1 Friday, 21 May 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 8.31 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. Thank you all for
7 co-operating in order for us to start very early in the morning. Let's
9 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic, and please be as brief as possible
10 and stop making comment, and please remember, you don't have to put every
11 document in such a lengthy detail to the witness. Let's continue.
12 WITNESS: AERNOUT VAN LYNDEN [Resumed]
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning to
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
16 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. van Lynden.
17 A. Good morning.
18 Q. Before I forget, I want to ask you something. Do we have your
19 promise that you're going to look at your notes and diaries carefully and
20 within a reasonable space of time be at the disposal of my Defence for
21 contacts with it so that we can see what we can use from that material.
22 A. My personal possessions are currently held in storage, as my
23 family and I moved from the Netherlands
24 am not immediately able to get a hold of that material.
25 Secondly, while I have kept most of my notebooks, I've never kept
1 a diary but I've kept most of my notebooks, I don't know if all of them
2 are there or some were lost. Certainly some were lost during the war,
3 but at the earliest when we get our possessions I will certainly look
4 through the notebooks. And if I believe that there is anything of
5 consequence to my testimony that I've given over the last two days of
6 this court, I would make it available.
7 Q. Thank you. The very fact that you will be in contact with my
8 Defence team means, I'm sure, that you'll be able to agree on what is
10 Now, we have two more maps, map number 4 first that I'd like us
11 to look at, and then map 6 from the Sarajevo-Karadzic binder. It's from
12 the binder titled "Karadzic-Sarajevo map." One is a panorama, and the
13 other is a detailed view.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, can we have an additional one in case
15 for the purpose of showing it to the witness in the future?
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, we do have the map books here.
17 Mr. Reid has them.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 0424-9164 is the number. I assume
19 it's the ERN number. But it's map number 4.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: I believe, Your Honour, that is 65 ter number
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. May we have it called up on
24 e-court, please. I'm sorry, it's not actually a map. It's a photograph.
25 JUDGE KWON: Now we have it on our monitor.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] They're in the same language, both
2 of them. Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. van Lynden, could you briefly -- or, rather, could you mark
5 the military hospital where you were. Do you see it there? That's
6 right. That's it.
7 A. [Marks]
8 Q. Could you put a number 1 there, please.
9 A. [Marks]
10 Q. Thank you. Now could you point out the Unis high-rises.
11 A. [Marks]
12 Q. Thank you. And now the government building, please, the
13 Executive Council, as we called it, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mark that in
14 for us, please.
15 A. [Marks]
16 Q. Thank you. Now the parliament building, please.
17 A. [Marks]
18 Q. Thank you. And the Holiday Inn Hotel next, please.
19 A. [Marks]
20 Q. Thank you. Hum hill next, please.
21 A. This is the hill you mentioned yesterday with the relay station.
22 Q. Yes, that's right, with the well-known relay station.
23 A. [Marks]
24 Q. Thank you. Now, do you know where Velesici is? It's the eastern
25 slope from Hum, the densely populated little area there.
1 A. If you asked me beforehand, I would not, but now that you've
2 pointed out what it is, then it must be here.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, underneath this -- these long-distance
4 transmission lines, you have a hill there to the right.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Could you put a number 8 there, please.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic repeat the name of the hill.
8 JUDGE KWON: What's the name of the hill, Mr. Karadzic?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Grdonj.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Could you indicate it before marking it to see if you know what I
12 mean, what I'm referring to, by the long-distance transmission lines.
13 A. This is what you referred to yesterday and when I said that on
14 that map I was not able.
15 Q. Can we have it with the cursor first, please. And can you see
16 the hill on this photograph, and is it Grdonj?
17 A. As I said yesterday, I didn't know. If you tell me it's Grdonj,
18 I'm willing to believe it, but I don't actually know that.
19 Q. All right. Never mind then. Thank you. Now, do you agree that
20 number 1 is the military hospital that you were in for a time, number 2
21 are the two Unis towers, number 3 is the government building of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, number 4 is the parliament building of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, number 5 is the Holiday Inn hotel, 6 is Hum hill,
24 7 is Velesici; right?
25 A. Yes, I've just marked them.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, can we have photograph
3 number 6 which shows this in greater detail.
4 JUDGE KWON: Before pulling up another --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Date, signature, and I'd like
6 to tender it first, please.
7 THE WITNESS: [Marks]
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I tender it into
9 evidence and have this recorded.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be Exhibit D213.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may this be given a number,
13 please. And then may we have map 6 from this same binder called up on
14 e-court. Well, not a map, a photograph.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls --
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As this one.
17 JUDGE KWON: -- 65 ter number?
18 MR. NICHOLLS: I think just to be clear we're talking about
20 JUDGE KWON: I think so.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: Yeah. That is 65 ter number 21215, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do believe we'll get through this
24 quickly as well.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. This is a part of Sarajevo
2 Yes. Thank you. That's it.
3 Now, could you mark in the Unis towers on this photograph,
5 A. Do you want me to number it? Would you like me to number it?
6 Q. Yes. Perhaps number 1, please, to move from right to left.
7 A. [Marks]
8 Q. Thank you. Now the government building or Executive Council of
10 A. [Marks]
11 Q. Thank you. The parliament or Assembly. So government building
12 is number 2. The Assembly number 3.
13 A. [Marks]
14 Q. Now, do you see the bridge at Vrbanja?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Could you mark that in as well, please. The entrance to the
17 street running towards the church?
18 A. [Marks]
19 Q. Thank you. Now, do you see a part of the Catholic church at
20 Marin Dvor which is to the very right edge of the photograph?
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 Q. Mark that in, please.
23 A. [Marks]
24 Q. And that's the route you take to go to the military hospital;
25 right? Upwards and to the right; right?
1 A. Yes. We did make a turn and then at a certain moment there's
2 another turn to the left that we made, but that's further along and off
3 this photograph.
4 Q. Yes, that's right. Thank you. Could you now mark in the faculty
5 of philosophy opposite the government building. Do you remember that
6 that's what it was, the faculty of philosophy?
7 A. I was never taken into the faculty of philosophy.
8 Q. All right. Now mark in the Holiday Inn, please.
9 A. [Marks]
10 Q. Number 6. And the technical school, please. Could you mark that
12 A. Again, I was never taken to the technical school. It was along
13 the front lines, but I was never taken there. And this is not an area of
14 town, Your Honours, I ever walked through. We drove through it at high
15 speed only.
16 JUDGE KWON: Do you know where it is?
17 THE WITNESS: As far as I'm aware, it's in the region to the left
18 of the Holiday Inn which I've marked with number 6. I believe that
19 slightly down to the left is the museum, was the museum, but the precise
20 location of the technical school I don't know, and I wasn't ever taken
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you agree that it's that large building with the courtyard to
24 the left? You were quite right there. It's to the left and opposite the
1 A. As I've just said, I was never taken there.
2 Q. Thank you. Now could you mark in both museum buildings.
3 A. As far as I'm aware, and again I have not been taken there, these
4 were the museum buildings.
5 Q. Thank you. Seven is the museum compound. Now could you mark in
6 where the Marsal Tito Barracks were. It's not there any longer. They're
7 obviously doing some construction work there.
8 A. [Marks]
9 Q. Thank you. The Marsal Tito Barracks is number 8. Now, behind
10 the Marsal Tito Barracks do you see the railway station?
11 A. Another place I never visited, but certainly there was the
12 railway yard behind the Marsal Tito Barracks, and I imagine that you're -
13 shall I mark it as 9 ? - you are referring to that building.
14 Q. Thank you. Yes. That's a well-known building in the city.
15 Now, can you mark in next the so-called Sniper Alley, and mark
16 that as number 10, Sniper Alley. Or perhaps you could draw a circle
17 around Sniper Alley and indicate its borders and the scene where the most
18 important events involving the snipers was.
19 A. I'm not aware of one scene that is the most important events
20 involving the snipers. There was sniping all along the Marsal Tito
21 Bulevar which runs there. It's that road. But I'm not aware of one
22 scene, as you put it, but that's the road. Do you want me to put a 9 --
23 Q. Yes. Number 10. Now, do we agree that it's between the museum
24 building and the Holiday Inn, that that was the main part where the
25 shooting took place? And if that is so, could you draw a circle round
1 that whole area between the museum and the Holiday Inn, which was
2 considered the most dangerous place in town.
3 A. [Marks]
4 Q. Thank you. And we can mark that in a with number 11.
5 A. [Marks]
6 Q. Now, I'd like ask you this, Mr. van Lynden: This --
7 A. Are we finished with the pen?
8 Q. Well, I do believe we are, yes. I can just tell you that the
9 technical school is that older building, and the faculty of philosophy,
10 but it's not essential for us to mark them in. But perhaps you could put
11 the date there and your signature, and let's stay with the photograph on
12 the screen, because I have one more question to ask in that regard.
13 A. [Marks]
14 Q. Now, Mr. van Lynden, from where is it that the Serbs could have
15 shot at this particular place?
16 A. From roughly where the photograph was taken, the higher buildings
18 Q. You mean that corner building below number 11 but on the Serb
19 side. Is that it?
20 A. Well, we -- in the photograph, the river Miljacka is visible. As
21 far as I'm aware, along that line, that was the front line. There are
22 high buildings there, but the territory -- the ground rises up, and there
23 were clear views down into the square. Indeed, in one of the stories
24 that I filed while with your forces in September 1992, we -- the
25 cameraman took shots and you see the streets directly below.
1 Q. Thank you. Yes, that's right. Now, could you indicate the
2 Miljacka River
3 Serbs and on the other the Muslims; right?
4 A. At that point of the city, yes. It is -- I mean, I marked
5 Vrbanja village which is across the river Miljacka. So would you like me
6 to make another marking? I mean, I can do here.
7 Q. That's right. For the participants to see where the
8 Miljacka River
9 Now, in the Holiday Inn, is that where most of the foreign
10 journalists were put up?
11 A. It's -- as far as I'm aware, it's where most of the foreign
12 journalists stayed. I'm not aware of any of them being put up.
13 Q. Yes, Mr. van Lynden. Now, this part of the street which was
14 referred to as Sniper Alley, did it inflict great political damage on us
15 in view of everything that went on there? Did it do us a lot of harm?
16 A. That is not for me to decide. That's a political question,
17 Mr. Karadzic.
18 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, do you think that we were stupid
19 enough to keep shooting ourselves in the foot and cutting our nose to
20 spite our face? Now -- well, in doing something that was causing us
21 harm -- or, rather, that called a world sensation. Now, to do this right
22 in front of the very noses of all those journalists on that particular
23 part of the street.
24 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'm not going to comment on that. I know that
25 there was shooting -- there were periods that there wasn't shooting, for
1 instance, in 1994 in Sarajevo
2 Dvor Square towards the end of March 1994. That's the only walk I ever
3 did there during the war, but I know that there was shooting at all other
4 times of the war.
5 I'm not going to comment whether I think you were stupid and
6 shooting yourselves in the foot. That is up for others, and is
7 yourselves, to decide.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 Now do you confirm or deny that along the very edge of the church
10 there was a legitimate target, and the Unis towers, Executive Council
11 building, parliament building, that there was a sniper and mortar on the
12 museum building, the technical school and in the Marsal Tito Barracks and
13 at the corner of the street leading from Dobrinja towards the church? Do
14 you exclude this possibility, or do you allow for the possibility that
15 there was significant military installations and that there was shooting
16 against us from those areas?
17 A. I'm aware, and I think I have testified to that account
18 yesterday, that after the evacuation of the Marsal Tito Barracks, I on
19 one occasion in July 1992 saw machine-gun fire, rifle fire coming from
20 the Marsal Tito Barracks in response to a shooting incident further down
21 the main Bulevar. That would be to the left of the photograph that is
22 now in front of us. So that would point that there were soldiers of the
23 Bosnian Army in that building.
24 I did not see when I was in the Unis towers - I went in there
25 before the evacuation of the Marsal Tito Barracks - any troops.
1 I'm aware that these are front line positions on the Bosnian side
2 and that there is a great likelihood that they did, indeed, have military
3 installations in them of one sort or another, whether it be snipers or
4 mortars. I didn't personally see them.
5 Q. Thank you. Now, Mr. van Lynden --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'd like to tender this into
7 evidence first, please, Your Excellencies. I hope the participants now
8 have a clearer picture of this part town that is mentioned all the time
9 in the indictment and in many other documents. But can I tender this
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. There will be admitted as Exhibit D1214.
12 THE REGISTRAR: That is correct, Your Honour.
13 THE WITNESS: Mr. Karadzic, are we finished with this photograph?
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Yes, we have finished with the photograph. Now, can I ask you
16 this. Did you have a look at the articles in the course of last night
17 that I gave you and, and if so, may we have them back?
18 A. I have them with me. You may have them back, and, yes, I did
19 look at them.
20 Q. I hope, Mr. van Lynden, that you understand that I can't but go
21 on to explain some of the things that you said or ask you about some of
22 the things that you said during the examination-in-chief, and I hope to
23 get through that fairly quickly.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: No, objection, Your Honours. We weren't told, and
1 no reason why we should have been, which documents were given to
2 Mr. van Lynden last night. I just ask, I don't know if Mr. Karadzic
3 doesn't go through them all, could we, at the end, some point have on the
4 record which exhibits were given to the witness to review before the
5 continuation of his cross?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I'll bear that in mind during the course of
7 cross-examine. Let's continue.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it's of any use, perhaps
9 Mr. Nicholls could take a look at these documents. They have their
10 numbers. They're on e-court. But while I'm dealing with the transcript,
11 perhaps he could take a look at them, and I can dictate the numbers.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Hand them over to the Prosecution, please.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. May I remind you that on page 16, line 15 of the transcript of
17 the direct examination -- oh, yes. We've finished that. Sorry.
18 Let's have a look at page 18 now. I'm a bit perplexed by one of
19 your assertions on the first day, the examination-in-chief. That was the
20 19th, wasn't it.
21 Page 18. I'm a bit perplexed by your argument that at a
22 particular location there weren't any snipers. I'd like to read that out
24 "[In English] I had already, from my experience in 1991 in the
25 former Yugoslavia
1 nationality or religious background were, usually do not very careful in
2 tidying up after themself, and therefore it seems likely to us that if
3 there had been snipers in the building, we would find empty cartridge
4 cases. That was not the case."
5 [Interpretation] Is that sufficient to conclude that there were
6 no snipers at a particular location?
7 A. No. I cannot conclude definitively that there were no snipers at
8 those locations. I was referring, if I remember correctly, to the
9 military hospital, and that we checked whether it had been used as a
10 military -- by the military at any time before we entered it.
11 I can check as well as I can. I can ask as many people, and I
12 come to a certain conclusion whether that building is safe for me -- or
13 relatively safe for me and the crew to work in, and we reached that
15 During the entire time that we stayed in that hospital, I never
16 saw military in that hospital unless they were brought there when they
17 were wounded. And to the best of my knowledge, it was not used, at least
18 when I was in that building, as a base for sniping or any kind of fire
19 from government-held Sarajevo
20 Q. Thank you. On the same page, the distinguished Mr. Nicholls
21 asked you:
22 "[In English] And while you were there staying there from the end
23 of May, early June onwards, was the hospital targeted and hit by fire?"
24 [Interpretation] May I ask you whether that means that before the
25 hospital was taken over by the Muslim side there was no firing at the
1 hospital itself?
2 A. I'm not aware of the hospital being taken over by the Muslim
3 side. Throughout my time in -- in Sarajevo
4 Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox worked in that hospital. Indeed, when I
5 first entered it the two chief surgeons, one of them was Muslim and the
6 other was Orthodox, or Serb, if you like. So I'm not aware of it being
7 taken over, as you put it, by the Muslims. I don't think -- believe that
8 every happened. It was run by the same people who had worked there
9 before. A number of those who had worked there before left, true, but
10 I'm not aware of it having been taken over.
11 Before I arrived, it's -- the building had clearly been hit on
12 numerous occasions. The first time we went there we filmed the building,
13 and that showed that it had sustained considerable damage. We filmed
14 inside the building and filmed the office of one former doctor there who
15 had been in the Yugoslav Army. His uniform was still hanging there. And
16 that office had been hit by a large projectile because it had basically
17 been completely destroyed.
