1 Monday, 1 March 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [Defence Opening Statement]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Will the Court Officer
7 please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you and good morning, Your Honours. This
9 is case number IT-95-5/18-T, the Prosecutor versus Radovan Karadzic.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Today we are continuing the trial
11 proceedings with the Defence opening statement, which has been scheduled
12 for the full morning today and continuing tomorrow morning. Before we
13 proceed, I would like to have the appearances. For the Prosecution,
15 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.
16 Alan Tieger, Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff, and Iain Reid appear for the
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
19 Mr. Karadzic, would you introduce the members of your team
20 present in the courtroom.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies. With
22 me are my legal advisors, Mr. Peter Robinson, and Mr. Marko Sladojevic.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I also note that Mr. Richard Harvey is
24 present here upon the instruction of the Trial Chamber. His role in the
25 trial is yet to be determined and we will do so after Mr. Karadzic's
1 opening statement and when the hearing of evidence begins.
2 Mr. Harvey, I wonder if you could introduce the other members of
3 your team who accompany you today.
4 MR. HARVEY: Good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours. I'm
5 accompanied by Ms. Mirjana Vukajlovic today.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.
7 MR. HARVEY: Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Before I give the floor to Mr. Karadzic for his
9 opening statement, I would like to note that this opening statement is
10 being given pursuant to Rule 84 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and
11 Evidence rather than Rule 84 bis.
12 Mr. Karadzic, you will have the opportunity at a later stage,
13 should you so choose, to make a Rule 84 bis statement, in which case the
14 provisions of that Rule shall apply and the Chamber can decide what
15 probative value, if any, to ascribe to your statement.
16 There is one further matter to raise for purpose of the planning
17 of the -- today's or tomorrow's hearing. The Trial Chamber denied the
18 accused's motion for the further postponement of the trial last Friday,
19 26th of February. In that decision, the Trial Chamber set the dead-line
20 for the accused to make a request for certification to appeal the
21 decision, if he so wishes, by today, and I was told just now that the
22 accused filed a request for certification to appeal the decision. Can I
23 get the confirmation?
24 I see nodding. We need some voice for the purpose of transcript.
25 Is it Mr. Robinson or Mr. Karadzic?
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. If I can take the indulgence
2 of Mr. Karadzic to answer your question, I would say that yes, we have
3 filed that this morning.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I welcome you again.
5 In that case, Mr. Tieger, I wonder whether we -- the Chamber can
6 have your response by the end of today or you wish to respond orally
7 first thing tomorrow morning?
8 MR. TIEGER: That's -- that's fine, Your Honour. I can probably
9 respond first thing tomorrow morning or shortly before the conclusion of
10 these proceedings. It should be no problem.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
12 Then I now give the floor to you, Mr. Karadzic, for your opening
13 statement. Please bear in mind that we will need to break at
14 approximately 10.20 for 20 minutes' break for the first break, and at
15 12.00 noon for half an hour for the second break. This regime will apply
16 in the future hearings that will take place in the morning session.
17 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Just briefly, I wanted to
19 mention the Prosecution's motion of February 23rd regarding a cautionary
20 measure, and I don't know if the Trial Chamber's remarks to date reflect
21 its conclusions in that regard or if that was -- if that slipped off the
22 agenda, but I wanted to point out that the Prosecution does have that
23 motion pending, and would hope that could be addressed before the accused
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger, for your reminder. I dealt
1 with only part of it, and the remainder will be dealt with after the
2 opening statement.
3 Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would first like to greet all the
5 active and passive participants of this session. I stand here before you
6 not to defend the mere mortal that I am but to defend the greatness of a
7 small nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina which, for 500 years, has had to
8 suffer and has demonstrated a great deal of modesty and perseverance to
9 survive in freedom. I don't want to defend myself by saying that I
10 wasn't important or that I didn't occupy an important post while I was
11 serving my people, nor will I shift the blame to someone else. I will
12 defend that nation of ours and their cause, which is just and holy, and
13 in that way I shall be able to defend myself, too, and my nation, because
14 we have a good case. We have good evidence and proof, and if I'm given
15 sufficient time and resources to prepare my Defence, I shall be able to
16 do so and it will be to our advantage.
17 Therefore, the only thing that I expect here is to be given the
18 opportunity to have a well-prepared defence and to present my case here
19 in a proper manner, to show you the substance and crux of this matter and
20 everything that hasn't been uncovered yet and hasn't been realised.
21 I will start by describing a situation in my country. At the
22 elections in 1990, and they were the first democratic elections at which
23 many dissidents appeared because before that it wasn't a multi-party
24 system. In the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we had seven members,
25 two Serbs, two Croats, two Muslims, and a representative for the
1 minorities. My Serbian Democratic Party was in this seventh place, and
2 the nomination there was the president of the Jewish community in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, who was not a member of the SDS, but we did however
4 consider that he represents, in the best sense of the word, the rest, the
5 others. And apart from that, the community is very significant in
6 Sarajevo because after the persecution in Spain, the Jews came to
7 Sarajevo and have significant traces there and have contributed to
8 Sarajevo's development.
9 The Party of Democratic Action has put lamb's clothing on a wolf,
10 a wolf in lamb's clothing on Mr. Ganic, called him a Yugoslav for this
11 opportunity, and of course he was elected to this post which belonged to
12 the minorities or the others. And that is the well-known gentleman who
13 became famous when he slaughtered innocent soldiers who were withdrawing
14 from -- in Sarajevo in Dobrovoljacka Street, and the well-known order he
15 gave over the radio, As soon as Alija gets out of his car, kill them all.
16 So that is how the SDA and the Muslim community in Bosnia -- in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina achieved supremacy in a body where parity was supposed
18 to prevail.
19 The Serbs had an even better candidate which they could have once
20 again put in lamb's clothing, and somebody who declared himself as a
21 Yugoslav, but we consider that that wasn't done in proper society because
22 it wasn't democracy and it wasn't an honest and sound basis for life
23 together and progress in general. And it was almost an innocent child's
24 game in comparison to what the state organs, the joint state organs, did
25 for the war policy of the Party of Democratic Action that was geared
1 towards gaining as much advantage to their own community and inflicting
2 detriment on the Christian majority, that is to say, the Serbs and the
4 Now, why did the leaders of the Party of Democratic Action do
5 this in the first place? Not only because it was the basic model of the
6 fundamentalist way of thinking and acting, that is to say, domination,
7 supremacy, privileges, 100 per cent power, just as it was in the days of
8 the Ottoman Empire, but first and foremost, to gain one more vote in the
9 Presidency in order to achieve the Islamist goal, that is to say, a state
10 of the kind that the players in our drama had envisaged 50 years earlier.
11 There were some very subtle games afoot in cadre terms and so on,
12 but that was nothing compared to this, because the goals of the
13 Communists were not such. They were ideological ones. However, these
14 were fundamental goals changing the destiny and appearance of a whole
15 region and the destiny of several nations and ethnic groups within it.
16 Therefore, secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina in this case was the goal, and
17 not only secession which could not be carried out in a legal way, but the
18 establishment of a system and a regime and a state structure which I'm
19 going to depict to you here and present my arguments to show you what it
20 was like. And on the basis of the proof and evidence you will be able to
21 see what they envisaged, and what was planned to result.
22 So this -- there was this need to have one more vote, one extra
23 vote, but not only that was enough, because the substance of the
24 requirements of the SDA was to have Bosnia 100 per cent for them, and
25 that was the basic way in which they were thinking. Bosnia is ours. The
1 Serbs are guests here, and God knows the Croats, too, when they didn't
2 need them to leave Yugoslavia anymore, and so they have to obey. That is
3 how the Christian majority is treated to this day. And what would that
4 treatment become if they managed to increase their birth rate by political
5 means? Nobody minds the natural increase in the population, but if by
6 political means, by immigration, forced resettlement of Muslims from Sandzak,
7 the talked-about immigration of 4 million Turks who allegedly have roots
8 in Bosnia – you can imagine yourselves what that would look like, and
9 they wrote about this in their papers.
10 When the United States, in 1995, decided to end the war which
11 they had been waging in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their ambassadors, Holbrooke
12 and Bildt, write and say that Holbrooke told the Islamic leadership, they
13 said, What do you want us to negotiate for you? Do you want to have
14 100 per cent power in 30 per cent of Bosnia, or 30 per cent of power in
15 100 per cent Bosnia? You cannot have 100 per cent power in 100 per cent
16 Bosnia. And that is the crux of all our crisis and the war and the
17 crisis that is still ongoing today, and you can clearly see that the
18 State Department and Ambassador Holbrooke understood this. But precisely
19 that thing that they cannot get, that even their most powerful ally would
20 not grant them, the same thing that they wanted in 1914 and in 1941, - they
21 want it still; now, of course, they want it in a different constellation
22 of players. The Islamic fundamentalists pursued it in 1991-1995, and
23 they’ll continue to want that until the borders have been precisely
24 defined or jurisdictions of these entities. For as long as people in
25 Bosnia or a group in Bosnia has the chance of seizing a hundred per cent
1 of Bosnia, a hundred per cent of power in a hundred per cent of Bosnia,
2 you will not have peace in Bosnia.
3 Now let's make this quite clear. I'm not speaking about all the Muslims,
4 nor am I speaking about the whole of the Party of Democratic Action. What I’m
5 referring to is a core that is plotting and conniving and which was responsible
6 for all this. I'm not making a plea for the fact that Muslims should be Serbs,
7 but we consider them – many consider them – as Serbs. All their great minds,
8 from Mehmet-Pasa Sokolovic, Osman Dzikic, Hasan Rebcic [phoen], (Rebac) Mesa
9 Selimovic, to the great minds of our day, were and remain Serbs. In the Serbian
10 culture, which is theirs as much as it is mine, they achieved greatness. But that
11 is not the point of this discussion. Simply, let everyone be what they want to be.
12 Not even a whole of the SDA party is responsible for what was
13 happening and what is happening. Within the SDA there is a conspiracy
14 core which has been identified by the leaders of the Muslim Bosniak
15 organisation, other Muslim parties, Mr. Zulfikarpasic and
16 Professor Filipovic have identified them, and they left the SDA when they
17 saw what was afoot and what was going on. And a Muslim intellectual,
18 before the elections, wrote Izetbegovic a letter, when he left the SDA,
19 he said, "Do you think that the Serbs are fools that and they don't see
20 what you're doing?" Therefore, that was the reason for him distancing
21 himself from the party, because he was a man of vision and saw what was
22 going to happen ultimately.
23 Now what was this conspiracy core within the SDA? They were the
24 young Muslims. And it is these young Muslims that were formed as an
25 affiliation or a reflection of the Muslim brothers in Egypt, for example,
1 who, as you know, killed Sadat and did goodness knows what else. Now the
2 Prosecution can say that's tu quoque, that's not important, they're not
3 being tried. But why aren't they being tried? Why were the direct
4 perpetrators of heinous crimes on their side, men with blood on their
5 hands up to their elbows, acquitted here? Probably because the
6 indictments weren't what they were supposed to be and it wasn't -- it was
7 easy to have them liberated, acquitted. This is not about tu quoque;
8 it’s a fact that cannot be bypassed. Their conduct gave rise to our
9 conduct, they conditioned our conduct 100 per cent.
10 I am surprised and concerned as well to see how the Prosecution
11 is acting in various situations. They would like to have a trial without
12 any corpus delecti. They would like us to say, All right, let's just get
13 together and agree to prosecute and find people guilty. But this Defence
14 has much criticism to make of that stance and will not allow it to go
15 forward, to proceed in that way because it would appear -- and it would
16 appear that the Prosecution has struck an agreement with our enemies in
17 war, or as we like to say, without joking, that the Prosecutor is trying
18 to turn this Tribunal into a disciplinary commission of NATO. And to say
19 that this is not an exaggeration, you will hear from the high-ranking
20 officers of this Tribunal itself to the effect that everybody who -- that
21 NATO planned to liquidate Karadzic, and everybody who went against the
22 grain of NATO had to be taken to trial.
23 [Audiotape played]
24 "I want to speak you -- I want to speak with you about Karadzic.
25 SFOR, in particular the United States, they will try to locate Karadzic.
1 Karadzic knows, he knows perfectly that he is in danger because if they
2 locate him, he will not be transferred to The Hague alive. It will be an
3 operation and after shot down Karadzic, they'd say, 'Yes, he was armed,
4 and it was reacting.' [Indiscernible] and why I'm saying that, because I
5 am investigating about the agreement between Karadzic and Holbrooke. I
6 am investigating and I am getting some good -- some good evidence that
7 it's true. But if it is true, as it seems in my -- in my investigation,
8 it is more element to fear that they will kill Karadzic.
9 "The substance is that surrender is better than murder.
10 "Yes, yes. There's no parliament anymore, no government
11 anymore. It's no more federation. It's just Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's
12 not existing anymore Republika Srpska. It's finished. It's finished
13 Republika Srpska. Now it's only Bosnia."
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems to me that I even had
15 friends in the OTP, because this is a better version than having me
16 liquidated, isn't it? However, I believe that today this can only make
17 us realise what was going on.
18 The OTP is trying to link up this accused person and the chaos
19 and tragedy of civil war, and may I remind you that not a single war in
20 our part of the world did not also become a civil war. The aggressor
21 always managed to turn people against each other, and that's the way it's
22 been since time immemorial but particularly in modern times, in the
23 19th and 20th century. So the OTP is trying to link up this accused
24 person with the chaotic, tragic developments of a civil war that could be
25 expected and that were even envisaged. They're trying to accuse me of
1 planning, aiding, abetting, instigating, and whatever else you have, the
2 removal of Muslims and Croats from the territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina
3 that Serbs lay a claim to. They are claiming their own territories, as
4 you will see, and that is not a crime, and I don't think that the OTP
5 treats it as such. The Prosecution is behaving as if this were a crime.
6 We're going to hear that often enough here, and that just shows how false
7 this entire situation is, what a fabrication all of this is.
8 The Prosecution crosses this bridge, as it were, very quickly,
9 and they're saying that laying claim to one's own territory and
10 establishing a political party, and taking part in elections, and
11 political defence from political attacks, and armed defence from armed
12 attacks, and self-defence and self-organisation in a condition when a
13 state organism falls apart, and everything that was the Serb democratic
14 response to attacks from either side, and everything that Serbs did as
15 part of their own legitimate defence, all of that is being treated as a
16 crime, and they quickly move on to chaotic developments which happen in
17 civil wars. After all, everyone knew that that would happen. That is
18 what was envisaged. And people knew that’s what was going to happen.
19 Now, this fine bridge between the accused and everything that
20 happened is something that the Defence considers to be very important.
21 We want to go back to that bridge because there is that intention that is
22 referred, to remove non-Serbs from territories that Serbs in Bosnia
23 claimed. The Defence doesn't want to deal with this in minute detail as
24 to who killed who, how the first, the second, the third, or fourth party
25 behaved, because we will see during these proceedings that there were
1 four parties at war in this situation. The Prosecution has to prove this
2 basic thesis of theirs. Without proving that they cannot prove joint
3 criminal enterprise or any responsibility on the part of Republika Srpska
4 and its government, its organs, its police, army, et cetera.
5 A few things to begin with. First of all, Republika Srpska was
6 not the political objective of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7 Their objective was Yugoslavia.
8 Secondly, Republika Srpska was created out of necessity and as a
9 very painful compromise of the Serbs in order to agree to leave
10 Yugoslavia. I am going to enumerate Serb priorities. The first was the
11 preservation of Yugoslavia as big as possible, if possible consisting of
12 all of its six republics, and that was the superior prime objective. If
13 the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not wish to remain in
14 Yugoslavia, the Serb objective -- the secondary Serb objective was that
15 they remain in Yugoslavia, just like West Virginia remained with the
16 north, with the American Federation, whereas the majority of Virginia did
17 join the Confederacy. Western Virginia exists to this day because
18 Lincoln, a great president, agreed to that and recognised it. So we
19 haven't got an East Virginia, there's only a West Virginia; right? Now
20 are we to regret that these are not times of great presidents, so that we
21 could not see a proper solution to the Serb issue and to the situation in
22 the Balkans in general.
23 In the same way, Northern Ireland continues to exist. Most of
24 Ireland gained independence. However, part of Ireland did not. It
25 remained within the United Kingdom. This variant with Northern Ireland,
1 that is to say, Serbs with the Serb territories, genuine Serb
2 territories, as you will see, the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina are the
3 oldest population there because most of the population were Serbs in the
4 first place.
5 So anyway, this was Mr. Izetbegovic's idea. He even signed
6 on to that idea in his agreement, with the related declaration, with
7 Mr. Krajisnik in September 1993. Serb -- the third Serb priority
8 was the independence of a Serb constituent unit of the state in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina which Mr. Izetbegovic did not challenge either.
10 The fourth, very painful option was that all of Bosnia leaves
11 Yugoslavia on the condition that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina have
12 their constituent unit of their own in some kind of a confederation of an
13 alliance of Bosnian states. That variant, but less favourable in terms
14 of integration in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was offered to us by the
15 European Community within Lord Carrington's conference.
16 Ambassador Cutileiro was in charge of Bosnia within the scope of that
17 conference. That is the well-known Cutileiro Plan.
18 Rest assured that this was the list of Serb priorities. Every
19 one of these variants ensured the preservation of peace and the
20 achievement of Croat and Muslim optimal objectives through Serb lenience.
