Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 1660

 1                           Tuesday, 27 April 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning.

 7             Good morning, Ambassador.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, please continue your

10     cross-examination.

11                           WITNESS:  HERBERT OKUN [Resumed]

12             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you, Your Excellency.

13                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Ambassador.

15        A.   Good morning, Dr. Karadzic.

16        Q.   Thank you very much.  Mr. Ambassador, I would like us to have a

17     soft landing and to go through some things as quickly as possible,

18     because through your statements you gave me quite a few topics to deal

19     with.

20             Your journals are invaluable.  The only problem is a lot of it is

21     abbreviated, and then it can be interpreted this way and that way,

22     whereas I would like us to come to the right interpretations together.

23             Could we please try to deal with this now through yes-and-no

24     answers as much as possible.  I truly appreciate your inclination to

25     defend the other side, but let us try to deal with this without resorting

Page 1661

 1     to tu quoque.

 2             What about your bosses, the heads of the European diplomacies and

 3     others; did they tell you that Mr. Izetbegovic could not be trusted?

 4        A.   No, I don't think that ever arose.  I can't recall --

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Prosecution 065633.  P780, actually.  Page 61 in

 6     e-court.  Do we have it now?  The right-hand side, could we zoom in on

 7     the right-hand side, "Denis Pinheiro."  The penultimate paragraph, "Denis

 8     Pinheiro."  This is from your journal.  It says:

 9             [In English] "Cutileiro was very concerned about what they see as

10     Genscher’s efforts to lay all the blame on the Serbs and Milosevic for

11     everything that goes wrong in B and H.  Cutileiro says bluntly that

12     Mr. Izetbegovic is a liar and cannot be trusted.  Denis Pinheiro thinks

13     it would be disastrous for the CSCE to de-recognise and expel Yugoslavia

14     on the 29th of April.  He is probably going to Yugoslavia, including

15     B and H, before the CSCE April ..."

16             And so on.

17             [Interpretation] So it seems that they did report that to you,

18     but it was an oversight on your part; isn't that right?  I mean, is this

19     not in your diary?

20        A.   Yes, it is.  We heard comments along those lines about all of the

21     parties.

22        Q.   Well, that's tu quoque, I think, Mr. Ambassador.  [Overlapping

23     speakers]

24        A.   Mr. Karadzic, it's also true.

25        Q.   Yes.  But say that to Mr. Tieger if he asks you about that.  Now

Page 1662

 1     I'm asking you about Izetbegovic.  None of them said that I was a liar.

 2             Could I please have page 62.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, please refrain from making comments.

 4     Put your question.  Making comments does not help the Tribunal.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 6        Q.   62, on the right-hand side:

 7             [In English] "Bring pressure on all parties to calm down

 8     situation in B and H and tell Serbs and Croats to stop interfering.  Tell

 9     the Muslims, especially Izetbegovic and Silajdzic, to work more with

10     Cutileiro and stop running off to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states for

11     money, weapons, and general support."

12             [Interpretation] Do you agree that that's what you wrote.

13        A.   Yes, indeed.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Karadzic.

16             Ambassador, the accused made this statement like this in the

17     course of his questioning.  Let me find it again.  Yes:

18             "Now," the internationals, "none of them said that I was a liar,"

19     being Dr. Karadzic.

20             Do you have any comment on that?

21             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I do have a comment.  People did say that

22     Dr. Karadzic did not tell the truth.  Lord Carrington said that, and we

23     had direct experience of it.  The issue was not really tu quoque.  As I

24     mentioned right at the outset, none of the three parties in Bosnia was

25     innocent.  They all did very bad things.  As we saw from the journals

Page 1663

 1     from the ICRC, from the UNHCR, things that were reported to us by actions

 2     on the ground, the overwhelming number of the bad things were done by the

 3     Bosnian Serb side, and I've said that.  I don't have to say it again.

 4             In connection with the negotiations, specifically, that is, the

 5     attitude and the behaviour, we're quite used, as negotiators and as

 6     impartial mediators, to misstatements by one or the other side, to

 7     exaggerated statements by one or the other side.  That's what makes

 8     negotiation difficult.  There, again, are no angels.

 9             If I might give an example, I'm sure that Dr. Karadzic will

10     welcome this.

11             President Izetbegovic, in early March with the other leaders,

12     signed a tentative agreement regarding a draft map for

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and some other items.  When he returned to Sarajevo

14     at the end of March, he withdrew his signature.  No question about that.

15     And this angered, naturally, the negotiators and clearly the other

16     parties, but that's the kind of thing that happens in negotiations.  It

17     does not mean that this person or that person is inherently a liar.  It's

18     part of the game of negotiations, although it's not a game.  But there's

19     a good deal of back-and-forth on this as each party tries to enhance its

20     own position.

21             Thank you for giving me the chance to explain that.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ambassador.

23             Mr. Karadzic, see so refrain from making comments.  Put

24     questions.  If you think that the witness lied, then put to the witness

25     whether he lied, directly, instead of making comments.

Page 1664

 1             Let's proceed.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3        Q.   Nevertheless, from the previous document, Mr. Ambassador, we see

 4     that Denis Pinheiro and Cutileiro say that the Serbs are being blamed

 5     unnecessarily and that it's somebody else who's a liar.  With all due

 6     respect, Mr. Ambassador - now I'm dealing with your journals - nowhere in

 7     your journals does it say that Karadzic is a liar, but that kind of

 8     statement is made in respect of Izetbegovic in several places.  What do

 9     you say to that?

10        A.   As I said a moment ago, Lord Carrington was the first person,

11     probably, who told us that all sides lied, and that included the

12     Bosnian Serb side.  A leading Bosnian Muslim politician once

13     characterised the three sides to me in the following fashion.  He said

14     the way to understand the fighting in Bosnia is as follows:  The Serbs

15     are butchers, the Croats are killers, and we Muslims are assassins.  So

16     even the parties, themselves, recognised that we were not dealing here

17     with pure evil on one side and pure good on the other, but rather a

18     mixture on all sides.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  We're going to show here the latest

20     statement made two or three days ago, speaking of butchers, that it's not

21     really the Serbs.

22             Can I now have -- oh, I see, I see.  It's already been admitted

23     into evidence.  I see.

24             Now, can I remind you of yesterday's transcript.  75 is the page:

25             [In English] "Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  However, that is not

Page 1665

 1     correct.  You mentioned December 1992.  That is exactly when it was

 2     published in the 'Jerusalem Post,' that there are more Serb refugees than

 3     Croat and Muslim refugees put together.  Are you denying that?"

 4             [No Interpretation]

 5             [In English] "It's false, that's totally false and demonstrably

 6     false.  We have the account from the ICRC.  They took the refugees out.

 7     'Jerusalem Post' is an English newspaper ...," and so on and so on.

 8             [Interpretation] Could I now call up -- or, rather, do you stand

 9     by what you said yesterday?

10        A.   Yes.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can I now call up

12     P784.  The OTP 65 ter number is 06534.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, could you give the number again?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P784 on page 35, the meeting in

15     Zagreb on the 9th of September, 1992.  So that was even before December.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   On the right-hand side, Mr. Kumin:

18             [In English] "Situation deteriorating in Serbia.  Sanctions

19     heard.  Many Muslims going into Serbia.  Serbian response to refugee

20     inflow is a good one.  On whole, non-discriminatory."

21             Three points:

22             "Needs to tell donor community that too much aid going to B and H

23     and Croatia.  It is needed in Serbia."

24             [Interpretation] This is your diary, isn't it?

25        A.   Yes, it is.

Page 1666

 1        Q.   Thank you.  On page 36 --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  By the way, who is Kumin?

 3             THE WITNESS:  Judith Kumin was at that time the leader of the

 4     UNHCR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7        Q.   On page 36:

 8             [In English] "UNICEF - Lack of support from international

 9     community for refugees in Serbia."

10             [Interpretation] That's also from your diary, isn't it?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now I would like to ask for P785, page 65, the

13     meeting held on the 25th of September, 1992:

14             [In English] "Mendiluce.  Bosnian Serbs (and Muslims) also under

15     pressure; either fleeing, fighting in Eastern Bosnia, or fleeing

16     persecution by Muslims and Croats.

17             "About 350.000 refugees now in Serbia and Montenegro from Bosnia

18     and Herzegovina.  About 15 per cent Muslims.

19             "Displaced Serbs in East B and H:  170.000.

20             "Displaced in Western B and H:  150.000."

21             [Interpretation] Does this add up to 320.000 expelled Serbs who

22     had been moved out of their homes already in September 1992?

23        A.   The largest out-flux of Serbs came from Western Slavonia.  The

24     situation there was, after the Croatian, Serb, and Muslim attacks in June

25     and July and August, the Serbs and the JNA continued to the hold

Page 1667

 1     Eastern Slavonia.  That's the area of Croatia bordering directly on

 2     Serbia.  In August, for example, they began the siege of Vukovar, which

 3     they destroyed, utterly destroyed.  But in Western Slavonia, which is in

 4     the middle of the country, the Croatians rallied, defeated the JNA, and

 5     the Serbs -- the Croatian Serbs went south to Bosnia, which was

 6     Western Bosnia.  That's how they got there.

 7             Now, excuse me, I should add it's one of the reasons why, when

 8     you see in my journal remarks by the ICRC and the UNHCR people about the

 9     Serb detention camps in Western Bosnia, Trnopolje, Omarska, Manjaca,

10     really concentration camps, and they mention that the whole area is

11     hostile, that even when the prisoners of the Bosnian Serbs are allowed

12     out, they're in trouble, and the reason for that is that the area was

13     largely populated by these people from Croatia, and it's to be expected

14     that they were hostile.  So that happened, and there's no question that

15     the Serbs were expelled from Western Slavonia.

16             And there's no argument that all the sides, leaving Croatia apart

17     now, talking about Bosnia, that all the sides committed these kinds of

18     acts.  There's also no question that the overwhelming number was

19     committed by the Bosnian Serbs, and we have quite accurate refugee count

20     of the Bosnian Muslims who went largely to Croatia and then went all over

21     EuropeSwitzerland took in 100.000 or so.

22             And, Dr. Karadzic, since you quoted my journal, could I quote you

23     for a moment.

24             During the Prlic case to which you referred yesterday -- excuse

25     me, sorry.  During the Krajisnik case, there was introduced into the

Page 1668

 1     record, and no objection was made, the minutes of a meeting between the

 2     Bosnian Serb leadership and the Serbian leadership at the Co-ordinating

 3     Committee in January 1993.  I'm sure you'll remember that.  And it was to

 4     discuss the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and this was the top leadership from

 5     Belgrade and from Pale and Banja Luka.  And Dr. Karadzic is quoted, and

 6     here I have to be very careful, as saying -- really boasting about the

 7     following situation, and this is what he said:  If you look at Zvornik,

 8     the city in Bosnia on the Drina, if you look at Zvornik, before the war

 9     it had 50.000 people evenly divided between Serbs and Muslims.  Now it

10     has 50.000 people, all Serbs.  Well, what happened to the 50.000 Muslims?

11             So Dr. Karadzic was not ashamed, was not worried, was not

12     defensive about the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Bosnian Serbs,

13     and this is a reality.

14             I again repeat that all parties were guilty, to some degree,

15     about mistreatment of civilians belonging to the other ethnicities.

16     There was no question of that.  Yesterday, I spoke about the fighting

17     between the Croats -- the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims in the

18     Lasva Valley, in Central Bosnia, so I think that's been established.

19     And, indeed, we have many eye-witnesses to it.

20             And, furthermore, that is precisely why these people have been

21     brought to this Tribunal to be charged.  After all, it is only a few

22     doors away that the principal Croatian general, Gotovina, is on trial

23     here at the Tribunal.  Halilovic and Oric were tried here.  So we all

24     know --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, yes.

Page 1669

 1             THE WITNESS:  -- that they all did it.

 2             But the point I'm trying to make, and with which Dr. Karadzic

 3     disagrees, is that the overwhelming number of crimes of this nature,

 4     crimes against humanity, were committed by the Bosnian Serb side, in

 5     accordance, actually, again Dr. Karadzic, October 1991, when you left the

 6     old Bosnian Assembly, you said to them, If you vote for independence, it

 7     will take the Muslims on a path to hell.  And that's just what you did.

 8     So you kept your word, you took them on the path to hell.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ambassador, for your kind explanation.  I

10     hope your points were taken, but I have to note that this is sort of a

11     digression from the question.  The question was whether there were

12     320.000 expelled Serbs who had been moved out of their homes already in

13     September 1992.

14             THE WITNESS:  I thought I answered that by saying, yes, they came

15     from Western Slavonia.  They were not Bosnian Croats.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Let's proceed.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, thank you.

18        Q.   I agree that many Serbs from Western Slavonia fled in 1991.  I

19     also visited sports halls in Krajina, where the richest citizens of

20     Croatia lay on floors, and that caused a great deal of fear among our

21     people.  Thank you for having reminded me of that.

22             However, here a reference is made to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  From

23     Eastern Bosnia, 170.000 Serbs were expelled, and 190.000 Serbs from

24     Eastern Bosnia.  That's what's written here, isn't it?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 1670

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2        A.   Excuse me.  Might I just point out that on the previous page, you

 3     will read:

 4             "About 200.000 additional Muslims still in Serb areas run risk of

 5     displacement."

 6             Indeed, they were displaced.

 7        Q.   Well, we'll see in what way they were displaced and expelled.

 8     But, Mr. Ambassador, at that point in time they were still in

 9     Republika Srpska, whereas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the Croatian

10     Muslim control at this point in time, that is to say, to the end of

11     September, there was not a single village that was not destroyed and

12     people expelled, where in Republika Srpska there were.  And at that time,

13     right up to 1994, in fact, many Muslims and Croats lived on, and the

14     International Red Cross, in an organised way, tried to take them out of

15     Bosnia, and I prevented them from doing so.  And I have proof and

16     evidence of that.

17             Do you challenge that?

18        A.   Far from challenging it, Dr. Karadzic, that was one of the

19     principal crimes of the Bosnian Serbs.  Let me refer you to the

20     August 26, 1992, speech of Dr. Sommaruga, the president of the

21     International Committee of the Red Cross.  He mentions several detention

22     camps in Western Bosnia as being particularly bad and holding upwards of

23     hundreds of thousands of people.  He mentions, by name, Trnopolje,

24     Manjaca, and Omarska.  Those were all camps run by your people, those

25     were all Serb camps.

