Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 2374

 1                           Wednesday, 19 May 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, everybody.

 6             I was told that there are some matters for you to raise,

 7     Mr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED:  Yes, Excellency.  You tell me when I'm supposed --

 9     may I?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, there are a few matters to

12     deal with.  One of the most important ones is an intention - I hope it's

13     not a decision yet - to work four days a week.  We can barely take three

14     days a week, with the resources that we have.  Lord Bonomy had actually

15     mentioned that it would be two days per week, involving a team of eight

16     people.

17             The number of my associates has been reduced to five now.  One of

18     them is for legal matters, and all the rest cannot really keep up with

19     the workload.

20             In actual fact, I said at the very outset that I would challenge

21     everything but the climate.  That is my right, and that is my duty, to

22     challenge everything that is being mis-characterised here and

23     mis-portrayed, all the wrong allegations contained in the indictment, and

24     we believe that that is of great importance for the future of our

25     people -- our peoples, rather, and their reconciliation.  Therefore, it

Page 2375

 1     is my duty to present at this trial, and it is for you to provide a fair

 2     trial to me, to challenge each and every fact that should be challenged.

 3             If it's three days, we have a lot of difficulties involved,

 4     especially if we were not to get three more associates from the Registry,

 5     at least as many as we had so far; that is, a total of eight.  However,

 6     since all changes, on the basis of which my situation, as a whole, is

 7     being curtailed, it is even direct examinations by the OTP that are being

 8     shortened.  However, that does not diminish in any way the burden of the

 9     Defence, even when it's 92 ter, regardless of whether their direct

10     examination is half an hour or an hour and a half.  It doesn't make

11     things anything easier for us or it doesn't shorten the proceedings, as

12     far as we're concerned.  So the number of facts that we have to deal

13     with, the number of facts that they are going to introduce through a

14     particular witness, remains the same, irrespective of the way they are

15     examining the witness.

16             From the point of view of the Defence, this is an opportunity to

17     conduct exemplary hearings at an exemplary trial that will serve the

18     purposes of international justice.  If that is not the case, we are going

19     to be facing difficulties.  We are not going to have a fair trial, we are

20     not going to have an opportunity to present everything that we wish to

21     present and everything that we are supposed to do, in view of everything

22     that the Prosecution is accusing us of.

23             So that is our basic objection, and we had hoped in June we would

24     be sitting two days a week only.  If the Trial Chamber were to change its

25     decision, and if they were to require that all witnesses testify

Page 2376

 1     viva voce rather than 92 -- on the basis of 92 ter, then with eight

 2     people we would manage to do something.  However, this way, the rhythm is

 3     deadly, as far as we are concerned.  Resources, time, human capabilities,

 4     as it were, all of that is threatening these proceedings.

 5             You have noticed that the OTP have new Prosecutors for each and

 6     every witness, and we are who we are.  It's the five of us, and no one

 7     else, so there is no way we can speak of an equality of arms.  Their

 8     human and financial resources cannot be compared to ours.

 9             Therefore, I would like to ask you to look into that possibility,

10     sitting two days a week rather than four, or to have witnesses testify

11     viva voce so that we have more time to challenge everything that can be

12     challenged and disputed.

13             The other matter I wished to raise was the following.  Through

14     the kindness of Mr. van Lynden and Mr. Doyle, who were kind enough to

15     meet with the Defence, I found out that they had some kind of notes and

16     some kind of diaries.  However, we have had no insight of this nature.

17     You will see during the proceedings that some things have cropped up for

18     the very first time, things that were not contained either in official

19     reports or in TV reports, but they do appear in witness statements or in

20     witness testimony.  So the source of these new allegations that work to

21     our detriment have to -- has to be disclosed.  If it's not in a TV

22     report, then it's contained in a note-book.  That's why we kindly ask to

23     be given the opportunity to have the Victims and Witnesses Unit ask

24     Mr. van Lynden to submit his note-books and diaries, of course, the part

25     that does not have to do with his family and other private affairs.  Also

Page 2377

 1     from Mr. Doyle, we would like to ask that we have a look at the notes

 2     that he had.  He had them on the table when we were sitting there and

 3     talking, of course.  He said that there were a great many private matters

 4     contained in these note-books, and we will respect that.  If we get these

 5     documents from them, even without a subpoena from you, we are going to

 6     need some time to study these notes and perhaps even to investigate the

 7     matters involved to see whether that is actually the way things took

 8     place.  So in that case, at least parts of the cross-examination would

 9     have to be postponed, because the Defence cannot deal with all of this

10     new material so quickly.  We found out about it only yesterday and the

11     day before yesterday.

12             So these are the basic concerns of the Defence at this point in

13     time.  We don't know which one is our most important concern; perhaps the

14     first one that I referred to, the question of the rhythm and the time for

15     cross-examination.

16             For example, Mr. van Lynden said that he would have to leave

17     after the first session on Friday.  Indeed, that is a very short period

18     of time, and this is a big witness.  His reporting affected the world

19     public opinion.  He was an eye-witness.  He saw both sides.  Now, if we

20     were to have this kind of constraint imposed upon us, that would be

21     extremely difficult.  If the Trial Chamber so decides, we would be

22     prepared to work all day tomorrow or to have Mr. van Lynden appear some

23     other day when he can; next Monday, or next week, whenever.

24             Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger or Mr. Nicholls.

Page 2378

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, let me address one of the matters and

 2     perhaps touch on one of the others.  Mr. Nicholls was present, I gather,

 3     at the time of the discussion that the accused referred to and may be

 4     better placed to refer to respond to any issues related to the diaries.

 5             With respect to the scheduling issue, for the most part, the

 6     Prosecution, of course, leaves that matter, which is within the purview

 7     of the Court, in the Court's hands, with the following quick

 8     observations.

 9             First, I cannot recall any specific reference by Judge Bonomy to

10     a two-day-a-week schedule, and, indeed, if there was a reference to two

11     days, I suspect it was not in reference to this particular context, but I

12     didn't want my silence on that issue to be taken as an affirmation that

13     the Prosecution, too, was aware of that particular reference.

14             Secondly, perhaps it goes without saying, but I should note that

15     the accused's perception of his duty to the Serbian people or the Muslim

16     people is not an appropriate guide-line to the issues that are actually

17     involved and the matters that are actually at issue in this case, and it

18     may also signal some of the reasons underpinning disparities between the

19     assessment of what sufficient time for cross-examination consists of

20     between the Defence and the Prosecution or the Court.

21             And, finally, I would simply note that there have been examples

22     of the needless or pointless or even counter-productive expenditure of

23     resources by the Defence on issues that didn't need to be addressed.  One

24     came up in a motion recently.  That could serve as at least a partial

25     answer to the resource and time issues raised by the accused.

Page 2379

 1             And, finally, with respect to the issue of the notes or journals

 2     of the witnesses, I just want to make it clear, before any response that

 3     Mr. Nicholls has, that this is not a matter of documents in possession of

 4     the Prosecution that weren't disclosed.  That's not the issue.

 5     Apparently, the accused, during the course of his own investigation, has

 6     confirmed the existence of these things and now is interested in them.

 7     If they arise belatedly, it's for that reason, and that reason only.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

 9             Do you have anything to add, Mr. Nicholls?

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, Your Honours.

11             Just to confirm, I was going to rise at the beginning today and

12     explain that, unfortunately, Mr. van Lynden has commitments and would

13     need to go back Friday at about 11.00 a.m. for a flight.  I informed my

14     friends of that yesterday.  We will have the next witness ready at that

15     time.

16             And that -- confirm what Mr. Tieger said about the note-books.

17     We heard about them yesterday during the interview, and there was a

18     request to me at that time from Mr. Karadzic's associates for the

19     note-books, and I explained I don't have them, I haven't seen them, and

20     I'm not sure what the attitude of the witness will be or where they are.

21     So that's something that we'll need to look into, and the Prosecution

22     will assist in any way it can with these note-books.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?  May I, before you make a

25     decision?

Page 2380

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond to what Mr. Tieger

 3     said just now?

 4             First of all, the Prosecution has such a huge advantage.  They

 5     are counting on a vast amount of 92 bis evidence with people that I'm not

 6     even going to see.  Among them, there are some witnesses that were never

 7     cross-examined or even seen by any Defence team.  Also, there is an

 8     abundance of statements, written material, and so on.  All of that is

 9     cropping up, and I have to be given an opportunity to challenge that, or

10     let the Prosecutors say what they're going to give up on.  Let them --

11     let them tell us what is not going to be used as a basis for a sentence.

12     Whatever may lead to a sentence, I need to challenge.  I need to

13     cross-examine witnesses, I need to put our case to the witness,

14     everything that we know, and so on.

15             What Mr. Tieger said, that there were questions that should not

16     have been put, that probably relates to legal issues rather than factual

17     issues.

18             If the Prosecution had only three documents against me, all of

19     this would not be required.  They have nothing, so now they want me

20     simply to be snowed under, and I think they even need all the dead

21     witnesses that they have to keep in the case file in order to be sure

22     that I'm found guilty.

23             As for Muslims and Serbs, that is an additional matter.  Of

24     course, I'm defending myself here, but it is a fact that the importance

25     of this trial goes beyond the importance of a single individual.

Page 2381

 1     Enormous illusions have been created.  Many took part in the creation of

 2     these illusions; the Prosecution, journalists, diplomats, military

 3     factors, intelligence services.  They created such conditions that things

 4     are always boiling in the Balkans and there's always bad blood there.

 5             Of course, I'm defending myself, but I want to clarify all of

 6     this, not only because I am being charged in this way and can be

 7     sentenced therefor, but also because this is of enormous importance for

 8     the people living there.

 9             I really think the Prosecutors should be more modest when they

10     challenge the capacities of the Defence, because they have such a vast

11     advantage and they have far more resources.

12             Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you'll be surprised to hear that the

14     Chamber is minded to sit five days a week from after the recess.

15             In any event, the Chamber will consider the matter, will give a

16     ruling on that matter.  Speaking for myself, one potential solution may

17     be to have an exemplary hearing with you being represented, a full team

18     capable of investigating, defending, et cetera.

19             As to the note you referred to, as Mr. Tieger or -- Mr. Tieger

20     noted that they are not in the hands of the OTP, and I take it -- so it's

21     the matter for you to pursue with the witness.  So during the course of

22     direct or cross-examination, I hope you can sort it out in one way or

23     another.

24             And I noted that tomorrow, there's no -- there's a courtroom

25     vacancy, so during the course of today's hearing I'll explore, with the

Page 2382

 1     assistance of the Court Deputy, whether we can have an extended sitting

 2     tomorrow, and we'll do our best, and then we'll see how far we can get on

 3     with it, and then -- actually, we'll see, at the end of his evidence,

 4     whether we need to call Mr. van Lynden again or not.

 5             So that said, let's bring in the witness.

 6             Mr. Karadzic, are you minded to supplement your submission as to

 7     the sitting schedule in writing?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the Trial Chamber needs that, we

 9     will do so gladly, because we always objected to the rhythm involved,

10     bearing in mind the necessity to have equality of arms.  If we were to

11     neglect all of that and if there would be a speeding up of the rhythm,

12     then we would not have a fair trial.  So if you need this in writing, if

13     that would affect your decision, of course, I have to do that, I have to

14     make that kind of submission.

15             JUDGE KWON:  It is up to you whether or not to file something in

16     supplement -- to supplement your submission.

17             Let's bring in the witness.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How much time are you giving me for

19     that?

20                           [The witness entered court]

21             JUDGE KWON:  By the end of Friday.

22             Welcome, Mr. van Lynden.

23             If you could take the solemn declaration.

24             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

25     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Page 2383

 1                           WITNESS:  AERNOUT VAN LYNDEN

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  If you could take your seat, please.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 6                           Examination by Mr. Nicholls:

 7        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. van Lynden.

 8        A.   Good afternoon.

 9        Q.   As I told you, in this proceeding what we will be doing is

10     entering into evidence a statement you have given, and then asking some

11     follow-up questions.

12             So can I ask you, please, to confirm that you've read your

13     consolidated witness statement of 25th and 26th February of this year,

14     that you signed on 16th of March, 2010?

15        A.   I can confirm that.

16        Q.   And could you please confirm that the statement is accurate and

17     that if you were asked questions on the same topics today, your answers

18     would be the same?

19        A.   I can.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And, finally, in the statement there were various

21     videos referred to which are contained in the attachment to the

22     statement.  Can you confirm that these videos that you watched were

23     accurate copies of the original broadcasts?

24        A.   I can.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

Page 2384

 1             Your Honour, I would move to tender the consolidated statement,

 2     which is 65 ter 22289.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted as ...?

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P926.  Thank you.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 6             I'll now read a brief summary of the evidence.

 7             Mr. van Lynden worked as a television journalist, specialising in

 8     covering war zones.  In this capacity, he covered conflicts in Croatia

 9     and Bosnia-Herzegovina, starting in 1991, on behalf of the 24-hour

10     British news channel, Sky News.  Sky News went out via satellite and

11     could be watched throughout Europe by people who had a dish capable of

12     receiving that station.

13             Mr. van Lynden arrived in Sarajevo in late May of 1992, and he

14     stayed there through September.  He then spent approximately three weeks

15     in Pale, returning in October 1992 to Sarajevo to continue his work,

16     staying there for some time.

17             In 1993 and 1994, Mr. van Lynden was covering conflicts

18     elsewhere, other parts of BiH, and made shorter visits to Sarajevo.

19     While Mr. van Lynden was in Sarajevo, he stayed mainly at the former JNA

20     military hospital, also known as the state hospital and as the city

21     hospital later on.  The city hospital was 12 or 13 storeys high and at a

22     fairly central location in the city, near Marin Dvor Square, the

23     Parliament.  The front-lines of Grbavica were nearby, and thus

24     Mr. van Lynden had a crew, and his crew had a good vantage point to film

25     from this hospital.

Page 2385

 1             The city hospital had been targeted for fire before

 2     Mr. van Lynden arrived there, and was fired upon during his stay there as

 3     well.  While he stayed there, Mr. van Lynden did not see evidence of

 4     snipers operating from the hospital.

 5             Once he arrived in Sarajevo, Mr. van Lynden observed the

 6     conditions that the population lived under, including difficulties --

 7     severe difficulties caused by lack of necessary resources, food, water,

 8     utilities, as well as the impact of sniping and shelling on the

 9     population of Sarajevo.  In his evidence, Mr. van Lynden describes the

10     fear which accompanied shelling and sniping attacks.  He saw, on

11     occasion, civilians who had been shot, lying in the streets of Sarajevo,

12     and, in fact, sniping incidents became so common that unless there were

13     unusual or aggravating features to the particular incident, it was not

14     considered truly newsworthy.

15             And Mr. van Lynden reported on the situation in the streets of

16     Sarajevo, how people had to run crossing the streets at intersections for

17     fear that they could be hit by sniper fire.  He reported about sniping

18     and heavy shelling in Sarajevo, and these stories referred to in the

19     statement include: heavy shelling of the city and the Marsal Tito

20     Barracks in early June 1992; more heavy shelling in June 1992 at

21     increased intensity; firing upon the UNIS towers and other areas in

22     Sarajevo; his observations of injured civilians being brought to the city

23     hospital in early June; and a story from the 5th December 1992 on the

24     firing on and burning of an apartment building in Sarajevo.

25             Other stories and topics covered by Mr. van Lynden during this

Page 2386

 1     period include: the situation and conditions in Dobrinja in July 1992;

 2     his meeting with Juka Prazina in May and June of that year; a visit to

 3     Kula Prison in September 1992; a funeral of 28 VRS soldiers in Vlasenica

 4     in September 1992, which was also attended by Mr. Karadzic; and

 5     conditions he observed in Srebrenica in November 1992, when he entered

 6     the enclave.

 7             In September and October of 1992, Mr. van Lynden reported from

 8     Pale to try to cover the war from the Serb side, and while in Pale

 9     Mr. van Lynden spent several evenings with Mr. Karadzic.  During these

10     evenings, they would hold informal conversations after work in

11     Mr. Karadzic's office, and Mr. Karadzic would take out maps, explain his

12     view of the situation, and Mr. van Lynden stated that he could -- he

13     observed that taking Sarajevo was an obsession for Mr. Karadzic.

14             In September 1992, Mr. van Lynden was able to interview

15     General Ratko Mladic.  During this interview, General Mladic took

16     Mr. van Lynden and his crew to an artillery position directly overlooking

17     Sarajevo, and this interview was filmed.  And Mr. van Lynden, looking at

18     a map which we'll look at today, was able to identify the approximate

19     location on this map of the firing position, where the interview was

20     held.

21             Following this interview with General Mladic in September 1992,

22     Mr. van Lynden and his crew made several trips around the perimeter of

23     Sarajevo to different Bosnian Serb positions, including Grbavica and the

24     Jewish cemetery, where Mr. van Lynden was able to speak with the soldiers

25     there and film the positions.  He also visited Mount Trebevic, Hrasno and

Page 2387

 1     was taken by Bosnians to positions on Zuc Hill.

 2             In February 1993, Mr. van Lynden reported on his entry to

 3     Gorazde, where he had to walk through the foot trail overnight and spent

 4     some time there reporting on the conditions which he observed.  Although

 5     there was extreme poverty, the conditions were not as dire as in

 6     Srebrenica, that he'd seen there.

 7             In February 1994, after the Markale incident, Mr. van Lynden was

 8     sent to Pale, and he filed several stories from there about negotiations

 9     for withdrawal with heavy weaponry from Sarajevo.  After that agreement

10     on the withdrawal was reached, for the first time Mr. van Lynden was able

11     to see that one could walk across Marin Dvor Square in Sarajevo, which

12     had been absolutely too dangerous at any other time he'd been there.