21 These were minimum objectives as far as the Serbs were concerned, far
22 from maximum. What joint criminal enterprise can stand in the face of
23 this fact? What I'm going to present here is marble truth, and this is
24 one of the truths that I am referring to. How can there be a joint
25 criminal enterprise? What is it that Serbs could do if all Serb
1 compromises had been agreed to?
2 Thirdly, the Prosecution constructs this alleged intention of ours to
3 expel Muslim and Croats from their own home on this false presumption that we
4 consider Republika Srpska to be our home at the time. At that time, the home of
5 the Serbs was Yugoslavia, not Bosnia-Herzegovina, let alone Republika Srpska
6 that hadn't even been created yet. We are going to prove that there never was
7 any intention, any idea, let alone plan, to expel Muslims and Croats from
8 Republika Srpska. This is what another Chamber of this Tribunal says in the
9 first instance judgement to -- of Mr. Krajisnik.
10 It has to do with the words of Radovan Karadzic on the 14th of February,
11 1992, just before the war, and the Trial Chamber concludes that Karadzic, at a
12 party meeting, a closed Plenary meeting of the party, said that they will be
13 careful to govern responsibly at the local level and make sure there is no
14 fleeing en masse. Because, at that moment, the conference was already at some
15 advanced stage; agreements had been reached, although not yet signed; but an
16 agreement had been reached with Holbrooke that there would be three Bosnias.
17 So that is the most painful variant for the Serbs, that there will be three
18 Bosnias. That had already been achieved, and Karadzic says, before 200 people
19 that are responsible for life on the ground, as it were, to be careful, that
20 there would be no fleeing from our areas, quote/unquote. This Trial Chamber
21 admits that and says that Karadzic, even on the 14th of February, 1992, bore in
22 mind the interest of others. Therefore, everything prior to 14 February 1992
23 must be dropped. Until then there was no joint criminal enterprise.
24 We have to identify now what is the moment of birth of this joint
25 criminal enterprise that is called the expulsion of Croats and Muslims
1 from Republika Srpska. That is part of the words of caution of
2 Radovan Karadzic to the people in charge of affairs.
3 Now, the next reference. We have to realise that on the 14th of
4 February, 1992, there was no joint criminal enterprise. That was not its
5 moment of birth. It was not born on 18 March because that was when the Lisbon
6 Agreement was reached. The Agreement was reached and it was the solution.
7 Now we go to the 27th of March, and Karadzic is speaking at the
8 Assembly of the Serbian people, and you see:
9 "A war in Bosnia and Herzegovina will not solve anything. We
10 must study the situation regarding the saving of lives, property and
11 territory. We have no other plans."
12 That is Karadzic's response to a question put by one of the
13 assemblymen. The only plan of the Serbs at the time was to protect
14 people, property, and territory, and wait for a political solution.
15 Then we have to move that time forward, to move forward the
16 moment of birth of the joint criminal enterprise.
17 On the 12th of April, when the war had already broken out, with
18 Ambassador Cutileiro we signed a cease-fire, all three parties. On the
19 12th of March we signed a cease-fire, and on the evening of the
20 12th of March, the Muslim side, the SDA, sent -- Hasan Efendic sent this
21 well-known order, instruction to launch an all-out attack against the JNA
22 and Serbs throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. So on the Serb side, even
23 on the 12th of April there is no joint criminal enterprise.
24 On the 22nd of April, Karadzic presents a plan for the cessation
25 of hostilities and bringing the crisis to an end. I have to note that on
1 the 12th of April, within that cease-fire, what was concluded was to work
2 even faster on the maps involved in the Cutileiro Plan. So on the
3 22nd of April, there is no joint criminal enterprise either.
4 Then you're going to see August, for instance. Karadzic is
5 fighting for having Muslims and Croats elected to positions in the
6 judiciary and in government. Up until then, members of the Presidency
7 could make appointments, and I appointed 18 Muslims and Croats to
8 positions in the judiciary, in courts of law. Afterwards these powers
9 were returned to the Assembly.
10 It says here, as we said yesterday, we should see whether it is
11 the right person involved rather than that person's ethnic background.
12 And Karadzic says, As for others, you have to be aware of the fact that
13 they will always have proportionate participation in the government. The
14 war had already started. There was a lot of bloodshed. There were a lot
15 of clashes, conflicts. There is some restraint and there are some
16 reservations in terms of appointing Croats and Muslims. However,
17 Karadzic and Popovic and others who asked for the Judges to be appointed
18 quickly asked that ethnic background not being taken into account, only
19 the personal eligibility of all candidates and that there should be
20 proportionate representation of all the ethnic communities there.
21 I have to remind you what this looked like on the 18th of March.
22 You will see that all of 1991 was burdened with inter-ethnic tensions and
23 the Serbs gave way, whenever possible, just in order to ensure peace in
25 On the 18th of March, we agreed that there would be three
1 Bosnia-Herzegovinas within one Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is to say, to
2 carry out a Switzerlandisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it will be
3 outside Yugoslavia. That is the most painful compromise that the Serbs
4 had to make. At that point in time, we all three parties accepted this
5 and expressed our great pleasure.
6 All three parties then concluded that they all had maps, although
7 the SDA claimed that they did not have maps, and we came to the
8 conclusion that 80 per cent were not controversial. Serbs agreed to
9 80 per cent of the maps, and the Muslims and the Croats agreed up to
10 80 per cent as to what the others would have, et cetera.
11 The Muslim fared the best, and this is what this gentleman,
12 Mr. Irfan Ajanovic is saying. He said that 82 per cent of the population
13 will live in their own ethnic unit and that the Serb people make up
14 50 per cent of the population, the Serb unit, and no one ever mentions
15 any population exchanges or any kind of population movement, except for
16 voluntary migrations, if people simply want to move. Mr. Izetbegovic,
17 while working with me and very good relations -- well, we enjoyed very
18 good relations during our work on the maps, and I repeated that at that
19 meeting or, rather, he repeated at that meeting that I should not stick
20 to municipal borders. If a particular village, a Serb or a Muslim village,
21 wishes to join a neighbouring municipality, it's not going to be a Berlin
22 Wall, so let a particular village join one municipality or the other.
23 And his position was that there should be the smallest possible number of
24 them with us and us with them. That was his position. So that most
25 people should live within their own constituent unit. No one ever
1 referred to any exchange of population.
2 Even Karadzic said that openly, on the 3rd of May, upon his
3 return from Brussels. Asked by a journalist about what was going to
4 happen with the population, whether there was going to be any exchange,
5 somebody mentioned the case of India and Pakistan, I said this is not in
6 our plans and this is not what we recommend. They are going to be a
7 minority and they will have their rights protected on a reciprocal basis.
8 There will be no problem.
9 Now, faced with this marble solid truth, which is well known and easy
10 to prove – one only needs to look at the media reports from that time – which
11 kind of criminal joint enterprise was on the minds of the Serbs? The Serbs had
12 never dishonoured any agreement reached by that time, not even the agreements
13 on truce, as the United Nations’ documents will confirm for you. There were 12
14 agreements on cease-fire in Sarajevo, 11 of them were breached by the army of
15 the Party of Democratic Action. All of this was happening before the 18th of
16 March, and one can or could assume, at least on the Serbian side, that that was
17 going to be the solution. So based on that, can we draw an inference about the
18 intentions of the Serbs towards eliminating the Muslims and the others from the
19 parts of Bosnia that would not belong to the Serbs? However, my learned friends
20 from the Prosecution are reluctant to put this in the context of the events in
21 the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia in particular because that would then reveal
22 who did what and who was responsible for what. It would become clear that
23 the Serbs were the party that made concessions for the sake of preserving peace
24 and they were never in favour of a war solution for which some other party was.
25 Again, I have to say that this system is devastating and unusual.
1 In the absence of objective judicial investigation, the Prosecution has
2 endless resources to compile the indictment and provide supporting
3 documents. Now, you have a Serb or any person from the Balkan has to
4 appear here and defend himself from some invisible forces, because there
5 is no way for him to carry on his own investigation.
6 But if the Prosecution had conducted an objective investigation, if they
7 had lined up chronologically all that happened in Bosnia and in the Balkans,
8 that chronology would have immediately revealed the true essence. As it is,
9 it turns out, according to the Prosecution, that the war broke out because
10 the accused here set up the Serbian Democratic Party in July 1990 with the
11 intention of getting rid of non-Serbs from the territories that the Serbs in
12 the future, in the uncertain future, would claim, whereas at that point in time
13 Bosnia did not display any secessionist intentions. Well, I can tell you that
14 this was done with a lot of flexibility, creative interpretation and fantasy.
15 This is mentioned in another indictment. In my indictment it
16 says that this was caused by my setting up my party. And in the other
17 indictment it says that the secession of Slovenia on 25 June 1991 was the
18 cause of war. I agree. Croatia declared its independence on the 25th of
19 June, 1995, which led to clashes between the Croatian military forces on
20 the one hand and the JNA, paramilitary and the Army of Republika Srpska
21 Krajina. I don't agree with these paramilitary units, but I agree.
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence on the 6th of April, it
23 should be, 1992, which, after 6th of April, 1992, brought about a
24 widespread war. Why do you give up on this truth in my case?
25 ... and names instead something else as the cause of the war.
1 Now, let us hear what a very prominent figure, Professor Cassese,
2 who served as the President of this Tribunal, says:
3 "It is well known that in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, just
4 like in a few former Soviet republics, secession revived old hatreds
5 and brought about terrible bloodshed."
6 Therefore, in my case, according to the OTP, the war was not
7 caused by secession and hatred but rather it was done by Karadzic alone
8 with his impoverished and destitute 1.5 million Serbs in Bosnia, having
9 no allies except God and a few non-influential friendly country. He rose
10 to fight immeasurable forces in a war that was contrary to all Serbian
11 interests, even those interests and objectives, criminal objectives that
12 have been ascribed to us. Not even these objectives could have been
13 achieved through war.
14 Why would the Serbs need war in order to achieve something it
15 already had and wished, and that was to live in Yugoslavia along with all
16 the Muslims, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, et cetera? Why did the Serbs
17 need war? They already had what they -- what they wished and that was
18 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that can only be preserved in peace.
19 Why would they be against that because this state can only be preserved
20 in peace and will disappear in war. I don't see any reasonable conduct
21 in this context, and I don't see any reason why the Serbs would have done
23 Yugoslavia could only have been broken up in war, and this is
24 what is going to be shown here. This is another solid truth that
25 hasn't -- cannot be undermined by anything else.
1 Unlike the Serbs who wanted to preserve Yugoslavia, there were
2 those republics who wanted independence and they could only achieve that
3 through war. There is no doubt about it. Germany not only encouraged
4 that, but they said, "If you continue with the conflicts, we are going to
5 recognise you." But this was also confirmed by our direct war opponents
6 such as President Tudjman, who said that:
7 "There wouldn't have been any war had Croatia didn't want one."
8 And this is what he said at a public rally on a square in May 1991 --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: May 1992.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- when the war in Bosnia was
11 already in full flare.
12 I am grateful to Mr. Tudjman and others for what they said and
13 what is going to be useful for my case and I am also grateful for -- to
14 the Prosecution for stretching my responsibility to Croatia as well
15 because that will give me an opportunity to show how all of that looked
16 like and how in 1992 -- 1 and even 1992, column after column of Serbs were
17 arriving who had to flee helter-skelter from those areas because they were
18 being killed there. And on this picture you can see how Bosnia is burning
19 along its edges, but, of course, indeed in the interior part as well.
20 So after the refugees we are seeing shells coming in and the
21 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina became casualties.
22 Let us see who were the people who were killed before the
23 6th of April. I have been charged for that by the OTP. Those who were
24 casualties before the 1st April were only Serbs, but I'm also grateful to
25 Mr. Izetbegovic for his candour and honesty because he directly relieved
1 me of responsibility when he said in February 1993:
2 "We made our choice, although we could easily have gone another
3 way. The price we paid is high but it had to be paid. If I'm to be
4 blamed for it, then Karadzic should not. We could have avoided this
5 conflict had we remind united as Yugoslavia but we wanted independence.
6 Towards the end of 1991 we established the Patriotic League", and so on...
7 He took it gallantly upon himself, thereby absolving me. Apparently the
8 Prosecution doesn't want to acknowledge this chivalrous attitude of Mr.
9 Izetbegovic. They take everything they get from Izetbegovic as long as it
10 involves a ruse, a trick, deceit, etc. But the chivalrous admission that makes
11 this whole trial quite superfluous – they didn’t even notice. They have a number
12 of corrections for Mr. Izetbegovic.
13 The Patriotic League was not established toward the end of 1991 but, rather,
14 the 31st of March, 1991. During my statement you will see that it was set up
15 two months after we formed a joint government. And a few corrections, but one
16 of them is the most crucial one. The remaining of Bosnia within Yugoslavia and
17 the Bosnian Muslims as well was not the only way to secure peace; it was also
18 possible if we had remained a part of Yugoslavia, while the Muslims and Croats
19 exited according to the West Virginian model. The Lisbon Agreement and the
20 Cutileiro Plan, which envisaged for us, the Serbs, only a small portion of what
21 the Muslims and Croats already had in Bosnia and in the former Yugoslavia: if we
22 had received in Bosnia-Herzegovina only of fraction of that protection and those
23 rights, war could equally have been avoided in that case. The Serbs in Bosnia-
24 Herzegovina would then go to a referendum and give it legitimacy. Peace could
25 have been preserved by holding the referendum on independence.
1 On the eve of the referendum for independence, Radovan Karadzic and Muhamed
2 Cengic, the deputy chairman of the SDA, in the full view of all deputies, reached
3 an agreement for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to urgently regionalise the
4 country, that the Serbs go to the referendum to give it legitimacy, but someone
5 from the backbenchers asked Cengic, Who asked you and who authorised you to do
6 this? And you can clearly see Cengic saying, It was Alija Izetbegovic, if you
7 really want to know.
8 So it was Alija Izetbegovic who authorised Muhamed Cengic to offer a solution
9 to the Serbs that would salvage both Bosnia and peace. The Serbs accepted it
10 unconditionally, and in 15 days, an agreement on regionalisation would be adopted.
11 However, some demon forces were at work there that for a hundred times forced Mr.
12 Izetbegovic go back on what he had promised, and after a break, this agreement
13 between Karadzic and Cengic was annulled in front of the whole parliament.
14 Now, another correction relating to Mr. Izetbegovic. Thanks to Serbs'
15 flexibility and numerous concessions that they made, there were several solutions
16 that could have provided the avoidance of war and the price that Mr. Izetbegovic
17 mentioned. However, there was only one solution that inevitably led to war.
18 The Muslim leadership strictly stuck to this solution which could only lead to
19 war, and this solution was sovereign and independent Bosnia, 100 per cent ours.
20 This is the 100 per cent of Bosnia that they actually wanted. This is what
21 they wanted. Then this is what they want now, and this will remain until we
22 have the borders between the entities in Bosnia or we divorce in a peaceful way.
23 They will want it as long as they have a chance.
24 There are some forces that are pressing them and asking them to
25 provide a kind of bridgehead for the interests in Europe. What kind of
1 Serbian joint criminal enterprise could have come into force and be
2 implemented had Mr. Izetbegovic accepted a proposal that was on the table
3 throughout the whole war and which was brought by Mr. Holbrooke in 1995?
4 All these proposals were brought by Stoltenberg and Lord Owen and all
5 other groups. The Serbs accepted all these proposals.
6 Your Excellencies, we had five conferences and five peace plans.
7 I, as the accused, agreed to four of them. So what kind of joint
8 criminal enterprise would be possible had any of the other parties
9 accepted one of the four? And how could the Prosecution come up with the
10 idea at all that the moment we handed over our crisis to the international
11 community to solve it, from then on, there was not a single day without a
12 conference. There was no chance to achieve fait accompli. There was not a
13 chance of uti posidetis juris: what you possess, you shall keep.
14 The solution should have been a political one. Therefore, why would Serbs grab
15 any territories that they cannot verify at any of the conferences and accept it
16 at any of the conferences, and why would the Serbs do anything that then would
17 have to be restored to the previous status? Therefore, how is it possible for
18 the Prosecution not to see that the Serbs accepted everything save for 100 per
19 cent of Bosnia, which would brought us back to the Turkish times when we were a
20 docile people, suffering and trying to preserve their culture through 500 years
21 of unbearable conditions, and I bow to their destiny, and they all deserve
22 that we serve them, because this is something inconceivable.
23 Of course, I have to tell you the Serbs did convert to Islam, but
24 most often based on an agreement between brothers. Then their
25 grandchildren would become enemies. Those who were the first to convert
1 to Islam were not happy about that, but that's how it happened. The
2 brother who did not convert to Islam had to suffer, had to endure
3 pressures and to preserve that, and now it seems that he has to be
4 betrayed by someone and brought back to where he was before.
5 I would like to draw to your attention all the appeals that were
6 sent by prominent Bosniaks to Mr. Izetbegovic for him to change his
7 policy and his behaviour. Let's start with Rabija Subic, a woman from the
8 Muslim circle, but also the president of the Socialist Party of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina. That was a multi-ethnic party, with no fundamentalist
10 inclinations. She wrote to Izetbegovic at the beginning of war and she said:
11 "You refused to set up a council of nations. You refused the
12 historic agreement with Serbian people. You refused the Belgrade
13 initiative. Even during Communism we asked for the Council of Nations
14 that could have prevented any war. You rejected an historic agreement
15 with the Serbian people. You refused the Belgrade initiative, and after
16 the summons for the army, on the 4th of April, you started a bloody war."
