1 Wednesday, 19 May 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, everybody.
6 I was told that there are some matters for you to raise,
7 Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: Yes, Excellency. You tell me when I'm supposed --
9 may I?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, there are a few matters to
12 deal with. One of the most important ones is an intention - I hope it's
13 not a decision yet - to work four days a week. We can barely take three
14 days a week, with the resources that we have. Lord Bonomy had actually
15 mentioned that it would be two days per week, involving a team of eight
17 The number of my associates has been reduced to five now. One of
18 them is for legal matters, and all the rest cannot really keep up with
19 the workload.
20 In actual fact, I said at the very outset that I would challenge
21 everything but the climate. That is my right, and that is my duty, to
22 challenge everything that is being mis-characterised here and
23 mis-portrayed, all the wrong allegations contained in the indictment, and
24 we believe that that is of great importance for the future of our
25 people -- our peoples, rather, and their reconciliation. Therefore, it
1 is my duty to present at this trial, and it is for you to provide a fair
2 trial to me, to challenge each and every fact that should be challenged.
3 If it's three days, we have a lot of difficulties involved,
4 especially if we were not to get three more associates from the Registry,
5 at least as many as we had so far; that is, a total of eight. However,
6 since all changes, on the basis of which my situation, as a whole, is
7 being curtailed, it is even direct examinations by the OTP that are being
8 shortened. However, that does not diminish in any way the burden of the
9 Defence, even when it's 92 ter, regardless of whether their direct
10 examination is half an hour or an hour and a half. It doesn't make
11 things anything easier for us or it doesn't shorten the proceedings, as
12 far as we're concerned. So the number of facts that we have to deal
13 with, the number of facts that they are going to introduce through a
14 particular witness, remains the same, irrespective of the way they are
15 examining the witness.
16 From the point of view of the Defence, this is an opportunity to
17 conduct exemplary hearings at an exemplary trial that will serve the
18 purposes of international justice. If that is not the case, we are going
19 to be facing difficulties. We are not going to have a fair trial, we are
20 not going to have an opportunity to present everything that we wish to
21 present and everything that we are supposed to do, in view of everything
22 that the Prosecution is accusing us of.
23 So that is our basic objection, and we had hoped in June we would
24 be sitting two days a week only. If the Trial Chamber were to change its
25 decision, and if they were to require that all witnesses testify
1 viva voce rather than 92 -- on the basis of 92 ter, then with eight
2 people we would manage to do something. However, this way, the rhythm is
3 deadly, as far as we are concerned. Resources, time, human capabilities,
4 as it were, all of that is threatening these proceedings.
5 You have noticed that the OTP have new Prosecutors for each and
6 every witness, and we are who we are. It's the five of us, and no one
7 else, so there is no way we can speak of an equality of arms. Their
8 human and financial resources cannot be compared to ours.
9 Therefore, I would like to ask you to look into that possibility,
10 sitting two days a week rather than four, or to have witnesses testify
11 viva voce so that we have more time to challenge everything that can be
12 challenged and disputed.
13 The other matter I wished to raise was the following. Through
14 the kindness of Mr. van Lynden and Mr. Doyle, who were kind enough to
15 meet with the Defence, I found out that they had some kind of notes and
16 some kind of diaries. However, we have had no insight of this nature.
17 You will see during the proceedings that some things have cropped up for
18 the very first time, things that were not contained either in official
19 reports or in TV reports, but they do appear in witness statements or in
20 witness testimony. So the source of these new allegations that work to
21 our detriment have to -- has to be disclosed. If it's not in a TV
22 report, then it's contained in a note-book. That's why we kindly ask to
23 be given the opportunity to have the Victims and Witnesses Unit ask
24 Mr. van Lynden to submit his note-books and diaries, of course, the part
25 that does not have to do with his family and other private affairs. Also
1 from Mr. Doyle, we would like to ask that we have a look at the notes
2 that he had. He had them on the table when we were sitting there and
3 talking, of course. He said that there were a great many private matters
4 contained in these note-books, and we will respect that. If we get these
5 documents from them, even without a subpoena from you, we are going to
6 need some time to study these notes and perhaps even to investigate the
7 matters involved to see whether that is actually the way things took
8 place. So in that case, at least parts of the cross-examination would
9 have to be postponed, because the Defence cannot deal with all of this
10 new material so quickly. We found out about it only yesterday and the
11 day before yesterday.
12 So these are the basic concerns of the Defence at this point in
13 time. We don't know which one is our most important concern; perhaps the
14 first one that I referred to, the question of the rhythm and the time for
16 For example, Mr. van Lynden said that he would have to leave
17 after the first session on Friday. Indeed, that is a very short period
18 of time, and this is a big witness. His reporting affected the world
19 public opinion. He was an eye-witness. He saw both sides. Now, if we
20 were to have this kind of constraint imposed upon us, that would be
21 extremely difficult. If the Trial Chamber so decides, we would be
22 prepared to work all day tomorrow or to have Mr. van Lynden appear some
23 other day when he can; next Monday, or next week, whenever.
24 Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger or Mr. Nicholls.
1 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, let me address one of the matters and
2 perhaps touch on one of the others. Mr. Nicholls was present, I gather,
3 at the time of the discussion that the accused referred to and may be
4 better placed to refer to respond to any issues related to the diaries.
5 With respect to the scheduling issue, for the most part, the
6 Prosecution, of course, leaves that matter, which is within the purview
7 of the Court, in the Court's hands, with the following quick
9 First, I cannot recall any specific reference by Judge Bonomy to
10 a two-day-a-week schedule, and, indeed, if there was a reference to two
11 days, I suspect it was not in reference to this particular context, but I
12 didn't want my silence on that issue to be taken as an affirmation that
13 the Prosecution, too, was aware of that particular reference.
14 Secondly, perhaps it goes without saying, but I should note that
15 the accused's perception of his duty to the Serbian people or the Muslim
16 people is not an appropriate guide-line to the issues that are actually
17 involved and the matters that are actually at issue in this case, and it
18 may also signal some of the reasons underpinning disparities between the
19 assessment of what sufficient time for cross-examination consists of
20 between the Defence and the Prosecution or the Court.
21 And, finally, I would simply note that there have been examples
22 of the needless or pointless or even counter-productive expenditure of
23 resources by the Defence on issues that didn't need to be addressed. One
24 came up in a motion recently. That could serve as at least a partial
25 answer to the resource and time issues raised by the accused.
1 And, finally, with respect to the issue of the notes or journals
2 of the witnesses, I just want to make it clear, before any response that
3 Mr. Nicholls has, that this is not a matter of documents in possession of
4 the Prosecution that weren't disclosed. That's not the issue.
5 Apparently, the accused, during the course of his own investigation, has
6 confirmed the existence of these things and now is interested in them.
7 If they arise belatedly, it's for that reason, and that reason only.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
9 Do you have anything to add, Mr. Nicholls?
10 MR. NICHOLLS: No, Your Honours.
11 Just to confirm, I was going to rise at the beginning today and
12 explain that, unfortunately, Mr. van Lynden has commitments and would
13 need to go back Friday at about 11.00 a.m. for a flight. I informed my
14 friends of that yesterday. We will have the next witness ready at that
16 And that -- confirm what Mr. Tieger said about the note-books.
17 We heard about them yesterday during the interview, and there was a
18 request to me at that time from Mr. Karadzic's associates for the
19 note-books, and I explained I don't have them, I haven't seen them, and
20 I'm not sure what the attitude of the witness will be or where they are.
21 So that's something that we'll need to look into, and the Prosecution
22 will assist in any way it can with these note-books.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? May I, before you make a
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond to what Mr. Tieger
3 said just now?
4 First of all, the Prosecution has such a huge advantage. They
5 are counting on a vast amount of 92 bis evidence with people that I'm not
6 even going to see. Among them, there are some witnesses that were never
7 cross-examined or even seen by any Defence team. Also, there is an
8 abundance of statements, written material, and so on. All of that is
9 cropping up, and I have to be given an opportunity to challenge that, or
10 let the Prosecutors say what they're going to give up on. Let them --
11 let them tell us what is not going to be used as a basis for a sentence.
12 Whatever may lead to a sentence, I need to challenge. I need to
13 cross-examine witnesses, I need to put our case to the witness,
14 everything that we know, and so on.
15 What Mr. Tieger said, that there were questions that should not
16 have been put, that probably relates to legal issues rather than factual
18 If the Prosecution had only three documents against me, all of
19 this would not be required. They have nothing, so now they want me
20 simply to be snowed under, and I think they even need all the dead
21 witnesses that they have to keep in the case file in order to be sure
22 that I'm found guilty.
23 As for Muslims and Serbs, that is an additional matter. Of
24 course, I'm defending myself here, but it is a fact that the importance
25 of this trial goes beyond the importance of a single individual.
1 Enormous illusions have been created. Many took part in the creation of
2 these illusions; the Prosecution, journalists, diplomats, military
3 factors, intelligence services. They created such conditions that things
4 are always boiling in the Balkans and there's always bad blood there.
5 Of course, I'm defending myself, but I want to clarify all of
6 this, not only because I am being charged in this way and can be
7 sentenced therefor, but also because this is of enormous importance for
8 the people living there.
9 I really think the Prosecutors should be more modest when they
10 challenge the capacities of the Defence, because they have such a vast
11 advantage and they have far more resources.
12 Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you'll be surprised to hear that the
14 Chamber is minded to sit five days a week from after the recess.
15 In any event, the Chamber will consider the matter, will give a
16 ruling on that matter. Speaking for myself, one potential solution may
17 be to have an exemplary hearing with you being represented, a full team
18 capable of investigating, defending, et cetera.
19 As to the note you referred to, as Mr. Tieger or -- Mr. Tieger
20 noted that they are not in the hands of the OTP, and I take it -- so it's
21 the matter for you to pursue with the witness. So during the course of
22 direct or cross-examination, I hope you can sort it out in one way or
24 And I noted that tomorrow, there's no -- there's a courtroom
25 vacancy, so during the course of today's hearing I'll explore, with the
1 assistance of the Court Deputy, whether we can have an extended sitting
2 tomorrow, and we'll do our best, and then we'll see how far we can get on
3 with it, and then -- actually, we'll see, at the end of his evidence,
4 whether we need to call Mr. van Lynden again or not.
5 So that said, let's bring in the witness.
6 Mr. Karadzic, are you minded to supplement your submission as to
7 the sitting schedule in writing?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the Trial Chamber needs that, we
9 will do so gladly, because we always objected to the rhythm involved,
10 bearing in mind the necessity to have equality of arms. If we were to
11 neglect all of that and if there would be a speeding up of the rhythm,
12 then we would not have a fair trial. So if you need this in writing, if
13 that would affect your decision, of course, I have to do that, I have to
14 make that kind of submission.
15 JUDGE KWON: It is up to you whether or not to file something in
16 supplement -- to supplement your submission.
17 Let's bring in the witness.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How much time are you giving me for
20 [The witness entered court]
21 JUDGE KWON: By the end of Friday.
22 Welcome, Mr. van Lynden.
23 If you could take the solemn declaration.
24 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
25 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 WITNESS: AERNOUT VAN LYNDEN
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. If you could take your seat, please.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Examination by Mr. Nicholls:
7 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. van Lynden.
8 A. Good afternoon.
9 Q. As I told you, in this proceeding what we will be doing is
10 entering into evidence a statement you have given, and then asking some
11 follow-up questions.
12 So can I ask you, please, to confirm that you've read your
13 consolidated witness statement of 25th and 26th February of this year,
14 that you signed on 16th of March, 2010?
15 A. I can confirm that.
16 Q. And could you please confirm that the statement is accurate and
17 that if you were asked questions on the same topics today, your answers
18 would be the same?
19 A. I can.
20 Q. Thank you. And, finally, in the statement there were various
21 videos referred to which are contained in the attachment to the
22 statement. Can you confirm that these videos that you watched were
23 accurate copies of the original broadcasts?
24 A. I can.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
1 Your Honour, I would move to tender the consolidated statement,
2 which is 65 ter 22289.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted as ...?
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P926. Thank you.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
6 I'll now read a brief summary of the evidence.
7 Mr. van Lynden worked as a television journalist, specialising in
8 covering war zones. In this capacity, he covered conflicts in Croatia
9 and Bosnia-Herzegovina, starting in 1991, on behalf of the 24-hour
10 British news channel, Sky News. Sky News went out via satellite and
11 could be watched throughout Europe
12 receiving that station.
13 Mr. van Lynden arrived in Sarajevo in late May of 1992, and he
14 stayed there through September. He then spent approximately three weeks
15 in Pale, returning in October 1992 to Sarajevo to continue his work,
16 staying there for some time.
17 In 1993 and 1994, Mr. van Lynden was covering conflicts
18 elsewhere, other parts of BiH, and made shorter visits to Sarajevo
19 While Mr. van Lynden was in Sarajevo
20 military hospital, also known as the state hospital and as the city
21 hospital later on. The city hospital was 12 or 13 storeys high and at a
22 fairly central location in the city, near Marin Dvor Square, the
23 Parliament. The front-lines of Grbavica were nearby, and thus
24 Mr. van Lynden had a crew, and his crew had a good vantage point to film
25 from this hospital.
1 The city hospital had been targeted for fire before
2 Mr. van Lynden arrived there, and was fired upon during his stay there as
3 well. While he stayed there, Mr. van Lynden did not see evidence of
4 snipers operating from the hospital.
5 Once he arrived in Sarajevo
6 conditions that the population lived under, including difficulties --
7 severe difficulties caused by lack of necessary resources, food, water,
8 utilities, as well as the impact of sniping and shelling on the
9 population of Sarajevo
10 fear which accompanied shelling and sniping attacks. He saw, on
11 occasion, civilians who had been shot, lying in the streets of Sarajevo
12 and, in fact, sniping incidents became so common that unless there were
13 unusual or aggravating features to the particular incident, it was not
14 considered truly newsworthy.
15 And Mr. van Lynden reported on the situation in the streets of
17 fear that they could be hit by sniper fire. He reported about sniping
18 and heavy shelling in Sarajevo
19 statement include: heavy shelling of the city and the Marsal Tito
20 Barracks in early June 1992; more heavy shelling in June 1992 at
21 increased intensity; firing upon the UNIS towers and other areas in
23 hospital in early June; and a story from the 5th December 1992 on the
24 firing on and burning of an apartment building in Sarajevo.
25 Other stories and topics covered by Mr. van Lynden during this
1 period include: the situation and conditions in Dobrinja in July 1992;
2 his meeting with Juka Prazina in May and June of that year; a visit to
3 Kula Prison in September 1992; a funeral of 28 VRS soldiers in Vlasenica
4 in September 1992, which was also attended by Mr. Karadzic; and
5 conditions he observed in Srebrenica in November 1992, when he entered
6 the enclave.
7 In September and October of 1992, Mr. van Lynden reported from
8 Pale to try to cover the war from the Serb side, and while in Pale
9 Mr. van Lynden spent several evenings with Mr. Karadzic. During these
10 evenings, they would hold informal conversations after work in
11 Mr. Karadzic's office, and Mr. Karadzic would take out maps, explain his
12 view of the situation, and Mr. van Lynden stated that he could -- he
13 observed that taking Sarajevo
14 In September 1992, Mr. van Lynden was able to interview
15 General Ratko Mladic. During this interview, General Mladic took
16 Mr. van Lynden and his crew to an artillery position directly overlooking
18 a map which we'll look at today, was able to identify the approximate
19 location on this map of the firing position, where the interview was
21 Following this interview with General Mladic in September 1992,
22 Mr. van Lynden and his crew made several trips around the perimeter of
24 Jewish cemetery, where Mr. van Lynden was able to speak with the soldiers
25 there and film the positions. He also visited Mount Trebevic
1 was taken by Bosnians to positions on Zuc Hill.
2 In February 1993, Mr. van Lynden reported on his entry to
3 Gorazde, where he had to walk through the foot trail overnight and spent
4 some time there reporting on the conditions which he observed. Although
5 there was extreme poverty, the conditions were not as dire as in
6 Srebrenica, that he'd seen there.
7 In February 1994, after the Markale incident, Mr. van Lynden was
8 sent to Pale, and he filed several stories from there about negotiations
9 for withdrawal with heavy weaponry from Sarajevo. After that agreement
10 on the withdrawal was reached, for the first time Mr. van Lynden was able
11 to see that one could walk across Marin Dvor Square in Sarajevo, which
12 had been absolutely too dangerous at any other time he'd been there.