13             Also while in Pale, Mr. van Lynden's cameraman filmed a meeting

14     attended by Radovan Karadzic and Generals Mladic, Milovanovic, Gvero, and

15     others, and it was at this time that General Mladic, on seeing

16     Mr. van Lynden, grabbed him and expressed his anger about

17     Mr. Van Lynden's reporting on Gorazde and Zuc.

18             That concludes the summary.

19        Q.   I'm now going to ask you, Mr. van Lynden, just a few background

20     questions before we go straight to Sarajevo in 1992.

21             You were educated and born in the United Kingdom?

22        A.   That's correct.

23        Q.   And could you tell me just a little bit about your military

24     service, which I believe is with the Dutch Marines from 1976 to 1978?

25     Did you have any specialty training?

Page 2388

 1        A.   I was trained as an infantry officer and got special training as

 2     a mortar -- platoon commander and mortar platoon commander.

 3        Q.   And after that military service, you became a war correspondent;

 4     is that right?

 5        A.   That's right.

 6        Q.   And could you tell us briefly, before covering the conflict in

 7     the former Yugoslavia starting in 1991, which conflicts did you cover

 8     before that?

 9        A.   I began by covering the conflict then already going on in

10     Lebanon, which had begun in 1975, and I lived in Beirut from 1982 to

11     1986.  I covered the Iran-Iraq war that began in 1980.  I covered the

12     Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and made four treks into Afghanistan

13     during the 1980s, each of them lasting around three months, on foot with

14     the Afghan resistance.  I covered the Romanian revolution in December

15     1989, and I covered the first Gulf war after Iraq had taken over Kuwait,

16     and was with the allied troops during Operation Desert Storm, when Kuwait

17     was liberated at the beginning of 1991.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And if I'm correct, from 1988 onwards you were

19     working full time for Sky News?

20        A.   That's correct.  Before that, I was largely working in newspapers

21     and radio.

22        Q.   All right.  Now I want to talk about the bulk of your testimony

23     here today in the time we have, and that's your experience following your

24     arrival in Sarajevo.

25             Do you recall when it was, in May 1992, that you arrived?

Page 2389

 1        A.   Right towards the end of May, but I don't remember the precise

 2     date.

 3        Q.   And you speak about this in your statement at paragraph 6, but

 4     can you tell us what area of the Yugoslavia Sky News was broadcast over

 5     and where your reports could be received?

 6        A.   As far as I'm aware, our reports could be received in the whole

 7     of the former Yugoslavia, as in the whole of Europe.  Anyone who had a

 8     dish that could watch the Astra satellite, on which Sky News at the time

 9     was broadcast, would be able to see the channel.

10        Q.   Now, as I - I hope I got it right - explained in the summary, you

11     set up first -- or quickly in the former JNA military hospital, also

12     known as the city hospital in Sarajevo.  Could you tell us how you picked

13     that location and why you chose that spot to operate from?

14        A.   When we drove into Sarajevo, we -- there were at that time no

15     hotels open.  Journalists in a foreign country stay in hotels, but in

16     Sarajevo that was not, at that time, possible anymore.  They had all

17     closed or been burnt already.  So I went to the Bosnian Presidency and

18     asked them for help in finding somewhere for us to stay.

19             We were then taken to what we were told was a building that was

20     used in the past and during peace to house foreign VIPs, a building that

21     later became the house in Sarajevo of the UN commander there, but at that

22     time the UN commander wasn't there yet, and so we were housed there.  It

23     is a relatively low building, quite close to the Presidency, in the

24     center of the city, and we had one night there.  There wasn't particular

25     heavy shelling, but there was shelling that night, and my cameraman and I

Page 2390

 1     noticed that we simply couldn't film this from this low building, and

 2     therefore we went on the lookout, in the days after, for a higher

 3     building from which we would be capable of filming the shelling that was

 4     taking place.

 5             As I recall, on the second or third day we went to what was then

 6     still called the military hospital, because we had heard that apart from

 7     other injured being taken care of there, there was one soldier from the

 8     then still-occupied Marsal Tito Barracks who had been taken there after

 9     being wounded, and we wanted to film and interview him and find out how

10     that had happened.

11             We met the chief surgeon of the hospital, Dr. Abdulah Nakas, and

12     once we arrived at the building we saw that it had been repeated targeted

13     already, but that it was a high building.  It seemed to us a well-built

14     building, but that -- so we asked him to see the higher floors and what

15     we might be able to film from there.  The upper floors of the hospital

16     had been evacuated.  They were no longer considered safe for patients, so

17     it was an empty floor.  We went to the top floor, and we asked Dr. Nakas

18     if, in future, we would be able to stay there during the nights to film

19     the fighting when it took place.

20             The building had two different things that made it interesting

21     for us.  Firstly, it was high and had a good view of much of the city.

22     There was a little left-hand balcony.  You could film from there the old

23     part of Sarajevo.  Right in front was Marin Dvor Square, the Parliament

24     building, and the southern hills of Sarajevo, and to the right there was

25     another little balcony from which -- so we could film the new part of

Page 2391

 1     Sarajevo.  So it was a vantage point.

 2             We asked Dr. Nakas.  He was very surprised that we should want to

 3     live on the top floor of a building that had already been repeatedly

 4     targeted.  But he gave his consent, and after that, that's where we

 5     stayed practically every single night when we were in Sarajevo.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And did you make any inquiries or check to see

 7     whether that building was being used by Bosnian forces and whether any

 8     sniping activity took place from the hospital?

 9        A.   Yes, we immediately did.  If you go to a building that has been

10     repeatedly and very clearly targeted and hit, you also wonder why.  And

11     as the correspondent with a television crew, I am responsible -- or I was

12     responsible for the well-being, as far as possible in a war zone, of that

13     crew.  Therefore, if I'm going to go into a building, I'm going to check

14     whether it is actually a building that is being used by military forces,

15     and we checked quite carefully.  I had already, from my experience in

16     1991 in the former Yugoslavia, noticed that Yugoslav soldiers of whatever

17     their nationality or religious background were usually not very careful

18     in tidying up after themselves, and therefore it seemed likely to us that

19     if there had been snipers in that building, we would find empty cartridge

20     cases.  That was not the case.  We even went on the roof at night, which

21     is dangerous because then you are a silhouette.  We found absolutely

22     nothing there.  We found nothing on the lower floors.  And in all our

23     conversations, because we did ask other people as well, no one ever said

24     that that building had been used for military purposes by the Bosnian

25     forces.

Page 2392

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And while you were there, staying there from the end

 2     of May/early June onwards, was the hospital targeted and hit by fire?

 3        A.   It was.

 4        Q.   Just to the extent you can tell, what type of weapons or

 5     projectiles were used to target the hospital?

 6        A.   That's a difficult question to answer.  If you are in a building

 7     that is hit, it's not always immediately possible to know, A, the size of

 8     the hit, sound levels, when you're in one part and another part is hit.

 9     However, while I was in the building, most of it seemed of smaller

10     calibre, sometimes maybe 20, 30, or 40-millimetre which can be fired from

11     anti-aircraft guns, and only on one occasion that I was in the building,

12     and that I clearly recall, were we fairly certain that it had been a tank

13     shell or something of that nature, because it was an extremely heavy

14     detonation and it hit part of the lift shaft within the building,

15     destroying that particular lift shaft.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I'd now like to show you a photo, a panoramic

17     photograph of Sarajevo.  This is 65 ter 14665A.

18             Your Honours, this is the -- this is a photograph which I

19     would -- the one exhibit which I added to my list and filed a

20     notification about.

21             Now, what we can see on the bottom is 14665, and we've just blown

22     up part of the center of the photo.  On the top portion of the photo,

23     Mr. van Lynden -- no, that's a little bit too big.  If we can -- if we

24     can zoom out a bit.  Can we just -- yeah.

25             Are you able to see where the state -- the former military

Page 2393

 1     hospital that you stayed in is?

 2        A.   Yes.  It's on the right-hand side.  It's the white building on

 3     the right-hand side of the picture.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could somebody assist Mr. van Lynden?  I'd like

 5     him to mark this with a stylus.

 6        Q.   Could you perhaps just draw an arrow to the building and mark

 7     that as -- with the number 1?

 8        A.   [Marks]

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can you see and point out the UNIS towers?

10        A.   [Marks]

11        Q.   Thanks.

12        A.   Number 2?

13        Q.   Yes, please.

14        A.   [Marks]

15        Q.   Are you able to mark the Parliament building or point towards it?

16        A.   [Marks]

17        Q.   Number 3, thank you.  Could you also mark the Holiday Inn, if you

18     see it there?

19        A.   [Marks]

20        Q.   4, thank you.  That's number 4.  And number 5, could you just

21     mark -- this is not a photo from 1992.  This is a more recent photo.

22     Could you please mark the location of the Marsal Tito Barracks?

23        A.   Well, it's quite a large complex, but it was roughly here [marks]

24     behind these flags.  So that would be number 5?

25        Q.   Yes, please.

Page 2394

 1        A.   [Marks]

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  I'd like to tender that exhibit,

 3     please.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  As marked?

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  As marked.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, this document shall be assigned

 8     Exhibit P927.  Thank you.

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  That can be taken off the screen.

10        Q.   Now I want to ask you some questions, now that we've established

11     where you were staying and how you picked the spot, about what you

12     observed of daily life and the conditions for the population of Sarajevo

13     after you arrived.  This is mainly in paragraphs 21 to 30 of the

14     consolidated statement.  Can you just briefly tell us, in your own words,

15     when you arrived, your impression of what conditions the citizens were

16     living under in terms of their access to food, water, necessary

17     utilities?  Just briefly give us what you recall.

18        A.   Well, the first thing that made a very clear impression on us is

19     that we crossed, by road, from Ilidza, which was held by the Bosnian

20     Serbs, into the territory held by the Bosnian government, and it was that

21     there was no one on the roads.  At that time, the Marsal Tito Barracks

22     were still in the hands of the JNA, and, therefore, we had to take a

23     convoluted road around the hills to get to the central part of Sarajevo.

24     You saw practically no vehicle on the road.  If you did, they were

25     driving at extremely high speed.  It was sometimes on the roads as if it

Page 2395

 1     was a ghost town.  If you saw people on roads that were in sight of the

 2     Bosnian-held territory on the southern hills overlooking Sarajevo, people

 3     ran.  I mean, apart from sometimes the old, who were incapable of running

 4     but still had to cross the street, everybody ran across the streets.

 5             It wasn't, at the time when we arrived, that there was heavy

 6     gun-fire going on continually.  There was occasional gun-fire.  But

 7     wherever you were in these districts, where people were not under cover

 8     and where they felt they were under threat of gun-fire, people ran across

 9     the streets.

10             I've never been in a city before -- and I lived in Beirut, which

11     was a city of war, but it didn't have that kind of situation where, in

12     such a large part of the city, the only way people could cross the street

13     was at speed.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15        A.   As far as the other question of electricity, gas, water supplies,

16     and food was concerned, there were no shops open by the time we reached

17     Sarajevo at the end of May 1992.  They were empty.  There were small

18     markets where individuals sold whatever produce.  At that time, it was

19     still possible, for instance, in Sarajevo to buy bottles of red wine.

20     They would run out pretty quickly.  But there were just a few vegetables,

21     very little on the market, and so food was already a problem for the

22     population.

23             Electricity, at the end of May 1988 -- 1992, was not such a

24     problem, yet at later stages of the war most areas of Sarajevo would not

25     have electricity.

Page 2396

 1             And as far as gas and water supplies, as far as I'm aware, again,

 2     those problems would be much worse and exacerbated later on, but in that

 3     stage -- early stage of the war, people, I think, generally still had

 4     water supplies at home.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 6             I'd like to play a short video-clip now.  This is 65 ter 40264A,

 7     broadcast, it should be, on the 1st of June.

 8             And if we can stop, Mr. Reid, right at the beginning where we see

 9     the symbol.

10             All right.  We're stopped at 00:00:06:8, showing a computerised

11     screen with the date on it.  Can you just tell us, because we may see

12     more of these, Mr. van Lynden, what does this screen at the beginning of

13     your broadcast mean?

14        A.   These are put before a story by the central office in London,

15     because they go into a computerised machine so that the programme editors

16     can run the stories when they want to.  There is a line-up clock of 40

17     seconds beforehand, and after the two seconds -- we stopped two seconds

18     before the picture will begin, it shows firstly at the top a slug, which

19     is the name of the story, in this case, my first name, "Aernout" and

20     "Yugo," as in Yugoslavia.  "PGM" means the programme, so it was the 1800

21     show that this story went out on on the day, the Monday, and then on the

22     date, the 1st of June, 1992.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

24             And, Your Honours, for your reference, this is a video referenced

25     in paragraph 44 of the statement.

Page 2397

 1             Could we play the clip now, please.

 2                           [Video-clip played]

 3             "In Sarajevo, the cross roads can be lethal, needed to be taken

 4     at speed.  They and the avenues that cut across the city offer the Serb

 5     gunners in the hills above with open lines of fire, prime targets which

 6     the old and infirm are forced to accept as the new, uncomfortable

 7     realities of life.  As the people of Sarajevo scurry across their

 8     streets, the latest cease-fire is being proposed and agreed at a

 9     meeting --"

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  There, we can stop.  Thank you.

11        Q.   Now, these -- first of all, I think this is the first story, was

12     it not, that you sent out after arriving in Sarajevo in May 1992?

13        A.   As I recall, yes.

14        Q.   The scene that's been captured there of the people hurrying

15     across the streets and the intersections, you started to talk about it,

16     but was that the norm or the exception?  Was that something difficult to

17     find to film or could you just explain how prevalent that was?

18        A.   This was the norm.

19        Q.   And you started talking about it as well, but in paragraph 46 of

20     your statement you talked about how Sarajevo was very different from

21     Beirut and your experience in Beirut.  And we saw, in this short clip

22     that we played before we stopped at 00:45:4, a shot from the hills

23     overlooking Sarajevo.  It was straight down to the intersection.  Could

24     you explain to us about those lines of fire and how Sarajevo was

25     different, in your view, from Beirut?

Page 2398

 1        A.   Well, the first thing that one has to understand about Sarajevo

 2     is that it's the city built around a river at the bottom of the valley,

 3     the River Miljacka, and then it has hills rising up from that valley

 4     floor to the south and to the north.  What you saw there were the hills

 5     to the south which were held by the Bosnian Serbs, and it literally

 6     meant, and we were to see that ourselves when -- in September 1992, when

 7     we worked on the Bosnian Serb side and filmed it from that side, that

 8     those there could literally look down a street from above onto the

 9     various streets and intersections of the city of Sarajevo, the heart of

10     Sarajevo, on the valley floor below them.

11        Q.   When you say those there could look down at the valley floors, is

12     that who you are referring to?

13        A.   To the Bosnian Serbs.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

15             Your Honour, could we give that video a number, please.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this document shall be assigned

18     Exhibit P928.  Thank you.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:

20        Q.   Now, just briefly you discuss in paragraph 26 of your statement

21     one particular sniping incident, where you stated you did not witness the

22     people actually being shot and the impact of the bullet, but saw them in

23     the streets.  Afterwards, in the attempt to rescue them, can you for us,

24     just as an illustration, describe what you saw on that occasion?

25        A.   This was, as I recall it, July of 1992.  We had been at the TV

Page 2399

 1     station and were driving back from the TV station along Marsal Tito

 2     Boulevard, and we had just about reached or were just before what had

 3     been the Marsal Tito Barracks when we were stopped by people on the road,

 4     and then we stopped.  And then we saw that there were a number of people

 5     lying in the street.  This is a broad street, and they had been shot

 6     while trying to cross this street.  As I recall it, there were three

 7     people.  They were all still alive, but they had been seriously wounded.

 8     We were told that first one person had been shot and wounded, a second

 9     person had run out to help them, and that person had been shot, and then

10     it happened with a third person.  After that, people had got the message

11     and decided not to run out there anymore.  And they finally waited until,

12     as I recall, a blue-painted armoured -- wheeled armoured car, what must

13     have been the police forces, came to position itself between those bodies

14     and the position from which the fire had emanated, which was the southern

15     part of Beirut -- of Sarajevo.  My apologies.  This took some time, and

16     when the armoured vehicle came, there was further fire on the three

17     people lying in the street.  As I recall, at least two out of three were

18     killed.  They were then -- the bodies were then put into the armoured

19     vehicle and driven off.  We drove after the vehicle, and I recall that we

20     actually went into the mortuary of Kosevo Hospital, the academic hospital

21     of Sarajevo, where the bodies were brought, and were there, in rather too

22     graphic a manner, shown how these people had been killed.  As I recall

23     it, the man in the mortuary actually put his finger into -- through the

24     bullet hole of one of the dead people to show the trajectory of the

25     bullet that had killed this person.

Page 2400

 1        Q.   Do you remember if these were men or women?

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, Counsel, please.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry.

 4        Q.   Do you remember if these were men or women, the victims?

 5        A.   As I recall, one woman and two men.

 6        Q.   And just as far as you could tell, were these civilians or

 7     soldiers?

 8        A.   These were definitely civilians.  By that stage, most of the

 9     soldiers on the Bosnian side were wearing uniform.  They were not wearing

10     uniform.  As I recall it, the woman who was shot had a shopping bag with

11     her and was roughly middle-aged.  No, we were -- we asked, also, but as

12     far as we were told, these were civilians.

