1 Friday, 23 April 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, everybody. Is the reason why the
6 witness is not in the matter raised by Mr. Robinson yesterday? Probably,
8 Regarding that matter, Mr. Robinson, we are concerned that given
9 Mr. Karadzic's status as a self-represented accused, that this is not the
10 usual situation where lead counsel takes responsibility for the entire
11 Defence team, including any interns who might be permitted to be in the
12 courtroom. I wonder whether you have anything to say about this.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. I'll be happy to take responsibility for
14 them, Mr. President. Even though I'm not lead counsel, I'm subject to
15 the code of conduct, and I think I would be responsible for them in any
16 event under the Registry's regime. So they've held that the code of
17 conduct applies to those of us working as legal advisors for a
18 self-represented accused. So I think I'll be happy to take
19 responsibility for our interns. They're a very integral part of our
20 team. We rely on them because of the resource issues that we have and
21 because they're extremely talented. Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: One further clarification is whether your request is
23 limited to the remainder of Ambassador Okun's testimony.
24 MR. ROBINSON: No. I intended it to apply to the remainder of
25 the trial, actually. Which -- we have one intern who is assigned to each
1 witness. They prepare summaries of the witness's prior testimony and
2 prior statements for Dr. Karadzic, including the references to the
3 transcripts, and then secondly they're tasked with preparing a summary of
4 the witness's in-court testimony and the 92 ter materials. So I would
5 like to bring in one intern who is assigned to that particular witness to
6 both assist Dr. Karadzic if necessary and also help them to prepare the
7 work that they have to do after the witness leaves.
8 JUDGE KWON: And one further final clarification is this: As you
9 confirmed yesterday, in our order it is stated that Mr. Karadzic would be
10 permitted to have two members of his Defence team in the courtroom at any
11 given time unless otherwise authorised by the Chamber. We take it that
12 you are requesting such exceptional authorisation rather than suggesting
13 that your intern would replace either yourself or Mr. Sladojevic.
14 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will muse on the matter further and give
16 you a ruling after the first break.
17 Unless there's anything, let's bring in the witness.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, have you come to a decision
19 concerning whether the cross-examination would commence today?
20 JUDGE KWON: I have no clue when the examination-in-chief could
21 be concluded. We'll see. Mr. Tieger, how much longer do you expect
23 MR. TIEGER: The estimate was three hours. I'm not sure -- quite
24 sure how much I did before. I expected, although it's always a bit
25 difficult, to come in roughly around that time. So my best estimate at
1 this point is that I would conclude at the end of the session or some
2 point into the next session. As I said, that's my best estimate at this
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, we'll see how it goes on, and we'll
7 give our ruling later on.
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN [Resumed]
10 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Ambassador. Please make yourself
12 Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please continue.
13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
15 Q. Good afternoon, Ambassador.
16 A. Good afternoon.
17 Q. Ambassador, we'll be referring again to your note-books or
18 diaries if you want to begin. They may already be in the order you wish,
19 but I wanted to alert you to that so you could have them available for
20 the easiest access.
21 Ambassador, yesterday you testified concerning the areas of
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina sought by the accused and the Bosnian Serb
23 leadership, the demographics of those areas, including the number of
24 Muslims who lived there and some of the positions that the accused had
25 about Muslims. I wanted to ask you, then, directly, whether the accused
1 told you whether the ethnicities in Bosnia could live together or should
2 be segregated, separated.
3 A. Dr. Karadzic said more than once that the ethnic groups could not
4 live together and had to be separated. He added that perhaps one day,
5 undetermined, in the future that might happen but that at present they
6 could not live together.
7 Q. During the course of your testimony in the Krajisnik case, you
8 referred to more than one meeting at which you indicated such references
9 were made, including the meeting of March 6, 1993, and April 24th, 1993.
10 I wanted to turn your attention to a couple of additional meetings
11 referenced in the journals. The first is found at the
12 17th of September, 1992. That's P00785, at page 25. And for you,
13 Ambassador, that would be ICFY book number 2, the meeting that began
14 at 9.10. And the particular reference should be found at page 5 of that
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Sorry, Ambassador. I'm waiting for the version to come up on
18 screen for the benefit of the Court.
19 JUDGE KWON: I think it's on.
20 MR. TIEGER: There may be a mistake in the reference I gave,
21 Your Honour. That was formerly 65 ter number 06535, which I understood
22 had now become P00785.
23 JUDGE KWON: I think that's correct. Diary number 2.
24 MR. TIEGER: And the e-court page should be page 25, as I
25 understand it.
1 Q. And, Ambassador, if I could direct your attention to the entry on
2 the page to the right now showing on the screen in the middle of the
3 page, can you read what that says and indicate to the Court whether or
4 not that's another reference to the fact that the -- that Dr. Karadzic's
5 position was that the nations, the ethnicities, in Bosnia, could not live
7 A. Yes, that is another reference. Dr. Karadzic said:
8 "The communities," meaning the ethnic communities, "cannot live
9 together at present, too much hate.
10 "We need the towns, the individual towns, to run themselves."
11 Then Lord Owen asked him:
12 "Could you imagine yourself with Muslims?"
13 And Dr. Karadzic replied:
14 "Over time we'll either get closer or more distant.
15 "Some issues could still be in common, energy/water supply," that
16 sort of thing.
17 We asked about the judiciary, and he said:
18 "No, not with Muslims."
19 Q. And if I could next turn your attention to the meeting of the
20 19th of September, 1992. Again that's P00785, this time at page 44, and
21 that would be a meeting at 5.00, Mr. Ambassador, on the second page of
22 the meeting. And this appears to be a meeting with Dr. Karadzic,
23 Mr. Krajisnik, Dr. Koljevic, Mr. Buha, and Mr. Misa Milosevic, and on the
24 page to the right, toward the bottom of the page, there's a comment by
25 Dr. Koljevic. And if you could read that and indicate again whether that
1 reflects the position of the Bosnian Serb leadership that the ethnicities
2 could not live together.
3 A. Yes. Nikola Koljevic, who is the last person speaking on that
4 page, initials KOL, said that:
5 "The war has shattered trust. The communities cannot live
6 together any more. To deny that is fantasy."
7 He continued by saying that:
8 "Only by having borders can we begin to do away with borders."
9 And I then summed up the presentation by saying:
10 "Lengthy expatiation by Koljevic and Dr. Karadzic on that point."
11 Nikola Koljevic was a -- now dead, was an eminent Shakespearian
12 scholar with flawless English, and he liked to use his English, which is
13 no surprise, so that's how you get a statement that "Only by having
14 borders can we begin to do away with borders." We saw a good deal of him
15 along with Dr. Karadzic.
16 Q. Ambassador Okun, yesterday we had an opportunity to look at a
17 still from the video that was of Mr. Krajisnik at the ethnic map with the
18 overlay, and as reflected in the testimony in Krajisnik, during the
19 course of speaking about that map, Mr. Krajisnik said that the
20 territories shown within the horseshoe area belonged to the Serbs and
21 that they were not holding territories ethnically populated by other
22 national communities. And that could be found at page 4303 of the
24 Ambassador, by that time, that is, in the latter part of 1992,
25 was it correct that the other national communities were no longer
1 populating those areas shown within the horseshoe area controlled by the
2 Bosnian Serb forces?
3 A. Yes. It was largely true due to the ethnic cleansing of those
4 areas, particularly the western bank of the Drina River
5 mentioned yesterday there had been seven majority Muslim opstinas, and
6 they were all occupied and taken by the Bosnian Serbs and the
7 Yugoslav Army. And then in the Posavina area, around Brcko, which was a
8 very important target for the Bosnian Serbs, and in the west region, west
9 of Banja Luka, around Prijedor, was another area. But the two main areas
10 for the cleansing were the Drina River
11 Q. Ambassador, can you tell the Court from what sources you and
12 Secretary Vance, Lord Owen, and others received information about the
13 ethnic cleansing to which you referred?
14 A. We were in regular touch, that is to say, steady contact, with
15 the International Committee of the Red Cross, which had delegates all
16 over the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Besides the ICRC, we met
17 regularly with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which also
18 was deeply involved in the humanitarian deliverance of aid, and then
19 there was also the soldiers from the United Nations protective force,
20 UNPROFOR. And I would say last but not least, the European Community
21 Monitoring Mission
22 We had quite good sources on what was happening, and these
23 sources, particularly the ICRC and the UNHCR, were well represented on
24 the ground. As the Court knows, the International Committee of the
25 Red Cross is mandated by the Geneva Conventions, in this case the
1 IV Geneva Convention to look after the humanitarian needs of civilians in
2 areas of conflict.
3 Q. Ambassador, can I ask you to turn next to an entry in your diary
4 from the 6th of September, 1992. That's P00784, at page 21. And,
5 Ambassador, that's in ICFY book number 1, meeting at 10.00, found on the
6 first page.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And, again, looking at the page to the right on the screen, shown
9 on the screen now, there's a -- we see that the meeting's attended by
10 Thierry Germond and Ms. Sadako Ogata, and there's a reference to
11 TG speaking; I presume that's Theirry Germond. And can you read the
12 fourth entry down?
13 A. Theirry Germond, who was the senior ICRC delegate for all of
15 humanitarian aid in Bosnia
16 "Sommaruga was frank in London and none of the Yugoslav parties
17 objected. The Serb quantity is more, but all behave equally badly in
19 Sommaruga, Cornelio Sommaruga, the man he is referring to, was
20 then the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
21 had spoken at the London Conference at the last week of August 1992.
22 This was unusual, actually, and in his remarks Dr. Sommaruga noted that
23 because the International Committee of the Red Cross normally works
24 confidentially with governments as an impartial, neutral actor, it is, in
25 the ICRC view, important that they maintain this confidential
1 relationship in order to be able to have access to prisoners, civilian
2 and military. But Dr. Sommaruga felt the situation was so horrific in
4 Q. In that connection, Ambassador --
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
6 Mr. Robinson.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Excuse me, Mr. President. Mr. President, at
8 this time I would like to make a motion to exclude any information from
9 the International Red Cross, to strike the answers that have been given,
10 and to preclude further information from the Red Cross. As you know,
11 there's an absolute privilege by the Red Cross from giving evidence in
12 proceedings such as this and also in co-operating by furnishing documents
13 to a party to these proceedings. So we are in a position when the
14 Red Cross evidence is elicited in this trial of not being able to have
15 access to any of the information from the Red Cross by which we could
16 check or verify or even do any further investigation of this.
17 So since a Red Cross official would not be testifying here
18 directly to these matters, I don't think it's proper for there to be
19 indirect testimony which directly quotes what Red Cross persons had said.
20 So on that basis, I would ask that you exclude evidence as to -- coming
21 from the Red Cross.
22 Thank you.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, this is a specious objection on a
1 number of levels, but let me simplify it and say that I'm about to turn
2 to a public address by Mr. Sommaruga. Clearly to the extent any
3 privileged issue is entailed here, and there's no need to get into it in
4 any more detail, it's waived when a public address is given. So I don't
5 think we need to go any farther than that.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We agree with the observation of Mr. Tieger.
8 It's a public statement, and the witness can deal with it as such. Let's
9 move on.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, but my motion did
11 actually also include the private statements that were being made as
12 reflected in the diary. So there are -- he's about to go to public
13 statements, but we've also now had testimony about private statements
14 being made by Red Cross officials to Mr. Okun and Cyrus Vance and the
15 others. So I would ask that you address that issue as well. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: The weight of Mr. Ambassador Okun is for the Chamber
17 to assess at a later stage, so as such I don't see any problem in moving
18 along. So motion is denied.
19 Let's move on.
20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Can we turn now, as I was earlier requesting, to P00807.
22 And, Ambassador, as indicated, this is an address by
23 Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga, president of the International Committee of the
24 Red Cross at the London Conference as delivered on 26th of August. And
25 I'd like to turn to some of the things that Mr. Sommaruga said.
1 MR. TIEGER: If we could turn to the next page, please.
2 Q. We see at the top of the page to the left, Ambassador, that
3 Dr. Sommaruga said:
4 "The International Committee of the Red Cross has rarely been so
5 outspoken while active in a country affected by conflict."