13 Also while in Pale, Mr. van Lynden's cameraman filmed a meeting
14 attended by Radovan Karadzic and Generals Mladic, Milovanovic, Gvero, and
15 others, and it was at this time that General Mladic, on seeing
16 Mr. van Lynden, grabbed him and expressed his anger about
17 Mr. Van Lynden's reporting on Gorazde and Zuc.
18 That concludes the summary.
19 Q. I'm now going to ask you, Mr. van Lynden, just a few background
20 questions before we go straight to Sarajevo in 1992.
21 You were educated and born in the United Kingdom?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. And could you tell me just a little bit about your military
24 service, which I believe is with the Dutch Marines from 1976 to 1978?
25 Did you have any specialty training?
1 A. I was trained as an infantry officer and got special training as
2 a mortar -- platoon commander and mortar platoon commander.
3 Q. And after that military service, you became a war correspondent;
4 is that right?
5 A. That's right.
6 Q. And could you tell us briefly, before covering the conflict in
7 the former Yugoslavia
8 before that?
9 A. I began by covering the conflict then already going on in
11 1986. I covered the Iran-Iraq war that began in 1980. I covered the
12 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
13 during the 1980s, each of them lasting around three months, on foot with
14 the Afghan resistance. I covered the Romanian revolution in December
15 1989, and I covered the first Gulf war after Iraq had taken over Kuwait
16 and was with the allied troops during Operation Desert Storm, when Kuwait
17 was liberated at the beginning of 1991.
18 Q. Thank you. And if I'm correct, from 1988 onwards you were
19 working full time for Sky News?
20 A. That's correct. Before that, I was largely working in newspapers
21 and radio.
22 Q. All right. Now I want to talk about the bulk of your testimony
23 here today in the time we have, and that's your experience following your
24 arrival in Sarajevo
25 Do you recall when it was, in May 1992, that you arrived?
1 A. Right towards the end of May, but I don't remember the precise
3 Q. And you speak about this in your statement at paragraph 6, but
4 can you tell us what area of the Yugoslavia Sky News was broadcast over
5 and where your reports could be received?
6 A. As far as I'm aware, our reports could be received in the whole
7 of the former Yugoslavia
8 dish that could watch the Astra satellite, on which Sky News at the time
9 was broadcast, would be able to see the channel.
10 Q. Now, as I - I hope I got it right - explained in the summary, you
11 set up first -- or quickly in the former JNA military hospital, also
12 known as the city hospital in Sarajevo
13 that location and why you chose that spot to operate from?
14 A. When we drove into Sarajevo
15 hotels open. Journalists in a foreign country stay in hotels, but in
17 closed or been burnt already. So I went to the Bosnian Presidency and
18 asked them for help in finding somewhere for us to stay.
19 We were then taken to what we were told was a building that was
20 used in the past and during peace to house foreign VIPs, a building that
21 later became the house in Sarajevo
22 time the UN commander wasn't there yet, and so we were housed there. It
23 is a relatively low building, quite close to the Presidency, in the
24 center of the city, and we had one night there. There wasn't particular
25 heavy shelling, but there was shelling that night, and my cameraman and I
1 noticed that we simply couldn't film this from this low building, and
2 therefore we went on the lookout, in the days after, for a higher
3 building from which we would be capable of filming the shelling that was
4 taking place.
5 As I recall, on the second or third day we went to what was then
6 still called the military hospital, because we had heard that apart from
7 other injured being taken care of there, there was one soldier from the
8 then still-occupied Marsal Tito Barracks who had been taken there after
9 being wounded, and we wanted to film and interview him and find out how
10 that had happened.
11 We met the chief surgeon of the hospital, Dr. Abdulah Nakas, and
12 once we arrived at the building we saw that it had been repeated targeted
13 already, but that it was a high building. It seemed to us a well-built
14 building, but that -- so we asked him to see the higher floors and what
15 we might be able to film from there. The upper floors of the hospital
16 had been evacuated. They were no longer considered safe for patients, so
17 it was an empty floor. We went to the top floor, and we asked Dr. Nakas
18 if, in future, we would be able to stay there during the nights to film
19 the fighting when it took place.
20 The building had two different things that made it interesting
21 for us. Firstly, it was high and had a good view of much of the city.
22 There was a little left-hand balcony. You could film from there the old
23 part of Sarajevo
24 building, and the southern hills of Sarajevo, and to the right there was
25 another little balcony from which -- so we could film the new part of
2 We asked Dr. Nakas. He was very surprised that we should want to
3 live on the top floor of a building that had already been repeatedly
4 targeted. But he gave his consent, and after that, that's where we
5 stayed practically every single night when we were in Sarajevo.
6 Q. Thank you. And did you make any inquiries or check to see
7 whether that building was being used by Bosnian forces and whether any
8 sniping activity took place from the hospital?
9 A. Yes, we immediately did. If you go to a building that has been
10 repeatedly and very clearly targeted and hit, you also wonder why. And
11 as the correspondent with a television crew, I am responsible -- or I was
12 responsible for the well-being, as far as possible in a war zone, of that
13 crew. Therefore, if I'm going to go into a building, I'm going to check
14 whether it is actually a building that is being used by military forces,
15 and we checked quite carefully. I had already, from my experience in
16 1991 in the former Yugoslavia
17 their nationality or religious background were usually not very careful
18 in tidying up after themselves, and therefore it seemed likely to us that
19 if there had been snipers in that building, we would find empty cartridge
20 cases. That was not the case. We even went on the roof at night, which
21 is dangerous because then you are a silhouette. We found absolutely
22 nothing there. We found nothing on the lower floors. And in all our
23 conversations, because we did ask other people as well, no one ever said
24 that that building had been used for military purposes by the Bosnian
1 Q. Thank you. And while you were there, staying there from the end
2 of May/early June onwards, was the hospital targeted and hit by fire?
3 A. It was.
4 Q. Just to the extent you can tell, what type of weapons or
5 projectiles were used to target the hospital?
6 A. That's a difficult question to answer. If you are in a building
7 that is hit, it's not always immediately possible to know, A, the size of
8 the hit, sound levels, when you're in one part and another part is hit.
9 However, while I was in the building, most of it seemed of smaller
10 calibre, sometimes maybe 20, 30, or 40-millimetre which can be fired from
11 anti-aircraft guns, and only on one occasion that I was in the building,
12 and that I clearly recall, were we fairly certain that it had been a tank
13 shell or something of that nature, because it was an extremely heavy
14 detonation and it hit part of the lift shaft within the building,
15 destroying that particular lift shaft.
16 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to show you a photo, a panoramic
17 photograph of Sarajevo
18 Your Honours, this is the -- this is a photograph which I
19 would -- the one exhibit which I added to my list and filed a
20 notification about.
21 Now, what we can see on the bottom is 14665, and we've just blown
22 up part of the center of the photo. On the top portion of the photo,
23 Mr. van Lynden -- no, that's a little bit too big. If we can -- if we
24 can zoom out a bit. Can we just -- yeah.
25 Are you able to see where the state -- the former military
1 hospital that you stayed in is?
2 A. Yes. It's on the right-hand side. It's the white building on
3 the right-hand side of the picture.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Could somebody assist Mr. van Lynden? I'd like
5 him to mark this with a stylus.
6 Q. Could you perhaps just draw an arrow to the building and mark
7 that as -- with the number 1?
8 A. [Marks]
9 Q. Thank you. Can you see and point out the UNIS towers?
10 A. [Marks]
11 Q. Thanks.
12 A. Number 2?
13 Q. Yes, please.
14 A. [Marks]
15 Q. Are you able to mark the Parliament building or point towards it?
16 A. [Marks]
17 Q. Number 3, thank you. Could you also mark the Holiday Inn, if you
18 see it there?
19 A. [Marks]
20 Q. 4, thank you. That's number 4. And number 5, could you just
21 mark -- this is not a photo from 1992. This is a more recent photo.
22 Could you please mark the location of the Marsal Tito Barracks?
23 A. Well, it's quite a large complex, but it was roughly here [marks]
24 behind these flags. So that would be number 5?
25 Q. Yes, please.
1 A. [Marks]
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. I'd like to tender that exhibit,
4 JUDGE KWON: As marked?
5 MR. NICHOLLS: As marked.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this document shall be assigned
8 Exhibit P927. Thank you.
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. That can be taken off the screen.
10 Q. Now I want to ask you some questions, now that we've established
11 where you were staying and how you picked the spot, about what you
12 observed of daily life and the conditions for the population of Sarajevo
13 after you arrived. This is mainly in paragraphs 21 to 30 of the
14 consolidated statement. Can you just briefly tell us, in your own words,
15 when you arrived, your impression of what conditions the citizens were
16 living under in terms of their access to food, water, necessary
17 utilities? Just briefly give us what you recall.
18 A. Well, the first thing that made a very clear impression on us is
19 that we crossed, by road, from Ilidza, which was held by the Bosnian
20 Serbs, into the territory held by the Bosnian government, and it was that
21 there was no one on the roads. At that time, the Marsal Tito Barracks
22 were still in the hands of the JNA, and, therefore, we had to take a
23 convoluted road around the hills to get to the central part of Sarajevo
24 You saw practically no vehicle on the road. If you did, they were
25 driving at extremely high speed. It was sometimes on the roads as if it
1 was a ghost town. If you saw people on roads that were in sight of the
2 Bosnian-held territory on the southern hills overlooking Sarajevo, people
3 ran. I mean, apart from sometimes the old, who were incapable of running
4 but still had to cross the street, everybody ran across the streets.
5 It wasn't, at the time when we arrived, that there was heavy
6 gun-fire going on continually. There was occasional gun-fire. But
7 wherever you were in these districts, where people were not under cover
8 and where they felt they were under threat of gun-fire, people ran across
9 the streets.
10 I've never been in a city before -- and I lived in Beirut, which
11 was a city of war, but it didn't have that kind of situation where, in
12 such a large part of the city, the only way people could cross the street
13 was at speed.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 A. As far as the other question of electricity, gas, water supplies,
16 and food was concerned, there were no shops open by the time we reached
18 markets where individuals sold whatever produce. At that time, it was
19 still possible, for instance, in Sarajevo to buy bottles of red wine.
20 They would run out pretty quickly. But there were just a few vegetables,
21 very little on the market, and so food was already a problem for the
23 Electricity, at the end of May 1988 -- 1992, was not such a
24 problem, yet at later stages of the war most areas of Sarajevo would not
25 have electricity.
1 And as far as gas and water supplies, as far as I'm aware, again,
2 those problems would be much worse and exacerbated later on, but in that
3 stage -- early stage of the war, people, I think, generally still had
4 water supplies at home.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
6 I'd like to play a short video-clip now. This is 65 ter 40264A,
7 broadcast, it should be, on the 1st of June.
8 And if we can stop, Mr. Reid, right at the beginning where we see
9 the symbol.
10 All right. We're stopped at 00:00:06:8, showing a computerised
11 screen with the date on it. Can you just tell us, because we may see
12 more of these, Mr. van Lynden, what does this screen at the beginning of
13 your broadcast mean?
14 A. These are put before a story by the central office in London
15 because they go into a computerised machine so that the programme editors
16 can run the stories when they want to. There is a line-up clock of 40
17 seconds beforehand, and after the two seconds -- we stopped two seconds
18 before the picture will begin, it shows firstly at the top a slug, which
19 is the name of the story, in this case, my first name, "Aernout" and
20 "Yugo," as in Yugoslavia
21 show that this story went out on on the day, the Monday, and then on the
22 date, the 1st of June, 1992.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
24 And, Your Honours, for your reference, this is a video referenced
25 in paragraph 44 of the statement.
1 Could we play the clip now, please.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 "In Sarajevo
4 at speed. They and the avenues that cut across the city offer the Serb
5 gunners in the hills above with open lines of fire, prime targets which
6 the old and infirm are forced to accept as the new, uncomfortable
7 realities of life. As the people of Sarajevo scurry across their
8 streets, the latest cease-fire is being proposed and agreed at a
9 meeting --"
10 MR. NICHOLLS: There, we can stop. Thank you.
11 Q. Now, these -- first of all, I think this is the first story, was
12 it not, that you sent out after arriving in Sarajevo in May 1992?
13 A. As I recall, yes.
14 Q. The scene that's been captured there of the people hurrying
15 across the streets and the intersections, you started to talk about it,
16 but was that the norm or the exception? Was that something difficult to
17 find to film or could you just explain how prevalent that was?
18 A. This was the norm.
19 Q. And you started talking about it as well, but in paragraph 46 of
20 your statement you talked about how Sarajevo was very different from
22 that we played before we stopped at 00:45:4, a shot from the hills
23 overlooking Sarajevo
24 you explain to us about those lines of fire and how Sarajevo was
25 different, in your view, from Beirut
1 A. Well, the first thing that one has to understand about Sarajevo
2 is that it's the city built around a river at the bottom of the valley,
3 the River Miljacka, and then it has hills rising up from that valley
4 floor to the south and to the north. What you saw there were the hills
5 to the south which were held by the Bosnian Serbs, and it literally
6 meant, and we were to see that ourselves when -- in September 1992, when
7 we worked on the Bosnian Serb side and filmed it from that side, that
8 those there could literally look down a street from above onto the
9 various streets and intersections of the city of Sarajevo, the heart of
11 Q. When you say those there could look down at the valley floors, is
12 that who you are referring to?
13 A. To the Bosnian Serbs.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
15 Your Honour, could we give that video a number, please.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this document shall be assigned
18 Exhibit P928. Thank you.
19 MR. NICHOLLS:
20 Q. Now, just briefly you discuss in paragraph 26 of your statement
21 one particular sniping incident, where you stated you did not witness the
22 people actually being shot and the impact of the bullet, but saw them in
23 the streets. Afterwards, in the attempt to rescue them, can you for us,
24 just as an illustration, describe what you saw on that occasion?
25 A. This was, as I recall it, July of 1992. We had been at the TV
1 station and were driving back from the TV station along Marsal Tito
2 Boulevard, and we had just about reached or were just before what had
3 been the Marsal Tito Barracks when we were stopped by people on the road,
4 and then we stopped. And then we saw that there were a number of people
5 lying in the street. This is a broad street, and they had been shot
6 while trying to cross this street. As I recall it, there were three
7 people. They were all still alive, but they had been seriously wounded.
8 We were told that first one person had been shot and wounded, a second
9 person had run out to help them, and that person had been shot, and then
10 it happened with a third person. After that, people had got the message
11 and decided not to run out there anymore. And they finally waited until,
12 as I recall, a blue-painted armoured -- wheeled armoured car, what must
13 have been the police forces, came to position itself between those bodies
14 and the position from which the fire had emanated, which was the southern
15 part of Beirut
16 when the armoured vehicle came, there was further fire on the three
17 people lying in the street. As I recall, at least two out of three were
18 killed. They were then -- the bodies were then put into the armoured
19 vehicle and driven off. We drove after the vehicle, and I recall that we
20 actually went into the mortuary of Kosevo Hospital, the academic hospital
21 of Sarajevo
22 graphic a manner, shown how these people had been killed. As I recall
23 it, the man in the mortuary actually put his finger into -- through the
24 bullet hole of one of the dead people to show the trajectory of the
25 bullet that had killed this person.
1 Q. Do you remember if these were men or women?
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Counsel, please.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry.
4 Q. Do you remember if these were men or women, the victims?
5 A. As I recall, one woman and two men.
6 Q. And just as far as you could tell, were these civilians or
8 A. These were definitely civilians. By that stage, most of the
9 soldiers on the Bosnian side were wearing uniform. They were not wearing
10 uniform. As I recall it, the woman who was shot had a shopping bag with
11 her and was roughly middle-aged. No, we were -- we asked, also, but as
12 far as we were told, these were civilians.