18 Q. Thank you. Did you know that Dr. Nakas took the hospital over on
19 the 10th of May and that the entire security of the military hospital
20 that had belonged to the Yugoslav People's Army got killed on the 2nd of
22 A. Firstly, which Dr. Nakas are you referring to? There are two of
23 them, brothers. When I arrived there, Abdulah Nakas was the chief
24 surgeon, and Bakir Nakas was serving as the director of the hospital.
25 Q. Yes. Bakir Nakas was the director of the hospital from the 10th
1 of May onwards when the Yugoslav People's Army had left the hospital. Up
2 until then, it was the property of the Yugoslav People's Army, and it was
3 guarded by a small JNA unit. That unit got killed. All of its members
4 got killed on the 2nd of May? Did you know about that? And the
5 commander, Lazarevic, when he was wounded, he committed suicide.
6 A. I was not there at the beginning of May, so I cannot comment on
7 something that I did not bear witness to.
8 Q. But I believe that you did ask about what had happened three
9 weeks before you came at such an important location. All right. So you
10 didn't know about that; right?
11 A. I was aware, was told, that there had been a withdrawal of a
12 number of people from the hospital. Others had decided to stay.
13 The precise events I don't know. I wasn't there.
14 Q. Thank you. But on page 26, at one point you say:
15 "[In English] We were told that first one person had been shot
16 and wounded and the second person --"
17 [Interpretation] And so on.
18 So you are talking about things that you hadn't seen, but that
19 you had been told about. Believe me, the fate of the military hospital
20 and its security detail is so striking that I simply cannot understand
21 how come they hadn't informed you about that. So it's not that you had
22 to be a witness, but simply in the course of your duties as a journalist.
23 A. I'm not aware of this. You say we were told that first one
24 person had been shot and wounded and the -- and so on. I'm not sure what
25 you're referring to here. Can you first clarify that.
1 Q. I'm trying to say that you did not always talk about things that
2 you had seen yourself only, but you also talked about things that you had
3 heard about.
4 A. That --
5 JUDGE KWON: But in order for the witness to answer your question
6 correctly, you should remind him what he said on the first day. I take
7 it it's page 2399 on the first day.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Page 26 on the first day, line 5. It has to do with that group
10 that had been hit by sniper fire. You accepted information about that,
11 about what had happened before you could have seen it yourself.
12 "We were told." That is what I found striking. You said, "We
13 were told." So you were told certain things.
14 Did you hear anything about the military hospital? Were you told
15 about the military hospital? Did you know that the military hospital was
16 in JNA hands for a month, from the 6th of April onwards, and that it was
17 fired at, at the time when it was in JNA hands?
18 A. Firstly in reference to the "We were told," Your Honours, what I
19 said then, this was a scene that I actually saw. I saw three people who
20 had been hit by snipers who were still alive, lying on the ground. We
21 were told, I said, that one person came out, a second person went to help
22 the first person after they'd been shot, a third person went out.
23 I think that was something that we then witnessed what happened
24 and that finally those people were shot dead, and we followed them to
25 hospital. That was an incident that, although I didn't see all of it, we
1 were there for a part of it, also when those people actually died.
2 As far as the hospital is concerned, no, I'm not aware that there
3 was this incident that you're referring to in May. I was not given that
4 detail while we were there. We did ask. The precise details we were not
5 given, no.
6 Q. But since they had not informed you, you were supposed to infer
7 that it was the Serbs who had fired at the military hospital and left it
8 pockmarked; right?
9 A. The damage that we saw when we first went to the military
10 hospital on the outside was not equivalent to a gun battle at close range
11 with rifles or machine-guns. This was far heavier weaponry that had hit
12 the building and all the various floors, specifically the middle of the
13 building or the middle to upper part of the building. And that was
14 not -- much heavier weaponry was involved in that. There may, as you
15 say, have been a gunfight that occurred there. But my experience of gun
16 fights in cities would leave quite different markings on those buildings
17 than the ones that we saw. There were also bullet holes, but most of it
18 was heavier damage.
19 Q. You rule out the possibility of the Green Berets using rifle
20 grenades, hand grenades, mortars, and even heavy guns; right? You
21 believe that they could not have had, say, a recoilless gun that can
22 easily be placed in an apartment, for instance.
23 A. I do not rule that out, but the damage that would be caused to a
24 building by the use of rifle grenades, hand grenades, is quite different
25 to that on a building with rockets or artillery grenades. It -- there's
1 a significant difference.
2 There may have -- I'm not discounting, Mr. Karadzic, that there
3 may have been a gun battle, as you say, before I arrived there, but it
4 would have been carried out -- even if they were using, for instance,
5 RPG 7 rockets, the damage to the building would have been of a different
6 nature than what I now saw. Some of the damage that I saw would indeed
7 bear you out in that. There was small arms and rocket, anti-tank rocket,
8 damage, but there was -- most of the damage was of a much heavier nature.
9 Q. Thank you. In my previous question in the transcript it says
10 "hand grenades." I thought I had actually said hand-held launchers, or,
11 rather, Zoljas and Osas, but anyway.
12 On page 27, toward the bottom, you mention a very touching story
13 about a Muslim girl and a Serb man who got killed when they were crossing
14 over to Grbavica. Did you see that yourself, or were you told about
16 A. I referred to that in answer to the question by the Prosecution
17 as to the newsworthiness of sniping events. That incident happened when
18 I was not in Sarajevo
19 was made aware of it from -- by general press reports. I was just -- my
20 reference to it was simply saying that unless there were specific
21 reasons, many of the sniping events were no longer considered newsworthy.
22 I was just differentiating in answer to the Prosecution, but I did not
23 witness that particular incident myself, no.
24 Q. Thank you, but that really was something that we all knew about
25 because it was such a touching thing.
1 Do we agree that the Muslim man -- Muslim woman and Serb man were
2 trying to cross over to flee to Grbavica, the Serb side?
3 A. I've just told you, Mr. Karadzic, I wasn't there and I did not
4 report on this particular incident. You may well be right, but right now
5 I do not recall.
6 Q. Right. Who could be accused of having killed them, the Serbs or
7 the Muslims?
8 A. Mr. Karadzic, I can't -- I wasn't there. I don't know.
9 Q. All right. But if that's the way it was, it would seem that the
10 Serbs had killed the two lovers, the Serb man and the Muslim woman, who
11 wanted to cross over to their side, and that never happened, that
12 somebody would kill someone who was fleeing towards them. I'm right,
13 and --
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, is that your question?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the only question is whether
16 we can leave things so unclear that suggest that it is the Serbs that are
17 to be blamed. Can you be more specific? If we say something, we have to
18 be very specific in order to dispel. Are there any doubts there?
19 JUDGE KWON: The witness said he doesn't know. Move on to your
20 next question.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. On page 28, towards the end, from line 20 onwards, Mr. Nicholls
24 asked you to clarify -- this is what he said:
25 "[In English] I may have misspoke, Your Honour. That is correct
1 that -- thank you. I just --"
2 [Interpretation] Then:
3 "[In English] Just hours after the evacuation of the troops from
4 the Marshall Tito barracks --"
5 [Interpretation] And further on it says:
6 "[In English] Among the cities ancient minarets the rockets fell
7 heralding another night of heavy shelling.
8 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the Marsal Tito Barracks was
9 full of military weaponry, equipment, APCs, plus 600 rifles that a JNA
10 general had brought in, in order to get the cadets out? Do you believe
11 that the barracks was empty from the moment of the evacuation, or do you
12 think that it was taken over by the Green Berets straight away? So what
13 is it that you opt for? Was it empty?
14 A. Firstly, I was not taken into the Marsal Tito Barracks after its
15 evacuation, and therefore I cannot state what was or what was not left
16 inside it.
17 What we saw was that fairly shortly after the evacuation had been
18 completed was that it became a target for -- of a heavy artillery
19 barrage. We filmed people running out of it. Therefore, it is -- it
20 seems pretty likely to us, and I would agree with you therefore, that
21 certain elements of the Bosnian Army had gone in immediately after its
23 We were not there ourselves to see who these people were. We
24 filmed this from the military hospital, but we clearly showed people
25 running out of the barracks, and we showed the barracks then becoming the
1 main target of the shelling that night. The shelling that night, also
2 shells fell in other districts that had absolutely nothing to do with the
3 Marsal Tito Barracks or the evacuation of the troops from those barracks.
4 Q. Thank you. In that video-clip it says page 29, lines 11 and 12:
5 "[In English] This is the scene of wholesale devastation of a
6 city being obliterated while the world watched -- watches but does
8 [Interpretation] Is this some kind of a reprimand to the world?
9 Is it a call for intervention?
10 A. It was basically a statement of fact. The city was being
11 shelled, and as far as I could see, the outside world was not doing
12 anything to halt it.
13 Q. When you say that the world was doing nothing, do you mean that
14 they were supposed to intervene militarily?
15 A. No. I meant that they had to intervene in one manner or another
16 to see to it that the shooting stopped, which would seem to me in the
17 interest of all parties concerned. That could be done in various ways,
18 and that is -- I'm not a government or the United Nations. What we saw
19 at that time was a situation in Sarajevo
20 shelled, and it seemed to us that the world had turned its back -- that
21 the world's governments had turned their back on the city and what was
22 happening there.
23 Q. Thank you. Did you film that first clip, that heavy shelling
24 during the night? I think it was 65 ter 4264C. The part that we're
25 talking about, that is. Did you film that, or did you get that footage
1 from someone else?
2 A. Your Honours, I don't know what 65 ter -- I'm sorry.
3 JUDGE KWON: This is the film to which you commented this is the
4 scene of wholesale devastation of a city being obliterated.
5 THE WITNESS: Right. All the pictures and all those stories that
6 were shown on Wednesday afternoon to this Court were filmed by the
7 Scaranese [phoen] cameraman, except for when it came to the story of the
8 5th of December, 1992. In that case, pictures from other camera crews,
9 and I already testified that it was, for instance, the shelf an apartment
10 block being hit, that the wider shot was taken by a CNN cameraman, but
11 there were other pictures in that story that were taken by other camera
12 crews. But all the stories from June 1992 were filmed solely by us. I
13 believe at that time we were the only foreign television crew inside
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. So what happened on the 5th of June was something that you had
17 filmed directly. So practically you were filmed at the same time, you
18 yourself and the shells falling behind you.
19 A. Yes. I don't recall whether there were shells falling behind me
20 when I did the piece to camera, stand-up, as it is called in --
21 Q. Could we see that first clip of the 5th of June. I think that
22 4264C is the 65 ter number.
23 While we're waiting for that, let me ask you, Mr. van Lynden, you
24 filmed that from the military hospital. That is to say that you are
25 facing that area. Is it correct that all the shells on that footage are
1 falling from your right-hand side to your left-hand side?
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, we'll play that now if that's what
3 Mr. Karadzic would like. That's P929, if I kept my numbers straight.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that's correct.
5 [Video-clip played]
6 "These ancient minarets, the rockets fall heralding an another
7 night of heavy shelling."
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you stop here just for a
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Are these shots horizontal and at the level of your own eyes, or
12 of your camera, rather?
13 A. Mr. Karadzic, I wasn't the cameraman. These shots were taken
14 from what, if I'm looking towards Grbavica, would be the right hand
15 balcony of the building. As far as I'm aware the cameraman would see to
16 it -- and it was filmed on a tripod at all times, as much as possible to
17 keep the camera as steady as possible, not off the shoulder. And,
18 therefore, he would obviously try to get the camera straight. That said,
19 he was in an exposed position, and sometimes the camera could maybe not
20 be completely straight. It's not the same as in a peacetime situation
21 being able to look at everything and see to it that the tripod is
22 completely straight, but basically, yes, it is. So on the right-hand
23 side and the shots were jumping from left to right, yes.
24 Q. Are these shells falling into town, or are they going
25 horizontally from the eastern part of town towards the western part of
2 A. They're coming from the southern part of town, the southern
3 hills, into the city, away from -- towards the more -- well, the centre
4 and the western part of Sarajevo
5 Q. You're in the in the centre, and --
6 A. So to the west of us.
7 Q. Thank you. Let us go on.
8 Sorry, while -- just a moment, please. What -- is this -- what
9 shell is this?
10 A. This is heavy machine-gun, possibly light anti-aircraft fire, but
11 precisely I cannot tell you.
12 Q. Thank you?
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Just before we move on, can I, for the record, say
15 we were at 07:54:2 is the frame we were discussing.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. But we do agree that this is going from the lower parts of the
20 southern hills, as you said. It's not going from town. Actually, it's
21 ascending, as it were.
22 A. Yes, it is from the lower hills on the southern side and is, to a
23 degree, ascending, yes.
24 Q. Thank you. May we proceed now.
25 [Video-clip played]
1 "For the next six hours there is no let-up."
2 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
3 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Where these explosions took place, are they Vraca looking at it
6 from your vantage point, half to the right above Grbavica; right?
7 A. Well -- no. No, no, no, no, no, no. No, no. These are all on
8 the other side of the river Miljacka, Mr. Karadzic. No, this is all
9 incoming into the part of Sarajevo
10 the areas to the west of us, not to the south of us.
11 Q. May we go back 30 seconds. Let's see it again so that we can
12 establish where the explosions took place, and you'll see from the
13 reports that all the houses in Vraca were destroyed that night.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: If that's fine with Mr. Karadzic, we'll start
15 there, which is at 07:51:01
16 [Video-clip played]
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
18 [Video-clip played]
19 "For the next six hours there is no let-up."
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Right. Where those explosions are. Half to the right,
22 south-west of where you were. Is that where the Serb settlement of Vraca
23 was or is?
24 A. You're referring to the shot immediately preceding this one?
25 JUDGE KWON: Should we go back a few seconds?
1 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, this is edited pictures, edited
2 without my presence. Without me seeing the entire film, I can not
3 precisely say what that one -- whether one shot was. We moved from one
4 balcony to the other depending on the level of fire in one district or
5 another. I can't answer that question. The earlier ones were the longer
6 sequence, but this was one shot. You may be right, but I don't know.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you. But this is the first time that I hear that this was
9 edited, that it's not an authentic --
10 A. All television stories are edited, Mr. Karadzic. We filmed for
11 hours that night. The piece was 2 minutes and something. All television
12 news reports are edited.
13 JUDGE KWON: Do we need to locate the time-frame where we saw
14 that blast? It's around 8 minutes, 20 to 25. Thank you. Let's move on.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we see the footage
16 to the end, please.
17 [Video-clip played]
18 "In --"
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. What's this? What's this, Mr. van Lynden?
21 A. It's a light grenade. Grenades fired, probably from a mortar.
22 That gives illumination. Illumination grenade. There are different
23 names given to it. They can be fired from 60-, 81-, 82-millimetre,
24 possibly from 120, I don't have experience with 120-millimetre mortars.
25 They usually last for several minutes. It hangs on a small parachute and
1 gives light depending on -- on the calibre of the mortar it's fired from,
2 equivalent to hundreds of thousands of candles, and it burns usually for
3 a minute or two.
4 Q. And do you think that that was one of ours, one of our light
6 A. How am I meant to know? As far as I'm aware, you, the Bosnian
7 Serb Army, had a great deal more heavy weaponry and a great deal more
8 ammunition, but I am not discounting the possibility that this light
9 grenade, this particular light grenade, was fired by the Bosnian Army.
10 Q. Thank you. Now let's play some more to the end, please.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I just put it on, sorry. It's 08:27:04 is
12 the still image that we've been discussing. And if Mr. Karadzic could
13 say stop in English when he wants us to stop, that would be quicker for
14 Mr. Reid.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Very helpful. Let's move on.
16 [Video-clip played]
17 "The city is hit from every side by practically every imaginable
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. And what is this horizontal fire, the lower line, in your
22 A. Again either heavy machine-gun fire or fire from light
23 anti-aircraft guns that were usually truck-mounted and used, and I saw
24 them repeatedly when I was with your forces as used horizontally, not
25 against the aircraft because the Bosnian didn't have any aircraft.
1 JUDGE KWON: For the record, I note that we stopped at 8 minutes,
2 42 seconds.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. And how come these illuminated circles are so large for such
5 small calibres?