Page 1671

 1             Now, as I mentioned earlier, you offered to open up the camps.

 2     You will recall that.  We haven't mentioned it yet, but at one point

 3     Dr. Karadzic offered to open up the camps, knowing full well that the

 4     surrounding population from Western Slavonia were very bad, and that was

 5     one of the reasons why the situation was complicated.  The additional

 6     situation was complicated for the ICRC and the UNHCR was that the

 7     Bosnian Serbs, after much discussion, said to the ICRC and to the UNHCR,

 8     You can take the people out of these camps, the Bosnian Muslims and

 9     Bosnian Croats who were imprisoned.  And this was a real moral dilemma,

10     and you'll find many conversations in my journals to that effect.  It was

11     a moral dilemma for the ICRC and the UNHCR because, as they said to us,

12     We will be co-operating in ethnic cleansing, and that, indeed, was the

13     case.  But they also finally reached the conclusion that it was a

14     question of life or death for the prisoners being held by the Serbs, and

15     so they did, in fact, take the prisoners from these camps into Croatia.

16        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  With all due respect, this is a

17     rather sweeping statement and has to be established.

18             Now, I'd like to call up Prosecution Exhibit 786 next, please.

19             And what we claim all the time, Omarska and Keraterm were

20     investigative centres where the state organs conducted investigations:

21     41 per cent were released, and 59 per cent of people were sent to Manjaca

22     as prisoners of war, but we're going to show proof of that.

23             But let's see what it says about Trnopolje in your diary, and the

24     page is number 20 -- who was Thierry Germond, Mr. Ambassador?

25        A.   Excuse me?

Page 1672

 1        Q.   Who was Thierry Germond?

 2        A.   Thierry Germond was the principal delegate for Europe of the

 3     International Committee of the Red Cross and active in the former

 4     Yugoslavia; in charge of the Red Cross, the ICRC operation.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now let's see what it says on page 20 of this

 6     Prosecution Exhibit P786, or OTP 06536.

 7             On the left-hand side, Thierry Germond -- it says "Trnopolje":

 8             [In English] "Trnopolje, more than 1.000 people have entered the

 9     camp voluntary.  The since it was empty a few days ago, that is the

10     reality."

11             [Interpretation] I say the following, and I have proof of that,

12     which we might not be presenting during your testimony, but, anyway, we

13     have them:  Omarska and Keraterm were investigative centres where the

14     state organs investigated more than 1.600 prisoners of war in speedy

15     fashion, and Trnopolje was a centre where the Muslims, themselves --

16     well, they could come and go whenever they wished, and we have proof and

17     evidence to show that.

18             What do you have to say to that?

19        A.   Well, as I mentioned a few moments ago, the Serbs from

20     Western Slavonia who had been evacuated to the western region were so

21     hostile to the local population that the Muslims and the Croats were

22     afraid, and some did, indeed, go into the camp at the end of the period,

23     because going into the camp then meant that they would be evacuated under

24     the auspices of the ICRC.  So this is a question, Dr. Karadzic, largely

25     of timing.  There's no question that the camp was eventually emptied, or

Page 1673

 1     I should say closed and pretty much emptied, but the situation was very

 2     bad while it was open, and that's why President Sommaruga specifically

 3     referred to it to the world community at the London Conference in August

 4     1992.

 5             Now, also, Dr. Karadzic, along this same line, you haven't

 6     mentioned but I will mention Tarcin Silo.  Tarcin Silo was a prison camp

 7     run by the Muslims which had the Bosnian Serbs in it, and it was also

 8     visited by the ICRC.  And we were told that the conditions there were

 9     very bad, about as bad as in the Serb camps.  But I've said that, and I

10     don't think I really need to repeat the point that all parties, in terms

11     of quality, behaved badly.  In terms of quantity, the Bosnian Serb side

12     overwhelmingly was the biggest offender.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I am going to challenge that before this

14     Trial Chamber during the entire trial.  Thank you for remembering Tarcin.

15             Do you agree that Tarcin, the Tarcin Silo, was closed only in the

16     spring of 1996, that is to say, several months after peace was signed?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Since you mentioned Zvornik and the meeting in

19     Yugoslavia, I'm going to remind you that Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic was

20     opposed to any forcible movement of the population and removal of the

21     population; and I said, supporting Mr. Jovanovic, that that was a crime

22     and that it was completely unnecessary because, in a natural way, people

23     were moving anyway and fleeing anyway, and I repeated that several times

24     at the Assembly sessions.

25             And I'd now like to refer to one particular Assembly session of

Page 1674

 1     the 9th to the 11th of November, 1994.  I think it's 65 ter document

 2     00079.  No, the 23rd of November.  We need the meeting from the 9th to

 3     the 11th of November before that.  The same session was held from the 9th

 4     to the 11th and the 23rd of November; 65 ter 00077 is the document

 5     number, or 00079.  So 7, 8 and 9 are three pages of the transcript or

 6     documents.

 7             Here's what I said:

 8             "Never in history have we had a situation whereby war does not

 9     create a reality of some kind, and this war has done the same.  The Serbs

10     from Zenica are here now.  Now, if you want to give the Muslims Zvornik,

11     then you have to wage a new war to expel those Serbs back to Zenica.  And

12     it is according to that right that we are seeking Zvornik and a state of

13     our own, and we will get it."

14             So that, then, was an explanation on my part, not justification.

15     It was an explanation.  I did not justify the various phenomena that took

16     place.  I want to understand them.  And they are my intellectual debates

17     with you and with everybody else, all the international representatives,

18     and not justifying something that took place and something that is

19     stronger than me and which no power structures can harness.

20        A.   I understand your point of view, Dr. Karadzic.  I have to say,

21     briefly but forcefully, I disagree with it.  There were not so many

22     voluntary movements.  There were, yes, voluntary movements, but the

23     winning side always claims voluntary.

24             The Israeli founding myth was that about half a million

25     Palestinians voluntarily fled their homes in Palestine during the War of

Page 1675

 1     Independence in 1948.  That's just not true.  They were forced out.

 2             There are voluntary movements and there are forcible

 3     displacements, and the latter far exceed the former.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  I don't believe that it was

 5     voluntary, but it was through people's own will, and the cause was the

 6     fear of a hostile environment.  You mentioned that they were expelled

 7     from Western Slavonia because the inhabitants had this hostile attitude.

 8     Now, we prevented that, but what I'm doing here is defending state

 9     policy, and I'm also trying to understand the civil war and everything it

10     entailed.

11             I'd like to call up OTP document 11358 next, please, page 3,

12     which is Lord Owen's book, "The Balkan Odyssey."  Have we got that?

13     Page 3, please, "The Balkan Odyssey."  It's page 40 and 41 in the book.

14     That's right.

15             On the right-hand side, towards the bottom of the page, it says

16     the following:

17             "Once nationalism has found independent expression in Croatia and

18     Slovenia ..."

19             [In English] " ... he felt he had to establish Bosnia's

20     independence from Serbia."

21             [No interpretation]

22             [In English] "Izetbegovic knew that these would lead to bloodshed

23     in this -- in his 'Islamic Declaration,' he warned that the Islamic

24     renaissance cannot be imagined without people prepared for enormous

25     personal and material sacrifice.

Page 1676

 1             "I have often wondered whether Izetbegovic might have found it

 2     easier to negotiate with the Serbs if he had not been a devote Muslim."

 3             [Interpretation] Do you know Lord Owen's position, as expressed

 4     here?  Do you know that that was so?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  You see, many of your colleagues, those who were at

 7     the head of these undertakings and those who assisted you, have

 8     completely different opinions to yours, and that is why I want to make a

 9     distinction between your explanations and what you actually saw and

10     wrote.  And do you agree that there is, indeed, a difference between the

11     two?

12        A.   No, I do not agree.

13        Q.   Thank you.  May we call up the next document, which is -- no, I

14     have a private question to ask you first.  Are you a Republican or a

15     Democrat?

16        A.   Dr. Karadzic, in the United States one does not ask anybody

17     what's his religion and what's his party, so while I'd like to be

18     co-operative, that is a question that we don't ask and we don't answer.

19     I consider myself a centra-liberal.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, I expected an answer like that, but I know that

21     diplomats as a whole, professional diplomats, career diplomats, are not

22     affiliated in party terms.

23             May we have 1D157, please.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, are you going to tender this bit of

25     Lord Owen's book?  It was already admitted, it was part of the evidence;

Page 1677

 1     799, I was told.  Thank you.

 2             Let's proceed.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I hope everything has

 4     been tendered so far.  If not, we'll do so at the end of the session.

 5             But do we have the next document?  1D157 is the number.  Here it

 6     is.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   And that's precisely why I asked you about your party

 9     affiliation.  This is a Republican policy committee, and I'd like us to

10     turn to page -- well, it says here:

11             [In English] "Clinton approved Iranian arms transferred.  Helped

12     turn Bosnia into militant Islamic base.  There is no question that

13     getting arms into Bosnia was of great assistance in allowing the Iranians

14     to dig and create good relations with the Bosnian government, a senior

15     CIA officer told Congress in a classified deposition.  And it is a thing

16     we will live to regret, because when they blow up some Americans, as they

17     no doubt will before this thing is over, it will be in part because the

18     Iranians were able to have the time and context to establish themselves

19     well in BosniaCIA alleged classified report says Izetbegovic has been

20     co-opted, contradicting US public assertion."

21             This is "Los Angeles Times."

22             [Interpretation] 31st of December, 1996, is the date:

23             [In English] "Izetbegovic is the Muslim president of Bosnia."

24             [Interpretation] Tell me now, please, are you aware of this

25     report by the Republican policy committee?

Page 1678

 1        A.   This is the first time I see it, but it doesn't have anything in

 2     it that is a surprise to me.  I've already reported that

 3     President Tudjman on one occasion took Secretary Vance and me to the

 4     Zagreb Airport to look at an Iranian 747 jet plane, the big ones, that

 5     was loaded with arms and gas masks destined for the Bosnian Muslims.

 6     That was an open secret, that the Muslims, who were not armed, were

 7     trying to get arms from wherever they could.  And we also have to bear in

 8     mind that the reason they were doing this was that since September of

 9     1991, UN Security Council Resolution 713 established an arms embargo on

10     all of Yugoslavia, so that the Muslims, who were under attack, had

11     legally no way to defend themselves, which was anomalous situation, to

12     say the least.  And almost everybody we dealt with felt that lifting the

13     embargo was the fair thing to do.  Secretary Vance did not agree with

14     that.  He believed that lifting the embargo would widen the war, spread

15     it over all of the ex-Yugoslavia, and he was quite specific in that.  He

16     was condemned for that position, but that didn't bother him because he

17     believed it to be true, and I think it was true.  President Tudjman, for

18     example, believed it.  President Gligorov of Macedonia believed it.  But

19     it was a complicated situation.  I mean, here was a recognised

20     government, after April 1992, in Sarajevo being shelled every day, 3.000

21     to 5.000 Bosnian Serb shells were falling on Sarajevo, and they were

22     under an arms embargo.  They couldn't get weapons legally to fight back.

23     I think everybody knew that was anomalous situation, but the situation

24     was so complex that nobody had an answer for it.

25        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  I like your documents very much, and

Page 1679

 1     the Muslims, I'm sure, will like your explanations, so we'll all be

 2     satisfied.

 3             Now, let's take a look --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, that's the kind of statement I

 5     referred to.  Do not make statements.  Put your question.  Your

 6     statements lengthen the answers by the witness.  Let's not waste your

 7     time.

 8             What is your next question?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, my question was a yes-or-no

10     question, whereas we received a tu quoque answer, which deserves a bit of

11     humour, humorous comment.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Now let's look at the next paragraph:

14             [In English] "If you read President Izetbegovic's writings as I

15     have, there is no doubt that he is an Islamic fundamentalist, says a

16     senior Western diplomatic with long experience in the region.  He is a

17     very nice fundamentalist, but he's still a fundamentalist.  This has not

18     changed.  His goal is to establish a Muslim state in Bosnia, and the

19     Serbs and Croats understand this better than the rest of us."

20             [Interpretation] Were you the diplomat with a great deal of

21     experience in the region, or can you guess who said this?

22        A.   I was not the diplomat, and I cannot guess who said it.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24        A.   But it's a very arguable point.  I mentioned at the very outset

25     of my testimony with Mr. Tieger -- I outlined for you the war aims of all

Page 1680

 1     of the parties, and I mentioned that the last aim was open to question.

 2     Would they or would they not establish a Muslim state?  Nobody knows the

 3     answer to that, because there were also very strong secularist tendencies

 4     inside the Muslim leadership.  But there's no doubt that Izetbegovic was

 5     a religious man.

 6             And on that point, Dr. Karadzic, on the point of that Muslim

 7     declaration which you've read in extenso for the Court, we cannot forget

 8     that in February and March of 1992, when an expression of democratic will

 9     was called for by the Badinter Commission to determine whether or not

10     Bosnia would seek independence, it was your party, the SDS, under your

11     leadership and on your recommendation, that refused to take part in this

12     democratic election.  So I think it's a bit unfair not to mention those

13     points when you also mention how non-democratic the Muslim declaration

14     was.  That was words; yours was an action.

15        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  We'll come to that, all the points

16     you raised.  But the only problem is we can't challenge whether it says

17     this in the document or not.  We can't debate that, because that's what

18     it says in the document; right?

19        A.   You mean the Republican document you just read?  It's what it

20     says, yes.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Now may we have 1D93 for a moment, and we'll come

22     back to this document.  But let's have 1D93, Mr. Ambassador, so you can

23     see what deeds and acts are.

24             Do you challenge the fact that -- and deny the fact that the

25     Muslims procured weapons from Germany, and through Germany and Austria,

Page 1681

 1     including nuclear components?

 2        A.   I have no knowledge of any nuclear components being delivered,

 3     but there is no question that the Bosnian government did receive weapons,

 4     including from the United States.  They landed largely at Tuzla Air Force

 5     Base.  Everybody knew that.  As I said a moment ago, it was an open

 6     secret, that people felt that the imposition of an arms embargo on a

 7     defenceless state was an immoral act, and therefore they broke the

 8     embargo.  In terms of German weapons, most of those went to Croatia.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  The fact is -- yes, thank you.  They violated the

10     embargo, and the reasons were other reasons, but the embargo was violated

11     with the knowledge of the prime forces of the world and their

12     governments.

13             Now, would you look at this document, which is a document from

14     the investigative organs from Munich.  December 1998 is the date, whereas

15     the indictment dates back to 1993.  It says:

16             [In English] "Investigative proceedings against Senad Sahinpasic,

17     for arms," et cetera, et cetera.

18             [Interpretation] So it's an indictment of the 9th of March, 1993.

19             Now, they have we have "Explanation":

20             [In English] "The defendant is accused of violating the Law on

21     Arms, Law on War Arms Control and Law on Foreign Trade in 1992/1993 by

22     shipping conventional weapons and procuring atomic parts and by procuring

23     and delivering armament material to the Bosnian Army."

24             [Interpretation] Is there any doubt with respect to these

25     investigation organs of Germany and Austria?

