1 Friday, 27 May 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE LIU: Call the case please, Mr. Court Deputy.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is Case Number
8 IT-01-48-T, the Prosecutor versus Sefer Halilovic.
9 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
10 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
11 And good morning, Witness.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE LIU: Are you ready to continue?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am.
15 JUDGE LIU: We'll try our best to let you spend your weekend at
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would be grateful very much
19 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
21 WITNESS: BAKIR ALISPAHIC [Resumed]
22 [Witness answered through interpreter]
23 Cross-examined by Mr. Morrissey: [Continued]
24 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Alispahic.
25 Now, yesterday I was asking you some questions about particular
1 transcripts, and I wanted to ask you a couple of details about such
3 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown - just excuse
4 me - Exhibit 436. Yes, Your Honours, I'm sorry. I don't believe this has
5 been uploaded. We distributed copies of this yesterday. I don't know --
6 I think the witness probably doesn't have it in front of him here, so
7 could the witness just be given the Bosnian copy, please.
8 Q. I just ask that you -- I'm not going to ask you about the content
9 of this document because you've made it clear that you as minister didn't
10 normally have the job of looking at these documents. But I have another
11 formal question to ask you and that is that on the front page of this
12 document in the top right-hand corner there is certain writing. Would you
13 mind just looking at the top right-hand corner there. And in particular
14 it says the letters STR.POV. and then below that it says linija rada 02.
15 Do you see those notations?
16 A. I do.
17 Q. Very well. Now, the meaning of that marking 02 in professional
18 terms was that the person who was subject to these --
19 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Morrissey, I'm sorry to interrupt you. It
20 seems to me we did not get that document.
21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
22 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, this --
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes. And how about the B/C/S version?
24 MR. MORRISSEY: I think it was distributed both in English and
25 B/C/S --
1 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: The limited English version of it.
3 JUDGE LIU: Yes, thank you.
4 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, thank you.
5 Q. Sorry, Mr. Alispahic. I'll just resume the question.
6 That notation 02, does that mean that the person who was target of
7 the -- of the operative measure of phone-tapping had the status of an
8 internal enemy or potential internal enemy of the state?
9 A. Your Honours, can I explain certain matters that I believe to be
10 of key importance in this context in explaining this documentation?
11 Q. Well, it may be possible to have an explanation. I would just ask
12 if, are you in a position to answer the question I asked, first of all,
13 what is the meaning of that 02 number?
14 A. I will reply to any question of yours to the best of my abilities.
15 02 stands for the line of work, the kind of work. And as for your
16 suggestion that 02 stands for some kind of an enemy, be it internal or
17 not, is something that I don't know and it is not immediately obvious
18 based on this. Based on what is stated here in the heading, no conclusive
19 opinion can be drawn on the status of the person against whom the measures
20 of this service were implemented.
21 Q. You made it clear yesterday that you were a minister and not a
22 technician. Is it known to you what the -- what this 02 number means in
23 precise terms?
24 A. What it stands for can be verified with this service. These
25 figures and these marks are not permanent ones. They change from time to
1 time. This is something that is regulated by regulations. Figures 02,
2 01, 03 are not fixed ones; that can be changed depending on the
3 organisation of the service. What you need to do is check what at that
4 period of time 02 stood for. Nowadays I'm sure that 02 stands for
5 something else; you can verify this. I'm saying this because the same
6 situation was when I took the job from my predecessor. At that time we
7 also changed certain codes. So I assume that the same would apply
8 nowadays as well.
9 Q. Yes, well I'm grateful for that explanation. And could I just ask
10 you one step further. There must have been in existence at the time some
11 sort of document which explained the meaning of these numerals, and can I
12 ask you what would be the title of such a document and where would it be
14 A. This is the general document, the rules on the internal
15 organisation of the state security service. In this case it was the
16 sector of the state security service. But I would still like to ask the
17 Bench to allow me to give an explanation.
18 Q. What is it that you want to give an explanation about? What topic
19 is it that you want to give an explanation about?
20 A. Precisely this topic, the documents that we are currently
21 discussing. This is of procedural nature, of legislative nature. That's
22 what I wanted to explain.
23 Q. Well, perhaps if you deal with the questions I have to ask you
24 about these matters it may be that those questions cover what you want to
25 say, and if they don't then could you indicate that there's something that
1 we're missing that's important. And we'll see how far we can go that way.
2 Very well. Well, thank you for that indication. Now, I just had
3 some other -- I have one further question concerning that 02. You've
4 indicated that -- in your evidence now that there would be -- that there's
5 a general document, the rules on internal organisation of the state
6 security service. But that document itself would not contain a precise
7 explanation of the term 02 because the term 02, as you've indicated, is
8 one that would change from time to time. And therefore --
9 A. Unfortunately, you're not right. There are always explanations
10 which define what 02 or other figures stand for. This is something which
11 is always defined within the service. The code stands for a certain task.
12 You just simply have to make a connection between the type of the task and
13 the code.
14 Q. Very well. So that I understand you well, we can find the meaning
15 of 02 in that particular set of rules to which you referred. Is that
17 A. Yes. In the enactment of the SDB you will be able to find what 02
18 stands for. The document will set forth this type of tasks is defined
19 as 02.
20 Q. And the final on that topic is that: To your recollection did the
21 meaning of the term 02 change during your term of office as Minister for
22 the Interior or did it maintain the same meaning from the start to the
24 A. I couldn't say. I don't remember whether there were any changes
25 during that period of time. A lot of time has passed since then. That
1 was directly under the responsibility of the chief of the SDB, therefore I
2 really couldn't tell you.
3 Q. And which particular chief of the SDB are you referring to? Are
4 we speaking there of Mr. Mujezinovic?
5 A. No. Jozo Jozic.
6 Q. Sorry --
7 A. And later on Nedzad Ugljen.
8 Q. Yes, thank you. You're right. Very well. I just have a couple
9 of other questions to ask of a professional nature.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown -- I'm sorry,
11 just excuse me, I just want to select the document to be provided.
12 Your Honours, what is to be shown to the witness here is the rule
13 on the work of the SDB adopted in August 1992 by the Ministry of Interior
14 Affairs at the time. That was not this witness; it was before he was
15 there. Now, this document is not uploaded, it is not translated -- pardon
16 me, it is translated. It is not proposed to rely upon or take the witness
17 through document after document about it. And as I say, it's a lengthy
18 document. There are certain questions I want to put to him about it of
19 very much a formal nature just to indicate what the rules were and to make
20 them available, should anyone need to look at them. Very well.
21 Q. Mr. Alispahic, what's about to be shown to you is a document I
22 think authorised by your predecessor, Mr. Pusina, and I just ask you to
23 look at it and confirm what it is.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Morrissey, this document will be MFI 438.
25 MR. MORRISSEY:
1 Q. I won't ask you to read the whole thing, but if you wouldn't mind
2 flicking to see if it appears to be a familiar document to you and then to
3 indicate to the Court -- indicate to the Tribunal what that seems to be.
4 A. I don't think it would be proper for me to say whether I am
5 familiar with the rules or not. I think that there should be some
6 supporting documentation with these rules which would state that it was in
7 force during a certain period of time. I think that within the SDB one
8 could obtain documentation going to the validity of this document. I
9 think that from a professional standpoint it would be improper for me to
10 interpret the rules of -- on internal organisation of the SDB, which was a
11 document in force even before I came to office.
12 In addition to that, I would like to ask the Honourable Trial
13 Chamber not to require me to draw some conclusions, which would be
14 improper. These are highest-ranking documents within the SDB. The
15 documentation that is being shown to me here for the first time is
16 something that cannot be seen outside of the service. These are secret
17 documents, and if such secret documents are being shown to me, then there
18 should be some supporting documentation explaining how this came to be in
19 your possession.
20 Therefore, Your Honours, it is not up to me to assess whether
21 there is a valid document, whether this is an authentic document; this is
22 something that you should ask the service to confirm. The service that
23 provided the documents should also be able to give a confirmation of the
24 authenticity of these documents, because if you ask me to do that then I
25 would have to engage in speculation and that would only produce negative
1 effects. It could cause damage and I think that it would direct the
2 proceedings in the wrong direction. Thank you.
3 JUDGE LIU: Witness, I believe that the Defence counsel just want
4 to know how much you know about this document. We'll see how far you
5 could go. If you cannot answer certain questions or maybe some issues are
6 out of your knowledge, just tell us. There's no problem about it.
7 MR. MORRISSEY:
8 Q. Very well. But, Mr. Alispahic, it's -- I understand why you raise
9 those matters. From a security point of view, if you see a -- if you see
10 something that's potentially damaging to the organisation or that should
11 not be discussed in public, you should tell us that straight away because
12 there is an ability to move into the private session here where such
13 things will not then be broadcast to the public.
14 However, I'll just persist with a formal question here at the
15 moment. The document there, I do not ask you to interpret it or to look
16 at it -- or to give any legal opinions. What I wish to ask you is: Do
17 you recall whether that document was in operation at the relevant time,
18 which for our purposes is 1993?
19 A. I truly couldn't say. I couldn't reply to your question whether
20 precisely this -- these rules were in force in 1993. What I can say is
21 that there always was in existence such a document, the rules of the
22 service. But as to which particular document was in force at which
23 particular time, I really couldn't say.
24 Q. And I take it what you would also say is that the Bosnian
25 government would be in a position to provide some documentation as to when
1 a particular set of rules was in force and when it ceased to be in force?
2 A. Within the state security service, one should be able to find all
3 sets of rules which were in force in different periods of time; this is
4 something that could be established easily. They could give you an answer
5 to this question.
6 Q. Okay. Well, I'm grateful for the -- for your persistence with
7 this. And I have one further question and that is: When you mentioned
8 the document that explains what is the meaning of 02, were you referring
9 to this document or whichever document it was that succeeded this document
10 in your time as minister or are you referring to a completely different
11 set of rules?
12 A. I think that these were the rules on internal organisation of this
13 service. What you have here are the rules on the work of the SDB which
14 provide a framework for methods and -- that are applied in work, whereas
15 internal organisation is quite another matter. The rules can define
16 certain segments of work; however, internal organisation, I think, defines
17 what 02, 03, et cetera, stands for.
18 Q. Very well. Thank you. Just excuse me one moment, Mr. Alispahic.
19 I just have to raise something with the Judges.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, in the circumstances of that, I
21 won't seek to tender this document because the witness has made it clear
22 he can't say that it was in force at the relevant time. We really have to
23 make further inquiries about this issue, and the matters have been put to
24 this witness because he's the only witness called who would appear to be
25 capable of saying anything about it, but he's given his answer so I do not
1 offer this document for tender at this stage.
2 Q. Very well. Thank you for that. I just have to put a couple of
3 other transcripts before you now in the same way that I put the transcript
4 yesterday concerning Mr. Halilovic and General Jasarevic. If you haven't
5 seen the document before, tell us; and if you don't remember the contents
6 of the document, you also should tell us that. But we wish to put them
7 into evidence here, and therefore I'm going to show them to you and you
8 can comment.
9 MR. MORRISSEY: Now, first of all, could the witness please be
10 shown Defence document D408A. That is uploaded and it's DD00-1779.
11 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 439.
12 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, we have a hard copy -- because this
13 runs over four pages, we've got a hard copy of this for the Prosecutor.
14 Q. Mr. Alispahic, do you have on the screen in front of you now a
15 copy of a transcript dated 24th of --
16 A. I do.
17 Q. Very well. Very well.
18 A. 408.
19 Q. Yes, that's correct. Now, this is a conversation that occurs on
20 the 24th of September, 1993, between Ismet Dahic and Sefer Halilovic. And
21 I just wanted to ask you first of all before I come to the document, Ismet
22 Dahic, as you recall, was the deputy of Vahid Karavelic within the
23 military structure of the 1st Corps. Is that correct?
24 A. I think that's right, but please don't ask me to confirm with
25 certainty what role Dahic had at the time. I suppose you're right.
1 Q. Yes, certainly. And again, I make it clear that given your
2 answers yesterday we don't presume that you've seen this document before,
3 but we have to ask you whether you have. So would you mind just having a
4 look at it and if you remember seeing it before tell us; and if you
5 haven't seen it before or you don't recall, tell us that too, please.
6 A. I have never seen this document.
7 Q. Okay. Well, nevertheless, I'll just ask you whether you're
8 familiar with any of the information in it from other sources; in other
9 words, whether your memory tells you that you can recall this incident.
10 Perhaps about six or seven lines from the bottom there's a comment here
11 from Mr. Dahic where he says -- where he's asked, sorry -- or he says
12 this: "These units were available" --
13 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this is at the bottom of page 1 of
14 the English transcript and it says -- I'm probably going now about 10
15 lines from the bottom or perhaps even a bit more, 12.
