1 Tuesday, 23 October 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
9 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-84-T, the Prosecutor
10 versus Ramush Haradinaj et al.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
12 Mr. Emmerson, are you ready to continue your cross-examination?
13 MR. EMMERSON: Your Honour, I am.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Then I'll allow you to do so, but not until after
15 I've reminded you, Mr. Gajic, that you're still bound by the solemn
16 declaration you gave at the beginning of your testimony yesterday. Yes?
17 THE WITNESS: [No verbal response]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Emmerson.
19 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you.
20 WITNESS: BRANKO GAJIC [Resumed]
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 Cross-examination by Mr. Emmerson: [Continued]
23 Q. Mr. Gajic, I began to ask you some questions yesterday evening
24 about the deployment of the 52nd Military Police Battalion in the
25 locations that you have described in paragraph 22 of your witness
1 statement. One further matter in that regard at this stage, if I may.
2 Can you confirm, please, that those deployments remained from March
3 through to September of 1998? That they continued during that period.
4 A. As far as I'm aware, the answer is "yes."
5 Q. Thank you. Now could you please look in the white bundle behind
6 tab 1, which is provisionally marked for identification as P1152.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, do we have to replace the old index by
8 the new one?
9 MR. EMMERSON: Well, it has the MFI numbers inserted.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 MR. EMMERSON:
12 Q. You said yesterday that although there was no mini joint command
13 between the MUP and the 52nd Military Police Battalion in those deployment
14 areas, there were MUP patrols in those areas. And I just wanted to look,
15 if I could, with you, please, behind tab 1 at this document dated the 23rd
16 of March, 1998, and signed by Colonel Delic; and in particular, at the
17 second sentence of paragraph 1 and the first bullet point. So in the
18 B/C/S, obviously it is on page 1, as it is in the English.
19 The second sentence of paragraph 1 reads: "It is characteristic
20 that the area of the village of Jablanica, the village of Kravljane, the
21 village of Radonjic, the village of Bordanic is still under the control of
22 the Republic of Serbia MUP. We confirm this with the following facts."
23 And then the first one is on the 22nd of March, 1998 around 1500
24 hours. "Belts of 7.62 calibre bullets, several bullets that fell out of
25 the belt and food were found in several places in the area of the village
1 of Donji Biges in the forest towards the Radonjic Lake."
2 Pausing there for a moment. I don't know how it appears in the
3 B/C/S version, but "Donji Biges in the forest towards Radonjic Lake" is
4 presumably a reference to the village of Donji Bites. Is that your
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, if you read the original, then you'll
7 see that -- of course, a "G" and a "T" are very close to each other. And
8 upon looking at it, it sounds more -- it looks more like a "T" than --
9 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
11 MR. EMMERSON:
12 Q. And then there is a reference to the fact that the Djakovica MUP
13 has organised an ambush in that area on the 22nd and 23rd of March but no
14 one showed up by the morning.
15 Now, is that an example of the sort of MUP deployment in the area
16 around that Lake Radoniq that you were describing to us yesterday?
17 A. The first sentence of yours and your reference to me mentioning a
18 mini joint command indicates that we are at cross-purposes here. I said
19 that the MUP had organised check-points through which they exercised
20 control over the roads and the movement of people, et cetera. Whereas, a
21 mini joint command is quite a different matter. It's a coordinating body
22 which is set up if the army and the MUP are involved in a joint action.
23 Q. Can I interrupt you for a moment. I had prefaced my question by
24 reminding you that you told us yesterday that there was no mini joint
25 command in the area around the lake. So that I understand. What I'm
1 interested in is MUP patrols operating in that area.
2 Now, you said just a moment ago that the MUP had organised
3 check-points over the roads.
4 A. Yes. That's one of the ways in which they were active. Let me
5 remind you that throughout 1998 and in early 1999 the MUP was the main
6 force of the activities against terrorists. We had check-points which
7 were one method of their work; patrols were another.
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. As for -- well, the remaining activities, they amounted to the
10 third method of their work. They -- that was the ambushes, that's to say.
11 So they would lay ambushes wherever they expected the KLA to be active in
12 order to protect the features and the buildings in the general area where
13 an ambush was expected. But these activities were separate from that of
14 the army.
15 Q. Pause please. I'm -- I'm only interrupting you -- and I don't
16 mean to be rude at all. I'm only interrupting you because we have quite a
17 lot of material to cover and it would help me if, as far as possible, you
18 could keep your answers relatively brief.
19 Just to come back on the answer you've just given us. You say,
20 the MUP deployments involved check-points on roads, patrols, and ambushes,
21 three different types of MUP activity. Correct?
22 A. Yes. There were others too.
23 Q. Yes. Well, now, we can see here that in this document as an
24 example there had obviously been a MUP patrol in the area around Donji
25 Bites and the plan for a MUP ambush. Is that correct?
1 A. That's what follows from the text here.
2 Q. Yes. And I just want to understand. I mean, this is obviously in
3 the area to the east of the main Pec-Gjakova road. I just want to
4 understand whether those patrols and ambushes of that type of activity
5 continued on the east of the MUP -- of the main Pec-to-Gjakova road during
6 this period from March to September, as far as you understood the
8 A. The problem lies - and I believe that I mentioned that yesterday -
9 in the control over the roads, because this was one of the focal
10 activities of the KLA, to cut off any -- and all of the roads and to make
11 it impossible to use them, because they expected in this way to block the
12 activities of the MUP, the army, and the population in general. That was
13 one of the strategic goals throughout the time. And the MUP --
14 Q. Pause -- pause, if you will. Pause, if you will. Again, if I
15 could just repeat my question. In the area to the east of the
16 Pec-to-Gjakova road, such as Donji Bites, as we see here, were there MUP
17 patrols and ambushes taking place and planned between March and September?
18 A. I can tell you what the case was when it comes to the patrols, but
19 as for the ambushes, I wouldn't be able to tell you. I know that there
20 were patrols throughout the period.
21 Q. Thank you. So there were patrols going on throughout the period.
22 Leave the ambushes aside for a moment. Patrols going on throughout the
23 period in the area to the east of the main Pec-to-Gjakova road. That's
24 correctly understood, is it?
25 A. Yes, that's correct. And they were going on elsewhere too.
1 Q. Yes, I understand that. I'm only interested at the moment in this
2 particular area. And by "this particular area," I'm referring to the area
3 to the east of the Pec-to-Gjakova road.
4 Can -- can I ask you this: Do you know whether ambushes were --
5 without asking for specific dates or details -- whether ambushes were also
6 being planned by the MUP in that region during this period?
7 A. No, I'm not aware of that. I don't know.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you know how frequently the patrols would be
9 carried out in order to observe the area?
10 A. I don't know the frequency of the patrols. What I can tell you,
11 based on my experience and the reports I received, is that they were
12 conditioned by the activities of the other side.
13 Q. Yes. Understood. Understood. They would be armed patrols,
15 A. Well, of course. Both sides were armed.
16 Q. Thank you. Moving on to another topic, if I may.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, could we find some further
18 clarification here. It covers a period of six months.
19 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: In this document that was just shown to you, it says
21 - and it mentions a couple -- a few villages - is still under the control
22 of the Republic of Serbia MUP. Now, you told us that in the six months
23 after March - March including - that there were patrols.
24 Now, in this document, we are talking about controlling the area
25 and most of the questions were about patrolling the area, including
2 Now, what I'd like to know is: When these patrols went on for
3 those six months, were those -- was the MUP forces patrolling the area
4 still confident that they controlled the area as well by these patrols?
5 Because you said it was conditioned by the activity of the other party.
6 Could you tell us whether during all those six months they felt that
7 patrolling was in the exercise of their control or was that not the
8 situation? Could you -- if you know.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was an ongoing problem. I said
10 that one of the strategic tasks of the KLA was to take control of the main
11 roads and some of the secondary roads too. Taking control of roads did
12 not imply taking control of the asphalt road itself but also the
13 contiguous territories on both sides of the road. And MUP had the task to
14 prevent them from doing that. That's why I said that the frequency of
15 these patrols depended on the activities of the KLA.
16 Oftentimes a stretch of the road would be taken control of by the
17 MUP and then two days later the KLA would carry out a raid, taking control
18 of the roads again, and then this posed a great problem to the MUP because
19 it hindered the movement of the army toward the border areas where there
20 were border units, but it also prevented the movement of civilian traffic,
21 especially public transportation, and so on and so forth.
22 One of the key tasks of the MUP in general was to maintain public
23 law and order, which implied, among other matters, that there would be
24 free movement of vehicles, persons, and so on and so forth. And, of
25 course, the KLA had as one of their strategic goals to prevent the
1 movement from flowing freely, because it allowed them to spread throughout
2 the area and carry out their other activities. I don't know whether I've
3 been able to answer your question fully, but we can see based on the
4 orders of commanders that movement is even prohibited. Like, for
5 instance, the order by Colonel Lazarevic that some roads are not to be
6 used -- were not to be used at all, because they were too risky.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So in short, your answer is that patrols went
8 on, but this does not imply necessarily that there was continuous control
9 over the area. MUP was not --
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, one could put it that way.
11 JUDGE ORIE: MUP was not in every respect successful in achieving
12 their aims.
13 Please proceed, Mr. Emmerson.
14 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you very much.
15 Q. And just if I may to follow on from that, you said that this
16 process of what one might call "disputed territory" applied to the
17 contiguous territory both sides of the main road. Is that correct?
18 A. Well, yes, road control meant not only the control of the asphalt
19 stretch of the road but the entire belt running along both roadsides. As
20 far as the KLA activities were concerned, they seized control of higher
21 ground running alongside roads, and that's how they'd have these roads
22 under their control.
23 Secondly, they had their armed patrols moving in the area. So
24 they had at least two ways of going about it.
25 Q. Understood. And the deployments of the MUP - and I'm interested
1 particularly in the area to the east of the main Pec-to-Gjakova road -
2 would involve patrols in what was effectively disputed territory; is that
4 A. Yes, that -- whichever one was considered to be a problem in view
5 of the activities of the KLA.
6 Q. And can you give us an idea how many kilometres to the east of the
7 main road you would describe as falling within that area of disputed
9 A. I wouldn't be able to tell you that. Perhaps if I had a map. If
10 we're talking specifically about a unit or a group of the MUP, it would
11 certainly have had control of an area covering several kilometres. And
12 then, of course, this did not mean that they controlled that specific
13 stretch of territory but that they would also coordinate with their
14 adjacent units.
15 One of the interests for the KLA was to spread and expand the
16 territory under their control, and, of course, the task of the MUP was to
17 prevent exactly that. And later on we will be able to see also in terms
18 of percentages how much of the territory the KLA was able to control.
19 Q. I want to turn to the incident that you described in your
20 testimony yesterday, which is referred to in paragraph 23 of your
21 statement, which was a KLA armed attack on the 52nd Military Police
22 Battalion on the 22nd of April. And specifically I have just one matter I
23 want to raise with you, one collection of matters.
24 If you could turn, please, to tab 3 in this white bundle, which is
25 annex 18 to your witness statement and marked for identification as P1022.
1 In the B/C/S version, you will see that there are three bullet points in
2 the bottom half of the page, which is on the second page, which are on the
3 second page of the English translation. And this document, which is
4 signed by Colonel Lazarevic and dated the 22nd of April describes that
5 attack as well as another incident and lists certain measures to be taken
6 in response.
7 On the first bullet point, in the English translation it refers
8 to: "Full camouflage, fortification, loose deployment, and continuous
10 I wondered if you could explain to us, please, what "loose
11 deployment" means.
12 A. That means that -- let's take a squad of soldiers, numbering
13 between 10 and 12. In order for them not to be in one place but, rather,
14 3 soldiers here, then the next 3 at 10 metres, and then the next 3 at 10
15 metres, not grouped in one location.
16 Q. Yes. So --
17 A. The reason for that -- the reason for that -- for the activity,
18 yes. They were spread out.
19 Q. Yes, spread out.
20 A. In order for them not to constitute a concentrated target, because
21 the probability if their work came under attack was --
22 Q. Understood. Now, you've told us that the 52nd Military Police
23 Battalion had a number of combat groups within it. Can you give us some
24 idea of the size of a combat group?
25 A. I think that yesterday I mentioned two or three places around the
1 Radonjic Lake.
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. I think that's what I said yesterday.
4 Q. Yes. I'm sorry, you --
5 A. Although, I apologise, these also depended on the actual situation
6 and the intensity of KLA operations.
7 Q. I'm sorry, you -- forgive me, Mr. Gajic. You told us yesterday
8 that the 52nd Military Police Battalion had a number of combat groups
9 within it. And I just wanted to ask you the size, the number of men
10 approximately in one combat group.
11 A. Approximately the level of a platoon; meaning, between 30 and 40
13 Q. I see.
14 A. Roughly speaking.
15 Q. And you've told us in your statement at paragraph 22 where the
16 deployments were around -- around the lake specifically, including at the
17 base of Radonjicka Suka. With an order -- with an order for loose
18 deployment, that would involve, would it, spreading those men in the
19 combat group platoon out over the territory?
20 A. I don't know if you have an idea of how the Radonjic Lake looks
21 like and the area surrounding it. They were deployed in a form of a
22 horseshoe from the east, west, and south, but they also moved. But they
23 were mainly in this area. It also depended on --
24 Q. Understood. Understood. Over what sort of area would they move
25 when they were moving? Over what kind of geographical area? How many
1 kilometres away from their base post approximately?
2 A. Well, actually they didn't move at all. Just like any other unit,
3 they had their observation posts, forward observation posts in front of
4 the unit deployed in a certain area. They also had combat support,
5 observing the territory in order to avoid any surprises. But the unit
6 itself did not move.
7 Q. I'm sorry --
8 A. It was there.
9 Q. Just forgive me. I may have misunderstood you. But just a few
10 lines earlier on, your answer is recorded as saying: "They were deployed
11 in the form of a horseshoe from the east, west, and south, but they also
12 moved." I just wanted some clarification of what you meant by that
14 A. What I meant by that is they had their scouts and their observers
15 who were in a certain way providing this link, in terms of observation and
16 surveillance between the various groups. So there was also a physical
17 link but also technical links between them, like radio communications and
18 things like that.
19 Q. What is the movement you were referring to? Is that the movement
20 of -- of scouts, or what is it? What's the movement that you referred to
21 in that answer, please?
22 A. Yes, surveillance and reconnoitering units. And part of the unit
23 is billeted there and they provided their own security on the spot.
24 Q. So reconnaissance and surveillance units would move around the
25 territory? Is that understood?
1 A. Yes, just like in the other army, which sets up certain
2 observation activities in order to avoid surprises.
3 Q. And, again, can you give us some idea as to how far away from
4 their base unit they would be deployed in reconnaissance of that kind? Or
5 is there no limit to it?
6 A. Well, approximately 1 kilometre ahead of the deployment area of
7 the unit. Up to 1 kilometre. They didn't go too much beyond that.
8 Q. I see. Is there any -- looking back at this document and the
9 third bullet point, which records that: "All types of provocations by the
10 local population should be prevented. And in the case of attack on unit
11 members and features, immediately retaliate energetically and as
12 prescribed by the rules on combat use."
13 First of all, "all types of provocation by the local population,"
14 do you know what that expression is intended to convey?
15 A. This refers to armed provocations. We did mention something about
16 that yesterday.
17 Q. Is there any military significance to the expression "immediately
18 retaliate energetically"?
19 A. That's not a phrase. It's an order and a principled attitude of
20 the army.
21 Q. Very well.
22 A. An army responds only to --
23 Q. No, that's -- that's understood.
24 Could we look very briefly just behind tab 4, please, in this
25 connection. And tab 4 is marked as P1156.
1 Could I ask you, please, on the B/C/S version to turn to page 2
2 and to the first three lines, which in the English translation are the
3 last three lines on page 2, which refer back to this incident on the 22nd
4 of April.
5 I wonder if you could help us, because there's some --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.
7 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry.
8 JUDGE ORIE: For the record, it's MFI'd as P1157. Is that --
9 MR. EMMERSON: I have it MFI'd as P1156.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Behind tab 4?
11 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Pristina Corps -- well, that's the new -- I have to
13 look at the new version.
14 Yes. In your earlier -- in your earlier annex -- in your earlier
15 index, it had a different number.
16 MR. EMMERSON: No, I'm sorry about that.
17 JUDGE ORIE: I see that -- yes, that's also true for number 5.
18 MR. EMMERSON: I think --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
20 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
21 JUDGE ORIE: I understand the new one is the correct one and that
22 would then be P1156.
