica, which means this is
5 something they received when reports were exchanged. It's a serious
6 document, also in view of who it was addressed to.
7 If I could just add this. In my previous testimony, situations
8 were discussed in which the Ministry of the Interior might have been
9 involved in some form of cooperation with the army, maybe to take over
10 some tasks on behalf of the army. It was perhaps not entirely just that I
11 only mention the name of General Jasarevic as the person who issued those
12 requests. Any military bodies would have been entitled to issue these
13 requests. We had security services centres throughout the country who got
14 involved at the request of any corps, for example. So the understanding
15 should not be that it could only have been pursuant to a request made by
16 Jasarevic because even before Jasarevic there was an incumbent who also
17 used to make requests and cooperation would follow just the same. So much
18 for that particular explanation.
19 MR. RE: Thank you, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
21 What's the status of this document? It's been admitted into the
23 MR. MORRISSEY: It's already admitted into evidence, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
25 MR. MORRISSEY: I think the Defence tendered it.
1 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Morrissey.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, thanks, Your Honour.
3 Cross-examined by Mr. Morrissey:
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Alispahic. Just on that point that you raised by
5 way of explanation before. Mr. Jasarevic's predecessor was Fikret
6 Muslimovic in the position of director of the SVB, military security
7 service. Is that correct?
8 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe there's no translation to the witness.
9 MR. MORRISSEY: I'm sorry.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I didn't understand
11 the question.
12 MR. MORRISSEY:
13 Q. Let me ask it again and I'll see.
14 You mentioned a moment ago that it may well be other persons than
15 General Jasarevic who would made requests for measures to be taken. And I
16 just wanted to ask you: Was General Jasarevic's predecessor at the
17 military security service a man named Fikret Muslimovic?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And apart from those two persons, your service would respond to an
20 appropriate request from other military bodies, even at the corps level.
21 Is that correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. But it also is the case - you can tell us if this is true - that
24 where measures were to be taken against somebody of General Halilovic's
25 seniority, the fact of such measures would necessarily be made known to
1 the commander or the senior officer of the SVB. Is that correct?
2 A. Just in order to explain, when you say the same level of
3 seniority, I don't think there was anyone quite of the same level of
4 seniority because there was only one Chief of Staff, at least as far as I
6 Q. Yes. I think we have a translation issue there because I didn't
7 mean to say somebody of the same level of superior -- of seniority. What
8 I meant to say was that somebody who was as senior as Sefer Halilovic,
9 when measures were contemplated or indeed adopted against such a person,
10 that fact had to be made known to the commander of the SVB or the director
11 of the SVB. Is that true?
12 A. I'm trying to interpret your question and I ask the Chamber to
13 understand what I'm trying to say. I can only give you my opinion and I
14 can only talk about how it would have been in the Ministry of the Interior
15 because the military bodies had their own system, organised in their own
16 way. There was certain documents which they used in their work, and it
17 was based on these documents that they took measures or decided measures
18 should be taken. It was logical that all measures should be approved at a
19 certain level, depending on the level on which these measures were being
20 taken or applied and what precisely needed doing.
21 So if I can please have the Chamber's understanding in this. I am
22 a former minister, but I'm not trying to explain the inner workings of
23 command and control because I simply do not believe I am qualified to be
24 doing that here.
25 Q. Well, I'm grateful for that indication. At a later stage, I have
1 to ask you some questions about that, but I understand your answers as
3 Now, the next thing, Mr. Alispahic, that I wanted to deal with was
4 a meeting of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 26th of
5 November of 1993. And I'm going to show you a document which is a
6 transcript of that meeting and ask for certain comments by you.
7 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown this document.
8 Your Honours, could I indicate --
9 Q. And, Mr. Alispahic, I just indicate.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: This document is not uploaded; it's only partially
11 translated. We will provide a full translation as soon as is possible.
12 We believe it to be a publicly accessible document, so we hope it's not
13 too controversial in that regard. But we'll -- what I have in mind is to
14 give Mr. Alispahic the chance to read parts of this or indeed all of it if
15 he wishes, although some of it is quite lengthy, and to comment upon what
16 is said there. Very well. And I ask that a Bosnian copy be provided,
17 please, to Mr. Alispahic so that -- an English copy is being provided.
18 Now, Your Honours, perhaps if that could be given an MFI number.
19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
20 MR. MORRISSEY:
21 Q. Mr. Alispahic, that's a fairly lengthy document that's been
22 provided to you, and should you wish to read the entire thing, you should
23 be given that opportunity. The parts I wish to take you to are quite
24 confined because they concern Sefer Halilovic and what was said about
25 Sefer Halilovic by the president of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, on
1 that occasion. So that's going to be the focus of my questions, but of
2 course you are entitled to see the whole document if you feel that it's
3 necessary to do so.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Morrissey, this document will be MFI 435.
5 MR. MORRISSEY: Okay.
6 Q. Now, perhaps before you start reading could I just ask you some
7 general questions, please, about the Presidency.
8 First of all, the Bosnian political -- the Bosnian constitution at
9 the time provided for a Presidency, and in October and November of 1993
10 the president of the Presidency was Alija Izetbegovic. Is that correct?
11 A. I think so, yes.
12 Q. Some of these questions may seem to be relatively basic questions,
13 but I have to establish the basis for what I'm about to do.
14 Secondly, I think you indicated the other day that you as Minister
15 of the Interior sometimes attended meetings of the Presidency. And I want
16 to ask you: Were you yourself, formally speaking, a member of the
17 Presidency as -- by virtue of being Minister of the Interior at that time?
18 A. No.
19 Q. I see. Nevertheless, you attended at meetings when invited to do
20 so because of your specific area of responsibility. Is that correct?
21 A. Sometimes I was asked to attend meetings when problems that had to
22 do with the Ministry of the Interior were being discussed. I had to be
23 there in order to contribute to the Presidency's work because I was
24 well-placed to help them along with that.
25 Q. Yes. Very well. And it's the fact that the Presidency had
1 meetings from time to time, attended by members of the Presidency, Alija
2 Izetbegovic, Mr. Kljuc, Komsic, and other persons who were present,
3 Mr. Silajdzic as well. Is that correct?
4 A. As far as I remember, Silajdzic was not a member of the
5 Presidency. It was Pejanovic, Mirko Pejanovic at that time, Tanja
6 Lujic-Mijatovic, and I may leave someone out but I think it was those
7 persons. Haris Silajdzic was prime minister at the time I think, and if
8 he attended any meetings of the Presidency, there must have been specific
9 reasons for him to be there, something to do with the government. A Ganic
10 would be there, too.
11 Q. Yes, thank you for that. Now, do you recall whether you attended
12 a meeting of the Presidency on the 26th of November, 1993, a transcript of
13 which has been placed in front of you? I should indicate that I've
14 observed no mention of your name speaking in there, but you may have a
15 memory. So I ask you whether you can recall.
16 A. No, I don't.
17 Q. Very well. Well, there are some passages of this which I wish to
18 take you to and perhaps I could ask you to look at page 22 of the Bosnian
19 version. Now, I'm going to put a part of this to you and then ask for
20 your comment about it. At page 22 -- just excuse me a moment. While
21 that's being prepared for -- just excuse me a moment, please,
22 Mr. Alispahic.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this is a slightly unwieldy process,
24 I appreciate, but it seems the most -- the quickest way to deal with the
25 material hat we have in our possession. Could I indicate that the partial
1 transcript, unfortunately, is not -- is taken from segments of the
2 transcript where Alija Izetbegovic is speaking. But really for time
3 reasons I think we haven't been able to translate every word of it, and
4 there are some parts that come before -- even within Mr. Izetbegovic's
5 speech, there are some parts that come before what is interpreted here,
6 what is translated here. So having said that, of course any relevant part
7 can always be put.
8 Q. But I want to put this part to you. It seems that there was a
9 discussion about the creation of ranks within the Bosnian army structure.
10 Do you recall that topic being a matter of concern within the Bosnian army
11 at about that time, namely the creation of ranks?
12 A. As concerns the organisation of the army and its inner workings,
13 especially as the army was being organised, I really can't say much. Many
14 things kept changing. There were different needs that would arise over
15 time and all I know is that ranks were created and certain documents
16 adopted, defining how this was to be done. But I don't think I'm
17 sufficiently qualified to make any professional statements about this. I
18 am saying what I'm saying simply because I was there at the time and I was
19 to some extent involved.
20 Q. Yes. Well, I bear in mind your reservation, Mr. Alispahic, and I
21 won't ask you professional questions on that basis. What I'm really
22 asking you here is just as a matter of the chronology in this case, in
23 about November 1993 you were aware, in general terms, that ranks were
24 being created in some way within the army. Is that correct?
25 A. I was aware of the fact that they had started doing that; that was
1 one of the tasks that had to be carried out to develop the army. It's
2 necessary to have order, a hierarchy, et cetera, in all armies throughout
3 the world. I think that's quite normal in an army and I didn't give it
4 any more thought than that.
5 Q. I understand that. But from your -- the position that you had you
6 also became aware, I take it, that Sefer Halilovic, even though he had
7 been removed from the post of Chief of Staff, came to be given the rank of
8 general. Is that correct?
9 A. As far as I know, Sefer Halilovic held the rank of general. As
10 for the reasons and circumstances under which someone is conferred a rank,
11 I don't know, nor do I know the circumstances under which Mr. Halilovic
12 was conferred the rank of general. But I do know that he holds the rank
13 of general.
14 Q. Yes. Okay. Now, this transcript that I'm now taking you to
15 commences with a discussion about that topic. I won't ask you technical
16 questions about it, but what I'm interested in is what the president said
17 about mistakes made by Halilovic and the reasons why things were done in
18 the way that they were. Now, the passage I ask you to read, and I'm going
19 to read it out now as well so that we know each what we're talking about
20 is a paragraph beginning with the words: "As for Sefer Halilovic, he is
21 currently working at the Main Staff."
22 Do you see that?
23 A. I do.
24 Q. Okay. Well, I just want to take you through this and then ask for
25 some comments by you. "As for Sefer Halilovic" -- and this is from the
1 section -- from some of Alija Izetbegovic's comments. "As for Sefer
2 Halilovic, he is currently working at the Main Staff. His assignment is
3 dependent on other matters and further consideration by the Ministry of
4 National Defence or the Main Staff. I do not know what position he could
5 take over. We wanted to show that no major mistakes have been identified.
6 Mistakes have been made that make him unsuitable to stay on as the chief
7 of the main staff but not such mistakes as mean he must be somehow
8 sidelined from the army. On the contrary, he has performed great
9 services. We must not now allow ourselves" -- sorry, pardon me. "We must
10 not allow ourselves to neglect this fact. It is true that he has made
11 certain mistakes and omissions but he deserves credit for being involved
12 in the army's creation from the outset. It is two years now since they
13 started out, so we think that the two of them are on an equal footing.
14 "So he would have stayed at level one ... otherwise he would be
15 general of a division, at the very least, if what had happened had not
16 actually happened. However, this is a proposal that can be defended and
17 opposed all day long. After a great deal of consideration, this seemed to
18 be the right solution."
19 Now, I just ask you to go now to page 27 and approximately three
20 lines from the top of that page you'll see a sentence beginning: "People
21 think it's the people from Sandzak who are somehow on the carpet."