Page 1682

 1        A.   It's already been established that the arms embargo was widely

 2     violated, and, I repeat, it was an open secret.

 3        Q.   You said that what they dealt with was words and that we dealt

 4     with actions.  And you see that these are actions, actions aimed at

 5     procuring nuclear weapons, at that.

 6             1D102, please, could I have that now.

 7             Excellency, can this be admitted into evidence; 1D93, I mean.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll deal with first 157, the Republican committee

 9     report, and this one.

10             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, with respect to 1D157, I have some

11     difficulty understanding the relevance of a partisan -- clearly a

12     partisan document, an attack by the Republican committee against a seated

13     Democrat president.  I'm not sure what the relevance is to our

14     proceedings.  Insofar as the rest of the document is concerned, it seems

15     to be comprised of various newspaper clips that allegedly support that

16     position.  My understanding from the recent Bar table motion was that the

17     Court was not receptive, or at least particularly receptive, to those

18     documents for purposes other than perhaps some form of notice.

19             So for those reasons, given the previous guidance by the Court

20     and the tangential nature of the underlying nature of the document,

21     I think I would have to object.

22             JUDGE KWON:  It's a bit difficult to follow your objection as to

23     the relevance of it.  Probably, you are challenging the probative value

24     of the document.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Well, the underlying document seems to be about

Page 1683

 1     Republicans attacking President Clinton.  That's a bit far afield from

 2     the issues we're dealing with.  The reason it's tendered, I believe, is

 3     because it contains allegations based on newspaper -- various newspaper

 4     accounts that support some of the propositions the accused is positing.

 5     But my understanding is that the Court has not been particularly

 6     receptive to such newspaper articles.  If it is, that's -- I understand,

 7     and then the document has a basis, but the Prosecution will be submitting

 8     other newspaper articles that may well dispute those cited in this

 9     article -- or in this report, bearing in mind, in particular, that the

10     report was prepared for a particular purpose; to attack the president's

11     positions and marshal documentation that would support that particular

12     view.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

14             Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Robinson, do you have anything to say?  Would

15     you like to reply to this submission?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency.

17             First of all, I would not underestimate, by any means, the

18     Republican committee, the political committee of the Republican Party.

19     It certainly would not be showing off by providing false information and

20     referring to significant French sources, like the prime minister,

21     et cetera.  I will be going back to this document yet again, so if that

22     will make things easier for Mr. Tieger, you will see how relevant it is

23     when I finish dealing with this document.

24             I mean, really, if you can have hearsay arguments here and if

25     they are not being challenged, and if what is being challenged is a

Page 1684

 1     document of the US Congress, I don't believe that, in the United States,

 2     any kind of congressional material can be declared irrelevant, any

 3     material related to either one of the two big parties.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll confer.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber finds both documents relevant, albeit

 7     the probative value is a matter to be assessed at a later stage by the

 8     Chamber.

 9             Let's admit them both and then give the exhibit number.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter 1D157 will be Exhibit D79,

11     and 1D93 will be Exhibit D80.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Let's proceed.

13             Thank you for your patience, Ambassador.

14             THE WITNESS:  Could I have a word?  Might I speak?

15             JUDGE KWON:  About the --

16             THE WITNESS:  About this document, specifically.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very briefly, Ambassador.

18             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I'll be very brief.

19             Since you admitted it, it seems to me relevant to point out that

20     the decision of the Court was to suspend the investigation, in other

21     words, to stop it.  They had information based on telephone wire-taps.

22     It says that, but it also says that no documentation could be found.  So

23     what you have here in this document, with the word "Decision" at the top

24     and then "Explanation," is a guess -- I would say an educated guess as to

25     some actions based on wire-taps that were unproven.

Page 1685

 1             So while it's in the record, and I don't object to that, that's

 2     not my place to do so, but I think it's my place to point out that is a

 3     document of extremely dubious value.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Once again, I have to say that the

 7     conclusion is not the way the ambassador had put it.  The conclusion was

 8     that US law was not violated.  I remember that full well.  It was not

 9     stated that the arms embargo of the UN was not violated, so US law was

10     not violated, and this was an elegant way to save President Clinton.

11             However, I'd now like to have 102, and then we're going to go

12     back to this document, 157, because it contains important statements made

13     by important people, regardless to what extent they were taken into

14     account, but there are quotations there of statements made by

15     high-ranking UN officials and officials from other countries.

16        Q.   You see here that Hasan Cengic, who we know very well, and who

17     was in power now, and who perhaps would not have been that dangerous if

18     he were not in power, as you had put it, so he is providing information

19     on the 2nd of February, 1994.  He is informing his German partner,

20     Mr. [Indiscernible]:

21             [In English] "We are informing you and confirming that

22     declaration whereby Amer Cviko is replacing Senad Sahinpasic in all

23     transactions and mediations of goods.  The document is valid as of today.

24     Hasan Cengic."

25             [Interpretation] Were aware of such activity in terms of

Page 1686

 1     procuring weapons, that there were indictments, investigations,

 2     dismissals, replacements, and so on?  At that point in time, did you know

 3     that Germany and Austria were carrying out such large-scale

 4     investigations on the arming of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, violations

 5     of the arms embargo, and even this dangerous access to nuclear weapons?

 6        A.   On the point of nuclear weapons, as I mentioned in my previous

 7     answer, that was unproven.  It's only mentioned in this document, which

 8     was suspended, and it's based on bugged telephone conversations with a

 9     criminal.

10             As regards your question, was I aware that the arms embargo was

11     being violated, the answer is, of course, yes.  I've said that probably

12     ten times this morning.  And it was being violated openly.  There's no

13     doubt of that.

14        Q.   Thank you, thank you.  However, I meant this reference to nuclear

15     components, nuclear material, in the German document, not in the American

16     one.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I have 175 again -- or,

18     rather, 157 again, please.

19             Excellency, can we have at number assigned to the previous

20     document?  Can it be admitted?

21             JUDGE KWON:  If it is not objected to.

22             Mr. Tieger, 102, Mr. Cengic's letter.

23             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.  Can we pass on that

24     briefly, and let me just take a quick look at 102 again?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, let's move on to D79.

Page 1687

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I please have the next page,

 2     and then under number 3.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   While we're waiting for the page:

 5             [In English] "The radical Islamic character of the Sarajevo

 6     regime," page 8, "underlying the Clinton administration's misguided green

 7     light policy as a complete misreading of its main beneficiary, the

 8     Bosnian Muslim government of Alija Izetbegovic, rather than being the

 9     tolerant multi-ethnic democratic government it pretends to be, there is

10     clear evidence that the ruling circle of the Izetbegovic party, the

11     Party of Democratic Action, has long been guided by the principles of

12     radical Islam.  This Islamist orientation is illustrated by profiles of

13     three important officials, including President Izetbegovic, himself, the

14     progressive Islamisation of the Bosnian Army, including creation of

15     native Bosnian Mujahedin units, credible claims that major atrocities

16     against civilians in Sarajevo were staged for propaganda purpose by

17     operatives of the Izetbegovic government, and suppression of enemies,

18     both Muslim and non-Muslim."

19             JUDGE KWON:  We need to go back to page 3, I gather.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, 3, you're right,

21     Your Excellency.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Unfortunately, we're on the wrong page.  Number 3

23     there.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it's paragraph number 3, the

25     one that I just read out.  You can see it here.  That's the way it was

Page 1688

 1     written.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Irrespective of its provenance and the political party it came

 4     from, Ambassador, these are claims made by significant circles in

 5     American politics, that the regime in Sarajevo is Islamist and that it is

 6     committing crimes against civilians in Sarajevo in order to stage -- now,

 7     how do we say that?  Yes, staging -- staging events for propaganda

 8     purposes.  Is that what is written here?  And do you think the Republican

 9     committee would lie with regard to this matter?

10        A.   On the first question, it needs to be said, and we have to remind

11     again this is a partisan document; Republicans attacking the Democrats.

12     You can find everything like this today in Washington about the war in

13     Afghanistan, the war in Iraq.  This is normal American politics, to

14     accuse your opponent of the most heinous crimes.

15             With regard to the second question, would they lie in this

16     matter, the answer is, yes, but they were probably misinformed.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I don't agree with that, if it's a partisan document,

18     that that makes it false or less valuable.  However, let's leave that to

19     the American voters.  They would certainly punish any political party

20     that lied.

21             Let us look at page 10 now, page 10 of this document.  The

22     paragraph is entitled "Sniping":

23             [In English] "French peacekeeping troops in the United Nations

24     unit trying to curtail Bosnian Serb sniping at civilians in Sarajevo have

25     concluded that until mid-June some gun-fire also came from government

Page 1689

 1     soldiers deliberately shooting at their own civilians.  After what is

 2     called a 'definitive' investigation, a French marine unit that patrols

 3     against snipers said it traced sniper fire to a building normally

 4     occupied by Bosnians."

 5             [No interpretation]

 6             [In English] "A senior French official said, 'We find it almost

 7     impossible to believe, but we are sure that it is true.'"

 8             [Interpretation] The reference here is "The New York Times" of

 9     the 8th of January, 1995:

10             [In English] "Snipers shoot at civilians."

11             [Interpretation] Should this be rejected as well, Ambassador?

12        A.   Not necessarily.  We've already discussed yesterday that it was

13     Bosnian small-arms fire that killed some French peacekeepers, so this is

14     not a contentious point.

15        Q.   Thank you.  This has to do with killing one's own civilians in

16     order to vilify the Serbs.

17             Let's look at the next paragraph:

18             [In English] "Breadline Massacre.  United Nations officials and

19     senior Western military officers believe some of the worst killings in

20     Sarajevo, including the massacre of at least 16 people in the bread

21     queue, were carried out by the city's mainly Muslim defenders, not Serb

22     besiegers, as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and military

23     intervention ... Classified reports of the UN force commander,

24     General Satish Nambiar, concluded ... that Bosnian forces loyal to

25     President Alija Izetbegovic may have detonated a bomb.  'We believe it

Page 1690

 1     was a command-detonated explosion, probably in a can' ..."

 2             [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, should this be taken seriously

 3     as well?

 4        A.   Oh, this should be taken seriously.  As we can read by the very

 5     language, it's not definitive.  "May have detonated a bomb," quote, "may

 6     have -- Bosnian forces loyal to President Alija Izetbegovic may have

 7     detonated a bomb."  Well, maybe they did, maybe they didn't.  They're not

 8     accusing the government of a specific action.

 9             But we've already discussed yesterday, Dr. Karadzic, the point

10     that I brought to your and to the Court's attention about the

11     Bosnian Muslim Army firing from the grounds of the hospital in order to

12     draw return fire, so I can assure you I was no abject defender of the

13     Bosnian Muslim position.  My job is to bring the facts before the

14     Chamber.  Wherever the evidence leads us, I am willing to go, which is

15     why I mentioned that hospital incident.  We would not be discussing this

16     if I had not raised it.  I don't mean that we wouldn't be discussing

17     these specific points, but the hospital incident.

18             But there was a good deal of confusion about who was shooting at

19     whom.  As we've said several times, it was a very complex war.  It was

20     not a two-sided war, side A, side B.  It was at least a three-sided war

21     as between the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims, and the

22     Bosnian Croats, and alliances shifted during the fighting.  I think we've

23     established that.  I think we're all agreed on that.  I don't think

24     there's any argument on that.

25             It's important to remember what I mentioned right at the

Page 1691

 1     beginning, that since the Muslim side was basically unarmed, that for

 2     most of the fighting between 1992 and 1995, about 80 per cent of the

 3     front-line on the Bosnian side was, in fact, manned by Croatian soldiers.

 4     And yet at the same time, while they were fighting against the Serbs,

 5     Mate Boban and Dr. Karadzic had a very important and quite friendly

 6     meeting in Graz, Austria, in May 1962 [sic].  So this was a complex

 7     situation.  Their soldiers were shooting at each other while Dr. Karadzic

 8     and Mate Boban were chatting up in the Austrian mountains.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Probably you meant 1992.

10             THE WITNESS:  Pardon?  May 1992.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             With that, we'll have a break for 20 minutes.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.21 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 10.44 a.m.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17        Q.   We were dealing with document 157, page 10.  I hope that we've

18     completed that, and now I'd like to ask for page 11.  Page 11, thank you:

19             [In English] "The 1994 Markale market massacre":

20             "French television reported last night that United Nations

21     investigation into the market-place bombing in Sarajevo two weeks ago had

22     established beyond doubt that the mortar shell that killed 68 people was

23     fired from inside Bosnian (Muslim) lines."

24             [Interpretation] That was published in "The Times" in 1994, on

25     the 19th of February:

Page 1692

 1             [In English] "A senior UN official has admitted the existence of

 2     a secret UN report that blames the Bosnian Muslims for the February 1994

 3     massacre of the Muslims at the Sarajevo market ... after studying the

 4     crater left by the mortar shell and the distribution of shrapnel, the

 5     report concluded that the shell was fired from behind Muslim lines."

 6             [Interpretation] Now, it says:

 7             [In English] "Policy":

 8             [Interpretation] On the 22nd of December, 1994, by David Binder:

 9             [In English] "A veteran 'New York Times' reporter in Yugoslavia

10     had access to the suppressed report.  Bodansky categorically stated that

11     the bomb 'was actually a special charge designed and built with the help

12     of Hezbollah Party (pro-Iranian terror group) expert and then most likely

13     dropped from a nearby rooftop onto the crowd of shoppers.  Video cameras

14     at the ready recorded this expertly-staged spectacle in gore, which

15     dozens of corpses of Bosnian Muslim troops killed in action (exchanged

16     the day before in the body swap with the Serbs) were paraded in front of

17     the cameras to raise the casualties count."

18             [Interpretation] Does this change your position, Mr. Ambassador,

19     about Serb misdeeds and specifically about these incidents?

20        A.   Two questions, two answers.

21             About these incidents, I was aware, although I was not actively

22     involved at the time, of the differences of opinions as to the origin of

23     the market massacre in 1994 and the 1995 incident.

24             On the second point, does it change my opinion, I have to say,

25     no, it does not.  I mean, if I could just give an example of an incident

Page 1693

 1     in 1995, about the same time, that nobody has disputed - the evidence is

 2     overwhelming - namely, the Bosnian Serb Army's murder of 7.000 Muslim men

 3     and boys at Srebrenica.  If Dr. Karadzic wants to raise that, I'd be

 4     interested to hear his views, but it's an unarguable fact that this

 5     happened.