6 Is that a reflection of what you were mentioning a moment ago
7 about the unusual nature of Dr. Sommaruga's remarks?
8 A. Yes. Yes.
9 Q. He goes on to say that:
10 "All these appeals were made necessary by the seriousness of the
11 humanitarian situation in former Yugoslavia
13 And then toward the bottom of the page he states:
14 "Let me give you the sad picture.
15 "The civilian population is systematically harassed; thousands of
16 civilians are arrested in their homes, brutalised, or even killed. Whole
17 minority groups comprising tens of thousands of civilians are
18 systematically transferred by force or as is currently the case in
19 Sanski Most driven without any protection towards and across the front
20 lines. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been besieged for several
21 months in cities such as Bihac, Bosanski Brod, Derventa, Gorazde, and
23 conditions of extreme hardship in places of detention which are totally
24 inadequate for the purpose. They are ill-treated and hundreds of them
25 have been executed either in places to which the ICRC has been denied
1 access or in places it has been allowed to visit only after --"
2 JUDGE KWON: Could you wait just so that we can follow.
3 Can we see the next page?
4 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour. Could we move to the
5 next page, please.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. And continuing in the first full paragraph at the top left
9 regarding the detainees, most of whom are civilians:
10 "... they are ill-treated and hundreds of them have been executed
11 either in places to which the ICRC has been denied access or in places to
12 which -- in places it has been allowed to visit only after the executions
13 had stopped."
14 And he goes on to talk about the refusal of access to the
15 detention camps in Manjaca and Trnopolje and entry after many demarches
16 at local and the highest political level.
17 Mr. Ambassador, is this the type of information that you,
18 Secretary Vance, Lord Owen, and the others involved in the negotiations
19 were receiving?
20 A. Yes, it is. It was given to us perhaps more directly, but this
21 is a very accurate commentary on what we received. Yes, this is the kind
22 of stuff we got.
23 Q. Now, the reference in your journal for September 6th says that
24 none of the parties objected to Dr. Sommaruga's observations, his
25 statement. And you've explained that you met with many of the parties,
1 their leadership, and many of the leaders in the area, including
2 Slobodan Milosevic, Dobrica Cosic, Mate Boban, other internationals. Did
3 anyone tell you that the ICRC and others who were reporting what was
4 happening had it wrong, that -- that the ethnic cleansing, the detention
5 of civilians in camps, was not happening?
6 A. No, nobody denied that. Dr. Karadzic did mention once, I recall,
7 that the Trnopolje camp, which was a particularly bad detention centre
8 run by Bosnian Serbs, holding Bosnian Muslims and Croats, Dr. Karadzic
9 did mention to me once that that camp was open, that anybody was free to
10 leave it whenever he wanted or she wanted. But I have no evidence that
11 that statement is accurate.
12 Q. Now, I'm going to ask you some questions about the comments by
13 Dr. Karadzic to you and the other negotiators concerning camps and
14 cleansing, but first I want to turn to some of the other leadership
15 figures with whom you dealt during the negotiations.
16 Did other leadership figures within the region acknowledge that
17 ethnic cleansing was taking place?
18 A. Yes. I would say they all did. Indeed, on more than one
19 occasion, President Cosic, who was the president then of the
20 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and President Tudjman referred to ethnic
21 cleansing by name as ethnic cleansing in a formal note that was issued
22 together, a diplomatic document, and that was not the only time it was
23 referred to. In fact, in all of the conversations about ethnic cleansing
24 with the Bosnian Serb leadership, it was highly unusual, almost never the
25 case, that they denied it. When they were asked about it, the almost
1 invariable response was, "Look what they're doing to our people," or from
2 Dr. Karadzic, "Sarajevo
3 being held prisoner, hostage."
4 So that was the typical dialogue about ethnic cleansing. No
5 denial on the part of the accused and others, but, rather, a finger
6 pointing at the other parties.
7 Q. Ambassador, let me ask you to look quickly at a couple of
8 references in the journals. First if we could turn to P00784, at
9 page 53. And that would be in ICFY book number 1, a meeting at 9.10,
10 page 2 of the meeting. And in this case I want to look at a couple of
11 comments by President Cosic, to whom you referred.
12 Sorry, that would be a meeting of the 11th of September, 1992.
13 It should be on page 53 of 784.
14 And at the top page at the left, Ambassador, this appears to be a
15 discussion about camps with Cosic saying he'd like to invite Elie Wiesel
16 and similar others to visit camps and see the situation. "Need to clean
17 up." And then if you could continue.
18 A. Yes, President Cosic continued by saying to us:
19 "You are justified in asking us to pressure Karadzic, but you
20 should also pressure the Croats and the Muslims to cease offensive."
21 He meant their offensive actions.
22 Q. And, similarly, if I could ask you to turn next to P00785.
23 That's ICFY book number 1, a meeting at 11.15, on the first page, and
24 electronically that should be found at page 68 of 785.
25 A. What is the date of that meeting?
1 Q. I'm sorry, Ambassador. That's the 28th of September, 1992
2 if you go to page 68. The date is September 28th.
3 MR. TIEGER: If page 68 is the wrong page electronically, then we
4 need to go to -- we need to move forward to the 28th. Yeah, that's it.
5 And it should be the ...
6 This may have been copied in a strange way. Can we turn to the
7 very next page, page 73, e-court page 73. Let's see how that is. Okay.
8 That's fine. Thank you.
9 Q. Sorry about the technical problems, Ambassador. I imagine you've
10 been on that page for a while.
11 If I could ask you to look at the entry that follows just after
12 the beginning of that meeting. We see in that first paragraph
13 President Cosic speaking. And if you can -- it begins -- you've got some
14 of the participants in the meeting listed immediately to the right,
15 immediately below where it says President Dobrica Cosic in the box, and
16 then in other box it says regarding BH, and then look down and then
17 there's a reference to ethnic cleansing by President Cosic.
18 Approximately four lines down it seems to say:
19 "Ethnic cleansing continues - all do it."
20 A. Yes, that's what he said, and that was the case.
21 Q. And -- all right. Now, you have mentioned President Cosic is
22 among those acknowledging the ethnic cleansing that was taking place, and
23 you also mentioned earlier that you brought the matter of ethnic
24 cleansing, the matter of the camps, the detention of civilians, to the
25 attention of Dr. Karadzic and the other Bosnian Serb leaders and that their
1 response was tu quoque, "The others are doing it too."
2 You made reference to some of the meetings at which such comments
3 were made in your Krajisnik testimony. If I could turn you to at least
4 one other, and that would be the meeting of the 29th of January, 1993
5 That's ICFY book number 7, a 4.00 meeting, and that would be -- that
6 would be P00789, at page 39.
7 JUDGE KWON: Could you check the exhibit number again? It's ICFY
8 book number what?
9 MR. TIEGER: It's -- for the Ambassador's benefit, he will find
10 it in book number 7.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 MR. TIEGER: It's P00789, I believe.
13 JUDGE KWON: Not 790. What is the 65 ter number?
14 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, it was 06539.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. My list says its ICFY number 6.
16 MR. TIEGER: Well, the meeting -- you may be right, Your Honour.
17 Your Honour, thank you. It is 790. That is correct. But I believe the
18 page number should be correct. And we'll have to scroll back. It's a
19 meeting of the 29th. And that would be page 37.
20 Q. Now, Ambassador, if I could ask you to look toward the bottom of
21 the page at the beginning of the meeting. That's a meeting with
22 Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and Mr. Buha. And there we see, according
23 to your entry:
24 "Karadzic criticises DLO statements regarding Serbs, especially,"
25 and it looks like "Tribune de Geneve interview."
1 Is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Okay. And if you could continue?
4 A. Lord Owen responded by saying this talk of referendums is
5 impossible. He's referring to the fact that on numerous occasions the
6 Bosnian Serbs offered to hold referenda in the conquered areas, in the
7 areas that they were occupying, and since they had been ethnically
8 cleansed, one understood why they wanted to hold these referenda, and
9 Lord Owen is saying that's impossible.
10 Q. And then does Dr. -- does Dr. Karadzic continue to --
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. -- raise the issue of what was said in the article and respond to
14 A. Dr. Karadzic said to Lord Owen:
15 "You said we burn down villages. Many more Serb villages are
16 burned down than Croat or Muslim, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera."
17 The three "et ceteras" mean that this was a common argument that
18 we had heard many, many times before and therefore there was no need to
19 repeat it in the diary. And you can see that Mr. Vance was a little
20 impatient, because the next entry reads:
21 "Secretary Vance: Appeals to get on with the job."
22 To which Mr. Buha responded at length and with some force.
23 Q. All right. And was -- with regard to the comments by
24 Dr. Karadzic in response to the statement about the activities of Serbian
25 forces and burning down villages another of the tu quoque responses to
1 which you referred earlier?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now, Ambassador, did Dr. Karadzic ever tell you who was in
4 charge of the forces of the Bosnian Serbs that were the subject of these
6 A. Yes. In Geneva
7 Dr. Karadzic said that he was in control of the Bosnian Serb armed
8 forces. They were under his command. And he also said that
9 General Mladic had been difficult to deal with at the beginning, adding
10 that, "You know how soldiers are." And he then indicated that Dr. --
11 that General Mladic was under his control also.
12 Q. Let me ask you to turn to the meeting of September 17th, 1992.
13 That's P00785, page 25, and that's found in ICFY book number 2,
14 Mr. Ambassador, a 9.00 or 9.10 meeting, and at pages 4 to 5 of that
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Okay. Now, looking toward the bottom of the page towards the
18 left, it appears that CRV
19 "What of your irregulars, control."
20 And can you indicate what Dr. Karadzic responded to --
21 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... yes, Secretary Vance asked who
22 controls the irregulars. Dr. Karadzic answered that 5 per cent were not
23 under control. As for the rest, "I control."
24 And then I quote him as saying, and this is the quote:
25 "We can do anything. The army has a unified command. I have
1 full power."
2 Q. Ambassador, let me also ask you to turn to an entry from the
3 31st of October, 1992. That's -- sorry.
4 [Prosecution counsel confer]
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. It's P787, and it's page 39. And indicates that at 12.55 --
8 MR. TIEGER: We were on the correct page just a moment ago.
9 That's good. Thank you.
10 Q. At 12.55 there's a telecon from Radovan Karadzic from Prijedor
11 for CRV
12 ask you to turn --
13 MR. TIEGER: Or ask the Registrar to call up P00811.
14 Q. And, Ambassador, is that the note for the file concerning that
15 telephone conversation?
16 A. Yes, that is it, with my signature.
17 Q. And can you tell us quickly what that was about? Well, let me
18 assist by simply noting that some of this -- these portions -- the first
19 part indicates the telephone call itself and the time, and Mr. Vance's
20 absence, and it indicates that you raised with Dr. Karadzic the issues of
21 civilians fleeing from Jajce in the direction of Travnik.
22 A. Yes. I said we were receiving reports that these people were
23 being shelled and that their condition was extremely serious. I'm
25 "Dr. Karadzic said that there had been little or know shelling of
1 Jajce. The town had been captured by infantry alone. He further said
2 that civilians were protected at Jajce and that the town had been taken
3 by a disciplined group of soldiers 'who were not irresponsible.' He said
4 this was a disinformation campaign directed against the Bosnian Serbs. I
5 replied that we had very different information, that I believed it to be
6 reliable, and that in any case he should immediately call his commander
7 on the spot and order him to protect all innocent civilians no matter
8 what. I reiterated that the reports we were receiving said that
9 thousands of people were fleeing Jajce. Dr. Karadzic said this was not
10 so but that residents of Jajce had left earlier. I reiterated in the
11 strongest possible terms that he should call his local commander and
12 order him to cease and desist from any activity directed at innocent
13 civilians. I said this was a matter of the most extreme urgency.
14 Dr. Karadzic said he would call his commander and so instruct him."
15 Q. And was that a further reflection, Mr. Ambassador, of your
16 understanding that Dr. Karadzic was the man in control of the military
17 forces and his affirmation of that?
18 A. Yes. If I might mention on the facts of the situation. On that
19 same date in Geneva
20 12.55 p.m.
21 notice on that page it says "telecon," which means telephone
22 conversation, from Arnie Kanter in the department re: Jajce. And Kanter
23 was the number 3 person in the US Department of State and here he was
24 calling me at 10.00 p.m.