22 Do you see that sentence? I'm sorry, Mr. Alispahic, we'll assist.
23 Are you able to see that passage?
24 A. I am following you quite well. Just go ahead.
25 Q. Okay. Well, I'll read and you can read along or ahead if you
2 "People think" -- perhaps before we go ahead, would you mind just
3 looking at the previous page and confirming if this is a passage of Alija
4 Izetbegovic speaking. So perhaps check page 26 to make sure that what I'm
5 putting to you is accurate about that and then we'll go on.
6 "People think that it's the people from Sandzak who were somehow
7 on the carpet. They should be dissuaded from this view, if possible. Of
8 course, nobody should be amnestied for big things. As for Sefer, there
9 were only things that were cast in his teeth. He was questioned. This
10 state is based on law. It was found that there had been no crimes. If
11 there had been any, criminal proceedings would have been initiated against
12 him, end of story. He did have a telephone conversation with Celo, but
13 this evidence was not relevant for the court. The situation's clear.
14 However, that conversation was also quite vague. This is why, in my
15 opinion, he could not hold the post of Chief of Staff and should've been
16 removed. Because only a man who's absolutely certain, who never
17 hesitates, can hold such a post. Nothing else was found about him. On
18 the other hand, much credit goes for him -- goes to him for the
19 organisation of the Army."
20 And that's where I stop. Now, could I just ask you about that,
21 Mr. Alispahic. What is recorded in the transcript there, does that accord
22 with the views that you knew Alija Izetbegovic to hold at the time?
23 A. I think that I agree with the views of the president. What he
24 said is probably what he thought, and this is reflected in the minutes of
25 the session held at the Presidency.
1 Q. And to move from the president to you, yourself. That was also
2 your position. Is that correct?
3 A. I never expressed such a position.
4 Q. No. But did you hold discussions with president -- with the
5 president in your capacity as Minister of the Interior?
6 A. Yes. I spoke to the president about numerous issues, especially
7 about security issues, about certain problems, about the complex security
8 situation in the town and sometimes in the field.
9 Q. Of course. And although you had many duties, one of your
10 important duties was to provide exactly that sort of advice and
11 information to the president, as minister. Is that correct?
12 A. I did provide information. Most of the information was written
13 down, was in written form. The president would receive the information.
14 Some of the information was returned. Some of the information remained in
15 the Presidency and was made use of there.
16 Q. And perhaps just dealing with one aspect of the Trebevic
17 investigation, it's the fact that the Trebevic operation which took place
18 on the 26th of October was a fully legal operation which went ahead with
19 the approval of the president, Alija Izetbegovic. Is that correct?
20 A. As far as this operation is concerned, the entire Presidency
21 discussed it, not just the president of the Presidency. The entire
22 Presidency took that decision. If someone wanted to speculate about the
23 political validity of this decision, I don't think that that would be
24 possible. The entire Presidency took that decision. And if my opinion
25 counts for anything, I think that I also played an important role in that
1 operation. I was directly involved in the operation and in carrying it
3 Q. Yes. And because of -- sorry, perhaps I should make it clear,
4 less there be any doubt. We are not seeking to cast any doubt on the
5 validity of the operation at all. But I have some questions about the
6 important tasks that you had to perform. Once the Trebevic operation had
7 commenced and once the two commanders had been arrested and neutralised,
8 one part of your function was to continue to brief the president as to the
9 way in which the investigation was proceeding. Is that correct?
10 A. That wasn't my task. That was the task of the military service.
11 You can check that. Both commanders were taken in. Ramiz Delalic and
12 Caco were taken to the 1st Corps command. They were never in the Ministry
13 of the Interior and --
14 Q. I'm sorry. The question has created a problem. Perhaps I'll let
15 the interpreter finish what he was interpreting but then I'll clarify
17 I was really using that arrest as a time point. I'm not
18 suggesting that you had any involvement in those and the evidence has
19 already been given about it.
20 Let me put it another way. From the 26th of October following
21 that, in the days following, you did continue to liaise with the president
22 and provide him with information that came to you concerning the Trebevic
23 operation. Is that correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now -- well, just excuse me a moment.
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, I offer that transcript for
3 JUDGE LIU: And could you brief me about the source of this
4 document, the chain of the custody of this document.
5 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this document, the Bosnian version
6 of it has been disclosed to us by the Prosecution and as far as we can see
7 represents a transcript of a presidential hearings that were heard on a
8 regular basis. I think the Prosecution have disclosed a number of such
9 transcripts over time, and not all of them are to be used in evidence
10 here. But this is one disclosed to us. Mr. Izetbegovic is no longer
11 alive, so...
12 JUDGE LIU: And was the translation done by yourself?
13 MR. MORRISSEY: The translation is -- Your Honours, can I say that
14 the translation, as it currently stands, is a hybrid translation. Some of
15 it is done by CLSS, but I asked for a -- an additional part of the
16 translation, which will be on the third page to be done. It's simply been
17 done by a team member, so that the last page there is not an authorised
18 translation. But it follows on where the official translation ended on
19 page 27. And because there seemed to be a possible doubt as to the
20 context of what was being said, I thought it appropriate to have that
21 done. Now, I can ask the witness to read it into the transcript, but it
22 seems that the most elegant solution would be that we offer this English
23 transcript now and when a fully authorised transcript becomes available,
24 we'll move to substitute that into evidence. And of course if it departs
25 in any material way, well, then that might be something that could raise a
1 controversy later, but we think it won't.
2 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
3 Any objections, Mr. Re?
4 MR. RE: No, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.
6 This document is admitted into the evidence.
7 MR. MORRISSEY: Very well. Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE LIU: And the Court Deputy will assign a number.
9 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D435.
10 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
11 MR. MORRISSEY: Okay.
12 Q. Mr. Alispahic, can I indicate I'm going to be changing topics now,
13 and I wish to move now to some of the documents which the Prosecutor asked
14 you to look at in the course of the evidence in-chief here. These chiefly
15 concern operative information of various sorts which came into your hands
16 in your capacity as minister.
17 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown -- just excuse
18 me. My cross-referencing document is gone.
19 Could the witness please be shown Exhibit 429, that was
20 Prosecution document 169 -- sorry, 165.
21 Q. The document that's coming up on your screen is dated the 28th of
22 June, 1993.
23 A. Could you please enlarge that a little?
24 Q. All right. Now, do you have that document in front of you now?
25 A. Yes, it's here.
1 Q. Very well. Now, the learned Prosecutor asked you some questions
2 about the form of this, and my questions will relate to the form and then
3 there will be a couple of questions about the substance as well of it. In
4 this case, who is the author of that document? Is this -- and perhaps I
5 should make it clear, it might not be on your page. Is it Munir Alibabic?
6 A. He certainly did sign the document, but I believe that the police
7 station, which was in the clinical in Kosevo, compiled a report on the
8 incident and the chief of the police station, Alibabic, transformed this
9 into a report and mentioned the individuals who are mentioned here.
10 Q. Okay. Now, is it possible to work out from the document who -- or
11 what is the name of the person who provided the report to Munir Alibabic?
12 A. I don't know if we could find the exact name, but we could
13 certainly get the report from the police station, the document on the
14 basis of which this was stated. And I say that the name of the person and
15 the date of birth were mentioned. All the other particulars were
16 included, the particulars that are usually noted down by the police. I
17 believe that this is an authentic document and that what is alleged in the
18 document is correct.
19 Q. Yes. Well, I can't ask you about whether the document is telling
20 the truth or not. I should ask this - don't take this the wrong way - you
21 didn't witness this incident yourself of course. Is that correct?
22 A. Yes, that is certainly correct.
23 Q. Okay. The difficulty for us in this court, Mr. Alispahic, is that
24 we have this document to deal with. So I've asked you the question as to
25 whether we can get the name of the person from the face of the document;
1 you've answered that. Is it possible to infer from the document that it
2 was written by someone connected with the police station at the hospital
3 or at the clinic?
4 A. Could I ask you to clarify what you mean when you say "connected."
5 Q. I used the term "inferred," but -- well, perhaps I'll ask you
6 this. In the normal course of events, you would expect that Munir
7 Alibabic would base this report on what he was told by the police at the
8 scene of the incident. Is that correct?
9 A. I don't think you're right. The police drafted a report on the
10 incident, and it's on the basis of that report that Alibabic compiled this
11 report, and this was done for two reasons, firstly because the police
12 station is in contact with the security services centre and the security
13 services centre can be in touch with the bodies referred to here to whom
14 the report was forwarded.
15 Q. So it's likely there's another report. Is that the conclusion?
16 A. No, just one report. There were not two reports.
17 Q. All right. And moving to the substance of this document, you
18 observe here that there's reference on three occasions to the unit which
19 was -- to which the wrong-doing soldiers belonged. Can I ask you to
20 confirm that that unit is identified in the Bosnian version on each
21 occasion as the 9th Mountain Brigade?
22 A. I think that this document only concerns one occasion, and the
23 individuals involved are the same.
24 Q. Yes. I am having some questions -- some trouble with putting the
25 questions properly here. On three occasions in the text the term "9th
1 Mountain Brigade" is referred to. Do you agree with that?
2 A. That's what it says.
3 Q. Yes. Okay. It is the fact that Ramiz Delalic's brigade was the
4 9th Motorised Brigade. Is that correct?
5 A. I think so.
6 Q. And we also have evidence here, but I'll ask you to confirm it,
7 that within the organic structure of the 1st Corps there was a
8 9th Motorised Brigade and a 9th Mountain Brigade. Is that correct?
9 A. Well, I couldn't say because the names of the units changed.
10 There was the motorised unit, then the mountain unit. On one occasion it
11 was the motorised unit and then it was the mountain unit. So in fact I
12 think you're wrong. I think that the unit in question is the same one.
13 Q. Well, let me just -- we can show you a diagram, if need be, drawn
14 by General Karavelic in this court. But the evidence has been given by a
15 variety of witnesses that there was two separate institutions, the
16 9th Motorised and the 9th Mountain. Now, I understand you were from the
17 ministry rather than from the army. Could I ask you to cast your mind
18 back and see if you remember whether there were two such units, in other
19 words, the 9th Motorised and the 9th Mountain?
20 A. I really couldn't confirm that. I have remembered the
21 9th Brigade. As to whether it's the 9th Motorised Brigade or the 9th
22 Mountain Brigade, I don't know. But when I use these terms, I'm thinking
23 of the same unit. I'm thinking of Ramiz Delalic's unit.
24 Q. I understand you are thinking of that. Do you agree with me,
25 though, that there's -- well, in any event, you -- could you just confirm
1 for the Judges that there's no reference in the document that you've got
2 there to the 9th Motorised Brigade. Just have a look over it and see if
3 you can see in the Bosnian any reference to the 9th Motorised.
4 A. I think that this is what the document says. I don't think it's
5 necessary for me to confirm that. It says the 9th Mountain Brigade. I
6 don't know if it's necessary to read through the entire contents of the
8 Q. No. It's not an attempt to be clever at your expense in any way,
9 Mr. Alispahic. It's just that we've got the English version in front of
10 us, and the Judges and I don't read Bosnian. So, anyway, we're just
11 asking you to confirm that if you can. That's the end of the questions on
12 that document. Very well. Thank you.
13 MR. MORRISSEY: I would now ask that the witness please be shown
14 document -- Exhibit 430.
15 Q. Now, what's being brought up on the screen before you is a
16 document from the 6th of July, 1993 concerning intelligence about the
17 10th Mountain Brigade, and you were shown this document I think earlier in
18 the week.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, with respect to this document it's headed -- or it commences
21 with the term "certain intelligence."
