1 Monday, 10 May 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. Good morning, Mr. Harland.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, everybody.
10 WITNESS: DAVID HARLAND [Resumed]
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
12 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, good morning.
13 A. Good morning.
14 Q. It seems to me that in your report and in your interest overall
15 the enclaves occupied quite a big space; am I right? They occupied quite
16 a big space in your interest well, as well as in our overall crisis, I
17 would say; am I right?
18 A. Yes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce
20 1D982. 1D982. 09639 is the Prosecution document number. 09639 is the
21 Prosecution number before 1D928.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Let me jog your memory. We had a very unusual crisis regarding
24 Gorazde, which entered many books and memoirs of its participants. In
25 Pale -- the Prosecution number is 09639. And that's -- that's not it.
1 This one can be removed from the screen.
2 In Pale, there were Mr. Akashi, Mr. Stoltenberg, Mr. Churkin.
3 Mladic was somewhere around Gorazde. General Rose was in the centre. Do
4 you remember where radio ham operators were who reported back from
6 A. I remember there were some radio operators reporting back from
7 Gorazde, but I can't remember any of the details about it, no.
8 Q. But they were in Sarajevo
9 A. No.
10 Q. Very well. We will see a document later to show how the American
11 experts showed interest in that endeavour. We still don't have the
12 document. 09639 is the Prosecution document number. 09639. This is a
13 United Nations document, and that event speaks about the 16th of -- yes,
14 that's the document. Can we go straight to page 2. First of all, are
15 you familiar with this document, sir?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you. Page 2, please. And while this is happening -- no.
18 It has happened. What I'm saying is this: Muslim lines collapsed
19 intentionally in order to pull in the Serb forces and possibly NATO and
20 the United Nations. And let me describe the situation for you. Near
21 Gorazde a number of military observers found themselves on their lines
22 without informing the Serb sides. When the Muslims withdrew, they
23 remained in the Serbian encirclement and that was clarified over the
24 radio. Let's look at page 2 and let's see where it says Gorazde crisis,
25 and I continue reading in English because there is no Serbian -- no,
1 there is Serbian:
2 "The Eastern Bosnian enclave Gorazde has collapsed. The lines
3 have been broken. One monitor of the United Nations was killed and the
4 other was wounded. The credibility of the United Nations in the country
5 has been reduced. In other parts of Bosnia, the Serbian forces hold
6 about 150 members of the United Nations. Commander Rose made three
7 requests for close-air support, in English, for close-air support."
8 [In English] "These were rejected by special representative of
9 Secretary-General Akashi, who was in Pale negotiating with the Serb
10 leadership when the big Serb advance occurred."
11 [Interpretation] Do you agree that this was not so much a big
12 advance on our part as it was the process of their withdrawal and pulling
13 our forces in towards our lines? Do you agree?
14 A. Yes. It was certainly the -- the view of General Rose that the
15 sudden collapse and withdrawal of the Bosnian forces could not easily be
16 explained simply by the presence of the Serb forces.
17 Q. Thank you. And then paragraph 3 where it says Gorazde crisis.
18 Towards the bottom where it starts "Gorazde --" [In English] "Following a
19 second use of the NATO airpower on Monday, [Interpretation] And then it
20 says at 11 --"
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Given that nobody is looking at the
22 B/C/S version, why don't we zoom in the English version for the benefit
23 of the witness so that it be clearly be -- we can collapse this. Yes.
24 Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree, Your Honours.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. And then the last paragraph on the screen:
3 "[In English] At 11.45 a demonstration of close-air support was
4 made, and at 12.25, General Mladic was verbally warned that air support
5 [sic] would be used if the shelling did not stop immediately."
6 And then the last sentence in the same:
7 [In English] At 14.19, following further low passes by NATO
8 aircraft, two US F-18 jets struck at a tank and two armoured personnel
10 [Interpretation] And can we now --
11 "[In English] At 14.33 General Mladic was warned again, but at
12 15.08 a tank opened fire again on Gorazde. Flares were dropped, a final
13 warning was delivered to General Mladic 14 -- 15.45, and after some time,
14 a fax was received from General Mladic assuring UNPROFOR that an order
15 had been passed to cease fire."
16 [Interpretation] Do you agree with me that that operation by the
17 Serbian Army around Gorazde was a counter-offensive -- or, rather, that
18 it was a response to the previously launched offensive from the enclave
19 of Gorazde?
20 A. That -- that was not our understanding.
21 Q. I must admit that it was our own fault, because we were not very
22 good at propaganda. So we did not present the situation very well,
23 although there is proof that we did process, saying that we were being
24 attacked from the enclave of Gorazde?
25 Thank you. And now let's go to page 4. Page 4 in the same
2 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Harland, do you wish to comment
3 on what Mr. Karadzic said in response to your answer?
4 THE WITNESS: About the --
5 JUDGE KWON: Propaganda thing.
6 THE WITNESS: Well, at some level it was true. The Serbs were
7 very bad at putting out their side of the message even when they -- even
8 when they had points that they needed to justify. They -- for example,
9 they never allowed us -- I think Dr. Karadzic's daughter, we used to have
10 this debate with her. They never allowed us internationals free access
11 to territories controlled, or let alone for journalists controlled by
12 Republika Srpska, and that naturally created a suspicion among us and
13 among journalists that they had a lot to hide. When they would say we
14 have sniper victims in Grbavica or the Bosniaks are making an offensive
15 out of Gorazde, we would say, Let us see. But very often, they did not
16 give us permission, whereas the other side, who they always accused of
17 perfidy and lying, generally gave us rather open access to the whole
18 battle-field, but it's a big subject.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. As you saw, Mr. Karadzic, put your
20 question to the witness instead of making submissions yourself. Let's
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. However, do you agree with me that at first when you were still
25 not there the journalists did have open access and that we suffered so
1 much damage from some of the journalists that that -- those damages were
2 even bigger than the damages from shelling? Do you remember the scandal
3 around Trnopolje when a team of journalists fabricated a whole picture
4 and thus put us in a very dire position?
5 A. By the time I was there access to the Serb areas was very
6 restricted, but I must admit it was something of a vicious circle. You
7 didn't give access, and so the general -- the journalists became
8 suspicious and hostile, so you didn't give access. There was a very
9 negative relationship between Republika Srpska and the Western press.
10 Q. Thank you. I'm sorry that you were not there from the very
11 beginning. You would have seen what the journalists did to us, but we
12 will have documents to prove that. But what I'm saying here is this:
13 I'm sure that you know that Muslims launched a number of offensives and
14 were never shelled, and whenever we launched a counter-offensive we
15 always had to suffer consequences. We were always shelled. Do you
17 A. It is true that we in the international community never used
18 force against the Bosniak side, but we often did against the Serbs and
19 occasionally against the Croats.
20 Q. Thank you. On that same page, which is page 4 -- we don't have
21 page 4. There is a comment on your behalf. I'm going to read it in
22 English. Before that it says the ban on contact --
23 [In English] "The ban on contacts with the UN was lifted when
25 yesterday. The Serbs indicated that the door was still open for an
1 agreement for the cessation of hostilities throughout B and H."
2 [Interpretation] Do you agree with me that we advocated a forced
3 cease-fire in the entire area, not only in some areas until a political
4 agreement could be reached, whereas at the same time the Muslim side
5 advocated a partial and temporarily limited cease-fire; is that right?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Thank you. Do you agree with me that our explanation for that
8 was that during those cease-fires they were consolidating their ranks and
9 preparing for further fighting? That was our explanation for their
10 request. Do you agree that our explanation was well grounded, that it
11 was justified?
12 A. That was certainly one of the reasons, and they would be quite
13 clear with us about that, that they wanted to buy time because they
14 needed weapons or time for training, yes. But there were also -- there
15 was a bigger reason, in our view, and that was that if there was a
16 general cease-fire, a really good general cease-fire across Bosnia and
18 held, and they fear that if it was a really good cease-fire that over
19 time those boundaries would become fixed and they would be left on a very
20 small part of the territory. So for both reasons that you -- or for the
21 first reason you mentioned, the need to buy time to re-arm but also the
22 need to keep the situation open, they had very little interest in an
23 effective general cease-fire.
24 Q. Thank you. May I remind you that we always claimed that there
25 would be no fait accompli and that the final solution would be reached at
1 the conference. In that sense, I'm afraid, and we have proof to that
2 effect, that they wanted an entire Bosnia
3 would have done. Do you agree with me?
4 A. I think they were on the Bosnian government side also very
5 sharply divided. Different members would give us different opinions.
6 Some had very maximalist goals and believing that one day the Bosniaks
7 would control the entire country if they could just buy enough time.
8 Others felt they should take an agreement that was on offer, and they, in
9 fact, regretted that they had not accepted earlier agreements like
10 Cutileiro or Owen-Stoltenberg or HMS Invincible agreements. I think they
11 were a little divided. And sometimes changed their own minds, sometimes
12 would have one position and then the other.
13 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that you were there in 1995, and that
14 was described by Ambassadors Bildt and Holbrooke. Do you remember that
15 when a decision was reached to put a stop to the war they asked the
16 Muslims, What do you want us to do on your behalf? How should we -- how
17 should we negotiate, for you to have 30 per cent of power and 50 per cent
18 of Bosnia
19 Do you remember that?
20 And they openly told them, You can't have 100 per cent of power
21 and 100 per cent of Bosnia
22 Do you remember?
23 A. I wasn't present when that was said, but I've heard it quoted
25 Q. Thank you. Can we now pay attention to your comment which I'm
1 going to read in English.
2 [In English] "It appears that Serbian President Milosevic is
3 attempting to appeal to the best interests of the Bosnian Serbs:
4 Pointing out that a major conflict with NATO is in nobody's interests
5 except Sarajevo
6 risk that NATO will not intervene to defend the designated ... areas.
7 "The Bosnian government reaction to the collapse of Gorazde has
8 been strong.
9 "Prime Minister Silajdzic has attacked the UN for failing to
10 execute its mandate to deter attacks on the safe areas, including
11 Gorazde. In a statement last night he said that the UNPROFOR had
12 betrayed Bosnia
13 Gorazde in return for a promise from the Serbs not to attack it."
14 [Interpretation] And then on the following page, again part of
15 your comment:
16 "[In English] The Bosnian government has long seen UNPROFOR's
17 presence here as a substitute for lifting the arms embargo."
18 [Interpretation] Looking at your comments can we say that they
19 confirm that the Muslims wanted to use you on their side during the war?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can we now look at page 7, please, in the same document. Can we
22 look at the comment again, which is a bit lower. The second sentence:
23 "[In English] By appearing to support hardline Presidency member
24 Ganic in his visit to Bihac, UNPROFOR lost credibility with Abdic's
25 people in the northern pocket."
1 [Interpretation] Does it arise from this that UNPROFOR was not on
2 the entire Muslim side but on the side of some Muslims, not on the side
3 of Abdic's Muslims but rather on the side of Izetbegovic's Muslims? Your
4 comment here is very insightful, I would say.
5 A. I must say I can't remember what I wrote the comment about.
6 Q. Well, let me give you the context. Ganic, who was a hard-liner
7 in the Presidency, had gone to Bihac to counter Abdic who was also a
8 Muslim and two-third or, rather, three-fourths of that province were in
9 favour of Abdic, but Abdic was a pro-European Muslim. You're saying that
10 maybe that should not have been done because UNPROFOR lost credibility
11 with Abdic's Muslims by supporting Izetbegovic's or Ganic's Muslims when
12 they made the visit to the 5th Corps possible. Do you agree with me?
13 A. I actually have to admit I can't remember the specific context,
14 but I can confirm that this is a document I wrote.
15 Q. Thank you. On page 8 there is Eastern Bosnia, and here are our
16 remarks, and a general comment, and I'm going to read in English.
17 "[In English] Srebrenica, long quiet, is more active than in
18 recent months.
19 "Serb commanders appear to be intent to [sic] stopping the
20 north-south flow of traffic between Srebrenica and Zepa ..."
21 [Interpretation] The following paragraph:
22 "[In English] There are reports of persistent provocations of
23 Dutch units in Srebrenica. The identity of the provocateurs is not
24 shown, though UNMOs suspect that BH soldiers are involved."
25 [Interpretation] You say that for a long time Srebrenica was
1 quiet, and then Serb commanders decided to interrupt the communication
2 between Srebrenica and Zepa when they realised that weapons were being
3 procured from there, and they also realised that UN troops had been
4 provoked by Muslim soldiers, at least according to UN observers; is that
6 A. Yes, that seems to be what it says.
7 Q. And now let's go back to Gorazde again. Muslims played a trick.
8 They led UNPROFOR members very far to their lines. Then they withdrew
9 very quickly and left them in our encirclement, and we were not aware of
10 that. Their lines collapsed, and their trick was a success; am I right?
11 A. I was not on the field at Gorazde. I was at the other end of the
12 radio with General Rose when the -- the two or was it the four of his
13 observers, his British observers that he called the joint JCOs, were
14 exposed by the Bosnian -- by the Bosnian withdrawal, and he certainly
15 shared your assessment that the withdrawal had been not forced by Serb
16 military pressure and that it may even have been the intent of that
17 withdrawal to expose his observers, one of whom I think died of his
19 Q. Thank you. However, the transcript doesn't say that the -- the
20 trick worked because ultimately we were bombed by NATO. That should be
21 reflected in the transcript.
22 1D982. Could we have that, please. General Janvier to the
23 United Nations.
24 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to tender that previous report?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly. However, I would
1 just like Mr. Harland to confirm that that was when we were bombed, on
2 that occasion. That's what the document says, a tank was hit, two
3 armoured vehicles, I think an ambulance was hit, too, and then
4 General Rose kept that photograph in his office and it said, "Bravo
5 NATO." Remember, an ambulance had been hit.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Do you remember that?
8 A. I certainly remember the -- a photo and General Rose's
9 commentary. The -- if I remember correctly, the close-air support
10 attacks that were made against the three Serb vehicles was -- was because
11 they had refused to comply with a demand from General Rose to
12 cease-firing, I think. It was not immediately related to the incident
13 that you were describing, which is the actual moment of the Bosnian
14 withdrawal that left the -- left the four -- the two or four British
15 observers exposed. But I must admit I can't remember exactly the
16 sequence, but I -- that's how I think it was.
17 JUDGE KWON: Unless it is objected to, the 16th of April report
18 will be admitted as --
19 MS. EDGERTON: And just to note, Your Honour, that report is one
20 of the associated documents referred to in Mr. Harland's statement from
21 paragraphs 104 to 108 mentioned in our original notification of 29 April.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Would you like it to be admitted as part
23 of Prosecution exhibit?
24 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be done.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will Exhibit P829.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. 1D982 is what we have now, although that's the old number. I
6 mean, 204 is the old number. 1D982 is the number, actually. So now I'd
7 like us to have 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 -- page 6. General Janvier's report.
8 It's the penultimate paragraph. I'll read it out in English, "Similar":
9 "[In English] Similar to what happened in Gorazde (spring 94)
10 the BiH can attempt to draw UNPROFOR including the rapid reaction forces
11 or NATO into the conflict on the BiH side. Sudden abandoning of
12 positions along the confrontation line, the simulation of a collapse of
13 the enclave or alarming reports from Bosnian side on the situation in the
14 enclaves will be indicators for this. A stronger involvement of the
15 international community could be interpreted by the Bosnian Serb army as
16 an incentive to step up operations and try to eliminate the enclave, as
17 well as retaliate against UN forces."
18 [Interpretation] Do you agree with this conclusion made by
19 General Janvier? I understand that you're not a military expert, but
20 this is a general question, after all.
21 A. I can confirm that that was the view of both General Rose and
22 General Janvier. I had my -- I had my doubts, I have to say, but I'm not
23 a soldiers, not a military expert.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the previous page,
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. This was sent on the 10th of July, 1995. The document was --
4 that's right. It is the 10th of July, 1995. That's when it was written.
5 And it has to do with Srebrenica as well.
6 Now, on this page it says "Military Assessment":
7 "[In English] By attacking the Srebrenica enclave, the Bosnian
8 Serb army probably wants to achieve the following aims:
9 "Reduce the size of the enclave in order to be able to free
10 assets for use in other -- in other conflict areas. Secure the road
11 links to the north, south-east, and south-west of the enclave.
12 [Interpretation] I'm going to miss one of them.
13 "[In English] Eliminate the threat of the B and H harassment.
14 Patrols, ambushes from the enclave, and increase the control over the
15 enclave. Establish full control over the bauxite mine located on -- on
16 this position.
17 [No interpretation]
18 "[In English] All BSA offensive activity has been concentrated on
19 the south-eastern part of the enclave and there are no reports of
20 advances in other areas."
21 [Interpretation] At the top it says that:
22 "[In English] Having previously being prevented from withdrawing
23 by the B and H -- was overrun by the B --"
24 [Interpretation] All right, this doesn't matter. It has to do
25 with the Dutch soldiers that were taken prisoner by the Muslims. We've
1 already discussed that.
2 So do you agree with the contention that General Janvier's
3 assessment completely corresponds to the position of the Serb army to
4 stop all links between Zepa and Srebrenica basically? Do you agree that
5 General Janvier assessed that very accurately, the initial intentions of
6 the Serb side?
7 A. This document, which was, it seems, sent on the 10th of July from
9 what, in my view, is not a very appropriate assessment of the -- of the
10 situation, and in general the -- if I can say so, the documents you have
11 you've shown from General Janvier give a version of events which is very
12 similar to how the Serbs were explaining it, but I think we saw it in
13 more complicated terms. In particular, this document says that the Serbs
14 probably wants to achieve the following aims: To reduce the size of the
15 enclave. But this was written on Monday, the 10th of July. The enclave
16 hardly existed on the Monday, the 10th of July. It had been reduced.
17 Within just over 24 house of this, the entire enclave would be wiped out,
18 but there's nothing in this assessment from General Janvier to Mr. Annan
19 that says the Serbs may be intending to eliminate the entire enclave of
20 Srebrenica even though by this point it's absolutely obvious that that's
21 what they wanted to do.
22 So with the fear of contradicting a military expert, I would say
23 this assessment was proved to be dramatically factually incorrect within
24 one day.
25 Q. Sorry, what was General Janvier's position? I seem to have
1 forgotten that.
2 A. Well, you've -- you showed a piece of text that showed that he
3 saw these -- ah, yeah, that it cannot be ruled out -- you -- you showed a
4 document which said -- gave his assessment that the Bosnian government
5 forces, the Bosniaks, the Muslims, were going to deliberately withdraw or
6 pretend to collapse in order to provoke some sort of NATO response,
7 and -- and that a -- that was -- and when you showed the document, I was
8 able to confirm that was his position.
9 Q. Thank you. When you say, We thought something different, what do
10 you mean when you say "we"?
11 A. Well, I thought something different.
12 Q. Thank you. Let me remind you. General Janvier says here that
13 actions are underway only at the south-east. That's the link between
14 Zepa and Srebrenica; right? South-east is the link between Zepa and
15 Srebrenica, and he says that that is the only place where there is
16 activity and where there are some advances that are being made, and
17 nowhere else. He is writing on the 10th about what he had received
18 concerning the 9th; isn't that right? So what we see here is the
19 situation on the 9th, because what is written on the 10th has to do with
20 what happened on the 9th; isn't that right?
21 A. Well, I didn't see the reporting period, but --
22 Q. 12.30 on the 9th -- on the 10th.
23 A. Yeah. By the 9th, the Dutch troops in Srebrenica were -- were so
24 alarmed -- were alarmed enough by the posture of the Serbs and the
25 advance of the Serbs that they had made five requests for air attacks,
1 and the main request for air attacks by NATO was sitting on
2 General Janvier's desk, and General Janvier never -- or did not approve
3 those attacks, including up to the day before the fall of Srebrenica.
4 And although I'm -- I may have seen this document before but I don't
5 remember it, although -- and this document certainly gives his
6 assessment, which is a substantial understatement of what the Serbs were
7 attempt to do, in my view.
8 It's by the way -- I mean, it is a small detail, it's not totally
9 factually correct that the Serbs were only attacking from the south-east.
10 By the 9th, they also controlled some high ground directly to the east.
11 I forget the name of the place, Hotonj, or Hotolj or something. It
12 begins with an H. But anyway, it's a detail. But certainly, I think, by
13 this point it's absolutely obvious that they've gone beyond just clearing
14 the road from Bosnian attack.
15 Q. Thank you. Perhaps it's better if I put specific questions so
16 that you can just give yes or no answers.
17 A witness from Srebrenica confirmed here that Srebrenica had not
18 been defended. Do you agree with that? He said that it was actually
19 abandoned on the 9th, which allowed the Serb forces to enter Srebrenica
20 and that that was confirmed in a telegram that we are going to tender
21 here one day, a telegram sent by General Tolimir to me asking whether
22 they have approval to enter Srebrenica; that is to say that they had
23 already left Srebrenica and stopped defending it. Do you agree with
25 A. If I remember correctly, the Serbs attacked Srebrenica on the
1 6th -- on the enclave of Srebrenica on the 6th of July, and I think what
2 you say may have been true after the 9th of July. I believe there was
3 resistance from the 6th to the 9th, but then also in what you say is also
4 what President Izetbegovic said, which is that the -- he was very
5 surprised by the lack of Bosnian army defence, particularly after the
7 Q. Thank you. I would just like to remind you of something.
8 Actually, I don't know whether you know about this. The position of the
9 Serb side was to push them back to the agreed borders of the Srebrenica
10 enclave. General Janvier perhaps assessed this on his own or had
11 intelligence to that effect. Do you agree that the position initially
12 was just to do that, not to take Srebrenica as such?