13        Q.   Thank you.  And as I referred to in my opening short summary of

14     your evidence, at one point in paragraph 49 of your statement you say

15     that the sniping incidents became so common that individual incidents

16     were not newsworthy; is that correct?

17        A.   I'm afraid to say that it is.  When it first begins in a war, if

18     I can draw the parallel, it is like the suicide bombings in Iraq today.

19     They may have been first point of the news during 2003, but today hardly

20     get a mention, while they do continue.  With Sarajevo, that was the case

21     with the sniping incidents.  The early stage of the war, when this was

22     still something completely new, that the city that had hosted the 1984

23     Winter Olympics was coming under sniper fire, where civilians were being

24     shot at, that changed, even by the summer of 1992, after just a few

25     months, that sniping incidents became much less newsworthy.  There were

Page 2401

 1     occasions when that was not the case.  There was one incident of a young

 2     man and a woman who tried to flee from Sarajevo, and it was a kind of

 3     Romeo and Juliet story of a Muslim and an Orthodox, and they were both

 4     shot dead.  That was something that took a lot of international

 5     attention.  By on the whole, by this stage of the war already, the

 6     international media was not paying that much attention to such individual

 7     sniping incidents.

 8        Q.   I'm going to move now to --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:

11        Q.   I'm going to move now to June 1992 and the stories you filed in

12     early -- in the first weeks of June.

13             And this, Your Honours, concerns paragraphs 52 to 58, primarily,

14     of the consolidated statement, the shelling and targeting of the city.

15     And I noted in the filing Monday, Your Honour, there was a typo in the

16     statement.  At paragraph 52, footnote 14, we had the wrong 65 ter number.

17     The correct is 40264C, a video, and I'd like to play that now.  This is

18     from the 5th of June, according to the slug at the beginning.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I remember that you noted the correct one should

20     be D.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  D.  I may have misspoke, Your Honour.  D is

22     correct.  Thank you.  Yes, thank you.

23                           [Video-clip played]

24             "Just hours after the evacuation of the troops from the

25     Marsal Tito Barracks --"

Page 2402

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  I apologise.  If we can stop.  I want to play a

 2     different one first.  It is 4264C.  My apologies.  I'll play this one in

 3     a minute.

 4                           [Video-clip played]

 5             "... dusk in Sarajevo.  Amongst the city's ancient minarets, the

 6     rockets fall, heralding another night of heavy shelling."

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Switch off microphones in the courtroom,

 8     please.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             "For the next six hours, there is no let-up.  Eerily lit up by

11     flares, the city is hit from every side by practically every imaginable

12     projectile.  Long lines of heavy machine-gun fire gliding across the

13     roofs, exploding against their targets.  Heavy shells slamming into

14     buildings, within seconds engulfing them in flames.  A mass of crazy

15     sparks lighting the brow of one hill from a quick-fire volley of mortar

16     bombs.

17             "This is the scene of wholesale devastation, of a city being

18     obliterated while the world watches, but does nothing."

19             MR. NICHOLLS:

20        Q.   Now, this video we just watched, on the front, the computerised

21     date had the 5th of June.  We can see quite clearly what you were able to

22     film, but could you just tell us what are we seeing here?  Which areas of

23     the city, if you recall, were you filming in this clip and at that time?

24        A.   All these images were taken from our position within the military

25     hospital, as I described at the beginning of the session here.  The first

Page 2403

 1     pictures were taken from the balcony, what we called the left,

 2     overlooking the old part of Sarajevo.  You see a rocket.  It's a rocket

 3     fired from the top of the hill to the east of Sarajevo, landing on the

 4     old part of Sarajevo.  What you see later is filmed either from the

 5     middle windows overlooking the central part of Sarajevo or on the

 6     right-hand balcony, of shells, heavy machine-gun fire, going into the

 7     newer part of Sarajevo.

 8             This fire is all emanated from south of Sarajevo, from the

 9     hill-sides south.  You could see it coming down on the city.  The whole

10     city was basically being targeted.  It wasn't one specific target that

11     was being hit or one particular district of the city being hit.  This was

12     fire that was coming down all across the city.

13        Q.   Could you tell us, that short clip that we saw ending at 09:28:8,

14     it's a difficult question, but how much of the shelling that night were

15     you able to capture on that short clip?  How much does that represent?

16     And I'll ask you a follow-up question in a minute.  If you could just

17     tell us about how much you were able to get that we saw there.

18        A.   The first thing I should explain to anyone who's not been in a

19     war zone, working for television, is that filming that kind of thing is

20     extremely difficult, because you hear a bang and it's over there, and by

21     the time you get there, of course, the bang has already happened, and you

22     may see some smoke, but at night that's even more difficult.  And then

23     you think, Well, maybe I should focus the camera there, and then it

24     happens on the other side.  For a film crew, therefore, to get quite this

25     much, and not only that night but several other nights after that, to

Page 2404

 1     capture that much firing, it means there was much, much more.  There were

 2     moments -- and the cameraman who was with me was also the cameraman who

 3     had been with me in the Gulf war, in the Romanian revolution, and

 4     throughout 1991, during the war in Croatia.  We had never been able to

 5     capture such footage of fighting or of artillery.  It should give an

 6     indication that this was really an extremely heavy night of shelling, as

 7     were the nights that followed.

 8        Q.   And can you just give us an idea of how long this shelling would

 9     go on for; in other words, when it would start in the evening and how

10     late into the night or into the morning it would continue?

11        A.   Well, that differed from day to day.  On these pictures you see,

12     they were still daylight pictures that we began with, so that would have

13     been towards the end of the afternoon, the early evening.  As I recall,

14     that night it went on until 3.00, 4.00 in the morning, something like

15     that.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  Now I'd like to --

17             Sorry, Your Honours.  Could I please give this an exhibit number?

18             JUDGE KWON:  So what we saw just now is D, not C, just to be

19     clear?

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, that was C, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE KWON:  That was C, thank you.

22             Yes, it will be given the number of P292?

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Correction, Your Honours.  It will be given

24     Exhibit P929.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 2405

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 2             Now, you already spoke a little bit today about the Marsal Tito

 3     Barracks and the situation there.  I want to play another video now,

 4     which is 65 ter 40264D from 6 June, which concerns the barracks and other

 5     areas.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             "Just hours after the evacuation of the troops from the

 8     Marsal Tito Barracks, it becomes the night's prime target.  The shells

 9     land long, around Sarajevo's railway yard.  But inside the vast army

10     complex those still looking for loot get the message and run.  Not long

11     after, the gunners in the hills above the Bosnian capital find their

12     range.  The barracks explode in flames.  The barracks form the principal

13     target, yet no district escapes.  Through the dark, the rockets streak

14     down, for a moment illuminating Sarajevo's ancient centre, before

15     reducing it to further rubble.  They come in ones, in twos, in threes,

16     and it sounds as if the city's crying.

17             "At 3.00 in the morning, the barracks are again bearing the full

18     weight of attention.  Whole wings of this vast, if not deserted military

19     complex are in flame.  With light, the people rarely come out to inspect

20     the damage."

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  We've stopped now at 12.53:2, at the

22     point where the video shows people carrying a bed out of a building.

23        Q.   Could you explain to us what we saw there in the beginning, when

24     you discussed in the broadcast the gunners finding their range, and at

25     the beginning we can see shells hitting near the railroad tracks?

Page 2406

 1        A.   It is normal for all artillery or mortar units that when they are

 2     given a specific target to fire on, that they will initially probably

 3     have shells landing too long or too short.  What we witnessed there was

 4     the initial shells falling too long, falling over the Marsal Tito

 5     Barracks and hitting the railway yard behind it, to the north of the

 6     barracks, and then they found their range.  This is what happens with

 7     artillery units and mortar units throughout the world.  They go too far,

 8     they go too short, and then they hit it and they continue to hit it.

 9             On this occasion, there was extremely -- after those initial

10     shells, there was extremely accurate fire throughout that night on the

11     Marsal Tito Barracks, whole parts of which, indeed, burnt.  That's what

12     you saw right at the beginning.

13        Q.   And then what do we see later on?  Is it the same kind of fire or

14     is it all Marsal Tito, or what's happening afterwards on that clip?

15        A.   What you see after that is that whilst the Marsal Tito Barracks

16     was being directly targeted, simultaneously all other districts of the

17     city were being targeted as well, and there in an often much more

18     haphazard fashion, again, Your Honours, making it much more difficult for

19     us to film, because one or two rockets would come down in one part of the

20     city, and then it would stop there, at least for some time, and we would

21     have to go from one part of the hospital -- from one side to the other

22     side because the fire was coming down on the other side.  It was much

23     more haphazard fire on the other parts, never as concentrated as we saw

24     on the Marsal Tito Barracks.

25             When I was with the British and American forces in the Gulf war

Page 2407

 1     in the lead-up to the ground campaign to liberate Kuwait, I spent quite a

 2     lot of time with artillery units.  I'm not an artillerist, I wasn't

 3     trained in this, and I asked them about what they were planning and how

 4     they were planning the actual operation right at the beginning of the

 5     ground campaign to liberate Kuwait.  They explained to me that they would

 6     be given specific targets, that you would get this kind of shooting, and

 7     that with all their targets there would be a follow-up of military

 8     personnel on the ground; tanks, armoured vehicle, infantry attack on that

 9     target following the initial artillery barrage.  What we saw here, there

10     was absolutely nothing happening as far as infantry was concerned.  This

11     was purely a barrage on the Marsal Tito Barracks, but also on the city as

12     a whole.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

14             Could we give that a number, please, Your Honours.  That was D.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this document shall be assigned

17     Exhibit P930.  In addition, just one thing for the record.  There is no

18     surrogate sheet for this document.  Thank you.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm going to ask you now a question and look at

20     the video about the story about the UNIS towers, which is referred to in

21     paragraph 59 of the statement.

22             Your Honours, am I right that we have five minutes to the break?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, if it's convenient.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  We could -- we could continue.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 2408

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'd like to play this video now, which is 40264E,

 2     from the 7th of June, according to the code on the beginning.

 3                           [Video-clip played]

 4             "It was the symbol of modern Sarajevo, now of its destruction.

 5     Flames tear across the floors and up into the higher storeys, showering

 6     debris onto the streets at the heart of the Bosnian capital, the

 7     disintegration of one of the city's UNIS towers reflected in the broken

 8     windows of its twin.

 9             "Three hundred metres on across the road, the Parliament of this

10     newly-independent state is also struck.  It doesn't burn, but the nearby

11     Marsal Tito Barracks do.  Since its evacuation two days earlier, it's

12     been systematically destroyed.

13             "Every night in Sarajevo, you think it can't get worse, but it

14     does, making a mockery of the attempts of mediators to bring peace to

15     this city which is enfolded in war.

16             "Less than 24 hours earlier, the Serb commanders had put their

17     signatures on yet another agreement, affirming a truce never adhered to

18     and their readiness to reopen the airport.  Now the Serb gunners in the

19     hills show where their true commitment lies.  Under a sickle moon, the

20     city rocks to the explosions.  Lit up by fire and the mass of glowing

21     sparks that drift across its roofs.

22             "Daylight, we find the intensive care wards of the city's central

23     hospital packed, with amputees in pain.  Some will live, but the doctors

24     are resigned to this girl's death.  Not far from where she lies, do

25     others that have gone before.  A place of haphazard death, some covered,

Page 2409

 1     some not, where maggots crawl the floors.  A little house of Bosnian

 2     horror.

 3             "Aernout van Lynden, Sky News, Sarajevo."

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:

 5        Q.   Could you -- I think the clip and your narration was pretty

 6     self-explanatory, but can you tell us what you know about who this person

 7     in the last shot is, the young boy lying on the table, or what happened

 8     to him?

 9        A.   He wasn't lying on a table.  He was lying on a stretcher on the

10     floor.  He was a young boy, as you say.  And from what we'd gathered,

11     he'd been killed by shrapnel.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

13             Could we give that a number, please, Your Honour.  That was

14     40264E.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, this shall be given Exhibit P931.

17     Thank you.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll have a break for 25 minutes.

19                           --- Recess taken at 3.34 p.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 4.02 p.m.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

23        Q.   The last question on that video about the UNIS towers,

24     Mr. van Lynden.  Were you able to notice or did you see whether there was

25     any fire coming from the UNIS towers at the time that it was being hit?

Page 2410

 1        A.   I never witnessed fire coming from the UNIS towers, no.  We went

 2     into the UNIS towers several days earlier, because this was when the

 3     Marsal Tito Barracks was still occupied by the JNA, and we wanted -- it

 4     was a high position so we could film into the Marsal Tito Barracks.  We

 5     wanted to open the window, and we couldn't.  They were fixed windows.  It

 6     had an air-conditioning system.  And, therefore, unless one broke a

 7     window in there, it would not have made a perfect firing ground.  That's

 8     the first thing.

 9             The second thing is during the time -- relatively few days, it's

10     true that we had been in the hospital, we had seen the UNIS towers every

11     single day, and we never saw any fire emanating from there, no.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

13             I'd like to continue now to play another video, this one from the

14     first screen shot of 9 June, 1992.  It's 40264F, is the 65 ter number.

15                           [Video-clip played]

16             "Sarajevo's burning, in its heart and in its suburbs.  Suddenly,

17     on Sunday night the whole city becoming the target, no district spared,

18     all shaking as every 10 seconds the rocket shells and mortars land, the

19     fire so heavy, so incessant, that the deadly streams of light criss-cross

20     each other.  By early Monday morning, the inundation of the hospitals

21     begins.  The doctors and the nurses of the city's former military

22     hospital already up throughout the night, at the beginning of a dark,

23     grim day, the like of which they've never known; trained fingers which,

24     for 24 hours will work without respite to stem blood, extract jagged

25     metal, preserve life.  But so many casualties of war, so many distorted

Page 2411

 1     faces and torn limbs.

 2             "At the city's main hospital, the situation is even worse.  The

 3     counter-offensive of the Bosnian territorial defence forces have run into

 4     a continual barrage from the heavy guns that surround them, the costs

 5     enormous, and the stream of casualties is now incessant.

 6             "This is a scene of utter mayhem.  No minute passes without a new

 7     van or ambulance coming in bearing more wounded.  The battle of Sarajevo

 8     has reached a peak.  Countless young men on stretches raging against the

 9     dying of the light, and so many who've lost that struggle that they lie

10     outside a morgue already over-full.

11             "Across the town, in its modern center, a new fire rages just by

12     the front-line.  Somehow, the firemen make it, but their efforts are

13     futile.  They're impotent as the water is cut.  All they can do is stand

14     and watch.  Fifty yards away, others fight on from behind the cover of a

15     devastated urban battleground, small groups of men answering artillery

16     with small arms.

17             "As evening falls, the city is marked by tens of fires, and

18     inside its surviving walls, by pain and endurance, by faces marked by

19     fear, shock, and sheer fatigue.

20             "Aernout van Lynden, Sky News, Sarajevo."

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

22        Q.   Now, in that --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25        Q.   In that video-clip, we saw in the beginning, again, more

Page 2412

 1     shelling, and you said words to the effect of the whole city becoming a

 2     target.  Can you tell us just, as you remember, which areas of the city

 3     that night were shelled, or which districts?

 4        A.   As I said, it was our impression that the whole city came under

 5     fire.  We did not see the same sustained fire that we had seen on one

 6     particular target, as with the Marsal Tito Barracks, at which time other

 7     parts of the city had also been hit, but that night the whole city seemed

 8     to be the target.  And it was our impression that this was done to simply

 9     terrorise those still living in the city.

10        Q.   Thank you.  And then later on in the morning film, there were

11     soldiers being brought in from a counter-offensive.  Can you just tell

12     us, briefly, what we were seeing there?

13        A.   This was -- this was a separate matter.  This -- from what we

14     were given to understand, at a certain area around what had once been the

15     maternity hospital of Sarajevo, the Bosnian Army had launched some kind

16     of a counter-offensive to push back the Serb lines in that area, and

17     there was very heavy fighting going on, and many of those men were

18     wounded and killed.  And as far as I'm aware, that offensive didn't work.

19     It was -- it was not successful.  But that should be held separate to the

20     pictures that we took during the night, the preceding night, of the

21     entire city coming under shell fire.  Those were two separate things.

22             While that battle was going on during the day, there was fire

23     into the city as well, but not nearly as heavily as there had been during

24     the night, and the fighting was very much concentrated in that one

25     district slightly to the north of Sarajevo.

Page 2413

 1        Q.   And, just very briefly, you talk about this in paragraph 59, but

 2     what ethnicities did you see being brought into -- I'm not talking

 3     specifically about this incident, but when you observed people -- injured

 4     people being brought into the hospital you stayed at, and other

 5     hospitals, which ethnicities were they?  Was it simply Muslim Bosniak or

 6     others as well?

 7        A.   Well, as far as I'm aware, they were all Slavs, which I think is

 8     the same ethnicity.  They had different religions.  We were told, and we

 9     asked those who were capable of speech, those who had been wounded, what

10     they were, and what we got was that most of them were Muslim, but there

11     were also Catholics, what people would call Croats, and Orthodox Bosnian

12     Serbs amongst those soldiers that were wounded.

13             Throughout the war, wherever I was in Bosnia, I encountered

14     Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian Army.

15        Q.   Thank you.  I'm going to move now to what's contained in

16     paragraph 62, the portion of your statement where you talk about the

17     story you did on Dobrinja.  I'm not going to show that story now, but

18     could you just tell us -- clarify for me one point from paragraph 62.