 6             Again, just to be brief, all sides behaved badly.  The

 7     Bosnian Serb side behaved worst of all.  And since they had the better

 8     arms, because they had not only their own Bosnian Serb Army, they had the

 9     Yugoslav Army behind them, they were able to do more damage.  But it is

10     an unarguable fact, and we've established that, I think, here,

11     Dr. Karadzic and I, that some blame attaches to all sides in wars like

12     this.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  Do you agree that this answer of

14     yours makes it right for me to appreciate your writings and documents

15     more than your opinions and assessments?  Just give a yes-or-no answer.

16     That will do.

17        A.   No, it does not make you right to draw those conclusions because,

18     unfortunately, they are not the correct conclusion.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And now my cue comes from you to speak about

20     Srebrenica.  However, we will get to that as well.

21             Let's just quickly finish dealing with this document, the next

22     paragraph, and then move on to other subjects:

23             [In English] "The 1995 second market massacre":

24             "A crucial UN report stating Serb responsibility for the market

25     massacre is a classified secret, but for specialists - a Russian, a

Page 1694

 1     Canadian, and two Americans - have raised serious doubts about its

 2     conclusion, suggesting instead that the mortar was fired not by the

 3     Serbs, but by Muslim government forces.  A Canadian officer added that he

 4     and fellow Canadian officers in Bosnia were convinced that the Muslim

 5     government dropped both the February 5, 1994, and the August 28, 1995,

 6     mortar shells on the Sarajevo markets.  An unidentified US official

 7     contends that the available evidence suggests either the shell was fired

 8     at a very low trajectory, which means a range of a few hundred

 9     yards - therefore under the Sarajevo government control - or the mortar

10     shell, converted into a bomb, was dropped from a nearby roof into the

11     crowd."

12             [Interpretation] That was published in "The Nation" on the 2nd of

13     October, 1995.

14             A bit further down:

15             [In English] "French managing editor Jean Denir [phoen] put the

16     question directly to Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, 'They,'" meaning

17     Muslims, "'have committed this carnage on their own people.'  I explained

18     in consternation.  'Yes,' confirmed the prime minister without

19     hesitation, 'but at least they have forced NATO to intervene.'"

20             [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, do you have Prime Minister

21     Balladur would be partial or would have any reason to present something

22     that was not the truth?

23        A.   I think we're all agreed that violence was committed by all

24     sides.  It's one of the reasons, Dr. Karadzic, these incidents that you

25     bring to our attention, it's one of the reasons why we implored with you

Page 1695

 1     the Serb shelling of Sarajevo.  You'll recall Lord Owen said more than

 2     once that it was probably the single biggest item that harmed your side;

 3     namely, the daily shelling of an innocent city, which, by the way, one

 4     cannot forget, is, in itself, a war crime.

 5             I have to admit that even at this late date, I do not understand

 6     why you didn't order General Mladic to stop shelling Sarajevo and Gorazde

 7     and the other cities that you besieged.  It surely did you harm with the

 8     rest of the world, and it is something of a mystery to me still, why you

 9     continued this shelling, knowing that it was bringing you this harm.

10             Now, I'm aware of your argument - we discussed this - about

11     60.000 Serbs allegedly being held hostage in Sarajevo.  Of course, you

12     know that.  But even so, I have to say that was actually not true,

13     because after UNHCR took over the airport of Sarajevo in June/July 1992,

14     there were relief flights and mercy flights taking people in and out.

15     That was how the negotiators actually got in, on the UNHCR flights, and

16     very few Serbs applied for those flights.  But that takes us down a path

17     that is of historical interest, and, of course, it's a charge that this

18     Court will decide.

19             But I have to say that I still do not understand why you didn't

20     order General Mladic to pull his troops off Mount Igman or just to stop

21     shelling Sarajevo and Gorazde.  Thank you.

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  That's a separate issue, and evidence

23     will be led, evidence of a very precise nature, in respect of that.

24             Now let's go back to another stand of yours, and a stand taken by

25     the Prosecution; namely, that I ruled out the possibility of living

Page 1696

 1     together with Muslims in Republika Srpska.  We claimed that we did not

 2     want to live in an independent Bosnia under Bosnian domination.  We

 3     always asserted, in all our speeches and in all our documents, that we

 4     did, indeed, have minorities.  Now, you challenge that as well.

 5             Could I have OTP 65 ter 2.  That is the session of the Assembly

 6     of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That is when we walked out

 7     of Parliament and established our own assembly.  Number 2, 65 ter 2, OTP.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  While we are waiting for that document, Mr. Tieger,

 9     what's your position on 102?

10             MR. TIEGER:  No objection, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Cengic's letter is admitted, the number being

12     what?

13             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D81, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  81 or 91?

15             THE REGISTRAR:  D81, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Now, these are the stenographic notes from that session, and may

19     we have page 47 displayed, please.  In English, it is page 24; 24 for the

20     English, please.  And may we just have the English version on our

21     screens, please.

22             Professor Koljevic, whom you met and whose English was far better

23     than mine, I'm sure you'll agree, do you?

24        A.   Yours is very good.  His was somewhat better.

25        Q.   Professor Koljevic says:

Page 1697

 1             "But this assembly of ours, we're not creating it to hold back

 2     somebody else's right.  That is not in the nature of the Serb being.

 3     I think that --"

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, could we check whether we're on the

 5     correct page?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 24 of the English.  I can't

 7     see the page number there, and I can't see Koljevic speaking, who was a

 8     member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.

 9             May we scroll down to the bottom of the page, please.

10             Let's try page 22.  I think that Professor Koljevic takes the

11     floor there.  Yes.  Now let's find that passage.  It begins -- let's go

12     back to page 24, and it's the second paragraph from the top on page 24.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Paragraph 2:

15             "What we sought to do by this act ...":

16             "But we are not establishing this assembly to prevent somebody

17     else from having their rights.  I don't think any Serb would be able to

18     sign up to something like that.  When this sort of thing is being done,

19     then it's not done in public, as we have been doing things.  And ever

20     since olden times, when they would assemble around churches to discuss

21     issues, the Serbs have always done things publicly."

22             Do you have any objections or comments to make to what

23     Mr. Koljevic says here?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now page 25, please, in English.  Page 25.  After:

Page 1698

 1     [In English] "Confusion caused by treachery is passing":

 2             "... we want to preserve a state that will bring political and

 3     state unity to the Serbian people and to all those who want to share the

 4     state with us on the basis of full equality."

 5             [Interpretation] So we want to preserve a state that will bring

 6     political and state unity to the Serbian people and to all those who want

 7     to share this state with us on the basis of full equality.  So this is --

 8     he's advocating for Yugoslavia there; do you agree?

 9        A.   Yes, I think that these statements of yours, that "we want to

10     preserve a state," that will bring political state unity to the Serbian

11     people, is consistent with President Milosevic's and, I suspect, your

12     desire for a Greater Serbia.  And it is surely consistent with your

13     comment to me, when we first met, that if the Bosnian Serb opstina were

14     not allowed to remain in Yugoslavia, that there would be war.  You, of

15     course, recall saying that.  And, indeed, you made it happen, because you

16     did start a war.

17             With respect to the point that Dr. Koljevic made about Nikola's

18     point was about allowing minorities in the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska,

19     you misquoted me a bit there, Dr. Karadzic, because you said I challenged

20     that.  I didn't.  What I said was your war aim was to make the

21     Republika Srpska as Serb as you could.  I didn't expect it to be

22     110 per cent Serb; and, indeed, during the trial of Krajisnik he pointed

23     out that there would be certain reservations, he called them, like Indian

24     reservations, inside Republika Srpska where Muslims could live.  So there

25     would be these Muslim exclaves in Republika Srpska, very small ones, and

Page 1699

 1     that was understood.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  But this is October 1991.  There was

 3     no mention of Republika Srpska.  This is Yugoslavia here at that time.

 4     Nobody mentions any Republika Srpska, and our priority was Yugoslavia;

 5     whereas Republika Srpska was a choice of necessity because we did not

 6     manage to keep Yugoslavia.  And so it's not about minorities in

 7     Republika Srpska that's mentioned here, but the unity of the state of

 8     Yugoslavia and full equality for all those sharing that state.

 9             Do you agree with me that in October 1991, there's no mention of

10     Republika Srpska at all?

11        A.   Yes, but I just said that you were talking about linking the

12     Bosnian Serb opstinas to Yugoslavia in 1991.  That's not a point at

13     issue.

14        Q.   But, Mr. Ambassador, it's at this point that we're asking for

15     Bosnia to remain in Yugoslavia, and all those who want to remain in

16     Yugoslavia to be able to do so; isn't that right?

17        A.   Well, you're certainly entitled to ask.  On the other hand, the

18     referendum that was held, unfortunately for you aside, voted for

19     independence, and in a democratic vote the people voted not to remain in

20     Yugoslavia.  That doesn't mean you were wrong to argue that position.  It

21     doesn't mean they were wrong.  There was a difference of opinion as

22     between you, the Bosnian Serbs and the SDS, on the one hand, and the

23     Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, on the other side.  We've

24     discussed that already.

25        Q.   Thank you.  All that was later, and we'll come to that in due

Page 1700

 1     course, the illegality question and the referendum question and the

 2     unlawful decision.  And I'll put that to the Chamber in due course.

 3             But now may we have OTP 65 ter 5, please, document 5.

 4             And I'd like to remind you, Mr. Ambassador, that

 5     Republika Srpska, or, rather, a separate republic of the Serb people, is

 6     mentioned for the first time only after the illegal government

 7     decision -- BH government decision to seek independence.  But here we're

 8     still dealing with the month of October and the struggle to preserve

 9     Yugoslavia, and for equality within Yugoslavia, and by the same token,

10     within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11             May we have page 13 displayed now, please, on document 5.  Yes,

12     13 of the English, that's right:

13             [In English] "The basic principal":

14             [Interpretation] "The basic principle that we need to maintain in

15     our activities is not to force the will of the Serbian people,"

16     et cetera.

17             This is what Mr. Krajisnik says:

18             "Everything we do must take into account the complex political

19     conditions, and all decisions offered up must be based on the

20     Constitution and the law and reflect the interests of the Serbian people

21     and not at the expense of the other nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The

22     basic principle that we need to maintain in our activities is not to

23     force the will of the Serbian people on other nations.  We have to

24     respect the justified will of the Muslim and Croatian population ..."

25             And then we come to the crux of the matter, the substance of

Page 1701

 1     this.  Where is that?  I can't find it.  Yes:

 2             "The essence of our strivings is clear, a life together in a

 3     joint state."

 4             So that is the position taken by the president of the

 5     Joint Assembly, Mr. Krajisnik, in a situation in which we were out-voted

 6     unlawfully and then went to form an assembly of the Serb people which

 7     could, as such, take part in the work of the Joint Assembly.  And it

 8     wasn't only the SDS that was in the Assembly of the Serb People, but all

 9     the other Serb parties as well.  Do you agree with that?

10        A.   That's correct.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now may we have OTP 65 ter document 7.  Number 7,

12     please, page 13 of the English.  And the date is the 11th of December,

13     1991.

14             Radovan Karadzic says here:

15             "I see.  When we're thinking about the situation properly and

16     well, and when we project the future, regardless of what we -- regardless

17     of staying in Yugoslavia, regardless of the fact that we are going to

18     remain in Yugoslavia, because that was forecast, I see that Bosnia will

19     not be able to be organised like all the other republics, ethnic

20     republics, because it's a republic with three ethnic communities,

21     national communities, and I would like us to move ahead and use this term

22     'three national communities.'"

23             It's paragraph 5 or 6:

24             "When we think things over, we plan the future."

25             It's the middle paragraph.

Page 1702

 1             Now, do you agree, Ambassador, that I'm striving to have Bosnia

 2     remain in Yugoslavia, but that Bosnia should take on board the reality of

 3     three national communities in doing so?

 4        A.   Dr. Karadzic, it has never been a point of contention in this

 5     Court, and certainly not between us, that you wanted to divide up the

 6     state into three states, that is, three states within one state.  And

 7     this is what you called, in various ways, a composite state, a federal

 8     state, a confederal state, and other expressions that all meant the same

 9     thing; namely, three states within one state.  That's never been argued,

10     and that's exactly what the Croats wanted also.  The people who did not

11     want that were the Muslims, and the reason they didn't want it we've also

12     discussed in the map that we looked at, where they were given this patch

13     of land in the middle, based on the Sarajevo-Tuzla-Zenica-Travnik

14     diamond, and the rest of the country basically would belong and be

15     partitioned between you and Mate Boban.  That was the issue, but nobody

16     has argued that you did not want your own state.

17        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  I would like to remind you, and we'll

18     come back to your map, that it was always envisaged that the Muslims

19     would get at least 30 per cent of the most developed part of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina because they lived in the towns, they were

21     concentrated in towns, whereas the Serbs were farmers living on a large

22     surface area of land.

23             Now, I'm asking you something else now.  Is it clear that we are

24     advocating political solutions here and solutions which would take into

25     account the interests of all three national communities?

Page 1703

 1        A.   No, it's not clear.  In fact, the opposite is clear.  If the --

 2     if we go back to the preceding page, the one that you showed us just

 3     before this one, you'll see Nikola Koljevic saying that, if I could find

 4     it, that "we have all the advantages."

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it's 65 ter 5, page 13.

 6             THE WITNESS:  And what he meant by saying "we have the

 7     advantages," which is another way of saying, We have the upper hand, was

 8     that you were already by this time in the winter of 1991/1992, well

 9     armed, you're paramilitaries and the SAOs were doing okay, and you had

10     the JNA, the Yugoslav Army, which as you pointed out a few days ago was,

11     by this time, a Serb army, and they were behind you, and so of course you

12     had the advantages.

13             If I could read exactly the words:

14             "We shouldn't underestimate our advantages, expressed through

15     realistic ratio of political forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we

16     cannot renounce our rights for others."

17             You were stronger on the ground, and everybody in your party and

18     all observers knew that.

19        Q.   Thank you.  With all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, your

20     explanations and interpretations of Mr. Koljevic's words are

21     unacceptable.  He was never a military man, so you cannot change the

22     sense of his sentence, where it says "political advantages," to translate

23     them as being military advantages.  We didn't need the agreement of

24     Croats and Muslims to remain in Yugoslavia, but they did need our

25     agreement to step down from Yugoslavia.  Wasn't that the case?

Page 1704

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Before, Ambassador, you answer:  Mr. Tieger?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I'm not sure there was something to answer.

 3     My objection was going to be we're having further commentary and

 4     argumentation, rather than putting questions.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Ambassador, do you think you can answer the

 6     question?

 7             THE WITNESS:  The answer is -- to the question, "They did need

 8     our agreement to step down from Yugoslavia.  Wasn't that the case?"  And

 9     the answer to that is, no, they did not need your agreement because you

10     boycotted the referendum of February 29 and March 1, which gave you and

11     your party the chance to express your views.  You chose not to, and,

12     therefore, they went forward.