23 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you.
24 JUDGE ORIE: If ever someone else at a later stage would have to
25 consult this, then P numbers would do better. Please proceed.
1 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you. Yes.
2 Q. I just wonder if you can help us with the first two lines on the
3 top of page 2, which in the English translation are the last three lines
4 on the bottom of page 2.
5 Without going through the detail of all of it, is there a
6 suggestion there that a platoon should be assigned? Can you just tell us
7 what that -- what that entry is indicating?
8 A. This refers to, based on the consequences of the attack on men and
9 the equipment -- are you referring to this section and the 52nd Military
10 Police Battalion at 11.00?
11 Q. Yes. Yes, in -- at 11.00 --
12 A. Activities -- this is not very clearly written, but as far as I
13 can understand, this is again the case of an attack on the 52nd Military
14 Police Battalion and it was estimated that the forces involved were
15 approximately of a platoon.
16 Q. I see.
17 A. That is how I understand it. And the goal was to take control of
18 this area where this part of the 52nd Battalion was.
19 Q. I see. Thank you very much for that.
20 Can we look, please, at tab 5, please. I'm going to take the
21 these documents at a reasonable pace, if I may, because there are only
22 particular passages I want to ask you about.
23 Could we look at tab 5, please, which is P1159. And in the B/C/S
24 version, if you could please find the number "2" about halfway down the
25 page and then drop down seven lines to a line beginning "U toku," which in
1 the English translation is on page 2, six lines up from the bottom and
2 reads: "In the course of the 26th of April, 1998, the composition of the
3 53rd Gb entered into the composition of the 52nd IDC, Reconnaissance and
4 Sabotage Company, which up to now was in the composition of the 52nd bVP,
5 Military Police Battalion."
6 Could you just explain to us, please, what that deployment
8 A. This is an order. The 53rd Gb, which stands for the "Border
9 Battalion" incorporates the 52nd Reconnaissance Sabotage Company, which up
10 to then had been part of the 52nd Military Police Battalion. Mr.
11 Emmerson, we mentioned something about that yesterday when you asked me
12 about the scouts.
13 Q. Yes. Could you --
14 A. So here have an order for this reconnaissance unit from the 52nd
15 Battalion be attached to the 53rd Border Battalion, in view of the
16 problems prevailing on the border. And the duty of the scouts was
17 precisely that, to collect intelligence.
18 Q. I see. And if you could just look, please, at item number 5 on
19 page 2, which lists the ammunition spent by the 52nd Military Police
20 Battalion during the past days. It doesn't say how many days.
21 We can see that there are 7 -- I'm sorry, 6.300 7.6-millimetre
22 bullets, for example, listed there. That would be ammunition expended by
23 the Military Police Battalion located in the area of Lake Radoniq, would
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. Thank you. Thank you very much.
2 Can we look, please, now behind tab 7 -- I'm sorry, behind tab --
3 yes, behind tab 7, which is --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re.
5 MR. RE: Before Mr. Emmerson goes on, it's just been brought to my
6 attention. If we could just -- this may impact on documents in
7 cross-examination. The first document Mr. Emmerson took the witness to,
8 at page 2 of the translation under tab 1, which is P1152, and he read a --
9 a passage from the document saying: "It is characteristic that the area
10 of the village of Jablanica," et cetera, "is still under the control of
11 the Republic of Serbia MUP. We confirm this with the following facts."
12 I've just received some advice from a translator - and this is
13 only an unrevised translation - that the words "still under the control"
14 should actually read "outside the control of." Which is entirely
15 different to what is written there.
16 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
17 MR. RE: And I'm having a languages -- sorry, translator revise
18 the entire document as we speak. But I mean that could quite easily be
19 confirmed what it actually says --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Well, of course the witness has explained, since I
21 put a specific question --
22 MR. EMMERSON: Precisely so. That -- essentially he characterises
23 this as disputed territory.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. With patrolling, not necessarily controlling.
25 MR. EMMERSON: Exactly so. But --
1 JUDGE ORIE: But it's good to have the right translation there
2 so --
3 MR. EMMERSON: Exactly so.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one additional question.
5 Could you tell me, Mr. Gajic: You said the 6.300 pieces of
6 7.62-millimetre bullets, you say they were fired in the Lake Radonjic
7 area. Where do I read in this document, or is it your own memory that it
8 was specifically there? Because this document, as far as I understand,
9 and also the PrK units cover a wider territory than just Lake Radonjic
11 MR. EMMERSON: Yes. I -- I may be able to assist to this extent.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 MR. EMMERSON: If one looks at the immediately preceding words, it
14 refers to ammunition expended by the 52nd Military Police Battalion. And
15 the testimony of the witness yesterday was that the only location in
16 Western Kosovo where the Military Police Battalion was deployed --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MR. EMMERSON: -- were the locations he describes in paragraph
19 22. That was the premise for the question.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is that -- was that on the basis of which you
21 said that these 6.300 were fired there?
22 THE WITNESS: [No verbal response]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
24 Please proceed, Mr. Emmerson.
25 MR. EMMERSON:
1 Q. Tabs 7, then, Exhibit P1162. Again, just a matter of
2 interpretation, if you could, please. In the B/C/S version on page 2,
3 under paragraph 3, five lines up from the bottom is a line beginning "1
4 hab 155-millimetre." Which appears on page 2 of the English translation,
5 again under paragraph 3, of course, about halfway down the page.
6 This is an order by Colonel Lazarevic for the 2nd of May ordering
7 as follows: "Replenish the first 155-millimetre hab from the 2nd
8 Battalion of the 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade within the composition of
9 the 52nd Military Police Battalion in the Lake -- I'm sorry, the Radonjic
10 Lake sector to full MF peacetime establishment capacity (with two
11 additional artillery pieces)."
12 What I'm interested in at this stage, please, is for you to
13 explain to us the relationship that is there described between the 2nd
14 Battalion of the 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade and the 52nd Military Police
15 Brigade, because it appears that there is some transfer either of men or
16 of equipment taking place or being ordered here. Could you just explain
17 to us what that means.
18 A. This is about the 1st Howitzer Battery, 150-millimetre Howitzers
19 from the 2nd Battalion of the 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade. This battery
20 was attached in order to reinforce the 52nd Military Police Battalion, and
21 it was ordered here to put it at full combat readiness in order for it to
22 be able to carry out its orders by attaching it to the 52nd Military
23 Police Battalion. So, in other words, the 52nd Military Police Battalion
24 was reinforced in this way.
25 Q. I see. So, again, just to make sure I've understood, does this
1 involve the reinforcement of the forces, the 52nd Military Police
2 Battalion forces deployed at the lake through the addition of a Howitzer
3 battery from the 2nd Battalion of the 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade?
4 A. You understood it well.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 A. From the 52nd Battalion of the Mixed Artillery Brigade.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 Tab 8, please. In the B/C/S, fourth line down. In the English,
9 fifth line up from the bottom. It's a single page document in the
10 original; two pages in the English translation. I'm looking at the bottom
11 of page 1 in the English translation.
12 Tab 8 is marked for identification as P1038.
13 The entry reads: "128-millimetre self-propelled multiple rocket
14 launcher battery Oganj from the 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade is to be
15 redeployed to the sector of Radonjic Lake dam and tasked with giving
16 infantry support to the corps units pursuant to a special order."
17 Do you see that?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Is that a -- is that a further and separate reinforcement of the
20 forces of the 52nd Military Police Battalion or is it the same one as we
21 were just looking at?
22 A. No. This has nothing to do with the 52nd Battalion. In the area
23 of the Radonjic Lake dam, I think that this Military Police Battalion was
24 not there. But this is generally this area, the general area that we are
25 talking about.
1 Q. Where do you understand -- I'm sorry. Where do you understand the
2 Radonjic Lake dam to be? Just approximately. If you can describe it for
3 us, please.
4 A. There is a canal called Bistrica, but I cannot tell you exactly
5 without a map.
6 Q. Well, help me. If I can -- we know that there is a canal that
7 runs into the lake. And we know that there are loch gates in one end of
8 the canal at Lluka e Eperme. Is that what you're referring to as the dam?
9 A. Yes, that's the part.
10 But, Mr. Emmerson, what I wanted to say here was that this unit
11 here, Oganj, was part of the 52nd Military -- had it been part of the 52nd
12 Military Police Battalion, it would have been referred to in the same way
13 as it was referred earlier to the Howitzer Battery. In other words, they
14 are totally unrelated.
15 Q. Understood. But just so that we -- so that we can try to
16 understand what this entry means, this is a deployment of the 52nd Mixed
17 Artillery Brigade to the area of Lluka e Eperme at the other end of the
18 canal. Is that right?
19 A. Yes. Yes, one could say that.
20 Q. Thank you. And it's tasked with giving infantry support to corps
21 units pursuant to a special order. Now, what -- infantry support pursuant
22 to a special order. Can you help us with that, please, as to what we are
23 to make of that, how we are to interpret that?
24 A. This was a kind of preventative order or pre-emptive order based
25 on the actual situation prevailing on the ground and the estimate of the
1 possible further development. The command decided to undertake certain
2 pre-emptive measure by engaging this formation with the rocket launcher
3 system Oganj. This does not mean that this system was actually engaged.
4 An army always takes some preventative measures in order to avoid
5 surprises. So this was dictated by an actual intelligence and security
6 and tactical situation to launch this kind of pre-emptive move.
7 Q. Understood. Understood. We don't know, obviously, from this
8 document whether that battery was ever used.
9 A. Yes. Yes.
10 Q. But we do -- but we do know it was deployed. Is that correct? To
11 that area. Yes?
12 A. Yes. Yes. You can see it from this document. But what I'm
13 trying to explain to you is that there were certain conditions and
14 parameters so that you can get a general idea.
15 Q. Understood. I'm only interested at this stage in deployments.
16 Infantry support -- now, to a layperson, "infantry support"
17 suggests ground troops. Is that what we're to understand by this?
18 A. Well, not only infantry measures -- well, yes, generally infantry,
19 because infantry is -- or was mostly involved in this combat.
20 Q. Yes. Understood. All I'm trying to do is to make sure we've
21 understood this particular entry in the document. So, again, from the
22 answers you've given, may I see if I've understood correctly. This is an
23 order deploying a 128-millimetre self-propelled multiple rocket launcher
24 battery and infantry support to the area you've described.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 A. Given that -- please. But given the range, it could have been
3 some other area or artillery. But as you also underlined, this was under
4 a special order. It could not have been used unless it was estimated that
5 there was the need for using it, because it's a very powerful system.
6 Q. Yes. Do you know what level of infantry support would come with
7 the Oganj system? Would accompany it? Some indication.
8 A. Oganj was most commonly used before an action was launched.
9 That's the so-called artillery -- artillery preparation before an action
10 is carried out. A certain territory, so to speak, covered with fire from
11 Oganj in order to isolate it, and after that the infantry moves in. So
12 that was its purpose. Basically that was its purpose.
13 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Not long-range fire from the
14 fire system, followed by infantry support moving through the territory is
15 what we would expect.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Yes. Thank you.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, I -- just for -- for further certainty,
19 I'd like to again spend a few words on the Lake Radonjic dam.
20 MR. EMMERSON: Mm-hm.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Gajic, our understanding of the Lake Radonjic
22 water household is that there is a river. From this river, there is a dam
23 in this river, Lluka e Eperme. There is an inlet to the canal which takes
24 you quite a lot of kilometres down. For you it would be south-easterly
25 direction. Then the water from this canal flows into the lake. And then
1 at the end of the lake, there is a dam which keeps the water at a certain
2 level so that electricity, I think it was --
3 MR. EMMERSON: And the filtration system.
4 JUDGE ORIE: And a filtration system.
5 Now, Mr. Emmerson went with you through the words "the sector of
6 the Radonjic Lake dam." And I think you identified that it would be the
7 inlet system and not the end of the lake. Is that correctly understood
8 that the reference to "the Radonjic Lake dam" is not the dam at the very
9 end of the lake where the water then further flows down? Is that
10 correctly understood?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I said when I mentioned the
12 inlet part, I mentioned Bistrica. This section is called Bistrica, and it
13 enters the canal. And the other thing referred to the outlet, Lluka and
14 things -- other issues that you mentioned. And it was explained how this
15 system functioned. And I had an opportunity myself to see it with my own
17 JUDGE ORIE: The sector of Radonjic Lake dam is the beginning and
18 not the end of the system. Is that correctly understood?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
21 Please proceed.
22 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you.
23 Q. Tab 10, if I may, please. This is marked as P833, which means
24 presumably that we've seen it -- yes, of course we have, seen it
25 elsewhere. P833, which is annex 16 to your witness statement. And I
1 asked you yesterday about army special units or KSJ. I wonder if you
2 could help me, please, with this. It's a little difficult because of the
3 numbering on these pages, but if you look in the B/C/S version, on the
4 bottom right-hand corner you will find that the alternate pages are
5 numbered as 2 and 4. And I'm looking for the page in the B/C/S with the
6 number "4" at the bottom right and the number "5" typed at the top.
7 And so far as the English translation is concerned, the passage
8 that I'm looking at appears on page 6 at point 2.
9 First of all, Mr. Gajic, just to -- just to repeat that, you're
10 looking in the B/C/S version at the page which has "5" typed at the top,
11 the number "5" at the top, and a number "4" written in handwriting at the
12 bottom. Do you have that page? If you just take it through from the
13 beginning to page 5.
14 And we need to come down the page on the screen, because the --
15 the point I want to ask you about is paragraph 2.2 on that page, little 2.
16 So paragraph 2.2 little 2.
17 The translation reads: "Propose" -- this is -- I'm sorry, just
18 place this in its proper context, this is a submission by Major-General
19 Pavkovic to the Pristina Corps Command of the 13th of May, assessments and
21 And at 2.2, little 2 on the relevant page, the entry reads:
22 "Propose to the VJ GS the engagement of KSJ, or special corps -- special
23 units corps, units to replace the 52nd bVP, BG-2 of the 549th Motorised
24 Brigade and BG-2 of the 125th Motorised Brigade for rest and replenishment
25 and in order to carry out anti-terrorist operations."
1 Now, first of all, this appears, would you agree, to be a proposal
2 made by Major-General Pavkovic to the General Staff? Is that correct?
3 A. Let me have a look at this.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 A. This is a proposal for the General Staff.
7 Q. And he proposes the engagement of KSJ units to replace the 52nd
8 Military Police Battalion, first of all. So that would presumably involve
9 putting the KSJ units in the area that you've described as the deployment
10 positions around Lake Radoniq; is that correct? That's what he's
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Yes. Thank you.
14 A. To replace the 52nd Military Police Battalion.
15 Q. Thank you. Did that happen, as far as you know?
16 A. To my knowledge, it did. And the reasons for it are stated here.
17 For rest. They had to rotate units, which was a common thing to do.
18 Q. I -- I'm just asking, because I asked you yesterday whether there
19 were KSJ units deployed in the areas that you described in paragraph 22 of
20 your statement, and I thought you told us yesterday that there were not.
21 But in fact does this now refresh your memory that there were?
22 A. I don't think the question had to do with the 52nd Military Police
23 Battalion yesterday but, rather, the engagement of the KSJ. And I
24 answered in the affirmative.
25 Q. There may have been a misunderstanding. But anyway, the position
1 is that special -- special units were deployed to the areas you describe
2 in paragraph 2, around Lake Radoniq and the foot of Suka Radoniq sometime
3 after the 13th of May; is that correct?
4 A. That's correct. Along with the two combat groups mentioned
6 Q. Yes. Now, just help us with this. Just to understand what this
7 paragraph is saying. Is it saying that the special units corps should be
8 redeployed to replace the Military Police Battalion together with BG-2 of
9 the 549th and 125th? In other words, that the special units and BG-2 of
10 the 549th and BG-2 of the 125th should then be deployed to the Lake
11 Radoniq area? Is that how we're to understand it?
12 A. No, it's stated here in quite precise terms, and I'll read this:
13 "Propose to the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army to the engagement of
14 special units corps for -- to replace the 22nd Military Police Battalion
15 and the Combat Group 2 of 549th Motorised Brigade and the BG-2 of 125th
16 Motorised Brigade," which means that the KSJ units were to replace all
17 these units: The 52nd Military Police Battalion and the two combat
18 groups, and they were to be replaced by KSJ units.