25 seriousness of the situation and that our information about the
1 mistreatment of the civilians was accurate.
2 In any case, Dr. Karadzic undertook -- said he would undertake to
3 call his commander and order him to presumably stop doing what he was
5 Q. Now, Ambassador, in an earlier reference in the diary you noted
6 Dr. Karadzic's reference to the unified command of the army and full
7 power and also to his control of 95 per cent of the irregulars. And I
8 want to ask you about a couple of references in the diaries to
9 paramilitaries or paramilitary figures. The first one is found at
10 April 15th, 1992
11 Ambassador, that's in the Vance mission book number 7, a meeting at
12 6.45 -- that began at 6.45, with Slobodan Milosevic. And if we can look
13 at the entry on the right side of the screen, page -- pages marked 41 in
14 the journal, it appears that Secretary Vance is asking a question about
15 the presence of Arkan. And can you indicate what Secretary Vance
16 inquired and what Mr. Milosevic's response was and how that conversation
18 A. Yes. Arkan was the leader of a particularly vicious paramilitary
19 group that had been active during the war in Croatia, and then when the
20 cease-fire went into effect, the hostilities ended in 1992, transferred
21 his activities to Bosnia-Herzegovina. And this was early days still,
22 April, so Mr. Secretary Vance asked Milosevic:
23 "What about Arkan on the Drina?"
24 Meaning that he had heard that Arkan's forces were active along
25 the western bank of the Drina
1 added that General Adzic, who was the Commander-In-Chief at that point of
2 Yugoslav Army, says:
3 "He's there."
4 And Milosevic answers:
5 "No. Maybe somebody could be somewhere."
6 That, I should say, was a typical Milosevic answer. Maybe
7 somebody could be somewhere. He later confirmed that:
8 "Arkan was there, but he went on at this point to say it's
9 completely prohibited to go out of Serbia
11 He was initially 'privately' in Bijeljina, and that answer was so
12 obviously mendacious that Secretary Vance said:
13 "No, that won't wash."
14 And then Milosevic admitted that Arkan was there but said:
15 "Only at the beginning. Rest of the time, Arkan was in
17 Q. Ambassador, if I could ask you to turn, quickly, to page 44, and
18 that's page 24 electronically.
19 A. Yes. And Secretary Vance comes back to the subject stating:
20 "Everyone knows Arkan was there." He meant Bijeljina. And then
21 Milosevic answered the tu quoque answer:
22 "Yes, but others are in Bosnia and Herzegovina too."
23 Q. And, Ambassador, let me ask you to turn next to a meeting the
24 following day, this time with Dr. Karadzic. That's the same exhibit,
25 0 -- P00780, at page 38, and, Ambassador, that's a meeting that began at
1 12.05, and the relevant entry is found at page 6 of the meeting. I
2 believe that's marked as page 73 in your book.
3 And the following day did Secretary Vance raise the issue of
4 Arkan with Dr. Karadzic?
5 A. Yes, he did. Shall I read the entry from the journal?
6 Q. Yes, thank you.
7 A. Secretary Vance asked Dr. Karadzic and Koljevic:
8 "What about Arkan and other Serb irregulars?"
9 And they answered in tandem:
10 "We have never ever even seen Arkan. In Bijeljina, a Serb caused
11 a -- a Serb caused a problem in a cafe. Then a manipulation occurred and
12 a fight. Then somebody invited Arkan in. Muslims even sent a cable
13 thanking Arkan."
14 Q. Thank you, Ambassador. And I wanted to ask you, the other -- the
15 other day in court, not during your testimony, but this Chamber heard a
16 colloquy between the accused and a witness who was here in which there
17 was repeated references to who had men and who had weapons. So I wanted
18 to ask you whether Dr. Karadzic told you which side had the men and which
19 side had the weapons.
20 A. Yes. That was a point he made more than once. I would not say
21 he made it repeatedly or all the time, but he did make that point. And
22 he said that the other side, that is, namely, the Bosnian Muslims and the
23 Bosnian Croats, have the men, and, "We have the weapons. If we give up
24 our weapons, then we are doomed." And what he was referring to in
25 general was the issue of the heavy Serb artillery shelling Sarajevo and
1 other populated places, and the shelling of Sarajevo, in particular, drew
2 the world's attention and was, needless to say, heavily criticised and
3 led to the heavy criticism of the Bosnian Serb army.
4 Q. Ambassador, during the course of your testimony in the Krajisnik
5 case, you testified that Dr. Karadzic told you before the conflict began
6 that unless the Bosnian Serbs got what they wanted they would attempt to
7 get it through force. That's at page 4173.
8 Did -- and also at -- yeah, basically at 4172 to 4173.
9 Did Dr. Karadzic tell you after the conflict began that the
10 Bosnian Serb use of force would stop when the Bosnian Serbs got what they
12 A. Yes, he did, but he rarely used the phrase "got what we wanted."
13 He would more often say "We are ready to stop fighting." Of course, at
14 that point, the Bosnian Serb army was occupying 70 per cent of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they in fact had what they wanted, well, almost
16 all of it, so that it was easy to offer stopping the fighting.
17 Q. Let me ask you to turn to a meeting of the 16th of April, 1992
18 That's P00780, at page 37, and for your benefit, Ambassador, that's
19 Vance mission book number 7, a meeting at 12.05, at a page that's
20 marked 71.
21 And if you could look at the middle of the page, there's a
22 comment by Dr. Karadzic:
23 "We won't fight after map is decided."
24 Can you tell us what that discussion is about and what
25 Dr. Karadzic was indicating to you and Secretary Vance?
1 A. The fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina had several components.
2 The ethnic cleansing was one. The question of what kind of state
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina would be was important. I should mention here
4 parenthetically that the 16th of April, 1992, was exactly ten days after
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised as an independent state by the
6 European Community. The next day, the United States recognised it, and
7 it was admitted to the United Nations, so that on the date of this
8 conversation, namely April 16th, 1992
9 state of the United Nations.
10 Well, one of the other factors that was always discussed in
11 addition to the nature of the state and the relationship between the
12 ethnicities was the map, who would occupy what parts of Bosnia. And
13 that's what Dr. Karadzic was stating: That when we can agree on who is
14 somewhere, that is to say, a map, then "We would stop fighting."
15 Q. Ambassador, did Dr. Karadzic and the other Bosnian Serb leaders
16 take positions during the negotiations that depended upon the change in
17 the demographic structure or the demographic conditions that had been
18 produced by the ethnic cleansing?
19 A. Yes. That was involved in the calls for referendums in the areas
20 that the Bosnian Serbs claim for the putative Republika Srpska.
21 Q. During the course of your Krajisnik testimony you made reference
22 to meetings at which there was a call to "accommodate ethnic realities,"
23 which you explained was a "very clear, not so subtle reference to the
24 ethnic cleansing." And you referred to a meeting also of
25 September 19th, 1992
1 where they are and where we are."
2 Let me also turn your attention, if I may, to a couple of
3 additional references. The first one of -- at the meeting of the
4 30th of January, 1993, at page 40 electronically. That would be ICFY
5 book number 7, a meeting that began at 10.55.
6 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, I think that's 790. I believe I indicated
7 789. My apologies. Thank you. That's it.
8 Q. This is a Plenary Session, Ambassador, and Dr. Karadzic is
9 indicated speaking in an entry found on the right side of the page. Can
10 you indicate to the Court what Dr. Karadzic was explaining and what
11 Lord Owen's reaction to that was.
12 A. This was an important meeting following the introduction, the
13 formal introduction, of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan - that occurred on
14 January 2nd, 1993
15 plan had had a mixed reaction from the three parties, the
16 Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Serbs.
17 I have to take a moment to outline the plan for you, because
18 otherwise this entry will be meaningless. So if you would permit me to
19 outline it, I shall, as briefly as I can.
20 The Vance-Owen Peace Plan consisted of three independent parts:
21 First, constitutional arrangements for the state; second, the military
22 arrangements; third, a map of the provincial structure. The parts had to
23 be signed separately, so nine signatures were required, three parties,
24 three parts, and the situation as of January 30th, the date of this
25 meeting, was that Mate Boban and the Bosnian Croats had signed all three
1 parts. They had fully signed on to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The
2 Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs did not sign, except that the
3 Muslims accepted the military principles. You see at the bottom of this
4 page Izetbegovic:
5 "Accept military principles, but do not accept map and do not
6 accept military" -- excuse me, "accept 9 principles." I beg your pardon.
7 He's saying he accepts the constitutional principles, does not
8 accept the military or the map. And Dr. Karadzic's side had rejected all
9 three. So we had four signatures out of nine that were required, and the
10 purpose of this meeting was to work with the parties and encourage them
11 to sign on to the other parts of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. And
12 Dr. Karadzic, on the very next page, the point you asked about, Counsel,
14 "Have already accepted nine principles and most of the map.
15 'Some details should be a matter of democratic decision.'"
16 "Democratic decision" is in quotes.
17 "If the people could decide democratically, we'd accept."
18 This was the argument for a referendum in the Serb-held areas.
19 Lord Owen responded, as you see from the journal:
20 "I take that as a rejection, which it indeed was."
21 He added:
22 "Too much of the population has been displaced."
23 MR. TIEGER: Ambassador, may I just quickly ask you to turn to
24 another entry with reference to --
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, I would propose to take a break now.
1 I'm noting that all the LiveNote have failed, so I hope that technical
2 difficulties could be solved during the break.
3 So we'll take a break for 25 minutes.
4 --- Recess taken at 3.34 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 4.06 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure the technical difficulties have been
7 solved. I'll try.
8 Mr. Ambassador, I have a couple of administrative matters to deal
9 with before we continue with your evidence, so could you bear with us
10 just for a minute.
11 So, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Robinson, the Chamber has been carefully
12 considering Mr. Robinson's request for a Defence intern to be present in
13 the courtroom during the cross-examination of Ambassador Okun and indeed
14 for each future witness brought by the Prosecution.
15 The Chamber is aware of the practice in some other Chambers and
16 at the ICTR where both the Prosecution and Defence are permitted to bring
17 interns into the courtroom on occasions. However, we view the situation
18 here as rather different in light of the fact that Mr. Karadzic is
20 As you are aware, the Chamber gave some considerations in
21 formulating its order on the procedure for the conduct of the trial to
22 how much assistance you, Mr. Karadzic, would need during the course of
23 the proceedings and determined that Mr. Robinson would be entitled to be
24 present to assist you on legal matters, and Mr. Sladojevic or one of your
25 Case Managers would be entitled to be present to assist you on other
1 matters such as the provision of documents, page references, and so on.
2 We are of the view that should you consider it necessary to have
3 additional assistance, you should make such a request in writing,
4 explaining why you believe that Mr. Sladojevic or your Case Manager do
5 not suffice in this particular instance.
6 So we will therefore deny that -- Mr. Robinson's request at this
7 stage, and ask you, Mr. Karadzic, to make any further application in this
8 regard that you wish in writing bearing in mind the Chamber's order on
9 the procedure for the conduct of the trial.
10 And the next thing is regarding the starting of the
11 cross-examination by you, Mr. Karadzic. Given that the evidence of
12 Ambassador Okun covers a lot of fields such that you anticipated length
13 of time for cross-examination amounts to 14 hours, so the existence of
14 that document in question which was the subject of later -- late
15 disclosure in the opinion of the Chamber does not prevent you from being
16 able to start your cross-examination. I gather the examination-in-chief
17 will be concluded during the course of this session. So therefore, on
18 that basis, the Chamber is recommending you to start your
19 cross-examination immediately following the conclusion of
21 Let's continue, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. Ambassador, just before the recess, I had asked you about whether
24 Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership took positions that depended
25 upon the change in demographics brought by the ethnic cleansing and you
1 indicated, in the last reference we looked at, the insistence on
2 referendums. I'd also, in that connection, like to turn next to a
3 meeting of the 15th of January, 1993. That's P00789, at page 58, and,
4 Ambassador, that's found in ICFY book 7, I believe -- six, I'm sorry. At
5 a meeting that begins on 11.55 with Mr. Buha, Mr. Lukic, and
6 Mrs. Plavsic.
7 And the particular reference is found at the -- I think the
8 bottom page 5 of that meeting. In any event, it's also depicted on
9 screen at the moment.