13             I should also mention here, for the benefit of the Court, that

14     already before the referendum on Bosnian independence of February 29 -

15     March 1, 1992, already in the first week of June, the Republika Srpska

16     had declared its independence, so that the fait accompli that they were

17     facing was your previous declaration of independence in January of 1992,

18     and that is also a matter of historical record.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, I limited myself to saying that you erroneously

21     interpreted the words of Mr. Koljevic and that he didn't have in mind any

22     military advantage, but political advantage, because we were a

23     constituent people and against our will there could be no secession for

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But let's leave that to one side.  You have your

25     view, I have mine.

Page 1705

 1             Let's go on and look at page 14 of this same document, please.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  What document?  65 ter 7?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right, the same

 4     document, number 7.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Now, there, at the very beginning, it says:

 7             "Whatever we do --"

 8             Paragraph 2:  [In English] "Even the smallest --"

 9             [Interpretation] No, paragraph 1:

10             [In English] "Perhaps these three national communities will have

11     the three school system perhaps --"

12             [Interpretation] And so on.  So in the formulation of this

13     recommendation, one should perhaps say that where the Serbs, because of

14     out-voting, are not able to retain their civic, national, economic, and

15     other rights, that the Serb Assembly recommends that they set up their

16     own municipality.

17             Now, was it explained to you, Mr. Ambassador, that we were

18     striving for having large municipalities, with many inhabitants, could be

19     transformed into two or three municipalities according to the will of the

20     citizens, as is the case in many other instances, that they can -- and

21     that they can set up those municipalities on an ethnic basis?

22        A.   Two points, if I might mention.

23             The text on line 19 of the English, there's an error.  It says

24     "June," where it should say "January."  The declaration of independence

25     by the self-appointed Republika Srpska was January 1992, not June.  I

Page 1706

 1     mention that because it's important to know that it preceded the vote --

 2     the referendum of the next month.

 3             Now, on this point, Dr. Karadzic, whether the municipalities

 4     should be enlarged and have control of their own affairs, it's

 5     interesting to read it here, because when that was given to you in the

 6     Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which had 10 provinces instead of 109 opstina, 10

 7     provinces, with large powers devolving to the provinces, and three of

 8     those provinces were Serb-majority provinces and they would have had all

 9     the rights that you mention here, you rejected the plan.  So I have to

10     ask whether and how much credence we can put in these words, when, in a

11     concrete case after the fighting, with the peace plan on the table, you

12     rejected it.

13        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, allow me to make some corrections.

14             On the 9th of January, 1992, was when Republika Srpska was

15     proclaimed, whereas on the 7th of April, independence was proclaimed for

16     Republika Srpska, not January.

17             Secondly, I mentioned here that the Government of

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the 21st of December, which it did not have the

19     right to do - that's not what a government does - it sought independence,

20     asked for the European Community for independence.

21             Now, we're talking about 1991 here, Mr. Ambassador.  The

22     Vance Plan was in 1993, after the war, after the death of the babies --

23     the 12 babies in Banja Luka because nobody could provide them with oxygen

24     on time, so those are two different periods and plans.

25             Now look at this:

Page 1707

 1             "Even the smallest municipality can have three municipalities if

 2     we so decide."

 3             It's on that same page.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, and I'm very reluctant to

 6     intervene, but the Court has repeated said -- noted the nature of

 7     cross-examination, and it's for asking questions, and the accused

 8     repeatedly uses it as an opportunity for introducing comments and

 9     arguments, and I would note that's not appropriate.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I tend to agree, Mr. Tieger.

11             Please concentrate on asking questions.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Thank you.  I can ask a question, and that is this:  Do you agree

14     that the Republika Srpska was only proclaimed -- founded on the 9th of

15     January, but not operational until the 27th of March, whereas

16     independence was proclaimed in April, after Bosnia had gained

17     independence, or, rather, there was a session simultaneously in

18     Banja Luka of Republika Srpska; yes or no?

19        A.   Dr. Karadzic, you're playing with words.  Excuse me.

20             Let's look at the situation on January 8th, 1992.  You have

21     something called the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The next day, you

22     proclaim your independence, the existence of a separate unit.  I think

23     that meant what it meant at the time.  We all understood it at the time.

24     And I really think your interpretation now, the gloss you put on it is

25     incorrect.

Page 1708

 1        Q.   Well, all right.  We'll come to that.  All I want to do is to

 2     establish the facts.  But let's go back to this document:

 3             "Even the smallest municipality can have three municipalities if

 4     an agreement to that effect is reached."

 5             Now, do you agree, Mr. Ambassador, that when the Serb assemblies

 6     were formed, the Serb Assembly, for example, of Sanski Most

 7     municipality - let's take that as an example - that that meant and

 8     implied that it would be both a Muslim municipality and -- here in

 9     December 1991, it says that if the Croats have the necessary conditions

10     and prerequisites, they can form their own municipality within the

11     frameworks of the former municipality; yes or no?

12        A.   That formula was clearly unworkable.

13        Q.   That wasn't my question, but thank you.

14             May I have OTP 65 ter 04984.  Could I please have page 3,

15     SA025898.  This is the agenda, and page 3 of that document, ending with

16     "98," I guess that's the ERN number.

17             So let us move two pages ahead in relation to the page we see

18     now, page 3 in relation to this one.

19             At the very top of that page -- I don't know whether we have it

20     in English yet.  It's paragraph 2, and then further on the president of

21     the Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik, so you have to move on to page 3:

22             "The president of the Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik, reiterated the

23     need to establish Serb municipalities, where Serbs are the minority,

24     without the obligation of having this done in all municipalities."

25             Do you understand, Mr. Ambassador, that when the Serbs say that

Page 1709

 1     they formed an assembly somewhere where they were a minority, it doesn't

 2     mean that they proclaimed the entire municipality to be a Serb

 3     municipality.  But it's only that part of the municipality where the

 4     Serbs live that they call the Serb part, just like in Brussels, where you

 5     have Flemish or [indiscernible] neighbourhoods?

 6        A.   That is partially true, Dr. Karadzic.  Let me complete that

 7     thought of yours for the Court.

 8             More than once, the Bosnian Serb leadership was asked about the

 9     Republika Srpska and about the Serbian opstinas or municipalities which

10     joined it, and what were the criteria for joining.  And the answer was

11     that in an opstina where a majority of the Serb population voted in

12     favour, that municipality became part of Republika Srpska.  What that

13     meant, and this we saw in reality, is that let us suppose that we have a

14     municipality A and it has a population of 10.000; 5.000 Muslims, 3.000

15     Serbs, 2.000 Croats.  So the 3.000 Serbs vote, and if 2.000 of the 3.000

16     vote in favour of joining Republika Srpska, it goes to Republika Srpska,

17     but that's 2.000 out of 10.000.  And so while it is correct to say that

18     the majority of Serbs voted, it is not correct to say that the majority

19     of the populous voted.  And that was precisely one of the problems,

20     because these documents that we're being shown here, which I'm seeing for

21     the first time, and I appreciate that, are all leading up to the

22     proclamation of the independence of Republika Srpska.  These documents

23     are from December 1991, by which time it was becoming pretty clear that

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina was going to follow Croatia and Slovenia down the road

25     of independence.  And so here we see the Bosnian Serbs preparing

Page 1710

 1     themselves carefully to take their land out of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- out

 2     of the rule of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I don't mean they were going to

 3     physically move themselves.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Ambassador, do you agree that this session was

 5     held on the 11th of December, 1991; yes or no?  At least we can have a

 6     yes-or-no answer in this case.

 7        A.   If you say so, Dr. Karadzic, I always say yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  On the basis of what the MPs are saying, and the

 9     speaker of the Assembly, is it not clear that what is envisaged is that

10     Bosnia remains undivided, ensuring the equality of rights in all

11     municipalities; any community can establish its municipality, there is no

12     regions, there is no partition?  That is the 11th of December.  Is it not

13     clear that what is envisaged here, that even the smallest municipality

14     can be established and that no one should be separated in any way; yes or

15     no?  What you spoke of earlier on, that's different, but this is the

16     session of the 11th of December.

17        A.   The answer to your question is, no, it is not clear, and the

18     reason is - and you and I know this - that the SAOs, that is to say, the

19     Bosnian Serb autonomous oblates, were already being formed, and Bosnian

20     Serb paramilitaries were already being armed by the Yugoslav People's

21     Army, the JNA.

22        Q.   I'm challenging all of that, Ambassador, but I want to ask you

23     the following:  If, in a municipality, 10 local communes, Serb local

24     communes, decide to establish a municipality, and after the 21st of

25     January -- sorry, December, they link themselves up to a Serb entity, are

Page 1711

 1     you saying that these 10 Serb local communes decided on behalf of the

 2     entire municipality or only on behalf of the Serb part of that

 3     municipality?

 4        A.   I am saying -- I am quoting Mr. Krajisnik, who said that these

 5     decisions by the Serbs were made and involved the entire municipality,

 6     not just at few streets in some town somewhere.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  We are going to challenge all of that.

 8             Well, actually, number 7 -- or, rather, number 5 has been

 9     admitted into evidence, 65 ter 5, that is.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Let's deal with those minutes.

11             We have dealt with, so far, four documents, number 2 -- in terms

12     of 65 ter number, number 257 and 4984.

13             MR. TIEGER:  No objection, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  So we are admitting only those pages dealt with by

15     the accused?

16             MR. TIEGER:  I think I've indicated if that's what's tendered, of

17     course, that's right.  If the entirety of the session is tendered,

18     I think that's appropriate too.  I have no objection to either course.

19             JUDGE KWON:  It is a separate matter, procedural matter, but I'm

20     concerned about admitting extensive pages, while having dealt with part

21     of it.  But these documents, I take it, will be used extensively during

22     the course of examination-in-chief and in cross as well?

23             MR. TIEGER:  I think, in particular, we're going to find the

24     Assembly sessions referred to repeatedly by both parties, yes, and I

25     don't think there's any dispute about that.

Page 1712

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any observation, Mr. Karadzic, on this,

 2     or Mr. Robinson?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have no objection whatsoever to

 4     the admission of all the transcripts of all the sessions, regardless of

 5     whether they were public sessions or secret sessions, or, rather, ones

 6     closed to the public.  Everything the Serbs did, we have no objection

 7     whatsoever.  However, then they will be viewed in their entirety as well,

 8     won't they?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber needs to confer briefly on this matter.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Following the principle we have been adopting so

12     far, we'll be admitting only those pages dealt with in the courtroom.  So

13     can we give the proper name so far, the 65 ter 2.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter 2 will be Exhibit D82.

15     65 ter 5 will be Exhibit D83.  65 ter 7 will be D84.  And 65 ter 04984

16     will be D85.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Just for clarification purposes, I understand that

21     4984, in fact, should be 0006.  I just want to make sure we're talking

22     about the same document, but I've been advised that it was listed as

23     such.  We can move on, and we can check that with the Registrar later.  I

24     just wanted to note that possibility.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, they can be sorted out.  I noted that it is on

Page 1713

 1     page 7 -- I'm sorry, is a seven-page document.

 2             Let's move on.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could I now have OTP

 4     65 ter 9, 0009, that is, and page 41 straight away.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   While we're waiting for that, Mr. Ambassador, I would like to

 7     remind you that we've moved on to the 21st of December [Realtime

 8     transcript read in error "12th of October"] already, and this is one day

 9     after the government unlawfully, in our view, asked for a recognition,

10     and all the Serb ministers were opposed to that and they left that

11     session of the government.

12             Now, we have page 40 -- it should say "the 21st of December,

13     1991" in the transcript.

14             As you know, there is intensive activity going on.  After the

15     decisions made by one side, the other side - in this case, that is the

16     Serb side - makes its own decisions.

17             Page 41 in the English language, Karadzic's remarks:

18             [In English] "Our proposal is that in achieving this goal, it is

19     possible to realise territorial and individual autonomy.  It is possible

20     for the little Muslim enclaves surrounded by Serbian territory to have

21     their own administration, so that no nation can exercise power over other

22     nations.  Nobody's sovereignty must be threatened or denied.

23             "Sovereignty primarily means power, the ultimate power over

24     oneself," that means not the others.

25             [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned that there would

Page 1714

 1     be some kind of ghettoes or enclaves.  In this paragraph, I'm advocating

 2     a single Bosnia.  However, whether 30.000 people or whatever, everyone

 3     can organise an administrative unit of their own, for instance.  It was

 4     precisely then that the Swiss Canton Euro was established precisely on

 5     that principle, the most recent one.  There is no reference to

 6     Republika Srpska here now.  It is only Bosnia that is being referred to.

 7     Any unit can have its own administration; isn't that right?

 8        A.   Well, what we're seeing here is basically your position that

 9     you've maintained as long as I've known you; namely, that the Serbs

10     should rule the Serbs and not be ruled by anybody else.  I don't find

11     that surprising, because that is a position you've taken consistently.

12     That's why you created Republika Srpska.  That's why you ethnically

13     cleansed mostly the Muslims, but lots of Croats, out of it.  That's not

14     at issue.

15        Q.   That is totally at issue, but I'm not going to challenge that

16     while you're here.  However, I am going to challenge it successfully,

17     Mr. Ambassador.

18             Now I would like to ask for this to be admitted into evidence,

19     this session, or, rather, the numbers -- number 9, OTP 65 ter 9, page 41,

20     the words I quoted here.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D86.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Now I'd like to call up OTP 06147.  While we're waiting for the

25     document and -- it's page 029641 -- I think it's page 7, actually.  In

Page 1715

 1     e-court, it is page 107.

 2             Let me explain briefly what this is all about.  This is a

 3     Joint Assembly meeting attended by Serb MPs on the 24th and 25th of

 4     January, before the decision on the referendum.  So a decision is in the

 5     making as to whether the Serbs are going to take part in the referendum.

 6     In our view, the referendum is worthless without the participation of the

 7     Serbs.  Also, it doesn't work numerically, because they could not have a

 8     two-third majority to vote in the referendum.  And even from the voters

 9     that did vote in the referendum, there wasn't a two-third majority.

10             Now let us see what the situation was, whether the conditions

11     were created for voting in the referendum.

12             Now we have Radovan Karadzic on page 107.  In English, it's 103.

13     In English, it's 103 in e-court.  So that's it:

14             "Not to impose anything on each other.  We will not stop.  We

15     will work around the clock until we achieve such a state organisation and

16     such form which all three nations will agree to, Croats, Serbs and

17     Muslims.  Then we will hold a referendum that can be finished in 15 days.

18     Gentlemen, that is the only way in which we can avoid unwanted effect, so

19     that people calm down, so that they start living normally, finally.