17 She said:
18 "Immobilise your connections in the Islamic world as well as in
19 Germany and Vatican so they would diplomatically recognise something that
20 was erected by using a political violence. We warn you, Mr. Izetbegovic,
21 that BH independence will be bloody and tragic."
22 In this area there were two municipalities and you will see why
23 this was -- this was possible. This civilised lady, from this
24 multi-ethnic party, correctly perceived the situation and correctly
25 perceived what the solution would be. In similar situations, this was
1 also uttered by Muhamed Filipovic, Nijaz Durakovic, and many others, even
2 some Serbs like Pejanovic, who represents 1.5 Serbs who were in favour of
3 Bosnia without entities.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you will be hearing this very often.
5 Please slow down for the benefit of the interpreters. Proceed.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will.
7 This recollection of the agreement in Bratunac and Vlasenica will
8 initiate the Party of Democratic Action to cancel those meetings. Now,
9 what happened next in Bratunac and Srebrenica, for instance -- I mean,
10 Vlasenica? You're going to hear about that. Srebrenica was, of course,
11 the neighbouring municipality, but you'll hear about Bratunac, then
12 Vlasenica, during this trial, but we could have avoided all that if what
13 Ms. Subic identified as an agreement in those municipalities were
14 respected. And in municipalities throughout Bosnia, negotiations were
15 taking place for the reorganisation of the municipalities and thus avoid
16 tensions, and everybody could see to their own affairs.
17 Now, which Serbian joint criminal enterprise could have been
18 possible at that point in time, if you look at everything that had
19 happened until the letter that the woman wrote to Izetbegovic and what
20 was on the table generally.
21 Now, the Prosecution says that Yugoslavia disintegrated. It fell
22 apart. And that what was needed now -- well, should we actually
23 acknowledge that or was it broken up? Did it disintegrate of itself or
24 was it broken up? Now, the forces that wanted to see the fall of
25 Yugoslavia couldn't have brought it about if there hadn't been influence
1 from outside, and a prime influence, decisive influence. And let's see
2 who said what, what was said by prominent people in the international
3 community about this general matter.
4 "I witnessed at first-hand how Western diplomatic ineptitude and
5 clumsiness hastened the break-up of Yugoslavia and contributed to the
6 dreadful violence and bloodshed that followed the disintegration of the
7 country. Here are a few examples. The premature recognition of Croatia
8 before any guarantees of civil and human rights were given to the Serbian
9 population in Croatia which, because of the horrendous events that
10 occurred there during the Second World War, made civil war inevitable.
11 "The encouragement of Alija Izetbegovic to withdraw his signature
12 from the so-called Lisbon Agreement and proceed with a referendum on
13 independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which everyone knew would lead to the
14 death and displacement of thousands of people."
15 James Bissett, the Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia said that.
16 "The greatest -- biggest mistake was recognising all these little
17 countries when they started to decide they were independent. The Serbs
18 had very good reason to be worried about being in a Muslim-dominated
19 country. It wasn't just paranoia." That was said by Colin Powell,
20 American General.
21 "EC's premature recognition had destroyed the possibility of
22 preventing a global negotiated position for Yugoslavia and contributed to
23 the civil war in Bosnia. The responsibility of Germany and the Vatican
24 for the escalation of the crisis was enormous." That was Ronald Dumas,
25 French foreign minister.
1 "I'm deeply worried that any early selective recognition could
2 widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive situation, especially in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina." That was Perez de Cuellar.
4 "The prize promised by Genscher had its effect. The Croat
5 separatists intensified their armed activities, blockaded the JNA
6 barracks, their access to water and electricity. The bloodshed went on,
7 and at the year's end, Germany pushed through the recognition of Croatia.
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the wonderful small-scale Yugoslavia, was driven into
9 a disastrous civil war lasting several years." Said Ralf Hartmann, the
10 German ambassador to Yugoslavia.
11 "We said if Yugoslavia does not break up peacefully, there's
12 going to be one hell of a civil war. The real problem was that there was
13 a unilateral declaration of independence and a use of force to gain that
14 independence rather than a peaceful negotiation of independence, which is
15 the way it should have happened." Said James Baker, the then US
16 Secretary of State.
17 "The premature recognition of Slovenia and Croat was a guarantee
18 that the break-up of Yugoslavia would not be resolved by peaceful means.
19 Once again, Western intervention had exacerbated and complicated a
20 serious Balkan problem. Again, the German intervention had little to do
21 with the actual problem faced on the ground in Yugoslavia."
22 Said James Bissett, another ambassador, US ambassador.
23 "My view has always been that to have stuck unyieldingly to the
24 internal boundaries of the six republics within the former Yugoslavia
25 before there was any question of any recognition of these republics as
1 being the boundaries for independent states, was a folly far greater than
2 that of premature recognition itself." David Owen, Balkan envoy
4 "Zimmermann told Izetbegovic the following: Look, why don't you
5 wait and see what the US can do for you, meaning we will recognise you
6 and then help you out, so don't go ahead with the Lisbon Agreement, don't
7 accept the Cutileiro Plan and just hold out for some kind of unitary
8 Bosnian state. So this is a major turning point in our diplomatic
9 efforts." Said George Kenney, an official of the US State Department
10 working on these affairs.
11 Now, I don't know whether to read all these statements or perhaps
12 you can read them on your screens. We have two or three more to go.
13 "Anyway, this kind of American intervention guaranteed civil war
14 in Bosnia and the death of thousands of people, and it acted as if the US
15 had decided to implement a policy which would prevent a solution to the
16 conflict in a way which would not be violent." James Bissett, Canadian
18 "The premature recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia by the
19 EC and US brought about the war that is going on now." Said Cyrus Vance,
20 US UN envoy.
21 "The German government was pushing for recognition against the
22 resistance of other European countries and the result was a catastrophe."
23 Our host, Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch prime minister.
24 Once when Izetbegovic returned from Germany, he was very sad and
25 said to Professor Koljevic and to myself, that he had received an offer
1 that he couldn't refuse and that he had to move towards independence.
2 Although heavy-hearted, I accused those governments here, of which some
3 were friendly to boot, which set the flames of the third fire in the
4 Balkans in the 20th century. And proof and evidence will show that some
5 of those governments, principally Germany, even while Josip Broz Tito was
6 still alive, had foreseen the outbreak of war and the brutality of that
7 war. The outcome of the war that were advantageous to them, but also
8 not, so they were clairvoyants in a way. And one form of that
9 clairvoyance was one I mentioned, that never was there a war in our
10 country without the civil war component. If you're going to have a war
11 in the Balkans, you're going to have civil war and you'll have brother
12 killing brother. How then can the Prosecution place the responsibilities
13 for the outbreak of a civil war, in the very throes of a civil war which
14 the Western governments and Western services envisaged in this almost
15 clairvoyant way, far before they had ever heard of Karadzic and the
16 Serbian Democratic Party, how can they link it to this accused here and
17 burden him and accuse him for -- of being responsible for all that?
18 The second form of clairvoyance as far as these governments were
19 concerned was that they knew exactly how Yugoslavias came into being and
20 disappeared. This was not the first Yugoslavia nor was it the first
21 disappearance of a Yugoslavia. And if we have time, we'll address that
22 matter in due course, but what I want to tell you is that Yugoslavia was
23 formed and disbanded exclusively following the Western countries'
24 interests when, after World War I, for instance, Serbia as the winning
25 power could decide what Serbia was going to look like, then the Croats
1 and the Slovenes asked to rush into that Serbia and unite. And the West
2 saw a chance for them to get one up on Germany and have Croatia and
3 Slovenia form part of Yugoslavia and reject the Germans from the scene.
4 Now when this was no longer necessary Yugoslavia -- was disintegrated
5 when Germany attacked. When the allies won out, Yugoslavia was
6 reinstated. And when Germany became stronger than the Western powers in
7 1991, the Yugoslavia disintegrated again and was disbanded, but now, as
8 opposed to 1941, the actors of those Germans' intention were our allies
9 from World War II. And that makes a German victory complete and
10 definite, that their adversaries from World War II were doing -- were
11 doing its work for them. What Germany didn't succeed during World War II
12 when it was defeated, the allies have succeeded now. So those countries
13 are the responsible people. Yugoslavia was just an indicator of the mood
14 and state in Europe and the relationship between Germany and other
15 European countries. It wasn't the intrinsic need of these nations, and
16 let me remind you that before they, for their own interests, pushed the
17 Croats into Yugoslavia in 1918, the Serbs and Croats weren't enemies.
18 There was no reason for them to be enemies at that time.
19 Now let's see what somebody else has to say about the situation
20 or, rather, those forecasts were made during Tito's era. Let's see what
21 Lord Carrington says about the interference of the European Community at
22 that point in time.
23 [Video-clip played]
24 "[Indiscernible] Americans had not intervened in Yugoslavia,
25 there would have been far fewer people killed. There would have been far
1 less ethnic cleansing. There would have been some extremely unhappy and
2 dissatisfied people who felt that they had been done out of their country
3 or their livelihood or whatever it might be, but there was going to be a
4 very large number of dissatisfied and unhappy people at the end of all
5 this. And perhaps the moral of the goal is that you should think very
6 carefully before you intervene in a civil war."
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Truth and intelligence always wins
8 in the end, and small nations can only wish to win at the beginning and
9 not later on because later on it's too late.
10 Now I'd like to remind you of this interference of the Western
11 countries not only in influencing the outbreak of the war but also its
12 course, and this was confirmed recently by Richard Holbrooke, Ambassador
13 Richard Holbrooke. And all I can say to him which Njegos, the great poet
14 would have said, thank you very much for that recognition.
15 It will prove correct that certain governments even destroyed all
16 chances for agreements to be reached between the ethnic groups.
17 Now I'd like to skip the part relating to the Assembly.
18 The interpreters have asked me to speak slower.
19 Now, Mr. Tieger, my respected adversary, in his opening statement
20 says even at first glance at the documents from the October session, for
21 example, the Assembly session on the 15th of October which was a crucial
22 Assembly and a crucial decision taken about the future of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that even a cursory glance at the transcript of the
24 Assembly meeting proves Serb responsibility and Serb culpability, but I
25 think that this cursory glance is our problem here. The Defence is
1 opposed to having any superficial view of this question, and it will do
2 everything in its power to avoid this superficiality but go into the
4 Now, the text that you see on your screen is a session at which the SDA
5 party finally managed, in an unconstitutional and illegal way, to pass the
6 declaration on sovereignty without any Serb Assembly members and without the
7 Speaker of the Parliament who had concluded the session, and they convened a
8 new meeting without the right to do so. So all the barriers in avoiding
9 constitutionality and legality were broken down. I delivered a speech at
10 the Assembly which is the most exploited speech ever by the Prosecution.
11 And I think that's the worst thing that they can say of me and hold
12 against me, whereas, Your Excellencies, that speech is an antiwar speech,
13 very much so, in which the Serb side -- or, rather, I am entreating that
14 we opt for variants for peace and I'm offering all manner of concessions.
15 Now, if the Defence is given the opportunity of presenting all
16 the relevant data and evidence, you will be able to see that what
17 happened on the ground, in the chaos of civil war, to that was added mass
18 killing of one's own population, mass crimes in the centre of Sarajevo,
19 the bread line at Vasa Miskin, the crime at the stadium, Markale 1 and 2.
20 These are all amazing examples and twists and innovations of slyness
21 applied in war, and the actors thereof are proud of that.
22 Now, if we reject what Mr. Tieger says, a cursory glance,
23 superficial glance of the material we have concerning the Markale
24 incident, we can see what actually happened.
25 [Video-clip played]
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a normal market day at
2 Markale, when there are a lot of sellers, a lot of goods at the market to
3 be sold. Now, this is another picture before the alleged explosion of
4 the Serb mine. It is the 5th of February, 1994, in the afternoon. This
5 is a leg, artificial limb, which allegedly was blown off by a Serb mine
6 from somebody, but it's a prosthetic. There are no people in the
7 marketplace, no fruit and vegetables being sold, whereas 3 or 400 people
8 are supposed to have been there and many of them hit by shells allegedly.
9 And here we have that same artificial limb as having been blown
10 off by a Serb shell.
11 Now, look at the tables. There's nothing on them. No goods are
12 being sold. It's a dark, winter's afternoon, an unpleasant place.
13 Nobody there, and 3 or 400 people suddenly appeared there. What were
14 they doing there?
15 How does the Prosecutor expect experienced Judges to accept this
16 plot or planting of evidence?
17 We will see in the courtroom -- here you have the corpses of the
18 killed -- of killed fighters who they scattered around for their
19 purposes. This killed soldier was brought in a plastic foil and then
20 taken away in this state, rigor mortis had already set in.
21 You see that there are no goods on the stalls. Let us hear what
22 he has to say.
23 "I want to introduce myself. I am Colonel Demurenko. I am Chief of
24 Staff, Sector Sarajevo. I want explain any details of investigations which
25 was provided UN, so-called UN expertise. As a professional man, I cannot
1 agree with argument of UN specialist about reasons and sources of this
2 shelling. This is a material -- maybe one portion of whole material of
3 UN specialist about the shelling, but it was very strange conclusion,
4 include idea about the shelling was from Serbian side. Small picture
5 which explained angle. This is a direction of fire. This is place of
6 explosion, and in accordance with investigation, direction of fire was
7 176 degrees.
8 "Today, personally, with my special -- not special, very small
9 investigation group including [indiscernible] officers, we was to this
10 place, this place, this, this and this, we went on foot and I can
11 affirm absolutely without -- beyond any doubts this is place unacceptable
12 or unsuitable for firing position mortar shell.
13 "For conclusion of material of investigation was wrong. Now I
14 said only about terrain where is located Serbian troops. They
15 investigate only angles and directions and automatically thinking about
16 Serbian so-called aggressions against civil population in Sarajevo, but I
17 think it's -- it's not correct.
18 "Let's stop them, stop false and falsehood and lie about Serbian
19 aggressions in this area, please. Or investigate it absolutely correctly
20 with full argumentation or stop it."
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, whenever you find it convenient.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If you allow me, I would just like
23 to state my views on this particular matter.
24 This is a war trick, a display of cunning in war which led to the
25 punishment of the Serbs as a warring party. They say that all is fair in
1 love and war. I don't think that all is fair either in love or in war,
2 but it is certain that in war these kind of things happen, but is this
3 permissible in a courtroom, in a court of law? How does the Prosecution
4 dare to proffer this to you as if it were the truth? And there is not a
5 single element, there is not a single marksman who can shoot this way, who
6 can, with just one mortar shell – and that is indirect fire - hit that market
7 in this way. There are no people there. There are no goods in the market,
8 and all of a sudden two hundred people turn up injured, or – let’s say -
9 at least one hundred are not hit. Did those market stalls protect anyone?
10 I think that this is the supreme injustice that happened in this
11 court of law. It is the supreme injustice because it's against truth and
12 justice. However, the Prosecution is continuing this war trickery and
13 they bring this in to convict a general to life in prison. This was the
14 trial of General Galic. And now they are trying to convict me of the
15 same thing as his supreme commander for something that we never did.
16 The -- one Trial Chamber already passed this kind of judgement.
17 However, the OTP convinced five Appeals Judges that this was a crime
18 committed by the Serbs. What is an even greater crime is to convince the
19 Muslim masses that this is what the Serbs had done to them. How can one
20 hope for reconciliation between the Serbs and Muslims if the Muslims are
21 to believe that the Serbs did this to them? And we are going to prove
22 that the Serbs never did this to the Muslims. We are going to prove in
23 this courtroom that Serbs never did this.
24 Excellencies, I believe that that will do as far as the opening
25 statement is concerned with regard to this particular incident, but I do
1 have to draw your attention to these war tricks, that the OTP simply took
2 over and continues along those lines as if the war were not over. In
3 this way, the OTP becomes a participant in the war, and they are trying
4 to draw this Chamber and this Tribunal into a war that seems to be
5 ongoing in that way.
6 If this is convenient, we can take the break now.
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll break for 20 minutes.
8 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, excuse me, but if I could raise one
9 potential point of clarification before you break very quickly. My
10 earlier request in connection with a cautionary measure, that is the
11 motion filed on February 13th, I believe, was not about a warning -
12 excuse me - to the accused concerning the continuance of trial, which was
13 the earlier subject, but instead to the motion for an instruction
14 regarding admissibility of submissions. It may well have been understood
15 but I wanted to clarify that because the Court's reference to previous
16 discussion caused me some concern that the Bench may have been thinking I
17 was referring to the possibility of a warning about continuance rather
18 than the motion for an instruction regarding the admissibility of
20 JUDGE KWON: Admissibility of submissions.
21 MR. TIEGER: Of submissions instead, Your Honour, yes. And that
22 was a motion filed on February 23rd. I believe the Defence responded by
23 indicating they had no position on that.
24 JUDGE KWON: We'll take a look over the break. Twenty minutes.
25 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, we looked at the motion you referred to,
3 and the Chamber found it sufficient to note that this stage that it is
4 pursuant to Rule 84 that the accused is making his statement, and then
5 the remainder will be taken care of after his statement.