16 Q. "These units were available. The deltas have refused. They
17 never even responded, won't speak to me -- the duty officer won't speak to
18 me. He hung up on me last night. The commander isn't returning my
20 Sefer says: "Uh-huh."
21 And Dahic says: "These here have agreed and so has Mujo, 125 men
22 as agreed. We talked to them and they were about to set off last night
23 but the 9th has refused. There are no available troops from other units."
24 And Sefer's then recorded as saying: "Fuck it, what shall we do?"
25 Now, just from your own subjective memory, does this ring a bell?
1 Do you recall this incident where Halilovic and Dahic were trying to get
2 troops to go and having trouble, as described here?
3 A. I really couldn't give you any comments, either in relation to
4 this document or to its contents. This is the first time I've seen this
5 document, and the best I can tell you is that this is a reflection of what
6 was going on in Sarajevo at the time, nothing more than that.
7 Q. Yes. Well, thank you for that comment. And because of that
8 answer, I'll move on to the next one and ask you exactly the same
9 questions about it.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown D408B. This
11 also is uploaded. It's DD00-1785.
12 Q. Mr. Alispahic, while that's being brought up, I'll just explain,
13 this is a similar document between the same two people, and I just ask you
14 to look at it. And do you have that in front of you now, that document?
15 A. Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 440.
17 MR. MORRISSEY:
18 Q. Is the situation the same with this document, you haven't seen it
20 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't get the witness's answer.
21 MR. MORRISSEY:
22 Q. Would you just mind repeating your answer, please; the interpreter
23 didn't get it.
24 A. No, I haven't seen this document before.
25 Q. Thank you. Very well. Very well. I won't ask you any further
1 questions about that document, frankly. Very well.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness now please be shown another one.
3 Q. I have about six of these to put to you one after the other in the
4 same way that I have.
5 MR. MORRISSEY: So the next one is D323. This document is not
6 uploaded, so we'll have to provide hard copies to everyone, which we'll
8 Q. While this is arranged I'll explain what is coming. This is
9 another similar transcript, this time dated the 9th of October, 1993.
10 This one is a conversation -- it's a short conversation between Stjepan
11 Siber, who was a deputy commander of the army at the time, and Sefer
12 Halilovic. And I'll ask you exactly the same questions: Have you seen it
13 before? Do you remember the incident? And you simply tell us what you
14 remember about that.
15 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 441.
16 MR. MORRISSEY:
17 Q. Would you mind just taking the chance briefly to look at that and
18 seeing if you recall seeing this transcript before.
19 A. No. This is the first time I see this document. Should I go
20 through it?
21 Q. If you wouldn't mind just briefly looking to see whether it helps
22 your memory. You may remember such an incident, as is described in there,
23 or you may not. And if you remember it, tell us; and if you don't, tell
24 us that, too.
25 A. I can't remember. I have never seen the document before. What it
1 talks about doesn't ring a bell.
2 Q. And there was no need for -- very well, I withdraw that. Very
3 well. Thank you. Could I just ask you as a question of form and the form
4 of the documents you've been shown, the two Dahic documents and this Siber
5 document, do they appear to you to be the products of the same process of
6 phone-tapping that we've discussed yesterday and today?
7 A. I couldn't say either way, but it's possible.
8 Q. At all events do you agree that the documents appear consistent
9 with that conclusion? And I mean in a formal sense, not in terms of their
11 A. These documents -- this document looks very much like the ones
12 we've looked at. It belongs to the same group of documents, but I must
13 express a reservation with regard to all these documents as long as
14 there's no explanation that would go to their authenticity, like I said at
15 the outset. This is just an assumption on my part, but it's something you
16 may be interested in. I think it talks about measures applied against
17 General Halilovic.
18 Q. Yes. Yes. Well, we understand you personally did not review
19 these documents, and therefore we don't ask you to authenticate them
20 yourself. Is that a fair way to put the matter?
21 A. Precisely what I said, and I'll repeat it. There's a procedure
22 precisely for this kind of document for perfectly understandable reasons,
23 human reasons, and technical reasons. This is the sort of measure that
24 can be applied against anyone, but there are certain procedures to follow.
25 And the same applies to these documents being produced. All you could
1 find in the file is a list of persons, but never anything else in relation
2 to the state security or the intelligence service. Everything else would
3 imply that there was a procedure in place and how this -- these documents
4 were to be used. I'm telling you about this as a matter of principle,
5 that there had to be a procedure according to which these documents were
6 compiled and used.
7 Q. Yes. Well, thank you for that explanation. Very well. Thank
8 you. Now, that completes for the moment the questioning concerning the
9 telephone transcripts, and I wish to turn now to another measure.
10 Mr. Alispahic, yesterday you were shown a document which was the
11 decision signed by you concerning measures against -- or concerning
12 measures about General Halilovic. And at that time, two measures were
13 authorised, the zolja measure and another measure called the agava
14 measure. Now, was the agava measure a different measure involving the
15 placement of listening devices within physical locations such as offices
16 or other such places?
17 A. I really can't talk about the definition of the agava measure,
18 whereas the previous measure was used more frequently and that's why I
19 remember it more clearly. But all measures change over time and their
20 names change in order to protect the secrecy of these measures, and this
21 is the reason why I can't comment on specific documents or anything like
23 Q. Well, I understand that and I wasn't proposing to ask you to
24 comment on specific documents. Just on the terminology question, in the
25 case of Mr. Halilovic the phone-tapping method was called zolja, but --
1 A. I think that's correct.
2 Q. But I take it from what you say that the terminology your service
3 used to describe phone-tapping changed over time, too. Is that correct?
4 Sometimes it would be zolja; sometimes it would be another name?
5 A. Yes. The name of that measure changed frequently over time.
6 Q. Very well. Now, as to agava, as a matter of principle I think
7 you've made it clear you don't recall exactly what that involved. Could I
8 just ask you -- I'll ask you to look at a document now that we're going to
9 show you.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: We don't have this uploaded, but this is Defence
11 document D816, and we'll just circulate copies of this. I think it would
12 be MFI 442.
13 Q. What's going to be shown to you now - it's being circulated around
14 the room - but there's -- this is a photocopy of what seems to be a map of
15 Mr. Halilovic's office. I'LL just ask you to take a moment to look at
16 that and familiarise yourself with it while I explain something to the
17 Judges at the same time.
18 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, there is a rough translation -- when
19 I say "rough," we hope it's not rough but we hope it correct. It's done
20 by a team member here not by CLSS. It was done I believe yesterday or the
21 day before. It's simply is a translation of the terms used on the
22 previous page. You'll see on the left there's a list 1 to 9 -- sorry,
23 1 to 10. And this is -- sorry, 1 to 10, pardon me. It goes down to 9 at
24 the bottom and then 10 is to the right of that. And that list is
25 translated on the following page. And I'm reminded that there's an
1 official translation of this pending and we'll provide that as soon as
3 Q. Very well. Thanks. Now, what -- first of all, have you seen this
4 document before?
5 A. No, never.
6 Q. Have you seen documents of this form before, not necessarily
7 connected with Mr. Halilovic but concerning the placing of listening
8 devices in other cases?
9 A. Yes. That was a long time ago while I was still working as an
10 operative for the state security service. I saw documents like this one.
11 These documents were produced by people from a technical department within
12 the state security. This was not done by operatives; these were purely
13 technical matters. So I think there were very few people who were ever in
14 a position to look at these documents. It's been 15 or 20 years since I
15 last saw one like this.
16 Q. Yes. This document does not have a date on the face of it. Are
17 you able to say by reference to this document the time period in which --
18 well, perhaps I'll ask you another question first.
19 Is this document consistent with the measure agava which was
20 proposed against -- proposed concerning Sefer Halilovic in the order
21 signed by you? In other words, was Mr. Halilovic's room subject to
22 listening device measures?
23 A. I can't give you the sort of specific answer that you expect, but
24 I can give you my opinion.
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. And we can see how far that will take us or how useful you find
2 it. This is a document that indicates that there's a plan for a room to
3 be bugged or that it has already been done. What that says to me is that
4 this measure that you refer to as agava is a measure to bug a room.
5 That's what I can conclude based on this document and based on our
6 previous discussion. I couldn't commit myself on anything else. I
7 couldn't say whether it was done before, at this time, or after, or
8 whether it was ever actually applied at all. I simply can't say. If the
9 measure was applied, then probably this was done. If not in that case,
10 well, I don't think I could possibly comment.
11 But if I may, this is also within the sphere of operative work.
12 This is a very complex measure. It's not particularly simple to apply,
13 and sometimes teams simply give up because things happen that they can't
14 control, and the result is it becomes impossible to take the measure. But
15 if we're asking ourselves whether this measure was applied or not, it must
16 be possible to establish that in some way, this certainly not being one of
18 Q. Yes. Well, I understand that. Thank you for the clarifications.
19 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, I offer that document for tender.
20 JUDGE LIU: Well, would you please provide us with some
21 information concerning of the source and chain of custody of this
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, Your Honours, I've got a general answer.
24 I'll just see if I can get a more specific one. If you'll just excuse me.
25 [Defence counsel confer]
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, this document was provided by the
2 organisation FOSS to the Defence some five months ago. That's the chain
3 of custody that we have about it.
4 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
5 Any objections, Mr. Re?
6 MR. RE: Well, not really. Just a question as to the relevance of
7 it to the proceedings. I'm still unsure whether it's referring to a
8 listening device or telephone interception. There's been a fair bit of
9 evidence about telephone interception. I think the witness mentioned in
10 part -- I think he said it was a listening device, but I'm not sure from
11 looking at the document whether it was actually a listening device or
12 telephone interception. But in any event, we probably don't object, we
13 just question the relevance to the proceedings of this particular
14 document. Perhaps that could be explored, though, whether it's a
15 listening device or an intercept.
16 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.
17 Well, the Bench believes that this document will help us to
18 understand and to consider the admission of all those intercepts. So we
19 believe in this sense it's a relevant document. Since there's no serious
20 objections from the Prosecution, this document is admitted into the
21 evidence with the official translations; I believe that will be checked by
22 this Tribunal.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes. Well, Your Honours, as soon as we have it,
24 we'll forward it. And to the extent that it conflicts with our
25 translation here, the official one should prevail.
1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you. Very well thank you.
3 Q. Now, some final questions on that topic. And, Mr. Alispahic, you
4 yourself are not aware of any material produced by the agava method in
5 relation to Mr. Halilovic. Is that correct?
6 A. I'm not familiar with that.
7 Q. In the circumstances of surveillance of Mr. Halilovic, it was a
8 perfectly logical thing for the service to do, to place a listening
9 device -- or attempt to place a listening device in his office. Is that
11 A. I wouldn't comment on that. Those who decided on the application
12 of the measure -- I merely studied the measure. But those who decided on
13 its application made the call as to which measures would be applied
14 against General Halilovic eventually.
15 Q. Yes, I understand that. Is it within your knowledge whether a
16 listening device was placed in any car or vehicle used by Mr. Halilovic in
17 August and September 1993?
18 A. I'm not familiar with that.
19 Q. Is it within your knowledge whether a listening device was placed
20 in any other location -- well, I withdraw that question. I'll ask a more
21 specific one.
22 Is it within your knowledge whether a listening device was placed
23 at the IKM, the -- the location which you indicated you visited, in
24 Jablanica in September of 1993?
25 A. I don't know that there was a location, as you say, at the IKM,
1 forward command post. What I can say is link these statements to the
2 general or Skup, as the code-name implies or to a more general context.
3 If you want my opinion based on information that I had as a member of the
4 Ministry of the Interior, I don't think they had adequate equipment at the
5 forward command post to begin with, not that I'm an expert but I'm just
6 trying to help.
7 As for the location itself, I'm not familiar with any measures
8 being taken there. I never received any reports to this effect, and it
9 would have constituted a technical matter.
10 Q. In whose -- who did have responsibility for deciding whether or
11 not to place such a listening device at the IKM at the operative level?
12 Who had to make that decision?
13 A. The military and intelligence bodies. I'm not sure about the
14 level, whether corps level or the level of the unit in question. I can't
15 possibly be more specific when it comes to the army. I can't say how
16 exactly measures were applied there or at what level.
17 Q. Mr. Alispahic, you've been patient in answering these questions,
18 and I've nearly finished this part of the cross-examination now. The last
19 thing I want to ask you about concerns how the material gained by
20 application of the zolja method was passed over to the military security
21 service? In other words, how did your service pass that over?
22 So my first question is: Who was responsible at the SDB for
23 passing that material over to the military? Was that Mr. Ugljen?
24 A. U-g-l-j-e-n, that's the spelling.
25 Q. That's what I thought it was. But in any event, is that the
2 A. He was the number one man of the service. He had the closest
3 cooperation with other services, specifically the military intelligence
4 service. If assistance was provided to the army applying these measures,
5 then certainly each and every document you've shown me should be recorded
6 somewhere in the archives and it should say exactly who received the
7 relevant document. Someone from the service who was in charge of General
8 Halilovic, for example, and then this person would pick up the transcripts
9 and conversations. These, after all, were the people who used these
10 measures for their own end.