6 A. Well, we're talking heavy machine-guns or we're talking about
7 20-, 30-, or 40-millimetre. That's not such a small calibre. It's not a
8 rifle bullet. It is considerably bigger.
9 Q. Thank you. We don't have to play any more of this. Just let me
10 ask you, Mr. van Lynden, what position could we have held so low to the
11 left of the military hospital in Sarajevo, that low down? Did you know
12 where our positions were, and from what position did this firing come
13 from? To the left, east of the military hospital at the level of the
14 military hospital, that low?
15 A. No. This is -- these shots are coming in to the part of town
16 west of the military hospital, and they emanated, as I already said, from
17 the southern part of Sarajevo
18 a low point. This was from a relatively high point. It didn't come from
19 the banks of the river Miljacka. These came from higher positions.
20 Q. All right. But they're coming in from the east, never mind the
21 slope, east of the military hospital, east of the military hospital. The
22 direction is east/west, right? It's not going north/south. If it went
23 north/south, it would be over your heads.
24 A. If it was going south/north, it would be going over our heads.
25 This was coming from the south, sometimes directly south of where we
1 were, sometimes slightly more to the east, south-east of where we were
2 from that -- the hillside into town. And on these particular pictures,
3 to the west of us, but we had other images of rockets landing to the east
4 of us in the old part of town.
5 Q. I'm interested in where the projectiles are going horizontally
6 from south-east to north-west, but flying horizontally at the level of
7 the military hospital. Do we agree there that this is horizontal fire?
8 A. Just about, yes, but I mean, it -- it -- this is fire emanating
9 to the south of where we are and then striking targets to the west of
10 where we were.
11 Q. But they're hitting south too. They're moving horizontally from
12 east to west on this screen; right?
13 A. I just said that it's not as if they're going straight in front
14 us in the hospital, no. They're coming from south of the hospital,
15 possibly somewhat south-east, but not from the east straight by us, no.
16 They're coming from the south into town.
17 Q. So what is the direction of this fire, not in relation to the
18 military hospital but to the azimuth. Is it south/north or
19 east/south-west -- north-west?
20 A. I would say south to north-west.
21 Q. Very well. But then the fire would have gone over your heads and
22 not --
23 A. Not necessarily.
24 Q. -- flying past you?
25 A. Well, some of the fire did fly past us, and the buildings we were
1 in were also repeatedly hit. So there was fire straight from south to
2 north. But on this occasion, this was fire at some distance away from us
3 as the images clearly show.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Yes, we don't need that
6 clip any more. I think we've seen enough.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Now, on page 30, you say:
9 "[In English] You could see it coming down on the city."
10 [Interpretation] On the city. And then to the end of the page
11 you say something specific and say that you couldn't see such things
12 anywhere else, and:
13 "[In English] We had never been able to capture such footage of
14 fighting or of artillery. It should give an indication that this was
15 really an extremely heavy night of shelling as were the nights that
17 [Interpretation] But you stand by what you said, that what came
18 from the hill and was falling on the city was Serb fire; right?
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, just a small error in the translation.
21 Never been able to "capture" such footage, not "counter" such footage on
22 page 2404.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: In answer to your question, firstly I related this
25 footage to my own personal past and what I had experienced in other war
1 zones, and throughout my career as a war correspondent, I have never been
2 able, as a television correspondent, to be able to capture such amounts
3 of artillery, machine-gun fire coming down on a city.
4 As I tried to explain on Wednesday, filming in war zones is not
5 the same as making a Hollywood
6 don't decide where the shells are going to land. We have to react to
7 them. And to be able to get so much on camera showed that this was
8 extremely heavy shelling.
9 The -- when I spoke of "you saw it coming," I'm referring
10 specifically to the rocket fire coming from the top of the mountains to
11 the east of Sarajevo
12 being fired but where they landed. Again, that's fairly unusual in my
13 personal experience.
14 I do not discount that some of the fire would also have been
15 directed towards Serb areas, but I didn't see a barrage of heavy weaponry
16 directed at the southern hills of Sarajevo that were controlled by your
17 forces. I saw an intense barrage coming down on top of Sarajevo, the
19 Q. Did I understand you correctly when you said on page 32 that --
20 that the mortar was overshooting, then undershooting, and then hitting
21 the target? So do you mean to say that at first go, first try, they
22 can't hit the target, first time round?
23 A. I was referring then to -- that was not mortar fire, that was
24 artillery fire that hit the railway yard. Of course an artillery unit
25 can hit something first time round. On the whole, my experience is that
1 it takes a few shells for a particular artillery piece to hit its precise
2 target. It is why there are artillery observers or spotters who will
3 tell the crew to change the level of their gun. My experience as a
4 mortar commander is that the first one either lands short or long. You
5 then try to bring it in or further out. Again, usually the second
6 doesn't hit the target. And if you have an extremely good crew, then on
7 the third time you do hit the precise target you are aiming for.
8 What we saw on that day, this is just after the evacuation of the
9 Marsal Tito Barracks, were the first artillery rounds that were long on
10 the railway -- hitting the railway yard. They were clearly told to
11 change the level of their guns, and afterwards they hit the target which
12 they were aiming for, on that occasion the Marsal Tito Barracks, and from
13 what we could see, they were extremely accurate after that with their
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, with that answer, we'll take our first
16 break for today for 15 minutes.
17 --- Recess taken at 9.48 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 10.07 a.m.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, if I may very briefly. I don't want
22 to slow anything down. I hope, I truly hope we're able -- for the
23 witness's sake that we're able to finish completely today. If that is
24 the case, if possible, I'd request no more than seven minutes of
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 JUDGE MORRISON: That's very precise.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Trying to be.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Well, yes, this is such a valuable witness that I'm not sure that
6 I'll be able to get through in the time I have, but let's try.
7 On page 35 of the 19th of May, you say:
8 "[In English] Every night in Sarajevo you think it can't be
9 worse, but it does, making a mockery of the attempts of mediators to
10 bring peace to the city which is unfolded in war. Less than 24 hours
11 earlier the Serb commanders had put their signatures on the agreement,"
12 and so on and so on.
13 [Interpretation] Therefore, what you're suggesting is that
14 somebody is making a mockery of the attempts and efforts of the
15 mediators, and I agree with that, but can you tell me who you had in mind
16 when you said that? Who avoided peace conferences and a peaceful
17 solution? The Serbs or the Muslims? It's a simple answer. Let's leave
18 the Croats to one side for the moment. Just the Serbs or the Muslims,
20 A. I wasn't referring -- I said that the fighting and the escalating
21 scale of the fighting as we saw it and witnessed it at that time seemed
22 to us to make a mockery of the attempts of both the European Union and
23 the United Nations to bring peace to a city that was clearly enfolded in
25 Q. Thank you. Now, in the next paragraph you say less than 24 hours
1 earlier you suggest that the Serb commanders signed cease-fires and then
2 failed to respect it and that their shooters kept firing.
3 Now, do you know of the official position taken by the
4 United Nations according to which 90 per cent of the cease-fire
5 agreements were violated by the Muslim side and on the Serb side and that
6 almost 100 per cent of offensives in the town of Sarajevo were launched
7 by the Muslim side? And those are facts and figures from the
8 United Nations, UNPROFOR. Were you aware of that, and does that suggest
9 that it was the Serb commanders who violated the cease-fires they signed?
10 A. We were informed by the people we spoke to at the United Nations
11 at that time that Serb commanders had signed a cease-fire and that, as
12 far as the UN at that time could see, it had been broken by Serb fire.
13 I'm not referring to the entire war. This was just really still at the
14 beginning of the war, obviously.
15 Q. But let me remind you of something. The Muslim documents from
16 the beginning of June, from the 1st of June right up to the 20th of June,
17 that we displayed several days ago clearly show that on the one hand they
18 signed, and on the other hand they continued their actions just as if
19 Hasan Efendic had signed nothing. Halilovic continued his offensive, and
20 we have a lot of minutes and transcripts where they say Milinkladska is
21 light. We've taken their barracks at Nedzarici almost completely. How
22 then can we accept that these were Serb violations when they were in fact
23 Muslim violations? And now if you look at the bottom of that page,
24 Mr. Nicholls, the distinguished Mr. Nicholls was very satisfied and said
25 I think the correct remuneration was pretty self-explanatory. Therefore
1 he understood it completely, and I believe everybody else in the
2 courtroom understood you to have accused the Serbs of violating those
3 cease-fires. Did you?
4 A. As I have just said, we were told by those at the United Nations
5 headquarters in Sarajevo
6 occurred, yes.
7 JUDGE KWON: But I have to note that when Mr. Nicholls said it
8 was self-explanatory, he must have referred to the boy who was lying on
9 the table.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Well, we know nothing
11 about the boy either, but I think he was referring to the entire clip.
12 That's what I thought at least. But if we can briefly look at 1D01155
13 next, please. I think we've already had at that displayed, have we? On
14 e-court. 1D01155 is the document number.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. You were in Hadzici at the time, and this is a report from the
17 command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to the Main Staff. I'd like us to
18 look at the first paragraph. It says:
19 "Despite the cease-fire agreed in the Sarajevo sector, the enemy
20 fired 15 shells at Ilidza and Nedzarici from the Hrasnica sector, and
21 this was from the sector where UNPROFOR vehicles were supposed to pass.
22 No other significant enemy activities were observed."
23 Do you agree that this report confirmed that 15 shells did indeed
24 fall on Serb settlements?
25 A. The first thing I would point out that this has nothing to do
1 with my report in June 1992. These are two completely separate matters.
2 Does this report confirm that 15 shells landed at Ilidza and
3 Nedzarici? I don't know if that report is accurate or not. I have not
4 seen it before, and I wasn't -- as you yourself said, I was outside
5 Hadzici. I wasn't in Ilidza and Nedzarici.
6 Q. Well, all right. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this report into
8 evidence, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: I would object, Your Honour, following the
11 guidelines as I understand them. The witness has made clear he can't
12 really comment on it, was not able to see it. He's able to say, Well,
13 this report says what it says, but that's all.
14 JUDGE KWON: Agreed. Same rule. We will not admit this.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D01154 called up,
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. And it refers to Hadzici, which is where you were. 1154 is the
19 document number, 1D01154.
20 Thank you. It says:
21 "During the day the enemy fired artillery shots at a number of
22 locations especially in Hadzici, Zenik, Vrelo Bosne, Vreoce, and
23 Nedzarici sector. There was artillery fire and especially sniper fire,
24 and Brownings were fired at Hadzici. In line with their orders, our
25 forces did not return fire."
1 Now, at that time you were in Hadzici, were you not? And did you
2 see that Hadzici were being targeted? I think you reported on that, did
3 you not?
4 A. I cannot state whether I was in Hadzici on the 20th of September.
5 I was in Hadzici during September with that precise date that I'm afraid,
6 Mr. Karadzic, I don't remember. We were actually -- we didn't stay in
7 the village, town, whatever Hadzici can be called, very long. We were
8 sent to a unit of the Bosnian Serb forces in the hills, as I recall a
9 forested area. I think I testified yesterday that when we came to that
10 unit, no shooting was going on, and that that unit came under fire. We
11 filmed that and we filmed their response, and they did return fire.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 A. May I just add that when we were in Hadzici, it was not under
14 shell-fire. We did not observe shell-fire when we were there. That does
15 not exclude that it could have happened before or afterwards. We were
16 not shown if it had happened earlier. We were simply taken to this one
17 position in the hills in the forests, and there we filmed, as I have just
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this document admitted? Can it
21 be admitted?
22 JUDGE KWON: The witness can't confirm the content of it. You
23 will have another opportunity to introduce this document later. We will
24 not admit this through this witness.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we now go on to
1 page 37.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Well, I'd like to draw your attention to page 37 of the 19th of
4 May where you say in your video-clip: "Sarajevo is burning in its heart
5 and its suburbs."
6 [Interpretation] And lower down:
7 "[In English] At the city's main hospital, the situation is even
8 worse. The counter-offensive of the Bosnian Territorial Defence forces
9 have run into a continual barrage," and so on and so on.
10 [Interpretation] And then on page 38 you go on to say in response
11 to Mr. Nicholls's question in the video-clip:
12 "[In English] We saw at the beginning again more shelling, and
13 you said words to the effect that the whole city becoming a target. Can
14 you tell us if you remember which areas of the city?"
15 [Interpretation] You say:
16 "[In English] As I said, it was our impression that the whole
17 city," and you repeat, and so on.
18 First question: Do you still assert that this was a
19 counter-offensive of the Muslim forces, or was it simply their offensive
20 as such and a Serb counter-offensive, rather?
21 A. We were told that they -- this is in the area where the maternity
22 hospital had been. We couldn't actually go there, and we were not
23 allowed to go there. We were told that they had launched a
24 counter-offensive and that the men that we saw being brought in who had
25 been wounded had come under a sustained barrage in response to that
1 offensive. This was clearly a purely military affair taking place on the
2 front lines.
3 That's the first question.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 A. Answer to your first question.
6 Q. Yes. Also, you said that that was your impression, that the
7 entire city was a target.
8 I asked you when we spoke before your testimony whether you saw
9 Vukovar and whether you saw Mostar. How long did the war going on in
10 Vukovar, and how long did it go on in Mostar? Two or three months in
11 Vukovar; right?
12 A. About three, three and a half months in Vukovar, yes, which I did
13 cover from the beginning until the very end.
14 Q. In Mostar?
15 A. I did not cover the battle for Mostar.
16 Q. If Sarajevo
17 after 1.300 days of war in your experience? What would Sarajevo look
18 like after 1.300 days of war? On average reports said that at least
19 500 shells fell per day. So what would it have looked like in that case?
20 Compared to Vukovar, for example, after three and a half months, or
21 Mostar. And you saw the pictures of Mostar with empty buildings, totally
22 destroyed buildings and so on.
23 A. I think you're distorting my words. I said that on that
24 particular night, it seemed to us that the entire city was the target
25 because we saw shelling landing in -- right across the city. That was
1 not the case on a daily basis for 1.300 days every war. It was the case
2 on that particular night.
3 How did Vukovar look after three and a half months of -- Vukovar
4 was a small baroque town on the Danube
5 very heavily shelled. I don't know the precise number of shells that
6 fell on Vukovar, but most of Vukovar was reduced to rubble. As far as I
7 have seen, large parts of Sarajevo
8 it was a different situation. It's a much bigger city than Vukovar.
9 Q. Which part of Sarajevo
10 least one example?
11 A. Various parts were reduced to rubble. You had the "Oslobodjenje"
12 building, the old library. Shells landed all over the place.
13 Q. You are saying that certain buildings were destroyed. However,
14 my conclusion here was that you are saying that entire neighbourhoods
15 were destroyed. As for individual buildings, we can agree on that.
16 On page 37 you say Sarajevo
18 Do we agree that the Serbs held part of the heart and most of the
19 suburbs of the city of Sarajevo
20 A. I would agree that the Serbs held part of the heart and some of
21 the suburbs of the city, but the areas that we saw burning were those
22 within the area controlled by the Bosnian government. On that particular
23 day. I'm not discounting that there were not fires in the territory held
24 by you on other days, but on that particular day that is what we saw and
1 Q. Thank you. On page 42 of the transcript of the 19th of May, you
2 say that you were arrested at different check-points.
3 Were you stopped, or were you arrested? And if you were
4 arrested, why did you not inform your own station or me personally?
5 A. We were arrested in the sense that we were not allowed to drive
6 on, and we were told to go back to Pale. We did inform. You had, as I
7 recall, even a minister for information. He was informed of this, that
8 every time we went out, at a check-point we would be told that we could
9 not go further and that we had to return to Pale. I meant arrested in
10 that sense that we were not allowed to go to front lines to film, and we
11 did absolutely inform the members of your administration who had to look
12 after the foreign media.
13 It's the reason that I spoke to you at the London Conference and
14 then at the Intercontinental Hotel at the beginning of September in
16 that if we came, that we would be able to work and be able to film and
17 interview Serbs, for them to put their case, Mr. Karadzic. And in
18 September that, to a degree, worked, although again there were military
19 units that we were not allowed to film at despite the fact that we were
20 accompanied by two military policemen of your forces.