6 MR. TIEGER: I understand, Your Honour, and I wasn't disputing the Court in any
7 way. I just was concerned about the possibility of some confusion. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would now like us to have a look
10 at what Lord Owen says, who was a mediator in the search for peace. Let
11 us see what he says about Markale.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 THE INTERPRETER: "Lord Owen, formerly head of the British diplomacy,
14 represents Europe as a Co-Chairman of the Conference on the former Yugoslavia,
15 together with Mr. Stoltenberg, representative of the United Nations. [Voiceover]
16 On the evening of the 12th of February, the twelve foreign ministers received
17 reports, which was photocopied for me, specifically paragraph 7 which is related
18 to the Sarajevo assassination on the 5th of February. Lord Owen wrote, I quote:
19 'The position from which this shell was launched is located one and a half
20 kilometre deep into the Muslim-held territory, measured from the demarcation line
21 which separates this territory from the Army of Republika Srpska.'"
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You will see, Excellencies, in this
23 courtroom, a multitude of similar things that the other side did to their
24 own people, that were stage managed.
25 Now I'd like to draw your attention to yet another trick of this
1 sort that caused serious damage to us there and now the Prosecution is
2 trying to benefit from it even further.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 "Anybody pretending that there are innocents in this business,
5 and that there is one side that is pure white, the victims, and other
6 side pure-on black, the aggressors. That is not the case.
7 "Lord David Owen came to Bosnia-Herzegovina in August of 1992 to
8 replace Lord Carrington as mediator for the European Community and with a
9 reputation as a hard-line critic of the Bosnian Serbs. But Owen quickly
10 learned that Muslim forces routinely staged incidents to turn world
11 opinion against the Serbs. Media reports, for instance, had accused the
12 Serbs of targeting Kosevo Hospital in Sarajevo.
13 "The UN monitors actually saw a mortar bomb, a mortar crew come
14 into the hospital in Bosnian government military forces uniform and fire
15 over the Kosevo Hospital into an area, presumably Serb. And all of it
16 was packed up very quickly. A television crew arrived, set up on the
17 grounds of the hospital. A few minutes later, retaliatory fire from the
18 place where the mortar came and, of course, landed on the hospital, all
19 filmed on television.
20 "Owen learned a strongly worded letter had been sent to the
21 government of Alija Izetbegovic by the UN commander in Sarajevo,
22 General Filip Morillon, stating: 'I now have concrete evidence from
23 witnesses of this disreputable and cowardly act. I must point out to you
24 the harm that such blatant disregard for the Geneva Convention does to
25 your cause.'
1 "When I said to General Morillon, who is, I think, an
2 exceptionally able soldier in every way, Why don't you make this public?
3 He shrugged his shoulder in a sort of Gallic way and he said, You have to
4 look at it."
5 "Lord Owen and UN mediator Cyrus Vance found that their efforts
6 to negotiate a compromise to end the conflict were undermined by the
7 propaganda war that targeted US public opinion.
8 "In America they have a press and a television presentation that
9 is still cowboys and Indians, good and bad. They like to see things in
10 simple terms. There's no doubt about that, and it's been helped by some
11 very strongly motivated propaganda. It's a propaganda war as well as an
12 actual physical war."
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. What His Lordship said was a
14 propaganda war, as he had put it, and this propaganda war could not have
15 been waged and all of this cunning could not have been something that the
16 Serbs would be blamed for if there weren't for the assistance of all of
17 those who were there on behalf of the international community. You will
18 see in this courtroom, in due course, to what a low level humanitarian
19 organisations stooped, even some who had a perfectly good name until
20 then. There were some that were without borders indeed before, but they
21 destroyed the very essence of the idea of being humanitarian. They were
22 spying for one of the warring parties. They lied in press releases.
23 They smuggled arms and ammunition, and they also crossed our lines,
24 pretending to belong to these organisations and protected vehicles, and
25 later when our soldiers became suspicious and started checking them, then
1 we are criticised for being unpleasant to these organisations. They
2 smuggled weapons. They smuggled enemy combatants. In a word, they were
3 a warring party. They were a warring party.
4 When our troops legitimately started defending themselves from
5 these sabotage actions, these unlawful actions launched by certain
6 organisations, humanitarian organisations that were doing this either on
7 their own or were simply handing their vehicles, their protected vehicles
8 over to others, we had this dirty war waged against us. And also there
9 was the war in the media, as Lord Owen said, that could not have happened
10 if it weren't for the media.
11 You will see during this period of time -- or, rather, during
12 these proceedings, that false journalists ruined the idea of journalism,
13 of impartial journalism, how these false journalists led to the death of
14 true journalists in many theatres of war throughout the world because
15 they destroyed the very idea of the impartiality of journalism, and they
16 abused this sacred duty or this sacred position of being impartial and of
17 not being a warring party and that thereby they should have open access
18 everywhere, just as we did for them.
19 For example, there was a British TV crew that we brought on our
20 own plane after the London conference. We brought them there, and we
21 allowed them to go wherever they wanted to go. And then there was this
22 other Markale in 1992, from Trnopolje. You will see that footage and you
23 will prove -- and we will prove that Trnopolje was not a camp. Rather,
24 it was a collection centre that was run by the refugees themselves.
25 This is how that picture with barbed wire appeared and was
1 broadcast all over the world.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 "[Previous translation continues] Trnopolje village. The centre
4 was used by people in transit. They were trying to get away from the
5 fighting and needed a place to stay during their travels."
6 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] I had to come here. Those that
7 did not fight came here.
8 "We have nothing to fight for. I came with children, young
9 children, here down the field. Nobody harassed us. Nobody laid a finger
10 on us. I stayed in the village.
11 "[Previous translation continues] [In English] ... centre of
12 Trnopolje included a medical facility. The Yugoslav and ITN crews
13 interviewed Dr. Mestrinic Idriz [phoen], a Muslim doctor there.
14 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] We have been here from the very
15 first day. People came here of their own free will, probably because of
16 food shortages."
17 "[In English] Ms. Marshall chose not to set up her cameras and
18 film in this open area. Instead, she and her crew manoeuvred into a
19 partly enclosed space used as a storage area for wheelbarrows and the
20 like. The dilapidated fence had chicken wire on the bottom, a few
21 strands of barbed wire on top to discourage theft. Our crew filmed the
22 ITN people as they manoeuvred into this area through a hole in the
23 broken-down fence. Someone in front of the crowd of refugees said, Here,
24 this one speaks English, pointing to Mr. Mehmet [phoen].
25 "I think it's very [indiscernible] nothing wrong here.
1 "Do you feel safe here?
2 "I think it's very safe but it's very hard.
3 "Here's a little diagram showing the position of the two crews.
4 The ITN people are the blue circle on the left; we are the red circle on
5 the right.
6 "This man is very thin.
7 "Penny Marshall had set up her cameras behind barbed wire. She
8 was in position. Now she searched the crowd for that perfect look. She
9 wanted a star for her story. The story she would sell the world."
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, we will prove by
11 way of evidence that the Prosecution has been trying to use against us,
12 through that we are going to prove what we are trying to say.
13 This was a collection centre. This was a transit point for
14 persons who had nowhere to go because of the combat going on around them.
15 This will tellingly be proved by the evidence that the Prosecution is
16 trying to use against us, but we are going to use it in our own defence.
17 The team that you saw went into the tool shed, and there's barbed
18 wire around it. So they were surrounded by barbed wire, but they were
19 filming free people, and we suffered gravely on account of the fact that
20 this image went all over the world. We were harshly punished for that
21 imagery. I wonder how Ms. Penny Marshall sleeps after all the harm she
22 inflicted on us by sending these images around the world, but to have
23 this brought into court and to have this war cunning be used in a court
24 of law and to create a picture of the Serbs on that basis and to condemn
25 the Serbs on that basis, that is a different matter.
1 I have said that we had done everything possible to achieve peace
2 and avoid war. Let me remind you that in 1991 there was a lot of
3 tension. There was war in Croatia. There were misunderstandings. Then
4 this junior MBO, Muslim party led by Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic, came to
5 see us and said, This is bad, what's going on is not good. Are you going
6 to give up on the idea of regionalisation of Serb autonomous provinces
7 and all other measures that we undertook exclusively as a response to the
8 measures undertaken against us by the SDA and we did accept, and this is
9 what one of their leaders testified about this.
10 They designed and proposed an historic Serb-Muslim agreement with
11 a view to avoiding war, and the whole idea was to have the Muslims and
12 the Serbs living alongside each other. If that had happened, we would
13 know how many of them would still have been alive and how many of them
14 would not have been living in poverty had this agreement been accepted.
15 And as I said, all the measures that we have employed in response to
16 illegal measures undertaken by the Muslim and the Croat side were based
17 in law and international covenants. However, we abandoned all that once
18 Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic came up with this idea.
19 Now is a good time to point to an illusion that the Prosecution wants to
20 create, because this -- without this kind of illusion and trick they cannot
21 indict me. They claim that Serbs do not wish to live with the Muslims. On the
22 other hand, we were doing everything possible to keep Muslims in Yugoslavia.
23 The Serbs wanted to live with Muslims, but they didn't want to live under the
24 Muslims, and this is our right. We shall never live under this kind of regime
25 that would deprive us of our fundamental rights.
1 So once we have established that the Serbs did everything to keep the Muslims
2 in Yugoslavia and to live with them, the indictment should fall. For some time
3 they would have been in the second place. Soon, perhaps, they would have been
4 in the first place. But they would have had protection. What would the Muslims
5 have in this kind of Yugoslavia? They would enjoy the protection as a people,
6 and they would enjoy the protection in their own republic. If the Muslims said,
7 "We want to leave Yugoslavia," we would just tell them, "Give us what you have
8 in Yugoslavia, give us our own constituent unit in Bosnia, and we can leave."
9 As I said, 100 per cent of power in 100 per cent of Bosnia was never an option.
10 Now, if you take only one sentence from one speech, and I'm
11 talking about my speech that was very much exploited, I would like to
12 draw to your attention to this speech and this -- I would like to assess
13 it. It was delivered on the 15th of October, and it relates to a
14 definitive and forcible adoption of the declaration on independence.
15 [Video-clip played]
16 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Because what you are proposing impinges on the
17 integrity of Yugoslavia and the integrity of Yugoslavia can be disrupted in the
18 federal parliament, I'm not sure even of that, but it can be if you come to an
19 agreement in the federal parliament and other federal institutions. Many plans
20 get mixed here. You referred to the constitution and the laws when it suits
21 you; and when it doesn't suit you, you come out political proclamations. Serbs
22 in Bosnia-Herzegovina can prevent Croats and Muslims, if necessary, from getting
23 out of Yugoslavia, but we will not prevent you. We will not do that because we
24 are a sovereign people. Gentleman, I did not come here as a god of war, which
25 is how somebody from the Croatian Democratic Party named me, but I want to
1 repeat, for the hundredth time, that the Serbian Democratic Party does not create
2 the will of the Serbian people. It interprets it. We would lie to you if we
3 said that you can adopt this and that you can do something with this in Europe.
4 "Gentlemen from the SDA, for the last three months we've been
5 talking about other rights. We are talking freely and openly about a
6 different way of organising Bosnia and Herzegovina, where some kind of a
7 three-tier approach will enable Bosnia to stay united and Serbs, Muslims
8 and Croats to stay in Yugoslavia for as long as they want to. This is a
9 three-tier solution where the sovereignty of the peoples, as Mr. Bjelobrk
10 correctly said, would be exercised not only at the level of the republic
11 and the federal state but also in autonomous provinces. If you don't
12 want this, we could agree with you leaving Yugoslavia by means of a
13 plebiscite, but we shall use the same mechanism to prevent you from
14 taking us out of Yugoslavia. We do not mind if you submit an initiative
15 to change the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But you cannot do it
16 this way. It has to be done through the constitutional commission, civil
17 council of citizens which is where we would then vote.
18 "I'm trying to tell you, in the calmest way possible, the Serbian
19 people know what you want. You want to tell the people in The Hague
20 that this is a third or fourth republic that does not want to live in
21 Yugoslavia, but you cannot do that because we want to live in Yugoslavia.
22 You can say that in your name. All the sovereign people in Bosnia can
23 only speak for themselves. They cannot speak for other peoples. We have
24 reached that conclusion in this parliament. Before the national and
25 international public, we will prevent you from committing violence,
1 constitutional violence against Serbs because the constitutional violence
2 breeds all other kinds of violence. We will not be in control anymore.
3 This has been repeated here a hundred times. We will no longer be in
4 control if we get into a situation where Croatia and Slovenia are,
5 especially Croatia. The hell would be a thousand times worse in
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. There would be no way to stop it.
7 "I ask you once again, I am not threatening, I am pleading that
8 you take seriously the political will of the Serbian people represented
9 here today, the Serbian Democratic Party, the Serbian Renewal Movement
10 and some Serbs from the other parties represent. I plead with you to
11 fully understand that what you are doing is not good. The road that you
12 are choosing for Bosnia and Herzegovina is the same highway to hell and
13 suffering that Slovenia and Croatia have already taken. Do not think
14 that you will not take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and the Muslim
15 people maybe into extinction, because if there is a war, the Muslim
16 people will not be able to defend themselves.
17 "Please, these are big statements, but serious situations demand
18 big statements. How are you going to prevent people in Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina from killing each other? How can the war in Croatia be
20 prevented, especially in areas where Serbs and Croats live together and
21 where their political wills have clashed without adhering to the legal
22 framework which is the only way to resolve."
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I also said we have to prevent
24 chaos from setting in. We can introduce order. We have it in our hands.
25 But we cannot manage chaos.
1 So taking this all into consideration and having heard what
2 exceptional authorities worldwide said about the recognition and other
3 issues, we have to ask ourselves what this small community of Serbs in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina could do except surrender and annihilate themselves.
5 Therefore, we have an opportunity here to make a distinction between
6 whether this was lawful conduct on the part of the HDZ and the SDA and
7 the Serbs were violating their rights, or whether it was vice versa.
8 They were in breach and the Serbs tried to defend themselves to a
9 minimum, by making endless concessions.
10 You saw that the constitution was violated when and if necessary,
11 and then this kind of brokered constitution is being revoked, which is
13 Now, the Croatian writer Krleza said that this crisis developed
14 by making a comparison with this picture: You turn off the light in the
15 Balkan tavern, and after everything is over, you turn the lights back on.
16 The Serbs couldn't allow that to happen. Let me remind you that the
17 division and the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina came from outside,
18 and that was primarily the idea of Mr. Izetbegovic. This will be confirmed
19 by all his associates and by this intercept that you are going to hear.
20 He was only interested in having Bosnia-Herzegovina, albeit a small one,
21 but with Arab and Muslim influence in it.
22 Can we now please listen to this conversation between Karadzic
23 and Milosevic, which is not intended for the public to hear, where they
24 speak to each other very candidly and authentically.
25 [Audiotape played]
1 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Karadzic: They surprised us the
2 day before yesterday, after that lunch. They completely took us by
3 surprise. Izetbegovic talked about the division of Bosnia, explicitly
4 and openly, he'd never been more explicit. We were shocked. We hadn't
5 thought about that. I don't think he (Izetbegovic) wants to unite with
6 Croatia. He wants to use Croatia to leave Yugoslavia, because what he'd
7 like is to have some Islamic enclave in the valley of the River Bosna,
8 which I think he needs for the Arab world. We still believe that it
9 would be a pity if Bosnia were to fall apart. That is our basic stand.
10 "Milosevic: Not all Muslims will do what Alija Izetbegovic is
11 doing. I am sure.
12 "Karadzic: He is very cunning. He doesn't speak what those
13 ultimate moves are. Those last moves of his, the last intentions of an
14 Islamic republic, and he is hiding behind the state and citizens."
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, having had insight into all of
16 this, the Prosecution is trying to characterise me as a leader who
17 formulated and implemented this criminal plan of creating a separate ethnic
18 entity comprising large territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This did not
19 happen until we were forced to take what was offered to us just to save
20 our lives.
21 They said Karadzic was the ultimate leader. If they knew the
22 Serbian people properly, they would have said that Karadzic was the
23 ultimate servant of his people, and this is what you can find in -- in
24 the Gospels.
25 The second part of the sentence is not only disputable but it's
1 also untrue, and it's similar to the one in -- proffered by the
2 Prosecution in paragraph 11, where it says:
3 "As Yugoslavia disintegrated, republics moved toward
5 This is very cunning. I have to give them credit for that. The
6 republics moved toward independence because Yugoslavia was
7 disintegrating. I would like to recommend to all of you, as a kind of
8 entertainment, everything that the Prosecution says against me just turn
9 it around. You will see it's more correct and true and it's very
11 We have to reverse this upside logic. In that case, this
12 paragraph would sound as follows: When the republics moved towards
13 independence, that is when Yugoslavia started disintegrated. And this is
14 what the truth is, not what the OTP is saying. The first step was for
15 the republics who proclaimed unlawful, illegal, unilateral secessions, and
16 we heard it from a very prominent expert. However, the OTP here is trying
17 to convince you this took place the other way around, and, of course, in
18 that context you can't speak about the Serbs' blame. However, if it is
19 clear that the independence of republics caused the disintegration, then
20 everything becomes clear, let alone the fact that Yugoslavia did not break
21 up, did not disintegrate, but it was broken up from the outside. Bosnia was
22 fragmented, and Yugoslavia was broken up.
23 How could Bosnia embark on the road towards -- towards independence
24 without the Serbs and against the Serbs’ will? If you look at the maps and
25 the areas where the Serbs have been living for ages, you will understand that
1 we’re going to prove here that the SDA didn't need the Bosnian Serbs but
2 they, rather, needed their territories, the two-third territories of Bosnia.