19 Q. Thank you very much. That was the alternative interpretation. I
20 wasn't sure which was correct.
21 And it ends by saying: "For rest and replenishment and in order
22 to carry out anti-terrorist operations."
23 So can I understand how in the B/C/S version that is to be
24 interpreted. Who is to be carrying out the anti-terrorist operations? The
25 troops that are doing the replacement - that is to say, the KSJ - or the
1 troops who are being temporarily relieved?
2 A. If the superior command decided to launch an anti-terrorist
3 operation - and we know that it started in late July - then the KSJ would
4 be engaged in those activities, and that's to say, the unit replacing the
5 three other formations.
6 Q. See, we know that there was a -- a -- there were a series of
7 operations in which there were -- let me put it neutrally -- significant
8 engagements at the end of May in the area along the main Peje-to-Gjakova
9 road and villages around. We can see here that there is a proposal to
10 free up troops and make them available for anti-terrorist operations. And
11 we have already had some testimony from Colonel Zivanovic of the 125th
12 that authorisation for the VJ to engage in anti-terrorist operations was
13 not given until the second half of June.
14 Now, can -- can you help us, please. Were the VJ permitted under
15 authority of the General Staff to engage in anti-terrorist operations
16 before the second half of June?
17 A. Let me be quite precise about this. I don't know what
18 General Zivanovic said. But only on the 28th of July, 1998 was a
19 directive adopted to carry out the anti-terrorist operation, which was in
20 fact carried out under the code name "Grom-3."
21 Q. Pause, please.
22 A. End of July through to September, when it was supposed to finish.
23 Q. And -- and that was the operation that began with a sweep from
24 Peje along the main road towards Kijevo and up towards Malisevo in Central
25 Kosovo; is that right? With Malisevo falling to Serb forces at the end of
2 A. Well, I wouldn't say that the sweeping of the terrain was the main
3 objective. The objective was to basically carry out a crackdown on all
4 the terrorist forces in -- not only in the Dukagjin Operational Zone.
5 These forces had grown to such an extent that the army was unable to do
6 anything else but to launch an offensive. Up to that point, up to that
7 anti-terrorist operation, there were clashes with the KLA, but they only
8 grew in intensity, starting in the month of April and May. And then in
9 time -- or rather, there came a time when this operation had to be
10 launched. And what it says here --
11 Q. Can I interrupt you? It's my fault. I asked you for confirmation
12 of which offensive you were referring to, and I'm going to come back to
13 ask you some questions about the end of July offensive and what occurred
14 during it in -- in a little while, if I may. I just wanted to make sure
15 we understood one another as far as authorisation was concerned.
16 Still in this document, please, behind tab 10. If you could look,
17 please, to the front page and to the fourth and fifth paragraphs under
18 the -- the figure "1" which again, of course, are on page 1 of the English
19 translation. This is a document dated the 13th of May of 1998 and gives,
20 as we can see in the fourth paragraph, an estimate of 3 and a half to
21 4.000 members of the KLA armed and trained for armed raids and guerilla
22 operations and goes on to suggest that the terrorist forces are
23 increasingly taking on the attributes of a military organisation and
24 setting up units from platoon to company size.
25 Now, I think in your evidence yesterday in answer to a question
1 from Mr. Re you suggested that during the first three months of 1998 --
2 forgive me for a moment. Between January and March it was
3 counter-intelligence's estimation that there were up to 3.000 armed men
4 who had organised themselves.
5 I just want, if I may, to give you an opportunity to comment on
6 the assessment of this document by the British military attache to
7 Belgrade, who was invited to assess these estimates and this particular
8 document during testimony he gave in the Limaj trial, which is behind tab
9 10A in the bundle. And I'm particularly interested in pages 1919 to 1920.
10 I'm just going to read you a very short extract of Colonel Crosland's
11 testimony in another trial concerning the estimate as it appears in this
12 very document.
13 He says: "I think the numbers that General Pavkovic replies to is
14 a very debatable area. I myself had said that I thought there were
15 between 400 and 500 what I would call hard-core KLA. It is difficult to
16 say who is correct. If he is taking into account the potential numbers
17 that were apparently and possibly training in Albania itself, then those
18 numbers are 3 and a half thousand to 4 and a half thousand, not too
20 Can I understand the position. When you gave the evidence that
21 you gave yesterday and the figures that you gave, were you taking account
22 of potential recruits from outside of Kosovo?
23 A. No. Yesterday I said that up until the month of March there were
24 roughly 3.000 members of the KLA who were both armed and organised. I
25 also said that in our estimates there were between 6 and 8 thousand of
1 those who wielded weapons. So there's a big difference between the
2 numbers of those organised in some formations and others.
3 Q. You also --
4 A. I believe that this is a realistic figure. I did not, in other
5 words, take into consideration members of the KLA who were undergoing
6 training in Albania.
7 Q. There's also a vast difference, as I'm sure you'll agree, between
8 Colonel Crosland's estimate of 4 to 5 hundred active organised members and
9 yours; a difference of tenfold.
10 A. I have to make two points here. I hold the Colonel Crosland in
11 high esteem. I know him personally. I know him to be a true
12 professional. Based on what you read, he said that there were between 400
13 and 500 extremist members of the KLA. So he spoke of the nucleus. He did
14 not speak of their numbers in general. He only mentioned the most
15 extremist ones. With all due respect to Colonel Crosland, we were much
16 more familiar with the situation in the field. He had been in the service
17 in Yugoslavia for three years, and we had been dealing with the matters in
18 Kosovo for over ten years and we were more aware of the situation.
19 Q. You mentioned in your testimony yesterday that the assessments
20 that you received from the RDB were not always accurate. I just want to
21 come back to this transcript, if I may, because Colonel Crosland goes on
22 to comment on Major-General Pavkovic's assessment in this document of
23 organisation into battalions. And this is at line 17 on 1919.
24 Having been asked about this comment about setting up the KLA,
25 setting up platoons and companies in May, the 13th of May, as --
1 A. My apologies.
2 Q. Just --
3 A. I only have this in English.
4 Q. No, I understand that. And I'm going to read it to you so that it
5 can be translated to you into B/C/S.
6 He says: "I think, with respect to Your Honours, it is very
7 difficult to look at a terrorist organisation in the same light as regular
8 forces who are based on specific organisation of platoon, i.e., 30 persons
9 to a company -- to a company of 100 to a battalion or a regiment of
10 between 400 and 600 men. I personally visited about five or six KLA
11 headquarter bases scattered throughout Kosovo during my time there. And I
12 would say at this stage in May they were not as organised as General
13 Pavkovic is saying. I mean, he may have been using this for his own
14 propaganda, and any general facing an insurgency as this was is bound to
15 put a more glossy view on the opposition in order to ensure that he gets
16 the correct support to deal with the problem that was a very real problem
17 and a growing problem. But to say it was as organised within platoon and
18 company, you know, 30- and 100-man units, I think it was possibly
19 stretching the credibility at this particular time. There was a basic
20 area of command control, but I stress basic, and that was basically
21 against mainly linear - either a road or a river - into which area a
22 headman would have what I would describe token authority."
23 So Colonel Crosland is here accusing, in the nicest possible way,
24 Major-General Pavkovic of exactly what you're accusing the RDB of, as I
25 understand it, which is exaggerating the figures for propaganda reasons in
1 order to secure the resources that are required. Is that correct?
2 A. I would not fully agree with Colonel Crosland. That's his view of
3 the matter, which was slightly partial, and one knows why.
4 What was characteristic was that until the month of March the KLA
5 had predominantly been organised in groups. That's true. We're talking
6 about the end of 1997 through to the month of March 1998, and these groups
7 numbered three, five, ten men, up to the maximum of thirty. They were
8 attached to certain staffs that had been established in villages. These
9 were village staffs. They had a body coordinating this, which was called
10 either the Main Staff or a staff of sorts. And they were not that closely
11 connected. After that, they embarked on setting up a military formation
12 starting from the month of April, May, and especially June, because we
13 know that brigades were set up in June. On the 21st of June, Krasniqi -
14 you have that footage, I believe - set up a brigade.
15 Q. Pause for a moment. Let us catch up with you. I think maybe
16 you're referring to July, are you, for the establishment of the
17 Adrijan Krasniqi Brigade, rather than June? I mean, it's quite important
18 that we get dates right, Mr. Gajic. It's quite important that we
19 understand the accuracy of the testimony.
20 A. The 21st of June, 1998 in Tirana, Ahmet Krasniqi, who you know was
21 killed later on, and so on and so forth, gave -- handed wartime flags to
22 the commander of 134th Brigade. Zemaj was the commander. Two more
23 brigades were set up, 131st and 133rd Brigade. 134th Brigade, together
24 with their men, crossed over to Kosovo.
25 Q. Yes. Thank you very much. I understand now the testimony --
1 A. In late June.
2 Q. I understand now what it is you're referring to. In June.
3 Finally this, just before we -- I suggest a break. Could we --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Because the Chamber would like to deliver a few
5 decisions as well. So if within two or three minutes you would --
6 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, of course.
7 Q. Just finally, could you look in your annexes -- I'm afraid it's
8 not in the white bundle -- to tab 4, which is P1442. If it could be
9 brought up on the screen, please. And I'm interested, if I may, in the
10 B/C/S in the third paragraph on page 1; and in the English, in the first
11 paragraph on page 2.
12 This is a document dated the 23rd of February, issued by
13 Colonel Delic, assessing the strength and composition at the end of
14 February -- or the 23rd of February, I'm sorry, of KLA deployment and
15 forces in his area of responsibility, which he describes in the first
16 paragraph as covering the territory of Djakovica both in the border area
17 villages of Junik, Batusa, Morina, Ponosevac, Seremet, and in the
18 Djakovica town, specifically in the eastern side of the Beli Drim River
19 and the Decanska Bistrica river to the north until the village of Vrhovac
20 to the west, Lake Radonjic, and to the south, the Crmljane bend, an area
21 he describes as 90 square kilometres, including, as far east as Jablanica.
22 In the third paragraph, his assessment, which is based upon a
23 reliable MUP source, is as follows: "A reliable source MUP told us that
24 up to 200 members of the so-called KLA are occasionally staying in this
25 area, feeling totally safe. Among them are many of the Siptar terrorists
1 wanted by MUP. In addition to the unconfirmed number of armed members of
2 the so-called KLA, the majority of the estimated 200 men is engaged,
3 according to the system, a peaceful farmer by day, a KLA terrorist by
5 So as far as I understand it - and correct me if I'm wrong - what
6 Colonel Delic is saying as of the 23rd of February is that in a
7 90-square-kilometre area stretching from the border as far east as
8 Jablanica, the estimate regarded as reliable was a total of 200 so-called
9 members of the KLA, the majority of whom were farmers by day, soldiers by
10 night. Is that how you understood the position at the end of February?
11 A. You have not read this properly.
12 First of all, the period is the last months of 1997 and early
13 January of 1998, which goes to confirm what I've been saying.
14 Q. Forgive me --
15 A. And then it says the --
16 Q. Excuse me. Forgive me. This document is an assessment of the
17 state of affairs as of the 23rd of February, is it not? You see the date
18 of the document?
19 A. Well, yes. But it refers to the last months of 1997 and early
20 January. That's one thing.
21 The other thing is that he speaks of 200 members of the KLA,
22 armed, and so on and so forth --
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. -- who are under arms at all times and a greater number of them are
25 engaged, and so on and so forth. So there are 200 of them who are
1 organised, and most of the 200 are farmers by day and then soldiers by
3 Q. Yes, that's what I understood the paragraph to mean. So a total
4 of 200 --
5 A. Then my apologies are in order.
6 Q. A total of --
7 A. Organised. Plus those who are farmers by day and carrying out
8 actions by night. So it would -- the number would be far greater.
9 Q. Well, a total of -- is -- a total of 200 who are organised;
11 A. Yes. According to this, in late 1997 and early January of 1998.
12 Q. And does it --
13 A. Of course, it was written in February.
14 Q. Does it go on to say: "A majority of the estimated 200 men is
15 engaged according to a peaceful farmer by day, KLA soldier by night"
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. That was a characteristic of them in general. They'd change into
20 civilian clothes and then you'd have the person farming the land and then
21 at night changing into a uniform, taking up arms, and carrying out
22 actions. That was the tactics that they used. And they were successful
23 in doing so.
24 Q. Yes. And --
25 JUDGE ORIE: It's still not entirely clear to me whether you say
1 those farmers by day, KLA soldiers by night, are these in addition to the
2 200 organised people, or are they part of these 200 organised people?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Above the number of 200. So there's
4 more than the ones who were organised.
5 MR. EMMERSON:
6 Q. Yes. And again, that description, you would say, was correct,
7 would you? The description that appears here.
8 A. Yes. Because this was an assessment of the situation as at the
9 end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998.
10 Q. Yes. Thank you.
11 MR. EMMERSON: Would that be a convenient moment?
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, Mr. Gajic, we'll have a break for -- for
13 you it will be approximately half an hour. The Chamber would like to
14 deliver -- to deliver some decisions, but I ask already Madam Usher to
15 escort you out of the courtroom so that you can enjoy your coffee rather
16 than listen to decisions.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance, I'm here
18 to be called upon.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Well, the first which I will read is not actually a
21 decision but, rather, an inquiry. It is an inquiry into whether the
22 Defence has any further submissions relating to the notes of Witness 29.
23 The Chamber would like to address the matter relating to Witness
24 29's notes.
25 The parties will recall that the issue was left at the stage where
1 on the 26th of April, 2007, after the witness had finished testifying, the
2 Chamber ordered that on his return home, the witness should hand over to
3 VWS any remaining notes referred to in his witness statement that he still
4 had in his possession. On the 30th of May, 2007, a legal officer from the
5 Chamber handed these notes to the Prosecution with the instruction that
6 copies should be made available to the Defence.
7 Since this time, the Chamber has heard nothing further on the
8 issue from the parties. The Chamber would like therefore to ask the
9 parties if they intend to raise any further issues on this matter. Should
10 they choose not to do so, the Chamber will consider the matter to be
12 MR. EMMERSON: Can I indicate straight away that unless anybody
13 corrects me, the direction that the Trial Chamber gave has not been
14 carried into effect. Those notes have not been provided to Defence.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's ...
16 Then I think the instruction was that the notes handed to the
17 Prosecution were given with the instruction that copies should be made
18 available to the Defence.
19 Has this happened, Mr. Re?
20 MR. RE: Your Honour, I absolutely have no idea.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Would you please try to find out.
22 MR. RE: I am taken entirely by surprise.
23 JUDGE ORIE: I do not blame anyone for not having these details
24 immediately available, but would you please inquire into the matter.
25 Then the Chamber would like to deliver a decision on the admission
1 of the Visnjic report and his resume.
2 On the 12th of September, 2007, the Chamber heard the evidence of
3 Mr. Visnjic, who testified about ballistics and an examination of bullet
4 casings he conducted in 1998. The Prosecution tendered through this
5 witness document P916, which is a ballistics report made by the witness on
6 the 2nd of December, 1998 with accompanying correspondence, and P917,
7 which is the resume of Mr. Visnjic.
8 The admission of this report has already been the subject of a
9 number of filings in this case. An overview of those filings is to be
10 found in the Chamber's written decision on the Defence motion to exclude
11 ballistics evidence and the Prosecution application to add Mr. Visnjic as
12 a witness, filed on the 28th of August of this year. The Defence opposes
13 the admission of the report on the grounds that it is irrelevant, that it
14 has no probative value, that it is not sufficiently specific, that the
15 bullet casings that Mr. Visnjic examined are no longer available, that his
16 personal notes have been destroyed, and that a report from another
17 examiner, who, according to Mr. Visnjic, gave a second opinion on his
18 conclusions, is missing as well. For more details on the parties'
19 submissions on the issue, we again refer to our decision of the 28th of
20 August and the references therein.
21 According to the report and the witness's own testimony,
22 Mr. Visnjic compared bullet casings found at Lake Radonjic with bullet
23 casings found in the village of Gramocelj on the 24th of March, 2007,
24 following an incident there. It is the Prosecution's case that the
25 incident in Gramocelj in fact took place in Glodjane, in the vicinity of
1 Mr. Haradinaj's house. Therefore, the subject matter of the report is
2 relevant to an issue in this case and, as a result, the document meets the
3 relevance test for the admission of evidence.