10 I wanted to -- if you found the reference, I want you to turn
11 your attention to the remarks of Mr. Buha that can be found at the last
12 entry on the page to the right on screen at the moment.
13 First let me -- let me turn your attention first to -- perhaps
14 it's easier to look at the preceding page, the reference in the middle,
15 the "Corridor," and then below. Do you see that, Ambassador?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Okay. So we see:
18 "Corridor. We need it."
19 And then:
20 "Perhaps hold referendum to decide."
21 And then the last entry on the page to the right:
22 "Per Kara," I presume that's Karadzic, "identify controversial
23 areas and solve on basis of referendum."
24 And, Ambassador, is that another instance of insistence by the
25 Bosnian Serb leadership on holding referendums in the areas where the
1 demographics had been changed?
2 A. Yes, it is.
3 THE ACCUSED: I would object that. I would object.
4 JUDGE KWON: So on what point do you object?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the distinguished
6 Mr. Tieger is forcing the Ambassador to draw conclusions that are not
7 based on the text. Therefore, my work will be a lot more difficult.
8 Quite simply, I will need a lot more time. Quite simply, I do not agree
9 with this.
10 JUDGE KWON: Given that most of the evidence of Ambassador Okun
11 was given pursuant to the regime of 92 ter, we allowed some sort of the
12 leading questions so far. So if you could reformulate your question,
13 Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: Of course, Your Honour. No problem.
15 Q. Ambassador, what is Mr. Buha referring to here in that last
17 A. Well, on the previous page after he says, "We need the corridor,"
18 he says:
19 "Perhaps hold a referendum to decide."
20 And then a few minutes later says that:
21 "Self-determination is vital."
22 And I took that to understand at the time, and I'm sure it was
23 correct, actually, that the phrase "Self-determination is vital" is
24 another way of asking for a referendum. And that was my understanding
25 then, and it is now.
1 And he continues to say that Dr. Karadzic has said, this is the
2 last entry on the page:
3 "Per Kara," Dr. Karadzic has said, "identify the controversial
4 areas and solve on basis of referendum."
5 Now, the controversial areas were the areas that the Bosnian Serbs
6 had conquered, and that was the issue with the map, and again this is a
7 call to take a referendum in the ethnically cleansed areas.
8 Q. Ambassador, I'm going to ask you -- you testified about
9 Dr. Karadzic's response when ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serb forces was
10 brought to his attention, and you talked, in particular, about tu quoque.
11 I'm going to ask you and the Chamber to look next at a videotaped
12 interview, that's P00809. And I would ask that we play several clips
13 from the interview. The first would be clip 6 followed by 7 and 8, if we
15 [Video-clip played]
16 "Karadzic: I would like to stress that beside ethnic refugees,
17 we do have ethnic hostages, and believe me, it's much better to be ethnic
18 refugee than to be ethnic hostage. Ethnic hostages are people who are
19 forbidden to leave certain area. This is violation of Geneva Convention,
20 and we strongly demand that civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina be
21 allowed to move, to leave certain areas. Sarajevo, city of Sarajevo
22 the biggest concentration camps for Serbs. From 60 to 70.000 Serbs are
23 imprisoned in Sarajevo
24 [Video-clip played]
25 "Karadzic: This is homemade. This is Muslim weapon for killing
1 Serbs. They kill them by that, and they -- as a hammer -- taking --
2 using it as hammer, and they put the eyes out of -- by this part. That's
3 how -- do you know why they do that? They do that to scare the others,
4 to make them to run out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And the main plan was
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina to be state without a single Serb, without a
6 single Serb. That is continuation of policy run by fascistic Croatia
7 during Second World War where Pavelic ideology was -- or theory of
8 three-thirds: One-third of Serbs to be extradited to Serbia, another to
9 be converted into Catholic religion, and third one to be killed. So all
10 of them conceived their own states without a single Serb, and that's why
11 they do massacres to scare people from -- into next area, into next
12 village, to make them run. So it's not just without any purpose. It has
13 a purpose."
14 [Video-clip played]
15 "Koljevic: Well, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to add just
16 a few words about the most serious blame of Serbs with so-called ethnic
17 cleansing. All of you, as media people, know how serious that charge is,
18 and most of you, I hope, know that there was Muslim ethnic cleansing of
19 Serbs. Especially recently in Gorazde and 26 villages which you may
20 visit sooner or later, if you're lucky, from Gorazde along Drina
21 Bratunac. There are some other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina
22 there was very serious ethnic cleansing and we have documents and we have
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. Now, Ambassador, I'm not sure I mentioned that this was a press
1 conference conducted on the 18th of September, 1992, at the
2 International Conference of the former Yugoslavia.
3 I wanted to ask you if the statements of Dr. Karadzic and
4 Dr. Koljevic were consistent with what you were hearing from them in
5 response to allegations of the ethnic cleansing that was taking place?
6 A. Yes. They were entirely consistent.
7 Q. And if I could ask you to -- ask to play one more clip and --
8 from that press conference, and that would be clip number 2 -- 12,
9 excuse me.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 "Reporter: You say that the Serbs have only 35 per cent of the
12 population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, you claim about
13 60 to 70 per cent of the whole republic for the Serbs.
14 "Karadzic: We do not claim. We own it, and we possess it, and
15 we control it. That's because we have been majority before
16 Second World War, before genocide. During Second World War, the same
17 coalition have killed more than 700.000 Serbs. That's why we are now
18 35 per cent of population. Everything in terms of ownership is still
19 64 per cent."
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. And, Ambassador, later in that same press conference, at the page
22 which is marked 0092-9867, a reporter asks again:
23 "You just said that you want three states in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
24 and you control the 65 per cent of the Bosnian territory right now."
25 And Dr. Karadzic says:
1 "No, Serbian territory. This is territory which belongs to
3 Ambassador, I wanted to ask you if that's consistent with the
4 position taken by Dr. Karadzic with respect to the territory of
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina to which he asserted Serbs were entitled and
7 A. Yes, it's consistent. And we also heard that argument from
8 President Milosevic.
9 MR. TIEGER: Now, if we could call up the transcript of the press
10 conference on screen. I think that's P00809. And that's the page marked
12 JUDGE KWON: Do we have a separate exhibit number for the
13 transcript, Mr. Tieger?
14 MR. TIEGER: It's under the same number, Your Honour, the video
15 and the transcript together. If the Court wishes, we can make provision
16 for --
17 JUDGE KWON: That can be sorted out. My e-court has only one
18 page. Let's move on.
19 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
20 JUDGE KWON: I was told that it has a separate attachment. Yes.
21 Let's go on.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. Ambassador, there in the middle of the page Dr. Karadzic says:
24 "As a matter of fact, Serbian side as well as Croatian side have
25 its own objective, and it's much easier to deal with Croats, because we
1 know they have objective. Muslim side has no objective -- or, rather,
2 Muslim side has unrealistic objective to have the whole of Bosnia and
4 to stop animosity with Croats and to stop any fire and to establish
5 commission for delimitation between delimitation of these two ethnic
7 Now, first of all, Mr. Ambassador, can you explain what is meant
8 by "delimitation" in that context?
9 A. He's talking there of a border between the Republika Srpska, that
10 is to say, the Bosnian Serb territory, and the community of Herceg-Bosna,
11 namely, the Bosnian Croat territory. There was agreement between the
12 Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats on a number of points, as I've
13 mentioned in the objectives of the three parties, and here he's referring
14 to giving life to that situation, namely, the geographic border between
15 the two ethnicities.
16 Q. And did Dr. Karadzic make clear to you and to the other
17 negotiators during the course of negotiations why he found the
18 Bosnian Croat objectives realistic in contrast to the unrealistic Muslim
20 A. Yes. He used the word "realistic." He might have chosen another
21 word. "Compatible," perhaps, with Bosnian Serb objectives. They were
22 "compatible" might have been more accurate, or "congruent." But as we
23 know, both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats wanted to carve out
24 of the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina separate individual political entities,
25 and they had discussed that before the fighting began, while the fighting
1 began. For example, in May 1992, Mate Boban and Dr. Karadzic met at
3 So Dr. Karadzic's remark here is consistent with their actions
4 and consistent with what we understood at the time to be their actions,
5 namely, to partition one way or another Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 Q. Ambassador, can I ask you to turn to a meeting of the
7 17th of September, 1992. That's P785, page 26, and that's ICFY book
8 number 2, a 9.10 meeting, at page 7.
9 And if you could look at the last sentence on the left side of
10 the page, at the bottom of the page on the left, moving on to the text on
11 the very next page, and if you could tell the Court what that says and
12 what's -- what is being indicated at that meeting.
13 A. Well, this meeting was September 17th, in the third week of the
14 international conference, and that particular meeting was with
15 Dr. Karadzic and Misa Milosevic, and Dr. Karadzic says:
16 "The Muslims are losing because their objectives are
18 The same point he made in his press conference the next day:
19 "Neither the Croats nor the Serbs will allow this."
20 Indicating the parallel goals of the Serbs and the Bosnian Croats
21 that I've already mentioned. And he says:
22 "Izetbegovic is aiming at a rule via the high birth rate."
23 We've discussed that earlier. Then he continues:
24 "How to end the war?"
25 And his answer is:
1 "Get the Serbs and the Croats together. Help them to exchange
2 territories. Help Croatia
4 And he goes on to illustrate the point very accurately:
5 "If a table had Milosevic, Hadzic, and me on one side," that is,
6 the Serb side, Milosevic, Hadzic, the leader of the Krajina Serbs in
8 we could solve the problem."
9 Well, they would solve the problem via partition, because you
10 notice who's missing is the Muslims. So that's a very straightforward
11 answer to the question of who was who and who wanted what.
12 Q. And just quickly, Mr. Ambassador, two related references. If I
13 could ask you to turn to the meeting of November 28th, 1992, P787, at
14 page 6, and it's ICFY book number 5, a meeting that begins at 9.15. And
15 I'd like to turn your attention to page 5 of that meeting.
16 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, that's P788. Thank you.
17 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, this is a meeting with President Tudjman of
19 depicted in approximately -- well, the beginning and middle part of the
20 screen on the entry -- on the page to the left. Can you indicate who is
21 speaking and what he's conveying there?
22 A. Well, the subject of boundaries came up with President Tudjman,
23 and Lord Owen asked:
24 "Can they be changed?
25 And President Tudjman, FT, Franjo Tudjman, said:
1 "Not ours."
2 He said that in very strong, definitive terms. And I capitalised
3 the answers, you'll notice.
5 1919 and smaller than in 1939."
6 And here he was referring to the Cvetkovic/Macek Agreement of
7 August 1939
9 because the very next month Germany
10 and, of course, it was no longer an issue. But it was on his mind.
11 Indeed, everybody connected with Bosnia-Herzegovina knows of that
12 agreement of August 1939, the "Sporazum," as it was called, because it
13 was a major non-event in Bosnian history, but it also was a formal
14 partition of the state.
15 In any case, he says:
16 "It is smaller than it was at the time. There's the rub."
17 And he goes on to say:
18 "I discussed Bosnia-Herzegovina with Milosevic and Izetbegovic
19 before the current war and said there are two possibilities:
20 "(1) either a confederal Bosnia-Herzegovina," by which he meant
21 three states within a state. The world "confederal" is often used --
22 another expression was a federal state. Another expression was a
23 composite state. Another expression was a cantonised state. But they
24 all meant the same thing. They meant three states within a state, a
25 non-unitary state. So he says:
1 "... there are two possibilities:
2 "... either a confederal Bosnia or (2) divide Bosnia-Herzegovina
3 into three parts, Serb to Serbia
4 and that's a quote, "patch," "as in medieval times."
5 Dr. Tudjman was a historian, so he thought in very long terms.
6 But he says:
7 "But now, after the war," meaning after the war has begun,
8 "that's academic."
9 But what this indicates is that both the Bosnian Serbs and the
10 Bosnian Croats as well as the leaders of their mother countries, namely,
12 would be to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbs and Croats.
