1 Wednesday, 26 May 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. Good morning,
7 Colonel Doyle.
8 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: Welcome back, Mr. Robinson.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.
12 WITNESS: COLM DOYLE [Resumed]
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies and
14 everybody else.
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
16 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning to you, too, Colonel.
17 A. Good morning.
18 Q. We did start last week, so let's carry on and talk about what we
19 agreed during our interview. You confirmed that you didn't know that the
20 Serbs did not obstruct the Muslim referendum on independence. Do you
21 accept now that it was the Serb position was this: We had our
22 referendum. The other two communities can and should have their own
23 referendum or plebiscite in order to see the will of the people prevail,
24 and all this was subject to procedure for amendments to the constitution
25 in the Assembly. Do -- are you aware of that? Do you have knowledge
1 about that?
2 A. Yes. I'm aware that the Bosnian Serbs had the referendum and
3 that the parliamentary debate on the holding of the referendum was
4 carried by the Croats and the Muslims, yes.
5 Q. My point is this: Do you remember that the Serbs had nothing
6 against their referendum and that they didn't obstruct it in any way and
7 enabled it to go through on the territory where they had power and where
8 they were the decisive majority?
9 A. Sorry, are you referring to the Serbs had nothing against -- is
10 it their referendum or the other referendum? Could you clarify that
11 point for me, please.
12 Q. My position is this, and we shall come to that: You were at the
13 meeting. We proposed that regionalisation be conducted first and that we
14 go to a national referendum. As that was not successful, we had nothing
15 against that the other two communities should carry out their own
16 referendum and we didn't obstruct their referendum. Nowhere, there were
17 no incidents anywhere. I'm talking about the referendum at the end of
19 A. Yes. I agree with that.
20 Q. Thank you. Now, I'm not quite clear on one thing in your report
21 where it says very nicely and clearly what the cause of the
22 demonstrations were in Sarajevo
23 during the examination-in-chief, you mostly said that the results of the
24 referendum were the reason, whereas in your report it says that the
25 reason was the killing of the wedding -- in the wedding party, and then
1 during the in chief you talked about the referendum.
2 Now, our position is that the results of the referendum did
3 contribute to this but not with barricades but the behaviour of those
4 criminals that attacked the Serb wedding party.
5 Now, do you agree with your report, what you say in your report,
6 that the pretext or the reason was the killings that -- the killing that
7 took place at the wedding party and that that was a major event?
8 A. The report that I made out at the conclusion of the referendum
9 debate was that the barricades were erected by the Bosnian Serbs and that
10 there were two factors. The two factors were, one, the result of the
11 referendum; and two, according to the Bosnian Serbs, the reason the
12 barricades were raised was because the death -- the killing at the
13 wedding. So I took that -- the fact that the Bosnian Serbs told me that
14 in their view the reason why the barricades went up was the killing at
15 the wedding. I took that in consideration, and I mentioned that in
16 addition to the results of the referendum.
17 The point to make here is that in my view, the barricades were
18 erected at such a time and such a short period of time that in my view
19 there had -- there had to be some prior consideration to these being
20 erected. That was my professional opinion at the time, and I reflected
21 that in my report.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have Prosecutor's
23 Exhibit 611040 next, please. It's the same as 21077. On e-court,
24 please, may we have that called up. It is Prosecution 65 ter 11040
25 document. Thank you.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. And there we have the first paragraph where you put in first
3 place the fact that the killing of the Serb at the wedding ceremony was
4 number one and that the tensions could also be attributed to the
5 referendum. Do you see that first and second sentence:
6 "[In English] Tension was heightened in Sarajevo as the result
7 of all the killing of a Serb and the wounding of another at the wedding
8 ceremony in the city of 98 [sic] February."
9 A. Yes, I see that.
10 Q. [Interpretation] I think the killing was on the 1st of March, in
11 actual fact, and the barricades were erected on 1st of March. And then
12 you go on to say:
13 "[In English] A degree of the tensions could be also attributed
14 to the referendum which has had --"
15 [Interpretation] To the referendum and so on. So it is more
16 convincing. Well, the results of the referendum were common knowledge in
17 the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina but the killing in the barricades only
18 existed in Sarajevo
19 the Prosecution seemed to like something else more. What I want to say
20 for the transcript, it wasn't recorded, is this: That the results held
21 true for the whole of Bosnia
22 whereas the killing was only in Sarajevo
23 were barricades, only there. So at that point, your report is fairly
24 accurate by placing the number one point first. However, the Prosecution
25 seemed to have liked the second point better, that the results of the
1 referendum were the reason and pretext, which they weren't.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, what is your question?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, my question is why the
4 Colonel now decided to use the conditional that he used in the second
5 sentence, "could," although he confirmed that with time memory fades?
6 JUDGE KWON: I think the witness has answered the question.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
8 JUDGE KWON: Move on to your next question.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Now, can we agree over another point. You said that you saw me
12 after that, after that first and second -- at our meeting you said that
13 you saw me. Now, I have here my secretary's diary, and he writes that
14 you came to see me. The entry is on the 1st of March, probably in the
15 morning, because then in that same diary it says that at 1600 hours I,
16 too, flew together to Belgrade
17 Now, is it possible that you might have got that muddled, that you might
18 have seen me before the assassination?
19 A. I'm aware that with spoke at the meeting last week you brought
20 this up, and I checked over my notes, and I don't think I said in the
21 notes of my witness statement that in actual fact I met you by name on
22 that day. When you asserted to me last week that in fact you weren't in
23 the city, I actually accept that. It doesn't take away from the point
24 that the Serb leadership on that day gave me a list of demands which I
25 handed over to Ejup Ganic. So I accept the point that you say that you
1 weren't there. It wasn't in my original report that I may have made a
3 Q. Thank you. I think that it would be a good idea if we were to
4 stay with this document for a while longer, because there we can see the
5 Serb demands handed over to the Presidency at a Presidency session, but
6 there's something else that has caught my attention here, and it is this:
7 You said that they said that they would erect barricades only if the word
8 came from me; right?
9 A. Yes, that's correct.
10 Q. Now let's look at page 2 of this document.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 2 called up,
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. This is what it says, the last sentence the first paragraph:
15 "[In English] It became apparent from the negotiations which
16 followed that the armed Serbs would only consider dismantling the
17 barricades on the directive orders of the SDS leadership, however, they
18 expressed their gratitude to the EC Monitoring Mission."
19 [Interpretation] So not Karadzic but the leadership; right?
20 A. Yes, but when I put down the leadership, basically, I was
21 referring to you as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs. And your name is
22 mentioned, as far as I recall, on my witness statement of 1995.
23 Q. Well, yes, but not in your report, you see. And the rest of the
24 leadership would not have agreed that I was the leadership. I was just
25 one member of the leadership. But let's move on.
1 Now let's have the following page. Next page on our screens,
2 please. There we are. This is what you say here that after an agreement
3 had been reached in the Presidency and the Presidents unanimously
4 accepted the Serb demands and we'll go back to them in due course:
5 "[In English] On this information being announced, the
6 barricades began to be dismantled."
7 [Interpretation] Therefore, Colonel, not when I gave the word but
8 as the result of negotiations between the leadership of the Serbian
9 Democratic Party and the Presidency in which there were two members of
10 the Serbian Democratic Party; right?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D1210 called up,
14 please. I think that this document is in evidence. Is it? Has it been
15 admitted? Associated?
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it was admitted as Exhibit P924.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we now have 1D1210
18 next, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Here we have the minutes from the 56th Presidency session of the
21 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 2nd of March:
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the English version,
23 please. Zoom into the English.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And present were Alija Izetbegovic; Biljana Plavsic;
1 Franjo Boras; Ejup Ganic; the Deputy Secretary Mile Dmicic; the Prime
2 Minister and Vice-Premier Jure Pelivan and Muhamed Cengic; the Minister
3 and Deputy Minister Alija Delimustafic, Vitomir Zepinic,
4 General Kukanjac, and the command of the 2nd Military District,
5 Drago Vukosavljevic, as command of the Territorial Defence. And in the
6 second part of the session, the president of the Crisis Staff of the
7 Serbian Democratic Party took part, Rajko Dukic. He was president of the
8 Executive Board in actual fact, but for that purpose he became involved
9 so that he could control the events.
10 Now, may we have page 3 called up, please. And while we're
11 waiting for that, let me just remind you, you said that in all the
12 negotiations I took part. Now, do you agree that that was the demand
13 made by our mediators or that it would be disrespectful for me not to
14 have attended but to send a deputy of mine; right?
15 A. First of all, I've never seen this document before. I mean,
16 I'm -- the report that I gave was based on the information I gained at
17 the time. The demands of the Bosnian Serbs were handed to me, and I
18 passed them over to Ejup Ganic. Who sat at what meeting after that I
19 wasn't a part of, so I really don't know.
20 Q. Well, Ganic didn't hand them over then because here we see that
21 Dukic handed them over at the meeting itself and that that's why he was
22 asked to attend the meeting, to negotiate and to say under what
23 conditions he would be able to influence the people to lift the
24 barricades. But what I asked you beforehand, do you agree that if the
25 mediators, Vance, Owen, and others, expected me to be present then it was
1 the proper thing to do for me to be present and that it would be
2 disrespectful for me to send anybody else, any deputy in my stead?
3 A. I'm not too sure why you're bringing up Cyrus Vance. I thought
4 we were talking about a situation which prevailed in the city on the 2nd
5 of March. You were the leader of the Bosnian Serbs. I accept that you
6 may not have been there on that day, so I really -- I really don't
7 understand what the issue is.
8 Q. This is not a problem, Colonel. It's just a question of you
9 claiming that I participated in all the negotiations, and it seems to me
10 that this is something that the Prosecution liked, but what I would like
11 to ask you is: Is this a regular thing, and is it a polite thing for me
12 to respect the mediators, to attend or not? Was I expected to be
14 A. Any time that there were negotiations held in the city of
16 happened with people like Cyrus Vance, I simply don't know, but I'm
17 referring to the occasions where there were negotiations being held. The
18 Bosnian Serbs, on all occasions that I attended, was headed by yourself.
19 Q. Very well. Thank you. We haven't achieved what I wanted to
20 achieve for you to say whether this is just customary, that -- was I
21 expected to be there, but let us look at page 2. We have page 2 in the
22 Serbian. Can we look at page 2 in the English as well, please.
23 JUDGE KWON: Probably we may have to see page 1 in English.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Very well. We can see on page 2 that Rajko Dukic participated.
1 Can we look at page 3 now, please. In the English this would be on
2 page 2. Thank you.
3 I am going to summarise it. The president of the Crisis Staff of
4 the SDS
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina came out with the following demands and these are the
6 demands that you are talking about and that you have to cease all further
7 activity, more specifically the campaign that is being waged with a goal
8 to declare a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina and to
9 secure it's international recognition until a satisfactory and final
10 solution is released.
11 I hope that the English -- the interpreters have the English
12 version in front of them. All right. Very well.
13 And then it continues:
14 "To unconditionally cease the campaign that is being waged in the
15 sphere of public information supporting a sovereign and independent
17 And then the next sentence:
18 "To ensure unbiased information until the conference on Bosnia
19 and Herzegovina
20 community is concluded."
21 And it goes on that the tragedy in all the places is a direct
22 consequence of the situation in the MUP and that personnel transformation
23 of the B and H MUP should be carried out pursuant to the agreement
24 reached by the three leading political parties immediately after the
25 republican elections.
1 I'm going to ask you if you knew, Colonel, sir, that the Muslim
2 side, as you can see, for the whole year, 13, 14 months, sabotaged the
3 appointment of Serbian cadre to the posts in the police?
4 A. I'm certainly not aware of that, no.
5 Q. This is one of the features when you live under the Muslims and
6 not with the Muslims. You would grant -- be granted positions in the
7 police, but they would not actually appoint those people. This is
8 something that you should know. Perhaps it's our fault as well, but this
9 is an important thing, and I can see that that is here, and I wonder that
10 nobody asked themselves what this particular point meant.
11 Did you ask yourself what this meant?
12 A. No, I didn't. My job on that occasion was to get the demands
13 that were made by the Bosnian Serbs and pass them over to the
14 Crisis Committee of the Presidency for them to come up with whether or
15 not they would agree to accept those demands. In other words, I was a
16 facilitator. My job was not to interpret what was being said here. My
17 job was simply to pass on the message and try to make some progress that
18 all sides would agree on. That was the main mission of the
19 European Union and that's the mission I stood by; in other words, not to
20 take sides but to pass on information, and to try and ensure that we
21 would facilitate an agreement.
22 Q. Thank you. The next paragraph:
23 "To arrest the persons of the heinous crime in front of the
24 Serbian Orthodox church in was Carsija in Sarajevo during the day."
25 Did you know that in April the killer of the Serbian best man,
1 Ramiz Delalic, Celo, appeared on state television in Sarajevo
2 of having killed the best man because he had seen in the wedding party a
3 Serbian flag? This was already when you were there, after the 10th of
5 A. No, I'm certainly not aware of that.
6 Q. Do you agree that this was insulting and humiliating for the
7 Serbs and also irritating?
8 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Your Honour, how is the witness expected
9 to answer that question which is both speculative and asked about an
10 event that he didn't know about.
11 JUDGE KWON: If the witness can answer the question, he can deal
12 with it; otherwise he can say that he cannot answer the question.
13 THE WITNESS: I'm accepting that because one of the conditions or
14 one of the conditions laid down by the Bosnian Serbs was to the effect
15 that they wanted the perpetrators of this crime arrested, I accepted that
16 as one of the conditions. I assume it wasn't being denied by anybody,
17 and therefore I would have accepted for what it was. But other than that
18 I would not have a comment, no.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you. And do you know that that criminal, the killer, was
21 liquidated after the war in some cafe without having being brought to
22 trial or having been convicted for this crime?
23 A. His name had been mentioned to me before. I had been informed
24 that he was a criminal. As to what happened to him afterwards, I had no
25 idea. I did hear he was killed, but I didn't know any of the details.
1 Q. Do you know that he was the assistant commander in the
2 9th Mountain Brigade throughout the whole wartime period in Sarajevo
3 A. No, I was not aware of that.
4 Q. Thank you. The next paragraph is -- states:
5 "Considering the fact that the Serbian people have been
6 experiencing a length informational blockade and pressure to conduct and
7 urgent division of the television and radio as well as to stop a
8 broadcasting Jutel until the talks about the constitutional arrangement
9 of BiH are over."
10 And item 6:
11 "To immediately disband the Crisis Staff of the Presidency of the
12 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina led by Ejup Ganic as an
13 unconstitutional body and to urgently disarm paramilitary formations of
14 the Green Berets which are acting openly in Sarajevo and protecting,
15 among others, criminals-perpetrators of crimes."
16 Colonel, sir, do you know that it was the Muslims who formed the
17 Crisis Staffs in the Presidency first and throughout Bosnia
18 Serbs followed before the war broke out?
19 A. No, I don't know that. I was aware that there was a
20 Crisis Committee of the Presidency. Who constituted that Crisis
21 Committee, I simply don't know. The only person I met in relation to
22 that was Ejup Ganic. So I had no knowledge as to who else was in that
23 committee. Again I must say that my job was to pass over the demands,
24 for they to be considered by the Presidency, by the Crisis Committee of
25 the Presidency, and if they were acceded to, then we solved the immediate
1 problem in the city, and that was my prime objective.