11 Q. Yes. At that time can you recall -- well, we've had some evidence
12 from General Jasarevic here in this Tribunal already, and he explained to
13 us the structure of his office. And he indicated that he had about 30
14 people working for him. Could I ask you: Does that accord with your
15 recollection of the situation, that his staff in Sarajevo at the SVB, and
16 in particular the UB, consisted of about 30 staff members?
17 A. Yes, but I really can't say more about that. I've no idea how
18 strong the security service or the security administration were. I'm not
19 familiar with the way these services were organised, nor did I have any
20 free time on my hands to deal with these issues.
21 Q. No. I understand that and you've made yourself clear about that,
23 So in terms of the person to who Mr. Ugljen gave the
24 documentation, do you know the identity of that person?
25 A. I really don't know the name of the person who directly and
1 frequently communicated and/or received such information or documents. We
2 had cooperation on several levels. There was cooperation between the
3 services, between the SDB chief, Ugljen, and Jasarevic, and before
4 Jasarevic, there were offices from the state security service. And there
5 was cooperation on the lower level of the SDB and the military bodies in
6 the field and in Sarajevo, alike. If there was communication in Sarajevo,
7 it could have been with Mujezinovic, who was the centre chief at the time.
8 There could have been communication regarding operative activities.
9 Q. Yes. And one final question coming from that. Contacts at the
10 high level between Mr. Ugljen and Mr. Jasarevic can be distinguished from
11 contacts at a lower, more local and operative level between employees of
12 each service. Is that correct?
13 A. That's correct. What they define would eventually lead to what
14 you are discussing right now.
15 Q. Very well. Well, thank you for those answers.
16 Now I need to move to a new topic -- oh, sorry, there is one --
17 there is one residual one. I've forgotten about that.
18 Apart from the measures zolja and agava that are mentioned in that
19 document, was it also -- was it also within the discretion of the person
20 organising these measures, in this case possibly Mr. Ugljen, to adopt
21 other measures as well, such as personal physical surveillance, following
22 of General Halilovic, and so on?
23 A. All measures which are regulated by various regulations and can be
24 applied within the security service, including the military security
25 service, can be used at the discretion of the chiefs of these services.
1 I'm going -- I'm speaking now in general terms --
2 Q. Yes, I understand that.
3 A. -- not specifically regarding General Halilovic.
4 Q. Yes, now I understand you're speaking at that level of generality.
5 You've indicated that the military security service needed your
6 organisation to help because you were technically better equipped than the
7 SVB. When it comes to physical surveillance, having operatives follow a
8 particular target and so on, did the SVB from the military need your help
9 with that sort of thing, or were they able to do that much on their own?
10 A. I can't remember whether the SVB asked for assistance from SDB in
11 any other field except for the technical measures. I don't remember them
12 asking any other kind of assistance.
13 Q. Very well. And another, if you like, formal matter. In the case
14 where operatives of the SDB are used in such surveillance activities -- in
15 fact, I'll withdraw that question. I'll ask you a more general one.
16 Where SDB operatives are involved in measures of any sort against
17 a particular target, is it necessary for the SDB to retain a list of those
18 operatives on the file? For example, in the case of General Halilovic,
19 was it necessary for the SDB to maintain a list of those operatives who
20 were concerned in the measures against him?
21 A. Within its structure, the service has a department where there are
22 a number of officers of the secret service who do exclusively that type of
23 work. That measure is a lower-ranking measure in terms of other technical
24 measures that require approval. And the employees who do that kind of
25 work are identified by their first name, last name, and affiliation to
1 that department.
2 Q. And just finally, it's necessary for a copy of a document with
3 those names on it to be preserved in the archives at the technical
4 section. Is that correct?
5 A. Either the activities of that department or the names have to be
7 Q. And they have to be recorded in a document that is stored at the
8 archives. Is that correct?
9 A. As far as I remember, the reports coming from that surveillance
10 apparatus normally are sent to an operative who follows the target. And
11 this is stored in the archives, either in that file or in another file.
12 These people finish their task, write up a report, and that's it. It is
13 possible that they have a logbook where this information is recorded in
14 rough terms. I have never engaged personally in that type of work,
15 therefore I'm not very familiar with the technical methodology.
16 Q. No. I'm grateful to the assistance you've given, and that is the
17 end of those questions.
18 MR. MORRISSEY: Now, Your Honours --
19 Q. And, Mr. Alispahic, I wish to turn to some narrative matters on
20 how this case unfolded and your memory in the best way that you can give
21 it. Were you ever shown by the Prosecutors -- or perhaps first of all.
22 Were you ever shown at the time, that is in August and September 1993 -- I
23 think I'll show you the document first and then I'll ask you if you've
24 seen it.
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Just excuse me one moment.
1 Could the witness please be shown Exhibit 146.
2 Q. What I'm going to show you now is an order appointing Sefer
3 Halilovic in charge of an inspection team consisting of himself,
4 Mr. Karic, Mr. Suljevic, Mr. Bilajac, a security officer named Namik
5 Dzankovic and two other individuals who play no part in these proceedings.
6 I'll just ask you whether you've ever seen that before. Do you have that
7 order on the screen?
8 A. No, I don't have it yet.
9 Q. Neither do we. Do you have it now?
10 Now, Mr. Alispahic, I'm not going to ask you for a military expert
11 opinion here, but I just wanted to ask you: Have you ever seen that
12 document before?
13 A. No, never.
14 Q. Did the Prosecutors not show you this document at any time during
15 the investigation?
16 A. No, I've never seen it.
17 Q. Okay. And let me ask you: Was there any necessity for you as
18 Minister of the Interior to be shown such a document back in
19 August/September of 1993?
20 A. I don't think that was necessary.
21 Q. No, very well. Well, I won't ask you to consider the text of it.
22 The only thing I'd ask you to note is the date there. Do you see that
23 it's dated at Sarajevo, 30th of August, 1993? And I'm looking at the top
24 left-hand part. Do you observe that date?
25 A. I can see that.
1 Q. Very well. Was -- were you aware of the -- the process by which
2 Mr. Halilovic -- well, I withdraw that.
3 Did you know that he was appointed the head of an inspection team
4 at the time or was that level of detail not necessary to be provided to
5 you at the time?
6 A. I don't see why would the army send this type of an order to me?
7 They didn't normally send such documents to me. So it's not up to me --
8 up to me to say. It was up to them to decide whether they would send
9 something like this to me or not. I never really focussed on the role of
10 General Halilovic and his function. It was not necessary for me to know
11 that some kind of an inspection team was established, led by General
12 Halilovic. I don't think I needed to know that.
13 Q. No, I -- well, that's the -- that also is the proposition I was
14 going to put to you. In light of that -- nevertheless, you gave evidence
15 earlier in the week that you considered or it was your view that Sefer
16 Halilovic was the commander of this operation, and I have some questions
17 for you on that topic.
18 First of all, you indicated -- and I just want to confirm that
19 this is the reasons why you gave that evidence. You indicated that you
20 gave that evidence because of things that were said at the Zenica
21 conference. Is that correct? I'm going to put a number of these things,
22 but first of all Zenica was one basis for that opinion that you had. Is
23 that correct?
24 A. I learned that General Halilovic was the commander of that
25 operation based on several things, including the meeting in Zenica where
1 the general explained why the operation was needed. Then I was also asked
2 to allocate a special unit to be resubordinated in that operation. In
3 addition to that, I knew that General Halilovic was the chief of the Main
4 Staff. I also was familiar with the communications with the IKM or
5 forward command post. Then I went, myself, to the forward command post.
6 It was no weekend cottage; it was a typical forward command post. Being
7 under oath now and wishing to state only the truth, I couldn't tell you
8 now that I ever saw a decision appointing General Halilovic commander of
9 that operation. However, the fact that the operation was indeed
10 implemented and that I knew all other things point in that direction.
11 Q. Yes. Well, I understand that. And I'm just going to ask you
12 about some of the specific bases one after the other that you've given and
13 put some questions to you about them. And the first ones concern the
14 meeting at Zenica. You've indicated that Sefer Halilovic raised the issue
15 at Zenica. Could I ask you: What was the reaction of the other generals
16 who were present at Zenica to Sefer Halilovic's proposal? In other words,
17 was it a popular move? Was it unpopular? What do you recall about that?
18 A. At the time when all of these discussions were held, these issues
19 were debated, and the meetings which I attended allowed me to infer or
20 understand how important it was to launch such combat activities and to
21 liberate the territory. I think that even if we disregard other facts, it
22 is undoubtable that General Halilovic was a much more prominent figure
23 than any other commanders. He was a much more charismatic figure. And
24 personally, I and other leaders always treated his proposal, suggestions,
25 with respect.
1 In addition to what I have stated previously, based on that and
2 everything else I understood that General Halilovic was the commander of
3 the operation and the number one man in the field.
4 Q. So I understand what you say about that, but I have to ask you
5 perhaps some more precise questions about the Zenica meeting. Do you
6 recall the presence at that Zenica meeting of a man called Salko Gusic,
7 who was the commander -- and in fact the relatively new commander of a new
8 corps, the 6th Corps?
9 A. I truly -- I truly couldn't claim with any certainty that it was
10 Salko Gusic. As I saw things, he was a lower-ranking officer in the army,
11 lower than others who attended the meeting. I hope he will not take this
12 as an insult, Salko Gusic, but other officers I knew much more and they
13 ranked much higher at the time, were much more established, whereas Salko
14 Gusic was just appearing on the scene, so to speak. That's really all I
15 can tell you because I have no additional information.
16 Q. No, that's okay. Are you able to recall how Salko Gusic responded
17 to Sefer Halilovic's proposal, that there be an operation in Herzegovina,
18 at the Zenica meeting?
19 A. I can't recall. I would like to remind the Defence that the
20 meeting was recorded, both on audiotapes and videotapes. So perhaps you
21 could use that material to find answers you're looking for.
22 Your Honours, I was an observer there, somebody who came to see
23 and hear what was going on and what needed to be done further. I was not
24 in the same position as active army members. I did not have an active
25 role. I had a small minor task to participate and assist to the extent of
1 my abilities and that's all.
2 Q. Yes. And I make it clear, there's no criticism of the role that
3 you played at this meeting at all, Mr. Alispahic, but I have to ask you
4 some details because we have witnesses -- evidence from other witnesses in
5 the case.
6 You recall that Arif Pasalic, the commander of the 4th Corps, was
7 present. Do you remember how he responded to Sefer Halilovic's proposal
8 at the Zenica meeting?
9 A. I think that Arif Pasalic, as commander of the corps -- and
10 please, you have to analyse my position from another angle as well. All
11 officers attending meetings normally have their logbooks, their diaries
12 where they record things that transpire. Therefore, it is much easier for
13 them to explain and to recall what happened at a particular time, whereas
14 I, as an interior minister, did not have any such diary or a logbook where
15 I would record my activities. Our work procedures are different. And
16 when I left the ministry, I didn't take with me any documents, any diaries
17 or logbooks that army officers have and which could help me reconstruct
18 the events.
19 Q. Of course we understand that. If we could just come back to the
20 Arif Pasalic issue. How did he respond at Zenica to the suggestion or
21 proposal that you've described of General Halilovic?
22 A. No, I couldn't remember Pasalic's reaction.
23 Q. But Pasalic was present, I take -- or Pasalic and all of these
24 generals were present at the time when Sefer Halilovic made this proposal.
25 Is that correct?
1 A. Everybody was present the entire time, at least that's as far as I
2 can remember. Perhaps somebody did leave the conference room for an hour
3 to attend to something else, but that's all I could tell you.
4 Q. And do you remember whether General Halilovic tabled any paperwork
5 or plans concerning this proposal at the Zenica meeting in that conference
7 A. I can't say that General Halilovic presented any such paperwork.
8 However, I do remember that there were various discussions which also
9 focussed on various problems. Not everybody had the same viewpoint and
10 position as to how things ought to be done. Officers had different views,
11 and they elaborated on their views in military terms. I did not
12 understand that completely. Therefore, I didn't really go into the depth
13 of what they were saying; it was beyond me. If a commander was speaking
14 about a battalion or brigade or an artillery unit, this is not something
15 that I fully understand. Therefore, I didn't really focus, I didn't pay
16 so much attention to what the army people were saying.
17 Q. Yes. Well, I understand your account. Thank you.
18 Could you indicate with respect to the resubordination of the
19 Laste Unit whether you provided to the Prosecutor any document concerning
21 A. Until today, I never provided any documents to anyone. All
22 documents relating to my position, my office, could be found at the
23 Ministry of the Interior. I know for a fact that a dispatch or an order,
24 whichever way you want to define it, was sent from the Ministry of the
25 Interior about the deployment of that unit where various elements of that
1 deployment were specified, the date of deployment, accommodation, and so
2 on. So I would urge you to look for that document in order to fully grasp
3 the role of the police within that operation.