20     Believe me, we have no influence over war or peace.  Situations are often

21     outside our control, and I and all of us can imagine what would happen

22     if, God forbid, riots would start now or an inter-ethnic and religious

23     war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We can draw that on the board.  Serbs would

24     run away from Muslim areas, Muslims from Serb areas, Croats would go to

25     their own areas.  Along the way, there would be shooting, there would be

Page 1716

 1     destruction of towns, there would be bloodshed, and we would find

 2     ourselves exactly where we are now; Serbs in Serbian areas, Muslims in

 3     Muslim ones, Croats in Croat ones, but fully homogeneous.  And what will

 4     we have to do?  We would again have to sit down and agree and place three

 5     signatures.  Without all three signatures, there is no solution for

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina."

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Were you aware of that speech of mine on the 24th and 25th of

 9     January, and this proposal of mine to speed up the transformation of

10     Bosnia and to have a new organisation, a new administrative internal

11     organisation, and to have the Serbs join in the referendum?

12        A.   I was not aware of that particular speech.  We were aware, in a

13     general fashion and sometimes in a specific fashion, of the Bosnian Serb

14     position on the question of the independence referendum, the decision not

15     to participate and the decision to form units of your own in Bosnia and

16     Herzegovina.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Ambassador, your colleagues subsequently made

18     many comments to the effect that it was a major mistake to consider Serb

19     claims to be illegitimate.  Do you agree with that?

20        A.   The claim to establish your own state within Bosnia-Herzegovina,

21     along with a Muslim state and a Croat state, was an illegitimate claim

22     because we also knew that it would ally the Bosnian Croats and their

23     Community of Herceg-Bosna with the Bosnian Serbs and their

24     self-proclaimed Republika Srpska and would be the opening measures in a

25     partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbs and Croats.  This was not a

Page 1717

 1     theoretical proposition.  It was not a matter of saying that each

 2     individual is sovereign in his own personality, that sort of thing.  It

 3     was a reality of how a country would be ruled.  And you have always been

 4     consistent, Dr. Karadzic, and I've said it since the first five minutes

 5     on the stand here, in wanting your own state within a state.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I shall remind you that it was my wish that we remain

 7     in Yugoslavia.  But now I'm going to ask for page 104 in e-court.

 8        A.   But the problem, excuse me, Dr. Karadzic, was that Yugoslavia was

 9     ceasing to exist.  So that, you know, it sounds perfectly reasonable to

10     say you wanted to remain in Yugoslavia, except there was no Yugoslavia to

11     remain in.

12        Q.   With all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, Yugoslavia was a great deal

13     more of a state than Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Yugoslavia existed a lot

14     more than Bosnia did.  According to Badinter's opinion, Bosnia was

15     crumbling, there were three entities that were being formed.  So was

16     Bosnia ceasing to exist as well; yes or no?

17        A.   Badinter's decision on the question of whether Yugoslavia existed

18     was negative.  His exact words were, It is a state in a "position de

19     dissolution," a state in the process of dissolution.  That was not my

20     opinion; it was the Badinter Commission.  I'm just repeating it for your

21     benefit, because I know I've said it before, but it does have to be taken

22     into account that as the state was dissolving, the Bosnian Serbs wanted

23     to join what, in effect, was Greater Serbia.

24        Q.   Thank you.  We'll deal with all of that in due course.

25             Please look at the middle of this page.  My speech continues:

Page 1718

 1             "We think that Bosnia and Herzegovina can turn into Switzerland,

 2     we can organise it as a link between Serbia and Croatia.  Without that

 3     and prior to that, everything is a catastrophe.

 4             "I was delighted with Mr. Cengic's proposal," Muhamed Cengic,

 5     that is, the deputy prime minister, not Hasan Cengic.  "Let us go in this

 6     direction, let us make the decision, let us set a firm dead-line for the

 7     democratic transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  After that, 15 days

 8     later, let us hold a referendum.  Whatever we agree to, it must be agreed

 9     in such a way that all three peoples have full freedom."

10             Were you aware of my position, as well as that of Mr. Cengic?

11        A.   I was aware of your position.  It was consistent, and we were

12     well aware of it.  Namely, you wanted a state of your own, and that you

13     and Mate Boban were discussing the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  You

14     say it here, only it's more polite -- I quote your words, Dr. Karadzic:

15             "We think that Bosnia and Herzegovina can be Switzerland, we can

16     organise it as a link between Serbia and Croatia ..."

17             No mention of the Muslims, who happen to be the most numerous

18     people in the state:  "A link between Serbia and Croatia."  Well, that

19     was consistent, because we knew that you were interested in partitioning

20     the state.  So it's fully consistent with what we understood at the time.

21     And, of course, it was -- it led to a war.

22        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, please, let's stick to our timetable.  I talked

23     to Boban on the 6th of May about something different, about not resolving

24     territorial issues by war.

25             However, let's go back to this.  We say here that Bosnia would be

Page 1719

 1     transformed not into three units, as you have been suggesting; rather, it

 2     will be transformed in the sense that ethnic communities can have their

 3     own administration.  Switzerland does not have three constituent units.

 4     Wherever there are 30.000 people, they can have their own canton.  That's

 5     the case of Switzerland.  Is that the way it was?  Or on the 25th of

 6     January, are you saying that the Serb side ruled out the possibility of a

 7     single Bosnia with several units within it?

 8        A.   Quite the contrary, I've said consistently, and you agree, that

 9     you wanted three states within one state.

10             But with regard to your previous question about the decentralised

11     nature of the state, and the opstinas, and how people should be able to

12     rule themselves, when you were offered that in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan,

13     you rejected it.  It would be interesting to know why, Dr. Karadzic.  You

14     had in front of you what you were asking for, and you rejected it.

15        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, that was after a year of war, and I'm sure you'll

16     agree with that.

17             Now, Your Excellency, I'd like to tender the previous document

18     into evidence, including what it says on page 103 of the English version.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will admit this page of this document.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D87, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  And we'll have a half-an-hour break.

22                           --- Recess taken at 12.01 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

Page 1720

 1             I'd like to call up on e-court number OTP 65 ter 17, and the page

 2     in English is 5.  No, sorry, 10, page 10 in English.

 3             It starts with:  "Members of minorities ...," that paragraph.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And before that, Mr. Ambassador, let me clear up one matter.

 6     It's my duty to put this to you, to avoid confusion over time.  We're

 7     dealing with the 25th of February, 1992, here.  That's the date.  Now, it

 8     was just pending the referendum, but the Conference on

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina, within the frameworks of the Carrington Conference on

10     Yugoslavia, and under the chairmanship of Ambassador Cutileiro, was

11     ongoing.  Now, I want to do ask you this:  What date do you put to the

12     cessation of this conference and the start of your conference?  The 25th

13     or 6th of August, 1992, would that be the date?

14        A.   The date would be the conclusion of the London Conference, which

15     was at the very end of August.  I don't have the date in my head.

16     Probably the 28th or 29th, something like that.  And the beginning of the

17     International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, the one co-chaired by

18     Vance and Owen for the UN and the EC, was a few days later.  I believe we

19     arrived in Geneva on September 2.  So the end of the London Conference

20     ended Lord Carrington's operation.

21        Q.   Thank you.  But this is the 25th of February that we're dealing

22     with now, and in English -- yes, we have that page in English, the

23     paragraph begins with "Members," in the middle paragraph:

24             "Members of minorities in a constituent unit would be protected

25     in a way similar to that envisaged in Article 3, paragraph 3, of the

Page 1721

 1     Draft Agreement (The Hague document for Yugoslavia).  And this implies

 2     absolute freedom of movement, includes total freedom of movement, which

 3     means moving from one constituent unit and taking up residence in

 4     another.  In other words, major relocations from one unit to another

 5     without a special permit and not foreseen, as that would upset the

 6     national mix."

 7             Now, there, Mr. Ambassador, I am tabling a report to our

 8     Assembly, telling them how far we have come at the conference under the

 9     chairmanship of Mr. -- or, rather, Ambassador Cutileiro.  Did you know

10     that this was put to our Assembly and adopted?

11        A.   Yes.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'd like to tender this

13     document into evidence now.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, the Chamber had the opportunity to

15     reconsider the issue of admission of these kind of contemporaneous

16     record, given that they are minutes of the assemblies, and, as such, they

17     are relevant and of probative value.  And if both parties agree, for

18     convenience and everything, we are minded to admit it in its entirety.

19     What do you think about it?

20             MR. TIEGER:  I think that's quite appropriate for a number of

21     reasons, Your Honour, including knowing -- understanding different

22     references at different points by different witnesses.  I think we'll

23     find it much more suitable, so I quite agree and think they should be

24     tendered in their entirety.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I'd like to emphasise that this practice is

Page 1722

 1     limited to these kind of contemporaneous records, not to books or

 2     et cetera.

 3             So this will be admitted in its entirety.  As well, on the same

 4     token, the 65 ter number is Exhibit D82, 83, 84, 85, 86, will be admitted

 5     in their entirety.  What is this number?

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 10 will be Exhibit D88, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  17 or 10?

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 10.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I take it it should be 17.  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  I stand corrected.  17.

11             JUDGE KWON:  D88, Exhibit D88.

12             Let's proceed.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             I'd like to call up OTP 65 ter 18 now, please.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] And that, Mr. Ambassador, is the

17     28th of February.  That means the next Assembly session.

18             And while we're waiting for that to come up on our screens, let

19     me say that in the space of three days, there was a lot of activity in

20     the Parliament, in the Assembly.

21             May we have page 8 displayed, please, page 8 of the English:

22             [In English] "The chair said ..."

23             [Interpretation] In the middle paragraph:

24             "The chair said," and the chair was Momcilo Krajisnik, "said that

25     the aim was that in Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina no one should feel

Page 1723

 1     their status is different in a subjugated status.  We do not wish to rule

 2     over anybody.  Nobody who lives with us -- they should be treated

 3     equally," that's what it says.

 4             Now, two or three lines down, it says:

 5             "All three peoples, the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims, and

 6     there will be certain minority peoples.  In Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 7     it will be others, and among the Muslims, the Serbs will be a minority.

 8             "That is why we must formulate it in such a way as to avoid

 9     making a mistake and putting somebody in a second-rate position."

10        Q.   Now, this concept about the protection of minorities, was that

11     something you were aware of, Mr. Ambassador?

12        A.   Yes.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can I tender this?  I'd

14     like to tender this number 18 into evidence, please.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D89.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to call up OTP 65 ter 20

18     now, please.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   And while we're waiting for that, let me inform you,

21     Mr. Ambassador, that this is my report -- my reporting to the Assembly

22     after full agreement was reached by the three sides about the

23     Lisbon Agreement, or the Cutileiro Plan, as we referred to it at times.

24     So we went on until early in the morning, and then that same day I

25     reported to the Assembly, and all the negotiators did too.  We reported

Page 1724

 1     to the Assembly about what had been achieved and what we had agreed, and

 2     we asked for the Assembly's support to have it adopted.

 3             Now, I'd like to turn to page 9 in the English.  All we need is

 4     the English version, page 9, on our screens, please.

 5             [No interpretation]

 6             [In English] "The institutions will proportionally --":

 7             [Interpretation] "The institutions will proportionately reflect

 8     the composition, and we do agree that they do so in the constituent

 9     units.  If we have 6 per cent Croats in our units, then there should be

10     6 per cent of Croats in the police, the national guards, the judiciary,

11     et cetera, just as there should be 12 per cent of Serbs outside our

12     unit."

13             Are you familiar with this proportionate representation, which

14     was the position we advocated?  Were you aware of that, are you familiar

15     with that?

16        A.   I was aware of it.  I was not aware of this particular document

17     that you're showing now.

18             I might add that the Cutileiro Plan, as it was called, was well

19     known to us, and we discussed it at length and on numerous occasions with

20     Ambassador Cutileiro, and it was acceptable to the Bosnian Croats and the

21     Bosnian Serbs, above all, because it established three states within a

22     state.  As we saw in the previous document that Dr. Karadzic had us read,

23     Krajisnik refers to the three units as republics, three states, three

24     republics, and that indicates pretty clearly that, in his mind, each one

25     was, in fact, going to be independent.  And that is the reason why the

Page 1725

 1     Bosnian Muslims didn't care for that plan, because they knew that they

 2     would be squeezed both between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs

 3     and that they would be squeezed out by the two larger parties.  We've

 4     covered this extensively, I don't think we have to go into it, but it

 5     does explain the concern that the Bosnian government had with the

 6     Cutileiro Plan, and it does explain the acceptance, nay the joyful

 7     acceptance, of the partition by the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  The evidence will show something quite different,

 9     Mr. Ambassador, in due course.

10             But just another small question.  Here I'm asking whether the

11     agreement envisages everybody staying where they are and that there would

12     be no population exchange or abolishing the existing minorities; yes or

13     no?

14        A.   That's what you said.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, another small question.  Did you know,

16     Mr. Ambassador, that the number-one personage who mentioned the partition

17     of Bosnia and Herzegovina was Alija Izetbegovic, and this was well known

18     to Zulfikarpasic, and we have enough documents to bear that out?  But

19     just let me ask you whether you're aware of that?  Just yes or no.

20        A.   I'm not aware of that.  I am aware of the Cvjetkovic-Macek plan

21     which in August 1939 was decided upon between the Serbs and the Croats,

22     and it envisaged the partition, the map was drawn.  And I think 1939

23     comes before anything that Alija Izetbegovic ever said about partition.

24        Q.   Yes.  Well, I'd have to say that three states were envisaged and

25     proposed by Ambassador Cutileiro.  But let's now focus on page 16 in the

Page 1726

 1     English.

 2             May we have page 16 displayed, please.  And the paragraph I'd

 3     like to look at begins with:  "We shall ..."

 4             And I continue:

 5             "We shall now have to establish a full structure of government on

 6     the ground, because this is our duty to the people who live there, Serbs,

 7     Muslims, or Croats, so that we can ensure peace.  Then, through

 8     negotiations, we shall try to achieve the maximum requirements ..."

 9             Did you know of that position taken by the Serb side, that as

10     soon as it is determined what our unit is, that we would establish peace

11     and security for all three national entities, communities; yes or no?

12        A.   Of course, we knew this.  But the whole point, Dr. Karadzic, and

13     I must reiterate this, is that partitioning up -- dividing up Bosnia was

14     never accepted by the international community until much later.  It was

15     later, but at this time it was not acceptable.  So all of the points that

16     you make about how the country was to be divided up were considered

17     illegitimate, since nobody wanted the country to be divided up except you

18     and the Bosnian Croats.

19        Q.   Except for the majority in Bosnia; is that what you want to say?

20     Isn't it true that this is Cutileiro's plan, proposed by him on behalf of

21     the European Community?