22 Can you say, first of all, who is the author of this document?
23 A. We can check to see who signs the document. But as to who drafted
24 it, there is probably a certain procedure that was followed to draft this
25 document. I think that this is a sort of report.
1 Q. Okay. Well, it's a great help to us for you to explain how these
2 reports come about. As to the author or the person who signed it, on my
3 Bosnian copy I simply can't make that out but you may be able to recognise
4 it. Are you able to help with that?
5 A. If I can have a minute to look through the entire document.
6 Q. Of course.
7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear the witness.
8 MR. MORRISSEY:
9 Q. Would you mind repeating your answer; the interpreter didn't hear.
10 A. If you could please scroll the document down for me because I
11 can't see the whole thing. All the way down, please. I think this
12 document was signed by Jozo Jozic, who was then the chief of the state
13 security service. The last time around, I noticed his signature was on
14 one of these.
15 You asked about how this document was produced. This is operative
16 information that was produced based on operative intelligence collected
17 from a number of different sources. Operative information must contain
18 verified information because these reports are then forwarded to a number
19 of different bodies. I think it had to be delivered to the military
20 intelligence service and probably also to the Presidency or even the
21 president himself. I was one of the users of this report; that much is
22 certain. I think this is about a whole set of security-related
23 information, about security-related matters. Based on that, this report
24 was drafted to indicate how serious the security problem was. I think
25 this is in reference to the 9th and 10th Brigades, Celo's unit, and Caco's
1 unit. I think this is an overview of the security situation on the ground
2 and it also speaks about the behaviour of some members of those units.
3 Q. Yes. There's a passage -- a paragraph commencing with the
4 words "we have" -- and this is at page 3 of the English, Your Honours.
5 "We also have significant intelligence that on the 3rd of June,
6 1993, Sefer Halilovic held a meeting with Ramiz Delalic," and some details
7 of such a meeting are then provided.
8 Could I just ask you to find that passage and then I'm going to
9 ask you some formal questions about it. I think it's the only reference
10 to Halilovic in there. Could you just indicate when it is you've found
11 that part.
12 It may be that you'll find it on the last page of the document,
13 three or four lines from the top.
14 A. You can go ahead and ask the question. I haven't found the
15 relevant portion.
16 Q. Well, it's best if we find it for you. I'm sorry it's taking a
17 little while.
18 The section I'm talking about commences: "We also have
19 significant intelligence that on the 3rd of June, 1993, Sefer Halilovic
20 held a meeting with Ramiz Delalic and the command staff of the Delta Unit.
21 On that occasion they advocated an attack against the Presidency of the
22 republic and the capture of some Presidency members."
23 It should be on the screen about three lines from the top.
24 A. [In English] Okay, okay.
25 Q. Okay. Now, the question I have for you is, if you know the answer
1 to this, could you tell us who is the source of that information?
2 A. [Interpretation] Well, now, it's been 10 or 15 years. I can't say
3 who the source was. I can only say who could have been the source or
4 should have been the source. The media communications equipment and
5 informants or perhaps measures taken by the military and state security
6 services, measures imposed against a number of people who were of security
7 interest, especially some who were in touch with Caco and Delalic. It was
8 based on those contacts that this conclusion was arrived at probably.
9 Q. Very well. I thank you for that indication. Elsewhere in the
10 document there is a reference to some other people, and I'm just going to
11 ask you a couple of questions about them.
12 MR. MORRISSEY: It's said on page 4 of the English, Your
13 Honours, "Some of the persons who were close to Musan Topalovic intended
14 to leave Sarajevo, thus Mujo Zulic, commander of the 1st Mountain Brigade,
15 attempted to leave the city with help of UNPROFOR, while Faruk Abadzic,
16 unit commander in the 1st Mountain Brigade, Sakib Puskar and Ramiz Delalic
17 had similar intentions."
18 That section is towards the end of the document, you'll see,
19 perhaps five or six lines.
20 Q. Now, I must ask you the same question about that information. Are
21 you now able to tell us what the -- who the person was who gave that
22 information, or is your answer essentially the same as to the previous
24 A. There might be some difference. We probably got this information
25 from our contacts in UNPROFOR. It was very difficult to leave Sarajevo at
1 the time. Those who wished to do so had to go to UNPROFOR for assistance.
2 There was several ways to go about this. I noticed there were two legal
3 ways to do it. If you were a government official, you had to file a
4 request with UNPROFOR for a person to be taken outside of Sarajevo.
5 Certain channels were used, the assumption was that there was a contact in
6 UNPROFOR. You paid and you were allowed to leave Sarajevo. We're talking
7 the security situation now, and this is the information that we obtained.
8 My assessment is that there were a number of people around at the time who
9 realised they could no longer be part of the command structure of the
10 army. Some had already secured substantial financial gain for themselves
11 and decided that they should leave Sarajevo. They no longer believed it
12 necessary to stay in Sarajevo, since they would only be facing loss.
13 Q. Yes. Okay. Well, thank you for that explanation, and those are
14 the questions about that document.
15 Now, could I ask that we move to another document. This is one
16 that's not tendered in evidence yet. It's Prosecution Exhibit 65 ter
17 number P150. And I'll just give you an MFI number. I think it's MFI 431
18 I believe, a document dated the 15th of June, 1993. Yes, it's 431.
19 Now, this document that's coming up on the screen is one that
20 you've seen before earlier this week and you were asked some questions
21 about it by the Prosecutor. My questions to you really relate to the
22 source, SS. Do you have that document in front of you now?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Very well. The assessment in paragraph -- sorry, paragraph 1
25 provides that: "In contact with the source SS, we obtained security-wise
1 important information."
2 Now, my question for you first of all is: Can you say -- before
3 we get to SS, can you say who wrote this report or who drafted this
4 official note?
5 A. On the face of the document it appears that the official note was
6 drafted by an operative of the state security service.
7 Q. Very well. Could you explain the formal reason why this report is
8 not signed by a person who identifies themself, but rather is authored or
9 drafted by a person with an operative number?
10 A. That was the procedure in the state security service. That's how
11 it was done. If you look at the heading it says "operative member," then
12 there is a code and the source is designated as SS. No name's given, as
13 you see. This is a primary document of the state security service, and if
14 I were in charge of deciding I would not release this document for further
15 use myself. All information contained in a document like this is subject
16 to verification. So that was what needed to be done. All the information
17 had to be verified and that's all I could say about this document.
18 Q. Okay. Well, I'm grateful for your indication and the questions
19 have nearly finished about it. I just have to ask you about the
20 source SS. Are you personally able to say who the source SS was?
21 A. I don't think anyone could tell you. You would need to get into
22 the system. You would need to do a search and then maybe you would be
23 able to track someone down or to find a name.
24 Q. All right. Thank you for that indication. Those are the
25 questions about that document there.
1 JUDGE LIU: Well, since you finished this document, could we have
2 a break now?
3 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We'll take a break for 30 minutes and then we'll
5 resume at 10 minutes to 11.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.21 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey, please continue your
9 cross-examination, please.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Q. Thank you again, Mr. Alispahic.
12 MR. MORRISSEY: Now, could the witness now please be shown another
13 document, Exhibit P207.
14 Q. Mr. Alispahic, the document that's coming up now is dated the 19th
15 of September and it's the police report concerning an incident involving
16 Ramiz Delalic, Celo, and or near to Pazaric at Hadzici. Do you have that
17 document on the screen?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Very well. Now, in this case the proceedings or the pre-criminal
20 proceedings and indeed the proceedings themselves concerning Ramiz Delalic
21 were conducted by the military security service of the army. Is that
23 A. You mean the military security service?
24 Q. Yes, the SVB.
25 A. Yes, they were in charge. He was an officer of the army, and the
1 military security service would take steps with regard to army members.
2 Q. And so cooperating with that investigation, this report was
3 brought into being by the civilian police, effectively, to assist. Is
4 that correct?
5 A. I wouldn't quite say that. First of all, this document stemmed
6 from the fact that the incident in Zovik near Pazaric was committed by
7 Ramiz Delalic, Celo, who attacked a patrol of the military police. There
8 was a fight that ensued and some people were injured. There was one
9 police officer in particular. I remember that I was informed immediately
10 by the local police station. I think there was this report that the
11 military security -- state security service I think sent to the security
12 administration, who probably conducted their own investigation. So this
13 is no participation by the police in the investigation of Ramiz Delalic,
14 Celo. This is an incident that occurred and all the perpetrators were
16 Q. Yes -- could I just ask -- this, the document we have here, seems
17 to indicate that what is being alleged against Ramiz Delalic is an attack
18 on members of the police station. The transcript here recorded you here
19 as saying the military police, and I just-- I think I have to clarify that
20 with you. Who were the victims in this case according to your
21 information, military police or civilian police?
22 A. I think in this case, at least as far as I can tell based on the
23 document, the civilian police, unless some members of the military police
24 were there because sometimes there were mixed checkpoints that were manned
25 together by the military and civilian police. The reason was it was
1 easier to deal with incidents in this way. If an incident occurred that
2 was caused by a military officer, then the military could take over and
3 vice versa. This is a way that we found of dealing with these problems,
4 and I can't speak about each and every name. I can't tell you whether
5 they were military or civilian police officers. They may have been
6 together, but I'm quite certain that a police representative was around.
7 Q. Yes. And as to the source of the information in this document
8 here, although the -- the signature is somewhat obscured, are you able to
9 comment whether that document is signed by Jozo Jozic? I think it's to be
10 found on the second page of the Bosnian version.
11 A. Yes. Jozo Jozic is the person who signed it. At the time he was
12 chief of the state security.
13 Q. Yes. And are you able to say who provided this information to
14 Jozo Jozic and in what form was it provided?
15 A. This information could have been obtained from the Sarajevo state
16 security sector. The state security service, in turn, could possibly have
17 obtained a report from the Ducin [phoen] police station. That's where it
18 was during the war.
19 Q. I understand. And is it possible to identify on the face of the
20 document who -- which individual people provided the information that
21 you've just indicated?
22 A. I think if you consider the procedure used by the ministry, it
23 should be possible to track the document down. The original should be
24 somewhere in Tarcin kept by the police administration there. It has been
25 a long time but there should be some sort of a paper trail that you can
1 follow. There is a document to this effect. I know this for a fact
2 because I was informed about this incident at the time in my capacity as
4 Q. Can you recall who that document you got was composed by [sic]?
5 A. I'm sure I read this document at the time. There was daily
6 communication going on between the chief of the state security and the
7 chief of the Ministry of the Interior. As to who compiled this document,
8 now that's something that I really can't speak about.
9 If I may, I believe this information is actually accurate, if you
10 take into account the names given here. Those people really were around
11 at the time. And there was this one police member who was hospitalised
12 and I think there should be a document to that effect, to show that this
13 member was hospitalised on account of severe injuries.
14 Q. Yes. Well, I can't ask you about the accuracy of the document,
15 Mr. Alispahic, but I'm grateful to you for what you've said about the form
16 of it. And now I would seek to move to another document which is
17 Exhibit 238, a document of Jozo Jozic which is dated the 2nd of October,
18 1993. And here -- this is the document that the learned Prosecutor showed
19 you this morning.
20 Do you have that in front of you now?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Okay. Now, again these are questions of form and questions about
23 the sources, not questions about the truth or accuracy of the document.
24 Firstly, are you able to say what sources Jozo Jozic relied upon
25 to compile this short letter? Or short report, I should say.