21 Q. Well, no commander likes having civilians milling about his
22 lines, especially not journalists, let alone foreign correspondents, but
23 I would rather call that being stopped rather than being arrested. Would
24 you not agree? It wasn't an arrest in the strict sense of the word, yes
25 or no?
1 A. In the strict sense of the word, you're right. We were stopped
2 and sent back. But we weren't put in gaol, for instance, no.
3 Q. Thank you. Can I now draw your attention to page 44. You said
4 that your colleagues from Serbian television attacked you not because of
5 all your other reports but because in their opinion, it seems that you
6 portrayed Juka Prazina as -- as some kind of a hero. What was his name
7 now? Robinhood. Right. So they did not object to what you were doing,
8 but to portray a rapist who threw people out of windows as well, well --
9 as a hero, well, they minded that.
10 "[In English] Mr. Karadzic likely intervened in this
11 conversation. The conversation also ranged about other matters, but it
12 was for me an example of the strange mentality that seemed to have more
13 people in their grip in Pale, that the story about a man who I described
14 as one of the principal defenders of Sarajevo in that story done at the
15 beginning of June, Juka Prazina who I mentioned was a convicted criminal,
16 that they felt that this was a story that was against them."
17 [Interpretation] And then -- yes. Would you agree that this is a
18 characterisation of a group mentality, a national mentality, rather? I
19 mean, it wouldn't be right if a psychiatrist said it, but nevertheless,
20 you presented this characterisation of the Serb mentality in Pale; right?
21 A. We found it extremely strange that they were -- that the people
22 that we spoke to in Pale and specifically at Pale television, were
23 absolutely happy with the stores about Sarajevo being shelled, showing
24 the wounded, et cetera, the stories that you are now arguing to me over
25 these last two days, that there were inaccuracies in them. They never
1 said there were inaccuracies in any of those stories. They were
2 perfectly happy with those stories, while it would seem to us that those
3 were stories that were not in the interests of the Bosnian Serb cause.
4 The story of Juka Prazina, in which I make absolutely clear that
5 he was a convicted criminal, was a story that would -- seemed to us and
6 indeed seemed to people that I spoke to in London, Brussels, and
7 The Hague
8 they inverted this. The stories that you have, in your defence, argued
9 that I wasn't careful enough about were stories what they thought were
10 fine. And the story that was in the interest of the Bosnian Serbs they
11 thought was terrible and I was attacked about. We thought that was very
12 strange, yes.
13 Q. I assume that you know of the work and reputation of David Binder
14 of the "New York Times." Everybody else does as well. You have heard of
15 Binder. You know Binder, do you?
16 A. No, I don't know Mr. Binder.
17 Q. However, he is very, very well known. He is a senior journalist.
18 He wrote in the "New York Times" in June 1994:
19 "It is politically right in New York and Washington
20 Serbs whenever possible going up to a point when it becomes almost
21 racist. Making Serbs notorious practically rules out the possibility of
22 balanced reporting."
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We don't have the
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. This is an old hand at journalism, a journalist from the "New
2 York Times" that enjoys a very high reputation. What do you say to what
3 he said?
4 A. I'm not responsible for the statements Mr. Binder, whom I do not
6 Q. Thank you. But he is talking about correspondents who are
7 reporting about the Serbs. He's not talking about the Serbs. I hope
8 that doesn't pertain to you as well, although this characterisation of
9 mentality reminded me of this, and that's why I actually quoted him,
10 because this characterisation of a group mentality reminded me of this
11 mildly racist approach.
12 JUDGE KWON: Stop making comment, Mr. Karadzic.
13 Mr. Nicholls?
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Do we have a 65 ter number for what he's reading
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is quotation from
18 David Binder. It's a quotation from the "New York Times." If necessary,
19 we'll show you the entire text, but I had not intended to tender it.
20 JUDGE KWON: No, the point is not that. You have to inform the
21 other parties of the documents you are going to use during your
22 cross-examination as a principle.
23 Let's move on.
24 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, may I just react to the comment that
25 Mr. Karadzic made at the end there?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, briefly, Mr. van Lynden.
2 THE WITNESS: I wasn't making a characterisation of a group
3 mentality. I was describing what happened in relation the reaction of
4 Bosnian Serbs to the stories that I filed at the beginning of June. They
5 were anti one story, and they were perfectly happy with the rest. That's
6 not a characterisation of a group mentality, Mr. Karadzic. And certainly
7 not racism.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Thank you. On page 45, you say that I had said to you -- this is
11 "[In English] He told me that the enclaves were unacceptable,
12 that they had to become part of Serb territory."
13 [Interpretation] Do you agree that on all maps the territory that
14 you call enclaves was accepted by the Serbs to be in Muslim-held
15 territory, the Cutileiro map, the Vance-Owen map, then Owen-Stoltenberg,
16 that map was accepted. In all these maps, and primarily in Cutileiro's
17 map, we accepted that that would be Muslim territory. As a matter of
18 fact, I authorised President Milosevic to say that we did not care about
19 Srebrenica, that in some version it could be within Muslim territory.
20 Don't you know that?
21 A. I was asked what you had said to me when we met, and I -- as I,
22 to the best of my knowledge recall, you said that they were not
23 acceptable. What you did elsewhere I was not asked about. I was asked
24 what you had said to me, and as I recall those conversations.
25 Q. Now we're going to agree even more that your notes would be
1 invaluable. Isn't that right?
2 Now, let me draw your attention to page 50 --
3 A. Are you asking a question? "Isn't that right," is that a
5 Q. No, no. I'm just supporting, corroborating my request to receive
6 your notes.
7 A. I do not know if I wrote notes about those meetings,
8 Mr. Karadzic. I do not remember.
9 Q. Well, it's on the record, and I'm challenging it. Now, let's
10 look at page 52. Page 52. You are talking about the convent. On who's
11 territory was it, with the nuns there that were giving coffee and food?
12 On who's territory was that? Towards the end, you say:
13 "[In English] The attacks by Serbs in this sector have diminished
14 leaving the battalion commander exuding confidence."
15 [Interpretation] On whose territory was this convent?
16 A. By Serbs in -- I'm sorry, the line does not make any sense to me.
17 By Serbs in this sector have diminished leaving the battalion --" as far
18 as your question of the convent is concerned, it was in Bosnian Serb-held
19 territory. The convent was in --
20 Q. [In English] Attacks --
21 [Interpretation] This is what you said, these are your words from
22 the video-clip:
23 "[In English] The string of little village lining the cemetery
24 have been turned into bunkers, sitting room floors roughly redecorated
25 with logs, although some are more imaginative. Some mirrors deployed for
1 one guard to view all angles. Attacks by Serbs --
2 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it's correct. I will read out for
4 "The string of little villas lining the cemetery have been turned
5 into bunkers. Sitting room walls roughly redecorated with lines of logs,
6 although some of the defences are more imaginative. Bathroom mirrors
7 subtlety deployed to allow one guard to view all angles. All of late the
8 tanks against the Serb lines in this sector have diminished, leaving the
9 battalion commander exuding confidence."
10 Do you remember that?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, I remember that.
12 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, what it says here is
14 "attacks by Serbs," not "on Serb lines," if we have the same transcript.
15 JUDGE KWON: The transcripts are corrected overnight, comparing
16 the audio recording. So what I read out is the corrected version from
17 the e-court.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: And I would just say, Your Honour, we do have the
19 translation of that story, the transcript from that video, which accords
20 with what Your Honour read.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do we agree then that this convent is on the Serb side, on Serb
25 territory, and that those nuns were in territory where the Serbs had
2 A. I've already said that that was the case.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 A. What is your question as to the other part of the story that
5 you've just -- that the Judge has just read out to us?
6 Q. Thank you. I would not have had a question had the transcript
7 been correct, because according to the version that I have, it had seemed
8 that it was the Serbs who were attacking the area, whereas my assertion
9 is that it was Serb-held territory attacked by the Muslims. We protected
10 these nuns. We saved their library. We returned it at the end of the
11 war, and we have proof of that throughout the war. Thank you.
12 May I draw your attention to page 56. It's the transcript of the
13 19th. Mr. Nicholls asked you:
14 "[In English] That you stated that it was a civilian target in
15 the story we just watched. If you could just explain that. Did you see
16 any indications there, any fire coming from that building or how you came
17 to that conclusion?"
18 [Interpretation] Answer:
19 "[In English] Well, we were certainly by that stage of the war
20 very much aware that whenever there was an incident in Sarajevo
21 defence from the Bosnian Serb side would be that it had been a legitimate
22 military target or that the Bosnians had been shooting at themselves.
23 And this in December 1992 we are talking about, and so we were quite
24 quick. I mean, we did this anyway. Wherever we went was the building
25 used by elements of the Bosnian Army, we did not only meet this one
1 distraught -- distraught man who you say in these pictures who lost his
2 flat. We met other people in the flat, and they all -- they all went,
3 are you mad to let the military use the building, because we know what
4 the repercussion would be."
5 [Interpretation] My question: Do you think that citizens in
6 buildings in Sarajevo
7 from that building or from a particular apartment or from the roof? Do
8 you think that it was for the citizens to say, or did they simply have to
9 accept everything that the Green Berets would decide? Is this sufficient
10 to conclude that something was not a military target?
11 A. I'm referring to one particular building and to the questions we
12 asked and the answers that we got from the people living in that one
13 particular building. We also went to the UNPROFOR headquarters to ask
14 them whether any of their forces had seen fire emanating from that
15 building that was targeted with incendiary rounds, and they said they had
16 not. It is not a comment made about every single block of flats in the
17 whole of Sarajevo
18 Q. Thank you. In another video-clip you said that the defenders had
19 turned apartments and offices into places from where there was shooting,
20 and that explains what you said just now, and I'll accept it.
21 A. No, no, no. No, no. Wait a second. On the front lines, as also
22 on your side of the front lines, apartments and office blocks were turned
23 into military installations. This was not a front-line apartment
24 building. This was a civilian apartment building that was targeted.
25 Quite different to the other positions on the -- right on the front
2 Q. Have you heard of the killing of the wife of General
3 Sefer Halilovic and her brother? They were killed on the terrace of
4 their apartment. An attempt was made to portray this as being due to a
5 Serb shell. Since Sefer Halilovic was a military officer, he managed to
6 refute that and prove that it was an explosion. Did you hear about that?
7 A. Yes, we did, and yes, we were also told that this was not done by
8 Bosnian Serb fire, but that this had something to do with an internal
9 power struggle.
10 I wasn't in Sarajevo
11 this myself, but I am aware of the incident happening and that the fire
12 had come from, let's say, within the Bosnians' forces themselves.
13 Q. Now I would like to ask for D162. It is General Rose's book that
14 we'll be quoting often here. D162, page 18.
15 So this is General Rose's book. Page 18:
16 "[In English] Initial Muslim tactics --"
17 [Interpretation] I'll start reading it before we get it in
19 "[In English] As we crossed the conflict line on the Bosnian side
20 a detachment of 120-millimetre mortar opened fire close by the road to
21 our left. Bosnian forces were shelling Serb positions on the hills above
22 the city. I asked rather nervously what was happening, and
23 Victor Andreev, the Russian UN civilian advisor in Sarajevo, who had come
24 to meet me and who was to become my inseparable friend and colleague,
25 told me there was nothing to worry about. There was no such thing in the
1 eyes of the Bosnian government, he explained, as a purely military
2 action. There was only political action. They always greeted new
3 arrivals to Sarajevo
4 with artillery fire on the city. Visitors were thus given a practical
5 demonstration of the aggression being committed against the state of
7 [Interpretation] We maintain -- or, rather, in our interview you
8 said that the weakness thesis of ours, our weakest position, was
9 precisely that we said that they shot often, that they shot at their own
10 people, that they employed trickery, and so on. We claim the same as
11 Mr. Rose claims, that the basic goal of the Muslim forces and policy was
12 to provoke foreign intervention and to blacken the Serbs, besmirch the
13 Serbs, either by talking about killing or opening fire, and so on.
14 Did [as interpreted] you feel uncomfortable when you realised
15 that the Muslim government had duped you, tricked you?
16 "Would you." In the transcript it says "did you?"
17 Would you, would you feel uncomfortable if you were to realise
18 that? Would you fell uncomfortable if they duped you the way we claim
19 that you were duped by them? And I hope you weren't by us intentionally.
20 A. I'm glad to hear it, Mr. Karadzic. I was never welcomed to
22 I cannot believe that what we witnessed at the beginning of June was done
23 for my entertainment. I have not myself witnessed the same as Mr. Rose,
24 and you would have to ask Mr. Rose and Mr. Andreev about their version of
25 events. What I said to you on Tuesday afternoon was that the repeated
1 claims you made was that basically the Bosnians only shot at themselves,
2 they were never shot at by you is not something that holds up in my
3 experience. The Bosnian were fired at enough by your forces; they didn't
4 need to shoot at themselves to cause international outrage.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 69 and 70
7 displayed, please, of this same book. And while we're waiting for that
8 come up, I'll start reading:
9 "[In English] Many journalists in Sarajevo also supported the war
10 option either because they believed that it was morally right to engage
11 in some form of holy war against the Serbs or else because images of war
12 sell better than those of peace."
13 [Interpretation] That's towards the end of page 69, the bottom of
14 page 69, and then goes on to page 70. Now, how do you see this, this
15 assessment made by the reporter from Sarajevo, an experienced journalist,
16 General Rose, saying that it was different?
17 A. As far as I'm aware, General Rose was a soldier and not a
19 It's his view. I cannot comment on his view.
20 Q. But I'm saying that he as a soldier understood that the reporting
21 was different from what he saw the situation to be as a soldier, which
22 means he did not agree with the reporting.
23 A. That's -- that's his business. You should ask him about that,
24 not me.
25 Q. But the United Nations were one of the sources of information.
1 So you could be informed through the United Nations. You could ask them
2 for information, could you not?
3 A. Yes, but in 1992, General Rose was not in Sarajevo. He arrived
4 in 1994.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, how much longer do you have for your
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, two or three hours, but I see
8 what the situation's like. So I'd like to ask you to ask Mr. van Lynden
9 to come back, because then we could allow him to select entries from his
10 notebooks. And although he was in Bosnia
11 valuable witness, and we can use his example and the example of what he
12 said to throw light, shed some more light on the situation. On many
13 things, in fact.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. van Lynden, I was told from the Registry and
15 through Victims and Witnesses Section that they have -- because they have
16 some special arrangement with the Schiphol Airport, you may leave around
17 12.00, leave the Tribunal around 12.00. Is it -- is it correct?
18 THE WITNESS: I haven't been told that. I just know that I have
19 a flight that I absolutely need to take this afternoon, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: I am aware of the time, but I was told -- I was
21 confirmed by the Registry --
22 THE WITNESS: No one has told me about special -- deals at
23 Schiphol Airport
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, just very briefly, I'm sorry. I
2 haven't heard about that special arrangement or time or anything like
3 that either. I just want to put my position, I strenuously do not want
4 Mr. van Lynden to be too rushed. I don't want there to be any chance of
5 him missing this flight whatsoever, and I would say that the accused has
6 had just shy of 8 hours of cross-examination time. Regardless about how
7 some of that time was used, he has had ample time to cross-examine this
8 witness based on the statement and direct, two days of court time in
10 JUDGE KWON: I don't think he has had that many hours, but
11 around -- I haven't checked, but I -- it's better to save on -- to err on
12 the safe side, and I don't like the witness to miss his flight in any
13 event, but -- but unfortunately, we would request to come back in -- at a
14 time when it would be convenient for you. The Victims and Witness
15 Section will communicate to you to find out what time will suit you. So
16 we have to adjourn your evidence at this time.
17 THE WITNESS: That is your decision. Your Honour, given my past
18 experience in being a witness at this Tribunal, I'm somewhat surprised.
19 I think I -- the accused has had a great deal of time to question me. He
20 believes that I'm a very important witness. I wouldn't make that claim
21 for myself.
22 I would also like to point out something else to this Tribunal as
23 far as this is concerned. I was first told in November and given a date
24 when I would be a witness to this court. I have been given several other
25 dates since then. On each occasion I've had to change my plans because I
1 had to keep the Tribunal in mind, and on each occasion it was cancelled.