4 Q. And we don't have that document here, Mr. Alispahic, so I have ask
5 you the questions to answer as best you can now after these many years.
6 And the question is: Do you recall the date or the approximate date of
7 that written document?
8 A. First of all, the document had to be signed by Munir Alibabic,
9 chief of the security services centre because Laste belonged to that
10 centre. I, as a minister, was able to approve the participation of the
11 unit in the operation, and that document had to be drafted in early
12 September before they were deployed. I know that the document exists
13 because the commander and his deputy told me about receiving a dispatch
14 where this is defined. However, to this day I have not read that
15 document, but it must exist because without that document the unit could
16 not have been deployed.
17 Q. It ended up being the case -- perhaps I should ask you this -- no,
18 I'll come to the question -- I'll come to the Mostar question in a few
19 moments' time.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I'm about to move to another topic
21 now. Now might be a moment to take the break.
22 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we'll take a break and we'll resume at 11.00.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.
25 JUDGE LIU: Well, I'm so glad that Mr. Weiner is present in these
2 MR. WEINER: Sorry, Your Honour. Thank you very much for
3 welcoming me back. Thank you.
4 JUDGE LIU: And I might, I might, ask the parties to have a
5 meeting this afternoon, but this hasn't been decided yet. But I just
6 remind the parties to be available this afternoon.
7 Yes, Witness, let's continue with the proceedings.
8 Mr. Morrissey.
9 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Thank you again, Mr. Alispahic. Very well. Now, I have to put
11 some matters concerning the Zenica meeting to you and ask for your
12 comments on these. Excuse me a moment, please.
13 In these proceedings -- what I'm going to do is put an account of
14 another witness here to you. In these proceedings we heard evidence --
15 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this is at page 64 of the 4th of
16 February of 2005, and it's from the evidence -- it's from the evidence of
17 Mr. Gusic.
18 Q. I'm going to read this evidence to you and then I'm going to ask
19 for your comment about it.
20 "Q. You can confirm, I take it, the following facts: No
21 Operation Neretva 93 was mentioned at all. Is that correct?
22 "A. The name of the operation was never mentioned. I did not
23 hear it mentioned at the meeting. I did not hear the term "Neretva 93"
24 mentioned at the meeting.
25 "Q. The next point. Sefer Halilovic offered no plan at that
1 meeting for an operation related to Mostar or indeed related to
2 Herzegovina at all at that meeting. Is that correct?
3 "A. As far as I remember, no, he didn't, not an operation. No.
4 "Q. In fact, in a statement you made to the Prosecutors
5 recently -- the most recent statement that you made you made the
6 comment 'listening to the statements of General Sefer Halilovic during the
7 meeting and on the recording I can see that his main focus was the
8 warehouse in Zemunica, Hadzici, and an explosives factory in Vitez, Vitez
9 being the priority. General Halilovic did not even mention Mostar. The
10 situation in Mostar was presented by General Arif Pasalic.' And that's
11 what you said to the investigators and that was the truth. Correct?
12 "A. Yes, yes, yes.
13 "Q. Okay. And at that meeting no one was appointed to command an
14 operation in Herzegovina. Is that correct.
15 "A. As far as I recall, that is correct. No one was appointed."
16 Now, Mr. Alispahic, we have a problem because that's different to
17 what you say. Can I ask you what you have to say about that difference?
18 A. The obvious difference is between my status and the status of the
19 remaining officers who were present in Zenica. Secondly, the difference
20 is I was only there for one day, and I was asked to resubordinate this
21 special unit to them. Another thing I said in my testimony, and Gusic
22 agrees, that I didn't hear the name of the operation used and defined in
23 Zenica. It was never said that the operation would have this or that name
24 or anything like that. What I testified reflects what I remember about
25 this. I can't say more than that. I can't speculate about Gusic's
1 statement. It is possible that Gusic's testimony related to their entire
2 stay in Zenica. I also said that at the meeting I didn't hear that anyone
3 was appointed as commander of the operation, and the same applies to
4 General Halilovic. I also said my understanding of the meeting in Zenica
5 was that a framework was defined for the operation that was to follow, and
6 our own police unit was supposed to be part of this, about 50 strong. I
7 said it then and I'm saying it now.
8 Q. Well, I understand that. But you also understand we have to put
9 these materials to you. It's not fair to just leave them behind your back
10 without giving you the chance to comment.
11 MR. MORRISSEY: And the next thing I'd ask is that the witness be
12 shown Exhibit D109.
13 Q. The Prosecutors have already shown you this document,
14 Mr. Alispahic, but this is a document we've been calling the "Zenica
15 Conclusions" dated 29 August and produced, as we understand, by Commander
17 Do you remember being shown this document by the Prosecutor?
18 A. Yes, and that was the first time I saw that.
19 Q. I understand that. But it's apparent on the face of the document
20 that there's no reference to any operation to relieve Mostar nor to the
21 appointment of General Halilovic to lead such an operation. Now, do you
22 know why that is, if there was an operation -- an operational plan and --
23 sorry, I withdraw that.
24 Do you know why that is at all?
25 A. I don't understand the question, but I can look at the context and
1 try to answer your question. It's stated that I, the Minister of the
2 Interior, was only there on the first day. It doesn't strike me as
3 particularly important; there's only one line here mentioning that. I
4 left after that, but I remember that I was supposed to be part of the
5 combat operations to free the area, and General Delic and General
6 Halilovic and all those present can confirm this. But my testimony now is
7 that police involvement was requested to liberate the area around Mostar.
8 I never said it was about Mostar itself; I was being quite specific. But
9 combat operations were to take place that would liberate the area
10 surrounding Mostar. Bearing in mind the difficult situation in Mostar
11 itself from a military point of view, or at least that's how I understood
12 what the soldiers were saying, that was the topmost priority at the time,
13 to help that area.
14 Q. Well, I understand what you say about that, but I think we have to
15 deal specifically with what Salko Gusic said. He specified in evidence
16 what General Halilovic talked about at the Zenica meeting, and he
17 specified a focus on Vitez -- I'll mention them again just so that we're
18 clear, Vitez, and Zemunica, and Hadzici. He mentioned those three as
19 being the areas that General Halilovic spoke about.
20 But what you've said is that he spoke about an operation to
21 liberate the area around Mostar. Now, that's a conflict we have to focus
22 upon. Let me ask you this: Do you think at this distance in time many
23 years ago, do you think your memory might be mistaken about what happened
24 at Zenica, and in particular what Sefer Halilovic said about Herzegovina?
25 A. I really think that at this meeting in part what was discussed was
1 the problems in the Mostar and Neretva areas and the need to carry out
2 combat operations in that area in order to liberate the area and in order
3 to reopen communications with Mostar. I think that is what -- what was
4 discussed. This may not have been a crucial issue at the meeting they had
5 then, which was some sort of a conference really. Maybe these issues were
6 relegated to the operative sectors within the army, but the reason I
7 remember this is I was asked to participate, just that, nothing else. And
8 I wasn't up to date about any of the plans that were or were not being
9 prepared. I had no idea what the army was planning. It would have been
10 impossible for me to know.
11 Q. And we fully appreciate that's the case, and I'm not going to
12 press you with questions about that. But I do have to press you with some
13 other questions, and one concerns the videotape that was taken. Did the
14 Prosecutors give you the opportunity to view that videotape before you
15 gave your evidence here?
16 A. No, I haven't seen any videotapes here.
17 Q. Well, rather than keeping us all here for five hours or so
18 watching it, I'm going to put to you what's in it and if I put it wrongly
19 the Prosecutor will correct that. But we've all -- we have that
20 videotape; it's in evidence here. And Mr. Gusic had the chance to look at
21 it before he gave his evidence and commented on it.
22 Mr. Alispahic, that videotape reveals you, yourself, clearly
23 indicating a concern for the plight [Realtime transcript in error "plot"]
24 of Mostar and a need for the Bosnian armed forces to focus upon that area.
25 And frankly, so far that's consistent with what you say here, that you
1 were concerned by that. Do you remember expressing such a concern in
2 the -- in the course of the meeting, saying that you thought there was a
3 danger we'd fail the test at Mostar and that we should really focus on
4 that area?
5 Sorry, now we have a translation problem here. Before you answer
6 that question, just excuse me a moment, it's been identified and I'm going
7 to have to rectify it, so hold on, please.
8 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, there's a problem here, and I better
9 record what it is. At page 39, line 1, the interpreter has recorded my
10 question as referring to the "plot of Mostar," whereas in fact I referred
11 to "plight." Plight, bad situation, in other words. The danger for
12 Mostar. That would change the question -- the meaning of the question
13 completely for the witness.
14 Q. So, Mr. Alispahic, forgive me, and I'm going to ask that question
15 again and I'm going to use another word so the interpreter is not placed
16 in a bad position by the Australian accent.
17 Mr. Alispahic, the videotape which we're seeing here clearly
18 reveals you expressing a concern for the dangerous situation of Mostar and
19 a concern for the need to help in that area. We agree that's consistent
20 with what you say up to now. But do you remember making comments to that
21 effect in the meeting?
22 A. Based on information provided by the Mostar security services
23 centre, I was aware of the fact that the situation was extremely difficult
24 in the town of Mostar itself. They were facing great difficulty treating
25 the wounded and putting up the wounded. They were facing a crisis
1 regarding food supplies because the enemy forces were in control of the
2 road into Mostar. As for all the ideas that people talked about, all the
3 possible activities that were brought up, what I said was about that area,
4 the Mostar area and to remain within that context, something to the effect
5 that operations should be carried out to liberate the area. I said that
6 the situation was disastrous and I can't reproduce this word for word, you
7 must understand this. I proposed that the special unit be the first to be
8 dispatched to Mostar to give them a hand with combat operations and to
9 relieve the people down there who were extremely exhausted because they'd
10 been involved in the operations for weeks and months by this time, while
11 the other units were to carry out operations along the axis leading to
13 The other reason was really quite simple. The army, within the
14 context of their own plans and operations and what they were supposed to
15 do on the ground, that would only have entailed military units but no
16 police units, and that was perhaps one of the reasons to have the special
17 unit dispatched to Mostar. This was not discussed at any great length,
18 but when I think back I think I said this to mean that those combat
19 operations were necessary. I believed so at the time, and I still
20 believed it was necessary at that point in time to carry out combat
21 operations in order to relieve the situation of Mostar.
22 Q. Yes. Well, I have two questions arising out of that. First of
23 all, did you mention -- do you say you mentioned the Laste Unit by name at
24 that meeting?
25 A. I can't remember. It's possible that I did.
1 Q. Second question: Do you recall whether the resubordination of
2 that unit was discussed at that meeting?
3 A. It's possible. It's possible that this was said in passing, but
4 this was not a subject that was singled out for special treatment. That
5 was to happen later but nothing needed defining at that point in time. I
6 think one of those present actually came up with the Laste Unit. I don't
7 think the original proposal was mine. I think it was one of the soldiers,
8 one of the officers, who had spent some time fighting alongside that unit,
9 and they requested that particular unit as assistance, which I didn't
11 Q. Do you remember which officer that was?
12 A. No. I don't think I could possibly remember. Those were just
13 talks. It wasn't like someone was being interviewed or interrogated.
14 Q. You were aware at all times that that video -- that that meeting
15 was being videoed and that wasn't anything secret. That was quite open
16 that it was being videoed. Correct?
17 A. I don't know. I think I didn't. I believe that I didn't think at
18 the time that the meeting was being videotaped at the time -- or perhaps I
19 did. It didn't matter. That's what I think. I think the meeting was
20 being videotaped. There was the military information service there and I
21 think they were taping the meeting, but I'm not sure about the context, to
22 be quite specific.
23 Q. That's okay.
24 A. There was an awareness, yes.
25 Q. Yes. All right. But just to continue with the document on your
1 screen there, would you agree with me -- feel free to look at it if you
2 need to, but I'll put to you the proposition, and the Prosecutor can
3 interrupt if it's wrong, that that document, the Zenica Conclusions
4 document of the 29th of August, doesn't make any reference to Sefer
5 Halilovic being appointed to command any operation in Mostar or in the
6 region surrounding Mostar.
7 And what I'd ask you is this: Are you entirely certain that in
8 the discussions at Zenica, General Halilovic really was made the commander
9 of any operation in that area? Given what's on the tape, given what's in
10 the evidence of Mr. Gusic, given what's on -- what's not in the document
11 before you, what's your answer to that?