19     You say:

20             "During the initial stages of the war," and we're speaking now of

21     July 1992, "that Dobrinja had a separate siege to the rest of Sarajevo."

22             Could you just tell us what that means.

23        A.   Could I just have the screen back so I could see what is being

24     said?

25        Q.   I can ask the question again, and in a better way, as well,

Page 2414

 1     hopefully.

 2             What was -- what is meant by "the separate siege of Dobrinja"?

 3        A.   Dobrinja is the western suburb of Sarajevo, built close to the

 4     airport, to house the athletes for the 1984 Winter Olympic Games.  After

 5     that, it became an area where I believe mostly young couples were able to

 6     get apartments.  It's slightly separate, and that area was -- the whole

 7     of Dobrinja wasn't in Bosnian government hands, but a large part of it

 8     was, and the Bosnian Serbs controlled a hill called Mojmilo Hill, which

 9     was really the connection between Dobrinja and the rest of the city, and

10     thereby they made it impossible for there to be a direct connection

11     between the two different parts, Sarajevo proper and the suburb of

12     Dobrinja, and, therefore, there was a form of separate siege.  You

13     couldn't drive to Dobrinja, and that only became possible when, in July,

14     the forces of the Bosnian government within Dobrinja took Mojmilo Hill.

15     After that, a direct connection was made between this western suburb and

16     the city proper.  And we were able to get in there, but it was a very

17     dangerous drive.  We were the first journalists to go in.  We were told

18     that five other cars had tried to make that journey during the day, and

19     all five had been hit by Serb gun-fire.  We did manage to go there.  We

20     were there for 48 hours and then drove out again, and both when we drove

21     in and when we drove out, we did come under gun-fire.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

23             And, Your Honours, with the last exhibit, 40264F, the video we

24     just saw, I neglected to ask for that to be tendered.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That will be Exhibit P932.

Page 2415

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 2        Q.   I'm now going to move, Mr. van Lynden, to September 1992 and your

 3     time in Pale, and first ask you, just very briefly, how you came to go to

 4     Pale.

 5             And, Your Honours, this is -- the area I'm going into now is

 6     principally in paragraphs 65 to 90 of the statement.

 7             THE WITNESS:  You want me to explain how I first came to --

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, I'll ask you a question first.

 9        Q.   I understand, from the statement, that you'd met with

10     Mr. Karadzic in June 1992 in Pale, and then in August 1992 in London, and

11     then in September 1992 in Belgrade.  And if you can just explain briefly

12     how those meetings resulted in your being able to report from Pale.

13        A.   When we had first gone to Sarajevo towards the end of May 1992,

14     we had gone from Belgrade and driven to Pale.  It was decided by Sky

15     management -- we had a satellite dish to be able to send the stories back

16     to London with us.  They felt at that time it was not safe to take it

17     into Sarajevo, so that was left in Pale, at the Pension Olympic.  I

18     didn't at that time meet Mr. Karadzic, but I then drove into the city.

19     Our stories were sent from Pale, and when we at a certain moment left

20     Sarajevo and we returned to Pale, because we needed to send our material

21     out of the city.  That was in June.  We then tried to work for a number

22     of days out of Pale to try and cover the war from the other side.  This

23     is when I briefly met Mr. Karadzic.  And that turned out to be

24     practically impossible, because every time we set out from the hotel in

25     Pale and went to further areas, we would be arrested at various

Page 2416

 1     check-points.

 2             My bosses in London then decided to withdraw me for a time, and I

 3     went back to London and later returned to Sarajevo.

 4             When at the August conference that was held in London, I had the

 5     opportunity to meet Mr. Karadzic, and asked him for his help in returning

 6     to Pale and being able to actually work from Pale so that we could cover

 7     their side of the story and to allow the Bosnian Serbs to speak for

 8     themselves.  He agreed that we should hold a meeting in Belgrade.  When I

 9     got there at the beginning of September, a meeting was held at the

10     Intercontinental Hotel, as I recall.  Mr. Karadzic arranged for an escort

11     from Belgrade to take us to Pale.  Once we were in Pale, we met him

12     again, as we did several times during that stay there, and he then

13     arranged for two military policemen to be given as a permanent escort for

14     us to be able to work on the Bosnian Serb side.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And did you get any kind of letter of authorisation

16     or letter of credentials from the Bosnian Serb authorities to show that

17     you were able to work there?

18        A.   Yes.  Again, this was after a conversation with Mr. Karadzic, and

19     we were given a letter the next day; not signed by him, but signed by

20     Mr. Krajisnik, who was the speaker of the Bosnian Serb Parliament.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you discuss, in paragraphs 69 to 75 of your

22     statement, that you had several informal -- not formal interviews, but

23     informal meetings with Mr. Karadzic while you were in Pale, and that you

24     would discuss various topics, and I'm going to ask about that now.

25             But, first of all, where would you meet Mr. Karadzic when you had

Page 2417

 1     these meetings?

 2        A.   We met him at his office, apart from on one occasion when we were

 3     at the television station and he was there as well, and we then got into

 4     a conversation there with him and with several of the people working at

 5     TV Pale.

 6        Q.   And can you just tell us what that was about?  That's another

 7     topic, but since we're there, what was going on at the TV station?

 8        A.   We would go to the TV station to be able to send our stories,

 9     which then went from Pale to Belgrade, and from Belgrade they were

10     up-linked and sent to London.  When we were there on that particular

11     evening, an argument broke out.  A number of those people working at TV

12     Pale attacked me for my coverage from Sarajevo, my previous coverage from

13     Sarajevo, in particular for a story I had done about a certain Bosnian

14     called Jusuf Prazina.  They felt that I had made him look like a hero,

15     while I think in the story I had made quite perfectly clear that this man

16     had been in jail and was a convicted criminal.  Mr. Karadzic slightly

17     intervened in this conversation.  The conversation also ranged about

18     other matters, but it was, for me, an example of the strange mentality

19     that seemed to have most people in their grip in Pale, that a story about

20     a man who I described as one of the principal defenders of Sarajevo in

21     that story done at the beginning of June, Jusuf Prazina, who I mentioned

22     was a convicted criminal, that they felt that this was a story that was

23     against them.  And they never mentioned any of the other stories of

24     Sarajevo being shelled, as we've just seen the stories that you have just

25     shown the Court, or held those stories against me.  It was the Prazina

Page 2418

 1     story.  And I said, This is the inverted world.  A story that's actually

 2     in your interests, you attack me for.  The stories that you might have

 3     attacked me for because they are not in your interests, you think are

 4     fine.  It struck me as very odd.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And I won't go through, because it's in your

 6     statement, everything about these meetings, but in paragraph 73 you talk

 7     about, at one point, that Karadzic, talking about Sarajevo, made a

 8     reference to a Berlin wall being built there to divide the city.  Could

 9     you just tell us about -- briefly about that conversation and what

10     Karadzic -- his views that he expressed to you were about living with the

11     other people in Sarajevo?

12        A.   As I recall, this was a conversation at the end of the evening,

13     quite late, around 11.00.  And we were offered a glass of wine, and, as I

14     recall, he was drinking white wine, and he showed us maps.  He said that,

15     in his view, Sarajevo was actually a Serb city, belonged to the Serbs, it

16     was Serb territory, and that he made the point repeatedly that it was

17     impossible to live with these people, and that he said a wall, that could

18     be one of the solutions.  I'm not sure that it was the -- that he said

19     that was the only solution, but one of the solutions that he offered was

20     that a wall should be built between the Serb parts and those of the other

21     communities living in Sarajevo.  I found that a fairly outrageous

22     comment, because this was made less than three years after the fall of

23     the Berlin Wall, which was a symbol of the divisions of Europe, which had

24     finally ended.  And to make a suggestion to build a wall in a city to

25     divide people in this manner in Europe at the end of the 20th century, I

Page 2419

 1     found totally unacceptable, to be frank.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And one other point, I just want to make it very --

 3     ask you a follow-up question.  In paragraph 71 of the statement, you talk

 4     about Dr. Karadzic telling you that the Serbs had to have the northern

 5     areas and Banja Luka, and that he said that Eastern Bosnia was all Serb:

 6             "He told me that the enclaves were unacceptable, that they had to

 7     become part of Serb territory."

 8             Now, in this conversation in September 1992, which area was under

 9     discussion when we -- when he said, These enclaves are unacceptable?

10        A.   The enclaves of Gorazde, Srebrenica, and then you had a number of

11     smaller enclaves.  I don't know -- I cannot recall whether every single

12     one was precisely named, but the Eastern Bosnian enclaves were something

13     that everybody understood, and that he felt that they -- not only were

14     they nonviable in an economic sense, but that they were a thorn in the

15     side of the Bosnian Serbs and that thorn should be removed.  He made that

16     quite clear.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I'm now going to move on - this is contained in

18     paragraphs, again, 76 to 90 - and ask you some questions about your

19     interview with General Ratko Mladic in September 1992.

20             And can you briefly tell us, how was this interview set up?  How

21     did you get permission or arrange to interview General Mladic?  Who did

22     you ask for that?

23        A.   This was done by speaking to Mr. Karadzic and through his office.

24     There was -- I think he was a lawyer, a Bosnian Serb, who was working for

25     Mr. Karadzic, whom we spoke to on a daily basis.  We didn't speak to

Page 2420

 1     Mr. Karadzic on a daily basis.  And we had asked, really, on arrival in

 2     Pale whether we would be allowed to have an interview with

 3     General Mladic.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  All right.  I'd like to play the video of that

 5     interview now.  That's 40259B.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             "... the scourge of Sarajevo, the chief warrior of the Serbs.

 8     He's called Ratko Mladic.  Appropriately, Ratko means warrior, and this

 9     squared-jouled Serb general has lived up to the name.  Commander always

10     on the move, a visit to one of the mountain's chalets where the Serbs of

11     Bosnia have established their separatist government is but a fleeting

12     one.  In a short briefing, the Commander-in-Chief speaks only of attacks

13     on his forces, never of offensives by them.  And as if to prove the

14     point, he gives us the rare chance to accompany him to front-line

15     artillery positions where the UN observers are conspicuous by their

16     absence.

17             "High up on the windswept hills, the 100-millimetre guns are dug

18     deep into the rocks directly overlooking Sarajevo, an overwhelming

19     position of strength which is obviously to the general's satisfaction, as

20     he says he holds the city in his palm, and many of the buildings in the

21     haze below bear testimony to that power.  Yet General Mladic is quite

22     unrepentant.  He is a man who has no doubts, only a total assurance that

23     he's right, the world wrong, and that his people have been slandered.

24             [Voice-over] "I hope that the Security Council first takes

25     measures too understand that we Serbs are a reality in this world, not

Page 2421

 1     some sort of extra terrestrials, and that we have the right to defend

 2     ourselves.

 3             "Nearby, more positions are being dug.  In the general's eyes,

 4     the world may deny his people their rights, but that's not going to stop

 5     him.

 6             [Voice-over] "We have to fight as long as we continue to exist to

 7     defend ourselves.  There is no other way, and we're prepared for a long

 8     war.

 9             "Far away from the battle-field, the UN is preparing a resolution

10     on war crimes.  It leaves Ratko Mladic quite unmoved.

11             [Voiceover] "I'm not bothered at all.  I did not take part in any

12     crimes, I have only defended my people.

13             "With that, the general departs to inspect other front-lines in a

14     war neither he, nor his officers, believe will end any time soon.

15             "Aernout van Lynden, Sky News, on the front-lines outside

16     Sarajevo."

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  And could we perhaps give that a

18     number now.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this document shall be assigned

21     Exhibit P933.  Thank you.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:

23        Q.   Just a couple of questions about the video we just saw.

24             In the video, you described buildings visible in the haze below,

25     but on the video we just saw in court, it was difficult to see anything

Page 2422

 1     other than a sort of white cloud.  At the time -- well, can you just tell

 2     us how visible the city was below at the time that you were actually

 3     there?

 4        A.   Well, you could see the city and you could see -- in the original

 5     pictures, you could see the city.  The pictures have been copied too

 6     often, and the quality has clearly reached a stage which you can't.  But

 7     while there was a haze over Sarajevo, you could clearly see the city

 8     straight below that artillery position.

 9        Q.   Were there any restrictions put on you about what you could film

10     when you came to this artillery position?

11        A.   No, we were allowed to film, only on -- right at the end, when

12     the general left, the cameraman followed the general and his party

13     leaving, and they walked past the cemetery.  And this was clearly also

14     that the cameraman got that in his shot, and we were then asked not to

15     include that shot in the story that we filed to London.  But that's -- in

16     any war zone, television teams are usually asked to be very careful not

17     to -- so that you don't give away the position to the enemy.  So that is

18     a reasonable request, although the filming was so open of the position

19     that we were that anyone watching in Sarajevo should pretty much have

20     been able to work out where that position was.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

22             And with that, could I show you P00914.  That, Your Honours, I

23     should say, is the same as P00842, a map which was on my list, but it's a

24     slightly larger section of the map that's simply blown up a little bit.

25        Q.   Now, I don't know how clear the map is to you, Mr. van Lynden,

Page 2423

 1     but are you able to locate the approximate position of the interview on

 2     here?  And if you could --

 3        A.   [Marks].

 4        Q.   All right.  And just to be very clear, that's -- from looking at

 5     this map and being at the interview and filming from that spot, you

 6     believe that's the approximate location of the interview with

 7     General Mladic?

 8        A.   Yes.  It's to the east of the city, looking from the east over

 9     the whole city, so it would have been roughly up there on the high

10     ground.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

12             Your Honours, if I could give this a number as marked, please.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I think I forgot to ask the witness to put the date

14     and signature.  Could you do that at the end of -- in the right bottom

15     part of the map, could you put the date of today, the 19th?

16             THE WITNESS:  [Marks]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. van Lynden.  If we can store this and

18     then exhibit it.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this document shall be assigned

20     Exhibit P934.  Thank you.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

22        Q.   Now, while you were there at the position with General Mladic and

23     his escorts, did you see an indication that this position was vulnerable

24     to fire from the opposing forces?

25        A.   It was high up -- a high-up position.  If the opposition had

Page 2424

 1     artillery of their own, then it would have been vulnerable, yes.  Any

 2     other way, no.  It was too far away from the front-lines, so it was

 3     certainly not vulnerable.  If the Bosnian Army had had heavy artillery in

 4     Sarajevo, then they could have fired back on that position.  I saw no

 5     indication that there had ever been any fire on that position.

 6        Q.   And it's in your -- could you tell us how the next time you saw

 7     General Mladic and ran into him, if he had any reaction to this story or

 8     if you could see that he had actually heard about or watched the story?

 9        A.   Yes.  The initial reaction in Pale by certain people, certainly

10     at TV Pale, was fairly negative to this story, specifically for the

11     opening line that I used for that story, which was, "He's the scourge

12     [Realtime transcript read in error 'courage'] of Sarajevo."  They felt

13     that that was a negative comment on my part.

14             General Mladic, himself, whom we encountered by chance on the

15     road three or four days later, stopped and said, Hello, and with a big

16     smile on his face, in Serbo-Croat said, I'm the scourge of Sarajevo, and

17     clapped me on my shoulder, and then said -- invited us to come and have

18     lunch with him.  He was driving to a certain base, and we went with him

19     and had lunch with him and his forces there.  And he certainly didn't

20     feel that the comment that I had made was in any sense negative.  In

21     fact, he seemed rather proud of it.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I should note that, for the record, the transcript

23     should read "scourge" instead of "courage."

24             THE WITNESS:  I haven't switched.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

Page 2425

 1             THE WITNESS:  It's okay.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:

 3        Q.   Now, in paragraph 88 of your statement, you say that it's not on

 4     the interview, but you asked General Mladic if it would be possible to

 5     visit his troops in other positions.  Can you just briefly tell us, and

 6     then I'll ask you about a couple of them, which areas from the Serb

 7     positions you were able to visit after this interview?

 8        A.   We had also asked Mr. Karadzic, obviously, and it was -- it was

 9     possible.  We were taken to positions on Mount Trebevic and down into

10     Sarajevo, in Grbavica and certain Serb positions in Hrasno.  Later on, we

11     were taken right the way 'round Sarajevo by a road that had been

12     constructed clearly after the beginning of the siege, passed Vogosca and

13     to Ilidza.  There, it was not always possible for us to work.  Local

14     commanders, despite the fact that we had an escort of two Serb military

15     policemen and the letter from Mr. Krajisnik, as I mentioned earlier,

16     local commanders sometimes refused to let us film or refused to even

17     speak to us.  And we went to Hadzici, and close to Hadzici we were

18     allowed to film at a certain front-line position.  So at Hadzici -- but

19     specifically where we did most of the filming, was when we went to

20     Mount Trebevic, to Grbavica and Hrasno.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm not going to play the Grbavica video now, and

22     it's discussed in your statement, but I will go to the next one, 65 ter

23     40259D, which is a story on one of these positions you visited.  This is

24     in paragraphs 102 to 103 of the statement.

25             If we could watch that, please.

Page 2426

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             "They still sing of amazing grace at Sarajevo's Catholic convent,

 3     but the pews are practically empty.  Just five nuns have stayed on in the

 4     building literally overlooking the front-lines of the war.  That and the

 5     food shortages hamper their work, although Sister Matila [phoen] still

 6     brings a meal each day to an elderly Serb labourer.

 7             "The Convent of the Sisters of Little Jesus is one of the very

 8     few havens in an areas which, even by Sarajevo's standards, is notorious

 9     for the ferocity of its war.