2 Q. Thank you. I'm not holding it against you if you didn't know,
3 and if you didn't it's more of our fault than anybody else's, but would I
4 like to remind you that the Crisis Staff in the Presidency as an
5 unconstitutional act, which the Presidency agreed on was used to bypass
6 Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic as representatives of the Serbs with
7 veto power on important Presidency decisions; thus that is one of the
8 manifestations of life under the Muslims and not with the Muslims. Would
9 you agree that such a Crisis Staff formed as early as September 1991
10 before the Serbs formed their Crisis Staffs, that it is an improper act?
11 A. Well, first of all, I don't know which Crisis Committee was
12 established first. It wasn't something that came to my attention. And
13 not knowing that, it wasn't of any great concern to me. Once again, I
14 have to say that any time we made approaches to any of the political
15 parties it was a view to getting a common agreement amongst them to stop
16 a conflict. That was our prime objective, nothing other than that.
17 Q. Excuse me. And when did you come to Sarajevo for the first time?
18 Was it early October; is that right?
19 A. I came to Sarajevo
20 the end of November 1991. Before that I was working as a monitor in the
21 city of Banja Luka.
22 Q. Was there a Crisis Staff of the Serbian Democratic Party in
23 existence when you came and did the staff get in touch with you,
24 communicate with you? Did it exist at all?
25 A. I have no idea as to when the Crisis Committee of the Bosnian
1 Serbs was established. As you may recall yourself, my first official
2 meeting with you was in February 1992, and that meeting was set up at my
4 Q. Thank you. Can we please look at the next page in the Serbian
5 and the English page can stay for now. And we can see that it states
7 "An agreement was reached --"
8 It's at the bottom of the English copy:
9 "An agreement was reached that abolishing the barricades ends the
10 need for the existence of the Crisis Staff of the Presidency of the SRBiH
11 which was formed on the 21st of September, 1991."
12 It was agreed at the same time that at the next Presidency
13 meeting the report on the work of the Crisis Staff should be reviewed.
14 The Crisis Staff was thus formed on the 21st of September, without any
15 barricades, without any need as an unconstitutional act whereby the
16 Muslim part of the Presidency conducted Presidency business without
17 participation of the Serbian representatives, and agreement was reached
18 here for that Crisis Staff to be abolished. Do you agree that that is
19 what is stated here?
20 A. I can see from the document that is in front of me, from the
21 English translation, it says that. When there's reference to the
22 establishment of the Crisis Committee in September 1991, I wasn't in
24 wouldn't have been aware as to when this Crisis Committee was
1 Q. Thank you. And let us look at this paragraph:
2 "The Presidency's announcing that the referendum that has just
3 taken place does not determine the organisation of Bosnia and
5 organisation of BiH which are being led by the European Community. These
6 talks should be continued urgently and their results have to respect the
7 interests of all three nations as well as other citizens of Bosnia
9 This sounds good, doesn't it? Do you agree?
10 A. First of all, as I said, I haven't seen the detail of this
11 document before, but I don't see any great difference between the content
12 of this document and the content of the measures that were mentioned in
13 my report. So we're probably repeating what's already been said before.
14 Q. Well, there is no difference, but it's a little bit more complete
15 here. There are a few things that indicate how the Presidency took into
16 account natural, normal, legitimate demands only after the barricades,
17 and my question is: Wouldn't it have been normal for this never to have
18 been put on the agenda and had the barricades not been put up, the
19 Presidency would have functioned according to the constitution. Do you
21 A. Well, that's a question I actually -- I can't answer myself, but
22 I am finding it strange that we have now in front of us a detailed
23 document about a Crisis Committee which is talking about the future
24 constitution of Bosnia
25 because of a killing at a wedding. I find it very strange that if these
1 barricades were simply erected as a direct result of shooting at a
2 wedding, that all of these details constitutional issues would have been
3 discussed in order for the barricades to be taken down. So this would
4 lead me to -- to believe that the reason the barricades went up in the
5 front -- in the first was not, in fact, the killing at the wedding but
6 the issue of the referendum, but that's only my opinion.
7 Q. But, Colonel, sir, would you agree that there were considerable
8 tensions which resulted in the killing of the best man and that the
9 killing of the best man is the result of the tensions, not the cause of
10 the tension? The killing is the cause of the eruption and the
11 barricades, but the actual killing is the result, is the fruit of
12 long-term tensions, political gainsmanship which the Muslim leadership
13 conducted against the Serbs; is that correct?
14 A. No, I don't actually agree with that.
15 Q. Are you trying to say that there was an idyllic political
16 situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the killing?
17 A. No. What I'm simply trying to say is that there were three
18 different political parties in Bosnia
19 each other. And this was the indirect result of -- or this resulted in
20 an extremely high degree of tension where everybody in the international
21 community was aware that if these tensions continued to fester because of
22 whatever was find them, then it would let to conflict, and our objective
23 as to try and avoid that at all costs, and all our efforts were directed
24 to that end. Who did what and where it was done, I don't have all the
25 details because my appointment was head of the monitor mission, and
1 our -- our freedom of movement and our safety and security was no longer
2 guaranteed. Therefore, it was extremely difficult for us to get
3 movement, to get information, and therefore we were not as effective as
4 we might otherwise have been.
5 Q. Thank you. These are the minutes from a Presidency session, so I
6 do understand that you did not have insight into them before that, but
7 here you can see exactly what happened at the session in detail, and I
8 can conclude, and may we have the last page for me to carry on, that all
9 these conclusions were adopted unanimously, by which the Presidency
10 confirmed that these were the legitimate goals -- or, rather, legitimate
11 demands and that they were acceptable and accepted unanimously. Do you
13 A. Well, if those documents were signed, yes, I would agree. I'm
14 looking at the document in front of me. If it has been signed by the
15 various members, then I have to accept it. I don't have a problem with
17 Q. Thank you. Now, I have to read out a paragraph which we don't
18 have in translation but we do have in Serbian. It says it was concluded
19 that the public should be informed about this straight away and that the
20 vice premier, Muhamed Cengic, and the president of the Crisis Staff of
21 the SDS
22 should do what they can to disband the barricades from the main roads in
24 So you see there that the special involvement of these two
25 people, Muslims and Serbs, for the barricades to be disbanded, because if
1 you remember, there were both Muslim and Serb barricades erected; right?
2 A. I have no evidence that there were Muslim barricades in the city
3 on that particular day. The Muslim barricades, as far as I recall, were
4 erected maybe the day after or two days later when there was great fear
5 that Mr. Arkan was coming to the city, because I received a message that
6 Mr. Arkan wanted to meet me. And all of the barricades that I saw in
8 Serbs, and that evening I had to negotiate my way from the Holiday Inn
9 Hotel all the way to the airport. I had to negotiate my way through
10 eight armed barricades which were erected and manned by Bosnian Serbs. I
11 did not come across any Muslim check-points at that time.
12 Q. Thank you. We'll see that they did exist on the basis of other
13 documents but may I have 1D1236 next, please. And I'd like to tender
14 this document into evidence, please, Your Excellencies.
15 JUDGE KWON: I take it you would like this document to be fully
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. And there's also one
18 issue that I'm a bit puzzled about. It claims to be the minutes of the
19 56th session, but when you look at the B/C/S version it doesn't look to
20 me like minutes but rather like a report from another source summarising
21 particular parts of something. Therefore, I would rather suggest to
22 first mark it for identification until we have checked whether it is
23 really what this says to be. We would like to check whether these are
24 indeed the minutes of the 56th session of the Presidency or, rather, a
25 filtered document published in whatever source.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, can you help us in regards to this.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, certainly, yes. This was
3 published by the national security and the future, prepared by Mr. Simic,
4 published in 2006, that documents of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina
5 from 1991 to 1994, Tomo Simic prepared this. We asked the Prosecution to
6 provide us with all the records, all the transcripts and minutes of the
7 BH Presidency sessions, but we did not receive them. So this is what we
8 managed to find. Tomo Simic is the editor, and I think it has already
9 been used in one of the trials.
10 So this is the only document that we could access, that we could
11 come by. Now, if the Prosecution could provide us, and that would be
12 very necessary, the entire documents of Presidency, BH Presidency,
13 sessions, we'd be grateful. Perhaps something has been left out here,
14 but it's the only document that we were able to find with a well-known
15 publisher and everything else. And it is the minutes. It's not the
16 transcript, it's the minutes, and the minutes are always a little
17 shorter; right?
18 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow who this Mr. Simic is, in what
19 capacity he prepared this.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He is an associate of this
21 institute, obviously the national security and -- for national security
22 and the future as it's called, and he worked with the documents and
23 prepared them on that basis. And it hasn't been challenged. Nobody's
24 challenged it yet. He compiled a collection of documents relating to the
25 BH Presidency.
1 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do you accept his explanation,
2 or would you like him to call foundation witnesses to this document?
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I don't think there is a need to call a
4 witness, another witness, for this, but --
5 JUDGE KWON: Then we'll mark it for identification pending
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, thank you.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that be MFI D214.
9 JUDGE KWON: All right. Thank you. Let's move on.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we kindly request that the
11 Prosecution provides us with any documents they have linked to the BH
12 Presidency, to disclose them to us.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Now, Colonel, we have here parts, excerpts from a diary by my
15 chef de cabinet, and it says Sunday, the 1st and 2nd, 1992. May we leaf
16 through it further and move on?
17 JUDGE KWON: What is the 65 ter number of this?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1236. Yes. The diary has been
19 admitted into evidence as 1D1236.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Under number 2 it says:
22 "Trip to Belgrade
23 Then under 3, the Turkish ambassador, et cetera, et cetera, will
24 come on Monday, and so on. But there's a mistake in the date. You see
25 the SA043963 number up there at the top. Can we go back a bit through
1 the agenda, turn back the pages? Or, rather, let's go to the next page,
2 the following page.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Maybe I can be of assistance. This document
4 is in e-court twice. Once it is the single page, and then there are
5 several more pages under 1D01255. That's the same item.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I apologise. May I have
8 1D1255 then, please. And there are several pages there. The date is --
9 well, February doesn't have 31 days. Well, let's look at SA043987, that
10 page number, which I believe is the next page. No, 3938 are the last
11 digits. Saturday is the 1st of February. Sunday is the 2nd of February.
12 May we go on to the next page, please. It says Monday, the 3rd of
13 February. And now we can move on to the 29th of February. This is
14 Saturday, the 29th of February. And it says:
15 "In the night between Friday and Saturday, a conflict broke out
16 between the Serbs and Muslims at Turbe. A Serb was seriously wounded,
17 and two Muslims killed. The Serbs erected barricades at the entrance to
18 their village.
19 "2. Dr. Karadzic in Banja Luka attending talks."
20 "3. The German television programme," et cetera.
21 May we move on to the next page, please. Sunday, the 1st of
22 February where it should be the 1st of March. Number 1:
23 "Three members of the European parliament mission wish to meet
24 Dr. Karadzic," et cetera.
25 Second, the trip to Belgrade
1 ambassador, Omer, et cetera.
2 May we move on to the next page, and the number on this page was
3 3963. Now we go on to 3964. Monday, the 2nd of March. He corrected the
4 date himself there. It says:
5 "Demonstrations and barricades in Sarajevo. The reason being --
6 or the pretext for that, the killing of a member of the Serb wedding
7 party at Bascarsija."
8 So he says that that was the pretext.
9 Next. Here it says Pristina, Sarajevo, et cetera, but Wednesday
10 the 4th of March, demonstrations in Sarajevo, situation critical, Green
11 Berets attempted to attacked the Serb territorials. Dr. Karadzic was on
12 Jutel with Alija Izetbegovic. So it was only on the 4th of March that I
13 was in Sarajevo
14 Mr. Izetbegovic for us to make a joint statement and calm the situation
16 Do you accept that?
17 A. Yes, I do. If Your Honour would permit me, I have a diary here
18 which I've used before. It's -- it's very basic, but it just gives me
19 recollection of who I may have met and when I met them on dates. Can
20 I --
21 JUDGE KWON: By all means.
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
23 I accept, Dr. Karadzic, when you say there was a meeting on
24 television. I was aware of that on that date.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Thank you, yes. We will wait for -- to see your notes. That
2 would be a good idea. If we could have a look at your diary entries.
3 A. My diary entry for the 3rd of March says that I was at the
4 Presidency and I was given details of the arrangement that was made or
5 the deal that was made. It also mentions that there were barricades
6 erected by the Muslims and that they were very afraid, that there were
7 rumours of - what I wrote down here - was according to them, of Chetniks
8 arriving in the city and Mr. Arkan. And my diary for the 4th of March
9 says that the barricades came down, situation quiet.
10 Q. Thank you. That really does show that your diary and entries are
11 very valuable. So I'll have to see with the Registrar how we can be
12 provided them. Now, this diary by Ljubo Grkovic, I'd like to tender
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I have a problem with this
16 diary because as we can see, there are obviously problems with dates
17 provided, and we don't know who that person is. Perhaps if we get a bit
18 more information on that person. Otherwise, I would oppose it, and the
19 witness should be brought who made this diary.
20 JUDGE KWON: If Mr. Karadzic could help us as regards this diary.
21 Who is Mr. Grkovic is and --
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Grkovic was a journalist in the
23 newspaper "Oslobodjenje" before the war. And just before the war broke
24 out, he was my chef de cabinet in the Serbian Democratic Party. I was
25 working at my clinic as a psychiatrist right up until the 1st of March
1 and -- well, I worked in the clinic in the afternoon, and this diary was
2 found by the investigators of the Tribunal -- or, rather, the OTP. I
3 didn't even know it existed. And we can see looking at the number of
4 pages, and the page numbers SA04379, et cetera, you can see the order.
5 So there was a mistake for the 1st and 2nd of March. He made a mistake
6 in recording the date. But if you look at the sequence, then you can see
7 that that's it because you see the 1st of February was Saturday, the 2nd
8 of February was Sunday, and then he continued to the 1st day of March, he
9 wrote down February instead of writing March. So it's a document which
10 we received through the IDS
11 the Prosecution -- or, rather, the investigators. No, we received it
12 from the Prosecution in one of the batches they provided us with.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I can confirm this -- this
15 diary was seized by -- by the Bosnian authorities and provided to us, and
16 now that I know who that person is, I have no objection any more.
17 JUDGE KWON: So we'll admit it, but mark it for identification
18 pending translation.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D215.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the excerpts we just had we
21 have a translation of, and I am informed by Mr. Reid that we do have
22 indeed the full translation of this document, so we can provide it to
24 JUDGE KWON: So with that explanation, you have no objection --
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Correct, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: So it will be admitted then, Exhibit D215.
2 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence kindly requests to be
4 provided with that translation.
5 JUDGE KWON: Of course.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 65 ter 6608,
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this has been admitted as
9 Exhibit P938.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right, yes. And it's the
12 minutes from the deputy's club of the Serbian Democratic Party. But I
13 see that Mr. Kalinic was there as well. So, in fact -- well, all those
14 Serbs who joined the Assembly of the Serbian people.
15 May we turn to page 2 of the document, which is 090 -- ah. The
16 English page number is 13. Page 13 for the English -- or, rather, 13,
17 page 13 for the English. 19 and 20 for the Serbian. So page 13 for the
18 English, please. That's right.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I would like to draw your attention to what Velibor Ostojic is
21 saying, Colonel, Velibor Ostojic whom you met for minister for
22 information in the Bosnian government; is that correct?
23 A. Yes, that is correct.
24 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to be reading that in the Serbian and
25 you have it in English, Velibor Ostojic.
1 "Gentlemen, I will merely provide some information which will
2 really be important for taking position on some issues.
3 "First, let me inform you that an informal body has introduced a
4 special unit into the RTVSA, Sarajevo
5 without the knowledge of the government and the Ministry of Information.