12 A. I can say that I think that I said before that I didn't understand
13 that anyone was appointed at that meeting by name, that any operation was
14 defined under any specific name or even a plan. It was my understanding
15 that all these things would happen; that's as much as I gathered at the
16 meeting itself. But I understood nothing about what you're suggesting.
17 Q. Very well. After the Zenica meeting, did your duties involve you
18 holding any further conferences or formal discussions with Commander Delic
19 concerning any operations in Herzegovina prior to the departure of the
20 Laste Unit?
21 A. I don't remember that we held any talks on that occasion in order
22 to make matters more specific. The officers stayed in the meeting and I
23 left to attend to my other duties.
24 Q. Yes. And in subsequent days, was it any part of your duty to
25 speak to Commander Delic about military operations in the Herzegovina
1 area, and the time period I'm asking you about is between Zenica and the
2 departure of the Laste in the early days of September?
3 A. It wasn't my duty to talk to Delic. Normally we didn't discuss
4 military operations. I remained duty-bound, or rather I had accepted the
5 duty as soon as the time was set for the special unit to be in a certain
6 place that the unit would be dispatched according to the plan. But I
7 assume you're thinking about -- or rather, you're saying -- well, we
8 didn't talk, nor did I talk to anyone else later about any possible plans
9 for any activities or the operation, the way it's defined here. We are
10 treating it as the Neretva operation. No, I didn't talk about that plan
11 or about any other military activity.
12 Q. Very well. Thank you. And on the question of the Laste and its
13 resubordination, who was it who ultimately drafted the -- any order
14 concerning the moving of that unit down to Mostar? Was that Munir
15 Alibabic who did that?
16 A. I think it was Alibabic that wrote the order for the unit to be
17 sent. I think that order must exist because that was the order followed
18 by the unit command.
19 Q. Now, I think you confirmed that you, yourself, had not seen this
20 order, but in what archives might that order be expected to be found?
21 A. It should be in the archives of the security services centre in
23 Q. Very well.
24 A. Perhaps -- or if I may be of any further assistance in this
25 context, as they say, you should go and look. It might be in the archives
1 of the special unit, which again is part of the security services centre
3 Q. Very well. And although I'm jumping forward to Mostar briefly,
4 it's in relation to the Laste Unit. In Mostar at the CSB at that time --
5 sorry, perhaps if you could just explain to the Judges what the CSB is.
6 A. That's an abbreviation for security services centre, which is an
7 organisational unit within the Ministry of the Interior covering a region,
8 an area, in which there are further police stations. There could be
9 anywhere from three to ten or 11 police stations in the region.
10 Q. Yes. Now, in the case of the Mostar CSB, there was a man named
11 Maslesa, M-a-s-l-e-s-a. What was his position at the CSB?
12 A. He was the chief of the security services centre, the CSB.
13 Q. There was another man called Alica Bilic. What was his position?
14 A. I think that Alica was an employee of the state security service
15 in Mostar.
16 Q. A man named Sejad Brankovic. Do you recall him and what was his
18 A. I think that he, too, was an employee of the state security
20 Q. And was he, too, based in Mostar?
21 A. I couldn't say whether he was in Mostar. The CSB covers a large
22 area, so he could have been based in Jablanica, Konjic, or anywhere else,
23 although his -- the institution that he belonged to was certainly based in
25 Q. Yes. Well, my question was imprecise and you have repaired it.
1 Thank you for that answer.
2 Well, now, returning to the issue of the Laste, it's -- in terms
3 of the order, are you now able to say what date it was that the Laste
4 actually set off?
5 A. I can't really state anything about the dates with full certainty.
6 The unit must have left Sarajevo on or about the 4th or the 5th of
7 September, but I couldn't be more specific than that. I couldn't tell you
8 where they were at a particular time because I didn't closely monitor its
9 departure. All I'm saying is that my visit to Mostar coincided in time
10 with the travel of the unit to Mostar. We, in fact, travelled together.
11 Q. Yes. It may be possible to build a chronology by reference to
12 some other events. Did you come out through the tunnel yourself on an
13 occasion when you were passing through the tunnel and you met Sefko
14 Hodzic, a journalist, and Sefer Halilovic going back into Sarajevo for a
15 brief visit on or about the 5th of September?
16 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
17 MR. MORRISSEY:
18 Q. This being a chance meeting, as you passed through the tunnel.
19 A. It's possible, but I can't be certain because we would meet in
20 many places, on many occasions. Our meetings were frequent. We had many
21 activities together, so I couldn't be more specific.
22 Q. Yes. I understand that. We have had such evidence from
23 Mr. Hodzic that this was a -- just a passing meeting, accidental and
24 probably of no consequence, but that it took place on the evening or night
25 of the 5th of September. Do you have any comment to make about that
1 beyond saying that it's possible it happened? Do you have any specific
2 recollection that you can help with or not?
3 A. No, I don't have any.
4 Q. That's okay. Did the Laste leave before you or after you?
5 A. I couldn't say. I don't know when they left because their
6 departure had to be planned in advance because they're quite a large
7 formation, and it's quite a different matter when an individual travels.
8 It's arranged in different way. So I couldn't tell you anything more.
9 Q. Very well. Can you say whether the Laste Unit came to be billeted
10 at Konjic on the way down?
11 A. I wouldn't know where they were billeted. All I know is that
12 their first destination was in Tarcin because some other members of the
13 unit were waiting for them there. This is where the two parts of the unit
14 linked up. They had their own plans detailing their travel, their
15 billeting. This was done in the assistance with lower formation, because
16 after all this involved 50 people and they couldn't just sleep anywhere.
17 Q. Of course. And who had the responsibility -- you don't have to
18 provide a name if you can't remember. But what organisation and what
19 officers had the responsibility to arrange transport and accommodation for
20 the Laste Unit as they made their way down towards Mostar?
21 A. I think that what you're talking about now is specified in the
22 document dispatching the unit. Normally such a document will specify who
23 exactly will provide accommodation for the unit and so on. Therefore, I
24 couldn't tell you whether it was the police station that they reported to
25 or some military command.
1 Q. Very well. Did you meet up -- when you came to travel down to
2 Mostar in the company of the Laste, did you meet up with them in Konjic
3 and commence the journey from there?
4 A. I truly believe, but I can't be absolutely certain, that we met up
5 in Jablanica in the foot of the mountain over which we had to go in order
6 to reach Mostar.
7 Q. Yes. Well, I was going to put some transcripts to you about that.
8 We have some evidence in this case from -- or from a number of witnesses,
9 actually, and I'll put them to you. Just excuse me while I find the right
11 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I'm sorry, I have about 30 pieces of
12 transcript, not that they're all going to be put to this witness, but it
13 will take me a moment to find them.
14 Q. Just excuse me, Mr. Alispahic, while that's done.
15 The first of these pieces of evidence is -- comes from a
16 deposition taken on the 10th of July, 2003, from Vehbija Karic, who was a
17 member of the inspection team under General Halilovic at that time. This
18 was recorded at an earlier time. I'm going to put it to you and I'm going
19 to ask for your comment, same way as I did with Salko Gusic's material
21 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this is at page 118, commencing at
22 line 7, and it's discussing a meeting that takes place on the day when,
23 according to this witness, Caco and Celo arrive in Jablanica.
24 Q. So this is what the witness says:
25 "During the mentioned meeting with the authorities and the
1 commanders of local brigades, the 44th Brigade from Jablanica, Enes
2 Kovacevic, we had a meeting on the premises there, that is at the building
3 of the hydroelectric power plant, Jablanica. Bakir Alispahic appeared
4 during the meeting. We all said hello and he conveyed the
5 following: 'I've come to see you. The supreme commander, President
6 Izetbegovic, sends his regards to you. He's giving you his moral support,
7 wishing you success in the operation, and I've brought you 50 members of
8 the Laste Detachment to help you in the operation.'
9 "We accepted that and the same night he went to Mostar via Mount
10 Prenj taking the Lastes with him. And we found it strange the next day
11 because we had given the assignment to Enes Kovacevic to put them up and
12 deploy them the next day according to the existing plan of the operation.
13 So nothing came out of it in actual fact.
14 "During this meeting I found out that Caco had arrived from
15 Sarajevo as well as Ramiz Delalic with their troops, and I saw, as I was
16 entering the premises where the meeting was held, I saw Adnan Solakovic
17 with a group of his soldiers. We greeted his -- we greeted each other and
18 I let them go and find their accommodation because Zulfikar Alispago had
19 been given the assignment earlier to find proper accommodation for them.
20 That's it."
21 Mr. Alispahic, that's what's recorded from Mr. Karic, and I just
22 ask you for some comments from you arising out of that.
23 The first is: Do you recall arriving in Jablanica and entering a
24 meeting involving Mr. Karic and other members of the inspection team? And
25 this is on your way to Mostar, not on the way back.
1 A. I remember that these people were down there, but I don't remember
2 that I attended that meeting. I especially do not remember these words
3 being uttered, namely that I had come there to convey greetings from
4 President Izetbegovic. I never uttered those words in any place. It was
5 up to Izetbegovic to send his greetings if he wanted to do that.
6 Now, it's true that these people were down there. I saw Vehbija
7 Karic in that area several times; we had contacts, formal ones, proper
8 ones. The Zulfikar unit had already been there for quite a while, which I
9 was aware of. I can't remember the name. Enes Kovacevic might have had
10 to do something to help with the accommodation of the unit. Everything
11 concerning the movement of the unit and its accommodation was something
12 that was discussed and decided upon by the commander of the unit and the
13 organs to which they reported. This was once they left the -- Sarajevo it
14 was out of my hands. And I'm not quite clear about the date that Karic
15 gave as the date of the meeting.
16 Q. No. Well, he didn't give a date in that -- in that passage that
17 I've put to you. And you recall I -- and so that's why I'm asking you --
18 it's one of the reasons I'm asking you questions about it.
19 Do you recall being in Jablanica when the units -- when certain
20 units under the -- or units taken from the 9th and 10th Brigades arrived
21 in that town?
22 A. I do not recall that. I truly can't say that I know that. I
23 really wouldn't know whether any such unit arrived somewhere or where it
24 was supposed to be. I did not have such information. Let me also clarify
25 that it was easier for me to obtain information about a special unit of
1 the MUP because there are all these policemen out there in the field who
2 could provide you that information about the movement of the unit. This
3 was logical. Policemen knew each other, but they did not know the army
4 brigades. They didn't know members of those brigades, the 9th, the 10th,
5 or any other one for that matter.
6 Q. Okay. Well, I just want to take you now to evidence on the same
7 topic from a man named Dzankovic who gave evidence in this court on the
8 21st of March, 2005.
9 MR. MORRISSEY: And this is at page 73 of that day, Your Honours,
10 at line 12.
11 Q. Once again, I'm going to put this transcript to you and ask for
12 your comment:
13 "Q. I want to now turn to the meeting that you did attend. This
14 was a meeting that had as its focus the provision of logistics to the
15 units that were going to arrive in Jablanica on that day. Is that
17 "A. Yes.
18 "Q. And this was a meeting that in fact did take place at the
19 IKM. Is that correct?
20 "A. Yes.
21 "Q. And present at that meeting were Karic, Suljevic, and
22 Bilajac. Is that correct?
23 "A. Yes.
24 "Q. And also the Minister for the Interior, Bakir Alispahic?
25 "A. Yes.
1 "Q. The War Presidency president, does the name Safet Cibo assist
2 your memory?
3 "A. I heard of him, but he wasn't present."
4 Mr. Alispahic, there's then a gap of other irrelevant
5 conversation, and then the next question was:
6 "Q. Now, to your knowledge, Sefer Halilovic was absent up in
7 Konjic area on that date. Is that correct?
8 "A. As far as I know, he wasn't in Jablanica.
9 "Q. Yes, okay. Anyway, during the course of this meeting did
10 Vehbija Karic announce that in fact the units from Sarajevo had arrived in
12 "A. Yes.
13 "Q. And was it in fact in that context that the discussion about
14 supplies took place? In other words, we've got to feed these troops
15 because they've arrived from Sarajevo?
16 "A. Yes. Because the units that were there in that area had
17 their own logistics and had the accommodation and food problems resolved."
18 Now -- then there's another gap, and the relevant part I want to
19 put to you is --
20 And this is on -- on line -- on page 75, line 10, Your Honours:
21 "In the meantime there was also talk that the Lastes had come.
22 All these troops needed to have food and accommodation provided for.
23 "Q. And to your knowledge, were the Lastes a civilian -- a
24 military unit directly under the control of the Minister for the Interior,
25 Bakir Alispahic, and administratively speaking under the Ministry of the
1 Interior rather than the army?
2 "A. Yes. It was not around of the army; it was a unit comprising
3 police officers and it was directly under the command of Mr. Alispahic."
4 Mr. Alispahic, can I interrupt there, I'm going to put something
5 more. But that's something you can respond to as well specifically. If I
6 forget to ask you the question you should have the chance to answer that
8 But to go on, the last thing this. This is at line 20, Your
10 "It was discussed where this group should be accommodated,
11 however, later it left for Mostar."