4 We note that the arguments raised by the Defence in opposition to
5 the admission of the report go to the weight of his -- this evidence and
6 will be considered by the Chamber in due course. Without any prejudice to
7 future considerations of the evidence given by Mr. Visnjic, the Chamber
8 holds the view that the report is the indispensable basis of Mr. Visnjic's
9 testimony which has served the Chamber to better understand the background
10 in which the report was made. It would make no sense at this stage to
11 have Mr. Visnjic's testimony in evidence but not the report around which
12 that testimony revolves. What weight, if any, will finally be given to
13 Mr. Visnjic's conclusions is a different matter that needs not to be
14 decided at the admissibility stage.
15 Therefore, the report is admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule
16 89(C) of the Rules.
17 As to P917, the resume of Mr. Visnjic, the Chamber considers it
18 relevant as it provides information about Mr. Visnjic's education and
19 experience in the field of ballistics, and in light of the aforementioned,
20 we also admit that document into evidence.
21 And this concludes the Chamber's ruling on this matter.
22 The last decision the Chamber delivers is a decision not to recall
23 Professor Lecomte.
24 The Chamber will address the issue of whether Professor Lecomte
25 should be recalled.
1 On the 3rd of October, 2007, Professor Lecomte testified in this
2 case as a witness for the Prosecution. At the end of the court day, and
3 approximately one hour into re-examination, the Prosecution indicated that
4 they still had some questions that they wanted to put to the witness. It
5 was not possible to ask the witness to return the following day, as she
6 had to return to her home country for a court appearance. The Defence, on
7 being asked if they would join in requesting that the witness to be
8 recalled to enable them to put further questions to her took no position
9 on the matter. The Chamber then informed the parties that it would
10 consider whether to grant the Prosecution's request.
11 The Chamber has carefully reviewed the transcript of
12 Professor Lecomte's evidence and is of the view that the matters for which
13 she was called to give evidence have been sufficiently covered. The
14 Chamber therefore decides that there is no need to recall the witness. In
15 reaching this decision, the Chamber has also noted that the Defence does
16 not insist on putting any further questions to the witness after the
17 completion of her re-examination.
18 The Chamber invites the Victims and Witness Section to inform the
19 witness that she will not be required to return to complete her
20 re-examination in this case.
21 And this concludes the Chamber's ruling on this matter.
22 We will have a break until five minutes past 11.00.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, please proceed.
2 MR. EMMERSON:
3 Q. Mr.. Gajic, could you turn to tab 13, please, in the white bundle,
4 which is Exhibit D75. This is a document not annexed to your witness
5 statement but is a 23rd of June order of Colonel Lazarevic for the
6 formation of Combat Group 5 with, as in paragraph 1 indicates, various
7 constituent elements.
8 And in paragraph 2, the deployment of Combat Group 5 to the Donji
9 Bites village sector by Radonjicka Suka by 1500 hours on the 23rd of June.
10 Do you see that? Paragraph 2.
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 Q. And then a task is set out which is that BG-5 in coordinated
13 action with the 52nd Military Police Battalion and making use of
14 Radonjicka Suka should prevent operations by the DTS along a series of
15 axes and the axes are there set out. The first is Rznic to Glodjane to
16 Donji Bites. The second is Gornji Ratis to Donji Ratis to Rakoc. And the
17 third is Gramocelj to Donji Bites.
18 Now, obviously we know the geography of that area and the various
19 points on those three axes. I just wanted you to help us, if you could,
20 please. How would a joint action between a combat group -- a newly
21 established combat group and the 52nd Military Police Battalion, how would
22 they set about preventing KLA activities along, for example, an access --
23 an axis stretching from Donji Bites up to Rznic? What would they do in
24 practical terms?
25 A. First of all, this is a pre-emptive order, because based on the
1 situation, surveillance thereof, DTS activities were -- DTS stands for
2 sabotage and terrorist forces along this axis.
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. Therefore, the army was preparing itself for such an action.
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. This coordinated action, however, would be in response to such an
7 attack. The Military Police Battalion will use its combat resources to
8 respond to the attack, and the BG would also respond with what they had at
9 their disposal by engaging these DTS forces attacking these two units. In
10 other words, the army would not have acted before an actual attack took
12 Q. Understood. But --
13 A. So they would just act in response. This is a response to an
14 expected or anticipated attack or attacks, because we are talking here
15 about three axes.
16 Q. I understand that. How does the joint force, this joint BG-5 and
17 52nd Military Police Battalion force, how do they, for example, secure the
18 area of Rznic?
19 A. I don't quite understand your question.
20 Q. In order to prevent -- in order to be in a position to prevent KLA
21 operations starting in Rznic, what exactly do they do?
22 A. If there was an action along this axis, they would use their
23 firing systems to engage these forces. So if you have an armed group
24 coming your way and its goal is to attack a certain group of the 52nd
25 Military Police Battalion, the battalion would respond in order to prevent
1 the attack, incur losses, take captives, et cetera. Therefore, in
2 anticipation of an attack, measures need to be undertaken.
3 Q. Thank you. Could you turn, please, behind tab 14 now. And this
4 is Exhibit D179, which is a letter of the 23rd of July from
5 Colonel General Perisic to the President of the Republic, Mr. Milosevic.
6 And I just wanted to ask your help, please, to see if you could
7 assist with one matter, given the seniority of your position at the time.
8 Could you turn to paragraph 3, subparagraph (a) of this letter.
9 So paragraph 3 is on page 4 of the English translation and on the third
10 page of the B/C/S original.
11 It reads: "Constant aspirations by members of the MUP to have
12 some VJ units subordinated to them leads to misunderstandings if the units
13 are not given, and if they are given, this represents unauthorised and
14 unprofessional use, which has counter-effects, the best examples being
15 Decani and Orahovac."
16 Now, obviously -- so this is General Colonel Perisic writing to
17 Mr. Milosevic to raise a number of concerns on the 23rd of July. So just
18 before the end of July operation you've described.
19 Do you know what that is a reference to, "attempts by the MUP to
20 have VJ units subordinated to them"?
21 A. Well, that was a constant problem in relation to re-subordination
22 of units. Namely, under the law it was very clear. In the event of an
23 emergency situation or a state of war and an escalation of a situation on
24 the ground, the MUP may be re-subordinated. That's one of the articles on
25 the -- of the law of the Yugoslav Army stipulates. It can be
1 stipulated -- it can be re-subordinated to the Army of Yugoslavia and not
2 vice versa.
3 As you read this, it indicates that the MUP strived outside the
4 law to re-subordinate the army to it, and this is from which
5 misunderstandings occurred and this is what the general mentioned in his
6 letter to President Milosevic.
7 Q. Now I just need you to explain that in a little more detail. What
8 attempts -- what sort of attempts were the MUP making to have the VJ units
9 subordinated to them? How did they go about it and what attempts were
10 made and by whom? You say it was a constant problem.
11 A. I said that this was a constant problem relating to
12 re-subordination. There was an outstanding question about the MUP being
13 re-subordinated to the VJ under the law. However, in these specific
14 circumstances, they requested that their commander become a superior
15 commander to the commander of the VJ, which was contrary to the law and
16 which the army never allowed to happen.
17 Q. Well --
18 A. But General Perisic thought that this should be drawn to some
19 somebody's attention, because he was -- to the Commander-in-Chief's
21 Q. But you say it never happened. If we just look at the paragraph
22 in detail, it seems to say: "The aspirations by the MUP to have VJ units
23 subordinated to them leads to misunderstandings if the units are not
24 given, and if they are given, this represents unauthorised and
25 unprofessional use, which has counter-effects."
1 Would you agree the suggestion appears to be that there have been
2 some instances in which the units of the VJ have not been given and some
3 instances in which they have, which have produced counter-effects?
4 A. I wouldn't put it so harsh and decisively. I would interpret it
5 rather by saying that the army perhaps allowed for a possibility in a
6 coordinated action to grant certain commanding requests coming from the
7 MUP contrary to what was strictly ordered. So there was a mild deviation
8 there which then demonstrated to be dysfunctional and wrong. However, the
9 army never allowed the MUP commanders to command the army throughout the
10 whole period.
11 Q. I see. And do you know what the -- where it says "the best
12 examples being Decani and Orahovac," do you know what the reference to
13 Decani indicates there? Do you remember any specific instance of either
14 an attempt to re-subordinate the VJ to the MUP or -- occurring in Decani?
15 A. I don't remember this specific incident.
16 Q. Very well.
17 A. It was probably some MUP action involved.
18 Q. Finally on this topic, just -- just by reference to the answers
19 you've already given, we've heard some testimony from Colonel Crosland
20 that on the 28th of July he came across a mixed strike force on the main
21 Peje-to-Pristina road close to Lapusnik, poised to launch an attack on
22 Malisevo which was commanded by Milorad Ulemek, or Milorad Lukovic, or
23 Legija, a JSO commander who claims to be in command of a force that
24 included VJ soldiers. Now, did that sort of event occur, Mr. Gajic?
25 Joint forces of JSO and MUP together but with a, for example, JSO
1 commander in overall control?
2 A. I can say categorically that special operation units from the
3 State Security Service were never under the command of the VJ, nor were
4 they ever engaged at the request or an order by the VJ. They were a State
5 Security Service formation engaged along the lines of service and in
6 cooperation with the Serbian MUP. Therefore, never. We were always
7 absolutely against this kind of engagement.
8 Q. And why was that?
9 A. Well, this was not up to us. This was a legitimate and legal
10 formation, a special unit of the State Security Service, and they were
11 engaged according to their own plans. The army had never had any
12 paramilitary groups within its ranks. It only had voluntary units that
13 were organised on very strict rules and principles governing these
14 matters. We never had any paramilitary formation or group in our ranks.
15 And we were very -- extremely stringent on this.
16 Q. Do you class the JSO or Red Berets as paramilitaries?
17 A. No. They were a legal formation, a special unit, as part of the
18 State Security Service; just as SAG was part of the MUP, the special
19 operation units were part of the State Security Service. So in general,
20 it was also a MUP unit, because it is probably well known that MUP had two
21 sectors: Public security sector and state security sector.
22 Q. Very well. So -- so -- and finally on this topic, a very short
23 answer, if I could ask for it. You would rule out, would you, the
24 possibly that Milorad Ulemek could have been in charge of a joint strike
25 force at the end of July which included VJ forces?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you. Tab 15, please. This is D170. This is a letter from
3 the following year, May 1999, from Colonel General Pavkovic to the Supreme
4 Command Staff. And I want to ask you about paragraph 4.
5 Paragraph 4 reads: "It has been established beyond doubt, and we
6 have already reported on it in regular combat and other reports, that due
7 to the non-compliance with the re-subordination orders, some MUP members
8 and to a considerable extent entire smaller units which 'operate'
9 independently on the ground are committing serious crimes against the
10 Siptar civilian population in settlements or refugee centres -- shelters -
11 murder, rape, plunder, robbery aggravated, theft, et cetera, and they then
12 purposefully attribute or plan to attribute those crimes to units and
13 individuals in the VJ."
14 Now, pausing there for a moment, Mr. Gajic. Can I understand, did
15 you see regular combat and other reports that made allegations against the
16 MUP of that kind?
17 A. Throughout the whole period of NATO bombing of the FRY, I was at
18 the command post with the Supreme Command Staff as the chief of security
19 administration, so I can categorically say that not a single combat report
20 did not contain this kind of allegations that are here under item 4.
21 Q. Pause, please.
22 A. When I testified --
23 Q. Pause, please. There's a double negative in your answer. You
24 say, "Not a single combat report did not contain," as it's been
25 translated. Does that mean to say every report did contain such
1 allegations? Is that what you're trying to indicate?
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: It shouldn't be a
3 double negative. Sorry.
4 MR. EMMERSON: Then it's an interpretation problem.
5 Q. So you say none of the reports you received contained any
6 allegations of crimes committed by the MUP. Is that the position?
7 A. I categorically say "yes."
8 Q. And that covers the whole period of 1998 and 1999, does it?
9 A. The whole period.
10 Q. Thank you. And so far as this letter is concerned, then, this
11 would be the first time you'd heard such allegations being made; is that
12 correct? The first time you'd heard that such allegations were being made
13 at the time.
14 A. I first saw this letter when I testified in another trial.
15 Q. In the Milutinovic case.
16 A. Yes. And in view of my position, had this document arrived at the
17 Supreme Command Staff, I should have seen it. I must have seen it.
18 Secondly, this is addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme
19 Command, but letter did not receive a file number. It was just filed by
20 the sender but was not filed with the recipient, which is inadmissible,
21 which probably indicates that it never arrived. I don't know what
22 happened. Actually, I do know, but it's irrelevant.
23 Q. Well, it's not entirely irrelevant. What did happen?
24 JUDGE ORIE: Please tell us.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that something was done
1 subsequently, because the document was drafted on the 25th of May and
2 after checking the registration, it was found out that it was registered
3 on the 15th of May.
4 MR. EMMERSON:
5 Q. So you're suggesting somebody has been tampering with the records.
6 Is that the position?
7 A. Well, no, I don't know at all. Probably General Pavkovic can
8 answer that question.
9 Q. Do you recognise the signature?
10 A. Yes. Yes. As far as the signature is concerned, everything is in
12 Q. Yes, I see.
13 We're going to come back to this question of -- of allegations
14 being reported in relation to the MUP in a little while, if I may. Can I
15 turn to another topic briefly with you. You gave some evidence yesterday
16 about annex 3 to your witness statement, which is in the white file at tab
17 22, just to remind you. And for the record, that is exhibit marked for
18 identification P1141. And there's just one aspect of it I want to ask you
19 about in a little more detail.
20 You -- you were taken by Mr. Re to the entry which records the
21 presence of Arkan on the territory of Zvecan municipality together with
22 members of the Serbian Guard and his arrival in the area by helicopter.
23 Now, this is a report dated the 23rd of January, 1998.
24 Now, when you gave evidence about this yesterday, you said that
25 the reason why such a matter would be included in a counter-intelligence
1 report was because, first of all, the army considered this to be a
2 paramilitary formation. And then you said this: "They were in contacts
3 with the State Security Service, but in the army's view, they were a
4 paramilitary formation. There existed a strict order of the Chief of
5 Staff according to which paramilitary forces and groups should not be
6 allowed access into Kosovo and Metohija. Therefore, they arrived there
7 without the approval or the knowledge of the army and it was considered
8 that this ought to be included in the report. Besides, there were great
9 problems precisely with that formation. There had been great problems
10 with that formation ever since 1991."
11 Now, we'll just let the transcript catch up. I just want to
12 understand the position here. You were aware of this report being made in
13 January presumably.
14 A. Yes, certainly. And it was signed by my subordinate,
15 Mr. Aco Tomic.
16 Q. When you say, then, in relation to this report that "they," that
17 is Arkan's unit, "were in contact with the State Security Service," what
18 was the basis for that assessment?
19 A. It was not an assessment. The fact was that they were engaged in
20 their tasks with the MUP the whole time. They treated it as a kind of
21 back-up formation. They didn't have a very clear view, but it was based
22 on the rules and -- and the service as a serious institution abided by the
23 rules. They couldn't have been treated as volunteers, because if that
24 were the case, they should have passed the proper procedure for
25 volunteers. So in our eyes, they were a paramilitary formation engaged by
1 the MUP. And what you read just now, I stand by it and I'm not going to
2 repeat it.
3 Q. And just to be clear, you used the expression "State Security
4 Service" yesterday, rather than public security service. You're referring
5 to the RDB; is that correct?
6 A. Yes, the RDB. But it couldn't have been done without the
7 knowledge of the public security sector in the MUP of Serbia. So as I
8 said, there were two sectors: The public sector and the state security
9 sector. Two sectors.
10 Q. At this point in January 1998, did you know how many men were in
11 Arkan's formation or where they were deployed to?
12 A. There were never fewer than 30 of these formations, and they were
13 mostly engaged on the axis between Pristina, due south, to Kosovo Polje,
14 Zvecan and places like that, so in that general area.
15 Q. And they remained in Kosovo throughout 1998; is that correct?
16 A. No. They would come and go, come and go. And we mentioned this
17 problem at the meeting with Mr. Milosevic on the 17th of May, 1999, when
18 we said that we knew about the existence of this formation down there and
19 that they had done certain things that were in contravention of the
20 International Law of War.
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. And we were told that sanctions were going to be imposed or taken.
23 Q. Let me just take you up on that, if I may, for a moment, because I
24 think you were tasked, were you not, by the VJ during 1999 to investigate
25 the presence of irregular, that is, illegal paramilitary groups operating
1 on the territory of Kosovo. Is that correct?