13 Q. And finally, Ambassador, I want to turn your attention to a
14 meeting with President Kucan on the 26th --
15 A. Excuse me, could you talk a bit louder, please.
16 Q. Sure, I'm sorry.
17 I wanted to turn your attention to a meeting with Mr. Kucan on
18 the 26th of January, 1993. That's P790 at page 17, and it's ICFY book
19 number 7, a meeting at 10.00. And I direct your attention to
20 pages 4 and 5 of that meeting.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Yes. I'd like to ask you about --
23 MR. TIEGER: We just lost the page. Thank you.
24 Q. I'd like to direct your attention to the entry that begins:
25 "Your plan is very much based on principles ..."
1 But first I'd like to ask you to explain who Mr. Kucan was and
2 then explain what he's conveying during the course of that meeting.
3 A. Milan Kucan was then the president of Slovenia. He had been a
4 leader of the Communist Party, a young leader, before the war, and it was
5 he who, in 1990, led his country, Slovenia, into a vote on independence.
6 And that vote was positive and -- followed by Croatia, and that led --
7 that happened directly before the fighting. He was a very intelligent
8 man and a pretty keen observer of events in Yugoslavia. Everybody knew
9 that Slovenia
10 of the country. So he carried some weight in spite of the small size of
12 And here he says to us:
13 "Your plan -- " and here he's referring to the
14 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, "Your plan is very much based on principles. The
15 ethnic structure of 1981 on which your plan or Cutileiro's earlier is
16 based is overtaken by event," OBE, overtaken by events, "because of
17 cleansing, et cetera." Meaning the ethnic cleansing.
18 And he continues to say:
19 "It is better to take the existing situation as a basis for the
21 And he continues by elaborating on that point:
22 "You should adopt Tudjman's and Milosevic's idea of, (A), a
23 transitional government followed by, (B), partition of Bosnia and
25 And he finishes that statement by saying, and I'm quoting:
1 "The existing reality will win over your principles."
2 And, indeed, that was correct, because the Vance-Owen Peace Plan
3 never was accepted, and subsequent peace plans, of which there were four
4 or five, ended in the Dayton
5 the country in half as between Republika Srpska and a Muslim-Croat
7 Q. And does Mr. Kucan continue making his point at the top of the
8 next page, Ambassador?
9 A. Yes. He goes on in the same vein.
10 "I already told you, Mr. Vance, of my conversation, a very long
11 time ago," I left the word "ago" out, "with President Tudjman in which he
12 said the only solution was partition based on large-scale population
13 transfers. The war has accomplished this process. Discussions between
14 Serbs and Croatians are continuing on partition. This will create two
15 new problems with the Muslims. One, drug pedaling and criminality; and
16 two, Muslim terrorism in Europe
17 "Is a compromise possible ..." this is Kucan asking himself
19 "Is a compromise possible 'between principles and reality'
20 preserving your ethical approach?"
21 And he continues:
22 "The answer could be found only if it were Yugoslavia alone and
23 not an issue for the Eastern Europeans and Russia. Look at Hungary
24 it's large minority in Slovakia
25 just like Tudjman towards this -- towards Serbs with their own Hungarian
1 minority. Look at Russia
2 Q. And, Mr. Ambassador, was Mr. Kucan's relating of his discussion
3 with President Tudjman his urging of acceptance of the reality effected
4 by ethnic cleansing consistent with or a reflection of the same
5 discussions you were having with the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
9 MR. TIEGER: That concludes my direct examination, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: I note again that LiveNote is experiencing another
11 technical difficulty.
12 So I propose to take another adjournment --
13 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, are you ready to resume, or you wish
15 to take a break right now and continue -- start your cross-examination
16 after the break?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Whatever you would like,
18 Your Excellency. Since I haven't been given Monday, I don't mind either
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE KWON: No. Our ruling was for you to start and do as far
22 as what you can do today.
23 Given the technical difficulties, Ambassador, we are going to
24 take a break again. We'll break for 25 minutes. We'll resume at quarter
1 --- Recess taken at 4.48 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 5.16 p.m.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, to be just clear, we never meant to
4 limit your cross-examination at all. I didn't mean to say to you to
5 conclude your cross during today, far from it. The Chamber is not minded
6 to limit your cross-examination as long as you stick to relevant
7 questions. So with that, let's start your cross-examination. But can I
8 request to you to try to conclude your evidence by the end of next week,
9 given various logistical problems.
10 Let's start.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I'll
12 do my best to do that, although the examination in chief raised many more
13 topics than we had expected, and therefore the Defence will have many
14 more documents to go through.
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
16 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, good afternoon.
17 A. Good afternoon, Dr. Karadzic.
18 Q. I should like to thank you first and foremost for coming with the
19 will to help us to put together the truth about the Balkan crisis and to
20 especially thank you for placing at our disposal your valuable diaries
21 and bringing them with you, your note-books. And I must agree that I
22 will be able to agree with them far more readily than with some of your
23 explanations and thoughts -- or, rather, the explanations and thoughts
24 that Mr. Tieger, through his leading questions, managed to elicit from
25 you. And I did not wish to interrupt him in his examination in chief.
1 Now, do you agree that it will be more important for the Defence,
2 and that it is indeed more important for the Defence what you saw and
3 recorded at -- contemporaneously than what you thought and concluded
4 later on?
5 A. On the whole, I would say yes.
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Now, may I ask you a question now.
7 How long did you spend preparing for this testimony and the testimony in
8 the Krajisnik trial -- or, rather, how long did you spend in the proofing
9 sessions with Mr. Tieger?
10 A. It was a couple of days on each.
11 Q. Thank you. Well, I regret all the more so for not agreeing to
12 meet with me, because we could have cut down on the time we shall need in
13 clearing up certain dilemmas, but let's continue.
14 I'd like you to help me now understand the role and the capacity
15 and mandate of an ambassador such as yourself with all the repute that
16 you have and the career you followed. Do you agree to that?
17 A. Yes. An ambassador normally represents his country to another
18 country. That would be a bilateral relationship. Given the fact that in
19 our modern world there are many multilateral organisations, ambassadors
20 also represent their countries at these multilateral organisations such
21 as the United Nations, which is a universal organisation; the
22 Organisation of Islamic Conference; EU, that sort of thing. In all
23 cases, I would say, the ambassador is to represent either his country's
24 position, or if he has some other title in another organisation, he would
25 represent the -- that other organisation.
1 In the current matter at hand, Mr. Vance and I were appointed by
2 the Secretary-General of the United Nations. He is guided by the
3 membership of the UN, and in the cases of maintenance and peace and
4 security by the supreme organ, namely, the United Nations
5 Security Council. So we were responsible to him and through him to the
6 United Nations Security Council.
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Now, performing that function, did
8 you represent your country to a certain measure as well?
9 A. I would say no, we did not. That may seem odd to you, but
10 Mr. Vance and I, to the maximum degree possible, sought to carry out the
11 mandate that was given us by the Secretary-General. Of course, we spoke
12 with other Americans the way we spoke with everybody who was interested
13 in the matter, but at no point did we represent purely American
15 Q. Thank you. Now, when you were the political advisor to the
16 Commander-In-Chief of the NATO forces for the Mediterranean, when you
17 occupied that post, did you represent your country?
18 A. Yes. Of course, I was in a command that was headed by the
19 United States, and I was there as his political advisor in Naples
20 a responsibility also to his staff, which was a NATO staff.
21 Q. Thank you very much. Tell me now, please, during the mandate
22 with Mr. Vance, did you inform your country and report back to your
23 country or just to the United Nations? And during your mandate in the
24 NATO command, did you inform both your country or only the NATO command?
25 A. During the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, we reported only to
1 the United Nations. When I was political advisor to the
2 NATO Commander-In-Chief in the Mediterranean
3 reported, as a matter of course, to Brussels
4 because he was, to use the jargon of the day, twin-hatted. He was a
5 US Navy admiral, and he held a NATO command.
6 I did more advising than reporting, but he reported to both, to
7 the navy on to NATO.
8 Q. Thank you. I'd like to explain why I'm asking you these
9 questions. It's because we have difficulty in accessing certain
10 documents. The response we get from NATO is always that they belong to
11 Member States
12 that at the recommendation of the Trial Chamber they will co-operate, but
13 I would like to know, and it's important for me to know, where the
14 information went.
15 Now, can you tell me in this case, the conference on Yugoslavia
16 who did you receive your instructions from?
17 A. Well, I assume you're asking about the International Conference
18 on the former Yugoslavia
19 Instructions? We didn't receive any instructions, at no time.
20 Q. It relates to both conferences. Does that then mean that the
21 ambassadors, the mediators, had a free rein, completely free rein, not
22 only in finding ways and means of solving the crisis, but with respect to
23 the results of the crisis, that they had every creative opportunity to do
24 what they liked and say, "Yes, that will be solution"? Because as I
25 understand it, an ambassador is usually there to implement the policy of
1 his own country, and his creativeness is viewed in tactics and in finding
2 ways and means of arriving at a solution.
3 So in the case of the conference on Yugoslavia, both Carrington's
4 conference and the Vance-Owen conference, did you have that creative
5 freedom with respect to an ultimate solution, or were you duty-bound and
6 responsible to someone?
7 A. I can't speak for Lord Carrington, although having observed his
8 conference on more than one occasion I would say that he was probably
9 given carte blanche by the EC, the European Community, to develop the
10 plans for the former Yugoslavia
11 accepted by five republics and rejected only by one republic, only by
13 With regard to the International Conference on the
14 former Yugoslavia
15 so to speak. Again, as I said, they reported to the Secretary-General
16 and to the Security Council, and their reports are a matter of record.
17 They were all public. There were no private reports. And they worked
18 inside a larger group that was a steering committee to the conference,
19 but it met only rarely and had no practical effect on the course of the
20 conference. Their job was to continue the work of the Carrington
21 conference to the degree possible but mainly to focus on the conflict in
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And to that end, all the negotiations with you,
23 Dr. Karadzic, and with the other parties were directed.
24 Q. I believe that we are privileged to have you here today, because
25 you are living history, as it were, of the diplomatic relations between
1 the West and the Slav countries. Would you agree with that?
2 A. Well, I played a modest role, but I would agree with that up to a
4 Q. Because of your vast experience with Russia, the Soviet Union,
5 and Yugoslavia
6 Mr. Vance?
7 A. I suspect that was part of the reason. The other reason was that
8 he knew I had done quite a bit of negotiating in my day and I also had
9 worked for Secretary Vance previously, and I'm sure he consulted
10 Secretary Vance before he called on me. And so it was a compatible
12 Q. Thank you. As you said yourself, throughout your career you were
13 a negotiator. In relation to that, I would like to ask you something.
14 Can we agree that in true negotiations, sincere negotiations that are
15 carried out bona fide, no one ever knows what the exact outcome of such
16 negotiations are going to be. Is the outcome always uncertain? There is
17 always a scope of solutions that may be reached in the process.
18 A. That would really depend on the nature of the negotiation. If,
19 for example, two parties come together, two states, to sign an agreement
20 on telecommunications, one can be pretty sure that they'll come away with
21 the agreement.
22 If, on the other hand, one has a large multilateral conference
23 such as the recent one on climate change, we all know that there was
24 great doubt that it would succeed. In advance there was doubt. There
25 was also some confusion as to the processes that would be followed, and
1 the net result was no result whatsoever. So it varies a good deal on the
2 type of issue that's before the conference, before the negotiators.
3 Of course, it's important that all sides negotiate honestly and
4 honourably. That does not always happen, but it's important that it
6 Our task at the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia
7 was, as I've noted, primarily Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a washing brief on
8 the other countries -- parts of Yugoslavia
9 countries, other parts of Yugoslavia
10 groups at the international conference. The principal one was on
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was headed by a Finnish diplomat who had been
12 seconded to the United Nations by the name of Martti Ahtisaari. A very
13 good man. He later became president of Finland.
14 There was a Working Group, as I mentioned earlier on,
15 humanitarian affairs headed by Madam Sadako Ogata, the UN --
16 United Nations High Commission for Refugees. There was a Working Group
17 on national minorities which mostly dealt with Kosovo and Macedonian
18 issues. That was a Working Group on confidence in security building
19 measures largely between Belgrade
20 Working Group on military arrangements which dealt mainly with Bosnia
21 tangentially with Croatia
22 UN peacekeeping force in Croatia
23 So that was the procedure that was followed at the international
24 conference, and you were able to see that since you were an active
25 participant in the conference.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I'll go back to the question of
2 negotiations. Now I'd like us to look at something else.