6 This can be done only in a state of emergency and under wartime
7 conditions. I wrote a letter to the chief of the monitoring mission,
8 Mr. Doyle. I met with him yesterday and gave him detailed information,
9 and he promised that he would investigate this case. The man was simply
10 flabbergasted when he heard about this event.
11 "I asked Mr. Zepinic, Mandic, Kic, and Zuban, our entire
12 structure in the MUP from the republic down to the municipality if they
13 were aware of that. Nobody was. This was done when the RTSA leadership
14 was in Banja Luka."
15 Now, you were informed by the minister, the late minister now,
16 regrettably, that somebody had usurped the minister's authority and
17 placed a special unit in the TV building; is that correct?
18 A. No, that is not correct, Mr. Karadzic. I never received any
19 letter from Mr. Ostojic. I agree with you that I had a meeting with him,
20 and I can give the details of that meeting because I remember it quite
21 well, but Mr. Ostojic certainly did not send me any letter. I certainly
22 didn't receive any.
23 Q. Do you remember that he was objecting to the occupation of the
24 television by some special forces which were there illegally?
25 A. Mr. Ostojic certainly did not mention that to me. Mr. Ostojic's
1 primary purpose in asking to meet me was, one, to let me know that it was
2 his view that as minister for information he should have control of the
3 television at Sarajevo
4 went on to inform me that he had been attacked and beaten up outside his
5 apartment and that he suspected it was done by officials from the
6 Ministry of the Interior. I told him that it was not appropriate for me
7 as head of the monitor mission to get involved in internal wranglings
8 between ministries of the government, but that if I was going to do
9 anything about it, I would first need to hear what the other side said,
10 which was the Ministry of the Interior.
11 I subsequently had a meeting with Mr. Hebib, who I understand was
12 the deputy minister of the interior, who told me that under no
13 circumstances would television come under the control of the minister for
14 information and that the reason why he understood that Mr. Ostojic had
15 been attacked was nothing to do with the television. It was a private
16 matter. But at no stage did Mr. Ostojic mention to me about any special
17 unit that had been deployed into the television Sarajevo. I have
18 absolutely no knowledge of that.
19 Q. Thank you. Colonel, this was not a private quarrel as it was
20 informed in an insulting way. It was actually -- actually a murder
21 attempt, and that is why we all received protection. We received
22 protection from the regular police, including myself. But we're going to
23 come to that when we start dealing with the transcript from your
25 Can we tender this document. Ah, it's already been admitted.
1 Can we look at 1D1128 now, please, to see what the command of the
2 2nd Military District -- actually, at the time it was probably the 4th
3 still. No, actually, the 2nd Military District reporting to the --
4 report from the 17th Partisan Brigade about their area of responsibility.
5 This is document 1D1128.
6 We can see here that this is a military secret in perpetuity,
7 meaning that this information is not to be revealed.
8 Can we look at page 2. Thank you.
9 It says here:
10 "In the TV Sarajevo
11 among a large number of journalists because of the constant presence of
12 armed paramilitary formations which are present in the television
13 building and are mingling with reporters from various towns. That is why
14 the reports are one-sided and tendentious, and they are being written
15 under threat of weapons. We would like you to inform your entire unit
16 with this information."
17 The document is dated the 23rd of April, 1992.
18 Can we go back to page 1 now, please.
19 You were there on the 23rd of April, weren't you? Did you know
20 that the Sarajevo Television was full of paramilitary formation forces?
21 A. No, I had no knowledge of that.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 On page 1 it says:
24 "On the 17th, 18th April 1992, the Green Berets and special
25 forces of the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina carried out an attack on the
1 Pretis factory in Vogosca when five of the attackers were killed, 20
2 wounded and 9 captured. Seven trucks were driven away, two of them with
3 ammunition. One hundred Golf vehicles were stolen, which are being used
4 by the Green Berets. With a timely intervention by the JNA unit,
5 catastrophe of broader scope was prevented."
6 Were you aware of this attack by the paramilitary forces and the
7 Muslim part of the joint MUP on a factory which belongs to the JNA and
8 the ministry is being informed about it.
9 A. No, I have no knowledge of that.
10 Q. Thank you. The next paragraph states:
11 "On the 18th to 19th April 1992, in the organisation of the
12 Green Berets, the military industry Igman at Konjic, near Konjic, was
13 captured, blocked. The phones were switched off in order to prevent
14 reactions via the military."
15 Were you aware of this action?
16 A. No, I was not.
17 Q. Thank you. And then the next but one paragraph:
18 "The situation in Visegrad is calming down and a key influence on
19 this was played by units of the 2nd Military District. Several hundred
20 of refugees were protected, primarily of Muslim ethnicity. A lot of
21 assistance in food was given. The escalating conflict between Serbs and
22 Muslims has led to the HOS units to strike both sides in order for the
23 conflict to continue."
24 This is the latest that is happening in Sarajevo. They are using
25 shattering cannon blasts in order to increase tensions and fear among the
1 citizens because in that way the sound effect and the explosions are
2 magnified several times over.
3 Sir, do you know what HOS is?
4 A. Well, HOS to me is one of the paramilitary organisations. We
5 referred to all of those armed paramilitaries that were not JNA. Our
6 collective title for them was simply paramilitaries, because there were
7 so many types, colours, uniforms, it was very difficult to distinguish.
8 I should say here if I may, Your Honour, that during this period
11 the monitor mission, but I had nobody under my command, nobody under my
12 control. I was on my own. It was not appropriate for me, nor was it
13 safe for me to travel around the city to investigate any of these
14 allegations that may have been made. The city at this stage was in
15 turmoil. It was very difficult to get an accurate reflection or a
16 picture for what was going on. Out freedom of movement was interfered
17 with, our safety and security was in jeopardy, so I am not at this stage
18 able to give any detailed information about any of these incidents that
19 are being brought up now.
20 Q. Thank you, but I believe that you know whose formation HOS is.
21 Here it says that HOS was striking at the Muslims and at the Serbs in an
22 attempt to escalate the conflict and that they were firing cannon in
23 order to increase the effect. Shells were falling, among them HOS
24 shells, both on the Serbs and on the Muslims. This is a secret document
25 meant to remain that. So, please, do you know whose paramilitary
1 formation HOS is?
2 A. One of the points that I want to raise here is that it was not a
3 matter for me to try and identify military units, armed or otherwise,
4 because my experience in peacekeeping led me to believe that I must
5 maintain an impartial and neutral stance and this is something I always
6 did, and if I was to be start writing reports about various paramilitary
7 organisations one side or the other might indicate that somehow I was
8 somebody's agent. So I did not get involved in the details of all of
9 these paramilitary organisations at all. I was there as Carrington's
10 personal representative. I was there in a diplomatic role, and I
11 confined it to that.
12 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, we've heard now on several
13 occasions the witness very clearly set out the parameters of his duties
14 and the opportunities which he had and didn't have. It seems to me it's
15 very necessary now for you to concentrate on questioning him about
16 matters which it's apparent he did have actual personal knowledge. First
17 of all, the witness will be able to assist the Tribunal a great deal
18 easier, and secondly, we'll go a great deal faster.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency, but
20 it's a fact that the Colonel has said a lot of things during the
21 examination-in-chief, among them that many documents were also being
22 admitted through him which testify to that time. So it should then be
23 possible for me to probe the documents that I agreed to be admitted. So
24 I would just like him to answer whether he knew -- whether he knows whose
25 formation the HOS was.
1 THE WITNESS: I don't know whose formation the HOS was.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you. You talked about the attack on the television. You
4 affirmed or confirmed that you didn't know that the Green Berets had
5 occupied the television building and that the -- how the news should look
6 was being dictated. Do you then believe that the television building
7 should and -- not and must not be a legitimate target?
8 A. Well, I already mentioned that I had no knowledge that the
9 Green Berets had a unit in television. I had no proof that it was there
10 either. So it wasn't part of my consideration. This is the first I've
11 heard of it. It was never brought to my attention by anybody on either
12 side that there was a unit on Sarajevo Television. You make reference to
13 a letter I'm supposed to have received from Mr. Ostojic, which I'm
14 telling you I did not receive. So I have no idea what you're talking
15 about in relation to any unit going into television. And if that's the
16 case then, any views I had of the television would not have taken into
17 consideration the allegation that there were Green Berets there. I can
18 talk about the attack on the television which is a separate issue.
19 Q. My question was: Do you consider or do you believe that
20 television cannot be a legitimate target? We can just leave the presence
21 of the military forces aside for a second.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that's actually a matter for
23 the Trial Chamber to decide whether anything is a legitimate military
24 target or not, definitely not for the witness in his capacity as he was
25 in the former Yugoslavia
1 JUDGE KWON: I agree with you, but when the colonel will be able
2 to answer the question in the capacity as a military as far as he knows.
3 THE WITNESS: Well, I certainly would not deem that a television
4 would be a target for any sort of military action. If some -- if
5 somebody or organisation is attempting to upset or destroy the
6 institutions of a state, then an attack on its television or on its
7 communication complex would be one of those targets. So I don't know in
8 what context Dr. Karadzic you're asking me this question. Can you
9 explain it a bit clearer for me, please?
10 JUDGE KWON: We can move on.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Thank you. I would just like to say that NATO would get upset
13 with you because you described the attack on Television Belgrade where
14 there was no military presence, whereas here there was a military
15 presence, and then later like you --
16 JUDGE KWON: No speech, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender
18 this document. This is a confidential report to the command of the
19 17th Partisan Brigade. Actually, to the command of the 2nd Military
20 District from one of the units out in the field.
21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would object against it.
23 First of all, we don't have a translation, and secondly, we do not really
24 have a foundation for this document. The witness could not deal with it,
25 and the commander Partisan -- 17th Partisan Brigade is definitely not a
1 JNA unit. So the value and the reliability of this document has not been
2 established. We would need to really get a foundation for this.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. In addition, the witness has no
4 knowledge about the content of this document except for the name of one
5 of the paramilitaries, and there are no circumstances in which we need
6 this document to assist the credibility. So as such, we will not admit
7 it, Mr. Karadzic.
8 And I take it it's time for a break.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just be given a minute to say
10 that the Defence is -- well, would like to say that this is an attack on
11 the television, and it shows that the television station building was a
12 military facility and this is the JNA right up until the 20th of May. So
13 the Defence is disappointed. And we certainly shouldn't -- wouldn't have
14 called it the Partisan Brigade, because we were against the partisans and
15 Chetniks for a modern Serb society.
16 JUDGE KWON: You will have ample opportunity to lead that
17 evidence later on.
18 Twenty minutes.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.20 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 10.43 a.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic, bearing in mind what
22 Judge Morrison had told you.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Before we resume the
24 cross-examination, I wanted to ask if the Chamber might be willing to
25 entertain a request that we have concerning the agenda of Colonel Doyle,
1 and our request is that he go and at some point convenient to him today
2 make a photocopy of those pages of his agenda which deal with the issues
3 that have been the subject of his testimony, either meetings or events,
4 and redact from those pages any personal information that he doesn't want
5 to share with us and then have that made available to us before
6 Dr. Karadzic concludes his cross-examination in the event that any
7 material arising from those notes can be useful. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: As a matter of principle, in fact, we leave it in
9 the hands of the parties and witnesses negotiation, but can I ask,
10 Colonel Doyle, what your position is as to the request from the Defence.
11 THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, this is a very personal diary to
12 me, and it contains written notes in relation to communications I've had
13 with my family over that period. The diary basically was made out just
14 to remind me of who I met and where I met. The diaries don't have any
15 personal notes as to views or opinions or reports. So -- so my request
16 would be that I will do, of course, what I'm told to do, and if any of
17 this was to be photocopied, I would reserve the right to delete most of
18 its content because it is personal.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: It may be slightly more time-consuming, but if
20 you were going to have to go through a photocopy it would take time
21 anyway. It might be simply better for you to make a separate annotation
22 on a separate piece of paper of those meetings which are relevant and the
23 people there. And that sort of information may be easier for you and it
24 may be more productive for the Defence.
25 THE WITNESS: I would think, Your Honours, the area of the diary
1 which -- which -- in which I had notations on who I met probably would be
2 from the period of the 1st of March to the day I was evacuated on the
3 12th of May. Now, I don't have any problems to having those dates if the
4 Defence wish having those photocopied, but I would reserve the right just
5 to delete anything that's personal. I really don't have a problem with
7 JUDGE MORRISON: That's very kind, but normally the position is
8 where a diary is referred to in court then it becomes a matter which can
9 be disclosed to the Defence. For instance, if a police officer is giving
10 evidence from his notebook, the same principle applies whether it's
11 called a notebook or a diary, but the same principle of nondisclosure
12 also applies in that those parts of the notebook which are not relevant
13 to the case are not disclosed, and in your case it would be those parts
14 personal to you.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. I -- I don't have a problem with
16 that. But as I said, it -- you know, to do it for the entire period of
17 the full year, I think, is not necessary. I would suggest from the
18 period of the 1st of March when the situation began to develop to the
19 period that I was evacuated on the 12th of May. I don't have a problem
20 with that if Your Honours so wish what to be done.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We do appreciate your co-operation.
22 Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, may I have 1D01273 next,
24 please. Let's just identify the first page and then we can move on to
25 page 4 of this document. And that portion has been translated as well.
1 So there we have the first page of the document. Now page 4 of
2 the Serbian and -- well, it's been translated in the English.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Now, Colonel, here we see a report from the police of the Serbian
5 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
6 rather, the secret service, and it says Ilidza. And they are reporting
7 and saying that Television Sarajevo has been taken over by the
8 Green Berets, that there are 50 to 70 of them led by Sejo Saric, and then
9 a man called Boca and another man called Saban, with assistance from
10 Bajrovic and Kasim, and so on, and that they have large quantities of
11 ammunition, and during the attack on Svrakino Selo, 30 to 40 members of
12 the Green Berets had arrived at the television station, put up launchers
13 and bazookas on top of the TV station and that they fired at ranges of
14 500 metres and also present -- well, were TV station employees begged the
15 Green Berets to provide them with ammunition so that they could exchange
16 it in the city for bread, exchange ammunition for bread. And then it
17 goes on to say that when it was bombed on the 9th of May, and when the
18 6th floor was precisely hit, the result was the destruction of studio 1
19 and offices and the 7th floor was hit, and so on and so forth.
20 Now, is this proof and evidence that the building was indeed used
21 as primarily a military facility, target?
22 A. No, it was not. As far as I'm concerned, I never saw any
23 military units at the Sarajevo Television. There was never any reference
24 to me. Nobody from the Bosnian Serbs came to me to say anything about
25 this. This is all absolutely astonishing for me to read. I find this
1 very difficult to believe or accept. I never saw, during the period that
2 I was in Sarajevo
3 saw any weapons placed on the -- on the roofs, and considering that there
4 was a mortar attack done by the Bosnian Serbs on the television station,
5 I'm just wondering is this ammunition to, in some way, justify the
6 attack. But I have to say that for the period that I was there, I never
7 saw any Green Berets or anybody in uniform or any large quantity of
8 weapons or anything of that nature, and nobody every said a word to me
9 from any side about this allegation.
10 Q. Thank you. Now, Colonel, we have to clarify some things that are
11 contradictory. You said that you were alone and helpless and that you
12 had no other people. When we talked, you said that you didn't go into
13 the centre of town but that you did have your people in the centre of
15 Now, let's see, were you in a position to see something, and if
16 you didn't see something, do you allow for the possibility that it
17 happened and existed regardless of the fact that you didn't see?