1 A. I think a report was used that was obtained from the state
2 security service stationed somewhere on the ground. They in turn probably
3 had their own contacts in the area, including the Jablanica police
4 station. They were probably in touch with them; they would have had to be
5 to send a report like this to me. I believe it is a brief report but
6 fairly accurate.
7 Q. Yes. Now, I hear your answer there. I just want to put one
8 specific part of it to you and ask you a very similar question. The
9 section that says this: "Members of the military police of the RBiH army
10 and the Jablanica SJB were unable to conduct an on-site investigation
11 because there were indications that they, too, could be liquidated."
12 Now, what was the source for that piece of information, if you're
13 able to tell us?
14 A. I think it could only have been the police station. There was
15 daily communication between them at the time, especially in the area.
16 They probably obtained this from the chief or the commander, someone like
17 that, saying that it was impossible to carry out an on-site investigation,
18 telling them what the situation was like because that was the sort of
19 danger that they were talking about. Because the service sometimes
20 manipulates certain things and they say there is every indication that
21 this or that happened, so they're talking about a security problem. And
22 they had in the area a state security detachment. They said they had
23 tried to go to the area but were not granted access, wherein as members of
24 the state security would not have been in charge. They didn't necessarily
25 need to go there, but they were obviously able to provide a report like
2 Q. And I think just to pick up what you said there, you personally
3 made it very clear when you were in Jablanica and you spoke to Emin Zebic,
4 you made it clear that the police in Jablanica should hold themselves out
5 as ready to help whenever they were asked to by the army in relation to
6 the Grabovica matter. Is that correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. In other words, it was an SVB investigation, but your organisation
9 was of course prepared to help. Is that correct?
10 A. Yes, that's correct, insofar as it concerns our readiness. I
11 can't tell you what the SVB did, whether they did anything at the time,
12 whether they did anything about this case.
13 Q. Very well. You can't tell me and I won't ask about that if you
14 can't say.
15 But I do want to move on to the next document and that's an
16 information dated the 11th of the 10th, 1993. Just excuse me and I'll
17 give you the exhibit number.
18 JUDGE LIU: What is the 11th of 10th, Mr. Morrissey?
19 MR. MORRISSEY: Sorry, Your Honour, the 11th of October.
20 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
21 MR. MORRISSEY: I apologise. Just excuse me while I match the
22 exhibit number to the document. Just excuse me one moment, please.
23 [Defence counsel confer]
24 MR. MORRISSEY: Sorry, Your Honours. This will have an MFI number
25 I think. This is MFI 434.
1 Q. Now, with respect to this document which is under the hand of
2 Enver Mujezinovic, what sources -- are you able to say what the particular
3 sources were upon which the author, Mr. Mujezinovic, relied in compiling
4 this information?
5 A. I can't say who the sources were. It was produced by the Sarajevo
6 state security sector, specifically Enver Mujezinovic. It talks about
7 indicative efforts. What that means is that it's there and yet it's not
8 there. This information talks about something that needs to be taken into
9 account or checked. There is every indication; this is the phrase used by
10 the police. Information could be accurate or merely an evaluation, and
11 that's why there is talk here of indication. There is nothing that is
12 certain or reliable or there may not be anything there that is certain or
13 reliable but could merely be used as an indication.
14 Q. Yes, thank you for that explanation.
15 Could we move, please, to Exhibit 415 now. Now, this document is
16 undated, but it's possible to draw a conclusion about it that it was
17 composed later than the 17th of October, 1993, because the content refers
18 to incidents on the 17th of October, 1993. Do you have in front of you
19 that document?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Very well. This document contains a list of various informations
22 concerning Ramiz Delalic, and in the first line of the substantive text it
23 provides: "Through operative work in the field and taking other measures
24 and actions in the domain of the service, among other things, we obtained
25 much data pertaining to the abuse of the office overstepping the official
1 authority and criminal acts committed by the 9th Motorised Brigade deputy
2 commander, Ramiz Delalic."
3 Now, are you personally able to say what the sources of the
4 information in this document are? Of course we have the phrases in those
5 two sentences. Are you able to add to that information that it's
6 operative work in the field, other measures and actions in the domain of
7 the service?
8 A. I couldn't say anything about sources now, because it's impossible
9 to determine the sources on the basis of documents. You can do this if
10 you use the appropriate technology that various services have recourse to.
11 If you had a look at the documents that served as a basis for this
12 information, then you would be able to determine what the sources were.
13 You have a summary of information for a given period in time that is of
14 interest for security reasons. There are a number of issues here that
15 refer to that officer.
16 Q. Yes. Very well. Thank you.
17 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown now P212, which
18 I think is the last of the operative-information-sort-of documents that
19 were shown to this witness.
20 Q. Mr. Alispahic, this one is another document that you were shown
21 and it has the gloomy heading "report on the negative conduct and
22 activities of Sefer Halilovic, Chief of Staff of the supreme command of
23 the Army, Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces."
24 Now, this document -- could I just ask you some -- I'm not asking
25 about the truth or otherwise of the allegations in there, but what I'm
1 asking about is the form of the document and its sources. First of all,
2 is it possible to say who -- from the document who it was who compiled
3 this document or who drafted this document, I should say?
4 A. The authorities behind this document, the military security
5 service and the state security service, those two services are concerned.
6 This is a report on negative behaviour and work, and I think it was
7 drafted after discussion with the general. Perhaps one could see or have
8 a look at the date of the document. I believe that two copies were made.
9 I believe that it was a state secret. The terminology used is military --
10 or rather, it says that the military service and the civilian authorities
11 participated in drafting the document. Numerous documents were used,
12 sources, information, data, information obtained for the report was
14 Q. Yes. As to the individual person who drafted it, are you able to
15 say who that was?
16 A. I really couldn't say. I really couldn't provide you with the
17 name of the individual who drafted the report. It was probably -- or
18 there were probably at least two individuals involved in drafting the
19 document, since the document concerns two institutions. So the SDB and
20 the military security service cooperated in drafting this report. As you
21 have noticed, the title of the document is quite negative. It refers to
22 the negative conduct of an individual, and these are terms often used in
23 the military. But since it is a joint document, this doesn't seem a
24 significant problem to me.
25 Q. And whilst you're unable to identify the particular individuals
1 who drafted this, are you able to comment on whether or not anyone senior
2 from your organisation was one of the authors? And I have in mind those
3 people whose signatures are on other documents, Jozo Jozic, or Enver
5 And perhaps I'll try to phrase the question precisely. Is it
6 likely or possible, given the form of this document, that either of those
7 senior people is the author or -- is the author or part author of this
9 A. Usually reports are compiled by departments responsible for
10 analysing things. They have all the information that relates to certain
11 security issues, given the tasks they have to perform. When such a report
12 is requested, when it's necessary to draft such a report, whatever the
13 reason, these services propose a certain report on the basis of the
14 information they have, on the basis of the documents they have. As for
15 the final version of the documents concerned, the SDB chief, the state
16 security service chief, or the supreme command staff would have to check
17 the final version. I don't know whether it was the security service in
18 the army or the army commander who would do that, but in the Ministry of
19 the Interior the SDB chief is the last person to check all the reports
20 from within the SDB.
21 Q. Yes. And is there any indication on the face of this document
22 that that was done on this particular occasion?
23 A. Could you please rephrase your question; put it a little more
25 Q. Of course. Of course. You know the form of these documents well
1 and we in this court are only grappling with the form. So I ask you
2 whether you can assist. Is there anything on the face of this document
3 which indicates whether it was finally checked by any person at the senior
4 level, whether that be Mr. Jozic, Mr. Mujezinovic, or any other official
5 at a senior level? For example, are there any initials or signatures or
6 stamps or anything of that nature to indicate such a viewing?
7 A. If we have a look at the document, then it's quite clear. There's
8 a footnote here, perhaps there are several footnotes, which indicate that
9 the report was drafted on the basis of certain documents. The author of
10 this report had documents that were used to draft this report. As I have
11 already said, the report was drafted at the two levels I have referred to.
12 In the military service and the SDB there should be certain documents that
13 were used to draft this report. Here it says that certain information has
14 been obtained; that quite clearly indicates -- well, what does this mean?
15 All you have to do is refer to the documents concerned, are these
16 statements that have been made, or documents that refer to secret methods
17 used by the SDB or is it something else. There might be certain
18 confidential sources, people who cooperate with the military and state
19 services. So if someone had a look at the report and read through it,
20 well, one couldn't really discuss the weight one should attach to it, its
21 authenticity, referring to it in professional terms.
22 Q. Yes -- sorry, go on.
23 A. I apologise. There's something I would like to add.
24 Q. Of course.
25 A. In the footnote it says that the document's reliable and to a
1 certain extent there are court documents. There were documents that had
2 been prepared for the needs of the court.
3 Q. Yes. Yes, well we see that footnote and thank you for that
4 explanation. That completes the questioning on that -- on those documents
5 which you were shown by the Prosecutor, and thank you for your patience in
6 dealing with them.
7 Could I now move on to another topic. I now have some questions
8 concerning chronology of the events at Grabovica and your movements at
9 that time and how you came to know about the events. That's the focus of
10 the next line of questioning that's coming.
11 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown P118, Your
13 Q. And this, Mr. Alispahic, is a document you were shown already.
14 It's a document entitled "order to the 4th Corps command at Mostar,"
15 asking the 4th Corps command personally to inform Minister of Internal
16 Affairs, Bakir Alispahic, to head for Jablanica tonight because he has a
17 meeting tomorrow, 10 September, 1993, at 1900 hours in Konjic with
18 Mr. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic.
19 Now, to the best of your knowledge you indeed did what was
20 suggested in this order, even though I understand you didn't receive the
21 order personally. You did come back to Jablanica and ultimately on to
22 Konjic and have a meeting with Rusmir Mahmutcehajic on the 10th of
23 September, 1993, at approximately 1900 hours in Konjic. Is that true?
24 A. That's true.
25 Q. Okay. So now using that date, I'd just like to get a sense of the
1 chronology of what you did before that and after that. Firstly, when you
2 came to Konjic -- when you came back from Mostar to Jablanica, I want to
3 ask you about your approximate departure time and how long it took you to
4 get back there. Did you leave Mostar during the afternoon or in the
5 evening of the 9th of September, the day before your meeting with
7 A. Well, first of all, I think that this order arrived, as they
8 wanted to inform me through the command; there was no other way this could
9 have been done, through the police, but it was done through the army.
10 Since Mahmutcehajic probably found it easier to do this through the army
11 since he was in a military facility. So it was easy to send this document
12 in this way. In Mostar I was informed that upon returning I was to have
13 this meeting with Mahmutcehajic. And that concerns the reasons for this
15 And secondly, when I arrived in Jablanica I was in the Jablanica
16 police station with Cemin [phoen], the chief, was present. I said that we
17 had a meeting and other issues that were the responsibility of the MUP was
18 concerned. And at the meeting I was informed about the events in
19 Grabovica by the chief.
20 Q. Could you provide -- sorry, I cut you off there. But could you
21 provide an approximate time when you arrived in Grabovica that morning on
22 the 10th -- I'm sorry, I take that back. I put in the fatal
23 word "Grabovica." Let me take that back and start again.
24 Could you give an approximate time when you arrived in Jablanica
25 on the morning of the 10th?