13 A. No. The attack began on the 6th. By the 7th, the Serbs were
14 well within the area that had been demarked by General Morillon as on
15 Bosniak territory, and then the Serbs continued to advance on the 7th,
16 the 8th, the 9th, 10th; and then on the 11th, they overran the place
17 completely. So I can't accept that statement, no.
18 Q. All right. We're going to prove that, that this action that
19 General Janvier says was primarily on the south, that is to say between
20 Zepa and Srebrenica.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this document now,
22 unless it's already become a Prosecution exhibit? No? 981, please.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Of course no objection, Your Honour, but one
24 question, actually. I'm just concerned about the continued reference to
25 this as being General Janvier's report when I note on the first page of
1 the document, although it might emanate from his office, it seems to have
2 been drafted by a Major Bridge and the releasing officer was
3 Colonel de Jonge, a G3.
4 JUDGE KWON: That is for the Chamber to assess later. It will be
5 admitted as?
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D137, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I note that General Janvier
9 also had his drafter, just like Mr. Harland was. When he was younger, I
11 6D03. That's an old number. 981 is our number, but any way, it
12 is the document.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that it is
15 already the 11th. Actually it says here the 10th of July, 1995, and this
16 is being written to Mr. Akashi by Mr. Annan. And now I'm going to read
17 the second paragraph.
18 [In English] "In light of the serious attack by the B and H on
19 the Dutch APCs, Riza called in the charge d'affaires of Bosnia and
21 emphasised that this action was particularly incomprehensible at a time
22 when UNPROFOR had taken a clear and assertive position to respond with
23 force against any further advance by the B and -- SA into the safe area
24 of Srebrenica."
25 [Interpretation] Do you agree that that attack on the Dutch APCs
1 by the Muslim army had, as its ultimate objective, again a ploy to
2 accused the Serbs? All of this was actually a ploy. There were a lot of
3 war tricks being played around Srebrenica.
4 A. No, I'm not sure I can agree with that. I think when the young
5 Dutch soldier was killed my -- I interviewed some of the people on both
6 sides around. I think it had been a sort of spontaneous act of sort of
7 fear and anger by the -- by the Bosnian defenders. This -- this one I
8 don't think was a -- I don't believe it was a trick. I also don't at all
9 agree with this assessment from Mr. Annan, but that's a separate matter.
10 Q. I think there is no risk now to disagree with Mr. Annan because
11 he's no longer in office.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Anyway, can we have this admitted.
13 Can we admit this document.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D138.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I now have 1D954, please?
17 This is a document from the Muslim side, from Zepa, dated the 5th of
18 February, 1992, at the very outset, and down here the 30th of October,
19 1994. So that was 1995 and this is 1994. And now let's look at page 2.
20 Do we have page 2? Yes, we do.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Now, in the Serbian version it's the fourth paragraph. Various
23 forms of disinformation. That is what it says in English.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you give me the date of this
25 document again? The transcript says February 1992; is it correct?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. The first part up there is
2 1995, but this document is the 30th of October, 1994.
3 THE WITNESS: There's also a mismatch between the Bosnian version
4 and the English version.
5 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the first page of this document again.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The first document -- the first
7 document is an accompanying letter. The 30th of January, 1995. The
8 ministry is referring to a document dated October 1994. So the first
9 part is a letter, and they are drawing the attention of the ministry to a
10 letter from October 1994. So now this other document is 1994.
11 If you agree, we are going to move on to page 2 now.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's move on.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. We are trying to find a paragraph in English starting with,
15 "Various forms of misinformation." You probably found it. Spread by
16 people from Avdo's delegation have had repercussions on the situation in
17 the Zepa Public Security Station. That's a police station, right?
18 Particularly information on the disbanding of the Zepa SJB as well as
19 information that so far, the 1st Zepa Light Brigade has received around
20 400.000 German marks and that this money is for the exclusive use for the
21 brigade and it's members, while other organisations in Zepa have no
22 resources at their disposal.
23 And then further down in the penultimate paragraph it says:
24 "The only thing that disturb the population was the conflict
25 between the commander of the brigade here and the command of the 8th
1 Operative Group regarding the way in which the Luka Company is operating.
2 Luka is a locality. And the negotiations that were held by the commander
3 of the brigade here at Bovsanica and what was discussed inter alia was
4 the autonomy of Zepa in the so-called Republika Srpska."
5 Do you agree that at the time Zepa was rather peaceful and that
6 they could even negotiate about a secession of hostilities, however,
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into
11 evidence, please.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D139.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D955, please.
15 And while we're waiting, this is the Supreme Staff of the armed forces of
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina sent to the 8th Srebrenica Group on the 9th of
17 November, 1994. On the first page of the document, paragraph 1, the plan
18 is -- in the English it's towards the bottom of the page:
19 "The plan is --"
20 "The plan is: Liberate in active combat actions part of the
21 temporarily seized territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina - the
22 municipalities of Bratunac, Vlasenica, Sekovici, Zvornik, and Kalesija,
23 and link the free territories of Zepa and Srebrenica with the free
24 territories of Zvornik, Kalesija, and Zivinice, in order to create a
25 permanent free corridor for the supply of the population and logistics
1 support to the units of the army of the RBH, and a basis for the further
2 liberation of North-eastern Bosnia
3 At the United Nations were you aware that all the events in
4 Srebrenica and Zepa were motivated with the idea of, as they term it,
5 liberation of Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Serbs?
6 A. Your first contention is certainly true, that the commanders of
7 Zepa had a relatively professional relationship with the surrounding Serb
8 units, and they sought a local cease-fire agreement. That was confirmed
9 to me by Commander Palic himself, Avdo Palic.
10 On the Srebrenica side, yes, it's certainly true. We were aware
11 that the Bosniaks wanted to attack and were attacking sometimes out of
12 the enclave. The nature of this document, however, is somewhat
13 delusional. I mean, it wildly overstates what is possible or realistic
14 military objectives for them.
15 Q. But this is sent by the Supreme Command Staff to Naser Oric as an
16 instruction for further -- actually, Main Staff is stating its intentions
17 to him. Wishes, intentions, however you want to put it.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please tender this document.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit D140.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can I have 1D956 now,
24 please. While we're waiting, this is the 1st Zepa Light Brigade, and
25 it's sending a telegram to Enver Hadzihasanovic, who is at the Kakanj
1 command post, and it states:
2 "Referring to your strictly confidential telegram with the above
3 reference number, we inform you of the following:
4 "Two sabotage operations were carried out in the Laze-Mislovo
5 sector. The actions were carried out on the 12th of December, 1994
6 "We suffered no losses and had no wounded in these sabotage
8 "The Chetnik side had five killed -- five killed, one of whom
9 was an officer."
10 And it's signed by Colonel Avdo Palic. Would you agree that they
11 should not have left the protected zone to go out and kill Serbs around
13 A. When you say they should not have, I should remind you that
14 according to our mandate, like it or not, that mandate was requiring all
15 forces except for the Bosnian government forces to withdraw from around
16 the -- the enclaves. Certainly it would have been useful if the sides
17 had entered into a viable cease-fire, but our view was that neither side
18 was interested in that.
19 Q. Thank you. We were interested. We could have used all those
20 units around Srebrenica elsewhere. Isn't that right? Would you agree;
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you. Now we're going to have to clarify this with some
24 military expert about whether the protected zones should have been
25 demilitarised or not. It is our view that they should have been
1 demilitarised. Otherwise, how would it be possible for the Serb forces
2 to withdraw while the Muslim side had all of these plans to liberate the
3 entire area? So wouldn't you agree that there should have been no danger
4 from without and from within the protected area; right? Would that make
5 sense? Doesn't it?
6 A. I would agree that if this Resolution 824 and 836 which was
7 basically directed against the Serb side, if it was going to be
8 implemented it would have required vastly greater forces than were made
9 available to UNPROFOR. So, yes, I think we can agree that there was a
10 basic problem with -- with the mandate there.
11 JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Harland, while the transcript is there,
12 your answer to the previous question was, "Yes." I'm asking for the
14 THE WITNESS: The previous question, the one about --
15 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters or the court reporter couldn't hear
16 because you were overlapping.
17 THE WITNESS: "We could have used all those" -- yes.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's proceed.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you and I would like to
20 tender this document, please. And I would also like to call up 1D957.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will be admitted as.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D141, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, the next document. I believe
25 that we have it. Yes. We have both versions here. Actually, it's in
1 English. I'm going to read it in English. This is also the 1st Zepa
2 Light Brigade, and it says: On the 31st of December, 1994, addressed to
3 Brigadier-General Enver Hadzihasanovic, and it states at the beginning:
4 "[In English] Everything has been done on our part per your
5 order and with a fair degree of success; the cargo was unloaded quickly,
6 transferred to a secure location and the tracks covered.
7 "UNPROFOR saw a helicopter entering the town and reported to the
8 commander in Zepa that three helicopters had landed in the vicinity of
9 Zlovrh (probably because they were circling during their descent). I
10 made every effort to keep UNPROFOR from doing anything to harm us, and I
11 will report on this to you when I have the time. This location for the
12 helipad was suggested to you by Brigadier Naser Oric."
13 Do you agree that Serbs do have cause for anger at the
14 international community because not only are helicopters coming here, but
15 it's also possible to ask the UNPROFOR commander not to take too much
16 noise on this and to report back about it. Do you agree?
17 A. Well, he doesn't say that he asks the UNPROFOR commander. At
18 least in the English version he said he made every effort to keep
19 UNPROFOR from doing anything to harm us. But certainly I can confirm and
20 President Izetbegovic acknowledged it directly that the government of
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina was very assertively violating the no-fly zone to
22 insert weapons and sophisticated resent weapons and they told me --
23 President Izetbegovic told me, trainers as well and personnel, yes.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
1 document, and I would also like to look at 1 --
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will be admitted.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D142, Your Honours.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next document is 1D958. I
5 would also like to ask the witness, Mr. Harland, as well as you.
6 We have a lot of documents confirm what has already been
7 confirmed. Well, after this document. We're going to look at this
8 document first, but there are several documents confirming the intense
9 supplies of weapons and equipment to the enclaves in order to continue
10 their military activities. Shall we go through them one by one, or can
11 we just admit them in a bundle? Mr. Harland can also go through them one
12 by one. It's up to you, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: I wonder whether Ms. Edgerton would agree with it.
14 MS. EDGERTON: I'd like a few moments to reflect on that,
15 Your Honour. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. You were informed of the kinds of
17 exhibits Mr. Karadzic is referring to?
18 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, and I've had a chance over the weekend to
19 look at most of them.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's move on for the moment.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We have the document
22 here, and routes and check-points in the area of responsibility of the
24 the ICRC and humanitarian organisations entered the Drina Corps zone of
25 responsibility and moved about therein on a daily basis during 1994 using
1 the following roads and then the roads are referred to below.
2 On the following page, following page --
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Actually, are you familiar with the roads that are referred to on
5 the first page, Karakaj, Zvornik, Bratunac, and so on and so forth?
6 A. In general, yes.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 2 now. We have
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. It states:
12 "Behaviour and abuse of mandate by UNPROFOR and humanitarian
14 And then second sentence:
15 "They're particularly frequent on the routes to the Muslim
16 enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa, and especially Gorazde."
17 And then the last sentence in that paragraphs:
18 "Up to 30 transits by convoys, teams, and individuals are
19 approved each day."
20 So up to 30 a day, or as many as 30 a day, and we're going to see
21 why. And then the following paragraph, no actually, we skip that one and
22 then we look at the other one:
23 "In 1994, as previously checks mostly revealed the following
24 attempts at abuse: Transport of goods which are not permitted at all in
25 UNPROFOR convoys, transport of goods which do not constitute humanitarian
1 aid in convoys of humanitarian organisations, transport of goods in
2 quantities greater than those permitted, attempts at border crossings
3 without approval of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska."
4 Do you know that numerous convoys or a certain number of convoys
5 committed such abuses?
6 A. No. Here is a point of disagreement: You said that the goods
7 were not permitted at all. You permit -- you said that we were trying to
8 cross the border without Bosnian Serb army approval, but we insisted on
9 the principle of freedom of movement. So this document merely states
10 that you had your position, but we had our position which was our mandate
11 from the Security Council.
12 Q. But I think that there was no misunderstanding there between the
13 UNPROFOR and the Army of Republika Srpska. A convoy had to be announced.
14 The precise number of vehicles, precise number of personnel, and the type
15 of goods; isn't that right? And it was understood that at least one
16 inspection or check would be done? Do you agree? This was something
17 that was agreed on.
18 A. The Serb side continuously abused the reasonable checks that we
19 agreed to. We would agree to one check of large cargo vehicles as they
20 entered Bosnian Serb army controlled territories, but this was constantly
21 being abused. We have many orders from General Milovanovic saying we
22 will not be allowed to move on Fridays, we will not be able to move
23 without an additional inspection, we will not be allowed to carry radios
24 in cars. There were extensive abuses of United Nations freedom of
25 movement in Serb territory, the basic effect of which was to weaken
1 UNPROFOR and to weaken humanitarian assistance in the enclaves that were
2 inside Bosnian Serb held territory.
3 Q. Thank you. But General Wahlgren writes into a document that
4 we're going to show here later, and also Mr. Akashi writes that Serbs
5 were willing to allow the convoys pass but were making a lot of noise if
6 we appeared at a different check-point or had an extra vehicle. Would
7 you agree that a soldier who was informed at Karakaj that a convoy would
8 cross there and the one at Cepi [phoen] has not informed about it, and
9 then if the convoy appears at Sevka, the guy there cannot let it pass.
10 And at Karakaj, if a convoy has 11 instead of 10 vehicles, the soldier
11 cannot let it pass. Do you agree that somebody does not have the
12 creative liberty to let through something that is not exactly as
14 A. No. The Serbs never wanted to put in place a clear simple system
15 that allowed us to have freedom of movement. They stole vehicles. They
16 abused our people, they shot at our vehicles, and the document you're
17 presenting does nothing except to confirm the very persistent bad
18 behaviour, illegal behaviour of the Bosnian Serb side.
19 Q. And now we're going to see why that was. You say that there were
20 no -- there was no smuggling and so on, and now we're going to look at
21 the following paragraph. Actually, it's a paragraph in the middle:
22 "There were such cases of the leaders of particular UNPROFOR
23 convoys acting aggressively and threatening the VRS inspection organs,
24 but they ceased after becoming aware of the determination of the
25 inspection organs to carry out the blocking measures announced, in
1 accordance with the instructions."
2 And then the next paragraph:
3 "Understandably, most cases of attempted smuggling of goods were
4 in the convoys for Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde, which had the fewest
5 options for being provisioned. Apart from humanitarian aid, the
6 following goods were those that were most smuggled, video cameras,
7 cameras, film, weapons, radio sets, satellite equipment and antennae,
8 signalling apparatus, optical devices, night vision apparatus, motor oil,
9 various parts for devices, anti-freeze, chemical manoeuvre, oxygen
10 cylinders, flack jackets, helmets, sleeping bags, military clothing and
11 footwear, and various items of food. Articles of food were smuggled for
12 the black market because their prices in the Muslim enclaves at one time
13 were significantly higher, and goods for military purposes are the result
14 of activities sympathetic to the Muslim side, in order to aid them in
15 obtaining scarce goods for the requirements of the army.
16 "There is no doubt that there would have been very few attempts
17 to smuggle banned goods if those had been confiscated permanently at the
18 check-points because temporary confiscation merely enforces delay and
19 leaves the actors the hope that they will succeed in getting them to
20 their destination at their next attempt, without any fear of the goods
21 being permanently lost.
22 "When representatives of UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations
23 complain about the procedures of the organs at the check-points, in the
24 majority of cases their aim is to use counter-accusations to lessen their
25 own responsibility owing to attempts to abuse their humane function and
1 play fast and loose with the mandate entrusted to them."
2 Do you remember that goods were not permanently seized but they
3 were temporarily confiscated and returned to those they were confiscated
4 from upon their return?
5 A. The accusations made here are absolutely false. If we were
6 bringing in video cameras, cameras, films, weapons, radio sets, satellite
7 equipment, antennae signaling apparatus, optical devices, night vision
8 apparatus, none of this ever appeared in the hands of the Bosnian
9 government. We were bringing equipment for United Nations military
10 personnel. When you say weapons, for example, you tried to stop the
11 Dutch from bringing in their own 20-millimetre machine-guns that were the
12 natural part of the armoured vehicles they had. You tried to stop us
13 from bringing in the radios and the communications assistance.
14 Was there some leakage from all of this onto the black market?
15 Of the military equipment, in my experience, never or almost never -- I
16 almost never found a Bosnian unit that had equipment that had come from
17 us. I saw Chinese weapons. I saw many weapons, but not that.
18 I would certainly agree that food aid was diverted partly to
19 members of the fighting forces or to the black market, but basically
20 these allegations are nonsense, and they are indicative of the
21 differences that were between us then.
22 I would say in answer to your last question that, no, in general
23 when convoys were looted or pillaged by you, in general they did not give
24 us back the equipment. In fact, I would often pass Serb -- through Serb
25 facilities and find that they were driving our vehicles, vehicles stolen
1 from us.
2 Q. I think, Mr. Harland, that each such case was clarified between
3 General Mladic and General Rose and later General Smith, but I don't see
4 any reasons for you to get angry, because it's possible that you didn't
5 know that. But this document is an internal army document. It's not
6 propaganda. This is an internal army document where the commanders are
7 informing each other about this. And later we're going to ask to have
8 this document tendered.
9 Now I want you to look at 1D967 so you can look at the Muslim
10 sources discussing co-operation with certain branches of the UNPROFOR on
11 the smuggling of very dangerous goods. 967, a document of the 23rd of
12 February, 1996. There's a mistake in the date here.
13 Can we look at page 4 of the document, please.
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. It's an analysis --
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Harland, did you want to comment upon the
18 accused's statement that it was an internal army document?
19 THE WITNESS: I would say that the -- the document is a perfect
20 illustration of the massive violation by the Bosnian Serb side of the
21 principle of freedom of movement which they kept affirming and
23 I should make one small correction to the record, though. Where
24 I said that I acknowledge that food aid would appear either with the
25 Bosnian government forces sometimes or on the black market, the other
1 item that would considerably appear in the black market would be fuel.
2 But this list of materials they give was simply materials we had a
3 minimal right to take for ourselves. And it's certainly not true what he
4 says, that all these issues were resolved between General Mladic and
5 General Rose and then between General Mladic and General Smith. We had
6 hundreds of vehicles in the end that were stolen and not returned and
7 many that were looted and the goods never recovered.
8 JUDGE KWON: 1D958 will be admitted.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D143, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Harland and the parties,
11 please bear in mind that one of the members of the Bench is following the
12 proceedings in French, which is much slower than English. So could you
13 put a bit more pause than you would expect between the question and
14 answers. Let's proceed.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. The document we have is an analytical overview about the
18 conditions of the fall of Zepa and Srebrenica address to the commander of
19 the Main
20 it's sent by Jusuf Jasarevic, and this is now page 4 that we are going to
21 look at. Actually, page 3 in English and page 4 in Serbian.
22 It states:
23 "Among the populations of Srebrenica, there is growing discuss
24 trust towards the civilian and military leadership. There was all kinds
25 of machinations with goods from humanitarian aid. As soon as Naser Oric
1 and the municipal officials, Osman Suljic, Adem Salihovic, and
2 Hamdija Fejzic were linked to this, there's information indicating that
3 these men smuggled humanitarian aid, weapons, oil, and so on and so
4 forth, and that they collaborated with members from UNPROFOR and even
5 with the aggressor in their smuggling activities," meaning the Serbs.
6 They're trying to say that it was with the Serbs.
7 And then on the following page, and I can repeat that if
8 necessary, but I think that you have it. And then it states on the next
10 "During his time in Srebrenica, Oric surrounded himself with
11 generally criminally-minded people such as Ejub Golic, commander of a
12 battalion; Ibrahim Mandzic, aka Mrki; Husein Aljukic, aka Behaija; a man
13 called Celo, who was his body-guard, and so on -- and others. These
14 people committed several crimes at Oric's behest."
15 And now, Mr. Harland, I believe that you didn't know about many
16 things, but Muslim documents, many of them, some of which we're going to
17 show you and some later, they received more food and more fuel than was
18 needed, than was essential, that they smuggled these items, bought them
19 from the United Nations, and that they also received and bought weapons
20 from the United Nations. How are you going to explain, for example, that
21 a convoy would have more of these flack jackets than there were UNPROFOR
22 soldiers who would be using them, and did you believe that the
23 Serbian Army did have reasons for concern knowing about the intentions of
24 the commanders of those three protected areas to conquer or, as they say,
25 liberate the entire North-eastern Bosnian?