3 The OTP said that the Serbs constituted one-third of the population, but
4 we shall come to that, how it happened that the Serbs who had always been
5 majority became only one-third, but that one-third of population lived on
6 two-thirds of the territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7 If the SDA had wanted the Serbian territories, it could have been
8 available to the OTP in the form of one very strong proof thanks to
9 Mr. Tudjman with whom I had a lot of conversations. Let us now listen to
10 an intercept between Tudjman and a high delegation from the US in which
11 he said, Muslims told me once that they were going to exterminate them
12 all, talking about the Serbs. I asked them, How are you going to expel one
13 and a half million Serbs out of Bosnia? And then Tudjman says, Although the
14 Muslim leadership is not unified, they cannot count on a war that will end
15 with the expulsion of the Serbs but they, rather, have to rely on Croatia,
16 and sooner or later the Serbs would leave Bosnia.
17 I have been accused here of wanting the Muslims to leave
18 Republika Srpska. The Muslims that they are referring to, the SDA
19 Muslims, the young Muslims, the fundamentalists, wanted all the Serbs to
20 leave Bosnia. And now we see just how sincere Mr. Izetbegovic was, the
21 president of the SDA, and his moves, when he said, If I am to be accused
22 of that, then you don't have to accuse Karadzic. And at one point in
23 time I take it upon myself, liberating me of all responsibility.
24 Now, President Tudjman protected Mr. Izetbegovic during the war.
25 We didn't want his defeat, but we did want to see his political defeat
1 and his political idea of having 100 per cent power and 100 per cent
2 Bosnia. So this is a completely authentic piece of evidence.
3 The Prosecution then moves on and follows the same erroneous path when it
4 says in one of its paragraphs that Karadzic took part in negotiations aiming to
5 create a joint state and simultaneously prepared organs and conditions for the
6 forcible ethnic separation and creation of a Serb state carved out from Bosnia
7 and Herzegovina similar to a process that had started in Croatia. What kind of
8 joint state when the joint state already existed, I ask you.
9 Now, further on in another paragraph, the Prosecution goes on to
10 say that the Serbs in Croatia, because they're now linking us up, have
11 this earmarked territories considered Serb, created separate Serb
12 institutions to resist Croatian authority, declared autonomy and then
13 independence, and forcibly took control of approximately one-third of
14 Croatian territory.
15 Well, this is how it was. We saw that the Croatian secession was
16 illegal, unlawful, and this illegality the Serbs resisted, and that is
17 legitimate. But as far as the Prosecution is concerned, it's not
18 legitimate. Now, because of things of this kind, the Prosecution seems
19 to be a porte-parole of my wartime adversaries rather than a Prosecution
20 in this Tribunal. No legal instance or scholarly or scientific forum
21 ever established that Croatia acted lawfully and that the Serbs did not
22 have the right to put up a resistance to that illegality.
23 Let me remind you what happened to the Serbs in Croatia. The
24 Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina are the oldest population there. All the
25 territory was theirs. The Serbs came to Croatia 300 or 350 years ago and
1 they were given Krajina not from Croatia but from Austro-Hungary. Austria,
2 in fact, and they were fighters there and they were given privileges as such,
3 autonomous rights were accorded to them. They were given the territory. If,
4 in 1918, the Serbs in Krajina had been told that one day they would have to
5 leave this joint state and be in Croatia, live in Croatia, Krajina would not
6 have been a part of Croatia, and maybe not even Croatia would have been part
7 of Yugoslavia, and we would still be friends. Or if in 1945, the population
8 in Krajina were told that the Croatia that they were entering would one day
9 be taken away from them and that they would been expelled, Krajina would not
10 be in Croatia at all.
11 So the people of Krajina were tricked. They were given Krajina
12 from Austria because they earned it by fighting and defending the whole
13 of Europe from the Turkish onslaught and invasion and then they entered
14 then Croatia, when in 1945 they entered Croatia and took in the dowry
15 that Croatia was. Then it said in the constitution that Croatia was
16 two-nation state, a state of Croats and Serbs; whereas in 1991, the first
17 thing that the HDZ did in Croatia was to throw the Serbs out of the
18 constitution and turn them into a national minority so that they could
19 then seize Krajina away from them.
20 Now we can see what Professor Antonio Cassese, whom you all know
21 well, says about these unlawful steps taken by Croatia for which the
22 Prosecution maintains that the Serbs cannot resist in Krajina, as if
23 those steps had been lawful.
24 The Prosecution is accusing me of ethnocentrism of some kind, and
25 it says that we were ethnically motivated in wishing to create our own
1 territories both in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Please,
2 exclusively ethnic motives were on the side of the Slovenes, Croats and
3 Muslims to step down from Yugoslavia. They weren't political motives or
4 economic ones or racial or religious ones. They were purely ethnic
5 motives that led them to do that. Whereas the Serbs are being denied
6 their right at the onslaught of other interests to protect their own
7 interests. So ethnic -- all possible crises after World War II were
8 ethnically motivated, especially from 1968 to 1971 in Croatia, when Tito
9 replaced the whole Croatian leadership ethnically. Karadzic, after 1968,
10 no longer delved in politics. He took part in the student movement and
11 then was a sort of dissident and worked in his profession and not in
13 So ethnic nationalism in 1990 and 1991 brought about everything
14 that happened later on, whereas the Serbs are held responsible.
15 Let me remind you that in Croatia the Serbs did not vote for the
16 Serbian Democratic Party in the majority but for a multi-ethnic party of
17 Ivica Racan, of the Communists of Ivica Racan. Croatia had many parties
18 and many secessionist parties at that, but the Croats voted for the HDZ,
19 the most ethnically coloured one; whereas the Serbs voted for the least
20 ethnically coloured party that cannot be considered Serb at all, and
21 those Serbs in Croatia are then accused in the package and all of us
22 together with them by the Prosecution that we were ethnocentric or
23 goodness knows what else.
24 Now, if we have time, I would like to show you what it is that
25 the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, because Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 during World War II was joined to Croatia, what they could expect. We're
2 going to see something about Jasenovac, which is just across the Sava
3 River from us, and this is what the Wiesenthal Centre says. The Ustashas
4 founded in 1930, according to the centre, killed 500.000 Serbs, expelled
5 250.000 and the others were converted. So that's Mile Budak's theory of
6 the three thirds, a Croatian writer and ideologue. We're going to expel
7 a third, kill a third and convert a third. And when a Serb in
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina says this as an allegory, as tit for tat, the
9 Prosecutor says and places in the indictment that this is the Serb
10 position. But it's common knowledge that there will be three thirds.
11 However, the Prosecutor does not have good advisors on the ground so that
12 they can be told and explained what a reported speech actually means.
13 Now, this is what the German -- is this still Wiesenthal on our
14 screens? Let's see what a German intelligence officer says. And I'd
15 like to draw Your Excellencies 'attention to the fact that up until the
16 17th of February, 1942, there was a very precise estimation made by a
17 German intelligence officer, according to which up until then
18 300.000 Orthodox Serbs had already been killed, butchered, using --
19 applying sadistic methods. Now this figure could not have decreased. It
20 could only have increased. It only began to decrease when the Communists
21 came into power. It became smaller and smaller until they reached a
22 figure of 80.000, as if 80.000 were a small figure. But the -- Croatia
23 was ready to acknowledge the 80.000, but it is certain that there were
24 more than 500.000 because if in one year it was 300.000, then the number
25 could have only increased with each passing year. And the Wiesenthal
1 Centre claims that about a million Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia were in
2 fact killed.
3 Now, what I'm being accused of by the Prosecution in their false
4 indictment I would like to turn round and create into a truthful
5 indictment, where everything stays the same but the actors change.
6 Instead of the Serb leaders, the Croatian and Muslim leaders would stand
7 accused, and the places would be reversed too. And let's see what that
8 would look like.
9 Genuine indictment. As if Tudjman or Izetbegovic in -- from 1990
10 to 1995, led the formulation and implementation of a criminal plan to
11 create an ethnic entity on large portions of the FRY of Yugoslavia. Or
12 Tudjman, Izetbegovic, engaged in negotiations to secure a common state,
13 and they did indeed, while simultaneously preparing the organs, entities
14 and conditions for the forcible ethnic separation and creation of a Croat
15 Muslim state carved out from Yugoslavia similar to a process that had
16 started in Slovenia -- or, rather, in Croatia vis-a-vis
18 Furthermore, paragraph 13, everything is the same -- remains the
19 same but we changed the actors. Croats, Muslims earmarked territories
20 considered Croat Muslim, created separate Croat or Muslim institutions to
21 resist Yugoslav authority, declared independence and forcibly took
22 control of a large part of Yugoslav territory, and the Yugoslav
23 population did not accept those decisions on that territory.
24 Now, Your Excellencies in the Trial Chamber and gentlemen in the
25 various governments and the Prosecution that supports this process of
1 taking the Serbs to trial, my variations of these paragraphs in the
2 pre-trial brief of the Prosecution is far more believable and far more
3 exact than the Prosecutor's. To this paragraphs we should add that these
4 leaders of the Croats and Muslims, and they can't accuse us of that, that
5 they worked to set up secret republican armies, services, armed
6 themselves, violated United Nations Resolutions, had plans to revive the
7 empire Croatia, and the Western Europe countries would like to reinstate
8 the Habsburg Monarchy. And you will see how the Muslim population in
9 Turkey would like to see Turkey return to the Balkans, which allegedly
10 during the Turkish occupation of 500 years, flourished and was stable.
11 Yes, it was stable, just like a cemetery is stable. Nobody does anything
12 there. There is no movement at all in a cemetery. But Serbian culture
13 which until the arrival of the Turks was the leading culture in real
14 Europe, and Stefan Lazarevic was the leader, leading figure, he was a
15 poet, he was a hero, well liked by his friends in Europe, all this
16 stopped when Turkey arrived.
17 Now Turkey wants – from the mouth of the most responsible
18 individuals from 1990 on, from Turgut Ozal, and Minister
19 Davutoglu – that Bosnia is Turkish and Turkey is Bosnian.
20 We are one and we will come back again because it is in our
21 interest to revive the Ottoman Empire. That is something that
22 the Serbs do not accept.
23 If I had more time, I would produce a series of evidence to show
24 that the rhythm of the terrible changes in Croatia immediately after the
25 elections, what happened. Every month there was a new shocking measure
1 against the Serbs. First of all, the amendment throwing them out of the
2 constitution. Then the constitution itself in which they were reduced to
3 a national minority. Then you had other measures that were taken.
4 Arming secretly. Then next we had expulsions, killings in towns and in
5 Serbian territories where the Serbs were in the majority, and so then we
6 had -- already had columns of refugees. People were sacked from their
7 jobs. And the Prosecution knows this full well and they have uttered it
8 in -- we have heard testimony about that from witnesses in these various
9 courtrooms. I was personally able to see what those refugees looked like
10 in those columns.
11 President Tudjman rehabilitated the NDH, Independent State of
12 Croatia. He was not a Ustasha. He was a partisan. But the Ustashas
13 took power, they occupied leading positions in the land, and everything
14 resulted, already in 1991, with a vast number of refugees whom we took in
15 in Bosanska Krajina and Banja Luka. Now the Prosecution wants to say
16 that that had no effect and influence on the state of mind of the Bosnian
17 Serbs, that they could see the heads of the wealthiest houses in Europe
18 lying on the floor of a sports hall with nothing left, no villages,
19 no past, no present, no future.
20 And one of those measures was to introduce Ustasha symbols
21 straight away, Ustasha insignias taken over from the previous Ustasha
22 state, and the Prosecution thinks that that is of no importance. And
23 let's see what Lord Owen has to say on the subject, just how important
24 that was.
25 "It was extremely provocative," he says, "for the Serbs in
1 Croatia that Tudjman's government had adopted the independent Croatian NDH flag
2 with the same symbol used by Pavelic, the red and white chequer-board. And it
3 is under these insignias that the million Serbs suffered and fell as fatalities
4 in World War II." That is what His Lordship says. These are lucid and accurate
5 observations from his Lordship, but with a little addendum. It wasn't
6 provocative only, it was terrifying, both for the Serbs and for the Jews.
7 And it corresponds to the title of a book written by Goldstein, a Croatian
8 Jew: 1941, The Year That Is Returning.
9 But the Prosecution says, Don't pay any attention to any
10 insignias. It is just a gesture, nothing stands behind it. Let's see
11 precisely what stands behind it, and for that, let us see what the
12 minister says, Ministers Spegelj and Boljkovac say on subject, the
13 minister of defence and the minister of the interior.
14 [Video-clip played]
15 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] There are 9.000 JNA officers and 18.000 JNA
16 soldiers on the whole territory of the Fifth Military District: Slovenia,
17 Croatia and part of Bosnia. We have now 80.000 people armed with Kalashnikovs.
18 We will resolve Knin in the way that we will butcher them. We have the
19 international community, especially now when this whore has won in Serbia.
20 [INTERLOCUTOR] Milosevic?
21 Yes. Now, two days after he had won, the Americans offered to help us,
22 and up until then they had only speculated they would -- they said, Now it will
23 be like this, 1.000 armoured vehicles, cars, who knows what else. They will
24 provide weapons and equipment for 100.000 soldiers, all free of charge."
25 JUDGE KWON: Are we hearing interpretation? Can you stop the
2 THE ACCUSED: Why it is not translated?
3 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that they don't have the
4 transcript and what is being now --
5 THE ACCUSED: That should be live translation.
6 THE INTERPRETER: -- said has already been translated --
7 THE ACCUSED: Those words --
8 THE INTERPRETER: -- before.
9 THE ACCUSED: Those words of Minister Spegelj are repeated here
10 clearly and should be translated live, simultaneously.
11 JUDGE KWON: I take it that what we heard is the interpretation
12 of what just heard now. Let's proceed.
13 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Free of charge. The army has no
14 business there. They will be massacred. Everybody will be massacred
15 already in their homes. To kill on the spot, on the street, in the army
16 barracks compound, anywhere. Just take a pistol and shoot in the
17 stomach. This will not be a conventional war. It will be a civil war
18 with no consideration towards anyone. Not even towards women or not
19 children. The bombs simply need to be thrown into family apartments.
20 "Physical liquidation. Somebody enters the apartment, the
21 courier, he appears in front of the door, bang, bang, bang, and returns
22 downstairs. Let them call the police to establish who was that. Then
23 down the stairs he goes to the other and kills him at the same time.
24 Don't mind the women or the children. It does not matter.
25 "We will use all means. We will also weapons. Serbs will never
1 again be in Croatia as long as we are here."
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please believe me, Your Excellencies,
3 that they did all this and worse. Everything they announced at the end of 1990,
4 when they were deep in Yugoslavia still, they were within Yugoslavia. Whereas
5 they had prepared part of their population, the Serb population, they had
6 prepared massacres for them and they carried that out ultimately. And what
7 was promised at the time just as, for example, at the inauguration of the Party
8 of Democratic Action - Dalibor Brozovic said that Croatia would defend itself
9 along the Drina River, as was the case in World War II. Or like some hapless
10 Sime Djodan, of Serb origin, Croatian extremist, said that on a Serb mountain
11 overlooking Sarajevo, the chequer-board flag would be hoisted in five years'
12 time. Well, we didn't believe that that would happen but in five years' time,
13 yes, indeed, there was a complete repetition of what happened during World War
14 II and the columns of persons who were expelled, and you saw those columns
15 leaving and fleeing Croatia.
16 All of that is accessible to the Office of the Prosecutor and to the entire
17 world. Everyone knows when this happened, how it ended, and what the authentic
18 story is. However, the Prosecution claims that it is I who watched what was
19 happening to the Serbs in Croatia, and that on that basis, I warned the Bosnian
20 Serbs, mobilised them, told them to defend themselves and so on.
21 So it is without reason, without foundation that I disturbed the
22 Krajina Serbs and taught the Bosnian Serbs, as their leader, what could
23 happen to them and what they should do in order to prevent that from
24 happening to them. The OTP says that this had no basis, but really,
25 this pre-trial brief against me would have to be better or there should
1 have been no indictment against me in the first place.
2 If grenades, shrapnel, streams of refugees and promises from the
3 minister of defence and the minister of the interior in Croatia are not a
4 danger for Serbs in Croatia and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that means
5 that we should have been in a deep state of anaesthesia and that we
6 should have waited to be butchered like the Serbs before us. This is how
7 the OTP qualifies this.
8 Now, if we were to turn it the other way round just by switching names and
9 protagonists, this is the genuine indictment. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb
10 leadership were aware of the nature and purpose of Croat arming campaign, the
11 creation of an illegal army through creating an illegal army and an enormous
12 police force, dismissals of Serbs from work on ethnic grounds, killing of Serbs
13 in towns, illegal degradation of Serbs constitutional status. They knew that
14 Croatian Serbs were living in fear because of the return of Ustasha emigres and
15 their appointment to official positions; because of the unstoppable preparations
16 for Croatia’s unilateral secession from Yugoslavia; because of the future
17 position of the Serbs after secession in that republic, which was already hinting
18 what that position would be by changing the Constitution to the Serbs’ detriment.
19 Karadzic supported the efforts by Krajina Serbs to protect their
20 existence and cited them as an example to the Bosnian Serbs in case
21 Bosnia chooses the same path as Croatia. And the new Croatian authority
22 believed that the most important business they had to do was to change
23 the constitutional position of Serbs. Karadzic supported the Krajina
24 Serbs in their efforts to ensure their safe future and quoted them as an
25 example if Bosnia were to take the path as Croatia did.
1 That is the proper and genuine indictment that should have been
2 signed by the OTP, but they are accusing me because I was in this
3 position of high responsibility.