18 A. If I may just clarify the position here. Up until the time that
19 I became the personal representative of Lord Carrington, I had control
20 over approximately 60 monitors of the European Union that were under my
21 command in the city of Sarajevo
22 tasked by me to submit daily reports on developments in their various
23 areas. This would have included the city of Sarajevo.
24 When I became Lord Carrington's personal representative and I
25 returned to Sarajevo
1 support of the monitor mission and was able to get reports from them, I
2 didn't have any control or authority over them.
3 The second thing I would point out is that the
4 Television Sarajevo
5 Ilidza. It's not -- Sarajevo Television was not in the centre of the
6 city. Therefore we knew and were able to have contact with
8 I can only give you my personal opinion that in my mind this whole report
9 alleging that there were bazookas and all sorts of munitions, I just
10 can't accept that. That is my opinion and assessment at that time.
11 Q. Colonel, were you in a position to know more than state security?
12 Because this is a document dated the 11th of May. So you claim to know
13 better than the state security and you are also saying that this isn't an
14 authentic document. You were alone in Ilidza and this is state security
15 with branches everywhere, like any intelligence services, and now you're
16 claiming you have better insight into the situation and you're
17 challenging an authentic document from that time, a contemporaneous
18 document. Is that what you're doing?
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Karadzic, that's a complete
20 misrepresentation. What the witness said was what he saw and what he
21 personally didn't see, which is of course what any witness is limited to
22 saying. He doubts the authenticity of the document on the basis of what
23 he saw. The authenticity of the document per se is not something that
24 this witness can speak to. If you have evidence in due course that
25 authenticates the document, then you're free to bring it, but you've
1 misrepresented entirely the nature and substance of the witness's
2 evidence on that point.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Colonel, my dilemma is in the following: You talk about many
5 things. During the examination-in-chief you talked about many things.
6 Now, when I went to ask you about the details of those events or things,
7 you say you don't know, or you claim that you know differently from what
8 the documents show. So are you biased, Colonel?
9 A. No, the one thing I will never be accused of, Mr. Karadzic, is
10 being biased, with all due respect.
11 Q. Thank you. Now, let me ask you, why did you avoid seeing the
12 Serb side, meeting with the Serb side or having your photograph taken
13 with the Serb side? Wasn't the Serb side an equal party in the
14 negotiations and in the conflict?
15 A. I don't -- is there a question there about meeting the Serbs?
16 Does it relate to a particular time and incident? I am not sure I
17 understand the question, Mr. Karadzic.
18 Q. Well, the question is: When you were in the European mission,
19 and I see later on, too, you refused to be a guest at Ilidza with the
20 local leadership there, and when you came to Pale, your condition was --
21 that you stipulated was that you shouldn't be photographed for
22 television. Now, I'm wondering why all the high representatives
23 respected all three sides, whereas you were against having anything to do
24 with the Serb side? So that's the question.
25 A. Okay. I can -- I can answer that. The first instance you are
1 referring to is a dinner that I was invited to by a newly formed
2 Bosnian Serb community committee in Ilidza. At that dinner I began to
3 realise that I was being used, I would say, in a political manner. The
4 entire non-Serb members of the hotel staff had been taken by the Bosnian
5 Serbs and removed without their consent into the centre of the city. My
6 view at the time when this speech was made in my presence was that they
7 wanted to welcome me, and I felt that if I was to be seen to be part of
8 this new organisation, it would somehow give legitimacy to it. This is
9 something I was not prepared to do.
10 In reference to the meeting in Pale in which I went up with
11 Mrs. Plavsic. Mrs. Plavsic agreed with me that there would not be any
12 publicity of my visit, because at that stage the entity of Bosnia Srpska
13 had not been accepted internationally. And again if I was seen up in
14 Pale in uniform of the European Union Monitor Mission and publicity was
15 given, it somehow might be interpreted as an acceptance of the entity of
16 Republika Srpska, and this is something I wanted to avoid because I was
17 trying to maintain my neutrality and impartiality. As events turned out,
18 because Mrs. Plavsic realised it was my birthday, she arranged for a cake
19 to be brought in and the televisions arrived and photographed and covered
20 all this, and of course, it was given prominence, I understand, even in
21 one of the papers in Belgrade
22 been trying to do is I've been trying to maintain a neutral stance and
23 that's the reason why I didn't want any publicity. I never at any stage
24 refused to mediate or co-operate with the Bosnian Serb leadership. I
25 think you will have to accept that yourself, Mr. Karadzic. I never
1 refused any meeting, and I tried to be as helpful as I could to all sides
2 in this conflict.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I now tender this
4 document, Your Excellencies. And I should like to call up 1D1291 next,
5 please, briefly. It's a book by General MacKenzie.
6 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In relation to ID 1273, the same opposition
8 applies like with the previous document. It was not adopted by the
9 witness. The witness could not deal with it at all. There's no
10 foundation to accept this document at this point in time.
11 JUDGE KWON: Agreed. We'll not admit this document.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we're disappointed again,
13 because it shows that the witness was not sufficiently well informed
14 about matters, but it's your decision.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Now, I'd like to draw your attention to this next document.
17 That's the title page of General MacKenzie's book. And now may we turn
18 to page 182 of the book, please. Page 182. 182. That's what it says on
19 the page. It's page 182 of the book. Or, rather, page 22 if we look at
20 the document itself. Yes, that's right.
21 Let's see what General MacKenzie has to say:
22 "[In English] May 11th. The European Community had been
23 conducting marathon peace talks over the previous few days. The EC
24 continued to exclude the Bosnian Serbs from the deliberations, and as a
25 result, was becoming less and less popular with them. Meanwhile, the
1 Bosnian Serbs under Dr. Karadzic were becoming more and more independent
2 from the JNA. There were even reports of Bosnian Serbs attacking JNA,"
3 and so on.
4 [Interpretation] So you see, that that was the position taken by
5 General MacKenzie, too, that the European Commission -- or
6 European Community, rather, that its representatives bypassed us.
7 Now, the position of the entire conference, including Carrington,
8 and you accepted that when we had our interview that it was his position,
9 Carrington's position, that the only important thing was for all three
10 sides to place their signature to the peace agreement and everybody treat
11 us as equal parties in the negotiations and in the conflict later on,
12 except for the European mission.
13 And now at the bottom of that page under May the 12th, it says:
14 "[In English] After a restless night in new surroundings, I sat
15 around with General Nambiar, Philippe Morillon, and Cedric Thornberry to
16 discuss our expanding peacekeeping role in Bosnia. We still didn't have
17 a mandate from the UN for Bosnia
18 Community, we were the only game in town and slowly but surely had
19 already been getting involved. We agreed that we had to involve the
20 Bosnian Serbs in any cease-fire negotiations chaired by the UNPROFOR."
21 [Interpretation] Therefore, Colonel, we didn't ask you to
22 recognise our republic, Republika Srpska, but to respect the Serb side
23 without which there could be no negotiations and which was part of the
24 legitimate system, a third of the legitimate system in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So why was that so difficult to do? Why was it so
1 difficult to accept that, for the European Commission to accept that? I
2 mean, the European Community to accept that.
3 A. There's no issue here about the European Community, not
4 accepting the Bosnian Serbs as one of the legitimate ethnic groupings in
6 negotiations which I was involved in, I can give you answer to that. So
7 I'm not too sure what your question is. There's never been any doubt
8 that the Bosnian Serbs were part of the entity there. No one is
9 disputing that. The other thing I'll tell you is General Lewis Mackenzie
10 was a United Nations military commander, in command of a considerable
11 amount of troops and represented the United Nations. I did not represent
12 the United Nations. I didn't represent the European Community. I
13 represented the International Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia
14 and it is, you know, General MacKenzie can be cross-examined himself.
15 His views of it may be different to mine and are in many instance, but I
16 would just remind you that even though we were all trying to do the same
17 thing, General MacKenzie was a United Nations military officer. I was
19 Q. Thank you. We'll come back to that document. May I tender it
20 into evidence now, please, the book, although we'll come back to the book
21 in due course a number of times, I believe. Well, I can tender it later
22 on if need be.
23 May we have 1D01270. Just to round off this topic. And you'll
24 see there a letter there General Kukanjac to Alija Izetbegovic, written
25 on the 19th of April. You were there at the time. And General Kukanjac
1 is writing to Izetbegovic -- I think we have the translation of that too.
2 Yes, we do.
3 I'm going to read it out in Serbian, just some of the more
4 pertinent portions:
5 "Mr. President, in the course of the night of the April 17th
6 through the 18th, 1992, your Green Berets carried out an attack on part
7 of a factory in Vogosca, Pretis, the mortar and artillery ammunition
8 production, you are aware of the results of the attack.
9 "In the course of the night of the 18th of April through to the
10 19th, 1992, in Konjic, at 2000 hours on the 18th of April everything was
11 blocked. All telephones of the PTT were turned off to military
12 facilities. The Green Berets occupied the military equipment factory of
14 And then lower down says:
15 "Mr. President, a cease of all attacks on military facilities,"
16 and under C, "order the deblocking of military facilities Ljuta and
17 Celebic." And on the next page -- we can stay there with the English
18 page, it's on that same page in English or perhaps not, perhaps not. It
19 says, "Mr. President --" What? Yes, we stay there with the English:
20 "Do not forget that we have signed a peace agreement -- we
21 signed a peace agreement on the 12th of April, 1992, and at that very
22 same day your command to attack or where you declare war on the JNA was
23 released and directed of course at Serbs and other innocent citizens."
24 And the last paragraph:
25 "Analyse all this and state publicly that you want war. If you
1 don't want war then demonstrate it through your actions."
2 Now, all this was happening when you were Lord Carrington's envoy
3 to the peace conference. Should you have known about this, and are they
4 circumstances under which the conference was to take place and that those
5 circumstances and the situation affected the conference itself and it's
6 outcome? Do you agree with that?
7 A. Well, this is the first time I've seen this document. I'm not
8 aware that it was sent by anybody. I wasn't aware of its content, and
9 therefore I can't comment on it. I can only say on the 18th of April
10 that was the day that the television was mortar bombed by Bosnian Serbs.
11 Q. You know all that, but you don't know all that the Muslim forces
12 did; is that right?
13 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'm not totally aware of what anybody did at this
14 stage. I mean, you have to appreciate this city was under siege. It is
15 bound to have allegations flying all over the place, and of course we
16 need to get the background to them. But most of the concern for the
17 international community was what was happening to the city from outside
18 the city to wit the mortaring and shelling of the city from outside.
19 That was the main concern. I find it -- I find it very difficult to
20 understand why there are so many allegations against Muslims carrying out
21 all these actions in the city that was basically under siege, where
22 freedom of movement was denied, where we were spending a lot of time in
23 bunkers. So I find these -- these documents surprising to say the least.
24 Q. Colonel, sir, do you know who was doing the shelling? Did you
25 know that it was the HOS and its artillery who were present in Sarajevo
1 Did you know that or not?
2 A. I was aware that there were elements inside the city that were
3 attempting to defend the city and that there were elements inside the
4 city that were fighting for territory. Yes, I'm aware of that. I don't
5 know the exact details of it, but the predominantly -- the predominant
6 action that was taking place around that period was the shelling of the
7 city and different parts of the city from weapons that were placed on the
8 hills surrounding the city of Sarajevo
9 taking shelter in bunkers in the United Nations.
10 Q. Colonel, do you know who was on the hillsides around Sarajevo
11 Did you know who held which position?
12 A. No, I don't know, but we were -- we were very well aware of the
13 fact that it was predominantly Bosnian Serbs, because they had already
14 established a Bosnian Serb Army. All of the tanks, heavy artillery,
15 mortars were taken up. I've seen evidence of that in a document that I
16 think has already been placed here from a meeting of the
17 Republika Srpska's committee when it talked about all of the weapons
18 they'd already taken. So I think it is beyond dispute or doubt but that
19 the vast and overwhelming bulk of the armaments at that time were
20 belonging and controlled by the Bosnian Serbs and they were directing
21 this against the city of Sarajevo
22 Q. We must be precise, lieutenant [as interpreted], sir, so please
23 don't get angry with me. But can you tell me did the Bosnian Serbs have
24 their own army up until the 12th of May, until the time that you were in
1 A. Yes, they did.
2 Q. But it's well known that the decision on forming the army was
3 adopted on the 12th of May at the Assembly session in Banja Luka and that
4 the Serbian Army -- the Bosnian Serb Army came into being on the 20th of
5 May, because on the 19th of May the JNA withdrew from Bosnia; is that
7 A. The JNA withdrew from Bosnia
8 But you don't create an army overnight, Mr. Karadzic. We saw evidence of
9 massive convoys of armaments and tanks going up the road to Pale to the
10 Republika Srpska headquarters. I've already mentioned that I went up
11 there on the 1st of May with Mrs. Plavsic. I attempted to get up the day
12 before that but the roads were blocked with so many tanks and artillery
13 pieces heading up to Pale that were taken over by from the Bosnian Serbs
14 from the JNA who, at that stage, were anxious to withdraw from the
15 territory of Bosnia
16 Q. Whose tanks with those? Were they JNA tanks and when did the
17 Serbs -- the Bosnian Serbs take them over from the JNA?
18 A. Well, I assumed that they were taken over at the time I saw them
19 going up to Pale. And I also recall that when you were coming to a
20 meeting yourself at Ilidza that you came in one of these tanks yourself
21 with the JNA protection. So I don't know exactly. I know when the
22 decision -- I know when the announcement was made on the creation of the
23 Bosnian Serb Army, but there was a huge amount of military movement
24 before that. One of the missions given to the ECMM was to monitor the
25 movement of convoys of the JNA that were withdrawing from the territory
1 of Croatia
2 mission and we did this and we watched the movement of many convoys of
3 the JNA coming through Bosnia
5 mind, coming under the immediate control of the Bosnian Serbs who very
6 quickly established a Bosnian Serb Army, because the arrangement was that
7 anybody who was from the territory of Bosnia
8 JNA, they could remain in Bosnia
9 did they remain, but they took with them their equipment and tanks, et
10 cetera. So it was beyond dispute as what was happening.
11 Q. There's a lot that is disputable. Where did General Delic come
12 from, from which army?
13 A. I have no idea. I don't know him.
14 Q. Well, where did Hajrulahovic come from who you did meet? Where
15 did the command cadre of the Muslim army come from, and where did they
16 get their initial weaponry? I'm not talking about second or third
17 deliveries of weapons which arrived from Iran, but anyway, where did they
18 get the weapons from in the first place? And do you agree that the JNA
19 was the mother of all the armies in the republics of the former
21 A. Yes, I accepted that the JNA represented all of the republics of
22 the former Yugoslavia
23 Bosnian Serbs -- or Bosnian Muslims and Croats who had access to weapons.
24 What I'm saying here is the overwhelming bulk of the withdraw army from
1 denying for a moment that some of those members of the JNA who were
2 Bosnian Muslims became part of the territorial army. I'm not saying
3 that. What I am saying is that the overwhelming bulk of the
4 retreating -- not of the retreating, but of the JNA that were being
5 monitored leaving Croatia
6 that were Bosnian Serbs, became part of the Bosnian Serb Army.
7 Q. I'm going to put something to you, Colonel, sir. Croats and
8 Muslims, for a long period of time were gradually leaving the JNA, so the
9 JNA predominantly became a Serb army. The Serbs were not leaving the JNA
10 until the very end, so that the Serbs inherited these things at once
11 while the Muslims and the Croats did that, gradually seizing the weapons
12 from the JNA. So the JNA is the mother of all the republican armies
13 which were being created from the police forces and the
14 Territorial Defence units of those republics, as well as the JNA units
15 that were leaving the JNA. Croats and Muslims were leaving the army
16 gradually and the Serbs did not. So that is why you have the impression
17 that the Serbs inherited the JNA. But it's only because they did not
18 leave the army until the very end. Would you agree that all the armies
19 were actually created out of the JNA except the Croats and the Muslims
20 were leaving the army gradually and the Serbs did not do that until the
21 very end? Would you agree with that?