3 Can we agree that the basis of the Yugoslav crisis was the
4 misunderstanding between Serbia
5 between them, because as you said yourself, Slovenia and Macedonia
6 obtained independence easily. Although the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 was far more drastic in the way in which it was ultimately materialised,
8 the core of the Yugoslav crisis was the Serbian-Croatian conflict. Would
9 you agree to that?
10 A. Yes, that's correct.
11 Q. Thank you. I'd like to discuss the negotiations a bit more. Do
12 we agree that in sincere negotiations there have to be concessions made
13 on both sides unless we are dealing with an ultimatum, a
14 take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum, or one that's more drastic than that?
15 A. It's normal for the sides in a negotiation to express at the
16 outset their extreme demands, and then there are what the diplomats
17 routinely call fall-back positions, and that, depending on negotiation,
18 may lead to a fruitful compromise, but it may not.
19 You will recall that one of the V.I. Lenin's most quoted and
20 favourite expressions was that of the quote "Rotten compromise," and that
21 was Soviet policy for many years. But on the whole, it would be expected
22 that the sides would compromise since it would be expected that each
23 would put forth his desiderata, his extreme position, so to speak.
24 Q. Thank you. That is quite an exhaustive answer.
25 Now I would like us to look at the following: From that point of
1 view, does a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum discredit the party that comes
2 out with that ultimatum?
3 A. Take-it-or-leave-it ultimata are very rare in conferences and
4 usually do not mean what they say. I can give you an example,
5 Dr. Karadzic, that you yourself are aware of well. The presentation in
6 the summer of 1944 of the Contact Group map, which was presented to the
7 Bosnian Serb side particularly on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and you
8 chose not to take it or to leave it, and they negotiated with you on the
9 borders of Republika Srpska. So that one can't really answer that
10 question in the abstract.
11 There are times, at the end of a war, for example, when one
12 country surrenders to the other. But even there, even there, at the very
13 highest level, at the most important instances in world history, there
14 have been changes.
15 For example, President Roosevelt, during World War II, announced
16 at the Casablanca
18 Unconditional surrender was the condition. Well, Germany did surrender
19 unconditionally, but the Japanese government, in the summer of 1945, was
20 negotiating and laid down a condition after the bombings of Hiroshima
22 be maintained, which certainly would not have happened without their
23 insistence on it. And the US
24 stay on the throne.
25 So even at the height of World War II, an unconditional surrender
1 was a conditional surrender.
2 So there are very few take-it-or-leave-it examples that one can
3 find. Indeed, the major criticism of diplomats in every country is that
4 they are too eager to compromise with their opposite numbers. That's a
5 routine criticism.
6 Sorry to give you a long answer, but you're asking very important
8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Do you recall that the
9 European Community plan within Lord Carrington's conference in the autumn
10 of 1991 was offered to the republics, Serbia included, on the basis of
11 take it or leave it?
12 A. Yes, that's correct, but it was also negotiated. It's a very
13 good example of what I just said, that the offer of take it or leave it
14 is usually not -- not, in fact, the reality.
15 Q. Thank you. And do you remember that practically none of the
16 Serbian proposals were built into the take-it-or-leave-it proposal that
17 was on the table in 1991?
18 A. They were added to the proposal after Lord Carrington heard all
19 the parties at the end of October. And more than that, the Commission of
20 Arbitrage, the so-called Badinter Commission, the Commission d'Arbitrage,
21 which was appointed formally by the European Community to adjudicate
22 questions -- the legal questions regarding the possible dissolution of
25 It also -- it also passed on the question of which of the four
1 republics that had asked for independence were -- should be granted
2 independence; and the four, of course, were Slovenia, Croatia
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia
4 say, the commission, the Badinter Commission, decided that two of the
5 four republics were worthy of recognition by the European Community. And
6 those two were Macedonia
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia
9 The reason that they gave in either case was the following: For
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina, they felt that the will of the people had not yet
11 been tested, and therefore they said that there ought to be an expression
12 of the will of the people before the country was recognised by the
13 European Community.
14 In the case of Croatia
15 and government did not grant the Serb minority in Croatian enough
16 minority rights and that until those minority rights were granted to the
17 Serb people in Croatia
18 the objections of the Badinter Commission were met and those two
19 countries were recognised eventually.
20 So they were not take-it-or-leave-it proposals. They were vetted
21 by the Arbitration Commission, and action was taken on the basis of the
22 decisions of the Arbitration Commission. They were not
24 Q. Thank you very much. As for the Badinter Commission, did they
25 come to their conclusion on the basis of the state in which the state of
2 A. Excuse me, Dr. Karadzic, which conclusion are you commenting on,
3 the conclusion on recognition or the conclusion on the -- on the
4 condition of Yugoslavia
5 The Badinter Commission, in an important avis, an opinion, said -
6 and this was the fall, early winter of 1991 - that the state of
8 of dissolution, and that the Yugoslav claim, basically the Serb claim
9 that the declarations of independence by the four republics that we've
10 mentioned, the Serb claim that this was wholly illegal and could be --
11 was unjustified, that that claim was not correct because the state was,
12 in fact, dissolving.
13 Q. Thank you. Indeed we'll have to be going back to that yet again,
14 because the distinguished professor Cassese presented a different
15 opinion. As a professor, that is, not as a judge of this court. And he
16 pointed out that these secessions were unlawful and revolutionary.
17 However, I would like to ask you something else.
18 Since Badinter stated that the unresolved questions of minorities
19 were the reason why Croatia
20 granted, apart from the fact that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not
21 consider themselves to be a minority but a constituent people, did the
22 situation improve from the moment when Badinter reached his conclusion up
23 until the moment when independence was recognised?
24 A. Yes, it did. The relevant articles were contained in chapter 2
25 of the draft treaty that Lord Carrington's conference had prepared and
1 presented to the six parties. The Croatians, subsequent to the
2 Badinter Commission's decision, recognised and put into effect that
3 chapter 2, and that solved the problem. And it also was accepted by the
4 leadership - I should say most of the leadership - of the Serbs in
6 So, yes, the answer is they did put into effect the shortfall.
7 They made up the shortfall that the Badinter Commission had pointed out.
8 Q. Mr. Ambassador, you confirmed just now that Lord Carrington, in
9 his draft, rectified that. However, do you think that these countries,
10 these republics, members of the Yugoslav Federation, Croatia, Slovenia
11 sorry, Croatia
12 Serbs up until the moment of recognition?
13 A. Well, it depended on which republic you were talking about.
15 Q. Slovenia
16 A. I recall, by the way, Dr. Karadzic, that at an earlier meeting
17 you said to us that Slovenia
18 In any case, as I say, it varied from republic to republic.
19 Twelve per cent of the population of Croatia was Serb. So that was not a
20 huge number, but it was a significant minority, although the Serbs are
21 constituent people. In Bosnia
22 less than one-third, of the population was Serb, who played an important
23 role historically, we all know that, in Bosnia.
24 The situation varied from state to state. I don't think it's
25 possible to say anything more than that. In Macedonia, for example,
1 there was no problem, no fighting, no dislocations. President Gligorov
2 eased the JNA and the Yugoslav authorities out of Macedonia without any
3 fighting, which was pretty much a surprise to everybody, because most
4 people thought that Macedonia
5 told us it would. And that was the majority view, but it did not happen.
6 So the situation was really different in each republic.
7 Q. Your memory is great. However, do you agree that in the case of
9 conflicts were possible not because of the Serbs but because of the large
10 Albanian minority there and that afterwards, indeed, these conflicts did
11 break out. Was that not the case?
12 A. Yes, that's correct. The -- there was no difficulty in the early
13 years as between Serb and Macedonian, but afterwards, yes, there was a
14 problem with the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia.
15 Q. It was a short war that ended with the Ohrid Agreement; right?
16 A. Whether it was a war or fighting, I wouldn't charge; but, in any
17 case, there was fighting and it was a conflict situation. And it didn't
18 last very long, but there was some fighting at the much later
19 stage - this was the late 1990s - as between Macedonian and the ethnic
20 Albanian minority.
21 Q. Thank you. Again, your memory was extraordinary, and you
22 recalled my position on Slovenia
23 Do you remember that I wrote a letter to President Kucan, and
24 this letter was made public as well? In it I asked him the following:
25 To have Slovenia
1 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in accordance with the
2 constitution, because that would chart the course for all the rest,
3 rather than resort to a one-sided secession. Do you remember that?
4 A. I don't remember that, Dr. Karadzic. That would have been
5 probably in early 1991, before I was involved in the Yugoslav matter.
6 But I can believe you wrote that letter.
7 Q. Thank you. Then we'll try to find that letter. Had Slovenia
8 gone to parliament and become independent lawfully, it would have been
9 easier for us.
10 Do you agree that the Yugoslav authorities, the federal
11 authorities, started building a legislation on the basis of which the
12 republics could attain independence?
13 A. Well, the constitution of 1974 set forth some general principles
14 as regards self-determination of peoples, "samoopredeljenje," you know it
15 well, I'm sure. The argument, as I recall it in 1991, hinged on the
16 difference or the alleged difference between self-determination of
17 peoples and self-determination of republics. I was never involved in
18 that argument because it was the early years of the conflict with
20 of the arguments on both sides, namely, the difference between the
21 republics and the Narod, the people. Or the alleged difference, because
22 the parties disagreed on that. All of the Yugoslav parties disagreed on
24 Q. Thank you. Now, do you agree that in 1945, 1943 with AVNOJ, the
25 antifascist organisation, that there were five constituent peoples of
2 there were five fissures and that in the 1960s the Muslim community was
3 recognised as being one of the peoples of Yugoslavia and that the sixth
4 flame was added to the coat of arms?
5 A. Yes, that's correct. And the Bosnian Muslims, as we know, were
6 recognised as a nation or a people, as a Narod, in 1974. I believe I'm
7 correct in that.
8 Q. Politically I believe that that was in the 1960s, but in
9 constitutional terms I'm sure you're right. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
10 Now, I'd like to go back a bit and ask you to help us to
11 understand the nature of the negotiations. Do you agree that the
12 negotiating parties observed one another, assessed one another, their
13 determination, their strengths and weaknesses, their readiness to accept
14 and concede or to refuse, and to size each other up, if I can put it that
16 A. Yes, I think you put it accurately and well.
17 Q. Thank you. Now, was it -- is it customary that during
18 negotiations the negotiating parties try and boast and present themselves
19 to be stronger than they in fact are and that they use political speech
20 and atropic [as interpreted] language and linguistics and skills of that
21 kind to make an impression on the opposite side?
22 A. Well, it's hard to give a definitive answer on that, but I would
23 say in my own experience that happens very rarely. It does happen, but
24 it happens very rarely, because let us assume that party A to a
25 negotiation goes out and makes a big speech somewhere or goes back to his
1 home country and has a big crowd cheering. That sort of thing does not
2 impress the other side very much. It might even have a negative effect
3 on the other side.
4 So I think that what you described does happen, but it doesn't
5 happen very often. Certainly not in serious negotiations.
6 Q. How would you -- or, rather, would you agree that the party who
7 very early on and very quickly demonstrates a readiness to concede, does
8 it in that way show up its weakness?
9 A. I wouldn't agree with that, Dr. Karadzic, because a sincere
10 political negotiation does not depend so much on bravado or expressions
11 of strength. A party that agrees quite early might agree because it's
12 the weaker side; it might agree because it thinks it's getting a better
13 deal from the negotiations than it could otherwise. So there are various
14 reasons that parties concede a position.
15 As I said, it's -- it's common that parties to a negotiation
16 will express their extreme positions at the outset, knowing that they
17 will have a fallback position at some time, and that's what the
18 negotiation is all about. So I think that's more the case than that
19 parties comes in and concede at the outset. Unless, of course, we're
20 talking about a wartime situation where a defeated party comes to sign a
21 surrender agreement. In that case, there's not much negotiation,
22 although even there there's negotiation.