4 Now, that was paragraphs 15 and 16.
5 You see what Croatia looks like according to the new
6 constitution. The Republic of Croatia establishes itself as the national
7 state of the Croatian people and the state of the members of autonomous
8 national minorities, the Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians,
9 et cetera. And the Serbs joined Croatia together with the Krajina that
10 belonged to them, which they got from Austro-Hungary, not from Croatia.
11 Minister Boljkovac, whom you heard at the very beginning of the crisis in
12 January 1991, now takes a position that is one of moral high ground and a
13 repenting person. He says Croatia attacked the Serbs and Yugoslavia, not
14 the other way round, and in order for you to see what that looked like,
15 Saso Gersovski, a Macedonian, a conscript who was doing his army service
16 in Split in May 1991.
17 [Video-clip played]
18 "[Previous translation continues] ... attacks, their families are
19 being exposed to all sorts of pressures to compel them to move out of
20 Slovenia and Croatia. You remember the first attacks on army members was
21 the assault of the infuriated civilians, nationalists, on the soldiers
22 who did their military service in Split. On that occasion soldier Sasa
23 Gersovski was killed. Here are only some of the atrocities committed on
24 officers in Zadar by the Ustasha Black Legions."
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Bjelovar, Split, an army in its own
1 country, and this is how they lose their lives. These are somebody's
2 children. Sasa Gersovski has parents. He has a family in Macedonia.
3 And now let us have a look at what Warren Zimmermann says, who
4 was not pro-Serb at all. Let us see what he says in this situation. The
5 JNA was in its own country, a legitimate force. And the Prosecutor is
6 charging me with supporting response to mobilisation and the departure of
7 recruits who went into the only legitimate army, and he finds a
8 connection between the Serb Democratic Party and the army.
9 I shall tell you, Excellencies, since the SDS was a non-Communist
10 Party and they, the army, viewed us the same way as they viewed the SDA and
11 the HDZ. It's only when they realised that they could not spend a single
12 night into -- in areas that were under HDZ and SDA control, that they realized
13 that we were something different. The OTP is going to say that they were
14 doing something -- something for the Serbs. No, these were Communist generals
15 who did not like us but they realised that they didn't even dare spend the
16 night in areas that were under HDZ and SDA control; only then did they realise
17 they had to move their weapons to Serb areas; it was not for the Serbs’ sake.
18 And for an entire year Croats and Muslims did not go into the army. They
19 withdrew their own officers as well and created their own armies. The OTP is
20 going to tell you that the JNA turned into the Army of Republika Srpska.
21 All the armies in all parts of the former Yugoslavia came into existence
22 on the basis of the JNA, except that the others were created later
23 because they created their own armed formations over a long period of
24 time; whereas the Serbs refused to create their own armed formations
25 until the order was given for the Army of Yugoslavia, the army of their
1 homeland, to withdraw from Bosnia. Of course these people, these
2 individuals joined their own people, their own nation then.
3 Now, let us see how Germany in 1991, just like in 1941,
4 congratulated Croatia, its ally. I have to say to our Western allies
5 from the First and Second World Wars that perhaps we should envy the
6 Croats for their allies. Germany proved to be a far more reliable ally
7 than our allies from the First and Second World Wars, who turned against
8 the Serbs and who caused us great pain.
9 That shows that the German victory in 1991 was full and definite.
10 Now, let us see what the OTP is charging me with. They say
11 that -- that our basic sin was the fact that we wanted to have a policy
12 of our own, a continuity of the SDS and state structures. So the
13 establishment of a political party among the Serbs is a crime.
14 May I remind you that the Serbs were the last to set up a
15 political party on ethnic grounds in Bosnia-Herzegovina, four months
16 before the elections. All others formed their own parties before that,
17 and they showed what their political programmes were of these political
18 parties, and this caused great concern among the Serbs who then wanted to
19 establish a political party of their own. Everything that the Serbs did,
20 establish a party, establish an Assembly, take part in the elections,
21 they did all of that, according to the OTP, in order to create a state of
22 their own in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to expel from that state Muslims and
23 Croats. Instead of isolating a particular crime that was committed by
24 this accused person, instead of the OTP doing something like that, they
25 are accusing Serbs for any activity they engaged in. They claim that
1 that is joint criminal enterprise.
2 They behaved not the way they wanted to. Serbs were not engaged
3 in action. They were engaged in reaction. The Prosecution omits to say
4 that, and they do not say what would have happened had there have been no
5 action. Would the Serb reaction be the same?
6 Who can say: We heard here at the last status conference that the
7 Army of Republika Srpska legitimately reacted to Srebrenica and Zepa. How
8 could crimes be committed had this action not be legitimate, had there not
9 been for provocations? The Serb Democratic Party, it is stated here, was
10 created in order to do something that never crossed their minds. No one
11 thought that that kind of thing could happen. On the basis of the efforts
12 made by the OTP, excellent people were convicted here, people I know well.
13 Mr. Krajisnik, 20 years in prison, as if he led a gang of criminals. He was
14 sentenced according to mafia laws and he headed a democratic Assembly.
15 Wonderful men. Certain generals were indicted and convicted as if they were
16 attacking an innocent population, not an army that was three times stronger
17 than their own and that was committing such bestial acts.
18 Here you are. You know the name of this young man whose head is
19 being held here. That is what happened in Bosnia. That is the army that
20 my generals fought against in their very own territory, just defending
21 these territories against combatants of this kind, who were prepared to
22 do this kind of thing and have their picture taken at that.
23 But the OTP behaves as if the Serbs were doing something
24 different. They were dealing with a raging bull, but the OTP claim that
25 they were dealing with lambs and causing lambs irreparable harm.
1 The basic problem of the OTP was the existence of the Serb
2 Democratic Party. They say it was a centralist party. They say that the
3 leader was a very fierce one, an autocrat, and so on and so forth.
4 First of all, without an army and police you cannot do much among
5 the Serbs and you cannot be an autocrat least of all. Serbs like to
6 protest. It is hard to keep Serbs under control. And let us see what
7 this leader advocated.
8 The need of the OTP to present me as a monster is due to the fact
9 that they don't have any evidence, and it's going to be easier for them
10 to prove their case if they portray the accused as a monster rather than
11 if they portray him as a real live person.
12 It is very important that the OTP admitted that I personally did
13 not commit any crimes. However, I think that that is very risky from the
14 point of view of the Prosecution interests. If I did not commit a single
15 crime, if it was, rather, committed by those who shared the same values
16 with me, then the question has to be raised as to why they did that.
17 According to the position of the OTP, they did that in order to attain
18 certain objectives. However, it is totally absurd and paradoxical to
19 have behaviour that is in total contravention of these interests ascribed
20 to the Serbs. None of the Serbs' objectives can be attained in those
21 ways, not even those criminal ones that the OTP ascribes to the Serbs.
22 Ethnic cleansing. The Serb Democratic Party and Radovan Karadzic
23 and the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina did their utmost, everything
24 that could have been done, in order to avoid a war.
25 Excellencies, now we're going to put things in their right place.
1 We are going to look at the chronology of what happened, what was cause
2 and what was effect, and what stemmed from all of this. Then we are
3 going to see that this kind of chronological analysis is going to prove
4 causality, sequence of events, the options at one's disposal. Let's see
5 whether the Serbs could have done anything else.
6 Then genuine, not false consequence. Just five seconds,
7 Your Excellency, please.
8 Then we're going to see that this indictment should not have been
9 issued in the first place, because it is the crisis itself, the war
10 itself that show what the reasons were, and there is no Serb
11 responsibility for this. However, all of this is vague due to the
12 position taken by the Prosecution, and this Prosecutor managed to -- or,
13 rather, the Office of the Prosecutor managed to convince some Judges that
14 things stand the way they portray them.
15 JUDGE KWON: We will break for half an hour.
16 --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.
20 We visited Croatia for a while because it was the OTP who
21 introduced Croatia. I have nothing against that, because it involves one
22 people and one single crisis.
23 Let me just remind you a little how this whole picture was
24 created, starting from the beginning. In 1990, the League of Communists
25 started to disintegrate because they failed to conclude their
1 14th convention. They disintegrated into ethnic and nationalist Leagues
2 of Communists of various republics. At that point, Karadzic had been a
3 dissident since 1968. I was living with my family. I had my friends and
4 I was working, and I didn't believe that the Communists will ever leave
5 power. However, that is what happened, and a multi-party system was
7 On the 27th of March, 1990, a group of young Muslims known for
8 having served lengthy prison sentences in various trials announced that
9 they were going to form a Muslim party with Muslim objectives. This
10 didn't concern the Serbs because in their programme they said they will
11 not talk even to the parties who were not favouring Yugoslavia. However,
12 very soon thereafter, graffiti targeting Serbs were seen on the old Serbian
13 church. Already something to worry about. A Muslim party was created and
14 their enemies were going to be the JNA and the Serbs.
15 On the 15th of May, 1990, the forum for the protection of
16 individual and traditional rights of Muslims was established. The
17 Croatian elections took place on the 22nd of April. The HDZ, which was
18 the most ethnic-based and the most extremist political party, had very
19 successfully assimilated the Ustasha policies and they won the elections.
20 So all of this was happening during that period. And then on the
21 26th of May, the Party of Democratic Action had its founding Assembly.
22 It had been announced on the 27th of March. The Serbs, at that period,
23 do not even have any plans for setting up their own party.
24 We saw that this founding Assembly, Dalibor Brozovic said that
25 Croatia was going to be defended on the River Drina although nobody had
1 had attacked it, and that was only a month after the elections in
2 Croatia. It was only on the 28th of June that the Serbs in Sarajevo and
3 Bosnia, a strong community, renewed the operation of the cultural society
4 called Prosvjeta, that the been banned both during World War II and
5 immediately after World War II, and unfortunately I have to say that when
6 it came to the Serbian questions, the Communists very often were acting
7 in unison with the Ustasha and the German Nazis. They shared opinions on
8 that issue.
9 The Serbian Democratic Party was formed on the 12th of July by
10 the Serbian intellectual and political elite under the pressure of the
11 people, because they didn't know who to vote for. The HDZ already
12 spilled over into the -- into Bosnia. They were seeing the banners of
13 the HDZ and SDA being tied together in rallies, whereas the Serbs had
14 nothing. Therefore, the Serbian intelligentsia was asked to establish
15 the Serbian Democratic Party. Izetbegovic came to the rally, greeted us,
16 and he said that he had expected this to happen sooner. Somebody from
17 the audience asked him what were his views about Yugoslavia, and he said,
18 "I'm in favour of a reasonable federation," and by that, Izetbegovic lay
19 down the foundations for our coalition, possible coalition, by convincing
20 us that there were no major differences between our political platforms.
21 The Prosecution omitted, although they were searching for the
22 elements of mens rea and the characters of those involved, the main
23 players of the Serbian Democratic Party, but they omitted to say who
24 founded the Serbian Democratic Party, whether those were extremists,
25 losers, scum, or were they university professors, authors of many books,
1 scientists, et cetera, who subsequently, by living for four years on the
2 mountains and in deserted lands, became a party that had so many
3 intellectuals amongst its ranks like no other party in Europe. They
4 could boast very high level of expertise and knowledge, and they led a
5 very small community in very hard times.
6 This does not suit the Prosecution, and that is why they
7 disregarded this.
8 In their search for mens rea, Mr. Tieger went back into the past as
9 far as Czar Dusan. He claims that I wanted to have what Czar Dusan had, and
10 that was the ethnic-clean state. The Serbian state during his reign, in the
11 14th century, was a multi-ethnic state incorporating Serbs, Albanians, and
12 other ethnic communities. Even today Serbia has probably the largest number
13 of various ethnic communities. They haven't been assimilated, and their
14 identity is being protected and preserved. Therefore, you cannot take Czar
15 Dusan as an example for an ethnically clean state.
16 We all know, as all the governments had proclaimed it even before Tito’s death,
17 that if Yugoslavia falls apart, Bosnia would suffer the most; so I wrote a letter
18 to Milan Kucan, proposing to everyone that we carry out a Scandinavisation.
19 The countries of Scandinavia, in 1905, agreed to part peacefully. They had six
20 months to decide in which country they wanted to live, and even today all these
21 countries live happily, in prosperity next to one another.
22 This accused was against the split-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, when
23 the secession started, he was in favour of turning Bosnia into a country made
24 according to the model of Switzerland. It would be divided into cantons, and
25 wherever there are thirty thousand of one group, fifty thousand of another or
1 a third group, let them make a canton of their own. Cantons do not necessarily
2 have to have territorial continuity, because at that time there was no war.
3 It was only important for everyone to do their job and administer the country
4 without any internal clashes and permanent attempts to dominate.
5 I have to say that the issue of cantonisation was for the first
6 time mentioned in a newspaper in Zagreb, but we accepted it immediately
7 as a very good solution for saving Bosnia.
8 While searching for mens rea and the intentions of the Serbian Democratic
9 Party and when the OTP wants to prove that the SDS was, in fact, formed in order
10 to start the war and form a Serbian state and expel others in the process, they
11 do not invoke anything else other than things that happened only according to
12 the logic of a civil war, not because the Serbian Democratic Party intended them
13 to happen. Just like other nationalist parties, the SDS won around 98 per cent
14 of votes. This implied a huge responsibility. We won that on a democratic
15 programme, and the Prosecution was unable to show a single element of our
16 responsibility that would have been instrumental in creating the events
17 that followed. They couldn't find a single such thing, a single such
18 cause in our documents.
19 The OTP should not look what a deputy said if angered or something
20 like that. They should just focus on the party platform and programme.
21 We divided power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we created a
22 coalition that was possible at the time. The Serbian Democratic Party,
23 on behalf of the Serbian people that it represented, accept the post of
24 the speaker. This is not in the executive branch. The Muslims had the
25 president of the Presidency, and the Croats had the prime minister.
1 Although they only constituted 17 per cent, but that didn't matter. No matter the
2 percentage, they are on an equal footing, a constituent people. We didn't seek
3 neither the Ministry of the Interior nor the Ministry of Defence. The Serbs wanted to
4 be allocated the Ministry of Agriculture, because if you look at the map, these blue
5 areas are the areas where the Serbs constitute majority nowadays, after all the
6 various genocides, and that was the case before the war as well. That is why we were
7 looking for the Ministry of Agriculture.
8 I would like to remind the Chamber and the Prosecution of the fact that one cannot
9 say that these people who have been a constituent people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
10 that you cannot circumvent them when to making serious decisions. Just because
11 somebody is set on violating the Constitution and the laws and, based on mere
12 numerical prevalence, even without any requirements met for making such a decision
13 democratically - these people have to swallow that and that to accept the dictate of
14 the other two parties. That was not an option for us. We got the Ministry of Science
15 and the Ministry of Information. In short, there was not a single ministry in our
16 hands that would serve war efforts.
17 Immediately after the elections, this accused, due to tensions, made a proposal for
18 creating an expert government. Those were people who had been dissidents for a long
19 time and they were not popular among the Communists. For that we proposed that the
20 party people should not be in the government but, rather, people who are professionals.
21 This Accused also did not run for any positions, because he had recommended to his
22 party colleagues that party cadres not be taken on into the government, that
23 technocrats be chosen instead. The other two parties didn't accept that, but the SDS
24 stood by its position. There was only one Serb minister who was a member of the
25 Serbian Democratic Party, and that was the Minister of Information. Of the others, in
1 the Communist times, two had held ministerial positions. We took the Ministry of
2 Justice, we took what I said, finance, agriculture, etc.
3 So how is it possible for the Prosecution to overlook these efforts on the part of
4 the Serbian Democratic Party, and how can the intentions to wage war, that go back to
5 the 12th of July, how can they reconcile that with the fact that they had the ministries
6 in their hands that I mentioned they had and that they were willing to give power to
7 professionals? This is probably a trap that the Prosecution fell into due to their lack
8 of knowledge of the language.
9 On the eve of the war and the most serious crisis, when we got the right to have
10 our constituent unit, to have the police, the National Guard and the government, the
11 words of this accused were:
12 "This is what we agreed. Go out into the field. Take power into
13 your hands and act responsibly."
14 This is being translated by the OTP "Take over." And one of the main things in
15 this indictment is the claim that the Serbs took over power in municipalities. But,
16 Excellencies, if you look at this map, there was no need for Serbs to take over power
17 but just to administer power that they won in the elections. Why would they take it
18 over? From whom? They were already in power there, and you can see that from this map.
19 Why would we take over power from someone in Bijeljina? And Bijeljina features
20 here as a municipality that was taken over by force. But this lack of knowledge of
21 language, when somebody takes over a tool, it means he is taking a tool that belongs
22 to someone else. And when somebody takes up a tool, it means he is picking up his own
23 tool that was lying there, and he just picks it up. So this is a drastic difference
24 between these two terms, and this gave rise to this Indictment.
25 Not only didn't we take the Ministry of the Interior, but we didn't even have our
1 own people at any of the lower levels in that ministry. All the people who
2 were there had already been in the police. We didn't bring any criminals.
3 I would draw your attention to the intercept of the conversation
4 between the accused and the deputy minister, which is a confirmation that
5 this deputy minister was not a member of the SDS.
6 [Audiotape played]
7 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] I want to ask them if it's in the
8 interest of the Muslim people to appoint only criminals at the MUP.
9 "Karadzic: Vito, we haven't appointed a single criminal.
10 "Zepinic: Yes, but I'm talking about that.
11 "Karadzic: Look, please. We have nothing to be ashamed of. We have not
12 brought a single man who hasn't been at the MUP. Their interest was, Vito, to
13 bring on board loyal men. Listen to me carefully. They brought on board loyal
14 men. And they did put one over on us, they double-crossed us while we were
15 taking on professionals, honest people who had nothing to do with the party.