1 A. No. I would say that the Serbs were looking for excuses to
2 strangle the enclaves. I have no doubt that there were criminal elements
3 among the leadership on the Bosnian side. We were well aware of it. But
4 it doesn't change the fact that the Serbs were massively interfering with
5 our freedom of movement in order to reduce our effectiveness and in order
6 to reduce the amount of humanitarian assistance that went to a deeply
7 suffering population.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 6 and 5 in
9 English, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. And while we're waiting for these pages to appear, Mr. Harland,
12 how many convoys passed? For example, there were 30 a day headed for the
13 enclaves. How many in total were recorded during the war? Discounting
14 UNPROFOR convoys. How many convoys were sent in the direction of
15 enclaves to provide for their needs? We're talking about thousands, are
16 we not?
17 A. The humanitarian situation was miserable. The people were cold
18 and hungry. I don't have immediately the number of the convoys or of
19 what they finally carried, but I can confirm to you that the situation,
20 the basic situation of the ordinary innocent civilians was -- was
21 miserable, and all the documents you've just shown simply confirm how you
22 manipulated it to increase their misery.
23 Q. We will see that that was not indeed the case. Things were
24 different. I'm asking you how many convoys went to the enclaves
25 throughout the war. Do you agree with me that over 10.000 planes landed
1 at Sarajevo
2 A. Probably. That sounds about right.
3 Q. There was on average eight to nine a day; right?
4 A. Probably, until you ordered it stopped in early 1995.
5 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient, shall we take a break now?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. We will continue after
7 the break.
8 JUDGE KWON: We will resume at 11.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. May I ask you to go back to a general picture. There were 10.000
15 and even more flights landing in Sarajevo. Those aircraft were all
16 within the range of Serb, Muslim, and other rifles, pistols. How many of
17 the 10.000 flights experienced any problems at all from the Serbian side?
18 A. A relatively small number were -- were shot at and received
19 bullets through the fuselage. Only one was shot down, I think, near the
20 beginning of the war. I think that was by Croats, probably. And then
21 sometimes we couldn't tell whether it was Serbs or Bosnians. A small
22 number. I don't have the exact figure.
23 Q. Thank you. You were right about that aircraft. That aircraft
24 near Fojnica was outside of the range of Serb weapons. I agree with you.
25 And now, throughout the 1.200 days or even longer while the
1 enclaves of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica existed, how many convoys
2 entered those enclaves, approximately?
3 A. Thousands.
4 Q. How many experienced problems? You can almost list them. They
5 were all recorded. They were wildly documented. CNN talked about them.
6 A. No. There were problems big and small, but really we had a major
7 problem and really a major problem with freedom of movement across Serb
8 territory into the enclaves. I would say there was systematic
9 interference both with UNHCR bringing humanitarian aid and with UNPROFOR
10 trying to give itself the basic supplies. You yourself just mentioned
11 the regular theft of flack jackets.
12 Q. First they would take them and then return them on the way back,
13 but we'll come back to that.
14 When it comes to the freedom of movement, we have information
15 from UNPROFOR that when they passed through the Muslim territory then
16 they would be in APCs and then when they reached the Serb territory they
17 would get out. They would be out of the APCs because APCs used to be
18 very uncomfortable and hot during the summer. Would you agree that they
19 felt more at ease in the Serbian-controlled territories than they did in
20 the Muslim-controlled territories?
21 A. No. I would say first the most difficult places were always
22 crossing the confrontation line. Second most difficult places were the
23 internal check-points, including the Serb check-point at Rogatica was a
24 major problem for us. But your general point that the Serb forces were
25 more disciplined is, I think, correct.
1 Q. Thank you. However, let me try and put some numbers to the whole
2 picture. Of the thousands of convoys, how many had to go back? I know
3 of just one, in Rogatica. Women sent it back from Rogatica. As far as I
4 know, all the others were able to pass through with or without problems
5 or with some smaller or bigger problems. Do you agree?
6 A. No. We -- I -- this I insist on. There was a systematic attempt
7 to block our freedom of movement, to limit the amount of humanitarian aid
8 that reached the suffering populations and to allow UNPROFOR to do its
9 job. It happened in Rogatica. It happened in Hadzici. It happened --
10 in the end, you closed down almost everything, and to get any convoys
11 into Sarajevo
12 being shot at by your forces. So we have a different memory of the
13 freedom of movement situation.
14 Q. You will see that it was Muslim forces who opened fire, according
15 to your sources and Muslim sources, but let's look at a document, and I'm
16 reading -- this is the same document, Muslim analysis, which says:
17 "At the time of Chetniks' attacks on Zepa on the 9th of July,
18 1995, about 6.500 people resided in the area. Just like the members of
19 the 285th Light Brigade were well -- they were well supplied with all
20 types of foodstuffs. In addition, information gathered to date indicates
21 that the co-operation between civilian and military authorities of Zepa
22 and the Ukrainian Battalion which was deployed in the Zepa sector was
23 good up to the beginning of the beginning of the Chetnik offensive.
24 After the commander of this UNPROFOR battalion crossed over to the
25 Chetnik forces, meaning the Serb forces, the new commander of the
1 Ukrainian Battalion handed over all the weapons at his disposal to our
2 soldiers, and these were immediately used to defend Zepa. According to
3 several displaced persons from Zepa, he even sent false reports to
4 UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo
5 Battalion had been directly attacked and requested NATO air-strikes
6 against the Chetniks."
7 Mr. Harland, do you see that the Muslim forces permanently
8 resorted to all sorts of ploys, these ploys worked, and that's why we had
9 to worry about the things that you might have had, because all those
10 things could have been seized from you at any moment and sold on on the
11 black market. Do you see the document? Do you agree with all that?
12 A. Well, this document says that he sent a false report to UNPROFOR
13 command in Sarajevo
14 recall receiving the report that weapons had been seized by the
15 defenders. So maybe I was one of the ones who was deceived there.
16 Q. Thank you. I believe that we can remove this document. However,
17 I would like to say, Mr. Harland, that the concern on the part of one
18 military about what UNPROFOR was in possession of, that could easily
19 become the position of their enemy, the other military, is a legitimate
20 concern. Would you agree with that?
21 A. No. There was no transfer of weaponry from UNPROFOR to the
22 Bosnian forces directly. I mean, I can't say there was no -- absolutely
23 zero criminal activity, but there was no significant element of that.
24 What is true is that UNPROFOR was planning to directly use force against
25 the Serbs, but only as a result of years and years of types of
1 obstructions that you have just been illustrating.
2 Q. Thank you. I wanted to spare both you and the United Nations
3 from showing some documents, both Muslim and yours. However, you called
4 for it.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document please be
6 admitted, and can we now see 669 on our screens. P10669. 10669. I
7 believe that it is already in evidence, and, Your Excellency, was the
8 previous document admitted into evidence, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 96 --
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it is.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 1D967 will be Exhibit D144.
13 JUDGE KWON: And was the Exhibit 65 ter number 10669,
14 Ms. Edgerton? Do you follow?
15 MS. EDGERTON: Not yet, Your Honour. I'm still on the last
16 document, but I'll move with alacrity.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, that's not it. 10669. That's
18 the P number. P10669.
19 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it has been admitted into evidence
20 yet. My e-court says so. Let's proceed. Is that the right document,
21 Mr. Karadzic?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. And this is its English
23 version. And Oric's document has been admitted, the one in which he
24 threatens that he will execute the prisoners. That was a long time ago,
25 and that's only the Serbian version. And as for this document, we only
1 have the English version.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. This is your document. You drafted it together with
4 Victor Andreev, or on behalf of Victor Andreev who sent it to
5 Cedric Thornberry. Let's look at the last paragraph on page 1. I'm
6 going to read in English:
7 [In English] "The inference of organised crime appeared to have
8 reached unprecedented levels especially in Sarajevo."
9 You recognise your own words, don't you.
10 A. Yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the top of the second
12 page, please, starting with the "Rump B and H." I will need the entire
13 page, but for the time being, let it be like this.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. [In English] "Muslim radicals appear to be gaining the upper hand
16 at the expense of moderates who favour a multinational B and H society.
17 BH controlled Sarajevo
18 Muslim. The non-Muslims are being replaced in government by Muslims, and
19 non-Muslims are increasingly uncomfortable.
20 "Organised crime appears to be spiraling out of control in
22 facilities being used as conduits for black market goods. Civil affairs
23 personnel have also been touched (the local Mafia have evicted Daljeet
24 Bagga from his apartment at 5 minutes' notice; threatening calls have
25 been made to civil affairs by black marketeers wanting press cards)."
1 [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, I think that at that time you were
2 a lot less biased than you are today in the courtroom, and in here you
3 qualify the situation in Sarajevo
4 hedging unnecessarily. Would you agree?
5 A. No, I'm not. My position is not much different from when it was.
6 I just don't think that the criminalised element of what was going on in
7 Bosnian government territory justified any of the terrible things
8 happening on the other side. I was equally critical I like to think.
9 Q. Thank you. And can we scroll down and start reading from the
10 paragraph beginning with "The food situation":
11 [In English] "The food situation continues to be confusing.
12 Convoy deliveries have increased recently, but the distribution by the BH
13 government to Sarajevo
14 this food is diverted to the military and a smaller amount re-surfaces on
15 the black market. The bulk of the missing aid (perhaps 60 per cent),
16 remains unaccounted for. Speculation is that the BH government is
17 stockpiling it."
18 [Interpretation] Do you remember this part of your report?
19 A. Yes. We had a statistician working on this problem, but I must
20 say we even didn't get so much co-operation from UNHCR in our
22 Q. Thank you. That's why I'm saying that you don't have to defend
23 yourself, because you did not have to know everything, but we knew it.
24 Do you agree that we knew how well supplied they were?
25 A. I'm -- I don't know, but I can believe it.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document please be
3 admitted into evidence?
4 JUDGE KWON: I note that's one of the documents proposed by the
6 MS. EDGERTON: Quite so, Your Honour. Quite so.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted as part of Prosecution
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P830, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: While we are for another document, can we go back to
11 the previous document which was admitted as Exhibit P144 or 1D00967.
12 While that document will be appearing in our monitor,
13 Mr. Karadzic, I noted that the date on the cover page seems somewhat odd,
14 as it is dated as -- as February 1995 while dealing with the fall of
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the beginning, I said that there
17 is a printing error. It is obviously the year 1996, February 1996.
18 There's a typo in the document. This is a subsequent analysis of the
19 fall of the enclave.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's move on.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise, which document did you
22 say that --
23 JUDGE KWON: Move on to your next topic. I wanted just clarify
24 this date.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce
1 09599, just briefly. I'm interested in one paragraph only.
2 Yes. Very well. And in this document I'm interested in page 3.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. This document, as we can see, was drafted by yourself, and
5 Mr. Andreev sent it to Cedric Thornberry, according to a customary
6 procedure. This is one of the more common documents and let's read from
7 the paragraph starting with the BM media. That's 1, 2, 3, 4, 5th
8 paragraph from the top of the page.
9 "[In English] [Overlapping speakers] The BH media is bringing
10 the UN for many of its wars, including organised crime. Ukrainian and
11 French troops allegedly conduct a wide range of black market and other
12 illegal activities in Sarajevo
13 public. The allegation may be well-founded."
14 [Previous translation continues] ... [overlapping speakers]
15 "[In English] BH snippers have been firing on UN personnel and
16 around UNPROFOR's forward headquarter. Two Bosnian snippers have been
17 firing, not only at the UN personnel, but also at local pedestrians in
18 the vicinity. First call claimed that these snipers are renegades,
19 supporters of Caco."
20 [No interpretation]
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. The small number of maybe 1 or 2 per cent of --
23 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, you're so fast the interpreters missed
24 your question. As a result. It was not translated. Although
25 Mr. Harland was able to answer. What was your question, Mr. Karadzic?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was whether he
2 remembers this report, the report about those events. That was the
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's move on. Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. I'm not attacking either you or the United Nations. However, we
7 can see from all of those examples that the Serbian military did have a
8 good reason for concern and that it had to take into account and be fully
9 aware of what was being supplied to the other side. And according to our
10 estimates, there was plenty of food, but the food was abused, sold on the
11 black market, and that the high stations of power participated in that.
12 Would you agree that all of the above arises from your report?
13 A. No, I wouldn't agree that all the above arises because of my
14 report. I would say yes it is true that there was some black market
15 activity, including by some members of UNPROFOR. For example, the
16 selling of fuel, diesel fuelling from the Ukrainian base headquarters in
18 of extremely limited food and other necessities of daily life caused by
19 the -- the siege.
20 You didn't ask any question about the second paragraph you read,
21 I think.
22 Q. This talks about sniping activities against UNPROFOR and their
23 own civilians. According to the 1st Corps, those were renegades which
24 supported Caco. That was the answer given to you by them; isn't that
1 A. That is what they told us, yes.
2 Q. And you will probably remember that Caco was under the direct
3 command of Alija Izetbegovic, who even visited him in his headquarters,
4 as we will see in some of the documents; right?
5 A. I'm not sure that Caco was under the control of anybody during
6 this rather wild phase of September and October of 1993.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document please be
9 admitted, Your Excellency. What did you say about one of the previous
10 documents? You said something.
11 JUDGE KWON: This is also included in the Prosecution's list and
12 has been admitted already. And the number is?
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document has been admitted as
14 Exhibit P823.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Now, Mr. Harland, I would like to go briefly to -- through some
18 documents speaking about the armament of the enclaves. We don't have to
19 see all of them, but we don't have to waste a lot of time. I would like
20 to call 1D959. While this is being produced, I would like to introduce
21 it to you. This is a report, a text, rather, which was submitted to the
22 8th OG in Srebrenica, to the attention of Naser Oric, and it was sent by
23 General Hadzihasanovic on the 2nd of February, 1995. 1D959.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's it.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. And while we're waiting for the English version, I'm going to
2 read in Serbian.
3 "Immediately arrange for the reception of the helicopter at the
4 agreed location (building fires) and so on and so forth. This shipment
5 will be delivered by helicopter in two rounds and it shall be distributed
6 as follows:"
7 And now there's a list of all the ammunition and equipment that
8 they will be provided with. Do you see the document, and do you agree
9 that that's exactly how things transpired?
10 A. I see the document. I can't confirm this specific document, but
11 it generally accords with our understanding of how weapons were
12 transferred into Zepa and Srebrenica, yes.
13 Q. Thank you. Perhaps we can move a bit faster now.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As --
17 THE WITNESS: I'm surprised how cigarettes got on the list of
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D144.
20 JUDGE KWON: I take it should be 145?
21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, 145.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Exhibit D145.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D961, please. Then 962, so that
24 we can move fast. This is in Serbian.
25 Mr. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. So on the 13th of February, 1995, yet again this is a report
2 concerning 150 rifles, RPGs for Srebrenica, Zepa, and also it says:
3 "Rifles are to be handed over to the indicated manoeuvre brigade,
4 the money, 3.000, 8.000 German marks that Brgulja took over from the
5 pilot is to be handed over to the OG-8 Srebrenica Command."
6 Do you see this document? Does that fit into what you knew?
7 A. Generally, yes.
8 Q. Thank you. Can it please be admitted.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes. Ms. Edgerton, you have an observation.
10 MS. EDGERTON: No, no objection, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, it will be Exhibit D146.
13 JUDGE KWON: And do you have objection to 1D962?
14 MS. EDGERTON: No.
15 THE REGISTRAR: 1D962 will be Exhibit D147, Your Honour.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Did UNPROFOR try to control this influx of weapons and military
18 equipment into Srebrenica?
19 A. We had a -- a so-called no-fly zone policy, and we did have an
20 arrangement with NATO which gave them a general authorisation to
21 intercept and destroy non-cleared aircraft, but it was very easy for
22 helicopters on short flights to evade the no-fly zone or to evade
23 detection and interception.
24 Q. Thank you. This is a similar document dated the 16th of
25 February. This is a third flight into Zepa in the month of February
1 carrying a lot of weapons, and it says here:
2 "The shipment that was announced has arrived.
3 "The aircraft has been hit and is now in Zepa. You or your
4 deputy should come, if you can, with your men to take it over and to
5 clarify some issues on the spot. Do it when I send you the signal
6 Mjesec. That's a code isn't it. Do not send anyone now before the
7 aircraft takes off. For security reasons, be very cautious of UNPROFOR,
8 the column with the cargo should absolutely move at night only. The
9 previous group was detected by UNPROFOR with all the cargo and manpower
10 between Vukoljin Stan and Sarena Bukva."
11 So you seen how intensive the arming was in February, the arming
12 of Zepa and thereby Srebrenica as well. Do you agree that this had to
13 alarm the Serbian Army to the effect that something was in the making?
14 A. There was a considerable movement of weaponry, yes.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into
17 evidence. Oh, it already has been admitted. 1D965. Could that please
18 be admitted or, rather, could that be called up in e-court.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. This is information by way of a response signed by
21 Brigadier Naser Oric. General, rather. And he is sending it to the
22 Main Staff, to Enver Hadzihasanovic, and he said that command of the
23 Srebrenica OG has recently received the following materiel and technical
24 equipment in Zepa and delivered it to Srebrenica as per your memo, et
25 cetera, et cetera. And then there's a list of everything they received
1 over that period of time. This is the 17th of February. You see that
2 there is ammunition here, mines, 60 millimetres, cables for tank crews,
3 hand grenades. There are cigarettes too. Not that many, but yes.
4 Anyway, do you agree that all of this happily arrived in Zepa and
5 Srebrenica and was ready to be used against the Serbs?
6 A. I can't confirm this exact document or shipment, but it generally
7 accords with our understanding, yes.
8 Q. Do you agree that UNPROFOR was, in all fairness, supposed to
9 prevent that arming of Zepa and Srebrenica? Somehow the Muslims
10 succeeded to do this, during the night or whatever, as if there weren't
11 any restrictions; right?
12 A. No. The previous document, in fact, confirms one of the Bosnian
13 commanders expressing great anxiety because UNPROFOR was interdicting the
15 To your second question, I would simply say I think you and I
16 both know who was the main violator of the free -- the no-fly zone, and a
17 relatively small number of Bosnian flights escaped, but not nearly as
18 many as those of your own.
19 Q. Well, that's a bit tu quoque, as we say; right? But it is a
20 fact -- well, I'm not saying that UNPROFOR allowed it, but they
21 nevertheless did succeed in deceiving UNPROFOR and arming Zepa and
22 Srebrenica; right?
23 A. Zepa and Srebrenica were, by the moment they fell, not at all
24 well armed from what our personnel in Srebrenica and Zepa could see.
25 It's certainly true that some material got through, but they were not
1 well armed.
2 Q. But in one of the previous documents, an analysis of the fall of
3 Zepa, they say that they had enough food, enough ammunition, and in
4 addition to that they took the weapons of the Ukrainian Battalion; right?
5 A. I think both in Srebrenica and in Zepa the defenders had small
6 arms, not enough for every soldier, but they had small arms and they had
7 ammunition. President Izetbegovic expressed to me his frustration that
8 they weren't able to use effectively the few medium weapons they had, the
9 antitank rockets and so on.
10 Q. However, he did admit to you that he sent sophisticated weaponry
11 to Zepa and Srebrenica; isn't that right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this document been admitted,
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. 965. Actually, I'm asking for
18 968 to be called up in e-court.
19 JUDGE KWON: 1D965 will get admitted as?
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D148, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE KWON: While we are waiting for the next document,
22 Mr. Karadzic, I'm of the opinion, of the view that all of these facts, in
23 particular relating to the arming of the Srebrenica or Zepa enclave,
24 would not be objected to by the Prosecution, so you may wish to think
25 about sitting yourself, or your legal advisors may sit with the
1 Prosecution and discuss and produce all the agreed facts. That will save
2 us a lot of time.
3 The Chamber is minded to arrange a kind of 65 ter meeting in
4 which we'll encourage the parties to agree upon as many facts as
5 possible. So think about it, and let's proceed.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's not that they sat and
7 discussed this, but they did discuss it over the break on their feet.
8 The Prosecution wanted these documents to be shown nevertheless. 968,
9 967, 970, 971, 972, all of these documents speak of significant
10 quantities of weapons and ammunition, and it's regular.
11 On the 25th of February, and sophisticated weaponry, rockets,
12 RPGs, nitroglycerine, ammunition for breaking fortifications, and so on.
13 All of this indicates that there was a great deal of activity going on.
14 One of the dates is the 4th of March. Then also mines. 82 millimetre,
15 60 millimetres, launchers. 971 on the 21st of April, also lots of
16 ammunition. On the 27th of April as well. Significant quantities of
17 weapons and ammunition.
18 If you agree, if everyone agrees, the Trial Chamber, the
19 Prosecution and the witness, all of these documents could be admitted
20 into evidence because they are authentic and they show this exceptional
21 rhythm of arming Zepa and Srebrenica. And in the summer of 1995, it will
22 become evident that all of that was done with the objective of starting
23 an offensive from these enclaves.