13 Q. Thank you. And as I referred to in my opening short summary of
14 your evidence, at one point in paragraph 49 of your statement you say
15 that the sniping incidents became so common that individual incidents
16 were not newsworthy; is that correct?
17 A. I'm afraid to say that it is. When it first begins in a war, if
18 I can draw the parallel, it is like the suicide bombings in Iraq
19 They may have been first point of the news during 2003, but today hardly
20 get a mention, while they do continue. With Sarajevo, that was the case
21 with the sniping incidents. The early stage of the war, when this was
22 still something completely new, that the city that had hosted the 1984
23 Winter Olympics was coming under sniper fire, where civilians were being
24 shot at, that changed, even by the summer of 1992, after just a few
25 months, that sniping incidents became much less newsworthy. There were
1 occasions when that was not the case. There was one incident of a young
2 man and a woman who tried to flee from Sarajevo, and it was a kind of
3 Romeo and Juliet story of a Muslim and an Orthodox, and they were both
4 shot dead. That was something that took a lot of international
5 attention. By on the whole, by this stage of the war already, the
6 international media was not paying that much attention to such individual
7 sniping incidents.
8 Q. I'm going to move now to --
9 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
10 MR. NICHOLLS:
11 Q. I'm going to move now to June 1992 and the stories you filed in
12 early -- in the first weeks of June.
13 And this, Your Honours, concerns paragraphs 52 to 58, primarily,
14 of the consolidated statement, the shelling and targeting of the city.
15 And I noted in the filing Monday, Your Honour, there was a typo in the
16 statement. At paragraph 52, footnote 14, we had the wrong 65 ter number.
17 The correct is 40264C, a video, and I'd like to play that now. This is
18 from the 5th of June, according to the slug at the beginning.
19 JUDGE KWON: I remember that you noted the correct one should
20 be D.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: D. I may have misspoke, Your Honour. D is
22 correct. Thank you. Yes, thank you.
23 [Video-clip played]
24 "Just hours after the evacuation of the troops from the
25 Marsal Tito Barracks --"
1 MR. NICHOLLS: I apologise. If we can stop. I want to play a
2 different one first. It is 4264C. My apologies. I'll play this one in
3 a minute.
4 [Video-clip played]
5 "... dusk in Sarajevo
6 rockets fall, heralding another night of heavy shelling."
7 THE INTERPRETER: Switch off microphones in the courtroom,
9 [Video-clip played]
10 "For the next six hours, there is no let-up. Eerily lit up by
11 flares, the city is hit from every side by practically every imaginable
12 projectile. Long lines of heavy machine-gun fire gliding across the
13 roofs, exploding against their targets. Heavy shells slamming into
14 buildings, within seconds engulfing them in flames. A mass of crazy
15 sparks lighting the brow of one hill from a quick-fire volley of mortar
17 "This is the scene of wholesale devastation, of a city being
18 obliterated while the world watches, but does nothing."
19 MR. NICHOLLS:
20 Q. Now, this video we just watched, on the front, the computerised
21 date had the 5th of June. We can see quite clearly what you were able to
22 film, but could you just tell us what are we seeing here? Which areas of
23 the city, if you recall, were you filming in this clip and at that time?
24 A. All these images were taken from our position within the military
25 hospital, as I described at the beginning of the session here. The first
1 pictures were taken from the balcony, what we called the left,
2 overlooking the old part of Sarajevo
3 fired from the top of the hill to the east of Sarajevo, landing on the
4 old part of Sarajevo
5 middle windows overlooking the central part of Sarajevo or on the
6 right-hand balcony, of shells, heavy machine-gun fire, going into the
7 newer part of Sarajevo
8 This fire is all emanated from south of Sarajevo, from the
9 hill-sides south. You could see it coming down on the city. The whole
10 city was basically being targeted. It wasn't one specific target that
11 was being hit or one particular district of the city being hit. This was
12 fire that was coming down all across the city.
13 Q. Could you tell us, that short clip that we saw ending at 09:28:8,
14 it's a difficult question, but how much of the shelling that night were
15 you able to capture on that short clip? How much does that represent?
16 And I'll ask you a follow-up question in a minute. If you could just
17 tell us about how much you were able to get that we saw there.
18 A. The first thing I should explain to anyone who's not been in a
19 war zone, working for television, is that filming that kind of thing is
20 extremely difficult, because you hear a bang and it's over there, and by
21 the time you get there, of course, the bang has already happened, and you
22 may see some smoke, but at night that's even more difficult. And then
23 you think, Well, maybe I should focus the camera there, and then it
24 happens on the other side. For a film crew, therefore, to get quite this
25 much, and not only that night but several other nights after that, to
1 capture that much firing, it means there was much, much more. There were
2 moments -- and the cameraman who was with me was also the cameraman who
3 had been with me in the Gulf war, in the Romanian revolution, and
4 throughout 1991, during the war in Croatia
5 capture such footage of fighting or of artillery. It should give an
6 indication that this was really an extremely heavy night of shelling, as
7 were the nights that followed.
8 Q. And can you just give us an idea of how long this shelling would
9 go on for; in other words, when it would start in the evening and how
10 late into the night or into the morning it would continue?
11 A. Well, that differed from day to day. On these pictures you see,
12 they were still daylight pictures that we began with, so that would have
13 been towards the end of the afternoon, the early evening. As I recall,
14 that night it went on until 3.00, 4.00 in the morning, something like
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. Now I'd like to --
17 Sorry, Your Honours. Could I please give this an exhibit number?
18 JUDGE KWON: So what we saw just now is D, not C, just to be
20 MR. NICHOLLS: No, that was C, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE KWON: That was C, thank you.
22 Yes, it will be given the number of P292?
23 THE REGISTRAR: Correction, Your Honours. It will be given
24 Exhibit P929. Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
2 Now, you already spoke a little bit today about the Marsal Tito
3 Barracks and the situation there. I want to play another video now,
4 which is 65 ter 40264D from 6 June, which concerns the barracks and other
6 [Video-clip played]
7 "Just hours after the evacuation of the troops from the
8 Marsal Tito Barracks, it becomes the night's prime target. The shells
9 land long, around Sarajevo
10 complex those still looking for loot get the message and run. Not long
11 after, the gunners in the hills above the Bosnian capital find their
12 range. The barracks explode in flames. The barracks form the principal
13 target, yet no district escapes. Through the dark, the rockets streak
14 down, for a moment illuminating Sarajevo
15 reducing it to further rubble. They come in ones, in twos, in threes,
16 and it sounds as if the city's crying.
17 "At 3.00 in the morning, the barracks are again bearing the full
18 weight of attention. Whole wings of this vast, if not deserted military
19 complex are in flame. With light, the people rarely come out to inspect
20 the damage."
21 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. We've stopped now at 12.53:2, at the
22 point where the video shows people carrying a bed out of a building.
23 Q. Could you explain to us what we saw there in the beginning, when
24 you discussed in the broadcast the gunners finding their range, and at
25 the beginning we can see shells hitting near the railroad tracks?
1 A. It is normal for all artillery or mortar units that when they are
2 given a specific target to fire on, that they will initially probably
3 have shells landing too long or too short. What we witnessed there was
4 the initial shells falling too long, falling over the Marsal Tito
5 Barracks and hitting the railway yard behind it, to the north of the
6 barracks, and then they found their range. This is what happens with
7 artillery units and mortar units throughout the world. They go too far,
8 they go too short, and then they hit it and they continue to hit it.
9 On this occasion, there was extremely -- after those initial
10 shells, there was extremely accurate fire throughout that night on the
11 Marsal Tito Barracks, whole parts of which, indeed, burnt. That's what
12 you saw right at the beginning.
13 Q. And then what do we see later on? Is it the same kind of fire or
14 is it all Marsal Tito, or what's happening afterwards on that clip?
15 A. What you see after that is that whilst the Marsal Tito Barracks
16 was being directly targeted, simultaneously all other districts of the
17 city were being targeted as well, and there in an often much more
18 haphazard fashion, again, Your Honours, making it much more difficult for
19 us to film, because one or two rockets would come down in one part of the
20 city, and then it would stop there, at least for some time, and we would
21 have to go from one part of the hospital -- from one side to the other
22 side because the fire was coming down on the other side. It was much
23 more haphazard fire on the other parts, never as concentrated as we saw
24 on the Marsal Tito Barracks.
25 When I was with the British and American forces in the Gulf war
1 in the lead-up to the ground campaign to liberate Kuwait, I spent quite a
2 lot of time with artillery units. I'm not an artillerist, I wasn't
3 trained in this, and I asked them about what they were planning and how
4 they were planning the actual operation right at the beginning of the
5 ground campaign to liberate Kuwait
6 be given specific targets, that you would get this kind of shooting, and
7 that with all their targets there would be a follow-up of military
8 personnel on the ground; tanks, armoured vehicle, infantry attack on that
9 target following the initial artillery barrage. What we saw here, there
10 was absolutely nothing happening as far as infantry was concerned. This
11 was purely a barrage on the Marsal Tito Barracks, but also on the city as
12 a whole.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
14 Could we give that a number, please, Your Honours. That was D.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this document shall be assigned
17 Exhibit P930. In addition, just one thing for the record. There is no
18 surrogate sheet for this document. Thank you.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm going to ask you now a question and look at
20 the video about the story about the UNIS towers, which is referred to in
21 paragraph 59 of the statement.
22 Your Honours, am I right that we have five minutes to the break?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, if it's convenient.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: We could -- we could continue.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: I'd like to play this video now, which is 40264E,
2 from the 7th of June, according to the code on the beginning.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 "It was the symbol of modern Sarajevo, now of its destruction.
5 Flames tear across the floors and up into the higher storeys, showering
6 debris onto the streets at the heart of the Bosnian capital, the
7 disintegration of one of the city's UNIS towers reflected in the broken
8 windows of its twin.
9 "Three hundred metres on across the road, the Parliament of this
10 newly-independent state is also struck. It doesn't burn, but the nearby
11 Marsal Tito Barracks do. Since its evacuation two days earlier, it's
12 been systematically destroyed.
13 "Every night in Sarajevo
14 does, making a mockery of the attempts of mediators to bring peace to
15 this city which is enfolded in war.
16 "Less than 24 hours earlier, the Serb commanders had put their
17 signatures on yet another agreement, affirming a truce never adhered to
18 and their readiness to reopen the airport. Now the Serb gunners in the
19 hills show where their true commitment lies. Under a sickle moon, the
20 city rocks to the explosions. Lit up by fire and the mass of glowing
21 sparks that drift across its roofs.
22 "Daylight, we find the intensive care wards of the city's central
23 hospital packed, with amputees in pain. Some will live, but the doctors
24 are resigned to this girl's death. Not far from where she lies, do
25 others that have gone before. A place of haphazard death, some covered,
1 some not, where maggots crawl the floors. A little house of Bosnian
3 "Aernout van Lynden, Sky News, Sarajevo."
4 MR. NICHOLLS:
5 Q. Could you -- I think the clip and your narration was pretty
6 self-explanatory, but can you tell us what you know about who this person
7 in the last shot is, the young boy lying on the table, or what happened
8 to him?
9 A. He wasn't lying on a table. He was lying on a stretcher on the
10 floor. He was a young boy, as you say. And from what we'd gathered,
11 he'd been killed by shrapnel.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
13 Could we give that a number, please, Your Honour. That was
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this shall be given Exhibit P931.
17 Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll have a break for 25 minutes.
19 --- Recess taken at 3.34 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 4.02 p.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. The last question on that video about the UNIS towers,
24 Mr. van Lynden. Were you able to notice or did you see whether there was
25 any fire coming from the UNIS towers at the time that it was being hit?
1 A. I never witnessed fire coming from the UNIS towers, no. We went
2 into the UNIS towers several days earlier, because this was when the
3 Marsal Tito Barracks was still occupied by the JNA, and we wanted -- it
4 was a high position so we could film into the Marsal Tito Barracks. We
5 wanted to open the window, and we couldn't. They were fixed windows. It
6 had an air-conditioning system. And, therefore, unless one broke a
7 window in there, it would not have made a perfect firing ground. That's
8 the first thing.
9 The second thing is during the time -- relatively few days, it's
10 true that we had been in the hospital, we had seen the UNIS towers every
11 single day, and we never saw any fire emanating from there, no.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
13 I'd like to continue now to play another video, this one from the
14 first screen shot of 9 June, 1992
15 [Video-clip played]
17 on Sunday night the whole city becoming the target, no district spared,
18 all shaking as every 10 seconds the rocket shells and mortars land, the
19 fire so heavy, so incessant, that the deadly streams of light criss-cross
20 each other. By early Monday morning, the inundation of the hospitals
21 begins. The doctors and the nurses of the city's former military
22 hospital already up throughout the night, at the beginning of a dark,
23 grim day, the like of which they've never known; trained fingers which,
24 for 24 hours will work without respite to stem blood, extract jagged
25 metal, preserve life. But so many casualties of war, so many distorted
1 faces and torn limbs.
2 "At the city's main hospital, the situation is even worse. The
3 counter-offensive of the Bosnian territorial defence forces have run into
4 a continual barrage from the heavy guns that surround them, the costs
5 enormous, and the stream of casualties is now incessant.
6 "This is a scene of utter mayhem. No minute passes without a new
7 van or ambulance coming in bearing more wounded. The battle of Sarajevo
8 has reached a peak. Countless young men on stretches raging against the
9 dying of the light, and so many who've lost that struggle that they lie
10 outside a morgue already over-full.
11 "Across the town, in its modern center, a new fire rages just by
12 the front-line. Somehow, the firemen make it, but their efforts are
13 futile. They're impotent as the water is cut. All they can do is stand
14 and watch. Fifty yards away, others fight on from behind the cover of a
15 devastated urban battleground, small groups of men answering artillery
16 with small arms.
17 "As evening falls, the city is marked by tens of fires, and
18 inside its surviving walls, by pain and endurance, by faces marked by
19 fear, shock, and sheer fatigue.
20 "Aernout van Lynden, Sky News, Sarajevo."
21 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
22 Q. Now, in that --
23 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. In that video-clip, we saw in the beginning, again, more
1 shelling, and you said words to the effect of the whole city becoming a
2 target. Can you tell us just, as you remember, which areas of the city
3 that night were shelled, or which districts?
4 A. As I said, it was our impression that the whole city came under
5 fire. We did not see the same sustained fire that we had seen on one
6 particular target, as with the Marsal Tito Barracks, at which time other
7 parts of the city had also been hit, but that night the whole city seemed
8 to be the target. And it was our impression that this was done to simply
9 terrorise those still living in the city.
10 Q. Thank you. And then later on in the morning film, there were
11 soldiers being brought in from a counter-offensive. Can you just tell
12 us, briefly, what we were seeing there?
13 A. This was -- this was a separate matter. This -- from what we
14 were given to understand, at a certain area around what had once been the
15 maternity hospital of Sarajevo
16 of a counter-offensive to push back the Serb lines in that area, and
17 there was very heavy fighting going on, and many of those men were
18 wounded and killed. And as far as I'm aware, that offensive didn't work.
19 It was -- it was not successful. But that should be held separate to the
20 pictures that we took during the night, the preceding night, of the
21 entire city coming under shell fire. Those were two separate things.
22 While that battle was going on during the day, there was fire
23 into the city as well, but not nearly as heavily as there had been during
24 the night, and the fighting was very much concentrated in that one
25 district slightly to the north of Sarajevo.
1 Q. And, just very briefly, you talk about this in paragraph 59, but
2 what ethnicities did you see being brought into -- I'm not talking
3 specifically about this incident, but when you observed people -- injured
4 people being brought into the hospital you stayed at, and other
5 hospitals, which ethnicities were they? Was it simply Muslim Bosniak or
6 others as well?
7 A. Well, as far as I'm aware, they were all Slavs, which I think is
8 the same ethnicity. They had different religions. We were told, and we
9 asked those who were capable of speech, those who had been wounded, what
10 they were, and what we got was that most of them were Muslim, but there
11 were also Catholics, what people would call Croats, and Orthodox Bosnian
12 Serbs amongst those soldiers that were wounded.
13 Throughout the war, wherever I was in Bosnia, I encountered
14 Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian Army.