12 And then he's asked: "When you say later, do you mean later on
13 that day?"
14 And he said: "Whether it was on the same day or the next morning,
15 I don't know. But they left without telling anyone, without telling
16 anything about it in advance because we from the inspection team actually
17 found out about it once they had already left the area."
18 Now, Mr. Alispahic, there was a lot of information I understand
19 there and a lot of things to respond to. The first one I want to -- the
20 first thing I want to do is a timing question and then I want to put to
21 you whether you agree with what's been put in there.
22 First of all, do you agree that it's possible that your units and
23 you were in Jablanica on the 8th of September in the morning?
24 A. I can't be firm about the date, but I think that at around that
25 time we were in Jablanica, the 7th, the 8th. So it could be that we were
1 in Jablanica at around that time, especially since I believe that on
2 the 4th, 5th, and 6th the unit left Sarajevo. So it could be at around
3 that time.
4 Q. Thank you. Next of all I turn to the substance of the meeting
5 that's just been described in the evidence of Namik Dzankovic. Do you
6 recall, and I ask you to search your memory as best you can, do you recall
7 going to a meeting in Jablanica just before you left for Mostar where
8 Sefer Halilovic was not present, but Karic, Suljevic, and Bilajac and
9 Namik Dzankovic all were present and discussing logistics matters. Can
10 you recall attending such a meeting.
11 A. I really couldn't because I don't know who Namik Dzankovic is;
12 that's first. The second is that that certainly wasn't a meeting that I
13 was invited to attend. Third, it's possible that these persons mentioned
14 here, Karic, Suljevic, Bilajac, and so on are persons I met, not had a
15 meeting with. I probably exchanged some information with them concerning
16 the areas of our interest, such as logistics, accommodation, and so on.
17 So we might have exchanged that type of information, and that was the
18 substance of our communication.
19 When I went to Mostar, I did not see General Halilovic on my way
20 there. The first time I saw him was at the IKM, as we call it, upon my
21 return. That's what I remember.
22 Q. Very well. What do you say as to the comments by both Dzankovic
23 and Karic that the Laste Unit effectively left Jablanica without them
24 knowing anything about it and went down to Mostar?
25 A. I can't really give any comments. Perhaps they didn't have to
1 know. Perhaps the unit wasn't supposed to return to them. What we should
2 do is check as to who was informed about the travel of the unit and with
3 whom it had been agreed.
4 Q. The key issue really in determining the units of the Laste Unit is
5 to find this document that you've referred to that must have been prepared
6 by Munir Alibabic. Is that correct?
7 A. I think that this document would be of great assistance in
8 determining exactly what were the movements of the Laste Unit. It is
9 possible that the document specified everything, which is how it should
10 have been. On the other hand, it is possible that it only specified
11 certain issues, whereas other issues were specified en route, as the
12 situation developed. It is impossible to specify in a dispatch where the
13 unit would be billeted that night if that was not physically possible. It
14 is impossible to foresee all complications that might arise in the field.
15 So while the unit is there in the area of responsibility of another unit
16 where it needs to be resubordinated to somebody else, it is impossible
17 sometimes to foresee everything in advance.
18 Q. Yes, I understand what you say about that.
19 A. I apologise. Once the unit leaves, then the fate of the unit and
20 the responsibility for the unit is something that's in the hands of the
21 commanders of the unit and commanders of the unit to which the unit is
22 resubordinated during the operation.
23 Q. Very well. Now -- and another question for you. You were present
24 when the Laste Unit arrived in Mostar. And I want to ask you to which --
25 under which military commander was the Laste Unit directly resubordinated
1 or directly controlled at all events when it took up its positions on
2 Santiceva Street?
3 A. I am unable to answer that question, simply because I don't know.
4 This is something that you can check with the 4th Corps in Mostar, and
5 perhaps, perhaps, the CSB in Mostar, they might have this information.
6 That's where you need to address your inquiry.
7 Q. Yes. I take it, though -- well, perhaps you can confirm this.
8 From what you observed when you were down there, they were under the
9 control of a local commander, I take it, someone subordinate to Arif
10 Pasalic, the 4th Corps commander. Is that correct?
11 A. I really can't say. That would be a very long shot. I really
12 can't answer this question.
13 Q. Well, I --
14 A. I -- the first time I came to Mostar was during the war. I didn't
15 know too many people. I knew the security services centre chief and
16 commander, Pasalic. I hardly knew anyone from the police. The only
17 person I knew was the chief of the security services centre.
18 Q. Yes. I understand. Very well. Now, we've been going in
19 chronology. We were at Zenica. We've gone through the issues concerning
20 the Laste. We've gone through the departure of you and the Laste
21 separately in the early days of September, and we've gone to your meeting
22 with the Laste in Jablanica and your journey down to Mostar.
23 Could I just indicate, I'm not going to repeat that chronology
24 now, overlapping with what we asked yesterday. It's the fact that you
25 spent some time in Mostar and it's the fact that you came back to
1 Jablanica on the -- arrived back in Jablanica on the morning of the
2 10th of September. And my questions now concern what happened there.
3 You've indicated that you went to the police station and made
4 contact with Emin Zebic. Is that correct?
5 A. I think so. I think that's what I said, and I think your
6 understanding is correct.
7 Q. Yes. Very well. What I want to do now is show you a document
8 that arose from a local policemen there named Ahmed Salihamidzic. That
9 will come on the screen now as soon as we have the exhibit number to tell
10 you, which we're just finding now.
11 Could I just ask you: Do you recall a man called Ahmed
12 Salihamidzic with a nickname Cicko?
13 MR. MORRISSEY: And, Your Honours, it's 222, Exhibit 222.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first time I heard this name was
15 when a Sarajevo weekly called Slobodan Bosna indicated that he worked at
16 the public security station in Jablanica. This newspaper published what
17 they alleged was the testimony of this person before the Tribunal in
18 relation to General Halilovic, but that was the first time I heard the
19 name. So I think that must be the person you're speaking about.
20 MR. MORRISSEY:
21 Q. Well, yes, it is. It is the person I'm speaking about. I can
22 promise you this: I am not going to be putting Slobodna Bosna to you.
23 I'll just put this report to you which has been tendered in evidence and
24 you can make the comment.
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Very well. Can the witness please be shown this
1 document, D -- excuse me, Exhibit 222.
2 Q. This is an official note. I'll ask you to comment on the form of
3 the document and then I'll ask you to comment on whether the information
4 in it matches, in effect, the information which you were provided when you
5 got to the police station. I understand you were provided that
6 information orally, but we have this document and I just want to ask you
7 about the document.
8 A. Can I just ask to see the entire document?
9 Q. Of course.
10 A. From the heading to the bottom.
11 Q. Yes. And when you see the heading, I just -- I'll ask you at the
12 end of your reading just to comment about that and what the meaning of the
13 term "official note" is there and so on.
14 Could I indicate to you that the -- probably the key things I'll
15 ask you about are on the first page there but you should, of course, just
16 take the opportunity to look at the rest.
17 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I might -- I'm just noticing the
18 time now and I wonder if it might be appropriate to -- Your Honours
19 sometimes break at a quarter past 12.00. I wonder if it might be
20 appropriate to -- a copy of this could be printed. It occurs to me the
21 witness could have the chance to look at a printed copy of it during the
22 break rather than we all sit -- he should be given the chance to read it;
23 I acknowledge that, and --
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes. So are you suggesting that we take a break right
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, please. And could I ask if the court would
2 assist by printing a copy of this exhibit. We could provide it to the
3 witness right now so that he could look in the break. I know it's not the
4 usual procedure, but it's...
5 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Maybe it's the time for us to take a break, and
6 we'll resume at 20 minutes to 1.00. Yes.
7 --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.
8 [The witness stands down]
9 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey, are you going to address the
12 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you very much, Your Honours, for the
14 Your Honours, I'm likely to finish this witness and I intend to.
15 There's been, as you know, ongoing issues of finding material. My learned
16 friend Mr. Mettraux has been mostly concerned in that. There's a matter
17 that he's going to raise with you in just a moment. It's very desirable
18 to finish this witness immediately, as we can, send him home, and not
19 delay things, and for that reason I'm just going to ask Mr. Mettraux to
20 explain what our problem right now is. It may be that it doesn't delay
21 anything, and I think we can handle it by finishing this witness and just
22 putting what we have to put on record now, so that if we have to make an
23 application later, we've put it on record and it's understood, and we
24 won't seek to have things adjourned.
25 Perhaps I could ask Mr. Mettraux to speak now.
1 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Mettraux.
2 MR. METTRAUX: Yes, good afternoon, Your Honour.
3 We have been informed yesterday that two witnesses -- and perhaps
4 we should go into private session before I start.
5 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we'll go to the private session, please.
6 [Private session]
21 [Open session]
22 [The witness entered court]
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey, please continue with your
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honours.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Alispahic. Did you have the opportunity to read
2 that document in the break?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Yes. I'm not going to take you to every part of it but I would
5 just ask you in relation to some of the -- question one: Have you ever
6 seen it before?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Very well. Well, then I'll just ask you about your actual memory
9 of your meeting with Zebic and what you were told there. Were you given
10 the information that the deputy chief of the CSB and also Mr. Kurt, a
11 military policeman, went to Grabovica and spoke to Adnan Solakovic there?
12 Were you given that information?
13 A. I remember the public security station and Emin Zebic. His
14 commander and some other members of the police station tried to verify
15 information. They tried to find out what had happened. They tried to do
16 something to help the population in the area, but they also pointed out
17 the existence of checkpoints that the police were not allowed through.
18 They said they believed that if they pushed it it could only lead to a
19 clash between the military and the police in the area.
20 Q. Yes. And what I'm really asking, I think, is whether that
21 information given to you by Emin Zebic on the morning of the 10th appears
22 consistent with the information within this document where it says that -
23 and I'm looking at the first paragraph here on the first page - where it
24 says that there was an improvised checkpoint -- I'm sorry. I'm looking at
25 the wrong improvised checkpoint now.
1 Would you go down about 20 lines down the page, I think. There's
2 a sentence where it says: "We were advised by the commander that it was
3 not possible to protect the lives of Ivan Pranjic and his wife Stoja
4 without use of weapons, and it was recommended that we should try to
5 organise an evacuation of Croatian inhabitants from this part of
6 Grabovica. Because of this and for personal security reasons, we did not
7 go to the suburb where Celo's unit was billeted which was about 100 metres
8 downstream. An improvised checkpoint that had been set up could also be
9 seen close to Ante Maric's house."
10 Now, it's that checkpoint that I want to ask you about. Do you
11 remember whether or not Mr. Zebic got as specific as this report here in
12 that section, or indeed whether he told you anything about that particular
14 A. I really can't talk about all these details from this note. But a
15 good deal of this same information was conveyed to me by Emin Zebic at the
16 time. Whether he used the word "checkpoint" or the word "swing-gate," I
17 really can't say which specific word he used. But there was obviously a
18 checkpoint; whether it had a swing-gate or not makes little difference.
19 Certainly Emin talked about this difficult situation. He said people had
20 been killed over there. He said there was no way to approach the area.
21 And he said that if they pushed the situation there could be a clash with
22 the soldiers who were there.
23 That was what he told me and that's what led me to believe that
24 the situation was complex and that the problem was huge and needed
25 tackling. I think even then they had a lot of information on this
1 problem, but they, in their capacity as a police body, a police station,
2 having a limited number of men to work with, were in no position to deal
3 with this, and they couldn't have done anything at all without
4 coordination, without explicit approval, and without authorisation by the
6 Q. Very well. Thank you. Those are my questions on that topic.
7 Now, the next topic concerns the discussions that you had with
8 Sefer Halilovic on the 10th of September. This cross-examination does not
9 concern the content of those discussions. In other words I'm not asking
10 you questions about what you said to him and what he said to you; you've
11 already given that evidence. But what I am asking you questions about is:
12 Where those conversations took place.
13 Now, you've indicated that you went to the IKM and spoke to Sefer
14 Halilovic there on that morning. I just want to ask you to look at a
15 statement that the Prosecutors have provided to us. I'm just going to
16 show this to you.
17 MR. MORRISSEY: Very well. Could this please be circulated. This
18 is just a copy to assist the Court and to assist Mr. Alispahic of an OTP
19 statement given to us.
20 Q. Mr. Alispahic, what's going to be shown to you is a document
21 provided to us by the Prosecutors which is dated the 1st - sorry, that's
22 your birthday - the 24th of May, 2001, conducted with an interview Nikolai
23 Mikhailov and apparently signed by you. In this document --
24 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, on the fourth page of the English
25 document, it's the third paragraph.