22        A.   There's no argument about that.  As I've mentioned earlier, the

23     Cutileiro Plan, which you, of course, approved, envisaged three states

24     within one state.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Just another small question:  Do you remember that

Page 1727

 1     the Muslim side, with jubilation, stated that it was -- on the 19th of

 2     March, that it was happiest because the fewest Muslims would stay with

 3     the Serbs and Croats and that they accept the plan, and that it was only

 4     after the intervention by Ambassador Zimmermann that the Muslim side

 5     withdrew its agreement; yes or no?

 6        A.   We've already discussed and I have already mentioned the fact

 7     that Izetbegovic withdrew his signature from the draft plan at the very

 8     end of March 1992, when he returned to Sarajevo from the discussions.

 9     Your remark about Ambassador Zimmerman has been denied, formally and

10     under oath, more than once by Ambassador Zimmermann, so I can't accept

11     that, and nobody else accepts it.

12        Q.   Thank you.  May we have the same document, but page 45 now

13     displayed in English, please.

14             Page 49 begins as follows:

15             "We shall --" or, rather:

16             "I think --" "I think --"

17             The third paragraph from the bottom:

18             "I think that the Council of Ministers --"

19             [In English] I think the Council of Ministers will have to work

20     around the clock to be able to prepare some additional laws, establish

21     the SDK," this is a payment agency, "and so forth."

22             [Interpretation] Then it goes on to say:

23             "We shall announce our withdrawal from MUP, not to mention that

24     we have already obtained badges.  Our police will have to act in

25     accordance with the law.  No one -- not the hair of anybody's head must

Page 1728

 1     be harmed, regardless of their religion and nation.  Everybody must feel

 2     absolutely safe."

 3             Now, do you see, Mr. Ambassador, that from the agreements

 4     reached, on the 18th of March we proceeded to have the Council of

 5     Ministers finish its job, and that we said that our police would be

 6     established, which we had a right to do under the agreement offered up to

 7     us by the European Community by Ambassador Cutileiro; yes or no?

 8        A.   We've already agreed, Dr. Karadzic, you and I, that you were

 9     delighted with the Cutileiro Plan because it partitioned

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11        Q.   I won't pursue the matter.  But the Muslims were even more

12     delighted, and we're going to show that here, but we don't have time now.

13             But staying with page 45 now, I'd like you to focus on the last

14     paragraph:

15             "That is why I ask you to do whatever is necessary on the ground

16     to establish the de facto situation based on justice and the law, to have

17     good and complete control of our destinies and territories, with full

18     respect for the citizens of other nationalities.  That is what people

19     will be judged by."

20             Now, since you have confirmed that, I'd just like to put this to

21     you:  Does this mean that we were ready to have minorities and that those

22     minorities would be protected, and, of course, all this is happening on

23     the 18th of March within the frameworks of the agreement reached to avoid

24     a war; isn't that right?

25        A.   Well, since it never actually happened, all one can say is that

Page 1729

 1     it might have happened and it might not have happened.  I mean, it's

 2     entirely hypothetical, the point you're making, and I can understand

 3     that.  But it is impossible to give a definitive answer to a hypothetical

 4     question that, in fact, never ensued in reality, because already by this

 5     time the fighting had started, by the middle of March, and by the end --

 6     by the end of March, your army was already moving its artillery onto the

 7     hills around Sarajevo in preparation for the shelling of Sarajevo which

 8     began in early April.  So it's a bit hard to -- I realise it's a little

 9     difficult to take these words off the paper and deal with the existing

10     realities in Bosnia, but the reality was quite different from these

11     words, unfortunately for everybody.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  I like far more the "but," I liked

13     what you said before the "but" rather than what you said after the "but."

14             But may we have 1D75, please, which is Mr. Cutileiro's map to

15     which we agreed.  And it shows, Mr. Ambassador, that we accepted the

16     external borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that we also accepted the

17     existence of administrative units within Bosnia-Herzegovina, without any

18     territorial continuity, and that we also accepted that what you denoted

19     as Eastern Bosnia should be in the Muslim administrative unit.

20             May we have the map displayed now, please.  Have we got the map?

21     1D675 is the number.  I see we have to place it on the overhead

22     projector.  I think it's in e-court under the number 675.  Yes, here it

23     is.  We have it on our screens.

24             Now, Mr. Ambassador, this is the map we had agreed to, that we

25     accepted along with the possibility of making slight corrections.  Now,

Page 1730

 1     do you see that all three ethnic communities, national communities, have

 2     their administrative units which don't have territorial continuity; isn't

 3     that right?

 4        A.   I'm well aware of this map.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see where it says "Srebrenica," "Zepa,"

 6     "Gorazde," that we agreed that this be within the Muslim unit?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Ambassador, was this plan, in its different

 9     versions, the basis for all other plans up to the Dayton Agreement?

10        A.   No.

11        Q.   Did all these plans envisage administrative units?  One envisaged

12     three, another envisaged ten, the third one envisaged three, and the

13     fourth one envisaged three as well, and the Dayton Agreement envisaged

14     three; isn't that right?

15        A.   The Dayton Agreement envisaged and contains not three, but two.

16     One is called the Federation of Croats and Muslims.  The other is called

17     Republika Srpska.  But --

18        Q.   I think you're right.

19        A.   -- to your direct question, where the concept of three states

20     within a state -- or two states within a state, was that envisaged by

21     future negotiators, the answer is yes.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

23             Excellency, could this map, this very well-known map, be admitted

24     into evidence?

25             Now, Ambassador --

Page 1731

 1             JUDGE KWON:  We'll first admit the previous one, 65 ter 20.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter 20 will be Exhibit D90.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  And I take it there would be no objection to this

 4     Cutileiro map.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  I think based on discussion, this map will come in

 6     as no objection.  In that sense, Your Honour, I'm not sure of the precise

 7     provenance of this particular map.  There is a map which the Prosecution

 8     has on its exhibit list, which is appended to something provided by

 9     Ambassador Cutileiro, which doesn't look like this, although it does seem

10     to be -- it's not in colour.  I haven't compared this precisely, whether

11     this is a coloured depiction of the same thing.  In any event, I don't

12     have any objection to this map going into evidence.  But to the extent

13     it's characterised as the Cutileiro map, I'm not in a position to verify

14     that, especially in light of the information I just provided.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             With that caveat and with the confirmation from Ambassador Okun,

17     we'll admit this.

18             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ambassador.

20             THE WITNESS:  A point that should be said about the map that is

21     relevant, it was never completely accepted.  It was always a draft map.

22     And Cutileiro, when he presented it, said, This is for further

23     discussion.  So what we're looking at is a draft map, not a definitive

24     version.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 1732

 1             Exhibit number ...?

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, Exhibit D91.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Let's proceed.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             Just another small matter by way of a reminder.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, on Friday the distinguished Mr. Tieger proposed

 8     an exhibit from my press conference in Geneva.  Mr. Tieger highlighted

 9     the second or the third paragraph.  However, the first paragraph of that

10     document says Mr. Darwin has passed away.  I expressed my condolences,

11     and I say that we are going to remember him as the first creator of a map

12     of Republika Srpska, and for that we pay our due respects to him.  If we

13     find that document, we will show this to you, but we are not challenging

14     that it was Mr. Darwin who was the author of this first map of

15     Republika Srpska; isn't that right?

16        A.   That's entirely correct.  This map was routinely referred to as

17     "Darwin's map."

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can you confirm, Mr. Ambassador, that all maps were

19     open to further adjustment on the basis of agreement reached by all three

20     sides, three parties, including the contact group, all the maps all the

21     way up to Dayton?  Even after Dayton, we exchanged certain villages and

22     territories; isn't that right?

23        A.   Well, your question is:  Were all maps open to further adjustment

24     on the basis of agreement?  The answer is yes.  Quite obviously, until

25     and unless the three sides agreed on a map, the fighting was going to

Page 1733

 1     continue endlessly.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  Now I'd like us to have OTP 65 ter

 3     28.

 4             While we are waiting for that, I would like to remind you,

 5     Mr. Ambassador, that the Muslims had accepted this agreement and also

 6     conditionally the Owen-Stoltenberg map, on the condition that they

 7     receive an additional 3 per cent of the territory, and that they signed

 8     on the 16th of September, 1993, Izetbegovic and Krajisnik, that is, that

 9     the Republika Srpska had the right to a referendum, including secession.

10     Do you agree to that?  We have that document.

11        A.   Well, yes, I'm aware of the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, which was

12     never put into effect.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Could we please have page 87, 87 and 88 in English.

14     Let's just check the English page, actually.  86, it is actually 86 in

15     English.

16             Radovan Karadzic, speaking on the 25th and 26th of July, 1992 --

17     that is to say, the war is still going on, but the Carrington Conference

18     is still underway, until it was replaced by the Vance-Owen Conference, as

19     we've agreed.

20             The last paragraph on this page -- let's see whether we have the

21     right page.  86, right.  It's not on that page:

22             [In English] "In the state --"

23             [Interpretation] "In the state that we are building, we have to

24     ensure that they have all the rights that we have, under the condition

25     that they are not hostile towards us and that they drop their weapons.

Page 1734

 1     The villages in Romanija should drop their weapons like those who lived

 2     in Bijeljina and other villages did.  The main condition is that they

 3     drop all weapons in order to be able to enjoy all rights."

 4             I have to say that the translation is imprecise.

 5             [In English] "Should leave their weapons ..."

 6             [Interpretation] Instead of saying --

 7             [In English] "Some villages in Romanija are leaving their

 8     weapons."

 9             [Interpretation] So, Ambassador, the war is still underway.  It's

10     still the first Carrington-Cutileiro conference that is underway as well.

11     And the position that we are taking is that we are going to ensure fall

12     equality of rights on the condition that we are not being shot at.  And

13     I'm saying specifically that there are villages in Romanija that had

14     already surrendered their weapons, and that they are living in peace like

15     those in Bijeljina.  Were you aware of that?

16        A.   Yes.  I was also aware, since this is July 1992, that Arkan and

17     his Serb paramilitaries had already started ethnic cleansing in

18     Bijeljina.  Milosevic admitted that to us.  We've discussed it earlier,

19     that Arkan was there with his paramilitaries.  So while you were

20     expressing these noble sentiments, the Bosnian Muslims were being

21     ethnically cleansed from Bijeljina.

22        Q.   Thank you.  For the time being now, because of the "but" -- I

23     keep telling you, whenever you insert that "but," you give me a lot more

24     work.

25             Let us move on to another topic.

Page 1735

 1             Ambassador, do you agree that Arkan was in Bijeljina on the 1st

 2     and 2nd of April, while Yugoslavia still existed, that is to say, before

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence, and already on the 3rd and 4th

 4     of April, Arkan was no longer in Bijeljina?  Do you agree with that?

 5        A.   No, because what you've just said, Dr. Karadzic, is not correct.

 6     He was, indeed, there with his paramilitary troops, but the statement

 7     that Bosnia-Herzegovina did not exist is not true, because by April

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina, as we know and we've said endlessly here, had already

 9     declared its independence, and, by April 7, had been admit into the

10     United Nations and had been recognised by the European Community and by

11     the United States.  So it was a recognised state no later than April 7.

12        Q.   Well, you've said just now that it was admitted into the

13     United Nations along such a fast track that it was unprecedented.  I

14     agree with that.  Mr. Ambassador, I did not say it did not exist at all.

15     I said that on the 1st and 2nd of April, Yugoslavia still existed, and

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina was within that Yugoslavia, and Republika Srpska did

17     not function.  It was the authority of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was in

18     Bijeljina, isn't that right, until the Republika Srpska started

19     functioning on the 7th of April; isn't that right?

20        A.   During this time, Yugoslavia was disintegrating rapidly.  Indeed,

21     the very next month the name of the country was changed, as we all know,

22     from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia to the FRY, the

23     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Anyway, the army was changed,

24     institutional names were changed to take account of the reality, namely,

25     that Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia were no longer part of

Page 1736

 1     Yugoslavia.  But that's a technical matter, although it's a very

 2     important matter.  More important is what was happening on the ground in

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina in April, and what was happening was very unfortunate.

 4     The displacement and the ethnic cleansing, particularly of the Muslim

 5     community, was already well underway at the hands of both the

 6     Yugoslav Army and the Bosnian Serb armed forces and paramilitaries.

 7             I know, Dr. Karadzic, that this is hard for you to hear, but it

 8     is the truth, and we both know it.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  That sounds like a judgement, rather than like

10     testimony, Mr. Ambassador.  I denied that, I challenged that.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] However, I would like to have 1D934

12     called up.  And could the previous document from the Assembly be admitted

13     into evidence, although we will go back to some paragraphs later if there

14     is enough time.  However, since you will admit the entire document --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D92, Your Honour.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D194, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   While we're waiting for that, Mr. Ambassador, let me remind you

20     that I took office on the 12th of May, and already on the 13th of May,

21     and on the 13th of June, on behalf of the Presidency of Republika Srpska,

22     I made the following decision, on the 12th of May orally and on the 13th

23     of May in writing.  The English version is not exactly legible.  However,

24     I'm going to read it.  So this is the decision of the Presidency on the

25     ban to establish armed groups and individuals in the territory of the

Page 1737

 1     republic that are not under the single command of the army or the police.

 2     What is also banned is the establishment and the activity of all

 3     self-organised groups and individuals in the territory of the Serb

 4     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Existing groups and individuals are

 5     duty-bound to place themselves under the single command of the Army of

 6     the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within three days or the Ministry

 7     of the Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The

 8     Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina renounces groups

 9     that would continue to operate independently and will order the

10     sanctioning of their existence -- the punishment of their existence and

11     activity.  Re-subordination to the single command of the army or police

12     also means strict observance of the provisions of International Law of

13     War.

14             Were you aware of this order of mine, Ambassador?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to go to -- back to one of the answers that

17     you gave, or, rather, it's something that you wrote down in your diary.

18             What you wrote down was that I had said that I controlled the

19     Army of Republika Srpska and 95 per cent of the paramilitaries.  Now,

20     what I'd like to put to you is a different interpretation: that I

21     re-subordinated -- I ordered the re-subordination of all independent

22     groups to the army, and that my only control was through the army rather

23     than along parallel lines, lines parallel to that of the army.  Yes or

24     no?

25        A.   Well, of course -- of course you preferred to control

Page 1738

 1     95 per cent, and 5 per cent was either out of your control or perhaps

 2     just lesser.  In that same conversation, you said that you were the

 3     commander, that you controlled the army.  And when we asked you about

 4     General Mladic, you said, and I quote, He's obedient.  So from that, one

 5     can conclude that when General Mladic led his troops onto the mountains

 6     around Sarajevo and started shelling the city -- or perhaps I should say

 7     should we conclude that he was doing that on your direct order?  Since

 8     you said he was obedient, and there's no argument about his troops

 9     shelling Sarajevo, that was easily visible, and we had observers there,

10     I think perhaps you might want to comment to the Court on that, but

11     that's your decision, of course.