24 Can we agree on having all of these documents admitted? They all
25 speak of the same thing, but it's just a question of rhythm.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. That's not quite consistent
3 with the very brief discussions that we had with Mr. Sladojevic during
4 the break. We indicated we wanted to see the documents at issue, and we
5 certainly agreed to look them over and accepted the possibility of
6 agreeing to their admission but not before we had a chance to hear which
7 ones were at issue and what the proposed relevance in.
8 In general, we -- we're happy to follow the guidance of the Court
9 as recently -- as just enunciated a few moments ago. So, no, we didn't
10 reach an agreement on the admission of those documents. I accept it
11 certainly in principle that possibility, but we indicated clearly to
12 Mr. Sladojevic, who I think understood and agreed with that approach,
13 that we'd have an opportunity to see which ones they had in mind and look
14 them over quickly first.
15 JUDGE KWON: The issue was not whether there was an agreement but
16 you would -- but whether or not you were opposed to the admission of
17 those documents.
18 MR. TIEGER: That -- sorry, Your Honour. That's the point that,
19 we would take a position on it once we had an opportunity to see which
20 ones they had in mind and -- and look them over and see what the
21 relevance was.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Very well.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. We have 1D968 here, dated the 25th of February, 1995. Yet again
1 this is a response. It is from Srebrenica about everything they had
3 Sir, do you see that? Do you see all the things that they
4 received in Srebrenica? The first and the second and the third. There
5 is boots, camouflage uniforms, 220 kits, 190 pairs of boots. That's on
6 the third page. But do you see the first page here?
7 This report is being submitted to the Main Staff, to the
8 General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are providing
9 information to the General Staff as to all the things that they have
10 received in the meantime. Do you agree?
11 A. Again, I can't confirm this particular report, but it does
12 confirm our general understanding that a certain amount of light weaponry
13 and materiel was being transported into the enclaves, yes.
14 Q. Thank you. Well, it's a very considerable quality -- quantity.
15 Can we look at page 4 now so as to see what Naser Oric is saying? The
16 last page. The last page in English as well:
17 "As for all helicopter flights and the transport of materiel and
18 technical resources from Zepa to Srebrenica, the enemy found out all
19 about that from the deserters who deserted to the Republic of Serbia
20 who told the enemy everything about all activities.
21 "On the 10th of February, 1995, three prostitutes who had spent
22 ten days in UNPROFOR for -- 30 days, I think, were discovered and
23 detained in Zepa. During their interrogation, they described the entire
24 situation and basic combat activity plans, so I, therefore, propose that
25 the axis be changed. It can be done from the direction of Zepa and
2 At any rate, you are not disputing what Naser Oric says in his
4 A. I have my doubts about this final paragraph. There were no
5 Russians anywhere near Zepa. There were Ukrainians, but there were no
6 Russians that I remember.
7 Q. But there were some prostitutes there; right?
8 A. I didn't notice, but I did notice there were no Russians.
9 Q. Well, I believe that for them Russians and Ukrainians are one and
10 the same thing.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
13 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit Number D149.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Just two or three more, very brief. 1D966. Could we have that
18 called up in e-court. It is also a Muslim document we are still waiting
19 for it 1D966. This is an order to take measures to raise combat
20 readiness of units, and it is sent to Operations Group 8, and copies are
21 sent to Operation Groups 6 and somebody else, and I can't really read
22 that. So anyway, the General Staff is the command of the 2nd Corps, the
23 Tuzla Corps, and Srebrenica and Zepa belong to them.
24 Now, what does it say here? I'm going to read it in Serbian:
25 "On the 16th of February, the aggressor put a request before
1 UNPROFOR to declare Zepa a non-demilitarised zone with the following
4 "Helicopter fly-overs, transporting ARBiH weapons and ammunition
5 have been registered.
6 "ARBiH movements have been observed in the Zepa area.
7 "Members of the Ukrainian Battalion are accused of concealing the
8 activities and measures of the Army of B and H which is why they are no
9 longer guaranteed safety."
10 The last paragraph:
11 "On the basis of all the above, the aggressor informed the
12 UNPROFOR command's Sector Sarajevo that unless Zepa is declared a
13 demilitarised zone, they will begin offensive combat operations within
14 seven days. The dead-line for the ultimatum expires on the 23rd of
15 February, 1995."
16 Do you see that, namely that the Army of Republika Srpska was
17 fully aware of this? This is the 17th of February. Amidst all of this
18 arming, the Army of Republika Srpska fully realised what was going on,
19 and they asked for Zepa to be considered a non-demilitarised zone.
20 A. Yes. The Serbs expressed the same concern to us.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. This document can be
22 admitted and could we now call up 1D970.
23 JUDGE KWON: D150.
24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, excuse me.
25 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: As a matter of customary procedure, I -- I don't
2 want to indicate that we'll be able to work in this fashion repeatedly;
3 that is, documents announced on the spot for a kind of submission without
4 presentation. But we're doing our best to accommodate now in view of
5 time concerns. So this is a document to which we have no objection. So
6 what I indicated before, the general approach of letting us know in
7 advance so we can -- what the document -- the list of documents are and
8 what the proposed relevance is, we stand by, but in this case we've been
9 able to move forward quickly, and I wanted to let the Court know to save
11 JUDGE KWON: So you are not opposing to the admission of the
12 documents referred to by the accused previously. That means 967, 970,
13 971, 972.
14 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. They will be admitted. Could we assign
16 the numbers for those exhibits.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. 970 will be Exhibit D151.
18 971 -- 1D971 will be Exhibit D152. And 1D972, will be Exhibit D153.
19 1D967 has already been admitted as D144.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D340, could we have
22 that document now, please. It is also a document from the Muslim army.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Let us just identify the first page and then we are going to move
25 on to the fourth page of the document. Yes, that's the first page. And
1 now could we have page 4, please.
2 JUDGE KWON: Do we have the English translation?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think so, so I'm just going
4 to read out what is marked here. However, we are going to ensure that
5 there is a translation eventually. I'll read slowly for the benefit of
6 the interpreters.
7 So this is it:
8 "A reliable source has made it known to us that over these past
9 few days in the Raguza cafe in the street Prkos a few citizens were
10 discussing matters with members of the French Battalion from UNPROFOR
11 concerning transfers by aircraft to foreign countries. The price of this
12 'arrangement' was 1.500 dinars."
13 THE INTERPRETER: Says the speaker, interpreter's note.
14 Mr. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
15 Q. This is a document of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
16 12th of December, 1993.
17 You were already there by then. Do you know that things like
18 that were being done?
19 A. I doubt that's correct.
20 Q. However, there's no doubt that this was written by the Main Staff
21 or, rather, the Muslim army, that that was the kind of information that
22 was contained in their bulletin; right?
23 A. They were wrong about many things.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
25 JUDGE KWON: The number of this document is 1D340.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like it to be MFI'd.
2 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, the document has not been addressed
4 or adopted by the witness in any kind of meaningful way or any manner
5 that might be of assistance, in my submission, to the resolution of the
6 issues. I'd object to its admission.
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification for the time being,
8 and we'll deal with it at the end of this session when we come to the
9 issue of the admissibility of documents. For the time being it will be
10 marked for identification as number what?
11 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D514. While we're
14 waiting for that, may I tell you that that is also the security
15 administration of Main Staff of the Army of Bosnia and hearse, and the
16 date is the 7th of September, 1993. We don't have a translation yet
17 again, so we will just have it marked for identification. Let's just
18 identify the first page and then we'll move on to page 3.
19 So this is the document, and now we can move on to page 3.
20 Right. That is the part that is marked. I'm going to read slowly in
22 "The sector of the military security of the 1st Corps," that's
23 the Sarajevo Corps, "has information to the effect that there is more
24 intensive interest by UNMOs towards the 1st Motorised Brigade and the
25 2nd Vitez Motorised Brigade. The head of the monitoring mission UNMO in
1 Sarajevo Dzon Mekroj persisted in his request to tour the front line of
2 the 1st Motorised Brigade. And the representatives of the UNMOs insist
3 on establishing co-operation with police stations especially in Vogosca,"
4 et cetera, et cetera.
5 A bit further down it also says:
6 "These UNMOs also indicated during discussions that between them
7 and members of the UNPF there is antagonism allegedly, pointing out that
8 they inform their superiors objectively. They report to them in an
9 objective fashion, but that most of their information is censored at the
10 command in Zagreb
11 on in the UN. As for this possible discrepancy between UNMO and UNPF in
12 the area of Sarajevo
13 on the part of UNMOs for awareness by our units pertaining to crimes
14 committed by UNPF members. And then in parentheses it says black market,
15 alcohol, drugs, prostitution.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Harland, now I seem to understand a bit more. It becomes
18 clearer what you said, that there was a difference between UNMOs and
19 UNPROFOR. It seems that you were realising what the other side was
20 doing; right?
21 A. Yes. It seems to confirm that others also thought there was some
22 difference sometimes between the UNMO reports and the battalion reports,
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we MFI this document, this
25 document 514, please.
1 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
2 MS. EDGERTON: Fine, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: This will be marked for identification pending
5 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D702, please. I'm
7 sorry, that one doesn't seem to be on the list. Can we look at 1D964,
9 This is a regular daily combat report of the command of the Light
10 Infantry Brigade, dated the 16th of February, 1995, sent to the
11 Drina Corps command, and it states that at approximately 500 hours, the
12 part that has been marked, to the direction of Srebrenica -- from the
13 direction of Srebrenica to the Zlovrh sector two helicopters landed who,
14 after staying there for ten minutes, returned towards Srebrenica again,
15 from which activity -- based on the activity undertaken by the enemy side
16 in the Zepa and Gorazde enclaves, it can be concluded that the Muslims
17 are preparing an attack from the enclaves which can take part imminently.
18 It is quite certain that Muslim forces are arming themselves intensively
19 and preparing to continue the war with the objective of capturing
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Would you agree that that was a valid assessment and a well
23 grounded one?
24 A. This is an assessment by the Serb forces of the intentions of
25 the -- of the Bosnian army, yeah. Yeah.
1 Q. Yes, yes. Looking at these helicopter flights, on the basis of
2 that the Serbian Army, the local brigade commander, is assessing or
3 informing the command that something seems to be underway. Thank you.
4 In item 3 you can see here, I will read it:
5 "The following convoys and international organisations have
6 passed through the check-point at Rogatica during the day. UNHCR convoy
7 going from Zepa to Belgrade
8 A team of the civilian police, four members with two vehicles, on the
9 Gorazde-Sarajevo route. Ukrainian convoy number 16-187/02 on the
10 Sarajevo-Gorazde route comprising one truck with two soldiers. Ukrainian
11 convoy number 16-185/02 on the Sarajevo-Zepa route, composed of one truck
12 with two soldiers. Ukrainian convoy number 16-182/02 on the
13 Sarajevo-Zepa route composed of three trucks with --"
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we have -- we seem to have difficulty
15 with the French translation, so let us wait till Judge Lattanzi will have
16 got the French translation.
17 Will it be okay.
18 JUDGE LATTANZI: It's okay.
19 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed, but ...
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. So during one day, we have one, two, three, four, five, six,
23 seven, eight, nine, ten convoys on this notorious Rogatica check-point.
24 And if you would agree, over the 1.300 days of the war there was a very
25 small number of these misunderstandings in percentages regarding convoys.
1 Would you agree with that? If you say that you don't agree, perhaps
2 we're going to have to count them. Perhaps not with you, but perhaps
3 count each one. But anyway, I would like you to see that this was in the
4 context of the arming of the Muslim side and the -- the fact that the
5 convoys were being allowed through freely.
6 A. No, I don't agree, and in fact there is a -- there's a document,
7 your Directive 7, signed by you, which states that the goal of Serb
8 forces for 1995 will be to strangle the enclaves, and that is completely
9 consistent with what we viewed, and these restrictions which were very
10 widespread were just manifestations of that intention. There were gross
11 violations. For example, they would arbitrarily say nobody's allowed to
12 move on Friday, whatever the humanitarian need, whatever the urgency. Or
13 they would say nobody's allowed to move at all unless you provide us with
14 a huge amount of fuel supposedly for road maintenance.
15 So I think we will not agree on the subject of freedom of
17 Q. Well, look, that will be a big issue, these Directives 7 and 4
18 for which we have quite satisfactory illumination and explication.
19 However, the directive that you referred to, Directive 7, was issued on
20 the 17th of March, and all of this is before that directive. So the
21 directive has nothing to do with that; is that right?
22 A. The directive was an illustration of a policy. And certainly
23 though you are correct that the restrictions became even tighter until
24 eventually they cut off some of the -- a lot of the convoy movement. For
25 example, they blocked all access in and out of Sarajevo, and we wouldn't
1 even have been able to feed the population if we hadn't been willing to
2 bring the convoys over Mount Igman
4 Q. Well, you are defending the United Nations, and I'm defending
5 Republika Srpska, and you will see now that I am right.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we Prosecution document 21139.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. And you will see that this is not true either. After
9 Directive 7, that on the 26th of April, 1995, from Akashi to Annan. So
10 Mr. Akashi's writing to Mr. Annan. Prosecution number 21139, and this
11 will be then page 8, page 8 of this document. First we're looking at the
12 cover sheet in order to identify the document. Then on page 8 -- page 8.
13 I'm going to read it in English.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 8 of this
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. UNHCR convoy.
18 [In English] "UNHCR convey access to Gorazde and Srebrenica was
19 basically unhindered and the humanitarian situation is reported as
20 satisfactory. On 18th of April, 600 litres of fuel was confiscated by
21 BSA from a convoy bound for Srebrenica. The weekly convoy to Zepa was
22 denied access by the BSA because of bad road conditions and military
24 [Interpretation] Of all those convoys, only one was stopped
25 because of bad roads, and the other one was disputed because of 600
1 litres of fuel with the suspicion that it would be handed over to the
2 Muslim army, but the assessment is that even after the directive UNHCR
3 convoys were allowed to go through without any obstacles, and the
4 situation was assessed as satisfactory. So please don't say that you
5 don't agree with Akashi
6 with --
7 A. Well, I don't think I've seen this document before, and I don't
8 remember the situation that week, but I can say that I was in Bosnia
9 Mr. Akashi was not. But it may be a correct assessment for that week. I
10 don't know which week we're talking about.
11 Q. I'm not sure this is a weekly report. I'm not sure that it's a
12 weekly report. It's a collective report for that whole period, I
14 JUDGE KWON: So it was a Weekly Situation Report, as appearing on
15 the first page. Can you see the first page?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, you're correct. It's
17 there. Yes, yes, you're correct. Weekly Situation Report.
18 I would like to tender this document, please. Well, it's already
19 a Prosecution document, 21139.
20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
21 JUDGE KWON: Is 21139 included in the Prosecution exhibit list?
22 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour. I
23 haven't been able to find it yet.
24 JUDGE KWON: While we are waiting for the response, are you
25 minded to tender 1D964 as well, Mr. Karadzic, the 1st Light Brigade
1 report which was not translated?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. For -- to be MFI'd until it
3 is translated. It's a reports from the field to the -- from the brigade
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I found it. 21139 was included in your list.
6 I have number 55. I'm not sure whether it's matching with your number.
7 So it will be admitted as part of Prosecution exhibit.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. That will be Exhibit P831.
9 JUDGE KWON: And what do you say what would you say,
10 Ms. Edgerton, to 964 of the Defence document?
11 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.
12 JUDGE KWON: So then it will be marked for identification pending
14 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's move on.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I look at 1D974 now, please,
17 and while we're waiting, I'm going to inform you now why our army had --
18 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me. Your list 65 ter 21139 says it's a code
19 cable regarding a meeting between Milosevic and Mladic. I'm afraid this
20 is not the correct document.
21 MS. EDGERTON: No, it's not. There seems to be some confusion,
22 and I think I might have shared in this misunderstanding, Your Honour.
23 The 65 ter number matches with our list, but let me please check and see
24 if I can add some clarity.
25 JUDGE KWON: Irrespective of the title in e-court, my e-court
1 shows exactly this identical document, so we cannot -- we can proceed on
2 that basis. Yes.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I don't know if we have
5 the translation for this document. Yes, we do. It's 1D974.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. This is a report of the commander of the 1st Birac Infantry
8 Brigade to the corps command, and it's headed: "Order to prevent
9 smuggling of fuel by UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and other organisations." I'm
10 going to read it in Serbian:
11 "On the basis of available information, we have been informed
12 that members of UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and other international organisations
13 have been transporting fuel illegally for the need of the Muslims in the
14 enclaves of Sarajevo
15 in double or large tanks on combat and noncombat vehicles, which they
16 empty in the enclaves leaving just the quantity needed for their return
17 journey from the enclaves to the territory of the FRY and the
18 Republika Srpska. In order to prevent the smuggling of fuel to Muslims
19 in the enclaves and pursuant to the order of the Drina Corps command,"
20 such and such a number, "I order:
21 "Train and prepare, and if possible supply with technical
22 equipment, men at the check-point in the Crni Vrh sector to enable them
23 to control," and so on and so forth.
24 Item 3:
25 "Confiscate any quantity of feel that has not been approved or
1 reported, record its quantity and value, and issue it to the battalion
2 logistics organ which will submit a report on the procedure and the
3 quantities of confiscated fuel to the brigade command.
4 "Confiscate the surplus of fuel from large tanks leaving just
5 the quantity needed for their journey to the enclave and back to the
6 check-point. On their return from the enclave return the fuel against a
7 receipt, note for quantities confiscated and/or returned."
8 Do you see here that the perception on our side, the Serbian Army
9 side, was a little bit different from the perception on your side on this
11 A. I can confirm that the perception was different.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
13 document, please.
14 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
15 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it will be Exhibit D157.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would just like to ask the
18 Registry whether this 1D966 was admitted.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It was admitted as D150.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at 1D969
21 now, please.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. While we're waiting, and I think this document does have a
24 translation, it's a document dated the 1st of March, 1995, from the
25 Drina Corps command to the command of the -- well, sending information to
1 the command, and it says:
2 "On the basis of the VRS Main Staff order," such and such, "a
3 number of the 28th of February 1995, and assessment of the situation, we
4 have come to the conclusion that the Muslim forces will most probably not
5 observe the four-month cease-fire and cessation of hostilities that was
6 signed but will begin with its announced spring offensive in early March,
7 and as part of the same, they will try to link up the enclaves of
8 Srebrenica and Zepa, after which they will direct their actions towards
10 Do you agree that there was a cease-fire agreement mediated by
11 President Carter in late 1994? Do you remember that?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And do you recall that it was frequently violated and did not
14 last four months as agreed but was actually broken much earlier?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this 1D969 now,
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D158.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D705 on the screen
22 now, please.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. While we're waiting, I would just like to inform you that this is
25 a document from the Muslim side, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
2 translation, so I'm going to read a part of the document at the bottom.
3 We have it marked. Actually, the document is from the 31st of March, and
4 the Zepa commander, Colonel Avdo Palic, is asking for instructions and he
6 "On the 30th of March, 1995, a convoy of UNPROFOR arrived at Zepa
7 in the afternoon."
8 And I note, Mr. Harland, that it is evident that they were
9 preparing for an offensive but the convoys came nevertheless:
10 "At the check-point of Brezova Ravan, members of the Zepa Public
11 Security Station confiscated a certain quantity of commercial goods
12 intended for smuggling that was being brought in through that channel
13 also. Nobody contacted me from UNPROFOR that day, but officers and
14 soldiers of UNPROFOR Ukrainian company went to Mr. Enver Stitkovac, Zuco,
15 for help here in Zepa, who among other registered and unregistered people
16 in the public security station in Zepa co-operates -- they co-operate
17 with him."
18 So on the same day, at 2200 hours, the goods were confiscated by
19 force from the policemen on duty. So we let through some goods that were
20 intended for smuggling. The Muslim police confiscated that, and then the
21 officers and soldiers of UNPROFOR again confiscated these goods from the
22 Muslim police officers. Does something like this sound plausible to you
23 or not? I am not attacking anybody here. We're talking about criminals
24 here from UNPROFOR and from Zepa.
25 A. I can't comment on this particular case, but generally I can
1 confirm that we also had to have some investigates of the activities of
2 our Ukrainian contingent in Zepa, particularly with respect to fuel.
3 Q. Thank you. And now it also talks about fuel. This is the last
4 sentence on this page. We're going to move then to the following page:
5 "So far we are in such a situation that we were able to purchase
6 a certain quantity from Mr. Enver Stitkovac of fuel, gas, clothing for
7 soldiers, which was originating from UNPROFOR, at a price which was all
8 right for us, lower than the current market price in Zepa. I noticed
9 that he was receiving directly by convoy from Sarajevo a quantity of
10 goods, fuel, and footwear which our unit needs."
11 So this person is some kind of sheik in Zepa. He has his own
12 clothing and fuel supplies, and all of this is going through -- passing
13 through the check-points unimpeded. But you also have stated that you
14 were conducting investigations about this just like the Serbian side was.
15 But anyway, this is a Muslim document. This is not a document that was
16 drafted by the Serbs.
17 A. Yes, I can confirm we were conducting our own investigates, yeah.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document please be
20 admitted into evidence. Or, rather, can it be MFI'd, because a
21 translation is still pending.