22 A. Well, I can only repeat what I've said earlier, that it was known
23 that 80 per cent -- approximately 80 per cent of the JNA army that went
24 into Bosnia
25 overnight you had a -- nearly overnight you had an easy transition from
1 JNA units become Bosnian Serb units. It would have applied to Croats and
2 Muslims on a much smaller scale.
3 The second reason why the Bosnian Serbs were armed was because
4 President Izetbegovic had declared a state of neutrality and therefore
5 directed that for the federal JNA call-up of reservists that those who
6 were Muslims and Croats would not have to obey that, and they didn't.
7 Therefore, most of the people who obeyed the call for mobilisation were
8 Bosnian Serbs, and they were issued with weapons when they were
9 mobilised, and those weapons they were allowed to retain when they were
10 demobilised. So you had a gradual arming of Bosnian Serbs, and this was
11 not done to any great extent to the Bosnian Muslims. So it was natural
12 that they were going to have access to weapons. And it was a cause of
13 concern to the monitor mission. We had reports coming in of concern
14 being expressed by various opstina that Bosnian Serbs were being
15 gradually armed because they were obeying the call for mobilisation.
16 President Izetbegovic said that it wasn't, in his view, legal and
17 therefore many Bosnian Muslims did not obey the call-up for mobilisation.
18 So that would be another factor in the gradual arming of Bosnian Serbs.
19 Q. I have to remind you that during our interview we talked about
20 it. I asked you whether you few about the Tito's -- about Tito's
21 doctrine of an armed peoples, about the Law on All Peoples Defence and
22 Social Protection, and that a long time before the war reservists were
23 allowed to take weapons and their uniforms and equipment home. This was
24 long before the war began. So do you remember that we discussed all
25 these questions?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. Thank you. That was something that was generally known.
3 Colonel, sir, do you know when the Muslim side began to create
4 it's own armed forces?
5 A. No, I'm not aware of as to when that happened. I don't -- I
6 knew, of course, that the president was Alija Izetbegovic, and that
7 therefore as president and president of the Presidency that he had a
8 certain amount of influence, but I had concerns because I was called into
9 the Presidency to be told of the concerns of the Presidency at one, the
10 gradual arming of the Bosnian Serbs, and two, that there were munitions
11 coming into the territory of Bosnia
12 and they were coming in in trucks. And I had an incident where the prime
13 minister at the time at Peladin [phoen] asked me to meet with the JNA to
14 find out a reason as to why these weapons were coming in to the JNA. I'm
15 not saying they went to the Bosnian Serbs. At that time they went to the
17 So these were issues that were being discussed earlier on in the
19 Q. Very well. Do you accept that the JNA could, just like any other
20 army, engage other transport vehicles to transfer its equipment somewhere
21 else? That was the case, and the army did confirm that it was theirs.
22 Do you agree that any army in the world can engage another company to
23 transport -- or for transport services on its behalf?
24 A. Well, I don't have experience of that from my country. We use
25 military equipment for the transfer of military goods. I was concerned
1 at that time because the manifest -- the manifest that was with that
2 convoy I was told - I don't have evidence of this but I was informed by
3 the prime minister - that the manifest of that convoy of four civilian
4 trucks had no mention of rocket launchers that were subsequently found on
5 those trucks and that was what created concern. And I can also say on
6 record here that it was my recommendation to the prime minister that the
7 weapons be released to the JNA and that it would be of advantage to the
8 Presidency if it began to open dialogue with the JNA as an army. Up to
9 that time this wasn't being done. So at my suggestion there was some
10 contact done officially with the JNA, something which wasn't done before
11 I met the prime minister.
12 Q. Thank you. Colonel, sir, I'm going to put some facts to you and
13 you can just say whether you agree with the possibility, rule it out or
15 Mr. Izetbegovic, in February, two months after the first
16 democratic power was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina
17 secret committee for the protection of Muslims even though by the very
18 nature of his function he was the president of the council for defence of
19 all the three peoples. Do you allow for this fact to be true or do you
20 disagree that that was the time when this secret commission for the
21 defence of Muslim was formed, for the defence of Muslims? This was in
22 February 1991.
23 A. No, Mr. Karadzic. I've absolutely no -- no idea on that. I
24 didn't go to Bosnia
25 Q. [Overlapping speakers] Thank you. And along that line do you
1 know that on the 31st of March, 1991, a decision was adopted on the
2 formation of the Patriotic League as the secret army of the SDA?
3 A. No, I have no knowledge of that. Again I didn't go to Bosnia
4 until October 1991.
5 Q. Thank you. I'm just going to put this to you: Do you know that
6 this Patriotic League was formed on the 30th of April and that from that
7 time on all the Muslim fighter's date of service began to be recorded,
8 the date of service for all Muslim fighters began on the 30th of April,
10 A. No, I have no knowledge of that.
11 Q. Thank you. Do you know that in 103 municipalities, with the
12 exception of only six Croat municipalities, so 103 municipalities where
13 Serbs and Muslims lived together, brigades were formed in -- of the
14 Patriotic Leagues in all of them. So a secret army was being formed in
15 all of these municipalities where Serbs and Muslims were living together?
16 A. I -- I have no knowledge of that.
17 Q. Thank you. Do you know that already at that time arming began
18 and they were receiving weapons from all over and that when the conflict
19 began they received weapons from Iran
20 United States continuously through Croatian territory?
21 A. No, I'm not familiar with that.
22 Q. If I were to tell you, Colonel, sir, that the new year, 1992, we
23 awaited with 103.000 of our armed Muslims belonging to the
24 Patriotic League, what would you say?
25 A. I'd say that I'd be very, very surprised.
1 Q. Thank you. And what would you say if I were to tell you that on
2 the 27th of June, 1991, President Kucan, President Tudjman, and the
3 presiding President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
4 Alija Izetbegovic, made a secret alliance against Yugoslavia and the JNA?
5 This was a military alliance intended to wage war against Yugoslavia and
6 the JNA.
7 A. Again, I have no knowledge of that.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I'm very reluctant to
9 interrupt, and you probably have already seen that I do not object much,
10 but the witness is -- has said he has no knowledge, and he came in 19 --
11 he came at October 1991. So these questions do not lead anywhere, and I
12 just wonder when this will be stopped.
13 JUDGE KWON: Some of the questions were related to 1992, after he
14 arrived, and then I understood him to be putting his case. So let's be
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to state the
17 following: The distinguished colonel, Mr. Doyle, whom we always
18 respected and still do, arrived and faced a situation that he did not
19 know much about, and I'm convinced that Colonel Doyle would have viewed
20 matters differently had he known of the secret alliance, war alliance,
21 and so on.
22 JUDGE KWON: Do not make your speech.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just explaining why I consider
24 this to be relevant. The colonel did not know then what he knows now.
25 JUDGE KWON: You will have the opportunity to explain to the
1 Chamber as to the credibility or the relevance of the evidence later on.
2 This is the time for you to put your question instead of making speech.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Now, do you agree that you agreed when we had our interview that
6 you did not know who Dr. Karadzic controlled -- or, rather, which
7 formations, which units at that time, and that your idea about Karadzic
8 controlling something is based on the fact that Karadzic had an armed
9 escort; right?
10 A. I would have taken it that as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs you
11 would have had responsibility for all elements of Bosnian Serbs under
12 your control, and that, in my view, would have included military. That
13 is the normal. When one is a leader, one accepts responsibility for what
14 his subordinates do or failed to do. Therefore I would have assumed and
15 it would have been the same for the Bosnian Muslims under
16 President Izetbegovic, that the political leaders who control these
17 people, they're the ones who accept -- who should take responsibility.
18 So it's in that light that I would have understood you to be the
19 undisputed leader of the Bosnian Serbs.
20 I mean, I -- I'm certainly willing to state that there would
21 always be elements that are not under central control, some radicals, but
22 by and large it is the norm for political masters to control military
24 Q. Thank you. But we're talking here about something that happened
25 up -- up to the 12th of May, and you agreed and said that you don't know
1 that I controlled certain formations up until the 12th of May. So we're
2 not talking about the situation after the 20th of May when the Army of
3 Republika Srpska existed but while you were there.
4 You agreed that while you were there, you had no knowledge of and
5 were not aware of me controlling any formations. But you've said in your
6 statement that you saw that I had an armed escort.
7 Now, did you agree when we met that that armed escort was
8 assigned to us by the ministry -- or, rather, the police and that they
9 were employees of the regular police force?
10 A. When we had the meeting and you put that to me, I accepted what
11 you said. Yes, I accept that. I'm not in a position of saying when
12 exactly I can recall whether any of these suddenly became armed Bosnian
13 Serbs, because at that time they were many armed forces who were in
14 uniform and out of uniform and it was very difficult to get a handle on
15 exactly who was what, but when I saw you on occasions that you had an
16 escort, some of them did not appear to me to be in uniform so I wasn't
17 too sure who they were. So I accept when you say they were given to you
18 by the police. I have no reason to disbelieve that.
19 Q. Thank you. Now, did you know, based on this document -- well,
20 the second page in Serbian -- or, rather, from this letter by
21 General Kukanjac to Alija Izetbegovic, don't forget that we reached an
22 agreement on a truce on the 12th of April, and that afterwards they
23 issued a directive declaring war on the JNA? Did you know about this
24 cease-fire, the truce? You said previously, I believe, that you knew of
25 this 12th of April cease-fire agreement?
1 A. Yes. I was involved in -- at that stage I had returned to
3 the negotiations that were going on in Ilidza in order to get that
5 Q. Thank you. Now, do you know that on that very same day,
6 Hasan Efendic sent a secret directive for war against all JNA facilities,
7 to block roads, cut off electricity and water and everything that
8 happened to the JNA in Croatia
9 A. No, I'm not familiar with that. No.
10 Q. Well, we published that, and we sent it out to the mediators in
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I'd like to tender this letter
13 by General Kukanjac to Mr. Izetbegovic into evidence, please.
14 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the witness has actually said
16 that he cannot confirm anything in this letter, and he cannot deal with
17 the letter, and therefore the position is actually as before.
18 JUDGE KWON: We agree. Witness --
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But he did confirm it,
20 Your Excellency. He said that he took part, that he was a peace broker.
21 JUDGE KWON: He couldn't comment on it. We do not admit it.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D0178 is the document I'd like
23 called up on e-court next, please.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And while we're waiting for that to come up, let me ask you,
1 Colonel, whether you knew of attacks by the Muslim army against Nedzarici
2 and the JNA installations, weapons theft and so on?
3 A. We had been informed that there were some attacks by Muslim
4 elements against some of the JNA installations with a view to attempting
5 to get weapons, but I had no written report of it and I wasn't in a
6 position of verifying that information.
7 Q. Here we have a document which refers to your interview to
8 "Vecernje Novosti" on the 12th of May, 1992, and this is what it says:
9 "Lord Carrington's personal envoy gave a statement saying that he
10 was going home."
11 And there's a better variant:
12 "... saying that he is returning home tired and exhausted from
13 meeting with hundreds of different people during --" et cetera.
14 Now, at the bottom it says:
15 "Colonel Doyle stressed that he does -- that an attack on the JNA
16 ammunition storage depot near Nedzarici is inconceivable to him by which
17 the Rump Presidency once again violated the agreement and word they had
18 given. If we agree upon something and if we confirm all the details,"
19 this is a quotation, "he says, 'Completely unbelievable that that which
20 was agreed on is not respected,' said Doyle. I believe that in Sarajevo
21 at the time nobody has complete control of the situation, that the many
22 armed forces are outside of any kind of control. That is perhaps the
23 reason for the attack, which unfortunately there were once again dead and
24 wounded men."
25 Do you remember giving that interview?
1 A. I have to admit I don't -- I don't actually remember. I gave --
2 I gave many interviews, but I actually don't remember this one.
3 Now, when this is dated the 12th of May, on the 12th of May I was
4 up at 5.00 a.m.
5 was being evacuated by aircraft to Belgrade. So I presume the -- the
6 interview didn't take place on the 12th of May. Maybe the paper was
7 issued on the 12th of May, but I certainly don't recall that specific
8 interview, no.
9 If I had time to analyse the document, I could give a view on it,
10 but I'm just -- I'm -- I'm -- it -- it's coming as a surprise to me.
11 Q. Thank you. But, yes, that's correct. These -- the paper was
12 published on the 12th of May. So I assume that you made the statement at
13 least one day prior to that if not more. But let's see what it says in
14 reference to the 3rd of May, when the military column was massacred.
15 Mr. Doyle had this to say:
16 "Even with the passage of the military convoy, everything was
17 arranged beforehand and that crime should not have happened, although I
18 must say that during the evacuation of the army and command of other
19 military regions there were military mistakes being made; namely prior to
20 the decision to move, I had forewarned General Milutin Kukanjac that a
21 column of 25 vehicles was far too large and I had told General MacKenzie
22 that it was far too late to start moving."
23 Do you remember saying that and that position of yours?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this now,
2 Your Excellency. May it be received?
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted as.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D216, Your Honour.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now may we have called
7 up again 1D1291, which is General MacKenzie's book, and it's page 3 of
8 the document.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Since you mentioned the attack on the column in your interview,
11 the events of the 3rd of May, we're now just going to glance at this
12 passage where your name is mentioned. I'm going to read it out in
14 "[In English] By the 3rd, definitely it was the worst day in my
15 life begins my diary for this date. Around midmorning, Bosnian
16 vice-president Ejup Ganic came to my office and met with me and
17 Colm Doyle of the EC. Ganic explained that President Izetbegovic, on his
18 return from Lisbon
19 being detained by the JNA at their Lukavica camp, just east of the
20 runway. Ganic said he was not a strong leader and needed his president
21 back in ordered to control the radical officers within the Bosnian
22 Territorial Defence forces, who were rapidly getting out of control.
23 Territorial Defence forces had General Kukanjac's headquarters under
24 siege in the eastern part of city; Ganic feared that if they attacked the
25 general's barracks, the JNA would retaliate by levelling Sarajevo."
1 [Interpretation] Do you remember Ganic's arrival in
2 General MacKenzie's office?
3 A. Yes, I do. I was there.
4 Q. Thank you. Now, do you know how long the siege of the 2nd
5 Military District lasted, command and headquarters?
6 A. I'm not exactly sure, but I knew that the military headquarters
7 was surrounded by -- by Bosnian Muslims, that I can verify. And when
8 General MacKenzie said to me the United Nations did not have a mandate to
9 work in Bosnia
10 the -- to try to secure the release of the president against
11 General Kukanjac, and that's what I did.
12 Q. Thank you. Now, if I tell you that it was weeks before and that
13 the headquarters was under siege by the Green Berets weeks before this
14 incident, would you accept that?
15 A. Well, as I said, I actually don't know, so I've no reason not to
16 accept it, but it -- it gave -- it gave me ammunition to do a deal, to
17 swap the president for the general, and that's what I set about to do.
18 Q. Thank you. I'm sure you'll remember that before that an
19 agreement was reached about the way in which the JNA would be withdrawing
20 and that the government guaranteed it. We have the document here. I
21 think the Prosecution presented it. Do you remember that such a document
22 did exist, that the Muslim part of the authorities guaranteed security
23 during the withdrawal?