10             "The no-man's land that has given the area its name is the Jewish

11     cemetery, across the jumble of graves, new and old, some of the fiercest

12     battles have been fought.  The string of little villas lining the

13     cemetery have been turned into bunkers, sitting-room walls roughly

14     redecorated with lines of logs, although some of the defences are more

15     imaginative; bathroom mirrors subtly deployed to allow one guard to view

16     all angles.  Of late, the tanks against the Serb lines in this sector

17     have diminished, leaving the battalion commander exuding confidence.

18             [Voiceover] "We're ready for a long struggle, but we believe we

19     will only spend a short time in these positions.  Either they will have

20     to accept peace or there will be all-out war, in which we will try to

21     achieve victory in a very short time.

22             "The major's confidence is understandable, unlike his opponents

23     he doesn't face a lack of logistical support made worse by siege.  And if

24     he is ordered to attack, he will do so from a commanding position, so

25     commanding that in the streets below few dare to move.

Page 2427

 1             "Aernout van Lynden, Sky News, Sarajevo."

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 3        Q.   Now, at the end there, from that VRS position we could see shots

 4     of the street below, but I just wanted to ask:  Were those actually shots

 5     taken from that position by the Jewish cemetery?

 6        A.   That, I don't think -- no, I think they were pictures taken from

 7     a slightly different position.

 8        Q.   Oh, thank you.  But they're from the position that we're seeing

 9     in the story where your talking, or are they from --

10        A.   The positions at the Jewish cemetery are lower down.  These would

11     be slightly higher up.  It would be fairly close and probably in the same

12     area that this battalion commander who you saw, the major that I

13     mentioned and that we saw in the picture, had under his command, but they

14     were filmed at different position.  I mean, the building you saw at the

15     end is the parliamentary building, and the streets are in that part, I

16     mean, Bosnian-held Sarajevo.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  And could we give that video a number,

18     please, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this document shall be assigned

21     Exhibit P935.  Thank you.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  All right.

23             I now want to go to the last video which I'll play today, and

24     that is 65 ter 40267, which is from the 5th of December, I believe, or

25     approximately that date, in 1992.

Page 2428

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             "... burned four days after the Serbs launched their offensive,

 3     Sarajevo's wester suburb falls into their hands.  For months, the

 4     defenders of Sarajevo have tried to break the siege.  Now it's being

 5     tightened another notch.  By morning, only small pockets of resistance

 6     remain, yet the shelling continues, unchanged, incessant.  Those who can

 7     escape.  Those who can't face almost certain death.  For the UN forces

 8     here and for the politicians who sent them, the latest fighting marks yet

 9     another humiliation, making a mockery of peace-making efforts.  For a

10     change, they admit as much.

11             "We are not making any progress at all.  The situation is

12     deteriorating.  I can't see any progress.  And all of the

13     Security Council's resolutions, all of these [indiscernible] agreements,

14     all of these effort we are making here to improve the situation and to

15     save the lives and to restore the capability of the utilities for the

16     winter is completely failed, and we move one -- one step forward and we

17     find ourselves two steps back.

18             "Words mirrored by the reality in the city.  Serb incendiary

19     rounds setting a string of flats ablaze in one apartment block.  A

20     resident watches, distraught, his home and belongings gone.  Seconds

21     later, further bursts of incendiary rounds crash into the building or

22     bounce off the wall into the street below.  Wanton arson on a purely

23     civilian target.  As ever, Sarajevo's remarkable firemen fight back,

24     getting their hoses to the flames, for once unhampered by a cut of the

25     water supply.  For the fire chief, water is not the main concern.  His

Page 2429

 1     engines are running out of fuel, and he tells us he won't be able to cope

 2     with another fire this day.

 3             "The fall of [indiscernible] and escalation of shelling here in

 4     the center of Sarajevo again underlining the importance of international

 5     efforts in Bosnia.  Cease-fires and political talks have lead nowhere and

 6     won't until the Western world proves it has a true commitment in ending

 7     this war.

 8             "Aernout van Lynden, Sky News, Sarajevo."

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

10        Q.   Now, first, at one point -- thank you.  At one point in that

11     video, we see a red object bounce down and bounce over.  Can you just

12     tell us what we were seeing there?

13        A.   That's a bullet, but the Yugoslav Army had bullets that caused

14     fires.  We don't have those within -- we didn't have those within the

15     Dutch forces, in which I served, and, as far as I'm aware, in NATO

16     countries before, prior to 1989.  These are bullets -- incendiary rounds,

17     as they are called, which are there to cause fire in a building, and

18     that's what bounced over the head of my cameraman and myself, because I

19     was standing next to my cameraman when he took the shot.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And you discussed it in your statement, but can you

21     just tell us the situation of what happened with the fire-fighters, what

22     you observed once they entered the building and made their way towards

23     the top?

24        A.   When we arrived on the scene, and we were driving from central

25     Sarajevo back to the TV station, so this is the sort of more modern part

Page 2430

 1     of Sarajevo, we saw the bullets going into this building, and we saw that

 2     there were some fires mostly at the top of the building, a couple in the

 3     middle of the building.  We stopped to film.  All the pictures that you

 4     see of the close-ups of the building were taken by my cameraman.  The

 5     pictures that were taken from the side further off of that building, that

 6     same building being hit, were taken by a CNN cameraman.  We did an

 7     exchange of footage that evening.

 8             When the firemen arrived, they set off up the staircase, as you

 9     could see in the pictures, to the fires at the top of the building.  What

10     we then saw was that more fires -- rounds were fired now at apartments

11     lower in the building, and it seemed to us clear that what the people who

12     were doing the firing intended was to try and cause more fires, therefore

13     catching out those who were at the top of the building.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And you stated that it was a civilian target in the

15     story we just watched.  If you could just explain that.  Did you see any

16     indications there -- any fire coming from that building, or how you came

17     to that conclusion?

18        A.   Well, we were, certainly by that stage of the war, very much

19     aware that whenever there was an incident in Sarajevo, the defence from

20     the Bosnian Serb side would be that it had been a legitimate military

21     target or that the Bosnians had been shooting at themselves.  And this is

22     December 1992 we are talking about, and so we were quite quick -- I mean,

23     we did this anyway, wherever we went, Was this building used by elements

24     of the Bosnian Army?  We did not only meet this one distraught man who

25     you saw in these pictures who lost his flat, we met other people who were

Page 2431

 1     living in the flat, and they all went, Are you mad that we would allow

 2     the military to use the building, because we know what the repercussions

 3     would be.  The moment that fire comes from this building, there would be

 4     a great deal of fire returning to it, and they all were adamant that it

 5     had not been used militarily.

 6             Secondly, we checked with the UN.  The UN by that stage was much

 7     more organised in Sarajevo, by December 1992, than they had been in the

 8     initial days of May and June when I had been there, and while they were

 9     not very good at ever stopping anyone shooting at each other, what they

10     were good at was telling where fire was coming from.  They assured me

11     that as far as their observers were concerned, no fire had emanated from

12     that building.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  And could we give that a number,

14     please?  That was 40267.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, this document shall be assigned

17     Exhibit P936.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Mr. van Lynden.

20             Your Honours, that's all I have at this time.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  So you are minded to tender all the

22     exhibits which were not put to the witness now, all the remaining

23     associated exhibits?

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour, although, as I say, 40264B,

25     which was on my filing, was a mistake, a typo, so that --

Page 2432

 1             JUDGE KWON:  So you're not tending that part?

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  No.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have any objections to any one

 4     of those associated exhibits?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no objections.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Those will be admitted, and in due

 7     course the Court Deputy will circulate his memo as to the number of the

 8     exhibits.

 9             Now, Mr. Karadzic, for you to cross-examine the witness, you

10     requested 14 hours for your cross-examination of this witness, although

11     you originally requested for 12 hours.  However, the Chamber finds that

12     14 hours isn't a reasonable number of time for your cross-examination.

13     In any event, we explored the possibility to have an extended sitting

14     tomorrow, but due to the fact that one of the Judges has to sit in

15     another case tomorrow morning, so extended sitting will not be possible.

16     And, instead, on Friday we will explore the possibility to start, for

17     example, at 8.30.

18             So that said, I gather that you will have about seven hours --

19     approximately seven hours in total.  And speaking for myself, that should

20     be an adequate amount of time for your cross-examination, as far as you

21     limit your cross-examination to the relevant questions, refraining from

22     making statements, and without putting unnecessary readings to the

23     witnesses.  But it's never meant to encroach upon your right to

24     cross-examination, so we'll try our best to go as far as possible, and

25     then at the end of the day we'll see how much we get on with the

Page 2433

 1     evidence.  And considering how the cross-examination has been conducted,

 2     we'll see whether further time for cross-examination is necessary.  In

 3     that case, we'll ask the witness to come back again, if necessary.

 4             So with that comment, let's start your cross-examination.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, may I just make a point from my side,

 6     is that I have to return to my home, and I cannot stay the whole of

 7     Friday morning.  I don't know if this has been made clear, but in that

 8     case it was done before I entered your courtroom.  I have to, at a

 9     certain moment, leave because I am booked on a flight.

10             JUDGE KWON:  That has been communicated to the Chamber.  My

11     understanding is that you have to leave by 11.00 on Friday, and then

12     we'll try our best to conclude your evidence here.  But if necessary, we

13     may ask you to come back again in a convenient time.  We'll see.

14             Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.

16             I'm afraid that that will not be sufficient at all, even if we do

17     what Mr. van Lynden and I agreed upon; namely, that most of my questions

18     are put in such a way that yes-or-no answers can be sufficient.  However,

19     I'm afraid that Mr. van Lynden will have to come back again if we cannot

20     sit for longer hours tomorrow.

21                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

22        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. van Lynden, and thank you

23     for having been kind enough to meet up with the Defence before this

24     examination.  I believe that this will be of assistance, at least to a

25     certain degree.

Page 2434

 1             First of all, I would like to ask you to let us have your notes

 2     and journals.  Of course, we can redact the private parts.  We certainly

 3     wouldn't go into any kind of private detail.  What is of particular

 4     relevance is the fact that this material contains some of the things that

 5     were not contained in your reports, and it is quite different from

 6     everything that we know with regard to these subjects and that is

 7     contained in your journals.

 8             What do you say to that?

 9        A.   Firstly, Your Honours, I did not agree with Mr. Karadzic

10     yesterday that we should do yes-and-no answers.  Mr. Karadzic said that

11     that's what he would like to do.  I heard that, but I did not agree to

12     it.  The manner in which he asks questions or wishes to have answers is

13     up to him, but I did not agree to that.  He did say it, but I did not

14     agree to it.  That's the first thing.

15             Secondly, this Tribunal has never asked for my notes before.  I'm

16     not -- I have kept many of my note-books.  They are currently not in my

17     direct possession, because our possessions are locked up before -- given

18     our move from Holland to Italy, and therefore I would not have instant

19     access to them, nor do I know for certain that I have all my note-books

20     from the periods relative to this case.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] May I?  Thank you.

22        Q.   Well, I thought that we had agreed, because I asked you whether

23     we can shorten things and be as efficacious as possible, and you said,

24     That depends on your questions.  So if I put such questions, perhaps we

25     can do it.  Let me put a question like that now.

Page 2435

 1             Was it your understanding that the Muslim army, the Army of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina, was fighting for a united, unitary

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 4        A.   Yes, although I would not call it a Muslim army.  As I mentioned

 5     earlier, throughout Bosnia, when I encountered the Bosnian Army, there

 6     was always also non-Muslims within its ranks.

 7        Q.   Well, that's what you said today, but let me ask you this:  Do

 8     you know that it was less than 3 per cent, that Serbs accounted for less

 9     than 3 per cent of that army, and that is according to their information?

10        A.   I was never given percentages as to the religious background of

11     the force.  What I'm saying is that I encountered, if you will, Serbs and

12     Croats in all the units of the Bosnian Army that I ran into during the

13     various stages of the war while I was in Bosnia.  Percentages, I was

14     never given, nor did I ask for them.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And did you receive information that in the Serb Army

16     there were Croats and Muslims, and that there were even entire units that

17     consisted of Muslims only; yes or no?  We can deal with that on a yes

18     -or-no basis, can't we?

19        A.   I never encountered one Muslim with any Serb unit.

20        Q.   Did you ask whether there were any, and could you recognise a

21     Muslim or a Serb just by seeing them?  Do they differ to such an extent?

22        A.   No.  As I pointed out earlier in my testimony, they are all

23     Slavs.  Yes, we did ask.  And could we immediately tell?  No, certainly

24     not.  But we did ask, and we never -- I never encountered one.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Well, you should be well informed because you sent

Page 2436

 1     such exhaustive reports, and I wonder how come you did not realise that

 2     there were Muslims in the Serb Army, even entire units consisting of

 3     Muslims only.  But let's leave that aside now.

 4             You said that even when you were not in a particular location,

 5     you, nevertheless, had your own producer and that he was a source of

 6     information for you.  Who else were your sources of information?

 7        A.   Back to the point about the Muslims in the Serb Army.  If there

 8     were Muslims in the Serb Army, it was up to the Serb Army or your office

 9     to have shown them and introduced them to us, which you never did, nor do

10     I have any recall of ever being told in Pale, by you or by

11     General Mladic, that there were Muslim units fighting within that army.

12             When I was not in a particular location -- I'm sorry, that is

13     completely unclear to me.

14        Q.   When I asked you where you were, when I asked you how come you

15     knew about some things, you said, Well, my producer was there, and that's

16     how I had that particular information.  So you had producers in all the

17     republics, didn't you, and you said that they were your source of

18     information in case you were not there yourself?  Is that actually the

19     case?  And if so, who else were your sources of information?

20        A.   No, I brought producers with me.  We had a permanent producer

21     based in Belgrade, and then I had field producers who came with me or

22     with the other crews.  I wasn't the only team sent by Sky News into

23     Bosnia.  And there were always local producers with these teams.  They

24     were a source of information, in the sense that they spoke the language,

25     they could speak to everyone.  I could not speak to everyone, as I did

Page 2437

 1     not speak Serbo-Croat.  Other sources of information would be whoever we

 2     happened to run into and have a conversation with, whether it be you,

 3     yourself, when we were in Pale, or others that we spoke to when we were

 4     in Pale, Mr. -- General Mladic, who did give us a briefing before we

 5     actually did the interview.  We, at various points of the war, went to

 6     the Lukavica Barracks and were given various briefings there by military

 7     officers, all of these briefings not in front of the camera, I should

 8     add, and it's the same wherever we went.  We talked to people, and from

 9     those people we took information.  We didn't always take that information

10     to be correct, but we talked to people and then we tried to work out

11     whether it was correct or not.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did we agree that -- as you had put it, you said that

13     the Serbs shot themselves in the foot.  Now, my interpretation of that is

14     the Serbs had lost the media war, if I can put it that way, and if they

15     waged one at all.  Can we agree on the fact that the Serb cause was

16     poorly represented in the Western media?  The reasons don't really

17     matter, but do we agree on that?

18        A.   Can I just make clear to Your Honours that Mr. Karadzic is

19     referring to a comment I made yesterday, when I visited him in prison.  I

20     said that in my opinion, by making it so difficult for the Western media

21     to work on the Serb side, and that they had done this in 1991 and again

22     later in Bosnia, that the Serbs had, metaphorically, shot themselves in

23     the foot.  I believe that the Serb cause, as you put it, was poorly

24     represented in the Western media because the Serb cause was very poorly

25     put to the Serb media -- to the Western media.  The reasons for that lie

Page 2438

 1     with the Serbs, not with the Western media.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that the media are very important, and

 3     that they affect the public opinion in their respective countries, and

 4     that the public opinion affects the positions taken by governments, or do

 5     you think that governments influence the media, or is it mutual?

 6        A.   I think it is complex.  I don't think it's as simple to say.

 7     Yes, of course the media is important, but the level of the importance of

 8     the media from one case to another, from one issue to the other, differs

 9     a great deal.  And while the media can have great influence on public

10     opinion and then on government, it's also the case that sometimes this

11     doesn't happen, whatever the media may do.  And even if public opinion is

12     moved, government doesn't also -- always also move as well.  It's a

13     complex issue, and it's not a simple black-and-white one.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that the Muslim side was represented by a

15     public relations firm, Ruder and Finn, in the West?

16        A.   I was never put in touch or never contacted by the public

17     relations firm that you mentioned.  In fact, I was never contacted by any

18     public relations firm on behalf of any of the parties to the various

19     conflicts in Yugoslavia.

20        Q.   But you did hear of that, that they had a public relations firm

21     representing them, the Muslims in the West, I mean; right?

22        A.   I have no recall of being told that, but then I wasn't in the

23     West.  I was in Bosnia.  There were various pressure groups of one nature

24     or other that I was told about specifically in the United States and in

25     London, but that's not where I was working.  When I was not in Bosnia, I

Page 2439

 1     was at home, and I did not encounter any of these groups.

 2        Q.   And did this kind of thing happen, and that's what other

 3     journalists told us when they were trying to justify what they did and

 4     make excuses for themselves, that editors would significantly change

 5     their reports?

 6        A.   My reports were never changed by any editing in London throughout

 7     my time in Yugoslavia.  I recall only one shot that was once taken out of

 8     a story, which the foreign editor decided to do, which was of blood

 9     flowing down an injured person's back, and he felt that this was too

10     graphic and unnecessary.  I protested, that he should leave my stories

11     alone, and the shot was put back in again.  None of my stories were ever

12     edited.  Whether this happened to other journalists, that may be the

13     case, but I can't comment on that.