1 Q. I'm not sure what page it is on yours, Mr. Alispahic, but it's a
2 paragraph beginning with the words: "One day, it was in the morning."
3 Do you have that paragraph? It says: "One day, it was in the
4 morning, I was in the Konjic police station." It's on the fourth page --
5 fourth page of the Bosnian. It's the third paragraph on that page
6 beginning with "jedno gdana."
7 A. What's the problem?
8 Q. Do you see that -- I hope there's no problem. Do you see the
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Very well. Very well. The Prosecution have given us this
12 document and I just want to -- I'll have to clarify with you its
13 implications. So if you just read through it, then you will be in a
14 position to comment.
15 It says: "One day, it was in the morning, I was in the
16 Konjic police station together with Jasmin Gusa, chief of the Konjic
17 police station. Emin Zebic arrived from Jablanica and informed me
18 verbally that Bosnian army soldiers had killed Croatian civilians in the
19 village of Grabovica. I ordered Emin Zebic to prepare a report on the
20 event in Grabovica and to send it to the Ministry of the Interior on
21 Sarajevo. I also ordered him to gather more information without
22 interfering with the military because before the operation the military
23 command staff requested in writing not to conduct any police activities in
24 the zones of operational activity, that is, the zone of the preparation
25 for combat activities and the zone of combat activities itself. Thus, the
1 Ministry of the Interior was not allowed to conduct any criminal
2 investigation in this zone. I do not remember whether I informed Sefer
3 Halilovic immediately after I'd been informed by Emin Zebic.
4 "From Konjic I went to Jablanica in my car. There was the IKM
5 forward command post of the supreme command staff in the Jablanica
6 hydroelectric in the town of Jablanica. I do not remember when I arrived
7 at the IKM. There was a hall in the Jablanica HE where Bilajac, Suljevic,
8 Karic, Halilovic and others were."
9 Then you go on to say what the substance of the discussion was.
10 Very well. Now, Mr. Alispahic, that appears to be different from
11 what you've said in this court. Can you indicate how it came about that
12 this was said to Nikolai Mikhailov, the OTP investigator?
13 A. If I may comment, the Defence is right. These are two different
14 things, in a way, but essentially they both come down to the same thing.
15 There is a possibility, it's one which I can't remember right now.
16 Following my return from Mostar, I spent the rest of the night resting,
17 whether in Jablanica or in Konjic. These two towns are not far apart.
18 It's a 20- or 30-minute drive, perhaps a half-hour drive, depending on
19 who's driving. I was with both station chiefs at that time in Konjic and
20 in Jablanica. Back when I gave this statement, I think it's -- it was in
21 2001, I really believed it was Mr. Zebic who had come and we had the first
22 briefing in Jablanica. Only then did we go to Konjic.
23 Between 2001 and the present time, I think I read this somewhere
24 or someone provided me with information in relation to this situation, and
25 that is the only document. I'm not sure if anything else could be found,
1 a document that talks about this meeting or a public security station
2 report from Jablanica, that was sent to the ministry, but the essence
3 remains the same. It is still my submission that I was in touch with the
4 general, that following that I met the general in person, that I met both
5 police chiefs, the Jablanica police chief and the Konjic police chief. So
6 that's how I can explain this slip in my two statements dated 2001 -- in
7 my statement dated 2001 and my testimony now, in 2005.
8 Q. Yes. Well, now, Mr. Alispahic, as I said earlier on I'm not
9 asking you questions or criticising you in any way concerning the content
10 of the discussion between you and Mr. Halilovic. We're not pressing you
11 about that. So it's really about where and when it all took place that
12 I'm pressing you. I need to ask you -- I need to put something to you
13 from the evidence of Mr. Zebic here, and if you just excuse me I'll find
14 that passage for you.
15 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this is at page 80 of the transcript
16 of Emin Zebic on the 16th of March.
17 Q. And this was Mr. Zebic's evidence in this court, Mr. Alispahic --
18 MR. MORRISSEY: Line 23, Your Honours.
19 Q. "Q. Did anybody else visit the police station?
20 "A. At around 2000 hours, my minister, Bakir Alispahic, arrived.
21 "Q. Why did he come to your place?
22 "A. A few days previously he'd taken a unit of the Ministry of
23 the Interior to Mostar to assist the public security services centre
24 there. In view of the fact that to reach Mostar from Jablanica you had to
25 go on foot over the mountain crags, he stayed there for a few days. And
1 on that day, the 9th of September, he came back across mountain Prenj to
2 Jablanica, and then he dropped into the public security station. He was
3 on his way to Sarajevo. He was passing through in other words."
4 So Mr. Zebic has given an account that you came along on the night
5 of the 9th, that's at about 8.00 in the evening or 2000 hours in the
6 evening on the 9th. Do you have any comment to offer on that evidence?
7 A. No comment. I think my recollection is much clearer than that of
8 Emin Zebic, that at least is my position. I simply don't believe it would
9 have been possible for me to be in two different places at the same time,
10 in Jablanica and Konjic, with Mahmutcehajic or perhaps there is a
11 phenomenon involved that I failed to understand.
12 Q. Well, the one I have to ask you about is: Do you say at that time
13 it took 30 minutes to get to Jablanica from Konjic?
14 A. Yes. Those two places were not far apart. There were no
15 checkpoints or barriers along the road.
16 Q. We've heard some evidence in this court that there was an HVO
17 checkpoint along that road and that it actually took six hours or so,
18 between four to six hours, to get between those towns on a mountain track.
19 In fact, we had some evidence to that effect from Ramiz Delalic -- I
20 should be clear to you that he gave that evidence. Is that your
21 recollection, that it took four to six hours on a mountain track?
22 A. He's right, and this in fact was the case at certain points in
23 time. But the checkpoint was not there all the time. It was there for a
24 period of time in which the relations with the HVO were strained. There
25 was the checkpoint that was set up and throughout this period you did need
1 to take a roundabout route.
2 Q. Yes. So in light of that, what was the time that you would have
3 to take in early September 1993 to get from Konjic to Jablanica?
4 A. If this happened at a point in time when there was no checkpoint
5 and you could just drive straight through, it would have been a short
6 journey. If this was in one of those periods when you had to take one of
7 the mountain routes, it would have been like he said. But I can't be
8 specific right now as to these respective periods of time. When you could
9 go from Jablanica to Konjic unhindered, after all you can go back to
10 operative documents and check.
11 Another thing you can go back to operative documents for is to see
12 when exactly I was at each of these police stations. I think this is
13 recorded. I mean every visit by the Minister of the Interior must be
14 recorded, I should assume. One thing is certain: It would have been
15 quite irrational for me to go to Konjic, spend four or five hours doing
16 that, and then drive back to Jablanica. I don't think any of these
17 propositions are true, frankly, but we're each entitled to have our own
18 memory and we each have our own conclusions. I remember what I remember,
19 which is different from what you're putting to me.
20 Q. Well, I'm putting evidence of other witnesses to you. I'm not
21 putting anything from my own head, and I certainly wasn't there,
22 Mr. Alispahic.
23 But I have to ask you this question, too. You heard me reading
24 out Mr. Zebic's account and he said that you had taken a unit -- that you
25 had taken a unit of the Ministry of the Interior to Mostar to assist the
1 public security services centre there.
2 Now, once again, you've indicated your belief that the -- I
3 understand you didn't see the order but you've indicated your belief that
4 this unit was to be resubordinated to the military there. Now, what do
5 you say to this comment here of Emin Zebic that a few days previously you
6 had taken a unit of the Ministry of the Interior to Mostar to assist the
7 public security services centre there?
8 A. That's Zebic's opinion; that's all it is. That's what Zebic
9 believes and that's what he has stated. He was a police station chief. I
10 don't think he was in a position to define who did what within the
11 ministry, who did what in relation to that unit, least of all what I did.
12 Q. Very well. Well, in light of what's contained in your statement
13 that you've looked at and in light of what Mr. Zebic says, do you concede
14 this possibility: That it's possible that you had the discussion that you
15 had with Sefer Halilovic in Konjic but not at the IKM, or the so-called
16 IKM, in Jablanica on the 10th of September? And again, it's the location
17 I'm asking you about, not the substance of the discussion.
18 A. I'm really doing my best to be as objective as possible. The
19 substance doesn't matter. The substance and all the communication that
20 went on was more than proper. What I'm trying to do is get the chronology
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. And get the places right. But I'm stating this with certainty: I
24 was with the general both in Konjic and in Jablanica. Our meetings were
25 brief and entirely proper. In the context of this situation, I know that
1 he was greatly concerned. Now, this is something I remember with great
3 But if you're asking me about the specific chronology of my
4 movements at the time, if I had known at the time that this would have
5 been one day required, I would have noted everything. And when I was in
6 Sarajevo, I would have consulted with the security services centre, I
7 would have consulted with both police stations, and then you could have
8 the exact chronology and all the concomitant facts.
9 So I can't be specific about how long these meetings were. We
10 were both in leading positions at the time and we were both at the same
11 time in Jablanica and in Konjic. If memory serves, most of these people
12 were billeted in Jablanica after all, Karic, Bjelovac, Zijic, Suljevic.
13 It must have been easier for them to work from them. As far as I
14 remember, General Halilovic was billeted at Konjic at the military
15 installation there, and sometimes we went there to meet Mahmutcehajic or
16 for another reason. So please understand me and take my words exactly for
17 what they are.
18 Q. I just have two more areas of questioning and then I'm finished
19 all together, Mr. Alispahic. The first one concerns some comments about
20 Trebevic. It is the fact that on the 26th of October, numerous people
21 were arrested, including numerous people from the 9th Motorised Brigade.
22 Is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Responsibility for investigating the crime at Grabovica you
25 understood to be a matter to be for the SVB, the military security
1 service, albeit assisted by your service, rather than being an
2 investigation by the MUP, is that correct, or by the civilian police. Is
3 that correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Nevertheless, I should ask you this question. Out of all those
6 who were arrested during the course of Trebevic after the 26th of
7 the 10th -- sorry, the 26th of October, 1993, is it the fact that until
8 1998 no indictment was raised against any of those men. Is that correct?
9 A. I don't understand which case you're talking about, which
11 Q. You're correct and -- you and my co-counsel at the same time.
12 What I'm referring to is the crimes at Grabovica. To your
13 understanding, no indictment was raised against any of those 9th Brigade
14 individuals concerning the crimes at Grabovica until 1998. Is that
16 A. I can't be positive, but I think you're right.
17 Q. And certainly whatever may have been the situation for Sefer
18 Halilovic at other times, he was removed from the position of Chief of
19 Staff on the 1st of November, 1993. Is that correct?
20 A. I'm not familiar with the exact date that the general left this
21 position, but apparently there's been testimony about that.
22 Q. Yes. Yes. Well, we have --
23 A. I think we read a note from one of the Presidency meetings. I
24 think that was about that.
25 Q. It was. It didn't specify the date, but in any event we know the
1 date from another documents, so I won't trouble you further about that.
2 But were you aware that numerous of the -- you may be aware you
3 may not be aware, numerous of the 9th Brigade people who were arrested on
4 the 26th or in the following days in Trebevic were granted an amnesty.
5 Did you know that that was the case?
6 A. I'm not sure I understand the question, first of all. Let's
7 review the problem as a matter of principle. When you say "amnesty," I'm
8 not sure in relation to what offence. I do agree that on that day quite a
9 number of members of both the 9th and the 10th Brigades were arrested the
10 same day. Many of them were released immediately because they had been
11 brought in for different reasons, those who had put up armed resistance,
12 well, of course they had to be arrested in order to make them stop. There
13 was a brief procedure, and those people were released. Some people were
14 kept in detention because information had been obtained, intelligence had
15 been obtained that those people had committed criminal offences. And this
16 needed to be investigated and established, and that's as much as I know.
17 Q. Yes. All right. Thank you. And the final questions relate to
18 one aspect of the lead-up to Operation Trebevic. Now, at the -- during
19 the -- sorry, after the crimes at Grabovica and indeed the incident that
20 took place at Uzdol, it's the fact that Sefer Halilovic continued to be
21 under the operative measures that we've discussed earlier, in particular
22 the zolja measure, that is the wire-tapping. Is that correct?
23 A. I don't think I can answer the question as to the exact time when
24 the measure was applied. What I testified about here was that the measure
25 was applied. I think that if you found the document, you would find the
1 exact time when it was applied.
2 Q. Well, the document itself I think reveals the timing of it, which
3 is a year. I can bring it up on to the screen if you want. But when you
4 sign a proposal -- sorry, when you authorise a proposal to institute
5 wire-tapping, that authorisation has to specify a time period, doesn't it?
6 A. That's not right. The measure is applied based on the assessment
7 and if it is established that it is needed. The time period can be
8 extended; however, the need must be justified. And within the service, we
9 have a rule to the effect that every so often, every six months or every
10 year or so, the measure needs to be re-evaluated in order to see whether
11 it needs to be continued with the measure or not. And that is what you
12 need to understand.