15 Q. Thank you. I'm going to move now to what's contained in
16 paragraph 62, the portion of your statement where you talk about the
17 story you did on Dobrinja. I'm not going to show that story now, but
18 could you just tell us -- clarify for me one point from paragraph 62.
19 You say:
20 "During the initial stages of the war," and we're speaking now of
21 July 1992, "that Dobrinja had a separate siege to the rest of Sarajevo
22 Could you just tell us what that means.
23 A. Could I just have the screen back so I could see what is being
25 Q. I can ask the question again, and in a better way, as well,
2 What was -- what is meant by "the separate siege of Dobrinja"?
3 A. Dobrinja is the western suburb of Sarajevo, built close to the
4 airport, to house the athletes for the 1984 Winter Olympic Games. After
5 that, it became an area where I believe mostly young couples were able to
6 get apartments. It's slightly separate, and that area was -- the whole
7 of Dobrinja wasn't in Bosnian government hands, but a large part of it
8 was, and the Bosnian Serbs controlled a hill called Mojmilo Hill, which
9 was really the connection between Dobrinja and the rest of the city, and
10 thereby they made it impossible for there to be a direct connection
11 between the two different parts, Sarajevo
12 Dobrinja, and, therefore, there was a form of separate siege. You
13 couldn't drive to Dobrinja, and that only became possible when, in July,
14 the forces of the Bosnian government within Dobrinja took Mojmilo Hill.
15 After that, a direct connection was made between this western suburb and
16 the city proper. And we were able to get in there, but it was a very
17 dangerous drive. We were the first journalists to go in. We were told
18 that five other cars had tried to make that journey during the day, and
19 all five had been hit by Serb gun-fire. We did manage to go there. We
20 were there for 48 hours and then drove out again, and both when we drove
21 in and when we drove out, we did come under gun-fire.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
23 And, Your Honours, with the last exhibit, 40264F, the video we
24 just saw, I neglected to ask for that to be tendered.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be Exhibit P932.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
2 Q. I'm now going to move, Mr. van Lynden, to September 1992 and your
3 time in Pale, and first ask you, just very briefly, how you came to go to
5 And, Your Honours, this is -- the area I'm going into now is
6 principally in paragraphs 65 to 90 of the statement.
7 THE WITNESS: You want me to explain how I first came to --
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, I'll ask you a question first.
9 Q. I understand, from the statement, that you'd met with
10 Mr. Karadzic in June 1992 in Pale, and then in August 1992 in London
11 then in September 1992 in Belgrade
12 how those meetings resulted in your being able to report from Pale.
13 A. When we had first gone to Sarajevo
14 we had gone from Belgrade
15 management -- we had a satellite dish to be able to send the stories back
16 to London
17 into Sarajevo
18 didn't at that time meet Mr. Karadzic, but I then drove into the city.
19 Our stories were sent from Pale, and when we at a certain moment left
21 out of the city. That was in June. We then tried to work for a number
22 of days out of Pale to try and cover the war from the other side. This
23 is when I briefly met Mr. Karadzic. And that turned out to be
24 practically impossible, because every time we set out from the hotel in
25 Pale and went to further areas, we would be arrested at various
2 My bosses in London
3 went back to London
4 When at the August conference that was held in London, I had the
5 opportunity to meet Mr. Karadzic, and asked him for his help in returning
6 to Pale and being able to actually work from Pale so that we could cover
7 their side of the story and to allow the Bosnian Serbs to speak for
8 themselves. He agreed that we should hold a meeting in Belgrade. When I
9 got there at the beginning of September, a meeting was held at the
10 Intercontinental Hotel, as I recall. Mr. Karadzic arranged for an escort
11 from Belgrade
12 again, as we did several times during that stay there, and he then
13 arranged for two military policemen to be given as a permanent escort for
14 us to be able to work on the Bosnian Serb side.
15 Q. Thank you. And did you get any kind of letter of authorisation
16 or letter of credentials from the Bosnian Serb authorities to show that
17 you were able to work there?
18 A. Yes. Again, this was after a conversation with Mr. Karadzic, and
19 we were given a letter the next day; not signed by him, but signed by
20 Mr. Krajisnik, who was the speaker of the Bosnian Serb Parliament.
21 Q. Thank you. Now, you discuss, in paragraphs 69 to 75 of your
22 statement, that you had several informal -- not formal interviews, but
23 informal meetings with Mr. Karadzic while you were in Pale, and that you
24 would discuss various topics, and I'm going to ask about that now.
25 But, first of all, where would you meet Mr. Karadzic when you had
1 these meetings?
2 A. We met him at his office, apart from on one occasion when we were
3 at the television station and he was there as well, and we then got into
4 a conversation there with him and with several of the people working at
5 TV Pale.
6 Q. And can you just tell us what that was about? That's another
7 topic, but since we're there, what was going on at the TV station?
8 A. We would go to the TV station to be able to send our stories,
9 which then went from Pale to Belgrade
10 up-linked and sent to London
11 evening, an argument broke out. A number of those people working at TV
12 Pale attacked me for my coverage from Sarajevo, my previous coverage from
14 called Jusuf Prazina. They felt that I had made him look like a hero,
15 while I think in the story I had made quite perfectly clear that this man
16 had been in jail and was a convicted criminal. Mr. Karadzic slightly
17 intervened in this conversation. The conversation also ranged about
18 other matters, but it was, for me, an example of the strange mentality
19 that seemed to have most people in their grip in Pale, that a story about
20 a man who I described as one of the principal defenders of Sarajevo in
21 that story done at the beginning of June, Jusuf Prazina, who I mentioned
22 was a convicted criminal, that they felt that this was a story that was
23 against them. And they never mentioned any of the other stories of
25 shown the Court, or held those stories against me. It was the Prazina
1 story. And I said, This is the inverted world. A story that's actually
2 in your interests, you attack me for. The stories that you might have
3 attacked me for because they are not in your interests, you think are
4 fine. It struck me as very odd.
5 Q. Thank you. And I won't go through, because it's in your
6 statement, everything about these meetings, but in paragraph 73 you talk
7 about, at one point, that Karadzic, talking about Sarajevo, made a
8 reference to a Berlin
9 you just tell us about -- briefly about that conversation and what
10 Karadzic -- his views that he expressed to you were about living with the
11 other people in Sarajevo
12 A. As I recall, this was a conversation at the end of the evening,
13 quite late, around 11.00. And we were offered a glass of wine, and, as I
14 recall, he was drinking white wine, and he showed us maps. He said that,
15 in his view, Sarajevo
16 was Serb territory, and that he made the point repeatedly that it was
17 impossible to live with these people, and that he said a wall, that could
18 be one of the solutions. I'm not sure that it was the -- that he said
19 that was the only solution, but one of the solutions that he offered was
20 that a wall should be built between the Serb parts and those of the other
21 communities living in Sarajevo
22 comment, because this was made less than three years after the fall of
23 the Berlin Wall, which was a symbol of the divisions of Europe, which had
24 finally ended. And to make a suggestion to build a wall in a city to
25 divide people in this manner in Europe
1 found totally unacceptable, to be frank.
2 Q. Thank you. And one other point, I just want to make it very --
3 ask you a follow-up question. In paragraph 71 of the statement, you talk
4 about Dr. Karadzic telling you that the Serbs had to have the northern
5 areas and Banja Luka, and that he said that Eastern Bosnia was all Serb:
6 "He told me that the enclaves were unacceptable, that they had to
7 become part of Serb territory."
8 Now, in this conversation in September 1992, which area was under
9 discussion when we -- when he said, These enclaves are unacceptable?
10 A. The enclaves of Gorazde, Srebrenica, and then you had a number of
11 smaller enclaves. I don't know -- I cannot recall whether every single
12 one was precisely named, but the Eastern Bosnian enclaves were something
13 that everybody understood, and that he felt that they -- not only were
14 they nonviable in an economic sense, but that they were a thorn in the
15 side of the Bosnian Serbs and that thorn should be removed. He made that
16 quite clear.
17 Q. Thank you. I'm now going to move on - this is contained in
18 paragraphs, again, 76 to 90 - and ask you some questions about your
19 interview with General Ratko Mladic in September 1992.
20 And can you briefly tell us, how was this interview set up? How
21 did you get permission or arrange to interview General Mladic? Who did
22 you ask for that?
23 A. This was done by speaking to Mr. Karadzic and through his office.
24 There was -- I think he was a lawyer, a Bosnian Serb, who was working for
25 Mr. Karadzic, whom we spoke to on a daily basis. We didn't speak to
1 Mr. Karadzic on a daily basis. And we had asked, really, on arrival in
2 Pale whether we would be allowed to have an interview with
3 General Mladic.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: All right. I'd like to play the video of that
5 interview now. That's 40259B.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 "... the scourge of Sarajevo, the chief warrior of the Serbs.
8 He's called Ratko Mladic. Appropriately, Ratko means warrior, and this
9 squared-jouled Serb general has lived up to the name. Commander always
10 on the move, a visit to one of the mountain's chalets where the Serbs of
12 one. In a short briefing, the Commander-in-Chief speaks only of attacks
13 on his forces, never of offensives by them. And as if to prove the
14 point, he gives us the rare chance to accompany him to front-line
15 artillery positions where the UN observers are conspicuous by their
17 "High up on the windswept hills, the 100-millimetre guns are dug
18 deep into the rocks directly overlooking Sarajevo, an overwhelming
19 position of strength which is obviously to the general's satisfaction, as
20 he says he holds the city in his palm, and many of the buildings in the
21 haze below bear testimony to that power. Yet General Mladic is quite
22 unrepentant. He is a man who has no doubts, only a total assurance that
23 he's right, the world wrong, and that his people have been slandered.
24 [Voice-over] "I hope that the Security Council first takes
25 measures too understand that we Serbs are a reality in this world, not
1 some sort of extra terrestrials, and that we have the right to defend
3 "Nearby, more positions are being dug. In the general's eyes,
4 the world may deny his people their rights, but that's not going to stop
6 [Voice-over] "We have to fight as long as we continue to exist to
7 defend ourselves. There is no other way, and we're prepared for a long
9 "Far away from the battle-field, the UN is preparing a resolution
10 on war crimes. It leaves Ratko Mladic quite unmoved.
11 [Voiceover] "I'm not bothered at all. I did not take part in any
12 crimes, I have only defended my people.
13 "With that, the general departs to inspect other front-lines in a
14 war neither he, nor his officers, believe will end any time soon.
15 "Aernout van Lynden, Sky News, on the front-lines outside
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. And could we perhaps give that a
18 number now.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this document shall be assigned
21 Exhibit P933. Thank you.
22 MR. NICHOLLS:
23 Q. Just a couple of questions about the video we just saw.
24 In the video, you described buildings visible in the haze below,
25 but on the video we just saw in court, it was difficult to see anything
1 other than a sort of white cloud. At the time -- well, can you just tell
2 us how visible the city was below at the time that you were actually
4 A. Well, you could see the city and you could see -- in the original
5 pictures, you could see the city. The pictures have been copied too
6 often, and the quality has clearly reached a stage which you can't. But
7 while there was a haze over Sarajevo
8 straight below that artillery position.
9 Q. Were there any restrictions put on you about what you could film
10 when you came to this artillery position?
11 A. No, we were allowed to film, only on -- right at the end, when
12 the general left, the cameraman followed the general and his party
13 leaving, and they walked past the cemetery. And this was clearly also
14 that the cameraman got that in his shot, and we were then asked not to
15 include that shot in the story that we filed to London. But that's -- in
16 any war zone, television teams are usually asked to be very careful not
17 to -- so that you don't give away the position to the enemy. So that is
18 a reasonable request, although the filming was so open of the position
19 that we were that anyone watching in Sarajevo should pretty much have
20 been able to work out where that position was.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
22 And with that, could I show you P00914. That, Your Honours, I
23 should say, is the same as P00842, a map which was on my list, but it's a
24 slightly larger section of the map that's simply blown up a little bit.
25 Q. Now, I don't know how clear the map is to you, Mr. van Lynden,
1 but are you able to locate the approximate position of the interview on
2 here? And if you could --
3 A. [Marks].
4 Q. All right. And just to be very clear, that's -- from looking at
5 this map and being at the interview and filming from that spot, you
6 believe that's the approximate location of the interview with
7 General Mladic?
8 A. Yes. It's to the east of the city, looking from the east over
9 the whole city, so it would have been roughly up there on the high
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
12 Your Honours, if I could give this a number as marked, please.
13 JUDGE KWON: I think I forgot to ask the witness to put the date
14 and signature. Could you do that at the end of -- in the right bottom
15 part of the map, could you put the date of today, the 19th?
16 THE WITNESS: [Marks]
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. van Lynden. If we can store this and
18 then exhibit it.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this document shall be assigned
20 Exhibit P934. Thank you.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
22 Q. Now, while you were there at the position with General Mladic and
23 his escorts, did you see an indication that this position was vulnerable
24 to fire from the opposing forces?
25 A. It was high up -- a high-up position. If the opposition had
1 artillery of their own, then it would have been vulnerable, yes. Any
2 other way, no. It was too far away from the front-lines, so it was
3 certainly not vulnerable. If the Bosnian Army had had heavy artillery in
5 indication that there had ever been any fire on that position.
6 Q. And it's in your -- could you tell us how the next time you saw
7 General Mladic and ran into him, if he had any reaction to this story or
8 if you could see that he had actually heard about or watched the story?
9 A. Yes. The initial reaction in Pale by certain people, certainly
10 at TV Pale, was fairly negative to this story, specifically for the
11 opening line that I used for that story, which was, "He's the scourge
12 [Realtime transcript read in error 'courage'] of Sarajevo." They felt
13 that that was a negative comment on my part.
14 General Mladic, himself, whom we encountered by chance on the
15 road three or four days later, stopped and said, Hello, and with a big
16 smile on his face, in Serbo-Croat said, I'm the scourge of Sarajevo
17 clapped me on my shoulder, and then said -- invited us to come and have
18 lunch with him. He was driving to a certain base, and we went with him
19 and had lunch with him and his forces there. And he certainly didn't
20 feel that the comment that I had made was in any sense negative. In
21 fact, he seemed rather proud of it.
22 JUDGE KWON: I should note that, for the record, the transcript
23 should read "scourge" instead of "courage."
24 THE WITNESS: I haven't switched.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
1 THE WITNESS: It's okay.
2 MR. NICHOLLS:
3 Q. Now, in paragraph 88 of your statement, you say that it's not on
4 the interview, but you asked General Mladic if it would be possible to
5 visit his troops in other positions. Can you just briefly tell us, and
6 then I'll ask you about a couple of them, which areas from the Serb
7 positions you were able to visit after this interview?
8 A. We had also asked Mr. Karadzic, obviously, and it was -- it was
9 possible. We were taken to positions on Mount Trebevic and down into
11 were taken right the way 'round Sarajevo
12 constructed clearly after the beginning of the siege, passed Vogosca and
13 to Ilidza. There, it was not always possible for us to work. Local
14 commanders, despite the fact that we had an escort of two Serb military
15 policemen and the letter from Mr. Krajisnik, as I mentioned earlier,
16 local commanders sometimes refused to let us film or refused to even
17 speak to us. And we went to Hadzici, and close to Hadzici we were
18 allowed to film at a certain front-line position. So at Hadzici -- but
19 specifically where we did most of the filming, was when we went to
20 Mount Trebevic
21 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm not going to play the Grbavica video now, and
22 it's discussed in your statement, but I will go to the next one, 65 ter
23 40259D, which is a story on one of these positions you visited. This is
24 in paragraphs 102 to 103 of the statement.
25 If we could watch that, please.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 "They still sing of amazing grace at Sarajevo's Catholic convent,
3 but the pews are practically empty. Just five nuns have stayed on in the
4 building literally overlooking the front-lines of the war. That and the
5 food shortages hamper their work, although Sister Matila [phoen] still
6 brings a meal each day to an elderly Serb labourer.
7 "The Convent of the Sisters of Little Jesus is one of the very
8 few havens in an areas which, even by Sarajevo's standards, is notorious
9 for the ferocity of its war.