2 A. Yes, we investigated this and reported, and everything was proven
3 to be correct. And now some of the members of this paramilitary
4 formation - one of them was already convicted, who was also in Kosovo, and
5 a week ago four of them were arrested and are going to be prosecuted for
6 war crimes. So there's intense work on punishing all those who committed
7 war crimes in Kosovo.
8 Q. Just --
9 A. That's the state -- states of view.
10 Q. Just pause for a moment. When you gave evidence in the
11 Milutinovic case, you suggested that a number of the paramilitary
12 formations that you discovered were operating on the territory of Kosovo
13 would be issued with SAJ uniforms so that they would be indistinguishable
14 from the MUP forces. Is that correct?
15 A. Yes, they had either MUP or SAJ uniforms, since we knew some of
16 them personally from the previous period, we knew who these people were.
17 Q. And you mentioned the meeting with President Milosevic on the 17th
18 of May. You were present at that meeting. Was the head of the --
19 A. I was.
20 Q. And was the head of the RDB, Radomir Markovic, present at that
21 meeting as well?
22 A. Yes, he was.
23 Q. And during the course of that meeting, did Mr. Markovic raise one
24 particular paramilitary group, known as the Skorpions, under the control
25 of someone called Slobodan Medic, or Boka?
1 A. We raised this issue.
2 Q. Thank you. And help me. Is it correct that your understanding
3 was that that group had -- had entered Kosovo having been facilitated in
4 entering by General Colonel Vlastimir Djordjevic?
5 A. No. Vlastimir Djordjevic, aka --
6 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the nickname.
7 MR. EMMERSON:
8 Q. Sorry, what was the nickname?
9 A. Vlastimir Djordjevic, aka Rodja.
10 Q. Yes. And what was his role, if any, in bringing the Skorpions
11 into Kosovo?
12 A. He was one of the assistants of the Serbian interior minister.
13 Q. So --
14 A. This was within his purview.
15 Q. Yes. Well, you've told us that these were an illegal paramilitary
16 grouping. Is that correct?
17 A. It was not an illegal one. It was entirely legal. They didn't
18 come covertly.
19 Q. I see. Well, then perhaps you can just help me with this. Is it
20 right that you discovered that at the end of March, the 31st of March,
21 1999, that group had been involved in an incident in Podujevo in which ten
22 children and two adults had been killed?
23 A. I wouldn't call it an incident. It's a war crime.
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. On the 31st of March, they killed 14 innocent civilians of
1 Albanian ethnicity. Among them were women and children. One of the
2 members of the group who participated in this, Sasa Cvijan was sentenced
3 to 24 years of imprisonment. And as I said a moment ago, four of them
4 were arrested a week ago since they are suspected perpetrators of that
6 Q. After that crime, the Skorpions were moved off the territory of
7 Kosovo; is that correct?
8 A. Yes, they were taken back to Prolom Banja.
9 Q. Did they come back into Kosovo again?
10 MR. RE: Well --
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, for a shorter period of time.
12 MR. RE: It's getting a long way from the indictment period.
13 We're in March 1999. We're seem to be now going further and deeper into
14 1999. The indictment finishes in September 1998.
15 MR. EMMERSON: The relevance relates to a series of questions and
16 answers that were given by Mr. Stijovic in connection with the RDB's
17 knowledge of the operation of paramilitary groupings on the territory of
18 Kosovo and how that is to be reconciled with the evidence of this witness
19 about RDB involvement with paramilitary groupings.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Well, in certain limits we'll allow you to these
22 MR. EMMERSON: I'll deal with it relatively briefly.
23 Q. Did -- can you help us. As far as you understood the position,
24 and based on the meeting you had on the 17th of May, did
25 General Colonel Djordjevic have any responsibility for reintroducing the
1 Skorpions into Kosovo after that incident?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Thank you. Do you know why they were brought back after having
4 been involved in a crime of that gravity?
5 A. No, I don't.
6 Q. And the information that General Colonel Djordjevic had been
7 involved in that, that was information provided by Mr. Markovic, the head
8 of the RDB; is that correct?
9 A. Yes. At that meeting.
10 Q. Yes. And is it also true that at that meeting Mr. Markovic -- I'm
11 sorry, at that meeting with Mr. Markovic and Mr. Milosevic, the question
12 of the deployment of Arkan's paramilitaries was raised?
13 MR. RE: I renew the objection. We're getting way beyond any, in
14 my respectful submission, any latitude in relation to this questioning.
15 MR. EMMERSON: Well --
16 MR. RE: Deep in 1999, in relation to Arkan. It's nine months
17 after the indictment.
18 MR. EMMERSON: With the greatest of respect, Mr. Re began his
19 examination-in-chief by reference to a document exhibited by this witness
20 concerning the deployment of Arkan's paramilitaries in January 1998 as to
21 which this witness has testified, the connection between that deployment
22 and the RDB, and that is what I'm seeking to explore.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Within certain limits you may proceed, Mr. Emmerson.
24 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you.
25 Q. Just to be clear, was it your understanding that Radomir Markovic
1 had been involved in the deployment of Arkan's men?
2 A. I wouldn't say that he was involved in that. I -- I should say
3 that he gave his consent.
4 Q. Yes. And returning, then, to the document that you exhibited to
5 your witness statement and were taken to by Mr. Re. We have heard some
6 testimony in this court from a man called Zoran Stijovic, who was head of
7 the analytical section of the RDB in Pristina and who appeared to know
8 you. Do you know him?
9 A. Yes, of course.
10 Q. In your opinion as a military intelligence analyst, is it possible
11 that Mr. Stijovic could have been ignorant of the deployment of
12 paramilitary forces in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999?
13 A. It's a hypothetical question, and I really can't give you an
14 answer. I don't know if he was aware of that. I know what I know.
15 Q. Which is the involvement of the RDB directly with Arkan's men.
16 A. No. What I've just told you. I believe that I gave you the gist
17 of it so far.
18 Q. Well, you -- you did give us the gist of it, but it may be that
19 I've misunderstood your testimony. I thought the testimony that you gave
20 us about the deployment in January of 1998 of Arkan's men was that that
21 was a deployment organised by the State Security Service, Mr. Gajic.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. The state security sector was behind that. They knew of it.
25 That's not in dispute.
1 Q. Well, I think it is in dispute, in fact, as between yourself and
2 Mr. Stijovic. But -- but what I'm trying to understand is as an
3 individual based in -- involved in counter-intelligence at the time and
4 bearing in mind that Mr. Stijovic was head of the analytical section of
5 the RDB in Pristina, whether in your opinion it is conceivable that he
6 could not have known of that deployment.
7 A. It is possible that he didn't know. He was the head of analysis,
8 and that department was able to work only on the basis of the reports it
9 received. If there were no reports speaking of the presence of Arkan's
10 unit there, he did not need to know about it, because he was not an
11 operational officer; he was an analysis officer who analysed whatever came
12 and ended up on his desk. If he didn't receive a report about the
13 activities of a given unit, then he wouldn't know about it. Had he been
14 an operations officer, the matter would stand differently.
15 Q. Were you generally exchanging intelligence as between the RDB and
16 your own counter-intelligence units?
17 A. We were exchanging intelligence, but -- well, we let them know
18 what our information was and, well, most often we didn't receive a
19 response from them on that score. But we did exchange information
20 wherever we thought --
21 Q. Did you --
22 A. -- there were matters of interest.
23 Q. Did you inform them from January 1998 that you were aware that
24 paramilitaries were operating in the territory of Kosovo? Is that
25 information that you provided to them as an exchange of intelligence?
1 A. I don't recall this exactly. It's been a long time ago. It's
2 possible that we had our oral exchange of information so the head of the
3 military intelligence could have informed the head of the RDB,
4 Mr. Stanisic, I believe. At any rate, we never withheld from them any
5 important information. We did not keep the information to ourselves.
6 Q. Thank you. Two final matters on this general topic, if I may.
7 Colonel Crosland has testified to the Trial Chamber that during 1998 he
8 observed groups of men he described as having the appearance of
9 paramilitaries in the Decan area and followed them across the border into
10 Montenegro, where they appeared to be rallying or corralling together.
11 Can you help us at all as to the operation of paramilitary
12 formations in the Western Kosovo area generally and in Decani in
13 particular? In 1998.
14 A. As far as I remember, in that period in the Decani area there was
15 a group from the special police units, as far -- for a while there, but
16 I -- I don't recall anything else.
17 Q. Very well. And -- and the final question on this topic, and
18 perhaps you can just deal with this very briefly: You testified in the
19 Milutinovic trial about the infiltration into the 125th Brigade of a group
20 called the Pauk Group or the Spider Group, led by Jugoslav Petrovic, who
21 was believed to be an agent of French intelligence. Is that correct?
22 A. This wasn't the case of an infiltration, as you put it; it was a
23 volunteer unit of 23 men at the head of which was Jugoslav Petrusic, not
24 Petrovic. Otherwise, a member of the French intelligence service and an
25 agent of that service, which is something he confirmed to us when we spoke
1 to him back in the month of May 1999. There is nothing controversial
2 about that. He, I believe, was even the target of an investigation, but
3 no evidence was found against him. But this was a volunteer unit that had
4 passed the procedure in place and become formerly a volunteer unit.
5 There is even an order of the commander of the 3rd Army to the
6 effect that this unit should become part of the 125th Brigade. I repeat
7 that the army did not have any paramilitary formations within its
9 Q. Forgive me, Mr. Gajic, but when you testified in the Milutinovic
10 trial you gave evidence that this group had sidestepped the regular
11 procedure, that they had not gone through the appropriate vetting
12 procedure, and that their entry into the ranks of the 125th had been
13 organised by insiders acting improperly. Did you not?
14 A. No. I spoke in no uncertain terms, and I even had a discussion
15 with Judge Bonomy about that, because he didn't understand me. They were
16 cleared -- I mean, they got the clearance after the vetting procedure, but
17 the procedure was not thoroughly carried out. Had it been thoroughly
18 done, half of them would not have passed it, because they had crime --
19 criminal records; they had been involved in robberies, and so on and so
20 forth, and nevertheless got the clearance.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, the Chamber now receives evidence about
22 a 23-strong -- a 23-man-strong group led by someone who is supposed to be
23 an agent for the French intelligence service. We have got no idea what we
24 are talking about at this moment. So what the activities of this group
25 were, whether you'd give that any follow-up, that's --
1 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
2 JUDGE ORIE: We're talking about the formalities, rather than --
3 MR. EMMERSON: I -- I take Your Honour's point.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes?
5 MR. EMMERSON:
6 Q. Can you help us very briefly --
7 JUDGE ORIE: If there's any relevance in it. Of course, I do not
8 know but ...
9 MR. EMMERSON:
10 Q. Can you help us, very briefly. When was that group in Kosovo?
11 A. Sometime in the second half of April through to the first half of
12 May. When we discovered that Jugoslav Petrusic was suspected of being a
13 French agent, an agent of the French intelligence, the group was sent
15 Q. And this was -- sorry, this was 1998 or 1999?
16 A. 1998.
17 Q. Thank you. Now, I want, if I may, to turn to the end of July
18 operations that you have mentioned from time to time. Could you have a
19 look, please, first of all, behind tab 16 in the bundle. And this is --
20 just bear with me one moment. This is a document not yet exhibited or
21 marked for identification. And its identification number is 1D67-0001.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, that would receive number?
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be marked for
24 identification as D187.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
1 MR. EMMERSON:
2 Q. Now, first of all, this is a document signed, as you can see, I
3 think, by Colonel Delic on the 8th of August, 1998 which refers, as we can
4 see in the opening words, to a strictly confidential order dated the 7th
5 of August and sends an analysis of combat operations from the 18th of July
6 to the 6th of August, 1998 along the axes in which the 549th Motorised
7 Brigade took part.
8 Now, my first question, before we look at the detail, Mr. --
9 Mr. Gajic, is: We have seen an entry in the minutes of the Joint Command
10 for Kosovo and Metohija for the 7th of August in which the Deputy Prime
11 Minister, Mr. Sainovic, complains about the unnecessary destruction of
12 civilian property during the course of this operation. Were you aware
13 that such complaints were being expressed on a political level about the
14 operation that had occurred at the end of July and the beginning of
16 A. No, I wasn't.
17 Q. Do you know what this report is referring back to when it speaks
18 of a strictly confidential order of the 7th of August?
19 A. This is a report made by the command of 549th Brigade, signed by
20 its commander, pursuant to the order of the command of the Pristina Corps.
21 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear the date. Can
22 Mr. Emmerson switch off his mic.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It speaks of the analysis of the
24 combat activities for the period between the 18th July and the 6th of
1 Now, what was going on and what tasks were carried out in the area
2 of the 549th Brigade. Well, I saw this report. I believe that under
3 items 3 -- item 3 it speaks of the treatment of the civilian population,
4 and so on and so forth.
5 In any event, it's the sort of report that was normally done as a
6 periodical analysis of the activities heretofore.
7 MR. EMMERSON:
8 Q. You --
9 A. And all the units of the Pristina Corps submitted their respective
11 Q. You mentioned paragraph 3. And in the third subparagraph of that
12 paragraph, the entry reads: "After the liberation of the place, there
13 were incidents of theft and unnecessary destruction of property by MUP
14 forces holding positions who were securing the liberated territory and by
15 civilians from these areas out of revenge."
16 Now, just to take this as one example that you say you saw at the
17 time, Mr. Gajic, I'm trying to understand the testimony you gave us
18 earlier when you said you never saw VJ reports of crimes committed by the
20 A. Yes. This wasn't contained in any of the combat reports. This is
21 the 549th Brigade report sent to the Pristina Corps from where reports
22 were made and sent to the 3rd Army and then the 3rd Army in their turn
23 sent reports to the Supreme Command. Why this wasn't entered into that
24 particular report, I don't know.
25 Q. I think we misunderstand each other. I think we misunderstand
1 each other, Mr. Gajic. You told us a moment ago you saw this report at
2 the time, and it makes reference to crimes committed by MUP forces.
3 Now, a little earlier in your testimony, when I showed you the
4 letter at tab 15 of the bundle from Colonel General Pavkovic, you said
5 that you never saw a report during 1998 or 1999 of crimes committed by the
7 Now, help us. What is the position? Did you or didn't you see
8 reports from the VJ of crimes committed by the MUP? Any report.
9 A. Well, we seem to be at cross-purposes at times, the two of us. I
10 saw this report during proofing for my testimony here. It was at that
11 point in time that this was shown to me.
12 Q. No, Mr. Gajic, that's not correct, I don't think, because it's not
13 one of the exhibits to your statement. It's not one of the documents that
14 you've been commenting upon. And it's not one of the documents that the
15 Prosecution, so far as we're aware, have shown to you before.
16 Now, the evidence you gave us a moment ago is that you'd seen the
17 document at the time, as I understood it. Is that not correct?
18 A. No. I saw this document during my proofing for this testimony.
19 This is an original document of the 549th Brigade. The command reports of
20 units did not reach the General Staff. Combat reports were sent to the
21 General Staff, which presented --
22 Q. I think you should pause for a moment. I think you should pause
23 for a moment.
24 Mr. Re is sitting opposite me in the courtroom. This is a
25 document that was not disclosed to the JDB and not a document provided by
1 the Prosecution to us. If Mr. Re is in a position to confirm that he
2 showed you this document in proofing, then now is the time for him to do
4 I see no response.
5 You're confident, are you, that this document was shown to you by
6 proofing, in proofing sessions?
7 A. Well, yes. While I was being proofed here now, upon my arrival
8 here, I was shown this document.
9 Q. Very well. Very well. Well, if there's been a failure of
10 communication between Prosecution and Defence, then that's not your
11 responsibility. This is the first time, is it, you've seen a VJ report
12 reporting crimes from the MUP? When you came here to -- to do the
13 proofing for your statement?
14 A. Well, the document dated the 25th of May focused on item 4, war
15 crimes committed against the civilian population. There was mention of
16 murder, and so on and so forth. That's where the focus was and less focus
17 was given to thefts, robberies, and so on and so forth. So it was the
18 grave crimes that were being focused on. And as for these other matters,
19 we did not -- and we did not receive any information on these crimes of
20 any gravity in any of the combat reports; whereas, when it came to reports
21 about theft, property crimes, well, we did see that. I mean, there was a
22 war on and everybody is -- was engaged in that sort of misconduct. And
23 the point was that once such crimes were reported on, they were supposed
24 to be prosecuted.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.