22 JUDGE KWON: Unless it is objected to, it will be marked for
23 identification pending translation.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
25 JUDGE KWON: And that said, we will have a break for an hour, but
1 before that, Mr. Robinson, the document we admitted minutes ago which was
2 admitted P831 which has the 65 ter number 21139, was one of the documents
3 you're opposed to. At that -- am I correct.
4 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct. That is on the list, yes.
5 JUDGE KWON: What is the point of your position while using as
6 Defence exhibit?
7 MR. ROBINSON: Well, at the time based on the foundation that was
8 laid in the 65 ter amalgamated statement, we felt that it fell without --
9 or outside of the Trial Chamber's ruling, but since it's been further
10 identified and discussed by the witness, it seems like it can be
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will have an hour. We will convene
13 again at half past 1.00, and in the afternoon instead of half an hour
14 break we will have a three-quarters break, 45 minutes. So today we will
15 end about a quarter past 5.00.
16 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 1.35 p.m.
18 JUDGE KWON: Let's begin. Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask for Prosecution 10820,
20 Prosecution number. Could I have that in e-court. Dated the 13th of
21 June, 1995. Do we have it on the screens? No, we don't. Yes. Yes,
22 there is an English version too.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Harland, I would like to draw your attention to this order
25 which I had issued to the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska on
1 the basis of the conclusions of the State Committee for Co-operation with
2 the UN and international humanitarian organisations, and then we actually
3 see the order. Actually, I can read this part in Serbian:
4 "To allow the UNHCR to occasionally, according to notifications,
5 lead a humanitarian convoy from Metkovic to Trebinje and from Metkovic to
7 Republika Srpska (via Herzegovina
8 and by no means via Hadzici or Ilijas). For this particular week, the
9 convoy Metkovic-Trebinje and Metkovic-Sarajevo should be approved
10 according to the notification.
11 "2. In relation to the incident concerning the ammunition found
12 in the UNHCR convoy for Zepa and Gorazde, a detailed investigates should
13 be allowed for a commission involving Milos Dzurdzic, an officer from the
14 Main Staff, Momcilo Mandic, and Dragisa Mihic."
15 That is to say military security, then public security, rather
16 the minister of justice and Dragisa Mihic, deputy head of state security.
17 "The task of the commission is to submit a detailed report to
18 the state committee for relations with the UN and international
19 humanitarian organisations."
20 You will recall that the chairman of the committee for relations
21 with the UN was the vice-president of the republic, a renowned professor,
22 a specialist for Shakespeare, Professor Nikola Koljevic; isn't that
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Could I have appointed a more eminent person at a higher level
1 than that? Could it have been anyone else but the president of the
2 republic then? So it was the number two man in the country who was
4 A. Yes. He was vice-president, yes.
5 Q. Thank you. Thank you. All of this can be seen. The entire
6 document can be seen [No interpretation]:
7 "[In English] A positive opinion [indiscernible] three should be
8 immediately given to all the notifications that arrived through the
9 co-ordination body for humanitarian operations attached to the state
10 committee, referring to weekly plan -- to the weekly plan of deliveries
11 of the UNHCR from 10 to 17 June, that have already been examined by the
13 "To allow ICRC to continue its visit of imprisoned members of
14 UNPROFOR except those in housed -- that are housed in critical locations,
15 to allow ICRC to leave Sarajevo
17 [Interpretation] I would now like to draw your attention to the
18 date, the 13th of June, 1995. So this Directive 7 was that relevant. It
19 had no effect. Can't you see? This is an explicit order to the
20 Main Staff, and it was observed for the most part, and
21 Vice-President Koljevic enjoyed quite a bit of respect, and he was quite
22 influential too. So it's not that any non-commissioned officer could
23 oppose what he had to say. Wouldn't you agree to that?
24 A. We didn't think he had much influence over the military
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. This is a Prosecution
2 number, isn't it? Can it be admitted, this order?
3 JUDGE KWON: I think this is included in one of the exhibits on
4 the part of the Prosecution. As well, it is one of the documents listed
5 by Mr. Robinson to be opposed to. However, we will admit it.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be Exhibit P832.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Harland, during the course of questioning
8 Mr. Karadzic said to the effect that in light of this document, the
9 Directive 7 was not that relevant, or to that effect. It had no effect.
10 Do you have any comment on that?
11 THE WITNESS: The document, which I've never seen before, so I
12 can't comment on its authenticity, is extremely interesting. One,
13 because it openly acknowledges they are holding large numbers of UNPROFOR
14 prisoners, hostages, and it's allowing people -- it's allow the ICRC to
15 visit them. I mean, so the document is extremely illustrative of the
16 situation in which the way the Serbs were behaving. I would say that in
17 the opening in chief, I said that the Serbs tended to suddenly reduce the
18 pressure on us and reduce the amount of shelling and sniping and killing
19 and allow more food to go through when they were under threat, and there
20 was a particular moment here, this is after -- I think we made some air
21 attacks on them at the end of May, and they were very -- they then seized
22 some hostages, a large number of hostages, and there was a threat of a
23 major escalation, and this is precisely an example of how they were
24 trying to de-escalate so as not to get into a conflict with NATO while
25 admitting they had a lot of hostages.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Karadzic.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you. I'm not going to thank you for that analysis. Let
4 the Trial Chamber thank you because they're there for that. It's their
5 job, isn't it. However, 10669, this document that we saw earlier on, the
6 date is October 1993. We allowed these convoys again:
7 [In English] "The convoys delivered having cleared
8 [indiscernible] recently but distribution by the B and H government to
10 That was not provided to the people. In this case, the bombing
11 was already over, and while we were hosting the UNPROFOR people, and you
12 call them hostages but we are going to oppose that with arguments, during
13 that period of time there was no danger of us being bombed. So this
14 order was a sign of goodwill rather than of fear, but let it be.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, actually, this has already been
16 admitted; right? It's part of something, isn't it? Oh, I see. That's
17 the document that this is. I just wanted to mention -- actually, can we
18 have the document that's here. The one that's here has already been
19 admitted. Could we just have page 2 of this document.
20 JUDGE KWON: I note this was admitted as P -- Exhibit P830.
21 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. I just wanted to remind
23 Mr. Harland of the first paragraph.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. In Sarajevo
1 where it says the food situation, et cetera. So there was no bombing.
2 There was no threat of bombing at that point in time. And we let these
3 people through. However, Mr. Harland, arithmetic shows that thousands of
4 convoys had passed and only a few had problems, and that thousands of
5 aircraft landed and that less than ten had some problems. So this is a
6 vast disproportion between those that did run into problems and those
7 that did not; isn't that right?
8 A. No. The document we were looking at from sometime in the middle
9 of June, I think, of 1995, by that time your forces had tried to
10 completely seal and strangle Sarajevo
11 that week, but basically nothing came into Sarajevo during that late
12 spring and summer except what we were able to fight over Bosnian
13 government controlled territory through firing from your guns in Ilidza.
14 So it was -- very few convoys came in. The statistics will show almost
15 nothing, except what we were able to fight through.
16 Q. Well, now it's the Muslim government that would have to thank
17 you. However, do you remember that that summer, already by mid-June,
18 there was this huge offensive launched by the Muslim side that had been
19 prepared for a long, long time; isn't that right?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. So it's the fault of the offensive. It's not our fault.
22 Do you perhaps have the report in which you characterise the
23 shelling of Sarajevo
24 few days after this, how you counted these shells and who you ascribed
25 them to, as it were. Do you have that report?
1 A. To the first part of your question, I don't think it's true that
2 we can blame the offensive. In fact, I don't think that because there
3 was a Bosnian government offensive - which is correct, you are correct -
4 I don't believe that's a reason to inflict additional suffering on the
5 civilian population. In fact, it's that concern that principally brings
6 me here.
7 Concerning your second question about how to characterise the
8 shelling of Sarajevo
9 think this was the period of those sort of improvised rockets, wasn't it,
10 in the middle of June, just after the Bosnian offensive. I can't
12 Q. However, now we would have to go back to one of the previous
13 documents that clearly states - it is your document - that they had
14 enough food but that they had stockpiled it somewhere. They didn't give
15 it to the people. So there was food, but they're the ones that caused
16 the suffering. The Muslim side hid that food in order to keep prices
17 high and in order to victimise Sarajevo.
18 May I ask you how much time is needed to prepare that kind of
19 massive offensive? That certainly could not have been done over three or
20 five days. It must have been prepared for months; isn't that right?
21 A. I think it was prepared long in that sense, correct.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I now call up 038320.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. This is another document of yours. I think that 0383 is --
1 03832, actually. 03832, that's a Prosecution number, isn't it? And the
2 date is the 19th of July, 1995, and it has to do with the proposed
3 demilitarisation of Zepa. You were with General Smith then. This is the
4 first page. And Security Council Resolution 998 is being referred to.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 2, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I'm going to read it in English. We don't have a translation:
8 [In English] "We recommended that UNPROFOR propose an immediate
9 and complete demilitarisation of the Zepa safe area, to be implemented
10 under UNPROFOR supervision within 48 hours of agreement (in accordance
11 with Reference C)."
12 [Interpretation] Reference C is Resolution 998 from page 1.
13 Resolution 998 envisages demilitarisation, that is. Then in the second
15 [In English] "The draft agreement should be presented first to
16 the Bosnian government and then to the Bosnian Serb authorities."
17 [Interpretation] Then further on:
18 [In English] "The Bosnian government accept the agreement and the
19 Bosnian Serbs refused. Pale will be informed that under Resolution," so
20 and so, "military assets, as well as the direct and essential military
21 support facilities, including but not limited to fuel installations and
22 munitions sites will be subject to NATO air-strikes (Reference to D and E
24 [Interpretation] Actually -- actually, when NATO decided that
25 [indiscernible]. And then there's Akashi
1 Do we agree now that there is a prerequisite for bombing the
2 Serbs? That is to say that Zepa is demilitarised and the Serbs are still
3 targeting Zepa, and they have military equipment around it; right?
4 A. We were trying to clarify the exact circumstances that might give
5 rise to air attacks. This is, of course, something we were drafting just
6 a week or so, I think, after the fall of -- of Srebrenica. So we were
7 extremely worried about the situation in Zepa, and we -- and this is an
8 example of how we were trying to prepare, including to use airpower more
10 Q. All of that is to be commended, but the point is that Serbs could
11 not be bombed before the enclaves -- or, rather, the safe areas are
12 demilitarised in accordance with Reference C, that is to say Security
13 Council Resolution 998, which provided for demilitarisation. We were
14 bombed, though, although none of these demilitarised -- these safe areas
15 had been demilitarised. On the contrary. The Secretary-General informed
16 the Security Council that the safe areas are military strongholds.
17 So the point here is not your noble attentions but what the
18 precondition was for bombing the Serbs. Do you agree?
19 A. No. The preconditions for the circumstances in which the Serbs
20 could be bombed are outlined in Resolution 836. The problem is that 836
21 is not very precise. So this is one example by me of a proposal by me to
22 my boss to give great precision to the end transparency to the sides
23 about precisely when we might use overwhelming force, because we felt
24 that if this had been clearer in Srebrenica, then we might have been able
25 to avoid the outcome there.
1 Q. A wonderful line of thinking. However, unfortunately the Muslim
2 side did not accept that. Could we see page 3 now where we see the draft
3 document for the demilitarisation of Zepa is that you had proposed within
4 this effort. I'm going to read out the second paragraph:
5 [In English] "No later than 12 hours after the signature of this
6 agreement, all firearms and munitions (regardless of calibre) in the
7 possession of the Bosnian Army or others within the Zepa safe area shall
8 be turned over to the UNPROFOR UKRBAT in Zepa. These weapons shall be
9 destroyed by UNPROFOR at the earliest feasible opportunity in the
10 presence of observers from both parties."
11 Do you believe, as I do, that this is a good proposal? Do you
12 think that it came in too late? Had it come in earlier, everything would
13 have been different.
14 A. Well, it's my proposal, so I can't obviously say it's not a good
15 proposal. The basis on which we could use force is Resolution 836, which
16 imposes certain obligations on the Bosnian Serb party. It does not, if I
17 remember correctly, unilaterally require a demilitarisation. Yes, a
18 demilitarisation would have made it much easier. And this was negotiated
19 in the context of the fact that the Bosnian commander in Zepa,
20 Colonel Palic, though he was not supported by Sarajevo, I think, was
21 willing to consider an agreement like this. And he went directly to
22 negotiate with General Tolimir and General Mladic about it, but when he
23 went to do so, they took him away and then he was killed. So this
24 agreement never came to a good outcome.
25 Q. Well, I have to correct you with regard to the sequence of
1 events. Something had happened to him even earlier.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But can we -- can this document
3 please be tendered into evidence before that?
4 MS. EDGERTON: It's one of the associated documents to this
5 witness's statements, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: 3832?
7 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. Referred to in paragraph number 223.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. It will be admitted as Prosecution can
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P833, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce 993.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. And before that, let me ask you, Mr. Harland. Do you remember
15 that I, on several occasions, from 1992 up until the end of 1994 proposed
16 for Sarajevo
17 "militarised"] and proclaimed an open town and placed under the control
18 of the United Nations? There are a lot of documents to the effect, but
19 I'm asking you whether you remember that that's indeed the fact.
20 A. Yes. And can I say that the text you just showed is really an
21 example of how we, even me who you clearly think was not very sympathetic
22 to your position, was making really a good effort to try to stabilise the
23 situation around the safe areas and were really considering force really
24 as the -- only as the last resort. But I can confirm that I was at
25 meetings from the Igman period on where you supported a total
1 demilitarisation of Sarajevo
2 Q. Thank you. I really don't --
3 JUDGE KWON: Line 6, militarised should read demilitarised, for
4 the record. Let's proceed.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I really don't have any doubts about your good intentions, but
8 the problem was, according to a very imminent witness, you were evidently
9 on the Muslim side. Wasn't that the case?
10 A. No. What an unkind witness. Who was that?
11 Q. A very imminent witness, and you co-operated with him. What you
12 just said about Palic prompted me to use the following document. I don't
13 know whether there is a translation. Let me read:
14 "Smith stated that our side, which is the Muslim side, did not
15 accept the -- the agreement on exchanges all for all and that our side
16 was asking for additional concessions. In Boksanica, which was the place
17 of negotiations, Hamdija Torlak stayed behind, and he was told that if we
18 were prepared to carry out the exchange, General Smith should be informed
19 during the night so that a plan of helicopter evacuation could be
20 drafted. President," that's Mr. Izetbegovic, "on behalf of my brigade,
21 which is on the brink of a nervous breakdown, I implore you to do
22 everything in your power for our side to accept that agreement. And
23 finally the [indiscernible] of our hardships. We cannot believe that it
24 is you who do not want to solve the problem."
25 This corroborates what you have just said, and it also
1 corroborates our thesis, and that is that Mr. Izetbegovic augmented the
2 suffering of his people in order to provoke a military intervention on
3 the part of the West. Is that what you meant when you said that Palic
4 had not had support in his efforts to strike a deal with the Serbian
6 A. Colonel Palic, who I had met sometime before, had always favoured
7 an early negotiated end to the conflict, and he wanted to set a good
8 example in the area around Zepa. By this stage Srebrenica had already
9 fallen. Very large numbers of people had been massacred. Zepa, which
10 was a very small community, was being attacked and was about to collapse,
11 and Colonel Palic told us that he wanted quickly to reach a negotiated
12 conclusion, but this was not accepted by President Izetbegovic. We put
13 it to President Izetbegovic, and when he tried to negotiate it directly
14 with the Serbs, even under a flag of truce, it seemed that they -- they
15 killed him.
16 Q. I don't know exactly how he was killed, but it is well known that
17 it was after all the negotiations and after the evacuation of Zepa. But
18 let me ask you, do you remember that the Army of Republika Srpska did
19 have a lot of reasons not to trust Mr. Palic, because the convoy that
20 supplies the relay in 1992, in May or in June, had been massacred,
21 although Avdo Palic had given his word that he would secure the relay.
22 However, young men from Pale and elsewhere were burnt there.
23 Do you think that they should have trusted him again, although
24 the previous experience that they had -- had with him was awful?
25 Wouldn't that have been a good reason for concern when it came to any
1 deals and negotiations with Palic? What do you think?
2 A. That occurred before I was there. While I was there, the Serb's
3 military around Zepa had a reasonably professional relationship with him.
4 General Tolimir then said at this point that he was willing to negotiate
5 with Colonel Palic. I was not there, but my colleague Ed Joseph escorted
6 him up to the check-point where he would -- could negotiate this
7 agreement with General Tolimir under a flag of truce. General Tolimir
8 had him taken away, and his body, dead body, was only identified much,
9 much later. I think it's really a terrible thing that your forces did
10 to -- to Palic under a flag of truce.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document, Palic's
12 telegram, if it's not already, can it be, Palic's telegram, what is on
13 the screen, can it be admitted into evidence, please?
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Do we have the English translation? Not yet.
15 It will be marked for identification pending translation.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Harland, we were talking about the Zepa
18 negotiation. In the course of answering you said at one point, By this
19 time Srebrenica had fallen and a large number of people had been
20 massacred, or to that effect.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: My question is when was it known to you that that
23 took place?
24 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, we were aware that Srebrenica had
25 fallen straight away. I believe that the first survivors of the massacre
1 appeared in Bosnian government held territory around the 18th. There is
2 one -- the very first person which led me to send an officer from my
3 office to investigate first made a statement on television that --
4 Bosnian government television that there had been a massacre. We didn't
5 know anything about it then because the Serbs were negotiating with us
6 for a prisoner exchange. So we were a bit skeptical, but we sent people
7 to investigate, and then later, several months later, I myself went to
8 investigate some of these sites. So we were just beginning to be aware
9 in this period that a large-scale massacre had taken place.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D984 is the document
12 that I would like the court to produce now.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. It's another telegram sent by Colonel Palic. He sent that
15 telegram to Asim Dzambasovic, a brigade general, asking him to forward
16 the telegram to Dr. Heljic as urgently as possible. And now let's look
17 at the reference UNPROFOR. If this can be blown up a little, we will be
18 able to see it. He says:
19 "UNPROFOR, we are disarming UNPROFOR according to the previously
20 given instructions. That was on the 16th of July. We are disarming
21 UNPROFOR according to the previously given instructions."
22 And that was sent to the General Staff of the army in Kakanj, to
23 the administration for operative planning, to Brigadier Asim Dzambasovic
25 You see, you did not have a very easy time with them either, did
2 A. [Microphone not activated] we also had our --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can 984 be admitted, please. And
4 can we now be provided with 06864, the Prosecution document.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Now it's -- could you repeat your answer,
6 because your answer was not recorded in full because the microphone was
7 not activated.
8 THE WITNESS: I said, yes, we also had our difficulties, I think.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Has the previous one be
10 given a number? Has it been admitted?
11 JUDGE KWON: This will be admitted again. Exhibit D161.
12 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Q. 06864, Prosecution document, was drafted by you and by
15 Mr. Andreev on the 28th of September, 1994. And it was sent to the late
16 Sergio de Mello, who -- who got killed in Afghanistan, unfortunately, in
18 On page 1, Pale meeting. I will proceed in English:
19 [In English] "Dr. Karadzic and his colleagues Professor Koljevic,
20 Mr. Krajisnik, General Milovanovic began the meeting in Pale with an
21 angry statement about the Bosnian attack out of Sarajevo on Sunday,
22 18th of September, 1994. Karadzic said that there could be no talks on
23 demilitarisation after such attack and that he would flatten the
24 Presidency if there were a repetition of the episode."
25 [Interpretation] Do you think that they had the right and they
1 did good for both sides when we were in the middle of negotiations about
2 the demilitarisation of Sarajevo
4 warmongering effort? What would you say.
5 A. It doesn't sound like a peace-loving initiative.
6 Q. Thank you can we now see the following page, which describes your
7 meeting with Izetbegovic. Number 7, paragraph number 7:
8 [In English] "President Izetbegovic was absolutely contrite with
9 Sunday's attack, and promised, in front of General Delic, that there
10 would be no repetition of the incident."
11 [Interpretation] Mr. Izetbegovic accepted responsibility and he
12 promised that that was the end of that. However, as we know, that wasn't
13 the end. Do you remember that meeting with Izetbegovic?
14 A. I can't now remember exactly the meeting or the attack, but it
15 certainly is part of a familiar pattern.
16 Q. Thank you. I don't know whether you believed him, but let me
17 tell you that we doubted all of his promises.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see page 3 in the same
20 MR. KARADZIC: [In English]
21 Q. "Conclusions," number 10:
22 "On the brighter side one would have to conclude that
23 General Rose's swift actions in denouncing the Bosnians for Sunday's
24 attack was a success. His comments threatened to undermine their vital
25 advantage, international sympathy and support through positive media
1 coverage. If they undertake similar provocative actions in the future,
2 then I think that they will at least be careful to disguise them better."
3 [Interpretation] And then paragraph 11 your remarks about the
5 [In English] "With the Serbs things are much less positive. The
6 Serbs feel cornered by the closing of the border with FRY. If more
7 sanctions are imposed on them there will certainly be a back-lash
8 about -- both on the Bosnians and on us."