24 A. I can't remember the exact detail of that, but what I can say is
25 that I was very, very concerned when we had what I thought an agreement
1 that we would swap the presidential party for General Kukanjac, and an
2 officer of colonel rank who was in the room decided that the ante, as
3 they say, would be put up. And instead of Kukanjac getting out he wanted
4 the entire military headquarters. Now as a military officer, the same
5 for General MacKenzie, we knew that to withdraw a full military force
6 from a sieged barracks was something that was very dangerous and we were
7 anxious that the information would be given to the Bosnian Muslims. We
8 told the president that we felt this was not a viable option, that
9 withdrawing all of these troops with all of their equipment would not be
10 accepted by the Muslims who were surrounding the -- the headquarters, but
11 this colonel was extremely abusive to me, and he tried to thwart my
12 efforts to get the president out.
13 So what I'm saying in essence is that yes, we were aware that the
14 military headquarters was surrounded by armed Bosnian Muslims, and we
15 were very concerned that even though the president said he could
16 guarantee the security of the convoy, neither General MacKenzie nor my
17 myself believed that this could actually take place.
18 Q. Thank you. Thank you. And we see:
19 "[In English] Ganic was extremely shaken by this news. He almost
20 lost control. Colm and I decided to go to the JNA camp at Lukavica to
21 find out what was happening."
22 [Interpretation] May we turn to the next page, please. Do you
23 agree with this? Yes, you do? Yes or no?
24 A. Sorry? Do --
25 Q. Is that passage I read out correct?
1 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.
2 Q. Thank you. Now on the next page:
3 "[In English] The president was on the phone talking to
4 General Kukanjac and seemed to be in pretty good spirits."
5 [Interpretation] Do you confirm that too?
6 A. No, I can't confirm that because for the first two hours we were
7 in Lukavica I was not in with the president. I stayed outside. And
8 General MacKenzie was dealing with the president, and he came out to let
9 me know that the deal we had originally negotiated had now fallen through
10 because there was a conversation between the president, I understand, and
11 General Kukanjac which I wasn't privy to. And then I was told this
12 colonel came to me and said that -- that there was going to be a
13 difficulty because the deal we had arranged at the headquarters of the UN
14 in the city was now negated, and I was getting very frustrated and very
15 annoyed. I was also concerned that if this drew on much longer that
16 darkness would fall, and trying to move a convoy in darkness would be
17 very serious. So I gave my views, but the president said, I will
18 guarantee the security of the convoy.
19 And then the -- the colonel changed his mind and -- because he
20 didn't want to release the other members of the Presidency. He said to
21 me, You've just negotiated the release of the president, not his daughter
22 or a security officer or another member of the Presidency.
23 So in trying to get this problem solved, I was certainly held as
24 a hostage myself, or I was held back as collateral. So what happened
25 from the time the convoy left Lukavica barracks with the president inside
1 to the time that the president got to the Presidency I have no idea. I
2 certainly know what happened from looking at it in television and getting
3 reports, but I was not witness to the operation. I do know and accept
4 that the convoy was attacked and that approximately five or six members
5 of the JNA were killed.
6 Q. Thank you. I'm afraid that there's more to that, but what you
7 have just said more or less is also written in this book by
8 General MacKenzie about how you were against such a large evacuation and
9 that Izetbegovic accepted responsibility.
10 I would now like us to look at the next one, two, three, four
11 pages ahead, please.
12 On this page we can see:
13 "[In English] At that moment we heard the claxon horn on the
14 approaching emergency vehicle. It was a JNA ambulance. The driver was
15 frantically sowing [phoen] on the steering wheel trying to avoid hitting
16 anyone. His task was made all of the more difficult to JNA colonel
17 collapsed on his right shoulder and missing half his face. The colonel
18 was obviously dead or about to die."
19 [Interpretation] A bit lower:
20 "[In English] It seemed that wherever we were the killing
21 stopped. The stealing of equipment was still going on but at least
22 people weren't being executed."
23 [Interpretation] General MacKenzie is describing, because he was
24 there at the scene, he believes that more people were killed than what
25 you described and now there are proceedings being conduced. Ganic has
1 been arrested in London
2 Now can we go to the next page, please. It's a pity that you were not at
3 the scene. Did General MacKenzie inform you about what happened?
4 A. I don't remember an exact conversation with him. I -- I was very
5 concerned about my own safety when I was held at Lukavica because I was
6 threatened with a pistol. So I really had my own concerns about my own
7 future. But really I wasn't witness to -- as soon as the president left
8 Lukavica, I was out of it, so I had no detailed knowledge of what
9 happened after that, nor was I witness to it. So I really can't comment
10 on that.
11 Q. On this page, 170, we have to look at the page -- the bottom part
12 of the page:
13 "At this point General Kukanjac started pacing back and forth
14 [In English] Across the street, shouting that he was missing at least 200
15 soldiers as he had to go back for them."
16 [No interpretation]:
17 "[In English] I told him that if he did so, he would be killed
18 for sure."
19 [No interpretation]:
20 "[In English] I ordered him back into Steve's vehicle.
21 Reluctantly he obeyed it, his face expressing the agony of someone who
22 cared for his soldiers."
23 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the Serbs expected that the
24 presence of international forces would make the evacuation safe and that
25 they had sufficient reason to be angry because of this massacre?
1 Regardless of whether they were right or not, did the Serbs have the
2 feeling that they could rely on the presence of international forces and
3 on the word of the president, President Izetbegovic?
4 A. Well, what I can say here is that when the president said that he
5 would -- that he would guarantee the safety of the convoy we disagreed
6 with him and we told him he wasn't in a position to guarantee the safety
7 of the convoy. And as military officers, we would not have been happy
8 with this arrangement. However, he was the president of the country. He
9 had assured us he would guarantee the security of the convoy. It was a
10 very dangerous situation. This military barracks was surrounded, and as
11 we know, we had talked about approximately 27 trucks, but it was a lot
12 more than 27 trucks that left that military headquarters. This is what
13 we had suspected.
14 So I have no doubt that -- I have no reason to disagree with
15 anything that is pointed out here by General MacKenzie because he was at
16 the screen and I wasn't.
17 Q. Thank you. Yes, you were there on the 6th of May when Mr. Ludwig
18 was there; is that correct?
19 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Goulding, interpreter's correction.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was. Yes.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Can we look at the eighth page after this one, please.
23 On the 5th of May, Marrack Goulding, the UN under-secretary for
24 special political affairs, was in Pale. Later, he was escorted by
25 General MacKenzie, and then it says:
1 "[In English] After our initial escort party was held up by
2 fighting in the east of Sarajevo
3 the next attempt."
4 [Interpretation] And then lower it says:
5 "[In English] On the 6th of May I spent a full day with
6 Mr. Goulding, briefing him all morning. In the afternoon, we went on a
7 tour of the city with President Izetbegovic and came under modest fire in
8 the middle of the Muslim old city. There were very strong indications
9 that it was an orchestrated show for the accompanying media intended to
10 put the Serbs in a bad light."
11 [Interpretation] Were you aware of these moves that were supposed
12 to blacken the Serbs' reputation?
13 A. No, I wasn't, because on the 5th of May I was chairing a
14 cease-fire negotiation at the PTT building as a consequence or a
15 follow-up to the release of the president. So all that day, and in fact,
16 from that day to the day that I was evacuated, I don't believe I left the
17 PTT building at all. My total focus no was on, one, getting a cease-fire
18 as a consequence of the -- securing the release of the president, and
19 second, on negotiations to effect the total withdraw of the JNA army from
21 United Nations, I wasn't aware of.
22 Q. Thank you. Can you look at the following paragraph:
23 "I also went at my request --"
24 Mr. Goulding is giving his assessment of what happened with the
25 cold-blooded killings of the soldiers and the commanders by the Bosnian
1 Territorial Defence, and General MacKenzie says in the following
3 "[In English] Later when I had left Sarajevo for good I was
4 surprised to see just how little media covered Goulding's strong
5 statement as received around the world. I couldn't help thinking that if
6 the JNA had ambushed the Territorial Defence forces instead of the other
7 way around, it would have been front-page news."
8 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the world media was partial
9 and that the Serbs had a more difficult time of it in the world media?
10 A. Yes, I would. I mean, the world's media felt that this was a
11 conflict started by Milosevic, and there was a certain amount of sympathy
12 to the Bosnian Muslims. So in the eyes of the world, yes, I would say
13 that that is the case.
14 Q. Thank you. We're going to show in the course of these
15 proceedings that it was the other way around.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender these
17 sections of General MacKenzie's book, please.
18 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, in relation to the convoy
20 incident description, that's chapter 17, I agree. No opposition here.
21 In relation to the chapter 18, it's basically General MacKenzie's
22 viewpoints. However, as it was at least addressed by Colonel Doyle in
23 one aspect, I also agree to have this chapter 18 admitted.
24 JUDGE KWON: He didn't confirm anything about -- on page 182 or
25 page 22 of the e-court in English.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, that's correct. So --
2 JUDGE KWON: But given it's all 23 pages, shall we admit it in
3 its entirety?
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, I would say so. Would I say so,
5 although he wasn't part in -- of the events at some stage, but at least
6 it's sort of related, everything.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. It will be admitted.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D217, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I'm noting the time. We will have a
10 break for half an hour.
11 --- Recess taken at 12.03 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Just in relation to one document, we have
16 clarified the situation in relation to the Defence Exhibit 1D01210. The
17 text provided is consistent with the actual minutes of the 56th session
18 of the Presidency, which were disclosed to the Defence, and we are just
19 providing the details where they can find it, but unfortunately we also
20 do not have a translation. So the full translation is still outstanding.
21 JUDGE KWON: So we're talking about D214, marked for
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. That's the minutes and --
24 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: If these are the minutes from the 56th
1 session of the Presidency.
2 JUDGE KWON: That's correct.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then it's correct, yes.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for the information. Let's move on.
5 Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. If I remember correctly, Colonel, you said you'd agreed that you
9 had attended the 24th of January meeting of the Bosnian Assembly; right?
10 A. Yes, that's correct.
11 Q. And you also agreed that I proposed that regionalisation be
12 undertaken first so the Serbs could go to the referendum and that
13 Muhamed Cengic proposed that the government be given a fortnight to carry
14 out the regionalisation and that proposal was accepted by me; right?
15 A. Well, I remember sitting in the Assembly for the duration of that
16 debate, but you'll have to accept that I -- can I had an interpreter with
17 me, so I didn't get, you know, the full translations of everything that
18 was said. So -- so I was there and I understood what generally the
19 debate was about, but the exact details I wouldn't be competent, I think,
20 to -- to comment on.
21 Q. Let me remind you. I accepted Muhamed Cengic's proposal, and
22 we'll call up that document, a document that bears it out, if need be,
23 and I went up to the microphone together with him, and for two and a half
24 hours people thought that an agreement had been reached and the
25 government would carry out regionalisation within a fortnight and that
1 the Serbs would go to the referendum regardless of how they would be
2 voting, do you remember that?
3 A. No, I can't say I remember the specifics. I was tasked by the
4 headquarters of the monitor mission to attend the referendum debate to
5 give them the result of what the debate was, not necessarily all of the
6 content of it. So the report that I made out was -- was pretty general
7 in terms, but not the exact details, because it went on for so long. It
8 went on throughout the entire night.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have D87 called up next.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. To refresh our memories, Colonel, because it appeared that we had
13 saved Bosnia
14 when we thought we might have saved Bosnia
15 course, the conference, the Cutileiro conference during your stay in
18 And may we have page 103 of this document displayed, please.
19 It's a meeting of the joint Assembly, the tape recording of it. The date
20 is the 24th of January, 1992
21 Let's see what Mr. Cengic says here, Muhamed Cengic, and I'm
22 reading the Serbian version:
23 "Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to inform you and something
24 to you. The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina --"
25 JUDGE KWON: I don't think we are seeing Mr. Cengic's words here.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Now we have it. Thank you.
2 At the bottom of the page.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. "I would like to inform you and suggest something. The
5 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina received the order, made its
6 decision to establish -- to carry out the regionalisation, a new
7 regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think the Serbian democratic
8 party as well as the Party of Democratic Action, the Croatian Democratic
9 Union, need to make their own requests on this regionalisation, what
10 should be done, and I think that it would be useful if this
11 regionalisation were to be carried out. It's the task of the government
12 too. And we should schedule a referendum date and to set the dead-line
13 for both the referendum and the establishment of regions. There will be
14 no referendum before the plan for the regionalisation is presented. I
15 think that that would be a good solution and that it would satisfy all
16 the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it's useless for us to
17 talk about what all the Serbs want, to live in all -- in one state or the
18 Muslims, or anybody else, but we have to start talking and discussing the
19 matter amongst ourselves. Therefore, the proposal that I have offered up
20 now, and Mr. Karadzic agrees with it, I think is a good one, an
21 acceptable one, and I'd like to hear your views on the matter."
22 Now, may we turn to the next portion to see what Karadzic says.
23 Right down at the bottom of the page. Can we scroll down there. Next
24 page, in fact -- yes, that's right. Radovan Karadzic. I'll read it in
25 English. I don't see it in Serbian:
1 "[In English] You will forgive me because my voice is not the
2 best. Just when we think we agreed, we distort --" [Interpretation] I
3 see. I found that now:
4 "[In English] We actually change the entire essence. It is
5 clear that B and H cannot prevent or avoid the changes that are going on
6 around it. It cannot. Those changes request that new factual state is
7 sanctioned and that the legality and new legal state is achieved. In
8 that sense, new referendum would be acceptable to the --"
9 [Interpretation] Next page, please:
10 "[In English] ... Serbian people provided that a new democratic
11 transformation of B and H into a new state which all three sovereign
12 nations would accept, would be carried out prior to that. Therefore, I
13 believe that for a new state, all three people would participate in the
14 national and collective civil referendum. Nothing is possible in B and H
15 without the consensus of three peoples. I have to present to you what I
16 would mean -- what it would mean if we do not do this way. If we do not
17 do this way, we would create the conditions for the independent state to
18 be announced without our consent. Because according to the
19 unconstitutional law and -- the law that is not in accordance with the
20 constitution, it is said that 51 per cent of the votes is needed for the
21 referendum to be recognised. The existing law is unconstitutional, and
22 it is not adjusted to the constitution because it is written in the
23 constitution that there should be 66.6 per cent of the votes for the
24 referendum to be recognised. For any changes of the situation according
25 to the new constitution, we need 66.6 of the votes and Serbs and Croats
1 do not have 66 per cent votes together, and they will participate less
2 and less in the general population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore,
3 it -- if we hold a referendum before the transformation of Bosnia
5 internationally recognised borders that no one can -- ever can change.
6 They are in total power of the host and the boss of Bosnia and
8 outnumbered," and so on and so on.
9 [Interpretation] So you can see, Colonel, that the Muslims
10 managed to have the constitution changed with a 51 per cent of the votes
11 at the referendum, which is completely or was completely
12 unconstitutional, and there is no constitution in the world which can be
13 amended if there's only 51 per cent votes in the -- on the referendum and
14 in the Assembly.
15 So do you see that we were tricked and forced to do something
16 that was unconstitutional?
17 A. I think to clarify this point, Your Honour, I would just like to
18 say that at the conclusion of this marathon session of the Assembly, I
19 compiled a report to -- to my headquarters and that report gave a general
20 outline as I understood it to be of what the issues were. I was
21 sufficiently concerned to put in that report the fact that according to
22 the Bosnian Serbs there was a requirement for an agreement to be done by
23 consensus, whereas most of the people in the parliament seem to be going
24 along the line of where they are going to pass a referendum if they had a
25 majority. What that majority was I wasn't aware. But I did put down
1 that maybe this is something that needed to be checked out legally. So
2 as a consequence of that, I sought a meeting with the supreme legal
3 court, or whatever, of Bosnia
4 find out whether or not the allegations by the Bosnian Serbs that this
5 referendum debate was constitutional, because I'm not a lawyer.