1 MR. EMMERSON: I'm going to move on.
2 JUDGE ORIE: You put to the witness that he testified that he saw
3 the document at the time. I have not found yet --
4 MR. EMMERSON: It may -- I mean, obviously I'm on my feet. It may
5 be that I understood the answer in that way and --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
7 MR. EMMERSON: -- the transcript does not reflect it. I'll
8 obviously have to check the transcript.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
10 MR. EMMERSON:
11 Q. Mr. Gajic, just returning to this document, please, for a moment.
12 Under paragraph 1, third bullet point, you can see the record that units
13 of the 549th together with the 9th MUP Detachment were between the 2nd and
14 4th of August engaged in what is described as the liberation of the Mece
15 village, Crmljane village, Crmljanska Kosa, Kraljane village axis. Do you
16 see that?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 MR. EMMERSON: Now, I don't want to take up time producing a map,
19 but can you please confirm for us --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, where does it read that exactly? I see
21 that under 1 it says that MUP forces were engaged on the same axis as
22 combat groups of the -- Combat Group 1 of the 549th Brigade.
23 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
24 JUDGE ORIE: And then later it says: "The MUP unit from Nis 9th
25 was engaged in liberation" -- no, let me just -- yes.
1 MR. EMMERSON: Sorry.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Under the -- well, let's say the fourth bullet
3 point under there it says that: "The MUP unit, the 9th MUP Detachment,
4 was engaged in" --
5 MR. EMMERSON: Yes. I'm -- I'm sorry, I'm reading the fourth
6 bullet point in conjunction with the preamble in paragraph 1. Perhaps I
7 should read the exact text.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But you are suggesting in your question -- you
9 say you can see the record that units of the 549th together with.
10 That's -- I -- that's more or less a conclusion interpretation. I
11 think --
12 MR. EMMERSON: Well --
13 JUDGE ORIE: -- it should be clear from --
14 MR. EMMERSON: Very well.
15 Q. What the preamble and paragraph -- the preamble indicates that it
16 is an analysis of combat operations from the 18th of July to the 6th of
17 August along the axes that the 549th Motorised Brigade took part.
18 Paragraph 1 says: "Between the 18th of July and the 6th of August
19 MUP forces were engaged on all the same axes as BG-1 of the 549th
20 Motorised Brigade."
21 And then as a subparagraph of that, bullet point 3 indicates that
22 between the 2nd and the 4th of August, the MUP unit from Nis, the 9th MUP
23 Detachment was engaged in the liberation of Mece village, Crmljane
24 village, Crmljanska Kosa to Kraljane village axis."
25 Now, I'm -- that -- that is the ipsissima verba of the text. My
1 understanding of that is that was a joint -- as it indicates in paragraph
2 1, deployment of BG-1 of the 549th Motorised Brigade along that axis and
3 the 9th MUP Detachment.
4 I mean, if I'm -- if I appear to Your Honour to be misreading it,
5 then obviously I'll stand corrected but --
6 JUDGE ORIE: No. It reads the first they were engaged along the
7 same axis. What is still to be established, whether this was a joint,
8 coordinated action or whether it was --
9 MR. EMMERSON: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry.
10 JUDGE ORIE: -- by coincidence.
11 MR. EMMERSON: I do apologise.
12 JUDGE ORIE: I mean, the one is a location.
13 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, I see.
14 JUDGE ORIE: The other --
15 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry. That was not -- the reason for my error
16 was that wasn't the focus specifically of the information I was seeking.
17 But I take Your Honour's point.
18 JUDGE ORIE: No. I --
19 MR. EMMERSON:
20 Q. You would agree, would you, first of all, Mr. Gajic, that what
21 this indicates by way of a report is that the BG-1 of the 549th was
22 deployed along the same axis as the 9th MUP Detachment as appears in the
23 bullet point 1.3?
24 A. Yes. They were conducting a coordinated action. And under 1
25 bullet it says: The engaged MUP units were -- under 3, 9th Detachment; a
1 group from Nis, had the strength of some 250 men.
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. Supported by -- and that means the 549th -- the 82-millimetre
4 mortar detachment.
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. So they were launching the activity; whereas, they had the support
7 of the -- of a unit from the 549th Brigade.
8 Q. Yes. I think if we look a little further down in the document,
9 two -- two paragraphs further down, there's a paragraph that indicates
10 that the combat group in this composition provided support to the MUP
11 forces and enabled them to carry out successful combat operations.
13 A. Where is that reference, please?
14 Q. You'll find that --
15 A. What part are you reading from?
16 Q. Do you have it? I'm reading -- if you look at bullet point 1 --
17 the third bullet point 1 --
18 A. Which page?
19 Q. Page 1.
20 A. Page 1.
21 Q. Page 1 in the B/C/S version, the paragraph just below halfway
22 down. Do you have that?
23 A. Uh-huh. "The combat group in this composition provided support to
24 the MUP forces and enabled it to carry out successful combat operations."
25 Is that what you meant?
1 Q. Yes, exactly. Thank you.
2 Now, Mece is a village along the main Gjakova-to-Klina road;
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And the next village from Mece is Crmljane and then Rakovina; is
6 that right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Thank you. And --
9 A. Well, this was unblocking the roads, to be precise. So that was
10 the action to unblock the roads.
11 Q. Yes. To your knowledge, were crimes committed during the course
12 of that operation?
13 A. No. I have no knowledge of that sort.
14 MR. EMMERSON: Can we go into private session for one moment,
16 JUDGE ORIE: We'll turn into private session.
17 [Private session]
14 [Open session]
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
16 MR. EMMERSON:
17 Q. Mr. Gajic, during the course of the trial of Slobodan Milosevic,
18 the Prosecution called a witness under the pseudonym K32, who testified
19 that he had been conscripted in March 1998 and that in June 1998 he was
20 assigned to the logistics corps in Prizren as a driver and then assigned
21 to Combat Group 2 of the 549th under the command of General Delic.
22 And amongst other matters, he testified that between the 1st and
23 3rd of August he was present with the VJ contingent on the operation on
24 the main Gjakova-Klina road, including the village of Mece. He -- he
25 testified that en route towards Mece, he came across a group of soldiers
1 standing a few metres from the body of two Albanians who had been shot in
2 the head and mutilated and was told by the soldiers that they had been
3 captured, questioned, and then summarily killed. And on entry into Mece
4 itself, he heard and saw Colonel Delic personally order a tank to open
5 fire at a house, and after two shells had been fired, a group of
6 civilians, mainly women and children, ran out of the house and
7 Colonel Delic then sent in the infantry.
8 Next he said the group entered Rakovina, where he saw MUP and PJP
9 officers burning houses and looting property. And the references for
10 those extracts are 8225 to 8228, 8320.
11 No allegations of that crime found their way to you, so far as the
12 VJ were concerned; is that correct?
13 A. No. And as far as I can remember, I listened to General Delic's
14 testimony and I think he refuted that with strong arguments, even this
15 witness's testimony and the statement of this witness that you mentioned.
16 I don't know if you had an opportunity to study General Delic's evidence,
17 and I think that's what he said.
18 Q. Yes, I have.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, just for the record, in order to avoid
20 other people seeking for ages, your last reference was to 8230, wasn't it?
21 MR. EMMERSON: It should have been 8320. I don't know if it
22 says --
23 JUDGE ORIE: No, it says 8320.
24 MR. EMMERSON: Oh.
25 JUDGE ORIE: The reason why I'm asking is because our transcript
1 behind tab 17 --
2 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: -- goes until 8290.
4 MR. EMMERSON: Your Honour is quite right.
5 JUDGE ORIE: So I won't find it there.
6 MR. EMMERSON: It must in those circumstances, be my error in my
7 notes and be 8230. If Your Honour would just give me a moment.
8 JUDGE ORIE: I'll have a look at ...
9 The events in Rakovina --
10 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: -- are described in the lower part of --
12 MR. EMMERSON: 8230.
13 JUDGE ORIE: -- 8230.
14 So for the record, therefore, where you may have said and it was
15 recorded 8320 should be 8230.
16 MR. EMMERSON: Your Honour, thank you very much.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
18 MR. EMMERSON:
19 Q. Could I ask you a little more, please, about the 52nd Military
20 Police Battalion. In particular, in terms of the deployment that you
21 describe in paragraph 22 of your witness statement, do you know who
22 Major Janos Celj was?
23 A. No, I don't know.
24 Q. So you didn't follow the testimony, obviously, then that he gave
25 in the Milosevic trial.
1 A. No, I didn't. I didn't listen to all the testimonies in the
2 Milosevic trial.
3 Q. Very well. Very well. And Major Celj was company commander of a
4 unit called the 2nd Motorised Company, as we understand it. Can you help
5 us as to where they were deployed?
6 A. Part of which unit? It was the 2nd Company, but in which unit?
7 In which brigade?
8 Q. Well, the record indicates -- the record indicates the 2nd
9 Motorised Company of the -- I'll check to make absolutely certain I've got
10 this correct -- of the 549th. Yes.
11 A. I don't know.
12 Q. Very well. Mr. Celj testified in the Milosevic trial that an
13 individual by the name of Rade Radojevic -- that is Lieutenant
14 Rade Radojevic was a commander commanding a battalion of the military
15 police in August in the area securing the dam on the reservoir at Lake
16 Radoniq. This is in the Milosevic transcript at page 47278.
17 Does the name Rade Radojevic ring any bells to you?
18 A. No, it doesn't.
19 Q. Behind tab 18 is a conviction record - I'll see if it, perhaps,
20 prompts your recollection at all - of a series of officers from within
21 the -- or two officers from within the 549th, a conviction in September
22 2002 at the military court in Nis of Lieutenant Colonel Zlatan Mancic
23 together with Rade Radojevic for the murder of two Albanian civilians in
24 April 1999. And according to the record, Lieutenant Colonel Mancic was a
25 senior officer within Combat Group 3 and Radojevic was his subordinate.
1 Do you recall anything about this conviction?
2 A. Look, generally speaking, I can give you the following answer:
3 Between the 1st and the 7th of June, 1999, I was with General Vasiljevic
4 in Kosovo, and the subject matter there was, among other things, war
5 crimes. As far as I can remember, there were 95 detected cases in which
6 there were reasonable ground to suspect that war crimes were suspected.
7 They were in a certain stage of procedure. Most probably these gentlemen
8 were part of the procedure.
9 If you are going to ask me about individual details, it is very
10 difficult for me to comment.
11 Q. Yes. What I'm -- what I'm interested in is that it appears that
12 Mr. Radojevic, one of those, in fact, in the end convicted of murder of
13 Albanian civilians, was in command of a military police battalion in the
14 area of Lake Radoniq in August 1998. That's why I'm interested.
15 A. It is possible. I am not contravening you. But what I said in
16 principle is what I said before. All those who were detected at the time
17 were within the certain procedures instituted against them. No one was
18 forgiven for anything.
19 Q. Very well. And you have no specific recollection of any
20 connection between war crimes, prosecutions, and those in charge at -- of
21 the Military Police Battalion or commanders located in the Lake Radoniq
22 area in August 1998.
23 A. This specifically I don't remember; however, it was found out that
24 they had committed war crimes. Criminal reports were filed and
25 proceedings instituted. And you said that punishments were pronounced.
1 For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Stosic from the 37th Brigade and
2 a group of soldier were also prosecuted and punished. Another officer
3 with the 137 volunteers were -- was convicted to several years in prison.
4 So all these procedures and proceedings were completed. As I said, no one
5 has been forgiven for what they did.
6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
7 A. And I don't remember this specific --
8 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... The question. I'm not
9 interested in other instances but simply in the commanders stationed at
10 the lake during the period that we're concerned with. If you have no
11 recollection of that, then --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.
13 MR. EMMERSON: I'm very close to concluding.
14 JUDGE ORIE: I'm looking at the clock. We would like to have a
15 break, but we first ask the witness to leave the courtroom. We'll have a
16 break. And then I'll further inquire into timing. And I might
17 deliver ...
18 [The witness stands down]
19 JUDGE ORIE: How much time would you still need?
20 MR. EMMERSON: No more than 15 minutes.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Not more than 15 minutes.
22 Mr. Guy-Smith?
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'll be extremely short. I believe I have one
24 area, maybe two. I shouldn't be more than ten minutes. Maybe. Maybe --
25 maybe -- well, to be safe, say maybe 15. But that would be the absolute
2 JUDGE ORIE: Makes 30. Yes.
3 Mr. Harvey.
4 MR. HARVEY: Your Honour, I have no plans for any questions for
5 this witness.
6 JUDGE ORIE: That would take us half an hour.
7 Mr. Re, how much time at this moment your estimate would be you
8 would need?
9 MR. RE: How long does that leave?
10 JUDGE ORIE: Well --
11 MR. RE: Counting down from quarter to --
12 JUDGE ORIE: I'd rather ask you how much time you would need and
13 then see whether any time remains, because there are other matters as
15 MR. RE: I would think between five and ten minutes. Not very
17 JUDGE ORIE: Five to ten minutes. That leaves time now to read
18 two decisions.
19 The first decision is a decision on an application for videolink
20 testimony. This is a decision on the Prosecution's application which was
21 filed on the 19th of October, 2007 to have a witness's testimony heard by
22 way of videolink connection with a location in the former Yugoslavia.
23 I shall not name the witness in case an application for protective
24 measures arises in the future.
25 The witness is said to have serious health problems, making travel
1 to The Hague unduly burdensome for him. The Prosecution asks for the
2 witness's testimony to be heard on or about the 31st of October, 2007.
3 This is relatively short notice, but the Registry apparently is able to
4 meet the request if a decision is issued today. It is for this reason
5 that the Chamber asked -- asked the Defence yesterday for an oral
6 response, and the Defence kindly enough provided its response on the same
7 day, informing us that it did not oppose the application.
8 The witness in question has been issued with a subpoena, and
9 therefore the question of his significance as a witness has already been
11 There remains the question of his health. The Chamber has seen a
12 recent medical report on the witness which states that he suffers from
13 high blood pressure as well as from spinal cord complaints causing
14 dizziness and headache. All the medical records of the witness indicate a
15 history of such complaints.
16 In light of the information we have received, the Chamber believes
17 that the witness's testimony through videolink is justified in his -- in
18 this instance. We therefore request the Registrar to make the necessary
20 And this concludes the Chamber's decision on the Prosecution's
22 I will now deliver a decision on the admission of exhibits which
23 were introduced through the Witness Crosland.
24 On the 24th of May, 2007, the Chamber provisionally admitted,
25 under seal, a number of documents which were exhibited in the Limaj case
1 and which were tendered by the Prosecution in this case through witness
2 Crosland. The relevant documents accompanied Mr. Crosland's testimony in
3 the Limaj case, which has already been admitted in this case on the 19th
4 of April, 2007 as Exhibit P69. There are 41 accompanying documents in
6 The provisional nature of the admission of these documents was
7 that, despite no objections from the Defence as to their admission, the
8 Chamber wanted to study the documents which it had received only shortly
9 before Mr. Crosland's testimony in order to be able to reach a final
10 decision on their admission. After its review, the Chamber would then
11 inform the parties whether any of the documents would be inadmissible.
12 For reference on this, see transcript pages 4750 through 4753.
13 Upon review, the Chamber found that five of these 41 exhibits had
14 already been tendered by the Defence and admitted into evidence. These
15 are Exhibits 76, 78, 81, 84, and 87; of course, all D numbers. These are
16 respectively tabs 38, 39, 43, 46, and 34 in the Limaj exhibit binder
17 provided to the Chamber and the Defence by the Prosecution.
18 Furthermore, the document behind tab 15 of that binder, which was
19 not MFI'd, was also tendered by the Defence and marked for identification
20 as D110. This leaves us with 36 MFI'd documents from the Limaj case:
21 D110 tendered by both the Defence and the Prosecution, and 35 documents
22 tendered by the Prosecution as MFIs P819 through P853. However, out of
23 these documents, MFI P822 is identical to MFI D107 and MFI P824 is
24 identical to MFI D108. Since they are duplicates, we decide to strike
25 MFIs D107 and D108 from the record.
1 In relation to the old Rule 92 bis (D), which doesn't exist any
2 more, at least not as it was, the Trial Chamber in the Naletilic and
3 Martinovic case held that "Exhibits accompanying transcripts form an
4 inseparable and indispensable part of the testimony and can be admitted
5 along with the transcripts." This was a quote. This is in paragraph 8 of
6 the "Decision Regarding Prosecutor's Notice of Intent to Offer Transcripts
7 under Rule 92 bis (D)," which was filed on the 9th of July, 2001.