2 November to May is quite a long time to keep being told that you have to
3 change your personal life because you have to be a witness at a Tribunal.
4 I don't know if Your Honours have been a witness at a Tribunal ever in
5 your own lives. It is not a comfortable experience.
6 I feel I have come. We've made time again. Although it has
7 caused problems in my own private life, I have come here this week. I
8 have given the time, and would I agree with the Prosecution that this has
9 been ample.
10 One other point on this, Your Honour, is that in my experience of
11 this court, I have never encountered such muddled questioning and heard
12 so many comments made by the accused or by the representative of the
13 accused, and that, as Your Honours yourselves have pointed out to the
14 accused, has wasted a great time of time. That's his decision. That's
15 not my fault.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, and I don't want to weigh in long.
18 I would only ask the Court to review the transcript, to reconsider
19 it's -- I don't know that the Court has made an actual decision to recall
20 the witness. Instead to consider that possibility. My recollection is
21 the accused was told how much time he could expect to have, indicated
22 that he was aware of that but might nevertheless make some request for
23 the witness to return, that that would have to be considered in light of
24 the manner in which he used the time he had. The Court encouraged him
25 repeatedly to be more efficient, to ask relevant questions. I think a
1 review of the transcript will reveal that he repeatedly failed to comply
2 with that request, and I think that bears on any request to bring the
3 witness back, particularly in light of the time that the witness has
4 devoted to this process already. Thank you.
5 JUDGE MORRISON: The position is never easy. When a witness
6 comes to court to give evidence, he is at large when it comes to
7 cross-examination, but the observations made by this witness mirror the
8 observations that were made from the Bench as to the nature and content
9 of some of the cross-examination, but nevertheless, it remains the
10 position that the defendant must be able to conclude his
11 cross-examination, whether that's done in a manner which is appropriate
12 in terms of absolute efficiency or whether there is a different view as
13 to that efficiency. But the position is this, that normally speaking
14 when a witness comes to court, the time for the witness is predicated by
15 the end of the cross-examination, not predicated by the necessity to
16 catch a particular flight. The reality is in this position that the
17 Court is very happy and wants the witness to catch his flight, and the
18 Court can then consider by looking at the transcripts, and no doubt
19 Dr. Karadzic can reconsider whether it's absolutely necessary to ask
20 Mr. van Lynden to attend again, and if he is asked, he must make his own
21 mind up as to whether he's prepared to come or not prepared to come.
22 THE WITNESS: Well, I think I would be in contempt of court if I
23 did not return.
24 JUDGE MORRISON: You may -- that's an arguable proposition, but
25 we're not dealing with that at the moment. Let's -- let's see whether or
1 not it's a necessity, an absolute necessity, and I'm sure Dr. Karadzic
2 has expended a great deal of time, if not all the time that he wanted --
3 reconsider the position rather than, as it were, to make any definitive
4 statement now and waste more time when you have a flight to catch. I
5 think it's better that all parties consider their decisions and make a
6 rational decision upon a mature reflection of the transcript.
7 THE WITNESS: Fine, Your Honour. But I would ask that if I do
8 have to return that it be in -- as quickly as possible. Either at the
9 end of next week or the week after that.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: I'm -- I don't think the Bench can assist with
11 the scheduling in that sense, but no doubt the Prosecution hears what you
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I don't think I'm allowed to
14 talk to the Prosecution, if my testimony hasn't finished, I would -- I'm
15 trying to send a message to them by you.
16 JUDGE MORRISON: I'm sure that Dr. Karadzic would not object, nor
17 would the Bench object if you negotiated as to the timings of a return
18 rather than anything substantive in respect of your testimony.
19 JUDGE KWON: I would ask the victim and witness section to
20 coordinate with the Prosecution as well as the Defence to set a date for
21 Mr. van Lynden to come over again. I do appreciate, Mr. van Lynden, for
22 your kindness to come over yet again to give your testimony and further
23 to agree to come back again. So please do bear in mind in this case your
24 evidence was admitted via written statement, which took several hours to
25 give in it direct. So although your evidence in this case took less than
1 two hours, the accused needs some more time.
2 Thank you very much. You are free to go.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break for 15 minutes, and then we'll
5 start -- we'll hear other evidence. Fifteen minutes.
6 --- Recess taken at 11.06 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 11.22 a.m.
8 JUDGE KWON: I was advised that there are some administrative
9 matters to be raised. Who is going first? Mr. Nicholls or Mr. Karadzic?
10 MR. NICHOLLS: I just came in to object, Your Honour, if they
11 offered the pages of the Rose book, which I thought we had not yet dealt
12 with and that were shown to Mr. van Lynden just before he departed. I
13 don't believe that they tendered that document and were about to.
14 JUDGE KWON: But e-court says part of that book has been admitted
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, but my understanding was that these pages had
17 not been. If it's already, then --
18 JUDGE KWON: No, no. Part of the book, I don't know to whom, but
19 which was put to some witness, must have been admitted. That's why we
20 have the exhibit number. Do we know the page number which was -- 174.
21 And I take it --
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 18 and 69, 70, if I might be
23 allowed to add. And I'd like to remind you that the witness confirmed
24 that after Markale in February 1994 he was in Sarajevo. So he
25 co-operated with General Rose -- or, rather, could co-operate and could
1 take information from him.
2 JUDGE KWON: And it is your position to object to admitting
3 those, page 18 and 69 to 70.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, under the guidelines which we've
5 issued and the general principles. The conversation about the greeting,
6 for lack of a better word, that General Rose described at page 18, the
7 witness said he knew nothing about it, and that nothing like that had
8 happened in his experience. General Rose's comments contained in the
9 book on journalists. The witness again said, That's nothing to do with
10 me, and I can't comment on it. The time-frame wasn't given, and this
11 should not be admitted.
12 JUDGE KWON: I tend to agree. I don't recall in what context
13 page 147 of that book was admitted. 174. But in this case --
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And one more thing.
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The witness didn't confirm the
16 content of it, and then could not comment on it, and for the practical
17 purpose to check the credibility of the witness, the crux of the book --
18 of the pages, those pages, were put to the witness. I don't feel the
19 need to admit those parts. Following our procedure, by principle we do
20 not admit General Rose's book.
21 What is your next agenda, Mr. Karadzic?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, with respect to the previous
23 question, although you've made a ruling, what I want to say is that
24 Mr. van Lynden confirmed that he did take information and was informed
25 about events at the -- from the United Nations. It's impossible that
1 General Rose would have kept quiet about something that was his generally
2 known position. So that shows a discrepancy there.
3 And the second thing was this: The Defence has nothing against
4 having Mr. van Lynden appear already on Tuesday or when we finish with
5 Mr. Doyle. That was his wish, and perhaps it would be best for everybody
6 concerned, because his testimony will be fresh in our minds.
7 JUDGE KWON: I will leave it in the hands of the parties. So the
8 parties should communicate through VWS and what date would be most
10 Is that it? Yes. Judge Morrison.
11 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, I really would like to urge you to
12 consider whether it is absolutely necessary. I think Mr. van Lynden set
13 out his general position, I think fairly clearly, to all of us in that
14 there were things that he adopted and things that he didn't adopt. And
15 if you are intending to put statements to him in extensio, you're likely
16 to receive the same sort of answers, and a lot of the statements you may,
17 on reflection, feel are better produced through another witness who can
18 speak to the authenticity of the statement and the contents of the
19 statement, rather than simply commenting upon a partial observation or a
20 subjective observation of one or two sentences. You may find that that's
21 actually a much better way to adduce the evidence before the Court, and
22 upon mature reflection that it isn't actually necessary to deal through
23 Mr. van Lynden with that matter.
24 I'm not making any definitive judgements. I couldn't on my own.
25 But it seems to me that that is a valuable exercise which you might want
1 to undertake before requesting Mr. van Lynden's re-attendance at the
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will consider that
4 proposal of yours with my associates and advisors, but we first of all
5 asked for 12 hours for Mr. van Lynden and then 8 hours later on. Now, if
6 he's not coming in next week, we would need next week as a break, and I
7 think that break was promised us when the start of the trial and the
8 proceedings were scheduled, and I think that is to be found in the
9 transcript. I don't know the number of the page transcript number off
10 hand. So we will -- we had to go ahead sooner than we had planned with
11 less time for preparation, especially when we have this very important
12 witness coming in next. So I'll be able to give you a definitive answer
13 when I consult -- having consulted my associates.
14 Now, if Mr. van Lynden is not coming in next week, then if we
15 complete Mr. Doyle's testimony early, the Defence would request that we
16 don't work next week, that the next witness does not come in next week,
17 but that we have a break. Or perhaps just the examination-in-chief and
18 to defer the cross-examination to the week after that.
19 JUDGE KWON: We will consider when the parties come up with an
20 agreement or suggestion.
21 Let's bring in the next witness.
22 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Good morning, Your Honours. Before we bring
24 in the next witness, I would like to raise one administrative matter, but
25 we have to do this in private session.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 [Private session]
21 [Open session]
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
23 We will bring in the witness.
24 There will be a slight correction of exhibit number from the
25 Court Deputy.
1 THE REGISTRAR: The two exhibits that were admitted today with
2 the previous witness which were numbered previously as Exhibit D213 and
3 D214 should in fact be Exhibit D211 and D212 respectively. Thank you.
4 [The witness entered court]
5 WITNESS: COLM DOYLE
6 JUDGE KWON: Welcome, Mr. Doyle. If you could take the solemn
7 declaration, please.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Microphone.
10 If you could repeat, because it was not translated.
11 THE WITNESS: Repeat it?
12 I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth,
13 and nothing but the truth.
14 JUDGE KWON: If you could make yourself comfortable.
15 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:
18 Q. Good morning, Mr. Doyle.
19 A. Good morning.
20 Q. Please state your full name.
21 A. My full name is Colm Doyle.
22 Q. And you are a retired colonel in the Irish army?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. You testified here at the Tribunal already twice; is that
1 A. Yes, that is correct.
2 Q. And in particular, you testified in the case of the Prosecutor
3 versus Slobodan Milosevic on the 26th and the 27th of August, 2003?
4 A. Yes, I did.
5 Q. And, Colonel, have you had an opportunity to review the
6 transcript of your testimony in the Milosevic case when you came here?
7 A. Yes, I have.
8 Q. And in doing so, did you identify three facts that you want to
9 clarify or correct?
10 A. Yes. There were three points which -- which I thought needed
12 Q. Yes. And in relation to the transcript page 25312 in the
13 Milosevic testimony, were you -- where you discussed with Mr. Milosevic a
14 parliamentary debate on a referendum on independence, did you wish to
15 clarify a date given there by Mr. Milosevic and he spoke about 24th
17 A. Yes. The 24th of October was a different occasion, and I was
18 referring to the parliamentary debate which took place in -- at a later
19 date than that.
20 Q. And which date?
21 A. I think that date was in January in 1992.
22 Q. And on page 25377, Mr. Milosevic quoted General MacKenzie in
23 relation to the duration of the blockade of the Marsal Tito Barracks to
24 which you responded that that's an impossibility. Mr. MacKenzie was
25 speaking of months, and you said -- and you were referring to your visit
1 there and providing your understanding that the barracks were surrounded
2 for approximately two days.
3 What is the clarification that you wanted to give?
4 A. The clarification is that when I was talking about the barracks
5 that was blocked for two days, it wasn't in fact the Marsal Tito
6 Barracks, but it was the headquarters of the federal army based in
8 referring to and not the Marshall Tito.
9 Q. Thank you. And finally on page 2538 there is the date 12 June
10 given as the date on which the European Community Monitoring Mission and
11 you were withdrawn from Sarajevo
12 A. Yes. The date in question in fact was the 12th of May, 1992, and
13 not the 12th of June, 1992.
14 Q. With the exception of these clarification, can you affirm that
15 the transcript of your testimony in the Milosevic case accurately
16 reflects the evidence you provided to the Court at that time?
17 A. Yes, it does.
18 Q. And, Colonel, would you provide that same information to the
19 Court if examined again on the same matters here today?
20 A. Yes, I would.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to tender this
22 testimony, 65 ter number 90012, for admission under Rule 92 ter.
23 JUDGE KWON: So in sort it's a transcript of his testimony in the
24 case of Slobodan Milosevic.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, and it's now 65 ter number 90012.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Doyle's evidence at the time was given pursuant
2 to Rule 92 ter, wasn't it?
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, but Mr. Doyle actually gave a quite
4 extensive additional testimony, and we want to tender the -- this
5 testimony. The statement that was the basis for the 92 ter in the
6 Milosevic case is -- was exhibited in the Milosevic case, and it is now
7 our Exhibit Number 10879. We -- I -- we did not produce an amalgamated
8 statement because the evidence in the testimony and the -- the statement
9 are basically the same. The reason why we also, however, want this to be
10 exhibited is that during the testimony in the Milosevic case, the
11 paragraphs in that statement are constantly referred to, in particular by
12 Mr. Milosevic. So therefore at the end I will ask the Judges to also
13 exhibit this statement just as a reference document. It's not that there
14 is something in there which would be different from the testimony.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have any objection to its
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. If I get enough time to
18 challenge everything, then it's all the same to me.
19 JUDGE KWON: I would expect in the future you would produce in
20 such case an amalgamated statement.
21 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I -- I don't want to take time right
23 now, but perhaps that matter can be discussed. I mean, we've taken quite
24 a close look at that, trying to meet both the letter and the spirit of
25 the Court's guidance with respect to that, but this seems to us, upon
1 careful reflection, a matter that does not advance the -- the interests
2 underlying the amalgamated statements. It produces -- it, in fact, is
3 potentially confusion -- confusing and results in, what we would
4 consider, perhaps unnecessary work. In any event, perhaps we can -- we
5 can find a better opportunity to address the pros and cons of the
6 amalgamated statement in this kind of context, and I would just ask that
7 we have that opportunity. But not now. I know we're trying to move
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's move on.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Your Honour, with your permission, I
11 would now read a summary of Colonel Doyle's evidence as admitted.
12 From October 1991 to March 1992, Colonel Doyle served as a member
13 of the European Community Monitoring Mission, the ECMM, in Bosnia
15 November, 1991, in Sarajevo
16 ECMM mission in Sarajevo
17 During this time, Colonel Doyle met with leaders of Bosnia
19 including the accused.
20 He recalls that local Serb -- Serb leaders very often referred
21 back to historical events and atrocities of the Second World War and
22 expressed fears of their repetition. Muslim representatives informed the
23 witness that they were intimidated and afraid to go out at night.
24 Bosnian Serb reservists would return from service and retain their
25 weapons and cause incidents which increased the tension between Serbs and
2 Colonel Doyle was aware that following the withdrawal of the JNA
3 from Croatia
4 their presence. He observed the transformation of the JNA into a
5 Serbian Army, and the JNA's close relationship with the Bosnian Serbs.
6 From meetings with the accused, Colonel Doyle observed that he
7 was the undisputed head of the Serbian Democratic Party. The Bosnian
8 Presidency members Plavsic and Koljevic and other Bosnian Serb leaders
9 would defer to his decisions.
10 During a meeting with the accused immediately before the
11 referendum on Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence, the accused
12 predicted that there would be a conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 Would the state internationally be recognised without first reaching an
14 agreement with the Bosnian Serbs.
15 On 2nd March 1992
16 were announced, shooting commenced in Sarajevo and barricades were
17 erected by Serbs. Upon approaching one of these barricades,
18 Colonel Doyle was informed by the person in charge that the barricade
19 would only be dismantled upon Karadzic's specific direction.
20 From April 1992 to August 1992, Colonel Doyle functioned as
21 personal representative of Lord Carrington, the chairman of the
22 international peace conference on the former Yugoslavia. In this
23 capacity, he continued to participate in high-level meetings with all
24 sides, including the accused, and to monitor political and military
1 On 10th of April, 1992, Martin Bell of the BBC informed
2 Colonel Doyle that 25.000 refugees were on the move from Zvornik, and
3 Colonel Doyle conveyed this information to the accused. On another
4 occasion, after reports of ethnic cleansing had been received by the
5 ECMM, an ECMM team was dispatched to Foca but was prevented from entering
6 by the JNA forces. Colonel Doyle raised this matter with Mr. Koljevic.