13 Q. Yes. And we do. And thank you for that explanation. But
14 however, in that time between the crimes at Grabovica and Trebevic, let me
15 ask you the question: Wasn't the telephone-intercept material concerning
16 Sefer Halilovic circulated and analysed at a very high political level?
17 In other words, wasn't that material made available to yourself, to the
18 President, and members of the Presidency, to General Delic, and General
19 Jasarevic, and others at that very high level?
20 A. I would like to kindly ask you to split this into subquestions,
21 otherwise you're covering a very broad topic and I'm not sure I can
23 Q. I'll split it this way. Wasn't that level in that period leading
24 up to Trebevic -- wasn't that material leading up to the Trebevic made
25 available to you personally?
1 A. The material from the Trebevic operation, the one that was needed
2 at certain levels in order to issue approvals and to -- and for other
3 action reached me, the general, and the Presidency in the context for the
4 preparations for the operation.
5 Q. Yes. Now, in relation to -- these are just final questions now,
6 cleaning-up ones.
7 Were you aware that on the 15th of June, 1993, the President,
8 Alija Izetbegovic, met with the then-president of Croatia, Mr. Tudjman,
9 and indicated to Mr. Tudjman on tape that Halilovic had been removed from
10 the army and that he now had no power to command anyone, although he'd
11 been made Chief of Staff? Were you aware of that conversation and
12 particularly of that -- those words of Mr. Izetbegovic on that occasion?
13 A. At that time, I really knew nothing about that.
14 Q. Have you found out something about it since that time or not?
15 A. No, I haven't heard anything.
16 Q. Were you ever shown an order of Commander Delic dated the 5th of
17 October, 1993, which -- sorry, it's just what I want to show him now and
18 this will be the last -- very well. This is Defence number D65.
19 It's DD00.0253.
20 This is a military order. You may have been shown it, you may
21 not, and I'll ask you to comment on it.
22 THE REGISTRAR: This will be MFI 443.
23 MR. MORRISSEY:
24 Q. Do you have that in front of you?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Very well. First of all, did you ever see that order before?
2 A. I don't think so. No.
3 Q. Very well. In your discussions, though, with General Delic, did
4 you ever have it brought to your attention that these particular units
5 that are mentioned there, Zulfikar, Muderis, Akrepi and Silver Fox,
6 although they were supposed to join the 4th Corps, they had - in practice
7 that order had never been implemented. Were you aware of that problem
8 within the army from your conversation with General Delic?
9 A. I was never informed about that particular problem. I knew that
10 the army was dealing with that internal structure, as we discussed just a
11 while ago. And in Zenica itself, there was some announcements that the
12 army would be reorganised, that various formations would be defined and
13 their areas of responsibility and so on.
14 Now, as to these particular units, whether they were supposed to
15 become a part of a certain corps, I really know nothing about that. Out
16 of all these units, as I've told you, I only knew about the Muderis unit.
17 I only knew about that one. As for the others, I didn't even know that
18 they existed.
19 Q. Very well.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness just be shown, please, D -- a
21 document that's MNA, marked not admitted, 244. And page 3 of the B/C/S in
22 particular. It's page 3 of the English version, too, Your Honours.
23 Page 2 of the English, Your Honours, is where the passage starts.
24 This is a document dated the 11th of June. It's a transcript gained from
25 Croatian archives following the release of those, the opening of the
1 presidential archives there.
2 Alija Izetbegovic says this: "So you had -- this has to remain,
3 too, between us. It needn't be like this now. We removed Halilovic, you
4 know. There were complaints that he might not want peace with the Croats,
5 that he was not implementing the agreements, that he was maybe even
6 obstructing them.
7 The president says: "Where? Moved where?"
8 And Alija Izetbegovic goes on to say: "Moved -- he is not a
9 commander anymore."
10 The president, who is Tudjman, says: "So what is he?
11 Alija Izetbegovic says: "Formally he's the Chief of Staff. I
12 think it seems to me, you know, he isn't. He can retain some professional
13 duties but he will not conduct tasks, he will not command units, he will
14 not issue orders, he cannot issue an order to go into action anywhere. He
15 cannot do anything. Perhaps we could not remove a man who did fight after
16 all. We do not have reliable facts."
17 Now, having seen that transcript, does that refresh your memory on
18 the topic?
19 A. This is the first time I see this document. That was on the
20 11th of June, as you've stated. This document never reached me.
21 Q. Since you didn't see the document, I'll ask you one final
22 question. Does that information accord with what you knew to be the
23 position of Alija Izetbegovic at that time, approximately the 11th of
24 June, 1993?
25 A. At that time General Halilovic was removed from the post of the
1 commander and was appointed Chief of Staff. I'm not sure that I described
2 the positions properly.
3 Now, what was the explanation given to -- given by Izetbegovic to
4 President Tudjman or to the Presidency or anybody else is something that
5 was purely his explanation, his decision, and did not concern either
6 myself or the government or anybody else. At the time, President
7 Izetbegovic was the supreme commander, in he had full authority to make
8 such decisions, and he did.
9 Q. And to your knowledge, he did so on that basis. Is that correct?
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. Yes. Well, thank you.
12 MR. MORRISSEY: On that basis, I offer this document for tender.
13 Your Honours, that can be debated later. I understand the position. And
14 those are also my questions.
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Thank you very much.
16 Any re-direct examination, Mr. Re?
17 MR. RE: Yeah, there is. Thank you.
18 Re-examined by Mr. Re:
19 MR. RE: Just so we're organised here, I wish to show the
20 following documents, Exhibit 429, 415, and 390.
21 Q. Firstly, if you could -- the first one I'll show you is 429.
22 While that's coming I'll ask you something else.
23 Today my learned Defence colleague, Mr. Morrissey, asked you about
24 the forward command post and you said that it was no weekend cottage. It
25 was a typical forward command post. That's the one we visited -- at which
1 you visited Mr. Halilovic. What was typical about this particular forward
2 command post that you went to?
3 A. I can tell you that from my perspective, based on what I know and
4 the extent of my knowledge is not tremendous, this was a place where there
5 were only officers present and there were maps hanging and depicting the
6 situation on the ground. I visited the premises. And based on what I saw
7 there, I called them forward command post. Some people refer to it as
8 simply command post. This is something that is within the domain of the
9 military definitions. I called it a forward command post because the top
10 military leadership was present there, the top leadership below General
11 Delic, and they were commanding from that spot.
12 Q. You were also questioned about the number of visits you had. How
13 many visits do you remember to that forward command post at which
14 Mr. Halilovic was present?
15 MR. MORRISSEY: It better be clarified. Is he asking about visits
16 when Mr. Halilovic was present or visits to that IKM generally?
17 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
18 MR. RE: Well, at which -- when he was present.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. Perhaps I can give an
20 answer to both questions. I was obviously there in passing. I was not in
21 the conference room where I later saw the general. So while passing
22 through, I saw Karic and Bilajac in that general area, and that was the
23 only time I went there. I stayed very briefly, exchanged maybe just a few
24 sentences about what we were discussing and which was related to the
25 incident, and that was it. I think that the premises were not used as
1 forward command post for a long time. Before the war --
2 Q. Mr. --
3 A. -- those premises were owned by a company producing electrical
5 Q. Please concentrate on this: I'm just asking you how many times
6 you went there when it was a forward command post, that's all.
7 A. I think just once.
8 MR. RE: Is document 429 on the screen?
9 Q. Just please look at document 429. Mr. Morrissey asked you about
10 that and in particular about the fact that it says the "9th Mountain
11 Brigade." And your evidence was that you were thinking that it was Ramiz
12 Delalic's Brigade that it was referring to. Why do you think it was
13 Mr. Delalic's brigade?
14 A. First of all, it does say there that this was the 9th Brigade --
15 excuse me. There are facts here in this document about members of the
16 army causing a certain incident registered by the police station. It was
17 them who established that these were members of the 9th Brigade. At the
18 time, the incidents were almost exclusively caused by this unit, incidents
19 with policemen.
20 Q. When you say "9th Brigade," are you referring to the 9th Motorised
21 Brigade or the 9th Mountain Brigade?
22 A. I'm not familiar with the military terminology, therefore I
23 couldn't tell you. It was the 9th Brigade. I don't know whether it was
24 motorised or not, but it was led by Delalic. The incident itself was
25 caused when somebody spat at Celo's badge, and this was what provoked the
1 incident. I don't know how the corps defined it, but when I
2 say "the 9th," that's what I'm referring to.
3 MR. RE: Can the witness please be shown P415.
4 Q. Now, this was the document of the 16th of October -- sorry, it was
5 the official secret highly classified document dated the 16th of October,
6 1993. Mr. Morrissey asked you some questions about this, and throughout
7 the document it refers to the 9th Motorised Brigade. What I want you to
8 do is look at the last page, and there's a handwritten comment at the
9 bottom referring to -- it says: "In June 1993, Delalic organised armed
10 rebellion in the 9th Mountain Brigade attacking the brigade headquarters
11 and holding the brigade commander Suljo -- Suljevic and his closest
12 associates as hostage under the threat of weapons."
13 I just want you to comment on were it says "the 9th Mountain
14 Brigade" in handwritten -- in handwriting at the bottom, but throughout
15 the text, the remainder it said "9th Motorised Brigade." In your view, is
16 it referring to the same particular brigade, that is, Delalic's brigade?
17 A. I'm referring to the same brigade.
18 Q. My learned friend, Mr. Morrissey, also put to you an extract from
19 Mr. Dzankovic's evidence to this Tribunal in which he said that the Laste
20 police units were "directly under the command of Mr. Alispahic."
21 My question is simply this: Were those units -- or was that unit
22 directly under your command when you were in Jablanica on the way to
24 MR. RE: Can you please have 390 ready.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That unit, from the time when I was
1 appointed the minister of the interior, was never under my direct command.
2 When the unit was deployed to Mostar, it was allocated or resubordinated
3 to the BH army. So it was a police unit within the Ministry of the
4 Interior and, as such, it was subordinated to the minister because the
5 minister is in charge of all police formations.
6 However, the unit also has its own autonomy, which means that that
7 unit falls under the responsibility of the Sarajevo CSB. And for those
8 reasons, the chief of the Sarajevo CSB, due to procedural reasons and
9 substantial reasons, had to write up an order deploying the unit and
10 specifying to whom it would be resubordinated. The logic they used was
11 that I as minister was out in the field at the time and that because of
12 that everything was resubordinated to me. But that logic is flawed.
13 Q. Look at the document on your screen, which is MFI 390. It's in
14 the -- I just want you to comment on this. You were shown a number of
15 documents by Mr. Morrissey purporting to be transcripts of telephone
16 intercepts between Mr. Halilovic and people he was speaking to on the
17 phone. I just want you to comment very briefly on this. Does that
18 document there, purporting to be a conversation between Mr. Karavelic --
19 or a transcript of a conversation between Mr. Karavelic and Mr. Halilovic
20 on the 22nd of September, 1993, does that appear to be in the same form as
21 all the other ones you were shown?
22 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, could I just indicate that this
23 particular document does not arise out of cross-examining, but however, in
24 light of what I have sought to do with these documents, I must say I
25 reluctantly concede that -- it would just save everyone time and trouble
1 so we can deal with it with this witness while he is here.
2 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much for your cooperation.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my view, this is flawed, as I've
4 explained earlier. But I believe that this could be the document of the
5 same type and that ...
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness finish the sentence or repeat
7 it, please.
8 MR. RE:
9 Q. The interpreters missed the part of your sentence you said: "But
10 I believe that this could be the end of the document -- sorry, "could be
11 the document of the same type and that" -- at that point you trailed off.
12 Could you just repeat that part, please.
13 A. As in the previous documents. I think that in this case as well,
14 this has to do with a contact between Halilovic and Vahid Karavelic as
15 commander of the 1st Corps.
16 MR. RE: Thank you.
17 JUDGE LIU: Well, thank you very much.
18 Well, I think we have passed the time that is allocated to this
19 trial, and it seems to me that we have no time to deal with the document
20 issues. At this stage I just simply lost track of which documents have
21 been admitted and which are not. So I hope the parties will file to this
22 informally or formally, whatever you like, a list of the documents you
23 would like to submit into the evidence, and we'll consider it later on.
24 Witness, thank you very much indeed for your coming to The Hague
25 to give your evidence. I think I've fulfilled my promise to you that
1 we'll let you spend the weekend, and we wish you a very pleasant journey
2 back home. When we adjourn, Madam Usher will show you out of this
4 I hope to meet the lead counsel as well as their assistants
5 at 4.00 in the lobby. We'll try to find some meeting room this afternoon.
6 Yes, the hearing for today is adjourned.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,
8 to be reconvened on Monday, the 30th day of
9 May, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.