1 A. Well, I really couldn't give you a precise time, since so much
2 time has passed since then. It would be easier for me to focus on the
3 event concerned, on the conduct concerned, rather than to focus on the
4 precise time. Even in peacetime it was difficult to provide an indication
5 of the precise time that something happened. All I know that the trip to
6 Mostar and from Mostar -- well, we had to go on this trip in the evening
7 because of the combat. So those are the circumstances that I can
9 Q. Okay. Putting the matter as generally as possible then, did you
10 arrive in Jablanica in the morning or in the afternoon of the 10th of
11 September, to the best of your recollection at this date?
12 A. I think it was in the morning. That day we were supposed to have
13 a meeting in Konjic in the afternoon. In the morning, as I have already
14 said, I was in the police station, or rather in the army command. And
15 therefore, I think that I arrived in Jablanica in the morning and got
16 involved in those events.
17 Q. Yes. All right. Now, working backwards from there you left
18 Mostar at some stage in the evening on the previous day, the 9th of
19 September. Is that accurate?
20 A. I think I left Mostar the previous day and set off in the
21 direction of Jablanica.
22 Q. Yes. Now, could I ask you this: It was necessary to travel
23 overnight to get to Jablanica from Mostar because of the danger of fire
24 from HVO positions at some points. Is that accurate?
25 A. It was necessary to travel at night because of one part of the
1 road. You had to see when you would travel down the road that could be
2 travelled down during the day. There was a more dangerous part of the
3 road because of the fighting, and it would be safer to travel down that
4 part of the road at night, although some people did so in the day.
5 Q. And can you say approximately how long the journey took you to get
6 from Mostar to Jablanica? And again, I understand you can't be
7 minute-perfect or perhaps even hour-perfect. But just doing the best you
8 can, what was the duration of that trip?
9 A. Well, this is how I would put it. As far as I can remember, when
10 travelling to Mostar, given that many men carried weapons and had
11 equipment, you needed far more time to get there. When you have a large
12 column of men, you need a lot of time to get there. And I believe that it
13 took us between 14 and 16 hours to reach Mostar. And when setting off
14 from Mostar, there were few of us who were returning, myself, my security
15 officers, and some civilians, and it took us far less time. The CSB from
16 Mostar also assisted us, and they managed to escort us in military
17 vehicles for a certain part of the route. I don't know how much time it
18 took us, but it was significantly quicker because you had only a few
19 people. The military has the statistics on how long it takes a soldier to
20 travel a certain route if he is fully equipped, and I think this is
21 something that has to be taken into consideration when estimating the
23 Q. Anyway, the return back from Mostar to Jablanica was quicker than
24 the trip from Jablanica down to Mostar with the Laste Unit. Is that
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And -- now, just to fix, if we can, the date which you went down
3 to Mostar with the Laste Unit. Is that the fact that you set off from
4 Jablanica to Mostar on the 8th of September and travelled overnight on the
5 night between the 8th and 9th of September, arriving in Mostar on the
6 morning of the 9th of September. Is that accurate or not?
7 A. Well, perhaps what you said about going to Mostar is not quite
8 correct. Perhaps you could obtain the document that shows exactly when we
9 set off for Mostar, when the Laste Special Unit set off at the time I was
10 with them, and that would help you to determine when I left for Mostar,
11 when I was in Mostar.
12 Q. Well, we have to work with -- in this court we have to deal with
13 live evidence, and I really have to put the questions to you about this.
14 But perhaps you -- perhaps we can work it out.
15 Do you recall how long you personally were in Mostar on this
16 particular occasion? Were you there for a full day or less or more?
17 A. I really can't remember exactly how much time I spent in Mostar.
18 All I can say is that from the 5th onwards the special unit went into the
19 field. I think it's easy to find that document, but it's possible that I
20 was in Mostar the day before because I had a meeting in the security
21 services centre and in the 4th Corps command. But in the statement it
22 says that when I arrived in the police station I was involved in the
23 activities I was involved in.
24 Q. Yes. And -- well, the Prosecution have provided that statement to
25 us, of course, and I just wanted to ask you, if you can remember now, to
1 clarify that, if possible. Can you recall what activities you did
2 participate in in Mostar at that time?
3 A. I can remember that I was in the security services centre in
4 Mostar, I had a meeting there with the company commander, Pasalic. I
5 remember that the media was present. As far as I can remember, Beara was
6 present. I had an interview on radio Mostar. I'm not sure what the name
7 of the radio station was, and that is all I can remember. As far as the
8 activities I was involved in during that period of time in Mostar are
10 Q. You don't have a recollection of sleeping over at any hotel or any
11 facilities overnight in Mostar on that occasion. Is that correct or
13 A. Well, I said it's possible that I spent two days in Mostar.
14 Perhaps I was there on the 8th and the 9th, so naturally I had to sleep
15 somewhere in Mostar.
16 Q. Yes. All right. Well, thank you. Well, I appreciate your
17 efforts to recall these things, too, and we know it's 12 years ago, but
18 you just have to do your best with this.
19 Mr. Alispahic, very well. At a later time I'm going to come back
20 to that because we have evidence from other witnesses that we have to
21 compare your evidence to, of course. So I'm going to come back to that
22 issue and give you a chance to comment on what some other people say.
23 But for now I just want to move forward now. It's safe to say
24 that you were in Mostar on the 9th, you came back to Jablanica and
25 ultimately Konjic on the 10th. And are you able to comment what time it
1 was that you had the meeting with Rusmir Mahmutcehajic. In the order on
2 the screen it says it was scheduled for 1900 hours in Konjic. Can you
3 recall if that was the approximate time of the meeting or not?
4 A. I really can't say whether it was at 1900 hours or not, whether it
5 was before or after. I know we had a meeting. I know where we met. I
6 know what we talked about, and that's all I can say before this Tribunal.
7 Q. Yes. Okay. Well, I'm not going to ask you any questions about
8 the substance of that meeting. You've given your account of that. But
9 I'm still asking questions about the chronology.
10 And you slept in the facility called the Ark that night, is that
11 correct, that's the night of the 10th?
12 A. Correct, but I don't remember that I spent the night there. I
13 think I had set off for Sarajevo, since it was nighttime and you had to
14 travel by night.
15 Q. Are you able to say what the approximate duration of the journey
16 from Konjic into Sarajevo was on this occasion? Again, doing the best you
17 can to give an estimate.
18 A. I really can't commit myself on the duration of the journey. I
19 could give you an estimate on what I would expect the journey to take, but
20 it all depends on the circumstances of travel. Getting into Sarajevo
21 implied a late arrival, a nighttime arrival. The drive between Konjic and
22 Tarcin could take about an hour, and the rest could take several hours.
23 Usually it took the whole night to cross from one of these places to the
25 Q. Yes. Very well. Thank you. Now, did you get back to Sarajevo in
1 the early hours of the morning of the 11th of September?
2 A. I think it was the 11th of September, but I can't say when.
3 Whether it was just past midnight or in the morning hours, really can't
5 Q. That's okay.
6 A. If I remember my position at the time, I was able to use a vehicle
7 for this part of the journey but you had to keep the headlights off.
8 Q. Yes. Do you recall whether or not you had a rest or a sleep
9 before you came to your office and spoke to Commander Delic and then
10 subsequently the president, Alija Izetbegovic?
11 A. I think I rested briefly, not much though.
12 Q. Can you recall the approximate time at which you -- I'm sorry,
13 Mr. Alispahic, you were still speaking. You speak quite softly and I
14 started to speak over the top of you, but I cut you off. So could you
15 finish what you were saying, please.
16 A. That time during those operations and all the things that were
17 going on, we were all extremely exhausted and had little time to rest.
18 Therefore, it was perfectly normal for one to get some rest, especially
19 after nighttime arrivals in town, so that the next morning you could go
20 about your duties.
21 Q. Could you give an approximate time, again doing the best you can,
22 for when you made contact with Commander Delic on the morning of the 11th?
23 A. I said it wasn't really in the morning. It could have been in the
24 early afternoon [as interpreted], 10.00, as far as I can remember. What I
25 remember is a visit to the Presidency because the President would normally
1 be at work at about 10.00 or 11.00, so it was not in the early morning.
2 It was around about that time.
3 Q. Very well. Well, you'd better guide us as to this. The timing of
4 these meetings can be of some significance, Mr. Alispahic. So just doing
5 the best you can, do you say the range of times within which you met
6 Mr. Delic and Mr. Izetbegovic is between 10.00 in the morning and perhaps
7 2.00 in the afternoon? Would that be an accurate range to put?
8 A. No. I think both meetings were over by noon. I'd say it was
9 earlier, between 9.00 and 11.00, or between 9.00 and 12.00, if you like.
10 Q. I thank you for that range. Very well.
11 And can you recall in relation to those meetings the approximate
12 timing of the telephone conversation that you indicated you had with
13 General Jasarevic? Firstly, was it between those two meetings or was it
14 after both of them had finished?
15 A. I think it was after, but I can't remember.
16 Q. All right.
17 A. I can't remember a specific time.
18 Q. That's okay. All right. Now, I just have another question about
19 travel distances. Again doing the best you can here, are you able to
20 recall in those days how long it would take you to get from the supreme
21 command headquarters in Sarajevo to Zenica, to the town of Zenica?
22 A. I really can't say. Sometimes it took longer; sometimes it didn't
23 take that long. It depended on whether the roads were negotiable. It
24 depended on which road you decided to take. There were different travel
25 options, and it varied. It's next to impossible for me to give an
1 estimate. There were some wartime situations. Sometimes it took as many
2 as 24 hours to get to Zenica. I'm not tying myself down to a specific
3 date; I'm just trying to give you a general idea of what it meant to go to
4 Zenica at that time.
5 Q. Yes. We're grateful for that indication and that's -- that
6 assists. What's the -- I was going to ask you: What's the wartime speed
7 record to get from Sarajevo to Zenica? In other words, what would be a
8 good fast trip from Sarajevo to Zenica in about September 1993, if
9 everything went well and cars didn't break down and all conditions were
11 A. I really can't answer the question. I was hardly in a position
12 myself to make the journey in one go. I never measured the time it took.
13 I never did it in one go. I always had someone I was in touch with at
14 Tarcin, Visoko, Fojnica, maybe people who were members of the army
15 travelled between Sarajevo and Zenica which was in the nature of their
16 work. So maybe they should say.
17 Q. Well, indeed, of course we have some evidence from other witnesses
18 about this question, but you are assisting by your answers and I just
19 would persist a little bit further. If you were setting out from the
20 Sarajevo headquarters of the supreme command, how long would it take you
21 to get out through the tunnel -- perhaps I should ask you a preliminary
22 question before that one.
23 Was it necessary to go through the tunnel under cover of darkness
24 in all cases?
25 A. I could say yes and I could say no. Sometimes on account of my
1 job I had to go in broad daylight, and the journey was a difficult one.
2 Most people went under cover of darkness because it was safer. Secondly,
3 sometimes the tunnel was closed for whatever reason, and you could only go
4 one way.
5 Q. Perhaps you could assist with one other timing issue. What --
6 when you came out of the tunnel, what was that area called? We've had it
7 referred to as Hrasnica. What was the name of the precise place that you
8 found yourself in, having left Sarajevo and coming out of the tunnel?
9 A. Butmir.
10 Q. What was the timing -- to get from Butmir to Visoko, approximately
11 how long would that journey take?