10 "The no-man's land that has given the area its name is the Jewish
11 cemetery, across the jumble of graves, new and old, some of the fiercest
12 battles have been fought. The string of little villas lining the
13 cemetery have been turned into bunkers, sitting-room walls roughly
14 redecorated with lines of logs, although some of the defences are more
15 imaginative; bathroom mirrors subtly deployed to allow one guard to view
16 all angles. Of late, the tanks against the Serb lines in this sector
17 have diminished, leaving the battalion commander exuding confidence.
18 [Voiceover] "We're ready for a long struggle, but we believe we
19 will only spend a short time in these positions. Either they will have
20 to accept peace or there will be all-out war, in which we will try to
21 achieve victory in a very short time.
22 "The major's confidence is understandable, unlike his opponents
23 he doesn't face a lack of logistical support made worse by siege. And if
24 he is ordered to attack, he will do so from a commanding position, so
25 commanding that in the streets below few dare to move.
1 "Aernout van Lynden, Sky News, Sarajevo."
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
3 Q. Now, at the end there, from that VRS position we could see shots
4 of the street below, but I just wanted to ask: Were those actually shots
5 taken from that position by the Jewish cemetery?
6 A. That, I don't think -- no, I think they were pictures taken from
7 a slightly different position.
8 Q. Oh, thank you. But they're from the position that we're seeing
9 in the story where your talking, or are they from --
10 A. The positions at the Jewish cemetery are lower down. These would
11 be slightly higher up. It would be fairly close and probably in the same
12 area that this battalion commander who you saw, the major that I
13 mentioned and that we saw in the picture, had under his command, but they
14 were filmed at different position. I mean, the building you saw at the
15 end is the parliamentary building, and the streets are in that part, I
16 mean, Bosnian-held Sarajevo
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. And could we give that video a number,
18 please, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this document shall be assigned
21 Exhibit P935. Thank you.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: All right.
23 I now want to go to the last video which I'll play today, and
24 that is 65 ter 40267, which is from the 5th of December, I believe, or
25 approximately that date, in 1992.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 "... burned four days after the Serbs launched their offensive,
4 defenders of Sarajevo
5 tightened another notch. By morning, only small pockets of resistance
6 remain, yet the shelling continues, unchanged, incessant. Those who can
7 escape. Those who can't face almost certain death. For the UN forces
8 here and for the politicians who sent them, the latest fighting marks yet
9 another humiliation, making a mockery of peace-making efforts. For a
10 change, they admit as much.
11 "We are not making any progress at all. The situation is
12 deteriorating. I can't see any progress. And all of the
13 Security Council's resolutions, all of these [indiscernible] agreements,
14 all of these effort we are making here to improve the situation and to
15 save the lives and to restore the capability of the utilities for the
16 winter is completely failed, and we move one -- one step forward and we
17 find ourselves two steps back.
18 "Words mirrored by the reality in the city. Serb incendiary
19 rounds setting a string of flats ablaze in one apartment block. A
20 resident watches, distraught, his home and belongings gone. Seconds
21 later, further bursts of incendiary rounds crash into the building or
22 bounce off the wall into the street below. Wanton arson on a purely
23 civilian target. As ever, Sarajevo
24 getting their hoses to the flames, for once unhampered by a cut of the
25 water supply. For the fire chief, water is not the main concern. His
1 engines are running out of fuel, and he tells us he won't be able to cope
2 with another fire this day.
3 "The fall of [indiscernible] and escalation of shelling here in
4 the center of Sarajevo
5 efforts in Bosnia
6 won't until the Western world proves it has a true commitment in ending
7 this war.
8 "Aernout van Lynden, Sky News, Sarajevo."
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
10 Q. Now, first, at one point -- thank you. At one point in that
11 video, we see a red object bounce down and bounce over. Can you just
12 tell us what we were seeing there?
13 A. That's a bullet, but the Yugoslav Army had bullets that caused
14 fires. We don't have those within -- we didn't have those within the
15 Dutch forces, in which I served, and, as far as I'm aware, in NATO
16 countries before, prior to 1989. These are bullets -- incendiary rounds,
17 as they are called, which are there to cause fire in a building, and
18 that's what bounced over the head of my cameraman and myself, because I
19 was standing next to my cameraman when he took the shot.
20 Q. Thank you. And you discussed it in your statement, but can you
21 just tell us the situation of what happened with the fire-fighters, what
22 you observed once they entered the building and made their way towards
23 the top?
24 A. When we arrived on the scene, and we were driving from central
1 of Sarajevo
2 there were some fires mostly at the top of the building, a couple in the
3 middle of the building. We stopped to film. All the pictures that you
4 see of the close-ups of the building were taken by my cameraman. The
5 pictures that were taken from the side further off of that building, that
6 same building being hit, were taken by a CNN cameraman. We did an
7 exchange of footage that evening.
8 When the firemen arrived, they set off up the staircase, as you
9 could see in the pictures, to the fires at the top of the building. What
10 we then saw was that more fires -- rounds were fired now at apartments
11 lower in the building, and it seemed to us clear that what the people who
12 were doing the firing intended was to try and cause more fires, therefore
13 catching out those who were at the top of the building.
14 Q. Thank you. And you stated that it was a civilian target in the
15 story we just watched. If you could just explain that. Did you see any
16 indications there -- any fire coming from that building, or how you came
17 to that conclusion?
18 A. Well, we were, certainly by that stage of the war, very much
19 aware that whenever there was an incident in Sarajevo, the defence from
20 the Bosnian Serb side would be that it had been a legitimate military
21 target or that the Bosnians had been shooting at themselves. And this is
22 December 1992 we are talking about, and so we were quite quick -- I mean,
23 we did this anyway, wherever we went, Was this building used by elements
24 of the Bosnian Army? We did not only meet this one distraught man who
25 you saw in these pictures who lost his flat, we met other people who were
1 living in the flat, and they all went, Are you mad that we would allow
2 the military to use the building, because we know what the repercussions
3 would be. The moment that fire comes from this building, there would be
4 a great deal of fire returning to it, and they all were adamant that it
5 had not been used militarily.
6 Secondly, we checked with the UN. The UN by that stage was much
7 more organised in Sarajevo
8 initial days of May and June when I had been there, and while they were
9 not very good at ever stopping anyone shooting at each other, what they
10 were good at was telling where fire was coming from. They assured me
11 that as far as their observers were concerned, no fire had emanated from
12 that building.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. And could we give that a number,
14 please? That was 40267.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this document shall be assigned
17 Exhibit P936. Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Mr. van Lynden.
20 Your Honours, that's all I have at this time.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. So you are minded to tender all the
22 exhibits which were not put to the witness now, all the remaining
23 associated exhibits?
24 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, although, as I say, 40264B,
25 which was on my filing, was a mistake, a typo, so that --
1 JUDGE KWON: So you're not tending that part?
2 MR. NICHOLLS: No.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have any objections to any one
4 of those associated exhibits?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no objections.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Those will be admitted, and in due
7 course the Court Deputy will circulate his memo as to the number of the
9 Now, Mr. Karadzic, for you to cross-examine the witness, you
10 requested 14 hours for your cross-examination of this witness, although
11 you originally requested for 12 hours. However, the Chamber finds that
12 14 hours isn't a reasonable number of time for your cross-examination.
13 In any event, we explored the possibility to have an extended sitting
14 tomorrow, but due to the fact that one of the Judges has to sit in
15 another case tomorrow morning, so extended sitting will not be possible.
16 And, instead, on Friday we will explore the possibility to start, for
17 example, at 8.30.
18 So that said, I gather that you will have about seven hours --
19 approximately seven hours in total. And speaking for myself, that should
20 be an adequate amount of time for your cross-examination, as far as you
21 limit your cross-examination to the relevant questions, refraining from
22 making statements, and without putting unnecessary readings to the
23 witnesses. But it's never meant to encroach upon your right to
24 cross-examination, so we'll try our best to go as far as possible, and
25 then at the end of the day we'll see how much we get on with the
1 evidence. And considering how the cross-examination has been conducted,
2 we'll see whether further time for cross-examination is necessary. In
3 that case, we'll ask the witness to come back again, if necessary.
4 So with that comment, let's start your cross-examination.
5 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, may I just make a point from my side,
6 is that I have to return to my home, and I cannot stay the whole of
7 Friday morning. I don't know if this has been made clear, but in that
8 case it was done before I entered your courtroom. I have to, at a
9 certain moment, leave because I am booked on a flight.
10 JUDGE KWON: That has been communicated to the Chamber. My
11 understanding is that you have to leave by 11.00 on Friday, and then
12 we'll try our best to conclude your evidence here. But if necessary, we
13 may ask you to come back again in a convenient time. We'll see.
14 Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.
16 I'm afraid that that will not be sufficient at all, even if we do
17 what Mr. van Lynden and I agreed upon; namely, that most of my questions
18 are put in such a way that yes-or-no answers can be sufficient. However,
19 I'm afraid that Mr. van Lynden will have to come back again if we cannot
20 sit for longer hours tomorrow.
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. van Lynden, and thank you
23 for having been kind enough to meet up with the Defence before this
24 examination. I believe that this will be of assistance, at least to a
25 certain degree.
1 First of all, I would like to ask you to let us have your notes
2 and journals. Of course, we can redact the private parts. We certainly
3 wouldn't go into any kind of private detail. What is of particular
4 relevance is the fact that this material contains some of the things that
5 were not contained in your reports, and it is quite different from
6 everything that we know with regard to these subjects and that is
7 contained in your journals.
8 What do you say to that?
9 A. Firstly, Your Honours, I did not agree with Mr. Karadzic
10 yesterday that we should do yes-and-no answers. Mr. Karadzic said that
11 that's what he would like to do. I heard that, but I did not agree to
12 it. The manner in which he asks questions or wishes to have answers is
13 up to him, but I did not agree to that. He did say it, but I did not
14 agree to it. That's the first thing.
15 Secondly, this Tribunal has never asked for my notes before. I'm
16 not -- I have kept many of my note-books. They are currently not in my
17 direct possession, because our possessions are locked up before -- given
18 our move from Holland
19 access to them, nor do I know for certain that I have all my note-books
20 from the periods relative to this case.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] May I? Thank you.
22 Q. Well, I thought that we had agreed, because I asked you whether
23 we can shorten things and be as efficacious as possible, and you said,
24 That depends on your questions. So if I put such questions, perhaps we
25 can do it. Let me put a question like that now.
1 Was it your understanding that the Muslim army, the Army of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, was fighting for a united, unitary
4 A. Yes, although I would not call it a Muslim army. As I mentioned
5 earlier, throughout Bosnia
6 was always also non-Muslims within its ranks.
7 Q. Well, that's what you said today, but let me ask you this: Do
8 you know that it was less than 3 per cent, that Serbs accounted for less
9 than 3 per cent of that army, and that is according to their information?
10 A. I was never given percentages as to the religious background of
11 the force. What I'm saying is that I encountered, if you will, Serbs and
12 Croats in all the units of the Bosnian Army that I ran into during the
13 various stages of the war while I was in Bosnia. Percentages, I was
14 never given, nor did I ask for them.
15 Q. Thank you. And did you receive information that in the Serb Army
16 there were Croats and Muslims, and that there were even entire units that
17 consisted of Muslims only; yes or no? We can deal with that on a yes
18 -or-no basis, can't we?
19 A. I never encountered one Muslim with any Serb unit.
20 Q. Did you ask whether there were any, and could you recognise a
21 Muslim or a Serb just by seeing them? Do they differ to such an extent?
22 A. No. As I pointed out earlier in my testimony, they are all
23 Slavs. Yes, we did ask. And could we immediately tell? No, certainly
24 not. But we did ask, and we never -- I never encountered one.
25 Q. Thank you. Well, you should be well informed because you sent
1 such exhaustive reports, and I wonder how come you did not realise that
2 there were Muslims in the Serb Army, even entire units consisting of
3 Muslims only. But let's leave that aside now.
4 You said that even when you were not in a particular location,
5 you, nevertheless, had your own producer and that he was a source of
6 information for you. Who else were your sources of information?
7 A. Back to the point about the Muslims in the Serb Army. If there
8 were Muslims in the Serb Army, it was up to the Serb Army or your office
9 to have shown them and introduced them to us, which you never did, nor do
10 I have any recall of ever being told in Pale, by you or by
11 General Mladic, that there were Muslim units fighting within that army.
12 When I was not in a particular location -- I'm sorry, that is
13 completely unclear to me.
14 Q. When I asked you where you were, when I asked you how come you
15 knew about some things, you said, Well, my producer was there, and that's
16 how I had that particular information. So you had producers in all the
17 republics, didn't you, and you said that they were your source of
18 information in case you were not there yourself? Is that actually the
19 case? And if so, who else were your sources of information?
20 A. No, I brought producers with me. We had a permanent producer
21 based in Belgrade
22 with the other crews. I wasn't the only team sent by Sky News into
24 were a source of information, in the sense that they spoke the language,
25 they could speak to everyone. I could not speak to everyone, as I did
1 not speak Serbo-Croat. Other sources of information would be whoever we
2 happened to run into and have a conversation with, whether it be you,
3 yourself, when we were in Pale, or others that we spoke to when we were
4 in Pale, Mr. -- General Mladic, who did give us a briefing before we
5 actually did the interview. We, at various points of the war, went to
6 the Lukavica Barracks and were given various briefings there by military
7 officers, all of these briefings not in front of the camera, I should
8 add, and it's the same wherever we went. We talked to people, and from
9 those people we took information. We didn't always take that information
10 to be correct, but we talked to people and then we tried to work out
11 whether it was correct or not.
12 Q. Thank you. Did we agree that -- as you had put it, you said that
13 the Serbs shot themselves in the foot. Now, my interpretation of that is
14 the Serbs had lost the media war, if I can put it that way, and if they
15 waged one at all. Can we agree on the fact that the Serb cause was
16 poorly represented in the Western media? The reasons don't really
17 matter, but do we agree on that?
18 A. Can I just make clear to Your Honours that Mr. Karadzic is
19 referring to a comment I made yesterday, when I visited him in prison. I
20 said that in my opinion, by making it so difficult for the Western media
21 to work on the Serb side, and that they had done this in 1991 and again
22 later in Bosnia
23 the foot. I believe that the Serb cause, as you put it, was poorly
24 represented in the Western media because the Serb cause was very poorly
25 put to the Serb media -- to the Western media. The reasons for that lie
1 with the Serbs, not with the Western media.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the media are very important, and
3 that they affect the public opinion in their respective countries, and
4 that the public opinion affects the positions taken by governments, or do
5 you think that governments influence the media, or is it mutual?
6 A. I think it is complex. I don't think it's as simple to say.
7 Yes, of course the media is important, but the level of the importance of
8 the media from one case to another, from one issue to the other, differs
9 a great deal. And while the media can have great influence on public
10 opinion and then on government, it's also the case that sometimes this
11 doesn't happen, whatever the media may do. And even if public opinion is
12 moved, government doesn't also -- always also move as well. It's a
13 complex issue, and it's not a simple black-and-white one.
14 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the Muslim side was represented by a
15 public relations firm, Ruder and Finn, in the West?
16 A. I was never put in touch or never contacted by the public
17 relations firm that you mentioned. In fact, I was never contacted by any
18 public relations firm on behalf of any of the parties to the various
19 conflicts in Yugoslavia
20 Q. But you did hear of that, that they had a public relations firm
21 representing them, the Muslims in the West, I mean; right?
22 A. I have no recall of being told that, but then I wasn't in the
23 West. I was in Bosnia
24 or other that I was told about specifically in the United States and in
1 was at home, and I did not encounter any of these groups.
2 Q. And did this kind of thing happen, and that's what other
3 journalists told us when they were trying to justify what they did and
4 make excuses for themselves, that editors would significantly change
5 their reports?
6 A. My reports were never changed by any editing in London throughout
7 my time in Yugoslavia
8 a story, which the foreign editor decided to do, which was of blood
9 flowing down an injured person's back, and he felt that this was too
10 graphic and unnecessary. I protested, that he should leave my stories
11 alone, and the shot was put back in again. None of my stories were ever
12 edited. Whether this happened to other journalists, that may be the
13 case, but I can't comment on that.