16 "Zepinic: I'm going to send an open letter to the SDA and expressly ask them
17 whether it's in the interests of the Muslim people to appoint only criminals.
18 "Karadzic: We asked who was the most honest and the most competent and we
19 appointed them, and mind you, now we in a dead-end street. They were appointing
20 the most loyal people. We were appointing the most competent people."
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So that was this -- this difference
22 in approach of the SDA and the Serb community and this core of the
23 fundamentalist SDA party. The difference in moral approach. And
24 this led to the fact that the police in Bosnia-Herzegovina started to
25 massively abuse their state authority against the Serb people and for the
1 SDA. The gentleman talking to me was appointed as deputy minister in the
2 Serb place. He wasn't a member of the SDS. We didn't do things like
3 that. But they changed the entire picture of the police force. They
4 brought in criminals and they started to arm the people and to arm the
5 Party of Democratic Action and the Patriotic League as well, which was
6 formed very early on, the 31st of March, two months after the joint
7 government had been set up.
8 So this is proof and evidence that we get from this intercept,
9 that the number two man in the MUP confirms that yes, they were bringing
10 in criminals, we were not, and that we still maintain that professionals
11 should be used, honest professionals, and not party people in the
12 distribution of power and authority and political posts.
13 Now, it would be very useful if we were to see and look at what
14 Mr. Izetbegovic says under these circumstances, faced with this
15 situation. On the 27th of February to the 15th of January, he was in
16 favour of Yugoslavia. However, on the 27th of February of that same
17 year, just one month after the coalition government was formed,
18 Izetbegovic says that he will give up peace for Bosnia's independence and
19 sovereignty but he would not be ready to sacrifice sovereign Bosnia for
20 peace. So it is his resolve to go to the very end regardless of whether
21 he has the right to do so, whether he is right or not, and whether the
22 people living on two-thirds of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina --
23 well, there's one-third of the population there who were Serbs, because
24 genocide reduced that group of the population.
25 So, the Prosecution is suggesting that Serbs should have accepted
1 that Muslims and Croats were exploiting the results of the genocide
2 against the Serbs. They want to reap their own benefit because now
3 they're saying there's no more than a third of you, but we can see
4 where they were the majority when they were in the majority. They were
5 the majority on two-thirds -- in two-thirds of Bosnia, two-thirds of
6 Bosnian territory, and they were reduced because of the genocide during
7 World War II. Otherwise, they were always the majority population before.
8 Now, who are these people with whom we entered into a coalition
9 government and who conditioned our behaviour fully? We're going to see
10 that. Let's see what the leading ideology was of this group of people.
11 Since the Prosecution is seeking mens rea for all of us, let's see who we
12 were dealing with. Were they docile lambs or were we up against
13 something to which we had to react and react in the way we did?
14 Mr. Izetbegovic, in 1970, for example, published -- or, rather,
15 wrote and distributed secretly, clandestinely, the Islamic Declaration.
16 Mr. Izetbegovic in 1941, 2, and 3, was a member of the young Muslims
17 organisation, and at the time, he opted for the introduction of a
18 fundamentalist Islamic regime everywhere on territory inhabited by the
19 Muslims, and the bases and foundations of that programme was the Islamic
20 Declaration which he wrote in 1970. Now after the war, after
21 World War II, he continued to propagate clandestinely and subversively
22 and he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment after World War II.
23 After he left prison, he was one of the individuals that you should take
24 your hat off to, actually, because of his perseverance and because he
25 didn't want to give way. He wanted to stick to his programme, and he
1 never changed on that score.
2 During World War II, he and his collaborators, the Behmen brothers,
3 received this man who is on that picture there with Hitler. He is the Grand
4 Mufti of Jerusalem, El Husseini, who was in Sarajevo several times, at least
5 twice in fact, and he went to see Hitler umpteen times. And every time he
6 came to Bosnia, this resulted in the establishment of the Waffen SS Division
7 which was called the Handzar Sword Division, which was the most brutal
8 division. You couldn't even imagine how brutal they were and the brutalities
9 they committed. It was the most brutal unit ever. So that was Hitler's
10 friend as you can see and a guest with Behmen and Izetbegovic.
11 Therefore, after the war, Mr. Izetbegovic, as I said, was in
12 prison. He was given a prison sentence, and in 1970 he wrote the Islamic
13 Declaration which is, in fact, the programme of the Party of Democratic
14 Action. Of course, we hoped that it wasn't what it was, but it proved to
15 be exactly what we -- what it was and I saw sought ways and means, in
16 1990, to save Bosnia, and I wanted Izetbegovic to give up on the Islamic
17 Declaration and tell us that it wasn't the political programme of the
18 SDA. We know he never gave us those assurances. He remained firm.
19 Not only has the Prosecution not sought to find who our partners
20 were that conditioned our behaviour, but erroneously interprets our words
21 and says, when I'm speaking at a meeting, I think it was an Assembly
22 session or a party meeting, said that:
23 "We cannot control the Muslims in such a unitary state. We know
24 very well when fundamentalism turns up that we cannot live together.
25 There is no tolerance anymore."
1 Now, what is this all about? What has the Prosecution done here?
2 It cut off part of my speech and made this sentence stand alone and
3 failed to print the main sentence, and this is something that is often
4 done. But actually what it was was that the West, and it proved to be
5 true, did not allow Republika Srpska to be established or the Serbs to
6 remain in Yugoslavia, perhaps because it did not want to enable the
7 Muslims to be an express -- a majority and to form an Islamic state in
8 Europe. The thesis is that the Serbs and Croats should remain in Bosnia
9 to control the Islamic factor to the advantage of Europe, as a tool for
10 Europe, and Radovan Karadzic says that's not a good thing. The Serbs
11 will not -- Karadzic won't allow the Serbs to be used as a controlling
12 factor of the Islamic group, and also it would be much more peace loving
13 if the Serbs would get away from this fundamentalist project rather than
14 having them oppose it. Why should the Serbs once again stand at the
15 gates of the -- stand at Europe's gates and preserve Europe and protect
16 it as in the famous book about the Serbs as the gatekeepers of Europe?
17 So here what the Prosecution is trying to do is to say that we,
18 in fact, wished to control the Muslims, whereas we're stating quite the
19 reverse. We say we don't want to do that. We don't want to lay down our
20 lives for that. Similarly, another Assembly deputy says that we were set
21 to be the executioners of the Muslims in Bosnia, and we said we don't
22 want to do that, but what the Prosecution says is that is precisely what
23 we chose to do, to be the executioners. And then he went on to say, an
24 institution 700 years old, probably thinking about the Vatican, has set
25 us the role of being executioners, whereas we refuse to be executioners.
1 And this is being reversed by the Prosecutor. So, were it not for such
2 forgeries, there wouldn't have been an indictment. You have to read what the
3 man actually said. It's not that we chose to be executioners; they thought that
4 we could perform the function of executioners, but we refused to play that role.
5 Furthermore the Prosecution, in paragraph 23 of their pre-trial
6 brief, states that, without foundation, I told our people that we faced
7 the same plans, the same villains, and the same victims as in
8 World War II, and that I insisted that the Muslims sought an Islamic
9 state and were preparing laws to subjugate Serbs, and that Serbs were
10 unwilling to go back to slavery. And what if that's true, and that is
11 something the Prosecution should have established. The Prosecution's
12 position is that this wasn't true, but we will prove that it is true.
13 Why waste time and money by holding trials of this kind? Had an
14 investigating magistrate been in charge of this, he would have concluded
15 Karadzic was right, the Prosecution was wrong, because there's too much
16 evidence and proof to show that that is so. But let's see whether it is
17 true and what the situation is.
18 Mr. Izetbegovic was the creator of an organisation which has been existence for
19 50 years, that is since 1939 onwards, which had an oath of this kind. It says:
20 "Glory and praise to Allah, the Lord of all worlds, as a member
21 of the organization"... This first part is normal.
22 "As a member of the organization, I swear to Almighty Allah, among other
23 things, that I will sacrifice everything on God's path including my life, if the
24 interests of Islam require that. I will fight uncompromisingly against everything
25 non-Islamic. I will sacrifice everything on God's path including my life, if the
1 interests of Islam require that. I will also fight for the grandeur and fame
2 of Islam. So may God give me the power to do that on the road of jihad."
3 Yes. I'm being told to slow down so I have to do so. So this is
4 the oath, the oath taken by the Muslim youth.
5 Now let's look and see what Mr. Izetbegovic says in his
6 Islamic Declaration. What are Islam's tasks or the tasks of Muslims?
7 The Muslims must be a movement, and that movement can take over power and
8 authority as soon as it is morally and otherwise strong enough to topple
9 not only the current non-Islamic government, but to build up an Islamic
10 government. So they don't have do wait 50 per cent because waiting 50
11 per cent means waiting for a democracy of some kind, with some kind of
12 voting. But as soon as -- what he's saying is as soon as they feel
13 strong enough, they are duty-bound to topple everything non-Islamic.
14 After he came out of prison for the first time, Mr. Izetbegovic wrote this
15 Islamic Declaration and became a member of some important institutions. That's
16 something that the Prosecution doesn't know about but the political committee in
17 the US Senate does, the US Senate Republican Policy Committee, the whole world
18 knows about that. However, the Prosecutor is trying to make me out to be a
19 barbarian attacking a good neighbour, a good and peaceful neighbour. This is
20 what the US Senate Republican Policy Committee says, what it said in 1998,
21 about what Mr. Izetbegovic said in 1983. Here is what a Republican Senate, a
22 Republican-dominated Senate, said about this in 1998: that in 1983, Mr.
23 Izetbegovic stepped up his efforts, begun in 1979, to introduce Islamic rule in
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. At his 1983 trial – that was his second trial, where 65
25 witnesses were heard before the Grand Chamber made up of 5 judges – all five
1 judges were Muslims, and 62 of the witnesses were Muslims.
2 Now, the judgement for Alija Izetbegovic, Omer Behmen, Hasan Cengic, they
3 were all alive and active in 1990, the judgement and sentence says that they
4 were taken over by the idea of Islamisation and the Islamic revival, and that
5 this began in 1974, that is to say, the year of the promotion of the new
6 Yugoslav constitution which laid the foundations for the break-up of Yugoslavia
7 in the first place, and that they had accepted the Islamic revolution as being
8 their own Iranian revolution. He says -- he refers to this as the Islamic
9 population, that conditions should be created for Bosnia to become an Islamic
10 republic with Islamic laws, and that would refer to everybody living in Bosnia,
11 and he says the imams in Bosnia should be armed just like the Iranian Shiite
12 imams in Iran.
13 Now, in that same year, that is to say already in 1982,
14 Izetbegovic identifies the Serbs as the enemies. There's no Karadzic.
15 There's no Milosevic on the scene. There's no memorandum by the
16 Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, none of that. And all the
17 apparatuses that the Prosecution is aiming against the Serbs and takes to
18 be -- to prove that the Serbs are the culprits.
19 Kosovo and Vojvodina were provinces of Serbia. It was the only
20 republic that was not able to resolve its problems, and thanks to a
21 Macedonian, Lazar Kolisevski, we uncovered what was afoot. It was a --
22 the Communist slogan was, A weak Serbia will make a strong Yugoslavia.
23 The weaker Serbia, the stronger Yugoslavia. Well, that weak Serbia in
24 1982, according to Izetbegovic, was the enemy. It was the foe. His
25 associate Omer Behmen, with whom he co-operated during World War II as
1 well and in whose house the mufti stayed when he visited, the Husseini
2 muftis of Jerusalem, he said that there was pressure being exerted on
3 Muslims. And the other man or the third man, Cengic, says that a Muslim
4 could not feed a Serb child, nurse a Serb child. Mr. Cengic at the time,
5 because Karadzic isn't there yet, we're dealing with 1984 and 1983, no
6 SDS, so he says what the goal of their revolution is, the revolution that
7 they were preparing.
8 So if you envisage the map of Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Sandzak,
9 Kosovo, we call it the green transversal over there, you know. Now, the
10 Prosecutor doesn't agree with that. He considers that we shouldn't
11 even -- it should never enter our heads. Now, the minister of Turkey
12 comes and says that he's going to reinstate that green transversal. And
13 in 1990, Turgut Ozal said that Turkey would stretch from the Adriatic to
14 the Great Wall of China. Well, yes, maybe, but without the Serbs because
15 we're not going to take part in that kind of empire.
16 So here we have the green transversal plotted by a mighty man,
17 who is a clergyman as well, yes, a clergyman, and the American clergyman
18 who was publicly was sorry that Cengic wasn't killed on time seems to be
19 a lamb compared to this one, and he says you don't need a pretext for
20 that, and then in another place he says you should make a pretext. So we
21 saw Markale, for example, and the other pretexts that were created and
22 fabricated, and then based on that, they behaved towards the Serbs as if
23 it was the Serbs to blame.
24 Now, I wasn't surprised to see them doing it, but why is the
25 Prosecution following suit and why is it asking this Tribunal and the
1 Trial Chamber to do the same, to accept war trickery and cunning? There
2 was a second incidence of Markale later on. They were technically better
3 prepared but the same technology was used and for the same reasons. And
4 this is an image of Izetbegovic's trial in 1983, and the second man is
5 Behmen. I don't remember who the others were but it's the Izetbegovic et
6 al trial.
7 Now, we see that the plans are the same, the victims are the
8 same, and the perpetrators are the same, just as they were in
9 World War II. The Prosecutor -- the Prosecutor, however, considers
10 otherwise, and this is what the judgement states, the judgement in 1983,
11 the Chamber of five, all Muslims, 62 Muslim witnesses, says:
12 "In all circumstances, advocating such an ideology would mean
13 returning to the state of civil war. It is indisputable that such an
14 ideology cannot be implemented in a community which is religiously and
15 politically so profoundly mixed" --
16 THE INTERPRETER: A little slower, please. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's on the screen, that's why I'm
19 A community which is religiously and politically so profoundly
20 mixed that the dominance or complete supremacy of any of the existing
21 national entities is simply inconceivable, unless based on terror or
22 possibly foreign intervention.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, slow down further, please.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, let's look at
25 this and I'd like the Prosecution to look at it, too. Take a look at
2 Now seven years after this, after this judgement, we see the
3 realisation and implementation of that very ideology, but not with terror
4 or foreign intervention but both terror and foreign intervention. And
5 the Trial Chamber and the Judges here were very far-sighted because it
6 was terror and calls for foreign intervention. Markale were calls for
7 foreign intervention. It was montage and fabrication, the butchery of
8 one’s own people, and you will see that in the programme they had that
9 too, the butchery of one's own people. That is written down. You'll
10 come to see that when we look at the programme.
11 And now the Prosecutor, in addition to everything that is at --
12 is at its disposal, says that Karadzic insisted on as much separation as
13 possible. Well, if our neighbours are preparing a programme of this kind
14 and life of this kind, of course we're going to separate from them. We
15 don't believe that that's what the Muslim masses wanted. So it wasn't
16 Izetbegovic but Abdic who won the elections. The Muslims cried out to
17 the Muslims and Serbs. They applauded them when there was this
18 historical agreement in the offing, in 1991, until Izetbegovic withdraw
19 it. They were all very happy and applauded because the Serbs and Muslims
20 managed to reach an agreement. However, that group chose to manipulate
21 the SDA and the entire Muslim community.
22 Now let us have a look at what things would be like if we were to
23 write a genuine indictment and if we were to just to change the names.
24 Izetbegovic insisted on the secession of all Bosnia despite Bosnia's
25 ethnically intermingled character. This meant making Serbs a national
1 minority in his Islamic republic and taking them out of the country.
2 That is to say, that if Muslims and Serbs are intermingled in
3 Republika Srpska, then Republika Srpska cannot be established; but if the
4 Serbs are intermingled with the Muslims in all of Bosnia, then it can
5 happen. It seems that Muslims are more intermingled than Serbs and all
6 in the same place. However, they somehow manage to intermingle more.
7 You will see how figures are dealt with in very relative terms.
8 As the learned Mr. Tieger says, who likes cursory glances, he says, Let's
9 cast a cursory glance at this map. What about the Serbs in Bosnia? I
10 mean, when I say the Serbs own land, they own land in terms of private
11 ownership, but Serbs are a majority population in this area, and they
12 have the right to say, once they had attained the right to statehood and
13 lived in Yugoslavia, they had the right to say whether they are willing
14 to accept interventions of this kind, foreign interventions, ideologies
15 that hurt both Muslims and Serbs a great deal.
16 Does the Prosecution approve, say, the Prosecution says
17 30 per cent. Now, do they approve -- or actually, have a look at it.
18 This is what it would look like. We insisted upon separating from them,
19 but let's look at it this way: Izetbegovic insisted on secession of all
20 of Bosnia despite Bosnia's ethnically intermingled character. It would
21 mean that he can take a million and a half Serbs out, and the Prosecution
22 says that we sought the territories of Republika Srpska where there were
23 hundreds of thousands of Muslims and Croats. They seem to be more than a
24 million and a half Serbs for the Prosecution. That's something that we
25 don't understand. Except that these Muslims and Croats who would stay in
1 Republika Srpska, they wouldn't leave their own state; they would just
2 live in a different entity but within their own country.
3 Again this was abused. We cannot control the Muslims, et cetera, et cetera.
4 That sentence has been brutalised, butchered, and, when it is shown to the
5 Judges, of course they will confirm the indictment, it is not for the Judges
6 to carry out investigations, but all of this was abused. They just took parts
7 of this sentence, cut it up. There are three sources, three major sources of
8 artificial population growth rates, and that is not only the birth rate.