14             I should point out one other thing here.  American television

15     journalists have to send their written part of their stories to their

16     offices in New York or Atlanta beforehand.  British television does not

17     do so, does not request that; therefore, the reports were mine and then

18     sent to London and then broadcast, and none of the stories, as far as I'm

19     aware, were changed by editors in London.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree -- or, rather, does this sound plausible

21     to you, that due to sanctions, we could never engage any pressure groups,

22     or lobbying groups, or public relations agency in the West?

23        A.   I'm aware that there was a pressure group in London.  Whether

24     this had to be paid for or whether people were doing this for free, I

25     don't know.  I never met them.  And does it sound plausible to you that

Page 2440

 1     because -- to me that because of sanctions, the Serb government in

 2     Belgrade couldn't pay for a public relations firm?  No, it does not sound

 3     plausible to me.  If they had wanted to, they would have found the money.

 4     It's not a great deal of money to hire a public relations firm for a

 5     government.

 6        Q.   I didn't mean money, I didn't mean affordability.  I meant fear

 7     of sanctions.  Not a single agency would agree to represent us because in

 8     that way they would be violating the sanctions regimen; isn't that right?

 9        A.   I'm not an expert in the UN sanctions and whether a public

10     relations firm in the West would have violated that or not.  I simply

11     don't know.  It's not something that I looked into.

12        Q.   Thank you, but that's the way it was.  Did we agree that you had

13     said that you did not know which party had switched off water, power, cut

14     food supplies, et cetera?

15        A.   You are referring to the conversation we had yesterday about

16     cutting off power, water, food supplies to the city of Sarajevo.  My

17     answer to that was that a city does not grow its own food.  The water a

18     city produces does not come out of itself.  It has to be brought there,

19     and power usually as well.  No.  Did I have conclusive personal evidence

20     that this was cut by your government or by someone else?  No, I don't.

21     But it is clear that a besieged city is no longer in a position to

22     provide its citizens with its own food and water.  That has to come from

23     outside.  By besieging the city, your government effectively stopped the

24     people of Sarajevo from having access to the normal food and water

25     supplies.

Page 2441

 1        Q.   Are you trying to say that my government could have stopped it or

 2     that they did stop it?  Because if you put it this way, then you're

 3     saying that you know that they stopped it.

 4        A.   I know for a fact that the UN food supply to Sarajevo was

 5     repeatedly stopped, for instance, the supplies that came by air because

 6     the plane was shot at.  On various of these occasions, we were informed

 7     by the UN that that shooting had emanated from Serb lines and that they

 8     had then brought the air transport of food to Sarajevo to a halt.  I

 9     would call that a clear case of your government and your forces stopping

10     food coming to the besieged city.

11        Q.   Well, you see, that's not exactly the way it was.  We established

12     here with another witness that there were over 10.000 flights and that

13     not a single one of the incidents related to these planes came from the

14     Serb side, but let's move on.

15             Do you agree that you said that you did not always know who it

16     was that was doing the shooting?  I mean --

17             JUDGE KWON:  That's the kind of statement you should refrain from

18     making.

19             Mr. van Lynden, would you like to comment upon that?

20             THE WITNESS:  On the previous witness and the 10.000 flights,

21     Your Honour?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE WITNESS:  Well, I wasn't here to listen to the previous

24     witness, so I'm not aware of what the previous witness said.  So I cannot

25     make any comment on that.

Page 2442

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Absolutely.

 2             Mr. Karadzic.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Did we agree that you did not always know who it was that was

 6     doing the shooting; yes or no?

 7        A.   Did I -- of course I didn't always know.  It was an impossibility

 8     to know, if you're driving through a city, who's shooting or where

 9     they're shooting at, unless you're being hit, or unless you're filming

10     it, in which you can see who is doing the shooting, where the shooting is

11     emanating from.  But did I always know?  No, of course not.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did we agree that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

13     had positions to the south of the Holiday Inn and that it's possible that

14     they had sniper shooters in the government building, on the museum, and

15     so on?  You had said that was possible, that you knew that they had

16     positions to the south of the Holiday Inn and that it's possible that

17     they had sniper shooters in the government building, and on the Assembly

18     building, and on the museum building.

19        A.   I said it was possible that they had sniping and army positions

20     south of the Holiday Inn, yes.  Did I actually visit these positions?

21     The answer is no.  But it is certainly possible, yes.

22        Q.   You said that you weren't conscious of the existence of the

23     Mujahedin unit in the BH Army.  Do you still say that?

24        A.   I don't recall precisely.  You mentioned yesterday a Mujahedin

25     unit, but I thought one particular corps.  I was aware by the end of the

Page 2443

 1     war that there were certain what you call Mujahedin units.  Did I

 2     actually see them?  The answer is, no, until the war was actually over.

 3     Then I did see one unit.  But I did not see any such unit, nor did anyone

 4     say that they were a member of such a unit when I spoke to them during

 5     the war.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  You visited the staff, the headquarters of

 7     General Juka Prazina, but you said that you weren't sure that he was a

 8     general, and you actually said that you don't believe he was a general;

 9     is that right?

10        A.   To visit the staff and headquarters would signal an organised

11     military unit.  I visited the staff and headquarters of various armies.

12     That is certainly not what I saw with Juka Prazina.  I saw him in a

13     normal civilian apartment, either on the ground floor or in the basement

14     of a building in Sarajevo.  Hardly a headquarters, I imagine.  I saw him

15     in one or two other buildings later on during 1992 which were, again, of

16     a similar nature.  So headquarters, absolutely not.

17             No one ever, in my knowledge, called him "General."  They called

18     him, "Juka," and I was not aware that he was given that title, if such be

19     the case.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I asked you, and you said that you didn't know of the

21     existence of other generals who were promoted to that rank from

22     criminals, such as Celo -- there are several people with the same name

23     Celo, and their commander said that there were nine or eleven Celos, but

24     two of them were most prominent, and then Musan Topalovic, Caco, and so

25     on.  So is that right, that you weren't aware of that?  You weren't

Page 2444

 1     informed of that; is that right?

 2        A.   I'm aware of -- I'm not aware of 11 Celos.  I was aware of one.

 3     And I'm aware that there were other people, but I was not ever informed

 4     that they had the rank of general, no.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Two more questions before the break, Your Excellency, would that

 7     be right?

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   There are two things I have to ask you before the break, and then

10     after the break we'll move on to another area.

11             The first thing I want to ask you is this:  You said that the

12     BH Army did not have an artillery at that time from June 1992, but

13     roughly when was it did you realise that they did have an artillery in

14     the city of Sarajevo?  And, secondly, that you ascribed to me -- or,

15     rather, two things as being my position: first of all, that I said that I

16     consider the Muslims to be Turks, I consider them to be Serbs, and that I

17     wanted to build a wall in Sarajevo.  Those are two things that only you

18     seem to know.  Nobody else knows about that.  And if that is the case,

19     why didn't you publish that, because it's rather drastic and picturesque.

20     If Karadzic was in favour of a wall in Sarajevo, that should surely have

21     been publicised in all the media; right?

22        A.   Okay.  We are dealing with all sorts of different issues here.

23     The first one is the question of artillery on the Bosnian side within

24     Sarajevo.  I have never, during my entire time, seen what I call

25     artillery.  I have, in March 1994, seen, at a weapons collection point

Page 2445

 1     organised by the UN, 120-millimetre mortars.  These are heavy mortars.  I

 2     would personally not describe that as artillery, but that could be an

 3     argument.  I never saw the kind of artillery pieces that I saw at the

 4     position General Mladic took when I was in Sarajevo.

 5             Next question --

 6        Q.   The wall, and that Muslims were Turks.

 7        A.   Mr. Karadzic, we had various conversations late in the evenings

 8     in Sarajevo -- in Pale in September 1992.  These conversations were

 9     off-the-record conversations, as I -- this was not something -- or I

10     didn't have my cameraman there, these were not proper interviews, and I

11     did not use, in my reports, things that you said during those

12     conversations.  You -- and I recall this absolutely as one of the

13     options, not the only one, but one of the options, was that you said that

14     a wall should be built in Sarajevo.  When asked about this by

15     investigators of this Tribunal, I told them about it.

16             Yesterday, you mentioned something which you called the Brussels

17     solution.  I have absolutely no recall of you ever using that description

18     when we spoke in September 1992.

19             The final point is about you saying that they were Turks.  That

20     is how I recall it.  You said to me yesterday that you consider them

21     Serbs.  If you consider them Serbs, it now seems to me, it seems, rather

22     strange that we ever had this war.

23        Q.   Well, civil wars happen within the same people.  Why not a war?

24     Civil wars are civil wars.

25             Now, do you consider that if it was all right for you not to use

Page 2446

 1     informal conversations in your reports, why is it all right if you're

 2     using it in court?

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Objection, Your Honour.  It's not a proper

 4     question for the witness.  This is a court hearing, not a report, and

 5     there is -- the witness has explained his answer, why he didn't use them

 6     in press reports.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  If the witness is able to answer the question, I'll

 8     leave it to the witness.

 9             THE WITNESS:  I will try, Your Honour.

10             I was asked to tell the truth about conversations for a court of

11     law.  I consider that to be different than when you're reporting for a

12     television station.  If I had made those comments known by you, I could

13     not have approved them, because it was not a formal interview and we did

14     not have a camera present there.  You could, therefore, have said that

15     it's not true, what I said.

16             Apart from that, my understanding of those conversations was that

17     this was an informal conversation.  This is a court of law, and I think

18     that's a different matter, where one is asked to tell the truth, as close

19     as you can get to it.  That's why I told the investigators when I was

20     asked.

21        Q.   Very well.  Then we're going to find that in your notes.  I

22     assume you made an entry and recorded it in your notes, because it's so

23     drastic and something that springs to mind that you must have recorded it

24     in your memoirs, if not anywhere else.

25             And just by the by, I drink red wine.

Page 2447

 1        A.   So do I, but I recall you drinking white wine.  That may be a

 2     loss of memory on my part.  I don't know if it's in my notes, and do not

 3     have memoirs.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Then, with that, we'll have a break of 25 minutes.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 5.24 p.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 5.49 p.m.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   May I remind you, Mr. van Lynden, of this story number 5, where

11     you say that the skyscrapers of UNIS, the UNIS skyscrapers, that they

12     were disintegrated and that it was a symbol of the destruction of the

13     town, itself.  And then I think you went on to say that the Serbs had

14     signed a truce, but that they did not respect the cease-fire, and that in

15     keeping with that, the Muslims, or the BH Army, as you term it, did not

16     have any artillery, and you said, I think in an attachment, that they

17     stood up to the artillery with small-calibre weapons, infantry weapons.

18             Now, can I ask -- well, I'd like 1D1208 to be called up on

19     e-court, please, and then we can take a look and see what it is you're

20     reporting about to your viewers.  We have the president of the Presidency

21     of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim part, Alija Izetbegovic, and his army

22     commander speaking, or the chief of the Main Staff, rather,

23     Mr. Sefer Halilovic.  It's the minutes -- well, actually, we can just

24     have the English version put up on our screens so we can see it better.

25     It was a Presidency meeting, a session of the Presidency of

Page 2448

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina, held on the 17th of June, 1992, and it's a

 2     tape-recording of that.

 3             May we have page -- let me just see.  Page 3?  Page 3 in the

 4     Serbian version.  It's a short document, and I don't know whether we have

 5     that in English.  It's page 3 of the English, I assume.

 6             [In English] Page 3.

 7             [Interpretation] "The Sarajevo situation and the general

 8     situation in the Sarajevo area," says Sefer Halilovic - it's him

 9     speaking.

10             First of all, the distribution is as follows.  In the

11     municipalities, the transversals, you have the Chetnik forces, that is to

12     say, the Serb forces, and they make up -- there are 300 to 400 men.  In

13     the Trnovo municipality, there are 300 to 400 men, supported by two tanks

14     to two to three armoured vehicles, mortars, and so on.

15             Now let's see what it says on page 6 of the Serbian version, and

16     I suppose it's the same page of the English.  Yes, it says "page 6," so

17     where it says "page 6."  "During," it starts "during ," that's right.

18             Now, Sefer Halilovic is reporting to the Presidency about the

19     situation at the battle-front, and it says:

20             "During the two months of battle, the aggressor suffered large

21     casualties, especially losses in material-technical assets, around 20

22     tanks, 20 transporters, six VBRs, five Howitzers, seven 120-millimetre

23     mortars," et cetera.

24             "Certain number of lost or destroyed assets, three tanks, six

25     armoured vehicles, five Howitzers, 155 millimetres, six mortars, a

Page 2449

 1     certain number of infantry weapons, and a large quantity of infantry

 2     artillery ammunition seized.  Due to a significant loss in assets and

 3     artillery rocket assets, the intensity of the artillery actions against

 4     Sarajevo decreased."

 5             Now, did you report about those Serb losses?  Did you report to

 6     your viewers?  Did you inform them of these Serb losses, your audience,

 7     your public?

 8        A.   Your Honours, it seems to me that I'm being asked a whole bunch

 9     of different questions simultaneous, because we began with something

10     quite different and now we come to -- if I understand this correctly,

11     this is from the 17th of June, I have not seen this document before.  I'm

12     seeing this document for the first time.

13             The final question is whether we reported this to our -- back to

14     London.  Firstly, we -- by the 17th of June, I believe I had left Bosnia.

15     I do not know the precise dates of the events that Mr. Halilovic is

16     referring to in the loss of Serb assets.  When we left Sarajevo after the

17     bombardment and some of the stories that we -- that the Prosecution has

18     shown today, we went to Pale and asked you to work there.  We -- every

19     single time we left the Pension Olympic, we were arrested.  How were we

20     meant to be able to report on Serb losses?

21             Apart from that, it is my experience during the war that all

22     sides were not particularly good at taking journalists along and saying,

23     This is what we've lost.  I don't think any government around the world

24     is very good at saying, Here we've made a mistake, and this is what we've

25     lost.  I was certainly not taken by the Bosnians to places that they had

Page 2450

 1     lost, but I wasn't taken by your forces either.

 2             When I reported at the end of the year of 1992 that Zuc had been

 3     lost by the Bosnian Serb forces to the Bosnian Army, this is something

 4     that was never verified by your government, and, indeed, it led to the

 5     anger of General Mladic with me, or it was one of the reasons that he

 6     seemed to be angry, when I encountered him in 1994.  So, no, we did

 7     not -- I mean, I did not at this time -- I don't think I was in Bosnia

 8     anymore at that stage.  I did not report this, I was not aware of this,

 9     we were not made aware by your government of these losses, nor do I

10     actually ever remember being given something of this nature by the

11     Bosnian government, a breakdown of the military achievements that they

12     had made.

13             Would we have reported it?  If we had reported it, Mr. Karadzic,

14     we have been told by the Bosnian government that the Serbs have lost all

15     this, you would have said that is completely ridiculous and biased

16     reporting, You haven't checked with us.

17             One of the problems about working in a war zone is that you can't

18     cross lines to verify on an immediate basis, so I would have thought it

19     very unlikely that we would have reported this unless we had had direct

20     confirmation from your government or from your military forces that that

21     was, indeed, the case.  Otherwise, it might have been said that we were

22     reporting Bosnian propaganda.

23        Q.   Thank you.  That was a rather lengthy answer, but you see,

24     Mr. van Lynden --

25        A.   It was a rather lengthy question, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 2451

 1        Q.   You see, you can say yes or no now.  What I claim is that your

 2     reports were so biased and hadn't been checked out properly that the

 3     gentlemen in this hall here, watching your footage and films, gained the

 4     impression that it was the Serbs who were doing the shooting, that nobody

 5     was actually shooting at the Serbs, and that the city was unarmed,

 6     without any artillery, without any soldiers, without any actions going

 7     on, and the Serbs without having suffered any losses.  Would that be

 8     right?  Were you biased, were you prejudiced?  Did you want to check out

 9     the information the Muslims gave you, just as you wanted to check out

10     what the Serbs told you?

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, that's a comment, then three, four

12     questions.  You would never get a yes-or-no answer to that from any

13     witness.  If you want yes-or-no answers or short answers, you're going to

14     have to ask direct, contained, closed questions.  The witness can't

15     possibly deal with all those matters, except by giving a very lengthy

16     reply, which he may well now wish to do so.

17             THE WITNESS:  Whether I'm biased or not I leave to the Court to

18     decide for itself.  I do not believe I was biased in my reporting.  I

19     will say that I have a bias against war, in general, after nearly 25

20     years of being a war correspondent.

21             Did we check?  Yes, we always try to check specifically with the

22     UN.  The UN was in Sarajevo in May and June of 1992, albeit not in the

23     kind of numbers as later, but we did try to check with them.  We would

24     try to check with both sides as far as possible, but often it was an

25     impossibility.  We simply didn't get answers.

Page 2452

 1             I think the channel that I worked for gave you, personally, ample

 2     opportunity to put your point of view.  One of the reasons why I didn't

 3     do a sit-down interview with you in Pale in September 1992 is because we

 4     had agreed, and Sky News had agreed, that because you speak English, they

 5     could interview you directly from London, and many interviews were done

 6     with you to make your case.  But if we asked for precise information of

 7     the kind of nature that you're showing here, a reaction, we wouldn't have

 8     got it.  We would not have got it on either side, I'd have to say, of the

 9     front-lines.