9 [Interpretation] You appropriately estimated that the Muslims
10 benefitted from short but very fierce attacks. On the other side, you
11 realise that we were cornered by various problems, including sanctions
12 and so on and so forth, can you agree with me on that?
13 A. This doesn't look like a pro-Muslim assessment. Did I draft this
15 Q. Yes. You drafted this, but you said that their attack was a
16 success because they gained --
17 A. No, no. It looked very balanced, very correct.
18 Q. However, our backs were breaking at the time. The Serb backs
19 were breaking, but that was your position.
20 Let's look at number 9 on the same page:
21 [In English] "The president asked General Rose whether or not the
22 Serbs had agreed to restore gas, electricity, and water to the city. The
23 general informed him that the Serbs had agreed on the condition that the
24 Bosnian side co-operated with the restoration of utilities elsewhere in
25 the country."
1 [Interpretation] Do you remember that General Rose accepted my
2 offer and he thought that it was fair, but there was a condition or a
3 question why Gornji Vakuf or Sebobrin [phoen] would not have water at the
4 same time because there were people living there as well. Do you
6 A. Yes, I remember the linkage of Sarajevo with Donji Vakuf, yes.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a Prosecution document.
8 Can it been tendered into evidence or has it already been admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: We will admit it as a Prosecution exhibit because it
10 is included in the associated exhibit list.
11 THE REGISTRAR: That will Exhibit P834.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce
13 1D -- oh, it hasn't arrived yet. It hasn't been uploaded in e-court.
14 Can I offer an excerpt from General Rose's book, "Fighting for Peace."
15 The Prosecution should have it already. Does the Trial Chamber need
16 this, a copy? Does the witness need a copy as well?
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. While the copies are being distributed by way of an introduction
19 let my say this: Mr. Harland, in one of your statements, you recorded my
20 anger about some things that had happened in September 1994. However,
21 I'm still not clear on one thing. You said that I was angry and that I
22 threatened, but you left it as my final word, not as my introduction into
23 our entire conversation. Do you remember that? Am I right?
24 A. I can't recall.
25 Q. In any case, the Prosecutor may have been using only the part
1 that they find useful. In any case, it -- according to what you stated,
2 it seems that it was my final decision to introduce restrictions. But
3 let's see what General Rose, Michael Rose, has to say on page 174 of this
4 document which hasn't been uploaded in e-court, but maybe it can be
5 placed on -- very well. But it doesn't have to go on the ELMO. It
6 doesn't have to be put on the ELMO, but maybe for the audience, yes, yes:
7 [In English] "There was a limit to the hard line that we could
8 take with the Bosnian government. They knew that the Americans were
9 unlikely to allow NATO airpower to be used against the Bosnian army even
10 though it was in breach of a NATO ultimatum, nor was it likely that
11 economic sanctions would be imposed on the Bosnians for breaking UN
12 Security Council resolutions. In this context, UNPROFOR was not able to
13 sustain the principle of impartiality that is so essential to any
14 peacekeeping mission."
15 [Interpretation] Do you agree that this is just another way of
16 putting that you were overwhelmingly on the Muslim side? And I don't
17 mean just you personally but the entire Western community, and that
18 Muslims felt those positive feelings and that they benefitted from them.
19 They made the most of those feelings.
20 A. Yes. The mandate was constructed in a way that was much more
21 supportive of the Bosnian government. Our whole presence allowed food
22 and assistance to flow and allowed the lines to stabilise while they
23 rearmed, yes. The whole -- the whole mandate behind UNPROFOR was more
24 attractive to the Bosnian government than the Bosnian Serbs.
25 Q. Thank you. Let's continue with General Rose's words:
1 [In English] "As a result, relations between the UN and the
2 Bosnian Serbs became lastingly and immeasurably more difficult after the
4 helped it prevent the Serbs from cutting off the electricity, water and
5 gas to Sarajevo
6 Viktor and me to an angry diatribe, 'How can you talk about the
7 restoration of utilities to the Muslims in Sarajevo when they have just
8 attacked us with heavy weapons in breach of the Airport Agreement and the
9 NATO ultimatum? How can you raise such issues when they have
10 systematically refused to talk about a cessation of hostilities, and the
11 international community have subjected us to economic sanctions which are
12 causing our people to live far worse than the citizens of Sarajevo? How
13 dare you complain on behalf of leadership that cares so little for its
14 own people.'
15 "Viktor, who was generally treated with a certain deferences by
16 the Bosnian Serbs," [No interpretation] No, that's not how it was. It is
17 just an assumption that the Russian.
18 [In English] "Viktor was visibly shaken by Karadzic's anger,
19 Reiterated the fact that we had publicly condemned the action of the
20 Bosnian government and to respond to the Bosnian attack would merely
21 strengthen the image of a city under siege and that would not help the
22 Serbs. Karadzic eventually calmed down and said he would reconnect the
24 electricity lines that passed through Bosnian territory to Banja Luka
25 be repaired. This seems a reasonable trade-off. A civilian subcommittee
1 of the UN normally dealt with the restoration of utilities in Bosnia
2 their negotiations had remained, until then, in a state of deadlock."
3 [Interpretation] Do you agree that at that meeting I was angry at
4 the beginning and that the end of the meeting was constructive and
6 A. I can't remember the exact words at the meeting, but if this is
7 correctly quoted, then this is exactly what we -- I didn't like, which is
8 that you were linking a military attack with the fact that you would cut
9 off utilities, electricity and water and gas. So first of all, there was
10 that linkage which struck some of us as inhuman, from military to the
11 suffering of the people; and second was this statement about your people
12 living far worse than the citizens of Sarajevo. It was completely
13 delusional, and it was so far from reality that we can hardly emphasise
14 it enough. So if the quotations are correct, which I assume they -- they
15 are, they are very illustrative of precisely the problems we had at that
16 time. With the other side, but also with yourself.
17 Q. Well, we will provide another document. We were not thinking of
18 putting it forth today, but you said yourself something about how our
19 people are living anyway. Our backs were against the wall. There were
20 UN sanctions, sanctions by Yugoslavia
21 assessment by General Rose that life in Grbavica, which was much worse
22 than in that other part of Sarajevo
23 don't see anywhere here, Mr. Harland, that I am going to cut off
24 anything. We're talking about the restoration, not that I will suspend
25 or cut it off and then let it through, and this was done after this
1 offensive which destroyed all of those facilities. So there is some
2 difference if I say whether I am going to allow the restoration, and of
3 course I do have some right to some anger, at least at the beginning of
4 the meeting because the United Nations were not protecting us but
5 protecting our opponents; isn't that right?
6 A. The water and gas and electricity lines were not cut off by the
7 offensive. They were cut off because you cut them off. Occasionally an
8 electricity line could be cut or something, but certainly your statement
9 here, "How can you talk about the restoration of utilities, that is water
10 and gas and electricity ..." it's not possible that in a one-day attack
11 that the shooting should incidentally cut all of the water and gas and
12 electricity lines. This was just your normal way of retaliating. They
13 would attack militarily and you would, you know, retaliate against 2- or
14 300.000 civilians, and it struck us as a little barbaric.
15 Q. Let me remind you, Mr. Harland, that one single shell hit a relay
16 or a repeater station, and that's why Bacevo did not have any
17 electricity. Without electricity in Bacevo, Sarajevo is left without
18 water. And if you remember correctly, every time we had a restoration
19 then a repairman would be able to go, accompanied by UNPROFOR, to fix the
20 installations. It was not a question of a valve or something. There had
21 to be some infrastructure repair. Sometimes it would be just a single
22 shell that would cause the damage, and if the electricity was cut off
23 there would be no water. But as far as that is concerned, as far as
24 water supplies and everything, there are orders of mine forbidding any
25 means of that sort as a means of war waging. And you will admit,
1 Mr. Harland, that the international community applied much worse
2 sanctions towards the Serbs than the Serbs ever did towards the citizens
3 of Sarajevo
4 A. No. That is completely delusional. I would travel extensively
5 throughout Republika Srpska, and the situation of the civilian population
6 was vastly better, vastly better, Dr. Karadzic, than the situation of the
7 civilians caught in the enclaves controlled by the Bosnian government
9 Q. Would you agree, Mr. Harland, that Banja Luka had a right to
10 electricity, that nothing could function there without electricity, and
11 that as General Rose says, that was a fair, a reasonable trade-off? Why
12 would Sarajevo
13 entire Bosnian Krajina did not have electricity because they did not want
14 to repair the electricity pylons? We were fixing everything that needed
15 to be fixed in Sarajevo
16 was not repaired. Was that something that was fair or not?
17 A. Dr. Karadzic, life in Banja Luka was like life in Beverly Hills
18 compared to life in Sarajevo
19 questioning. There was simply no comparison.
20 Q. Fortunately, Mr. Harland, I am just using your documents and
21 documents of the Muslim side and this book by General Rose.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this document by
23 General Rose, the book by General Rose, this excerpt, and it's
24 Exhibit 1D3037. The book we plan to use quite a lot in our
1 And you can see this sentence:
2 "[In English] The subcommittee of the UN normally dealt with the
3 restoration of utilities in Bosnia
4 until then in a state of deadlock."
5 [Interpretation] Until we said, all right, but if Banja Luka
6 electricity as well, there was no chance of this going through. And we
7 had a large number of men, women, and children there.
8 Can we tender this excerpt from the book, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Of course I have no objection, Your Honour. I'm
11 just wondering procedurally how we might be inclined to do this,
12 especially since Dr. Karadzic has indicated that there's going to be
13 other excerpts from the book coming, but maybe that's best addressed next
15 JUDGE KWON: My understanding is that if the additional part is
16 to be admitted, that will be added to the existing number as discussed in
17 advance between the parties. So with that understanding, we'll admit
18 this part of his book as?
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D162, Your Honours.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
21 Q. Can I ask for D1403, which I need to do because of your
22 reference -- or actually because you disputed that. You disagreed that
23 life in Republika Srpska was worse. So can we please look at this
24 document. This is a Muslim bulletin by the defence ministry the security
25 administration dated the 3rd of April, 1994. This is before September,
1 before the events in September.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not in the courtroom? I mean
3 in e-court. 403. 1D403. If not, perhaps we can put it on the ELMO,
4 just this one page.
5 JUDGE KWON: We should have it.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, we have it. Let's have the
7 first page to identify the document, and then let us look at the last
8 page, first paragraph.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Harland, we saw this kind of -- this format
10 before, but are you familiar with this kind of document which is called
12 THE WITNESS: I was not familiar with them during the war, but I
13 have seen them since the war. They are publications of the Ministry of
14 Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, yeah.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Can we look at page 2 now of
17 this document.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Going to -- I'm going to read the part that is marked:
20 "According to information of the military security service of the
21 1st Corps, the area of responsibility of the 102nd Motorised Brigade of
22 the 2nd Battalion was toured by General Michael Rose accompanied by four
23 officers. While touring the facilities that the fighters were using in
24 order to prepare for departure to the front, Mr. Rose talked with the
25 soldiers who were there and explained to them that the part of the army
1 under the control of the army has started to live with a different life.
2 It has started to awaken, in parentheses, and is more or is better
3 supplied than Grbavica, which is desolate and without food."
4 Grbavica was under Serbian control, was it not?
5 A. Grbavica was under Serbian control, yes.
6 Q. So we must agree that General Rose estimated already in early
7 April 1994 that the Serbs were living much worse than the other part of
9 A. No, of course we can dispute it. Grbavica is a tiny part of
11 But anybody in Grbavica was completely safe if they went just a few
12 hundred metres away beyond Vraca, whereas almost 300.000 people were
13 caught in Sarajevo
14 And if the people of Grbavica went more than a few hundred metres away,
15 if they went over the -- behind this cemetery on Vraca ridge, there was
16 no shelling, no shooting. I would go there. The life was normal. You
17 could buy a good meal. You could live a normal life. This is a
18 completely wrong characterisation.
19 Q. Yes. Now I have to go back. I think this was admitted. You
20 said in your testimony in the case against President Milosevic on the 5th
21 of November, 2003, on page 286864. You said that:
22 [In English] "To the extent of the UN monitors, sniper activities
23 in Grbavica, it appeared that the Muslims were snipping more civilians
24 than the Serbs."
25 [Interpretation] So more people were getting killed in Grbavica
1 and we're going to show your -- and Muslim reports which note only
2 explosions in Grbavica for that day and nowhere else. So there were a
3 number of days where explosions are recorded only at Grbavica and not
4 anywhere else. So Mr. Harland, would you agree that the area behind
5 Vraca and the entire area of Republika Srpska was subject to sanctions?
6 A. There is a major difference between subject to sanctions and
7 being subject to mortar and shell-fire every day. And I -- you keep
8 confusing, deliberately, I think, Grbavica, which is a few hundred metres
9 of exposed territory, which thousands and thousands of square kilometres
10 of Republika Srpska that was completely safe and where there was plenty
11 to eat and where food and wine and alcohol could be obtained easily and
12 people could travel. Things are being mixed up here to give a completely
13 false characterisation of the situation in Sarajevo and other areas, in
14 my view.
15 Q. Well, it's time for me to say a no. You keep saying that, but
16 let us now look at this document, 09632. I have to keep adding documents
17 that I wasn't planning to so that you can see how all this looks. This
18 is your document. You drafted it. It's actually sent by Victor Andreev
19 to Sergio De Mello, and this is Prosecution document 09632.
20 JUDGE KWON: Which is also one of the associate exhibits.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. And now that we've seen the cover page, can we now look at page
23 4, please.
24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton --
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. At the bottom --
2 JUDGE KWON: What would you say to the previous document, 1D403?
3 MS. EDGERTON: Marked for identification pending translation, I
4 would think, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be done.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. In the Serbian version it's page 4 as well:
9 [In English] "BH authorities feel somewhat [indiscernible] that
11 is much worse is largely ignored by the international community."
12 [Interpretation] They are reporting from Mostar, the Muslim
13 community, but also throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Muslim territory
14 in Bosnia and Herzegovina is jealous of Sarajevo
15 also without electricity under sanctions, production is halted, and I
16 don't believe that that assessment of yours is all right, first of all.
17 I would say it was the fact that your sensitivity toward Serbian troubles
18 was not the same as the sensitivity towards Bosnian troubles. Would you
20 A. No.
21 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the next page of this document. 403.
22 It's already been marked, but I just would like you to see.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need to put away the document in
24 English, and we need to bring back 403, please. 1D403, the previous
25 document that we looked at. And can we look at page 3.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. I'm going to read a paragraph marked with 2:
3 "The military security service of the 2nd Corps through a source
4 acquired information that Captain John White and Mark, military planners,
5 spent a few days in Sarajevo
6 group of American military experts who are supposed to arrive at our
7 country. They came -- they brought a letter by -- signed by a certain
8 Colin Lionel with them, in which he is asking General Michael Rose to
9 provide them all the possible co-operation and help. Captain White, a
10 member of the air force parachute units expressed particular interest in
11 the work of our ham radio operators, how much they were working for the
12 BH Army and how reliable their information is."
13 Have you heard of this particular piece of information. Do you
14 know anything about this John White, and Mark, and Colin Lionel?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 20188. I think this
18 is a Prosecution document.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. While we're waiting, do you agree that some organisations,
21 military organisations, from the United States were present and engaged
22 in Bosnia and Herzegovina in providing help to them?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think the number is 21088,
24 Prosecution Exhibit, 21088. This should be Mr. Harland's document.
25 THE WITNESS: We were aware that they were -- the Bosnian
1 government was receiving external assistance for its military effort and
2 that this was supported by -- by the United States in some way.
3 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, previous document 9632 will be
4 admitted as Prosecution exhibit?
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that has been admitted as
6 Exhibit P827 already.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Harland, this is your document and Mr. Andreev's document of
11 the 16th of July, 1993
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go to page 5 of the
13 document. Page 5 of this document. Towards the bottom, Bosnian Serbs,
14 and the penultimate paragraph. I'm going to read it in English.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [In English]
16 Q. "Power (and hence water) and gas began to flow to Sarajevo
17 sporadic nature of these supplies appeared, as before, to be caused more
18 by the interference of the BH than by the Serbs."
19 [Interpretation] So you yourselves were also aware of this, and
20 you wrote it down that water depends on electricity and that these
21 sporadic disruptions in the supply were caused more often by the Muslim
22 army than by the Serbs or Serbian army; is that correct?
23 A. Yes. We were aware that they also interfered with the utilities,
25 Q. The document says that they are more responsible, in that sense,
1 than the Serbs; is that correct?
2 A. At the point of writing, yes, it must have been our assessment.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I have 08974, please. And was
5 the previous document admitted?
6 JUDGE KWON: As Prosecution exhibit? It's one of the associate
7 exhibit as well.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As 65 ter 21088 will be P835.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 08974 now, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Harland, I'm sorry that we're doing something that an
12 investigative judge would be doing in our system who would then
13 differentiate or discriminate between what is the truth and what is not.
14 So we don't -- we would not have to go into the whole process of
15 establishing that ourselves. Anyway, this is an order from the
16 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command, which is ordering:
17 "Pursuant to an order of the President of Republika Srpska,
18 Dr. Radovan Karadzic, based on the current political situation and in
19 order to resolve the problem of Sarajevo
20 "Regiment and brigade commands shall immediately take the
21 following measures.
22 "The Ilidza Light Infantry Brigade shall ensure that water and
23 gas are provided to the population of Sarajevo and after repairs have
24 been carried out of the electricity installation."
25 So we see that they were damaged.
2 "All units forbidden to fire on Sarajevo proper unless defending
3 VRS positions."
4 Then it goes on to say:
5 "The unnecessary and uncontrolled firing on Sarajevo
6 great harm to the Republika Srpska. Be in full control and render
7 impossible the unnecessary firing on Sarajevo unless it is to defend the
8 position of the RS army.
9 "Brigade regiment commanders are responsible for the realisation
10 of this order."
11 Now we're talking about the 15th of July, 1993, deputy commander
12 of the corps, Dragomir Milosevic, at the time is ordering that my order
13 be executed, and the order states that the water supply depends on
14 electricity, and as soon as the electrical installations are repaired, it
15 instructs that water should be turned on; is that correct?
16 A. This document seems to come from the middle of July 1993. So
17 it's at the height of the Igman offensive, which means it's precisely one
18 of the moments when NATO is threatening to attack. So an order by you to
19 improve the situation with water and gas and electricity and sniping and
20 shelling would be very consistent with what we discussed last week.
21 Q. Well, now I would have to be the one to say no. I am not asking
22 you about our motives. I'm asking you whether this is correct or not.
23 A. I think it's correct. It would fit that pattern.
24 Q. But we will have the opportunity to discuss the Igman crisis with
25 somebody else. We handed over the Igman zone to you, to UNPROFOR, but
1 they entered through that zone and killed 20 of our medical workers. An
2 entire company of medics were killed by people who had crossed over
3 through that zone. I did not get cross about private matters, but as far
4 as professional things and the people, that is something that I did get
5 angry about.
6 JUDGE KWON: We will admit this as RK document.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P836, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE KWON: Is it also one of the associated exhibits? I doubt
9 it. Oh, yes. Thank you. And then --
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please note in the
11 transcript that the witness answered yes. It was of not recorded in the
13 JUDGE KWON: Did you, Mr. Harland?
14 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure there was a question, but I definitely
15 recall the -- the act when Bosnian government forces crossed through the
16 zone from which the Serbs had withdrawn and killed a group of medics.
17 I -- I recall that.
18 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break for 45 minutes. We'll resume
19 at quarter to 4.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 3.00 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 3.49 p.m.
22 JUDGE KWON: Okay. One more session, Mr. Karadzic, for today.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. If Mr. Harland is not
24 defensive in his defence of the UN, and I'm not attacking the UN, we will
25 get a fair amount of work done today, I hope. This is a document that
1 we've admitted, right, this order issued by General Milosevic. It has
2 been assigned a number, Excellency, hasn't it?
3 Can I now have D123. Sorry, 321.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. 321, Mr. Harland. I will do my best to use as few Serb documents
6 as possible, so I hope that there will be as few "Nos" as possible and as
7 many "Yeses" as possible.
8 So this is the bulletin of the 25th of April, 1993.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3 now, please. Of
10 this document, I mean.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Do you remember that General Divjak said that about 75 per cent
13 of the Muslim army waged war in their own civilian clothes? Do you
14 remember that?
15 A. No, I don't remember that.
16 Q. Does it sound familiar, though, that they waged war mostly
17 wearing their own clothes?
18 A. By the time I arrived, most of them had uniforms. Actually, I
19 think they were uniforms from the former East Germany, but by the time I
20 arrived they almost all had camouflage, yeah.
21 Q. Well, this is the end of April, so it's a bit before your time.
22 The third page, starting with "According." This is their report. The
23 security administration is providing information to the Main Staff:
24 "According to the assessment of the commander of the
25 101st Motorised Brigade of the 1st Corps, the combat morale in his unit
1 has slowly started to decline. There are many reasons for this
2 situation, various rumours and negative propaganda included. There are
3 some rumours in the units of this brigade to the effect that the
4 president of the Presidency received from an Arab president 10.000 US
5 dollars for cigarettes for the army, but they did not receive. Also they
6 should buy 120.000 uniforms, but they did not do that, instead the
7 soldiers are still fighting in their own jeans and sneakers. Besides
8 that, they transferred to the town drinks, cigarettes, oranges, bananas
9 and other goods which were exclusively used for smuggling instead of
10 providing weapons and ammunition. Also in the city there are opened cafe
11 and other private shops and their owners are very often members of the
12 army who resell stolen goods -- who have been reselling stolen goods from
13 the beginning of the war, et cetera. Also many -- there are a lot of
14 negative comments concerning the division. Then there is Cele and Caco
15 and other criminals. Does this sound convincing? This is their very own
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you. Can it be admitted, please?