14 I should point out one other thing here. American television
15 journalists have to send their written part of their stories to their
16 offices in New York
17 do so, does not request that; therefore, the reports were mine and then
18 sent to London
19 aware, were changed by editors in London.
20 Q. Thank you. Do you agree -- or, rather, does this sound plausible
21 to you, that due to sanctions, we could never engage any pressure groups,
22 or lobbying groups, or public relations agency in the West?
23 A. I'm aware that there was a pressure group in London. Whether
24 this had to be paid for or whether people were doing this for free, I
25 don't know. I never met them. And does it sound plausible to you that
1 because -- to me that because of sanctions, the Serb government in
3 plausible to me. If they had wanted to, they would have found the money.
4 It's not a great deal of money to hire a public relations firm for a
6 Q. I didn't mean money, I didn't mean affordability. I meant fear
7 of sanctions. Not a single agency would agree to represent us because in
8 that way they would be violating the sanctions regimen; isn't that right?
9 A. I'm not an expert in the UN sanctions and whether a public
10 relations firm in the West would have violated that or not. I simply
11 don't know. It's not something that I looked into.
12 Q. Thank you, but that's the way it was. Did we agree that you had
13 said that you did not know which party had switched off water, power, cut
14 food supplies, et cetera?
15 A. You are referring to the conversation we had yesterday about
16 cutting off power, water, food supplies to the city of Sarajevo. My
17 answer to that was that a city does not grow its own food. The water a
18 city produces does not come out of itself. It has to be brought there,
19 and power usually as well. No. Did I have conclusive personal evidence
20 that this was cut by your government or by someone else? No, I don't.
21 But it is clear that a besieged city is no longer in a position to
22 provide its citizens with its own food and water. That has to come from
23 outside. By besieging the city, your government effectively stopped the
24 people of Sarajevo
1 Q. Are you trying to say that my government could have stopped it or
2 that they did stop it? Because if you put it this way, then you're
3 saying that you know that they stopped it.
4 A. I know for a fact that the UN food supply to Sarajevo was
5 repeatedly stopped, for instance, the supplies that came by air because
6 the plane was shot at. On various of these occasions, we were informed
7 by the UN that that shooting had emanated from Serb lines and that they
8 had then brought the air transport of food to Sarajevo to a halt. I
9 would call that a clear case of your government and your forces stopping
10 food coming to the besieged city.
11 Q. Well, you see, that's not exactly the way it was. We established
12 here with another witness that there were over 10.000 flights and that
13 not a single one of the incidents related to these planes came from the
14 Serb side, but let's move on.
15 Do you agree that you said that you did not always know who it
16 was that was doing the shooting? I mean --
17 JUDGE KWON: That's the kind of statement you should refrain from
19 Mr. van Lynden, would you like to comment upon that?
20 THE WITNESS: On the previous witness and the 10.000 flights,
21 Your Honour?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE WITNESS: Well, I wasn't here to listen to the previous
24 witness, so I'm not aware of what the previous witness said. So I cannot
25 make any comment on that.
1 JUDGE KWON: Absolutely.
2 Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Did we agree that you did not always know who it was that was
6 doing the shooting; yes or no?
7 A. Did I -- of course I didn't always know. It was an impossibility
8 to know, if you're driving through a city, who's shooting or where
9 they're shooting at, unless you're being hit, or unless you're filming
10 it, in which you can see who is doing the shooting, where the shooting is
11 emanating from. But did I always know? No, of course not.
12 Q. Thank you. Did we agree that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 had positions to the south of the Holiday Inn and that it's possible that
14 they had sniper shooters in the government building, on the museum, and
15 so on? You had said that was possible, that you knew that they had
16 positions to the south of the Holiday Inn and that it's possible that
17 they had sniper shooters in the government building, and on the Assembly
18 building, and on the museum building.
19 A. I said it was possible that they had sniping and army positions
20 south of the Holiday Inn, yes. Did I actually visit these positions?
21 The answer is no. But it is certainly possible, yes.
22 Q. You said that you weren't conscious of the existence of the
23 Mujahedin unit in the BH Army. Do you still say that?
24 A. I don't recall precisely. You mentioned yesterday a Mujahedin
25 unit, but I thought one particular corps. I was aware by the end of the
1 war that there were certain what you call Mujahedin units. Did I
2 actually see them? The answer is, no, until the war was actually over.
3 Then I did see one unit. But I did not see any such unit, nor did anyone
4 say that they were a member of such a unit when I spoke to them during
5 the war.
6 Q. Thank you. You visited the staff, the headquarters of
7 General Juka Prazina, but you said that you weren't sure that he was a
8 general, and you actually said that you don't believe he was a general;
9 is that right?
10 A. To visit the staff and headquarters would signal an organised
11 military unit. I visited the staff and headquarters of various armies.
12 That is certainly not what I saw with Juka Prazina. I saw him in a
13 normal civilian apartment, either on the ground floor or in the basement
14 of a building in Sarajevo
15 in one or two other buildings later on during 1992 which were, again, of
16 a similar nature. So headquarters, absolutely not.
17 No one ever, in my knowledge, called him "General." They called
18 him, "Juka," and I was not aware that he was given that title, if such be
19 the case.
20 Q. Thank you. I asked you, and you said that you didn't know of the
21 existence of other generals who were promoted to that rank from
22 criminals, such as Celo -- there are several people with the same name
23 Celo, and their commander said that there were nine or eleven Celos, but
24 two of them were most prominent, and then Musan Topalovic, Caco, and so
25 on. So is that right, that you weren't aware of that? You weren't
1 informed of that; is that right?
2 A. I'm aware of -- I'm not aware of 11 Celos. I was aware of one.
3 And I'm aware that there were other people, but I was not ever informed
4 that they had the rank of general, no.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Two more questions before the break, Your Excellency, would that
7 be right?
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. There are two things I have to ask you before the break, and then
10 after the break we'll move on to another area.
11 The first thing I want to ask you is this: You said that the
12 BH Army did not have an artillery at that time from June 1992, but
13 roughly when was it did you realise that they did have an artillery in
14 the city of Sarajevo
15 rather, two things as being my position: first of all, that I said that I
16 consider the Muslims to be Turks, I consider them to be Serbs, and that I
17 wanted to build a wall in Sarajevo
18 seem to know. Nobody else knows about that. And if that is the case,
19 why didn't you publish that, because it's rather drastic and picturesque.
20 If Karadzic was in favour of a wall in Sarajevo, that should surely have
21 been publicised in all the media; right?
22 A. Okay. We are dealing with all sorts of different issues here.
23 The first one is the question of artillery on the Bosnian side within
25 artillery. I have, in March 1994, seen, at a weapons collection point
1 organised by the UN, 120-millimetre mortars. These are heavy mortars. I
2 would personally not describe that as artillery, but that could be an
3 argument. I never saw the kind of artillery pieces that I saw at the
4 position General Mladic took when I was in Sarajevo.
5 Next question --
6 Q. The wall, and that Muslims were Turks.
7 A. Mr. Karadzic, we had various conversations late in the evenings
8 in Sarajevo
9 off-the-record conversations, as I -- this was not something -- or I
10 didn't have my cameraman there, these were not proper interviews, and I
11 did not use, in my reports, things that you said during those
12 conversations. You -- and I recall this absolutely as one of the
13 options, not the only one, but one of the options, was that you said that
14 a wall should be built in Sarajevo
15 investigators of this Tribunal, I told them about it.
16 Yesterday, you mentioned something which you called the Brussels
17 solution. I have absolutely no recall of you ever using that description
18 when we spoke in September 1992.
19 The final point is about you saying that they were Turks. That
20 is how I recall it. You said to me yesterday that you consider them
21 Serbs. If you consider them Serbs, it now seems to me, it seems, rather
22 strange that we ever had this war.
23 Q. Well, civil wars happen within the same people. Why not a war?
24 Civil wars are civil wars.
25 Now, do you consider that if it was all right for you not to use
1 informal conversations in your reports, why is it all right if you're
2 using it in court?
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Objection, Your Honour. It's not a proper
4 question for the witness. This is a court hearing, not a report, and
5 there is -- the witness has explained his answer, why he didn't use them
6 in press reports.
7 JUDGE KWON: If the witness is able to answer the question, I'll
8 leave it to the witness.
9 THE WITNESS: I will try, Your Honour.
10 I was asked to tell the truth about conversations for a court of
11 law. I consider that to be different than when you're reporting for a
12 television station. If I had made those comments known by you, I could
13 not have approved them, because it was not a formal interview and we did
14 not have a camera present there. You could, therefore, have said that
15 it's not true, what I said.
16 Apart from that, my understanding of those conversations was that
17 this was an informal conversation. This is a court of law, and I think
18 that's a different matter, where one is asked to tell the truth, as close
19 as you can get to it. That's why I told the investigators when I was
21 Q. Very well. Then we're going to find that in your notes. I
22 assume you made an entry and recorded it in your notes, because it's so
23 drastic and something that springs to mind that you must have recorded it
24 in your memoirs, if not anywhere else.
25 And just by the by, I drink red wine.
1 A. So do I, but I recall you drinking white wine. That may be a
2 loss of memory on my part. I don't know if it's in my notes, and do not
3 have memoirs.
4 JUDGE KWON: Then, with that, we'll have a break of 25 minutes.
5 --- Recess taken at 5.24 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 5.49 p.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. May I remind you, Mr. van Lynden, of this story number 5, where
11 you say that the skyscrapers of UNIS, the UNIS skyscrapers, that they
12 were disintegrated and that it was a symbol of the destruction of the
13 town, itself. And then I think you went on to say that the Serbs had
14 signed a truce, but that they did not respect the cease-fire, and that in
15 keeping with that, the Muslims, or the BH Army, as you term it, did not
16 have any artillery, and you said, I think in an attachment, that they
17 stood up to the artillery with small-calibre weapons, infantry weapons.
18 Now, can I ask -- well, I'd like 1D1208 to be called up on
19 e-court, please, and then we can take a look and see what it is you're
20 reporting about to your viewers. We have the president of the Presidency
21 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim part, Alija Izetbegovic, and his army
22 commander speaking, or the chief of the Main Staff, rather,
23 Mr. Sefer Halilovic. It's the minutes -- well, actually, we can just
24 have the English version put up on our screens so we can see it better.
25 It was a Presidency meeting, a session of the Presidency of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, held on the 17th of June, 1992, and it's a
2 tape-recording of that.
3 May we have page -- let me just see. Page 3? Page 3 in the
4 Serbian version. It's a short document, and I don't know whether we have
5 that in English. It's page 3 of the English, I assume.
6 [In English] Page 3.
7 [Interpretation] "The Sarajevo situation and the general
8 situation in the Sarajevo
10 First of all, the distribution is as follows. In the
11 municipalities, the transversals, you have the Chetnik forces, that is to
12 say, the Serb forces, and they make up -- there are 300 to 400 men. In
13 the Trnovo municipality, there are 300 to 400 men, supported by two tanks
14 to two to three
15 Now let's see what it says on page 6 of the Serbian version, and
16 I suppose it's the same page of the English. Yes, it says "page 6," so
17 where it says "page 6." "During," it starts "during ," that's right.
18 Now, Sefer Halilovic is reporting to the Presidency about the
19 situation at the battle-front, and it says:
20 "During the two months of battle, the aggressor suffered large
21 casualties, especially losses in material-technical assets, around 20
22 tanks, 20 transporters, six VBRs, five Howitzers, seven 120-millimetre
23 mortars," et cetera.
24 "Certain number of lost or destroyed assets, three tanks, six
25 armoured vehicles, five Howitzers, 155 millimetres, six mortars, a
1 certain number of infantry weapons, and a large quantity of infantry
2 artillery ammunition seized. Due to a significant loss in assets and
3 artillery rocket assets, the intensity of the artillery actions against
5 Now, did you report about those Serb losses? Did you report to
6 your viewers? Did you inform them of these Serb losses, your audience,
7 your public?
8 A. Your Honours, it seems to me that I'm being asked a whole bunch
9 of different questions simultaneous, because we began with something
10 quite different and now we come to -- if I understand this correctly,
11 this is from the 17th of June, I have not seen this document before. I'm
12 seeing this document for the first time.
13 The final question is whether we reported this to our -- back to
15 I do not know the precise dates of the events that Mr. Halilovic is
16 referring to in the loss of Serb assets. When we left Sarajevo after the
17 bombardment and some of the stories that we -- that the Prosecution has
18 shown today, we went to Pale and asked you to work there. We -- every
19 single time we left the Pension Olympic, we were arrested. How were we
20 meant to be able to report on Serb losses?
21 Apart from that, it is my experience during the war that all
22 sides were not particularly good at taking journalists along and saying,
23 This is what we've lost. I don't think any government around the world
24 is very good at saying, Here we've made a mistake, and this is what we've
25 lost. I was certainly not taken by the Bosnians to places that they had
1 lost, but I wasn't taken by your forces either.
2 When I reported at the end of the year of 1992 that Zuc had been
3 lost by the Bosnian Serb forces to the Bosnian Army, this is something
4 that was never verified by your government, and, indeed, it led to the
5 anger of General Mladic with me, or it was one of the reasons that he
6 seemed to be angry, when I encountered him in 1994. So, no, we did
7 not -- I mean, I did not at this time -- I don't think I was in Bosnia
8 anymore at that stage. I did not report this, I was not aware of this,
9 we were not made aware by your government of these losses, nor do I
10 actually ever remember being given something of this nature by the
11 Bosnian government, a breakdown of the military achievements that they
12 had made.
13 Would we have reported it? If we had reported it, Mr. Karadzic,
14 we have been told by the Bosnian government that the Serbs have lost all
15 this, you would have said that is completely ridiculous and biased
16 reporting, You haven't checked with us.
17 One of the problems about working in a war zone is that you can't
18 cross lines to verify on an immediate basis, so I would have thought it
19 very unlikely that we would have reported this unless we had had direct
20 confirmation from your government or from your military forces that that
21 was, indeed, the case. Otherwise, it might have been said that we were
22 reporting Bosnian propaganda.
23 Q. Thank you. That was a rather lengthy answer, but you see,
24 Mr. van Lynden --
25 A. It was a rather lengthy question, Mr. Karadzic.
1 Q. You see, you can say yes or no now. What I claim is that your
2 reports were so biased and hadn't been checked out properly that the
3 gentlemen in this hall here, watching your footage and films, gained the
4 impression that it was the Serbs who were doing the shooting, that nobody
5 was actually shooting at the Serbs, and that the city was unarmed,
6 without any artillery, without any soldiers, without any actions going
7 on, and the Serbs without having suffered any losses. Would that be
8 right? Were you biased, were you prejudiced? Did you want to check out
9 the information the Muslims gave you, just as you wanted to check out
10 what the Serbs told you?
11 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, that's a comment, then three, four
12 questions. You would never get a yes-or-no answer to that from any
13 witness. If you want yes-or-no answers or short answers, you're going to
14 have to ask direct, contained, closed questions. The witness can't
15 possibly deal with all those matters, except by giving a very lengthy
16 reply, which he may well now wish to do so.
17 THE WITNESS: Whether I'm biased or not I leave to the Court to
18 decide for itself. I do not believe I was biased in my reporting. I
19 will say that I have a bias against war, in general, after nearly 25
20 years of being a war correspondent.
21 Did we check? Yes, we always try to check specifically with the
22 UN. The UN was in Sarajevo
23 kind of numbers as later, but we did try to check with them. We would
24 try to check with both sides as far as possible, but often it was an
25 impossibility. We simply didn't get answers.