8 We agree with this conclusion and consider that the 36 documents
9 at issue here are so intrinsically linked to the transcript of
10 Mr. Crosland's testimony in the Limaj case that they make up one
11 inseparable body of evidence. As such, they should continue to be part of
12 the record of the present case and are therefore admitted, under seal,
13 without any further provision.
14 Having decided that, the Chamber recalls that the Prosecution
15 informed it that, in relation to the exhibits from the Limaj case, the
16 British government provided the so-called dip-tels to the Prosecution
17 under Rule 70. This is at page 2924. However, it may be that not all of
18 the exhibits originating from the Limaj case were provided to the
19 Prosecution under Rule 70, as some of them are not dip-tels and are
20 documents which are originally in B/C/S. These are Exhibits P833, P838,
21 P840, P841, P842, P844, and P848. We therefore invite the Prosecution to
22 inform us, within a week from today, whether these seven exhibits can be
24 Finally, the Chamber further recalls that the Defence tendered six
25 further documents through Mr. Crosland, which were MFI'd but not admitted.
1 Two of these are photographs, MFIs D111 and D112; two are maps, D36 and
2 D106; and two are Serbian military documents, MFIs D88 and D109. On the
3 25th of September, 2007, the Chamber's legal staff was informed by the
4 Prosecution that it has no objection to the admission of these documents.
5 In relation to D88, the Chamber notes that it's almost identical to
6 Exhibit D34. The Chamber was informed by Mr. Emmerson on the 24th of May
7 of 2007 in court that the parties had agreed that the two documents should
8 be assigned different numbers and that the parties would ensure that the
9 translations of the two documents are linked. This is at transcript pages
10 4752 and 4753.
11 The two Serbian military documents tend to show the activities of
12 the Serbian military forces in late May 1998 and the two photographs show
13 a Serbian unit on a hill, albeit at an unknown date. D36 is a map marked
14 by Mr. Crosland in court and D106 is a Serbian military map from 1998
15 depicting the area relevant to this case.
16 The Chamber considers these documents relevant, as they tend to
17 provide information on how the events related to the indictment unfolded;
18 in particular, in relation to the armed conflict. We therefore admit
19 these six documents, with a request to the registrar to note in the
20 e-court system that Exhibits D34 and D88 are almost identical.
21 And this concludes the Chamber's ruling on this matter.
22 We will have a break until 1.00. Then the Chamber wants to stick
23 very strictly to the time estimates, because it might leave some time,
24 although limited, for other matters as well.
25 We'll resume at 1.00 sharp.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.36 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.59 p.m.
3 [The witness entered court]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Since I announced that we would be strict, we start.
5 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.
7 MR. EMMERSON:
8 Q. Mr. Gajic, the last tab I want to ask you about is -- if you could
9 please turn behind tab 19. And I'm going to ask some questions about
10 Exhibit D146.
11 And just so that we can orientate ourselves in this document,
12 Mr. Gajic, this is an investigator's note of an interview with a man
13 called Ersad Colovic, who was -- or is recorded as having been conscripted
14 on the 18th of March, 1998 and assigned on the 8th of June, 1998 to the
15 549th Brigade, 2nd Motorised Company, 1st Motorised Platoon, 3rd Squad,
16 stationed in Gjakova, and under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Rade
17 Radojevic as his platoon commander. That's the gentleman who was the
18 subject of the conviction we looked at behind the previous tab. And
19 Major Janos Celj, as his company commander. The gentleman who's testimony
20 I read to you from the Milosevic case a moment ago.
21 MR. EMMERSON: Would Your Honour just give me a moment.
22 Q. I think -- if we can turn, please, to page 5, which sets out those
23 particulars and then -- just to confirm those. And then to page 11, where
24 the substance of the report is set out.
25 This individual reported to the Office of the Prosecutor that as
1 part of the squad under the command of Lieutenant Rade Radojevic he was
2 deployed in the area around Radoniq Lake until late August and took part
3 in attacks on a number of villages in the area. And in particular, an
4 attack is described in August of 1998 on the village of what is described
5 as Gornji Brits, but I think is clearly given the geography, Gornji Bites,
6 in these terms:
7 "Most of the people" -- I'm looking at about halfway down the
8 page. "Most of people who were killed were killed in their yards while
9 they were trying to flee. We used to use anti-tank anti-armour launchers
10 into houses. This killed a lot of people. Orders were to kill people in
11 their yards or in front of their houses. Not everyone was killed. One
12 group we would get orders to kill everyone, so we would kill everyone.
13 With other groups, we would be under orders not to kill, so we would let
14 them all go. The major made these orders and the second lieutenant
15 sometimes, mostly the major. The largest group of persons killed that I
16 am aware was ten persons (women and children). This happens in G. Brits,
17 Gornji Brits. It was in August. We entered the village. We were under
18 orders. We found the group and we were under orders to kill them, so we
20 And a little further down he describes the people as women in
21 their 30s and 40s, men in their 50s, two children, about 12 or 13 years
22 old. And he says: "No one lived. They all died. They were all
23 executed. They were shot at by two squads who received orders to kill
24 them. One of those squads was my squad."
25 And he a little later on he says that he and the soldiers with him
1 stayed in the area that night, but by the morning the bodies were gone."
2 And at the bottom of the page: "The dead bodies would not be there the
3 next morning. They were collected by the militia."
4 Were you aware of VJ involvement during August in military
5 activities in Gornji Bites?
6 A. Well, no. I said that I wasn't aware of this incident when you
7 asked me about it. If this is indeed how things transpired, there was
8 criminal prosecution --
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. -- in -- against the people involved, against the commanding
11 officers. As for this specific case, I'm not aware of it at all. This is
12 a statement of one witness. I don't know if there are other statements
13 corroborating this.
14 Q. For the avoidance of any misunderstanding, this is not the same
15 incident as the incident for which Mr. Radojevic was prosecuted.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But Mr. Emmerson, you asked whether the witness
17 was aware of VJ involvement during August in military activities in this
18 place. There's no need for you to say this is just one statement.
19 It's -- of course, the Chamber -- if it's only one statement, the Chamber
20 is aware of it; if there are more statements, you might not know about it.
21 That's -- but your answer was clear.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Emmerson.
23 MR. EMMERSON: Yes. Thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
25 MR. EMMERSON:
1 Q. Did you have any reports of operations in Gornji Bites or those
2 villages during August, you yourself?
3 A. No. I personally didn't receive any such reports, and this is the
4 first time I hear of it, of the things you read.
5 MR. EMMERSON: Yes. Thank you. Those are my questions.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Emmerson.
7 Mr. Gajic, you'll now be further cross-examined by Mr. Guy-Smith.
8 MR. EMMERSON: Just -- I'm sorry.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 MR. EMMERSON: Just before Mr. Guy-Smith does that, tab 17, the
11 transcript of the testimony of Witness K32 --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 MR. EMMERSON: -- is not yet marked for identification. It's
14 Defence Exhibit --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. EMMERSON: -- 1D67-006.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Registrar, could you assign a number for
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be marked for
20 identification as D188.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
22 MR. EMMERSON: And tab 18 is the conviction document for
23 Mr. Radojevic, which is Defence 1D67-0087.
24 JUDGE ORIE: That would be number?
25 THE REGISTRAR: Marked for identification as D189, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
2 Could I invite the parties to see what is needed to get an idea of
3 the context and what is not needed to have an idea about the context,
4 because both 17 and 18 are rather lengthy documents. So perhaps the size
5 could be reduced, taking out matters that are less relevant. But that
6 could even be done at a later stage.
7 Mr. Guy-Smith.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Guy-Smith is Defence counsel for Mr. Balaj, and
10 he'll now further cross-examine you, Mr. Gajic.
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
12 Q. You mentioned in your testimony earlier that sometime around the
13 29th of July there was what I understood - and I'm hoping you can help
14 me - an operation that you called Grom-3. And my question to you is:
15 Was there an operation in 1998 which was known by the name of Grom, or
16 Grom, which I understand means "Thunder," which was an operation involving
17 the VJ?
18 A. Yes. This was an operation in which the VJ was involved pursuant
19 to the directive issued by the Supreme Defence Council.
20 Q. And the operation called the Grom Operation, which -- which we're
21 talking about, that's an operation that began in July; correct?
22 A. That's the same operation. It's just that its code name was
24 Q. Before July, I take it there was no implementation of the
25 Operation Grom within the VJ. Correct?
1 A. No. Up to that point it was the MUP that launched all the
2 activities against the terrorists with -- acting in coordination with the
4 Q. Now, when you say it was the MUP who was launching all the
5 activities against the terrorists in coordination with the VJ, were they
6 operating under that same plan? Was that also the Grom Operation? Or was
7 that a different -- did that operation have a different name?
8 A. No, that wasn't the operation. There existed a plan of combat
9 against the terrorist forces, but it did not have a title such as
10 Operation Grom, but nothing that was done outside of a plan.
11 Q. So just so I'm very clear, before July any operation that existed
12 was an operation that was launched by MUP. It did not have a name, and it
13 was in coordination with the VJ. And after July, then there was Operation
14 Grom. Am I correct in -- in my understanding?
15 A. Yes, you're correct in your understanding. I repeat, before the
16 month of July there existed a plan. There is always a plan in place when
17 you're deploying forces, especially when you're deploying combined forces,
18 such as the VJ and the MUP.
19 Now, Operation Grom-3 was a separate operation that was carried
20 out in the months of July, August, and ended in September.
21 Q. But before that time, there -- there was no -- there was no
22 operation involving MUP that was called Operation Grom, was there? That
23 was specifically defined --
24 A. Apologies. It wasn't called that way, no.
25 Q. Okay. Now, you were asked a question earlier about whether or not
1 there were any special police units in the Decani area in 1998, and I
2 believe your response was that you believed that there were some but that
3 you couldn't recall anything further.
4 I'm wondering whether or not you -- have you ever heard of a
5 police unit called the Munja Group that operated in this area in 1998.
6 A. I don't know. I am not aware of a unit with such a name.
7 Q. Did you ever hear about an individual by the name of
8 Nebojsa Minic, who I believe his nickname was Mrtiv or "death", who
9 operated in this area during 1998? And by "this area," I'm talking about,
10 obviously, Decani area.
11 A. No.
12 Q. Did you ever hear about an individual by the name of
13 Vidomir Salipur who was a member of any police unit or special unit
14 operating during that time?
15 A. No. No, I never heard about such an individual.
16 Q. Okay. One -- and one last -- one last name, which is Srdan - and
17 I could be pronouncing it incorrectly, and if I am, I apologise. That's
18 S-r-d-a-n, last name is Perovic, who I believe was a deputy company
19 commander. And that would have probably been in some part of the MUP, but
20 I'm not exactly sure exactly which part. Does that name ring a bell?
21 A. I know the name of Srdjan Perovic. He was a captain. If that's
22 the same person. Srdjan Perovic was a captain of the police who had been
23 captured by the KLA. He was killed later on, and we have --
24 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...?
25 A. -- the findings, the pathological findings, and so on and so
1 forth. If that's the person.
2 Q. I'd like you to see if you can help us with regard to a particular
3 document in -- in light of -- of some of the answers given. And perhaps
4 you can clear something up for us, if you could, and we can see D162,
5 marked for identification.
6 And I'm hoping that you can help us just with -- with one part.
7 As I understand the document, the date is the 24th of June, 1998.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And that would be sometime before the month of July, if I'm not
11 mistaken, about a month before July 29th. Right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. The subject of the document is report on the measures and actions
14 taken to protect damaged and abandoned property and on the legality of
15 police actions during Operation Grom, "Thunder," for the period from 29
16 May 1998 to 20 June 1998.
17 As I understand this document - and this is where I'd like some
18 help for you, especially in light of the answers you've just given - this
19 document reflects that the police were involved in Operation Grom
20 beginning at the end of May through close to the end of June approximately
21 a month before you have told us that the operation itself started with the
22 VJ. Could you -- could you be of some help with that, please.
23 A. I -- if I can be of assistance. The name Grom denoted the general
24 plan for Kosovo and Metohija in relation to the resolution of the problems
25 there. Most probably the colleagues from the MUP were aware of this name
1 and used it in order to have some sort of a cover of -- for what was done.
2 As far as the army is concerned and the execution of operations,
3 until Operation Grom-3 there had been no named operations that were
4 carried out. I suppose the colleagues in the MUP knew of this name and
5 then christened this activity this way, so to speak. It -- anyway, what
6 is stated here has to do with the activities carried out by the MUP of the
7 Republic of Serbia. It has nothing to do with the army.
8 Q. So any activity that -- as far as I can tell from this document,
9 any activity under the auspices of -- of the name "Operation Grom" from
10 the period of the 29th of May through June was an operation that was
11 solely a MUP operation and had absolutely nothing to do with -- with the
12 VJ. Is -- is that your evidence? Just so I'm clear.
13 A. No. The Yugoslav Army was acting in coordination with the MUP in
14 this period too.
15 Now, the MUP probably named all their operations as part of that
16 operation, Operation Grom. They did all that under that cover of -- of
17 the operation; whereas, the Yugoslav Army provided support. They acted in
18 coordination with them.
19 Q. You've used the word "probably" on -- on a number of occasions and
20 in response to -- to why this document is entitled "Operation Grom." I
21 take it that you have never received any specific information yourself in
22 the position that you had that MUP was operating under Operation Grom
23 during this period of time or any other period of time before July 29th,
24 1998. Is that correct? You have no documentation or ever saw any
25 documentation that indicated this. This is the first time you've seen
1 anything that indicates that MUP was operating under the -- the Grom plan.
2 A. Under that name, yes. We received reports through the line of
3 command. And as I said, the VJ acted in coordinated action with the MUP,
4 but we did not receive a single document about it from the MUP.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.
7 Mr. Harvey?
8 MR. HARVEY: Still no questions.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Still no questions.
10 Mr. Re, is there any need to re-examine the witness?
11 Mr. Re.
12 MR. RE: Yes. There are several matters. Thank you, Your
14 Re-examination by Mr. Re:
15 Q. Mr. Gajic, today Mr. Emmerson asked you some questions, mainly at
16 page 31 of the transcript, in relation to Colonel Crosland and his view of
17 the number of fighters or hard-core fighters there were in Kosovo in 1998,
18 and you expressed a different opinion to his.
19 Just to clarify further what you said, can you tell the Trial
20 Chamber what information you had access to or would have had access to at
21 that time which Colonel Crosland would not have had access to which
22 enables you to form a different view.
23 A. We had information from the field, from many more sources than
24 Mr. Crosland could have had. I said that I know him personally, and I
25 hold him in high esteem, but still we had the information down -- reaching
1 us down the line of command. Then we had information from special
2 services, the military counter-intelligence service, the intelligence
3 service of the MUP. Then we had information reaching us through
4 electronic surveillance, information through the reconnaissance organs of
5 the Army of Yugoslavia, and information coming from members of the KLA we
6 had captured. There were quite a few such individuals who through
7 investigations told us the head count of KLA members. Their weapons, how
8 many of them were involved in these activities, how many of them were not,
9 how many of them had weapons at home and had not. And then there were
10 border units of the VJ that had captured many KLA members who were coming
11 over from Albania, and through interviews with them we were able to know
12 what was going on in Albania in the various villages there.
13 These were all the diverse information we collated,
14 cross-referenced, and arrived at pretty reliable information at the end of
15 that process.
16 Q. Why do you say it's reliable? You said it's pretty reliable.
18 A. Well, because they came from several sources. Normally when you
19 have information from a single source or from two sources, then that
20 information is to be taken with much more reservations than information
21 arriving from several sources. Though, I have to tell you that we always
22 used approximate terminology. We never said -- or wrote anything in a
23 resolute manner. We would always use the terms "approximately," "circa,"
24 and so on and so forth.
25 Q. Mr. Emmerson also asked you about the assessment of 200 men being
1 engaged as peaceful farmers by day and KLA soldiers by night. That was at
2 page 37 and in relation to MFI P1142. And you were giving an answer to
3 Mr. Emmerson in which you said: "That was the tactics that they used and
4 they were successful in doing so."
5 Based upon everything you saw, observed, heard, the reports you
6 saw, what is your assessment of why they were so successful in adopting
7 those tactics?