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Harland, you must have said yes.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes.
21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
22 MS. EDGERTON: I note that the translation that we have isn't a
23 translation of the whole document, so I would still be prepared to agree
24 to MFI
25 JUDGE KWON: How long is the original? I haven't checked.
1 MS. EDGERTON: It's a four-page document, and we have around two
2 pages of translation.
3 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
4 MS. EDGERTON: One page of translation.
5 JUDGE KWON: It will be marked for identification pending
7 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. It is possible that this may be the next document. Let's have a
10 look. No.
11 Do you know Stefan Lot, Mr. Harland?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] According to this document, it is
13 046 -- the ERN number is 0465537. That's the ERN number. The previous
14 document can be removed if it's been admitted.
15 JUDGE KWON: For the record, I note that Mr. Harland answered no
16 to the question whether he knew Mr. Stefan Lot.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have 1D479, please, special
18 information, the 21st of July, 1993.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. You were there by then, weren't you?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Unfortunately, we don't have a translation, but I'm going to read
23 out the important parts. This is special information provided by the
24 security administration to the Main Staff of the Muslim army.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have page 2.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Some information and data received from Stefan Lot, liaison
3 officer of UNPROFOR attached to the command of the 1st Corps before he
4 left that duty. And then towards the middle of the first paragraph it
6 "In relation to the situation in town, Lot said that no one in
7 UNPROFOR understands that in this kind of war situation there are many
8 people in the streets, that cafes are open as well as some privately
9 owned shops. Also, many people go to work. However, not a single
10 company is working."
11 This assessment is a bit different from yours, that in Grbavica
12 and Republika Srpska it is fine, whereas it is bad out there. Don't you
13 agree that this is somewhat different?
14 A. I didn't really understand what he said, sorry.
15 Q. Well, he says that everyone in UNPROFOR is surprised at this
16 relaxed atmosphere, that everybody's out in the streets, cafes and
17 restaurants are open, everybody's milling about but nobody works. No
18 companies are working and everybody lives well. That's what he is
20 A. Did he really say everybody lives well? No, surely not.
21 Q. Well, he says that cafes are open and privately owned shops, and
22 these cafes and shops cannot be working if there's no one buying in those
24 A. There were some cafes open, and there were shops, and there were
25 the markets, but they had the most miserable produce. And it's true that
1 people would come out. They would go mad just sitting inside, but there
2 was nothing much to -- to buy, and it was extremely dangerous. And
3 whoever this colleague of mine, Mr. Lot is, I'm sure he cannot have been
4 saying that there was anything like normal life going on within the
5 besieged area of Sarajevo
6 managed to go to school, but for most it was just awful. But it's true
7 that there were some cafes open.
8 Q. Let us now have a look at another paragraph. His assessment is
9 that, "it is inevitable that our side will lose the war if things go on
10 this way." He also said that everyone in UNPROFOR is aware of the
11 problems in relation to different military police units, Celo, Caco, and
12 similar commanders outside the city of Sarajevo who do not obey orders
13 issued by superior commands, pointing out that for this kind of
14 disobedience heads would role in the French Army. Members of UNPROFOR
15 have the impression that political structures are obstructing the defence
16 system and that it is only the BH Army that is defending the state, and
17 relations between political structures in the army seem unclear to them.
18 He also says that a serious problem for the BH Army are the disagreements
19 with the Sandzak line, and he does not understand -- can we have the next
20 page. In the next, he says that Sefer Halilovic is a greedy man who is a
21 toy in the hands of politicians, and so on and so forth.
22 Do you know that the families of many of the top Muslim people
23 lived in Serbia
24 A. Oh, sorry. No, I didn't -- I didn't know that.
25 Q. On this second page, towards the bottom, it also says that he
1 said that:
2 "UNPROFOR has information about our ammunition production as well
3 as of hand grenades and rifle grenades in town, and that they know
4 exactly in which buildings this production is taking place."
5 He also knows that oil is purchased in the black market from
6 UNPROFOR members, but that will be brought to an end because in Sarajevo
7 soon it will only be the French soldiers who will be there.
8 Obviously he believes in the French Army, Stefan Lot, and
9 obviously there were these national differences in respect of your views
10 regarding the conflicts; right?
11 A. Right.
12 Q. Do you know who Valentin Tomasev [phoen] is?
13 A. Yeah, Colonel Valentin, yeah.
14 Q. At one point this report says that Stefan Lot said that Valentin
15 has a high regard for Hajrulahovic as a true professional, and he got the
16 impression that Valentin wanted to advise Hajrulahovic in some actions.
17 Well, we have been traditionally friends with the French, and I would be
18 sorry if he advised Hajrulahovic in terms of his actions against us. Did
19 you know about that?
20 A. I know that a lot of my colleagues, including General Rose whose
21 opinions you've just seen, also had a rather high opinion of
22 Mustafa Hajrulahovic as a professional soldier.
23 Q. Did he ever help him with advice, I mean UNPROFOR officers?
24 A. I don't think so, but he would often visit General Rose when I
25 was there, but I think it was it was a cordial professional relationship.
1 I think General Rose was of the view that militarily the Bosnian army was
2 extremely weak, badly equipped, badly led, bad tactical positions, and he
3 was generally happy to meet somebody he considered a professional and
4 talented soldier.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,
7 please. There is no translation, I think.
8 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be marked for
11 MS. EDGERTON: With that proviso, yes, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be MFI D165.
14 JUDGE KWON: That's mark pending translation, I make it clear.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D458, please. Could I
17 have that now? I'm afraid that we don't have a translation of that
18 document either. 1D458. Or actually, perhaps we do. Yes, we do. It's
19 the 6th of June. Now that we've identified the first page, could we
20 please have the second page, "Destructive activity by Musan Topalovic,
21 Caco." That is the heading. We'll see that document as well, but we are
22 actually asking for 1D458.
23 It should be the right number. 14 -- or 1D458. 458, that's the
24 number we have, and that should be right, but here we see another
25 document. We'll be needing that document pretty soon, too, but ...
1 All right. Let's -- no. No. Can we have this placed on the
2 ELMO, please.
3 JUDGE KWON: But which is what, Mr. Karadzic? I checked the
4 number, and the document we are seeing through the monitor is 1D458,
5 unless there's a mistake in numbering.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I believe that there must
7 have been a mistake. Of course, we'll be dealing with this document soon
8 as well, but sorry -- ah, yes, that's it. Yes, yes. That's it. This is
9 right. Now let us have page number 2, please.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Then we'll just deal
12 with this document now. Actually, can the other one be placed on the
13 ELMO, because we won't get our order right if we don't do it that way.
14 So can we please place this on the overhead projector.
15 There has been a change. 04035 and -- the page numbers are right
16 here in what I have.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Do we have any idea of what the 65 ter number of
18 this is document might be.
19 JUDGE KWON: No translation at all. So if you could tell us what
20 document it is.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is a special information
22 provided by the intelligence service of the Muslim army. The pages are
23 03570398, 78, and now it is 04035980, 81 and 82.
24 JUDGE KWON: Without any cover page.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as I understand things, it
1 is part of this special information, and it has its number, 04035982.
2 The cover page says "Special information," 04035979. And then the next
3 one is 980.
4 JUDGE KWON: Let's see how we can get on with -- put your
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 2.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. You did know something about what was going -- about what was
9 going on in Sarajevo
10 treated by these commanders, especially of the 109th and 110th Brigade;
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, the last paragraph on the second page. The cover page and
14 then the first page and then the second page. I'm going to read it
16 Fikret Muslimovic is reporting. He is the chief of military
17 security and he is reporting to his command. He says:
18 "We note that as regards the unlawful and destructive activity
19 of Musan Topalovic, Caco, we have provided information several times
20 already, and in this connection we have proposed certain measures in
21 order to make it impossible for him to behave that way. Inter alia, in a
22 document that we sent on the 1st of December, 1992, when the
23 10th Mountain Brigade was still in the process of being established and
24 Caco as one of the candidates for its commander, we presented the
25 information we had available on his mistreatment and arrest of citizens
1 and even his own soldiers. Liquidations of citizens who were ethnic
2 Serbs. Forced mobilisation and taking citizens to dig trenches. Among
3 these citizens there were sick people and disabled people. Also,
4 apartments were broken into, humanitarian aid was being looted, and so
6 So that was written in June 1993, and in December 1994, all the
7 authorities knew what Musan Topalovic, Caco, was doing in town, that he
8 was arresting people randomly in the street. He was slaughtering Serbs,
9 literally slaughtering them. You will see that from the documents that
10 are to come now. And how is it that no one from the international
11 community stepped in to protect these miserable people in Sarajevo
12 were being treated that way?
13 A. Well, first of all, if the English translation of your remarks
14 was right, there was a reference to December of 1994, but he was long
15 dead by December 1994. He was killed by the Bosnian government for just
16 these types of activities in, I think, October of 1993.
17 I must say I -- I have never met Mr. Muslimovic, I don't think,
18 but I have a generally positive impression. If this is an internal
19 report of a Bosnian army saying that a Bosnian army commander has been
20 abusing or has liquidated people because of their Serb nationality, and
21 on the basis of this, that the Bosnian army then got rid of him and when
22 he resisted he was killed, I would say it is indicative of the fact that
23 there was a major problem with gangsterism and criminality. But it's
24 last major sign of seriousness that they were addressing it, and they had
25 even identified as one of his crimes the fact that he was committing
1 crimes against people of Serb nationality.
2 So I don't see -- he was a well-known criminal. In the documents
3 we've looked at which I've signed, there's also references to his
4 actions. So I have nothing against this report here by Mr. Muslimovic.
5 Q. I can see from the previous document that UNPROFOR knew about it
6 and Stefan Lot knew and inquired about this, but -- but Mr. Harland, this
7 is not anyone. This is a brigade commander whom the government and the
8 authorities were tolerating for a whole year until he slaughtered all
9 these Serbs. He moved into Serbian apartments, and then they killed him.
10 And do you know after why they did that? That was after he killed the
11 son of the minister of the interior, Avdo Hebib, and organised an armed
12 uprising. And then documents that we will show will indicate that he was
13 not killed because of the Serbs but because of the fact that he started
14 to get in the way and started kill them; is that correct?
15 Do you know that the son of the minister of the interior,
16 Avdo Hebib, was killed, and that the son was killed by Caco?
17 A. Yes, but I -- you were correcting me on the sequence of events,
18 but I was there when that -- when those events to place, and if I
19 remember correctly, the Bosnian government and UNPROFOR had become
20 extremely alarmed by the behaviour of this man.
21 Now, you are right in saying that he committed crimes against
22 citizens of Serb nationality on the basis of their nationality, but he
23 also committed crimes against the population at large, and his -- the
24 little part of Sarajevo
25 brewery, yeah, was more or less a no-go zone for everybody.
1 And I think the sequence was that the Bosnian government tried to
2 arrest him; then he grabbed the people; then he killed the son of
3 Avdo Hebib, the minister of the interior; then he was killed. So my
4 understanding of this was: He was an out-of-control commander, in what
5 was a very chaotic defence of Sarajevo
6 is illustrative of an effort by the Bosnian government to gain some --
7 restore some sort of order and decency in the -- in the military
8 establishment, which was successful.
9 Q. Thank you. The Bosnian government would kiss you for these
10 explanations, but it wasn't like that, but you are correct, this was
11 December 1992, not December 1994. But if we accept this document, I
12 would ask for 1D453, and then you will see that it is not the way it was
13 presented to you. I don't believe that you wanted it to be like that
14 yourself, but it was presented to you like that. The document is 1D453.
15 It wasn't translated. The date is the 7th and the 8th of May,
16 1993, about the state of security on the -- or the security situation on
17 the 7th and 8th of May, 1993. And then in the penultimate paragraph it
18 says -- this is a brigade, Mountain Brigade. This is Caco's brigade that
19 we're talking about. It says:
20 "In any case, the security organs had the exceptional honour
21 today, as well as the very complex task of executing all security actions
22 in a very professional manner in order that the visit by Mr. Izetbegovic,
23 the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia
25 "At the time of the writing of this report, 14.45 hours, the
1 president is still our guest and we hope that the visit will be completed
2 successfully in every way."
3 So six months after being informed about the fact that
4 Musan Topalovic, Caco, was expending the Serbs around him and was
5 throwing him into Kazani -- we will explain that later. Have you heard
6 of Kazani?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. So Alija Izetbegovic is visiting. And this isn't the only time
9 that he is visiting this brigade. So he's visiting this brigade and you
10 can see that nevertheless, the 10th Mountain Brigade was not a renegade
11 unit but was, so to say, under the protection of Alija Izetbegovic. And
12 we're talking about May 1993 here; isn't that right?
13 A. No, I wouldn't say that. Would I say that the defence of
15 nationalists, there were Islamists, there were criminals, there were
16 psychopaths, there were good citizens, there were democrats, and there
17 were a lot of people who were simply confused to be the object of attack
18 from Serb forces, and they had nothing in common except they were all
19 under attack by you. And I think what brought them together, this very
20 strange group of people, this strange collection of people, was the
21 common horror that was inflicted upon them. And what the documents you
22 have been showing in fact show the process that the government was going
23 through of weeding out some of the more psychopathic and criminal
24 elements. I would not say that all the psychopathic and criminal
25 elements were eliminated, and you are right that the president and others
1 attempted to make compromises with some of them. But this document that
2 you have showed from this man is an extremely interesting historical
3 document, as it shows that process of trying to make a state out of what
4 was a very strange collection of people being attacked.
5 Q. Then we will use more time, more time than I planned. Are you
6 trying to say that Mr. Izetbegovic went to visit Caco, gave him this
7 death sower, this machine-gun 84, and went to lecture him not to slit the
8 throats of Serbs any more? Is this something that you would do with a
9 seasoned criminal about whom he had known for at least six months that he
10 had killed Serbs from the Old Town
11 agree with that even though you did explain very well this composition of
12 the force that was defending Sarajevo
14 Does this document indicate that Izetbegovic was visiting the
15 brigade that Caco was commander of? Is that so or not?
16 A. That appears to be so.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
19 document, please.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm a bit concerned about the number
21 of documents that have been -- that haven't been translated. It's
22 difficult for us to follow. The same is true, no doubt, with the
23 witness. So bear that in mind in presenting the document to the witness.
24 So we deal with two documents, the previous document which was
25 put on ELMO and as well as this one, 1D453.
1 Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON: I have no objection to their admission. I'd just
3 like to note, in the first document that appeared on the ELMO was shown
4 to me for the first time when my friend brought a copy to me. It was not
5 on any list of released documents that we were able to identify, and in
6 fact, that's the only point I'd like to make, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE KWON: It seems to have some ERN number or -- of that kind.
8 MS. EDGERTON: It does indeed, Your Honour, which is why I was
9 limiting my point, but it would still be useful to have notification of
10 these things ahead of time to be able to, at least, read the document.
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well. While we mark them for identification,
12 Mr. Karadzic, you are advised to tell the Prosecution as to the
13 provenance of that document, the previous one. Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document that was placed on the
15 ELMO will be MFI
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Both documents, Your Excellencies,
17 are from the EDS
18 relatives have been translating. They're all scattered from Pale to
20 almost three months ago. So where I come from, if somebody's not able to
21 complete something within a dead-line, within three months, then they
22 would close shop. So if we cannot keep up with the translations, well,
23 then we need to see what we can do.
24 I would now like us to look at 1D510.
25 Joking aside, but I really believe that we would need to have
1 more resources available, because I cannot really keep up any more. I am
2 giving my friends and relatives translations, and they're doing them for
4 Anyway, let's look at 1D510.
5 JUDGE KWON: I don't like to waste time for being involved in
6 this kind of discussion, but my understanding is that you are receiving
7 remuneration for your assistant, which should include translation as
9 Let's move on.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, I did comment while we
11 were waiting for the documents. As for the remuneration, you know what
12 that is. This is pursuant to your decisions to my motions appealing.
13 Anyway, this is from the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
15 interviewed Nihad Hodzic, who was a member of the 10th Mountain Brigade,
16 and it says at the bottom of the page that he was wounded in Mrkovici,
17 and Mrkovici is a Serb village where he should not have gone in the first
19 And now we can look for page 5. Page 5 of this document. This
20 is a Muslim document.
21 In this interview, he says -- I don't know if we have that on
22 page 4. Page 5. Page 5 in the English as well:
23 "About the alleged --"
24 "I don't know anything about the alleged visits made by the
25 officers of the SVK, but I did hear that Alija Izetbegovic once visited
1 the 10th Mountain Brigade before I was wounded and gave us a sower of
2 death. One night, I do not recall the exact date, but I think that it
3 was in mid-October 1993. I came to the brigade command. I came across
4 the commander Musan Topalovic, Caco, in front of the brigade with a
5 military vehicle. He stopped and told me to sit with him in the PUH
6 vehicle, in the back where a couple of young men of a certain age. Their
7 heads were bent forward. They were wearing civilian clothes," and then
8 there is a sentence below that:
9 "We stopped there and continued on foot towards Kazani. On the
10 way there, towards the front lines, we were joined by one of the snipers
11 whose nickname was Cuto. He took one of those young men and Caco took
12 the other one, and they took them forward. We were also joined by the
13 snipers' commander Omer Tendzo and the sniper Asif."
14 And then below that, it says:
15 "Caco took the smaller man, shoved him to the ground and kicked
16 him two to three times in the head. At that time, I was standing off to
17 the side, and the other man, young man, was sitting on the ground. Caco
18 then called me and told me, 'Come on. Do you want to kill him?'"
19 And then a little bit lower:
20 "Caco was holding a large knife in his hands. He came up to me
21 and gave me the knife and then says, 'Come on, slit his throat.' I was
22 still standing like that for some time. Then Caco told me, 'Come on,
23 don't make me slit your throat or to bring your wife and kids here and
24 slit their throats.'"
25 And then a few lines below that:
1 "Then I approached him from the right, bent over him and then
2 crossed my knife two or three times over the throat of the young man.
3 Blood gushed out of his throat. The man did not show any signs of
5 "After slashing my knife against his throat, I left the knife,
6 turned around and moved away. I started towards the bunker nearby and
7 turned around and saw Caco continuing to slash the head of the same man."
8 And then a little bit lower down:
9 "They brought the second man to that spot and Caco started
10 kicking him. Then I saw him starting to stab him across his body. I did
11 not hear the man scream or anything to that effect. In the meantime,
12 there was another young man who appeared, who was tall, 180 metres," and
13 so on.
14 This is something that a Muslim fighter from the 10th Brigade
15 stated, 10th Mountain Brigade, describing the actions of his commander
16 Caco Topalovic in slitting the throats of two Serb young men who were not
17 even defending themselves. They were resigned to their fate. What do
18 you say to this?
19 A. Well, I think we -- I said before that he was a psychopath and
20 that I was interested in the document from Mr. Muslimovic because it
21 showed a serious attempt to identify that even when that psychopathic
22 behaviour was demonstrating itself against Serb victims that the Bosnian
23 government did slowly sort itself out and gets rid of him. Yeah, he was
24 a monster, and this crime at Kazani, which, of course, is extremely
25 widely known and reported is an example of that.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll have further 40 minutes today,
2 and by -- by the end of today's session I think you will have had about
3 nine hours and a half. How much longer do you have for this
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I hope that we will have
6 those four and a half hours tomorrow. It will be good to have those full
7 14 hours if Mr. Harland is unable to come at any time. He is a very
8 valuable witness, except for this understanding for the Bosnian
9 government, everything else, all the facts are valuable and there's
10 nobody who could explain to us things as they were, just facts without
11 any explanations. And if we will not have this full amount of time, then
12 I would kindly ask for Mr. Harland to be recalled and to complete his
13 testimony another time.
14 JUDGE KWON: Before coming to the courtroom today I was advised
15 by VWS that Mr. Harland has to leave the Tribunal tomorrow by 1.00 to
16 catch the flight to Haiti
17 8.30 tomorrow morning to save time, if any. So I thank everybody for
18 their generous understanding in terms of security, interpreters, and
19 court reporters.
20 So we will start at 8.30 tomorrow morning, but we have to leave
21 at -- you have to leave at least an hour for the redirect. So bear that
22 in mind and concentrate on relevant questions in order not to omit any
23 important questions.
24 Let's continue.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can I tender this
1 document, please.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D168.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D338, please, just briefly,
5 because I would like to substantiate this particular matter. 1D338,
6 please. I believe that we also have the translation.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. This is also a security administration document. The date is the
9 6th of November, 1993. I think I saw a translation earlier. Perhaps we
10 don't have one.