12 A. Well, you know, we would need to distinguish between the various
13 routes. There were several depending on the combat operations that were
14 underway. There were roundabout routes, and sometimes it took 24 hours to
15 reach Zenica. Zenica and Visoko were not isolated, not encircled, and
16 sometimes you could get there in one or one and a half hours. There was
17 several different ways to get to Visoko, several roads you could take.
18 It's just very difficult for me to say, despite my best efforts to assist
19 you in this and make an assessment. I simply don't believe that in those
20 difficult days you could possibly have made the journey in anything under
21 eight to ten hours, but that's just an assessment on my part. I can't say
22 for sure.
23 Q. And the final question on these matters concerns one more leg of a
24 potential journey. Leaving aside any delays caused by shelling or other
25 accidents, how long would it take to get from the headquarters of the army
1 in Sarajevo to Butmir? In other words, to get to the airport and to go
2 through the tunnel?
3 A. If the journey was smooth in a manner of speaking, then in my
4 estimate it would take about one or one and a half hours to reach the end
5 of the tunnel from Sarajevo.
6 Q. Very well. Thank you very much for those timing questions.
7 Just excuse me, I'm just going to move to another topic. Very
8 well. Thank you very much.
9 Now, I want to turn to some questions concerning some transcripts
10 of telephone conversations that have been provided to the Defence in this
11 case. And I've got some questions about those. That will probably take
12 us out for the rest of the day I would think, those questions.
13 Now, first of all, the learned Prosecutor asked you questions
14 yesterday -- I'm sorry, on Tuesday, concerning the application of the
15 wire-tapping or telephone tapping method to Sefer Halilovic in 1993. So I
16 have to follow up those questions with some specific other questions, and
17 we'll proceed slowly through those.
18 Now, first of all, you have indicated that although it was
19 pursuant to an army request or, more specifically, an SVB request, your
20 service cooperated by undertaking the operative measures of telephone
21 tapping against Sefer Halilovic. Did those measures commence on the 10th
22 of June, 1993?
23 A. I can't say anything about the exact time. The measures
24 commenced -- if you go back to the documents, it should be there. I don't
25 think I could possibly answer the question since I was not in charge of
1 the implementation. I didn't know about it. I just can't say.
2 Q. Very well. Well, let me -- I'll just have to deal with the
3 structure of how this is done in general first and then perhaps come back
4 to some questions about it.
5 In general terms, when the method of phone tapping is applied to a
6 person, there is some quite strict legal requirements about how such a
7 measure is approved. Is that correct?
8 A. There certainly are a number of legal requirements; I agree with
9 that. There are legal requirements defining these steps.
10 Q. Now, in answer to some questions by the learned Prosecutor, you
11 indicated that Sefer Halilovic had been the subject of some previous
12 measures in the time before you became the minister. Is that correct?
13 A. I think I said the same measures and not some previous measures.
14 Q. So I think that's what I said, too, but perhaps we missed each
16 In any event, when you became minister you found yourself in the
17 position of making sure that from that time onwards things were done
18 properly. Is that correct?
19 A. I certainly hope so.
20 Q. Yes. And this is not the time to be discussing what happened
21 previously, but you yourself had sufficient concerns about -- look, I
22 simply won't ask you the questions about that previous time; you weren't
23 the minister.
24 Very well. Anyway, just going back to the procedures that have to
25 be followed to put in place a -- the measure of telephone interception.
1 Is it the fact that the sector chief or a senior official of the SDB, in
2 order to get a telephone intercept approved, must submit a proposal to the
3 minister and detail in that proposal a brief summary of the reasons why
4 they need this measure to be put in place?
5 A. Yes. That's what the procedure says.
6 Q. Yes. And is it also a requirement that then the minister is
7 obliged to -- to assess this proposal and to issue a decision, either
8 approving or not approving the implementation of these measures?
9 A. That is one of the reasons that these measures had to go to the
10 minister for approval. Sometimes you had to go even higher up to get
11 approval, the government or the Presidency, for example. I am talking
12 about the state security sector.
13 Q. Yes. No, I understand that you're confining it to the state
14 security sector. And what are the sort of situations where you would
15 need -- where the minister would need to go to the President in order to
16 get approval for the implementation of a measure -- of this measure?
17 A. It was necessary to obtain approval at that sort of level when
18 measures were being applied to members of the government or high-ranking
19 state officials. Everything else would have under the competence of the
20 state security service.
21 Q. Yes. Now, apart from going to the Presidency, in the case of
22 implementing a measure of this nature against a very senior army official,
23 obviously we have in mind the case -- the concrete case of General
24 Halilovic here, but I am speaking as a matter of general principle, too,
25 apart from going to the Presidency, when dealing with a senior army person
1 who was to be subject to these measures, was it necessary in those
2 circumstances to advise the commander of the army? And secondly, was it
3 necessary to advise the director of the military security service, the
5 A. I'm not sure future SVB person is a director; I think in the
6 military it's actually called chief.
7 As for the question when measures are taken or imposed against
8 members of the army regardless of their rank, this is governed by internal
9 army regulations. The army had its own system in place defining the steps
10 to be taken in these situations and how these measures were to be applied.
11 Sometimes one needed to get approval for these measures to be taken.
12 Q. Yes. Well, I understand that. But -- well, perhaps could I move
13 to a more specific situation. When the army -- when the commander of the
14 army would seek the assistance of your organisation to help with the
15 particular method of phone tapping in the course of one of their own
16 investigations or their own inquiries, did they have to submit a written
17 request to your organisation in order to get that assistance that they
19 A. In principle, there should be a document upon the basis of which
20 the SDB would provide that sort of service. There must be a document
21 showing the name of the person in question. These are the elements that
22 you must bear in mind in order to impose these measures as well as the
23 phone number and other such details. The document would take a certain
24 form and would then be submitted to the service.
25 Q. Would you be able to explain to us what the form of -- what form
1 that document would take? Would it be in the form of a letter, specifying
2 why the army wanted the assistance of your service? Or was there a
3 pro forma type of document to be used?
4 A. Unfortunately I really can't tell you whether it was a pre-typed
5 form or not. There must be some that were used by the MUP or by the state
6 security -- or rather, when these measures were being applied against
7 someone from the MUP or state security, but when imposed against a
8 civilian I really can't say what sort of form was used. I know that the
9 chief of the SDB told me that these measures were being applied to a
10 number of different individuals. But this was confidential, even in
11 relation to other members of the SDB with the exception of the person who
12 was implementing the measure, and then they would forward everything
13 to -- including the documents, to the military security service. If
14 there was anything of relevance, the military security service would write
15 up their own report, a document, and would then pass it on to the SDB or
16 the MUP whenever necessary.
17 Q. Yes. I understand that. And of course the role of the minister ,
18 in particular, the minister who was in your ministry, whether it was you
19 or your predecessor or the person who came after you, the role of the
20 minister did not include going and listening to telephone taps yourself.
21 Is that correct?
22 A. The minister doesn't listen to those telephone taps. Perhaps in
23 exceptional circumstances I would hear certain conversations or listen to
24 if serious issues were at stake. For example, an individual was at risk,
25 facility was at risk, someone wanted to harm someone else, but I really do
1 not remember ever having listened to such telephone intercepts, apart from
2 when I was a young operations officer involved in such activities in the
3 service. Civil servants don't listen to such intercepts; they receive
4 transcripts, they receive the relevant documents that have already been
6 Q. Yes. Very well. Well, yes, thank you for that information. And
7 now I just want to turn to some questions concerning what actually happens
8 when a phone -- sorry, well, I'm changing topics now --
9 MR. MORRISSEY: So perhaps it might be a moment, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We'll take a break for 30 minutes and we'll
11 resume at 10 minutes to 1.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.
14 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey, please continue with your
16 MR. MORRISSEY: Thanks, Your Honour.
17 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Alispahic. I was just going to move to
18 the method that was used back in those days by the SDB when actual
19 phone-tapping was occurring. I'll just put some propositions to you, you
20 tell me if these are accurate or not.
21 Once the minister had granted approval for a particular
22 phone-tapping to take place, is it the fact then that individual employees
23 to the service would listen to all telephone calls made from a particular
24 telephone of the target?
25 A. Could you perhaps clarify the question. What do you mean when you
1 say "all telephone calls"?
2 Q. Yes, okay. Well, I understand. I'll address the question in
3 slightly a different way. Once a person's telephone was approved -- I'll
4 start the question again.
5 Once the operative measure of telephone-tapping was approved
6 against a particular individual, a team of employees was given the job of
7 listening to that telephone, such team rotating in 24-hour shifts. Is
8 that correct?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. And just looking at it from the working class's point of view for
11 a moment, an individual SDB employee would work a 24-hour shift, and then
12 he or she would hand over to another employee and they would work a
13 24-hour shift, and there was a team of three people in the normal course
14 of events doing that. Is that correct?
15 A. I don't think that's correct, at least not in our service. There
16 were no officials who would work a 24-hour shift as far as I can remember.
17 They worked at a certain site, that's what we called it, or there were
18 three officials working at one site. And they rotated in order to cover a
19 24-hour period.
20 Q. And just to clarify one term there, you used the word "site." We
21 don't need to know physically where that was, but there was a particular
22 location where the employee was allowed to listen to the target telephone,
23 and that's what we call a site. Is that correct?
24 A. Yes. It's like the place where I am now sitting and responding to
25 your questions; that's what I meant.
1 Q. Yes. Okay. Well, thank you. Now, it's typical of that sort of
2 work that the worker -- I'm sorry. Perhaps could I just ask you this:
3 What's the appropriate technical term by which we should refer to this
4 worker who was doing the listening?
5 A. I don't know what the term is now, but I think that they were
6 called operators. I think that is how one called such people.
7 Q. Okay. Well, that's what we'll call them. Now, with respect to
8 the operators in a particular case, it's not necessary to mention any of
9 their names in court now, but it is clearly possible to identify who was
10 listening on a particular day by reference to the transcript that they may
11 produce at a later time, is that correct, because they'll have a number?
12 A. Yes, it should be possible to determine the names of the
13 individuals who were involved in those activities.
14 Q. That's okay. Well, we don't need to mention any names now here.
15 But --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to speak up a
17 little for the interpreters, thank you.
18 MR. MORRISSEY:
19 Q. The interpreter --
20 A. And as far as that issue is concerned, well, I couldn't provide
21 you with the names because I don't know their names.
22 Q. That's okay. And the interpreter has just asked, Mr. Alispahic,
23 if you would try to speak a little bit louder because they're having
24 trouble hearing.
25 Now, the process, I take it was this: That an operator would
1 listen to the telephone and if they heard a telephone call that was of
2 potential significance, then they should approach their supervisor or the
3 person coordinating their activities and advise them that there may have
4 just been an important telephone call. Is that correct?
5 A. I think that is correct. If the conversation was alarming, if it
6 was necessary to take certain other measures. But in principle this is
7 not correct. In principle the operator compiles a report on the
8 intelligence gained by intercepting telephone conversations. That is the
9 technology that was employed.
10 Q. Yes. In the archives of the -- of the organisation known as
11 FOSS -- well, look, I won't give evidence from the bar table. Can I just
12 ask you this: Records of those telephone conversations were preserved in
13 a verbatim handwritten form. Is that correct?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. It could have been typed out as well. It depended on the -- the
17 equipment available.
18 Q. In terms of the compiling of those records, let's just stick with
19 the handwritten record of the conversations, and I'm going to show you
20 some examples of these in a minute but I just want the general principle
21 now. But in terms of those handwritten ones, was the operator required to
22 do a handwritten verbatim record of every single conversation, or was he
23 or she just required to do a handwritten record of the ones which seemed
24 to be of interest?