6 And I met with all of these senior Judges of Bosnia, Serb, Croat,
7 and Muslim, and when I put that to them, a female member of the -- of the
8 senior legal branch said, Mr. Doyle, you don't understand. I'm a Serb
9 and this person is a Croat and this person is a Muslim. We can't agree
10 amongst ourselves as to what is constitutional or not because we all
11 follow our own political philosophies.
12 So even having a meeting with the senior legal brains of Bosnia
13 they could not give me collectively a definitive answer as to whether or
14 not that debate or whether the referendum was to be constitutional or
15 not, and I put that as part of my report which was sent to the
17 The exact detail, Dr. Karadzic, that you were bringing up, I
18 simply -- I'm simply not in a position to comment on because this was a
19 debate that went on for hours and hours and hours of legal wranglings in
20 a language I don't understand and at a level which I'm not commensurate
22 Q. Thank you. This is already an exhibit, so I don't have to tender
23 it. It's already been admitted. But you saw the development of events.
24 There was a referendum that we did not take part in, but we didn't
25 challenge it either. And then we come to the 3rd of March. Do you
1 remember what happened on the 3rd of March in Bosanski Brod?
2 A. No, I'm not familiar of what happened outside of Sarajevo on the
3 3rd of March, but only in Sarajevo
4 Q. Thank you. Now, while we still have this document on our
5 screens, do you agree that Lord Carrington's position was also that all
6 three sides should agree, should reach an agreement, on what Bosnia
7 should look like, that there should be no competition between all sides
8 but they should all agree, reach an agreement?
9 A. Yes, I know that when I was with Lord Carrington and that
10 question was proposed to him at a press conference at the airport. His
11 view was that as far at the peace conference in Yugoslavia was concerned,
12 any agreement that would be agreed by all sides, no matter what that
13 agreement was, once they agreed that was sufficient for the
14 European Union that the role of the peace conference was to be -- act as
15 a good office for these peoples to come up with a solution that would not
16 include violence. So it wasn't a matter for the peace conference or
17 certainly it wasn't a matter for Lord Carrington to decide what sort of a
18 solution should be -- should be established rather than saying whatever
19 you agree collectively together, three different parties, I'm happy with
20 whatever that is once you agree. So really he was putting the onus back
21 on the parties to try to come up with a solution that might be
23 Q. Thank you. Do you know that on the 18th an agreement was indeed
24 reached with respect to the Cutileiro Plan?
25 A. Yes. I don't know the exact contents of that agreement. I
1 wasn't party to it. But it was brought to my attention, because on the
2 18th of March I wasn't with Lord Carrington. I was still head of the
3 mission, and I was told that an agreement had almost been reached and as
4 far as I recall that the Muslims reneged or went back on that agreement,
5 but the exact content of the agreement, I wasn't familiar with.
6 Q. Well, all that remained was for the maps to be precisely defined
7 and to resolve the question of a joint army. Everything else was
8 accepted. All right. Perhaps you weren't there, but they gave up on the
9 25th and already on the 25th and 26th there was bloodshed again of Serbs
10 in Bosanski Brod, Sijekovac, and so on. Did you hear of that?
11 A. No, I wasn't aware of that.
12 Q. Thank you. Well let's move on to the 12th straight away and for
13 that may I have 1D01256 displayed, please. And at the time, you were
14 already in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 I'm not going to look at anything before the 10th, although there
16 were significant events during that period.
17 May we have the English version displayed as well, please,
18 alongside the Serbian.
19 Do you remember that on that day a truce was signed? And we have
20 the document in which, among other things, the cease-fire said that work
21 on the maps should be accelerated. Do you remember that? I'm referring
22 to the cease-fire. A cease-fire was signed on that day.
23 A. Yes, yes, yes. Yes.
24 Q. We will look at the document a little later on, but let's see
25 what the commander of the Green Berets is writing, the Green Berets of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. His name was Sead Ahmetovic. The Green Berets staff
2 it says Sarajevo
3 April, 1992, is the date, and it says police station, Visegrad. That's
4 who it is addressed to. So that police -- well, it says:
5 "Please convey the message of Murat Sabanovic, the Green Berets'
6 commander for the region of Visegrad and its surroundings, to blow up the
7 Visegrad Dam as soon as possible."
8 Do you remember that?
9 A. No. I'm not familiar with that. I would say here that one of
10 the most frustrating elements of what we were doing in Bosnia
11 and get cease-fires which were passed with what I would call monotonous
12 regularity, because as soon as they were -- as soon as they were signed,
13 they were broken. So it seemed to be an exercise in futility.
14 This specific incident, no, I'm not aware of.
15 Q. Thank you. We have a photocopy of this original document as
16 well, but at that time there was a crisis and on television we have
17 Kukanjac and Izetbegovic and this man Murat Sabanovic, and they entreated
18 him not to blow up the dam, and Izetbegovic entreated him saying, Murat,
19 not for now. Don't do it for the time being.
20 Which means that the opportunity would be there later on. Do you
21 remember there was a live television broadcast where they wanted to
22 convince him not to go ahead? And that was a real crisis. You don't
23 remember that?
24 A. I remember the incident but not the detail, but, yes, I remember
25 a lot of discussion about it.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
3 next, please.
4 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the reliability of this
6 document to me is doubtful. The witness has no details on this.
7 Therefore, I would object.
8 JUDGE KWON: But he remembers some discussion going around in
9 relation to this.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Okay. Yeah. Yes. Okay. No objection
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE KWON: Based upon the Chamber's observation that I just
14 spoke about, we'll admit this document.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D218, Your Honour.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we now have
17 document 1D01108, please.
18 JUDGE KWON: Would you give the number again.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01108. We have it in Serbian. I
20 don't know if there is a translation of it. I believe there is. The
21 Prosecution has the document. I don't know what their number is, but I
22 know they do have it.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Let me tell you what this document is about. First of all, the
25 date is the 20th of April, and it is the premier of the Serbian Republic
1 of -- Republika Srpska, professor Dr. Branko Djeric is issuing an order
2 and saying:
3 "Artillery fire and heavy weapons fire is forbidden from the
4 positions of Serb defence forces on targets in the city of Sarajevo
5 "2. The use of artillery and heavy weapons on targets in the
6 city of Sarajevo
7 of defence. The implementation of this order shall be seen to," et
8 cetera, et cetera, "and any violations of this order will be strictly
9 punished. The order comes into force immediately."
10 Now, I'd like to tell you, first of all, due to the pressure and
11 the shooting the government declared that the Serb territorials should
12 refrain from shooting in town. Do you agree -- are forbidden from
13 shooting in town. Do you agree that this is something that should be
14 ordered by the supreme commander and the president of the republic and
15 not the prime minister?
16 A. If this is a document that is -- has come from -- sorry, can I
17 just ask you to repeat the -- the -- this document was issued by?
18 Q. It was issued by the government of the Serbian Republic
19 and Herzegovina
20 because at that point in time there was no president of the republic or,
21 rather, the president of the Presidency and there was no Army of
22 Republika Srpska only the Serb territorials who could obey but did not
23 have to.
24 Do you think that it's usual for the prime minister to be issuing
25 an order of this kind?
1 A. Well, I suppose it probably depends on -- on whether or not it
2 was -- it was obeyed. Around this time there was a considerable amount
3 of shelling of the city of Sarajevo
4 Republika Srpska, it certainly wasn't obeyed, in my estimation.
5 Q. My point is that the prime minister tried to do what he could
6 without having the tools of enforcing his order. He tried to order the
7 territorials or those who were defending their neighbourhoods to stop
8 firing. Do you agree?
9 A. Well, if that's -- we don't have the -- we don't have the
10 translation of that document here. It's still -- the one I have is still
11 in Serbian, but I'm not too sure why this should have happened when --
12 when the -- the result was that there was shelling. In other words, the
13 directive wasn't obeyed.
14 Q. Thank you. I would like to tender this document.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour, and in fact, we
16 have received a translation. For some reason is -- it's obviously not
17 uploaded in e-court but it exists.
18 JUDGE KWON: So with that confirmation and then with the
19 anticipation that it will be disclosed to the parties, we'll admit it as
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, as Exhibit D219.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to have
23 1D00289, please.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And while we're waiting, Colonel, sir, do you remember what my
1 platform was for the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina on
2 the 22nd of April, 1992?
3 A. No, I'm sorry, I don't.
4 Q. This was quite known to the foreigners, because we had sent it
5 around. We had informed Lord Carrington and Ambassador Cutileiro about
6 it, and it was published in the media. We have it in front of us now.
7 This is a platform indicating what our -- what we were proposing and what
8 we were committing ourselves to. And here it is:
9 "1. An unconditional and immediate cease-fire and compliance
10 with the cease-fire agreement of the 12th of April, 1992."
11 Is this the cease-fire agreement that you were working on?
12 A. Yes, it is.
13 Q. Thank you:
14 "2. Urgent continuation of the conference on Bosnia
16 "3. Within the framework of the conference on Bosnia and
18 and constituent states.
19 "4. Public commitment by all the parties in Bosnia and
21 be joined to neighbouring states and that armed forces from outside
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be invited in or accepted in the
23 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
24 "5. Public commitment by all the parties in Bosnia
1 the one arising from the Communist heritage and the territorial
2 advantages gained by means of force will not be recognised.
3 "6. Urgent implementation of a new constitutional agreement
4 along with guarantees of the international community.
5 "7. The opening of the process of demilitarisation and the
6 precise defining of the role of the JNA in the forthcoming period."
7 How does this platform look to you, Colonel, sir. I'm sorry that
8 you didn't know about it before but all of your bosses did know about it.
9 Lord Carrington did and Ambassador Cutileiro did as well. Do you have
10 any remarks to make on this platform and was it a sufficient basis for
11 the continuation of the conference?
12 A. Well, looking at the document it looks very inviting and it looks
13 very attractive, but I'm just wondering why it is that on -- on that same
14 day was the commencement of the first -- first fighting in the city of
16 so that we could facilitate the arrival of Lord Carrington and the
17 president of the council of ministers of the European Union to Sarajevo
18 airport the following morning. So my focus was that. And it was the
19 following morning, on the 23rd of April, that we were trying to get some
21 So I'm not familiar with the content of this document. Whether
22 this, in actual fact, was to be implemented or not I think is quite
23 another matter. We know that it wasn't.
24 Q. Thank you. This is not an executive order. This is a commitment
25 by the Serbian side, a proposal of what should be done and our statement
1 that we're not going to accept a policy of fait accompli or territory --
2 territorial seizure by force and so on.
3 Do you --
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
5 document, please.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, avoid making comments. The last
8 comment was unnecessary, unless you put any question to the witness.
9 Bear that in mind.
10 That will be admitted.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D220, Your Honour.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at document 1D01109.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you agree that you were at -- in Ilidza on the 22nd of April,
15 1992; is that right?
16 A. Yes, that's correct.
17 Q. Thank you. We need 1D01109, please, a different document from
18 this one.
19 This is from the 2nd of May. We will need this one, too, but a
20 bit later.
21 This is not the number, actually, that I asked for.
22 There's something not quite right with the numbers. Can we put
23 this on the ELMO, please? First page first so that we can identify the
24 document, and then -- the number that we did get is 1D01110.
25 [In English] First page and then ...
1 [Interpretation] Up at -- you were in Ilidza when the Muslim
2 forces carried out an attack on Ilidza and this is what is said in the
3 police report:
4 "The attack carried out by Muslim paramilitary formations on the
5 22nd of April, in the area of the Serbian municipality of Ilidza
6 long-prepared and carefully planned one. According to the estimates of
7 the SDA leadership, this area is exceptionally strategically important
8 for the formation of the Islamic state. The leaders of the party
9 approved substantial funds for the procurement of weapons and military
10 equipment and these activities -- and as future financiers many well-off
11 citizens of Ilidza of Muslim nationality participated in it, including
12 the minister of internal affairs of former Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 this was aided by some religious officials of the Islamic Community, and
14 in this area that is why four paramilitary formations could have been
15 formed in this area.
16 "According to the information of the Ministry of Internal
17 Affairs of the Serbian Republic
18 Party of Democratic Action shipped in weapons to this area, the main
19 supplier was Senaid Memic."
20 And then we can now go to the bottom of the page and then we will
21 move to the next page.
22 We will just need to look at the highlighted parts, please, of
23 the document, the highlighted parts.
24 This is fine. Thank you:
25 "As for Ilidza, the main co-ordinator of all activities about
1 gathering, persuading to join, engaging and arming the population of
2 Muslim and Croatian ethnicity up to a point was Edin Malicevic, the chief
3 of the Ilidza public security service. This document describes how top
4 leadership abused the Ministry of Internal Affairs and at the local
5 affairs where you were, the chief of the public security station in
6 Ilidza, Edin Malicevic was the chief. He first armed the reserve forces
7 of the police of Muslim ethnicity really well and then in the
8 Fuego [phoen] cafe owned by Hamde Vatric together with Hamdo Pasic, a
9 well-known criminal, gathered together mostly younger people of Muslim
10 and Croat ethnicity, enrolled them in the Patriotic League and then he
11 had them at the staff which was close to the cafe Queen and distributed
12 arms to them."
13 Colonel, sir, were you aware that the police was behind these
14 paramilitary formations and was preparing these attacks?
15 A. No, I wasn't aware. I remember the attack in Ilidza on that day,
16 and the defenders were Bosnian Serbs that were being attacked. I don't
17 know who was being attacked. We were under cover because it was very
18 dangerous, and I know that approximately 13 died in that attack. So I
19 was aware that the attack took place and the Serbs were defending, but
20 that's all I can say.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that they were attacked from the Otes
22 neighbourhood as well as from the Sokolovic-Kolonija area and Hrasnica?
23 A. No. I would have to say that for most of that day I was in a --
24 I was in my room or in the hotel. We couldn't leave it. I left -- I
25 left the hotel to do an interview with the BBC, and that was the day that
1 I was -- that was the day I was asked to give my views as to whether or
2 not the meeting the following morning with Pinheiro and Carrington should
3 take place because we wanted to make sure that there was a degree of
4 safety for the visit to take place. So I was concerned about trying to
5 make an assessment of the situation, but I am aware that there was a lot
6 of fighting on, because that was first time I had actually seen fighting
7 in the city of Sarajevo
8 couldn't say because we were in a location very close to the people who
9 were defending.
10 Q. Thank you. I don't want to press on with this document any more
11 as it's clear that you did see with your own eyes the attack on the
12 Serbian part of Ilidza and the defence of that.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we tender this document for
14 identification first, please, because I'm not sure if we have the
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, in principle, yes, but marked
17 for identification because we don't have a translation.
18 JUDGE KWON: And the exact 65 ter number is 1109, Mr. Karadzic?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. 1109, yes.