1 I think the channel that I worked for gave you, personally, ample
2 opportunity to put your point of view. One of the reasons why I didn't
3 do a sit-down interview with you in Pale in September 1992 is because we
4 had agreed, and Sky News had agreed, that because you speak English, they
5 could interview you directly from London
6 with you to make your case. But if we asked for precise information of
7 the kind of nature that you're showing here, a reaction, we wouldn't have
8 got it. We would not have got it on either side, I'd have to say, of the
10 Now, let me just read through your question again.
11 No, I don't think I gave an impression that the city was unarmed.
12 We, indeed, filmed soldiers, policemen, as the Court has seen today,
13 firing with small arms. Our general impression at the time, backed by
14 those who we spoke to at the UN, who I would see as unbiased people that
15 we could go and speak to, all said that all the heavy weaponry was
16 basically on your side. I'm not discounting that they did have some
17 heavy mortars. I did, indeed, see heavy mortars, as I've already
18 testified. I did not see, in Sarajevo
19 definitely soldiers. At the beginning, it was very much ragtag. There
20 was no Bosnia Army when the war began. There were the
21 Territorial Defence forces, there were the police forces, and then units
22 came up, indeed a number of them led by criminal elements, as to which
23 I've testified, Jusuf Prazina being one that I personally knew. You
24 mentioned others. I'm aware that those existed. And I'm also aware that
25 we put those on air and talked about that. So I do not think that that
1 is a case of biased reporting, no.
2 I hope I've answered your question.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Q. I agree that my questions are rather complex, but that's because
5 I'm under time constraints. If we had sufficient time, things would be
6 different. But let's clarify one thing, Mr. van Lynden.
7 Up until September, were you at Pale up until September or
8 weren't you at Pale by June? I mean Sarajevo, not Pale. Sarajevo
9 said a moment ago that in June, at this particular time, that you were no
10 longer in Sarajevo
11 until September and then that you returned in October. That's on page 11
12 of the transcript today. Page 11 of the transcript, you said that you
13 were there until September.
14 A. No, I didn't say that I was there until September. I arrived
15 towards the end of May, left at a certain moment in June when -- and came
16 to Pale, because it was the only manner in which we could get our footage
17 out. I then left. I returned to Sarajevo and was there from later in
18 June, throughout July, until the beginning of August, when I left again
19 and went home to my family. I was in London for the London Conference,
20 where we met each other. And then from there, we met each other in
22 So I was -- and I do not claim to have been in Sarajevo the entire time.
23 Q. Thank you. But the Prosecutor read out that you arrived in
25 Pale is a municipality of Sarajevo
1 actually at Sarajevo
2 Can we scroll down the page to see what General Sefer Halilovic
3 says about what they have in Sarajevo
4 And he says:
5 "The deployment of forces of the Territorial Defence of the
7 Do we have that in English anywhere? It's the last paragraph:
8 "The position and state of the territorial defence forces in
10 We can move on to the next page in English now:
11 "... are composed of the following: The regional staff of the
12 Territorial Defence; two 120-millimetre battery launchers with 12
13 weapons; 105-millimetre Howitzer battery with five weapons; artillery
14 unit, 122 millimetres, three weapons; an armoured mechanical unit, a
15 group consisting of one tank and five armoured vehicles; 16 Territorial
16 Defence municipal centres; 16 TO companies, around 500 independent units
17 or platoons; around 450 independent groups or companies; and around 100
18 anti-sabotage units."
19 Now, is it possible that you didn't see that vast armed force in
21 aware of this presence -- military presence in Sarajevo, as described
23 A. No, I wasn't. I was aware of a large number of men armed with
24 Kalashnikovs, as I've already testified. I was not aware that they had
25 105-millimetre Howitzer battery. "With five weapons," I'm not quite sure
1 precisely what that means, whether there was one gun or whether there was
2 five. I would not call this -- there was a vast number of men with guns,
3 but this kind of armament is almost insignificant in comparison to the
4 kinds of heavy armament that your forces had at their disposal. But I
5 was not aware of it. No, I didn't see artillery. I've testified I have
6 not see artillery in Sarajevo
7 120-millimetre mortars.
8 Q. Thank you. A little further down, he said a total of 190-odd
9 thousand, of which 45 per cent were armed. You're right, not everybody
10 was armed. But since the weapons remained up at the front-lines, that
11 was sufficient for those up at the front-line to be armed. So 500
12 independent platoons, 450 independent companies, and 100 anti-sabotage
13 platoons or units. So that is a vast armed force in Sarajevo. Sarajevo
14 was a fortress, entrenched, full of weapons and soldiers, and you seem to
15 be reporting as if it was a kindergarten or a nursery attacked by the
16 wild Serbs.
17 Well, the Serbs would have too many reasons to be disappointed
18 with reporting of this kind and dissatisfied with it; isn't that right?
19 A. I can't speak for how the Serbs view my reporting and whether
20 they're dissatisfied or not.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now may we move on to
22 page 7.
23 We have page 7 on our screens.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. You said today, and in your report as well, that it was your
1 assessment that those who were killed and wounded were civilians because
2 soldiers wear uniforms, whereas civilians don't, and that that was the
3 criterion that you used when distinguishing between civilians and
5 Now, I'd like to focus your attention on the English passage,
6 where it says:
7 "During --" and it's still Sefer Halilovic speaking. He says --
8 let's see where that is. It's on page 7:
9 "During the initiated attack ..."
10 Yes, the previous sentence. The personnel dressed in civilians
11 [as interpreted]. So the armed people were dressed in civilian clothes,
12 and they had no protection against the elements. And then it says:
13 "Due to -- regardless of the problems, the TO units in the city
14 of Sarajevo
15 are preventing an attack on the city and simultaneously engaging in
16 actions in selected directions. During the initiated attack, strong
17 Chetnik forces were broken up in the area of Pofalice and
18 Zuc-Mojmilo Brdo, the front stretches below Kromolj towards Orlovac and
19 above Barice and Odzak towards Vasin Han, Ophodzi-Vidikovac, Pljevinac,
20 Osmice - Stari Grad, below the MUP school in Vrace, Mojmilo Brdo and a
21 part of Debelo Brdo. In the last five or six days, the activities of our
22 artillery became especially prominent. They were effective and caused
23 significant losses to enemy soldiers, and material-technical assets in
24 the region of Pofalice, Zuc, Mojmilo Brdo, Vrace, Zlatiste, Osmice,
25 Poljana, and the village of Mrkovici
1 forces, the TO units of the city of Sarajevo
2 positions they hold, and with certain offensive actions they can even
3 extend the lines of defence."
4 And now my question, Mr. van Lynden: This is a report by the
5 command of the Muslim army to the Muslim Presidency, or whatever you'd
6 like to call it, where he says that the fire that you showed to your
7 audience was -- that the Serb firing was more successful than the Serbs,
8 and that the Serbs suffered losses, and that they were very successful in
9 their artillery attacks. Now, from your reports, can we conclude what
10 Sefer Halilovic is saying here in his report to the Presidency?
11 A. Firstly, you would have to ask Mr. Halilovic what he was
12 precisely referring to and what dates these attacks took place on and
13 whether this was if this -- I doubt that this was the same as what I was
14 reporting on, because that was not action happening along the
15 front-lines. This was shelling coming in throughout the city. He
16 reports attacks on the front-lines. I haven't seen this document before.
17 I don't know if Mr. Halilovic, indeed, wrote all this down.
18 But, firstly, let's take the question right at the beginning
19 about the military being in uniform or not being in uniform. In a report
20 that has not been shown to the Tribunal, but made also in the early days
21 of June, I state quite clearly that there is a mish-mash within the
22 Bosnian armed forces. Some of them are in uniform, many of them are not.
23 They were not all in uniform at that stage of the war, and we made that
25 When we encountered wounded people, and in the one report that
1 was shown to this Court this afternoon, after heavy shelling and there
2 was fighting, we made clear that the wounded men were armed members of
3 the Bosnian Army who had been launching a counter-offensive. We didn't
4 say that these were civilians. We said these were members of the armed
6 Of course, with any man in a war zone who is under the age of,
7 let's say, 60, and he's dressed in civilian clothes, you can say, Well,
8 he was an army, and if somebody else says he was a civilian, what do we
9 say? On the whole, I think we made it clear who the civilians were, and
10 it was clear to us, and who the armed forces were, and we made that,
11 I think, clear in the reports that this Tribunal has seen today.
12 As far as the attacks are concerned, as I understand the reading
13 of what Mr. Halilovic reported to his president, was that these were
14 armed actions undertaken by the Bosnian forces along the front-lines.
15 That's on the edge. He doesn't mention fighting in the center of the
16 city, at Grbavica here. And the shelling that we showed and filmed on
17 those days in early June was shelling that landed throughout Sarajevo
18 There's a difference between the two.
19 Q. Thank you. Let's just clarify this. This is a session of the
20 Presidency held on the 17th of June. Halilovic is reporting about the
21 previous period, the previous two or three weeks. He is reporting about
22 the very same events that your report pertained to. However, in the
23 middle of this paragraph - please take a look - he is mentioning the old
24 city, Osmice, Ophodzi, Vasin Han. He is mentioning the parts of town
25 that are in their hands and from which they are operating. Of course,
1 you know that Stari Grad or, rather, the center of the city is Velesici;
2 right? Do you see where he says "Stari Grad," the old city?
3 A. I know that "Stari Grad" means "Old City
4 see him saying that there were attacks from the Stari Grad towards your
5 lines. As I see it, he is saying here that an initiated attack -- strong
6 Chetnik forces were broken up in the area of Pofalice, Zuc, and
7 Mojmilo Brdo. That's not the center of Stari Grad.
8 Q. Let us go on. Look at the very same sentence, sir.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
10 Mr. Nicholls.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, just to try to be clear, I'm looking
12 at the translation provided by the Defence, if we are talking about
13 page 7, the report is about "the past five to six days," not "the past
14 two to three weeks," if -- so I think that was either a misstatement, or
15 a translation problem, or a different section of the report.
16 JUDGE KWON: Could you indicate me to the part?
17 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm looking at the middle of what in the English
18 says is page 7, which is on page -- it's marked as page 7 in the
19 translation, on page 2 of the English in e-court, in the third paragraph
20 down which begins: "Despite the aforementioned problems ..."
21 JUDGE KWON: And "the last five or six days," yes.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: And this is that section I thought Mr. Karadzic
23 was directing the witness to.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] However, if we look at page 6, this
25 pertains to operations over two months. For example, on page 6, the
1 first paragraph, it says: "During the two months of operations, the
2 aggressor suffered" such and such casualties. Well, they were not
3 self-inflicted; right? It is an account of action taken by them, so they
4 are bragging about all the losses that they caused on our side. And you
5 will see that this is a second session on the 17th, so he's talking about
6 the preceding period. And there were some special operations perhaps
7 over the past five or six days. However, that is the entire reporting
8 period. And it says here where the front-line is, and, of course, it is
9 the front-line that is being operated from and operated against.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Isn't that right?
12 A. Whom are we referring to?
13 JUDGE KWON: Is that your question?
14 Let's move on to your next question, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 This is page 138 in Serbian. However, let's have a look now.
17 This was 7, wasn't it, now 8, 9, 10 -- page 11, page 11 in Serbian. And
18 we have it here, 11, page 11.
19 It says here:
20 "In the next stage, 10 to 15 days, the Territorial Defence of the
21 RBiH shall carry out the following activities," and then they are listed.
22 And what it says about Sarajevo
23 "In the region of Sarajevo
24 by active operations within the city, and deblockade should be carried
25 out along the axis Nova Gradiska-Ilidza-Blazuj-Kiseljak-Centar-Vogosca-
1 Ilijas-Visoko, and in the Gorazde region the road to the Drina River
2 valley should be deblocked."
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Did you receive any information about what was being planned and
5 that it is primarily offensive operations that are being planned around
6 town and from town?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls?
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, again, if he can break up the
9 questions a bit, it will be easier for the witness to answer. It's:
10 "Did you get this information?"
11 There's about three questions here.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Make your questions simple, Mr. Karadzic.
13 Mr. van Lynden, can you answer the question?
14 THE WITNESS: The basic question seems to be in reference to the
15 line of that there would be active operations by the Bosnian Army - this
16 is the Bosnian command, I'm told, to his president - within the city and
17 at other areas. Did I get that information? No. Would it be likely
18 that any army gives the information prior to launching an attack to a
19 foreign journalists? The answer is no.
20 The operation that we were aware of, while it was happening in
22 which we couldn't go to the outskirts to film, but we filmed the men who
23 came back from that operation wounded to the hospital. We reported that
24 that was a Bosnian operation. That, we knew about, and that was admitted
25 to us.
1 I'm aware that -- let me put it this way: Military commanders
2 will say a lot of -- make a lot of statements to their political leaders.
3 I'm also aware that it doesn't always work out. There were many
4 operations launched throughout the war in Bosnia by the Bosnian forces to
5 try and break through the siege of Sarajevo. As far as I'm aware, those
6 operations did not succeed. I'm not aware of any operation being
7 announced to a Western journalist beforehand, and even at certain
8 moments, for instance, in the summer of 1995, there was a refusal of the
9 Bosnian Army to even confirm that such an operation was underway.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 P934, could I have that briefly, please. It's a map, a
12 Prosecution map.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I would like to ask you -- I'm sure that you know this much.
15 While we're waiting for that, actually, it's a bit easier for me
16 now if you were not impartial, if you were simply uninformed. The
17 outcome is the same, but I find it easier to take this way.
18 Now, Mr. van Lynden, can you mark, for instance, who is around
19 this Serb zone? You see this Serb zone where you put that arrow? And
20 then on the north and on the west, who is there around us? It says
21 "HVO"; right? And if you could mark --
22 A. Mark what?
23 Q. Well, mark who is where. The blue line is the Muslim line,
24 right, the Muslim Croat line; right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And the red one right next to it is the Serb line. I see. And
2 then the area beyond that, are those Muslim government forces to the left
3 and to the north of the blue line, and down there to the south of the
4 blue line, beyond the blue line?
5 A. That would be territory controlled by the Bosnian Army or by the
6 HVO, yes. And the other territory would be controlled by your forces.
7 Q. So what is within the red lines is controlled by the Serb forces,
8 and what is beyond the blue lines is under the control of the Muslim
9 Croat forces; right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Do you agree that when Halilovic speaks about offensive
12 activities coming from the outside and from within, that what he actually
13 means is that the de-blockade of Sarajevo should take place through
14 attacks from Central Bosnia and from the city of Sarajevo itself; right?
15 A. Yes, I'm aware, at least, that in the summer of 1995 that was
16 tried and that it failed. And obviously it was tried and failed during
17 other periods of the war. The siege, as I said earlier, was never
19 Q. Can you identify Ilijas on this map? Do you know where Ilijas is
20 here? Down the road -- down the river to the north, actually; right?
21 A. Ilidza would be in the area, let's see, around here [marks].
22 Q. That would be Rajlovac, rather. No, Rajlovac. Nedzarici,
23 Rajlovac, but Ilijas is to the north.
24 A. If you say so. I'm not aware of being in Ilijas, apart from
25 possibly in March 1994.
1 Q. But, Mr. van Lynden, Ilijas is the location where most of the
2 shells in this war fell, and proportionately their losses were the
3 great -- civilians and soldiers, Sarajevo municipality that totally --
4 that your interest did not focus on at all?
5 A. But, Mr. Karadzic, if that's the case, why were we not taken
6 there by your government and by your army? If we are not shown and we
7 are not told, how are we meant to know? You cannot have correspondents
8 in a war zone running around freely without -- to front-lines. If you
9 didn't show us, how is the rest of the world to know? I was never taken
10 there by your government or by your army.
11 Q. All right. It was published all over, but never mind. Thank
12 you. I just wanted the Trial Chamber to see that we are all surrounded.
13 They are surrounding us, and we are surrounding them; semi-encirclement.
14 JUDGE KWON: You'll have the opportunity to make your submission.
15 Put your question.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Here's the question: Are we semi-encircled by them, like they
18 are semi-encircled by us?
19 A. The city of Sarajevo
20 encircled and besieged. The distances of what you call your encirclement
21 at certain points is tight, absolutely, but on the whole it is not. And
22 the two are incomparable, Mr. Karadzic.
23 Q. Well, an UNPROFOR military officer said that it was an
24 encirclement, not a siege, not a blockade, but we'll get to that.
25 Thank you for the map. Now I would like to move on to this
1 document again, page 12, I think, I think. If the previous one was 11,
2 then this would be 12.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, again, Your Honour, I haven't been objecting
5 really hardly at all today, but this is the kind of comment, that an
6 UNPROFOR officer said this or that and we'll get to it later, wastes time
7 and isn't a question. And most times Mr. Karadzic doesn't come back to
8 these points and is simply making argument.