25 A. As far as I know, the operator would try to assess the intercepts
1 that were important. These were seasoned operators and they realised what
2 they had to record and what they did not have to record. And since there
3 were audiotapes of the intercepts which were kept in the archives, it was
4 possible to check these tapes if necessary.
5 Q. Yes. When the -- when the operator did the handwritten transcript
6 of a particular call, did they do that by -- did they do that at the very
7 moment that the call was being listened to or did they at a later time go
8 back and listen to the tape and write out that conversation, since it was
9 a potentially relevant conversation?
10 A. As a rule, they would listen to the tapes and transcribe them.
11 But this could have been done simultaneously, too, although it would be
12 very difficult.
13 Q. Yes. I take it it might be possible to do it simultaneously in
14 very short conversations, but for longer conversations the practice was to
15 go back and transcribe the tape. Is that correct?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. Thanks. Now, once such a tape was -- once such a transcript was
18 written out, the procedure was that it should be given to the -- whoever
19 the supervisor was or the person coordinating the activities. Is that
20 correct -- or coordinating their activities, I should say?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. And then that supervisor then had to take a decision whether to
23 forward it higher up the chain of information or pass it to other people
24 or to act on it in a variety of different possible ways. Is that correct?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. Now, in the case of the Minister of the Interior, it was not your
2 job to look at every single of these transcripts that got brought into
3 being. Is that correct?
4 A. No. As the Minister of the Interior, it was not my job to look at
5 any of these transcripts. While I performed those duties, I did not read
6 any of the transcripts that had been compiled by the operators.
7 Q. Okay. Well, now there are some transcripts that even though I
8 understand what you say about that, there's still some that I have to show
9 you, but I still have some other preliminary questions before we get to
11 Once the supervisor, whoever that was, had acted upon the
12 information in an appropriate way and advised the appropriate people about
13 that information, it then became necessary to file that transcript. And
14 what I want to ask you is about the procedure of filing those transcripts.
15 Firstly -- actually, I'll ask you firstly about the tapes.
16 Firstly, the individual tapes upon which the telephone
17 conversations were recorded were actually in very short supply in Bosnia
18 during the war. Is that correct? In other words, there was actual
19 physical shortage of such tapes to use?
20 A. I had no such information, according to which it wasn't possible
21 to carry out certain tasks, as there were insufficient tapes. I never
22 received such information. I believed that tapes were always available,
23 and that was an obligation.
24 Q. Yes. Perhaps I'll put the question slightly differently. Is it
25 the fact that the tapes that were used on a day-by-day basis were at some
1 stage in the proceedings transferred onto a large master tape or
2 re-recorded on a large master tape?
3 A. Well, one might say that that was the case. The tapes were used
4 twice; tapes that had already been used were re-used. Tapes that were no
5 longer important were re-used. If the people responsible for these
6 matters believed that a certain tape was no longer important, that tape
7 would then be re-used.
8 Q. Very well. All right. Thank you. And then the master tape that
9 I've referred to would then have to be archived. Is that correct?
10 A. As far as I know, there were no other tapes. There was the master
11 tape. There was just one cassette tape or whatever you want to call it.
12 It was always placed in the archives, and it was always related to the
13 document that had been drafted by the individuals we have called
14 operators. It wasn't possible to make tape recordings of other tapes.
15 There was only one tape placed in the archives, unless an official request
16 was made to proceed otherwise, but I'm not familiar with any such requests
17 having been made.
18 Q. Very well. Now, could you just tell us what's the official name
19 of those archives? What was the official name of the archives in 1993 and
20 what's the official name of those archives today?
21 A. This is only one organisational unit within the SDB. It was the
22 technical department; that is what we called it.
23 Q. Very well. So when speaking of the place where archives are kept,
24 is it meaningful to speak of the archives of the SDB or should I use some
25 other term?
1 A. It was placed in the archives of the technical department.
2 Q. Very well. Now, the same procedure applied to the filing of the
3 transcript as well. Is that correct?
4 A. I think that the procedure was a little different in that case.
5 The transcripts were made available to those in charge of a certain case.
6 An operator is in charge of a certain case, and this operator would
7 provide written reports based on the tapes. But according to the protocol
8 and certain protocol regulations, this was coded. The documents had a
9 code so that they could be traced. The documents might be part of a file
10 on a certain individual.
11 Q. Yes. Very well. Thank you for that explanation. And finally,
12 there was in place a legal and lawful way -- a legal and lawful procedure
13 for the destruction of tapes and files. Is that correct?
14 A. Yes. There was a procedure for the destruction of all the
15 documents that the service had, and this included these documents we are
17 Q. And that procedure was, if you like, controlled by a need to
18 justify the destruction of any documents, if that had to be done, and to
19 record such justification in writing. Is that correct?
20 A. Well, I could say that that is correct, but I would like to add
21 that there are certain criteria that have to be respected, certain
22 documents have to be retained for a certain period of time, and then they
23 are destroyed in accordance with the rules. A commission is established
24 in order to make sure that everything is done in a regular manner. A
25 record is compiled on the documents destroyed.
1 Q. And the record of destroyed documents is, itself, preserved within
2 those archives. Is that correct?
3 A. Well, I would have to check the documents that regulate this
4 field, but the record is then retained for a certain period of time. And
5 then that document can also be destroyed after some time has elapsed.
6 Q. Yes. Very well. Now, there are some specifics of the account
7 you've given already, which we're going to return to when we come to some
8 concrete documents. But I now wish to turn to some concrete documents,
9 and before I do so I just have some narrative questions to ask leading up
10 to one document, the first that we're going to deal with.
11 You indicated -- could I just indicate where the questions are
12 going so that you follow the line of questioning. I'm now going to ask
13 you some brief questions about the lead-up to Trebevic and then I'm going
14 to come back to a document here, okay, so that's what coming so that you
16 It's the fact that in the two weeks or so before -- sorry,
17 Trebevic happened on the 26th of October of 1993, is that correct,
18 Operation Trebevic was carried out?
19 A. That's probably correct. It was a long time ago, but I know that
20 it was at the end of October 1993. As I have seen in the documents and
21 the plans, that's correct.
22 Q. Yes. Now, we had evidence from General Karavelic that there was
23 significant planning in the fortnight or so before the 26th of October,
24 and I just wanted to ask you: Does that accord with your memory, that in
25 those two weeks or possibly even more time before Trebevic you and also
1 General Jasarevic and also the soldiers, Karavelic and others, were
2 engaged in significant planning for Trebevic?
3 A. In principle I would agree with that, but he did this as part of
4 his duties. He performed certain acts to prepare for that.
5 Q. Well, I understand that each of you had a different function to
6 perform in this plan. But is it also the fact that in that -- in that,
7 let us say, two weeks or so before Trebevic you liaised closely with
8 General Jasarevic and indeed other persons involved in Trebevic about the
9 activities of the 9th and 10th Brigade and also to some degree about the
10 activities of Sefer Halilovic. Is that true?
11 A. Not true. I was not closely cooperating with Karavelic or with
12 General Jasarevic, not during the preparation or after. Those were
13 operative preparations, and then duties were carried out at the operative
14 level. If I was involved in any preparations, as far as that was
15 concerned, I must have talked to General Delic. As far as Nedzad Ugljanin
16 and the chief of the SDB sector certainly cooperated far more closely with
17 these officers that you have referred to.
18 Q. Thank you for that explanation.
19 MR. MORRISSEY: I just ask that the witness be shown Defence
20 document D -- this is 65 ter number D404.
21 This is going to have to be circulated in hard copy, Your Honours.
22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 436.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Now, I believe we have Bosnian copies for everyone
24 in court because this document will be used to explain some of the
25 notations as well, but I ask also that the English version be given to all
1 those who are operating in English in this court.
2 Q. Mr. Jas -- sorry, pardon me. Mr. Alispahic, I just explain what's
3 coming here. This is a particular transcript which you may or may not
4 have seen yourself; we're not presuming that you have. But whether you
5 have or you haven't, I'll ask you some comment on some features about it.
6 MR. MORRISSEY: You, Your Honours, it seems that the Defence copy
7 of this statement has inadvertently gone missing. So I wonder if -- the
8 one that's been placed on the ELMO, I wonder if I could have that for my
9 own use.
10 You, Your Honours, there's an issue that will have to be faced
11 here concerning the date of this document. Perhaps --
12 Q. Mr. Alispahic, could I just ask you to take the opportunity to
13 read that what time I raise a procedural matter with the Judge, and then I
14 can ask you questions about that.
15 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, the Bosnian version of this is
16 longer than the -- than the English version. And the reason for that is
17 that we've only translated the call that we're interested in, but it
18 arises from a longer transcript and the date of that transcript can be
19 discovered from the front page of the Bosnian. We'll ask the witness to
20 explain all of that, but you don't have that in English. You just have
21 the call in English. And because that arose after a number of other
22 calls, you'll see at the front page of the Bosnian on the left-hand side
23 the date is to be found of this call. On a previous occasion this has
24 been referred to and we didn't have a date for it, and we've hopefully
25 rectified that situation at this time.
1 MR. RE: Can I just ask, was this shown to Mr. Jasarevic or put to
2 him when he testified?
3 MR. MORRISSEY: It was.
4 MR. RE: Thank you.
5 MR. MORRISSEY: I think it was, Your Honours. Can I just -- can I
6 just indicate there was a shortcoming when we showed it to General
7 Jasarevic -- Your Honour, I've started attributing ranks today, I'm sorry,
8 Mr. Jasarevic. And the transcript is at the 3rd of March, pages 77 to 78
9 where this was put to him, but at that time we didn't have the full
10 Bosnian so we couldn't put a date to him properly. So we're going to try
11 to rectify that now.
12 Q. Now, Mr. Alispahic, the call I'm interesting in is really not the
13 Ivan Brigic call, which is the first one, it's there, it's a call that's
14 recorded there, but the one I'm interested in is the call to Jusuf
15 Jasarevic on the following page. And I'm going to ask you some questions
16 about that in a minute. But first I'm going to ask you some formal
17 questions about the document and just get you to explain some of the
18 markings on this document.
19 Firstly could I ask that you explain the markings at the top left
20 corner of the first page. So I'm now holding up the page to just
21 indicate -- do you see the word "MUP" at the top left?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. It says MUP, RBiH, and then SDB. Why are those letters written
24 there? In formal terms, what's the purpose of them being there?
25 A. These are abbreviations. The Ministry of the Interior of the
1 Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina state security service.
2 Q. And why have they been put there -- in formal terms on this
3 document, why were they written there?
4 A. I think this was usual practice. It was the usual heading put
5 there by the operatives.
6 Q. Yes. Okay. The next line says "sector SDB Sarajevo."
7 And that refers to the Sarajevo branch of the SDB. Is that
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And again, this is simply correct procedure on behalf of the
11 operator to write that there. Is that correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Can we go to the next -- can you just confirm this. This document
14 here, as you'll see, is dated 13/10/1993, and at that date was
15 Mr. Mujezinovic the person who had the duty as commander of the sector of
16 the SDB Sarajevo?
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't get the answer.
18 MR. MORRISSEY:
19 Q. I'm sorry. Pardon me. The interpreter didn't catch your answer
20 on that occasion. Would you mind repeating it, please.