20 JUDGE KWON: That will be marked for identification.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at 1D01258.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. While we're waiting I would like to inform you, Colonel, that
25 this is a directive of the TO staff of the Republic of Bosnia
2 time, efforts were continuing to establish a cease-fire on the 12th of
3 April, and this is an endeavour in which you and Ambassador Cutileiro
4 participated. This is a new directive by Hasan Efendic on the defence of
5 the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Bosnia
7 Do we have that? Unfortunately, we don't have a translation for
8 this either, but I would just like to draw your attention to the first
9 part under number 1 which talks about enemy forces. This is the
10 Territorial Defence of the Serbian autonomous region and the
11 Serbian Army, which is also considered to be an enemy on the 23rd of
12 April, and then in paragraph marked with a number 4 it says:
13 "I have decided immediately to carry out the mobilisation of the
14 entire composition of the TO of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
15 speedily carry on with the formation of combat units in all
16 municipalities which are to be placed under the Joint Command of
17 municipal, district, and the staff of the TO of the Republic of Bosnia
18 and Herzegovina
19 break the assault force of the enemy."
20 Can we please look at the following page:
21 "Immediately carry out the occupation of ammunition depots and
22 block the barracks, occupy them and capture members of the Yugoslav Army
23 on the territory of the Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina -- the
24 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
25 And then under 5 it says:
1 "District Staffs of the Territorial Defence form TO units,
2 volunteer units, the Patriotic League of the Republic of Bosnia
4 municipality all to be under the Joint Command and insignia as decreed by
5 the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
6 And then it says:
7 "While forming the combat disposition of the main force for
8 carrying out active combat and also have auxiliary forces."
9 And then we have on the following page number 7:
10 "To establish a system of command immediately at the level of
11 units, the Municipal Staff, the district staff, republic staff," and so
12 on. The rest is unimportant.
13 "While negotiations are underway for a cease-fire following
14 efforts from the European Community, preparations are being accelerated
15 for carrying on the war while the first is going on. "
16 So did anybody inform you about these activities of
17 Hasan Efendic -- or, rather, the Muslim command in this direction?
18 A. No. That was not bought to my attention.
19 Q. Should it have been brought to your attention? Mediators?
20 A. Well, on the 23rd of April, I was facilitating the arrival of --
21 of Joao Pinheiro and Peter Carrington to Sarajevo, and all of that day we
22 were involved in negotiations for a cease-fire with all the political
23 parties. You were there yourself, Mr. Karadzic, you will recall, and my
24 task then was to get the leaders back to the airport to actually sign the
25 document, and that in itself was a big, big challenge. So my total focus
1 was on implementing to get the signatures done.
2 We know that a lot of the cease-fires were broken. Who broke
3 them, I have no idea. And there were counter-claims from all sides, but
4 I'm for the familiar with this document.
5 Should it have been brought to my attention? I simply don't
6 know. That's all I can really say on it. I don't have a comment on it.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
9 now, please.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it should be marked for
11 identification. At the moment I'm actually not able to say whether this
12 document relates to the evidence of the witness because I can't really
13 read it, and the passages that were read into the record, they seem to be
14 also not adopted by the witness.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before you make a decision,
17 Your Honours, may I inform you that this is a secret document, and after
18 this document there's a public document which is an order from the
19 Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the police that
20 the decision be made for the withdraw of the JNA units and an order about
21 how the JNA should be treated.
22 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification, and when the
23 translation is done, the Chamber will assess its relevance and then
24 decide its admissibility then.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D222.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. A Prosecution document,
2 65 ter 01040. Is that an exhibit? Has that been admitted as an
3 amalgamated document? 65 ter 01040. I think we have it in English.
4 That's the platform. Yes, that's right. And here's this platform in a
5 collection of documents where the Prosecution is conveying some SRNA
6 agency reports. It's dated the 22nd of April -- well, it's a platform of
7 the 22nd of April, published on the 23rd of April. May we see the
8 portion that starts "The truth about the fight on Ilidza," and so on.
9 The bottom of the page in English, please. Thank you. And this is what
11 "[In English] SRNA
12 came from the Serbian police properly or Serbian Republic of Bosnia
13 22nd April 1992
14 consciously emitted on the principles of the psychological propagandistic
15 war over the radio and television of Sarajevo, press centre of Serbian
16 Republic of B
17 about following facts: This morning attack was started by the Muslim
18 formations from Sokolovic colony. The members of these units occupied
19 the restaurant Topola and institute of rehabilitation from where they
20 fired from their snipers -- snipers and during that time wounded several
21 members of Serbian police and Territorial Defence of Ilidza. On the
22 Serbian side there were killed people, but their number and identity
23 could be determined only after the possibility of being taken out from
24 the fire zone," and so on and so on.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. So, that, then, is what confirms what you have just told us;
2 right, Colonel?
3 A. In general terms, yes, but again the detail, where it was exactly
4 coming from, where the firing was coming from, I just can't say.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D54 next, please. Is
7 this document -- has this document been admitted, the one we just
8 displayed? Is it admitted -- or, rather, is it an exhibit? Is it an
10 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, as Exhibit D223.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's the Prosecution number. I
13 thought the Prosecution had tendered it, but if not, we can do that.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, we didn't.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We now see that this is
16 a document from the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which on the 27th
17 of April, 1992, issued a decision on the withdrawal of JNA units from the
18 territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
19 there it says:
20 "Members of the JNA who do not wish to place themselves at the
21 disposal of the state organs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for
22 any reason shall be required to leave the territory of the republic of BH
23 in a direction of their choice in organised fashion escorted by organs of
24 the Ministry of the Interior of BH and under the supervision of the
25 European Community observers."
1 May we turn to the next page, please. In English it says:
2 "The state organs of Bis will ensure the unimpeded withdrawal of
3 JNA units."
4 And then under number 5, it says:
5 "The units and institutions to which weapons technical equipment
6 and materiel of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been
7 entrusted for storage are required to hand over these weapons and
8 equipment to their owners, namely the authorised organs of the
9 Territorial Defence of BH."
10 And 7:
11 "The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina has taken this decision
12 with the aim of having a peaceful and equitable solution the question of
13 the JNA's position after the disillusion of the J -- SFRY, the Presidency
14 of the republic of BH
15 permanent demilitarisation of the territory of this republic."
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Now, what does it look like to you in relation to what happened
18 on the 3rd of May in Dobrovoljacka street, Colonel?
19 A. Well, this is obviously a request by the government that those
20 who want to become part of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina can do so and
21 those who don't may leave. And what relevance this has to the other --
22 is it the attack you're referring to on the convoy, or I'm not sure the
23 incident on the street is?
24 Q. Well, Colonel, first of all we have that secret document
25 referring to the attack, then we have a public document where they
1 guarantee the peaceful withdrawal, and then we have the realisation on
2 the 3rd of May where despite those guarantees they're killing people in
3 the column that's what I'm talking about. Do you see this line: "Secret
4 documents, attack, block, arrest, capture public document," says we
5 guarantee withdrawal, when the withdrawal takes place then they kill
6 them, not only in Sarajevo
7 May. That's what we're talking about. Does it -- did this contribute to
8 peace or did it contribute to flaming the fans of war and was that
9 government authorised to do that? Was that all right for a government to
10 do that?
11 JUDGE KWON: That's too many questions.
12 THE WITNESS: And first of all, I have no knowledge of this
13 document specifically and also I have no knowledge of -- of who may have
14 been as you alleged carrying out attacks against the JNA. All I can say
15 is that I was doing my best around this period to facilitate the
16 withdrawal of the JNA from the Republic of Bosnia
17 understood them to wish for, and that was verified to me at the JNA
18 military high command in Belgrade
19 evacuated. So I'm not familiar with this document, so I really can't
20 comment on it.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. But, Colonel, you do know what happened on the 2nd and 3rd of
23 May. On the 2nd and 3rd of May, the Green Berets killed JNA soldiers.
24 Isn't that right?
25 A. I know that on the 2nd and 3rd of May that JNA troops were
1 targeted on the convoy because we had effected the release of the
2 president. So I'm fully aware that the convoy which contained the
3 president and General Kukanjac was attacked. Yes, I'm aware of that. As
4 I said before, I wasn't present physically there. I was held back in
5 Lukavica, but I was aware that the attack on the convoy took place and
6 that there were some casualties, and I was tasked then with trying to
7 effect the release of the convoy that had been split, and I promised to
8 do this because I was -- I was threatened at a Serb -- Bosnian Serb
9 check-point after we left Lukavica and told that it was my
10 responsibility. I was told that I had negotiated the hostage release of
11 the president so therefore I would have to accept responsibilities as to
12 what happened, even though I couldn't and shouldn't have had to, but I
13 did my best to effect the release of the members of the convoy the
14 following day which in fact occurred.
15 Q. Thank you. But in point 3 it says that the organs of the
16 Ministry of the Interior will organise an escort along with supervision
17 from European monitors, so along with your supervision. And this is a
18 public document a week before the slaughter, that you would supervise it.
19 And then in the next point it says that the state organs will enable the
20 unimpeded withdrawal.
21 Now, the fact that an angry Serbian soldier or officer threatened
22 you, this happened after the slaughter that took place and he considered
23 that you could have prevented it. I'm not attacking you. I'm just
24 telling you what the situation was like. So this is a public document
25 which guarantees to us that the JNA would be withdrawing peacefully and
1 that you would be able to effect supervision over that process. So this
2 is a document issued by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But never
4 Thank you, Colonel.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
6 now, please.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit Number D224.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have 1D56 next, please.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Let me remind you that the Serb side through me on the 22nd of
14 April proposed the platform that we saw earlier on. Now let's see what
15 the Muslim side was doing at that same time.
16 This is a document dated the 29th of April, the MUP of the
17 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Let me remind you that we were part of
18 the authority. We had a third of all power and authority in Bosnia
19 Sending that to all the security services centres it, public security
20 stations and the secretariat of the SUP
21 "It is necessary that all security services centres, public
22 security stations and SUP
23 activities within their scope for the purpose of securing the
24 implementation of the order of the commander of the headquarters of the
25 Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," number
1 such and such, "of the 29th of April, 1992, which we are forwarding to
2 you in its original form."
3 And then it says:
4 "I hereby order:
5 "Carry out the full massive blockade along all road intersections
6 on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which the
7 units of the former JNA are beginning to withdraw technical equipment and
8 materiel, and that this should be co-ordinated with the MUP.
9 "2. Carry out the blockade of the wider region of military
10 facilities from which technical equipment and materiel are attempted to
11 be taken out with various methods," et cetera, "which should be secured
12 for the units of the Territorial Defence.
13 "Unannounced convoys of units of the former JNA and those that
14 are not escorted by the MUP should be prevented from leaving the barracks
15 and communicating on the territory of the republic of RH
16 "Immediately begin preparing and initiating that matter which is
17 on the entire territory of the republic of BH and co-ordinate them with
18 headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the region, district and
19 republic of BH. Within the scope of the battle activities plan all
20 encompassing measures for protecting the population and the material
21 assets of the citizens of the republic of BH
22 So there we have it. Despite all the guarantees this is how --
23 this is what was being prepared. Combat activities, it says here,
24 throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 Now, did you feel that the Muslim side was indeed preparing such
1 a large-scale war and were you able to inform Lord Carrington about that,
2 who was doing his best to bring about peace?
3 A. No, I'm not aware of this document, and I can say that on the
4 29th of April my total focus was on trying to get the president,
5 Izetbegovic, on an aircraft for talks in Lisbon. That was my total focus
6 on that day. So I'm not familiar with this document, nor am I aware of
7 its content.
8 Q. And do you feel tricked by your -- the Muslim partners who were
9 supposed to inform you sincerely about their intentions, honestly and
11 A. There were times -- there was times when I did my service in
14 Q. Thank you. May I tender this document now, please. And let's
15 have 1D01260 next, please.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, although the witness does not
17 know this document, it falls within the scope of his evidence in general
18 terms, so therefore no objection.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE KWON: We would be rather consistent with our rule. The
21 witness was not able to comment upon the content of the document, so
22 we'll not admit it.
23 I'm noting the time. That will be your last question,
24 Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Well, the Defence
1 doesn't quite understand now. If the colonel was there at the time and
2 if the documents speak about the phenomenon that he deals with partially,
3 then I think that the document should be admitted but never mind.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. This document, Colonel the command of the 4th Corps here, and
6 it's still the JNA, of the 7th of May, 1992, is setting out how those who
7 are within the barracks feel, and the previous orders relate to those
8 same people in the barracks. I don't know if we have a translation of
9 this, but this is what the document says. Point 1:
10 "The situation in BiH is catastrophic. There's complete lack of
11 law and order, chaos and terror towards the members of the JNA and Serb
13 Then item 3:
14 "With greater or lesser intensity, the barracks and other
15 facilities are blocked all the time. The people are being provoked and
16 attacked with weapons."
17 Then on the next page under B, next page, please, B, it says:
18 "Attacks against the JNA Dom, the column of motor vehicles moving
19 towards the Dom trying to save those working there, the command, the
20 district command and other military facilities during the 2nd of May --
21 the HOS members and Green Berets attacked the Dom JNA, and after that
22 units of the 65th Motorised Brigade were ordered to move towards the JNA
23 centre or Dom and pull out all the people there. So all the people who
24 went out to save the young men were killed."
25 And next page, please:
1 "They were ordered to move towards Skenderija to pull out the
2 dead and wounded, however the people were attacked by strong forces in
3 the Marin Dvor area and prevented from reaching their objective. Since
4 the intervention was not successful and there were no other possibilities
5 of doing so, the column that came upon an ambush had to fight by itself,"
6 and so on and so forth.
7 And the commander Lazarevic who was there to protect the military
8 hospital committed suicide when he was wounded, he killed himself. So
9 you see that everything that was ordered here and put into practice,
10 well, it's a document of several pages and we can come back to it
11 tomorrow because it's a pity not to look through it, you and the
12 Trial Chamber so that you can see that everything that was ordered was
13 carried out to a T and that all the JNA employees was the object of
14 brutal attacks and killings. At the time, you were there. Were you
15 aware of this? Did you know about it? Did you feel that this was
16 happening? Or do you challenge it? Or do you allow for the possibility
17 that that's what happened? Perhaps that would be a better question and
18 you can answer that perhaps.
19 A. Well, what I can say is that on the 2nd of May was the first
20 heavy shelling of the city of Sarajevo
21 had been surrounded, but that was also the day that the president was
22 detained at the airport and my total focus was to try and solve this
23 problem. I also made a public appeal on television because one side was
24 blaming the other for starting the shooting in the city, and I said that
25 I would make a contribution by making myself available provided people
1 stopped talking about accusing each other and instead concentrated on how
2 they were going to stop this fighting. So that was a very important day
3 for me, and that conflict went on into the night. So my -- my focus was
4 on trying to find out where the president was and why it was that he was
5 detained when he came back into the airport. There was a lot of
6 commotion that day. I had noted down also in the diary of which you've
7 been now given a copy that there was heavy fighting throughout the day in
8 the city. And I had made this appeal on television. So what I was doing
9 was I was trying to make the best of what I could do to make a
10 contribution. Who was doing what outside I just simply did not know.
11 Q. Thank you, Colonel. It's not disputable what you were doing.
12 What is being disputed is what you knew and how much you knew what the
13 other sides were doing. It wasn't just the Serbs who were firing. The
14 other side was firing as well, and during these days many Serbs were
15 dead. Well, I would just like to ask whether I need to tender this
16 document now because tomorrow we will continue working on it, although
17 the Colonel cannot really say too much about many things in the document,
18 but he was a witness of what was going on in the town at the time.
19 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue tomorrow morning or shall we mark it
20 for identification.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No. Actually, Your Honour, I just wanted to
22 point out that this -- we don't have a translation here.
23 JUDGE KWON: No.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: However, this document is a duplicate of the
25 Prosecution 65 ter 03721, and that's actually in e-court with a
1 translation. Perhaps we can --
2 JUDGE KWON: That's very helpful. We'll deal with it tomorrow.
3 So tomorrow, 9.00.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.
5 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 27th day
6 of May, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.