10             Now, let me just read through your question again.

11             No, I don't think I gave an impression that the city was unarmed.

12     We, indeed, filmed soldiers, policemen, as the Court has seen today,

13     firing with small arms.  Our general impression at the time, backed by

14     those who we spoke to at the UN, who I would see as unbiased people that

15     we could go and speak to, all said that all the heavy weaponry was

16     basically on your side.  I'm not discounting that they did have some

17     heavy mortars.  I did, indeed, see heavy mortars, as I've already

18     testified.  I did not see, in Sarajevo, heavy artillery.  There were

19     definitely soldiers.  At the beginning, it was very much ragtag.  There

20     was no Bosnia Army when the war began.  There were the

21     Territorial Defence forces, there were the police forces, and then units

22     came up, indeed a number of them led by criminal elements, as to which

23     I've testified, Jusuf Prazina being one that I personally knew.  You

24     mentioned others.  I'm aware that those existed.  And I'm also aware that

25     we put those on air and talked about that.  So I do not think that that

Page 2453

 1     is a case of biased reporting, no.

 2             I hope I've answered your question.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4        Q.   I agree that my questions are rather complex, but that's because

 5     I'm under time constraints.  If we had sufficient time, things would be

 6     different.  But let's clarify one thing, Mr. van Lynden.

 7             Up until September, were you at Pale up until September or

 8     weren't you at Pale by June?  I mean Sarajevo, not Pale.  Sarajevo.  You

 9     said a moment ago that in June, at this particular time, that you were no

10     longer in Sarajevo.  However, in your reports, it says you were there

11     until September and then that you returned in October.  That's on page 11

12     of the transcript today.  Page 11 of the transcript, you said that you

13     were there until September.

14        A.   No, I didn't say that I was there until September.  I arrived

15     towards the end of May, left at a certain moment in June when -- and came

16     to Pale, because it was the only manner in which we could get our footage

17     out.  I then left.  I returned to Sarajevo and was there from later in

18     June, throughout July, until the beginning of August, when I left again

19     and went home to my family.  I was in London for the London Conference,

20     where we met each other.  And then from there, we met each other in

21     Belgrade, and then I spent three to four weeks based in Pale after that.

22     So I was -- and I do not claim to have been in Sarajevo the entire time.

23        Q.   Thank you.  But the Prosecutor read out that you arrived in

24     Sarajevo in late May 1992 and that you remained there until September.

25     Pale is a municipality of Sarajevo, so when you were at Pale, you were

Page 2454

 1     actually at Sarajevo.  But let's move on.

 2             Can we scroll down the page to see what General Sefer Halilovic

 3     says about what they have in Sarajevo.

 4             And he says:

 5             "The deployment of forces of the Territorial Defence of the

 6     Sarajevo region --"

 7             Do we have that in English anywhere?  It's the last paragraph:

 8             "The position and state of the territorial defence forces in

 9     Sarajevo ..."

10             We can move on to the next page in English now:

11             "... are composed of the following:  The regional staff of the

12     Territorial Defence; two 120-millimetre battery launchers with 12

13     weapons; 105-millimetre Howitzer battery with five weapons; artillery

14     unit, 122 millimetres, three weapons; an armoured mechanical unit, a

15     group consisting of one tank and five armoured vehicles; 16 Territorial

16     Defence municipal centres; 16 TO companies, around 500 independent units

17     or platoons; around 450 independent groups or companies; and around 100

18     anti-sabotage units."

19             Now, is it possible that you didn't see that vast armed force in

20     Sarajevo, that it escaped you in some way, Mr. van Lynden?  Were you

21     aware of this presence -- military presence in Sarajevo, as described

22     here?

23        A.   No, I wasn't.  I was aware of a large number of men armed with

24     Kalashnikovs, as I've already testified.  I was not aware that they had

25     105-millimetre Howitzer battery.  "With five weapons," I'm not quite sure

Page 2455

 1     precisely what that means, whether there was one gun or whether there was

 2     five.  I would not call this -- there was a vast number of men with guns,

 3     but this kind of armament is almost insignificant in comparison to the

 4     kinds of heavy armament that your forces had at their disposal.  But I

 5     was not aware of it.  No, I didn't see artillery.  I've testified I have

 6     not see artillery in Sarajevo during my time there, apart from

 7     120-millimetre mortars.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  A little further down, he said a total of 190-odd

 9     thousand, of which 45 per cent were armed.  You're right, not everybody

10     was armed.  But since the weapons remained up at the front-lines, that

11     was sufficient for those up at the front-line to be armed.  So 500

12     independent platoons, 450 independent companies, and 100 anti-sabotage

13     platoons or units.  So that is a vast armed force in SarajevoSarajevo

14     was a fortress, entrenched, full of weapons and soldiers, and you seem to

15     be reporting as if it was a kindergarten or a nursery attacked by the

16     wild Serbs.

17             Well, the Serbs would have too many reasons to be disappointed

18     with reporting of this kind and dissatisfied with it; isn't that right?

19        A.   I can't speak for how the Serbs view my reporting and whether

20     they're dissatisfied or not.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now may we move on to

22     page 7.

23             We have page 7 on our screens.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   You said today, and in your report as well, that it was your

Page 2456

 1     assessment that those who were killed and wounded were civilians because

 2     soldiers wear uniforms, whereas civilians don't, and that that was the

 3     criterion that you used when distinguishing between civilians and

 4     soldiers.

 5             Now, I'd like to focus your attention on the English passage,

 6     where it says:

 7             "During --" and it's still Sefer Halilovic speaking.  He says --

 8     let's see where that is.  It's on page 7:

 9             "During the initiated attack ..."

10             Yes, the previous sentence.  The personnel dressed in civilians

11     [as interpreted].  So the armed people were dressed in civilian clothes,

12     and they had no protection against the elements.  And then it says:

13             "Due to -- regardless of the problems, the TO units in the city

14     of Sarajevo were successfully defending the outskirts of the city.  They

15     are preventing an attack on the city and simultaneously engaging in

16     actions in selected directions.  During the initiated attack, strong

17     Chetnik forces were broken up in the area of Pofalice and

18     Zuc-Mojmilo Brdo, the front stretches below Kromolj towards Orlovac and

19     above Barice and Odzak towards Vasin Han, Ophodzi-Vidikovac, Pljevinac,

20     Osmice - Stari Grad, below the MUP school in Vrace, Mojmilo Brdo and a

21     part of Debelo Brdo.  In the last five or six days, the activities of our

22     artillery became especially prominent.  They were effective and caused

23     significant losses to enemy soldiers, and material-technical assets in

24     the region of Pofalice, Zuc, Mojmilo Brdo, Vrace, Zlatiste, Osmice,

25     Poljana, and the village of Mrkovici.  Based on the current balance of

Page 2457

 1     forces, the TO units of the city of Sarajevo can successfully defend the

 2     positions they hold, and with certain offensive actions they can even

 3     extend the lines of defence."

 4             And now my question, Mr. van Lynden:  This is a report by the

 5     command of the Muslim army to the Muslim Presidency, or whatever you'd

 6     like to call it, where he says that the fire that you showed to your

 7     audience was -- that the Serb firing was more successful than the Serbs,

 8     and that the Serbs suffered losses, and that they were very successful in

 9     their artillery attacks.  Now, from your reports, can we conclude what

10     Sefer Halilovic is saying here in his report to the Presidency?

11        A.   Firstly, you would have to ask Mr. Halilovic what he was

12     precisely referring to and what dates these attacks took place on and

13     whether this was if this -- I doubt that this was the same as what I was

14     reporting on, because that was not action happening along the

15     front-lines.  This was shelling coming in throughout the city.  He

16     reports attacks on the front-lines.  I haven't seen this document before.

17     I don't know if Mr. Halilovic, indeed, wrote all this down.

18             But, firstly, let's take the question right at the beginning

19     about the military being in uniform or not being in uniform.  In a report

20     that has not been shown to the Tribunal, but made also in the early days

21     of June, I state quite clearly that there is a mish-mash within the

22     Bosnian armed forces.  Some of them are in uniform, many of them are not.

23     They were not all in uniform at that stage of the war, and we made that

24     clear.

25             When we encountered wounded people, and in the one report that

Page 2458

 1     was shown to this Court this afternoon, after heavy shelling and there

 2     was fighting, we made clear that the wounded men were armed members of

 3     the Bosnian Army who had been launching a counter-offensive.  We didn't

 4     say that these were civilians.  We said these were members of the armed

 5     forces.

 6             Of course, with any man in a war zone who is under the age of,

 7     let's say, 60, and he's dressed in civilian clothes, you can say, Well,

 8     he was an army, and if somebody else says he was a civilian, what do we

 9     say?  On the whole, I think we made it clear who the civilians were, and

10     it was clear to us, and who the armed forces were, and we made that,

11     I think, clear in the reports that this Tribunal has seen today.

12             As far as the attacks are concerned, as I understand the reading

13     of what Mr. Halilovic reported to his president, was that these were

14     armed actions undertaken by the Bosnian forces along the front-lines.

15     That's on the edge.  He doesn't mention fighting in the center of the

16     city, at Grbavica here.  And the shelling that we showed and filmed on

17     those days in early June was shelling that landed throughout Sarajevo.

18     There's a difference between the two.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Let's just clarify this.  This is a session of the

20     Presidency held on the 17th of June.  Halilovic is reporting about the

21     previous period, the previous two or three weeks.  He is reporting about

22     the very same events that your report pertained to.  However, in the

23     middle of this paragraph - please take a look - he is mentioning the old

24     city, Osmice, Ophodzi, Vasin Han.  He is mentioning the parts of town

25     that are in their hands and from which they are operating.  Of course,

Page 2459

 1     you know that Stari Grad or, rather, the center of the city is Velesici;

 2     right?  Do you see where he says "Stari Grad," the old city?

 3        A.   I know that "Stari Grad" means "Old City."  Yes, I see.  I don't

 4     see him saying that there were attacks from the Stari Grad towards your

 5     lines.  As I see it, he is saying here that an initiated attack -- strong

 6     Chetnik forces were broken up in the area of Pofalice, Zuc, and

 7     Mojmilo Brdo.  That's not the center of Stari Grad.

 8        Q.   Let us go on.  Look at the very same sentence, sir.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

10             Mr. Nicholls.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, just to try to be clear, I'm looking

12     at the translation provided by the Defence, if we are talking about

13     page 7, the report is about "the past five to six days," not "the past

14     two to three weeks," if -- so I think that was either a misstatement, or

15     a translation problem, or a different section of the report.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Could you indicate me to the part?

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm looking at the middle of what in the English

18     says is page 7, which is on page -- it's marked as page 7 in the

19     translation, on page 2 of the English in e-court, in the third paragraph

20     down which begins:  "Despite the aforementioned problems ..."

21             JUDGE KWON:  And "the last five or six days," yes.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  And this is that section I thought Mr. Karadzic

23     was directing the witness to.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] However, if we look at page 6, this

25     pertains to operations over two months.  For example, on page 6, the

Page 2460

 1     first paragraph, it says:  "During the two months of operations, the

 2     aggressor suffered" such and such casualties.  Well, they were not

 3     self-inflicted; right?  It is an account of action taken by them, so they

 4     are bragging about all the losses that they caused on our side.  And you

 5     will see that this is a second session on the 17th, so he's talking about

 6     the preceding period.  And there were some special operations perhaps

 7     over the past five or six days.  However, that is the entire reporting

 8     period.  And it says here where the front-line is, and, of course, it is

 9     the front-line that is being operated from and operated against.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Isn't that right?

12        A.   Whom are we referring to?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Is that your question?

14             Let's move on to your next question, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             This is page 138 in Serbian.  However, let's have a look now.

17     This was 7, wasn't it, now 8, 9, 10 -- page 11, page 11 in Serbian.  And

18     we have it here, 11, page 11.

19             It says here:

20             "In the next stage, 10 to 15 days, the Territorial Defence of the

21     RBiH shall carry out the following activities," and then they are listed.

22     And what it says about Sarajevo:

23             "In the region of Sarajevo, the city of Sarajevo will be defended

24     by active operations within the city, and deblockade should be carried

25     out along the axis Nova Gradiska-Ilidza-Blazuj-Kiseljak-Centar-Vogosca-

Page 2461

 1     Ilijas-Visoko, and in the Gorazde region the road to the Drina River

 2     valley should be deblocked."

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Did you receive any information about what was being planned and

 5     that it is primarily offensive operations that are being planned around

 6     town and from town?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls?

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, again, if he can break up the

 9     questions a bit, it will be easier for the witness to answer.  It's:

10             "Did you get this information?"

11             There's about three questions here.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Make your questions simple, Mr. Karadzic.

13             Mr. van Lynden, can you answer the question?

14             THE WITNESS:  The basic question seems to be in reference to the

15     line of that there would be active operations by the Bosnian Army - this

16     is the Bosnian command, I'm told, to his president - within the city and

17     at other areas.  Did I get that information?  No.  Would it be likely

18     that any army gives the information prior to launching an attack to a

19     foreign journalists?  The answer is no.

20             The operation that we were aware of, while it was happening in

21     Sarajevo, and they admitted it was their operation, this was an attack

22     which we couldn't go to the outskirts to film, but we filmed the men who

23     came back from that operation wounded to the hospital.  We reported that

24     that was a Bosnian operation.  That, we knew about, and that was admitted

25     to us.

Page 2462

 1             I'm aware that -- let me put it this way:  Military commanders

 2     will say a lot of -- make a lot of statements to their political leaders.

 3     I'm also aware that it doesn't always work out.  There were many

 4     operations launched throughout the war in Bosnia by the Bosnian forces to

 5     try and break through the siege of Sarajevo.  As far as I'm aware, those

 6     operations did not succeed.  I'm not aware of any operation being

 7     announced to a Western journalist beforehand, and even at certain

 8     moments, for instance, in the summer of 1995, there was a refusal of the

 9     Bosnian Army to even confirm that such an operation was underway.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             P934, could I have that briefly, please.  It's a map, a

12     Prosecution map.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   I would like to ask you -- I'm sure that you know this much.

15             While we're waiting for that, actually, it's a bit easier for me

16     now if you were not impartial, if you were simply uninformed.  The

17     outcome is the same, but I find it easier to take this way.

18             Now, Mr. van Lynden, can you mark, for instance, who is around

19     this Serb zone?  You see this Serb zone where you put that arrow?  And

20     then on the north and on the west, who is there around us?  It says

21     "HVO"; right?  And if you could mark --

22        A.   Mark what?

23        Q.   Well, mark who is where.  The blue line is the Muslim line,

24     right, the Muslim Croat line; right?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 2463

 1        Q.   And the red one right next to it is the Serb line.  I see.  And

 2     then the area beyond that, are those Muslim government forces to the left

 3     and to the north of the blue line, and down there to the south of the

 4     blue line, beyond the blue line?

 5        A.   That would be territory controlled by the Bosnian Army or by the

 6     HVO, yes.  And the other territory would be controlled by your forces.

 7        Q.   So what is within the red lines is controlled by the Serb forces,

 8     and what is beyond the blue lines is under the control of the Muslim

 9     Croat forces; right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Do you agree that when Halilovic speaks about offensive

12     activities coming from the outside and from within, that what he actually

13     means is that the de-blockade of Sarajevo should take place through

14     attacks from Central Bosnia and from the city of Sarajevo itself; right?

15        A.   Yes, I'm aware, at least, that in the summer of 1995 that was

16     tried and that it failed.  And obviously it was tried and failed during

17     other periods of the war.  The siege, as I said earlier, was never

18     broken.

19        Q.   Can you identify Ilijas on this map?  Do you know where Ilijas is

20     here?  Down the road -- down the river to the north, actually; right?

21        A.   Ilidza would be in the area, let's see, around here [marks].

22        Q.   That would be Rajlovac, rather.  No, Rajlovac.  Nedzarici,

23     Rajlovac, but Ilijas is to the north.

24        A.   If you say so.  I'm not aware of being in Ilijas, apart from

25     possibly in March 1994.

Page 2464

 1        Q.   But, Mr. van Lynden, Ilijas is the location where most of the

 2     shells in this war fell, and proportionately their losses were the

 3     great -- civilians and soldiers, Sarajevo municipality that totally --

 4     that your interest did not focus on at all?

 5        A.   But, Mr. Karadzic, if that's the case, why were we not taken

 6     there by your government and by your army?  If we are not shown and we

 7     are not told, how are we meant to know?  You cannot have correspondents

 8     in a war zone running around freely without -- to front-lines.  If you

 9     didn't show us, how is the rest of the world to know?  I was never taken

10     there by your government or by your army.

11        Q.   All right.  It was published all over, but never mind.  Thank

12     you.  I just wanted the Trial Chamber to see that we are all surrounded.

13     They are surrounding us, and we are surrounding them; semi-encirclement.

14             JUDGE KWON:  You'll have the opportunity to make your submission.

15     Put your question.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Here's the question:  Are we semi-encircled by them, like they

18     are semi-encircled by us?

19        A.   The city of Sarajevo wasn't semi-encircled.  It was completely

20     encircled and besieged.  The distances of what you call your encirclement

21     at certain points is tight, absolutely, but on the whole it is not.  And

22     the two are incomparable, Mr. Karadzic.

23        Q.   Well, an UNPROFOR military officer said that it was an

24     encirclement, not a siege, not a blockade, but we'll get to that.

25             Thank you for the map.  Now I would like to move on to this

Page 2465

 1     document again, page 12, I think, I think.  If the previous one was 11,

 2     then this would be 12.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, again, Your Honour, I haven't been objecting

 5     really hardly at all today, but this is the kind of comment, that an

 6     UNPROFOR officer said this or that and we'll get to it later, wastes time

 7     and isn't a question.  And most times Mr. Karadzic doesn't come back to

 8     these points and is simply making argument.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Absolutely.  So can we pull up the 1D1208 again.