21 A. Mr. Mujezinovic was the chief of the Sarajevo SDB sector in
23 Q. Yes. And I must indicate to you, please feel to correct it if I
24 use "commander" and it should be chief or director and it should be chief,
25 please always fix that up because later we have to deal with this
2 Very well. Thank you. Could you please go to the next line where
3 the word, I think it is "objeljenje" 03 is to be found. Could you explain
4 what that means?
5 A. It's probably the code or the number that relates to the
6 department where this sort of job is done.
7 Q. The department within the SDB. Is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you. Once again, that's just a proper notation -- a typical
10 notation by the operator. Is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Could we go to the next line, please. Could you just explain what
13 is written there and what it means.
14 A. Your Honours, I must say I can't be considered an expert as
15 regards procedures used by the SDB. My testimony is to be understood in
16 the following way, and I will do my best to provide whatever information,
17 understanding I have of these procedures. I am a former chief of the MUP
18 and SDB, but I never once found myself in a situation where I was expected
19 to produce this sort of document myself, personally. I wish to make this
20 abundantly clear and therefore not be asked any questions that might be
21 asked of an expert. I might inadvertently make errors and this is
22 something I wish to avoid. What's under consideration now is a purely
23 technical matter.
24 Q. Yes. Well, we understand and we're grateful to you for that
25 indication. I'm still going to ask you the questions, but we appreciate
1 exactly what your position was. You were the minister; you weren't a
2 technician. Now, having said that, what do you understand to be the
3 meaning of that line, "radnik," and followed by the words 50143? Is that
4 the worker's number?
5 A. It should be. There is a code and behind this code there should
6 be a person and the person's name.
7 Q. Very well. The next line, what is the -- what do you understand
8 that to mean, the one with "broje" or "brodje"?
9 A. I assume this is the numbering. It's a technical procedure.
10 Numbers are used for tapes that are listened to. That is just my take on
11 it; it need not be the case. It is an assumption.
12 Q. Very well. And following that is the date given, 13/10/1993.
13 Could you --
14 A. That's what it says.
15 Q. Okay. Now, just to proceed, there's then some further information
16 underneath that, and I just want to ask you this: Do you recall that --
17 you may not recall every detail of this document, but I'll ask you. When
18 you signed the -- do you recall signing an approval or a decision for the
19 implementation of operative measures against Sefer Halilovic back in June,
20 at some time, in 1993?
21 A. I don't remember signing this, but if I did the signature should
22 be valid at the level of the Ministry of the Interior for this measure to
23 be applied. There should be a document in the SDB archives authorising
24 them to do whatever they were supposed to do and explaining how they
25 should go about their work where members of the army were concerned. I
1 really can't recall this document right now.
2 Q. All right. Look, I -- there is a document I want to show you.
3 Could you -- could we keep that one alive, please, at the moment while I
4 just show the other document. This is a document that's uploaded, so this
5 is in the system. And could the witness please be shown Defence 65 ter
6 number D157. Its number is DD00-0698.
7 Now, there's a document that's going to come up -- up out of
8 history, actually, you'll see -- yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: This will be MFI 437.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honours.
11 MR. RE: Before we go on, the transcript doesn't seem to indicate
12 it, but the last document which was shown to the witness, MFI 436, is in
13 fact a translation of MFI 234, which was shown to Mr. Jasarevic. I'm just
14 saying that the two are actually linked together on the transcript and we
15 know the documents are. I think.
16 MR. MORRISSEY: My friend is both right and wrong, Your Honour.
17 What happened with that document as that because of the date issue we
18 withdraw it and so it did start off with an MFI number, and we ended up --
19 because it was simply incapable of getting a date, we didn't press ahead
20 with attempting to tender that. My friend is right, I think, but I think
21 it will turn out there's another document that has now got that. That
22 became an unoccupied MFI number. So we do ask for it to be given another
23 MFI number now.
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes. But for this Bench we'll only admit one
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, but the other one is not -- doesn't exist
2 anymore, so we'll need to give it a new number.
3 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
4 MR. MORRISSEY:
5 Q. Now, the current document --
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Could I also give the Prosecutors a copy of
7 this -- the document is on the screen, but because it might need some
8 flipping backwards and forwards we have just got a copy of it to give the
10 Q. Okay. Now, sorry about that, Mr. Alispahic. Would you mind just
11 looking at the screen now, please. And do you see there -- and I think
12 probably -- I'm not sure how your Bosnian one is set out there. It's one
13 page in Bosnian.
14 Do you see -- would you mind just having a look at that and tell
15 us if now after 11 years that can assist your memory about what happened.
16 A. What I can say is that this is a state security service document.
17 It was produced in 1993. The service imposed a measure against
18 Mr. Halilovic. There was a proposal by the SDB chief. The proposal was
19 approved, and I signed the decision to take these measures.
20 Q. Could I just --
21 A. This is a perfectly valid document.
22 Q. Yes. Sorry. That was going to be my next question. There's no
23 suggestion that it's a sneaky or sly document. What I want to put to you
24 is what you just said, that is perfectly legitimate and valid and you
25 followed all the right procedures in doing that, didn't you?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Okay. Well, I understand that. Well, now, having regard, then,
3 to the substance of the document, here there seems to be two measures
4 proposed in the second line. There's "agava" and "zolja" operative
6 Now, at the moment I'm only concerned really with the "zolja"
7 measures. The "zolja" measures, that was the telephone tapping, wasn't
9 A. I think you're right.
10 Q. Okay. Thanks. Yes.
11 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, I offer that document for tender, Your
13 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
14 MR. RE: There's no objection.
15 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
16 It's admitted into the evidence.
17 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D437.
18 MR. MORRISSEY: Thanks.
19 Could we come back now to the other MFI document --
20 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Morrissey, that will be MFI 436.
21 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes -- sorry, that's the -- 436 is the
22 conversation, thank you, yes. I understand.
23 Q. Pardon me, we're jumping but I'm grateful to you for your
24 attention about that.
25 Now, coming back to that here, is it the fact that the code name
1 Skup you see two lines below -- you see there's a section in the middle
2 here, I'm pointing to it, which you may be able to see on the transcript
3 there. There's a reference to the name Skup, S-k-u-p. Now, that was the
4 name attributed to Sefer Halilovic, wasn't it, in the course of this?
5 A. I can't be 100 per cent certain about this, but it's certainly
7 Q. Yes. Okay. Now I want to turn to the actual discussion that
8 occurs between Halilovic and Jusuf Jasarevic. Do you see here that Sefer
9 spoke to Jusuf Jasarevic and that a certain conversation is transcribed in
10 relation to that?
11 All right. Now, just what I'm asking you to focus on here is: Do
12 you see that there's a reference there to -- or to Sefer -- to Sefer
13 Halilovic saying: "In any case, we'll be in touch."
14 And then he says:
15 "Q. Has that lad Dzankovic arrived from down there?"
16 And Jasarevic says: "He has."
17 And Sefer says: "Have you talked to him?"
18 And Jasarevic says: "Yes, I have, and I've tasked him with
19 writing it down."
20 And Sefer then goes on to say: "Yes, he must. He must write
21 everything down."
22 Now, my first question about that is at the time that conversation
23 took place were you made aware of that conversation yourself?
24 A. There was no way I could have known about this. I would like to
25 ask you to please not ask me to comment on the control of these
1 communications. I have never seen any of these documents. I would need
2 to study them to give you an opinion. They're just outside my scope,
3 outside the scope of what I knew. And I think it would make no sense for
4 me to read transcripts that I've never seen before. I'm here to speak the
5 truth and to tell the Court what I know, but it would be extremely
6 cumbersome for me to go through all these transcripts I have never seen
7 before and provide you with mere speculations as to what I believe is or
8 is not the case.
9 Q. Let me just assure you I would not ask you to speculate over the
10 truth or otherwise of these documents, and that's not the reason I'm
11 asking you those questions. What I'm asking you about you've answered, I
12 think. You did -- you were not aware of this particular telephone call.
13 Is that correct?
14 A. How should I know?
15 Q. No, no, it's just important to establish the fact of whether you
16 did or didn't. And I take it what your answer is, you did not know about
17 this telephone call. Is that correct?
18 A. I don't think I knew. I'm trying as hard as I can, but I can't
19 remember that I ever memorised this conversation, that it ever took place.
20 But it only seems natural that Jasarevic and General Halilovic
21 communicated. That strikes me as perfectly natural.
22 Q. Yes. Very well. Thank you.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, I offer that document for
24 tender now.
25 JUDGE LIU: Any objections?
1 MR. RE: There's an outstanding similar document which we
2 attempted to tender through Mr. Karavelic which is MFI 390, which on the
3 face of it bears all the same indicia of reliability of a telephone
4 conversation between Mr. Karavelic and Mr. Halilovic, as this one does
5 between Mr. Halilovic and Mr. Jasarevic. There was a Defence objection to
6 our tendering that. Now, clearly one can't go in without the other if
7 they're in the same category of documents; that's our attitude.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
9 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, I must say it sounds as if my
10 friend is not objecting but that he says that it creates a strong argument
11 in favour of the other one. There may be differences with the other one.
12 He must be said to have a point, however. And of course I do press for --
13 I press for this one here. I think the -- 390 is pending. Perhaps that
14 can be clarified. I don't think you've ruled on it.
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
16 MR. MORRISSEY: So I think my learned friend gets another weight
17 in the balance in that argument, if I may put it that way, but I do press
18 for this one to be tendered.
19 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe this Bench has already made a decision
20 that we'll admit all the intercept documents all together in the future.
21 And the -- if you insist, we could admit this document. However, I have
22 to remind you that you have to remember the Prosecution's position on this
23 very issue.
24 MR. MORRISSEY: On document 390, I indicate to the Court I'm fully
25 aware of the Prosecution's position. And as I say, that one's pending and
1 Mr. Weiner and I had had some discussions about all of this. So perhaps
2 when that comes to be ruled upon, it may be that we might have something
3 else to say about it. Just right at the moment I'm just offering that
5 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Can I indicate, there are others but this one is
7 in its own category for obvious reasons, so we offer it now.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Now we could say that this document is admitted
9 into the evidence. And maybe sometime next week, since the Defence case
10 is approaching -- since the Prosecution case is approaching to an end, we
11 might find some time to discuss the admission of the evidence, especially
12 for those intercepts.
13 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE LIU: And I believe it's time for us to break.
15 MR. MORRISSEY: Could I just have the liberty of asking one more
16 question because I don't want to leave Mr. Alispahic --
17 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
18 MR. MORRISSEY:
19 Q. Could I just ask you to clarify something about these documents
20 generally. I take it from your answers what you say is you don't recall
21 seeing any of these transcripts, because I've actually got quite a lot
22 here, but you don't recall seeing any of them. Is that the position?
23 A. You're not correct.
24 Q. Well, this will assist the course of cross-examination tomorrow so
25 I'm just going to ask you about it.
1 Did you see any transcripts from the 26th of October itself, the
2 day when Ramiz Delalic, Celo, was arrested? Did you see any transcripts
3 of this nature relating to that day?
4 A. I need to have a look to say.
5 Q. And final --
6 A. But please, do bear in mind that we need a clear chronology of
7 these events and later when documents were processed and used and
9 Q. Yes. Well, okay. Thank you for those answers.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: And Your Honours, we'll proceed tomorrow.
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes, thank you. I believe that the hearing for today
12 is adjourned, and we'll resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 in the same
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,
15 to be reconvened on Friday, the 27th day of
16 May, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.