11 This is Haskic, Enes, nickname Zela, who stated:
12 "On the 2nd of July, 1993, at about 2100 hours, I was sitting at
13 the command of the 10th Mountain Brigade when Musan Topalovic, Caco,
14 called and asked that I bring 20 to 50 fighters to the command of the
15 10th Brigade Bistrik."
16 And it goes on to say, this is now on page 3 of this document,
17 that President Alija Izetbegovic went to see Caco twice and allegedly
18 gave him some foreign currency, funds for the needs of his brigade. The
19 Reis-Ulema Ceric also came as well as Sefer Halilovic.
20 General Briquemont from UNPROFOR also came to see Caco at one time, and
21 so on and so forth.
22 This was an important figure in the Muslim military, and you can
23 see that Mr. Izetbegovic had no intention of preventing him from doing
24 anything. He gave him foreign currency funds. He gave him a
25 machine-gun, and he was somebody who a welcomed visitor there.
1 Does all of that arise from this document?
2 A. I'm hesitating because I'm not sure that General Briquemont went
3 to see Caco. One could ask General Briquemont that fact, but we had
4 extreme limitations we put on ourselves about seeing Caco because he was
5 such a psychopathic person. But in general, I would say that there is no
6 doubt that President Izetbegovic did want to -- did work with people who
7 he thought could contribute to the defence of the city even when they
8 were people who were clearly extremely undesirable, at least up to a
10 So the general contention that he met with him and may have had a
11 positive interaction with him I would not doubt, but I have a little
12 doubt about what it says about General Briquemont there.
13 Q. I can confirm that General Briquemont is one of the most
14 exceptional figures that we had, and if he really did go there, then it
15 was probably an attempt to set something right.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
18 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for just one moment, Your Honour.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] While we're waiting can we look at
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 MS. EDGERTON: I actually want to rise on the relevance of this
24 document, Your Honour, because the question to my -- to Mr. Harland was
25 in regard to General Briquemont, and he answered the question as regards
1 General Briquemont and General Briquemont's character. That being the
2 case, I turn to the remainder of the document, which has -- other than
3 for that one sentence with respect to General Briquemont, has absolutely
4 no bearing on the question of General Briquemont but is full of what
5 might appear to be the beginnings of some tu quoque issues, a litany of
6 alleged crimes against Serbs. So I would object, Your Honour, on the
7 grounds of relevance of this document.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before the decision -- if I may say
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I can say something before your
14 JUDGE KWON: So while we are deliberating, we can't hear
15 anything, so -- but we find it generally relevant to -- relevant to the
16 general situation, so as such we will admit it while marking it for
17 identification pending translation.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D169.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, did you want to say anything?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You've said it all,
21 Your Excellencies, and this is introduction to the further development of
22 things where Muslims are being killed and Sefer Halilovic's wife and
23 her -- and her brother are killed, and this is something that is ascribed
24 to the Serbs, but it was discovered that it was not a Serbian shell but
25 explosives. So this is very relevant.
1 Can we look at 1D468. 478.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. While we're waiting, I would just like to remind Mr. Harland that
4 at that time internal struggles were going on in Sarajevo, and
5 Sefer Halilovic happened to a victim of that. His wife and her brother
6 were killed in an explosion, and before then we see how their
7 conversations with tapped.
8 This is a document signed by Enver Mujezinovic on the 12th of
9 July, 1993
10 On page 2, it says:
11 "Operational and technical measures and operational activities
12 are undertaken to clarify the motives and goals of armed rebellion of a
13 number of the 9th Motorised Brigade members as well as the 10th Mountain
14 Brigade, as well as special unit Delta which happened in the night
15 between the 2nd and 3rd of July of this year in the municipality of
16 Stari Grad. Some information displayed the positions and creation of the
17 subject Hasa."
18 That's Sefer Halilovic. He kept a very low profile during all
19 these events. We see that this was an armed rebellion of the
20 9th Motorised and the 10th Mountain Brigade, Mr. Harland, don't we?
21 A. Yeah, apparently. I haven't even this document before, but yes.
22 Q. So he was killed after that. He wasn't killed because he had
23 slaughtered Serbs.
24 And now let's go to page 4 in the same document. Page 4. Where
25 it says:
1 Hasa or Sefer Halilovic talked to Delic, and Delic asked him
2 whether he had sent somebody to pacify Delta who were under control of
3 Delic. He said Mido, standing for Midhat Aljic, the personal escort of
4 Sefer Halilovic, said that it would be dangerous to go anywhere because
5 there is shooting going on at several places.
6 At the bottom of this page Dzevad Radjo wanted to know whether
7 Hasa undertook measures to release those who had been forcefully taken
8 away to dig trenches. Hasa answered I can't do anything tonight.
9 So this is not only about the rebellion of one unit. It is
10 obvious that some high-ranking officers were also suspects and that there
11 was the reason for their inner struggle rather than any Serb victims. Do
12 you agree with that?
13 A. First of all, I would agree that clearly the fact that he's been
14 victimising Serbs is not the only thing that the Bosnian government had
15 against him, and it was probably not enough for them to move against him.
16 But, in fact, this transcript, like the earlier document from
17 Mr. Muslimovic, does seem to confirm that they were at least making a
18 serious internal effort to put their house in order. This -- it says in
19 the English transcription, "Believe me, Fikret acted there very
20 amateurishly. He had enough material to arrest him five months before
22 You see this clearly what we're looking at is a document which
23 shows how they are attempting to take some appropriate action, and they
24 are aware that it's too late and they need to establish some order.
25 So I -- I agree with you that the crimes against Serbs were not
1 sufficient to make the government move against him, but they were trying
2 to establish some sort of lawful state there.
3 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at page 9 in this same document.
4 It says here in repeated conversation Hasa put pressure on
5 Muslimovic to release those criminals that had been arrested and he said,
6 Think maybe it would be good. I'm not insisting. However when the
7 investigates is completed, maybe you should say, Lads, go home. And
8 criminal reports should still be filed. When the meeting was over, when
9 the goals of the meeting were achieved, we will then tear up the criminal
10 reports, and that's a conversation between Muslimovic and Hasa on the
11 23rd of June -- June, 1993.
12 I wouldn't go on elaborating and analysing this document. You
13 can see that this is just playing games, pretending that the rule of law
14 is in place, and you will see how Muslimovic implores but doesn't arrest.
15 Do you agree that it would be inadmissible in a state with the rule of
16 law for somebody to implore with criminals not to continue their
17 activities, and instead of that, instead of imploring them, they should
18 be arrested and prosecuted? What do you say?
19 A. By the time I arrived in Sarajevo, these original gangs who
20 had -- many of them criminal gangs, some of them police, some of those
21 who had defended Sarajevo
22 trying to regularise the situation, to eliminate some of them, to
23 integrate some of the others of them fully into the state structures.
24 But the reality was they had to work with the people who had the guns and
25 knew how to use them. So all of these documents from the one signed by
1 Mr. Muslimovic to this one are all, in fact, very interesting historical
2 documents which I haven't seen, basically illustrating that that process
3 of solely establishing order. And if we then forward this just a couple
4 of months to October, it ends with the final death of Caco and the
5 integration of his unit into the regular structure of the -- of the
6 1st Corps.
7 Q. Thank you. Well, if the other sides in Bosnia shared your
8 understanding for the impotent [Realtime transcript read in error
9 "impetus"] of the state, but let me remind you, Mr. Harland, the Serbs
10 fled the cities and created their state in the fields, a green-field
11 state without any institutions or any such thing. The Muslims, however,
12 inherited the entire infrastructure. How is it possible then that they
13 tolerated Caco for two years while he was killing the Serbs and only when
14 he turned against them they started dealing with him? Is your
15 understanding for the impotent of the Muslim government a bit too much
16 and would you be inclined to show the same understanding for the
17 governments of the other two peoples in Bosnia?
18 A. First of all, the transcript is -- is getting it's not impetus
19 it's impotence, that's the lack of power, right, twice.
20 Second, to answer the question, I think that the Bosnian
21 government was almost not a government at all. It was an absolutely
22 chaotic assembly of people who were under attack from the moment the
23 country came -- was born and recognised, from the most criminal, to the
24 most democratic, to the Islamists and Jihadi, all of them, and they had
25 no physical contact with each other. When I arrived they used to have to
1 ask us what was happening in Bihac or Mostar. They were physically
2 separated. They had nothing in common with each other. They were under
3 fire. They couldn't move. Whereas when you went to Republika Srpska
4 where they were at least able to move around and communicate, they had
5 created a functioning Assembly and army and system. So our impression
6 was that the Bosnian government was barely a government at all, and all
7 the documents you've shown is the process by which they were attempting
8 to form into some coherent state structure.
9 Q. Thank you. Can we please see the last page of that same
10 document. I'm interested in just one sentence there and then I will be
11 asking for 519. Before that, the last page. We have the Serbian. We
12 need English as well. All of that information indicates that Hasa still
13 wants to remain the number-one man in the BH Army, which is confirmed by
14 his conversation with Senad Masovic, and so on and so forth.
15 We're talking about a power struggle, not the struggle for a
16 state with the rule of raw. Does this look to you like a power struggle?
17 And nobody every mentions Serbian victims. Wouldn't you agree with me
18 that there's no reference anywhere here to any Serb victim? It's all
19 about a power struggle.
20 A. Well, I mean you've shown two of these documents which do show
21 Muslims expressing concern about Serb victims, which I consider very --
22 very positive, and given the fact that if one ever travelled to the Serb
23 side of the line, precisely this was happening on a vastly greater scale
24 and people were not removed. I consider this essentially a positive
25 process, because when Caco was removed, the -- the crime such as the
1 killing of those Serbs who were dumped in the Kazani pit above Bistrik,
2 that stopped. So I think, yes, there is a power struggle, but it's a
3 power struggle between some people who are definitely criminal and
4 definitely -- I mean, I don't want to use a technical term in your area,
5 but some apparently psychopathic against people who have some notion of a
6 regularly functioning states in which those crimes would not be
7 committed, but yes, it's a power struggle.
8 Q. It is clear that Hasa or Sefer Halilovic -- because it says here
9 that he still wants to be the number-one man in the army, so he's --
10 Sefer Halilovic.
11 Thank you. You said there were such cases in Republika Srpska as
12 well. We are going to prove that is not true.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,
14 please. The answer was not recorded, the witness's confirmation that
15 Hasa is Sefer Halilovic. That was not recorded.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, although the Chamber found that the
17 previous document to be relevant despite the objection from the Defence,
18 I'm wondering where you are leading us to. As you noted, this witness is
19 a very important witness. Let's not dwell on -- too much on Caco or the
20 historical background. Let's move on to your real issues.
21 Ms. Edgerton, I take it you want the full translation of this
22 document or are you happy with it as is?
23 MS. EDGERTON: No, I'd like the full translation, please,
24 Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: Then that will be marked for identification pending
1 full translation.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask Mr. Harland to
5 repeat that Hasa is Sefer Halilovic for the record, please.
6 A. Well, I haven't said anything about the authenticity of this
7 document because I can't possibly know, but it -- it does seem consistent
8 with what we -- with what we know.
9 Q. Very well. The document confirms it. Let's -- let me explain
10 for the participants in these proceedings. Let me say why I've taken
11 this option. According to our information, this is a rule and not an
12 exception. It was not just Musan Topalovic, Caco, but other commanders,
13 save for Hajrulahovic who everybody respected. Juka Prazina became
14 general. He had his own unit and he had special police within that unit;
15 am I right, Mr. Harland?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Ramiz Delalic, Celo, who killed a participant in the wedding
18 party, he bragged about that on TV, was he also a criminal who had his
19 unit in the territory of -- of the town of Sarajevo?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Ismet Bajramovic, Celo, was also a criminal. He was a drug
22 addict. He was also a commander. I don't know whether he died or
23 whether he killed himself. I believe that he committed suicide after the
24 war. But throughout the war he was a very important military figure. He
25 decided on the lifes -- on the life and death of the citizens. Am I
2 A. I think from the beginning of this line of questioning,
3 Dr. Karadzic, I have agreed that the Bosnian government used anybody who
4 was capable of fighting to defend the city, and many of those people were
5 extremely unattractive. Some of them they got rid of, some they
6 co-opted, and some of them they successfully integrated to the army, but
7 it was a very -- a very diverse coalition of people, including definite
8 criminal elements, yes, and including this last one you mention.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the court please produce 1D519
10 just to see what the relationship was between Alija Izetbegovic and
11 Sefer Halilovic. Sefer Halilovic was the head of that rebellion, and
12 when they were killed, he remained, and his wife and her brother were
13 killed by an explosion on the terrace and not in Serb shelling.
14 The document is 1D519, and you can see here that on the 26th of
15 April, 1994, a decision was made by the Presidency and a decision was
16 signed by Alija Izetbegovic about the promotion, Sefer Halilovic into a
17 general of BiH Army. He was removed from his position, and he was
18 replaced by General Delic as commander, but he was promoted into the rank
19 of general.
20 Unfortunately, the document is not on e-court by mistake.
21 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it was notified to the Prosecution as
23 MS. EDGERTON: But if I can assist at all, document 159 was, and
24 perhaps if Dr. Karadzic has a look at that, that might be the item he's
25 looking for, just in case, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Karadzic, you are not obliged to answer,
2 but how is this relevance to your case?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I just said that
4 those were not incidents. That was the system, and Mr. Harland very
5 kindly described the host of fighters who did not have to defend
6 themselves. They were waiting for a political solution. That was a
7 system in which there was no place for us. Those were the highest
8 ranking officials of the state who were in cahoots with the biggest
9 criminals, and the Serbs lost lives. They were slaughtered. They were
10 decapitated, men, women, and children. And that was a system that
11 existed, and I have to prove who was on the other side of the front line.
12 It is very relevant for these proceedings. According to me, it is of the
13 utmost importance. And by the way, many of those victims were portrayed
14 as Serb victims, but you will see what was actually going on there.
15 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is rarely intervening with your line of
16 questioning, but one may ask you whether your defence is that you
17 allegedly attacked, took over, seized because of this situation. You're
18 not obliged to answer, although I think you are already aware of the
19 tu quoque. So I would recommend you to concentrate on the real issues.
20 We have ten minutes. Let's get on with the evidence.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I will explain in two
22 sentences. Media and the partiality of the Western community, the
23 partiality of the united -- the United States of America have contribute
24 to the picture where 1.000 shells that fell on Sarajevo were counted as
25 hundred thousand of shells, and they were Serbs like in Dresden. And in
1 Sarajevo, there was not a single building that was destroyed by Serb
2 shelling. A picture was painted that the citizens of Sarajevo were just
3 like tame pigeons being attacked by wild Serbs, and the situation was
4 just the other way round. We were the ones who were waiting for a
5 political solution, and there was an all-out campaign of slaughtering and
6 killing waged against us. And all that was supported by the subjectivity
7 of the international community which is being confirmed here and such
8 reports about the crimes, about the crimes that the Serbs allegedly
9 committed went on the CNN. But if Serbs were attacked, if Serbs were
10 victims, that was never reported. There is nothing about that, not even
11 in secret reports of the United Nations. I have to show who was on the
12 one side of the front line and who was on the other. This is not
13 tu quoque. We have to show what we did. We are being charged with
14 launching attacks on a peaceful city. However, Sarajevo was a fortress
15 which was run by criminals, and they could go on killing Serbs without
16 being taken to charge and that was a whole system. There was not just
17 one single criminal in the Old City of Sarajevo. There were a host of
18 them and they were part of a system.
19 We are charged with being in a joint criminal enterprise, and
20 those who wanted to place the entire Bosnia under their control are not
21 charged with anything, and the condition for that was to first expel
22 Serbs and then Croats. Like I showed in my opening statement, and I will
23 show by means of documents, there was a plan to expel first Serbs and
24 then Croats from Bosnia. The Croats are the ones who discovered that
25 before the eyes of America. We have to show that it was impossible to
1 defend ourselves before we could prove who we are dealing with, and we
2 were dealing with the unprecedented atrocities committed by Muslims whom
3 we considered our own people. This is a new mentality, the mentality of
4 the jihad, and once that settles there's no way you can restore life back
5 to normal, and this is what we are going to prove because we have to
6 prove it.
7 May I go on?
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Mr. Harland, did you every hear of the so-called Seve?
10 A. I've forgotten.
11 Q. That was a secret unit, a unit of the secret police. There was a
12 wide coverage about the existence of that unit alleged set up by
13 Alija Delimustafic. You will remember Herenda and you will remember
14 Ugljen, I'm sure. And all of a sudden documents about those things went
15 missing from Bosnia. We requested those documents, but let me tell you
16 what Sefer Halilovic says about the alleged Serb bomb that killed his
18 The place of impact of the so-called shell, and in brackets it
19 says in the apartment of Sefer Halilovic when Halilovic's wife and his --
20 her brother were killed, close bracket, is the best proof that it was not
21 an artillery shell but that it was an imitation of an artillery shell. A
22 MUP commission that drafted the report consisted of unskilled men who
23 were not professionals. I know that pressure was put on some of them at
24 the time in order to compile false reports. I'm going to report those
25 people, because they covered up crimes.
1 If that had not been the killing of a person affiliated to such a
2 high-ranking military official who knew something about explosives and
3 shells, that shell, that explosive would have been ascribed to the Serb
4 side; right?
5 Maybe I can assist you by reading what he says next.
6 Would an artillery officer could have concluded with just a naked
7 eye could also be concluded by Vehbija Karic, and that is that the effect
8 of artillery shell would have been much more destructive than the effects
9 caused by the explosive that exploded on the terrace, actually.
10 JUDGE KWON: Are you putting your question? What was your
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I just wanted to present this
13 to Mr. Harland. I wanted to tell him how all that transpired and how it
14 was qualified by General Halilovic, and then my question will follow.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. It is tragic -- tragic -- tragical that three shells fell at the
17 brickworks area. As Karic says, one fell over, one fell short and the
18 third hit the target. Several thousand of people who reside in the
19 territory of the brickworks can testify to the fact that there was just
20 one explosion on that day, and that was on the terrace, and that was no
21 other shells falling on the brickworks.
22 My question, Mr. Harland, is this: If the incident had not
23 happened in the apartment of a general who knows about explosives and
24 shells, do you think that that incident would have also be described to
25 the Serbs, it would be -- it would have been reported that three shells
1 had fallen and one of them hit the -- Halilovic's apartment? According
2 to what you know and from your experience, do you think that that would
3 also have been ascribed to us?
4 A. I'm not familiar with this specific incident, but certainly from
5 our mortar-detecting radar, the vast majority of shells, the way over
6 99 per cent of the shells that landed in Sarajevo, came from Serb-held
8 Q. Well, you will see tomorrow that it wasn't like that pursuant to
9 the expenditure of ammunition according to their reports. We have an
10 interview here by Mr. Halilovic given to the Sarajevo Sivet [phoen] in
11 1998, and if we can accept this, then I have one last question from
12 1D474, where the report, official report, states that this woman was
13 killed from a shell which was assumed to have been a Serb grenade --
14 shell. I'm not talking about the number of shells from one side or the
15 other. What I'm talking about is that they were caught in something that
16 was ascribed to the Serbs and that this would have slipped through had it
17 not been Sefer Halilovic who was involved, and I just have one more
18 thing. Perhaps we could tender that and then we will be finished for
20 On the 7th of July, 1993, in the afternoon, one shell directly
21 hit the apartment of the Chief of the Main Staff, a commander in the
22 Ciglane neighbourhood, and on that occasion his wife and killed and her
23 brother. In connection with this event, misinformation is already
24 spreading according to which the case is being linked with the situation
25 in town following the conflicts caused by the members of the 9th and the
1 10th Mountain Brigades.
2 Mr. Harland, do you think that this is a correct report that
3 Halilovic is disputing?
4 A. It's very possible.
5 Q. That it's correct in the sense that Halilovic is correct or that
6 the police is correct?
7 A. It's -- I meant it's possible that there is a -- there are --
8 there would be grounds for him to dispute it. I don't know the context,
9 so I can't tell you anything definite about this event. I know the
10 organisation, though, and I worked with it in Sarajevo, but ...
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit these two documents,
13 please. Would I like to move them to be tendered.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Was the document that appeared before us the
15 document you wanted to tender, i.e., 1D159?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's the interview 15 -- 59.
17 It's very instructive.
18 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
19 MS. EDGERTON: With respect to that document, Your Honour, I
20 would raise the same objection as I did initially.
21 JUDGE KWON: Which is?
22 MS. EDGERTON: It's irrelevant, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE KWON: And the 474?
24 MS. EDGERTON: That's fine, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: 474 will be marked for identification pending
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D171.
3 JUDGE KWON: We will give our ruling as to the admission of 1D159
4 tomorrow morning when we will give our ruling as to the --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can say that the relevance also
6 has to do with the pattern, the pattern of incidents that were ascribed
7 to the Serbs. They would do something, and then they would say that it
8 was a Serb shell. I think that this is something that is relevant.
9 JUDGE KWON: We will resume at half past 8.00 tomorrow morning,
10 and I recommend you to prune your questions so as to conclude by 12.00
12 We'll rise.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.20 p.m.
14 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 11th day
15 of May, 2010, at 8.30 a.m.