7 Also in April 1992, Colonel Doyle was engaged in cease-fire
8 negotiations. During these negotiations, Bosnian Serb officials sought
9 to divide the assets belonging to the Sarajevo Television. On 18 April
10 1992, Sarajevo Television received a call from somebody in Pale warning
11 them to get off the air, otherwise they would be destroyed.
12 Colonel Doyle sought and received Karadzic's assurances that this would
13 not happen. About 20 minutes later, Sarajevo Television was shelled by
14 Serb forces, resulting in the death of two civilians. That same evening,
15 the accused acknowledged that the attack had been committed by Serbs but
16 that it was not authorised and that he would investigate the attack.
17 Colonel Doyle observed and was aware of the constant shelling of
18 the city of Sarajevo
19 sniping activities. The continued shelling of the city meant that on
20 11 of May, 1992, ECMM monitors and other internationals had to leave, and
21 Colonel Doyle left on the 12th of May.
22 On 3rd July 1992
23 noticed a deterioration of the situation. Each day there was heavy
24 artillery bombardment in the city.
25 On 16 August 1992
1 Colonel Doyle confronted the accused with a "Times" newspaper article
2 carrying a photograph on its front cover of Muslim detainees at a camp in
3 Prijedor. Later that day, the accused expressed concerns about the
4 impact of this news to Colonel Doyle. Colonel Doyle raised with him at
5 that occasion the issue of Muslims and Croats being forced to sign over
6 their property to Bosnian Serbs before leaving. The accused conceded
7 that this was unlawful and stated that he would publicly condemn this
9 Your Honour, this concludes the summary, and I would now ask
10 additional questions.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We haven't given the exhibit number to
12 his had 92 ter statement. Shall we do that now.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter number 90012 will be
14 Exhibit P918.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
17 Q. Colonel Doyle, you have described your functions and your
18 testimony as an impartial observer of the events on the ground. What was
19 the European Community Monitoring Mission's mandate?
20 A. Well, the basic mandate of the ECMM was contained in the
21 memorandum of understanding that was signed on the 1st of October, 1991
22 And the main mission of the ECMM was to attempt to contain the situation,
23 to try and ensure that there would be no escalation or no violence, and
24 if there -- if that was not succeeded by the mission to attain, then to
25 verify the situation so that we could give an accurate picture to
1 headquarters in Europe
2 Q. Thank you. I would ask that exhibit 65 ter 11038 be brought up
3 and page 10 of this -- this exhibit. It's the -- the ERN
4 number 0334-0091.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's not the right one. Page 10 of this
6 particular exhibit. Yeah. Yeah. That's the right one.
7 Q. Mr. Doyle, is that the memorandum that you just mentioned?
8 A. Yes, I believe it is.
9 Q. And moving on to the pages 16 to 18, the next -- at the end of
10 this particular document, please. Yeah. That's actually sufficient.
11 At the end of this memorandum, there is -- is there a detail of
12 the structure of the mission and the personnel involved?
13 A. Yes. That's the structure of the mission for -- for the
14 operation that was in Sarajevo
15 Q. Yes. Thank you.
16 A. Which was the regional centre.
17 Q. Yes. Thank you.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I would like to tender
19 Exhibit 65 ter 11038 for admission.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P919.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
23 Q. From your service with the Irish army, did you have experience in
24 monitoring activities in crisis or conflict areas before you joined the
25 ECMM mission?
1 A. Well, I served on a few occasions as a member of the Irish
2 defence forces in United Nations peacekeeping missions abroad. I served
3 in Cyprus
4 service in Lebanon
5 between 1984 and 1986, I was a military observer with the United Nations
6 truce sup division organisation. Six months of that I spent in Syria
7 a year and a half in Lebanon
8 parties to conflict.
9 Q. Now, in relation to the ECMM mission reports that you have
10 drafted, can you tell the Court what were your sources of information.
11 A. Well, the organisation of the monitor mission in Sarajevo
12 approximately 60 personnel drawn from the countries of the European Union
13 and also from four countries that weren't in the union at the time but
14 they were part of OSCE, the organisation for security and co-operation in
17 officers who had experience of service abroad and also members of
18 ministries of defence from member states and members of the EU
19 Commission. I had divided these into various teams. So we deployed
20 teams in areas of Bosnia
21 areas, and Muslim areas, places like Bihac, Tuzla, Banja Luka
22 and Mostar, and they would go out into the communities. They would have
23 meetings with the various local political leaders, the religious
24 communities, civilian communities, and even the JNA forces. And they
25 would compile a report which would be submitted back to my office. We
1 would then look at it, analyse it, and we would then make out a
2 consolidated report which we would send to the headquarters in Zagreb
3 Q. Yes, thank you.
4 From your contacts with the various leaderships you had yourself
5 of the parties involved, did you get the impression that the parties
6 accepted you as impartial?
7 A. Well, I had no reason at all to believe that we were not accepted
8 by all sides. They certainly gave us their co-operation. At meetings
9 we -- we asked. There was never any occasion when we were refused, so we
10 assumed that we were an acceptable, neutral group of people trying to do
11 the job that we were mandated to do, yes.
12 Q. You mentioned in your previous testimony as well in the reports
13 that were filed at that time that you received information from
14 representatives of the Bosnian government of the build-up by JNA troops
15 in the course of the withdrawal from Croatia and the influx of weapons
16 from the JNA, and that this was perceived as threats and intimidation by
17 the non-Serbs. Did you or the ECMM observers make observations to this
18 effect in the course of your monitoring?
19 A. Well, there were certain trends which came through the reports
20 which were received from all of the areas which were relatively common.
21 And one of those certainly was that it would appear that a lot of the
22 Bosnian Serbs had access to weapons that Muslim and Croats didn't have.
23 So when we tried to examine the background to this, we discovered that
24 first of all the -- when the -- when the JNA called up for mobilisation,
25 the president of Bosnia
1 were declaring a neutrality, and therefore there was no need for people
2 to obey the call-up. But this was done mainly by Bosnian Serbs. In
3 addition to that, when they were issued with weapons, they were allowed
4 to keep the weapons when they finished their few weeks of training. So
5 combined with that and also the fact that when the JNA were withdrawn
6 from Croatia
7 allowed to stay in Bosnia
8 Serbs, they then, practically overnight, became the Bosnian Serb Army,
9 because when the JNA left Croatia
10 attempting to leave Bosnia
11 of tanks, artillery, and most military equipment. So almost overnight
12 the Bosnian Serbs were -- were able to declare themselves that they had
13 an army.
14 Q. I would -- I would ask that exhibit 65 ter 11098 be brought up on
15 the screen, please. And as this is being done, it is a report of
16 13 March 1992
18 Colonel, is this one of your reports?
19 A. Yes, it is.
20 Q. And just to help us with -- because we see it in many documents,
21 RC Sarajevo stands for what?
22 A. The the regional centre.
23 Q. Mm-hmm. And DHOM
24 A. DHOM
25 based in Zagreb
1 Q. Looking at letter (b) -- a bit further down, please. Letter (b),
2 there is a reference. In point (b) you speak of an abundant supply of
3 weapons in the Serbian communities. Is that what you were referring to?
4 A. Yes. That was our -- that was our assessment at the time.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I would like to tender
6 Exhibit 11098.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P920.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would now ask that Exhibit 65 ter 00039 be
10 brought up onto the screen. And as this is being done, it is the
11 transcript from the 24th session of the RS Assembly, dated
12 8 January 1993
13 Q. Colonel, did you -- did you have an opportunity to review this
14 document when you came to The Hague
15 A. Yes. I had an opportunity of scanning it quickly, yes.
16 Q. Can we please have page 53 in the B/C/S and page 77 in English.
17 And can we -- can we zoom -- no. Okay.
18 If you look at the -- the third paragraph, now starting with,
19 "Now we go back to this."
20 A. Yes
21 Q. Yes. You see that?
22 A. Yes, I do.
23 Q. Just -- so to say it's Mr. Vojo Kupresanin speaking. This can be
24 seen from the two pages previous. And he is saying:
25 "We had aviation, howitzers, tanks, cannons. But what did the
1 Muslims have? Some guns, some machine-gun that they had bought from the
2 Serbs, and homemade guns. We could have gunned through Bosnia as through
3 cheese, but have not done it."
4 These remarks on the weapons on either side, is this consistent
5 with your own information that you had during the time in Bosnia
6 A. Yes, I think this is a fair reflection of what we had thought.
7 Of course we weren't naive enough to think that the Croats and the
8 Muslims didn't have weapons. They would have had some weapons, but
9 certainly there was no comparison between the amount that Muslims and
10 Croats would have had and those of the Serbs. They seemed to have them
11 at their disposal in whatever quantities they wished.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour --
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Do you have an objection, Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That was a leading question, so let
16 it be, but may it not happen again.
17 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I just have to say this is not
19 a leading question.
20 JUDGE KWON: No.
21 JUDGE MORRISON: It's not.
22 JUDGE KWON: She put the text of the transcript of your -- of the
23 Republika Srpska session, and you ask -- she asked whether it's
24 consistent with his impression. No leading question. Let's move on.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I request the admission of this
1 Exhibit 00039 into evidence. It is a long -- we have just addressed one
2 quote, and it is quite a long exhibit. However, these are
3 contemporaneous official records, so I thought this -- it would be the
4 right thing to admit them as a whole. And they are relevant, definitely,
5 in this case because they relate to -- in this document relate to
6 international negotiations, territorial details on -- given on all sorts
7 of municipalities that we are dealing with. It relates to humanitarian
8 matters, lifelong suffering of the Serb people is described, and
9 representation of the various municipality leaders on these issues. So I
10 thought it falls into the -- into the guidelines that we have gotten so
12 JUDGE KWON: And you are going to use this document with upcoming
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour, and I would actually think
15 that Dr. Karadzic would do the same.
16 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any additional comment, Mr. Tieger?
17 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. With respect to this particular
18 category of documents, the Assembly sessions, I believe the Chamber has
19 already made a determination about their admissibility in their entirety
20 and has done so on previously occasions.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any observation?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. No objections. I'm going to
24 use the same document.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will admit it in its entirety.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P921, Your Honours.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would now ask that Exhibit 65 ter 11036 be
5 Q. Colonel is this one of the weekly reports that you prepared in
6 handwriting at the time you were stationed in Banja Luka?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have page 3 on the screen.
9 Q. Can you read -- can you read paragraph 7 to us, the first
10 paragraph on that page?
11 A. "The presence of so many reservists who are undisciplined and
12 badly behaved is very worrying to Croats and Muslims. The Serbs support
13 the call-up and display a stubborn attitude in this regard."
14 Q. What you have here mentioned, is this a unique occurrence, or is
15 it something that you observed in other regions as well?
16 A. This is one of the factors that seemed to be current to all of
17 the teams that we had deployed, that there were reservists who were
18 mostly Serbs, because they were armed, they were undisciplined. And at
19 one stage I made an approach to the JNA commander in Banja Luka asking
20 him if he would take action against those who seemed completely
21 undisciplined and not under anybody's control. Now he assured me that
22 this would happen and when he was subsequently replaced by another
23 general, the situation in Banja Luka seemed to be eased somewhat.
24 Q. Yes. Thank you. Now the next -- Your Honours, I would like to
25 tender this exhibit. I almost forgot it.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. It will be admitted.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P922, Your Honour.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
4 Q. I would now like to ask Exhibit 11037 be shown. It's a report of
5 the 30th of October, 1991. Is this your report related to a visit to the
6 Manjaca detention facility?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 Q. During your term of office, did you get information on other
9 detention facilities?
10 A. We had heard a lot of reports, rumours, suspicions, that there
11 were other camps that were holding detainees. But as far as I know, we
12 did not get any access to any of these camps because at that time
13 movement was becoming increasingly difficult for the monitor mission.
14 But the camp that I went to in Manjaca was done with the sanction of the
15 JNA forces in Banja Luka.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to tender this
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Unless it is objected to, it will be admitted
20 into evidence as ...
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P923, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
24 Q. Colonel, you described the set-up of barricades beginning of
25 March 1992 and the negotiations involved later on to get them removed. I
1 would --
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In this context I would like to ask that
3 Exhibit 11040 be brought up.
4 Q. And as it is coming up, it is a special report on Bosnia and
6 the events?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can we please have page 2 displayed.
9 Q. And it refers -- in the first paragraph it refers to a group
10 approaching a barricade and the negotiation that followed. Were you in
11 this group, and is that mentioned here in this paragraph?
12 A. Yes. I was -- I was the -- I was organising the group to cross
13 the bridge to try and effect the lifting of the blockade in question, and
14 I was accompanied by the minister of information, Mr. Ostojic. And as it
15 says in the report, the abbreviation there HRC stands for head of
16 regional centre. That was my -- that was me.
17 Q. And do you recall the conversation and what was said was needed
18 for dismantling?
19 A. Yes. I was asked if -- because the city had been blockaded at
20 this stage, I was asked if I could use my -- my influence or my
21 appointment to try and effect the lifting of the barricades. So I
22 approached one of them and having discussed the matter with the person I
23 spoke with, I asked under what conditions would they be willing to lift
24 the barricade, and he specifically mentioned that the only way -- the
25 only condition under which he would lift the barricade was that if it got
1 the express direction from Mr. Karadzic.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I request the admission of this
3 exhibit into evidence.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P924.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
7 Q. You mentioned in your testimony and reports that the Bosnian
8 government were opposed to the presence of the JNA. Why was that?
9 A. Well, the first time this came to my attention was just after I
10 had assumed the -- the appointment of head of the regional centre, and I
11 was in Sarajevo
12 to meet with the prime minister, who was a Croat, Mr. Pelivan. And I had
13 asked him specifically why there seemed not to be any dealings with the
14 federal army, the JNA. And he replied that as far as he was concerned,
15 and I assume the government was concerned, they looked upon the JNA as an
16 "army of occupation" is the phrase he actually used to me. I suggested
17 that as the JNA were a very potent force based in Bosnia, that it would
18 be better if they opened up some sort of negotiations with them.
19 The issue of the JNA on that occasion was brought up specifically
20 by the prime minister, because he referred to a consignment of rockets
21 that were seized crossing the border if Montenegro into Bosnia
22 was no manifest for these. They were contained on four trucks. That
23 didn't -- that they were covered. They weren't military trucks. So they
24 were confiscated by the police, the Bosnian government police. And when
25 they searched, they found that they were full of rockets. So they
1 brought this attention -- they brought this information to the attention,
2 I understand, of the government or the Interior Ministry. And the JNA
3 said that if the government didn't release these rockets to their care,
4 they would take them by force. So my understanding was that the weapons
5 were actually handed over to the JNA.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 09446 be
7 brought up on onto the screen.
8 Q. And as we are waiting for it, it is a combat -- an operation
9 report of the 2nd Military District Command, dated 10th of April, 1992.
10 It's both in English and in -- yes.
11 Colonel, did you have the opportunity to review this document
12 when you came to The Hague
13 A. Yes, I did.
14 Q. And did you have contacts with the 2nd Military District Command?
15 A. Yes, I had.
16 Q. Where was it situated?
17 A. Well, the -- it was based in Sarajevo. It was headed by the
18 senior military commander General Kukanjac. And the direct corps based
19 in Sarajevo
20 General Djudjarevic [phoen]. I had taken it upon myself. I felt it was
21 important for the monitor mission that we had good contacts with the
22 federal army, and therefore I took it upon myself to visit all the major
23 military garrisons throughout the republic. So I went to the
24 garrisons -- the garrisons in -- in Bihac, Banja Luka, Sarajevo
25 and Tuzla
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have page 3 in the B/C/S and
3 page 2 in the English. Yes. And if we zoom in on 3.
4 Q. Under point 3 it states in the letter -- rather, in the middle of
5 page -- of paragraph 3 it says:
6 "The president of Bosnia-Herzegovina claims that the JNA is the
7 only force capable of acting to save the Muslim population in Zvornik
8 sector but is unwilling to do so, which will only compound further the
9 hostile stance of the Muslim population towards the JNA."