23 After World War I, the First World War, ended on
24 November 11th, 1918
25 treaty, the Treaty of Versailles, was negotiated for six months in 1919
1 and signed on Vidovdan, June 28th, 1919
2 six months after the conclusion of hostilities. That goes to show that
3 there are many ways to skin a cat.
4 Q. Thank you. And how would you assess a negotiating side whose
5 proposals had been accepted one day and the next day it raises the price,
6 ups the ante, as sincere or insincere?
7 A. Again, Dr. Karadzic, it's hard to give a definitive example,
8 because the proposals of the side might have been informal. They might
9 have been presented by persons who were only partially authorised to make
10 those proposals.
11 It's pretty common for proposals to be accepted and still
12 negotiated afterwards. That's why most negotiations take a long time.
13 It's an arduous process, negotiation. And when the matter is a serious
14 matter, the negotiations are more arduous.
15 Q. But you would agree, would you not, that once an agreement -- an
16 agreement has been reached, it should be adhered to the next day?
17 A. Well, if it has been formally signed and acknowledged, I think it
18 probably should be. But there are many cases where parties to a
19 negotiation, where countries have taken back their signatures after
20 they've given them, that it's very common, unfortunately.
21 Q. Countries like that, do they then shoulder the burden for the
22 responsibilities that ensue, the consequences that ensue?
23 A. By and large they -- they could. Of course, it still would
24 depend on the individual terms of the negotiation. In the hypothetical
25 case that you're giving, one would have to know more specifically what
1 aspect of the agreement party A had signed and then unsigned and then
2 what effect that had on the others. It's a bit hard to answer that in
3 the abstract.
4 Q. Thank you. I assume that negotiating is not a simple matter or
5 not a piece of cake, as the English would put it, and if so, would it be
6 a good idea if the negotiators have a certain amount of education in that
7 respect, that they have been educated and trained in the matter of
9 A. Well, there are many facets of negotiation and many qualities
10 that good negotiators should have. Ideally they should know their
11 subject matter. They should be good judges of the parties. They should
12 be, in some cases, impartial. Other cases, they, of course, would be
14 I think it's rare that most negotiators are actually trained in
15 negotiating. If they're lawyers or judges, they have, of course, legal
16 training and experience, and that's why many Secretaries of State in the
17 United States are lawyers. Mr. Vance was one, and many others. Not all
18 of them. Henry Kissinger was not a lawyer -- is not a lawyer. But legal
19 training gives a very strong advantage, and I think that's why it
20 happens. But whether one can say that every negotiation and every
21 negotiator has been trained for negotiation or should be trained for
22 negotiation, I think that's really an unanswerable point. It's a valid
23 point, but one cannot answer it Yes or No.
24 Q. Thank you. I meant negotiators on behalf of parties, but I'm
25 very thankful to you. You had in mind mediators, but I accept your
1 answer, and I'd like to fine tune it a little and expand it.
2 You consider that a mediator must be impartial, respect the other
3 parties, and so forth; but would you agree that it would be highly
4 detrimental, very harmful, if one party, rightly or not, considered that
5 a mediator, an intermediary, is not impartial, that he is strongly bias
6 in favour of one side?
7 A. That certainly would have a negative effect on negotiations.
8 Q. Now, if both sides were conscious of that or though that way,
9 would the side that is favourised be encouraged to raise the price and
10 make extreme -- call for extreme conditions and act more freely than the
11 other side, the side against whom a mediator -- where the mediator is
12 perceived as being biased, rightly or wrongly so?
13 A. That could be the case. I would not say it would always be case,
14 but it could be the case.
15 Q. Thank you. I'd like to go back to your enormous experience now
16 in our parts, in our part of the world. According to the information we
17 know of you as a sportsman, you went down our rivers, the Drina, in a
18 kayak, and in all wars and crises these rivers and places proved to be
19 important events -- where important political events took place, and also
20 war events; is that right?
21 A. Well, I did paddle. I was, in my younger days, an ardent kayaker
22 and paddled on many rivers in Europe
23 on the Ardeche and on the Black Drina, as we called it, in the
25 Q. Thank you. And after that, you took place -- you took part in
1 quelling the Cuban crisis, and then you came to the Yugoslav crisis.
2 Before that, you were a high-ranking political advisor to the
3 Commander-In-Chief of NATO for the Mediterranean
4 monitor Marsal Tito's activities, who, at that time, was 83 years old and
5 it was quite clear that the biological clock was ticking for him.
6 Now, do you agree that these were two very important years in
7 Yugoslav history?
8 A. You mean from 1973 to 1975? Yes, I would say they were important
9 years, because the constitution of 1974 was adopted, and with the
10 marshal's increasing age, the entire Yugoslav domestic scene was
11 shifting. Power was going towards the individual republics and away from
13 Q. Thank you. May I remind you that just before your taking up that
14 position, the crisis in Croatia
15 secessionist movement, had been completed, which Tito solved by replacing
16 the entire Croatian leadership, and some generals were given prison
17 terms, amongst whom was President Tudjman, Tudjman who later became
19 A. Yes, I was aware of that, as an outsider.
20 Q. And then one year later, President Tito, as was customary with
21 the Communists, rightly or for purposes of symmetry, replaced the
22 leadership of Serbia
23 neo-liberals -- or, rather, liberals. Do you remember that?
24 A. I don't recall that specifically, but I'm prepared to believe
25 that it happened.
1 Q. There was less of a hullabaloo over that because the conflict in
3 situation in which you have Croatia
4 leadership, an enormous number of leaders, do you agree that Bosnia
6 old, experienced, and respected leaders?
7 A. I suppose that could be the case, although in the case of Bosnia
8 as we both know, Alija Izetbegovic was also gaoled in the early 1970s,
9 not because of secession or problems with the Communist Party as much as
10 it was because of the Islamic Declaration that he had authored and
11 participated in. But I think as a general matter, the fact that the two
12 principal republics of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia,
13 namely Serbia
14 at the party level probably did leave the smaller republics with a bit
15 for -- a bit more room for manoeuvre than they might have had otherwise.
16 Q. You probably noted the rise of the Muslim leadership, for
17 example, Dzemal Bijedic, a case in point, who became prime minister, a
18 federal prime minister. Hamdija Pozderac, another case in point, who
19 became the absolute master of Bosnia
20 Branko Mikulic in Bosnia-Herzegovina held all power in their hands. One
21 was a Muslim, the other in -- was a Croat. And so the Socialist Republic
22 of Bosnia-Herzegovina was being translated and interpreted as an
23 independent undertaking by Branko and Hamdija.
24 A. Excuse me, I -- is that a question?
25 Q. The question is, Do you remember the rise of the Muslim
1 leadership after that crisis? Dzemal Bijedic who became a federal prime
2 minister and Hamdija Pozderac who was the absolute master of Bosnia
3 A. Yes, I do remember that. Not well, but I remember it.
4 Q. Mr. Ambassador, at that time from 1973 to 1975, did you happen to
5 notice somebody else, one of the other actors in the Yugoslav crisis of
6 the 1990s? Any other name come to mind? For example, me. Did you know
7 about me -- of me?
8 A. I apologise in saying I did not know of you at that time. Were
9 you perhaps thinking of Fikret Abdic and his role in Bosnia in 1973, 4,
10 and 5? Because I do recall hearing about Abdic.
11 Q. Yes, thank you. You're quite right. He was also one of the
12 actors, one of the participants, but more in economic terms and economic
14 I don't mind you not knowing of me, because after 1968 I was a
15 silent dissident and delved in medicine, but did you know about
16 Izetbegovic, for instance?
17 A. Only his name and that he was either the author or the co-author
18 of the Islamic Declaration.
19 Q. You're quite right. The Islamic Declaration was written before
20 your arrival in 1970, but Mr. Izetbegovic was tried and his associates
21 were tried with him in 1983, but we'll come back to that. Thank you for
22 mentioning it and bringing the subject up.
23 But this is what I'd like to ask you now: Are your diaries in
24 existence, what you noticed, records of that time when you were the
25 political advisor to the commander of NATO?
1 A. I did not keep any diaries at that time. I was not negotiating
2 anything, so I had no reason to keep a note-book or a journal.
3 Q. Thank you. That's unfortunate, because you are a keen observer
4 and always document things very well.
5 Now, Mr. Ambassador, at the time already, could you feel -- did
6 you feel what was going to happen to Yugoslavia? Did you have a
7 presentiment? Do you know when the seeds of Yugoslavia's downfall were
8 sown, because we saw the fruits of it? But was it the constitution of
9 1974 when the seeds were sown, would you say? And your opinion would be
10 very valuable. And I'm sure with your great experience you could
11 pinpoint that time when the seeds were sown.
12 A. Well, thank you, Dr. Karadzic. I'm sure there are as many
13 opinions as there are people on that subject, but my own view was and is
14 that the adoption of the constitution of 1974 basically decentralised but
15 did not democratise Tito's Yugoslavia
16 the Communist parties of the republics. In that sense, it decentralised.
17 But the modus operandi was still dictatorial. And I think that was a
18 mistake, to put it mildly, on the part of Marsal Tito.
19 And the other fact that led to the disillusion was that after
20 Marsal Tito's death in May 1980 and with the gradual improvement of
21 Soviet/American relations after Mr. Gorbachev came to power in the 1980s,
22 that Yugoslavia
23 because, as we all know, after the break between Stalin and Tito in 1948,
25 nonaligned movement. And this led to quite a lot of contact with the
1 West and good relations. And those good relations were not just
2 political; they were also military and economic. If I might give you
3 just one really extreme example but a good one:
4 In 1991 when general -- when Secretary Vance and I first sat down
5 with General Kadijevic, the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, in
6 October 1991, he told us that he had been trained in the United States
7 Fort Leavenworth
8 Army. So that gives you an example that the Chief of Staff of the
9 Yugoslav Army, the JNA, had been trained in the United States.
10 And on the economic front, the largest debtor to the World Bank
11 from 1945 to 1990 was not some underdeveloped country that you might name
12 or some developing country, it was Yugoslavia
13 obviously with the help of the Western powers, was granted enormous loans
14 from the international monetary authorities, which obviously helped the
15 economy and therefore assisted Tito in his rule. So that there were many
16 reasons that Yugoslavia
17 the end of World War II till roughly the mid-1980s, but then a decline
18 set in politically, economically. The country did decline.
19 Q. If I understood you correctly, that coincides with a lessening of
21 of the improved relations between the blocs; right?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. Thank you. In my introductory statement, I said that Yugoslavia
24 came into being and disappeared in accordance with the interests of some
25 countries from the West. Most often it was the European countries of the
1 West. In 1918, Yugoslavia
2 proposed by the London Agreement, so that there would not be a Croatia
3 and a Slovenia
4 stronger. In 1945, Yugoslavia
5 In 1991, Yugoslavia
6 What do you say to that thesis?
7 A. I don't agree with that. Without rehearsing 80 years of history,
8 touching the highlights, I would say that Yugoslavia was created at the
9 behest of the Yugoslavs. It was not, for example, a product of
12 The hope that the southern Slav peoples would some day unite goes
13 back to the mid-19th century when it was put forth largely by Croatian
14 journalists, artists, thinkers. But when the republic was formed in
15 1919, and it was not a republic. The original name, as we know, was the
16 Kingdom of Serbs
17 given to the country by the King in 1929 to avoid emphasising the
18 ethnic - excuse me - to avoid emphasising the ethnic aspect.
20 nothing to do with the situation in 1919, since it had just been defeated
21 in the first war, the Great War. In 1945 -- well, 1945 was preceded by
22 the AVNOJ republic, in 1943, declared by Tito in Jajce, incidentally.
23 Jajce was the place where Tito's Yugoslavia
24 was a -- entirely a Yugoslav operation, to be sure. It depended on the
25 defeat of Germany
1 their country, although it has to be admitted they also fought each
2 other. We had the fascist Ustasha and the Partisans and the
3 Serb Chetniks all fighting at the same time, fighting the Germans or
4 fighting each other. So that was a complicated situation. But Tito's
5 rule was pretty consistent until his death in 1980, and we've discussed
6 the situation after that.