8 A. First, let me tell you this: I spoke about the 200 men you
9 referred to just now, and I said that those were 200 men who were
10 organised in the various groups; whereas --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps, Mr. Re, follow-up questions showed
12 that these farmers by day, soldiers by night were above the 200, and this
13 might also give some clue where Colonel Crosland gave estimates or whether
14 he -- when he commented on it. He was talking about core KLA people.
15 There seems to be a distinction between those who were really engaged in
16 the core of the KLA and those who participated in their activities,
17 although perhaps not full time. But this issue, the witness corrects you
18 rightly, because in the follow-up questions this confusion has been set
20 MR. RE: That's not what I'm asking about. I'm asking about
21 the --
22 JUDGE ORIE: No. But you're introducing the question, and the
23 witness starts commenting on that, that you are more or less misquoting,
24 because your question started by saying - let me just stop the
25 transcript - "Mr. Emmerson asked you about the assessment of 200 men being
1 engaged as peaceful farmers by day and KLA soldiers by night."
2 As a matter of fact, this was above the number, in addition to the
3 number of, I take it, more-intensely-engaged KLA members. The answer was
4 in the beginning a bit ambiguous, but it has been clarified through
5 follow-up questions. And that's where the witness now is seeking to
6 correct your -- the way in which you reflect his testimony, which was
7 actually not correct.
8 But let's -- please proceed, because you --
9 That is fully understood, Mr. Gajic. Now Mr. Re would like to
10 know what you meant by that this was the tactics they used and were
11 successful in doing so, what you meant by that. That's what the question
12 focuses upon.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I understand. It took
14 quite some time for us to hone in on that tactics, because we had been
15 engaged in observing the activities of more closely-knit and organised
16 groups of the KLA. Since we captured a number of those who were
17 purportedly farmers, although they -- well, in actual fact they were
18 probably farmers, but they were also engaged in these night-time
19 activities and they told us about it. This was virtually the practice
20 throughout Kosovo. They carried out quite a few actions at night, and at
21 first we weren't able to grasp what was going on. That's why I said that
22 they were quite successful in practicing this. From the ranks of such
23 people, active members of the KLA were subsequently taken, and they then
24 set up staffs and continued to formalise the whole matter. But initially
25 they were pretty much lying low and working covertly.
1 MR. RE: I think that covers what I was asking about.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 MR. RE: Thank you.
4 That's my re-examination.
5 Just in relation to document D187, which was the 8th of August,
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 MR. RE: Mr. Emmerson asked about the disclosure of the document.
9 It has -- it has two ERNs: K0228027 and U0158196 to 7. The first one
10 with the "K," it appears we disclosed first on the EDS last year, either
11 in April or November as part of the Milosevic Rule 68 disclosure. The
12 second one, U0158196, we disclosed a translation of that on the 30th of
13 March, 2007. And it appears the original, the same -- the same document
14 with a different ERN, on the 28th of June, 2007.
15 In relation to the witness seeing it in -- when he was examining
16 documents and preparing to draft a statement for the Prosecution in these
17 proceedings, it -- we have no reason to disagree with the witness saying
18 he saw them as part of the documents which were, I think, referred to as
19 the Delic documents. We showed him the orders from the 549th and asked
20 him to select those which he could comment on. I have no reason to
21 disagree he -- he saw that document at the time.
22 JUDGE ORIE: So I see from Defence --
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: This raises -- well, this raises the age-old issue
24 of proofing and proofing notes and some form of recordation of what
25 information any witness of the Prosecution proofs is given to at the time
1 that the proofing goes on so that we are in a position -- excuse me,
2 Mr. Re.
3 MR. RE: It raises no issues at all.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, Mr. Re.
5 MR. RE: The witness is --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, Mr. Guy-Smith has an opportunity to -- but
7 whether this should be done --
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: -- an intelligent position to deal with the
9 testimony at the time that the witness takes the stand.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At the same time, I wonder whether this is a
11 discussion which should be -- which should take place at this moment in
12 the presence of Mr. Gajic. I don't think that ...
13 Any need to put further questions to Mr. Gajic?
14 Mr. Gajic, this means that this concludes your evidence in this
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: I do have one question as a result --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I apologise.
21 JUDGE ORIE: One more question to Mr. Gajic.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: It's probably a couple.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I need --
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'll be very quick.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Please.
1 Further cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
2 Q. You indicated you received information from the intelligence
3 service of the MUP. And my question to you is: Did you receive any
4 information from any of the following individuals: Dragan Jasovic,
5 Momcilo Sparavalo, Darko Amanovic? Did you receive any information
6 concerning what the JSO or police special units were doing in the field so
7 that you could make a determination of how best to coordinate with the
9 A. No.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Gajic, since the Bench has no further questions
13 for you, I'd like to thank you for coming to The Hague and to answer all
14 questions put to you both by the parties and by the Bench, and I wish you
15 a safe trip home again.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. All the
18 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, could you please escort the witness out
19 of the courtroom.
20 [The witness withdrew]
21 JUDGE ORIE: Then I would, since we still have some time, I would
22 like to go briefly through the list of exhibits tendered through this
23 witness, that is, mainly the annexes.
24 First of all, is there any general objection about series of
25 documents? Mr. Emmerson is nodding "no"; Mr. Guy-Smith, the same.
1 Mr. Harvey -- so then I would like to go through it rather quickly.
2 First of all, the 92 ter statement has already been admitted into
3 evidence as P1138. Then we have a list of P numbers, sequentially
4 numbered as P1139 up to and including P1172. That is -- I made reference
5 to the first one being attachment number 1 and the last one being
6 attachment number 38. I, however, would like to point at a few of the
7 attachments which are not covered by the range of numbers I just gave;
8 that is, number 18 had already been marked for identification as P1022;
9 number 20 had already been marked for identification D109; number 24 of
10 the list of attached documents to the 92 ter statement had already been
11 marked for identification as P1033; number 28 was already marked for
12 identification as P1107.
13 I'd like to know from the Defence whether there are any objections
14 against those numbers I referred to as the sequential series numbered but
15 also including the already marked for identification documents which I
16 specifically mentioned. Any objection?
17 Then, Mr. Re, I would have to ask you whether as far as D109 is
18 concerned - that was number 20 on your list - I take it it's a Defence
19 exhibit, but since you attached it to the 92 ter statement, I may take it
20 that there's no objection, also not against having this introduced by the
22 Yes. Then the -- these exhibits are admitted into evidence.
23 I now move on to three exhibits introduced by the Defence, that
24 is, D187, D188, and D189 as being newly introduced.
25 Any objection, Mr. Re?
1 These are numbers 16, 17, and 18 of the white binder.
2 MR. RE: Is 17 the --
3 JUDGE ORIE: 17 is the excerpt from the testimony of Witness K32.
4 Dated 17th of July.
5 MR. RE: The Defence hasn't made a -- hasn't made an application
6 under Rule 92 bis to have it admitted. It's --
7 JUDGE ORIE: No. I think, as a matter of fact, that for those
8 purposes we would need to have a hard copy in two languages; whereas, from
9 what I understand, the -- it's not -- the admission is not sought under
10 Rule 92 - what is it? - bis. By the way, it would not be 92 bis but it
11 would move to 92 ter anyhow, since the witness was present in the court.
12 I do understand that it's mainly giving the source for some
13 quotations that were put to the witness and to allow the Chamber to have
14 the context of their testimony, since several pages were separating
15 sometimes the quotes given.
16 Is that correctly understood? Yes.
17 And I invited, I think, already the parties to see whether
18 that's -- the size of that could be reduced.
19 MR. RE: The Prosecution does object to the entire transcript
20 being put in. The witness was --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Then.
22 MR. RE: -- cross-examined on a summarised portion.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 MR. RE: And has made his comments on the summarised portion. In
25 our submission, the summarised portion is sufficient for the purposes of
1 the Trial Chamber's understanding, because whatever the allegation was was
2 in that summary and one doesn't need to read the -- sorry, 80 pages.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The summary -- you are happy with the summary
4 or at least you accept the summary as adequate? Well, if not --
5 MR. RE: I don't concede that it is -- it couldn't have been put
6 more neutrally.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I briefly read what is --
8 MR. RE: Because the whole context has to be understood. It's not
9 just a matter of what one witness says. There's also cross-examination --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Now --
11 MR. RE: -- which wasn't put to the witness.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Parties are invited -- we have limited time. Parties
13 are invited to further discuss to what extent tendering of the transcript
14 under tab 17 is needed and whether there's, then, any remaining objection.
15 As far as 187 - that's tab 16 - and 189 - that's tab 18 - is
16 concerned, no objections, Mr. Re?
17 MR. RE: No, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then the Trial Chamber would like to hear from
19 the parties within a week on tab 17. D187 and D189 admitted into
21 Then I would move to another subject. That is, that on the 17th
22 of October, the Prosecution filed a motion to add seven witness-related
23 documents to its exhibit list. Meanwhile, the Chamber was informed that
24 the Balaj and Brahimaj Defence do not oppose against these seven exhibits
25 to be added to the exhibit list, but we have not heard yet from the
1 Haradinaj Defence.
2 MR. EMMERSON: I'm going, if I may, with the Trial Chamber's
3 leave, to reserve our position. There are a number of complexities
4 concerning the Prosecution's decision to call that witness which have been
5 touched upon earlier in the course --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 MR. EMMERSON: -- of trial.
8 At the Trial Chamber's invitation, I sought some clarification
9 from the Prosecution as to what it was that they alleged was his
10 participation in the joint criminal enterprise that is pleaded in the
11 indictment, given the denials that are contained in the transcripts of his
12 interviews. And Mr. Re responded to my letter in a manner which on the
13 face of it excludes certain allegations that are now being put at
14 (redacted) door -- I'm sorry, at this witness's door. I think we should
15 redact the name.
16 I've asked Mr. Di Fazio, who has carriage with this witness, to
17 indicate how exactly he proposes to conduct examination, because there's
18 no witness statement but merely two sets of suspect interviews. And given
19 the delicate situation of the Prosecution calling a witness, parts of its
20 testimony it does not consider to be the truth, according to its own case,
21 some clarification of exactly what it is the Prosecution proposes to call
22 this witness to say is -- is still outstanding.
23 JUDGE ORIE: If I -- looking at the clock, I am interrupting you,
24 Mr. Emmerson, this, of course, raises another issue, that is, with three
25 defendants, two Defence counsel not opposing against adding this to the
1 exhibit list. Nothing more. Nothing less. It's not admission into
2 evidence at this moment. It's just whether --
3 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: -- leave is granted to add that to the list.
5 MR. EMMERSON: I appreciate that. But for --
6 JUDGE ORIE: No, no, I do understand. But then, of course, the
7 Chamber finds itself, I think for the first time in this case in a
8 position that two Defence counsel do oppose -- and one Defence counsel
9 might oppose and two others do not on how to proceed then. Not a matter
10 which we'll have to fully explore at this very moment. But it means that
11 the Chamber invites you to see -- you may reserve your position.
12 Now, that -- if that witness appears, then, of course, we would
13 have to know whether it's on the list or not.
14 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: But -- I -- I do see problems --
16 MR. EMMERSON: Just for clarification, I'm reserving my position
17 pending an indication from the Prosecution as to what evidence they seek
18 to elicit from the witness.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber then encourages the parties to
20 further discuss the matter and also to -- to inform the Chamber about the
21 final position taken.
22 Mr. Harvey.
23 MR. HARVEY: Your Honour, in -- in that respect, I should simply
24 say that I would like to reserve my position until I've had that
25 clarification too. You're not going to find, I think, a conflict in the
1 Defence approach over this -- this matter.
2 JUDGE ORIE: No, at the same time, of course, the Chamber inquires
3 into whether there's any objection or not, and if the Chamber receives a
4 "no" from certain Defence counsel, then there must be good cause shown
5 why that position changes.
6 Mr. Guy-Smith.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Just so we're clear, with regard to the reasons
8 put forth in the Prosecution's request to add the exhibits - although, I
9 take issue as to whether or not good cause has been shown - I took the
10 position that I did not object to those exhibits being added. However,
11 that does not mean that I entertain the notion that it is appropriate for
12 this witness to be called --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: -- until they -- until these other issues have
15 been resolved.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that. And the mere fact that you do
17 not object doesn't mean that you would agree that there would be good
18 cause. But just for practical purposes, you can refrain from objections.
19 Mr. --
20 MR. EMMERSON: Just one line.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 MR. EMMERSON: May I indicate that if D188 is in due course
23 admitted - that is, the transcript of K32 - then it should at least
24 initially be admitted under seal.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's clear. And thank you for drawing our
1 attention to that.
2 Then finally, I would like to issue - and it will not take more
3 than two minutes - I would like to deliver an invitation to the parties,
4 that is, an invitation to make submissions on the recalling of Witness 55.
5 We addressed the issue relating to the interruption of the testimony of
6 Witness 55.
7 The parties will recall that on the 13th of September, 2007, the
8 Chamber decided not to continue with the witness's testimony, stating that
9 it would give the reasons for reaching this decision in due course.
10 The Chamber will now provide the reasons. These were that, on
11 returning to the Tribunal to complete his testimony, begun on the 6th of
12 September, 2007, the witness informed the Chamber at the start of
13 proceedings that he was under a great deal of stress and fear for his
14 safety and was therefore unable to continue with his testimony.
15 At the same time, the Chamber itself observed that the witness was
16 clearly not in good health and due to its concerns over the witness's
17 mental state, consulted with VWS. In doing so, the Chamber was informed
18 that the Victims and Witnesses Section had taken the witness to a doctor,
19 who found that on initial examination, the witness was apparently under a
20 great deal of emotional distress and prescribed the witness with
21 medicines -- medication. The Victims and Witness Section further informed
22 the Chamber that in their opinion the witness was showing signs of
23 possible post-traumatic stress disorder. The Chamber therefore found that
24 due to the apparently severe state of Witness 55's health, and considering
25 its obligations under the Statute to pay due regard to the interests of
1 victims and witnesses, that it would not be in the interests of justice
2 continue -- to continue hearing the witness's testimony. As a result, the
3 Chamber will have to decide whether the witness should be recalled. And
4 in this regard, the Chamber would like to invite the parties to make any
5 submissions they may wish to make on this matter.
6 Mr. Emmerson.
7 MR. EMMERSON: Just one point of clarification, if I may. That's
8 an invitation to the parties to make submissions on whether the witness
9 should be recalled, as opposed to an invitation to the parties to make
10 submissions as to what the consequences should be if he is recalled? Is
11 that correctly understood?
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. First of all, I mean, consequences of not being
13 recalled suggest that there is a decision not to recall him.
14 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: So the first decision to be taken is whether or not
16 he should be recalled. And then, of course, the next step is that if he
17 is recalled, whether there are any consequences attached to the course
18 of -- the course of the proceedings. And if he's not recalled, then, of
19 course, even more important, the -- that question arises, what should be
20 the consequences.
21 I can imagine that striking from the record would be one of the
22 options which would be favoured by perhaps one of the parties.
23 But we limit ourselves at this moment to the first question.
24 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, I see. Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 Mr. Guy-Smith.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: I -- I wonder whether or not there might be an
3 appropriate interim step because of the -- the nature of the difficulties
4 that the witness exhibited and the fact that there is apparently some
5 psychiatric or psychological condition that exists, whether it may be
6 appropriate to make a determination of where the witness stands today.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that could be one of the suggestions you make in
8 your submissions.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well. That's what I wanted to make sure
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Re.
12 MR. RE: The Prosecution did not show retired General Gajic in the
13 course of proofing Exhibit D17 -- 187. The General Gajic looked at a
14 number of documents emanating from the archive of the military in which he
15 served for 37 years in the course of preparing -- writing a statement in
16 August and October this year. Proofing is the preparation for his
17 testimony. He was not shown the document in question in preparation for
18 his testimony when he arrived here.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That clarification is put on the record.
20 The Chamber would like to thank the interpreters, the technicians,
21 but also security and everyone else who assists us for the additional
22 minutes we have stolen from the Chamber who will sit this afternoon, so
23 therefore our apologies to that Chamber is on the record now as well.
24 We will adjourn until Monday ...
25 Mr. Registrar, that would be courtroom ...? If you'd ... I would
1 think it would be in the afternoon.
2 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Until next week Monday, which is the -- I always
4 forget. The 29th of October. Quarter past 2.00, Courtroom I.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.52 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Monday, the 29th day of
7 October, 2007, at 2.15 p.m.