10 Can you describe what was expected from the JNA and how they
11 indeed acted in Zvornik to your information?
12 A. Well, I got some reports from -- from members of the ECMM, but
13 even though I got some reports, they weren't able to verify to me that
14 they were able to in fact get to Zvornik. So what I take from this is
15 that the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina must have been aware that
16 because the JNA were a military force, in times of conflict they would
17 have been the only force that would have been able to protect the
19 We had reason to believe that the JNA were used in the area of
20 Zvornik to surround the location and not to allow anybody in or out, but
21 I didn't have first-hand knowledge or evidence of that. So I think that
22 is probably what the president might have been referring to on that
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I request the admission of this
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P925.
3 JUDGE KWON: And Madam Uertz-Retzlaff, if it is convenient, the
4 Chamber is minded to take a break, another break, the last one for today.
5 And for your reference, the Chamber had the opportunity to go through
6 briefly the list of associate exhibits, and we had found some several
7 documents as to which we have some doubt whether it's a part of
8 indispensable or inseparable parts of his testimony in Milosevic. But
9 you covered most of them, and then one of -- one remaining document, as
10 such, is exhibit -- no, not exhibit, 65 ter number 11069. So in the
11 last -- in the remaining part of it, you can -- in direct examination, if
12 you can cover that document.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. I have actually foreseen
14 that, and that's why I am in fact doing this. And I will not address the
15 intercepts because I know the position of this Trial Chamber, except for
16 the one, and that is a very particular one.
17 JUDGE KWON: We'll see.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But I'm aware of this.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will have a break for 15 minutes, and
20 we will end up at 1.30 today.
21 --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 12.34 p.m.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. Colonel, you testified that you spoke about information on ethnic
1 cleansing in Foca with Mr. Koljevic in April 1992. The term "ethnic
2 cleansing," what did you understand it to entail?
3 A. Well, my interpretation of the term "ethnic cleansing" was to be
4 rid of or to expel or to -- basically to -- to expel by force a
5 population from a given area and also to attempt to get rid of all
6 evidence that they would have been in that area.
7 Q. Evidence of what?
8 A. Of personnel. In other words, to expel people by force and to
9 expel all aspects of that race. For example, mosques or institutions.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to ask to have Exhibit
11 65 ter 11591 on the screen. And as it is being brought up, it is a
12 report of the UN security -- Secretary-General to the Security Council,
13 dated the 12th of May, 1992.
14 Q. Colonel, did you have the opportunity to review this document
15 when you came to The Hague
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. And if we go a bit further down so that we can see paragraph 2.
18 In the very last line you are mentioned as having met Mr. Goulding. Did
19 you brief him, or what were your contacts?
20 A. Mr. Goulding had come to Bosnia
21 various -- I understand the party leaders and the institutions of
22 government, and I'd been invited to -- to meet with him. At the time, I
23 had been invited to meet him with the force commander General Satish
24 Nambiar, and we had a fairly quick discussion.
25 Q. Can we please have page 2 of this -- this report on the screen.
1 And I would like to have paragraph 3. Can we zoom in on paragraph 3.
2 Paragraph 3 refers to the situation in Sarajevo, and it says here
3 starting in the third line:
4 "The city -- the city suffers heavy shelling and sniper fire
5 nightly and intermittent shelling at other times, often on a random basis
6 by Serb irregulars in the surrounding hills who use mortars and light
7 artillery allegedly made available to them by the JNA."
8 Colonel, is this consistent with the information you got at that
9 time, that this was happening?
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 Q. Did you yourself experience shelling?
12 A. Yes, I did.
13 Q. When was that?
14 A. It was towards the -- it was -- basically it was in April, and I
15 was located for a while in the PTT building. And during certain
16 negotiations I was carrying out, artillery shells were fired, and they
17 landed just outside the PTT building. So there was a certain amount of
18 damage to the building itself.
19 Q. And in the last sentence of that same paragraph there is a
20 reference to the growing shortage of food and other essential supplies
21 owing to the blockade imposed on the city by the Serb forces. Is this
22 consistent with your own observations?
23 A. Yes. I mean, because there was a certain amount of conflict
24 going on in the city, there were shortages of food, and that even
25 extended to the location that I was in, which was the Serb area Ilidza.
1 We even had shortages there. So it was something that the population on
2 all sides of the city of Sarajevo
3 beginning to suffer.
4 Q. Could we now go to -- further down to paragraph 5, and -- yeah.
5 And I read to you. Here it says:
6 "All international observers agree that what is happening is a
7 concerted effort by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the acquiesce
8 of, and at least some support from the JNA to create ethnically-pure
9 regions in the context of negotiations on the cantonisation of the
10 republic in the EC Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina chaired by -- by
11 Ambassador Cutileiro. And the techniques used are the seizure of
12 territory by military force and --"
13 Can we move to the next page.
14 "-- and intimidation of the non-Serb population."
15 And it says here that all observers agree. Did you agree? Was
16 that your assessment?
17 A. Yes, that would be much what we would have thought, yes.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I request the admission of
19 Exhibit 11591.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P937.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
23 Q. During your contacts with the Bosnian Serbs' representatives both
24 on the local and also on the federal republic level, did any of them
25 speak to you about living with the Muslims?
1 A. Yes. This particular comment was brought up by an official of
2 the Bosnian Serbs when I went to Pale on the 1st of May, 1992. I don't
3 know in what capacity she was, but certainly she was one of the Bosnian
4 Serb officials I met up there. And she said, Mr. Doyle, you know, I'm
5 quite happy to live with others, but I want a fence built round my house.
6 I will only feel safe if I'm inside my house and I have protection
7 outside. And that was the feeling we got at the time.
8 Q. I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 06608 be brought up on the
9 screen. And as it is being done, it is a short-hand transcript of the
11 Did you have an opportunity to review this document in parts
12 while you were in The Hague
13 A. Yes, I had.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have page 33 in English, and
15 48 in the B/C/S on the screen. And we will see -- we will see that
16 Dr. Karadzic is speaking. That's not seen on that page, but two -- is
17 seen two pages before that.
18 Q. Dr. Karadzic -- I think it's not -- it's -- yes. And page 52 in
19 the B/C/S, and 36 in the English now. And in the -- in the upper part it
20 starts with "Imagine the stupidity." It's the fourth, the fourth
22 It says in the fourth paragraph:
23 "Imagine the stupidity of it: The conflict in Bosnia
25 case between India
1 a huge resettlement of the people.
2 "Muslims cannot live with others. We must be clear on that.
3 They couldn't live with the Hindu who are as peaceful as sheep. That's
4 the Indian religion. They are a peaceful people, and yet they couldn't
5 live with them. They could not live with the Greek on Cyprus. They
6 couldn't live in the Lebanon
7 but of a different faith.
8 "There cannot be -- there can be no discussion here.
9 "Yet they set up the Bosnian Krajina there, and in two years'
10 time you have a problem again, to separate each and every village there,
11 because they will overwhelm you with their birth rate and their tricks.
12 We cannot allow that to happen."
13 Colonel, did you see this view reflected by Serb representatives
14 that you met while you were there?
15 A. Yes, I did, and we were struck by the fact that the Serbs always
16 seemed to refer mainly to the Muslims, even though there were Croats, but
17 it was always the Muslims that they were worried about. And those
18 sentiments that appear in that report would be -- would be much the same
19 that we gathered ourselves. That was our impression.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I request the admission of this
21 exhibit. It's --
22 JUDGE KWON: Again, it's in its entirety.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, because it's again the same situation,
24 contemporaneous official document, and I'm sure that other witnesses will
25 refer to it, and also, most likely, Dr. Karadzic would like to use it.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you object to its admission?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No objection. I was just waiting
3 for the interpretation. No, I don't have any objections, except to say
4 that I'm going to have to tender more documents, because this isn't the
5 only place where I address that matter.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will admit it.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P938, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE KWON: Could you check the number. Is it P938? Thank you.
9 Let's continue.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you. I would ask now that
11 Exhibit 65 ter 40174 be played, and it's actually a video footage
12 depicting speeches on the 21st Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 30th of
13 October, 1992.
14 Q. And before we play it, did you have an opportunity to see part of
15 this footage and the transcript in The Hague?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we play now?
18 [Video-clip played]
19 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] This is the 21st session of our
20 Assembly, and the path behind us is so rich that many things occur
21 between two sessions. This is actually the path that gradually brought
22 us to our state, taking us from an artificial state in which we were
23 forcibly -- forcefully held in an artificial creation, this Bosnia
25 experiment in which a dog and a cat are held in a box against their will,
1 or a bad marriage maintained by all sorts of forceful means. It
2 transpired that a dog and a cat can remain in a box together only under
3 one condition, namely that they lose their natural characteristics and
4 cease to be a dog and a cat. We will remember that we could not be Serbs
5 and live in such a box."
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
7 Q. Colonel, when speaking to Bosnian Serbs, did they ever express
8 such views about the Muslim people being their foes, essentially old foes
9 being their enemies?
10 A. Well, I think most of the reference that was made by the Bosnian
11 Serbs was the fact that they simply couldn't live with the Muslims. I
12 don't know that I recall any incident where they actually said foes. But
13 certainly there was no doubt in our mind that they were not happy to live
14 with them in a -- the same location. And this would have been borne out,
15 I suppose, by the time I met that lady from the Bosnian Serbs up in Pale.
16 So it was something which they repeatedly referred back to.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I would request the admission
18 of Exhibit 40174. It's actually quite a big one. My suggestion would be
19 to just admit the speech that Mr. Karadzic does, and that would be the --
20 the ERN number 0096-8187 to 0096-8192, because the following clips are
21 basically the other people speaking, and that's not a quote from -- from
22 the session.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I didn't note the starting time, but the
24 ending time says is 1 minute, 23 seconds.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. The starting time, I had it somewhere.
1 It starts at zero. Yes, indeed, from the very start.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, that is admitted.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P939, Your Honour.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
6 Q. Colonel, in your testimony you describe a conversation with
7 Ms. Plavsic in Pale or on the way to Pale about the entitlement the of
8 Serbs to 70 per cent of the territory. Do you recall when you had this
10 A. Yes. It was when I was on my way up to Pale on May the 1st,
12 Q. And why did you go to Pale together with Ms. Plavsic on this
14 A. I was invited up by the Bosnian Serbs. They had moved most of
15 their personnel from Sarajevo
16 didn't want to go up there as the head of the monitor mission and somehow
17 be photographed with them so they would say this is a sort of recognition
18 of the entity of the Bosnian Serbs. So I told them that we didn't want
19 any publicity, and this was agreed to. So on the way up, I originally
20 tried to get up there the day before, which was the last day of April,
21 but such were the amount of tanks and artillery pieces and military
22 equipment that was moving up on the main supply route to Pale that we
23 couldn't actually get to Pale itself, and Mrs. Plavsic asked if I would
24 return the following day when we might have a better chance. So I did
25 that the following day, which was, as I say, May the 1st. And in going
1 up there with her, she expressed certain views. She intimated to me that
2 Bosnian Serbs were used to living in wide spaces, and therefore they
3 needed room to move round. She mentioned to me that Muslims were
4 practically people who were business, and therefore would be normally
5 domiciled in a city, and therefore did not need as much territory as the
6 Serbs would need it. And then she said something to me which I will
7 always remember, she said, You know, Mr. Doyle, if it takes the lives of
8 3 million people to solve this crisis, let's get it done and move on.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would now ask that Exhibit 21082 be put on
10 the screen, 65 ter exhibit. And it is, as we are waiting, it is a
11 transcript of an intercept depicting Mr. Koljevic calling
12 Mr. Mladjo Karisik, from Lisbon
13 Is there a problem?
14 JUDGE KWON: 21082.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
16 Q. Did you provide the transcript of this intercept to the Office of
17 the Prosecutor?
18 A. Yes, I did, earlier on. This transcript was personally given to
19 me by the deputy mayor -- or the deputy prime minister of Bosnia,
20 Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, and I was quite surprised when I saw a transcript
21 which had my name in it.
22 Q. Yes. And if you -- can we zoom in? It's in -- the latter part
23 is the reference. It's:
24 "Listen, you should take care of that today. We agreed with
25 Doyle to get the observers on the place where our artillery stands. Let
1 that artillery withdraw. We can't start the Conference here without
2 doing this [sic]."
3 As far as this intercept refers to you, would that be correct?
4 A. Yes. This was -- this was the same day that I went up to Pale.
5 That was one of the other reasons why we went up there, because there
6 were peace talks being held, I think, in Lisbon. I was asked by
7 Ambassador Cutileiro if I would go to Pale, because according to him the
8 Bosnian Serbs had intimated their willingness to withdraw some of their
9 weapons from the general area. So I took with me my deputy who was
10 Mr. Jeremy Braid, and while I stayed in Pale at the Bosnian Serb
11 headquarters, if you would like, he was taken by the Bosnian Serbs to --
12 in a car to -- to look, to find out, to ascertain whether or not the
13 artillery was being withdrawn. He had a better idea than I had where the
14 artillery pieces were. But when he returned he told me that there was
15 absolutely no evidence that the artillery was withdrawn, and on the basis
16 of that I recommended that the talks be stopped in Lisbon.
17 Q. And were they stopped?
18 A. I understand that they were, but I -- I can't be sure exactly
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I request the admittance of
21 this exhibit into evidence, because I think it's a different situation
22 than the other intercepts.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This is what a witness received from --
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
25 JUDGE KWON: -- somebody contemporaneously. Do you have any
1 objection, Mr. Karadzic?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would just like to say that it
3 would be a good idea if we were to know how come Mahmutcehajic had this
4 conversation, because we were also part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
5 government, a third of the government. We weren't rebels of any kind,
6 but we were part of the government, and the government is mentioned here
7 and some Serbs. So how come Mahmutcehajic has this document?
8 JUDGE KWON: That's subject for your cross-examination.
9 Yes. We will admit this, but Mr. --
10 Colonel Doyle, do you hear who intercepted this conversation at
11 the time?
12 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour, I did not.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P940.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
16 Q. Colonel, in your testimony you spoke about the fact that non-Serb
17 personnel in the Hotel Bosna in Ilidza, where you and also Dr. Karadzic
18 were staying, was forced to leave and that they were expelled. When did
19 this happen?
20 A. This happened around the period, I would think, of March 1992.
21 And it was memorable because there was already conflicts starting in the
22 city, and the dining area where we were had been moved because of the
23 chance of -- of a shooting at the hotel. And I was struck by being -- by
24 the fact that I was invited by the local Serb council, as it were. I'd
25 never met any of them before, which was a surprise to me, and the
1 entire -- almost the entire hotel staff were different to those that I
2 knew for the many months I was there as head of the mission. And when I
3 inquired of -- from this -- this person who intimated that he was now the
4 new leader of the local community he told me that the Muslims were moved,
5 they were put onto a truck, and they were taken into the centre of the
6 city and they were then released.
7 What I remember in particular was I asked him were any -- was
8 there any Muslim member of the staff retained? And he said, "Yes, we
9 kept one because he is a good cook."
10 Q. Now, you refer in your testimony to a session of the
11 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the 13th of August,
12 1992, and you described the situation where you showed Dr. Karadzic a
13 photo of the detainee from a camp in Prijedor, and how you then spoke
14 with him about the pressure of non-Serbs signing over their property
15 before leaving. How did you get aware of this practice of signing over
17 A. Well, we had received a considerable amount of information from
18 the monitor mission. That part of the modus operandi, if you were -- if
19 you wish, of the Bosnian Serbs was that they were taking some territory
20 and part of the policy was to ensure that the territory they were taking,
21 that those resident therein actually sign their property away. And this
22 may have been contained in that "Sunday Times" report as part of the
23 article containing that photograph which I gave to Mr. Karadzic. And
24 following on from that, when he saw this, he sent somebody, I think it
25 was a Mr. Kennedy who was advising him, if I would agree to meet with
1 him. So I replied that I wasn't part of the official delegation, but
2 that if we -- if we met in the lobby, I would -- I would certainly speak
3 with him.