7 I really don't see Germany
8 it, except that in the fall of 1991, during the Croatian business,
10 example, it said it would recognise Croatia regardless of what the rest
11 of the European Community did. That is correct. At that time, Germany
12 played an important role, but that was the only time.
13 Based on my experience at the conference on Bosnia
14 saw no particular German role nor any particular German interest in
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia was always their baby.
16 Q. Thank you. Since then, the popular song Danke Deutschland has
17 been well known in the context of Croatia. Germany did not figure
18 prominently for as long as things moved the way they wanted them to move,
19 but if the USA
20 direction, then Germany
21 the European Community. It's Warren Christopher, President Clinton,
22 Henry Kissinger, the presidents of France that speak of this. It is not
23 me saying that. Even some British prominent figures say that. Germany
24 was assessed by them as a generator of the Yugoslav crisis and ultimately
25 the party that caused the catastrophe because they were in favour of the
1 premature recognition of the republics. However, we'll go back to that.
2 Are you familiar with the position -- positions, rather, of these
3 persons that I mentioned in the context of Germany's role?
4 A. Not in any detail, but I'm aware of their position and of the
5 German position.
6 Q. Thank you very much. I would like to go back to the very
7 interesting thing that you said. Instead of having one dictatorship
8 through the constitution of 1974, we got six dictatorships. Did I
9 understand you correctly?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you mentioned that President Tito did quite
12 a bit within the framework of Yugoslavia
13 was not exactly being carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you recall
14 that the Macedonian statesman Lazar Kolisevski, after the first crises in
15 Kosovo in 1981, disclosed that it had been a big mistake to pursue a
16 domestic policy based on the motto of a weak Serbia, meaning a strong
18 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
19 Q. Do you know that after 1974, tens and hundreds of thousands of
20 Serbs and Croats left Bosnia
21 republican level? Serbs and Croats, especially the intelligentsia,
22 artists, intellectuals, Croats primarily to Zagreb and Croatia
23 primarily to Belgrade
24 A. I've heard that said, Dr. Karadzic, but I, frankly, wonder
25 whether that's accurate. I recall -- we all know, for example, that in
1 1984 the Winter Olympics, a major, major international event, were held
2 in Sarajevo
3 consent of almost everybody in Sarajevo
4 occasion, an Olympics. So I don't really have any answer to your
5 question, but I rather doubt it in some respects.
6 Q. Thank you. And if I were to show you statistics or if I were to
7 give you the names of prominent individuals who fled from Bosnia
8 practically, or if I were to tell you that what happened was that the
9 then-authorities of Bosnia
10 instance, then you would probably have a different view of that, wouldn't
12 A. Well, of course, I would believe you.
13 Q. Thank you. May I remind you of something that is called
14 "gerrymandering." It was named after Jerry Mander, who resorted to
15 electoral engineering, making it possible for a smaller party to win an
16 election, although that could not have been possible in natural
17 conditions, as it were. Are you aware of the phenomenon?
18 A. Yes, I'm well aware since gerrymandering was an American
19 invention in the 18th century, and it goes on to this day, unfortunately.
20 Q. And I were to tell you, Mr. Ambassador, that the Bosnian Serbs,
21 over the past -- or, rather, over the 20 years before the crisis,
22 underwent an involution in every conceivable way on the basis of
23 gerrymandering municipalities and regions. I could give you a few
24 examples of that.
25 Serb municipalities were abolished in the following way: They
1 would be annexed to a neighbouring Muslim municipality, thereby turning
2 the Serbs into a minority. Another way of gerrymandering was to have a
3 group of Serb municipalities taken out of another group, say
4 Visoko Krajina would be separated from Banja Luka and attached to Bihac,
5 thereby turning the Serbs into a minority. Or, for example, the
6 municipalities of Semberija would be attached to Tuzla thereby turning
7 the Serb municipalities. Modrica, Doboj, Derventa with Serb majorities
8 would be attached to another group so that they would become a minority.
9 Also in the case of Gorazde, Eastern Herzegovina would be attached to
10 Mostar thereby turning the Serbs into a minority. And in these centres
11 there would be an abrupt development, because these centres were the
12 focus of political and economic power.
13 Would you agree to the possibility of this leading to the
14 devastation of the Serbs and their economic and political downfall?
15 A. I would say that if that happened, it would only lead to their
16 economic and political downfall if many other steps were taken. There's
17 nothing automatic about political and economic downfall stemming from
18 gerrymandering, which basically concerns the voting procedures of a
19 state. It is why in the United States, to this day, most of the
20 representatives in the US House of Representatives are overwhelmingly
21 re-elected, because their districts have been gerrymanded to suit one or
22 the other parties. But I don't think it leads directly to economic
23 problems or, as you say, downfall, unless there were a whole series of
24 other steps taken.
25 Q. Thank you very much. That's what I meant. It's just being used
1 tentatively, the term "gerrymandering." It went on for decades. Also,
2 overall financial life and any other kind of life takes place in a centre
3 such as Mostar, for instance.
4 Thirdly, the measures that you speak of, you are right, but these
5 measures are quite possible in the absence of democracy, that is to say,
6 while there was a republican dictatorship, the one that we spoke of. Do
7 you agree?
8 A. Well, it is possible, surely possible, to disadvantage one or
9 another group against another group, but I think the Bosnian Serbs still
10 commanded a great deal of power and attention as late as 1991. It would
11 take a deep exhaustive academic analysis to determine whether and to what
12 degree the Serbs in Bosnia
13 I don't know that that's been done. Perhaps it has, but I really
14 couldn't speak to that subject.
15 Q. Thank you very much for that suggestion. I will put that to this
16 Trial Chamber. However, let us try to agree on matters. After the first
17 democratic elections in which my party won one-third of power, would you
18 agree that the position of president of the Presidency of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina is a position that carried a lot more weight than the
20 position of the speaker of parliament?
21 A. Yes, I'd agree with that.
22 Q. Do you agree that the other executive position, that is to say of
23 the prime minister, is much stronger than that of the speaker of the
25 A. I'm not sure I would agree with that. The speaker of the
1 Assembly had a great deal of power. The prime minister suffered, so to
2 speak, because the president of the Presidency had a commanding position.
3 We could see that, for example, even during the Bosnian conflict when the
4 president was Alija Izetbegovic and the prime minister -- a
5 Muslim, Izetbegovic, and the prime minister, Mile Akmadzic, a
6 Bosnian Croat, and Akmadzic did not really carry much power beyond the
7 Croat community. Of course, he was strong there. So I think that the
8 president of the Assembly, for example, the Bosnian Assembly,
9 Mr. Krajisnik, had much more power than Akmadzic both in the country and
10 within his own party.
11 Q. Thank you. I believe that you will agree with me in saying that
12 the power of the president of the Assembly -- well, I mean it's the
13 Assembly that has power. There are three institutions, the Presidency,
14 the Assembly, and the Government. The Presidency was a collective organ,
15 although Mr. Izetbegovic often presented himself as Presidency of the
16 republic, but he was not president of the republic; right?
17 A. That's correct. In fact, he did not receive of most votes, as
18 you know, in the election of 1990. Mr. Abdic received more votes than he
19 did, as the leader of the SDA.
20 Q. I agree. That is correct. Do you agree that that works in the
21 favour of the Bosnian Muslims, because Fikret Abdic was a secular
22 politician and he had a pro-European orientation when we compare him to
24 A. He was more secular than Izetbegovic. That is true. And he was
25 very popular in the far west, in the Cazinska Krajina. The Bihac pocket
1 was his home base and preserve, including during the fighting.
2 Unfortunately, as Dr. Karadzic mentioned earlier, his focus was on
3 economic matters, and he had gone to prison for behaviour - I should say
4 misbehaviour - with money, and this affected -- naturally affected his
5 reputation with the other communities and, above all, with the
6 Bosnian Muslim community. I'm referring to the Komerc case. I'm sure
7 you're aware of it. So that his small majority in the election of
8 December 1990 was not enough to automatically make him president of the
10 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that the president of the Presidency,
11 Izetbegovic, was a Muslim; the first prime minister was Jure Pelivan, a
12 Croat; and the speaker of the Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik, was a Serb?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Do you agree that the minister of the interior was
15 Alija Delimustafic, a Muslim; the minister of defence of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina was Jerko Doko, a Croat, and that those are the two
17 ministries of force? There is no third one because the secret services
18 were within the Ministry of the Interior.
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Do you agree that the Serbs asked for the Ministry of Agriculture
21 and got it, as well as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Science,
22 and the like, ministries that were quite far away from the ministries of
24 A. Well I'm not sure that they had them, but I hear you saying it so
25 I believe it. But in connection with the word "force," it's important to
1 remember that there was something called the Yugoslav People's Army, the
2 JNA, which had overwhelming power, and by 1991, 1992, was largely, almost
3 exclusively, a Serb army. So I find it difficult to equate the
4 Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the
5 Yugoslav People's Army as regards force.
6 Q. What I meant primarily was the Ministry of Defence. However,
7 will you agree that in Yugoslavia
8 There wasn't a federal function of this nature. Basically, the situation
9 was one as if it were a confederacy. Basically, the ministries within
10 the republics were sovereign. They only had some formal ties to the
11 federal ministry; is that right?
12 A. I was not intimately connected with the interstices of Yugoslavia
13 administrative organisation, but I can believe that that would correct,
14 given the strong decentralisation that had happened after the
15 constitution of 1974 took effect.
16 Q. Thank you. I assure you that there was not a single executive
17 police function at the level of the federal state that can be compared to
18 the FBI or the CIA
19 the day, I would like to ask you something else.
20 Do you remember that NATO, in 1978, held big manoeuvres, military
21 exercises, on the basis of what would happen to Yugoslavia after Tito's
22 death, and do you accept that they relied on your advice, although you
23 were not there at the time, but they did rely on your knowledge what
24 carrying out those manoeuvres?
25 A. Well, you're very flattering, Dr. Karadzic. In 1978, I was in
2 absolutely nothing to do with Yugoslavia
3 manoeuvres because of uncertainty regarding what might happen vis-à-vis
4 the Soviet Union after Tito passed from the scene, I can well believe
5 that that was the case, because there was indeed a concern about the
6 future of Soviet Yugoslav relations. And in this connection it's
7 relevant to bear in mind that in 1979 the Soviet Union invaded
9 country that was not a fellow Communist country, because they'd already
10 invaded Poland
11 of Afghanistan
12 East/West relations as you might expect.
13 So there was reason to be concerned about a Soviet reaction to
15 Q. However, these expensive manoeuvres - they probably did cost a
16 great deal - were carried out with a view to the following: All sorts of
17 things could have been expected to happen in Yugoslavia after
18 President Tito's death; right?
19 A. Well, as I remember, the overwhelming concern was, What would the
20 Soviet Union do, if anything? I don't remember many, if any, discussions
21 on the domestic side of it.
22 Q. However, Mr. Ambassador, we have the CIA reports from a later
23 date, in all fairness, forecasting the disintegration of Yugoslavia
24 crisis after Tito's death. Indeed, these forecasts were heard all the
25 way up to 1989; right?
1 A. Yes. The CIA
2 At the census, it's standard procedure to be asked, What ethnicity do you
3 belong to? Are you a Serb, a Croat, a Muslim, an Albanian, a Jew,
4 whatever? Not just the constituent peoples were counted, but all of the
5 peoples. There were -- there's a fairly substantial Hungarian minority
6 in Serbia
7 the 1981 census, less than 10 per cent of the respondents answered
8 "Yugoslav." Something like 7 per cent. So that meant that 93 per cent
9 of the people in the country did not feel any attachment to the
10 nationality called Yugoslav, and that was the basis, as it turned out a
11 correct basis, for the Central Intelligence Agency to point out the
12 internal difficulties that the state might some day face.
13 JUDGE KWON: With that, we will adjourn today.
14 Mr. Karadzic, while the background, historical background, may be
15 interesting, we have heard little, except for a few exceptions, that is
16 relevant to the period relating to the charges against you. So I hope
17 you would move on to the period on Monday.
18 We will resume again on Monday, 9.00. I hope everybody has a
19 nice -- good weekend.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.
21 to be reconvened on Monday, the 26th day
22 of April, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.