12             But to the point, none of the leaders liked the paramilitaries

13     because, you know, they're all difficult to command.  Tudjman didn't,

14     Milosevic really didn't, and neither did Dr. Karadzic, and I think that's

15     understandable.  But the reality was that the combat activities of the

16     Bosnian Serb Army, the VRS, were under your control, as you so stated to

17     us, and I think we have to bear that in mind when we discuss irregular or

18     paramilitary activity.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  My question was whether I had some

20     parallel units, apart from the regular army, and I think that you

21     accepted that I controlled them because I ordered their re-subordination

22     to the single command of the army; is that right?

23        A.   They were already doing the army's business, so it was to be

24     expected that they would become officially subordinated to the army, that

25     is correct.

Page 1739

 1        Q.   Do you know, Mr. Ambassador, that we arrested the remaining

 2     5 per cent on several occasions; whenever we found an independent group

 3     of that nature, we had it arrested?

 4        A.   Well, I suppose that may have happened on one or two occasions.

 5     It's also worth bearing in mind that we have had, before this Tribunal,

 6     cases of Serb irregulars who committed mayhem and murder and ethnic

 7     cleansing.  Several of them have been convicted by the

 8     International Criminal Tribunal.  So that the point you make is perhaps

 9     valid in 1 per cent of the cases.  I'm just estimating.  Perhaps it's

10     2 per cent.  But the reality was that the VRS, aided and abetted by some

11     irregulars, policemen, for example, was carrying out extensive ethnic

12     cleansing during the period you are discussing.

13        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, I'm going to challenge all of that here, and by

14     way of documents, at that.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, could this decision,

16     1D194, be admitted into evidence.

17             And now I would like to ask for 1D -- or, actually, just a

18     moment, please.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Of course, you are not obliged to answer, but which

20     one is original, English or the B/C/S, Mr. Karadzic?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Both were signed on the same day.

22     In English, it was sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

23     But we have a better copy in English.  Actually, this was damaged while

24     being up-loaded in e-court.  Otherwise, it is more legible when it's not

25     in e-court.  It was e-mailed to the relevant service, so it will be

Page 1740

 1     included.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  It's admitted.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D93, Your Honour.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             1D205, could I have that document, please.

 6             These are congratulations being proffered by myself, the

 7     president, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the founding of

 8     the party:

 9             [In English] "The state, which we the Serbs are creating --"

10             [Interpretation] "The state that we are creating has to be based

11     on the rule of law and humaneness ..."

12             And then we have, under quotation marks, a quotation from the

13     great Serbian poet, [indiscernible]:

14             "A kingdom does not demand inhumane people to defile itself

15     before the world.  With that, I ask all members and representatives of

16     the Serbian Democratic Party to constantly monitor our behaviour so that

17     the glory of our just battle would not be tarnished by inhumane actions.

18     Special attention should be given to just behaviour towards civilians of

19     other ethnicities within our republic.  Similarly, towards our defeated

20     enemies, we need to not only honour the clauses of the Geneva Convention,

21     we also need to show our Orthodox Christian mercy."

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Were you aware of this appeal?

24        A.   No.  And I read it now, and I find it very touching.  It's a pity

25     it wasn't not carried out in reality.

Page 1741

 1        Q.   It will be shown that it did happen in reality as well.  This was

 2     published in all media, and, indeed, it did have certain influence.

 3             Could it please be admitted?  Have we have been assigned a

 4     number?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Is it Exhibit D94?

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  That's correct, Your Honour.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  No objection, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D206, please.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, this is a telegram, a secret telegram at that, to

12     all presidents of municipalities in the area of Gorazde, because we held

13     half of Gorazde, Foca, Han Pijesak, Sokolac, Rogatica.  Now, Visegrad,

14     Rude, Cajnice, Gorazde, Foca, you see, all of that is in the Drina

15     Valley, and this is the text:

16             "All villages in which the Croatian and Muslim inhabitants hand

17     over their weapons and do not intend to fight against us must enjoy the

18     full protection of our Serb state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The

19     responsibility for this must be borne by the presidents of the

20     municipalities."

21             The date is the 14th of July, 1992.  Are you aware of the fact

22     that we took such measures as well?

23        A.   I'm aware that on paper, these measures were taken, and I'm also

24     aware, in the video that showed Krajisnik discussing these particular

25     areas, the overlay after your army occupied them showed that numerous

Page 1742

 1     municipalities were Muslim, but by the time Krajisnik was showing us that

 2     map, between September and December 1992, they were all blue, indicating

 3     they were all Serbian.  So that is something that has to be taken into

 4     account; namely, that these words -- this message that you sent was

 5     either not observed by the recipients or perhaps they understood that

 6     maybe you didn't really mean every word of it.  Because the ethnic

 7     cleansing in Foca, for example, was horrific, and several of the Serb

 8     cleansers have been tried and convicted here at the

 9     International Criminal Tribunal.  There is really no argument about that,

10     Dr. Karadzic, unless you wish to accuse the Tribunal of inventing things,

11     and I don't think that's what you want to do.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  As we've already said, and I believe

13     you'll agree with me when I say that everything that came before the

14     "but" is usable, whereas everything after the "but" I reject, when you

15     give your assessments and appraisals of the situation.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.

18             I'd like to tender this document next, and I'd like to call up

19     1D30.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Now, along with this document, Mr. Ambassador, you see you spoke

22     tu quoque.  This was a secret telegram and order.  It was a strict order

23     and calls upon the presidents of the municipality to accountability.  And

24     where some municipalities, such as Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica remained

25     Muslim until 1995 and not Serb; isn't that right?

Page 1743

 1             Did those municipalities remain Muslim municipalities until 1995,

 2     and did the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan and Vance-Owen Plan, did they both

 3     envisage them as remaining Muslim municipalities?

 4        A.   Gorazde was always seen to be Muslim.  Indeed, it was a Muslim

 5     area.  Today, it is within the federation of Croats and Muslims.  It's

 6     not in Republika Srpska.  Milosevic insisted on that at the very end of

 7     the day -- excuse me, he didn't insist on it.  The Muslims insisted on

 8     it.  Since the Serbs had been given their corridor from Belgrade to

 9     Banja Luka, through Brcko, they said they should have a corridor to

10     Gorazde, and it was indeed the last night at Dayton when, over a certain

11     amount of whiskey, Milosevic and General Clark and others decided that

12     Gorazde should remain with the Muslim Croat federation.

13             Srebrenica is a similar case up to a point, similar in that both

14     were UN protected areas, safe havens.  The UN Security Council and

15     UNPROFOR had declared six cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be safe havens;

16     Tuzla, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Bihac -- I don't remember the others.  So

17     that as we well know, Srebrenica held many refugees, since it was

18     considered safe.  There was a unit of UNPROFOR protecting the city.  They

19     were, in fact, Dutch soldiers.  And it's also known that in July of 1995,

20     the Bosnian Serb Army, in the presence of General Mladic, and we know

21     that because we have the newspaper -- videos of him addressing his

22     troops, that they murdered 7.000 Bosnian Serb men and boys.  Now, if you

23     want to contest that, Dr. Karadzic, I'm fully prepared to enter into a

24     discussion, but I don't think it needs to be argued.  It was the most

25     horrific crime during the entire war, and it was the worst single crime

Page 1744

 1     of war committed in Europe after World War II.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  My objection remains the same.  I

 3     reject everything after the "but."

 4             And may we have the next document --

 5        A.   Does that mean, Dr. Karadzic, that you are denying that

 6     Srebrenica occurred -- excuse me for asking, excuse me for interrupting.

 7     And I can appreciate that you don't like what I say, but I think in all

 8     fairness to the Court, denying the massacre at Srebrenica, I think you

 9     owe the Court an explanation for that.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  I think it's time to bring the witness to order.

13     I think he's playing a role here that far exceeds his position as a

14     witness.  So, please, I think you should ask him to restrict himself to

15     answering the questions, not to making the Prosecution's closing argument

16     or putting questions to Dr. Karadzic.  I think it's time for the Chamber

17     to step in and exercise some control over the witness.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             Ambassador, as you see we have limited time, so please --

20             THE WITNESS:  I appreciate that.

21             JUDGE KWON:  -- be brief in answering the question.  Thank you

22     very much.

23             So in the meantime, unless it is objected to, we will admit

24     1D206.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D95, Your Honour.

Page 1745

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             May we have 1D300 next, please.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   And while we're waiting for that, Mr. Ambassador, let me inform

 5     you that the date is the 23rd of July, my order containing four points, a

 6     four-point order.

 7             1D300 is the document number, 1D300:  That's it.  The English

 8     version will suffice.  I'll read it in Serbian.

 9             So the first conference, the London Conference, is still taking

10     place in London:

11             "Now, on the basis of -- pursuant to the constitutional powers

12     and in keeping with the obligations undertaken at the London Conference,

13     I hereby order:

14             "1.  The Serbian authorities must act in accordance with the law

15     and the Geneva Conventions towards the civilian population of any

16     ethnicity who do not exert aggression and combat operations against our

17     army and the civilian population.

18             "2.  All the inhabitants who surrender weapons and agree to live

19     peacefully and in keeping with the law must be enabled to remain in their

20     own homes and enjoy our protection."

21             Number 3, and we'll come back to that tomorrow:

22             "Any inhabitants who wish to -- who, from combat operation zones,

23     wish to move temporarily or permanently to other areas must be enabled to

24     do so.  The date and route to be used by the population must be agreed

25     upon, and complete security must be provided for the civilians on the

Page 1746

 1     move.

 2             "4.  I hereby warn all representatives of the authorities of the

 3     SAO of Birac of their great responsibility before the law to execute this

 4     and other orders in keeping with the law and the Geneva Conventions."

 5             And the date there is the 23rd of July, 1992.

 6             Now, you accuse me of conducting a tu quoque -- tu quoque

 7     proceedings, but did you know about this order and orders of this kind?

 8     Without the "but" this time, please.

 9        A.   I did not know of this order.

10             I must also state, in connection with Mr. Robinson's point, which

11     I appreciate, that it was not I who raised Srebrenica, it was

12     Dr. Karadzic in his question to me who raised Gorazde and Srebrenica.  I

13     was answering his question.

14        Q.   Well, I just challenged the fact that you said that all the

15     municipalities became blue already in 1992, and we could have stopped

16     there.

17             But I'd like to tender this document into evidence, the order,

18     1D300.

19             MR. TIEGER:  No objection.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may we have 1D215 called up

22     next, please.  Do we have 1D300; is that admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Was it Exhibit D96?

24             THE REGISTRAR:  That's correct, Your Honour, Exhibit D96.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 1747

 1             And now we have the conclusion here, dated the 6th of August, of

 2     the Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And it says:

 3             "The Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Ministry of Justice," et cetera, "is charged

 5     that through its municipal organs of the Interior, in a co-ordinated

 6     fashion, collect written information about the relation and conduct of

 7     the Serb authorities towards prisoners of war and the conditions of life

 8     for prisoners in prisons on the territory of the municipality in which

 9     there are such cases -- such prisoners," and then that that be sent to

10     the Presidency within a ten-day dead-line.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Now, did you know that the Presidency made this demand, that it

13     be reported back to and informed about the situation?

14        A.   No, I did not, and I'm pleased that you did.  It's a pity it

15     wasn't followed.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I will show you that it was -- I will prove that it

17     was, but unfortunately you won't be here then.  But I would like you to

18     gain a different impression and picture of the situation while you're

19     here.

20             Now may we have document number 205 next, please.

21             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification, pending

22     translation.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D97, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE KWON:  We are talking about 215.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 216 next, please.  1D216 next,

Page 1748

 1     please.

 2             While we're waiting for that, this was on the same day, a

 3     statement of the Presidency on the arrest of renegades.  The previous one

 4     was the conclusion.  Now we're asking for a different one.

 5             215 has been translated.  We did have a translation of it and the

 6     Serbian version as well.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  This should be the last question for today.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, the date of this is the 6th of August, 1992.  It

10     is a statement from the Presidency on the arrest of renegades:

11             "The Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

12     informs that several weeks ago, it issued an order whereby all groups and

13     individuals should be placed under the united command of the army and the

14     police.  This idea was, for the most part, carried out, except in the

15     case of certain groups of renegades in Podrinje and Kljuc.  The Ministry

16     of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

17     arrested groups and individuals who were renegades from the law and who

18     looted and burnt.  So it's not a case of the arrest of politically

19     organised individuals or units with other names that were attached to the

20     united command and courageously fighting for the freedom of Serbian

21     Bosnia and Herzegovina and deserve all commendation."

22             Now, this was issued to quell the people, to show them who we

23     were arresting, who it was we were arresting; that it wasn't combatants

24     who were organised, but that they were renegades.  Do you agree?

25        A.   That's what the document says.

Page 1749

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  And I'd like to tender

 2     this document as well.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, with respect -- no objection with

 4     respect to this document and the previous document.  There's a

 5     translation for both.  Both are on the Prosecution's 65 ter list.  The

 6     215 was 65 ter 01116.  This document is 65 ter 00865, and I think the

 7     accompanying translation should suffice.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.

 9             Mr. Karadzic, we'll adjourn for today, but you have had more than

10     nine hours with Ambassador Okun for your cross-examination, and you

11     originally indicated -- you had asked for fourteen hours.  So given that

12     you have approximately -- it would be less than four hours tomorrow, the

13     Chamber expects you to conclude your cross-examination by tomorrow.

14             But I take it that you will have some re-direct, Mr. Tieger.

15             MR. TIEGER:  That's correct, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE KWON:  How much longer do you have for Ambassador Okun,

17     Mr. Karadzic?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, it all depends

19     whether we're going to be efficient in asking questions and getting

20     answers.  I think that this is a unique occasion, when the Trial Chamber

21     has such a prominent personage before them, who was partly a participant

22     and partly learnt about the situation from other sources.  Now, unless

23     the ambassador is adverse to spending more hours in Europe, there could

24     be more -- I would like to have more time, but a minimum of 14 hours, the

25     14 hours I said to begin with.  So if the ambassador agrees, I would like

Page 1750

 1     to have more time, because we really do have a lot of documents to get

 2     through and to throw light on many more facts.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Given the ambassador has been spending more than two

 4     weeks already here, so it seems impractical, if not in-humanitarian, to

 5     ask him to stay longer.  So could you try to finish -- could you try to

 6     leave about 20 minutes before the end of tomorrow?  Let's see how we go

 7     on tomorrow.

 8             Tomorrow --

 9                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

10             JUDGE KWON:  What's the number of the last exhibit?

11             THE REGISTRAR:  1D216 will be Exhibit D98.

12             JUDGE KWON:  With that, we'll adjourn for today.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28th day of

16                           April, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.