4 So when we did that, I brought this question of signing away
5 their property, and he admitted to me that it was wrong and that it was
6 illegal. And I suggested that maybe as a gesture he might send a letter
7 to the "Times" indicating that -- or sending a message out there that he
8 agreed that it was illegal and this should not be done. So he intimated
9 to me that he certainly would do something about it. I don't know
10 whether that was done or not. I -- I have no -- I have no evidence one
11 way or the other as to where -- whether that was done by him.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 01136 be
14 brought up on the screen. And as we are waiting, it is a report on a
15 meeting in the context of the London Conference.
16 Q. You attended this conference and this meeting?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. Mm-hmm. And let me -- let's just go to page 2. Page 2 in
19 paragraph 5, just at the end is -- just the last two sentences, it is
20 says here:
21 "Dr. Karadzic had said that he had issued instructions to stop
22 these forces from harassing those Muslims and Croats who were willing to
23 leave Serbian areas from signing papers to that effect. He confirmed
24 that such papers would have not have validity in the light of a final
1 This document, did you receive it, this document about the
3 A. Yes, I received a copy of that at the London Conference.
4 Q. Your Honour, I would like to request admittance of this document
5 into evidence.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P941.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
9 Q. You described throughout your testimony meeting Dr. Karadzic and
10 other Serb representatives, and you stated that he was the undisputed
11 leader and that the other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership referred
12 to him. Did you actually observe him interacting with these other
14 A. Yes, I did. I remember in -- I think it was January or February
15 of 1992. Because Mr. Karadzic was the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, I
16 asked for a meeting with him. And this was arranged through the Serb
17 members of the Presidency, Mrs. Plavsic and Nikolai Koljevic. And I met
18 him there and spoke with him because I wanted to meet the -- all the
19 political leaders of the various parties. And since then when I was
20 either head of the mission or whether I was -- or Lord Carrington's
21 personal representative, at any session that we had with Bosnian Serbs
22 Dr. Karadzic was always there. And he could have been there with -- with
23 Nikola Koljevic, and maybe just the two of them, or with Mr. Krajisnik.
24 But Dr.
25 him. He spoke English. And in my mind, you know, when you attend a lot
1 of these meetings, you get a sense of who is the person that is the
2 leader. And in my view he was the undisputed leader of the
3 Bosnian Serbs.
4 Q. In your testimony, you also described the shelling of the TV
5 station in Sarajevo
6 this effect. Why did you turn to Dr. Karadzic to prevent the attack on
7 the TV?
8 A. Well, I received a phone call in the afternoon from the
9 television station to say that they had received a phone call from Pale,
10 from the Bosnian Serbs to say that if they didn't get off the air within
11 30 minutes, that the television station would be attacked with -- with
12 weapons. So at that time, Mr. Karadzic had the Bosnian Serb Crisis
13 Committee stationed in the Hotel Bosna, in Ilidza. So I decided to make
14 an approach to him. And I spoke to one of his officials and said that it
15 was very important that he get this message to Mr. Karadzic. So he did,
16 and the same -- I assume that he did, because within about 20 minutes
17 he -- he came back to me and what he said was that -- that he spoke to
18 Mr. Karadzic, and I should not worry because this attack would not take
20 The attack did take place. The television station was -- I think
21 it was mortar bombed, and my understanding is that there was either two
22 or three people killed.
23 When I got information of this, I immediately contacted that
24 official. I asked him to tell Mr. Karadzic that the attack took place,
25 that there were casualties, and that I was going to hold him personally
2 Sometime later that evening Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic came to
3 see me, and they were quite agitated. Mr. Karadzic acknowledged that the
4 attack had taken place, but he intimated to me that -- that he hadn't
5 ordered it, that he had condemned it, and that I would have to realise
6 that he didn't control all of the military all of the time. And
7 therefore he couldn't -- I suppose he didn't want to accept
8 responsibility for what some people had done. So he did say to me that
9 it wasn't authorised. But I did mention to him that part of the
10 responsibility of leadership is that you take responsibility for what
11 your subordinates do or fail to do. And therefore I was going to condemn
12 this attack on television which I did later on that evening.
13 Q. When you mentioned -- when you spoke about this during the
14 previous testimony and also in documents, you use the term "Serb
15 paramilitaries." What do you mean by using the term "Serb
17 A. Well, part of the peacekeeping operations in my experience was
18 that you don't go looking for specific information on military units
19 because then people have an opportunity of saying you're spying or you're
20 an agent. So I was very careful that I try and maintain a neutral
21 stance. So my interpretation of a paramilitary is if a Serb paramilitary
22 or a Muslim was somebody who bore weapons, who was not in the federal
23 army, in other words, all of those outside the JNA, because there were so
24 many different groups, there were the Muslim Eagles or the Green Berets,
25 and therefore it was -- it was common for us to refer to all non-military
1 JNA who were armed or wore some uniforms and some didn't. So we referred
2 to them collectively, simply as paramilitaries.
3 Q. Mm-hmm. And my last question is, did Dr. Karadzic have control
4 over these Bosnian Serb paramilitaries?
5 A. Well, I always assumed that he did, because as the -- as the
6 conflict escalated, he seemed to be always in the presence of people who
7 were armed who were close to him. Some of those were wearing the
8 uniforms of the JNA on occasions, and sometimes they weren't. So it was
9 my -- I suppose it was my interpretation or my view that, as the leader
10 of the Bosnian Serbs, that he controlled or should have had control over
11 all aspects of -- of the Bosnian Serbs, and that would include armed
13 Q. And did he attend cease-fires when you had negotiations? Did
14 Dr. Karadzic --
15 A. Yes. He attended -- he attended all of the cease-fires that I
16 was involved in with the exception of a cease-fire that was negotiated
17 shortly after the time in which the president -- we successfully
18 negotiated the release of President Izetbegovic. And at those cease-fire
19 agreements, it was basically -- we were concentrating on attempting to
20 get an agreement for the withdraw of the federal army from -- from
22 to the PTT building, I believe because they were worried about security
23 and most of them now were based in balances, and that was understandable.
24 But even though we invite them to come, they didn't attend those
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, this concludes the
3 examination-in-chief. In relation to the remaining associated exhibits,
4 I would request to admit them, except for the one that you yourself
5 mentioned. We do not ask admittance because it's basically related --
6 unrelated to this case. And I also will not ask for the admittance of
7 the intercepts, but I would request the admission of Exhibit 11087, and
8 that's the witness declaration as to the voices he recognised.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: What you exclude from the associate exhibit is, to
11 be clear, 11069; and two intercepts, 30323 and 30423.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Two intercepts? No. The -- what I had
13 actually said is the intercepts that are listed, they will be introduced
14 through other witnesses.
15 JUDGE KWON: So you are not tendering those two.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Which two? No, it's actually more than two.
17 It's more than two. It's -- the intercepts -- sorry, Your Honour. The
18 intercepts, I gave range -- a range. The intercepts starting 30323, down
19 to 0 -- 31614. So it's basically altogether --
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- quite a number of intercepts. They will
22 be introduced otherwise.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have any objections?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if there are no intercepts, I
25 have no objections in relation to the document.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. They will be all admitted and assigned exhibit
2 number, the numbers of which will be circulated in due course by the
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We have about 15 minutes. So will you
6 start your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we are going to go on working
8 today, then, yes, I shall certainly start.
9 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
10 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Doyle.
11 A. Mr. Karadzic.
12 Q. Once again, I wish to thank you for your kindness to meet up with
13 the Defence and help us shed more light on certain matters.
14 Now I would like us to recall together what it was that we
15 possibly agreed upon during that meeting. Would you agree?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you. I think that we agreed that the Muslims had rejected
18 calls for mobilisation. It's not that they were excluded from the JNA in
19 some other way. Namely, they did not respond to mobilisation, and
20 thereby the Serbs became the only mobilisation base for the JNA at that
21 time; right?
22 A. Yes, I agree with that.
23 Q. Thank you. Likewise, we agreed that you did not have any
24 particular knowledge about the situation in Yugoslavia before you came
25 there, that you did not have dealings with Yugoslavia; right?
1 A. Well, I'd received a standard operational briefing from our
2 military headquarters on the situation, but -- but no specific details.
3 So I would agree generally with that, yes.
4 Q. Thank you. We have agreed -- or, rather, you confirmed something
5 that worried me a bit. After 18 years, one's memory does fade a bit,
6 doesn't it?
7 A. Yes, I have to admit to that.
8 Q. Thank you. We agreed that you did not quite understand the
9 political manoeuvres within Bosnia-Herzegovina at a high level, at
10 policy-making level, as it were. Isn't that right?
11 A. Yes, that's agreed.
12 Q. Thank you. I think that we agreed and that you confirmed that
13 the Serbs wanted greater access to TV Sarajevo -- or, rather, more of a
14 presence at TV Sarajevo; right?
15 A. Yes. There was a different interpretation as to the discussions
16 we had on what the people that I represented meant by having greater
17 access and what I believe the Bosnian Serbs wanted. The inference on the
18 arrangements we had was that it was fair that the Bosnian Serbs should
19 have more access time to the Television Sarajevo, whereas the
20 interpretation of what the Bosnian Serbs thought they wanted or what they
21 thought they were entitled to was to actually divide the assets of the
22 television station. So they'd get so many studios. They'd get so many
23 percentage of the buildings, and that they would get things like the --
24 the vehicles, et cetera. This was not what was in mind when we held
25 those peace talks, and therefore, we held a meeting at the television
1 station about two days after the cease-fire was signed, and when I
2 realised that the Bosnian Serbs wanted physical occupation on a permanent
3 basis of the television station, I decided that this was not what was
4 intended and therefore we made no progress.
5 Q. Do you agree that I presented that to you as the establishment of
6 three national channels for the three national groups within a joint
7 television we cannot be treated equally unless we have our TV channel, in
8 our own language, involving our own culture, and meeting our own needs,
9 and that therefore we needed our own studio?
10 A. Well, I know that that's what you intended when we spoke last
11 Monday, and I can understand that, but when the negotiations were going
12 on on the ground in Bosnia
13 that time. Had that been the case, those of us who were involved in
14 negotiations would have made a decision, I think, one way or the other.
15 So my understanding is that at those negotiations it was that the Bosnian
16 Serbs would get more access to television time, which would obviously
17 have included giving over the airwaves their views of certain matters but
18 not the physical assets of the television.
19 Q. In your opinion what was it that the Muslims wanted as far as
20 television was concerned? What was their concept of television? What
21 was it that that they wanted?
22 A. Well, I have no idea what the Muslims wanted because they were
23 happy with the way things were. And at no stage do I recall the Muslims
24 actually raising the issue of television coverage as a matter of concern.
25 The only point I can say that they did mention was that the relay
1 stations which gave coverage to a wider audience were, according to them,
2 distorted physically so that the -- that these things would -- that the
3 range would point towards Belgrade
4 apart from that, I don't recall any incident where they were specific as
5 to what they wanted.
6 Q. Thank you. Well, now we're going to see what they wanted,
7 although you said that they were happy with what they had.
8 Are you aware of the fact that to this day Croats are asking for
9 their own channel? Serbs do have their own television, but to this day
10 the Croats have been asking for a channel of their own because they
11 haven't got one.
12 A. I have no knowledge of this, because my -- my up-to-date
13 information on the day-to-day life of Bosnia is not something which I
14 have much attention to. So I'm unaware of that.
15 Q. Thank you, but I believe that you will take my word for it.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have D148. 1D48 in
17 e-court. I hope that we have a translation. No, this is not the
18 document. No, no. That's not the document. This seems to be 148, but I
19 need 1D48. There should be a translation. Could we have the English
20 version as well. Yes.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Colonel, may I draw your attention to this letter. It is a
23 letter sent to the SDA personnel committee on the 23rd of March -- or the
24 20th of March. That is to say -- no, no, no. No. Actually, two weeks
25 before recognition. This is what it says here the Party of Democratic
1 Action, the chairman of the SDA City Board, Harun Imamovic, is asking for
2 the following:
3 "Dear sir: At the 75th session of the Sarajevo SDA City Board
4 held on the 17th of March, 1992, a conclusion was made to address you
5 with a suggestion that you take timely steps to resolve the
6 personnel-related problems at Sarajevo RTV.
7 "The relevance and importance of this institution for all
8 segments of social and political life goes without saying.
9 "The Sarajevo SDA City Board believes that every division of
10 Sarajevo TV into ethnic channels is out of the question, as it would not
11 suit the interests of the Muslim people.
12 "In addition, we would like to say that in order to protect our
13 ethnic interests, it is imperative that the general manager of the RTV be
14 a Muslim, as well as the editor-in-chief of the RTV.
15 "We deem this to be the minimum beneath which no talks should be
17 First question: Does the SDA think, based on what is said here,
18 what I believe as well, it is a division of channels that is being
19 referred to, not a division of property, assets?
20 A. Well, I would accept that's what the content of the letter would
21 indicate. I notice the letter isn't signed, though.
22 JUDGE KWON: I think the original on the left is signed.
23 THE WITNESS: I understand. Thank you, Your Honour, yes.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Second question: Do you agree that the interest of the Muslim
1 people is singled out here and placed above the interests of the Serb and
2 Croat peoples? I take you to the following sentence:
3 "The city board of the SDA believes that every division of
4 Sarajevo TV into ethnic channels is out of the question."
5 And let us see why.
6 "And it would not suit the interests of the Muslim people."
7 Do you agree that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in addition to the
8 Muslim people, there were Serbs and Croats who accounted for the
9 Christian majority of that country?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. Third question: Do you see that the minimum they are asking for
12 in this joint TV, in the joint country, and how they envisage a life
13 together and democracy, you see that they ask that the director and the
14 editor-in-chief of the RTV have to be Muslims. Does that explain the
15 position that Mrs. Plavsic expressed, that it is hard to live in that
16 kind of situation? Is this a fair claim, to ask for the TV to belong to
18 A. Well, I would agree that the content of the letter would indicate
19 that the Muslim population were looking for an unreasonable demand. I
20 don't think I would equivocate this with the phrase that Mrs. Plavsic,
21 however, spoke with me about it, because I don't think they are related.
22 Q. Thank you. But you do agree that it is hard for the Christian
23 majority, even if it were a minority, to imagine this kind of
24 TV Sarajevo, namely that this Christian majority cannot be represented
25 properly because that does not suit the interests of the Muslim people;
2 A. Yes. I've already indicated that, I think.
3 Q. Now I'm going to leave that material that is based on our
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can this be admitted,
6 this document?
7 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: That is admitted.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D213.
11 JUDGE KWON: You'd like to continue? One more question?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] One question.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I put it to you, Mr. Doyle, that it was not our position that we
15 could not live with the Muslims, rather, it was the that we could not
16 live under the Muslims. Since you came in 1991, may I remind you that we
17 had proposed to the Muslims that they stay with us in Yugoslavia and that
18 in that case we could have lived with them. Are you aware of that?
19 Also, that this constitutes lack of understanding. It's not a question
20 of not wanting to live with Muslims but not wanting to live understand
22 A. Well, the reference I made to the comment passed when I went up
23 to Pale by that Bosnian Serb official certainly did not make any
24 reference to living with or living under. So I can only -- I can only
25 refer back to what she said. And to the extracts that were taken that
1 have been shown here from the -- from -- from your own official Bosnian
2 Serb documents, I'm not too sure that I know of any document which
3 actually states that you would live underneath the Muslims, because I'm
4 not too sure what that really means.
5 There are three sides in Bosnia. There was the Bosnian Muslims,
6 Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats, and I'm not too sure why we should say
7 that the Bosnian Serbs should live under the Bosnian Muslims. I don't
8 quite understand that.
9 Q. Is the previous document telling enough in terms of what our
10 equality of rights would be in that state in we have the document here on
11 our screens?
12 A. The document on the screen, to my interpretation, deals
13 specifically with an issue of television. It doesn't -- it doesn't
14 encompass all of life in Bosnia
15 the demands for different channels on television, which I can understand.
16 But that doesn't mean in my view that that has to transfer itself to all
17 aspects of life in Bosnia
18 JUDGE KWON: With that question, we --
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 JUDGE KWON: -- we will adjourn for today. We will resume on
21 Wednesday next week at 9.00. Please have a nice weekend.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.33 p.m.
23 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 26th day of May,
24 2010, at 9.00 a.m.