9 First of all, the promoted migration of Muslims from Sandzak.
10 Secondly, plans to resettle the alleged descendants of the Muslim emigrants
11 to Turkey, and thirdly the fatwa that a Muslim woman should have five children
12 so that one could be sacrificed for Bosnia. Why must she bear 5 children?
13 So that they can outnumber the Serbs? We are against that kind of birth rate,
14 yes. And when the Prosecution says that I said that we would not allow them
15 to make settlements in Republika Srpska, I am saying to them what I'm saying
16 to Mr. Izetbegovic. I said, Mr. Izetbegovic, I know what your plan is, that
17 you want to bring in Muslims from Sandzak and Turks from Turkey.
18 However, don't fool yourselves that we are going to allow you to make
19 these settlements in Serb areas. Protestants or Catholics in
20 Northern Ireland would not allow that either. To have a conscious effort
21 made by way of political action in order to disrupt the ethnical balance,
22 that is a crime. We are not going to allow that to happen. That's what
23 I said before our Assembly or wherever, at some meeting. So I was just
24 interpreting what I had said to Izetbegovic. I had said that to them,
25 and he was just blinking and he said, "I understand."
1 Now, let us see what this Islamic Declaration is. This is a
2 programme text. Regardless of whether the Communists were in power or
3 not, nothing has changed whatsoever. It says:
4 "We announce, to our friends and foes alike, that Muslims are
5 determined to take the fate of the Islamic world into their own hands,
6 and we are going to set up a world in accordance with our own precepts.
7 The struggle already knows of its shahids. These are the holy warriors
8 that die in such wars, martyrs. They're martyrs, actually. A shahid is
9 a martyr. A Muslim can die only with the name of Allah on his lips and
10 for the glory of Islam, or escape from the battle-field."
11 Let me stop at this point for a moment and say that we're going
12 to bring proof of this, Mr. Izetbegovic saying to his associates, For
13 tactical reasons we say that our soldiers are laying their lives for a
14 multi-ethnic Bosnia, but let us not fool ourselves, they are not dying
15 for a multi-ethnic Bosnia. That was a moment of frankness, sincerity, in
16 a narrow circle, but we have that evidence.
17 The first most important conclusion is that the Islamic religion
18 and non-Islamic social and political institutions cannot co-exist. There
19 can be neither peace nor co-existence between the Islamic religion and
20 non-Islamic social and political institutions. Whoever wishes our
21 community well will not spare a struggle, danger and misfortune. The
22 Islamic movement should and can start to take over power as soon as it is
23 morally and numerically strong enough to be able to do that in their own
25 So this is not a lay state. The state should support the moral
1 precepts of religion. Islam is the first point and pan-Islamism is the
2 second point. Now, please have a look at this.
3 As we announce renewal, we are not announcing a period of safety
4 and peace but of unrest and challenges. There are many things that are
5 to be destroyed. People who are asleep can only be awakened by blows.
6 Who wishes our community well should not spare it of exertions, dangers,
7 and troubles. Islamic renewal can start without a political revolution,
8 but it cannot be brought to a successful end without a political
9 revolution. The movement has to take power as soon as it is strong
10 enough, numerically strong enough to be able to overturn not only the
11 existing non-Islamic government but also to build up a new Islamic one.
12 That is what is unequivocally stated, no dilemma whatsoever.
13 Unrest, challenges. It just looks like blood, sweat and tears, as
14 Churchill had put it, because it is the enemy that causes blood, sweat,
15 and tears among Churchill's people. Whereas here it is one's own
16 government that is going to cause blood, sweat and tears among their own
18 Who wishes our community well should not spare them, should hit
19 them and in this waking them up. The blow, the hit was Markale. So that
20 the people could stand strong against the Serbs, they will try to prove
21 that it is the Serbs who did that at Markale, and you saw how
22 unconvincing that is. It is impossible to do that with a single shell,
23 especially kill that many people who are not there in the first place.
24 That is what happened in 1990, and that is the moment when the renewal is
25 being heralded and when there is going to be a period of unrest and
1 challenges because many things are seeking their own destroyers. We did
2 not ask for any destroyers. These that will be destroyed and that were
3 begging for destruction were the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
4 secular government. There will be no compromise with secular states
5 here. Then the JNA, the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, life and
6 co-existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, common roots. The Muslim speaks the
7 same language we do, the Serbian language. The fact that you accepted such
8 a thing as the Bosnian language is a manipulation, that is wrong because the
9 Serbian language is heritage of the Serb people. Australians do not speak
10 the Australian language or an Australian language, they speak English.
11 Then common past was destroyed but also the common present and
12 the common future. We didn't ask for that. They asked for that, or they
13 thought that they had the right to do that, although no one did call upon
14 them to do it.
15 Now, let us see what accusations levelled at the Serbs are like.
16 They have to cut up sentences and mutilate them; whereas here they have
17 prepared documents. They were held accountable before courts of law
18 because of these texts that were written, and they didn't want to give up
19 on them. They rather went to prison. The Serb Democratic Party, even
20 before 1990, asked for a chamber of nations to be introduced in the
21 Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and such a Chamber would decide on
22 important matters by way of consensus.
23 That proposal does not correspond to a joint criminal enterprise.
24 If that were the case, what could the Serbs do against the Muslims and
25 the Croats? Nothing. Everybody would have the right to veto. They
1 responded by establishing this council for the equal rights of peoples
2 and nationalities. This is clumsy Communist language and jargon. It is
3 very long and clumsy.
4 So they would meet ad hoc. It's not a regular body. If we run
5 into some kind of trouble then it would meet. I mean, had that been
6 applied, then that would be some kind of guarantee that we would not be
7 brought into this position but the Serb -- it's not only the Serbs but
8 also the Muslims and the Croats who would not be brought into a difficult
9 position to accept something that was unacceptable.
10 In every particular case, the Serbs, the Serb Democratic Party
11 and this accused person proposed solutions that are directly contrary to
12 what they are being charged for. This is part of the constitution.
13 There was this declaration on sovereignty that was stopped twice through
14 this council, but it was never established because the SDA sabotaged its
15 establishment. So it was practically as if it had never been set up.
16 When I made that speech, on the 15th of October, they simply overrode
17 that. They said, We're not interested. Because even in March,
18 Mr. Izetbegovic said, in Split, when there was a conference of the
19 presidents of the Yugoslav republics, he said, We are going to adopt that
20 with or without the Serbs, that is to say, either with the Serbs or
21 against the Serbs.
22 Please, the OTP denies us the right to political life and
23 reciprocal measures. They even claim that we simply had to remain
24 silent, to bow to this illegally declared referendum and the unlawfully
25 achieved sovereignty and independence that were envisaged and that destroyed
1 our rights to such an extent. Also, the legal system which was a backbone,
2 as it is in any society, and that stems from the Islamic Declaration as an
3 act of destruction; whereas the Prosecution claims that we were not supposed
4 to do anything about it. Everything that we did was a crime on our part.
5 However, that is what was written. We had the right to challenge this.
6 Mr. Izetbegovic says, We are completely aware that by declaring
7 the neutrality of Bosnia-Herzegovina in relation to the war in Croatia,
8 we may have violated certain laws, but at the moment everything is fluid.
9 There are laws and there are laws. That is to say, there are laws that
10 we're going to abide by if they suit us and there are laws, on the other
11 hand, that we are not going to observe if they benefit others. Now, that
12 is that fluid situation that Karadzic is going to speak of, where Serbs
13 cannot find their way in these unlawful situations. The Prosecution is
14 going to hold that against us as well. However, that was the basis for
15 chaos in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This existence of laws and other laws. It
16 can be done this way or that way.
17 Let us see how Bosnia and Herzegovina could have functioned.
18 They could not attain any kind of independence without Serb approval.
19 They had to decide by a two-third majority. There was no two-third
20 majority at the referendum, there would not have been a two-third
21 majority in parliament either because 83 Serbs were against it, 83 Serb
22 MPs, and they separated from the Bosnian parliament and they established
23 the Assembly of the Serb people. So there was no way for Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina to adopt this resolution on sovereignty unless they said
25 there are laws and again there are laws on the other hand. So if we did
1 not agree to act unlawfully, there is nothing that they could do.
2 If someone were to say to us whether we, as Serbs, were denied
3 our right to defence, was our right to reciprocity taken away from us, to
4 a response to unlawful behaviour, to violations of our rights, to
5 breaches of the constitution. If that was not the case, then this
6 indictment is impossible, and it should have been rejected straight away.
7 It should be rejected now as well if we prove that we never intended to
8 throw Muslims and Croats out of their home. We did not consider Bosnia
9 or Republika Srpska to be our home. We thought that Yugoslavia was our
10 home. That was what we believed, and that is what we are going to prove
11 very soon.
12 The values of Bosnian society that were hoping to see its
13 destroyers, we didn't want to be any part of that. The Serbs, the Serb
14 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina at that point in time had the explicit
15 right, according to the constitution, but also historically viewed they
16 had the right to be a constituent people that were forming this joint
17 state and they were co-owners, as it were, of this Bosnia-Herzegovina,
18 just like the Serbs of Krajina were the co-owners of Croatia because they
19 had entered this joint venture.
20 Now, a change of the status, the constitutional legal status of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina had to evolve in accordance with the law. Serbs were
22 more than one-third. If you were to take into account Serbs, and about
23 one-third or one-quarter of them were Serbs who were in favour of the
24 creation of a Yugoslav nation, there were more than one-third of Serbs in
25 the population and they are sufficient not only in terms of consensus but
1 also through every other democratic process. They could have stopped
2 independence. It is peoples, not administrative territories that had the
3 right to independence and self-determination.
4 You know how the Serbs got into Yugoslavia? In 1918, a country
5 was established of Serb, Croats, and Slovenes from the newly liberated
6 territories of Austro-Hungary. There was not different republics that
7 were established. There was one single state that was established. So
8 the Serbs were sovereign in Ljubljana, and Slovenes were in Sarajevo.
9 Then that state asked the international community for permission to unite
10 with Serbia. They united with Serbia. Serbs joined that state as
11 co-owners of that state. That was what it was said that peoples had the
12 right to self-determination. President Wilson said that Serbia should be
13 given access to the sea, and the successors of President Wilson still owe
14 this to Serbia. He has made this pledge.
15 So we didn't have republics joining into Yugoslavia so that they
16 can disjoin later. And as Lord Owen said, then they drew the
17 administrative borders that suddenly became more important than the
18 external borders. This was done totally arbitrarily. Nobody can say on
19 what basis these administrative borders were drawn. Tito said it doesn't
20 matter. Now suddenly they have become more important and blood was
21 starting to be shed because of the borders, which is always the case when
22 you have Communist borders or Imperial borders. If you look at Croatia,
23 Croatia inherited Austro-Hungarian borders. The Serbs of Trebinje can
24 see the seashore but cannot have access to it.
25 This is what Hasan Cengic, a clergyman, says about the Patriotic
1 League, formed on the 31st of March, 1991. I would like the Prosecution
2 to show me a single formation behind which the Serbian Democratic Party
3 or the Serbian people stood. However, what we have here, even before the
4 31st of March, a unit formed in Foca by the father of this Hasan Cengic,
5 whilst the SDA was organising and leading its phalanxes from March
6 until the beginning of the war. So this is the chart of the Patriotic
7 League. The Commander-in-Chief is Alija Izetbegovic. The Main Staff
8 is led by Sefer Halilovic, who was, I think, acquitted here. Then you
9 had regional clergical [as interpreted] staff and regional military
10 staffs, and at the bottom municipal political staffs and municipal
11 military staffs. This organisation was very quickly manned and staffed
12 so that in January 1994 they already had around 100.000 troops. So this
13 is the role of the Patriotic League, of the Green Berets, and the other
14 organisations that existed at the time.
15 In these indictments against Serbs, the Prosecution is mainly
16 focused on Crisis Staffs. The Serbs had their Crisis Staffs. When
17 there's a shortage of gas, like it happened recently due to Ukrainian
18 cutting off gas supplies, you have to establish a Crisis Staff. The
19 situation is totally irregular, and you need a Crisis Staff to deal with
20 it. But I would like to draw your attention first to the fact that the
21 Crisis Staff of the Party of Democratic Action and the HDZ were present
22 everywhere, even in the smallest village, much before the war and before
23 of the inception of the SDS.
24 Here are some of the differences between the Crisis Staffs of the
25 SDA and the SDS. The SDA's Crisis Staff had been formed well before the
1 war when there was no indication of the war breaking out in Bosnia-Herzegovina. SDS
2 staffs were public and were only formed on the eve of the war, at the time when the
3 SDA managed to bring the state structure to collapse. And the war in Croatia produced
4 terrible problems and numerous refugees. The existence of the Patriotic League was
5 already evident. We had armed formations, covert transportation of armaments and
6 overt transportation of armaments, the existence of SDA crisis staffs, et cetera.
7 It was only then that the Serbs established their Crisis Staff. The SDA crisis staffs
8 were secret, conspiratorial, with powers and tasks that a secret executive power has,
9 and the tasks that are entrusted to defence ministers and army general staffs.
10 However, the SDS Crisis Staff's only function was to inform the Sarajevo headquarters
11 as quickly as possible of all dangerous and clandestine goings-on.
12 On the 14th of February, 1992, Karadzic tells them explicitly:
13 "You are not an authority in power. You are there to help, to
14 monitor the transportation of weapons, to monitor what's going on, and to
15 let us know if there were any extraordinary situation."
16 I quoted the example of the British people where Britain -- every
17 Britain guards and protects his own country.
18 The SDA Crisis Staffs took over the function of state authorities in municipalities.
19 They were controlled by the republican Crisis Staff established at the Presidency, led
20 by Ejup Ganic, who dubbed as the chief of the main political staff of the Patriotic
21 League. It enabled Alija Izetbegovic to circumvent Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic
22 as representatives of the Serbian people. They didn't have to adopt anything at the
23 meeting. The Crisis Staff would make a decision that would normally have to be put to
24 a vote and be debated, but in this way he bypassed them.
25 The SDS Crisis Staff existed for a short period of time before the war, and once the
1 war broke out they ceased to exist, and we had municipal Crisis Staff as state organs.
2 So these staffs were neither the staffs of the SDS of the Serbs but, rather, the
3 staffs of the authorities, and they were made up of the Muslims and Croats in the
4 municipalities where these ethnicities lived.
5 Here, for example, the Prosecution says that one report from the Bijeljina SDS
6 Crisis Staff informs the Main Board of the Serbian Democratic Party of what the
7 municipal Crisis Staff had decided. However, the Prosecution says it was decided
8 by the Crisis Staff of the Serbian Democratic Party, whereas it is clearly written
9 that the party’s Crisis Staff reports on what was decided by the authorities, and what
10 by the municipal Crisis Staff as a state body. This only expedited the whole process,
11 and there was no need for the Assembly to convene, and these decisions were later on
12 adopted at regular assemblies.
13 Crisis Staffs in Republika Srpska operated openly and publicly. They meticulously
14 recorded every decision that they made, and they submitted them for adoption to their
15 respective assemblies. For example, Kotor Varos had daily meetings of the Crisis
16 Staffs, and this is an illustration of how responsible authority operates, like the
17 one in Kotor Varos. But the OTP removed that example. However, I intend to bring it
18 back just to show you how a responsible body of authority operates.
19 Now, this is what they say about their achievements, that is to say, the heads of
20 the SDA and the Patriotic League. Every local commune in municipality had several
21 communes. In all 103 municipalities, the leadership of Patriotic League had their
22 units ranging from a squad to a company. One of their tasks was to procure weapons.
23 If you look back and remember the map that I showed you before,
24 that means that in all these municipalities where the Serbs were living,
25 there were a total of 109, because they -- they couldn't do this in the
1 Croatian municipalities. However, in all these municipalities where
2 Serbs lived they had their companies, and their Serbian neighbours were
3 able to see that. And Prosecution thinks that we should be banned from
4 observing and monitoring such activities. On the other hand, they
5 allowed them to have these kind of units in their local communes. And
6 they also criticise me for intimidating Serbs without any cause
8 The entire preparations of -- were co-ordinated by the Patriotic
9 League and its staffs throughout the territory of Bosnia or Islamic
10 Bosnia, regardless of whether Serbs were living there or whether they
11 were willing to accept what the Patriotic League and the SDA wanted.
12 Mr. Izetbegovic met them. He gave his approval. He was their
14 Now, look at this. We --
15 JUDGE KWON: We need to adjourn very soon.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I have three more minutes,
18 JUDGE KWON: No, one minute.
19 THE ACCUSED: One minute. Okay.
20 [Interpretation] Mr. Izetbegovic, by virtue of his position, was
21 the chairman of the National Defence Council, Bosnia-Herzegovina. In
22 February he forms a secret council for the defence of Muslims. So one
23 Izetbegovic should arrest the other Izetbegovic, because these two
24 occupied two different positions, and one of those positions was
25 undermining the republic of the other one. And that is what the Serbs
1 couldn't withstand any longer.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, that's for today.
3 Mr. Tieger, I'd like to make sure that we can hear you first
4 thing tomorrow morning.
5 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, we expect to be filing something today,
6 and I can foreshadow that for the Court. I believe we'll be -- we won't
7 be opposing certification. We will be opposing a stay.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That would be helpful.
9 9.00 tomorrow morning.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
11 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 2nd day
12 of March, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.