10             So, Mr. Karadzic, did you understand what Mr. Nicholls has said

11     right now?  You should refrain from making such statement.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nicholls knows who I'm talking

13     about.  They have that material.

14             Can I have page 12 now.

15             Now we have page 12.  Mr. Izetbegovic is asking the following:

16             "When adding up the engagement of enemy manpower near Sarajevo

17     that is holding town in encirclement," so, see, Izetbegovic also says

18     "encirclement," "how much is that?"

19             And Halilovic says:

20             "About 6.000 in Sarajevo, or, rather, those who are holding

21     Sarajevo encircled.  As for manpower, in our estimate, which I believe is

22     realistic, it's about 80.000 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

23             So Halilovic estimates that the Army of Republika Srpska has

24     80.000 soldiers throughout Bosnia.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I think --

Page 2466

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that is page 13, then.

 2     Page 13.  Sorry about that.  Yes, we have it now.

 3             This is Halilovic's response:

 4             "There are around 6.000 in the city of Sarajevo," I mean Serbs,

 5     and he probably didn't take into consideration those in Central Bosnia,

 6     and he says that in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are about 80.000 Serb

 7     troops:

 8             "However, for the city of Sarajevo to be completely conquered,

 9     much stronger forces are required than what they have," I mean "they,"

10     the enemy.  "Objectively, that cannot -- they cannot accomplish that in

11     the near future unless some radical turning points occur.  However, they

12     will still attempt to accomplish this goal, and the goal is to divide the

13     city of Sarajevo and merge the parts from Rajlovac over Stup and Lukavica

14     with Pale.  For that goal, objectively they need to have certain forces

15     at their disposal, but in that case their defence would weaken in other

16     areas; hence, even now it is unrealistic that they are able to do that."

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   You see, Mr. van Lynden, this is his own estimate of his own

19     forces of Sarajevo; 500 independent battalions, 450 independent

20     companies, and here there are 6.000 Serbs and 80.000 Serbs in all of

21     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Did you know about this vast disproportion in

22     terms of manpower?

23        A.   Firstly, back to the line as to how many battalions and

24     independent units Mr. Halilovic had within -- at his disposal within

25     Sarajevo, I came out of an alley where a battalion was usually around 700

Page 2467

 1     men.  I've encountered battalions in other countries where it's suddenly

 2     only about 100 men.  I see no actual figures that Mr. Halilovic gives as

 3     to the precise number of men in companies or battalions, so I am unclear

 4     as to the entire -- the number of men at his disposal in Sarajevo.

 5             As far as your larger question is concerned, that, as you say,

 6     there were only 80.000 Serb troops within Bosnia-Herzegovina, it did

 7     become clear in September 1992 that, in terms of personnel, you were

 8     probably out-numbered by the Bosnian forces.  In terms of weaponry, there

 9     was no comparison between the two.  You completely out-gunned them in

10     every single way in the form of artillery, tanks, armoured personnel

11     carriers.  They simply did not have that kind of weaponry, so the one

12     made up for the other.  There was a problem of manpower on the Serb side,

13     but you did have 80.000 fully you armed men backed by heavy arms, and

14     that kind of backing was not there on the Bosnian side.

15        Q.   Thank you.  He actually said that on that earlier page, page 7,

16     that he had 91.000 men, 500 independent platoons, 450 companies, and so

17     on and so forth, but that doesn't matter now.  What does matter,

18     Mr. van Lynden, is that we agree that against us -- well, if there were

19     one and a half million of us, there were 3 million against us.  So the

20     ratio was 2.1 in favour of the Muslim Croat Federation, as far as

21     mobilisation was concerned; yes or no?

22        A.   In terms of manpower, to a degree, but there was a split between

23     the Bosnian forces and those of the Croats.  And then, as I said before,

24     you can call up men, but if they don't have a gun, they're not much good

25     to you.

Page 2468

 1        Q.   Well, now you are making me show information provided by the

 2     Secretary-General of the UN, you are tempting me to do that, where he

 3     says that a shortage of weapons is no longer an issue, as far as the

 4     Bosnian Serb side is concerned.  However, we've already shown that to the

 5     Trial Chamber.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So could this previous document,

 7     the transcript from the session of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina

 8     held on the 17th of June, be admitted, and could I have in e-court

 9     1D01130.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection, Your Honour.  I just notice that on

12     some pages it appears that only one sentence is translated.  I don't

13     object to the document, but we hope for a fuller translation at some

14     point so we can read around this one sentence of page 11.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll mark it for identification, pending

16     translation.  And the exhibit number will be ...?

17             THE REGISTRAR:  It will be Exhibit D192, marked for

18     identification.  Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought that what was used by the

20     Defence and what can be translated can be admitted.  I mean, we had this

21     translated privately, and who needs a translation can have it translated.

22             So could I now please have 1D01130 in e-court.

23             JUDGE KWON:  For example, you read out some part from page 3, but

24     only one line was translated.  Without full translation, we have

25     difficulty in understanding those parts.  So we marked it for

Page 2469

 1     identification, pending full translation of those parts.

 2             Let's move on.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Unfortunately, there is no translation for this yet.  However, I

 5     am going to read the document out.

 6             It is The service of National Security of Republika Srpska.  The

 7     date is the 20th of June, 1992.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Now, Mr. van Lynden, this is about localities that you presented

10     in your reports.  And now I'm going to read this to you.  It's entitled,

11     "Information," and then it says:

12             "In the former barracks of Marsal Tito and at the Faculty of

13     Civil Engineers and the Faculty of Architecture, training is taking place

14     of members of the so-called TO BiH.  According to the same information,

15     in these barracks there is a centre for the training of members of the

16     so-called TO BiH for rapid interventions, and the training takes about 25

17     days.  In the town of Velesici, there is a tank, and in front of the

18     building of the so-called TO BiH at Ciglane, an APC and a tank are

19     stationed."

20             So, tell me, did you know about this?

21        A.   What, about this document?

22        Q.   No, no.  About the deployment of those forces.  Did you know

23     about that?  Because you said that the Marsal Tito Barracks were alight,

24     on fire, and it almost brings tears to your eyes, but here we see that

25     it's a legitimate target.  Did you know that it was, in fact, a

Page 2470

 1     legitimate target with military structures there?

 2        A.   I didn't say it was not a legitimate target immediately after its

 3     evacuation by the troops of the Yugoslav Army.  As far as I'm aware, no

 4     one used it, because this document says that people are being -- it is

 5     being used to train forces.  It was certainly not used to train anyone

 6     in that period.  No one went into it in that period.  We, indeed, showed

 7     right at the beginning people running out of it.  I am aware that

 8     Bosnians, I imagine, army units went in to see what they could find

 9     immediately following the evacuation of Yugoslav Army troops.  That it

10     was later used by the Bosnian Army, but that is afterwards, after the

11     shelling I reported on, is an absolute possibility.  I didn't enter it

12     after that period.

13             On one occasion in July, an incident that the Prosecution has

14     asked me about earlier this afternoon, when we saw three people that had

15     been hit on the road, we saw fire emanating from what remained of the

16     Marsal Tito Barracks, a form of covering fire.  So there was certainly

17     soldiers in there in July 1992.  But in the period that we have seen the

18     various stories that have been shown in court this afternoon, during that

19     period there were no Bosnian Army units within the Marsal Tito Barracks.

20     It would have been very foolish to be there when they come under such

21     sustained fire, let alone that it was used for training at that stage.

22     Afterwards, quite possibly, but during -- when we made those reports,

23     absolutely not.

24        Q.   Now, this tank in Velesici, you can't tell us anything about

25     that, right, because you didn't see it, and you weren't aware of the fact

Page 2471

 1     that they had tanks at all; is that right, is that what you said?

 2        A.   I have never seen a tank inside the part of Sarajevo controlled

 3     by the Bosnian forces, no.

 4        Q.   It goes on to say:

 5             "The Main Staff of the so-called TO BiH for this area is located

 6     on the premises of the Transport and Technical School, whereas the

 7     so-called police station is in the Velesici local commune."

 8             Now, let me ask you whether you know where the bus stop in

 9     Sarajevo was, the main bus station.

10        A.   The main bus station that I'm aware of is in the newer part of

11     Sarajevo towards the west.  There was another bus station that I'm

12     vaguely aware of.  Hard to put its location.  In the photograph that I

13     was shown right at the beginning I could -- saw that.  But there was

14     certainly a main tram stop.  That was to the west, and I imagine there

15     were buses there as well.  But in the period when I was in Sarajevo,

16     there were no buses or trams running.  It was not something that I looked

17     into as to what was happening with the buses.

18        Q.   Might I be of assistance?  Let me remind you.  Was the bus

19     station between the Marsal Tito Barracks and the railway station?  So

20     right up along the Marsal Tito Barracks wall, then you have the bus stop

21     and the railway station?  Do you remember that?  If not, we'll come to

22     that tomorrow and we'll indicate it on the map.

23             But let's move on with this document, and for that may I have the

24     next page displayed, please.

25             It says:

Page 2472

 1             "The artillery weapons were located on Hum Hill, underneath the

 2     relay station of RTV BH and in the Velesici and Kosevsko Brdo.  We'd like

 3     to mention that tank movement was noticed around the bus station from

 4     where they fired, and after that they withdrew immediately."

 5             So what I want to say, Mr. van Lynden, is this:  That Hum and

 6     below Hum, Velesici, and somebody says that Mladic mentioned that here,

 7     Kosevsko Brdo, the tunnel, and the bus station from time to time were

 8     legitimate targets; isn't that right?

 9        A.   Am I meant to say yes or no, whether they were legitimate

10     targets?  If I didn't see military forces there, how can I judge whether

11     they were legitimate targets, Mr. Karadzic?  I did not see those tanks

12     there, and therefore I cannot say whether they were or were not.

13        Q.   Well, let's assume they were there.  And if they were, would that

14     be a legitimate target?

15        A.   I've been told never to make assumptions in journalism.

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  The same applies in the law, I think.

17             THE WITNESS:  Glad to hear it.

18             JUDGE MORRISON:  Would you, as a general principle, if there's

19     military operations and if there are tanks and artillery in a location,

20     from your extensive experience as a war correspondent, would you

21     genuinely take that as being a legitimate military target?

22             THE WITNESS:  I would, with one qualification.  Under the Laws of

23     War, fighting in a city forces the armies concerned to be extremely

24     careful so that you don't cause civilian casualties, and that should

25     be -- it's a part of the Geneva Conventions, as I'm sure that you are

Page 2473

 1     more than aware than I, and therefore that should always be a

 2     consideration for the military involved.  But, yes, of course, generally

 3     speaking, in a more general sense, they would be legitimate military

 4     targets.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6        Q.   Now, in the document there is a enumeration of all the places and

 7     localities where there are legitimate targets, so once we have that

 8     translated, we'll be able to come back to that.

 9             But now let's go to page 3, and I'd like to draw your attention

10     to the UNIS building.  It says in the UNIS building is the Territorial

11     Defence of Novo Sarajevo.  In the UNIS building, in Masic Street, is the

12     headquarters of the so-called Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina

13     for Novo Sarajevo.  We have information according to which the park by

14     Miljetska between the Vranica skyscraper, to the right is a mortar set up

15     on a truck.  The staff of the so-called Territorial Defence of BiH for

16     that area, Cengic, Vila, and so on, is located in the Treska [phoen]

17     Furniture Store.  At Pero Kosoric Square is a large concentration of

18     troops, more than 1.000 men, and so on and so forth.

19             Now my question:  In one of your reports, you said that flats and

20     business premises were turned into places from which they shot.  We have

21     that somewhere, I believe, that they were turned into places from which

22     there was shooting; rifles, sniper fire, and the like.  Now, here we see

23     a report from the secret police which confirms the fact that these

24     business premises, commercial buildings, UNIS, Treska, Vraniska [phoen],

25     and so on, were, indeed, used for military purposes.  So if that was so,

Page 2474

 1     were they, too, legitimate targets?

 2        A.   The report you allude to was when we were on one of the

 3     front-lines.  If your -- if there are a war in an urban battleground, by

 4     definition what used to be people's offices or people's houses on the

 5     front-line gets turned into military strong points.  That's what happens

 6     in an urban battleground.  Whether, as you say, the UNIS towers was used,

 7     I don't know.  I didn't see so.  I was taken to various territorial

 8     defence -- this is not an army.  This is territorial defence.  We have to

 9     remember just what this is.  It's something quite different.  I saw a

10     number of their headquarters in Sarajevo.  I did not see one at the UNIS.

11             Later in the war, I did visit a number of different offices that

12     had been used, and these had been commercial offices, I imagine, that

13     were used as bases -- offices of various units of the Bosnian Army.

14     Where else were they meant to go?  They were bound to go to one building

15     or another.  Those buildings had previously been of civilian use and were

16     now being put to military use.

17             UNIS towers, I wasn't aware.  And we had visited it, and we did

18     not meet anyone during that visit of the Territorial Defence forces

19     there.  Therefore, I didn't see it as a logical target.  Can I be

20     completely certain, Mr. Karadzic?  No.  Is everything told to me from the

21     Bosnian side?  No.  So there is a possibility.  But as I said, we did

22     visit the building prior to the attack that was carried out on it.

23             The other points -- the other areas, I can't comment on.  I

24     didn't visit every area, and so I just simply -- I don't know.

25             We also, of course, don't know whether this document is actually

Page 2475

 1     accurate.  We have absolutely no way, or that I can tell, that this

 2     document is accurate.  That it comes from the secret services, I've seen

 3     documents from secret services before that were fairly inaccurate.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry to interrupt.

 6             No objections, Your Honour.  I might be wrong, but if the

 7     document we're talking about -- I think we begin at page 94, line 15, the

 8     date read out is "19th of June, 1992."  I'm not sure if it's a typo.

 9     I think the document is dated 20th of July, looking at it.  So that would

10     need to be corrected if that's right.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, correct, it's dated 20th of --

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May it be MFI'd?  It's the 20th of

13     July.  That's what it says on the first page.

14             And, Mr. van Lynden, just to inform you - this isn't a

15     question - this document was seized by the OTP investigators.  They're

16     the ones that got hold of it, not me.

17             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, but I can't let that pass.  I mean, the

18     witness's comment was about the source of the document, not who seized it

19     ultimately.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Well, I was about to ask the position taken by the

21     OTP, Mr. Nicholls or Mr. Tieger, about this document.  He seems to be

22     tendering this document into evidence.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection, Your Honour.  As I think you said,

24     it could be marked for identification and we'll look for the translation,

25     but no objection to the document.

Page 2476

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It will be marked for identification, pending

 2     translation.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  This document shall be assigned Exhibit D193,

 4     marked for identification.  Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Now may I have 1D361 displayed, please, 1D361.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   And while we're waiting for that, Mr. van Lynden, let me just

 9     tell you that this a document from the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina, the Muslim part, of course -- the Muslim Croatian part, and

11     in English -- it's in English, and it says on the 14th of June, 1992,

12     Hasan Efendic, a very well-known commander of the Territorial Defence, is

13     re-affirming -- re-asserting a cease-fire.  It's the re-affirmation of

14     the cease-fire established on the 1st of June, 1992.  So on the 1st of

15     June, 1992, the parties signed a cease-fire agreement.  From the 1st of

16     June to the 15th of June, 1992, we see all the offensive actions

17     undertaken by the BH Army and the terrible material and human losses it

18     inflicted on the Army of Republika Srpska.  On the 14th of June, he once

19     again expresses his attachment of the cease-fire that was not respected.

20             So did you know that there was a cease-fire in force when you

21     arrived, on that first day?

22        A.   I arrived at the end of May, and I wasn't aware of a cease-fire

23     being in place then.  We were told that a cease-fire had been agreed to,

24     and we were told by people at the UN that this was almost instantly

25     broken.  When we asked them who had broken it, they said, We cannot

Page 2477

 1     initially tell.  But we spoke, for instance, to the Australian colonel

 2     who is in one of my stories from those days, who was negotiating on

 3     behalf of the UN, and he told me that a cease-fire had been broken

 4     repeatedly, and obviously it was broken repeatedly, but he blamed the

 5     Bosnian Serbs.

 6             Secondly, you say that during that time, you -- your people

 7     suffered such terrible consequences of the fighting.  I was not on your

 8     side of the front-lines.  I was inside Sarajevo.  All I can say is what I

 9     witnessed and what we filmed was a form of carnage going on inside the

10     Bosnian-held part of Sarajevo.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  But we heard from

12     Sefer Halilovic, the commander of the Muslim army, about all the losses

13     we suffered and that they were all offensive operations launched by his

14     army.

15             I'd like to tender this document into evidence now.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  Again, objection to that argument without any

17     question attached, even a pretence of a question at the end.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you are having a habit of making a

19     comment at the end of each question and answer.  Please refrain from

20     making such statement.

21             I take it there's no objection to this document.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE KWON:  It will be admitted.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this document shall be assigned

25     Exhibit D194.  Thank you.

Page 2478

 1             JUDGE KWON:  And --

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, and I apologise.  But my

 3     question was whether we've just read that the commander of the Muslim

 4     army informed us about the Serb losses; yes or no.  And we looked at the

 5     document a moment ago.  The 17th of June is the date.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I think we heard that answer.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             May I have 1D01231 next, please.  1D01231 on e-court, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I'm seeing the clock.

10             We'll rise today, and we'll resume at 2.15 tomorrow afternoon.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.,

13                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 20th day of May,

14                           2010, at 2.15 p.m.