9 JUDGE KWON: Absolutely. So can we pull up the 1D1208 again.
10 So, Mr. Karadzic, did you understand what Mr. Nicholls has said
11 right now? You should refrain from making such statement.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nicholls knows who I'm talking
13 about. They have that material.
14 Can I have page 12 now.
15 Now we have page 12. Mr. Izetbegovic is asking the following:
16 "When adding up the engagement of enemy manpower near Sarajevo
17 that is holding town in encirclement," so, see, Izetbegovic also says
18 "encirclement," "how much is that?"
19 And Halilovic says:
20 "About 6.000 in Sarajevo
22 realistic, it's about 80.000 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
23 So Halilovic estimates that the Army of Republika Srpska has
24 80.000 soldiers throughout Bosnia
25 JUDGE KWON: I think --
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that is page 13, then.
2 Page 13. Sorry about that. Yes, we have it now.
3 This is Halilovic's response:
4 "There are around 6.000 in the city of Sarajevo," I mean Serbs,
5 and he probably didn't take into consideration those in Central Bosnia,
6 and he says that in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are about 80.000 Serb
8 "However, for the city of Sarajevo
9 much stronger forces are required than what they have," I mean "they,"
10 the enemy. "Objectively, that cannot -- they cannot accomplish that in
11 the near future unless some radical turning points occur. However, they
12 will still attempt to accomplish this goal, and the goal is to divide the
13 city of Sarajevo
14 with Pale. For that goal, objectively they need to have certain forces
15 at their disposal, but in that case their defence would weaken in other
16 areas; hence, even now it is unrealistic that they are able to do that."
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. You see, Mr. van Lynden, this is his own estimate of his own
19 forces of Sarajevo
20 companies, and here there are 6.000 Serbs and 80.000 Serbs in all of
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Did you know about this vast disproportion in
22 terms of manpower?
23 A. Firstly, back to the line as to how many battalions and
24 independent units Mr. Halilovic had within -- at his disposal within
1 men. I've encountered battalions in other countries where it's suddenly
2 only about 100 men. I see no actual figures that Mr. Halilovic gives as
3 to the precise number of men in companies or battalions, so I am unclear
4 as to the entire -- the number of men at his disposal in Sarajevo
5 As far as your larger question is concerned, that, as you say,
6 there were only 80.000 Serb troops within Bosnia-Herzegovina, it did
7 become clear in September 1992 that, in terms of personnel, you were
8 probably out-numbered by the Bosnian forces. In terms of weaponry, there
9 was no comparison between the two. You completely out-gunned them in
10 every single way in the form of artillery, tanks, armoured personnel
11 carriers. They simply did not have that kind of weaponry, so the one
12 made up for the other. There was a problem of manpower on the Serb side,
13 but you did have 80.000 fully you armed men backed by heavy arms, and
14 that kind of backing was not there on the Bosnian side.
15 Q. Thank you. He actually said that on that earlier page, page 7,
16 that he had 91.000 men, 500 independent platoons, 450 companies, and so
17 on and so forth, but that doesn't matter now. What does matter,
18 Mr. van Lynden, is that we agree that against us -- well, if there were
19 one and a half million of us, there were 3 million against us. So the
20 ratio was 2.1 in favour of the Muslim Croat Federation, as far as
21 mobilisation was concerned; yes or no?
22 A. In terms of manpower, to a degree, but there was a split between
23 the Bosnian forces and those of the Croats. And then, as I said before,
24 you can call up men, but if they don't have a gun, they're not much good
25 to you.
1 Q. Well, now you are making me show information provided by the
2 Secretary-General of the UN, you are tempting me to do that, where he
3 says that a shortage of weapons is no longer an issue, as far as the
4 Bosnian Serb side is concerned. However, we've already shown that to the
5 Trial Chamber.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So could this previous document,
7 the transcript from the session of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina
8 held on the 17th of June, be admitted, and could I have in e-court
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: No objection, Your Honour. I just notice that on
12 some pages it appears that only one sentence is translated. I don't
13 object to the document, but we hope for a fuller translation at some
14 point so we can read around this one sentence of page 11.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll mark it for identification, pending
16 translation. And the exhibit number will be ...?
17 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit D192, marked for
18 identification. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought that what was used by the
20 Defence and what can be translated can be admitted. I mean, we had this
21 translated privately, and who needs a translation can have it translated.
22 So could I now please have 1D01130 in e-court.
23 JUDGE KWON: For example, you read out some part from page 3, but
24 only one line was translated. Without full translation, we have
25 difficulty in understanding those parts. So we marked it for
1 identification, pending full translation of those parts.
2 Let's move on.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Unfortunately, there is no translation for this yet. However, I
6 It is The service of National Security of Republika Srpska. The
7 date is the 20th of June, 1992.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Now, Mr. van Lynden, this is about localities that you presented
10 in your reports. And now I'm going to read this to you. It's entitled,
11 "Information," and then it says:
12 "In the former barracks of Marsal Tito and at the Faculty of
13 Civil Engineers and the Faculty of Architecture, training is taking place
14 of members of the so-called TO BiH. According to the same information,
15 in these barracks there is a centre for the training of members of the
16 so-called TO BiH for rapid interventions, and the training takes about 25
17 days. In the town of Velesici
18 building of the so-called TO BiH at Ciglane, an APC and a tank are
20 So, tell me, did you know about this?
21 A. What, about this document?
22 Q. No, no. About the deployment of those forces. Did you know
23 about that? Because you said that the Marsal Tito Barracks were alight,
24 on fire, and it almost brings tears to your eyes, but here we see that
25 it's a legitimate target. Did you know that it was, in fact, a
1 legitimate target with military structures there?
2 A. I didn't say it was not a legitimate target immediately after its
3 evacuation by the troops of the Yugoslav Army. As far as I'm aware, no
4 one used it, because this document says that people are being -- it is
5 being used to train forces. It was certainly not used to train anyone
6 in that period. No one went into it in that period. We, indeed, showed
7 right at the beginning people running out of it. I am aware that
8 Bosnians, I imagine, army units went in to see what they could find
9 immediately following the evacuation of Yugoslav Army troops. That it
10 was later used by the Bosnian Army, but that is afterwards, after the
11 shelling I reported on, is an absolute possibility. I didn't enter it
12 after that period.
13 On one occasion in July, an incident that the Prosecution has
14 asked me about earlier this afternoon, when we saw three people that had
15 been hit on the road, we saw fire emanating from what remained of the
16 Marsal Tito Barracks, a form of covering fire. So there was certainly
17 soldiers in there in July 1992. But in the period that we have seen the
18 various stories that have been shown in court this afternoon, during that
19 period there were no Bosnian Army units within the Marsal Tito Barracks.
20 It would have been very foolish to be there when they come under such
21 sustained fire, let alone that it was used for training at that stage.
22 Afterwards, quite possibly, but during -- when we made those reports,
23 absolutely not.
24 Q. Now, this tank in Velesici, you can't tell us anything about
25 that, right, because you didn't see it, and you weren't aware of the fact
1 that they had tanks at all; is that right, is that what you said?
2 A. I have never seen a tank inside the part of Sarajevo controlled
3 by the Bosnian forces, no.
4 Q. It goes on to say:
5 "The Main Staff of the so-called TO BiH for this area is located
6 on the premises of the Transport and Technical School
7 so-called police station is in the Velesici local commune."
8 Now, let me ask you whether you know where the bus stop in
10 A. The main bus station that I'm aware of is in the newer part of
12 vaguely aware of. Hard to put its location. In the photograph that I
13 was shown right at the beginning I could -- saw that. But there was
14 certainly a main tram stop. That was to the west, and I imagine there
15 were buses there as well. But in the period when I was in Sarajevo
16 there were no buses or trams running. It was not something that I looked
17 into as to what was happening with the buses.
18 Q. Might I be of assistance? Let me remind you. Was the bus
19 station between the Marsal Tito Barracks and the railway station? So
20 right up along the Marsal Tito Barracks wall, then you have the bus stop
21 and the railway station? Do you remember that? If not, we'll come to
22 that tomorrow and we'll indicate it on the map.
23 But let's move on with this document, and for that may I have the
24 next page displayed, please.
25 It says:
1 "The artillery weapons were located on Hum Hill, underneath the
2 relay station of RTV BH and in the Velesici and Kosevsko Brdo. We'd like
3 to mention that tank movement was noticed around the bus station from
4 where they fired, and after that they withdrew immediately."
5 So what I want to say, Mr. van Lynden, is this: That Hum and
6 below Hum, Velesici, and somebody says that Mladic mentioned that here,
7 Kosevsko Brdo, the tunnel, and the bus station from time to time were
8 legitimate targets; isn't that right?
9 A. Am I meant to say yes or no, whether they were legitimate
10 targets? If I didn't see military forces there, how can I judge whether
11 they were legitimate targets, Mr. Karadzic? I did not see those tanks
12 there, and therefore I cannot say whether they were or were not.
13 Q. Well, let's assume they were there. And if they were, would that
14 be a legitimate target?
15 A. I've been told never to make assumptions in journalism.
16 JUDGE MORRISON: The same applies in the law, I think.
17 THE WITNESS: Glad to hear it.
18 JUDGE MORRISON: Would you, as a general principle, if there's
19 military operations and if there are tanks and artillery in a location,
20 from your extensive experience as a war correspondent, would you
21 genuinely take that as being a legitimate military target?
22 THE WITNESS: I would, with one qualification. Under the Laws of
23 War, fighting in a city forces the armies concerned to be extremely
24 careful so that you don't cause civilian casualties, and that should
25 be -- it's a part of the Geneva Conventions, as I'm sure that you are
1 more than aware than I, and therefore that should always be a
2 consideration for the military involved. But, yes, of course, generally
3 speaking, in a more general sense, they would be legitimate military
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Q. Now, in the document there is a enumeration of all the places and
7 localities where there are legitimate targets, so once we have that
8 translated, we'll be able to come back to that.
9 But now let's go to page 3, and I'd like to draw your attention
10 to the UNIS building. It says in the UNIS building is the Territorial
11 Defence of Novo Sarajevo. In the UNIS building, in Masic Street, is the
12 headquarters of the so-called Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina
13 for Novo Sarajevo. We have information according to which the park by
14 Miljetska between the Vranica skyscraper, to the right is a mortar set up
15 on a truck. The staff of the so-called Territorial Defence of BiH for
16 that area, Cengic, Vila
17 Furniture Store. At Pero Kosoric Square is a large concentration of
18 troops, more than 1.000 men, and so on and so forth.
19 Now my question: In one of your reports, you said that flats and
20 business premises were turned into places from which they shot. We have
21 that somewhere, I believe, that they were turned into places from which
22 there was shooting; rifles, sniper fire, and the like. Now, here we see
23 a report from the secret police which confirms the fact that these
24 business premises, commercial buildings, UNIS, Treska, Vraniska [phoen],
25 and so on, were, indeed, used for military purposes. So if that was so,
1 were they, too, legitimate targets?
2 A. The report you allude to was when we were on one of the
3 front-lines. If your -- if there are a war in an urban battleground, by
4 definition what used to be people's offices or people's houses on the
5 front-line gets turned into military strong points. That's what happens
6 in an urban battleground. Whether, as you say, the UNIS towers was used,
7 I don't know. I didn't see so. I was taken to various territorial
8 defence -- this is not an army. This is territorial defence. We have to
9 remember just what this is. It's something quite different. I saw a
10 number of their headquarters in Sarajevo
11 Later in the war, I did visit a number of different offices that
12 had been used, and these had been commercial offices, I imagine, that
13 were used as bases -- offices of various units of the Bosnian Army.
14 Where else were they meant to go? They were bound to go to one building
15 or another. Those buildings had previously been of civilian use and were
16 now being put to military use.
17 UNIS towers, I wasn't aware. And we had visited it, and we did
18 not meet anyone during that visit of the Territorial Defence forces
19 there. Therefore, I didn't see it as a logical target. Can I be
20 completely certain, Mr. Karadzic? No. Is everything told to me from the
21 Bosnian side? No. So there is a possibility. But as I said, we did
22 visit the building prior to the attack that was carried out on it.
23 The other points -- the other areas, I can't comment on. I
24 didn't visit every area, and so I just simply -- I don't know.
25 We also, of course, don't know whether this document is actually
1 accurate. We have absolutely no way, or that I can tell, that this
2 document is accurate. That it comes from the secret services, I've seen
3 documents from secret services before that were fairly inaccurate.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry to interrupt.
6 No objections, Your Honour. I might be wrong, but if the
7 document we're talking about -- I think we begin at page 94, line 15, the
8 date read out is "19th of June, 1992." I'm not sure if it's a typo.
9 I think the document is dated 20th of July, looking at it. So that would
10 need to be corrected if that's right.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, correct, it's dated 20th of --
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May it be MFI'd? It's the 20th of
13 July. That's what it says on the first page.
14 And, Mr. van Lynden, just to inform you - this isn't a
15 question - this document was seized by the OTP investigators. They're
16 the ones that got hold of it, not me.
17 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, but I can't let that pass. I mean, the
18 witness's comment was about the source of the document, not who seized it
20 JUDGE KWON: Well, I was about to ask the position taken by the
21 OTP, Mr. Nicholls or Mr. Tieger, about this document. He seems to be
22 tendering this document into evidence.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: No objection, Your Honour. As I think you said,
24 it could be marked for identification and we'll look for the translation,
25 but no objection to the document.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will be marked for identification, pending
3 THE REGISTRAR: This document shall be assigned Exhibit D193,
4 marked for identification. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Now may I have 1D361 displayed, please, 1D361.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. And while we're waiting for that, Mr. van Lynden, let me just
9 tell you that this a document from the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia
11 in English -- it's in English, and it says on the 14th of June, 1992
12 Hasan Efendic, a very well-known commander of the Territorial Defence, is
13 re-affirming -- re-asserting a cease-fire. It's the re-affirmation of
14 the cease-fire established on the 1st of June, 1992. So on the 1st of
15 June, 1992, the parties signed a cease-fire agreement. From the 1st of
16 June to the 15th of June, 1992, we see all the offensive actions
17 undertaken by the BH Army and the terrible material and human losses it
18 inflicted on the Army of Republika Srpska. On the 14th of June, he once
19 again expresses his attachment of the cease-fire that was not respected.
20 So did you know that there was a cease-fire in force when you
21 arrived, on that first day?
22 A. I arrived at the end of May, and I wasn't aware of a cease-fire
23 being in place then. We were told that a cease-fire had been agreed to,
24 and we were told by people at the UN that this was almost instantly
25 broken. When we asked them who had broken it, they said, We cannot
1 initially tell. But we spoke, for instance, to the Australian colonel
2 who is in one of my stories from those days, who was negotiating on
3 behalf of the UN, and he told me that a cease-fire had been broken
4 repeatedly, and obviously it was broken repeatedly, but he blamed the
5 Bosnian Serbs.
6 Secondly, you say that during that time, you -- your people
7 suffered such terrible consequences of the fighting. I was not on your
8 side of the front-lines. I was inside Sarajevo. All I can say is what I
9 witnessed and what we filmed was a form of carnage going on inside the
10 Bosnian-held part of Sarajevo
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. But we heard from
12 Sefer Halilovic, the commander of the Muslim army, about all the losses
13 we suffered and that they were all offensive operations launched by his
15 I'd like to tender this document into evidence now.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Again, objection to that argument without any
17 question attached, even a pretence of a question at the end.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you are having a habit of making a
19 comment at the end of each question and answer. Please refrain from
20 making such statement.
21 I take it there's no objection to this document.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: No, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this document shall be assigned
25 Exhibit D194. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: And --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, and I apologise. But my
3 question was whether we've just read that the commander of the Muslim
4 army informed us about the Serb losses; yes or no. And we looked at the
5 document a moment ago. The 17th of June is the date.
6 JUDGE KWON: I think we heard that answer.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 May I have 1D01231 next, please. 1D01231 on e-court, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: I'm seeing the clock.
10 We'll rise today, and we'll resume at 2.15 tomorrow afternoon.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.
13 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 20th day of May,
14 2010, at 2.15 p.m.